Liberal Citizenship in a Multicultural Society

– Brian Barry’s and William Galston’s Approaches to Citizenship

Tahmina Yesmin Shova

Supervisor: Göran Collste
Examiner: Anders Nordgren
Abstract

This thesis demonstrates a comparative and analytic discussion of citizenship idea based on two distinct liberal doctrines of two contemporary political philosophers: Brian Barry and William Galston. Barry's egalitarian liberalism argues for 'common citizenship' notion in order to promote liberty and equal treatment of all individuals irrespective of any social differences. On the other hand, 'liberal pluralist citizenship' of William Galston's signifies his liberal pluralism to mitigate cultural and religious conflicts of liberal democratic society. The fundamental disagreements among these liberal approaches over the issues of public recognition of group rights and restricted state authority are analysed in this study. Finally, by analysing both the liberal positions under the challenge of multicultural issues the author defends Galston's liberal idea and judges it as more convincing than Barry's liberal approach.

Key Words: Brian Barry, Egalitarian liberalism, William Galston, Liberal pluralism, Cultural conflicts, Group rights, State’s authority.

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1. Introduction

‘Citizenship’ is one of the dynamic concepts in political theories of justice. Intently, citizenship idea defines an individual’s membership in a political community. But broadly it narrates how individuals are being treated by the state, what kind of rights and responsibilities are suppose to carry out by the individuals, and what principles govern citizen’s lives under the precise political domain. Due to the philosophical disagreements among the political theorists, ‘citizenship’ notion has been interpreted from many innovative perspectives in every course of time. Political doctrines like Republicanism, Communitarian, Liberalism, Libertarianism, Feminism, and Marxism distinguisingly have demonstrated individual’s membership and their entitled rights within a political sphere. However, the most impressive consideration of citizenship idea has been shown by the contemporary liberals. Religious and cultural conflicts among the individuals and groups of multicultural society hence considered as most intense issues of concern. Contemporary liberal citizenship idea is thus aimed to integrate and balance the rights and other entitlements of individuals and groups within liberal procedures (Kymlicka 2002, p.284).

The concept of citizenship fundamentally has been discussed by two distinct political groups: republican and liberal. The core principle of the republican idea is ‘civic self-rule’ and it emphasises largely on the political status of the citizens (Leydet 2014). This citizenship approach dominates the political premise for a long time. In 17th century, liberalism has come into view with an enormous attention to individual’s freedom and rights. From 1970s to 1980s, liberal theories broadly understand individual’s rights and social justice in terms of the functions of basic political institutions rather than individual’s active political participation in public issues such as John Rawls (1971) who signified the basic structure of political institutions and its principles and functions under the notion of social justice. During the year of 1980s, the central concern of citizenship concept turns towards the debate between communitarian and individual idea (Kymlicka 2002, p.284).

However, in the early 1990s, citizenship idea once again obtained a central attention of many liberal theorists. Increasing cultural conflicts or diversity in multicultural society has been identified as the persuasive reason of this upsurge interest (Leydet 2014). In result, liberals themselves split into two distinct traditions: universal liberalism and pluralist liberalism. The decisive challenge is how to deal with multicultural issues under a liberal framework and what values are to be promoted by the liberal principles. Exponents of a universal liberal idea
like Brian Barry embrace the core values such as equal liberty and rights of all individuals similar to that of traditional liberalism. Common liberal laws and legal status of the individual have been prioritized here. Principles of this liberal version are thereby dedicated to promote certain kinds of rights equally among all the individuals irrespective of their any cultural and religious differences. That is why this idea prominently known as ‘difference-blind’ liberalism (Leydet 2014).

A universal constructive model of individual’s rights was first demonstrated by the economist and sociologist T. H. Marshall (1950) in his classical essay ‘Citizenship and Social Class’. Marshall defines citizenship as a concept of equal treatment in terms of ‘market and state’ notion since he believes that distributing rights to the citizens based on their differences can possibly affect the social cohesion and political stability (Leydet 2014). Instead Marshall argues for treating every individual as a full and equal member of the society. This full and equal membership of individuals ensures by their possession of certain categories of rights: civil, political, and social. A liberal democratic welfare state is bound to certify these rights of the citizens since such state committed to ensure full citizenship of its every member (Kymlicka 2002, p.288).

In Contrast to universal liberal version, pluralist or multiculturalists’ liberals like William Galston apprehend liberalism in terms of social diversity. This idea signifies individual’s political status which is their possession of rights to participate in political institutions. How basic political institutions are connected to the citizens’ personal qualities and how individual’s ‘private decisions’ helps common public policy to be ordered and sustained are centrally elucidated by this approach (Kymlicka 2002, p.285). Liberal principles hence are aimed to promote maximal accommodation of diversity and to secure political recognition of both individuals and minority group rights (Leydet 2014).

On the whole, contemporary liberal citizenship idea successfully draws the attention of many political theorists for various reasons (Kymlicka 2002, p.285-286). Firstly, this idea of citizenship stimulates our vision towards a clear distinction and interconnection between ‘private’ and ‘public’ dimensions of individual’s life. Secondly, it identifies some significant concepts and their role in public premise such as group rights, civic virtues, individual’s activities and responsibilities, and political participation. And thirdly, it focuses on other internal and external affiliations of individuals in a multicultural society such as individual’s belongingness to particular religious or cultural groups and, therefore, citizenship idea has
been presumed to play a ‘mediate role’ to resolve the problems between individuals and social groups (Kymlicka 2002, p.285). That is why, contemporary liberal citizenship view extensively perceived as a strong complementary notion to the idea of justice. While principles of justice are required to promote individual’s civic attributes and political participation, the idea of citizenship illustrates individual’s private understandings of public policy to uphold the value of principles of justice (Kymlicka 2002, p.287).

1.1. Objectives of the Thesis

In the present thesis, liberalism has been presumed as a strong political doctrine dealing with the issues of multicultural society. I shall particularly discuss two liberal doctrines: ‘egalitarian liberalism’ of Brian Barry and ‘liberal pluralism’ of William Galston’s under the challenges of multicultural dilemmas. To analyse the compatibility of these liberal theories, I limit my discussion to three common queries: firstly, how they define liberalism, secondly, how they understand the idea of individual’s rights, and thirdly, how they view multiculturalism or group rights concept. After comparing and analysing both liberal ideas. I will defend Galston’s liberal approach with few considerable remarks.

Considering the particular research aim, I choose to compare Barry’s text Culture and Equality: an Egalitarian Critic of Multiculturalism (2001) and Galston’s text Liberal Pluralism: the Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice (2002) in this regard. There are some reasons behind this particular texts choice. In both texts, authors have provided a comprehensive understanding of liberalism along with various empirical case studies. In defending their own theoretical stand, both the authors provide numerous counter arguments against opposite liberal theories in the texts. Barry developed his own egalitarian liberal model contrasting the arguments of multicultural liberals like specially Will Kymlicka, Charles Taylor, Bikhu Parekh, Iris Marion Young, and many more. On the other hand, Galston formulates his distinct liberal pluralism contrasting all those liberal versions who advocates for monistic and autonomy-centric liberal versions. He criticises liberal theories of Brian Barry, Ronald Dworkin, George Crowder and John Gray throughout the text. Such contrasting outlook of both liberal views thus increases the significant consideration of their theoretical grounds.

The overall thesis plan is: in the first section I shall briefly introduce the universal and pluralist liberal ideas following the contemporary liberal citizenship notion. Second section will focus on the discussion of Barry’s egalitarian liberal theory to clarify his ‘common
citizenship’ concept. Galston’s ideas of liberal pluralism and ‘liberal pluralist citizenship’ will be exemplified in the third section. Following the discussions of second and third sections, comparison and analysis will be carry out in fourth section. And finally, I will summarise the whole discussion with particular remarks in the concluding section.

2. Barry’s Egalitarian Liberal Approach to Citizenship

Brian Michael Barry has profoundly been known as an exponent of ‘egalitarian liberalism’. From the emerging period of liberal idea, he advocates for egalitarian liberal doctrine for its rational compatibility of fostering ‘individualism’ against the arguments of other liberal distributive theories of justice. This liberal idea not only advocates upholding the rights of individuals but ensures their liberty and equality regardless of any social differences as well. Albeit of variations and modifications in liberal idea assembled by many prominent liberals, Barry claims that his ‘egalitarian liberalism’ is the fairest normative doctrine to balance all individual’s interests under the veracity of diversity challenge.

