MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

A case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sweden

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Abstract

Sweden is a developed country whereas DRC is a developing country, and both are countries of migration and immigration. Taking these two countries as a case study in migration and development brings out a better understanding that good labour migration policy facilitates all actors to realize the benefits of migrant workers through labour and remittances. DRC’s paradoxical natural resources attract many international migrants. But it faces political and economic instability which are considered as push factors for Congolese migrants to leave their country and look for asylum, and economic betterment in Africa and beyond, especially in industrialised countries. DRC is one of the richest nations in the world with about 1,100 diverse kinds of minerals, and yet it is still one of the poorest countries in the world. Using qualitative method based on historical approach, findings show that migrant workers are workforces and they contribute to economic development in both sending and receiving countries through their labour and remittances sent back home. But these findings are contested, and they bring out debate and discussions.

Key words: Migration and development, workforce, remittances, DRC, Sweden.
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Acronyms

AU: African Union
AMS: Swedish Labour Market Board
BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation
CDM-IM: Community Demographic Model International Migration
CEMAC: Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CNN: Cable News Network
DGP: Gross Domestic Product
DRC: DRC
DTM: Displacement Tracking Matrix
EEA: European Economic Area
ESOL: English as a second language
EU: European Union
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
GFMD: Global Forum for Migration and Development
GISPI: Greece, Island, Spain, Portugal, and Italy
GCC: Gulf Countries Council
HDI: Human development index
ICMPD: International Centre for Migration and Policy Development
IDPs: Internally displaced persons
ILO International Labour organisation
IOM: International Organisation for Migration
LO: Swedish Trade Union Confederation
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SADC: Southern African Development Community

SAF: Swedish Employer’s Confederation

SIDA: Swedish International Development Agency

UN DESA: UN Department of Economy and Social Affairs

UN SD: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Division

UNEP: United Nations Environment Program

UNESCO: The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION

Available literature seems to support the view that international migration can foster development (IOM 2018: 3; Miller 2008: 74; Hear and Sørensen 2003; Castles 2009) on the regional level; for instance, Europe-Africa, “Eurafrica” (Hansen and Jonsson 2011: 7), and at the global level. The contributions that most of the authors emphasize, are the massive remittances, (Taylor 1999: 65), as well as human resources in terms of available workforce, as input in production chain and the process of commodification of labour in the making of global capitalism (Phillips 2009; Bair 2005).

Other research maintains controversially that the “South-North exodus due to poverty and income differences” (Massey 1988: 400) between poor Sub-Saharan African and developed countries reflects “a symptom of development failure” (Bakewell 2008; Collier 2013). Others again, such as Clemens (2016) and De Haas (2010: 236), highlight that migrant workers are causing unemployment and increasing inequalities as well in the destination countries. In addition, however many professional highly-skilled migrant workers access jobs rapidly, because in some cases, they do not need extra training as natives do; especially when host and sending countries use the same administrative language.

The debate on migration and development does not only concern academic discussions, but also political and public opinions, with a focus on migrants as partners of economic and social development.

Another key issue is that the link between deteriorating political and economic conditions, and the impact of international migration in developing countries has received little attention in the scientific literature. This is certainly true in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

DRC is one of the most populous countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the largest French speaking African country in Central Africa. It has around five hundred ethnic groups (Karbo and Mutisi 2011). It gained independence in 1960 from Belgium (Deschouwer, 2009: 216). DRC is a country whose international migrants from, for instance, Lebanon, Mexico, Ukraine, Senegal, India, and China, often have become employers of natives (Tshibambe and Kabunda 2010: 40) and are considered as actors who alleviate poverty.
However, “the black horror and racial argument of colonialism” (Hansen and Jonsson 2014) have contributed to the political and economic instability, which is considered as a push factor of Congolese migrants. Since the earlier 1980s, DRC has been a “country of outmigration” (Flahaux and Schoumaker 2016) due to its political violence, economic deterioration, lack of job opportunities, and repetitive wars of late 1990s, and 2000s (BBC 2017). Due to such push factors of asylum seekers, forced and economic migrants leave the country looking for protection, or asylum or for job opportunities in terms of economic betterment in African countries and beyond; in Canada, in Australia, in USA, and especially in Europe: France, Belgium, England, Norway, and in Sweden, to name a few. The country ratified ILO Migrant Workers’ Convention in 1975. Its human development index (Human Development Report 2016) in 2016, was 0,435 and ranked 176th position in the world.

As mentioned, however, DRC is not only a sending migration country but, it is also a “receiving country” (Tshibambe and Kabunda 2010). The country remains an attractive place for international migrants from its neighbouring countries and from outside Africa. It attracts forced and economic migrants not only because of its hospitality, but also because of its potential natural resources, which have been “illegally exploited” (McConnell 2017). Since the colonial period, and currently, the country is still overexploited by transnational corporations and agencies. Paradoxically, the country is one of the poorest in the world even though it is considered as “one of the most potentially rich in the world, which has 1,100 different minerals extracted by about 300 transnational companies, an estimated $24 trillion in untapped mineral deposits including the world’s largest reserves of coltan (tantalum, niobium, columbium), and three-quarters of the world’s cobalt” (Peppard and Vicini 2015). “Coltan is a mineral much used in fabrication of mobile phones, computer laptops, turbine blades for jet engines” (Hayes and Burge 2003).

Sweden, on the other hand, is one of the most attractive EU member states receiving international labour migrants, asylum seekers and refugees from all over the world, such as Sub-Saharan African including migrants from DRC. Simultaneously, Sweden has a long history of both “large emigration – and immigration flows” (Rooth 1999). In the mid-1800s up until 1930, about 1,3 million Swedes emigrated to North America (Migrationsverket 2018; Bohlin and Euranius 2009). The nation is still a sending country, and it has experienced similar migration challenges like DRC in receiving and sending migrants. Furthermore, it experiences even seasonal migrant workers in the berry industry (Lintner 2009; Krifors 2017: 7).
Nevertheless. Sweden’s population was about 9.95 million in January 2018 (UN 2018). The country’s human development index in 2016 was equivalent to 0.913 and ranked 14th position on the world scale (Human Development Report 2017). Since 2008, Sweden has implemented a new immigration labour policy that has allowed employers to hire migrant workers from outside of EU and EEA (Asiedu 2014). Sweden granted 15,552 work permits and 27,205 asylum applicants in 2017 (Migrationsverket 2018).

Migration contributes to the development of Sweden and DRC through migrant labour and remittances, but the impact of migration to development is contested issue and there is a need for further empirical studies in order to understand if and in what circumstances migration contributes to development, which this thesis embarks to do.

I.1. Research aims

This thesis aims to bring better understanding of how development and migration (Flahaux and De Haas 2016; De Haas 2010; Castles 2009: 4) intersect. It addresses and analyses four key concepts in contexts: Migration, development, labour, and remittances. Additionally, it presents specific theoretical and methodological approaches (Taylor 1999: 64) based on migration literature. The intersection focuses on the debatable positive socio-economic impact of migration in both receiving and sending countries.

This thesis also intends to bring human and labour rights (Likic-Brboric and Schierup 2011; Castles 2011) into the migration and development debate, including phenomena such as brain drain, brain gain, circulant migrants’ precarious work conditions, and their remittances. It also critically analyses proposed migration policies which are implemented in order to facilitate all actors to realize economic and social benefits.

I.2. Research questions

In the consequence of the above, the thesis asks the following research questions

- How is international migration perceived as a factor of development of both countries of origin and destination of migrants, regarding Sub-Saharan African and DRC migrants in Europe, especially in Sweden?
How can an historical approach orient research in international migration to apprehend the current impact of migrants on socio-economic development of Sub-Saharan African Countries, and especially the DRC?

How do migration policies hamper or facilitate well-functioning labour markets and enable migrant workers to foster development in terms of competitiveness and remittances in DRC and in Sweden?

In regard to these questions, the thesis will explore three hypotheses:

- International migration can foster economic development through remittances and through their workforce.
- An historical approach orients research in international migration so as to understand current phenomena through consultation of the archives, which will enable a better understanding and sound suggestions of current social phenomena in ethnic and migration studies.
- Good migration policies facilitate for all actors in migration and development to benefit from the workforce of labour migrants, but only if an adequate development model is in place.

I.3. Area of research and limitation

In order to meet the research aims and answer the research questions, the thesis addresses and compares Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sweden because these two countries have historically experienced similar migration challenges and benefits as both sending and receiving countries. However, in DRC, there is a lack of reliable statistics (Tshibambe and Kabunda 2010), due to poor public administration (Birungi 2006). The country has been politically and economically unstable during the colonial and post-colonial era, and the current period as well. This instability has not allowed the country to constitute reliable and available data on the one hand, and on the other, the lack of advanced technological materials to control its borders with nine neighbouring countries, explains these difficulties in assessing data about undocumented and migrant workers. Another key thing to remember is that the link between deteriorating political and economic conditions, and the impact of international migration in DRC, has received very little attention in the scientific literature.
Sweden, on the other hand, is a small but developed country with a rather different history of migration and development. Sweden is, together with Switzerland, also one of the states that stands behind the 2001 Berne Initiative to promote the policy approaches to connect migration and development and have actively participated in and chaired the Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD) that has promoted the making of global frameworks for migration management. Concerning the geographical and economic asymmetries between the DRC and Sweden, I am aware of the problems with this comparative approach, which is discussed in the methodological section and throughout the thesis.

I.4. Previous research

This thesis has taken into account the previous research in international migration and development such as Stephen Castles with his ideas of bringing human rights into migration and development debate. He believes that “international migration constitutes a key aspect of global integration”. The main goal of international corporations is profit (Castles 2011). However, the issue of human rights of migrants is less addressed by world’s leading economic nations because of ‘restrictive and control migration policies’ (Oltmer 2015: 30).

Coupled with literature evidence, this thesis is also inspired by Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson in their article entitled: “Demographic Colonialism: EU-African Migration Management and the Legacy of Eurafrica”, where they evoke the historical approach of African colonization vis-à-vis the policymakers’ disregard of European integration’s colonial history (Hansen and Jonsson 2011: 1). Scholars and intellectuals need to rethink current structural power asymmetries between Africa and EU, they argue. The authors revisit the archives and believe that migration between Africa and Europe has been a common European concern at least since 1920s. At that period, migration issues were seen in the context of co-European colonial efforts in Africa in general. However, colonialism’s impact on the current situation of Europe and migration has gone largely unnoticed (Hansen and Jonsson 2011: 5). The two authors note that some intellectuals and research analysts in ethnic and migration studies have been governed by ‘presentist’ perspective and lack a ‘historical dimension’.

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1 See further Global Forum on Migration and Development homepage. Available at: https://gfmd.org/
In connection to colonial history, Sarah Demart writes about elite emigration in Congolese Migration to Belgium and Postcolonial Perspectives. Her work highlights how selected Congolese elites started leaving DRC since 1960s, the main destination being firstly Belgium. But other research shows that, since 1951, “the colonial ministry started to invite each year between 15 and 17 Congolese notables for a study’s trip” (Demart 2013); and in 1958, two years before Congolese independence, about 700 Congolese were taken as “invited guests”, staying for 6 months in Belgium. Other research also shows that the “exploitative and segregating colonial policy practiced by Belgium did not stimulate Congolese to come to Europe, even after the Second World War, whereas its labour market needed immigrant workers” (Etambala 1993).

This kind of migration was selective for political elites and for wealthy families that had opportunities to send their children to Europe for higher education. The bilateral cooperation between DRC and country members of OECD further favoured Congolese political elites to send more of their children to pursue studies in OECD countries. It should be noted that OECD was created in September 1961.² In the 1970s, increasing emigration continued to other French speaking OECD countries such as France, Canada, Switzerland, and to other industrialised countries. Congolese political and economic instability, and the lack of job opportunities, became the most outstanding push factors in 1980s. In the early 1990s, Congolese forced, and economic migrants increasingly left the country, and looked for protection, asylum, and job opportunities in industrialised countries.

However, the DRC has also attracted international immigrants, as analysed by German Ngoie Tshibambe and Guy Mbuyi Kabunda, in Migratory Dynamics in DRC: Rationale and Implications in Lubumbashi. They identify the main reasons that attract international migrants, and especially Asian migrants into DRC. Furthermore, they argue that the Katanga province’s minerals attract international migrants in an incessant arrival movement in Lubumbashi (Tshibambe and Kabunda 2010), which they call “immigration cycle”, a term which they borrow from Bastenier and Dassetto, that defines “the whole process by which migrants enter, establish themselves, and settle in the space of a nation state, giving rise to changes and a new sequence of events over time” (Bastenier and Dassetto 1995). Lubumbashi has another

² Originally there were 20 OECD countries, mostly developed countries such as the USA, UK, Canada, France, Sweden, Australia, but the list has been extended by 15 more, even not so developed countries such as Turkey and Mexico, to name some. (http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-countries.htm)
attractiveness of international migrants because it is also a transit city for migrants who move from or to Southern African countries, especially to South Africa. Before 2015, Lubumbashi was the capital city of Katanga region, which contains the richest fields of diverse sorts of mineral in the DRC. In 2015, this province has been divided into four provinces.

