Refugees: victims or threats to society?

An analysis of the discourse on the securitization of refugees in the Netherlands

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Abstract

This thesis aims to understand how the discourse on the securitization of migration in the Netherlands is constructed and which components establish and shape this linguistic context. More specifically, the role of Dutch politicians in the shaping of the discourse will be investigated by means of an analysis of their questions, answers, and debates as recorded in the parliament. The discourse is further scrutinized by way of seven different categories of perceiving refugees: (1) refugees as opponents to the home regime, (2) as threat to culture, (3) as threat to socio-economic welfare, (4) as hostages in the receiving country, (5) as a threat to security, (6) as a political tool, and (7) as a victim of conflict. More importantly, this research intends to reveal how these different elements are interconnected and, through this, influence the shape and development of the discourse. Moreover, the development of the discourse on the securitization of migration between 2014 and 2017 is analyzed to understand if, how, and to what extent it has changed. This analysis is viewed from a postcolonial angle through which the ‘otherization’ of the refugees and the ‘us versus them’ typology in the Dutch society will be linked to the development of the discourse on the securitization of migration.

Keywords
Refugees, migration, postcolonialism, otherization, the Netherlands, discourse analysis

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1. Introduction

Since 2014 the amount of refugees making their way into Western Europe has been increasing speedily. The conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Eritrea and the overall instability in the Middle East have generated millions of refugees. In 2015, the world counted 244 million international migrants; this was the highest number ever recorded (IOM, 2016). Many of those fleeing hope to be able to seek refuge in Europe; by the end of 2015, the EU received over 1.2 million asylum claims, more than double the amount they received in 2014 (563,000) (IOM, 2016). A comparable conclusion can be drawn when looking at the Netherlands, which received 43,095 requests in 2015 compared to 21,810 in 2014 (CBS, 2017).

The debates in the so-called destination countries on how to receive the incoming refugees took various shapes. Ideas on the migration issue ranged from Germany’s Merkel “Wir schaffen das” (Die Bundesregierung, 2015) to Hungary’s anti-immigration policies. In the Netherlands far-right leader Geert Wilders gained popularity with his tough stance towards refugees; “The Islamic State is sending thousands of terrorists along with the migrants” (PVV, 2015). The country that for long had been perceived to be one of the most tolerant and including countries worldwide was now facing an increasingly popular voice on the far right side of the political spectrum. Not only Wilders but also other politicians that are traditionally more lenient towards refugees now took a firm stance towards the acceptance of these people (e.g. Prime Minister Mark Rutte of VVD: “My advise to those refugees is: stay home. You will end up at the bottom of the list” (NOS, 2016). Other parties attempted to counter this polarization by explicitly stating that refugees are welcome in the Netherlands and that the country will take its responsibility in the migration issue. In the March 2017 elections, the PVV increased its amount of seats in parliament by a third; a major victory failed to occur but nevertheless the right-wing parties did do very well. During the campaign, the topic of refugees often times lead to heated debates and, thereby, set the standard for the other upcoming elections in France and Germany. Besides, various opinion polls showed that the Dutch public considered migration to be one of the biggest challenges that the Netherlands is facing today. The changed nature of the Dutch political debate on refugees results one in asking questions such as: ‘where does this shift come from?’
and perhaps more importantly: ‘is the type of sentiment we currently hear an exception or has the perception of migration really shifted?’.

The core of many of these political debates boiled down to the way the refugees were being perceived; are they a victim of war or a threat to European-and national security? Through the use of specific images, language and stereotypes, the perception of refugees has been shaped in a particular way. The image of the late three year old Aylan Kurdi laying on a Turkish beach or the fact that news outlets mention that an attacker yelled ‘Allahu Akbar’ before becoming violent are examples of how refugees are being represented. These illustrations allow one to wonder whether or to what extent refugees are being ‘otherized’ and stigmatized through the use of language, images, and symbols in society. Edward Said’s concept of ‘the other’ (1979) will be used to narrow down the scope of the research and adds a layer of postcolonialism to it. His ideas about the native white population being perceived as ‘standard’ while the refugees are understood as ‘deviant’ will serve as the foundation of this thesis. The postcolonial ‘us’ versus ‘them’ typology that is present in society nowadays further intensifies the differences between the native population of a state and the incoming foreigners.

Furthermore, in the last three years various terrorist attacks have taken place in major Western European cities such as Paris, Brussels and Nice. Numerous politicians have used these events to securitize refugees (Marine Le Pen, FN, France: ‘At least one migrant among the terrorists: France should immediately stop migrants from entering its territory’ (FN, 2015). Did these recent events and developments influence the way refugees are being perceived? The theory of securitization as described by Barry Buzan, Ole de Waever, and Jaap de Wilde (1998) in their book Security: A new Framework for Analysis will serve as a base to understand on what grounds migration is represented as a security issue and how language is used to do so. The securitization of migration will be regarded as a central concept and this thesis aims to identify if and which other elements constitute the contemporary perception of refugees in the Netherlands and how this understanding has developed over the past three years.
1.1. Aim and questions

This thesis attempts to understand how the discourse on the securitization of migration in the Netherlands has been shaped in the past three years and to what extent this discourse has shifted over time. It is not necessarily the securitization of migration itself that will be further explored; instead, the elements constituting this discourse will be scrutinized. Which elements constitute the discourse? How are they connected and why? The different elements that, together, make up the discourse on the securitization of migration will be reviewed separately to understand how they developed individually and how, in turn, their developments have contributed to the shift in the discourse. Thus, this research aims to discover if and how the discourse on the securitization of migration in the Netherlands has changed and how the different elements within the discourse have contributed to this transformation. How have the components of the discourse on the securitization of migration changed? To what extent are elements that are relevant now also of relevance one, two or three years ago?

In order to analyze the above-presented case, the following three research questions have been formulated:

1. How are refugees represented in political documents of the Dutch parliament?
2. What specific components constitute the representation of refugees?
3. How did this representation of refugees develop between 2014 until 2017?

1.2. Limitations

This thesis does not necessarily scrutinize the way refugees have been securitized in the Netherlands; it does not attempt to understand the underlying mechanisms of securitization as such. Instead, it concentrates on the ways in which the perception of refugees is shaped, which elements constitute this perception, and how the perception has developed over the past three years. The securitization of migration is regarded as the central concept and this thesis sequentially aims to understand what other elements are reinforcing and strengthening this central
concept. It seeks to understand how the elements floating around the central concept are interconnected with each other and the central concept. In other words, it focuses on the construction of the perception of migration and its change over time. Thus, the research does not help to create understanding on the practice of securitization in the Dutch political realm; it rather aims to understand the process of constructing securitization.

Secondly, this thesis is built upon the notion that securitization is not an isolated development. Securitization is a concept that is heavily dependent on actors in society and on the elements constituting securitization as such. It is through the force of other signifiers and elements that the central concept stays in place and, therefore, neither these signifiers nor the role of society should be ignored. However, the scope of the research does not allow for an in-depth analysis of all factors influencing securitization. Due to the fact that the presence of certain elements and their role is ever changing, it is impossible to account for all components that impact the construction of securitization.

1.3. Previous research

Although migration has been on the security agenda throughout the 1990’s, the terrorist attacks in New York in 2001 increased the presence of the migration-security nexus in the international security debate. It was through this event that the interest in the relationship between globalization, migration, and security was further intensified (Adamson, 2013, p. 165; Bigo, 2002, p. 63). However, previous research has been primarily focused on the tangible results of the perception that migration is a threat, such as the installment of more police officers and soldiers on the streets (Goodrich, 2002; Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2002), the introduction of new laws (Arifianto, 2009), border controls (Benam, 2011; Biehl, 2009), and the collection of private data (Boswell, 2007; Fauser, 2006). Hereby, the steps prior to these decisions are overlooked. The political debate preceding the decision to increase the amount of surveillance is at least equally important to further explore. In Alternatives, Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia Tsoukala (2002) do have a more specific focus on the discourse on the securitization of migration; however, their study has a broader scope in the sense that the scholars analyze both the US and
the EU in terms of securitization. Furthermore, this particular research is specifically concentrated at answering the ‘why’ question of securitization: "why is migration automatically associated with unemployment, poverty, crime, social exclusion, discrimination, and racism?" (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002, p. 23). Hereby, the scholars aim to understand the reasons for the securitization of a certain topic but they fail to dig into the process and the 'how' of securitization. Maggie Ibrahim (2005) approaches the discourse analysis on the securitization of migration from another angle in her publication in International Migration; she applies the notion of racism to the current hostile stance towards refugees. This research establishes a clear link between securitization and racism, however it does not pay specific attention to the political debate. Ibrahim uses a reversed methodology in comparison to this thesis as she identifies how the discourse influences political events and behavior while this dissertation aims to do the exact opposite.

Various scholars have scrutinized the reasons used for the securitization of migration. In his publication in International Security, Myron Weiner (1992, p. 105) has established five grounds on which refugees are most often securitized. He defines the ways in which refugees might pose a risk to both the receiving and the sending country and how migration flows are able to impact the international stability and order. He argues that refugees can be perceived as opponents to the home regime (refugees as conflict creators, migration is perceived as a political risk (terrorism, drug trafficking), as a threat to cultural identity (traditions and citizenship), as a social- and economic burden (costs of hosting refugees and their problematic social behavior), and refugees can be used as hostages in the receiving country (as bargain material in conflicts). Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002, p. 24) have come up with a similar list of rhetorical arguments: socioeconomic- (related to unemployment), security (refugees harm sovereignty), identity (threat to national identity and demographics), and political reasons (the use of xenophobic discourses by politicians to achieve desired goal). These categories are repeatedly used by a variety of other scholars (Fauser, 2006, p. 3; see also Karyotis, 2007).

The supposed threat that newcomers pose to the cultural identity of the receiving county has been further elaborated upon by Thomas Faist (2002) and Samuel Huntington (1993). The latter has argued that people's religious and
cultural identities will serve as the primary source of conflict in the Post-Cold War era. Instead of conflicts fueled by ideological differences, the world will face struggles based upon cultural differences. Here, Huntington’s work is closely related to Said’s notion about ‘the other’. Faist (2002, p. 12) builds upon the foundations of Huntington and Said’s ideas on ‘otherization’ and argues that the arrival of new people to a certain state will inevitably lead to a ‘clash of civilizations’ (the West versus non-Western, Muslim countries).

Although the various reasons for perceiving refugees as a security issue are based on different grounds, all of them build upon two notions. Firstly, they assume that refugees are ‘the other’ and that they are different from the local population (as in Said’s work (1979). Through this postcolonial perspective, the refugee is perceived as being an outlier that will disrupt the original structure of a state. A distinct line is drawn between what is perceived to be normal (the native, white, Western population of a state) and what is regarded as deviant (the non-Western person). Besides, a link between ‘the deviant’ or ‘the other’ and Islam is often times made; Muslims are designated to be linked to terrorism easily and people with a foreign last name experience troubles and discrimination when trying to find a job (University of Bristol, 2015). Ibrahim (2005, p. 171) relates this to the imbalance of power between the Occidental people (us) and the Oriental ones (them). By perceiving the refugee as a threat, a power relation is established and both economic and political disadvantages might occur. In his working papers Thomas Faist (2005, p. 4) takes a similar approach but, instead, links the securitization of migration and ‘the other’ to the more far-reaching threats such as the sovereignty of the state and cultural homogeneity.

Secondly, the securitization reasoning deeply values the territory of a state, similar to the field of political geography (Taylor, 1993, p. 67). Geopolitics does not perceive the borders of states as given but assumes that they can change (they might get thicker for one person and more fluid for others). Despite the fact that the theory of securitization deliberately steps away from having the state as the sole referent object, the grounds on which migration is securitized are still state-based (national security, national (cultural) identity, and national economical security). Both postcolonialist notions and assumptions from the field of political geography, thus, influence the ways in which migration is being securitized. This
thesis will build upon the two assumptions above and, thereby, aims to add a new perspective to the already established field of securitization studies.

A substantial amount of research has been carried out to understand how and to what extent refugees in the Netherlands experience perceived discrimination (and, thereby, feel like they are ‘the other’ in the Dutch society). In ‘Arbeid en Inkomen’, Van den Maagdenberg presents his research and argues that 32% of the Iranian community experienced discrimination in the Netherlands. Other scholars have specifically focused on understanding what refugees in the Netherlands perceive as discrimination and which effect this perception of being discriminated against has on the welfare, health, and satisfaction of the refugees (Verkuyten and Nekuee, 1999, p. 281; see also Vedder, van de Vijver, Liebkind, 2006, p. 143). Moreover, Maja Korac (2003, p. 19) has found that the Dutch integration model is not contributing to providing the refugees in the Netherlands with a sense of inclusion. Instead, they widen the gap between the original Dutch population and the new refugees as the latter are obliged to meet all sorts of standards about which they have no say. Here, the power relation between the receiving country (and its population) and the newcomers is very much visible and further strengthened. A strong link to Huntington’s ‘us versus them’ typology can be found. However, research on refugees in the Netherlands has been predominantly focused on the perceived and experienced discrimination of refugees and the effects of this sense of being discriminated on the integration, satisfaction, and desire to move back to their countries of origin of the refugees. No research has been done to explore how the discourse on the securitization of migration is established and how it has developed through the speech-act of politicians.

1.4. Research relevance

In the light of the current ongoing migration crisis in Europe, the tough stance on immigration in the EU and the US, and the unstable situation in the Middle East, the securitization of migration is a highly relevant topic. Political leaders from across the political spectrum present migration as a threat and they do so by relating the influx of people to problems in the domestic job market, national (cultural)
identity, and terrorism. Responses in the political arena range from ‘we have to close our border immediately’ (PVV, 2015) to ‘I condemn the Brussels attack sharply. In these dark hours Europe stands together in solidarity. Belgium is not alone’ (Germany Foreign Office, 2016). This research aims to identify the way in which this discourse on migration has changed over the last years and, thereby, intends to fill the current gap that exists in the field. While other studies focus on the tangible results or the impact that the discourse has on the political debate, this thesis attempts to see how the political debate shapes the discourse and if and how this discourse then changes over time.

Furthermore, the unique postcolonial angle of this research provides the field with an in-depth understanding of orientalism in relation to the securitization of migration. Hereby, I attempt to clarify the impact that speech act in the political realm has on the formation of the discourse. By carefully analyzing the linguistics of the members of the Dutch parliament, this research attaches great value to the classic discourse analysis.

Besides, little research has been done on this rather recent escalation of the so-called migration crisis. Therefore, this research hopes to provide a base for future research that could further elaborate on the findings of this paper.

1.5. Disposition
This thesis is structured in the following way. First, the methodological chapter will elaborate upon the approach to discourse analysis that is used in this dissertation. Also, it will elaborate upon the methodological specifics of the study. Then, the theoretical chapter will discuss the theories on securitization and postcolonialism and, thereby, establishes the framework in which the findings of this research will be positioned. Following, the history of refugees in the Netherlands and the conflicts in Syria and Eritrea will be discussed to provide sufficient context for the reader to fully comprehend this study. Then, the process of the development of the discourse on the securitization of migration will be debated, based on the analysis that was done. Chapter six elaborates extensively on the analysis and discusses the different elements that constitute the discourse and the change they have gone
through. Finally, the conclusion will provide a concise summary of the findings of the research and discusses ideas for future research.
2. Methodology

The methodological fundamentals of this thesis can be found within Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s (1985) approach to discourse analysis as expounded in their publication *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. Their theory evolves around the notion of the nodal point that constitutes the center of the discourse and whose position is maintained through various elements and signifiers. This chapter will further elaborate upon this theory and dig into its concepts, perceptions on contingency, the objective and the political. Subsequently, this section draws connections between Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and Foucault (1980) with regards to their ideas on power and knowledge. Furthermore, van Dijk (1995) and Fairclough’s (1992) ideas on discourse analysis will be discussed in relation to the theory by Laclau and Mouffe (1985). In the second part of the chapter the choice of material for this research will be expounded in terms of accessibility, operationalization, and justification of choices. The terminology of this research will be clarified followed by a thorough discussion on the combination of the method by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and Fairclough (1992). Finally, this chapter will talk about the role of postcolonialism in discourse analysis and in this thesis in particular.

2.1. Discourse analysis

The interdisciplinary nature of the notion ‘discourse’ results in the situation in which many scholars approach the framework from different angles and, thereby, applying different definitions and descriptions. However, Louise Phillips and Marianne Jørgensen in *Discourse Analysis as theory and method* (2002, p. 1) argue that the broader underlying idea of discourse is: “the general idea that language is structured according to different patterns that people’s utterances follow when they take part in different domains of social life”. In *Family Practice* Sara Shaw and Julia Bailey (2009, p. 413) describe discourse analysis as the study of social life understood through analysis of language in its widest sense. Teun van Dijk (1995, p. 22) and Alan Bryman (2001, p. 528) similarly argue that discourse analysis concentrates on written and spoken language. Especially Van Dijk (1995, p. 22)
perceives discourse as a manner to continuously construct already present ideologies through text and talk. This broad approach is further specified by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) who argue that the aim of discourse analysis is to “map out the processes in which we struggle about the way in which the meaning of signs is to be fixed, and the processes by which some fixations of meaning become so conventionalized that we think of them as natural” (in Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002, p. 25).

Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) approach is strongly linked with Foucault’s notion of power. While Michel Foucault (1980, 1989, 1995) applies a broader approach and concentrates on the so-called power-knowledge nexus of discourse analysis, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) apply the theory in a more specific way. Foucault (1980) focuses on the role of power in relationships in society as perceived through language and practices. More specifically, in his work *Power/Knowledge* Foucault argues that the power relations that are present in society cannot be implemented or executed without the presence of a discourse (1980, p. 93). Moreover, he emphasizes that truth can only be constructed through power and power cannot be exercised without the production of truth. Thus, the production of truth or knowledge through a discourse is an exercise of power: the power-knowledge nexus (Ibrahim, 2005, p. 164). The products of power and knowledge, then, reinforce the established discourse and, thereby, the discourse is constantly maintained.

In a way, Foucault’s perception of discourse analysis is closely linked to Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) division between the political and the objective as discussed later in this chapter. Through power the political is continuously being constructed and altered; there is no fixed set of signs. Instead the discourse and society are constructed by a set of contingent signs that, in turn, establish truth and knowledge. Georg Glasze (2007, p. 659) in *Geopolitics* adds to this that Foucault perceives the notion of discourse as a system of statements. The statements have to behave a certain way to get accepted as being true but, simultaneously, they are marked by their individuality. This approach underscores the belief that discourses are not inert and fixed; their meaning is adaptable and depends on the interconnected signs.
The power-knowledge nexus provides a useful framework for analyzing the way in which the discourse on the securitization of migration is established. In particular, it enables one to scrutinize the role of postcolonialism in shaping power relations within a discourse thoroughly. It is, therefore, a very relevant approach to study the discourse on the securitization of migration.