Barry develops his egalitarian liberal theory based on ‘Enlightenment Project’ of 19th century following the paradox of universal and relativist liberal ideas (2001, p.9). Many theorists have been observed this ‘Enlightenment project’ as one of the foremost cognitive movements since this project was primarily dedicated to individual’s freedom and rights instead of communitarian claims of rights. Due to the increasing complicated cultural practices and socio-political institutional changes of contemporary society, many liberal theorists have come across to the debate of whether universal liberal idea is competent in dealing with diversity issues or not (2001, p.9-13). In result, a number of renowned theorists move towards different relativist liberal versions. However, this inclination against universalistic liberalism, Barry observes, is based on certain misunderstandings. He rather continues to proclaim that liberty and equality are the pedestals of this liberal idea that any compromise to these core values can diminish the whole rationale of liberal political doctrine. Therefore, Barry proposes an egalitarian liberal idea depending on the core concepts of classical liberalism-individualism, liberty, equality, and moral universalism. By introducing the principle of ‘equal treatment’, Barry holds that a universal liberal idea should promote equal treatment to ensure individual’s citizenship ability in choosing and exercising their rights mainly as individuals. Thus Barry comes to define individual’s citizenship status in terms of equal treatment irrespective of any social or cultural differences.
2.1. The Idea of ‘Common Citizenship’

Barry’s idea of ‘common citizenship’ or ‘equal citizenship’ is grounded on his two other fundamental concepts—egalitarian liberalism and the idea of universal human rights. He broadly understands the notion of ‘liberalism’ as ‘contemporary development of basic values of Enlightenment’ that embodies both the American and European social and political liberal understandings. But concretely, Barry signifies ‘liberalism’ as ‘idea of equal citizenship’ (Barry 1997). Generally an idea of common citizenship outlines ‘a legal status through which an identical set of civil, political, and social rights are accorded to all members of the polity’ contrasting to cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity of society (Leydet, 2014). As Barry writes, ‘the core of this conception of citizenship, already worked out in the eighteenth century, is that there should be only one status of citizen (no estates or castes) so that everybody enjoys the same legal and political rights’ (2001, p.7). This reflects Barry’s ‘equal or common citizenship’ basically as a political idea of liberalism.

Barry identifies liberalism as a ‘principle of equal freedom that underwrite basic liberal institutions: civic equality, freedom of speech and religion, non-discrimination, equal opportunity, and so on’ (2001, p.122). This citizenship agenda implies that members of liberal society are given equal treatment so that individuals won’t be treated based on their race, class, gender, religion, or culture rather as an individual. Equal treatment creates equal opportunity for all citizens and entitled them with all basic civil and political rights equally within a general liberal platform. This equality of opportunity exists depending entirely on individual’s rational decision; not on any external and internal societal factors (2001, p.37). Barry is that he refers these religious and cultural aspects as their ‘private’ matters that affect in no way the issues of justice while the fair accommodation such practices largely depends on that general political framework (2001, p.32). Therefore, state’s legal responsibility is thereby promoting liberty and equality to all its citizens so that they all can exercise their freedom in choosing the conception of good life from their distinct positions. This above brief discussion shows the necessity of Barry’s principle of ‘equal treatment’.

2.2. Equal treatment Principle

‘Equal treatment’ is the central norm of Barry’s common citizenship model. In other words, common citizenship notion requires the essentiality of equal treatment policy. According to Barry, a just liberal society ought to treat all its citizens offering ‘identical choice set’ in order to confirm equal distribution of rights, resources, and opportunities (2001, p.32). This implies
a universal insight to equal treatment policy that conveys the prima facie duty which is - respect all citizens equally. Consequently, state is confined with this prima facie obligation to maintain a general liberal law for all the citizens so that they can have the same access of public services. Barry proposes the following hypothetical ‘rational decision making model’ to make clear how a general law should be proceeding: ‘The rules define a choice set, which is the same for everybody; within that choice set people pick a particular course of action by deciding what is best calculated to satisfy their underlying preferences for outcomes, given their beliefs about the way in which actions are connected to outcomes’ (2001, p.32).

However, Barry’s two concepts need to be inspected more closely in this regard: the concept of ‘choice set’ and the concept of individual’s function.

i) Choice set: Barry defines the scheme of ‘choice set’ as a demand package of potential alternatives which symbolize the diversity of preferences available in the society (2001, p.32). This choice set must be offered by the state to all citizens being respectable to their liberty and equality. Identical choice set thus resulted in equal opportunities for all citizens.

ii) Individual’s Function: Barry describes the function of citizens in exercising their freedom to choose and enjoy the life with personal preferences. This forwarded the prima facie duty to the entire citizens that they must respect other’s freedom to choose their own conceptions of life others.

Thus Barry’s argument for common citizenship proceeds in the following way:

1. Egalitarian liberalism promotes equal treatment among all the citizens irrespective of any internal and external differences.
2. Such equal treatment is based on the conceptions of individualism and universal human rights
3. Equal treatment ensures the fair balance of individual’s interests and accommodation of all sort of religious, cultural, and ethnic diversity
4. Therefore, egalitarian liberal concept has no issue with diversity and so of the common citizenship idea.

2.3. Common Citizenship and Cultural Diversity

Barry’s common citizenship notion has come across to a number of contemporary challenges in respect to diversity among which two queries are fundamental here. One is how Barry’s
idea deals with the diversity of human nature. And the other one is how it assesses public appeal of religious, cultural, and ethnic differences among the individuals that embedded with individual’s identity. To clarify these, Barry forward the discussions of merits and scopes of religious and cultural diversity.

Firstly, an egalitarian liberal citizenship idea presupposes certain few things about human nature such as human beings are in nature ‘rational’ who best can judge his/her own interests and others things that play essential role in their life. Each individual person naturally possesses the urge of belongingness to some particular groups and thus he socially abides with dual identity- identity as individual person and identity as associational member. What is important here for an egalitarian is the individual’s yearn for social belongingness and it is a matter of social justice. Indeed, we have rational grounds to assume the intellectual ability of the individuals in advance. Rationality is a fact of individual nature like that of diversity and our individuality or individual interests prove the diversity in our nature.

For this reason, Barry acknowledges the policy of ‘rule and exemption’ arguing that while multicultural liberal account of this policy diminish the core values of liberal idea there his justification is consistent to egalitarian liberalism. Barry understands the multiculturalists’ conception of ‘rule and exemption’ as a policy that ‘keeps the rule objected for most of the population but allows members of cultural or religious minorities to opt out of the obligation to obey it’ (2001, p.33). Liberal multiculturalists’ claim that such ‘rule and exemption’ policy is required for an egalitarian liberal justice theory is centrally criticised by Barry (2001, p.33). Barry argues that it is wrong concept of liberal multiculturalists that the rejection of exemption policy makes minority groups deprived from their rights or makes unfair burdens on them. Inequality is always not a sign of unfairness rather reflects justified equality (2001, p.34). Rather Barry assumes that general principles normally would affect some people but we cannot recognise it as a deprivation. Mandatory tax payment, for example, of all citizens would feel like a burden to some people who have a lots of money but this does not mean that this rules are being unfair to them (2001, p.34).

However, for Barry, encompassment of special exemptions in general law of a liberal society is not possible without making any changes to its basic rules since general laws and exemption policy are principally opposite to each other. Barry claims that exemption idea must be based on the demand of justice. In this respect, he proposes to make some general law ‘less restrictive’ so that they can remain universal and can also provide some space for
minority groups for their essential principles (2001, p.39). Thus egalitarian liberalism firmly concedes the need of exemption or relaxation of general law for minority religious and cultural groups. Barry’s common citizenship idea neither overlooks people’s group rights nor does it ignore the essentiality of exemption because diversity itself affirms the individuality. Minority groups have the rights to exercise their fair share of resources and opportunities relying on their personal preferences. Special treatment for the disadvantaged people is required for the sake of justice. Members of minority groups can demand for justice for any deprivation in the same way they claims for their basic rights (2001, p.33).

Perhaps, Barry maintains a lexical order in promoting ‘exemption of rules’. This implies that exemption or special treatment would be justified only to reduce unnecessary burdens on the minority groups. However, special treatment has to be discarded whenever it comes into conflicts with the general interests of the political regime. Basic general interests of all individuals should be prioritized rather than the exemption. For instance, wearing a crash helmet to ride on motorbike is a general rule formulated for the security of people. If Sikh members wearing turban on head practice conflicts with that public security policy then the general rule will be sustained (2001, p.34). This rejection of exemption does not mean to exclude particular group member’s interest rather they all count as individuals in that general interest. Here the noteworthy point of Barry’s argument is, exemption itself is not a liberal policy but justified by the basic liberal principles.

Secondly, Barry perceives diversity or difference as a universal fact and it is only socially recognised, not politically. So, the diversity issue of contemporary liberal society is nothing new. What is new is the complexities that emerged in diversity due to encompassment of wide ranges of religious, cultural, and ethnic elements (2001, p.19). To examine the political merits of social diversity, Barry analyses the category of rules that govern individual’s social and political life: private and public.