According to conventional research, international migration has a positive impact on development in terms of its labour and remittances (World Bank 2017; Tamas and Palme 2008; Adepoju 2010). However, the link between deteriorating political, economic conditions, and the impact of international migration in the DRC, has received very little attention in the scientific literature (Shoumaker, Vause and Mangulu 2009). The lack of studies on this topic also reflects the lack of data. Data on migration flows of African countries are very few.

Turning now to the case of Sweden, available literature characterises the country as an example when it comes to the advantages of powerful pro-labour parties and employment security. In their book entitled Precarious Employment in Perspective: Old and New Challenges to Working Conditions in Sweden, Thörnquist and Engstrand (2011:19) highlight the major political goals of the traditional Swedish model up until the earlier of 1990s: to promote economic growth by full employment, to extend the public sector, and through the implementation of labour market programmes as anticipative and preventive measures. However, the problems of promoting employment or employability (Ibid: 222) are still persisting questions. Furthermore, Sweden’s development in the late twentieth century has been possible thanks to guest workers programs, which were regulated by the state and trade unions. This demonstrates that labour immigration supports development if the right migration and labour policies are in place (Dahlstedt and Neergaard 2015).

Kristof Tamas and Joakim Palme (2008) overview this problem from another angle; the geopolitical and demographic angle, in their book entitled How Migration can Benefit Development. They pose a question of how to provide productive employment for millions of educated youth who scramble for work in Sub-Saharan countries. If these countries fail to meet their demand, it is obvious that this group becomes the largest source of potential emigration South-North which makes pressures on Europe’s borders in terms of desperate job-seekers (Ibid: 73).

It should be borne in mind that there is lack of comparative research on developed and developing country and this also pertains to DRC and Sweden. This thesis may thus be one
among the rare number of such comparative studies if not the first, to be conducted in spatial and historical perspectives. It shows that migrant workers possess a double competence. On the one hand, they are considered as a workforce in the labour market, especially highly-skilled migrants in host countries. On the other hand, they have competence to create jobs, and employ locally in the receiving country such as DRC.

Some of the key findings related to migration and development that concern my comparative study may be summed up as follows:

- Research shows that “migrants alleviate the pressure on the labour market demand” (Adepoju 2004: 109; Asis, Baggio, and Roma 2010); they “support the balance of payment and development financing through remittances and contribute to transfer of knowledge as well when they return in the sending countries” (Adepoju 2004: 109).
- About 86 percent of migrants from and within Africa are economic migrants, not related to conflicts (UNHCR 2011), and most of them possess travelling documents (Schoorl et al. 2000).
- The Mediterranean sea has been transformed into “mass grave of Sub-Saharan African irregular economic migrants and refugees who cannot secure visas to come to Europe” (De Genova 2017); many of them also experience slavery in Libya (CNN 2017) as a country of transit.
- Sub-Saharan African migrants are “people of high aspiration and capabilities to emigrate” (Flahaux and De Haas 2016) to look for job opportunities in industrialised countries.
- Sweden and the DRC have in common experienced migrant flows, and they are both historically recognised as sending and receiving countries.
- “The demographic deficit regarding Swedish population aging, labour shortages, and competitiveness”, (Asiedu 2014:13) calls for high-skilled migrants, and immigrants’ family resettlement to fill the gaps, despite of the controversial political discourses of xenophobia, and racism.
- Well-functioning labour migration policies facilitate both receiving and sending countries to benefit from international migrant workers.
- The Migration Policy Institute (2017) shows total remittance inflows and outflows worldwide in 2014 in US Dollars. Sweden received 4,4 billion, and sent 1,4 billion, DRC received 22,4 million, and sent 15,6 million., Nigeria received 20,8 billion and
sent 57.7 million. Kenya received 1.6 billion and sent 171 million and South Africa received 913.4 million and sent 1.1 billion to name just a few. France received 25.2 billion and sent 13.8 billion while India topping the list, it received US Dollars 70.4 billion and sent 6.2 billion of remittances. Obviously, there is a need to discuss and explain such diverging statistics and correlations, where some developed countries like Sweden and France receive more remittances than they send.

I.5. Research methodology

This thesis uses the qualitative method in migration and ethnic research that uses literature review-based study (Jesson et al. 2011) in historical approach. It relays on social constructivism (Hjalmarsson and Höberg 2008) focusing on literature analysis. This methodology is based on the collection of material such as books, journals, articles, policy reports, government and non-governmental organisation reports, course literature, news articles, and data as well, for making a reflection and a critical analysis on the migration and development nexus.

Because knowledge is not static, this work adopts a critical approach but only after assessing the arguments, counter arguments, discussions, and interpretation that can be found in the material, with a view to define a paradigm (Bhattacherjee 2012: 17) that generates questions for further research. Focus has been placed on Sub-Saharan African migrants in Europe, on DRC, and on Sweden in migration and development issues, highlighting migrants as workforces in receiving countries, and as development agents through remittances in sending nations such as DRC and Sweden.

I gathered relevant data from various reports of International Organisation for Migration (IOM), various United Nations’ departments reports dealing with population, development, peace, migrant workers’ rights, and international labour organisation. Additionally, data from the World Bank play a determinant role, when it comes to the display and analysis of countries’ figures of annual remittances. The thesis also gathers information on estimated figures in different periods when it comes to analysing Sub-Saharan African migrants, and especially Congolese migrants found in OECD countries, and in Europeans countries including Sweden. Last but not least, the IOM policy reports as well as M&D projects in DRC have been used and analysed.
For providing a clear context of understanding how historical phenomena and events have shaped contemporary migration, I have consulted diverse books on European-African history related to colonialism and post-colonialism. These materials contain dark history of imperialism, nationalism, colonialism, nation-state creation, and their corollaries to racism and inexplicable illegally overexploitation of African natural resources. This is the case especially of the DCR’s colonial and post-colonial history, and this in itself is a root cause of push factors of mass movement of forced and economic migrants.

I.6. Structure of the work

This thesis proceeds in 4 chapters structured as follows: Chapter I. Introduction, Chapter II. International migration and development, Chapter III. DRC as migration country, Chapter IV. Sweden as migration country. The thesis ends with a summary and a conclusion.
CHAPTER II.
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

II.1. Introduction
The causes and consequences of international migration are different from what they were before the First World War at the period of the transoceanic emigration from Europe to central and to Northern America (Hammar et al. 1997), or at the period after the Second World War in the period of labour migration to Northern Europe. However, new migrant flows have emerged from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and new trends of international migrants’ contribution to economic development are facilitated by new communication technology, which is easily accessible to most of migrants in current time.

In this Chapter, the focus is put on international migration to try to understand the causes and the consequences such as Sub-Saharan African countries’ demography which is increasing with a high rate. This chapter does not only look on global markets, but it also analyses migrants and precarious working conditions and their labour rights. Migration and development are still a debatable subject, therefore different and opposing views emerge based on available literature.

II.2. International migration: Causes and consequences
International migrants are persons who are living in another country than their nations of birth (IOM 2015). At least two countries may be involved; the sending and the host one. It can be even transit countries implicated, while the persons are on the move to reach the country of destination. Furthermore, migration is a term that encompasses a wide variety of movements. “It is intertwined with geopolitics, trade, cultural exchange, and provides opportunities to states, business, and communities to benefit enormously” (IOM 2018). It should be noted that a “universal accepted definition of migrant does not yet exist at the international level” (IOM 2004).

It is reasonable to note that there is a definitional difference between migrant flows and migrant stocks. Migrant flows consider numbers of migrants entering and leaving countries on a given period, usually a calendar year, while migration stock data compiles the estimations of
all migrants residing in a country at a particular point of time (UN SD 2017; Migration data portal 2017). The main point here, is to try to understand or estimate the number of migrant inflows and outflows internationally. Migrant stock data gives an overview on migration at regional, national, or at global level on estimations at a certain point of time. Statistics on migration flows are produced by various data sources regarding how the country’s authorities collaborate.

For instance, OECD data on permanent migration inflows, facilitates to understand the classification of labour migration flows, humanitarian migration, and family reunifications.

Since 2005, UN DESA; the UN Department of Economy and Social Affairs has selected 45 countries in 2015, 15 in 2005, and 29 countries as well in 2008 on which it compiled migration data on international migrant flows. Furthermore, Eurostat provides international flow data disaggregated by sex and age covering the 27 EU member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. Raymer et al. (2013) highlights that these “migration flows are disaggregated regarding the motive of admission, staying, or going abroad. Various sources are involved in providing global migrant flows that consider an interval of 5-years of each providing migration statistics”.

Other statistics on bilateral migration flows can be found on actual links online such as Publicly available Community Demographic Model International Migration (CDM-IM) dataset”, IOM World Migration Reports, “DMIG County-to-Country Database, Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), and DTM Flow Monitoring, to name just a few.

UN DSA 2008 and 2015 present a synoptic table of migration from 1970-2015 as follows:
The way we should understand international migration, is to consider differences “in disciplinary and paradigmatic orientation”, and this level of analysis that have led to widespread controversies concerning the causes and consequences (De Haas 2007: 9) of international migration. Castles and Miller (2003: 22) argue that many demographers, economists, and geographers presume that individual decisions to migrate are made in perfect information and market situations, involving “comparison of the relative costs and benefits” of migration. This means that people move and seek for higher incomes and good living conditions.

However, as Tshabalala (2017: 59) points out, “states [act] as fabricants of migrants”, and he argues that this is something of an anomaly of movement in “an imagined more or less sedentary state of social fixity”. Hammar et al. (1997: 50) believe that differences in environmental macro-factors of geo-political special units (countries, region and location) influence people to migrate. Decisions of migrate are not governed only by economic factors, but also by social, cultural, political, or geo-ecological situations. Regarding the environmental issue, some migration analyses show that bad climate may in some cases influence decisions to move to a different place (Ibid 50).

The pull and push factors of South-North mobility of migrants are multidimensional. Nonetheless, above all, the global inequality between developing and industrialised countries is considered as the main factor. Since 1960s, “the relative decreasing industrial sector vis-à-vis the growth of the service sector, contributed to the diminishing of chances of immigrant employment integration on one hand, and on the other, in 1980s and 1990s the impact of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of migrants</th>
<th>Migrants as a % of world’s population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>84,460,125</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>90,368,010</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>101,983,149</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>113,206,691</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>152,563,212</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>160,801,752</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>172,703,309</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>191,259,100</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>221,714,243</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>243,700,236</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

technological and structural changes in industries and, in service sector, have led to decreasing of unskilled migrants in employment” (Bevelander 2000).

Furthermore, the post-colonial era in the Southern countries, has been characterised by political instability, while “neoliberal globalization has increased inequalities between North and South, especially in Africa” (Delgado-Wise, Márquez and Gaspar 2017). Therefore, “the rising poverty and unemployment are the main root causes” (Bretell and Hollifield 2015; De Haas 2010) of migrants’ push factors of crossing borders in looking for economic betterment.

As Castles and Delgado-Wise argue convincingly, “the distinction between globalization as a political project and as an economic process dominated by the profit interests of multinational corporations” (Castles and Delgado-Wise 2008: 5) must be taken in account, when the pull factors are evoked. In this view, it is worth mention that “governments are not managing migration alone” (Omelaniuk 2011: 3), but in contrast, a variety of players and factors are also involved in this challenging field, such as labour recruiters, families, employers, labour demand, and migration agents, as well as migration agencies.

Voluntary migrants face a different situation as they are less affected by the host country’s labour market policies, because they have time to gather information on the labour conditions, and on labour policies before they leave their countries of origin. Some may travel while they have read and accepted the work contract terms.

Additionally, migrant networks constitute a considerable social capital, according to Douglas Massey who highly estimates the importance of “mutual acquaintances, and the resources that can be mobilised through networks and connections that a person has” (Massey et al. 1998). Through internet and mobile phones, migrant workers know where to move to, and what kind of job opportunities are possibly offered in the receiving countries.

