Solidarity and Security

International and Swedish Preparedness for Climate Induced Migration in a Warming World

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Abstract

Migration due to climate change has been going on for millennia, and societies´ resilience will be put to pressure even more with an accelerating global warming. 22.5 million people have left their homes due to climate change since 2008, according to the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2017). All of these people are not recognized as refugees, but some of them will most likely seek refuge abroad. The aim of this Master´s thesis is to explore how the UN, the EU, and Sweden understand and analyse the phenomenon of climate induced migration from a geopolitical aspect. It is furthermore to explore the institution´s preparedness through analysing the suggested measurements they utilise today and recognize a need for the future. Applying a human security perspective, this thesis aims at exploring the following two questions; what views and perspectives of climate induced migration exist in the UN, the EU and among Swedish authorities, and what legal, technical, economic or other measures do they respond with to meet climate induced migration? The results confirm that there is a consensus among the institutions that climate change will lead to cross-border migration to some extent but the preparedness for it is inadequate in terms of available measurements.

Keywords: “climate refugee”, EU, geopolitics, Sweden, UN
Abbreviations and glossary

CEAS – Common European Asylum System
EASO - European Asylum Support Office
EU GAMM – European Union Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
FOI – Swedish Defense Research Agency
MSB - Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
PGU - Swedish politics for sustainable development
Rapid-onsets - extreme weather events, such as hurricanes and floods
Relocation – transfer of refugees within a state or from one EU Member State to another
Resettlement –selection and transfer of people from a state in which they have sought protection to a third country that admits them as refugees with a permanent residence status (UNHCR, 2013)
SIDA - Swedish International Development Agency
Slow-onsets - climate change processes that will take time to reach, such as desertification or change in monsoon
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
UNEP - United Nations Environmental Programme
UNFCCC - United Nation High Commissioner for Climate Change
UNHCR – United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees
UNU-EHS - the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security
Introduction

Climate induced migration has been going on for millennia (White, 2011). There are several examples in history of how climate change has caused migration and perhaps it is not hard to imagine since rapid environmental degradation is causing severe challenges in societies. Already vulnerable areas are especially exposed to negative climate change consequences and results in displacement, as figure 1 illustrates (IMDC, 2013). Previous research suggests that the Syrian conflict was worsened by climate change factors; in this case, a multi-annual drought which triggered an internal migration in the country - pressuring the already constraint political situation in the country (Mhanna, 2013, Femia & Werrell, 2016; Kelley et al., 2015).

Even though climate change seems to have affected migration patterns for a long time, there is until today no international regime protecting these people. Agenda 2030, EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (EU GAMM) and the Swedish politics for sustainable development (PGU) all recognize that climate change cause migration. (European Commission, 2011; Swedish government, 2016; UNDP, 2016) People who have fled as a result of climate change are not recognized as refugees; neither under the 1951 Geneva Convention nor EU law. They fall under the name of irregular migrants and irregular migrants in the EU they are supposed to be returned to a third country according to EU-law (European Commission 2011).

Figure 1 illustrates displacement due to disasters in 2014/2015. The map only illustrates a few climate change related weather events that could occur. Others are drought, change in monsoon patterns and sea-level rise. Used with permission by the IDMC (2013).
The reason why a person decides to migrate is complex, climate change is perhaps never the only reason, but it is a recursive causal factor that needs to be considered (Foresight, 2011; White, 2011). There are several contradictions and paradoxes in the review of climate induced migration. The UNHCR (2017) calculates that 22.5 million people have left their homes due to climate change since 2008. The EU is hindering migrants to reach EU borders and suggests increased climate adaption in vulnerable countries (European Commission, 2011). Sweden is an interesting case due to two central factors. Firstly, because of its foreign policy during the 1960’s and 1970’s, this formed a view of itself (and an international reputation as well) as a moral superpower (Neergaard, 2009). Secondly, because Sweden has/had a paragraph in the Alien Act that allowed asylum claims based on natural disasters which is quite unique in an international context.

The general aim of this Master’s thesis is to explore how institutions in an increasingly complex society construct an understanding of security, climate change and migration patterns through the phenomenon of climate induced migration. More specifically, the aim is to investigate the UN, the EU, and Sweden’s preparedness to concretely handle climate induced migration. In order to fulfil this aim, the following research questions are asked:

- What views and perspectives of climate induced migration exist in the UN, the EU and among Swedish agencies?
- What legal, technical, economic or other measures do they respond with to meet climate induced migration?

Organization of the thesis

The first section provides the reader a background of previously conducted research regarding climate induced migration, reaching back to a time of sceptics and alarmists and then describing today’s legal limbo and protection gaps. Then the thesis’ material, method and theory are presented, arguing for a human security perspective when analysing the material by the UN, the EU and Swedish agencies. I begin with the UN, following with the EU and end with the Swedish preparedness. A discussion of the analyses, integrating them into the bigger picture of previous research on the subject is lastly presented before ending with the results of this study.
Previous research and theoretical perspectives

Alarmists versus sceptics

Studies of climate induced migration began in the 1970’s - 1980’s (Kraler, Cernei & Noack 2011; White, 2011; Detraz & Windsor, 2014; Methmann & Oels, 2015) and there is a broad flora of articles and reports on the topic. Most common are articles which link climate change to migration.

Previously the debate was polarized between alarmistic and sceptic scholars. The alarmists who tend to see climate change as a direct cause of migration and predicted millions of migrants. One example is the Stern Report in 2006 who estimated 200 million migrants as a result of climate change until 2050. (Kraler, Cernei & Noack 2011) The other group doesn´t recognize climate change as a factor for migration at all. Black et al. (2011) represent this group; stating that personal characteristics and barriers are independent of environmental conditions.

In 2011, Gregory White published his book Climate change and migration – security and borders in a warming world. White critically examines climate induced migration and concludes that climate change might not be the only factor for migration, but it might be one of several factors. The British Government Office for Science published a report in 2011 called Migration and Global Environmental Change - Future Challenges and Opportunities (i.e. Foresight report) in which they stressed that climate change may amplify cross-border migration and present six “mobility outcomes” depending on migration possibilities and different slow- and rapid onsets.

One example of how climate change could drive migration is the previous research which suggests that the conflict in Syria was worsened by climate change factors with regards to the multi-annual draught from 2006 to 2011. It affected the Northern part of Syria, close to the Turkish border and the UN estimates that 1.6 million people were affected (Mhanna, 2013) Economic constraints due to lost crop yields and major internal migration increased the pressure on infrastructure and food services in the bigger cities which contributed to the already strained situation and eventually contributed to the civil war. (Femia & Werrell, cited 2016; Kelley et al., 2015)

Protection gaps

One of the most central aspects when discussing climate related migration and it’s hinders are the legal gaps. Using the term “refugee” has been criticized because of its connections to the Geneva Convention, but there is no definition in international law for the word ‘migrant’ either (Kälin, 2010). White (2011), Wyman (2013) and Scott (2015) have listed some of the obstacles which I represent below.

Skillington (2015) has assessed political and legal responses to climate induced migration from an EU perspective. Migrants are forced to flee due to vulnerable climate conditions in their country of origin but still lack legal recognition. Not being recognized makes the climate migrants exposed to legal violence such as detention and deportation. Skillington (2015) argues for a deepened recognition of mutual interests and better cooperation in the
international community to ease the humanitarian crisis formed by climate change consequences.

The UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (after called “Geneva Convention”) has been ratified by 151 states which give it a pivotal role in international refugee protection (UNHCR, 1996; UNHCR, 2015). The definition of a refugee stems from this convention and is used widely all over the world; a refugee is a person who

“owing a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” (White, 2011, pg. 22)

There are several reasons why the Geneva Convention is incompatible with climate induced migration. Firstly, the Geneva Convention does not acknowledge climate change or environmental disasters as a persecutor and “persecution”. Furthermore the Geneva Convention is founded on discrimination based on a person’s characteristics and climate change is on the contrary indiscriminating since it affects whole societies independent of race, religion etcetera. (Riera, 2008; White, 2011; Foresight, 2011; Wyman, 2013)

Secondly, there are conflicts regarding the role of the state. The Geneva Convention requires persecution from a state or human actor (Wyman, 2013; Scott, 2015). The state is either the persecutor or it allows the persecution to continue. Wyman (2013) argue that this is rarely the case since most states haven’t abandoned their citizens; on the contrary governments are often active in climate mitigation and climate adaption.

Thirdly, the lack of litigation and precedent constitutes a problem (Wyman, 2013; Scott, 2015). The lack of precedent is a consequence of little litigation (Scott, 2015). Those lawyers who have had “advanced arguments” have still been unsuccessful in the cases (Wyman, 2013; Scott, 2015). The participants in Scott’s (2015) project commented that references to climate change in an international protection claim would perhaps discourage judges because they might think that it would be more applicable through a political process or the judge would be afraid that the precedent would open up for mass influx of migrants.

In addition to the incompatibility to the Geneva Convention, Scott (2015) highlights the absence of knowledge and guidance among lawyers on how to handle climate induced migrants. The migrants rarely refer to environmental issues in their country of origin in their claims; the lawyers do no seek that type of information in order to make a claim for refugee status or subsidiary protection. Furthermore, neither the US State Department nor UK Government Country of Origin Service adds environmental disaster information in their reports. (Scott, 2015)

There are various issues regarding climate induced migration and current legislation but Scott (2015) found in his research that more people should be entitled refugee status than previous academic articles have suggested. He suggests that climate change affects some people more than others and this could be interpreted as a discriminatory factor in the Geneva Convention. In the case of drought (a slow-onset consequence of climate change) famine might hit a whole town or village, but this does not necessarily mean that the whole population will suffer from famine and, Scott argues that the fact that some will be more affected than others is considered a social construction which could be related to the Convention’s demands. This interpretation of the Geneva Convention is discouraged by Wyman (2013) who argues that
climate change migrants cannot be said being part of a particular social group because the group should fundamentally connected.

**Theoretical perspectives**

Different approaches to migration and measurements to handle climate induced migration are based on different theoretical approaches. Migration theories tend to be dominated by sociological and economic explanations such as the popular push-pull models on migration, arguing that migration might be a result of the economy (Holliefield, 2001; Mobjörk & Simonsson, 2011; EASO 2016). European Asylum Support Office (EASO) published in 2016 a literature review trying to explain migration to Europe through the push and pull model (EASO, 2016). Decisions to migrate or not are determined by pros and cons, comparing the area of origin and the destination area. Environmental degradation is a “pushing” variable while stable climate is a “pulling” one. (Castles, de Haas and Miller, 2014; EASO, 2016)

However, there are some critical points. Firstly, the model cannot explain return migration and the fact that immigration and emigration are taking place at the same time in the same country. Secondly, the model represents a deterministic point of view when assuming that economy, environment, and demography “cause” migration. (Castles, de Haas and Miller, 2014)

There is a tendency among actors and literature to view migration and climate change through a lens of security, and that is why the security aspect is crucial also in this thesis (White, 2011; Skillington, 2014; Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2014). Integrating environmental discourses with security discourse two central theories are more frequent than others; state security theory or human security theory (Detraz & Windsor, 2014). State security theory is widely debated within the field of international relations and scholars like Holliefield (2000) and Skillington (2014) refers it back to the Westphalian peace 1648 which is referred to as the foundation of the national state and its qualifications. The push-pull model could be viewed as a part of the state security perspective since the main actor is the state; state policies either pulls migrants to itself (as an example through big demand for labour) or pushes them away (for example by border controls).

The state security discourse emphasizes military preparedness and border control (Detraz & Windsor, 2014). Control can in this theory be used with more than one association; it could refer to control over the entry and exits of a state or a union. It could also refer to political control over the citizens. (Hollifield, 2001) Threats, vulnerability and risks are analysed on a national level and are posed to states rather than its citizens (Detraz & Windsor, 2014). The connection of migration as a threat to the national state and poses number of challenges in terms of territorial integrity, cultural cohesiveness, national identity and the fundamentals of sovereignty (Holliefield, 2001; Boswell & Geddes, 2001; Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2014; Detraz & Windsor, 2014; Hampshire, 2015).

Human security, on the other hand, puts focus on the security of citizens rather than the state. The perspective was developed during the 1990’s and emphasizes the responsibility to protect and using security more widely than the other theoretical perspectives. Security is not only freedom from fear, “security is about to confront extreme vulnerabilities” (Kaldor, 2007, p.
independent of war, political violence or hurricanes. Kaldor (2007) furthermore suggests that a human security perspective is best applicable when discussing displaced persons since they are exposed to both natural and manmade disasters; both material and physical insecurity. Jolly and Ray (2006) have defined the term for the UNDP and defined it as following:

An analytical tool that focuses on ensuring security for the individual, not the state… In line with the expanded definition of human security, the causes of insecurity are subsequently broadened to include threats to socio-economic and political conditions, food, health, and environmental, community and personal safety. Policy initiatives generated through the application of the human security framework have incorporated considerations far beyond the traditional focus on military force, greatly reducing the emphasis on armies, if not replacing them altogether. (Jolly & Ray, 2006, pg. 5)

Detraz and Windsor (2014) also apply the human security theory and they connect it to increased vulnerability as a result of climate change. They suggest that a human security perspective should use the narratives of vulnerability when discussing climate induced migration since it includes social, economic and physical factors.

This thesis made an attempt to explore the perspectives of climate induced migration in the UN, the EU and among Swedish authorities. The intention was further to explore the suggested measurements on climate induced migrations. To ensure an inclusive approach I decided to not focus solely on one theoretical perspective but to include both a state security perspective and a human security perspective.