2.2. Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Analysis

Laclau and Mouffe (1985) develop their understanding of discourse analysis through utilizing a variety of concepts to structure their theory. Their interpretation of discourse analysis is revolving around the notion of central concepts, which are called ‘nodal points’. These nodal points are a ‘privileged’ element of a discourse around which other elements are ordered. Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 99) refer to the elements in the discourse as ‘signs’; they constitute the fishing net of the discourse. Each sign receives its meaning through its relation with the other signs in the discourse. The nodal point is an extraordinary knot in the net as the other signs acquire their meaning based on the nodal point. However, according to Thomas Diez in Cooperation and Conflict (2001, p. 16) neither the signs nor the nodal point do necessarily carry meaning in themselves; they only become meaningful when they are positioned within a certain discourse. Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 91) refer to the process of a sign receiving value through its interaction with other signs as ‘articulation’. Its meaning, in turn, also depends on the discourse it is inserted in. Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 99) call the string of signs attached to one another defining each other’s meaning as a ‘chain of equivalence’.

The nodal point should continuously be regarded as a sign, as the meaning of this element is subject to alteration, too. Laclau (1990) refers to a nodal point that acquires its meaning through the discourse it is inserted in as a ‘floating signifier’ (as in Phillips and Jørgensen (2002, p. 28). Thus, nodal points can be both a fixed point of reference within a discourse and a floating signifier in the struggle where two discourses attempt to attach different meanings to it. Here, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) build upon Ferdinand de Saussure’s (1960) structuralist linguistic ideas about the meaning of words in his publication Course in General Linguistics.
Saussure (1960, p. 67) argues that the meaning of a word is fully dependent on its relation to other signs; it is part of a structure of meanings. A word, too, acquires meaning by everything that it is not.

Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 97) argue that a discourse can only be established in its totality; each sign receives a fixed position and, thereby, creates the fishing net of signs and the nodal point. Their notion that a discourse is solid and does not allow for overlap is built upon the practice of excluding every other possible meaning that a sign could carry. Hereby, the sign is related to one sole meaning, which means that no other discourse can use the sign simultaneously. Phillips and Jørgensen (2002, p. 26) refer to this practice of exclusion as a ‘reduction of possibilities’. According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 98) the collection of all excluded possible meanings is the ‘field of discursivity’. Phillips and Jørgensen (2002, p. 27) call this area the ‘surplus of meaning’ as it excludes the other meanings a sign might have for the sole purpose of creating unity of meaning within one particular discourse.

Figure 1: The meaning of discourse by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) as illustrated by Glasze (2007).

Hence, Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.91) continue by referring to signs that have not yet established a meaning in relation to the discourse as ‘elements’. These elements are polysemic and can possibly take on different meanings. Phillips and Jørgensen
(2002, p. 28) utilize the concept of element to reformulate the notion of discourse, according to them a discourse attempts “to transform elements into signs by reducing their polysemy to a fully fixed meaning”. A temporary stop, a so-called ‘closure’, halts the fluidity of the meaning of the elements and, thereby, constructs a solid and clearly outlined discourse. However, Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 99) add to that that the transition from elements to signs is never completely fulfilled, thus, the closure of a discourse is never definitive. Diez (2001, p. 16) here argues that discourses should, thus, be regarded as contested concepts as no element is firmly established. This notion of a discourse as a temporary closure allows one to understand the change of a discourse over time. Through time, the role of a certain element might change or possibly even leave the discourse. Therefore, this approach suits this research particularly well as it aims to understand how the discourse in its totality has developed; it attempts to understand how the underlying relations between the elements have brought about this change over time. Furthermore, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) enable one to look at the fine texture of the discourse and, thereby, help to understand which elements are included in the discourse, what role they play, and how they are related to other elements.

2.2.1. Political processes and power

Laclau and Mouffe deeply value the political process (Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002, p. 34; see also Diez, 2001); they go as far as referring to it as the prime element of discourse analysis. Through political articulations we determine how we act and think, and thereby, we constantly (re)create society. Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 93) do not distinguish between discursive and non-discursive phenomena, they perceive all practices and objects counting towards a certain discourse. The reproduction or alterations of the meaning of objects within a discourse are political acts (Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002, p. 36). Political, here, should be understood as a broad concept that refers to the way in which we continuously re-establish ‘the social’ by excluding and including. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) understand politics as “the organization of society in a particular way that excludes all other possible ways” (Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002, p. 36). Therefore, politics
forms the core of the discourse as it serves as the social organization that is being adjusted constantly through political processes.

Besides ‘the political’ Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 111) also argue for an ‘objective field’ to be present in their reality. While the political is deeply contingent, ‘the objective’ (or ‘sedimented discourse’) are those elements that are given and are virtually unchangeable; they do not acquire their meaning through the relation with other signs. The objective, thus, helps to stabilize the discourse by providing a solid and unquestioned part. However, the objective is the product of historical and political discourses and, thus, can enter the play of politics at any time (Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002, p. 36). In Laclau and Mouffe's (1985, p. 112) perception, the objective masks the possible alternatives that exist, and thereby, can be regarded as ideology. These scholars argue that society cannot exist without ideology as ideology is defined as objectivity (Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002, p. 37). Thus, while the political serves as the prime point, society could not survive without the objective.

Besides perceiving politics as a prime actor in the shaping of ‘the social’, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) build their theory upon the ideas of Gramsci on hegemony. Gramsci (1991) builds upon the framework set by Marx; however, he rejects the assumptions about the relations of actors within the framework. Marx argues that society consists of the economy (the base) that determines the superstructure (the state, the media, schools, etc.). The economy, thus, determines what people think or say and, thereby, is the main driving force behind society and history. Marx argues that the two classes (the workers and the capitalists) have an unbalanced power relation as the capitalists control the workers. Moreover, the workers do not rebel against this oppression as their thoughts are influenced by the superstructure that, in turn, is influenced by the economy (and the workers depend on the economy). Gramsci (1991, p. 506) assumes that a certain form of consent between the classes exists, the so-called hegemony. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) adopt Gramsci’s vision and, too, believe that the people are able to rebel against the superstructure as meaning can be created between the two classes (rather than imposed upon the people, as Marx argues). While Gramsci (1991, p. 507) attaches less value to the role that the economy plays in society, he admits
that economic conditions still play a crucial role in organizing society, as they constitute the people's true interest.

Marx' theory of materialism perceives power as driven by economic interest. Contrary to this, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) adopt another of power that is similar to Foucault’s ideas on power (Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002, p. 37). Instead of understanding power as something that people possess and exercise over others, it is understood as a notion that produces the social. Through power, one creates knowledge and identity. Therefore, societies cannot exist without power since the entire 'social' is built upon power. However, knowledge and identities are by no means fixed, they are subject to change at any time.

The notion that the political is central to the formation of the discourse constitutes the fundamentals of this research. The two-sided relationship between the Dutch political realm and the discourse on the securitization of migration constitutes the foundation of this research.

2.2.2. Other approaches to discourse analysis

While Laclau and Mouffe (1985) refer to the field of generally accepted elements as 'the objective', Teun van Dijk (2006a, p. 116) in *Encyclopedia of Language & Linguistics* calls this area 'ideology'. He defines ideology as belief systems that consist of social representations that define the social identity of a certain group. He argues that ideology is rather fundamental than a set of social beliefs; in fact he notes how ideology influences social beliefs. These representations, in turn, constitute the discourse. This loop is not one-directional; ideologies receive and express meaning through the established discourse. However, he writes that the relationship between ideologies and discourses is often times complex and nontransparent, as discourse analysis does not always reveal the underlying ideologies.

According to van Dijk in *Journal of Political Ideologies*, the field most closely related to the ideological is politics (2006b, p. 732). The struggle between various ideologies is fundamental to the field of politics; the political process is essentially an ideological process. Political ideologies do not only derive their meaning and significance from political discourses but they also provide meaning to those
discourses and, thereby, (re)produce them. Van Dijk (2006b, p. 732) argues that discourse enables ideologies to become observable; it is only in a discourse that these ideologies can be explicitly expressed and formulated. It is therefore that this thesis specifically explores how a discourse is established and developed in the political realm.

Fairclough’s (1992) approach to discourse analysis is founded upon the notion that discourse is as much a part of social practices as it shapes those practices. Through the social knowledge, identities, and relations are shaped and these, in turn, shape the discourse. According to Fairclough (1992, p. 64) social structure consists of both discursive and non-discursive practices. He argues that these practices do not only shape the already existing structure and discourse but it also questions and challenges it by including (linguistic) elements that traditionally lie outside the edge of the discourse. Moreover, Fairclough (1992) argues that people are often times not aware of the processes in which social practices are shaped in the social structure. Through detailed text analysis he aims to understand how people establish a “rule-bound world in everyday practices” (Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002, p. 66).

Central to Fairclough’s (1992) approach is the understanding of discourse as being simultaneously constitutive and constituted. This approach allows a vast amount of flexibility as the relationship between social structures and (non)discursive practices can vary greatly over time. Here, Fairclough (1992) differs from Laclau and Mouffe (1985) as they do not agree upon the notion that language-as-discourse is both a form of action through which people can change the world and a form of action that is socially and historically situated in relation to other facets of the social. However, Fairclough (1992) and Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) approaches are strongly interrelated and share many conceptions; therefore, those theories will combined to analyze the material in this thesis.

2.2.3. Critical reflections on Laclau and Mouffe

The notion that for Laclau and Mouffe (1985) virtually all aspects of the theory are contingent is perceived to be a weakness by scholars such as Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough (1999). By allowing this much amount of space for change and
facilitating it, the possibility of change is being overestimated. Besides, Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, p. 125) argue that Laclau and Mouffe (1985) overlook the notion that certain constraints such as class, gender, and race restrict particular people and groups to bring about change. According to them, change is not always initiated because an actor intrinsically feels like doing so; rather, change can also come about due to dependency. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (as cited in Phillips and Jørgensen (2002, p. 54) find Laclau and Mouffe (1985) to under theorize the role that social structure plays in society; these structures are fixed and hard to change.

Laclau and Mouffe (1985) partly invalidate the claims; they admit that their theory is heavily built upon the idea that all elements are able to change, however, they emphasize that change does not necessarily come about easily. Their theory includes an objective field within the discourse in which fixed social arrangements are included that we do not question or try to change (Phillips and Jørgensen (2002, p. 55). Furthermore, Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 86) note that, indeed, not everyone has equal access to change. The constraints that certain people experience are formed by the discourse they are part of. Glasze (2007, p. 661) adds to this that there are no determining laws dividing people into certain groups, instead, these groups are formed through discursive processes.

2.3. Choice of material

The Dutch parliament releases all transcripts of debates and all posed questions and their answers on their website (overheid.nl). This platform will be of great use when extracting the material for the discourse analysis. All questions, answers and debates that have been taken place between January 1st 2014 and January 1st 2017 will be analyzed. They will be filtered based upon the search term ‘migration’ (in Dutch: ‘migratie’) in order to make a selection of the available documents. This term was chosen as it is used as a verb to refer to both refugees and migrants; using the Dutch term for fleeing (‘vluchten’) excludes migrants from the analysis. Since politicians tend to use the terms ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’ interchangeably, ‘migration’ will be used as a search term to ensure a broad array of documents will be included in the research. Furthermore, only documents that concern the
answers and questions and the transcripts of debates will be used in this research. Other documents such as reports on other meetings or non-policy related files will be disregarded. These documents often times lack a focus and represent the government’s position vis-à-vis a certain topic. Since this thesis aims to find out how the discourse on the securitization of migration has developed itself over the years in the Dutch political arena, it is more useful and relevant to further dig into those documents that reflect the sentiment in the Dutch parliament. However, including other types of documents in this thesis would enhance the validity of this research as discourse analysis aims to identify the implicit ways in which the discourse is shaped. Politicians can shape a discourse outside the premises of the parliament and, therefore, it would be useful to also analyze other types of documents. Broadening the variety of types of documents would contribute to the strength of the analysis but it does not fit within the scope of this thesis.

When applying all above-mentioned filters, 259 documents are found to be useful. Many documents are an account of an elaborate debate or a reflection of a substantial amount of questions and, therefore, they do not solely cover the topic of migration. However, since discourse analysis aims to understand how the subtle linguistic aspects can shape a discourse, all documents will be screened regardless of whether they mention migration or refugees explicitly. When reading through the documents the parts that (in)directly discuss migration will be marked and further scrutinized.

The documents that will be used for this thesis are all representations of debates in the Dutch parliament or questions asked and answered by politicians. These documents are official releases from the Dutch government and, therefore, are reliable and accurate reflections of the actual debates. However, the sources of the analysis of this thesis are relatively one-sided and only represent the perceptions of the political actors in the Netherlands. While this is the scope of this research it would be good to improve the validity of the analysis by including other outlets in which politicians speak about their standpoints. The inclusion of unofficial or non-governmental documents would provide an additional perspective to the development of the discourse. This would also allow one to see if and how the usage of specific types of wording differs per document and setting; it would allow one to investigate whether politicians use different terms to speak
about the securitization of migration in interviews with the media or on their party's website.

The time frame 2014 to 2017 has been chosen based upon Eurostat statistics according to which the number of first time asylum applications from non-EU applicants in the European Union increased dramatically in 2014. The Netherlands received 13,060 first time asylum applications in 2013; this number increased to 24,495 and 44,970 in 2014 and 2015 respectively. The dramatic increase since 2014 of the number of first time asylum claims clearly indicates the international developments in terms of migration and, therefore, the relevance of researching this particular period.

Another important distinction that needs to be made is related to the terminology used in this research. Often times, the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ are used interchangeably but this causes turbidity and pollutes the field. Therefore, this thesis makes a clear distinction between migrants and refugees based upon the definitions provided by UNHCR (UNHCR, 2016). Refugees are understood as persons fleeing armed conflict or persecution. Their situation is so perilous and intolerable that they cross national borders to seek safety in other countries. It is dangerous for them to return home and they, thus, need sanctuary elsewhere. Migrants, on the other hand, do not move because of a direct threat or death but mainly to improve their lives by finding work, education or family reunion. Migrants can return home safely and if they do so they will receive protection from their government. While UNHCR (2016) has made a clear distinction between the two terms many publications continue to struggle with the correct usage of the terms. This ambiguity could possibly impact this analysis too as it concerns one of the fundamental elements of this research. However, now this section has explicitly paid attention to the importance of the correct terminology, a special focus will be given to this issue throughout the analysis.

2.3.1. Operationalization

Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) discourse theory is notably elaborate on the part of theory and the description of the various elements the theory is built upon. However, as Sara Walton and Bronwyn Boon (2014, p. 357) argue in *Qualitative*
**research in organizations and management** the scholars have not focused so much on strategies of operationalizing their theory with regards to textually oriented discourse analysis. Therefore, they suggest enriching the application of their theory by using methods from other approaches of discourse analysis. Phillips and Jørgensen (2002, p. 50) suggest applying Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) approach by relying on the key concepts of the theory:

- Key signifiers in the discourse: nodal points, master signifiers and myths
- Chains of equivalence: the investment of key signifiers with meaning
- Concepts concerning identity: group formation, identity and representation
- Concepts for conflict analysis: floating signifiers, antagonism and hegemony

Phillips and Jørgensen (2002, p. 50) propose a 4-step process in which one first attempts to identify the nodal points and other key signifiers that organize the discourse, identity, and social space. Second, the relationships between those key signifiers would have to be unraveled in order to understand how they establish the discourse. Following, the individual and collective identities can be understood when combining the various meanings that are produced by the chain of equivalence. Here, one should not only focus on what an entity is (‘the West’ is a geographic area) but also on what it is not (it is not ‘the rest of the world’). Lastly, one should attempt to identify which elements are contested. The elements that are at the edge of the discourse that struggle to fit in with different meanings. Here, one aims to understand where the ‘line’ of discourse is located and, thus, which entities are contested or perceived differently by different groups of people.

To add a focus to the method provided by Philips and Jørgensen (2002), elements of Fairclough’s (1992) critical discourse analysis (CDA) will be applied, too. CDA has a strong critical focus with regards to textual sources and provides a useful framework for analyzing linguistics. Moreover, Fairclough’s (1992) approach adds a degree of structure to the analysis of language. His textual analysis is based on the concepts of transitivity (how are concepts connected (or not) to certain subjects and objects) and modality (the degree of the speakers affinity to the subject). Therefore, Fairclough’s (1992) framework will be introduced in the
second phase of the approach outlined by Philips and Jørgensen (2002) (unraveling relationships between signs).

Fairclough (1992) suggest scrutinizing five different categories when analyzing a text; however, due to the nature of the material in this thesis, the first category that is aimed and understanding the dynamics within an average conversation does not apply here. The second category, ethos, refers to how language constructs the identity of the speaker. Thirdly, metaphors are perceived as distinct ways to construct an argument; they are much more than stylistic devices. Rather, a metaphor can be used to structure the way we think and act in a fundamental way (Fairclough, 1992, p. 194). The fourth category refers to wording; Fairclough (1992, p. 190) argues that the multiple ways in which a meaning can be given to a word (wording) rely heavily on experience and interpreting. Lastly, Fairclough (1992, p. 158) discusses grammar as a method to create modality. He argues that the use of auxiliary verbs (e.g. must, may, should), a particular tense, adverbs (e.g. probably, possibly), and terms such as 'sort of' and 'a bit' should be scrutinized to unravel their contribution to the message of a text.

In practice, the documents under scrutiny will first be filtered using Phillips and Jørgensen’s (2002) first step of identifying the nodal point. Then, the two methods are combined; in order to see how the signs are interrelated and how they acquire meaning through the chain of equivalence, the 4-step method by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) is applied. Lastly, possibly contested terms are identified (following Phillips and Jørgensen’s approach). Furthermore, the documents will be assigned to different categories based upon the way they represent refugees. The categories established by Weiner (1992, p. 105) are mixed with those of Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002, p. 24) and together create the following list: (1) refugees as opponents to the home regime, (2) as threat to culture, (3) as threat to socio-economic welfare, (4) as hostages in the receiving country, (5) as a threat to security, and (6) as a political tool. A seventh category, (7) refugee as a victim of conflict, is added in order to cover all ways in which refugees can be presented.

Fairclough’s (1992) approach adds more structure to the analysis, which allows the research to be replicated by other researchers in other settings. The findings of this particular study can, however, hardly be generalized as they attempt to understand the developments of a discourse of one country in a very
specific time frame. The validity of this research is considerably high; the extensive body of theory by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) enables this research to concentrate fully on what it aims to analyze; the development of the discourse on the securitization of migration.