Moreover, Dahlstedt and Neergaard present international migration through variant aspects. They dissect this concept in terms of persons and their crossing of borders, the duration of stay in the host country (temporary or permanently), the multiple challenges faced in terms of their identity recognition, their interaction with local community, their age, sex, and skills, their status as working or being unemployed, and whether they migrate voluntarily or are forced to leave their countries of origin (Quist et al. 2015: 40-41).

Furthermore, they see international migration as a social and political phenomenon, it is inherent to “political processes where policy measures of nation-states are not only about
controlling movement, but also about managing the conditions of membership” (Ibid: 41). They highlight additionally the existence of “unwanted migrants”, a concept which some researchers believe emanate from globalisation’s consequences that have eroded national sovereignty (Papastergiadis 2000; Quist et al. 2015: 41).

II.3. The root cause approach of international migration

Migration analysts raise diverse opinions regarding root causes of migration. Hammar et al. (1997: 150) think that when the south itself has a voice of discussing the root causes of migration, obviously, the structural problems of development may be evoked, including the colonial heritage, and the critical economic issues of developing countries. In other words, Papastergiadis (2000:17) believes that migration does not just happen; it has to be caused by something. He raises two prevailing motivations that play an important role in individuals’ making decision to emigrate. The first is the voluntarist perspective which defines the movement in dual concepts of an internal push out due to the stagnation at home, and an external pull, fuelled by the promise of greater job opportunities elsewhere.

The second, however, is related to a structuralist perspective which implies that global capitalism in the Western and Northern industrialised countries creates and offers job opportunities, which are considered as a second chance for both highly-skilled and low-skilled migrants. This situation may be debatable, but in the view of global market’s competitiveness, “capital interests fuel most of the debate, and humanitarian aspects take less place in the debate on international migration and development” (Ibid 2000). Of course, the degree to which migrants leave their countries may differ in space and in times. However, resources and status of migrants determine their movements having in mind that territorial boundaries remain actively policed. In some regions, migrants may move freely between borders, other borders may request travel documents, because “borders; have been politicised in terms of national security issues” (Ibid 2000).

II.4. Demography of Sub-Saharan African countries as cause of international migration

In 1960, a new chapter opened in African history when most of African countries acceded to independence. African’s population was this time around 285 million. In 2018, the exponential
demographic growth attended around 1.3 billion (World Population Review 2018), living in 54 African countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa 2017, the population was about 1,014 billion in 50 countries.

The transition of African countries from colonialism to independence was an important achievement but turned into political instability because African leaders were not prepared to manage and secure the post-colonial era, especially in economic and political domains. The USA presented pretexts to perpetuate the exploitation of African resources despite African independence. In some countries, this resulted in violence.

Since the late 1980s, the ideas of post-cold war international order took place with a neo-liberal economic framework related to a global economic orthodoxy. The phenomenon of globalization orchestrated a free movement of goods, people, and money across national borders to propel the global economic interactions. Did Africa embark on this global economic train? Unfortunately, this is not in the scope of the thesis, however the answer here must be a debatable issue. Moreover, Olungbenga and Oteh (2004) have already answered when saying that the African continent is in crisis and argue that the economic and the structural adjustment have created the African refugees and economic migrants. Black et al. (2006) converge in the same direction and claim that one area in which Africa has long been prominent is “the production of refugees”, considering the factors of conflicts that devastated some African countries such as Angola, Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Congo Republic/Brazzaville, DR Congo/Kinshasa, Eritrea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra-Leone, Somali, Sudan, to name a few.

Aderanti Adepoju notes that the “post-independence drive for African self-sufficiency in high-level manpower led to substantial investment in education and a rapid increase in educational facilities and the award scholarships for foreign acquisition of skills” (Adepoju 2014: 30). But controversially, “the continent is still in crisis”; note Olugbenga and Oteh (2004), after five decades of the continent’s acquisition of its independence. Shall we talk about crisis in independence or independence in crisis, while UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report based on current trends notes that millions of children and young people are left behind, excluded as victims of injustice and inequality? It predicts that “Sub-Saharan Africa will not achieve universal secondary school completion until after 2080” (Sy and Golubski 2017: 35) “based on current political turmoil regarding democracy, elections, and local institutions under political and social uncertainty” (Ibid: 100) in Sub-Saharan African countries.
In 2016, an alarming growing number of people estimated up to 65.8 million worldwide were in need of protection, which means that 22.5 million were refugees, 40.3 million were internal displaced persons, and 2.8 million were asylum seekers (European Commission 2017). Sub-Saharan African countries hosted over 20 percent of this number in 2017 (World Bank 2017). Notably, though, the large majority of African refugees are in other African countries. Even the number of refugees found in African countries is much larger than the number hosted by European countries. In 2016, South Sudan had the highest number of refugees in the region, and the third highest in the world. “Several countries are both origin of significant number of refugees, as well as host countries of refugees, namely South Sudan, Sudan and DRC” (IOM 2018).

Many extreme political parties in European countries spread anti-immigrant discourses and opinions inherited from colonial hegemonic inspiration, that stated for instance, in 1929, that “We must by all costs prevent that great numbers of black workers immigrate to Europe” (Hansen and Jonsson 2011: 26), that believe that migration is a “meta-issue” (Faist 2002: 11) of threat, insecurity, and a socio-economic loss (Miller 2008: 71).

Notwithstanding this, European demography is aging drastically, and a well-managed migration can respond to this issue, when asylum seekers and refugees’ families are resettled. Nowadays, well managed migration serves as a good response to the global labour market demand where the shortage of national domestic competence is expressed.

It should be noted that UNHCR identified about 623,000 Congolese migrants in December 2017 in the neighbouring countries and the majority were concentrated in Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda (Sputnik 2017).

In Sub-Saharan African countries, the agenda of migration varies, each country has its own priorities. Some organise to bring back their migrants from abroad, other countries focus on transit migration, while others still deal with displaced people. Whereas some countries are thinking about how to organise the diaspora in the favour of political and security issues, others have concern with human rights issue in relationship with countries that host their diaspora. In the same way, some are dealing with the issues of human trafficking, while other African countries are trying to explore which ways to use for making more productive the remittances, and the contribution of diaspora. Some are concerned with the question of how to reintegrate the returnees, while others are planning to attract more international highly-skilled migrants.
Yet other African countries are trying to put in place frameworks of new cooperation links with EU to stop economic migrants to take dangerous routes of Mediterranean to enter Europe. Having said this, it is clear to understand that migration policy in Sub-Saharan Africa appears to be a new field. The agenda is unfolding only gradually even as migrants’ mobility has been an international issue for ages.

**II.5. Globalization as push and pull factors**

“Colonisation laid the routes for globalization” (Papastergiadis 2000: 76), and “modern European colonialism is incomprehensible without reference to the capitalism that dynamized it” (Dirlik 2002: 441). Arif Dirlik believes that colonialism, postcolonialism, globalization and the nation are intertwined. However, the 1970s saw “the beginning of a new world order emerging now known as globalization” (Delgado-Wise et al.2013) and since 1980s the concept “globalization” expended widely, used in academic world as an interconnected whole and the consciousness that a growing number of issues can no longer be addressed purely at a local level. “Globalization has been associated with the flexible and speciality extended forms of production, rapid mobility of capital, information and goods, the denationalizing of capital, the deterritorialization of culture, the interpenetration of local communities by global media networks, and the dispersal of socio-economic power beyond the Euro-American axis” (Papastergiadis 2000).

Having understood what globalization is about, some doubts lose their existence, when it is used as causes and consequences of international migration. Furthermore, “Globalization has been considered as the formation of a total and integrated economic system that mobilises considerable political interactions between states” (Ibid 2000).

It is notable that the same causes produce the same effects although poor countries remain under control in the name of international cooperation. For instance, “development aid which is tailored to foster modernisation, is hailed naively by migration analysts as the resolution of the migration problem” (Appleyard 1992b). Moreover, industrialised countries use high wage jobs or safe havens as pull factors because they need skilled migrants, also called “economic migrants” in some other versions (IOM 2017).

According to the 1951 United Nations Convention, “a refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-
founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group” (USA for UNHCR 2018; Shokenove 2014). Refugees have three given options when they are living in camps: Firstly, they may choose to return to their countries of origin if the motive of their insecurity does no longer exist, such as for instance, the end of war, if they have left their countries because of civil war. Secondly, they may be integrated in the host countries if this country provides integration policies to those who chose to become citizens of this host county (Macrae 1999). Thirdly, other countries may proceed to resettlement for those refugees who face insecurity in refugee camps, related to rape cases, medical treatment outside the host country, facing insecurity caused by “political terror” (Bayefsky 2006) in the host country, to name just a few.

Globalization has led, it seems, to increased numbers of refugees in Africa. It has also led to an increase of economic migrants. “An economic migrant is someone who makes a voluntary choice to leave his/her home country and seeks work elsewhere to improve her/his quality of life. He/she has legal right to travel and work” (IOM 2004: 21). In economic migration theory (Hammar and et al 1997: 51), the push-pull approach of Lee (1966) entails two respective approaches that lead to a better understanding: The first approach concerns “micro-level units”: decision making is connected to individuals’ aspirations, needs, and desires to fulfil economic betterment. They can be stopped only just by obstacles along borders, while crossing borders. These obstacles limit the full realisation of economic migrants’ dreams if they are unable to be in possession of a travel visa, especially, when it comes to crossing borders in movement South-North migration.

The second approach concerns “macro-level units”; it does not reflect economic aspects such as costs and benefits of migration. Rather, it encompasses the “dimensions of justice, security, freedom, good health, love, esteem, and happiness” (Ibid 1966). This view implicates the micro-level in individual decision-making. Considering these approaches, it is comprehensible, that economic migrants decide to move because of international income or wage differences, but also security, good working conditions or precarious working conditions, play determinant roles in their decision-making of their mobility (Hammar et al. 1997: 51).

For instance, the deal between Turkey and the EU (İcduygu and Toktas 2016) has reduced chances of international economic migrants from Africa and Asia, who cannot afford the travel visa, to fulfil their dreams. “Many, who followed smugglers and human trafficking traps, had become victims of mass grave in Mediterranean” (De Genova 20017). Currently, the impacts
of globalization on international migration are stronger today than before. Means to facilitate longer distances by land, air, and sea in short time, have been developed worldwide. In addition, transnational networks, and transnational labour markets increasingly, drive flows. Earlier migration and transnational contacts often generated migration. What is stressed here is that facilitation of contacts among migrants in host countries and those in sending countries work like pull factors that guide those who are leaving their countries.

Similarly, media such as radio, TV and newspaper play an undelegated role on migrants’ movement. Entzinger et al. (2004: XXVI) think that “fluctuation in labour demand and the inflexibility of many domestic labour markets, especially in industrialised countries, make temporary labour migration an attractive proposal for migrants”.

### II.6. Labour migrants and labour markets

The migrants who come and go have more experience than anyone else of a world which is simultaneously globalized and fragmented (Bot 2013: 147). Low skilled and semi-skilled labour migrants present the largest number of international labour migrants compared to skilled or high skilled ones worldwide. They face numerous difficulties in host countries due to their low educational levels, sex, ethnical groups, employment, and status. Some may face discrimination, exploitation, abuse, and worse working conditions than skilled migrant workers in highly skilled jobs. In the ILOs’ Constitution of 1919, amended in 1944 and 1998, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work focused on “special attention to the problems of persons with special social needs, particularly unemployed and migrant workers” (ILO 2011). It is reasonable to note that the UN has also been involved in protecting and improving migrant workers together with ILO. They have adopted good standards rights regarding working conditions, for both employees and international migrant workers. Each ILO country member, and partner, that has adhered ILOs’ Protocols, should create good working conditions for international migrant workers.

However, many developing countries do not honour their commitment towards vulnerable low-skilled and semi-skilled migrants’ working conditions, because the ILO cannot sanction recalcitrant countries. Its mandate is very limited even if it advocates, or encourages both civil society, governments, international corporations, and locale employers to respect labour rights.
Marino, et al. (2017) show how most of EU member states structured national labour markets regarding economic conditions before the period of the finance crisis between 2000 and 2007. In this period, they had observed either relatively low or falling levels of unemployment. They therefore tried to stimulate hiring activity. Countries such as “Belgium, France, Hungary, and the UK introduced new job subsidy measures to motivate enterprises to recruit unemployed workers or apprentices. In the same way, Czech Republic, Ireland, Portugal, and Sweden tried to stimulate hiring activity by temporarily reducing employers’ social insurance contributions” (OECD 2010). The point here, is to emphasise the finance crisis, and to show that the reduction of job opportunities in GISPI economies and in other EU member states has had tremendous consequences on migrants.