In addition to these theoretical perspectives; the ongoing debate on the new geological era of the Anthropocene should also be mentioned. Some scholars, Johan Rockström is perhaps the most well-known, emphasize that humans dominate nature more than the opposite and that humans are the biggest factor to a changing environment; they have named this era the Anthropocene (Steffen et al., 2011). Accepting the Anthropocene is also to view humans a similar geological force as any natural geological force (Descola & Latour, 2013). The Anthropocene means the total domination over nature; scholars in favour of the Anthropocene approach stress a stewardship of man. This should be seen in contrast to the debate on the nature culture divide.

Scholars such as Latour (Descola & Latour, 2013), Hornborg (2009), and Hajer and Fischer (2005) argue that nature and humans (culture) should not be seen as two parallel systems, often referred to as the nature culture dichotomy. This nature culture dichotomy emphasizes two alienated systems. Rather, we need to bridge over or, underneath the nature culture divide and aiming for one dynamic system between them two. Culture, argue Hajer and Fischer (2005), should not be limited to an exploration of ´other cultures´ but rather it should be a reflexive procedure incorporating nature as well. There is currently no theoretical framework, presenting security from an Anthropocene view; but it is necessary to re-think how security and migration might change in a new world where ecosystems are changing rapidly and sovereign states are disappearing due to climate change (Dalby, 2014).

The principle of ´common but differentiated responsibilities´ acknowledges historical differences of how developing and developed countries have contributed to climate change but also recognizes that the differences also concern their capacity to tackle the negative consequences financially and technically (CISDL, 2002). One example of how the new era is
tackling climate change could be regarded through the Warsaw mechanism on Loss and Damage. It has been developed in light of the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ principle. The Warsaw mechanism on Loss and Damage is a financial mechanism which was established in 2013 to address climate change induced loss and damage in vulnerable countries (including both slow- and rapid onsets) (UNFCCC, 2014).

**Policy responses and suggested measurements**

Another part of the literature concerns policy responses and measurements; reaching over several disciplines. Eckersley (2015) have examined how states assist climate change affected countries through lenses of Loss and Damage, Polluter Pays Principle, Beneficiary Pays Principle and Ability to Pay Principle and concludes that none of the measurements alone can provide justice to climate migrants. Eckersley (2015) suggests monetary measurements such as a funding mechanism to ease resettlement connected to the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage.

Viewing migration from a climate adaptation and resilience building is also occurring in the literature. Tacoli (2009) argues that migration should not be viewed through a crisis lens but should be integrated in climate adaptation plans. Warner (2012) sheds lights on the Cancun Adaptation Framework which was adopted in 2010 and provides a financial framework to ease migration through climate adaptation.

Another example of how climate change can lead to migration is discussed by Warner, Dun and Stal (2008). They highlight the flooding in the river of Zanbezi in Mozambique in 2001, 2007 and 2008 made many people homeless and needed to be relocated (Warner, Dun and Stal, 2008). The delta regions and the coastal line of Zanbezi is still of particular high risk of erosion and inundation. Neither of these weather events created an international migration, it was rather the government who supplied for resettlement programs internally in the country.

Another dimension of climate induced migration is the sinking states in the Pacific. The citizens of Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tokelau and the Marshall Islands will most likely have to be resettled already by 2050 due to these vulnerabilities. Farquhar (2014) suggests that New Zealand should provide territory in order to resettle whole societies since New Zealand is a neighboring country and will most likely face immigration from the sinking states.

Methmann and Oels (2015) suggest that migration should be regarded as a climate adaption tool while Kelman (2008) goes a bit further and suggests that countries less affected by climate change should cede territory. Ödalen (2015) agrees with Kelman (2008) and concludes that migrant groups without a territory still could exercise sovereignty “to a certain extent”.

9
Definitions

People who are affected by climate change and have to migrate (internally or externally) have different names in the literature and many scholars such as Morton, Boncour and Laczko (2008), Dun and Gemenne (2008), Black et al. (2011) acknowledge and discuss the need for a term and definition. Dun and Gemenne (2008) emphasize the need for an interdisciplinary approach when constructing the term and definition. As mentioned earlier, classic migration theory tend to ignore environmental factors and focus on issues related to the Geneva Convention while environmental theories too often ignore migration patterns. (Dun & Gemenne, 2008; Farquhar, 2014)

**Climate induced displacement:** This term is commonly used in the literature and includes internally displaced persons, migrants and refugees. A definition of the term is however lacking. (Leckie, 2008; Wyman, 2013; Faruqhar, 2014; Baldwin, 2015; Skillington, 2015; UNFCCC, 2015) I have chosen to use the term “climate induced migrants” connected to this term since it is widely used even though I focused on cross-border migration.

**Climate refugee:** Used by Methmann and Oels (2015) and Eckersley (2015) but heavily criticized by scholars such as Stavropoulou (2008) and Adamo (2016). Eckersley (2015) stresses that the Geneva Convention is the pivotal legislative framework when analysing migration and refuge and therefore uses this definition to describe and compare climate refugees to political refugees (who are protected by the Geneva Convention). The most distinct argument against this term emerges from the lack of legal definition (Stavropoulou, 2008; Kothari, 2014; Adamo, 2016).

**Environmental refugee:** This term was suggested by Myers already in 1997 and defined it as

“There are fast-growing numbers of people who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, deforestation and other environmental problems. In their desperation, these “environmental refugees”—as they are increasingly coming to be known and as they are termed in this paper—feel they have no alternative but to seek sanctuary elsewhere, however hazardous the attempt. Not all of them have fled their countries, many being internally displaced. But all have abandoned their homelands on a semi-permanent if not permanent basis, having little hope of a foreseeable return.” (Myers, 1997, pg. 167)

Stavropoulou (2008) argues that this term also is legally inaccurate but still more constraining than “environmental migrant”. Stavropoulou (2008) argues that “climate change refugee” is incompatible due to the complexity of correlating all types of environmental degradation to climate change as the major factor.

**Climate/Environmental migrant:** This term provides a broad and diverse definition used by Morton, Boncour and Laczko (2008), Wyman (2013), Detraz and Windsor (2014) and by Baldwin (2015) to describe “…individuals, communities and societies who choose, or are forced, to migrate as a result of damaging environmental and climatic factors.” (Morton, Boncour and Laczko, 2008, p.5) Adamo (2016, slide 3) uses IOM’s definition of environmental migrant which is “persons or group of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.”
Limitations

Though the area of climate induced migration has been explored since the 1980’s the issue still requires several questions to be answered (Baldwin, 2015). There is an extensive literature on how climate change correlates with different internal migration; but this is not with the purpose of this thesis.

This thesis only focused on forced migration, as Skillington (2015, pg.289) defines it “involuntarily to leave their home and frequently their country as a consequence of declining environmental condition that cumulatively are not their own doing…”

Whose voices are presented and which ones are excluded are important to highlight. Since the aim of the thesis is to evaluate the Swedish preparedness for climate induced migrants, it is the responsible agencies which are the most important voices to be heard. On the other hand, one must be aware that respondents with experience of migration might have another view of the preparedness. This will be however be excluded since it is outside the scope of the study since it focused on the institutions views of the preparedness.

The gender aspect has been highlighted by scholars Detraz and Windsor (2014) and by the Nansen Initiative (2015) which implies that is an interesting aspect to include. This would certainly be interesting since there are extensive references on how climate change disadvantage women more than men (Nansen Initiative (2015). However, this aspect will not be considered in this thesis since the focus is on preparedness and that is independently of gender.

Not only governments are involved with developing the migration agenda; there are several highly respected non-profit organizations (such as International Organization for Migration, Migreurop) that could have provided interesting perspectives but I decided to focus on the political institutions.

Lastly, this thesis aimed for a degree in environmental science and not within political science or any other field. Hence this thesis did not elaborate on issues related to the political science field, such as the role of the states or other institutions. Nor did it explore the legal gaps in an extensive way, this is outside the scope of this article.
Methods and materials

Methodology is a crucial section that affects the credibility of a study. In order to reach a deeper understanding of the possibilities and barriers of climate induced migration among institutions and agencies, a qualitative study was conducted. Bryman (2016, pg. 375) introduces qualitative research as an epistemological position which underlines the understanding of a social context through analysis and interpretation of its participants. There are numerous types of qualitative methods. I used two types of methods based on Bryman (2016): qualitative document analysis and semi-structured interviews.

This chapter first motivates the chosen methodologies; first discussing semi-structured interviews and then the qualitative content analysis and its coding schedule. Thereafter it explains how the material was chosen, both regarding the documents and the interviews.

Methods

Semi-structured interviews

The communication between the researcher and the respondent is essential to understand. The formulated questions, both in the document analysis and in interviews, affect what type of answers the study receives. My name, gender and appearance could potentially also affect the answers (Gronmo, 2004). In order to reduce this bias it was necessary that I as the researcher develop a neutral communication and in interviews, create a safe atmosphere (Gronmo, 2004). In order to try to be as objective as possible in both matrix and interviews I used the same words as the documents from the Swedish level when constructing the questions and the matrix.

Gronmo (2004) points out a potential issue; respondents might change their responses in order to appear in a certain way. This could be an issue in the case of climate induced migration; the respondents might want to show that they have been working with the issue even though they haven’t. Gronmo (2004) highlights that the researcher needs to use follow up questions and compare the respondent’s answers to each other to reveal these faults. Since I conducted one interview per agency it was difficult to confirmation the answers by the respondents.

On the Swedish level there were only a few policy documents concerning climate induced migration; that is why I chose to complement the document analysis with interviews. Interviews are situations where a person asks questions and another answers them, they can have several aims. Teachers use the form to make students learn new knowledge and therapists utilise their questions to heal their patients. In a research interview however, the questions purpose is not to change the respondents but to achieve a better understanding of the research questions. In this thesis the interviews aim at developing an understanding of the views of my respondents. (Wengraf, 2001) Complementing the thesis with interviews gave me a broader understanding of how different Swedish agencies portray climate induced migration and what type of measurements they suggest. Particularly since the Swedish material is published by the same agency there would be a risk that perspectives would have been lost while interviewing several agencies has the potential to reveal interesting differences and similarities in the international context.

Semi-structured interviews are preferable in qualitative research since they allow the interviewee to tell their opinions without having the answers constructed from the beginning. The semi-structured interview has a number of both open and closed questions which will lead the interview in the direction as the researcher wants; compared to an unstructured interview where the questions are few, open and informal and the interview is similar to a
conversation. (Bryman, 2016) The questions in a semi-structured interview need to be sufficiently open for the respondent to create a narrative and the follow up-questions of the interviewer cannot be constructed in advance; rather there is a need to improvise them during the interview. (Wengraf, 2001) Improvising follow up-questions requires major mental preparations and planning of the researcher both before the interview, demands discipline and creativity during the session and a lot of time to analyse the results compared to a structured interview. (Wengraf, 2001; Bryman, 2016)

Before the interviews

Interview guide
I created an interview guide before conducting the interviews. There were several purposes doing so, the main purpose was to make sure the interviews correspond to the aim of the thesis. The interview guide aimed at

- Creating a frame in which the respondents understanding for climate refugees will be visible.
- To understand how the respondents explain the phenomenon of climate induced migration.
- Which perspective the respondents apply.
- Which measurements they see necessary to handle the phenomenon
- How the respondents frame the need of preparation on a national level.
- How the respondents view slow- and rapid-onsets and the potential differences when seeking refuge.

It was also crucial for the validity of the study to make sure that the questions in the interview guide were interpreted in the way they intend to be. I then tested the questions and discussed with other students on how they interpret the questions and how I want them to be interpreted.

As explained earlier, semi-structured interviews are neither complete open discussions, nor a questionnaire (Bryman, 2016). Instead the interview guide consists of open questions which seek to attain an understanding of climate induced migration by the respondents. There are also some hypothetical questions which are a certain type of open question that allows the respondent to talk freely about a non-existing situation. It aims at capturing ideas and thoughts that might be outside the box and Krag Jacobsen (2009) explains that hypothetical questions might give new and surprising answers. Apart from the open questions there was a mixture of direct questions, specified questions and are designed in a way that the respondent cannot easily answer “yes” or “no” (Bryman, 2016).

Anonymity and confidentiality
Anonymity was provided in that way that the interviewee’s name, age or place would not be exposed, and all interviewees was renamed as respondents from its agency. Wengraf (2001) stresses the importance of not promising anonymity when this is not possible and that is why I have chosen to still include the name of the authority. Choosing to exclude the name of agency and the position of the interviewee would discourage the aim of the thesis. Confidentiality cannot be provided since that’s a higher degree of anonymity. Confidentiality means nothing said during the interviews would be published, which would make it impossible to use quotes, but I assured my respondents a high degree of anonymity and also confidentiality to some extent if the interviewee requires it. (Wengraf, 2001)

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1 The full interview guide can be found in an English translated version in appendix 1 (page 60).
Ethics
Before conducting interviews, some considerations had to be outlined. Firstly, there was the ethical aspect. Ethics must always be regarded in order to protect the participant and to achieve a credible study. Baxter and Eyeles (1997) suggest that a credible study is a study in which the respondents and targeted groups recognize the description of an issue. In order to achieve this I used the same terms as the policy documents in my interview questions and try to not let my own values reflect the questions. It was also important to put emphasis on the fact that migration is a delicate matter with many feelings involved. However, I did not believe any ethical issues would arise from this, but to take it into account when conducting the interviews.

Qualitative content analysis
The qualitative content analysis is generally used to analyse documents and mass media productions (Gronmo, 2004; Bryman, 2016). Systematisation and objectivity are keywords in this analysis. Bryman (2016) present the analysis as a method in which the researcher constructs a matrix of questions before analysing the material. The matrix is then applied on all material which will lead to a systematized way of analysing the material. This is independent of whether the material comes from official documents or transcribed interviews.