This thesis is built upon a qualitative research that follows the above outlined strategy. Through qualitative research, an attempt is made to understand the construction and change of the discourse on the securitization of migration in Dutch politics. The Netherlands was chosen on several grounds; the high degree of familiarity with the Dutch political environment and the Dutch mother tongue of the researcher will be beneficial to both the contextualization of the findings as well as the thorough understanding of the documents in linguistic terms.

### 2.3.2. Organization of material

The documents will be analyzed using a template specifically designed for this research (see Appendix 1 and 2 for samples of the filled-out templates). These templates allow for the documents to be classified in seven different categories. Since a broad variety of aspects of the migration crisis that are discussed in the documents, they can be classified as fitting into more than one category. Furthermore, the documents will be analyzed on ethos, metaphors, wording, grammar, transitivity, modality, and contested terms. All documents are published by 'Tweede Kamer' (the parliament) and are labeled with a number and the date on which the debate took place. The documents will be grouped and analyzed based on the category they are assigned and the year in which they were published. In the analysis chapter of this thesis, the year of publication and the document number will be used to indicate when, by whom and in which debate a certain statement was made.
3. Theoretical framework

The foundations of this thesis lay within Buzan et al.’s (1998) (the Copenhagen School) theory of securitization. This chapter will, therefore, expound on this theory and include perspectives from other authors with a specific focus on two crucial elements of the theory, namely speech act and power. Furthermore, the linguistic aspects of the theory will be given attention. Following, a link between the theory of securitization and postcolonialism will be made to place the theory in a broader (historical) perspective. Important, here, is to elaborate upon the description of ‘security’ that is being used in this thesis. In accordance to Buzan et al.’s (1998, p. 27) reference to security in the field of international relations, this thesis will apply the notion of the survival of collective units and principles as the defining core of security studies. This description of the field allows one to not only perceive the state and the military sector as actors (as traditional security theories do) but instead gives way to sectors such as the environment and national identity to be securitized, too.

3.1. Theory of securitization

“Based on a clear idea of the nature of security, securitization studies aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results and, not least, under what conditions (what explains when securitization is successful).”

(Buzan et al., 1998, p. 32)

This thesis is built upon the foundations of Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde’s theory of securitization (1998). These scholars established their theory based on the
notion that an issue can only be regarded as a security issue when the speech on that issue refers to it as such. Only by referring to a certain event or development as a security issue, it becomes one. By labeling such a referent object as a security issue, the securitizing actor is allowed to take extraordinary measures in order to ensure the survival of the object. This decision moves the issue away from the field of normal politics and into the realm of emergency politics. In the latter, the issue can be treated as an existential threat and, thereby, democratic processes and rules can be disregarded. Through the securitization of an issue, it moves beyond the standard rules and regulations and, thereby, allowing the government to make undemocratic decisions. It is exactly this step that makes securitization the more extreme version of politicization (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23).

While politicizing refers to an issue that is part of public policy and that requires a government decision, securitization takes this idea one step further by presenting an issue as an existential threat that requires emergency measures. Securitization, thus, intensifies the process of politicization. However, situations might occur in which a certain issue is securitized in such a way that information sharing is too sensitive. Instead of making an issue seem more open (politicization) it becomes more closed and can only be handled by a certain group of top leaders (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 29). Thereby, the threat moves from the public sphere to the black security box. These extraordinary measures (both bringing a threat to the public sphere and keeping it secret) are justified by the notion that the threat is of such vast importance to the state that if it is not dealt with instantly and properly, dealing with all other issues is no longer possible or relevant: “If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way)” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24).

Buzan et al. (1998, p. 25) specify that an issue can only be securitized successfully if the audience accepts the idea that a threat is existential. Securitization can never be imposed but the process nevertheless relies on both coercion and consent. An effective securitization process does not necessarily require the audience to agree with a certain emergency measure that has to be adopted but the audience does have to perceive a threat as existential.

Furthermore, Buzan et al. (1998, p. 30) argue that securitization is very much an intersubjective process since a threat can hardly be assessed in objective
terms as all actors have a different perception of what a threat is. Even if the threat is unambiguous and immediate, one cannot assess objectively whether this should been perceived as a threat or not. Jef Huysmans (2002, p. 42) in *Alternatives* builds upon this argument and writes that the securitization of a certain issue requires the mobilization of certain institutions, a specific type of knowledge, and a distinct set of expectations from the social exchanges between various types of groups. This implies that the sphere in which security operates is already heavily politicized and, therefore, “speaking or writing about security is never innocent” (Huysmans, 2002, p. 43).

The shift in security studies to include non-military threats only happened relatively recently: Didier Bigo (2002, p. 77) notes that this only happened after the end of the Cold War. Prior to this change in perspective, the state and war were perceived as the two central elements in security studies (Nye and Lynn-Jones, 1988, p. 6; see also Walt, 1991). These elements remained the most important ones for a long time; however, when Barry Buzan in his 1991 publication (p. 2) introduced the ‘wide’ versus ‘narrow’-debate in which they argue in favor of widening the scope of the field of security studies the tide changed. Through this shift, issues such as health, migration, environment, and economics would be perceived as threats too. Scholars continue to have different opinions on whether or not to broaden the scope of security studies; some argue in favor of restricting the field to merely military issues because broadening the field would disturb the coherence of the framework and thereby the essential core of the field (Buzan et al., 1998, p.2). Others aim to sustain the narrow focus of the field, as they continuously believe military security is at the core of the study (Gray, 1994 as cited in Buzan et al. 1998, p. 3).

### 3.1.1. Speech act in the theory of securitization

The process of securitization is what language theory calls a speech act. This field does not necessarily evaluate to what extent the referent object is an existential threat, rather it perceives the reference in itself as an act (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26). The use of words is what securitizes a certain issue. As John Austin (1962, p. 12) in his book *How to do Things with Words* put it: “To say something is to do
something”. Important to note here is that speech act is not defined by using the word ‘security’ in order to securitize. Rather, the theory makes use of the so-called security logic in which a certain degree of urgency is implicitly present. Buzan et al. (1998, p. 27) use the usage of the term ‘dikes’ in the Netherlands as an example of this implicit urgency. By simply uttering this term, a sense of priority is created. The dikes in the Netherlands are an example of an institutionalized threat; the situation is not necessarily developing itself in any way but the threat is nevertheless persistent. The notion that a threat is institutionalized takes away the need for drama in order to securitize. Since an issue is persistent and ongoing, sudden urgency is not required for securitization. The securitizing move has been repeated enough for the public to take the threat for granted. On the other hand, ad-hoc threats do require a certain degree of drama in order to be successfully securitized. In order to securitize, the securitizing actors need to utter a speech act that convinces the audience that a certain issue should be regarded as an existential threat.

Buzan et al., (1998, p. 32) and Austin (1962, p. 26) have expounded on the conditions in which the speech act is most successful: (1) the internal, linguistic-grammatical (to follow the grammar of security) and (2) the external, contextual and social (the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor). Maximum success is achieved when both categories are combined and when one utilizes a securitizing actor with authority and a threat that contains objects that are generally considered to be threatening (e.g. tanks or polluted waters). However, Jef Huysmans (2006, p. 24) in The Politics of Insecurity points out that speech act does not only consist of merely performative acts (such as creating a security question from successfully speaking or writing ‘security’ just like a promise is the result from speaking the promise). The other side to it consists of a set of social conventions in which the speech act operates; both the security question and the promise only hold if they draw upon a certain set of social conventions. Thierry Balzacq (2005, p 172) builds upon Huysmans’ (2006) analysis in the European Journal of International Relations and adds that speech act should not be perceived as a formal act like Buzan et al., (1998) do. According to him, the term ‘security’ should be understood as a strategic or pragmatic practice that is influenced by its circumstances (context, socio-cultural position of the audience,
power of the speaker and the listener). Like Huysmans (2006) he, too, adds an additional layer to the performative practice of the speech act and argues that the circumstances of the process of securitization should be taken into account.

The speech-act approach of securitization is based upon three types of units of analysis: (1) referent objects, (2) securitizing actors, and (3) functional actors. The former refers to the things that are perceived to be threatened existentially and that have a legitimate claim to survival. The second are the actors who securitize issues by arguing that they are existentially threatened. The last unit refers to the actors that do influence the dynamics of a sector but are neither the referent object nor the securitizing actor (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 36). Traditionally, the state has been regarded as the referent object in the field of security studies. However, in recent years other sectors, such as the environment and economy, have been included in the security spectrum. In theory, anything can be framed as a security issue, however, Buzan et al. (1998, p. 36) point out that the successful securitization often times refers to a collectivity. Despite the notion that the theory of securitization moves away from perceiving the state as the sole referent object, the theory does apply a state-centric frame (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 18). This specific frame is being used as a fixed scale against which levels can be measured. Since securitization is incorporating various sectors, it is of vast importance that the same measurements are being used in order to create consistency. As Buzan et al. (1998, p. 18) point out; the political and military sector would probably perceive states as the units of analysis and add regions to be sets of adjacent states. However, in the societal sector, units might be nations and regions would be sets of adjacent nations. Therefore, the scholars have opted for a state-centric approach to which they add regions (spatially coherent territories composed of two or more states), sub regions (part of such a region; either one or more state or (parts of) states mixed together), and micro regions (a subunit within the boundaries of a state).

The process of framing an issue as a threat consists of three steps: (1) identification, (2) action, and (3) effects (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26). The first step (the securitization move) marks the moment in which an issue is presented as an existential threat. Here, a shared understanding of what is considered an existential
threat is created. The action and effects follow the securitizing action based on whether or not it was successfully accepted by the audience.

3.1.2. The role of power in the theory of securitization

When a securitizing actor is able to convince the audience of the need to go beyond the established rules and regulations for a particular threat (emergency mode), a case of securitization can be identified. Important to note here is that securitization is not open to all issues and events, rather, power plays an important role in the process of securitization. The powerful actor who has the capabilities and the means to convince the audience of the existence of the threat is the one who securitizes. Thus, power plays a crucial role in the first stage of the securitization process as it defines who is able and allowed to frame an issue as an existential threat.

Buzan et al. (1998, p. 31) confirm that power plays a vast role in securitization; they argue that the relationship among subjects is neither equal nor symmetrical. The success of securitization depends on the amount of power an actor holds; the ones who are accepted voices on security are more likely to securitize an issue successfully. However, power is by no means absolute; there is no guarantee that an actor who holds power will be able to effectively securitize an issue. Furthermore, the notion that a powerful actor is more likely to succeed in securitizing does not imply that only powerful actors may attempt to do so. The field is very much structured but no one ‘holds’ the power of securitization (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 31). In International Catalan Institute for Peace Caroline Charrett (2009, p. 20) builds upon the idea that actors with power are advantaged in terms of securitizing and adds that this reliance on power structures implies that less powerful voices are unlikely to be heard. In other words, many voices are being excluded from the practice and among those voices might be the subjects of the securitization (e.g. refugees are not included in the debate about the securitization of migration). Furthermore, securitization moves threats into the specific area where secrecy is legitimimized based on safety; this notion further thwarts the possibility of non-powerful actors to participate in the securitization process.
3.1.3. Critical reflections on the theory of securitization

Despite their efforts to expound the theory of securitization, Buzan et al. (1998, p. 29) argue that desecuritization is the optimal long-range option. The strategy of desecuritization refers to the practice of reversing securitization and moving threats away from the security realm. This strategy is most ideal to move issues into the ordinary public sphere where they can be discussed normally (Knudsen, 2001, p. 360). By doing so, an open debate in the realm of normal politics is possible and the strong threat-defense notion is avoided. This would, then, provide the space to start applying the roles of the democratic debate again. The scholars argue that securitization should be regarded as a negative notion and a failure to deal with issues of normal politics. The fact that the authors share their stance on favoring desecuritization over securitization is indeed normative, however, this does not affect the applicability of the theory as a whole. Rather, it emphasizes that securitization is a political act that is able to move issues away from the normal political sphere and, thereby, away from the analysts’ preference. The securitization theory should not be used to make political statements but instead it provides the researcher with a theoretical tool to analyze the why and how of securitization (Taureck, 2006, p. 2).

3.2. Postcolonialism

“But what seems to have influenced the Orient most was fairly constant sense of confrontation felt by Westerners dealing with the East. The boundary notion of East and West, the varying degrees of projected inferiority and strength, the range of work done, the kinds of features ascribed to the Orient: all these testify to a willed imaginative and geographic division made between East and West, and lived through during many centuries.”

(Edward Said, 1979, p. 201)

As a theory, postcolonialism analyzes the effects (long-time) colonial rule has on a nation. Both various human consequences and the effect of economic exploitation are scrutinized. As Leroy-Beaulieu puts it, “Colonisation is the expansive form of a
people: it is its power of reproduction: it is its enlargement and its multiplication through space: it is the subjection of the universe or a vast part of it to that people’s language, customs, ideas and laws” (in Said, 1979, p. 219). In other words, it is the relationship between culture, dominance and resistance (Aitken and Valentine, 2006, p. 147). Differently from colonialism, postcolonialism is based on the idea that the issues related to it lie in the past (Shohat, 1992, p. 105-106). Many regard Said’s work (1979) as the foundation of postcolonial thinking. He writes how postcolonialism refers to the colonized nations attempting to regain their (cultural) identities after the colonizers left while simultaneously the rulers are justifying the colonization through depicting the colonized people as inferior. This depiction mainly occurs through images. However, so far a single overarching definition of postcolonialism has not been found as many scholars argue over the terminology and the concept of postcolonialism in itself.

As Anne McClintock (1992, p. 86) in Social Text and Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin (2000, p. 269) argue, the term postcolonialism is contested. In particular the prefix ‘post’ has been criticized as it implies that a new period of ‘postcolonialism’ has started and that this era follows decolonization (Loomba, 1998, p. 1103; see also Shohat, 1992). This notion is contested by states such as Australia where the colonizers never left although the country is formally decolonized (Frankenberg and Mani, 1993, p. 291-293). Furthermore, the word ‘post’ implies that the urgency of the matter is lower than it used to be and that history can be divided in pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial. However, in reality these distinctions are much more fluid (McClintock, 1992, p. 86). While previously colonized nations do not experience direct rule anymore, they are in many ways still dependent on their former rulers. According to Ania Loomba we can, therefore, not always simply argue that a ‘freed’ colony is postcolonialist (1998, p. 1103). Moreover, over time many states have been colonized in different periods, for different amounts of time and in varying geographical locations. This makes it unclear as to where postcolonialism ‘begins’ and where it is located (Loomba, 1998, p. 1104, 1107).

The projected superiority of Europe (Said, 1979, p. 120) shaped the notion of ‘the other’ and plays an important role as it analyzes the (possible) unequal relationship between the West and the East (the Occident and the Orient). In
Foreign Affairs Samuel Huntington notes how by ‘othering’, the West legitimized its domination (1993, p. 28); simultaneously, it is the only way of identity formation for the colonized nations, as they were not allowed to build it themselves (Spivak, 1999, p. 215). This practice led to the colonized being depicted as underdeveloped and ‘less worthy’ than their rulers (Said, 1979, p. 207). Frantz Fanon (1963, p. 250) in The Wretched of the Earth even argues that the colonized people, together with the palm trees and the camels make up the ‘natural’ background to the human presence of the French (in the case of Algeria). Here, ‘othering’ does not merely imply that the colonized people are less intelligent and worth, it even indicates that these people are not always regarded as actual individuals. Through this, the colonizers aim to impose a subservient mentality upon the natives (Fanon, 1963, p. 252). The European people are reasoners and think logically; they are intelligent. Through the postcolonial discourse, ‘The Other’ (the Oriental) is presented as chaotic and lacking symmetry (van Dijk, 1995). Therefore, the Westerners needed to rule and civilize the Orientals. Also, Orientals were assumed to be the same anywhere, whether it was India or Egypt. Occidentals, on the other hand, were unique individuals (Said, 1979, p. 38). Fanon (1963, p. 210) illustrates this notion by arguing that from the perspective of the colonizer a black man was a ‘negro’ and was not referred to as a man from Angola or Nigeria. The colonizing powers had no interest whatsoever in sharing this identity-forming powers and thereby giving up the ability to construct these powers (Bhaba, 1983, p. 47).

3.2.1. Understanding of power through postcolonial perspective
The notion of power is very much present throughout the theory of postcolonialism. According to Fanon (1963, p. 38 – 39), the colonial occupation of states in the past divided the world into two camps: the native and the settler. While the colonizers had the freedom to move around, the colonized were held in specific zones and were thoroughly checked. Foucault (1980, p. 52) links postcolonialism and power in a different way, namely by showing how they are interrelated through the concept of knowledge. As Foucault (1980, p. 52) writes, knowledge and power are interrelated with one another. “The exercise of power perpetually created knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces
effects of power” (p. 52). Thus, power relations are subjected to constant change and adaption. This also implies that transferring knowledge might lead to the creation of power on the less powerful end of the negotiation. In relation to postcolonialism one can analyze the behavior and developments of states after their colonizers left and, thereby, received power and thus knowledge.

3.2.2. Postcolonialism as a discourse analysis

Postcolonialism is in fact a form of discourse analysis and, therefore, serves as a suitable additional filter for this research. The discourse analysis as presented by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) is already deeply connected with the struggle over power and knowledge and a postcolonial focus further helps to deepen the understanding of this power-knowledge nexus. This research specifically concentrates on refugees and how they are possibly experiencing exclusion in two ways: (1) by not being part of the group of actors that establishes the discourse and (2) by being perceived as ‘the other’ and, thus, being excluded from the treatment that ‘non-deviant’ people would receive. As this research attempts to understand how a group of people is perceived as ‘the other’ and how this ‘otherness’ influences the way politicians refer and discuss about these people it allows postcolonialism and discourse analysis to intersect intensely.

3.3. Linking securitization and postcolonialism

In general, a clear link between the theory of securitization and postcolonialism can be detected. Where Buzan et al. (1998, p. 31) state that power plays an important role in the securitization process, Foucault (1980, p. 52) does so about postcolonialism. Both (groups of) scholars argue that the power relations between groups are unequal and unbalanced; not everyone can securitize as easy and not everyone holds an equal amount of power. Through this imbalance, one player becomes stronger than the other.

However, a stronger connection between the two is visible when looking specifically through the lens of migration. Huysmans (2000, p. 758) clearly summarizes the way the two theories are linked: “The securitization of immigration as a threat to the survival of the national community is problematic, as
it labels the foreign migrant as the “other,” ultimately excluding them from society”. The ‘othering’ as Said (1979) wrote has a direct effect on the way refugees are perceived and received by states in the West. Due to the notion that these people are being regarded as Oriental and thus as ‘the other’, they are immediately understood as a threat to the West. Thus, despite the fact that states in the Middle-East and Africa have long been decolonized, we continuously perceive them as being inherently different than we are but, simultaneously, we believe ‘they’ all the same. This specific perception is often times used to portray refugees as a (existential) threat as they and their culture would eventually influence and alter ours; they would harm our economy, and behave violently.