Barry admits the internal forces of people’s associational practices as these particular practices play an essential role in constructing individual understandings of the good life, well-being, and many other things. But such particular practices belong to individual’s private life because these encompass individual’s subjective beliefs and preferences (2001, p.19). For example, Sikh member’s wearing of turban on head, Muslim’s consumption of halal meats, Muslim women’s traditional wearing hijab in public places etc. For Barry, Religious and cultural practices do not play any role in determining the equal treatment
principle (2001, p.32). Nonetheless, group’s practices stem from the beliefs and interests only of particular group members. So, it can never ask for equal affirmation from other members of the polity. Implantation of private rules in public rules thereby would increase nothing but the threats of inequality. Thus Barry rejects not only the political acknowledgement of group rights but also its possible intimation with justice.

On the other hand, rules that govern the basic political framework in which citizen’s private conceptions flourish are of public category (2001, p.32). For instance, distribution of employments, health service access, tax payment of the citizens, education policy etc. are decided according to the principle of equality. To be considered for political acknowledgement, public rules need to be confide with all individual’s basic interests. Even diversity can be exercised only when basic rights are ensured, but not vice versa. Minority groups can exercise their practices under the same public rules since these rules ensure their exercise of equal opportunities and rights. That is why, Barry proclaims that ‘justice guaranteed by equal opportunity’ (2001, p.32). Based on these sets of ideas, Barry examines the dominating arguments of liberal multiculturalists who favoured the self-governing rule of cultural groups in order to make his common citizenship idea compatible.

2.4. Multiculturalism and Group Rights

Diversity has always been a challenge to any distributive theory of justice especially when it comes to group rights demanding public recognition. However, it is not a new phenomenon for Barry. That is why, though diversity is a challenge for liberal theory, liberalism was never unknown and unaware of this diversity (2001, p.19). Barry observes group as a collection of individual persons, and accordingly, group rights always conceives to him as individual person’s rights (2001, p.112). Religious, cultural, or ethnic whatever association apparently claims for special political appreciation in terms of group rights is basically demanding rights for the individual person who belongs to that association. Group rights are only meaningful in terms of individual’s rights while have no independent political ground. Though Barry admits that today’s diversity issues are much more complicated than previous times but he is confident with his proposed egalitarian liberalism that it is compatible to confront religious, cultural, and ethnic challenges of multicultural society (2001, p.19).

Egalitarian liberalism firmly acknowledges the ‘freedom of association’ and cultural group’s role in forming group member’s well-being. But what is to be noticed here is that this liberal idea prioritizes the value of individual members by limiting the power of groups, based on
which Barry recommends two necessary conditions for group’s freedom (2001, p.124). One is association are required to ensure that all its members are matured enough on the one hand. And the other one is, all the member needs to show their full voluntary consent to be remain in the group (2001, p.148). Both of these conditions guarantee that individuals not only have the freedom to join group of their chosen but also to exit the groups anytime whenever they want (2001, p.148). Barry believes that fulfilment of such conditions by the cultural groups would protect individuals from the enforcement of illiberal practices of different social groups.

Barry criticizes the arguments of liberal multiculturalists stating that ‘multiculturalism is a formula for manufacturing conflict because it rewards ethno-cultural political entrepreneurs who can exploit its potential for their own ends by mobilizing a constituency around a set of sectional demands’ (2001, p.21). Barry’s fundamental objections towards multiculturalism are its misapprehension of universal liberal idea and its unjustifiable imposition of cultural practices within the idea of justice. He identified three gross flaws in liberal multicultural idea which shows that multiculturalism is ‘intellectually corrupted’ (2001, p.21). Firstly, proponents of multiculturalism appreciate ‘cultural practices’ as the central difference of all social diversity of individuals and groups which Barry refers as a sheer mistake. Barry argues that national identity of a liberal society does not wholly depend on cultural identity and cultural elements cannot fulfil all our national urges such as national autonomy, national freedom (2001, p.21). Cultural practices are not universal rather depends on individual’s own beliefs and choices. Anybody can adopt or abandon it according to their personal wish. Therefore, it does not require any political recognition.

Secondly, the meaning of ‘multiculturalism’ varies. Sometime the idea of multiculturalism has been used as prescribed political program and sometimes as descriptive fact of diversity. For this reason, Barry observes it as an ‘unargued shift’ from prescription to description (2001, p.22). Barry writes, ‘recognition of the fact of multiculturalism can easily be taken to entail a commitment to the multiculturalists programme; conversely, anybody who dissents form normative multiculturalism automatically stands accused of blindness to the fact of multiculturalism, (2001, p.22). Moreover, multicultural idea derives by an unreasoning process from fact to norm (2001, p.22-23). There is no necessary relation between the facts of diversity and multicultural norm. Any individual person can support the fact of diversity without believing in multicultural norm (2001, p.23).
And thirdly, this idea is principally ‘self-contradictory’. Since theoretically, liberal multiculturalists formulate multiculturalism based on general liberal idea but practically, it demands special treatment of some religious and cultural groups implying some kind of moral relativism. Being grounded on universal law multiculturalism undermines its universal application. Therefore, it makes an inconsistency with its own interpretation of liberal idea. Multiculturalism best recognizes as an account of equity between major and minority groups of liberal society, not of equality (2001, p.23.).

However, Barry finds the rationality of group rights idea commonly encountered by the allegations of ‘over-inclusiveness’ and ‘under-inclusiveness’ features which resulted in two ways (2001, p.114). At first, group rights notion is ‘over-inclusive’ since neither can it promote respect to the group members nor can it treat other different minority groups equally. Quota system in public job sector, for example, for black people would make them alienate from general people referring as disadvantaged group and this exemption for that particular group left other minority groups deprived from the same exemption. Thus promotion of special rights for one or some minority groups undermines their identity making separate from the general social structure and fall into accusation of other groups (2002, p.114).

On the other side, it is ‘under-inclusiveness’ policy since group rights idea even fails to treat group members equally. For instance, as Barry states, if exemption is given to the minority group to get enrolment in school then a few person of those group will get the advantage as they will have to fulfil the remaining relaxed requirements. Thus they all would not be benefited from such exemption (2001, p.115-116). Rather a general rule would be beneficiary for all. Thus Barry argued that group rights based on special treatment cannot fairly cover the equal treatment even among different group members.

And secondly, Barry thinks that group rights mostly based on religious beliefs and less on cultural practices. His several attempts to exemplify religious conflicts throughout the empirical studies prove this view point (2001, p.24-32). Any exemption given based on group rights can only promote the exercise of illiberal practices and inequality amidst its own members such as humane slaughter regulations, gender inequality, rejecting medical treatment in life staking context, forceful marriage practice etc. Instead equal treatment can cognitively prevent reactionary rituals of groups along with the protection of individual persons from any paternalistic attitude of the society. Therefore, Barry has symbolized group rights as illiberal and irrational.
Given the above allegations, Barry clarifies multiculturalists’ weak understanding regarding what things matter to justice and why group’s ‘self-governmental’ status is an unjustifiable demand. Even the incompatibility of genuine liberal idea in promoting liberty and equality is wrongly accused. Unfortunately, they failed to realize that liberalism believes in individualism and different impacts of the common rule on the individual person are also sign of individuality. Any apparent inequality does not necessarily denote any unfair treatment. Liberal multiculturalists’ even could not identify that institutionalization of group rights can be used negatively by the policy-makers which forwarded several impairments to the minority groups. We need to realize that institutionalization of group rights can be misused by the political leaders for political purposes (2001, p.39).

All the above clarifications necessitate the understanding of universal liberal framework for individual’s rights and justice. Egalitarian liberal theory is basically against unfair treatment towards minority group members. It categorizes the areas of unfair treatment that a liberal polity should take into consideration foremost. Thus, Barry expresses discrimination in unemployment, material resources, tax issue, health service etc. as essential issues of inequalities to be concerned that that of private cultural differences. ‘Any conception of equal treatment that would make such laws a violation of the principle of equal treatment is fundamentally misguided conception’ (Barry 1997). Universal liberal idea is not against peoples’ personal choice and preferences rather it gives room for citizens to sustain with their own cultural beliefs and practices. It secures this individual difference by ensuring their civil and political rights. Universal equal treatment approach layout the prima facie duty to the state authority is that “law must provide equal treatment for those who belong to different religious faiths and different cultures” (Barry 2001, p.24). Such premises also imply that egalitarian liberal idea is compatible to supersede the rationality of ‘politics of difference.