Moreover, worth noting is the labour market upheavals that, in the aftermath of the finance crisis, brought an “invention of diverse new policies, and relative reforms. The North European countries including Sweden have since 2008, adjusted in the implementation of the EU Directive on Temporary Agency Work. In the same way, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Belgium, and Netherlands have bolstered or reinforced regulations relating to agency workers and workers on fixed term contracts” (Marino, et al. 2017).

In spite of the increasing international migration, there is no a universal institutional migration framework for migration in general, and labour migration in particular. There is a normative framework of United Nations regulating international migration (UN DSA 2017: 23):

- The 1951 convention concerning the status of refugees;
- The 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees;
- The 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of migrant workers and members of their families;
- The 2000 Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children;

These legal instruments combined with ILO’s rights for protecting migrant workers, constitute a normative framework to regulate international migration. However, it is poorly implemented, which leads to migrants’ ruthlessness and precarious lives and working conditions (Likic-Brboric and Schierup 2011).
II.7. Migrants and precarious working conditions

Precarious work is defined as “a variety of employment below the socially established normative standards characterized by super exploitation” (Likic-Brboric and Schierup 2011: 11-12; Woolfson and Likic-Brboric 2008). Kalleberg (2008: 1; 14) believes that precarious work is a worldwide phenomenon and its level varies from country to country. Levels of precarious work can be observed through the country’s stage of development, cultures, and social institutions.

Precarious employment brings stress, conflicts, and accumulation of insufficient physiological needs. Precarious jobs do not follow norms and ILOs’ standards. The main issue of the precarious jobs is more accentuated in the case of migrant workers who are more easily exploited.

Furthermore, precarious workplaces may be characterised by discrimination, sexism, racism, low wages, absence of worker rights to adhere freely to work unions, or fear to demonstrate publicly, when work rights are violated. For instance, frequent confiscations of migrant workers’ passports by the employers may occur, to prevent the worker to resign or leave the host country, before having paid back the amount that the employer has often promised to the intermediary travel agency, or job arrangement agencies. The worst of these cases are often found in sex industries, or in developing countries sieged by war, dictatorship, and corruption. It is also frequently observed when governments’ rate of unemployment is very high, and the population is very poor.

To illustrate the precarious working conditions in developed industrialised countries, Maurin and Postel-Vinay (2005) (cited by Kalleberg 2008: 15), insist on key dimensions linked to differences in jobs in the formal economy, where “earnings inequality, security inequality, vulnerability to dismissals, and nonstandard work arrangements”, play a role. In Africa, Asia and Latin America, “precarious work goes parallelly with informal economy and it is often the norm” (Ibid: 15).

It should be noted that precarity is connected to neoliberal globalization that implicates free capital mobility, privatizations, and welfare provisions as well. These economic aggregates influence the labour markets, where low-skilled and semi-skilled migrant workers are exploited. Precarious work creates insecurity, affects families, and households. Therefore
“education has become increasingly important as a determinant of life chances due to the removal of institutional protections resulting from the decline of unions, labour laws, and other changes” (Ibid: 10).

II.8. Migration and development
Dahlstedt and Neergaard (2014) encourage sending countries “to incorporate migration into their national development to reduce poverty”. The important issue here, is the meaning and the value attributed to development as it opposes poverty. “Development is a political concern” (Ibid 2014), because it involves countries and their leaders in terms of policymaking. It relates to national economics, in the sense that, every input associated to taxes gained from labour migrants, build the national economy. Furthermore, OECD (2013) suggests convincingly that, “for more visibility in economic development, governments must be more open and more inclusive”.

Open and inclusive governments oppose the closing of borders, and the exclusion of otherness, because of the migrant’s skin colour, or because of his or her sexual orientation (Ahlstedt 2016; Bredström 2008; Burr and Hearn 2008). Moreover, Development is desirable as explained by Khan (2007): “economic development is understood as a process that a nation undergoes to improve the poor quality of life of the majority, to a higher living standard by reaching an acceptable rate of unemployment, and a higher rate of higher wages”.

Another overview of migration and development comes from Massey (1988:390) who expresses a virtual tautology in viewing that “development produces migration”, however, he founds his convictions on ideas borrowed from John Hicks, and from Harrison White, claiming that “market does not exist a priori, they are created by human actors for the economic exchanges and distributions”. These ideas of markets correlate with capital accumulation processes, that undermine “individual’s social and economic links to rural communities, making large- scale migration possible” (Hicks 1969; White 1981). What do rural communities have to do with development and migration? Massey (1988) argues that the reason that rural and small-scale agriculture becomes unsustainable is in part that governments decide to build large roads, airports, supermarkets, industries building, or other common interests’ investments. In this view, Nina Glick Schiller (2009: 20) notes that “since capital is constituted through social relationships, and when it is reconstituted, in a specific place, destroys previously
emplaced social relationships and the infrastructures and environment in which they were situated and construct others” (Schiller 2009: 20).

Some countries’ authorities can negotiate and dialogue with the local community and explain convincingly how to compensate the land which the state project will use. Other countries, with a high range of dictatorship and corruption, force the rural community to leave their lands, where the government intends to exploit. It can be, for instance, mining exploitation, industry building projects, roads, airports, to name a few. This phenomenon is called “land grabbing” (Ndi 2017: 4). Workers who have been working in agriculture, prefer to look for jobs in big cities or out of their countries, where they gain higher wages and better working conditions.

Tamas and Palme (2006) stress that “development does not relate only to the generation of incomes and wealth, but also to redistribution thereof”. It should not only be seen in the sense of “economic growth, but also in the sense of human development” (Ibid 2006), which focuses on the needs to enhance social, cultural, intellectual, technical, educational, economic, political, and cultural capacity of communities, groups, and individuals. In other words, “migration is a cross-cutting phenomenon with developmental opportunities. It needs to be integrated into all facets of state policymaking and planning, including programmes and strategies to alleviate poverty and reduce inequality” (Ibid: 87)

II.9. Debate on migration and development

As mentioned many scientists, anthropologists and migration researchers argue that international migration can foster development (Miller 2008: 74; Hear 2004, Castles 2009) on a continental level; for instance, Europe-Africa, ”Eurafrica” (Hansen and Jonsson 2011: 7), and at a global level through different measurement tools on remittances (Taylor 1999: 65), on human resources in terms of workforce as input in production chain and process in the capitalist world of commodification of processes (Bair 2005).

Others believe controversially, that South-North exodus due to poverty and income gaps (Massey 1988: 400) between industrialised and poor Sub-Saharan African countries, reflects a symptom of development failure (Bakewell 2008; Collier 2013). While Clemens (2016) and De Haas (2010: 236) believe that migrant workers increase inequalities and domestic unemployment in receiving countries, regarding the professionalism of many skilled migrants accessing speedily to jobs.
Migrants affect negatively local wages in receiving countries when they work for low wages under the minimum legal remuneration.

Moreover, the negative impact of racism, xenophobia, and discrimination can affect migrants when it comes to the matter of identity differences, the colour, race, ethnic or national origin (Bhambra 2017) in host countries. Nevertheless, Adepoju (2014) observes that the political relationship between the countries of emigration and return, the definition of progress in the home country may influence the returnees’ impacts.

The debate does not stop here. Recently, the question of insecurity has moved to the front in debates on migration. Fear of otherness has globally extended the distance between migrants and natives in the host countries. The consequences in terms of terrorism perspective, are evidently shocking, but this thesis does not explore this aspect. Terrorism and immigration are two different subjects, because well-managed migration leads to debatable social and economic development, while terrorism is anti-development and anti-migration in its quintessence. Furthermore, to “drive away strangers is to act like barbarians” as the great Ancient Greek traveller and geographer Strabo noted in his Geography (XVII.I.19) quoted by (Moses 2006). On the contrary, and the contemporary era, many people think that barbarians are those migrants who threat, hate, and bring fear to both genuine migrants and host societies in the name of international terrorism.

It is reasonable to note that in short period of human history, migration was considered as a fundamental need, and welcoming foreigners (Ibid: 39) was understood as an act of civility.

Regarding attitudes towards immigrants in Europe, (Marino et al. 2017: 67) think that Northern countries are generally less hostile to immigrants, while central Europe is divided. France, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom are showing a medium-high level of hostility, and other countries such as Germany and Switzerland, aligning instead with the northern European states.

To try to understand this debate, hostility must be clearly defined. Zicket et al. (2010), present two aspects of hostility. On the one hand, hostility is defined as an attitude of enmity composed of degree of acceptance of the other, viewed on the political aspects of identity demarcation, ethnicity, race, sex, age, high-skilled, low or semi-skilled migrants. On the other hand, hostility may refer to the degree of rejection, and aversion towards people from poor countries. The most important argument here relates to how local people anticipate the impact
of immigrants. Hostility may also refer to individuals’ projections of the future, correlated to the impact of international migrants on the local economy, job opportunities, culture, and life in the host countries.

Furthermore, IOM, ICMPD (International Centre for Migration and Policy Development), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Organisation of American States, World Bank, Inter-American development Bank, and Migration Policy Institute, see remittances as an essential tool in the development migrant-sending, developing countries (Delgado-Wise, et al. 2013). Yet, academics, international organisations and voices in civil society continue to debate migration development and human rights. There is evidence that remittances and labour migration as workforce stimulate economic development in receiving and sending countries. Yet, the consensus will take time to form while political interests diverge regarding extreme political parties’ discourses of anti-migration in most of industrialized countries. The problem resides at another level of international corporations that need increasingly highly-skilled specialist migrants to foster their business on the global scale.

Civil society is well informed on the importance of migrants as a workforce and has been organised in different movements, networks, and organisations such as World Social Forum on Migration, which had succeeded to bring together delegates every two years. Under the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GEMD), a governmental forum derived from the 2006 United Nations (UN) High level dialogue (Ibid 2013), has created spaces and rooms where issues of political and business agendas have been discussed on migration and development as a workforce that contributes to economic development in both receiving and sending countries.

II.10. Overview of remittances and development

The issue that has become central in the migration and development studies is the role of remittances for the development of the migrants’ countries of origin.

Peggy Levitt and Lamba-Nieves call remittances “Social remittances” (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). Remittances have been attributed an important role of stimulating the economic growth and large-scale emigration contribute to the best of both worlds: Rapid growth in the country of immigration (Kindleberger 1965: 253), and rapid growth in the country of origin. In addition, remittances generate foreign reserve and improve the balance of payment and is widely acknowledged as contributing, for instance, to Philippines’ economy. Phillips (2009)
elucidates the flow of remittances encompasses the whole vision of migration and development strategy. Therefore, they are the most obvious and most cited major input of development of international migration (Asis et al. 2010:1; World Bank Group 2017).

In the two past decades, Connell and Conway have tried to analyse migrant remittances in the Island microstates of South Pacific and the Caribbean, realising that, the sustainability of remittance-dependent development was uncertain (Connell and Conway 2000: 56). They argue that, as long as migration flows continue to grow, the resultant remittances might be equal to the task.

Ten years later, an optimistic view enriched the global debate through Willem Maas, who argues that migrants do not only bring back money in their countries of origin, but also, new ideas, knowledge, and entrepreneurial attitudes (Maas 2010). Currently, however, remittances sent to developing countries have dramatically, and consecutively declined in these last three years 2016, 2015 and 2014, regarding their trends (World Bank Group 2017).

Through the 230 Agenda for sustainable development in 2015, the UN issued a call to action to eradicate poverty, end hunger and reduce social, and economic inequality (UN 2017) and one of the means is migrants’ remittances. An estimated US Dollars 6,5 trillion of remittances between 2015 and 2030 sent by one million migrants workers worldwide of which 75 percent go directly to families for immediate needs, and 25 percent go to investment and entrepreneurial options, estimated to US Dollars 100 billion a year. According to UN, the potential impact of remittances can be realized when coherent public policies and priorities match with civil society and private-sector initiatives (UN 2017).