Postcolonialism provides a valuable foundation upon which the methodology of this research is built. As discussed in the previous chapter, postcolonialism provides a unique opportunity to scrutinize the role of power with regards to the treatment of a certain group of people. This thesis is specifically interested in understanding how refugees as perceived in the Netherlands and how the theory of postcolonialism can be used to explain this.
4. Dutch migration history: recent developments

This chapter aims to provide the thesis with a substantial amount of background information on the history of migration and refugee policies in the Netherlands and on how the situation in the Middle East has caused a vast increase of asylum claims in the European Union. This part of the research does not attempt to draw any conclusions; it rather aims to understand the developments in the Netherlands and the Middle East. However, due to the limited space and time, this chapter cannot go in-depth too much and will, therefore, discuss relatively recent developments on both topics. Moreover, this section will only provide background information on two conflicts in the Middle East (Syria and Eritrea) as these have generated the biggest amount of asylum applications in the Netherlands in the recent years.

4.1. Migration and refugees in the Netherlands

In the 40’s and 50’s, following the Second World War, the Netherlands was a country of emigration; many citizens moved to Canada, the United States, Australia, New-Zealand or South-Africa (Politiek Compendium, 2002). In the 60’s, the Netherlands was quickly industrializing and the economy was growing fast. Therefore, the government decided to formally invite low-skilled workers from southern European countries to come to the Netherlands; it was mainly Spanish and Italian workers who came to the Netherlands to work temporarily (CBS, 2000). Since the need for low-skilled workers was pressing, the Dutch government actively promoted migration and covered the travel- and housing costs of the workers (Huysmans, 200, p. 753; see also van Eijl, 2009). Simultaneously, a stream of illegal workers developed, the so-called ‘guest workers’. This group mainly consisted of Turkish and Moroccan men. By the end of the 60’s, over 80,000 foreign workers had come to the Netherlands to work (Politiek Compendium, 2002).

The Netherlands slipped into a recession in the 70’s. The economic hardship and the fact that the foreign workers were competing against the Dutch employees lead to idea of expelling those alien workers. However, moral considerations on unethical extradition were generally accepted and, thus, the workers could stay. Moreover, the government expected the foreign workers to return to their home
country at some point so they did not see why the group should be expelled forcibly or why they should be integrated. The independence of Surinam lead to a vast increase of the amount of Surinamese people in the Netherlands; as a former colony this group had the right to be a Dutch citizen and, therefore, they could not be denied access. The vast majority of this group of immigrants did not return to their country of origin; this generation and the following constitute a big Surinamese minority in the Netherlands (348,000 people in 2015) (CBS, 2015).

The 80’s were marked by another recession, the arrival of many people from the former Dutch colony ‘the Antilles’ and by the realization that the foreign workers were not going to return to their home countries (van Eijl, 2009, p. 21, 26). As Piet Emmer (2002, p. 1) writes in *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, most of the Spanish and Italian workers had returned home, while the Turks and Moroccans generally stayed. After the oil crisis of the 70’s, the arrival of Turkish and Moroccan workers was formally halted but the influx of their family members grew. They were making use of the regulations that allowed them to bring their family to the Netherlands. The Dutch government realized it could not send those workers and their families back to their countries of origin and, thus, decided to invest in catching up on the educational arrears of the children of the foreign workers. It was in this time that the desire for a multicultural society was translated into actions by the government (Scheffer, 2000, p. 1). The effects of this policy were visible only a couple of years later as these children were doing much better in both educational and economic terms than their parents (SCP, 2016). The second-generation immigrants were integrated substantially better than the first one. This can be attributed to the fact that many of the foreign workers that lost their jobs were provided with help from the government to sustain themselves. These groups, thus, stopped working and thereby integrated substantially less (Dekkers, 2003). Simultaneously, the Netherlands saw an increase of the amount of asylum applications due to the war in Yugoslavia and often times granted its asylum seekers only temporary residence (UCL, n.d.). During the course of time the Dutch stance on asylum requests became tougher and the government attempted to make the Netherlands unattractive as a destination country for asylum seekers. Besides, it eased the rules on expelling asylum seekers that were not granted a status.
With the turning of the century, the Netherlands further toughened its stance on ‘alien policies’. While the net migration rate in the beginning of the century was negative (ranging from -317 in 2003 to -31,320 in 2006) (CBS, 2017) Pim Fortuyn became the first respected politician who took a controversial stance on immigration- and asylum policies. He argued that the Netherlands ‘is too packed’. It became harder to settle in the Netherlands and it was even more difficult to have family members from your country of origin join you. Besides, the government eased the rules on deporting asylum seekers, following the initiative of VVD’s Verdonk. She also introduced the policy that immigrants would now have to pass their integration exam in their country of origin and that they are required to pay for the examination themselves. Her successor, Nebahat Albayrak, was more lenient towards immigration but nevertheless maintained the Dutch position of having one the most tough immigration policies of the European Union (Blik op de Wereld, n.d.).

In 2015, 2,038,059 people living in the Netherlands had a migration background from a non-Western country (on a total of 16,900,725 inhabitants) (CBS, 2017). While there have not been major policy changes with regards to migration and asylum since 2001, new voices have entered the political arena. In 2012, Geert Wilders established his Freedom Party (PVV); his core interest lies within fighting the so-called ‘Islamization of the Netherlands’. He has made controversial statements (such as comparing the Quran to Hitler’s Mein Kampf) and explicitly shares his dissatisfaction with Muslims and the Islam. Since the PVV was established its popularity has been growing constantly.

4.1.1. Asylum applications by refugees
With regards to the amount of refugees applying for asylum in the Netherlands, one can see a relatively stable pattern throughout the years with two main peaks disrupting this continuity. In 1994 the amount of arriving refugees grew tremendously as a result of the war in Yugoslavia; 52,575 people applied for asylum in the Netherlands that year (CBS, 2017). In the end of the 90’s a smaller wave of applications was visible (mainly Afghani, Iraqi, and Kosovars). This development was followed by a relatively quiet period in which yearly 10,000
applications were filed on average. 2015 saw a sudden and dramatic increase of applications; while in 2014 21,810 persons applied for first-time asylum the Netherlands received 43,095 requests in 2015 (CBS, 2017). The political response to the wave of refugees from Yugoslavia was to grant those people temporary residence; they were considered displaced and, therefore, were not participating in the regular asylum procedure. However, the Dutch government expected those people to return home at some point in the future (CGM, n.d.) and, therefore, granted them a special type of residence.

The Dublin III Regulation that was introduced in 2013 was set up to identify the EU Member State that is responsible for a certain asylum application. In practice, this is often the state where the asylum seeker first entered the EU (EC, 2017). The predecessor of Dublin III (the Dublin Convention) entered into force in 1997 and significantly reduced the amount of asylum applications in the Netherlands as many applications were now filed elsewhere. However, the influx that the European Union witnessed in 2015 resulted in Greece and Italy being exempted from Dublin III and, thereby, increased the amount of refugees applying for asylum in the Netherlands.

Despite the Dublin III Regulation and the fact that the Netherlands has one of the most strict asylum policies in the EU (WODC, 2015), the country is one of the European front runners when it comes to granting residence to asylum seekers. This can be explained by the position of the Dutch government vis-à-vis the type of refugees; refugees with a promising future (both socially and economically) are accepted more easily than those who are presumed to have a less auspicious future ahead. In comparison to other European states, the Netherlands receives relatively high numbers of refugees with a promising future and, thus, its acceptance rates are higher. In practice this boils down to a higher acceptance level of Syrian and Eritrean refugees (91% of those receive asylum) (WODC, 2015). The current Dutch government aims to invest in accommodation in the region of origin of the refugees and, sub sequentially, attempts to avoid refugees that start ‘shopping’ for asylum.
4.2. Developments in the Middle East

The stream of refugees that are trying to reach Europe is mainly coming from Syria and Eritrea; respectively 34% and 9% of all asylum applications in the Netherlands are filed by persons from those two states (IND, 2016). The instability in the Middle East and the conflict in Syria in particular can be perceived as the instigators of the migration crisis. Also, the tensions in Eritrea have generated thousands of refugees in the region and in the EU. While there is much unrest and conflict in the region, this chapter concentrates specifically on the conflicts in Syria and Eritrea (due to limited time- and space).

4.2.1. The Syrian conflict

Syria has witnessed conflict since 2011 when the country became part of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, the revolutionist movement in Northern Africa and the Middle East. The revolts in the neighboring countries of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya toppled their respective presidents, however, the Syrian protestors did not manage to do the same and saw their country slide into a civil war instead. Protests continued but President Assad suppressed them violently. The US, EU, and various other players toughened sanctions on Syria while the fighting intensified and Assad bombed cities such as Homs heavily. When in 2014 the UN peace talks fail, an international coalition led by the United States gets involved in the conflict and bombs targets of the Islamic State of Iraq and ISIS (Al Jazeera, 2017 and BBC, 2017). In 2015, Russia joined the arena when it started bombing various terrorist groups including rebels backed by Western forces. With Russian support the Assad government managed to recapture a number of significant cities such as Aleppo and Palmyra. After Russia engaged itself, also Turkey, Lebanon, Iran, and Afghanistan got involved (to different degrees and with different motives).

Today, the situation has grown even more complex; while the Syrian army controls Aleppo, Damascus and other significant parts of the country, rebel groups, ISIL, and Kurdish forces dominate the rest of the country (Al Jazeera, 2017). The opposition of the government has fractured completely (CFR, 2013): rebel groups compete with each other for power with ISIL being the most notorious, partly because of their social media usage. Some analysts even state that the civil war in
Syria is actually consisting of two wars: one of the regime against the opposition and another among extreme and moderate groups within the opposition (CFR, 2013). Kurdish forces aim to establish self-rule areas which, in turn, alarms Turkey's government as it fears that its Kurdish minority might start claiming more autonomy.

Not only are many parties involved on the strategic- and military-related field, numerous neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan are hosting thousands of refugees. The vast influx of refugees further destabilizes the hosting countries (CFR, 2013). The warn-torn country of Syria with a traumatized population saw over 450,000 nationals killed and over half its population displaced since the start of the armed conflict five years ago. The series of failed peace talks and the increasing complexity of the situation provide a pessimistic outlook for stability in the upcoming months or even years.

4.2.2. The Eritrean border dispute

In 1993, Eritrea became independent from Ethiopia after a 30-year war in which over 70,000 people died (Ljunggren, 2005). The Eritrean independence led to some prosperous years in which the economy and society of Eritrea developed quickly. However, between 1998 and 2000 Eritrea and Ethiopia fought another war over Badme, a disputed territory situated between the two countries. This war resulted in many casualties on both sides and the socio-economic growth of the previous years had collapsed significantly. In 2000 Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed upon a ceasefire and a UN Temporary Security Zone. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission subsequently ruled that the Badme region was to be split between both regions with its central point belonging to Eritrea. At first this ruling was disputed by Ethiopia but it eventually agreed to recognize the ruling ‘in principle’. This led to a slow withdrawal of troops on the side of all parties starting in 2002. However, when the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that Eritrea had broken international law by invading Ethiopia in 1998, both sides remobilized again. Since then the two states have not been in war neither in peace (BBC, 2016). Mid-2016 the conflict arose again when fighting occurred over the disputed border. Since then, tensions are high once again.
Many Eritreans flee their state, as they fear for their government and more specifically for the obligatory national service program. The program officially requires Eritrean citizens to execute 18 months of civil or military service but in practice this is often an indefinite commitment (CFR, 2016). Moreover, the UN commission of inquiry has researched that the national service program often times contains (amongst others) arbitrary detention, (sexual) torture, and forced labor. For many Eritreans the only way to avoid being enlisted is to flee the country. So far, 5000 Eritreans have fled their country every month; hereby Eritrea is one of the world’s top producers of refugees and also one of the fastest emptying-nations (CFR, 2016).

The Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict has moved well beyond the borders of the two states central to the dispute. Somalia was included when Eritrea and Ethiopia were supporting opposing forces in their power struggle (CFR, 2006). The Eritrean government backed the rebel group ‘Oromo Liberation Front’ (OLF) while Ethiopia was supporting groups that opposed OLF and Eritrea and renewed its relations with the Islamic regime of Sudan. In 2009 the UN Security Council sanctioned Eritrea for its support of the Islamist rebel group Al-Shabab in Somalia and, thereby, undermining Ethiopia. Despite the claims that Eritrea has reduced its support to Al-Shabab the sanctions are still in place (CFR, 2016).
5. Process of shaping the discourse

The discourse on the securitization of migration has developed significantly over the past three years. Not only did new elements find their way into the discourse but also the intensity and direction of already established elements changed. The nodal point of the discourse remained ‘the securitization of migration’, however, as Laclau and Mouffe argue, the meaning of the nodal point is subject to alteration, too (as in Phillips and Jørgensen (2002, p. 28). The signs and the nodal point determine the meaning of the discourse and, therefore, it is perceived to be fluid (Diez, 2001, p. 16). This is very much visible in the discourse on the securitization of migration, as the majority of the signs, the elements, and the nodal points have been subjected to change over the last three years. This chapter will present how the process of the shaping of the discourse on the securitization of migration has taken place. In the next chapter, a more in-depth analysis will be given in which the different elements that constitute the discourse will be further scrutinized individually.

When exploring the discourse on the securitization of migration in 2014, one identifies the sign that perceives the refugees as a victim of conflict as the most dominant one. While the numbers of asylum seekers were increasing, the Dutch politicians did not focus on refugees but, instead, mostly spoke about the problems that working migrants caused. Refugees were addressed briefly as people that were fleeing social, political, and economic crises and that deserved a safe haven. The nodal point of the discourse here was, thus, mainly focusing on presenting the refugees that arrived as victims that should be provided with shelter and aid as they were assumed to be predominantly victims of war.

The discourse expanded significantly in 2015 when politicians started debating refugees as a threat to security and the cultural identity of the Netherlands. Also, they presented refugees as a burden to society and a victim of conflict. By doing so, the discourse shifted from perceiving refugees as victims of war to the assumption that they were also a threat and a burden to the Netherlands. Hereby, the balance of the discourse tilted from one side to another; new signs were added to the discourse and the meaning of the already established signs and the nodal point were affected. Furthermore, the meaning of the sign ‘refugee as a victim of conflict’ was further narrowed down as it became more
focused on emphasizing the urgency of the situation and the terror from which these people were fleeing. Besides, refugees were also discussed in relation to the way they affect the Dutch cultural identity. They were generally perceived as ‘different’ and threats to the freedom of the Dutch people.

The discourse further evolved when in 2016, the politicians distinguished ‘real’ refugees from economic migrants. Hereby, the intensity of the perception that all refugees were victims of war was reduced. This reduction was further aggravated by the findings that there had been terrorists among the refugees. Simultaneously, the strength of the notion that refugees are a socioeconomic burden was heightened as politicians started speaking about fundamental and long-term effects the influx would have. Also, the foundations of the Dutch culture were believed to be threatened by the newcomers, hereby, this aspect of the discourse was further emphasized.

The development of the broadening of the discourse also resulted in the inclusion of more contested terms. Not all speakers agreed upon the terminology that was being used to speak about refugees. The usage of the new signs led to new terminology (e.g. fortune seeker, economic migrants and testosterone bombs). The fact that not all politicians made use of all these terms underscores that these terms can be perceived as elements positioned at the edges of the discourse. Their meanings were disputed and, also, their meanings depend on the discourse they are inserted in.

Furthermore, the other components of the discourse (ethos, metaphors, grammar, transitivity, and modality) remained constant throughout the three years. The speakers steadily used the same terms to establish their identities and the power relation between the politicians and the refugees was expressed in a constant way. It was, thus, predominantly the wording and the contested terms that have made the discourse on the securitization of migration tilt from a perception of refugees as victims of conflict to the presentation of refugees as socioeconomic burdens and threats to the security and cultural identity of a state. The figure below visualizes how the discourse on the securitization of migration has developed; the size of the areas has been determined in relation to each other and according to the findings of the analysis.
When gazing through the lens of the theory of securitization by Buzan et al. (1998), one understands that the discourse on the securitization of migration is very much shaped by the politicians speaking about refugees as an existential threat to the cultural identity, the socio-economic stability, and the national security of the receiving state. They use the argument that the arrival of the refugees is an existential threat to justify the agreement they made with a country that is not respecting human rights. Hereby, the discourse shifts towards the presentation of the refugees as existential threats instead of victims.

Furthermore, it becomes visible that the discourse is vastly influenced by the power that is exerted by the actors in the field. The politicians are the securitizing actors and, thereby, have the power to decide what is being securitized and in what way (Buzan et al, 1998). This possession of power works two ways; the politicians securitize and simultaneously, they leave the group that is being securitized out of the discussion. Hereby, the imbalance between the two groups is further enlarged and ‘the other’ is increasingly excluded from society. The ‘othering’ (as in Said’s work, 1979) of the incoming refugees allowed the politicians
to present the refugees as fundamentally different from the population in the receiving country. They spoke about the refugees as savages, chaotic, dangerous, and disrespectful. Through highlighting the differences between the receiving population and the arriving refugees, the Dutch population became increasingly aware of their distinct identity (Huntington, 1993), which, in turn, led to a stronger emphasis in the discourse on the incoming refugees as a threat.
6. Analysis

Out of the 259 documents that were found through the use of the filter ‘migration’; 74 were found to speak about ‘migration’ in the sense of refugees and the ongoing situation in Europe (whereas others spoke about digital migration of files or the migration patterns of animals). Of the 74 documents that have been analyzed, the majority represents debates that have taken place in 2015 and 2016. This imbalance shows that the influx of refugees was only perceived as a major crisis (and discussed accordingly) from 2015 on. The categorization of the ways in which refugees have been discussed shows that the Dutch politicians do not speak about refugees as hostages in the receiving country. Therefore, this category has been left out of the analysis. This chapter will further elaborate upon the findings presented in the previous chapter. The sub-chapters ethos, metaphors, grammar, transitivity, modality, and contested terms will summarize and highlight the most important findings of the research. Then, the six different ways in which refugees have been presented (through wording) will be discussed and put in perspective. All quotes that are used to illustrate the analysis will be translated into English and can be found within the body of the text; the original Dutch quotes will be placed in the footnotes of the corresponding page.