To conclude, Barry’s egalitarian liberalism tries to uphold liberty and equality of all individuals prior to all other social differences. Barry considerably justifies the scopes and merits of universal liberal idea in respect to the diversity issue as well. He efforts to deal with those criticisms that headed by other liberalists against egalitarian liberal doctrine. Barry criticises against the multiculturalists’ arguments for ‘rule and exemption’ or ‘special treatment’ in terms of minority group rights and founded these ideas on general liberal principles. Besides, Barry refutes the wrong interpretation of ‘difference-blind’ liberal view by the multicultural liberals. Barry strongly believes that no other conception of liberalism,
except egalitarian one, can fairly face the complexities of contemporary diversity issues. Egalitarian liberalism can deal with the religious, cultural, and ethnic challenges accommodating diversity and balancing the interests and beliefs of the individuals.

3. Galston’s Pluralist Liberal Approach to Citizenship

Contemporary liberal political theories have several major challenges among which cultural diversity of multicultural society is the most crucial one. To find a reasonable solution to this diversity conflict, American political philosopher William Arthur Galston tires to formulate a liberal theory of justice within the framework of plurality. In his book *Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice* (2002), Galston proposes a comprehensive pluralist account of liberalism which is broadly known as ‘Liberal Pluralism’, ‘Reformative Liberalism’ or ‘Toleration Centric Liberalism’. Galston defines liberalism as a moral and political account of justice which permits individuals and groups to live their satisfying lives (2002, p.3). The central idea of this theory is that liberal democratic society is full of diverse values that are possessed by individuals, different groups or associations.

In liberal pluralism theory, Galston observes individuals and groups’ social and political identity in respect to value diversity. Citizenship reflects here a comprehensive relation between public authority and government authority. Galston describes the citizenship status of individuals and groups, their civil virtues, rights and responsibilities, scopes and limitations, and all other affiliations based on his three fundamental concepts of liberal pluralism such as value pluralism, political pluralism, and expressive liberty. As he claims that these three essential sources collectively and connectively execute a compatible liberal political system which is consistent to the vast diversity.

Galston assumes that the relation between individual’s freedom and state’s authority is the core issue of disagreement among the liberal theories. Thus he projected his whole liberal concept on the hypothesis that a liberal democratic society is best to accommodate maximum diversity and minimum authority of the state. Consequently, Galston’s liberal pluralism yields the need for a reformation of the ‘Enlightenment project’ regarding individuals and groups values. It is clearly standing against a monistic and autonomy based liberal doctrines. I shall focus throughout the whole section on what Galston means by citizenship and how he rationalizes this citizenship idea based on those three core concepts of liberal pluralism.
3.1. Idea of Value Pluralism

Value pluralism or moral pluralism is the fundamental ground of Galston’s liberal pluralism. By ‘value’ Galston means human’s ‘rational and moral understandings’ about certain basic things of life, while ‘diversity’ indicates the ‘differences among the individuals and groups over such matters as the nature of good life, sources of moral authority, reason versus faith, and the alike’ (2002, p.21). This value pluralism of Galston is largely based on Isaiah Berlin’s view of moral pluralism. As Berlin said, ‘The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally absolute, the realization of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others’ (Berlin 1969, p.68). So, ‘human goals are many, not all of them are commensurable’ (Berlin 1969, p.171).

Like Berlin, Galston believes that our moral universe is full of fundamental values which are ‘plural, conflicting, incommensurable in theory, and uncombinable in practice and there is no single univocal sumnum bonum that can be defined philosophically, let alone imposed political’ (2002, p.30). Therefore each value has ‘prima facie’ moral weight (2002, p.33). This statement implies two obvious aspects of a liberal democratic society. One is that diversity is a fact and existing individuals and various groups of multicultural society reflect this fact. And the other one is that each of this identity possesses different moral understanding of good life. This moral universe provides the rational ground to the fact of value diversity.

Galston tries to enhance a more sophisticated version of value pluralism by conferring a comprehensive explanation of the nature of values. All the fundamental values Galston has categorized either as intrinsic or instrumental. Those values are intrinsic that facilitate an individual’s understanding regarding the basic conceptions of life. For instance, values of the body, material resources, family and friends, a long and fortune life are basic category values. Galston stresses that basic values of individuals needs to be protected because deprivation of such values symbolize the coercion of state (2002, p.6). Apart from basic values, there are other important values that help citizens to make political decisions. These are instrumental values since their role are limited to form individual’s external activities such as medical treatment, education access etc. However, beyond this classification some values might be more defensible and reasonable than other values.

Based on the above sets of ideas, Galston illustrates the following distinguishing features of value pluralism. Firstly, value pluralism is not identical to relativism. Because value diversity do not rely on any arbitrary subjective opinion, rather it is based on our moral understanding
about good and evil (2002, p.30). If our understanding of good and bad is based on moral foundation then these values have objective and rationally justifiable ground. Secondly, there is no fully ‘rank-order’ among the values. As Barry said, all the values are incommensurable and uncombiable so, no common measure can reduce all the values as ‘qualitatively heterogeneous’ (2002, p.5). All the values are ‘qualitatively different’ and subject of no ‘comprehensive lexical orderings’. Galston’s argument of value pluralism follows:

1. Every liberal multicultural society comprises of individuals and diverse groups, associations, and communities
2. All of them hold their own beliefs and practices following their distinct moral understanding of values
3. These values are intrinsic, qualitatively different and rationally defensible, and they are not subject of any common social or political standard
4. Therefore, pluralist liberal policy is required to accommodate and respect such diversity

3.2. **Derivation of political pluralism from value pluralism**

Based on the moral ground of value diversity Galston moves towards his second source of liberal pluralism, what he calls ‘political pluralism’. Galston’s signifies here an affirmative interconnection between a moral universe of value diversity and the nature of public institutions (2002, P.8). This positive connection of value pluralism to political pluralism appears when Galston expresses that political pluralism highlights ‘an understanding of social life that comprises multiple sources of authority- individuals, parents, civil associations, faith-based institutions, and the state, among others- no one of which is dominant in all spheres, for all purposes, on all occasions’ (2005, p.1-2). Hence Galston’s rationale for the reasoning is that a liberal democratic society comprises not only of diverse values but also diverse sources of authority (2002, p.36). This indicates distinguish identity of both individuals and groups. Thus while value pluralism demonstrate our understanding of the ‘moral universe’ there political pluralism provide us with the social space where we can exercise those values.

Galston identifies the mutual relationship between value pluralism and political pluralism as an essential fact that a liberal political system must need to consider. A compatible liberal political system requires minimum control of state government over the liberty and rights of the people. State’s prior commitment should be the fulfilment of public legitimate needs and promotion of their freedom and loyalty while maintaining social security and civic unity
However, there are legitimate reasons for which Galston endorses such characterisation of public institutions.

Firstly, public institution is one of the instrumental values of liberal society. Since ‘pluralist politics does not presume that the inner structure and principles of every sphere must mirror those of political institutions’ (2005, p.2). This statement entails that being part of the state does not always mean that all the individuals and associations are similar to that regime. Thus it can manage only few external activities of citizens.

Secondly, liberal pluralist institution is both ‘limited and robust’. It is limited because it possesses only instrumentally value forming ‘external public activities’. For example, promoting education policy for making good citizens or fostering responsibilities of parents to educate their children (2002, p.4). On the other hand, it is robust because it can prevent anyone’s action only if it violates the minimum ‘basic decency’ or become threat to the ‘civic unity’ such as religious practice of human sacrifice, bind infant’s skulls, or education that affects individual’s ability (2002, p.38). Galston identified four main reasons for allowing such command of the government. These are: i) to reduce obstacles in mutual coordination and conflicts among legitimate activities of the people that cannot be ignored, ii) to prevent and punish those who violates and disrespect the rights of others, iii) to protect the legitimate conceptions of life from illegitimate one (meaning?), and iv) to secure and maintain the requirements for sustaining the order and harmony of public institutions (2002, p.4).

Thirdly, the plurality of values is not wholly ‘open-ended’ but ‘restricted’ (2002, p.27). Galston is well aware of the limitation of liberal political order. Liberal society cannot accommodate unlimited diversity since it has to maintain a minimal decent system. In order to justify the coherence of liberal system and pluralism, Galston acknowledges that there are some norms which are universal in nature and mandatory for all individual’s life as these ensure minimally decent society. Some basic goods always need to be respected by all and state can legitimately reject some bad conception of values as well such as to respect every individual (Azam 2016). Thus Gaston embraces the notion of value pluralism and political pluralism as essential grounds for liberal pluralism that insist for a liberal democratic public system to accommodate and promote diversity.
3.3. Criticisms of Autonomy-Centric Liberalism

Galston understands the concept ‘autonomy’ as individual’s ability for ‘rational examination of self, others, and social practice’ (2002, p.21). He finds the central liberal idea of autonomy rooted in the Enlightenment project or monistic liberalism and civic republicanism (2002, p.20). Monistic liberalism proposes a neutral liberal idea of individualism regardless of any diversity where individual’s rationality counts as the sole value. Accordingly, civic republicanism emphasises the intrinsic value of public institution to enhance rational quality of the individuals. Based on these two grounds, autonomy-centric liberalism elucidates that state’s actions are bound to flourish individual’s intellectual ability to understand the conception of good life. Thus autonomy based liberal idea affirms the interruption power of state over the internal affairs of the people (2002, p.20).