Qualitative content analysis can be used in different ways. Berelson, who developed the method in the 1950’s, described it as a method to analyse “communication” while Holsti refer to “messages”. Bryman uses the method as presented by Berelson and Holsti and presents some useful tools when developing the matrix; what is communicated, in which context does is get communicated and lastly, how much is it communicated. (Bryman, 2016)

Another version of qualitative content analysis is an ethnographic content analysis. It was developed by Altheide and Schneider (2013) and focuses on the researcher (Bryman, 2016). In Bryman´s (2016) method, the matrix is constructed by the questions and aims of the researcher while in the ethnographic content analysis the matrix is emerged by the material itself. The ethnographic content analysis could be of interest for this thesis since it would remove the biases of the researcher; on the other hand there is a risk that different material reveals such diverse results that it will be impossible to analyse and reach any conclusions relating to the aims of this thesis.

The qualitative content analysis suggested by Bryman (2016) proposes a matrix in which different themes are analysed, both outspoken and underlying. Detecting underlying themes and perspectives demands an interpretative approach by the researcher. In order to keep the transparency, a coding scheme might be used. Coding is a critical step in the process of the method and it consists of two parts; the coding schedule and the coding manual. Data that fit into the codes should be placed in a form; that is the coding schedule. The second part is the coding manual which is a description of the codes and how to interpret them. (Bryman, 2016)

The coding manual is an important complement to the schedule, the manual is the instruction of how the themes should be coded and is provided as a list of themes. Analysing the empirics revealed certain themes, depending on the research questions, and will be coded based on the coding manual in table 3. The codes are thereafter presented in the coding schedule. (Bryman, 2016)

Coding matrix
There are several aspects that need to be considered when devising the coding schedule and manual. For the sake of transparency and replicability it is crucial that there is no empirical
The coding matrix was used for analysing both documents and transcribed interviews. Table 2 below illustrates the coding schedule of this thesis. Bryman (2016) suggests that each material should be coded individually, but since the aim of this thesis was to get an understanding of the overall view presented by an institution I would argue the fusion is better suiting the aim. Any individual diversion from the general result will be visible in the analysis section. Table 2 below illustrates the coding schedule I used and then complemented with codes from the coding manual (table 3).

Table 1 Coding schedule by Bryman (2016), modified version coding the material by institution and not individually.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Measurements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The coding manual was divided into three categories connected to the research questions; the first two categories applied to the first research question “What view and perspectives of climate induced migration exist in the UN, the EU and among Swedish agencies?” And the third category applied to the second research question “What legal, technical, economic or other measures do they respond with to meet climate induced migration?”

Category *phenomenon* asks the question of how the institutions portray the phenomenon of climate induced migration. The codes were related to the previous research mark climate induced migration as triggered by conflict (code 1), such as White (2011), Foresight (2011) and Kelley et al. (2015). Other scholars argue that climate change cannot be regarded as a trigger to migration; previously labelled as ’sceptics’ such as Black et al. (2011) (code 2). Last was the code for scholars who defend that climate induced migration are a result of rapid and slow onsets (code 3), such as Warner, Dun and Stal (2008) and Mhanna (2013). I also included a fourth code called ‘other’ in case of unforeseen results from my empirics.

Category *perspective* was connected to the theoretical perspective. The first code was linked to state security perspective which Detraz and Windsor (2014) and Skillington (2015) argue is often applicable. Code 2 on human security was connected to researchers such as Kaldor (2007) who claim this code is best applicable in cases of climate induced migration. Consistently with the previous category, I added a fourth code called ‘other’.

The last category *measurement* was also connected to previous research. Code 1 was a code in case the empirics would decline a correlation between climate change and migration patterns and therefore not suggesting a measurement. None of the scholars I have read have provided support for this code, but I still wanted to give my respondents the opportunity. Code 2 is based on previous research on financial mechanisms such as loss and damage and polluter pays principle (Eckersley, 2015).
The code on climate adaptation and capacity building (code 3), including suggesting migration as an adaptation measurement is based on scholars such as Foresight (2011) and Methmann and Oels (2015). Code 4 on legislative measurements are being widely discussed; Riera (2008), White (2011) and Wyman (2013) advocate that the Geneva Convention cannot be used and there are several protection gaps in the field of climate induced migration, Scott (2015) proposes that current legislations could give refuge to people who have moved because of climate change. It therefore seemed appropriate to add a code for that type of legislation.

The code for cede territory (code 5) are based on scholars such as Kelman (2008) and Ödalen (2015) who recommend that migrant groups without a territory could be provided new territory by other states. In order to cover other suggested measurements in the empirics I once again added a last code I called ´other´(code 6). Table 3 illustrates the coding manual and it was used with an abductive approach.

Table 2 illustrates the coding manual and is used with an abductive approach.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>How is the phenomenon of climate migration portrayed?</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Which perspective on climate migration is applied?</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>What measurements are suggested to meet climate induced migration, if any?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Codes</td>
<td>1. Crisis related</td>
<td>Codes</td>
<td>1. Human security</td>
<td>Codes</td>
<td>1. No measurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Climate is not a driver for migration</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. State security</td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Economic measurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. A mixture of rapid and slow onsets</td>
<td></td>
<td>3. A mixture of both human and state security</td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Climate adaptation/building resilience in country of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Legislative measurement; relocation/resettlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Cede territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last part was to apply the coding manual on the documents and transcribed interviews. One document was analysed at a time and each category was given a certain colour; all sentences connected to a category was given a colour and a number (a code). The most accurate descriptions of a code was picked and used as quotes to illustrate the codes.

Material

The sampling of documents was done between August 2016 and January 2017. I initially made a search on Google; key words were the institution’s name and climate migration, i.e. “EU climate migration” or “UNHCR climate migration”. Other used keywords were: refugee, environment and climate induced migration. I continued looking for documents at the webpages of the Swedish Migration Agency, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute, Swedish International
Development Agency (SIDA), Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), Ministry for Justice and the Ministry for Environment and Energy. All documents were found that way except Mobjörk and Simonsson (2011) which was a suggestion by my respondent at the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI).

Other important search engines to obtain valuable information have been the webpage of the European Commission, the European Parliament and EU Information Centre.

My aim was to find as recently published documents in correlation to my research questions. Since I wanted to use documents referring to both climate change and migration (and not just one of them) the results were quite poor, especially on the EU and Swedish level. In order to keep high quality and accuracy on the material, two documents per institution seemed like a minimum. I could probably have found more documents, especially if I would have included politicians and academics but that would not be answering my aim with the thesis and could potentially make it more complicated to understand for the readers.
Table 3 illustrates the chosen material which will be used as premier empirical material for this thesis. Four interviews with Swedish agencies will complement the Swedish case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Swedish Defense Research Agency</th>
<th>Swedish Defense Research Agency</th>
<th>European Commission</th>
<th>EU Policy Department</th>
<th>UNHCR</th>
<th>UN Advisory group on Human Mobility and Climate Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
<td>Thinking Ahead on Security: What’s Different This Time? Dispatch no. 1 (10)</td>
<td>Klimaförändringar, migration och konflikter: samband och förutsägelser</td>
<td>Climate change, environmental degradation, and migration</td>
<td>“Climate Refugees” Legal and policy responses to environmentally induced migration</td>
<td>Remarks by Volker Türk for the Discussion Forum on Climate Change</td>
<td>Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change UNFCCC Paris COP 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose of document</strong></td>
<td>An interdisciplinary approach to study security and develop a new analytical framework with regards to technical, environmental and social factors in consideration.</td>
<td>Explore correlations between climate change, migration and conflicts. Also discuss predictions of future climate induced migration to Europe.</td>
<td>Overview of current research and data of linkages between climate change and migration, and overview of initiatives that EU already has taken.</td>
<td>Revision of the international debate and identifying policy responses under EU policy and suggesting new responses.</td>
<td>Official standpoint by UNHCR. Remarks on cross-border displacement and relocation.</td>
<td>Official recommendations on how migration is affected by climate change with regards to resilience, vulnerability and adaptation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The UN material

On the UN level I chose to analyze the working document *Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change UNFCCC Paris COP 21* by the UN Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility. The paper is a recommendation published in November 2015, consisting of a brief discussion on human mobility connected to climate change and suggesting various measurements of how to tackle it.

The second document on the UN level was a speech delivered by the Director of International Protection at the UNHCR; Volker Türk. The speech was held at a discussion forum on climate change in Berlin in June 2014. The remarks represent the UNHCR’s point of view on climate change and its effects on “persons of interest” (i.e. displaced persons) as well as legal gaps and measurements.

There were several other potential materials on the UN level, such as *Climate-Induced Displacement and Migration: Policy Gaps and Policy Alternative* (Center for Participatory Research & Development (CPRD 2015), 2015) or *Climate Change, Vulnerability and Human Mobility: Perspectives of Refugees from the East and Horn of Africa* (Afifi et al, 2012) but I did not use them because while both of them are published by institutions connected to the UN, they do not present the official standpoint of the UN itself. Furthermore, both migration policy and climate change policy change rapidly and the publication date of the material was given primacy.

The EU material

On the EU level I base my analysis on “*Climate Refugees” Legal and policy responses to environmentally induced migration* (Kraler, Cernei & Noack 2011) which is a policy paper produced by the policy department of the European Parliament. The report aims at clarifying the definition of climate refugees and at identifying policy responses under EU policy. Even though the Kraler, Cernei and Noack report (2011) is not an official statement by the European Parliament it has been written on demand from the Committee of Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs which illustrates an interest from the Members of European Parliament on the subject.

The second document is the working document *Climate change, environmental degradation, and migration*, published in 2013 by the European Commission. The working paper is a result of a request from the European Council to the European Commission. It aims at giving an overview of current research and data of linkages between climate change and migration. The aim is also to give an overview of initiatives that EU already has taken. (European Commission, 2013)

The Swedish material

Lastly, on the Swedish level I chose to examine *Klimatförändringar, migration och konflikter: samband och förutsägelser* which is a report by the FOI by Mobjörk and Simonsson (2011). The report was demanded by the Swedish armed forces and aims at exploring correlations between climate change, migration and conflicts as well as analyse the predictions on climate induced migration (Mobjörk & Simonsson, 2011).

The other document was also published by the FOI. It is the *Thinking Ahead on Security: What’s Different This Time? Dispatch no. 1 (10)* (Eriksson et. al, 2015) which is the result of a project named SÄKER: Project on Integrated Security. The report gives extensive information on theoretical perspectives on security, connects security to environmental
degradation and migration. Finally, it discusses measurements on how security, climate change and migration can be used (SÄKER, 2015).

There were some more options to consider when deciding on the empirical material for the analysis on the Swedish level. The Geopolitics of Climate Change by Haldén (2007) was one; it is widely referred to by Swedish agencies when searching for material on “climate” and “migration” and seems to be a key report for the Swedish view on climate induced migrants. It was published in 2007 and is a typical “sceptic” report arguing that climate change will not affect migration. It’s ten years ago since it was published and other more relevant reports have been published since then. Other options were Extrema väderhändelser och klimatförändringarnas effekter which is a knowledge review by Rummukainen (2010) and Klimatförändringarnas konsekvenser för samhällsskydd och beredskap – A Review published by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2012) but both reports only touched briefly on climate induced migration.

Choice of respondents

The Swedish model of government administration is built upon ministries with agencies responding to the ministries². In this case, the Ministry of Justice gives instructions to their authorities.

Salner (1989) stresses that human reasoning doesn’t have to reflect the “truth”. The answers given are rather the person’s reflections which are products of interpersonal agreements. These “truths” differ from societies (and groups within the societies as well, I would argue) and a valid thesis can only try to represent different groups views of reality. It should also be noted that the respondents accepting to participate in an interview doesn’t necessarily provide the general view at the agency. A deeper understanding of how Swedish agencies view climate induced migration and Sweden’s preparedness would require significantly more interviews and extensive research.

Öberg (2011) emphasizes the need for clarifying why societal actors are involved with the research, otherwise there is a risk of the respondents try to convince the researcher in a certain direction. This is even more important when dealing with value-laden issues. The agencies ‘attitudes are crucial for the thesis and that is why they were contacted and asked to participate.

One aim of this thesis was to explore Sweden’s preparedness through analysing suggested measurements to meet climate induced migration. To explore the in depth knowledge on these matters agencies are central actors. Contact was initially made through e-mail. I contacted the agency’s Head of Unit with responsibility for research and development and security, about two persons per agency. In the e-mail I asked for an interview with either the Head of Unit or someone at the unit who would suit the purpose of the thesis. Then I followed up with a phone call about one week after the e-mail was sent; except from the contacts with the Swedish Migration Agency where I did a one month internship and did one interview with a Head of Unit.

The following agencies were contacted for interviews: the Swedish Migration Agency, the FOI, SIDA and finally MSB. Moreover, since the agencies are dependent on appropriations from the Ministry of Justice I tried to get an interview from them as well. When the interview was declined I sent questions in an e-mail through my supervisor at the Swedish Migration Agency.

² A more extensive explanation of how Swedish administration functions can be found under the section Swedish Public Administration on page 35.
Agency but have not until now got an answer. I also tried to get an interview with the Ministry of Environment and Energy but got the reply that it was dealt with within the field of the Ministry of Justice. I also wanted to make an observation of the asylum process by participate in an interview between an asylum seeker and his or hers administrator, but was told that climate change or environmental conditions are not part of the asylum process; partly due to lack of litigation and precedent, partly due to the temporary law in Sweden\(^3\). Lastly I wanted to have a second interview with staff from the Swedish Migration Agency, either at Lifos\(^4\) or the Legal Unit. Although the responses from both units have been positive their time has been constraint and they couldn’t participate in an interview.