The World Bank highlights that Europe and Central Asian regions, are affected by the recent 30 percent decline of remittance since 2013, while Latin American and Caribbean regions increased remittances flows of 6,9 percent, due to more employments of their foreign workers in USA. The decrease of oil prices in the Asian region has also damaged the currency and exacerbated the unemployment of South-South migrants. It is worthy mention that the weak economic growth in Europe has influenced African remittances flows negatively (World Bank Group 2017). Nonetheless, in 2013, the top ten emigration Sub-Saharan African countries (World Bank Group 2016) have represented Africa on international migration board as the top migrant labour force in industrialised countries. The most known were: Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, and DRC.
Because of the labour market “nationalization policies in the Gulf Countries Council (GCC) and anti-immigration campaigns in industrialised countries” (Ibid 2017), the hiring of migrant workers has decreased. Therefore, hiring of foreign immigrant workers has regressed on the global scale. Also, the phenomenon of turning away migrant workers in the slave trade in Libya (CNN 2017), has negatively affected Sub-Saharan migrants’ remittances. Even so, Southern countries have marked a step forward in economic development and a growth of 3.3 percent, which was expected in 2017, and encouraged employments and hiring of foreign south-south workers. It should also be noted that the factor of maintaining a global cost at 7.45 percent of remittances transfer operations has restrained and discouraged the foreign workers.
CHAPTER III.
DRC AS A MIGRATION COUNTRY

III.1. Introduction

DRC has been both a country of emigration, and immigration. Its history is linked to its potential natural resources in terms of diverse minerals. The king Leopold of Belgium owned DRC as his private nation between 1885-1907. This nation was shaped only by the force of the colonial acquisition of Leopold II uniting discrete indigenous tribes, and empires under one reign of terror (Conrad 1973; Couture 2015). Leopold II ruled as an absolute monarch over his new country and freely extracted and traded its natural resources. Heavy international criticism of the cruel way in which Congo was ruled by Leopold II, made the Belgian parliament decide to take over Congo as Belgian colony in 1908 (Deschouwer, 2009: 216).

The location of Belgian Congo on the map of Africa 1885-1914. The country has changed its names many times. It was called Kingdom of Kongo between 14th and 19th century and became Congo Free State in 1885, Belgian Congo in 1908, Democratic Republic of Congo in 1964, renamed Zaïre in 1971, and again the current Republic Democratic of Congo (DRC) in 1997. Source: http://lancefuhrer.com/partition_of_africa.htm, February 2018
The DR Congo’s minerals continue to attract international migrants. Despite of these riches, it is still a poor country which depends on IOM security projects to reorganise its own migration policies. IOM also focuses on alleviating poverty in this country, it helps this country to counteract trafficking as well. Since 1999, the country has been under UN security control through the deployment of UN peacekeeping mission that failed.

DRC’s political and economic instability, ethnic conflicts and repeated wars have had a negative impact on the population and caused a high rate of unemployment, which in turn causes emigration. However, these problems do not deter influx of low-skilled and irregular immigration from neighbouring countries.

This chapter traces a brief historical overview of DRC’ situation. It also highlights DRC’ s paradoxical effects of natural resources on migration pull and push factors, and it shows an interesting illustration of Chinese migrant workers in DRC, who themselves employ local Congolese; which is, I claim, an encouraging contribution to the economic development. This chapter also encompasses the labour migration policies in DRC which relay on IOM project activities. It ends by looking at brain drain which is depending absolutely on DRC’s mineral attraction.

### III.2. Paradoxes of natural resources in DRC: Migration push and pull factors

On the pretext that communists would not takeover African countries, the USA decided to intervene in the DRC (1960-1965) just after Belgium withdrew from its former colony. American policymakers believed that “a communist takeover in the Congo, a country roughly the size of Western Europe, and strategically located in the heart of Africa, would lead to the loss of the central, if not all of, Sub-Saharan Africa” (Mountz 2014: 1). This situation could create devastating negative economic impact in European and Western countries (Ibid 2014).

Eckes (2011) makes a significant comment on the real value of the DRC for the Western imperialists’ greed for Congolese minerals. He argues that in 1959, DRC itself produced: 69 percent of its industrial diamond, 49 percent of its cobalt, 9 percent of its copper and 7 percent of West’s tin to the colonialists. At this point, Africa was considered as the hinterland of Europe. Research shows that the end of colonisation did not benefit African countries.
On the contrary, the US administration took advantage of African decolonisation to extend American leadership and their influence. The US continued to use the United Nations (UN) as an umbrella organisation under which it could pursue its goals, while keeping the Cold War (Mountz 2014); namely the Soviets out of the DR Congo.

### III.3. DRC as an immigration country

RDC is one of the most populous nations in Sub-Saharan Africa and the largest French speaking African country in Central Africa, it has more around 500 ethnic groups (Karbo and Mutisi 2011), it is as we have seen, a country that has received international migrants from various countries.

But this country is not only sending migrants, but it is also a receiving country (Tshibambe and Kabunda 2010). The DRC hosted about 452 thousand refugees in 2016 (World Bank 2017). DRC remains an attractive place for refugees and international migrants from its neighbouring countries and from outside Africa.

For instance, some data show that Lebanese migrants arrived in the DRC since 1970s; they were around 6,000 in 2009, Indian were around 9,000, and Chinese have reached the number of about 5000 in 2015. Others came from Mexico, Ukraine, Senegal to name just a few. They have become a palliative corner stone of employing locally the Congolese citizens (Tshibambe and Kabunda 2010: 40).

Since the colonial period, and currently, the country is still overexploited by transnational corporations and agencies. The country is still one of the poorest countries in the World even though it is considered as one of the most potentially rich in the world, which has 1,100 different minerals (World Bank 2015) extracted by about 300 transnational companies. An estimated $24 trillion in untapped mineral deposits including the world’s largest reserves of coltan (Tantalum, niobium, columbium), and the three-quarters of the world’s cobalt (Peppard and Vicini 2015).

The Congolese parts that holds diverse minerals are considered as catalysts of conflict and war. Tshibambe and Kabunda (2010) notice the main reason that attracts international migrants, and especially Asian migrants into DRC.
The diverse minerals fields in the Katanga Province are considered as the economic heart of the country. Furthermore, the Katanga province has been at the centre of DRC tumultuous politically history as the seat of failed secessionist movements at independence and as key for battleground in the second DR Congo war in the period of 1997-2003 (Crisis Group 2016).

Notwithstanding, the DRC’s potential natural resources have attracted international migrants. Many of them have been involved in the exploitation of minerals, oil, timber and land grabbing. Struggles rooted in a history of violence, regional instability, conflicts between different ethnic groups, have caused a negative impact on the country. Its divers resources attract (Tamas and Palme 2006: 71) migrants, refugees, and neighbouring countries such as Angola, Burundi, Centre Africa Republic, Congo Republic, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. African countries that do not have direct border with DRC are more implicated in DRC’s natural resources, such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Chad.

III.4. The example of Chinese migrant workers who employ locally in the DRC

Chinese migrants in Africa reached the number of about 270,000 in 2007, and in the DRC, they numbered about 4000. Their enterprises have influenced the local employment. Chinese migrants have a quite longue history in the DRC. They started their movement to this county since in the 1970s, grounding their enterprises in energy, telecommunication, construction, manufacturing and smaller business in mining, agriculture, trading and catering (Tang 2010: 521). A research was conducted in the field of Chinese migrants and their impact on employment in Angola and in DRC in 2007 by Xiaoyang Tang. The studies focused on Angola and the DRC regarding the variety of Chinese migrants which is made up of temporary labour migration in relation with big public constructions projects, systematic entrepreneurial migration, and small- and medium- sized merchants. He interviewed 195 persons including 39 Chinese based in Angola, 33 Angolan, 25 Chinese in DRC, 12 Congolese, 28 diplomates from other countries accredited in Angola and in DRC, as well as 58 Chinese by phone or on-line (Ibid 321). Persons interviewed were officials in charge of foreign trade and investment, employees, scholars, and intrapreneurial executive. He also interviewed officials from the Chinese Embassies merchants, community leaders and managers.
The research gives a short justification or the scope of Chinese economic activities in both countries Angola and DRC, by introducing them as countries that have suffered decades’ long civil wars and are in desperate need of reconstruction. Wars have ravaged the infrastructure of water and electricity supply, transportation infrastructure, health system and public education are almost non-existent in rural parts. In addition, millions of unemployed in Ghettos, and just small number of extraction industries companies provide well payed jobs, and “both countries are troubled by huge debts and corrupt governances so that they have difficulties in getting funds from Western countries” (Ibid. 352). The following table 2, gives an overview of Chinese migrant workers, enterprises, and local employment in the DRC.

### Table 2. Chinese migrant workers, enterprises, and local employment in the DRC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector no (of surveyed enterprises)</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Congolese</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Local employment % Congolese employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mining (23)</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecom (4)</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catering (5)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading (36)</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>76.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (68)</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>1644</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2149</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: (Tang 2010: 361)*

As the table shows: Local employment is higher than other nationalities workers. In 68 Chinese enterprises in DRC, 1644 Congolese are employed compared to 496 Chinese workers, while 8 employed come from other countries. More than 76 percent of local employment (Congolese citizens) are employed by migrant Chinese in the DRC.

Chinese enterprise managers put more emphasis on training of local employees to build a reliable workforce. Instead of continuing to bring more expatriates from their country, they build on long-term development the political managerial of constituting permanent and available competent local human resources through local recruitment and training.

In sum, table 2 appears to show that migrant workers from China contribute to Congolese economic and social development by creating jobs and employing Congolese citizens.

It should be noted however, that Chinese migrant workers have chosen the DRC as a country of destination, especially for its rich potential natural resources in terms of minerals as pull factors. It is interesting to note that, about 2.3 million km² of the territory contains over 110,000
different minerals (Kasongo 2015: 23) concentrated in four main areas: Katanga, both Kasai, North-eastern Congo, and Kivu-Maniema in the Eastern part of DR Congo. The Copper belt of Katanga province also contains cobalt, Zinc, Uranium etc. This cobalt is the most important in the world.

However, the Congolese mining sector still suffering from serious dysfunctions and especially from governmental mismanagement (Ibid 2010). In 2007, China invested 5 billion US dollars in the mining industry and in construction projects as a post war reconstruction, and inflows of Chinese companies and workers continued to increase significantly in the DRC.

Interestingly, China also increases its investments in African countries and especially in DRC to extend its hegemony, and its geopolitical and economic power to access easily to raw material for its own strategic development in long-term perspective, regarding South-South migration and strategical development.

The educational level of Chinese migrant workers in the DRC varies according to the field, type, and size of enterprise’s criteria of recruiting staff. However, some are highly- skilled migrants such as experts in geology, building engineers, experts in commercial and financial management, mine engineers, experts managers of small and medium-size enterprises, to name a few. But also, Chinese contractors usually recruit low- skilled workers, and mainly their family members. Chinese workers became more active in the DRC since 1970s, when they built the national stadium and the Congressional Palace in the capital city of Kinshasa. In 1990s Chinese private and state -owned companies implanted their economic activities in DRC. Currently, Chinese migrant workers together with their government, have expanded their economic activities in the DRC, and employed many local citizens Congolese in more than 68 different enterprises.

It should be noted that not only Chinese migrants have created jobs for local employment in DRC. There are also other international migrants from India, Lebanon, Mexico, Ukraine, Western African countries, Southern African countries through SADC country members, linked to free border movement in terms of circulant migrants, as well as state members of CEMAC (Central African Economic and Monetary Community) whose DRC is a member state.

Moreover, many African migrants especially from West Africa arrived in the DRC since 1960s, such as Malians and Senegalese and have become more involved in raw materials exploitation such as diamond and gold in Katanga/ Lubumbashi (Tshibambe and Kabunda
2010: 28). It was called “Shaba province” between 1971-1997 which ‘Shaba’ in Swahili language and can be interpreted as “Copper province” in English. It was a receptacle of the representative majority of African county senders of migrants, due to its international recognition as the Congolese part richest in cobalt, copper, tin, uranium, radium, and diamond. It is located in the South-East of DRC and it shares borders with Angola and Zambia, used as well as the main road to Southern African countries: Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana Namibia, Lesotho, and South Africa.

Most of Southern African countries have sent migrant workers in DRC, and most of them usually choose the ex-Katanga province, with its minerals still the main pull factors. They are most involved in informal economy and in raw material transactions. They open shops, restaurants, and hotels, and employ some local Congolese, but most of their shop managers are family members.

However, this contribution is a drop in the see of persistent unemployment and protracted poverty that the people of the DRC have to endure. DRC is a complex country to govern; it faces higher influences and domination under by the former colonialist countries. They make pressure and compete for exploiting the country’s natural resources, while some international corporations also do the same. These comparations have little favourable social impact in terms of projects that could involve poor and unemployed Congolese. The political elites of the DRC have no appropriate development model and often lack the responsibility for socio-economic development of their citizens. This creates the survival Congolese emigration to which we turn in the next section.