However, Galston rejects both liberal versions based on the argument he calls ‘implausibility of reductionist argument’ (2002, p.33). This argument shows that monistic account of ‘heterogeneity’ or commonness of value cannot justify the values of multicultural society or how plurality of values can be balanced (2002, p.7). Instead in such common standard polity minority groups possess the most vulnerable position because they are left either to sacrifice their own values or become separate from others (2005, p.1). On the other side, Galston recognises civic republican view of public system’s intrinsic value as incompatible to liberal ideas since it allows the political order to be ruled out over the liberty and fundamental values of the citizens. This logically shows a sheer interruption not only to the intrinsic value of diversity but also to the minority groups of liberal society (2002, p.4). Thus Galston raises two common accusations against both monism and civic republicanism. At first, they emphasise a common value standard to evaluate all other existing values of liberal society. And secondly, they have maintained a hierarchy order of the values.

Consistently, Galston argues that the autonomy idea is not compatible with a liberal regime, but conflicting. It introduces a ‘homogenizing pressure’ or coercive imposition on many individuals and groups by differentiating between faith and reason (2002, p.23). It resembles as coercion for those people who may not wish to be concerned about their flourishing autonomy. Besides, it undermines the value diversity in significant public sphere like education, rights of association, and the free exercise of religion (2002, p.22). Therefore, autonomy centric liberal idea appears under the same accusations like monism that it reduces
to a common value standard to evaluate all other existing values. And secondly, it follows a hierarchy of order values in which individual’s rational ability is superior to all (2002, p.7).

3.4. Idea of ‘Liberal Pluralist Citizenship’

The above discussions on value pluralism and political pluralism demonstrate that Galston assumes individuals and groups citizenship identity intensely founded on liberal pluralist institution and its public policy. He designates it as ‘liberal pluralist citizenship’ (2002, p.126). By citizenship, Galston means a package of benefits and burdens that are shared and accepted by all in a liberal society. Citizens of a multicultural society are entitled with some basic rights such as expressive liberty. Hence a consistent liberal system needs to embrace all the citizens following their value diversity. Thus, it is the liberal democratic political regime that Galston identifies as fitted to hold the diversity issues. Formulation of basic political institutions by the demands of all citizens reflects its freedom from majority or totalitarian state command (2005, p.1). Therefore, following a common query- what values should be promoted or strengthens by the political institution, Galston’s asserts that liberal public institution should promote diversity and liberty of the citizens. This premise of Galston necessitates the principle of ‘expressive liberty’ for the citizens.

3.5. Principle of ‘Expressive Liberty’

Galston’s principle of ‘expressive liberty’ is a significant requirement of a liberal democratic state that follows from his idea value pluralism and political pluralism. By ‘expressive liberty’ Galston means ‘the absence of constraints, imposed by some individuals on others, that make it impossible (or significantly more difficult) for the affected individuals to live their lives in ways that express their deepest beliefs about what gives meaning or value to life’ (2002, p.28). This definition makes explicit that expressive liberty reflects individual’s rights of negative liberty that related to their identity and understanding of good life.

Expressive liberty offers citizens the opportunity to understand what liberties are important for their lives and identity (2002, p.28). For example, all our cultural and religious practices are not necessarily chosen by us. Some things we believe and practice things as these are ascribed on us by the group or association. Thus expressive liberty helps us to distinguish the internal and external beliefs and practices. However, this is not to say that this liberty demands any necessary rational understanding of the citizens rather it assumes citizens as
only free to determine their desired good lives (Azam 2016). Therefore, expressive liberty is not same as the autonomy principle.

The facts of value pluralism and political pluralism endorse the crucial point is- what liberal policy should promote. If value diversity is a fact of multicultural society then it should entail that policy which can entirely accommodate that plurality. And to do this, principle of expressive liberty must be considered by the liberal idea. That is why, Galston tires to formulate his notion of ‘expressive liberty’ in such a way that could include the importance of groups’ liberty as well as the individual liberty. He writes, “expressive liberty may be understood as an extension of the free exercise of religion, generalize to cover comprehensive conceptions of human life that rest on non-religious as well as religious claims” (2002, p.2). Here, expressive liberty works as a ‘precondition’ to secures individuals and groups ‘ability to live in ways that others would regard as unfree’ (2002, p.29). However, Galston assumes that expressive liberty allows two possible consequences. One, individuals and groups would be free to perform internal cultural and religious practices that are of illiberal such as patriarchal gender relations. Two, conflicting value practices may come to clash not only with other individuals but to the political regime also (2002, p.20).

To resolve possible conflicts Galston abides expressive liberty principle with some necessary but minimum conditions (2002, p.3). Expressive liberty itself is valuable, but it is not the only good. Expressive liberty itself is a valuable human good among other valuable goods of the society (2002, p.29). On the other hand, though expressive liberty embraces by all the citizens, but its exercise is conditional. It is limited in the sense that it protects the ‘sincere’ or justifiable beliefs and practices of the citizens that may objectionable to others but required to give meaning to their lives such as gender discrimination or male domination over the women in some religious groups. Excluding that this liberty does not protect those practices that could affect the ‘civic unity’ and violate ‘basic decency’ of the society such as tyranny, genocide, cruelty and humiliation, mass starvation, and deadly epidemics (2002, p.29).

Based on this expressive liberty right of the citizens, Galston claims that a liberal multicultural society expresses two categories of principles: general public principles of the state and particular principles of the individuals and groups (2002, p.110). Any public policy thus requires justification before intervening in the sphere of groups or associations (Crowder 2004). In order to foster the inherent aim of expressive liberty, state authority may legitimately engage in public activities if they lack the ‘self-restraint’ practice and violate the
basic rights of others. But, political institutions of liberal society are thereby entitled with limited opportunity to interfere in the exercise of such liberty.

To resolve such crucial conflicts between the general and particular principles, Galston proposes the policy of ‘reverse exemption’. This policy approves ‘the removal of all forms of otherwise applicable public encouragement and favour’ (2002, p.112). If general principles of the state affect particular religious or cultural principles, this policy will restrict the enforcement of general principles over the particular principles. Galston argued that state has the right to promote and maintain certain general policy for all citizens but this right of the state is limited. State cannot enforce any common policy when it conflicts with any particular religious or cultural practices. However, Galston further clarifies that this ‘reverse exemption’ policy does not approves extreme illiberal practices of minority groups such as withholding medical treatment of the children in life-threatening issue (2002, p.114). Galston admits that though it is difficult to make a fine line what reverse exemption would approve.

Expressive liberty further promotes two other fundamental rights of the individuals and groups that derived from expressive liberty emphasised here.

i) Freedom of association: In exercising expressive liberty, all the religious and cultural groups are entitled with the rights of freedom or voluntary association (2002, p.122). According to the concept of ‘freedom of association’, minority groups or associations can exercise their internal practices to construct their member’s understanding about basic good things without any interruption of the state such as minority religious groups can provide distinct education system for their group members.

ii) Right of Exit: Galston considers individual’s ‘rights of exit’ more significant than that of autonomy (2002, p.123). This rights of the individual’s confirms that any group or association cannot enforce any individual in absence of his consent to remain member (2002, p.122). Hence the underlying reason is that all the individuals would be able to enjoy expressive liberty even those who belongs to certain religious and cultural groups.

Thus denial of the ‘rights of exit’ is the denial of expressive liberty rather its acceptance makes a reasonable balance between individual’s principles and group’s policy (2002, p.123).
3.6. Multiculturalism and Group Rights

Galston’s individual’s ‘right of exit’ concept depicts not only the scope of individual’s liberty but also how he perceives minority group’s rights. Galston’s liberal pluralism idea reveals his strong position towards multiculturalism or minority cultural group’s rights. Although Galstonean idea reflects quite similar to that of Will Kymlicka (Crowder 2004, Azam 2016), but it is quite distinct. Liberal multiculturalists hold individual autonomy as the central value of liberal idea. It narrates that liberal idea need to ensure a society where individual can flourish and exercise their autonomy. But in a multicultural society this opportunity is absent for minority cultural groups. Therefore, liberal idea required the special rights or exemptions policy for the sake of equality of circumstances (Smith 2002, p.29).