I did four interviews in total between November 2016 and February 2017 and they were all between 30 and 60 minutes long. These were:

- Head of Unit of one of the units at the International Department at the Swedish Migration Agency
- Researcher at the FOI
- Analyst at the MSB
- Senior Policy Advisor at the SIDA

Other agencies could probably have been interesting to interview, such as the Swedish Coastguard or Swedish Environmental Protection Agency but since it has been difficult finding officials who are working on the matter I decided to get interviews with the most involved agencies.

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\(^3\) More information on the Swedish temporary law can be found on page 37.

\(^4\) Lifos is the unit providing the agency information on the current situations of countries of interests. Their information are central in the asylum procedures and therefore also interest for this thesis.
The United Nations and its preparedness for climate induced migration

There are several institutions and organs working parallel to the UN level, connected to climate induced migration. Agenda 2030 is a UN based framework and a development of the Millennium Development Goals. The framework was adopted in September 2015 and has a broad approach; including poverty reduction, gender equality, climate change and economic inequality. Agenda 2030 is not only related to climate induced migration, but several of its aims points out key issues. The framework consists of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s) and some of them are related to climate induced migration; particularly SDG 10 which point out safe migration and mobility for people, SDG 13 on climate action and SDG 16 on strong institutions. (UNDP, 2016) However, the SDG’s do not make a correlation between climate change, environmental degradation and migration.

Koff and Maganda (2016) relate the SDG’s to the theory of human security and environmental security. In the mid 1990’s when UN and EU begun to turn away from the traditional development work (which had a heavy focus on financial transactions) a new development paradigm begun. The new focus was rather on ecology than economy, with concepts of ‘sustainable development’ and ‘Agenda 21’. Compared to the Millennium Development Goals, the SDG´s have a more including approach towards participants. (Koff & Magenda, 2016) In accordance with Kaldor ‘s (2007) principles of bottom-up approach and regional focus the SDGs was formed through a participative web platform called ‘The world we want’ (Beyond2015.org, 2015; Koff & Magenda, 2016). This participatory approach, notes Koff and Magenda (2016), is more democratic and transparent than the top-down approach but it could also result in stagnation and insufficient operationalized policies.

Apart from Agenda 2030, the UN has been working on environmental issues, disaster risk reduction and migration for a long time. The UNHCR, United Nation High Commissioner for Climate Change (UNFCCC) and United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) are perhaps the most distinguished institutions related to this topic. Figure 2 illustrates an organization scheme of the UN:
Figure 2 demonstrates the organisation scheme of the UN organs with the relevant programs,ries and agencies. Modified version of Swan (2017) and United Nations Department of Public Information (2007).

The UNHCR recognizes that since 2008, 22.5 million people have been displaced due to climate change, this include internally displaced persons. The UNHCR is the coordinator of the UN Advisory Group on Human Mobility and Climate Change and provides technical support to UNFCCC. In 2015, UNHCR presented the Guidance on protecting people from disasters and environmental change through planned relocation to assist governments and other actors in need of planned relocation. Suggesting that one adaption measurement to climate change could be planned relocation. The guidance includes policy recommendations, assessment of need for relocation and how to implement relocation. This could be seen both as a policy framework and as a measurement of how to handle climate induced migration. (UNHCR, 2017)

As a result of the outcome of COP 16 in Cancun in 2010, the member states acknowledge the existence of climate induced migration and need for relocation as a climate adaption measurement. The Nansen Initiative was founded as a result of this acknowledgement (Nansen Initiative, 2015). The Initiative concluded its work by publishing Agenda for the protection of cross-border displaced persons in the context of disasters and climate change Volume I and II which was endorsed by 109 states (Disaster Displacement, 2016d). The agenda provides effective practises connected to cross-border migration and stress the need for increased collaboration between multiple stakeholders to address root causes to migration (Nansen Initiative, 2015).

A new initiative was formed in beginning of 2016, called Platform on Disaster Displacement which is a follow up on the Nansen Initiative. Germany is chairing the meetings and Bangladesh is vice-chair, other founding members to the platform are Australia, Brazil, Fiji,
EU, France, Mexico, Morocco, Kenya, Philippines, Canada, Costa Rica, Madagascar, Senegal, Switzerland and Maldives. IOM and UNHCR have a standing invitation to the meetings. (Disaster Displacement, 2016a)

The Disaster Displacement Platform could be seen as a coordinating network; all of their work is bottom-up based and in cooperation with other existing networks. The platform are seeking to fulfil gaps in the legislation for climate induced migrants, not by suggesting new legal standards but by using existing ones based on the Protection Agenda. (Disaster Displacement, 2016b) But apart from that the platform seeks to increase and precise the data on climate induced migration and also collect measurements and existing practises around the globe. (Disaster Displacement, 2016c)

The UNFCCC is engaged in the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage; the committee has produced several articles related to the subject (UNFCCC, 2014). During 2016 the UNFCCC held a conference on the linkages between migration and climate change (UNFCCC, 2016). UNEP addressed the issue already in 2008 and formed a group of experts back then. Alike the work of the UNFCCC and the Disaster Displacement Platform, UNEP is identifying research, awareness –raising and country specific projects as the most important objectives. (UNEP, u.â.)

Coding of the UN material
The UN material consisted of, as presented in the chapter Methods and materials, two documents. The first document was the document Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change UNFCCC Paris COP 21 by the UN Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility (the UN Advisory Group hereafter). The second document represents the view of UNHCR regarding climate change and how it affects migration patterns; a speech by the Director of International Protection at the UNHCR; Volker Türk. Table 4 below illustrates the coding schedule of the UN material and each category was provided with a code from table 3 and the following section explains the codes. Table 4 below shows that the UN view climate change as crisis related and have a human security perspective. The UN advocates resilience building and climate change adaptation as a measurement to ease climate induced migration.

Table 4 illustrates a modified coding schedule presented by Bryman (2016).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN</th>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Measurements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 crisis related</td>
<td>1 human security</td>
<td>3 resilience building</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The portrayal of climate induced migration
It is clear from the documents that both the UNHCR and the Advisory Group agrees that climate change affects migration patterns.

“The drought made the conflict worse. Everyone became afraid of everyone. Some raiders came and took away the little food we had raised on our farm. Now we are in a very hard time: the people at home face conflict and famine. They are starving. If we could go back, we would have only dry land and death to greet us.’ Pastoralist from Somalia, Sherd Camp, Ethiopia” (Türk, 2014, pg. 1)

The quote above illustrates how climate change forces people to leave their homes and if they go back there is only “death to greet us”. Whether death alludes the conflict or the lack of food is left unsaid but the consequence of the drought is famine and conflict. It could also be said that this quote gives an example of how slow-onsets affects migration, which would then be code five in table 3, but the next quote point in another direction.
“Recognize that climate change is a threat to livelihoods and human safety.” (UN Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, 2015, pg. 4)

This quote above by the UN Advisory Group emphasize that climate change is a threat to human security. It is debatable whether this quote should be presented under this subheading or under next section; it could clearly fit in both. However, I would argue that the wording of climate change as a threat makes it interesting for this section. It clearly portrays climate change as a catalyst for crises. This view is also strengthened by next quote.

“This last quote reinforces the view of climate change as crises related. It might be a crisis in itself (drought causes famine) but more often it works as a trigger for conflicts. These findings give no clear view why people migrate, whether it is due to climate change consequences of because of conflict. The documents are not clear on this matter, but the first quote suggests that people migrate because of conflicts, reinforced by climate change.

The applied perspective on climate induced migration

Nowhere in the two documents were signs of a state security perspective. The quotes below provides support for code 1; the human security perspective.

“Looking to the future, the human rights and protection needs of those affected by climate change must feature in national development priorities (such as agriculture, infrastructure and education), strategic planning and budgeting.” (Türk, 2014, pg. 7)

This quote demonstrates clearly how human beings, rather than states, are the ones posed to threats and emphasize the state’s responsibility to protect its citizens. This quote is also interesting since it calls for a holistic approach to climate change adaptation and facilitation of strategic management. This is consistent with the view of climate change as a crises related phenomenon; climate change pose a risk towards citizens and it is the role of the state to reduce the risks in relevant sectors. This view is also supported by the UN Advisory Group who stresses the recognition of migrants and refugees as vulnerable groups. A crucial principle of the human security perspective, as described by Kaldor (2007) is the primacy of human rights. The quote below verifies that the UN has that perspective, illustrated by a quote by the UN Advisory group:

“Migration also supports economic development in the areas migrants move to. At the same time, migration may increase vulnerability especially for women and children, with specific risks of economic exploitation, discrimination or abuse and hazardous conditions in the workplace or at home. It is therefore essential to ensure that migration occurs in a manner that fully respects the dignity and human rights of those who move and those who stay behind.” (UN Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, 2015, pg. 7)

This quote provides insights into how migrants are disadvantaged also after arriving to their country of destination. Migrants are exceptionally vulnerable risking abuse and exploitation, both of economic nature and physically. These two quotes exemplify how migrants are exposed to risks first in their countries of origin, in the migrating process but also after arriving to their destination. This last quote represented below gives another interesting aspect:
“Let’s not forget that refugees and the displaced also happen to be talented and resilient people.” (Türk, 2014, pg. 6)

Why is there a need for a Director at the UNCHR to stress that refugees are “talented” people? Perhaps it could be a sign of a dominating state security perspective which, as explained earlier, aims at controlling borders and citizens. In a more radical notion, the state security perspective views migration (and thereby migrants) as a threat in itself (Holliefield, 2001; Boswell & Geddes, 2001; Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2014; Detraz & Windsor, 2014; Hampshire, 2015). This view could significantly create a negative view of migrants as untalented people.

The suggested measurements to ease climate induced migration

The suggested measurements points in two directions; firstly on code 3 on climate adaptation and resilience building in the vulnerable countries and secondly on code 4 on legislative measurements and especially planned relocation. I will argue why code 3 was chosen in table 4.

“Ensuring that access to funding is secured and facilitated to finance human mobility-related measures within local, national and regional climate change adaptation, resilience building, and disaster risk management plans and activities, including from the operating entities of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC.” (UN Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, 2015, pg. 5)

Climate adaptation and resilience building was in general more visible and consistent throughout the texts. The quote above confirms that climate induced migration best is solved through well-financed climate adaptation and resilience building. Climate adaption is generally regarded as physical measurement aiming at decreasing negative effects of climate change (Keskitalo et al., 2016; Wamsler et al., 2016). Climate change adaption is here regarded broader than that; it also includes social systems and stresses the need for viewing migration itself as a climate adaption measurement. New legislation is however not advocated by the UN, neither in the text by Türk (2014) or the UN Advisory Group (2015). Türk (2014) refutes the need for new legislation and stresses the use of using current laws and sharing best praxis at regional level. Even though no new legislation is suggested, both the UNCHR and the UN Advisory Group recommend planned relocation. Türk (2014) acknowledges planned relocation as a tool and calls on states for enhanced cooperation between stakeholders and identifying the rights and needs by affected societies.

“Planned relocation, if implemented in consultation with and with respect for the rights of the people and communities involved, can protect vulnerable populations from climate risks and impacts through settling them in safer, more secure locations.” (UN Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility, 2015, pg. 7)

Planned relocation is defined by the UNHCR (2015) as a process where people are moved to a new location within the national borders. This is slightly different from how the EU uses the term relocation; the EU relocates migrants within the union but across member state borders, from Greece to Germany as an example (European Commission, 2017). Since the UN advocates relocation within a state, this falls out of the scope of the thesis which does not include internally displaced persons. This gives a strong implication that code 3 is a far more accurate code than 4 in the UN material.

Summary
This section aimed at analysing how the UN view climate induced migration and what kind of measurements they suggest. The results are that the view on climate change will primarily
contribute to extreme weather events and long-term consequences that trigger conflicts (phenomenon code 1). Climate change in itself is not the issue; it is rather how well societies are capable of building resilience against it. Building resilience is viewed through a lens of human security (perspective code 1); the citizens and the migrants are vulnerable and need protection by the state. The Agenda 2030 framework is based on a human security approach and consists of goals connected to both climate change and safe migration involving respect of fundamental rights. (UNDP, 2016) The human security perspective is consistent in all work, including the Platform for Disaster Displacement which/who replaced the Nansen Initiative and the documents by Türk (2014) and the UN Advisory Group (2015).

Lastly, there is ongoing work on how to create a robust climate adaption process and resilience building in vulnerable countries (measurement code 3). The COP 16 in 2010 recognized climate induced migration and the year after the Nansen Initiative was founded to increase knowledge on measurements for climate induced migration. The most important measurement is to build resilient societies and a core issue is the funding. This is visible through the various suggestions that has been made; such as the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage and the Green climate fund.
The European Union and its preparedness for climate induced migration

Sweden is one of 28 member states in the European Union. The union is a supranational institution with intergovernmental foundations (Hague & Harrop, 2010). In 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty was adopted, EU begun its struggle to further implement a more coherent and unified answer to migration and asylum policies. The Council and the Parliament became co-legislators (Bosswell & Geddes, 2011; Bengtsson & Melke, 2014). Figure 3 demonstrates parts of how the European Union is organized:

Figure 3 demonstrates the relevant organs of the European Union, modified version EU-upplysningen (2016e) and EU Commission (2016e).