**III.5. DRC as an emigration country**

Since the early 1980s, the DRC has been a country of outmigration (Flahaux and Schoumaker 2016) due to its political violence, economic deterioration, lack of job opportunities, and repetitive wars of late 1990s, and 2000s). All of which we can see as push factors of asylum seekers, forced, and economic migrant flows, which leave the country to look for protection, asylum or economic betterment in African countries. Many of these migrants are concentrated in neighbouring countries such as Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda because these three countries use Swahili language which is also used in Eastern part of DRC, where most forced migrants come from. It should be noted that UNHCR identified about 623,000 Congolese migrants in
December 2017 in the neighbouring countries and the majority were concentrated in Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda (Sputnik 2017). In 2017, internally displaced persons reached the number of 3.9 million Congolese; the highest number of internally displaced persons in Africa. In addition, 1.9 million children under five are severely malnourished, and the country received over 525,000 refugees from neighbouring countries (EU Commission 2018). But, large numbers also find different ways towards developed countries such as Canada, Australia, USA, France, Belgium, UK, Norway, and in Sweden.

Last but not least, there are more and more economic migrants, people who leave to find better jobs and opportunities abroad. It is reasonable to highlight that economic migrants make a vital choice, when they decide to leave their countries of origin for looking for economic betterment abroad. The case of Congolese migrants illustrates this assertion by presenting a short synoptic view of how they are represented statistically in selected developed countries for different periods. Their number and the proportion of women are shown in table 3.

### Table 3. Congolese migrants living in selected developed countries, various years (Flahaux, and Schoumaker 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Proportion of women in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>59,941</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>44,715</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2011-2013</td>
<td>20,410</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>19,890</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England and Wales</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>19,193</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (foreign citizens)</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>9,299</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>6,724</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>6,010</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>4,973</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>3,092</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2,210</td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1,523</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1,494</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1,264</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Flahaux and Schoumaker 2016)

This table shows that language is the determinant factor of Congolese migrants, while deciding for the nation to move into, for looking economic betterment and job opportunities into industrialised countries. France has received the largest number of Congolese migrants followed by Belgium, because they use French. The second spoken European language in the DRC is English, which finds reflection in the fact that the US, Canada, England, and Wales have received the second largest number of Congolese, compared to countries that do not use either French or English. The rest of respective receiving countries which use neither French nor English, have received small numbers of Congolese migrants.

In Sweden 2015, Congolese migrant were about 3,092. This figure is a small number, because the Swedish language is not spoken in the DRC, and most of Congolese who came to Sweden have spent years in learning Swedish instead of working.

III.6. Skilled migration, brain drain, and brain gain in DRC

The highly-educated nature of the Congolese population (Shapiro et al 2003), is due to the good educational system inherited from Belgium, the former coloniser. The literacy rate is 77,3 percent, for male 88,9 percent and for women 66,0 percent (World Bank 2015).

Research conducted in Belgium (Schoumaker and al. 2009), show that over 85 percent of Congolese respondents interviewed in Belgium have completed at least secondary education, and more than 40 percent of those who have obtained a degree got it while studying in Europe,
especially in Belgium for most Congolese. 50 percent are men and 35 percent are women. 55 percent got their degrees when they were studying in DR Congo. 40 percent men and 65 percent women. Most Congolese migrant women have completed their degree in the country for each type of diploma.

In most cases, foreign credentials, especially Congolese in non-French speaking countries, are scarcely accepted and the equivalence often takes longue time, when they are not rejected. Most of holders of high degrees are usually overqualified for the jobs reserved for foreigners and this phenomenon concerns most of migrant workers from developing countries (Odhiambo 2013: 511). This phenomenon has led most Congolese to shift from intellectual work to physical or manual works for surviving. Researchers call this phenomenon “Brain waste” (Mattoo et al. 2008; Reitz 2011).

Reitz defines brain drain, brain waste, as a situation of skill downgrading, when an individual is working in a job that requires lower skill than the one he/she has acquired. It is a situation of skilled migrants who end up working as unskilled. Migrants from developing countries who emigrated to Europe at the age nearly 50 years old have experienced unemployability difficulties, even if they are part of the immigrant labour force.

In Europe and especially, in Sweden, there are few Congolese migrants if any in positions or functions of command. They are typically employed in hazardous works, dirty, dangerous, and demeaning (DDD), degrading their degrees and professional experiences. This is an example of brain waste as mentioned earlier. Many end up in jobs with low wages and precarious conditions linked to human rights abuse.

Few Congolese migrants use their skills or their degrees or professional experiences corresponding to the jobs relating to ILO’s standards, this phenomenon shows the contrary of literature calls “Brain drain, brain gain”. Abongo Chacha notes that about 23,000 qualified academics were migrating from Africa every year and this situation has caused big challenges (Chacha 2007: 510) of brain drain that end up in brain waste in industrialised countries. The reality of most migrants in Europe, is that they face precarious works when the job does not even relate to the worker’s profile and he/ she must just work to survive and help the families in the countries of origin.
III.7. Remittances to DRC

In 2017, the DRC received US Dollars 22.4 million in remittances and sent US Dollars 15.6 million (Migration Policy Institute 2017). Remittances should be understood in the simple ways as Sending money home by migrants, that is, to their country of origin. However, remittances transfer evaluated concomitantly as financial institutions emerged and developed their services and their implantations in developing countries’ cities. At this stage, Congolese migrants have started sending money home by using different informal or unofficial channels (Bazenguissa-Ganga 2005: 4; Sumata 2002: 622). Bazenguissa-Ganga outlines “the circulation of diaspora money from the host country to the country of origin” (Bazenguissa-Ganga 2005). All is about the importance of the sum and its usage which may be for helping families, start a business, paying children fees, or used for constructions. He considers ‘informal’ “to be an appropriate qualifier in order to speak about the means of circumventing the law in the context of certain social realities”. These ideas of informality and illegality bring the connotation of seeing remittances as illegal transfers, because the state loses its taxes gained from the transactions.

Nonetheless, Claude Sumata highlights convincingly that approximatively 20 percent of remittances were sent in DRC through official channels, and the rest were sent through unofficial channels to meet the supply and demand for foreign currencies in parallel to foreign exchange market (Ibid 623). Remittances play a vital role as one of the source of foreign exchange in DRC calculated by the ratio of remittance to macroeconomic variables such as import or export. However, data on this is patchy (Ibid 623).

Available literature seems to support the view that remittances refers to cash transfer from one place to another (Doom 2001). Remittances can be transferred from a migrant to a non-migrant; for instance, to friends or families. In this thesis I do not study the effective use of remittances by the receivers. The recipients decide themselves or together with senders how to allocate the received transferred money. As I noted earlier, the importance of the volume or amount of the transferred money determine whether its allocation should be for investments or for satisfying direct basic needs and consumption. When remittances are regularly sent, they turn to a regular income to the family budget.

In addition, Congolese international migrants have played an overall role through remittances that facilitates local entrepreneurial activities and representing a major inflow of capital for micro enterprises (Ibid 627). Congolese experienced the close link between
remittances and poverty alleviation regarding the Congolese political and economic crisis due to repetitive civil wars, and bad governance. Since its independence, the country experienced a dictatorship from 1965-1987. Which means 32 years of strong corruption period, dictatorship, and impoverishment. Since 1987 until now, not so much has been improved to alleviate poverty among Congolese, except remittances regularly sent into the country, international aid through NGOs, and from some governments that assist DRC through IOM project activities as I mentioned earlier. These finance resources have been a palliative funds for alleviating poverty.

Another way to think, is that remittances may originate from migrant and sent to a collective, or associations in terms of charitable donations or to an association of migrants, or a Congolese diaspora may provide remittances to support different local or regional projects of common interest of development, for instance, participating in opening agricultural sector roads in the rural areas, implantation of rural radio for teaching the outcomes of climate change which is exacerbated by deforestations activities, and agriculture of slash-and-burn practices. Moreover, remittances may support a microloan project for widows and for active poor men involved in small business of surviving. Furthermore, migrants may send remittances to the government, where voluntary transfers or specific taxes can be collected from migrants to support the government’s efforts of the country’s reconstruction, which has not been done yet in DRC.

Another kind of money transfer can come from government or private business to returnee migrants, in this case, former employers, government or pensions regularly send money transfers to returnee migrants in their countries of origin.

The money could be sent home through different informal channels. Some examples are hand delivery, couriering, cheque transfer, institutional and institutionalized bodies, NGOs, and missionaries network. In this logic of thinking, all these ways used for sending money home from Congolese migrants, work through individual relations networks and confidence accredited to these non-state organizations.

Since the independence of DRC in 1960 until the 1980s remittances flows were not common or largely known, but in 1990s and 2010s, the migration flows increased due to Congolese political instability, repetitive wars, and ethnic conflicts. At this stage, the demographic diaspora increased, and remittances flows increased in DRC as well. At these periods, financial service corporations started to specialize in money transfer from one location to another around the world, such as Western Union; the world’s largest money transfer company. However,
currently there are also various other international corporations in place to execute money transfer transactions to DRC such as MoneyGram. They all collaborate with World Bank for remittance global statistics issues and intra-bank transactions. It should be noted that members of the Congolese diaspora with regular statuses in the host country tend to send money home through formal transfer operators. However, remittances remain a debatable subject as to whether its impacts are positive or negative in developing countries such as DRC.

Table 4 gives an overview of the impact of remittances.
### Table 4. Possible positive and negative impacts of remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive impact of remittances</th>
<th>Negative impacts of remittances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Macro-economic Level</strong></td>
<td>Strengthening the balance of payment</td>
<td>Deterioration of balance of trade, by stimulation of import and appreciation of local currency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remittances are stable and counter cyclical</td>
<td>Deterioration of local balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remittances tend to decrease as migrant community is more established in destination countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic dependency on remittances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household Level</strong></td>
<td>Allowing families to meet basic needs</td>
<td>Dependency on remittances and negligent of local productive activities by families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opening of opportunities for investing in children education, health care, etc.</td>
<td>Hardly used for productive investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loosening of constraints in family budget to invest in business or savings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social security resource base</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community and Regional level</strong></td>
<td>Boost local economy</td>
<td>Increase inequality between families that receive remittances and those that do not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financing local development projects</td>
<td>Inflation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: (Bruyn and Wets 2005)*
III.8. Labour migration policies in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

In 2016, IOM created a project in the DRC following the increasing difficulties that the country faced gathering relevant data on migration management border crossings. The project focused on “strengthening the migration data collection and management system at border posts” (European Migration Network 2017: 107).

The DRC faces challenges with poor migration policies, migration data collection and a lack of competence in border control. Most of the DRC’s population lives close to the country’s borders and relies on cross-border exchanges (IOM 2014). At this stage, IOM is carrying out five major project activities to help the DRC reconstitute and elaborate its migration policies (ibid. 2014).

The IOM project’s first activity involves bettering security to regulate migration, with the British and American governments as sponsors. The main goal is to train Congolese border officers to take responsibility for security sector reform.

The project’s next activity is to counter people trafficking, as sponsored by the United States. This activity requires the DRC take an active role, and locate and combat people trafficking acts, resulting in a national counter-trafficking work plan, and counter-trafficking legislation (ibid. 2014).

The project then delves into migration health, as financed by the Belgian government.

The following project activity relates to migration and development, also sponsored by Belgium. The main idea is to transfer knowledge and technology for the benefit of the DRC’s socioeconomic development, with short-term consultancy from highly qualified, expatriated DRC nationals.

The final activity involves movement, emergency and post-conflict, financed by countries and governments including Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, Sweden through the United Nations Development Programme, Peace building fund, the UN’s Central Emergency Response Fund, UNICEF, the UN Development Programme and the UN Children’s Fund.
These project activities and diverse financial donors cooperate to develop new standards of migration policies for the consolidation of the DRC’s migration management. As I have mentioned earlier, DRC displays poor migration policies, and this is the justification of IOM intervention in this country to improve them and alleviate poverty. The efforts of international organisations, and finance donors, in the project activities may play an essential role, but not sufficient. These international efforts do not at all converge to combat the DRC’s circle of corrupt governance, which led the country to such desperation in the first place. These efforts are invaluable, of course, but they attack the consequences rather than the root causes of the DRC’s many conflicts.

It is beyond understanding to reflect on IOM’s project to train border officers in the DRC. This mission witnesses the country depend on external security, instead of relying on its own security capacities, to secure its territories. The impression of the DRC, then, is of a poor, weak country. Relations with some of its nine neighbouring countries are at stake as a result and considering the country’s size (5 times larger than Sweden), only well-trained border officers, equipped with modern border technology, can monitor the DRC’s border.

Apart from IOM’s mission, the DRC still depends on security from the Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO), translated as the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in Congo, formed in November 1999. MONUSCO deploys the largest number of soldiers, called peace keepers, in the world, yet peace is still absent in the DRC, especially in the unstable eastern part of the country.