However, Galston distinguishingly provides a broader concept of liberalism which promotes multiculturalism within political societies more reasonably (Crowder 2004). For Galston, if pluralism idea is supposed to accommodate all the value diversity then it also needs to accommodate the entire liberal and non-liberal groups as well (Crowder 2004). Expressive liberty of groups means that their group members have the right exit or to be free from the group whenever they want (2002, p.104-5).

3.7. Toleration as Liberal Virtue

In addition to the rights and responsibilities of citizens, Galston emphasises certain virtues that an individual person needs to possess and develop in a liberal society. In liberal pluralist citizenship idea, individuals are required to develop their civic or political virtue of tolerance. Since, expressive liberty can be exercised only in that multicultural society where people possess that kind of virtues. Civic virtues of the citizens depict their ability of ‘self-discipline and sacrifice’ or to reject any ‘comprehensive egoism’ (1991, p.224-50). This means individuals require being respectful to other’s distinct ways of life. However, Galston said that civic virtues are instrumentally valuable as play essential role in liberal society (1991, p.220). Civic virtues are not inherent rather individuals can obtain and develop it.

By toleration, Galston means ‘a principled refusal to uses coercive state power to impose one’s own views on others, and therefore a commitment to moral competition through recruitment and persuasion alone’ (2002, p.126). Hence, tolerance does not mean to become sceptic about one’s position or accepting any unreasonable belief. Instead it is individual’s ability to express disagreement to those beliefs that he differ. This virtue assumes the fact that
‘every personal choice, every ‘life plan is equally good, hence beyond rational scrutiny and criticism (1991, p.222). Toleration virtue defines the moral feature of humans fostering ‘the ability to listen to others and formulate one’s own position in a way that is sensitive to, and respectful of, the different experiences and identities of fellow citizens, acknowledging that these differences may affect political views’. Therefore, toleration works as a ‘maxim of personal conduct’ (1991, p.222).

Like Lockean idea of toleration which states that cultural or religious practices are not subject of intrinsically valuable but of toleration for sake of individuality, Galston argues that toleration quality of the citizens is required to maintain both the diversity and expressive liberty (Azam 2016). In this regard, civic education is required to promote civic virtues, especially toleration. The State has the responsibility to promote civic education among the citizens along with a compatible social and political arrangement for the citizens so that toleration towards religious and cultural diversity can be encouraged and sustained. So, the rationale for toleration idea is that it helps citizens to realize diversity value prior to all. This diversity may include non-liberal and illiberal religious and cultural practices but that are need to be tolerated as these possess intrinsic values (Crowder 2004).

3.8. Good citizen and full citizenship

Galston idea of citizenship prolongs the rights of liberal political system to improve the ‘self-sustaining’ skill of individuals and their status as good citizens (2002, p.126). This idea provides a justifiable ground of states’ rights in promoting civic education for the citizens since ‘civic education’ is instrumentally valuable, so it has no conflict with the fundamental values. However, Galston argues that civic education policy is robust or strong, but it is restricted (2002, p.126). State, of course, has the responsibility to make ‘good citizen’ but it should maintain certain restrictions (2002, p.17). Galston’s ‘liberal pluralist citizenship’ idea provides a restricted version of ‘full citizenship’ concept. A ‘full citizenship’ concept is not obligatory for all citizens since it requires a range of responsibilities to be fulfilled by the citizen, which can make unjustifiable burdens on those citizens who may wish not to do. Therefore, Galston favours a short and relaxed requirements provided by state (2002, p.127).

To conclude, the above discussion shows that Galston views liberalism as non-neutral account of diversity of multicultural society. All the central concepts of Galston’s liberalism are based on his liberal pluralist idea. The central value of Galston’s liberalism is thus proposing that liberal state which can uphold the identity of both the individuals and groups.
Liberal state is required to accommodate diversity and promote liberty and toleration among the citizens within minimum restrictions. Thus, the compatibility of pluralist liberalism is considerable as it principally focuses to the conflicts of diversity.

4. Comparison, Criticisms, and Analysis of Two Liberal Positions

Following the discussions on Barry and Galston’s liberal idea of citizenship in the previous two sections, it is so far clear how they have formulated their distinct liberal citizenship accounts under the challenge of multiculturalism. However, the basic disagreements between Barry and Galston’s idea seem regarding the issues of public recognition of minority groups and the restriction over state’s authority. In this section, I identify the basic similarities and differences between Barry and Galston’s liberal doctrines which will extend to the discussion of their criticisms and responses against each other’s theories. Based on the comparison and criticisms, I shall analyse the compatibility of Barry’s and Galston’s liberal idea from my own specific position.

4.1. Comparison between Barry and Galston

Theoretically, Barry’s egalitarian liberalism is mainly based on the ‘Enlightenment project’ which largely stresses on individual’s liberty and equality whereas Galston’s pluralist liberalism is rooted in the ‘post Reformation project’ by which he means liberal account to deal with religious differences and political structures (2002, p.24). A mutual coexistence between individuals and cultural groups has been highlighted in this liberal pluralist’s theory. Hence, two apparent noteworthy common aspects of Barry’s and Galston’s liberal views are the idea of universal truth and universal application of liberal principles, and the appreciation of multicultural group’s rights within liberal framework (2005, p.179). Thus, both the liberals suggest that liberalism is the most compatible political theory to resolve the conflicts and disagreements among individuals and groups of a multicultural society.

Like Galston, Barry acknowledges that diversity is a factual complicated issue of multicultural society and this need to be resolved under a liberal notion. But Barry’s liberal account left no room for independent political recognition of religious and cultural groups. Barry assumes groups as a collection of individuals through which individuals uphold their personal preferences to certain religious and cultural beliefs. Although Barry firmly acknowledges different group’s ‘freedom of association’ and their private role in shaping
group member’s good life but what he has ultimately prioritized is the value of individual members by limiting the power of groups (2001, p.124). Thus for the sake of individual’s private involvement, Barry accepts cultural group’s freedom to exercise their internal practices but under the conditions of basic liberal principles. An egalitarian liberal theory thereby covers all the notions of group’s rights in terms of individual’s notion.

However, Galston conversely signifies that religious and cultural groups are entitled with the rights and liberty like individuals. Cultural groups hold different intrinsic values and they have significant contribution in forming individual’s basic conceptions of good life and, that is why, religious and cultural group’s have legitimate rights to demand political recognition. Therefore, politically, both the liberal theories grasp different grounds. While Barry’s liberal idea embraces the political acknowledgement of only one agent there Galston’s liberal idea advocates for legitimate political recognition of both individuals and groups’ rights. In egalitarian liberal sense, citizenship principally concerns the issue of how to promote a fair treatment among individuals holding their different values, beliefs, and practices in a multicultural society. But the core objectives of pluralist liberal citizenship are not only concerned to mitigate multicultural conflicts but also how to encourage the ‘active and responsible participation’ of individuals and groups in public policy (Kymlicka 2002, p.287).

The scopes and limitations of state’s power over citizens have got a significant attention in both of these liberal theories. Barry’s proposed liberal state has the rights to impose some basic principles like equal liberty over all the individuals. State’s authority has been accepted here because the main liberal purposes that is ‘equal treatment of all individuals’ is not possible to achieve without appropriate command of the state. On the contrary, state’s minimum enforcement over the individuals and groups in order to secure ‘civic unity’ is a strict perquisite of Galston’s liberal idea. Hence the underlying rationale is that minimum interruption of state guarantees maximal accommodation and protection of diversity. Thus, state’s responsibility is limited to ensure social security, civic unity, and to promote civic education among the citizens but with least coercion. However, both Barry and Galston have admitted that the state has the right to interrupt in individuals and groups act only following certain situations. State’s intervention would be justified whenever any act violates or become a threat to basic liberal principles or civic unity of the society.
4.2. Barry’s Responses to Galston’s Liberal Idea

Barry’s criticisms of Galston’s liberal idea can be viewed in two phases: against multiculturalists’ criticisms towards his egalitarian liberal doctrine and against Gaston’s pluralist liberal idea. Refuting and criticising both the ideas, Barry claims that ‘Reformative liberalism’ is inconsistent with the liberal idea because neither it is compatible to uphold the core values of liberalism nor can it sustain the neutrality or diversity of liberal society. Besides, the pluralist liberal version is basically similar to the liberal multiculturalism and offers nothing but a supplementary notion of group rights endorsement. Therefore, Barry identifies this idea as a ‘bona fide’ version of liberalism which is no way worth of distinct liberal consideration (2001, p.122-123).

However, there are two elementary basic criticisms of multiculturalists liberals against universalistic liberal approach. Firstly, universal liberalism is unsuccessful to promote equal treatment among individuals and groups since this idea fails to show its neutrality in maintaining equal treatment for liberal and non-liberal groups (2001, p.118). Barry argues that egalitarian liberalism promotes universal liberal principles for all the individuals and it does not embrace any ‘interventionist’ implication (2001, p.148). Egalitarian liberalism does not demand anything exceptional behaviour from the minority groups rather only to respect the general liberal principles (2001, p.123).