The European Commission, Council of the EU (not to mix up with European Council) and European Parliament are all three legislators, but it is only the Commission who has the right to initiate new regulations and directives. The Commission consists of 28 Commissioners and their Director Generals; they are not elected but officials. (EU-upplysningen, 2016a)

The Council of the European Union consists of ministers from each member state. Depending on the area of legislation, different ministers attend the Council meetings. In the case of a new legislation on the migration area it is the minister responsible for migration who attends the Council’s meetings, and in environmental issues it is the minister responsible for that who attends the meetings. (EU-upplysningen, 2016b) The position of the Council is affected of domestic politics and aims and as Hampshire (2016) concludes, they are highly affected by the increasing suspicion towards immigrants.

There are 751 members of European Parliament and 20 committees. The committee responsible for migration issues is the Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. The committees debate and amend the legislation suggested by the European Commission and then the legislation is being voted in plenary by the whole parliament. Then
the regulation goes to a final negotiation between the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament before it’s implemented. (EU-upplysningen, 2016c)

On international level EU is part of the Platform for Disaster Displacement but the EU Joint Research Centre has own research on loss and damage. The work of the Disaster risk management knowledge centre (DRMKC) conducts studies on disasters in the EU, both man made and environmental (DRMKC, 2017). There is also a Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography and in 2016 they begun a study on the correlations between climate change and migration, also referring to EU GAMM and its instructions to develop tools for climate adaption (Barbas et al., 2016).

EU Global approach to migration and mobility

The overall framework of EU migration policy is the EU Global approach to migration and mobility (EU GAMM) which was adopted in 2005. The purpose of EU GAMM is to be the corner stone of EU external migration policy and act complementary to the union´s external policy and development cooperation. (European Commission, 2011)

The framework is divided in thematic priorities, they are defined as

- Organizing legal migration and mobility.
- Reducing and preventing irregular migration.
- Improving the union´s external asylum policy. (European Commission, 2011)

In official papers, these areas were given the same priorities but Hampshire (2016) argues that preventing irregular migration was the driving force behind the EU agenda and legal migration was only a supporting part. Better cooperation while also stemming migration to the union, creates asymmetrical interests since the third countries often doesn’t aim to stem migration. (Hampshire, 2016)

In 2011, when the European Commission did an update of the EU GAMM, they included climate change as a factor to migration. The Commission refers to the Stockholm program and notes that climate change is an international challenge which leads to migration and that climate adaption is necessary in the general strategy for migration since it will affect the immigration to the EU. (European Commission, 2011)

Related regulations and directives

EU GAMM is the overall framework and connected to it are several regulations and directives. There are mainly three levels of EU legislation; first are regulations which replace current national law, the second are the directives in which member states can adapt the EU legislation to fit the member state. Lastly are the recommendations which aren’t legally binding but rather policy recommendations which the EU Court might use. (EU-upplysningen, 2016d)

Currently there is no specific EU legislation which regulates the protection of climate induced migrants (Skillington, 2015). The choice of the following regulations and directives are mainly based on my time working in the European Parliament on migration issues and my internship

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5 For more information on the EU institutions and how the legislation process works, I highly recommend a visit to www.eu-upplysningen.se

6 Refers to The Stockholm Programme - An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens which was a policy framework including the issues of migration, development cooperation, justice, and security, active during 2010 and 2014. (European Commission, 2009)
at the Swedish Migration Agency. There are probably other current legislations that could have been added (such as the Schengen Agreement) but I believe these cover most of the legislation connected to climate induced migration.

Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is an umbrella of regulations and directives connected to asylum. These are the Dublin regulation, Asylum procedures directive (2013/32/EU), Reception conditions directive (2013/33/EU), Eurodac directive (2013/604/EU) and the Qualification directive (2011/95/EU). There is an ongoing process to reform the CEAS which will have a big impact on the European asylum legislation and procedures. (European Commission, 2016a)

The Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) is of special interest. This directive regulates the EU standards for subsidiary protection for stateless persons and third country nationals who are not recognized as refugees (Skillington, 2015). Even though this directive advocate personal circumstances and technical hinders to return to the country of origin, article 8 in the directive also state that

Member States may determine that an applicant is not in need of international protection if in a part of the country of origin there is no well-founded fear of being persecuted or no real risk of suffering serious harm and the applicant can reasonably be expected to stay in that part of the country. (2004/83/EC, art 8)

The Qualification Directive was in 2013 replaced by The Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU in which article 8 has been changed, but the context is the same. This requires that either a whole country has to be affected or the applicant must prove that he or she will face serious harm by returning to the country (Skillington, 2015). In July 2016, the European Commission presented a new legislation for third country nationals and subsidiary protection (European Commission 2016b). In the new proposal (COM(2016) 466 final), article 8 is suggested to be changed.

Skillington (2015) argues that the directive Temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons (2001/55/EC) also could be of interest for climate induced migrants. The aim of this directive is to give temporary protection for people who have been asked to be relocated due to “endemic violence” (article 2 C i) and the directive should be applicable in sudden disasters, referring to article 1. Even though these are interesting thoughts, I am not sure these interpretations of the articles are applicable in a climate change disaster. Firstly, article 2 seems to refer rather to human induced violence than environmental when reading the articles in English, French and Swedish. Secondly, in article 1 there is no explicit mentioning of disaster. It is only pointing at fair sharing between member states in case of “mass influx” of migrants. It is also worth noting that this directive was not applied by the EU Council during the political crisis which was a result of the major increase of refugees and migrants during 2015 (Ineli-Ciger, 2016).

Coding of the EU material
The coding of the EU material is based on the two documents presented in the chapter Materials and methods: the policy paper “Climate Refugees” Legal and policy responses to environmentally induced migration (Kraler, Cernei & Noack 2011) and the working document Climate change, environmental degradation, and migration, published in 2013 (European Commission, 2013). Table 5 below illustrates the coding schedule of the EU material and shows that the EU views climate change as crisis related and have a state security perspective. The EU suggests climate adaption and resilience building to prevent migration.
Table 5 illustrates a modified coding schedule presented by Bryman (2016).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Measurements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>1 crisis related</td>
<td>2 state security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The portrayal of climate induced migration

How the EU views climate induced migration was not as clear as the UN view. The phenomenon was discussed from several angles. The first quote implies a similar view to the UN

“In 2008, … the European Commission drew attention to the fact that climate change could act as a 'threat-multiplier', exacerbating trends, tensions and instabilities which would already have an influence on migration patterns” (European Commission, 2013, pg. 6)

Climate change as a driving force for increased conflicts and tensions would suggest code 1; a crisis related view on climate induced migration. This would also be consistent with the writings in the EU GAMM (European Commission, 2011). The next quote reinforces this believe and shows a good understanding of how climate change will lead to different consequences and affect communities in different ways:

“The nature of the environmental disruption will evidently be an important determining criterion, in particular as the needs and types of flows generated by sudden-onset events are likely to differ from those generated by slow-onset processes.” (European Commission, 2013, pg. 10)

However, other parts of the documents implies some scepticism

“… Most experts and scholars are reluctant to confirm a direct link between environmental issues and armed conflict in the sense that the latter would have been solely based on environmental factors.” (Kraler, Cernei & Noack 2011, pg. 23)

It could be argued that this quote comes from the European Parliament policy department and do not represent the official view by the European Parliament. Rather it could be a result of the sceptic scholars which were presented in the chapter Alarmists versus sceptics. But this view is also represented by the European Commission in the working document, stating that

“This suggests that the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on migration flows to the EU is unlikely to be substantial.” (European Commission, 2013, pg. 11)

These last two quotes could imply a hesitation of a link between climate change and migration; stating that there is no clear empirical evidence and in this case, it would probably not affect the European Union´s borders. Then code 2 would be more appropriate. However, I would argue that code 1 is the most accurate, even though it is not as obvious as in the UN section. The European Commission and the EU GAMM seem to believe in a correlation between climate change and migration and that it is crisis related. Moreover, since there still is a discussion on measurements I would say code 2 is highly unlikely.

The applied perspective on climate induced migration

As Holliefield (2000) argues, state security is about keeping control over the state´s borders and citizens. Neither of the two analysed documents had clear statements which enabled
identifications with a specific perspective but I will still argue that the EU applies a state security (code 2). The following quote represents my first argument

“Climate change and environmental factors can exacerbate migration pressure and it is very likely that these weather events will contribute to an increased level of mobility and changing migration patterns.” (Kraler, Cernei & Noack 2011, pg. 10, author’s italics)

The first quote uses the term “migration pressure” which I would argue is a view of migration as something pressuring the state. Combating irregular migration is crucial for a well-functioning migration management, or as EU GAMM stresses

Without well-functioning border controls, lower levels of irregular migration and an effective return policy, it will not be possible for the EU to offer more opportunities for legal migration and mobility. (EU GAMM, 2011, pg. 5)

It is not the migrants themselves who are in need of protection, it seems rather that the state is in need of being protected from the migrants; hence state security. Skillington (2015) also notes that the European Commission has described migrants as a threat to political stability since the volume of migrants would put pressure on the welfare system of the member states which in turn could lead to a breakdown of EU resource management. The premise is that open borders would have negative impacts for the European Union. (Skillington, 2015) Foresight (2011) recognizes this view of migrants as a general attitude across Europe. This state security view is strengthened in the quote below:

“The assumption is that climate change reduces resources for livelihood which will lead to conflict over remaining resources and, as a result, to intensified migration flows. This may further be exacerbated if migrants enter the territory of other people who may also be resource constrained.” (Kraler, Cernei & Noack 2011, pg. 23)

A human security perspective would underscore the primacy of human rights, strengthen regional focus and focus on multilateralism (Kaldor, 2007). My analysis could not find any writings in the EU documents on human rights and the migrant’s perspective. Regarding multilateralism; the European Union as such could be regarded as a multilateral institution in itself and thereby would all EU policies be multilateral. However, as Hague and Harrop (2010) argue, the EU is rather a supranational institution which could be labelled as new type of political entity. Kraler Cernei & Noack (2011) encourages labour exchange agreements between member states and non EU member states, this could be viewed as a multilateral perspective, this is however one of few writings on the subject I could find and does not give enough support for human security perspective. The European Commission (2013) argues that the EU has capacity strengthening programs in EU regional strategies, such as European Neighbourhood Policy and EU-Africa Strategy. (European Commission, 2013) However, none of these strategies are targeting climate induced migration as such.

The suggested measurements to ease climate induced migration

There is currently no specific instrument on the EU level, targeting climate induced migration (Kraler, Cernei & Noack 2011; European Commission, 2013; Skillington, 2015). Nevertheless, there is a need for measurements and the two analysed document’s suggestions are divided into two codes. Code 3 on climate adaptation and building resilience in the country of origin is partly discussed and code 4 on new legislation is partly discussed. It seems to me that climate adaptation is a first step and if needed, new types of legislation might be needed. The first quote lends support to code 3
“Adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change and effective disaster risk reduction of natural hazards are both very important for minimising the need for displacement.” (European Commission, 2013, pg. 21)

Once again, climate adaption is interpreted broadly. It could either reflect upon resilient states and physical measurements which decrease the need for migration. The European Commission (2013) also suggests migration as an adaption measurement, especially for particularly vulnerable populations who might be unable to migrate on their own. The EU GAMM is an important tool to handle migration and mobility, also with regards to climate induced migration as the quote below implies

“Under the Global Approach, third countries affected by climate change related phenomena should be assisted in order to support the national institutions in dealing with adverse environmental change. Measures may comprise strengthening the adaptation and resilience capacities of third countries to reduce the vulnerability of affected populations and enhancing the protection of environmental displaced individuals outside the European Union.” (Kraler, Cernei & Noack 2011, pg. 75)

Code 4 is also visible in the documents. The European Commission (2013) agrees that the lack of common terminology regarding climate migrants constrain proper policy-making. They also stress the need for better understanding of how slow-onsets might impact migration patterns.

Kraler, Cernei & Noack (2011) have identified several legal measurements, both on international level (such as the Geneva Convention) and on the EU level. Kraler, Cernei & Noack (2011) refers to a study by Biermann and Boas (2010) who suggest a sui generis regime for climate induced migrants instead of an extension of the Geneva Convention. Biermann and Boas (2010) present the idea of a protocol based on the principles of planned relocation and resettlement, international assistance for domestic adaption and international burden-sharing. The need for a new legislation which enhance the possibilities for resettlement is particularly visible in the quote below

“The resettlement of individuals from the countries that have experienced environmental disasters is an important solution that should be considered by the EU.” (Kraler, Cernei & Noack 2011, pg. 50)

The analysed document published by the European Commission (2013) does not suggest a new resettlement directive but rather urges a development of Regional Protection Programmes consisting of two components: first offering solutions to refugees through integration, resettlement and voluntary return, and secondly by supporting non-EU countries who host a lot of refugees.

**Summary**

The EU is more hesitant to climate induced migration compared to the UN. It is quite likely that climate change will affect migration patterns, but empirical evidence is lacking in order to ensure a clear enough causal link. However, the EU stress that climate change likely will cause insecurity in already unstable areas. This implies a strong state security perspective. There are no current regulations or directives applying to climate induced migration but there are several possibilities in current EU law for protecting climate induced migrants. Most commonly suggested is adaptation, reflecting upon physical system changes and relocation as

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7 “Of its own kind” in Latin and used to explain a form of legal protection which is not defined in typical legal protections. The sui generis is commonly used in intellectual property law. (Legal Information Institute, u.å)
adaptation measurement. The Lisbon Treaty offers possibilities to extend EU legislation in this area but current directives such as the Temporary Protection Directive could also be of interest.