MONUSCO’s failure stems from its largest, most expensive and complex operation of peacekeeping mission in the UN’s history (Menodji 2013). Peacekeepers working more as observers. The DRC’s migration policy must be effective, but when will the country gain political stability to control its territory? The answer remains uncertain, given the lack of transparency and free presidential elections. Both these elements promote the respect of government institutions, equal justice, combatting corruption, and creating a free, peaceful environment, all of which that attract new investors.

Nonetheless, in the DRC’s case, the main issue is how the government can demobilise the Congolese diaspora. One such method is to develop organisations and initiatives through remittance, donation and contribution projects for local development. From there, the DRC can attract and manage international highly skilled migrants the benefits they generate, if it creates
good labour migration policies according ILO and UN work standards. To reach this stage, the country cannot just build a data system that registers all migrants. It cannot only control migratory movements via competent national services. The DRC must build social security for citizens and a responsible, sovereign and democratic government, capable of leading the nation to peace and development.

The Oxford dictionary defines ‘national security’ as the safety of a nation against threats, such as terrorism, war or espionage. Since its independence, the DRC has been at war for control of its minerals, territory and borders. Neighbouring countries have many times invaded the DRC, supported by invisible hands demanding quick access to raw materials for developing their industries. (The Guardians 2018).

In 1960, just after the DRC’s independence, the USA declared war on the country to prevent communist powers from controlling the DRC’s minerals. Furthermore, in 2003, the DRC’s neighbouring countries split into two rival antagonists, fighting for control and possession of the DRC’s mineral fields. On one side was a block that invaded the country and desired the entire Congolese territory. The other contained neighbouring countries that supported the Congolese government’s personal defence against invaders, as well as SADC members that used their own power to defend fellow member the DRC. Already this country was a victim of its minerals.

Immense reserves of methane gas, oil and underwater biodiversity in the mountainous Lake Kivu are also immense riches that attract international attention as well as international migrants (Rosen 2015). The protection of this environment requires strong institutions that can elaborate new management policies, advanced technological border control and train personnel to hinder illegal exploitation and poaching in the DRC.

The DRC provides 50 percent of Africa’s forests. It is also endowed with one of the world’s mightiest river systems, which could provide hydro-electric power to the entire African continent. Apart from its minerals, the DRC’s waters position the country in the natural political centre in central Africa, and Africa as a whole (ibid. 2015).

It should be noted that the DRC is divided in two categories of people: the extremely rich, and the extremely poor. This configuration echoes the thoughts of Karl Marx, who believed that poverty is “evil of a society, where few own the means of production, and the majority are forced to sell their human labour. This situation divides consequently the society into classes:
A class of bourgeoisie and the class of proletariat” (Cox 1998). In this context, Congolese civil servants are paid a meagre salary of revolt, while those who work in private-sector mining and transnational corporations have a good standard of life. But most mining company owners and transnational companies in the DRC are foreigners and among the richest in the world.

Another key element is corruption in the DRC. But who are corrupted in the DRC, and who are corrupters? The nation continues its struggles with repeated political crises, weak governance and mismanagement of natural resources and entrenched corruption (Transparency International 2014). It is a system that must be combatted by all efforts, and it has long been an international issue. Most corrupters usually want to gain a quick service, especially foreigners who yearn to exploit mineral resources. One method of exploitation is land grabbing, wherein a large mineral field is mined, but corrupters are the compradors who never release the resource quantities they extract. Their statistics are opaque because they avoid tax payments according to the Congolese mineral taxation policy; they prefer arrangements of illicit payments, where they pay less taxes than officially required. The same problems reside in agroforestry in the exploitation of timber trees, and medicinal plants such as cinchona that produces quinine, a medication used to treat malaria (ibid. 2014). The corrupted authorities of course request some pecuniary exchange before signing important applied investors’ documents related to natural resource exploitation and other official services in different sectors. The anti-corruption agenda lacks a firm political will and is usually manipulated for political reasons. “The establishment of transparent and accountable institutions is further hampered by the existence of a rent-seeking elite and a complex web of political patronage that permeates all sectors of society” (ibid. 2014).

Migrant policy in the DRC is a building site that must take into account diverse aspects of diaspora, remittances, circulant migrants, labour migrant workers and returnees, to name just a few. Concerning the securitisation of migration, the DRC lacks advanced technological tools to cope with irregular migration from fellow members of African regional intergovernmental organisations, such as SADC, CEMAC and CEPGL.

Having said this, every African state has its own priorities in immigration policy, and considering the DRC’s diverse minerals, most of its migrant workers know the DRC’s border control weakness. This situation has caused more illegal migrants into the DRC. Despite the country’s best efforts to control entry at airports, it still lacks the technology to control clandestine migrants crossing land borders by foot, and coastal borders.
Sweden, on the other hand, does not deal with such border control difficulties under the Schengen acquis protocol, in the framework of the European Union (EU) (European Union 2004). Internal border checks were largely abolished for the free movement of people among EU member states until 2015, when Sweden reintroduced border controls as the refugee crisis advanced (the Guardian 2015).
CHAPTER IV.
SWEDEN AS A MIGRATION COUNTRY

IV.1. Introduction

Sweden is a country of both emigration and immigration. It has experienced international migration recruitment since after the Second World War and has been improving its labour migration policies regarding time and circumstances. It became an EU member state in 1995 and had cooperated positively with the EU to improve both EU and its own labour migration policies.

This chapter gives a brief history of Sweden’s migration, an overview of migration labour policies in Sweden and on brain drain, labour and brain gain in Sweden.

IV.2. Sweden’s history of migration

Immigration into Sweden has a long history. In the 1500s, Finnish settled in Mälardalen, and Romani people came to Sweden earlier in the same decade. During the late 1600s, Sweden drew Walloons who wished to learn iron mongering, and Savonian people were granted certain tax exemptions if they settled in virgin forests. In the 1700s, Sweden permitted Jews to settle in four of its cities. The country attracted French philosophers, artists and other intellectuals as well. In the 1800s, Italians skilled in stucco work came to Sweden and built cities of brick, joining Scots skilled in alcohol brewing (Migrationsverket 2018).

From the mid-1800s until 1930, Sweden faced a great emigration to America (Migrationsverket 2016, Bohlin and Euranius 2009). These Swedes were in search of economic betterment, because of “periods of poor harvests and famine, economic recession and unemployment” (Elinderson 2017: 4). Between 1860 and 1930, about one million Swedes emigrated to America. The first immigrant flows (1860 to 1879) came from rural areas and mostly consisted of families, with more than 60 percent married couples with children. The
second wave (1880 to 1910) was mostly young Swedish men looking for job opportunities and higher wages (ibid. 2017).

Sweden is also a sending country and has experienced challenges similar to the DRC in its migration history. Sweden even has seasonal migrant workers in its berry industry (Lintner 2009, Krifors 2017: 7). Its human development index in 2016 was 0.913 and ranked fourteenth (Human Development Report 2017). Its population was about 9.98 million in March 2018, and the number of migrants was about 40,000 (Countrymeters 2018). Sweden granted 15,552 work permits in 2017 (Migrationsverket 2018).

Sweden did not face the economic losses of the world wars as it remained neutral, and it flourished after 1945 (Yannu 2017). “The policy of Sweden’s neutrality is not laid down in the Constitution or required by any international agreement. Rather, it is a policy which Sweden itself has chosen to pursue, based on the conviction that neutrality is the best possible guarantee of Sweden being able to avoid involvement in a future war” (Global security 2014). Labour demand did increase after the war period, and the country recruited workers from neighbouring countries, as well as those from Southern and Eastern European countries—even workers from West Germany. Sweden’s flourishing export industry, against the reconstruction background of Western European countries, propelled the country towards an economic boom.

For improving, and maintaining, its exponential economic growth, Swedish labour authorities signed diverse contracts with European countries to send workers to Sweden. The country also prompted workers to travel by simplifying immigration policies and access to travel documents, including visas and work permits; low- and semi-skilled migrant workers thus found jobs directly after arriving in the country. In 1954, the Nordic countries signed a joint labour market agreement for easier travel to Sweden for Nordic workers, the Finns arriving at the highest population of migrant workers to Sweden.

In the 1950s, the Swedish government signed at the Geneva Convention, a permanent legislation of international agreement granting even political refugees asylum and permission to work in Sweden.

The economic boom in Sweden created a European exodus to Sweden, and its immigration rate peaked between 1959 and 1970 due to high demand of foreign workers in the country. From the early twentieth century, the key role of the National Union and employer organisations in Sweden was to develop labour market institutions. This way of working gave birth to a new
concept in contemporary economic management called the ‘Swedish model’. It thrived due to labour management cooperation, and the peaceful development of the employment market after the Second World War (Lundqvist 2004: 1). Working conditions, pay and other labour market issues found solutions within the Central Union Body, becoming the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), and by its employer counterparts: the Swedish Employer’s Confederation (SAF). To manage migrant workers, the central government involved itself in immigration labour matters, and played an important and a functional role in collaboration with the national labour market board (AMS) (ibid.:1).

In the 1970s, LO gained an increased influence over the government policies through its connections with Social Democracy. At this time, the total number of immigrants in Sweden reached 375,259, and the total number of emigrants was 221,225. The net flow at this period came to 154,004 persons (Lundh and Ohlsson 1999). Unfortunately, in 1990, the Unions lost legitimacy and influence, due to the general climate of a liberal-conservative government and a considerable degree of “de-corporatisation and a high rate of unemployment” (ibid.: 2).

Sweden is one of the most popular EU member states that has received international labour migrants, asylum seekers and refugees from all over the world, including those from sub-Saharan Africa—meaning Congolese migrants. Sweden implemented a new immigration labour policy in 2008 that allowed employers hire migrant workers from outside the EU and EEA to work in the country, and it hosted about 230,000 refugees (Asiedu 2014, World Bank 2017).

In 2015, the Swedish migration agency revised its policies and drastically changed the handling of refugee crisis. The country had been an attractive destination for asylum seekers among OECD states and stood out as receiving the most asylum seekers in Europe. The reversal peak period began when Sweden witnessed an over-growing number of asylum seekers from primarily Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea and Syria. The main argument read, “The new policies should not be understood as having political experience as their aim in terms of satisfying a sceptical Swedish public, but rather that the absolute numbers had become simply too large for the Swedish public sector to manage” (Barlai et al. 2017: 290). To confront subsequent migrant crisis, the authorities opted for new migration policies and declared that, “Our request to have the pressure taken off us when it comes to refugees, is not about calming the Swedish people. It is about that we cannot continue like this” (Eriksson 2015).
In addition, among migrants, some migrant workers come into industrialised countries for seasonal work. For example, several migrant workers from Southeast Asia work in the Swedish forest berry industry in Norrland (Faber et al. 2017; Eriksson, et al. 2014). They possess tourist visas, and their work is classified as unskilled seasonal labour. Most of the berry pickers are from Thailand and granted a temporary work permit in Sweden, despite exploitation in the forms of “flexible low-cost labour” and the “violation of human rights that these migrant workers face, and malpractices that some recruitment agencies are known to engage in” (Phillips 2009: 237, Vanaspong: 201). Thai migrants’ precarious work conditions do not stop their desire for work, but rather two positive impacts animate their motivation: even for a short time, they pick wild berries as raw material to spur the Swedish berry industry on as “global food” (Paassilta et al. 2009). Berry industries in Sweden depend on seasonal raw material picked by migrant labour forces. Secondly, they manage through their low seasonal wages to send remittances back home to help their families.

IV.3. Overview of migration labour policies in Sweden

Sweden did not face border control difficulties after the 2004 Schengen acquis protocol (European Union 2004). However, in 2015, it reintroduced border control. “Swedish border control took place mainly on Oresund bridge in the south of the country, where traffic comes from Denmark and ferry ports in the region where boats arrive from Denmark and Germany” (Maurice 2015). The increasing numbers of persons seeking asylum and protection in 2015 led Swedish authorities to take new border control policies to stop the migration flows. In this period, “the Swedish migration board has granted about 110,000 first-time work and/or residence permits distributed unto 5 categories” (European Migration Network 2016). They are protection/humanitarian reasons (33 percent); family reunifications (29 percent); employment reasons (25 percent); study reasons (10 percent); and free movement within the EU/EEA (3 percent).