And secondly, the liberalism commitment to ensure liberty for all individuals falls short. It does not respect the freedom of illiberal groups (2001, p.118). Barry clearly replies that egalitarian liberalism acknowledges ‘freedom of association’ and it has no issue with those cultural practices that are consistent to liberal idea but it is unwilling to accept those non-liberal practices of the groups that can affect core liberal values. A ‘non-negotiable’ and conditional attitude of liberalism towards non-liberal groups is required in order to protect the equal rights and well-being of all individuals. Thus restrictions or limitations over group’s practice make sure a universal establishment of equal treatment (2001, p.148).

However, following Galston’s ‘Reformation liberalism’, Barry identifies three major faults that directly relate to the fundamental grounds of liberal pluralism. Firstly, Barry strongly rejects Galston’s allegation regarding the ‘Enlightenment project’ that it promotes a neutral account of autonomy. It is a mistake to associate ‘Enlightenment project’ with the aim of autonomy because there is no such ‘single urge of Enlightenment project, Barry said (2001,
Rather it constantly highlights the general interests of all individuals rather than particular interests. So, no autonomy based liberal conception can be derived consistently from the ‘Enlightenment project’. Perhaps, the development of the individuals’ autonomous characters could be one of the consequential vision or outcomes of a universal liberal application (2001, p.122). Like the autonomy approach, Barry addresses that pluralist requirements of public policy to promote diversity or toleration is also a ideal vision of liberal society which can be appealing to some people but it is not a general interest at all. Therefore, Barry’s assessment come to the point that a ‘difference-blind’ liberal idea is compatible to sustain without promoting any particular values like autonomy or toleration (2001, p.122).

Secondly, according to liberal pluralism, if liberal theory endorses respect for all individuals then this respecting attitude also entails respect the things that individual possesses such as culture or religion. However, Barry rejects this argument since respect for all individuals notion does not include acceptance of illiberal practices of multicultural groups (2001, p.128). Illiberal practices of religious and cultural groups such as gender discrimination, forced marriage, genital mutilation or women’s deprivation often do not show equal respect of all people. ‘Freedom of association’ thus only entails the acceptance of particular culture in individual’s life, not any respect (2001, p.128).

Thirdly, Barry criticises the pluralist liberal claim that diversity offers a wide range of obtainable alternatives to the individuals (2001, p.128). He considers this as a misconception of the pluralist liberals because liberalism fosters individuality rather than diversity (2001, p.129). ‘Liberal diversity’ or ‘liberal ways of life’ means only that diversity which is compatible with liberal institutions. So, it is the liberal institutions which approve and promote conceptions of good life. Neither culture is an option nor diversity of culture provide any range of options (2001, p.130).

Fourthly, pluralist liberalism addresses the private and public divisions of the individual’s life in which cultural and religious practices belongs to private life to be interrupted neither by state nor by others (2001, p.130). This non-intervention even justifies group’s exemptions from general laws. Barry replies that historical challenges of liberalism always have shown its advocates for individuals in terms of their public affairs rather than private issues like protecting children against parents (2001, p.131). It is unjust to demand exemptions from general rules for some groups while left all other individuals to accept it. Nonetheless, state’s power is thus essential to ensure basic liberal values.
However, Barry believes that the common mistake happened by the liberals is that they understood egalitarian liberalism in terms of its outcomes. Universal liberal principles and its application are the prior things that egalitarian liberalism considers foremost. Any consequence in term of its application would be regarded as justified because what conception of good life to be exercised is totally depends on individual’s private choice. Thus consequences of personal preferences are not supposed to be burdened on general liberal idea. It is a theory of principles, not of consequence (2001, p.122).

4.3. Galston’s Responses to Barry’s Liberal Idea

According to Galston, contemporary liberals who have formulated their universal liberal ideas based on diversity or group rights are the most challenging competitors to Barry’s liberal idea. Barry perceives all the pluralist as similar in spirit, and therefore, subject of same critiques (2001, p.21). However, Gaston thinks that the most important fault of Barry’s approach is that he dismisses all the distinctions of liberal pluralist or multiculturalists theories. In fact, neither all the pluralist liberal theories hold the same sorts of liberal principles nor the claims of diversity is unreasonable (2005, P.177). Galston criticises universalistic or monistic idea for two basic reasons: for emphasising on a single value idea and for making value rank-order. However, the following responses of Galston against Barry’s liberal theory have been notified.

Firstly, in difference to Barry’s claim that there is no single moral substance of the ‘Enlightenment project’, Galston replies that many statements of Barry show his inclination towards the idea of autonomy or ‘secular rationalism’ (2005, p.180). Hence Galston perceives Barry’s liberal theory as liberal idea of early Barry and liberal idea of latter Barry. While early Barry has shown the tendency to recognize plurality of values the latter Barry admits the meaningful existence of a single universal value (2005, p.180).

Secondly, Barry addresses pluralist liberal claims for cultural groups as unreasonable because both group rights and restrictive state authority views require the forfeit of core liberal values; liberty and equality (2005, p.177). However, Galston defends that political recognition and freedom of multicultural groups have legitimately derived from liberal idea. Freedom of religion and conscience is one of the fundamental human rights (2005, p.178). This right forms independent political authority of different religious and cultural groups. However, acknowledging group’s rights does not indicates its absolute freedom and power over the
political regime instead state has the right to interfere in group’s practice based on two requirements. One is the reason of state’s intervention needs to be urgent and compelling that is necessary related to social security and civil unity of the liberal polity. And other one is state intervention need to be least coercion in that cases (2005, p.178).

Thirdly, Galston further replies that the state’s limited power in upholding group rights is required and justifiable. It would be partial to assume religious group’s rights of exemption from general law only because of the unnecessary burdens on them. Religion and conscience share a necessary relation for shaping individual’s conceptions of good life. Egalitarian liberal view ignores the importance of religious group’s qualitative role in forming individual’s self-development (2005, p.178). Therefore, any intervention of state over individuals and groups act requires compelling proof or reasons to justify the interruption. Otherwise rejecting exemption would be regarded as demoralizing individual’s personal development, which is a violation of liberal value.

Fourthly, Galston finds the condition of consistency of ‘freedom of association’ with the basic liberal principles as misleading (2005, p.180). Galston thinks that to stand on such a universal liberal idea, a peaceful coexistence of individuals and different groups is required. But, in reverse, a mutual coexistence of authorities does not permit the single value approach. So, the whole point is conditions that are required to construct a single value liberal notion do not allow the single value idea rather allow diversity (2002, p.24). In this regard, Galston assumes the importance of coexistence more promising then following higher order values.

Galston appreciates Barry’s views of freedom of association and the liberal stands for individuals against any coercion. But he further maintains that Barry’s liberal conceptions such as individual’s ‘voluntary’ consent and ‘condition in exercising group’s power over group members’ require more justifiable explanation (2005, p.181). In fact, the merit of Barry’s proposed principles are incompetent to promote equality among individuals and to resolve the conflicts of diverse groups (2005, p.180).

4.4. Analysis and Argument

Cultural conflicts are crucial political issues of today’s liberal multicultural society. To be fully competent, any liberal theory is required to be compatible to resolve the religious and cultural disagreements, since a successful and appropriate application of liberal principles
cannot be obtained without resolving the clashes between individuals and groups believers. Thus, what has been concerned primarily in the present thesis is to analyse the compatibility of Barry and Galston’s liberal versions of citizenship following the challenges of multicultural issues. Despite of being theoretically and politically opposing each other, both the liberal thinkers have shown immense endeavours to accommodate minority groups in the mainstream of liberal political structure under liberal policy. But both liberal views have paid less attention to the practical political problems of multicultural society.

Today’s most of the multicultural liberal society or political institutions are substantially influenced by the hegemony of internal majority group’s religion and culture. For instance, Britain or Sweden is largely Christian religion based state has state that recognizes national holidays for Christian festivals but not for the other minority religions like Muslim or Hindu. This demonstrates the political leading role of religious and cultural practices of majority group and inequality among the majority and minority groups. Following this practical image of multicultural society, Galston’s liberal citizenship idea seems more compatible to resolve cultural conflicts comparing to Barry’s citizenship theory. This given emphasise to Galston liberal idea does not indicates only his distinct theoretical position but also its possible practical political appeal. It is true that the liberal multicultural state first and foremost respects the equal freedom of all citizens. This obviously implies that respecting all individuals means respecting their distinct identity such as their beliefs or distinct understandings of life. But a liberal multicultural state just cannot run on this single value idea since many additional practical issues such as individual’s belonging to particular groups, political identity of the minority groups, individuals and groups’ political participation are also important issues to be considered.