The Temporary Protection Directive might be applicable in the case of a mass influx of environmental displaced individuals but it needs to be activated by way of a Council decision following a Commission proposal. It is thus subject to a high political threshold which makes it difficult to apply even in regard to cases of mass-displacement in the context of warlike situations for which it was originally designed to respond.

Resettlement is also discussed but not explicitly suggested by neither institution. However, the EU GAMM suggests a reinforced resettlement component in all Regional Protection Programmes (European Commission, 2011). Encouraging practice of current national laws and directives are an interesting point of view regarding that the EU are currently modifying several important directives such as the Qualification Directive and the Resettlement Directive. Both are suggested by the European Commission to become regulations, which in praxis would replace current member state’s laws and neither of the proposals include climate change as a factor to migration. (European Commission (2016b; European Commission 2016c)
Sweden and its preparedness for climate induced migration

Swedish Politics for Sustainable Development

Sweden has since 2003 a holistic approach for poverty reduction and sustainable development, called the Swedish politics for sustainable development (PGU). In 2016 the Swedish government made clear that the PGU should be in line with Agenda 2030 framework. The PGU consists of 17 goals similar to Agenda2030 but the Swedish government points out renewable energy, security and development, sustainable business, sustainable production and consumption and finally capital and tax evasion as their main targets. (Swedish government, 2016)

Goal 13 on climate change mitigation state that climate change results in increased water scarcity, natural disasters and affects the agricultural sector but also migration flows. However, this cannot be seen in the targets for goal 13 which some of them are

- Decrease greenhouse gases.
- Supporting developing countries in their international climate obligations.
- Supporting technical transfer according to the Paris Agreement.
- Pushing the European Commission to consider sustainable development and climate in their work on disaster risk reduction. (Swedish government, 2016)

Goal 10 on reducing inequality is strongly connected to migration. The PGU acknowledge that more than 60 million people are forcibly displaced and that migration is a strong force in people. The PGU also points out the commitment to achieve a secure, regulated and responsible migration in accordance with fundamental rights and human treatment of migrants and refugees. The Swedish government point out three main targets under goal 10; act for fair sharing in resettling refugees among EU member states, contribute to a broad and respectful dialogue in international migration negotiations and finally mapping the causes of the high cost for remittances. (Swedish government, 2016)

Public Administration

A resilient democracy needs a well-functioning public administration. The purpose of this section is to illustrate how Swedish governing differs from the UN and the EU. Public administration consists of agencies both on national and regional level but all related agencies in this thesis are on national level. Wennergren (2008) states that there is no general definition of an agency but there is one important distinction; either it is a political assembly or it is an agency. The Swedish government is in the first one and the Swedish Migration Agency in the second. Figure 4 demonstrates how the Swedish government’s structure is organized:
Figure 4 demonstrates the organisation scheme of the Swedish government with the relevant ministries and agencies. Modified version of Ramstedt, 2015.

Sweden has about 500 national agencies and they are all directly governed by the government through ministries (Wennergren, 2008). Officials working in public administration are mostly there because of their professional competence and not political opinion. Their purpose is to fulfil the democratic mandate which has been set by politics. The officials are responsible to follow rules and regulations but also to protect citizens’ interests. The bottom line in Swedish public administration is to respect that all men are born equal. (Bengtsson & Melke, 2014)

In addition to general rules and regulations the government assign the agencies general guidelines and instructions on annual basis. These guidelines point out the direction the agency should work towards, an amended budget and specific assignments are included as well. (Swedish Courts, 2015)

Central in Swedish public administration is the Administrative Procedure Act. This act consists of rules on how to handle cases, disqualifications and appeals. In public administration it is common to have a quite long investigation before taking any decision. An exemplification of the procedure in an asylum claim generally goes as the following, based on Bengtsson and Melke (2014)

1. The assignment starts with applicant hands in an asylum claim. The application is registered.

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8 Förvaltningslagen in Swedish
2. The application is being handled by an official at the Swedish Migration Agency. The applicant has the right to speak on his or her behalf; there are generally several interviews with the applicant.

3. There are various rules on how to take decisions but generally on national level it is one person (the official) who has the right to give or deny asylum. The applicant has then the right to disqualify the decision.

4. The decision is executed when the procedure cannot be disqualified anymore, so called res judicata.

Relevant legislation

Swedish migration law consists of national but foremost EU-legislation, since Sweden is a member state as explained in the EU section. Sweden is subject to follow the CEAS. However, the Swedish Alien Act (2005:716) regulates visa requirements, refugees and subsidiary protection, residence permits, return etcetera. Interesting is though, in chapter 4 Refugees and others in need of protection, the Swedish Alien Act acknowledges protection to people affected by environmental disasters:

In this Act a ‘person otherwise in need of protection’ is an alien who in cases other than those referred to in Section 1 is outside the country of the alien’s nationality, because he or she…

… 3 is unable to return to the country of origin because of an environmental disaster.
(Swedish Alien Act Section 2, point 3)

In June 2016 the Swedish Parliament adopted a temporary law on the migration area which resulted in extensive changes regarding asylum, residence permit and family reunification. The Swedish Alien Act Section 2, point 3 on environmental disasters was also affected and is temporarily inactive until the evaluation in 2019. (Swedish Migration Agency, 2016)

Coding of the Swedish material

This refers both to the interviews, the publication by Mobjörk and Simonsson (2011) and the project report by the FOI (2015). Table 6 below illustrates the coding schedule of the Swedish material, including both documents and transcribed interviews. The table shows that Sweden views climate change something else than the suggested codes in table 3 and also applies a mix of human security and state security in their perspective. Finally, Swedish agencies suggest climate adaptation and capacity building to ease climate induced migration.

Table 6 illustrates a modified coding schedule presented by Bryman (2016).

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Measurements</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4 other</td>
<td>3 mixture of both</td>
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The portrayal of climate induced migration

Unlike both the UN and the EU, the view on climate induced migration differed slightly between Swedish authorities. FOI who were represented both with an interview and the two documents have a similar view to the two previous institutions; a more crisis related view (code 1). The first quote by Eriksson et. al. (2015) published for the FOI emphasizes climate change consequences and the correlation to conflict

“A vulnerability assessment performed in Mali, in support of Swedish development assistance, concluded that one of the more important threats to livelihood security in Mali are climate-related. Climatic variability has led to several large-scale disasters such as droughts and floods, and impacts food security and migration patterns, which in turn may
relate to the overall conflict dynamic between different fighting groups.” (Eriksson et. al., 2015, pg. 12)

But somewhat less than the UN and the EU, FOI seems to believe that climate change in itself cannot trigger a new conflict. The quote below gives confirms this argument:

“Climate change hinders the ability of governments to provide infrastructure, basic services and social safety nets, weakening the social contract, which leads to greater insecurity and unrest, especially in weak governance environments. It should be emphasised that even states that are otherwise stable may endure periods of fragility or harbour pockets of fragility. Climate change is thus commonly best understood as an trigger in places where some drivers of conflict already exist, putting additional strain on already stressed governments.” (Eriksson et. al., 2015, pg. 32, authors italics)

The first part of the quote above was interesting since this implies that Eriksson et. al. (2015) also see a connection between climate change and unstable societies. There is an understanding of how climate change consequences hamper government’s possibilities to provide secure social and physical systems for their citizens, but why this could not lead to an antagonist conflict in a longer run is not clearly answered by Eriksson et. al. (2015). SIDA, the Migration Agency and the MSB present another view on climate change and its potential to change migration patterns. The respondent at the MSB challenged the view presented by the FOI and said that people might migrate of other reasons than conflict and wars, but rather because of lack of resources. The quote below represents this view

“I believe the living conditions will change and it has already changed for many people. It could be because of floods, landslide or earthquake, but also poor harvests and different circumstances in life or if one cannot feed himself, and many move into the cities. I think this is just the beginning.” (Respondent at the MSB, author’s translation)

This view is very much shared also by the SIDA:

“The problem is if climate change consequences are so slow that it becomes a permanent condition and the soil becomes infertile which makes it impossible to feed from. You can see it in many places and when food security is threatened because of temperature rises or floods, it will give huge effects.” (Respondent at SIDA, author’s translation)

This view of poor harvests and the connection to urbanisation before cross-country migration is supported by the Migration Agency and the SIDA:

“I´m thinking that desertification leads to poor soils and this makes it harder for people to support themselves and then they might move into the cities and after a while they realise it doesn’t work because there are so many others doing the same thing. Then some might start to think you need to move further away and eventually you end up at the Mediterranean thinking there are possibilities on the other side.” (Respondent at the Migration Agency, author’s translation)

The respondent at the SIDA stressed the need for a better understanding of the importance of secure agriculture in the international aid. Mobjörk and Simonsson (2011) counter-argue and point out that migration due to drought might even decrease because of lack of financial resources. The respondent at SIDA also stressed that difficulties to live from agriculture does not necessarily lead to permanent migration. It could also lead to temporary migration and require work in another field than agriculture.

9 All quotes from the respondents have been translated from Swedish to English, but can be found in their original language in appendix 2 Quotes in Swedish
“People move because they cannot survive. You don’t have food to put on the table, you get less and less water to survive. Food security is highly affected by climate change and that is a link we have missed, but also the issues regarding urbanisation. (Respondent at the SIDA, author’s translation)

These views represented by the SIDA, the Migration Agency and the MSB are more similar to the first quote represented by the UN on the situation by the pastoralist in Somalia. Even though the UN quote also connects climate change to conflicts, it is at the same time clear that famine and unfertile soils are forcing people to leave their homes. Since three out of four agencies represent a view on climate induced migration connected to famine, unemployment and mobility; I would argue that this implies another category than the ones represented in the coding schedule manual presented. That is why I chose to categorize the Swedish phenomenon as code 4, but also noting that the FOI represents another.

**The applied perspective on climate induced migration**

All explored agencies demonstrated different perspectives of climate induced migration; but all of the respondents underlined that they were following the guidelines and regulations set up by the government.

**A state security perspective**

The MSB pointed out that their main task is to focus on the Swedish state’s security but that this could mean supporting other countries in case of natural disasters and provide a holistic understanding for crises, both internally in Sweden and internationally. The Swedish Migration Agency also applied a state security perspective; the respondent’s task was a lot about international development project such as resettlement, sharing best praxis and returns. This indicates a strong need of control of the borders. The respondent emphasized that the agency is governed by CEAS, EU GAMM and current national regulations. As already highlighted, the EU GAMM applies a state security perspective as well as the CEAS.

The respondent from the FOI pointed out that since they are answering to the Ministry of Defense their role is to secure the Swedish state, which Mobjörrk and Simonsson (2011) also acknowledged. However, the respondent at FOI advocated an interdisciplinary approach to security

“…looking at the causes to conflict you see that there is often a combination of issues in human security and that might cause a state security issue, or the other way around. The consequences of a conflict are often affecting the human security. When the environmental aspect is involved it becomes even clearer how these two perspectives are connected and looking at when climate change suddenly was a part of the security dialogue then you end up in the international security perspective…” (Respondent at FOI, author’s translation)

This view is also reflected in the documents published by the FOI:

“…most observers would agree that maintaining a balance between the sustainability of the nation-state structure and the security of the individual people who live within its boundaries is an important challenge. … To encounter this challenge, i.e. on how to better understand the interaction between local and global security from a different set of interdisciplinary traditions, we propose the need to think “integrated security”.’’ (Eriksson et al., 2015, pg. 1)

The Swedish Migration Agency’s also represents a state security perspective but alike the FOI highlighted migration as a climate adaptation measurement, or as the respondent said
“People want to have a better future for one self and the kids; there is nothing strange with that. Perhaps migration is part of the human species; to move when things become difficult. It is perhaps the meaning of life.” (Respondent at the Migration Agency, author’s translation)

**A human security perspective**

The respondent at SIDA pointed out the PGU as an important document and the fact that it states that Swedish aid should apply a perspective focusing on poor people’s rights. Since the PGU was adopted/updated in 2016 the Swedish government has added three other perspectives in the instructions; environment and climate change, conflict and gender equality.

SIDA represents another view than the other agencies, claiming a human security perspective. The respondent added that the international society should act in the interest of the migrant; even though it is inefficient and inconvenient.

“A major part of today’s migrants are refugees, they have migrated because they have found themselves forced to move. Forced migration. Then you have the right for asylum and the human rights, even as a migrant and refugee who are recognized by all states. Even though it is poorly applied.” (Respondent at SIDA, author’s translation)

The view presented by the respondent is consistent with the agency’s new instruction (SIDA, 2016). There was obviously a scattered picture that the Swedish agencies presented regarding which perspective that should be applied on climate induced migration. It is for these reasons I chose to code the perspective with code 3, a mixture of both state security and human security.

**The suggested measurements to ease climate induced migration**

None of the agencies I made interviews with claimed they had tools to work with or analyse climate induced migration. The MSB stressed the need for improved knowledge and education but also continuing mitigation plans. The FOI promotes technological measurements such as satellite images; they also underlined the need of interdisciplinary approaches in already existing measurements. Decision-making might improve if conventional armed conflict analysis is integrated with environmental impact and vulnerability assessments (Eriksson et. al., 2015; respondent at FOI)

Both SIDA and FOI underlined the need for climate adaption and enhanced resilience in societies. Mobjörk and Simonsson (2011, pg. 51) stated that increased adaptation and resilience building will make societies more robust towards climate change. The quote below gives support to this argument, presented by the respondent at SIDA

“…maybe you need adaption measurements, I mean Holland have adapted to the sea level rise for hundreds of years, so it is possible but those countries we are cooperating with and the people we want to help do not have the resources, there is the big difference.” (Respondent at SIDA, author’s translation)

SIDA also connected the resilience building to include poverty reduction and aid.