6.1.1. Ethos of the politicians

The politicians used various ways to establish and reinforce their identities. They repeatedly used ‘we’ to present themselves as either a representative of the entire country, their respective party, the cabinet, or the members of the parliament: “we as politicians”¹ (Rutte quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 7). The members of the opposition used ‘we’ to express that they are part of the Dutch people (and not the cabinet) and are, therefore, better in expressing the sentiments among the people. On the other hand, the government representatives used ‘we’ to present themselves as an entity and to acquire credibility through their membership of the parliament. The usage of ‘we’ also reinforces the notion that these politicians represent a group of which incoming refugees are no part. Here,

¹ “Wij als politici.”
Said’s idea of ‘the other’ becomes visible as it is the Dutch politicians who are debating the reception of the refugees while the group of refugees itself is not in any way included in this discussion. The fact that the politicians continuously use ‘we’ in various ways underscores the notion that it is the Dutch politicians debating about ‘them’ (the ‘others’).

Furthermore, many politicians referred to the EU in their arguments and, through this, they further expressed their identities. They did not only present themselves as Dutch politicians but also underscore that they are part of the European community. This strategy of identity formation further strengthens the notion that the incoming refugees are ‘the other’ while the European countries are acting as one unified entity. Again, the notion that the West has the responsibility to help and support the East is detectable here; it is the Dutch politicians who believe it is their duty to cooperate with their fellow member states to help the newcomers.

6.1.2. Metaphors in the debate

The politicians used metaphors to frame their argument using different wording. Fairclough (1992, p. 194) argues that the usage of metaphors is of great value when trying to understand the underlying meaning of the message that is being conveyed. The fact that one metaphor is used instead of another impacts the way one thinks and acts.

Examples of the usage of metaphor are: “We have thus dodged the bullet”2 (Wilders quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 5); here, Wilders (PVV) speaks about how the Netherlands has been lucky in not having witnessed an attack yet. Instead of stating this explicitly, he uses a metaphor to draw attention to his statement and to leave some space for interpretation from the receiver's side. Another example is “the society is being hit in the heart”3 (Kuzu quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 4). Here, Kuzu argues that the Dutch society has been hurt in its core but through the use of a metaphor this statement is

2 “We zijn dus door het oog van de naald geglipt.”
3 “De samenleving is in het hart geraakt.”
dramatized. According to Kuzu, the very core of the society has been hit and it is up to the receiver to determine what this core is and what ‘hit’ means.

Interestingly, both speakers (and many of the other politicians) use rather violent or defense-related metaphors to express their arguments. In the above examples, a ‘bullet was dodged’ and ‘society was hit’ it becomes clear that the discourse has adapted terms from the military to not only shape the discourse but also the way people think and act (Fairclough, 1992, p. 195).

6.1.3. Grammar used by the politicians

The politicians make extensive use of the past tense to provide context to their arguments. They use this tense to refer to events that occurred in the past: “In the First World War the Netherlands hosted one million Belgians”4 (Zijlstra quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 4). These anecdotes about the (recent) past are used to provide a historical insight and context for the standpoints of the politicians. Through providing the other speakers and the audience with background information, they attempt to create sympathy for their arguments.

Interestingly, the speakers from the far right parties (PVV and Bontes/Klaveren) repeatedly use the imperative voice to dictate the government representatives what to do. They argue: “close those borders. Don’t let any asylum seeker enter anymore”5 (Wilders quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 7). Hereby, they add a sense of urgency to the situation and attempt to press the government into taking the actions they assume to be most efficient.

Thirdly, the politicians make elaborate use of the auxiliary verbs ‘must’ and ‘can’ to express matters that have to change in order to avoid further worsening of the situation and to speak about the abilities and capabilities of the Netherlands: “you should ask yourself if we can help so many aliens at the same time”6 (Dijkhoff quoted from Tweede Kamer 2016, document 7).

4 “In de Eerste Wereldoorlog heeft Nederland een miljoen Belgen opgevangen.”
5 “Sluit nou die grenzen. Laat geen asielzoeker meer binnen.”
6 “Je mag je afvragen of we zo veel vreemdelingen tegelijk kunnen helpen.”
6.1.4. Transitivity in speech

Transitivity was mainly used by the politicians to present one element as the victim and the other as the cause for the current situation. Either the Netherlands or Europe were presented as a victim with the refugees being the causal factor: “Europe is being flooded”7 (Bontes quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 4) or the refugees were presented as passive entities upon which the Dutch authorities could decide: “Even sending refugees back to Greece...”8 (Klaver quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 4).

Transitivity is useful to detect the power relations between the various actors and, also, to see how this relationship is expressed through language (Fairclough, 1992, p. 177). Through presenting themselves as an active actor or the refugees as a passive receiver, the politicians were able to express the power relations. Not only the power relations that are actually present were presented through this grammatical tool. Also, the desired relationships were expressed; the politicians repeatedly presented the Dutch government as the body that has full control over the geographical whereabouts of the refugees. However, in practice this is not always the case as the refugees might disappear from the government’s radar.

6.1.5. Modality of the politicians

As Fairclough (1992, p. 160) argues, modality is not necessarily about sharing one’s commitment to a proposition but more about showing solidarity. The politicians do both; they share their emotions, experiences and efforts to improve. Han ten Broeke (VVD) shares the feelings he has on a daily basis when watching the news about the sinking boats: “There is not a single day that I don’t get a knot in my stomach...”9 (quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 10). Secretary of state Klaas Dijkhoff does something similar when he says “I, too, struggle with these questions. I also have a double feeling”10 (quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 7). These phrases show that the politicians attempt to present

7 “Europa wordt overspoeld.”
8 “Zelfs vluchtelingen terugsturen naar Griekenland.”
9 “Er gaat geen dag voorbij dat ik niet met een knoop in mijn maag.”
10 “Ook ik worstel met die vragen. Ook ik heb er een dubbel gevoel bij.”
themselves as sensitive humans who understand what the Dutch people experience. They aim to present themselves as ‘one of the people’ by showing that they are emotionally affected by the situation, too.

Another way through which the politicians show their affinity is by explicitly mentioning that they made an effort to better understand the situation or that they have had similar experiences themselves. Tunahan Kuzu (DENK) argues: “as DENK we spoke with Syrian refugees in Rotterdam last week”\(^\text{11}\) (quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 3). Hereby, he shows that he is genuinely interested in understanding the situation from the perspective of the refugees. Dijkhoff does something similar in the debate on establishing refugee accommodations in regular neighborhoods: “I experienced something similar when in my quarter an accommodation was established”\(^\text{12}\) (quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 3). Through this statement, he shows that he himself has experienced how a refugee accommodation can impact a neighborhood and, thereby, he gains credibility as a politician as he is able to imagine what the ‘average’ Dutch person feels like.

The phrases in which the politicians aim to show solidarity with the Dutch people do have a postcolonial perspective as the speakers talk about how they spoke to ‘them’ and how they have experienced ‘these people’ arriving to their neighborhood. Through these phrases, the refugees are presented as ‘the other’ and the differences between this group and the population of the receiving country is heavily emphasized (you need to talk to them in order to understand them and when they arrive to your neighborhood, surprisingly, nothing really changes).

6.1.6. Contested terms

The term ‘refugee’ is the most often contested term as the politicians do not agree whether to perceive the incoming people as refugees, migrants, asylum seekers, economic migrants, fortune seekers or terrorists. Often times, the speakers use various terms interchangeably (migrant and refugee) while these words have different connotations. In general, it has been found that the speakers do not

\(^{11}\) “Wij van DENK hebben afgelopen week in Rotterdam met Syrische vluchtelingen gesproken.”

\(^{12}\) “Maar in mijn geval heb ik ze ook gehad, toen er bij mij een in de buurt kwam.”
necessarily use the same term continuously; they rather use the term that is most beneficial to the argument they are trying to make. The choice of words indicates which direction the speaker wants to go into. 2016 marked a change in the discourse as a clear distinction between ‘economic migrants’ and ‘real refugees’ was made. Instead of speaking of ‘refugees’ the politicians introduced the term ‘real refugee’ to indicate that these people were legitimately fleeing conflict while the other refugees were not fleeing from life-threatening situations.

However, the term refugee clearly finds itself on the borders of the discourse as speakers attach different meanings to these terms. The way these people should be called is heavily contested and, therefore, these elements acquire their meaning through the discourse in which they find themselves. When Linda Voortman (GroenLinks) speaks about the refugees as victims of conflict, she will use the term ‘refugee’ as this fits the discourse and strengthens the perception of refugees as victims. On the other hand, Bontes will rather speak of ‘terrorists’ when he aims to present the incoming people as threats to security.

6.2. A - Refugees as opponent to the politics of the former homeland

In 2014, the focus of the debate was on so-called ‘parallel societies’ in the Netherlands where Eritrean embassies supposedly were spying on the Dutch government. The speakers drew a link between the bad governance of Eritrea and the desire of these leaders to infiltrate in the Netherlands to spy on their people. Although this reasoning implies that the Eritreans in the Netherlands are here because they disagree with the Eritrean government, the focus of the debate was on the safety of the Dutch society.

This way of talking about refugees changed slightly in 2016 when the politicians discussed the human rights situation in Eritrea more thoroughly. They discussed the principle of refoulement and argued that sending Eritreans that entered Sudan back was a case of refoulement. Thereby, it would go against the international declarations. They presented the Eritreans as refugees that were opponents of their home regime and, therefore, should not be sent back to Eritrea. However, the Dutch politicians continued to predominantly perceive Eritreans as
threats to the Dutch system and democracy and argued (Dijkhoff quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 1599):

“They are a danger to the continuation of the democratic system, the safety and other important aspects of our state”

Thus, the politicians merely added a humanitarian layer to their perceptions as they underscored the difficult and dangerous position that many Eritreans find themselves in. Hereby, they slightly shifted the weight of the discourse to the humanitarian corner. However, the postcolonial idea of ‘the other’ is still very much present in this reasoning, as the Eritreans are perceived as ‘the other’ that are incontrollable and might harm the Dutch society. Here, the politicians’ way of presenting the refugees builds upon Fanon’s theory (1963, p. 250) in which he argues that the Westerners perceive all ‘others’ as similar (all Eritreans are the same; they are dangerous to our society).

6.3. B - Refugees as threat to cultural identity to the receiving society

In 2015 the politicians discussed the arrival of the refugees and the impact it has on the Dutch culture in relative soft terms. They highlighted the difference between the incoming people (which are assumed to be Muslim) and the traditionally existing culture based on Christianity and Judaism. Politicians argued: “these refugees should go to countries with similar cultures” (Wilders quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 8). The politicians continuously underscored the significance of Dutch norms and values and emphasized that the newcomers have to adapt to these traditions. However, they express the fear that the refugees will not do so: “We are importing people that do not want to integrate, they want to colonize us” (Wilders quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 2). Besides the focus on the differences between the cultures and the obligation to adapt, the

13 “Zij een gevaar vormen voor het voortbestaan van de democratische rechtsorde, dan wel voor de veiligheid of voor andere gewichtige belangen van de staat.”
14 “Deze vluchtelingen zouden naar landen moeten gaan met gelijksoortige culturen.”
15 “We importeren mensen die hier niet willen integreren, die ons willen koloniseren.”
politicians also concentrate on the fundamental differences between the cultures. Geert Wilders continuously calls the incoming male refugees “testosterone bombs” and, thereby, underscores that they are here to release their desires onto the Dutch women: “Dutch women are bothered by these people from different cultures”\(^\text{16}\) (Wilders quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 2).

The debates that were held in the following year were more intense and also highlighted the notion that these new cultures are dangerous, aimed at taking away our freedom, and causing the traditional Dutch culture to disappear. The politicians argued “many of them want to dominate us through the use of force”\(^\text{17}\) (Wilders quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 6). The fear for violence is directly linked to the feeling of freedom that the politicians inherently link to the Dutch identity. They argue that the arrival of the refugees will vastly impact on the level of freedom the Dutch experience; “will our children and grandchildren not be able to live in a free country anymore?”\(^\text{18}\) and “will the Netherlands remain a free country? Will the Dutch remain free people?”\(^\text{19}\) (Wilders quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 28). The expression of these fears implies the Dutch value their freedom to a great extent and that they perceive the arrival of people with different ideas and beliefs as a limit to their freedom. Like in 2015, the debates in 2016 highlight the notion that the influx of migrants will cause a “clash of cultures”\(^\text{20}\) (Bontes quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 28) and the fear that “we will have to make concessions to this group of people with a different cultural background”\(^\text{21}\) (Wilders quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 7).

The center of the discourse shifted in 2016 to the idea that the Dutch identity could ‘get lost’ due to the arrival of the refugees. The politicians repeatedly speak about “we are losing our country, our freedom, our democracy, our welfare state”\(^\text{22}\) (Wilders quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 28). In particular

\(^{16}\) “van vrouwen in Nederland die last hebben van die cultuur.”
\(^{17}\) “Velen daarvan willen ons domineren en daar geweld voor gebruiken.”
\(^{18}\) “Zullen onze kinderen en kleinkinderen niet meer in een vrij land leven?”
\(^{19}\) “Zal Nederland een vrij land blijven? Zullen de Nederlands een vrij volk blijven?”
\(^{20}\) “Botsende culturen.”
\(^{21}\) “Wij zullen ons aan moeten passen aan deze groep mensen met een andere culturele achtergrond.”
\(^{22}\) “Wij raken ons land, onze vrijheid, onze democratie en onze rechtstaat kwijt”
Wilders and Joram van Klaveren (Bontes/van Klaveren) speak about (Wilders quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 6):

“If we allow people that hate us, people that hate our lifestyle, people that hate women walking around in a short skirt and gay couples walking hand in hand, then the Netherlands will disappear”

They argue that it is not too late yet and that the country can be saved if the government takes a tough stance towards immigration but the underscore that “if we fail, it is game over for the Netherlands as a country…” (Wilders quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 6). They strongly perceive the incoming migrants to be ‘the other’ that will ruin the Dutch culture and identity. Wilders takes this argument one step further and argues: “they want to colonize us” (Wilders quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 28). Hereby, he presents the country of the Netherlands as an item that can be owned and that this ownership can change through the exertion of power. He further elaborates his stance towards the ownership of the Netherlands by saying that “the Netherlands is ours” (Wilders quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 6). The incoming people are different and, thus, do not belong to the Netherlands or ‘us’.

Lastly, also the traditions of the Netherlands are touched upon when Jesse Klaver (GroenLinks) argues: “the influx causes tense discussions about Easter eggs and the color of Black Pete” (Klaver quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 6). Hereby, Klaver draws a connection between the arrival of the refugees and the discussion about the nature of Dutch cultural traditions.

The development of the perception that refugees are a threat to the Dutch cultural identity shows that the weight of the discourse shifted to the fear of losing...
the Dutch identity entirely and the assumption that the incoming refugees are dangerous. Here, the politicians do as Buzan et al (1998) state and present the issue as an existential threat that needs to be fought or otherwise, nothing else will matter. They explicitly state that the arrival of refugees is a danger to our cultural identity and by doing so they openly securitize the issue. Besides, a strong ‘us versus them’ sentiment can be perceived; the Dutch culture and people are presented to be the standard from which the newcomers deviate heavily.

The refugees are presented along the lines of Said’s ‘the other’; the politicians perceive them as a homogeneous group rather than individuals. Moreover, the refugees are presented as less civilized than the population in the receiving country. They are more violent, they have different norms and values, and they have different ideas about how to treat women. Since their ideas do not correspond with the Dutch beliefs, these people are perceived to distort the Dutch identity (as they would hang on to their own beliefs and not adapt to the Dutch ones). Besides, the ‘othering’ of the refugees also helps reinforcing the identity of the Dutch people and their cultural identity (Huntington, 1993, p. 28).

6.4. C - Refugee as socioeconomic burden to the receiving society

It was only in 2015 that the political debate shifted its focus from immigrant workers to the arrival of the refugees and the socioeconomic effects of this influx. Wilders, van Klaveren and Louis Bontes (Bontes/van Klaveren) are particularly keen on debating the maximum amount of refugees that the Netherlands is able to take in. They argue: “our capacity has a limit, too”28 (Wilders quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 6) and ask the cabinet “what is the maximum amount of asylum seekers that the Netherlands can absorb in terms of the social, cultural, and economic perspective?” 29 (van Klaveren quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 749).

Other politicians also worry about whether the country can handle the current amount of refugees: “there are people who wonder for how long the

28 “Onze capaciteit heeft ook een limiet”
29 “Wat is het maximale aantal asielzoekers dat Nederland aan kan op sociaal, cultureel en economisch gebied?”
Netherlands is going to be able to handle the influx of 4,200 refugees per week”\textsuperscript{30} (Voordewind quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 3). These worries are often times related to the will and capabilities of the Dutch people but also to the costs that the refugees bring along; “Every asylum seekers costs the Netherlands €26,000”\textsuperscript{31} (Wilders quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 7). Van Dijck (PVV) specifies that this “is going to cost the taxpayer over 3 billion euros; only accommodation would be €450 per household”\textsuperscript{32} (quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 3). These costs are related to the arguments that the Dutch government should spend this money on the Dutch people rather than on refugees. Wilders argues (quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 4):

“Wouldn’t it be much better if you, instead of spending money on refugees and Greece, would give the money to the nurses in the Netherlands who are waking up every morning to do the work you cannot or do not want to do?”\textsuperscript{33}

Wilders’ colleagues continuously argue that the refugees are a burden to the society as they are prioritized over the Dutch people; “they have a huge priority on the housing market”\textsuperscript{34} (Fritsma quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 3).

The job- and housing market are discussed particularly often as areas that are impacted by the influx of refugees. Kuiken argues: “they are worried about whether they themselves will be able to get a house and if there are still jobs when people other than the refugees want to work”\textsuperscript{35} (quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015,

\textsuperscript{30} “Er zijn mensen die zich afvragen voor hoe lang Nederland de instroom van 4.200 vluchtelingen per week aan kan.”
\textsuperscript{31} “Iedere asielzoeker kost Nederland €26,000.”
\textsuperscript{32} “Dit gaat de belastingbetalen meer dan 3 miljard kosten, alleen al aan opvang €450 per gezin.”
\textsuperscript{33} “Zou het niet veel beter zijn als u, in plaats van dat geld te besteden aan de opvang van die vluchtelingen en aan de Grieken, dat geld gaf aan de verpleegkundigen in Nederland, de mensen die iedere ochtend opstaan om het werk te doen dat u niet wilt of kunt doen?”
\textsuperscript{34} “De onvoorstellbare voorrangpositie op de woningmarkt van asielzoekers.”
\textsuperscript{35} “Zij maken zich zorgen over de vraag of zij zelf nog een huis kunnen krijgen en of er nog wel werk is als ook andere mensen graag aan het werk willen.”
More explicitly, Wilders argues: “they are stealing our jobs”36 (quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 5).