Political acknowledgement of all individuals and groups is one of the essential perquisites in Galston’s liberal idea for civic unity and decent society. An attention to the affirmative interconnection among the individuals and different liberal and non-liberal groups is significant because harmonious liberal society and possible liberal principles cannot be exercised or achieved without mutual understanding. Examples of such political regimes are not rare. In Lebanon, 27 percent Shia and 27 percent Sunni Muslim, 21 percent Maronite Christian, 8 percent Greek Orthodox, 5 percent Druze, 4 percent Greek Catholic and some smaller minority religious groups of Jews, Buddhist, and Hindus are living together. According to its constitution of 1926, Muslim and Christian religious communities are
entitled with the rights to be presented in the parliament, the cabinet, high-level civil service ranks such as secretary general or director, and to make any major decisions regarding public affairs. Respect for the entire individual’s status and religious interests, and the balance of power distribution among the major religious groups have been stipulated by this constitution. Thus, Lebanese people celebrate all together Muslim festivals like Eid-ul-Fitr, Eid-ul-Adha, the birth of Prophet Muhammad, and Christian festivals like Armenian Christmas, Christmas, and Easter Sunday recognised as national holidays by the government. Lebanese Government also approves exemption from works for Armenian public sector employers on ‘St. Vartan Day’ (International Religious Freedom Report 2011). Other than Lebanon, different religious groups in Malaysia celebrate their religious festivals nationally although there are perceptible conflicts between them (International Religious Freedom Report 2014). Such practices of political rights and recognition of multiple religious groups also acknowledge by the constitution of Singapore, South Africa, and Albania.

Galston’s liberal appeal for the political recognition of minority groups is therefore significant. Galston’s idea of individuals ‘moral equality’ for the public recognition of minority bodies is strong enough to apply. ‘Moral equality’ of all humans provides a strong ground for integrating minority groups in public body rather than rational equality (Azam 2016). Above all, legitimate accommodation of both liberal and non-liberal practices of minority groups has made Galston’s liberal theory more appealing and advanced than that of Kymlicka (Azam 2016). What makes Galston idea more appealing is his comprehensive accumulation of toleration, mutualism or co-existence, civic education, and political recognition of minority group concepts which is clearly absent in Barry’s liberal idea. Moreover, the important clarification Galston makes is that he has not approved any absolute freedom and authority neither of groups nor of sate. In exercising the rights and responsibilities, both state and groups need to follow minimum conditions.

However, Galston’s liberal idea lacks the sufficient explanation of few things. Like Barry, Galston also admits that religious and cultural practices are ‘private’ affairs of different groups. But Galston also concedes their leading role in forming the identity of group members for which he thinks minority groups legitimately deserve political participation. This literally sounds appealing but not practically. Just stating liberal and non-liberal groups as intrinsic value holder or their significant role in group member’s life does not necessitates their political acceptance. In the same way, limiting state enforcement over the group’s rights
does not approve their candidacy in political institutions. What is challenging for Galston here is to provide compelling justifications to claim that illiberal practices are also worth of legitimate accommodation.

Galston’s efforts to accommodate both liberal and illiberal practices of minority groups make his liberal idea fall short to identify few deep multicultural conflicts. Although Galston accepts the accommodation of non-liberal minority groups but how far it is fair to accept those illiberal practices which make no conflict with the state law but morally hard to accept For example, early marriage or force marriage of girls is one of the common practices of many minority groups in most of the South Asian countries like Bangladesh, India, Pakistan. Let’s assume cases like an immature girl of 9-12 years who is being forced to marry someone without her consent. This aged girl normally does not understand or not be able to claim the rights of human, the freedom of exit, or even may unaware of any state law for her well-being. Other than force marriage, women are depriving from their rights of property, education, and freedom of expression under the domination of patriarchal authority of many religious groups. In such cases, individual’s ‘expressive liberty’ or ‘freedom of exit’ of women seem to remain less effective. This sort of practices makes no conflict with common public laws even though it is not fair to tolerate or promote such acts in the name of legitimate diversity. Unfortunately, Galston sufficiently have not explained how to draw line between what kind of non-liberal practices of religious and cultural groups should be tolerated by the state.

On the other hand, the argument Galston place regarding full citizenship and good citizenship idea is that these entitlements should be optional for the citizens since these can violate citizen’s freedom by making them compelled to fulfil certain civic responsibilities. Many of the citizens may do not wish to be good citizen or to have full citizenship endorsement. Such argument also works for individuals’ tolerance virtue that it is not necessary for all the citizens to develop toleration attitude to accept illiberal practices. If this is so, then it would be tough for Galston to make a peaceful co-existence of all individuals and groups. Then Barry’s term of toleration as a vision of the liberal society will be rightly executed. Thus Gaston’s notions of toleration and active participation of individuals and groups seems not fully established. Thus, Galston’s intense liberal attitude towards the minority groups and excessive restricted approach towards state power sometime makes obstacle for the political acknowledgement of minority bodies and peaceful co-existence of all citizens.
However, all such issues imply the necessity to welcome a reasonable state enforcement following the complexities of particular cases. Some restrictions are required to impose by the state both on majority and minority groups to make toleration virtue developed and exercised. And some additional liberal standards for the exercise of illiberal practices of minority groups can ensure their legitimate approval of political recognition and participation. Hopefully, considerations of few more additional standards would be helpful to rectify the lacks of Galston’s liberal citizenship idea and to make it more viable for multicultural liberal society.

Summary and Conclusion

I have discussed and analysed Barry’s and Galston’s liberal citizenship under the presumption that liberalism is an influential distributive theory of justice to confront the issues of multicultural society. The Liberal citizenship idea is essentially interconnected with three fundamental enquiries. Firstly, which kind of liberal principles are stressed as fundamental ground? Secondly, how it characterizes the rights and responsibilities of the individuals? And thirdly, how it deals with the issues of cultural conflicts or group rights? Both Barry and Galston have highlighted these three primary aspects in their distinct liberal theories acknowledging liberal idea as strong enough to accommodate and integrate minority groups within the majority domain.

Barry’s liberal understanding of ‘common citizenship’notion valuing the presence of social diversity has noticeably shown his distinct position in liberal tradition. What makes Barry’s liberal idea constructive is his realization of the complexity of diversity and its urgent requirement to integrate minority groups in the mainstream of the society. This is for what Barry distinguishingly admits the ‘freedom of association’. Recognition of ‘freedom of association’ or internal practices of minority groups for their member’s well-being under the conditions of general liberal principles, more or less, articulates the urge of egalitarian liberal theory to resolve cultural conflicts. However, two important criticisms of Barry that are political recognition of minority group rights and state’s minimum enforcement authority in promoting liberal values once again show the intolerant attitudes of universal liberal idea regarding diversity. Even the individuals of minority groups to whom universal liberal theory dedicates its liberal principles are free to exercise their privileges within their private sphere and, therefore, lack the active political participation in public issues. All these aspects of Barry’s liberal idea assert his theory less convincing to resolve diversity conflicts.
Apart from the common liberal thought, Galston liberal pluralism emphasises largely the value diversity and political recognition of liberal and non-liberal group’s rights so that both the individuals and groups can have the opportunity to participate in public policy-making decisions. As Barry sets some particular liberal conditions for the ‘freedom of association’, Galston also assumes ‘freedom of association’ under certain liberal conditions. Other essential concepts such as civil virtue, civic education, group rights, and mutualism of Galston’s ‘pluralist liberal citizenship’ notion certify his distinguish liberal position among other liberal multiculturalists’ theories. Galston argues that civil virtues like toleration is worth of contemplation since such virtues confirm individual’s willingness to participate in public issues, ability to question illegitimate enforce of the state, patience to understands other’s conceptions about basic goods, enthusiast to convey their own conception in decision-making procedures (Kymlicka 2002, p.289). Galston believes that a mutual coexistence of individuals and different groups is essentially required diversity cannot be removed or ignored (2005, p.179). These aspects make Galston’s liberal approach more compelling.

Finally, from the above discussion it can be said that Galston’s liberal pluralism is more convincing than of Barry’s liberal idea. Although Galston’s liberal conditions to outline acceptable non-liberal practices are not sufficiently explained but his assembled resourceful concepts such as toleration, civic education, mutualism and their interconnections are coherencies with the actual diversity image of multicultural society. In fact, ‘individualism’ which is the central philosophy of liberal political doctrine can be successfully accommodated in a multicultural society where individuals and groups exercise the tolerance virtue to respect the freedom and rights of each other. This reciprocal understating of the citizens helps to create a harmonious environment possible for mutual co-existence.
References