“The [poor people] have a hard time to support themselves as it is and if you are disadvantaged by climate change, and then you have a catastrophe. They have no resources to get back up again and I often see that they are not helped which lead to a slippery slope towards poverty and they can’t get out of it. We are currently talking a lot about this and that we need to bridge over this with long-term development cooperation.” (Respondent at SIDA, author’s translation)
One of many resilience building projects is the *Kompetensöverföring till Offentliga Miljösektorer i Burundi* initiated by the Swedish Migration Agency. SIDA and MSB have several projects connecting to climate resilience but not too common at the Swedish Migration Agency. The project was ongoing between 2012 and 2013 and the purpose was to educate ten people who had decided to return to Burundi voluntarily. The environmental sector in the country needed more qualified workers in the field of energy, water and waste and the Swedish Migration Agency cooperated with a private company in order to match the needs. Similar projects have been conducted with returning Iraqis. (Sweco, 2014)

In addition to climate adaption suggestions is the debate on additional legislation and all respondents are hesitating whether new legislation is needed. The Swedish Migration Agency connected the need for long-term development cooperation and poverty reduction to resilient societies. However, the respondent added that resettlement is the most efficient measurement to adjust people’s situations. The respondent verified that the European migration policy is primarily about fighting root causes to migration which leads to a need for secure local communities and climate change mitigation. Development aid is increasingly important in the general picture, the respondent noted.

Even though the respondent from the Migration Agency noted that resettlement might be a relevant tool for climate induced migrants, there is still a definition gap of who would be entitled to resettlement.

“I think there is a risk if you open up the Geneva Convention. It fulfils some important needs in how we regulate refuge today and a big majority of the states who have ratified the Geneva Convention. If you would start to amend it there is an obvious risk that those who ratified it 50 years ago wouldn’t ratify it now because we have a public opinion, a negative political angle on refuge. I don’t think one would risk that. (Respondent at the Swedish Migration Agency, author’s translation)

This view was also shared by the respondent at FOI who broadened the complexity by arguing that the juridical protection the Geneva Convention provides for refugees must be protected.

“… You cannot start applicate it [the term refugee] anywhere, because that might undermine it and someone will say ‘not everyone can be a refugee’ and then the protection will be gone.” (Respondent at FOI, author’s translation)

There were different ideas regarding measurements among Swedish authorities, which perhaps is in line with the different perspectives they apply to climate induced migration. But code 3 on climate adaptation was a general measurement suggested by the respondents and the documents.

**Summary**

The Swedish agencies represented a scattered view on the phenomenon, which perspective they apply and to some extent also what measurements they suggested. The FOI is consistent in their view; they tend to see climate change as a conflict trigger which creates a need for state security (but also advocate an inclusion of human security) and suggest technological solutions to monitor migration patterns. However, the respondent at FOI also identified migration as a climate adaption measurement.

Even though there are some common thoughts among the agencies, SIDA represented a somewhat different view on climate induced migration. The respondent highlighted the perspective of the migrant and the need for increased development aid, connecting the issues
to poverty reduction and agriculture. SIDA was also the only agency who connected their work to the PGU and not the EU which the others did.
Preparing for climate induced migration in a warming world

The general aim of this Master’s thesis has been to investigate how institutions in an increasingly complex society construct an understanding of security, climate change and migration patterns through the phenomenon of climate induced migration. More specifically, the aim was to investigate the UN, the EU, and Sweden’s preparedness to concretely handle climate induced migration. In order to achieve this purpose, I did a qualitative document analysis of relevant documents and transcriptions from interviews.

I will first discuss the similarities and differences in the view of the phenomenon, then continue to discuss the perspectives and end with a discussion on the measurements before reaching my conclusions. The results are demonstrated in table 7 below:

*Table 7 illustrates a modified coding schedule presented by Bryman (2016).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Measurements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>1 crisis related</td>
<td>1 human security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>1 crisis related</td>
<td>2 state security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4 other</td>
<td>3 mixture of both</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the Swedish material presents a scattered view a detailed table of the results are presented below (table 8):

*Table 8 presents detailed information on Swedish’ agencies views, perspectives and measurements regarding climate induced migration.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenon</th>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Measurements</th>
<th>Implementing measurement (example)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Swedish Migration Agency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 other</td>
<td>2 state security</td>
<td>3 resilience building</td>
<td>Country of origin (addressing root causes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SIDA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 other</td>
<td>3 human security</td>
<td>3 resilience building</td>
<td>Country of origin (development cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MSB</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 other</td>
<td>2 state security</td>
<td>3 resilience building</td>
<td>Country of origin (climate adaptation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FOI</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 crisis related</td>
<td>2 state security</td>
<td>3 resilience building</td>
<td>Country of origin (robust societies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mobjörk &amp; Simonsson (2011)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 crisis related</td>
<td>2 state security</td>
<td>3 resilience building</td>
<td>Country of origin (robust societies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eriksson et. al. (2015)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 crisis related</td>
<td>2 state security</td>
<td>3 resilience building</td>
<td>Country of origin (robust societies)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results are quite interesting. There were differences in how climate induced migration was viewed and which theoretical perspective to apply, but independent of the phenomenon and perspectives all institutions suggest the same measurement; climate adaptation and resilience building.
None of the actors believed that climate change is not affecting migration patterns at all (phenomenon code 2 in table 3) which is interesting since all respondents said that they didn’t have any tools for working on the matter. All three institutions have frameworks regarding migration and climate change; the UN has the Agenda 2030, the EU has the EU GAMM and Sweden has the PGU. All three frameworks recognize that climate change is a factor to migration. The EU GAMM explicitly writes that climate adaptation is needed in order to decrease the need for migration; the other two frameworks doesn’t suggest measurements. I conclude that the connection between climate change and migration is visible in official policy documents on all three levels.

**Views and perspectives on climate induced migration**

Climate change will lead to the lack of resources which in turn will lead to movements. The documents presented by the UN and the EU offered a similar view; that climate change will lead to conflicts and climate change should be regarded as a trigger for migration. None of the institutions believed that climate change wouldn’t affect migration patterns at all; even if some were more careful with the linkages. Neither did any of the institutions believe that climate change onsets by themselves would lead to migration; no one of the respondents discussed a possible migration due to floods or sinking states in the Pacific as two examples. The UN and the EU pointed out climate change as a conflict trigger but the Swedish agencies presented another view. They connected climate change onsets with unemployment and poverty which would result in migration.

The theoretical perspective applied differs among all institutions. The UN applies a coherent human security perspective and the EU is applying a state security perspective. It is interesting to note that all Swedish agencies are bound to their ministries and their regulations but these regulations seem to point towards both state security and human security. Perhaps this could imply why the FOI suggest an integrated view on security.

Foresight (2011) recognizes an overall negative attitude against migrants across Europe and the European Union does not seem to be an exception, and Mobjörk and Simonsson (2011) add that also small numbers of migrants have created big political impacts. Hansen (2008) points out the existing paradox in EU policy; EU is in need of labor migration due to its ageing population and they try to attract skilled workers outside the union. But at the same time, the EU is investing in militarized borders and tightens their migration policies. Skillington (2015) adds another dimension to the paradox presented by Hansen (2008) and stresses that people fleeing due to climate change are doubly disadvantaged. Firstly because climate change forces people to leave their homes and secondly because of the repressive legal violence caused by being an “irregular migrant”. This is somewhat a clash against the vision of Europe as a liberal, democratic union with open borders for refuge (Skillington, 2015). In order to overcome these legal barriers caused by being named as an irregular migrant, and here I would like to remind the reader that decreasing irregular migration is one of the pillars in the EU GAMM, is to provide legal ways for climate induced migrants but that requires a legal definition of the term.

Skillington (2015) and Eckersley add also a historic dimension of today’s large-scale migration. Those member states who refuse to receive refugees have played (and still do) an essential role in creating migration through their history of heavy usage of greenhouse gases; sometimes referred to as the historical debt.

A state security perspective is not easily compatible with a human security perspective since the two perspectives suggest contrasting focal points; either the state has to be protected from
any possible antagonistic threat or it is the humans who have to be protected by the states from antagonistic threats. But perhaps one could argue that the citizens are integrated into the state as such and a secure state provides security to its citizens. Or, as FOI suggests, the contrasts between state and human security has to diminish since reality requires both perspectives in an integrated manner.

Contrasting to this negative attitude towards migrants and perhaps even migration as such is the responses on migration as a part of life. The respondent from the Swedish Migration Agency said that migration perhaps is the meaning of life and Türk (2014) urged his audience to recognize migrants as resilient people. This view could also be interlinked with the view of migration as a climate adaptation measurement and the respondent at FOI emphasized that climate adaptation needs to include social systems and societal perceptions. All of this boils down to existential questions on the meaning of life, on how we create a meaningful and safe life and who has the possibilities to migrate? This last question should be further analyzed, not only from the migrant’s perspective but also from the receiving countries perspectives.

The nature culture divide
Finding respondents to the interviews have been hard. Few people and none of the agencies said that they were working on the issue. This could perhaps be related to the previous research in which climate induced migration has been lined with great uncertainties. This in turn, could have created two poles of science; either stating that it will lead to an exodus of migrants or that climate change in itself isn’t a factor to consider at all (Kraler, Cernei & Noack, 2011; White, 2011; Black et al., 2011)

As stated earlier, the uncertainty on climate induced migration emerges from two facts. Firstly, it includes two complex systems. Ecosystems and modelling climate change is complex and requires the inclusion of several parameters and migration patterns are equally complex and requires parameters on migration policies and human relations. (White, 2011)

Secondly, science has traditionally been conducted within separated disciplines where climate scientists have explored natural systems and changes in ecosystems, not including humans and social factors on a general basis. Migration scientists, on the other hand, have studied why people migrate, who has the possibility to migrate, and how conflicts and relationships are correlated to migration. There are few scholars who have included environmental parameters in their work. (Dun & Gemenne, 2008; Farquhar, 2014)

Climate induced migration in the context of the Anthropocene
I believe there is a third reason why research on climate induced migration is hard to conduct. The nature culture dichotomy has previously been mentioned and this debate relates back in the decades from a time when nature was dominating humans and to the industrialisation when nature was explained as a machine. (Fischer & Hajer, 2005) Viewing nature as a machine also enables humans to manage and fix it as long as they understand the machine; this created the dichotomy of nature and culture. This thesis has resulted in an interesting thought connected to this debate; is it possible to go underneath the nature culture divide and live in one dynamic system and meanwhile accepting the stewardship of man which is a central aspect of the Anthropocene? There are some concerns that I want to shed some light on.

Firstly, accepting the Anthropocene and the view of human domination makes it difficult to acknowledge that nature (climate change) could dominate culture (societies and thereby including migration patterns). However, the same problem emerges for those believing in a
divide between nature and culture since climate induced migration is clearly showing how migration is intertwined with natural systems.

Secondly, accepting the stewardship of humans creates new possibilities to manage natural systems which before have been outside the system’s boundaries, such as geoengineering (Steffen et al., 2011; Descola & Latour, 2013). The fact that all institutions suggested increased resilience building could be understood from a new geopolitical era of the Anthropocene. Lastly, it could be noted that humans always have affected natural systems and perhaps this is one of the reasons we see climate induced migration today, contributing to conflicts and crises in disadvantaged areas in the world. The Anthropocene is urging systematic, but technical, changes, and perhaps there will be a shift from today’s focus on individual changes towards the states again. Needless to say, all states are in need of increased preparedness for climate induced migration. However, the discussion on preparedness is also a financial matter, as Eckersley (2015) points out. How to transfer finance and/or technology is a matter of historical responsibility which is politically sensitive; but it should be noted that the UN have agreed on the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. But all these financial mechanism, as well as the practical guidelines of relocations, are newly developed tools that most likely will evolve in the near future.

Climate induced migration is an anomaly in the nature culture divide and as already mentioned, accepting the Anthropocene could make it difficult to accept situations where nature dominates humans; and this could be a reason why few people feel comfortable with discussing the subject of this thesis.

The geopolitical debate has previously been formed by the notion of environmental boundaries; a spatial boundary which understandings, policy frameworks, and practices have to obey. However, the geopolitical landscape is becoming more complex than before. The emerging debate on the era of the Anthropocene re-constructs the geopolitics also with regards to climate induced migration. I believe it is crucial to examine climate change and migration in an integrated way; policy-making models must include more sophisticated assumptions on migration and climate change and recognize a variety of disciplines. Discussing climate induced migration without including the context of the Anthropocene will probably not deliver the necessary policies in this century. (Dalby, 2014)

Suggested measurement to ease climate induced migration
All three institutions had different opinions on how climate change might affect migration patterns and they applied two different perspectives. That is why it is interesting to notice that the only measurement which was suggested was the climate adaptation and resilience building code. As table 8 also demonstrates, the suggested measurements should mainly be implemented in the countries of origin – measurements for Sweden or the EU is absent. Compared to the academy which has suggested several measurements to increase the preparedness for climate induced migration (such as Biermann & Boas, 2010; Farquhar, 2014; Eckersley, 2015; Scott et al., 2015) there were quite few measurements the institutions suggested. The focus on resilience and adaptation can be split into two debates; the first one is one capacity building and finance and the second on migration as an adaptation measurement.

Financing resilience in climate vulnerable countries
Connected to the debate on historical responsibility and the UN principle on ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ emerges the debate on finance ease climate induced migration. More efficient agriculture and urbanization are recurring themes in the analyses. SIDA stressed the need for more finance towards agricultural aid and more projects targeting
climate change. On the UN level the Cancun Adaptation Framework could be used to restore and build resilience (Warner, 2012).