Perhaps more important than the job- and housing market is the support from the Dutch people for the government to continue with their policies. Wilders (quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 5) argues: “the Netherlands cannot handle this. Millions of people do not want this”37 and

> Many people in our beautiful country are sad. They are angry and feel powerless because people laugh at their just worries and objections”38

However, not all politicians agree upon the notion that refugees are a burden to the hosting society: “refugee accommodation can be of great value for many municipalities. They are beneficial for the employment in the region and for the middle-class”39 (Kuzu quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 3).

In 2016, the debates continued in a similar manner but highlighted slightly different topics. Politicians spoke about the effect on the stability of the EU, the disruption of society and the possibility that the refugees would bring families and stay in the Netherlands for a longer period of time. Bontes and van Klaveren argued: “Merkel’s immigration policies are a threat to the social stability of many European countries”40 (quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 1263). Also, Henk Nijboer (PvdA) states: “the refugee problem is the biggest Europe is facing”41 (quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 14). These quotes show how the politicians are not only concerned with the Dutch society but also with the European reality. However, the focal point of the debates remains the future of the Netherlands: “It is disrupting the Dutch society: we cannot handle it. The Minister

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36 “Ze stelen onze banen.”
37 “Nederland kan dit niet aan. Miljoenen mensen willen dit niet.”
38 “Heel veel mensen uit ons prachtige land zijn boos. Ze zijn woest en voelen zich machteloos, omdat er lacherig wordt gedaan over hun terechte zorgen en hun terechte bezwaren.”
39 “Bovendien blijkt dat asielzoekerscentra voor veel gemeenten ook een meerwaarde kunnen hebben. Ze zijn goed voor de werkgelegenheid en voor de middenstand.”
40 “Het immigratiebeleid van Angela Merkel juist een enorm risico vormt voor de sociale stabiliteit van veel Europese landen.”
41 “Het vluchtelingenprobleem is het grootste probleem Europa momenteel heeft.”
of Defense even called it ‘hell’"\(^{42}\) (quoted from Tweede Kamer, Gesthuizen, 2016, document 5). These politicians underscore the impact of the arriving refugees on the social of the receiving countries; the influx of such huge numbers disrupts the social system in many ways and the entire population is affected.

Also, 2016 saw a shift to the more long-term perspective of the crisis when politicians started speaking about “they are, if they are not doing it already, going to bring partners and children”\(^{43}\) and “this is also going to cause huge waves of partner- and family migration”\(^{44}\) (quoted from Tweede Kamer, Fritsma, 2016, document 8). This inevitable extra flow of people will pose an additional burden to the Dutch society. Klaver admits: “whether we like it or not, a big part of these refugees will live in the Netherlands for a longer period of time”\(^{45}\) (quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 14). Hereby, he underscores that the refugees do not pose a temporary burden but that they will become part of the Dutch system of society for quite some time.

Only in 2015 the Dutch political debate started presenting refugees as burdens to the Dutch society and economy. In particular the costs of the influx and the disruption of the job- and housing market they caused were elaborated upon. These topics also formed the core of the debates in the following year, however, in 2016 politicians started putting the crisis in perspective and, thereby, shifted the debate to the more long-term and fundamental effects it would have. The politicians repeatedly discussed the impact on the European Union and the thorough disruption of the Dutch society. Thus, the discourse tilted towards the idea that long-term stay of these refugees would affect the Dutch society fundamentally.

A strong postcolonial perspective can be identified as the politicians continuously refer to ‘them’ and ‘they’. Hereby, they imply that the incoming refugees are fundamentally different than the population in the receiving country. By doing so, they simultaneously strengthen the sense of identity of the Dutch

\(^{42}\) “Ontwrichting van de Nederlandse samenleving: we kunnen het niet aan. De minister van Defensie sprak zelfs over een hel.”
\(^{43}\) “Zij gaan, als ze het niet al doen, partners en kinderen meebrengen.”
\(^{44}\) “Die gaat ook nog een keer zorgen voor grote golven partner- en gezinsmigratie die er achteraan komen.”
\(^{45}\) “Een groot deel van de vluchtelingen zal, of we het leuk vinden of niet, voor langere tijd in Nederland wonen.”
people (Huntington, 1993, p. 28). They emphasize this belief by arguing that these refugees are using the facilities, the houses, the jobs, the healthcare, and the money that was originally designed to supply the Dutch people. By stating this, the politicians make use of the security logic; without stating this explicitly they present the issue as a threat (to the Dutch welfare system). The politicians argue that the influx of refugees will disrupt both the Dutch and the European societies as these societies are designed to function on itself and a sudden but vast injection of ‘others’ would be hard or impossible to handle. Through this argumentation the arrival of refugees is presented as an existential threat to the social and economic functioning of the Netherlands according to the theory of securitization by Buzan et al. (1998) and, thereby, extraordinary measures are justified. Moreover, many politicians argue that these facilities, opportunities and sums of money should be used for the Dutch citizens; they have worked for it and, therefore, the money should be spent on them.

6.5. E - Refugee as threat to security to the receiving society

The politicians started presenting refugees as threats to security only in 2015. Then, the focus of the political debate was still on the possibility that terrorists would mix themselves in the incoming streams of refugees; “terrorists can piggyback the migrant stream” (Fritsma quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 6). Until then, the investigations of the November 2015 attacks in Paris had not been binding and, therefore, they did not know whether terrorists had actually been mixed with refugees. After the attacks in Paris, the politicians started hinting more intensely towards the notion that these perpetrators had actually been among the refugees: “at least two of the perpetrators of the horrible attacks in Paris are said to have entered the EU in that way” (Fritsma quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 16).

Despite this uncertainty, the politicians assumed that terrorists might be among the refugees; Azmani (VVD) argued: “migration is in the first place a

46 “Terroristen kunnen meeliften op de migrantenstroom.”
47 “Ten minste twee van de daders van de gruwelijke aanslagen in Parijs op die manier Europa zijn binnengekomen.”
threat” 48 (quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 16). Hereby, he summarizes the belief of most Dutch politicians. Wilders uses statistics to indicate how big the chances are that terrorists are among the refugees that entered the Netherlands (Wilders quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 4):

“Every week, 3,000 asylum seekers enter the country. Maybe, there are dozens of terrorists among them that want to carry out an attack tomorrow” 49

The statistics and words such as ‘to carry out an attack tomorrow’ intensify the idea that an attack can happen any moment and at any place. Wilders further explores this idea and calls the refugees “ticking time bombs” 50 (quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 4).

In 2016, the debate took a different turn when it became clear that a number of the perpetrators did indeed come to Europe in the refugee stream. The right-wing parties extensively discussed the fact that perpetrators had entered Europe through the migration influx: “There have been attacks in Paris and Brussels committed by people that have piggybacked the migration influx” 51 (Wilders, 2016, document 6). The outcomes of the investigation were directly linked to the open borders of both the Netherlands and the EU: “terrorists are able to simply move back and forth” 52 (de Graaf quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 13). The politicians highlight that it is partly the fault of the Dutch- and EU government that people with bad intentions are able to move around freely; they should control their borders better. Interestingly, not only the opposition members share their fear for terrorists entering the EU as refugees; Dijkhoff argues: “of course the route can also be used by people who have terrorist

48 “Migratie is in de eerste plaats een bedreiging.”
49 “Er komen 3.000 asielzoekers per week binnen. Daar zitten misschien wel tientallen terroristen tussen, die morgen een aanslag kunnen plegen.”
50 “Tikkende tijdbommen.”
51 “Er zijn aanslagen in Parijs en Brussel gepleegd door mensen waarvan we nu weten dat ze mee zijn gelift op de asielinstroom.”
52 “Terroristen kunnen gewoon op en neer reizen.”
“Natuurlijk kan die route ook gebruikt worden door mensen met terroristische motieven.”

“Deze rovende asielzoekers.”

“Voor het tot tweemaal toe aanranden van vrouwen.”

“Bloeddorstige Moslims.”
Furthermore, the terminology used to refer to the incoming refugees highlights the presence of the postcolonial perspective in the Dutch debate. The term ‘bloodthirsty Muslims’ implies that the speaker assumes all refugees are Muslims and violent. Here, Fanon’s theory (1963, p. 250) on how the Westerners perceive the Orientals as one homogeneous group becomes visible. Moreover, it underscores the belief that the Dutch population is not Muslim; therefore, the incoming refugees are ‘otherized’. This emphasizes Huntington’s (1993) ideas about how ‘othering’ reinforces the identity of the ‘standard’ culture. Said’s ideas on how the West perceives the people from the East as savages, chaotic, and dangerous is very much visible in the way the politicians speak about the refugees. They underscore the differences between the Dutch people and the refugees and present the latter as ‘dangerous aliens’. This notion is further strengthened by the fact that the politicians only refer to recent attacks in Western cities (Paris and Brussels). They exclude the attacks in the Middle East or Turkey and, thereby, create an image that the refugees (terrorists) are deliberately targeting the West.

6.6. F - Refugee as political tool

The agreement between the EU and Turkey caused the discourse on the securitization of migration to include ‘migration as a political bargain tool’. In the months prior to the signing of the deal, the Dutch politicians took two different positions: the government representatives emphasized that (Rutte quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 9):

“The accession process does, of course, not have any link concerning content with the accommodation question in Turkey”57

While the opposition members questioned whether there was any link or not: “a successful cooperation in the area of refugee accommodation cannot lead to a faster accession of Turkey to the EU, right?”58 (Voordewind quoted from Tweede

57 “Het toetredingsproces heeft natuurlijk geen enkele inhoudelijke link met de vraagstukken rond de opvang in Turkije.”
58 “Een succesvolle samenwerking inzake de opvang van vluchtelingen mag niet leiden tot een versnelde toetreding van Turkije tot de Europese Unie.”
Kamer, 2015, document 9) and “has there been a connection between the cooperation from the Turkish side in return for speaking about accession faster than initially planned, despite the deterioration of the human rights situation in Turkey?”59 (Buma quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 9).

Prior to the official signing of the document, Dutch politicians were critical and suspicious about the strategy of both Erdogan and the position in which the EU would bring itself by signing the deal. When the agreement was signed, the politicians expressed themselves in predominantly negative ways: “The EU and the prime minister have fallen for the politics of blackmailing by the Islamist tyrant Erdogan”60 (Fritsma quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 35). Hereby, the politicians underscore that it is Erdogan who gained from the deal and who is now in control. Interestingly, Prime Minister Mark Rutte argues: “the refugee influx has increasingly been used as a political tool”61 (Rutte quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 31). Hereby, he admits that Turkey is, indeed, using the agreement with the EU to strengthen its own position and to improve its chances to become a member of the EU.

Throughout the developments of the presentation of ‘refugees as a political tool’ the notion of power is very much present. The agreement between the EU and Turkey is presented as the ultimate power game in which both sides have attempted to negotiate the best possible deal. Hereby, the politicians present the arrival of the refugees as an existential threat that allows for extraordinary measures (as discussed by Buzan et al. (1989), such as a deal with Turkey (a country that violates human rights). The Dutch politicians imply that the EU was in a bad position and, therefore, Erdogan was able to exploit the EU by using his position of power. The politicians have exposed the strong position of Erdogan as they discussed all promises that the EU made in exchange for his support in the migration crisis. The politicians underscore that the offer made by the EU includes

59 “dat er een koppeling is gelegd tussen medewerking bij de opvang van vluchtelingen in ruil voor sneller dan de bedoeling was weer praten over toetreding, ondanks de verslechtering van de mensenrechten?”
60 “De EU en ook de premier zijn in de chantagepolitiek van de islamitische tiran Erdogan getuind.”
61 “De migratiecrisis is steeds vaker gebruikt als politiekmiddel.”
the most valuable assets the institution has and, thereby, confirm that Turkey has won this power game.

6.7. G - Refugee as victim of conflict

In 2014, refugees were perceived as victims but not necessarily as victims of conflict; they were also discussed in relation to “the political, social, and economic crises in their country of origin”62 (Maij quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2014, document 8). However, Rutte (quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2014, document 8) underscored that the refugees were first and foremost victims of conflict as “their lives were being threatened”63. Regardless of the reasons why the refugees were perceived as victims, the speakers agreed: “Europe should stay a safe haven”64 (Maij quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2014, document 8).

The assumptions discussed in 2014 formed the foundations of the debates held in 2015. The politicians enhanced their arguments by speaking of emergency situations, the terror people are fleeing from, and the plight for the Netherlands to help those in need. Alexander Pechtold (D66) highlights the notion that the refugees are, in the first place, victims of conflict. He speaks of (quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 4):

“These people have had bombs on their heads or were recruited for a war in which they were serving as cannon fodder. They and their families were fearing for their lives”65

These politicians present refugees as victims of conflict that fled for conflict. Other politicians speak about different reasons for these people to leave their homes: “people are being persecuted because of their religion, sexual preference, or

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62 “De politieke, sociale en economische crisis in hun land van herkomst.”
63 “Hun levens werden bedreigd.”
64 “Europa moet een veilige haven blijven.”
65 “Die mensen kregen bommen op hun hoofd of werden gerekruiteerd voor een leger waarin zij kanonnenvlees waren. En dus hadden zij en hun familie te vrezen voor hun leven.”
political ideas.” (Kuiken quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 26). Also, the conditions in the refugee accommodations in the Middle East and Greece are used as a reason why people flee: “Is it safe if your wife has to fear rape and abuse in these camps?” (Klaver quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 4).

The presentation of refugees as victims of conflict (and other harm) led the politicians to argue: “we have the humanitarian plight to provide shelter to vulnerable refugees” (Voortman quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 34). The notion that the Netherlands is responsible for hosting these people is explicitly related to the Dutch and European norms and values: “not doing so goes against all principles of the EU and the common asylum policy” (Kuiken quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 327).

The politicians underscore the need for such accommodation and protection as they argue that the refugees that currently coming to Europe and the Netherlands find themselves in an extreme situation: “the emergency situation in the region continues to exist. Millions of refugees are staying there in horrible conditions” (Kuzu quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 3). They emphasize the urgency of the situation by stating: “the biggest refugee crisis that we have ever had in the entire world” (Gesthuizen quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 16). They further highlight how extraordinary and urgent the situation is by speaking of “the human tragedies on the Mediterranean Sea” (Maij quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 34), and “the hell called Syria” (Pechtold quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 7). Through this type of wording, the politicians are able to add a sense of urgency to the situation and,

66 “Mensen worden vervolgd vanwege hun religie, seksuele voorkeur of politieke ideeën.”
67 “Is het veilig als je als vrouw in zo’n kamp moet vrezen voor verkrachting en misbruik?”
68 “Wij hebben de humanitaire plicht om onderdak te bieden aan kwetsbare vluchtelingen.”
69 “Indruist tegen alle beginselen van de Europese Unie en het gemeenschappelijk asielbeleid.”
70 “De noodsituatie in de regio blijft bestaan. Daar verblijven miljoenen vluchtelingen onder erbarmelijke omstandigheden.”
71 “De grootste vluchtelingencrisis die de wereld ooit gekend heeft.”
72 “De menselijke tragedies op de Middellandse Zee.”
73 “De hel die Syrië heet.”
thereby, they are able to present their perception that refugees are victims of conflict in a more powerful way.

In 2016 a shift in the debate can be observed as politicians are becoming more specific as to who can be classified as a refugee. The debate on economic migrants and ‘real’ refugees sparks and adds more emphasis on the notion that refugees are victims of conflict as victims of social or economic circumstances are no longer perceived to be refugees. The politicians attempt to differentiate between economic migrants and “real asylum seekers that are fleeing for war, violence or prosecution” (Monasch quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 7). They distinguish them based upon their nationality: “economic migrants and the non-Syrian refugees” (Zijlstra quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 31) and “Syrian refugees and other refugees that have the right to international protection” (Rutte quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, document 31). But the also refer to international treaties: “refugees that are not real refugees according to the definition of the UN-refugee charter” (Gesthuizen quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2016, document 7).

Despite the strong focus on the refugees as victims of conflict, a postcolonial perspective can be detected. In particular, the fact that the politicians feel very much responsible for hosting the refugees indicates that they assume that other countries in the Middle East are not capable of providing this shelter. Furthermore, they present themselves along the lines of Said’s theory; the West is the civilized part of the world that has the responsibility to look after the less developed parts (and people).

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74 “Echte vluchten die vluchten voor oorlog, geweld of vervolging.”
75 “Economische migranten en de niet-Syrische vluchten.”
76 “Syrische vluchten die andere vluchten die recht hebben op internationale bescherming.”
77 “Vluchten die geen echte vluchteling zijn volgens de definitie van het VN-Vluchtingenverdrag.”
7. Conclusion

“Be careful. Testosterone bombs, breast enlargement, and eyelid corrections: it sounds as if we are debating about healthcare. Tsunamis, streams, magnetic effect, tidal waves, curbing: it is as if we are speaking about water management. As I said: words do matter. Words create images, images influence people and people become afraid. Fear, however, does not solve anything. Words do matter”

(Jesse Klaver quoted from Tweede Kamer, 2015, p. 2)

This thesis is specifically targeted at understanding how the discourse on the securitization of migration has been shaped throughout the past three years and whether or not it has shifted over time. More precisely, this research aims to understand how the elements constituting the discourse have contributed to the presence or absence of this shift. It intends to comprehend whether the signs that were relevant three years ago are still relevant in the discourse today. A strong focus is added on the linguistic aspect of the study as the development of the discourse is researched in terms of wording, grammar, and other linguistic tools.