Another interesting financial opportunity for building more resilient societies is the Green Climate Fund which aims to mobilize 100 billion US dollars by 2020 from advanced economies to more climate disadvantaged countries. As Eckersley (2015) also stresses I agree that the common but differentiated responsibility should be emphasized in the regard of finance. Financial mechanisms have to be broader than mitigation and resilience building, perhaps as a tool also for resettlement as suggested by Eckersley (2015).

The EU is not suggesting a mechanism to ease the climate adaptation in third countries. However, there are several EU funds and perhaps some of them are already applicable but I would like to draw the attention to the migration compacts which the European Commission presented in June 2016. The compacts targets countries which are countries of origin and transit (such as countries in the Sahel area) and they combine migration policy with development aid. The European Commission states in their press release:

“A mix of positive and negative incentives will be integrated into the EU’s development and trade policies to reward those countries willing to cooperate effectively with the EU on migration management and ensure there are consequences for those who refuse.”

(European Commission, 2016d, pg. 1)

The development aid (and capability of resilience building) becomes dependent on how well the country cooperates with the EU. This gives the third countries strong incentives to stem the flows of irregular migrants which include climate induced migrants.

The Swedish agencies did not mention how the finances should be operationalized, but SIDA stressed the need for long-term development aid and the Swedish Migration Agency noted that development aid is increasingly important in terms of fighting root causes to migration.

Current legislation, resettlement and relocation

The second part of the measurement debate is the view of migration as an adaptation measurement. Both the FOI, the Swedish Migration Agency, Kraler, Cernei and Noack (2011) and UN Advisory Group (2015) stress that relocation and resettlement should be integrated in the view of climate adaptation. Kraler, Cernei and Noack (2011) suggest a development of the Joint EU Resettlement Programme but in the Commission proposal for a new regulation on resettlement there is no reference to climate induced migration (European Commission, 2016c). None of the Swedish respondents had suggestions for how planned relocation or resettlement could be operationalized and many of them said it was too much of a political question for them to answer.

However, urbanisation due to climate change was mentioned by several of the Swedish agencies and is also suggested by Foresight (2011). Mobjörk and Simonsson (2011) indicate that the floods in Pakistan 2010 resulted in increased urbanisation rather than returns. It is also worth noting that Pakistanis were one of the most common groups of asylum applicants to Europe in 2015 according to EASO. The applicants have been permitted asylum, subsidiary protection and humanitarian protection. (EASO, 2015)

It seems like the agencies are waiting for political directives and Scott et al. (2015) are concluding that judges consider that the matter should be addressed through a political procedure. How politics and politicians view climate induced migration is not part of the aim of this thesis, but it could be interesting for further research. I believe that Sweden has potential to take the lead in this debate. Sweden has a reputation of being a country accepting
refugees, or as Neergaard (2009, pg. 3) describes it “a moral superpower”. Sweden is also known for being a country with ambitious environmental policies. Integrating these two aspects and applying it on climate induced migration could increase Swedish influence in international politics.
Conclusions

The general aim of this Master’s thesis has to explore how institutions in an increasingly complex society construct an understanding of security, climate change and migration patterns through the phenomenon of climate induced migration. More specifically, the aim was to investigate the UN, the EU, and Sweden’s preparedness to concretely handle climate induced migration. This was done by conducting a qualitative content analysis of six official documents (two per institution) and additionally four transcribed interviews by Swedish officials. Applying a human security perspective, this thesis aimed at exploring the following two questions

- What view and perspectives of climate induced migration exist in the UN, the EU and among Swedish agencies?
- What legal, technical, economic or other measures do they respond with to meet climate induced migration?

Regarding the first question I conclude that the views on climate induced migration differ but the connection to conflicts and crises are consistent among the UN and the EU and FOI in Sweden. The other Swedish agencies (the Migration Agency, MSB and SIDA) rather connected climate induced migration to unemployment and poverty.

The applied perspectives are significantly different depending on the institution. The UN applies a human security perspective while the EU applies a state security perspective; describing migrants as something pressuring the union. The Swedish authorities show diverse perspectives, which perhaps could be connected to the regulations and guidelines provided by the government. The Migration Agency is bound to EU regulations and frameworks (such as the EU GAMM and CEAS) but also to national regulations which also point towards a state security perspective. FOI and MSB are in line with the Migration Agency and suggest a state security while SIDA stressed the need for the migrant’s perspective, the primacy of human rights and a bottom-up approach which suggests human security perspective.

The second question provides the insight that independent of view and perspective, climate adaptation and resilience building are the main measurement to ease climate induced migration. The preparedness is like an upside down pyramid; the UN are to some extent prepared and provides guidelines for planned relocation and coordinates the Platform on Disaster Displacement. The EU suggests that current EU legislation could be applicable on climate induced migrants, but there is no litigation or precedents giving legitimacy to the argument. Lastly, none of the Swedish respondents replied that they have tools to ease today’s climate induced migrations and none of them thought the new one was on their way in a close future. All of the respondents thought that the subject was very politically sensitive to talk about.

How adaptation and resilience building should be financed is a further task to explore and whether migration could be regarded as a measurement as well. Other technical, economic and legal measurement are explored and discussed within the academy but remains in its infancy at the institutions and agencies.

Climate change will have significant effects on societies and ecosystems. Increased food insecurity, water stress, extreme weather events and natural disasters are only a few examples of the challenges the international community will face. The academy and the investigated institutions are all agreeing that this most likely will lead to cross-border migration to some extent. However, the preparedness for these migrants are surprisingly poor; legally binding
policies are lacking, litigation and precedents are lacking and even though the institutions suggest climate adaptation to increase third countries resilience neither of them provides a developed solution for finance.

**Further research**

This study has concluded some facts while new questions have emerged. It is clear that all future research need to apply an interdisciplinary approach and use several actors’ knowledge. More research is further needed on:

- The geopolitical landscape becomes more complex with the dynamics of climate induced migration. How do different international actors portray climate induced migration and what kind of measurements do they see a need for in the future?
- Who becomes a migrant; who has the economic and social possibility to migrate due to climate change and what are the possibilities for the ones who stay? A gender aspect on this matter may be beneficial.
- This thesis has suggested that the climate aspect isn’t a part of today’s asylum procedure and that neither migrants, lawyers nor agencies include this aspect in the asylum claim and juridical procedure. Would migrants reconsider migration if climate change was acknowledged as a claim for asylum?
- The results of this thesis suggested that Swedish agencies lack tools and guidance from the Swedish government to handle climate induced migration. The respondents found the question political and therefore further research could benefit from exploring political parties’ views and measurements on climate induced migration.
- There is a need to develop new legal frameworks to handle the legal complexity of climate induced migration within the era of the Anthropocene.
- Today’s international regimes lack adequate tools and measurements. New tools and measurements needs to be developed with an interdisciplinary approach which responds to the new geopolitical situation in the Anthropocene.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Senior Lecturer Veronica Brodén Gyberg at the Department of Thematic Studies and Environmental Change at Linköping University. She constantly suggested ideas to improve every single detail in the thesis, but still with a sense that this was my own work. Thank you for all valuable feedback, coffees and advices.

This thesis is a result of my two big interests in life; climate change policy and migration policy. After my bachelor I got the opportunity to do work in the European Parliament, first as an intern following the Committee for Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. The second time I returned as a policy advisor following the Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. This thesis would never have been possible without my friends and colleagues at the European Parliament.

Despite my knowledge on EU polices, this thesis wouldn’t have been the same without the validation and knowledge provided by the staff at the Department of International Affairs at the Swedish Migration Agency. A special thanks to my supervisor Head of Unit Hugo Rickberg.

I also want to express my appreciation to the four respondents at the Swedish Migration Agency, Defense Research Agency (FOI), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) who gave me some of their valuable time. Without your pearls of wisdom, it would not be possible to conduct this research.

At last, I am grateful to my family. My parents Harun and Niina Tütüncü, and my sister Sabina who always believed in me and supported my work, both within the academy and outside. And a warm and loving thank you to Peter. Always by my side.
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Appendix 1. Interview questions

Following are the standard questions from the interviews. Apart from these I added some more specific ones related to the agency, as an example I asked the Migration Agency about the asylum procedure.

- Tell me a bit more about how you got this position?
  - For how long have you had this position?
  - What did you do before?
- How would you describe [the agency’s] connection to migration?
  - Is it strongly connected to the Swedish government’s regulations?
- If I say ‘climate refugee´ what do you associate it with?
  - Do you think they might come to Sweden?
  - Are you connecting climate induced migration to some specific environmental changes?
  - When do you think they might come?
  - Will there be a mass-influx or will they come one by one?
- How do you think Sweden is or will be affected by climate refugees?
  - How do you integrate climate change in your work with migration today?
- What kind of effects do you think climate induced migration can have? (focus on state or human security)?

Measurements

- It is difficult to predict how many climate refugees that might come to Europe, partly because of lacking definitions. But if we knew that within 10 years, hundreds of thousands climate refugees would come to Sweden, how do you think Sweden would act?
  - How would that affect [the agency’s] work?
- What kind of tools does [the agency] have to handle climate induced migration today?
  - Projects, policies, technologies etcetera?
- What kind of tools does Sweden have to handle climate induced migration today?
- What kind of tools do you think are missing today but will be needed to handle climate induced migration in the future?

Ending

- What do you think about the future, relating to climate change and migration?
- Is there something I have forgotten to ask that you would like to add?
Appendix 2. Quotes in Swedish

Below are the quotes presented in the section Coding the Swedish material. They are represented in the same order as they are in the section.

Phenomenon
"Jag tänker att levnadsvillkoren kommer att förändrats och att det håller väl på att förändrats redan för många människor och det kan naturligtvis vara översvämning eller skred eller jordbävning, liksom den typen av händelser men också dåliga skördar eller olika förutsättningar eller kanske inte kan livnära sig och mycket är kanske att man flyttar in till städer. Jag misstänker att det bara är en början." (Respondent at MSB)

"Problemet är då om klimatförändringarna är så långsamma att det blir ett permanent tillstånd och marken blir obrukbar och man inte kan försörja sig. Det är väl det man ser på många håll och när livsmedelsförsörjningen kommer ur balans på grund av stigande temperaturer eller översvämningar, det kommer att ge väldigt stora effekter." (Respondent at SIDA)

"Jag tänker att liksom att ökenutbredning leder till att tillgången till jordbruksmark och liknande blir försämrad, minskar och människor måste hitta en försörjning och då kanske dem flyttar till städerna och så småningom inser man att det här funkar inte, det är så många som gör likadant och då börjar kanske tankarna komma att man kanske behöver röra sig ännu längre och så tillslut står man vid Medelhavets rand och tänker att "nä men där på andra sidan kanske det finns möjligheter"." (Respondent at Migrationsverket)

"Det här med jordbruket tycker jag har kommit bort ganska mycket i biståndet. Folk flyttar mycket för att dem inte överlever helt enkelt. Du har inte mat för dagen, du kan fixa mindre och mindre vatten för att överleva. Livsmedelsförsörjningen påverkas så mycket av klimatförändringarna och där är en länk som vi tappat och vi har också tappat urbaniseringsfrågorna. Sida har ingen som arbetar med urbanisering idag vilket är helt galet." (Respondent at SIDA)

Perspective
"… om man tittar på orsakerna till konflikt så ser man att det ofta är en kombination av problematiska delar i den mänskliga säkerheten och det kan driva en nationell säkerhetsfråga eller tvärtom. Konsekvenser av en konflikt ger sig ofta på den mänskliga säkerheten, det är ganska givet. Men när miljö spelar roll blir det ännu tydligare att de här två hänger ihop och om man tittar på hur klimatförändringar helt plötsligt blev en del av säkerhetsdialogen då hamnar man mer i det internationella säkerhetstänket…" (Respondent at FOI)

"Det är ju mycket om att en stor del av migranterna idag är de facto flyktingar, dem har inte flyttat för sitt höga nöjes skull utan dem har funnit sig mer eller mindre tvingade och flytta. Forced migration. Då är det både rätten till asyl och dem mänskliga rättigheterna som du har, även som migrant och flykting och som erkänns av alla stater men tillämpas väldigt illa." (Respondent at SIDA)

Measurements
"… att man kanske kan göra anpassningsåtgärder, jag menar lilla Holland har anpassat sig mot vattnet under hundratals år så det går ju att göra saker om man vill men dem länder som vi jobbar med och dem människorna som vi ska hjälpa då dem har ju inte dem resurserna, det är ju det som är den stora skillnaden." (Respondent at SIDA)

 ”Risken är tror jag att börjar man peta i Genevekonventionen...den fyller trots allt ett par grundbehov för det som reglerar flyktingskap idag och det är en så pass stor majoritet av världens länder som har skrivit på Genevekonventionen, skulle man gå in i den och riva upp den och skriva om den finns en uppenbart stor risk att alla dem som har skrivit på, som gjorde det för 50 år sedan inte kommer att skriva på nu därför att vi har en opinion, en politisk synvinkel som inte är positiv till flyktingskapet. Så det tror jag inte att man kommer riskera.” (Respondent at the Swedish Migration Agency)

 ”så man inte börjar applicera det var som helst för då kan det bli lätt för någon att säga ”alla kan inte vara flyktingar” och då kan den försvinna.” (Respondent at FOI)

**Summary**

 “Människor vill väl ha en bättre framtid för sig själv och sina barn så jag ser inte det som något konstigt egentligen, någonstans kanske migration är liksom inbyggt hos arten människa, att röra på sig när det blir problematiskt. Det kanske är det som är meningen med livet.” (Respondent at the Swedish Migration Agency)