The transformation of the discourse has been scrutinized through the use of Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) approach to discourse analysis. The nodal point of the discourse has continuously been ‘the securitization of migration’ which allowed for a closer examination of the signs and their movements within the discourse. This thorough analysis has shown that the particular way of speaking about refugees is mainly present in terms of the words used. It is not necessarily the way in which the speaker identifies him or herself or the metaphors that are used through which a certain image of refugees is represented. Neither does this happen through the grammar that is used or the way in which the speaker shows his or her affinity with the subject. Instead, particular words such as “victims of war”, “people that

78 “Wees zorgvuldig. Testosteronbommen, borstvergrotingen, ooglidcorrecties; het lijkt wel een debat over de gezondheidszorg. Tsunami’s, stromen, aanzuigende werking, vloedgolven, indammen; het lijkt wel een debat over watermanagement. Ik zei al: woorden doen ertoe. Woorden maken beelden, beelden beïnvloeden mensen en mensen raken.”
flee their homes for conflict and destruction” but also “testosterone bombs’ and ‘terrorist scum” used by the speakers shape the way in which politicians refer to this group of people. It is through the usage of phrases as “they are stealing our jobs” and “we have the moral plight to provide protection to those in need” that the discourse on the securitization of refugees is shaped. Furthermore, through transitivity, the power relations between the politicians and the arriving refugees are further elaborated upon. Through the ways in which the politicians speak about the refugees, they imply their position vis-à-vis them; phrases such as “they are flooding Europe” and “thousands of them are coming to Europe” present the Netherlands and Europe as victims that are paralyzed by the influx of the refugees. Simultaneously, the speakers argue: “we can send them back” and “we should close our borders so they cannot enter any longer”. Hereby, they underscore their belief that it is the Dutch government who has the final say in the geographical whereabouts of these people. It is not the refugee who has the authority to decide where he or she wants to or can be but it is the Dutch government who is in charge of making these decisions.

The underlying postcolonial perspectives of the politicians became visible through the words and grammar that were used. The politicians continuously present the refugees as ‘the other’ that is not part of the Dutch society and, therefore, cannot make use of the facilities and the social security net. Besides, this presentation of ‘the other’ also implies that the incoming refugees are fundamentally different and that they must adjust to the Dutch lifestyle, otherwise they will change the Dutch traditions and culture. Thirdly, this notion of ‘the other’ presents the refugees as inherently different and, thereby, dangerous to the receiving society as they have different ideas about violence, women, and equality. The strong ‘us versus them’ sentiment that is present in the way the politicians speak about the refugees underscores the differences among the groups and, thereby, reinforces the power relation where the Western politicians dictate what the Orientals (the refugees) can and cannot do. The Dutch politicians present themselves as wise and resourceful (backed by the EU) and, therefore, feel they have the responsibility and the ability to direct the lives of the refugees that are savage, chaotic, and less intelligent.
The presentation of refugees as a whole shifted from posing refugees predominantly as victims towards speaking about them as threats to the cultural identity, the socio-economic status, and the national security of the receiving country. Hereby, the discourse on the securitization of migration shifted from focusing on the humanitarian aspects of the situation (the refugee as individual in need of aid and protection) towards a more critical standpoint in which the arrival of the refugees is mostly perceived as a threat to the hosting society. The various signs that together establish the entire discourse on the securitization of migration also changed themselves throughout between 2014 and 2017. While in 2014 the politicians did not speak about refugees as threats to the cultural identity or the national security of the receiving country, these signs grew into the most dominant ones in the discourse. A similar, but reversed, development can be found for the sign that perceives refugees as victims of conflict; in 2014 and more even in 2015 this sign prevailed in the discourse. In 2016, this sign was reduced to only a minor influencer of the discourse and the signs that were more critical towards the arrival of the refugees overshadowed it. Interestingly, the intensity of the sign that perceives refugees as a burden to the social and economic welfare of the receiving country increased every consecutive year. This shows how politicians perceived the refugees to be a burden to the society and economy of the Netherlands in increasingly various ways. In 2014 they were merely feared for the money it would cost to host them whereas in the following years the disruption of the EU, the job- and housing market, and the support among the Dutch population were also provided as reasons for unrest among the politicians.

In general, it has been found that the discourse on the securitization of migration expanded significantly. In 2014, the discourse is rather concise and is merely focused on refugees as victims and socio-economic burdens. This area is already increased in the following year when the politicians start speaking about the refugees as political tools, threats to security and the cultural identity of the receiving country. In 2016, the discourse is further developed when the weight on the sign that present the refugees as victims is shifted to the signs that perceive refugees as threats to the cultural identity, socio-economic situation, and national security of the receiving country. The three years mark a notable development of the discourse and it shows how the way that the politicians present refugees has
changed significantly. Moreover, it shows how the way political actors speak about refugees is subject to change and that this development, in turn, instigates further change.

This thesis shows how words can have a real impact on the way people perceive a certain topic or group of people. Words can have a particularly strong impact when used by figures with power, such as politicians. This thesis shows how Dutch political actors have securitized refugees through the words they used and the linguistic tools they applied. Hereby, this thesis distinguishes itself from others in the field of migration and security studies as it concentrates on understanding the developments in the discourse rather than understanding how refugees are securitized.

However, the findings of this thesis do not fully satisfy the need for answers in the field of migration and security studies. The conclusion that the discourse has changed and shifted weight during the last three years provides input for further research in a variety of areas and directions. It would be interesting to further scrutinize the reasons why the discourse has shifted; which factors have contributed to the change in the way the politicians speak about refugees? This thesis briefly discusses the relation between the terrorist attacks in Paris and the presentation of refugees as threats to national security. However, it would be relevant to investigate ties between other factors such as the occurrence of a concrete humanitarian disaster, items published in news media, the situation in the country of origin of the refugees and so on. This analysis would provide a better insight in the ways in which politicians are influenced by other factors and to what extent this is traceable in the words they use.

Another fruitful direction for research would be to enhance this particular research model to other European Member States. This would provide an elaborate overview of the development for various countries within the EU and, therefore, it would allow one to draw conclusions about whether the developments in the Netherlands are part of an international trend or whether it is an exception to the rule. This research would provide one with the opportunity to further investigate whether there is a European discourse on the securitization of migration or whether these sentiments are very much related to the different countries on their
own. Moreover, a research design like this one would also give space to analyze the role that geopolitics plays in the formation of the discourse.
8. Bibliography


Germany Foreign Office. [Germany Diplo]. (2016, March 22). FM #Steinmeier: I condemn #BrusselAttack sharply. In these dark hours Europe stands together in #solidarity. Belgium is not alone. #Brussels [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/GermanyDiplo/status/712260496032931840


## 9. Appendix

### 9.1 Discourse Analysis Sample 1

**Discourse Analysis Template**

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<td><strong>Type of document</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
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</thead>
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<td>A. Refugee as opponent to home regime</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Refugee as threat to cultural identity</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Refugee as socioeconomic burden</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Refugee as hostage in receiving country</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>E. Refugee as threat to security</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>F. Refugee as political tool</td>
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<tr>
<td>G. Refugee as victim of conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>Which part(s) is/are relevant?</td>
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<th>Analysis</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ethos</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Metaphors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wording</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Modality</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Contested terms</strong></td>
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### Focus

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Refugee as opponent to home regime</td>
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<td>B. Refugee as threat to cultural identity</td>
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<td>C. Refugee as socioeconomic burden</td>
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<td>D. Refugee as hostage in receiving country</td>
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<td>F. Refugee as political tool</td>
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<td>G. Refugee as victim of conflict</td>
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### Relevance

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### Analysis

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<thead>
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<th>Dutch strategy on integration and acceptance towards incoming refugees</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- “Nederland”, “als Nederland met zijn allen”</td>
<td>Speaker 2 refers to ‘the Netherlands’ twice to emphasize that he represents the country (and the government) and that he feels part of the country. He names the country to share that he feels connected to it and, through this, establishes his identity as a government representative of the Netherlands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- “we”</td>
<td>Speaker 1 uses ‘we’ when he speaks about what the Netherlands (and its citizens) can do to help the incoming refugees. Hereby, he presents himself as part of the people (and not necessarily of the government).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- “het kabinet”</td>
<td>Speaker 2 speaks about ‘the cabinet’ when asking a question to Speaker 1. She uses ‘the cabinet’ in a relatively negative way, which underscores that Speaker 2 is a member of the opposition and, thus, attempts to criticize the government. Through this, she further establishes her identity as a member of the opposition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphors</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- “op apegapen”</td>
<td>Speaker 11 speaks about the Netherlands ‘being at its last gasp’ in terms of the social- and financial-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
economic situation of the country. He uses this metaphor to intensify his argument and emphasize that he believes the country is about to collapse. Through the use of this metaphor he is able to use different words and, thereby, avoids being haunted by his own tough words as ‘collapse’.

| Wording | - “enorme toestroom aan vluchtelingen”, “oorlogsslachtoffers”, “het grote aantal vreemdelingen”, “vluchting”, “de mensen die op hun vlucht in ons land komen”, “asielinstroom”, “wie wel en wie niet tot ons land wordt toegelaten”, “echte vluchtelingen”, “mensen die uit veilige landen komen”, “of zij voor iets anders kwamen dan onderdak tijdens een procedure”, “vluchtelingen die geen echte vluchteling zijn volgens de definitie van het VN-Vluchtelingenverdrag” , “de echte vluchtelingen, met die echte Eritreeërs, met die echte Somalïërs, met die echte Soedanezen, met die echte Congolezen, met die echte Syriërs en die echte Jemenieten, die op de vlucht zijn voor oorlog en geweld?” | All speakers use a variety of terms to refer to the incoming stream of refugees. They use words such as: ‘a huge influx of refugees’, ‘victims of war’, ‘the huge amount of aliens’, ‘the people that are fleeing towards our country’, ‘those who can and those who cannot be accepted in our country’, ‘people from safe countries’, ‘those who came for other things than shelter’, ‘refugees that are not real refugees according to the UN-charter’, ‘the real refugees’. There is much discussion about who is a ‘real’ refugee and who is not. The speakers tend to use many terms interchangeably and there is no clear division among the speakers as to who uses which term. However, the terms itself present different perceptions as some are more neutral ‘the huge amount of aliens’ while other carry a strong humanitarian connotation ‘victims of war’. Then, there is a vast set of terms that can be used to speak about those people that are not ‘real’ refugees and should not be granted an asylum status ‘people from safe countries’ and ‘real refugees’.

<p>| Speaker 1 uses a rather humanitarian perspective to speak about the images that reach the Netherlands about ‘war violence and people that drown due to cynical human smugglers’. Hereby, he presents the refugees as the victims of the |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>smokkelaars georganiseerde overstek”</th>
<th>situation and he blames the human smugglers and the actors in the conflict as the causes for their tragedy and pain.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Blijft de buurt de buurt? Wie zijn die mensen precies die hier nu mogen komen? Blijven we veilig? Gaat het goed bij elkaar? Is men bereid om zich aan te passen?”</td>
<td>Speaker 1 asks a set of rhetorical questions that he believes many Dutch people are asking themselves: ‘will my neighborhood stay the same?’, ‘who are those people that can come here?’, ‘will we stay safe?’, ‘will we go along well’, ‘do these people want to adapt?’. He poses a series of questions to show that he knows what the average citizen is worried about (and thereby he hopes to gain support).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“enorme impact”, “fatsoenlijke”, “worstelen”</td>
<td>Various speakers use terms that are relatively unclear; a word as ‘decent’ does not provide any concrete ideas to which one can measure and it, thus, remains a very subjective indication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“dat is logisch”</td>
<td>Speaker 1 states that many Dutch citizens are ‘struggling’ with questions such as ‘will my neighborhood stay safe?’. The word ‘struggling’ implies that these people find it hard that they have these questions in the first place and that they are not necessarily occupied with how to answer the question.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“zomaar”, “sowiedo”, “juist”</td>
<td>Speaker 1 argues that ‘it is logical’ that people have questions such as the ones presented above. Hereby, he aims to take away the taboo that many of these questions find themselves in. He, hereby, presents himself as a human being who, too, faces these struggles. Hereby, he aims to create more support and understanding for his views.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“criminelen en verkrachters zouden zijn”, “kalifaat”, “de raddraaiers in die asielopvang”</td>
<td>Speaker 1 uses terms as ‘just like that’, ‘for sure’, and ‘exactly’ to strengthen his statements. However, by using rather ‘extreme’ terms such as these he knows on forehand that there is a chance that his opponents will not agree as their views might differ (slightly). He, thus, aims to spark a debate by using terms as these.</td>
</tr>
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Speaker 1 and 2 speak about how others sometimes perceive refugees and use terms as ‘criminals and rapist’, ‘caliphate’, and ‘instigators’. These terms all carry a negative connotation and the speakers make use of these as they argue that they do not agree with them. Thereby, they aim to
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dutch</th>
<th>English</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- “zijn onze waarden echter sterk en is ons land sterk”, “wilen een Nederland waar iedereen op een positieve manier samenleeft en samen dingen voor elkaar krijgt. Een Nederland waar wat ons verbindt sterker is dan wat ons verdeelt. Wat ons bindt zijn natuurlijk die Nederlandse normen en waarden en onze eigen cultuur”, “Accepteer je onze cultuur en onze normen en waarden niet, dan is het heel duidelijk: dan ben je niet welkom in dit land”</td>
<td>Speaker 1 attaches much value to the norms and values of the Netherlands and warns refugees that they should accept and respect them or otherwise 'you are not welcome in this country'. He makes similar comments with 'what unites us are our Dutch norms and values and our own culture'. Here, he explicitly underlines the importance of the Dutch culture in the Netherlands and, thereby, implies that the incoming refugees should accept it or leave. He aims to create a profile for himself in the political sphere by making a bold statement as this one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- “schuilen voor oorlog”, “thuis voelen in onze eigen buurt”</td>
<td>Speaker 1 emphasizes the need for safety for both the refugees 'to hide from war' and the Dutch citizens 'to feel safe in your own neighborhood'. He attempts to please both sides of the spectrum here and by using the word 'own' he implies that the neighborhood will remain the area of the Dutch whereas the refugees will be here temporarily.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- “asielshoppen”, “opvangshoppen”</td>
<td>Speaker 1 uses trendy terms as ‘asylum hopping’ and ‘accommodation shopping’ to criticize the current Dublin agreement. By using terms that sound modern and are easy to remember he aims to create terminology that will be used continuously (and thereby, his arguments will be strengthened).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- “migratie”, “asielmigratie”, “economische</td>
<td>Speaker 12 uses three terms to distinguish the difference among 'migration', 'asylum migration', and 'economic migration'. He deliberately points</td>
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</table>
| **migratie**
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<tr>
<td>out the differences among those three terms to argue that his fellow debaters mix those up and to strengthen his point that economic migrants should not be granted an asylum status.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Grammar</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>“Je mag je afvragen of we zo veel vreemdelingen tegelijk kunnen helpen en inpassen zonder dat dat de Nederlandse waarden en de Nederlandse samenleving verandert”, “de grenzen open kunnen zetten”, “kunnen mensen helpen en tegelijkertijd hun duidelijk maken welke waarden hier gelden”, “nog teruggestuurd te kunnen worden naar hun land van herkomst”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Speaker 1 and 2 use ‘can’ to speak about a possibility: ‘if we can host this many refugees’, ‘if we can open up our borders’. By using this verb they suggest that there is a possibility to get certain things done but they refrain from stating what conditions must be met to actually carry out these wishes. They, thus, leave space for themselves and the government to think about how to deal with these possibilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“we graag bereid zijn onze hulp aan te bieden”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker 1 points out that the Netherlands ‘is very willing to provide assistance’ but does not specify if there are any conditions that must be met for this assistance to actually take place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“hebben we met zijn allen een enorme prestatie geleverd. We hebben met zijn allen het beste uit Nederland kunnen halen. Mensen hebben ruimte gemaakt in hun buurt en we hebben ervoor gezorgd dat niemand buiten hoeft te slapen”, “Zij hebben al “nee” te horen gekregen en weten gewoon dat zij geen aanspraak kunnen maken op asiel”, “Als mensen de wet overtreden”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All speakers use the past tense to speak about actions that have already taken place ‘they have already been rejected’, ‘we have done something great together’. By doing so they either aim to point out what has gone wrong in the past (usually the opposition members) or they specify which actions have already been taken to improve the situation (government-representatives).</td>
</tr>
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</table>
hebben, wil ik dat zij ook berecht worden en hun straf krijgen”, “In een jaar tijd zijn er 15.000 bijstandsontvangers uit Syrië en Eritrea bij gekomen”

- “Sluit nou die grenzen. Laat geen asielzoeker meer binnen. Laat niemand uit islamitische landen immigreren. Stuur asieleisers zonder identiteitsbewijs eruit. Stop ook met het toelaten van nareizigers”

Speaker 11 uses the imperative voice to tell the government what to do: ‘close those borders’, ‘don’t let anyone from a Islamic country enter anymore’. By doing so he presents his suggestions as direct orders that do not tolerate any resistance. However, as he is part of the opposition this strategy might not work as well as he is not in charge of changing the policies, he is merely there to criticize and improve them.

**Transitivity**

- “Nederland kreeg een enorme toestroom aan vluchtelingen uit met name Syrië te verwerken”

Speaker 1 speaks about the Netherlands in the passive voice when talking about ‘the huge influx that the Netherlands has to deal with’. Hereby, he implies that the Netherlands did not have a say in whether or not they wanted to receive these migrants but that they were only witnesses to the happening of this event.

- “beelden ... bereikten onze huiskamers”

Speaker 1 speaks about ‘the images that arrived to our living rooms’. He does so by using the passive tense and, thereby, emphasizes that it is the images that are the central point of this sentence. The living room (and thus the people) are spectators but not active actors.

- “Voor de vluchteling die hier komt en zeker ook voor de Nederlander die hier al was”, “Hoe moeten die mensen in vredesnaam nog andere landen bereiken”, “Heel Nederland wist dat ze op stoom kwamen, dat de Middellandse Zee vol dreef met bootjes, dat al die mensen door

Speakers 1, 2, and 11 present people (the Dutch people or refugees) as active actors who have deliberately taken certain actions ‘the refugee that will come here and the Dutch person who was here already’, ‘how can these people reach other countries?’ and ‘those people were walking through Europe’. Hereby, these different groups of people are presented as active beings that are not merely witnessing what is happening but that are able to act whenever they want. Speaker 1 emphasizes this idea when he uses three sentences in which he repeats that a Dutch person ‘does not understand the other, does not have the same habits, and does not know the other’. It is
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Europa aan het wandelen en treinen waren en dat ze eraan kwamen, “Je verstaat de ander niet. Je vraagt je af of de gewoontes wel passen bij die van ons. Je kent elkaar niet”</th>
<th>not the refugee who is different but the Dutch person who is not familiar with their customs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- “Ze roepen dat hun komst van Nederland een kalifaat maakt”</td>
<td>Speaker 1 speaks about the people that ‘state that their arrival will turn the Netherlands into a caliphate’. Here, he talks about how these people argue that the arrival of refugees will result in the caliphate; the Dutch society is hereby presented as a passive actor that will simply witness how it is being changed without presenting any resistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- “We kijken niet weg van problemen, maar pakken die aan en proberen iedere dag stap voor stap de boel beter te maken”</td>
<td>Speaker 1 speaks in a clear active tone when referring to the Netherlands and how this country can fight problems. By doing so he emphasizes that the Netherlands is able to take action and that it is not a mere witness to the development of its own faith.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- “wie wel en wie niet tot ons land wordt toegelaten”, “niet in de asielketen terechtkomen”, “vluchtingen op bootjes terug te sturen en vanaf bepaalde plekken op het Afrikaanse continent een asielaanvraag te laten indienen”</td>
<td>Here, Speaker 1, 2, and 6 present the refugees as a passive entity over which the Dutch government can decide; ‘who will and who will not be accepted to our country’, ‘to send them back on their boats and to let them apply for asylum in different countries’. Hereby, those speakers imply that it is the Dutch government that is in control over the faith of these people and not those people themselves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- “wordt niet alleen maar een verklaring van bijvoorbeeld een winkeliersvereniging, hoe waardevol die ook kan zijn, meteen gezien als een reden om een streep door iemands asielaanvraag te halen?”</td>
<td>Speaker 2 questions which documents or statement suffice to cancel someone asylum request. Hereby, she presents the group who establishes such a document as the active actor who can, thus, decide over the asylum application of a refugee that is reduced to merely a passive witness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modality</strong></td>
<td>- “Volgens mij is dat een normaal”, “Ook ik worstel met die vragen. Ook ik heb er een dubbel gevoel bij. Ik wil die mensen helpen. Ik wil dat voor een deel ook in Nederland doen. Ik ken echter ook niet iedereen die we helpen, persoonlijk. Ik besef ook dat het niet allemaal vanzelf wel goed komt”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contested terms</strong></td>
<td>- “refugee fleeing for war and violence”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.3 Discourse Analysis Sample 3
### General Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of document</th>
<th>Gemeenschappelijk asielbeleid in Europa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of document</td>
<td>Debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>10.09.2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Focus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Refugee as opponent to home regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B. Refugee as threat to cultural identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Refugee as socioeconomic burden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Refugee as hostage in receiving country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Refugee as threat to security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Refugee as political tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Refugee as victim of conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Relevance

**Which part(s) is/are relevant?** Parts of the text

### Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nodal point</th>
<th>Reception and treatment of refugees and migrants in the Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethos</td>
<td>Speaker 2 refers to the EU as ‘we’ and, thereby, establishes his identity as a member of the European Union. He speaks about the solution that this institution can offer, and, through this, presents himself as a government representative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Speaker 2 speaks of ‘our policy’. Hereby, ‘our’ refers to the Netherlands. Speaker 2 is a member of an opposition party and, thus, refers to the country as a whole when establishing his identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Speaker 2 says: ‘and what does the Netherlands do? We...’. Hereby, he underscores that he perceives himself (and presents himself) as part of the Netherlands. Not only as a politician but also as a citizen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Speaker 4 speaks of Europe as ‘the continent of peace and prosperity’ and, thereby, identifies himself as someone who lives in peace and prosperity (and is thus a happy and lucky person).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Various speakers refer to the ‘UN-convention of refugees’ and by doing so they present themselves as people who respect the UN. They acquire their</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphors</td>
<td>- “de hel zou losbreken”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- “De samenleving is in het hart geraakt”</td>
<td>Speaker 5 speaks of ‘the society being hit in the heart’. Through the use of this metaphor he aims to state that society has been hit in its core (as the heart resembles the core of the human body).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- “de deur van het asielbeleid ook wagenwijd open moet”</td>
<td>Speaker 8 refers to the ‘door of the asylum policy being opened’. Hereby, she refers to the asylum policy being broadened but the metaphor can be interpreted in a literal sense too as the asylum policy is closely linked to the gates of the country (the doors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wording</td>
<td>- “Als je honger hebt en geen onderdak, als je bommen hebt zien vallen en je kinderen worden bedreigd”, “mensen komen hier omdat ze vluchten voor verschrikkingen. Mensen komen hier omdat ze hun leven bedreigd zien”, “Ze vluchten voor hun veiligheid, ze proberen naar een veilige plek te komen”, “De mensen vluchten voor oorlog en geweld”, “altijd blijven vluchten voor oorlog en geweld”, “Die mensen kregen bommen op hun hoofd of werden gerekruteerd voor een</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
leger waarin zij kanonnenvlees waren. En dus hadden zij en hun familie te vrezen voor hun leven”, “vluchtelingen voor geweld”, “de redenen om te vluchten, zoals oorlog, vervolging of schrijnende armoede, “Daar is geregeld geen drinken en ook te weinig voedsel. De kinderen kunnen niet naar school”, “schrijnende verhalen”, “Maar is het veilig als 80% van de kinderen geen onderwijs kan volgen? Is het veilig als het Wereldvoedselprogramma de hulp aan een derde van de vluchtelingen heeft moeten staken? Is het veilig als je als vrouw in zo’n kamp moet vrezen voor verkrachting en misbruik?”, “De chaos in landen als Irak, Syrië en Libië heeft miljoenen mensen tot vluchteling gemaakt”, “Als je geen eten hebt, als kinderen niet naar school kunnen, als vrouwen in hun veiligheid worden bedreigd, kun je toch niet spreken van een veilige situatie?”, “Die mensen verkeren in een verschrikkelijke situatie”

- “honderdduizenden mensen”, “duizenden, Speaker 3 uses numbers to indicate how many people will arrive to the Netherlands. However, he
honderdduizenden, miljoenen",
- “zijn het ontevredend veel economische vluchtelingen”, “Dat doe je voor een uitkering, dat doe je voor een huis, dat doe je voor iets anders dan voor de veiligheid van je leven”, “economische vluchtelingen noemen, ik noem het mensen die willen werken aan hun toekomst”, “Er zijn oorlogsvluchtelingen en er zijn vluchtelingen die de toekomst elders zoeken omdat de omstandigheden in hun land hen daartoe noodzaken of hun hoop geven op nieuwe kansen”, “heel veel asielzoekers helemaal niet zielig zijn, maar economische asielzoekers zijn”, “economische gelukzoekers”
- “politieke vluchteling”, “Ik vind het een vluchteling en dus is die welkom”, “En oorlogsvluchtelingen zijn welkom”, “Syrische vluchtelingen. Iedereen die op dit moment of de

uses terms as ‘hundreds of thousands’, ‘thousands, hundreds of thousands, millions’. These indications are extremely vague and, therefore, do not necessarily contribute to the strength of his argument.

Speaker 3 focuses specifically on the presence of economic migrants among the people that come to the Netherlands. He argues that ‘there are many economic refugees’, ‘a lot of asylum seekers are not to be found sad, they are economic asylum seekers’, ‘economic fortune seekers’. Speaker 2 also uses the term ‘economic migrant’ but he argues that these people, too, deserve accommodation in the Netherlands: ‘there are refugees that flee for war and there are refugees that try to establish a future elsewhere because the situation in their country of origin forces them to do so’.

Speaker 3 differentiates between ‘political refugees’ and ‘economic refugees’. Other speakers also speak of political refugees and argue ‘war refugees are welcome’, ‘Syrian refugees, everyone who fled from Syria the last couple of years is a war refugee’. They underscore that the concept of refugee is rather broad and that places where ‘there is not education and proper healthcare can also generate victims of war’. They, thus, argue that a victim of war is a broad concept that also covers people that flee from the consequences of
afgelopen jaren uit Syrië is gevlucht, is een oorlogsvluchteling”, “waar het onveilig is, waar geen onderwijs is en waar geen goede gezondheidszorg is, en ze vandaaruit vervolgens uitzichtloos wegaan naar Europa, dan zijn ze voor mij nog steeds oorlogsvluchtelingen en dus welkom”, “echte vluchtelingen”

- “vluchtelingenstromen”, “Migratiestromen, duizenden vluchtelingen”, “De asieltsunami”

- “fatsoenlijke opvang te bieden”, “fatsoenlijk en veilig opvangen”, “Alle Europese landen en landen in de regio hebben een verantwoordelijkheid om een veilige haven te bieden aan diegenen die nergens anders heen kunnen”, “Asielzoekers worden niet meer gezien als gelukzoekers en mensen die we buiten moeten houden, maar als medemensen die we moeten helpen”, “De vreemdeling die in nood aanklopt, verdient ruimhartige herbergzaamheid”, “Ieder medemens is onze naaste, iedereen”

war.

The speakers use various terms to speak of ‘streams of refugees’, ‘migration streams’, ‘refugees’, ‘asylum tsunami’. These terms all have different connotations; the first two underline the humanitarian character and the idea that these people are ‘real’ refugees while the latter two underscore the how this influx is unwanted.

Speaker 1, 4, 7 and 9 underscore that it is the responsibility of the receiving countries ‘to provide decent accommodation’. ‘All European countries and countries in the region are responsible for providing a safe haven for those who cannot go elsewhere’ and ‘the alien that asks for protection deserves hospitality. Through these phrases they underscore that the receiving states have the responsibility to host these people in decent and proper ways and, thereby, presents the refugees as victims.'
in nood moet geholpen worden”  
- “fata morgana”


-“Dit "eigen volk eerst", "Eerst voor onze eigen mensen zorgen", "We hebben het geld nodig voor onze eigen mensen”

- “wij hebben het vandaag over een

Speaker 3 repeatedly argues that his opponents speak of ‘fairy tales’ and ‘the fata morgana’. Hereby, he attacks them on the idea that their plans are not feasible and unrealistic.

Speaker 3 and 12 underscore that one is (and should) be asking ‘if we are ready to host a new wave of refugees?’. Speaker 3 argues that ‘these people think that the money should be spent on healthcare instead of spending billions of euros on bringing everyone to Europe’. He continues to argue that ‘they want to make use of our welfare state and they will destroy it’. Hereby, they underscore that the arrival of these refugees and migrants poses a vast risk to the receiving state, mainly in economic and financial terms.

Speaker 3 and 5 speak of ‘our own people first’ and ‘we need the money to take care of our own people’. Speaker 3 attacks speaker 5 on saying these things. Speaker 5 aims to state that the Dutch government should care about the Dutch people first and then about the incoming migrants. Hereby, he also presents the influx of refugees as a burden as they disturb the distribution of financial aid within the country. Speaker 5 and 8 argue that the arrival of migrants and refugees might hurt the Dutch cultural
| invasie, een Islamitische invasie van Europa, van Nederland. Massa’s vaak jonge mannen van rond de 20 jaar met baarden trekken zingend door Europa”, “Het is een invasie die onze welvaart, onze veiligheid, onze cultuur en onze identiteit bedreigt”, “Dat die mannen met baarden vaak ook nog “Allahoe akbar”-achtige liederen zingen”, “Jonge mannen, selfies makend, Allahoe akbar roepend en gillend”, “Ze zouden massaal naar een land moeten gaan met hun cultuur, hun taal, hun geloof”, “Onze christelijke cultuur kunnen we bij het vuilnis zetten en we worden langzamerhand geïslamiseerd”, “Dat hoort ook bij de christelijke cultuur die ons continent zozeer heeft gestempeld”, “we moeten oppassen voor mensen met een andere cultuur”, “meer en meer radicaal islamitisch gedachtengoed in Europa bijkomt, wat toch een zorgwekkend fenomeen is” | identity. They argue that ‘we are witnessing an Islamic invasion in Europe and the Netherlands. Groups of young men with beards travel through Europe’, ‘it is an invasion that threatens our prosperity, safety, culture, and identity’. Speaker 5 argues that ‘they should all go to a country with their own culture, language and religion’. Speaker 8 states that ‘the Christian culture that is very dominant in Europe’ and ‘that we should be careful of people with a different culture’. These speakers present the arrival of refugees as a threat to our culture, norms, and values. Speaker 5 and 7 argue that ‘be a bit more humane’ and ‘where is your heart?’. Hereby, they refer to the responsibility that the receiving countries |
wees barmhartig; kom op“

- “Islamitische Staat heeft al aangegeven dat men duizenden terroristen meestuurt”, “dat ze tussen de vluchtelingen zitten”, “Islamitische Staat claimt nu al 4.000 jihadisten Europa te hebben binnengesmokkeld”, “of daarin geen bedreiging zit”

have and that people should take care of each other instead of close the door for each other.

- “ISlamitische Staat heeft al aangegeven dat men duizenden terroristen meestuurt”, “dat ze tussen de vluchtelingen zitten”, “ISlamitische Staat claimt nu al 4.000 jihadisten Europa te hebben binnengesmokkeld”, “of daarin geen bedreiging zit”

Speaker 3 speaks of ‘IS sending thousands of terrorists along’ and ‘IS claims to have sent 4000 jihadists to Europe’. Speaker 8 questions whether there ‘is a threat’ in the notion that Muslim people come to Europe. They underscore the idea that the influx of refugees might have an impact on the safety of the country.

**Grammar**

- “die wij ze zouden kunnen bieden”,
  “Kunnen wij meer ongelijkheid en meer onderlinge spanningen in ons land voorkomen en oplossen?”, “Dat kun je niet stoppen, dat moet je ook niet willen, we moeten ze willen helpen”, “Die moet je dan ook bieden”,
  “Maar wij moeten die mensen en de landen in de regio die miljoenen vluchtelingen opvangen, wel helpen”, “Dat we ons hart moeten openen voor vluchtelingen betekent niet dat...”

Speaker 2 and 4 speak of ‘can’ and, thereby, imply that there is a possibility to make a certain move. They state that ‘we can offer that’, ‘we can avoid’. However, they do not specify which conditions must be met for these measures to be taken.

- “Wij moeten de Nederlandse grenzen sluiten, wij moeten de asielzoekers teruggesturen”, “Asielzoekers worden niet meer gezien als gelukzoekers en

The speakers continuously refer to ‘must’ to argue that there is an urgency for a certain action to be taken: ‘we must close our borders, we must send asylum seekers back’, ‘asylum seekers are no longer regarded as people that we must send back’, ‘we must do much more than average’. Here, the speakers use ‘must’ to indicate that there is a sense of urgency. Something has to


|mensen die we buiten moeten houden, maar als medemensen die we moeten helpen”, “Ik sluit af. Nederland moet koploper worden in Europa. Nederland moet meer doen dan gemiddeld, veel meer. Dat is wat veel burgers willen en dat is wat politici ook zouden moeten doen” |
|change in order to avoid worse or in order to become better. Also ‘must’ refers to a dictation from a higher government institution that does not allow for discussion and that ‘must’ take place. |

|“altijd blijven vluchten voor oorlog en geweld”|
|Speaker 1 uses ‘to continue’ to indicate that there is an ongoing situation: ‘people must continue to flee for war and danger’. They do so now and they will have to do so in the future. |

|“Syrische vluchtelingen. Iedereen die op dit moment of de afgelopen jaren uit Syrië is gevlucht, is een oorlogsvluchteling”|
|Speaker 2 argues that ‘everyone who fled Syria the last couple of years…’. He uses the past tense to indicate that the situation in Syria has been going on for quite some time now and that a substantial amount of people have fled the country. |

|“En die gaan we fatsoenlijk en veilig opvangen”|
|Speaker 1 argues that ‘we are going to accommodate them in a decent and safe way’. Hereby, he uses the future tense to indicate that he plans to do this in the future. |

|“Dan zie je dat Nederland al veel doet”, “Nederland heeft de afgelopen jaren vele vluchtelingen opgenomen”|
|Speaker 4 argues that ‘that’s when you see what the Netherlands is doing’ and ‘the Netherlands has hosted many refugees’. Here, the past tense is used to indicate that action has already been taken to improve the situation and that this action has been effective (but more needs to be done). |

|“zullen volgen”, “gaat ons miljarden kosten. De asieltsunami zal onze maatschappij ontwrichten”|
|Speaker 4 uses ‘will’ to speak about his expectations in the future: ‘it will costs us billions of euros and it will deconstruct our society’. He uses ‘will’ in a way to argue that he is certain about what is going to happen (a warning). |

<p>|“Wees een stukje medemenselijk, wees”|
|Speaker 3 and 5 use the imperative to tell their opponents (and the government) what to do. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transitivity</th>
<th>Modality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>barmhartig; kom op</strong>, “kies voor uw eigen land. Kies voor de Nederlanders. Sluit de Nederlandse grenzen. Kom op voor uw eigen land”</td>
<td><strong>Ik snap heel goed dat ze naar de plek gaan waarvan zij</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- “Islamitische Staat claimt nu al 4.000 jihadisten Europa te hebben binnengesmokkeld”, “De chaos in landen als Irak, Syrië en Libië heeft miljoenen mensen tot vluchteling gemaakt”</td>
<td>Speaker 2 argues that ‘it will chase the refugees into the arms of the smugglers’. Hereby, he presents the refugees as passive actors that don’t have their own will and that can be chased in any direction whereas the smugglers are presented as active entities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker 3 states that ‘IS claims to have smuggled over 4000 people into Europe’. He uses the past tense to indicate that this has already happened and nothing can be done to counter this development. This implies that the Netherlands should now change course in order to prevent further escalation. Speaker 7 does something similar when speaking about ‘the conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Libya have generated millions of refugees already’.</td>
<td>Speaker 2 and 4 present the refugees in an active way and argue that ‘they ask for protection’ and ‘they try to flee to the West’. Hereby, the refugees are presented as active human beings who can still determine themselves where they want to go and how.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transitivity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ik snap heel goed dat ze naar de plek gaan waarvan zij</strong></td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Modality</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ik snap heel goed dat ze naar de plek gaan waarvan zij</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested terms</td>
<td>‘Real refugee’ versus ‘economic migrant’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Real refugee’ versus ‘economic migrant’</td>
<td>The speakers differ in opinion on what the exact meaning of a ‘real refugee’ and an ‘economic migrant’ is. In particular, they do not agree upon what it entails to be an economic migrant. This leads to the speakers suggesting different ways to treat those people (allow them or send them back to accommodation in the region).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- “denken dat ze daar het best hun toekomst kunnen opbouwen” shows that he understands the position in which the refugees are and, thereby, he shows his humane and understanding side.

- “begrijpelijkwijzer" Speaker 1 uses the term ‘understandably’ to argue that it is understandable that refugees take certain decisions. Hereby, he shows that he has compassion for the actions of refugees and that he does not approach them from merely the political angle but also as a human being.

- “die beelden, de verhalen en het menselijk leed raken je. Daar word je stil van” Speaker 4 argues that ‘those images have a big impact on you’. Hereby, he shares his emotions and personal experiences. This adds a human layer to his argument that, in turn, strengthens his position (as he is now a human instead of a ruthless politician).

- “Het is hartverwarmend” Speaker 4 argues that it is ‘heartwarming’. This shows how he personally thinks about a certain set of actions and that he is not merely looking at the situation in a business-like way but that it also genuinely affects him.

- “Ik schaam me al kapot” Speaker 3 argues that ‘he is horribly ashamed’. This wording underscores that he does not agree with the policies of the government and that he feels uncomfortable and ashamed about them.