Sweden became part of the EU’s Blue Card scheme in 2013. The Blue Card is an EU work permit that is not an immigration visa, but which allows high-skilled migrant, non-European citizen to work and live in any EU member country. Moreover, the Swedish Migration Agency states that a citizen of a country outside the EU, who has received a highly skilled job in
Sweden, can apply for an EU blue card. Still, that person must have a university education equivalent of 180 university credits or five years of professional experience. Not only that, but that person must have a salary equal to at least one and a half times an average gross salary in Sweden (Swedish Migration Agency 2018). ‘Swedish labour migration reform is working well but needs more monitoring’ (OECD 2011). This reform took place in 2008, when the Swedish labour migrant policy authorised employers to recruit from outside Europe. This liberal approach allowed employees to come to Sweden and work and prompted businesses to hire foreign workers cheaply and rapidly.

Related, Sweden exempts some workers from work permits, including citizens of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. These exemptions concern students who require residence permits for higher education, guest researchers who have not yet been issued a special residence permit for research, as well as EU citizens and their families (Migrationsverket 2017). Otherwise, a residence permit is issued to persons who have a work and residence permit for longer than three months. This card must show some mention of ‘Temporary residence and work permit’, and ‘May work’ (ibid. 2017).

 Gregg Bucken-Knapp analyses the Swedish labour migrant model and alludes to domestic and international policies interactions that structure Swedish labour market policy reforms. On one side, Sweden prevents or anticipates unexpected labour shortages by implementing flexible labour supply policies. On the other, it minds the enlargement of Europe with new member states in 2005 from Eastern Europe, and “anticipates the new flows of migrant labour in the sense of setting selection’s criteria, focusing on highly-skilled labour migrants, intra-corporate transferees and seasonal workers” (Bucken-Knapp 2009: 179).

Most non-European citizens have to apply for a work permit and receive it before coming to Sweden. Additionally, having a Swedish visa is not synonymous to a work permit and does not allow someone to work within the country (ibid. 2017). However, Sweden does allow some to work without a work permit (ibid. 2017). Such categories include:

- Employees for the reason of intern training, and participation in practical experience or other skill development at a company in an international group, for a short period of three months, not exceeding one year
- Specialists in an international corporation who work for the corporation up to one year
- Technical instructors for installations or repairs to machinery in less than two months
• Railway personnel and lorry drivers in international commercial traffic
• Representatives who work temporarily as salespeople, journalists, etc. for a company that does not have a branch or office in Sweden
• Caregivers employed for a person who is visiting Sweden for up to three months
• Persons who participate in training, testing, preparation or completion of deliveries or similar activities related to business transactions for a short period (between three and twelve months)
• Individuals deployed in aid efforts for a disaster or accident in Sweden, among other, similar reasons (ibid. 2017)
• Drivers and staff members of tourist buses for up to three months
• Witnesses or plaintiffs in a criminal investigation who require a residence permit
• Professional athletes and functionaries who participate in international competitions for three to twelve months
• Visiting research fellows or teachers at higher education institutions who participate in research, teaching or lecturing activities for up to three months over twelve months.

IV.4. Recruitment and labour migration policy in Sweden

The Swedish parliament from 1968 to 1975 focussed on creating and improving labour market integration policies for immigrants. Three major goals—freedom of choice, cooperation and equality—provide opportunities to migrants as actors in the development of society through their active participation (Roth 1999).

In 1976, Sweden opted for a policy that states individuals ‘irrespective of ethnic or cultural origin have the same rights and opportunities,’ leading to a society based on diversity (Swedish Government 2001). Such a society considers ‘integration policies’ that dissolve homogenous migrant groups and minority ethnic groups within the national majority, regardless of origin and sexual orientation, with all working for equal rights and chances without xenophobia, racism or discrimination (ibid.: 28-29).

Sweden prioritized labour migration policies in 2002 as one of the six pillars of its migration and development strategies, and its foreign policies seemed intertwined with those of the EU.
It was especially focused on migration and development, while elaborating its strategies for global development.

It should be noted that Sweden adopted a holistic approach for global development (PGD) in 2003. The Swedish model inspired the EU to implement a policy favouring development, under the idea EU policy should comply with this Swedish model (ibid: 7).

In December 2008, through comprehensive approaches, Swedish labour immigrant policy gave large freedom to employers to recruit labourers beyond European borders (Asiedu 2014: 15). This freedom grants renewable permits to incoming labour migrants, with the possibility of permanent residence after four years. This labour migrant policy placed Sweden in a higher position as a more open country for labour migrants among OECD country members.

**IV.5. Labour migration, brain drain and brain gain in Sweden**

Sweden is one of the only OECD countries with an open approach towards labour migrant policy, to attract highly-skilled migrants. The country, through its 2008 labour migrant policy reform, made it easier for highly-skilled migrants to work and stay in Sweden, especially in the IT sector, as most are short-term workers on intra-corporation transfer (OECD 2011). Moreover “A labour migrant basically enjoys the same rights as other residents when working and living in Sweden; family members are entitled to accompany the employee from day one, and this includes cohabitee/husband/wife, as well as children under the age of 21” (Emilsson 2014: 7).

Migrant workers’ main aim is to look for decent work opportunities. ILO estimates that there are about 150 million migrant workers worldwide, representing 65 percent of all migrants and 4.4 percent of all workers. They have higher labour force participation rates than non-migrants globally (IOM 2018). Despite Sweden’s labour migration policies, the USA tops the list in attracting skilled workers from developing countries. Tito Boeri compares the EU to the USA’s success in attracting skilled migrant workers, and he asks why skilled migration is so important to Europe, and how to attract more skilled migrants. He concludes that the USA has more skilled migrants than the EU and “increasing the migration skill content in Europe requires much more than simply adjusting migration policy” (Boeri 2008). The labour market institutions must play...
a key role as well. The Swedish labour market has understood the importance of brain drain and brain gain in labour migrant for many decades; when compared to the rest of the world, Sweden attracts more highly-skilled people that it loses (Björk 2014). From 1997 to 2002, Sweden has sent out about 100,000 highly-skilled persons who wanted to work outside the country, with university degrees, and received about 180,000, including returnee Swedes and foreigners (ibid. 2014). In 2014, Sweden received US$4.4 billion as a receiving country and sent US$1.4 billion as a sending country (Migration Policy Institute 2017).

Highly-skilled migrants relate to a social mobile group that has a transnationally valid culture of competence, with skills applicable to any suitable labour market demand (Nowicka 2014). They are wanted professionals moving within transnational networks of corporation and international organisation. They can choose optimal environments and are liberated from nation-state commitment (ibid. 2014). Nonetheless, the UNESCO European Centre for Higher Education assures vital attractive salient points pull in more workers, such as higher wages, good living conditions, better working conditions, more career development opportunities, more lucrative study scholarships, greater access to information, greater financial support for research, more opportunities for networks, “less professional corruption and nepotism” (Wells, P.J. 1998). Tertiary education may also apply to high-skilled people, though other aspects distinguish highly-skilled workers from other categories of educated persons (Kone and Özden 2017: 6). These categories encompass educational and occupational attainment, as well as income level.

Some definitions are in order for a good understanding of the brain gain approach. Brain gain refers to how the receiving county benefits from high-skilled migrants, but also to the benefits gained by the sending country in the global direct foreign investment and technology flows. Highly skilled workers’ return home to their countries of origin, may be seen as migration to a third country, which Kone and Özden call “brain circulation” (ibid.: 2). This situation takes into account the additional financial and human capital acquired elsewhere that contributes to the social and economic development of sending countries.

Sweden has sent many of its highly-skilled workers to OECD member countries and beyond. From 2002, “Sweden has lately had a net immigration in relation to 15 of its 20 top emigration countries, and the only five countries with Swedish academic net losses were the USA, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Belgium and Singapore” (Björk 2014). But there were also considerable Swedish net gains in Denmark, Germany, Finland, China, the Netherlands, Japan.
and other European states. However, attracted by much higher wages, many Swedish doctors and nurses moved to Norway in the 1990s.

Moreover, Sweden’s own universities constitute notable sources of new academics, and valuable experiences of highly-educated foreigners. Swedish academic institutions enrolled an increasing number of new non-EU students, with an attendance rate of 46 percent between fall 2013 and fall 2014, a good indicator of advancement for the country. This encourages the labour market to open itself to internships and further employment opportunities.

Despite a skilled-labour shortage, highly-skilled migrant workers unfortunately do not yet satisfy all labour market demands, including fields such as IT, international organisation and education. But trends show that efforts must be made for looking solution, even with increasing competitiveness in global labour market demands, and the demographic deficit in OECD member nations (including Sweden).

In 2017, Sweden issued approximately 15,500 work permits to persons from non-European countries; almost two-thirds of these recipients accessed unskilled jobs that require less than tertiary education (The Local 2018). However, the ruling Swedish political party believes that calling for tougher rules on labour migration in Sweden, if it wins the elections in September 2018, can be one of the solutions address the issue of unemployment in the future (ibid. 2018). The current Prime Minister, together with the general secretary and the Minister of Employment and Integration, claimed, “We need many labour migrants and will in the future. We need to make it simpler to come here as a labour migrant within the areas where they are needed” (ibid. 2018).
CHAPTER V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This final section reviews the results and findings from this research and presents suggestions and perspectives for further research related to this case study. This research’s aim was to bring awareness and understanding of migration as a development factor. Three main questions were formulated to see how international migration is perceived as a development factor in the sending and receiving migrant countries. The questions are related to historical approaches and migration policies; answers from literature reviews were also provided in this thesis:

How is international migration perceived as a development factor in both countries of origin and migrants’ destinations, regarding sub-Saharan African and Congolese migrants in Europe, especially Sweden?

The impact of remittances sent to countries of origin matters. “Remittances are not substitute to development aids” (Adepoju 2010). Sweden received US$4.4 billion as a receiving country and sent US$1.4 billion as a sending country in 2014 (Migration Policy Institute 2017). The DRC received US$22.4 million as a receiving country and sent US$15.6 million as a sending county (ibid. 2017). These 2014 remittance figures exemplify how much money labour migrants can produce to foster economic development through labour and remittances. Countries that encourage their people to go abroad and look for job opportunities also receive considerable remittances. For instance, the Philippines received US$27.3 billion in 2014, which is listed the country at the third position worldwide after India (US$70.4 billion) and China (US$62.3 billion).

These figures are featured in Table 5, Brief overview of remittances in some countries.
**Brief overview of remittances 2014 in billions of US dollars**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Remittances received</th>
<th>Remittances sent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>0.0577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>0.0224</td>
<td>0.0156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: (Migration Policy Institute 2017)*

Under remittances sent, the USA tops the list with labour migrants sending US$56.3 billion to their respective countries of origin; in contrast, the USA received US$6.9 billion. In Canada, the same scenario occurs with its received US$1.2 billion and sent US$5.4 billion. Remittances in countries such as India, China and the Philippines top the list as the three main receiving countries in 2014. Additionally, the Philippines, as a developing country, reaches the third place as a receiving country, implying that its labour migrant policies overemphasise facilitating and encouraging people look for jobs opportunities outside the country.

This brief overview of remittances in 2014 offers a better understanding of labour migrants that positively contribute to the economic development of their countries of origin, as well as the labour force in their host countries.

This thesis also shows that international migrants find jobs in the DRC, as in the case of Chinese international migrants. But this thesis also shows that the developmental impact of this immigration can be negative, especially considering immigration efforts can be put towards

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3 This table is not exhaustive and does not register all receiving and sending countries from 2014. The eleven countries listed in this table are just an illustrative example of remittances from 2014.
developing more job opportunities and better working and living conditions (and thus developing the country as a whole) for Congolese citizens.

The critical research should discuss how and under which conditions these new perceptions of migration can be realized so that migration can contribute to developing countries’ economic growth, and not just through increased remittance flows. Moreover, these perceptions should ensure good working conditions and labour rights for migrant workers in their host countries. Developmental benefits of migration, as suggests Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD) (2011), bring “civil society, private sectors and governments together’ by changing negative public perceptions about international migration” (Delgado-Wise 2013). Already some GFMD member states, including Sweden, have introduced new circular migration programs in collaboration with the EU. While these are driven by labour market needs in developed countries, developing countries of origin through mobility partnerships alone may not suffice.

**How can historical approaches orient international migration research to apprehend the current socioeconomic impact of immigrants from sub-Saharan African countries (especially for Sweden and the DRC)?**

This thesis searched for increasing mutual awareness in historical approaches to migrants as development partners in countries such as the DRC and Sweden. These two countries have a long history of both large emigration and immigration flows. The DRC has faced different challenges, including the dark history of colonialism, while Sweden chose neutrality in World Wars I and II, and recruited labour migrants at the end of these wars. Revisiting history has permitted this thesis to give a better understanding of historical and social phenomena considered root causes of current migration crises at global, regional and local levels. The DRC is a country that has faced repetitive civil wars and ethnic conflicts that negatively affected its economy, despite its natural resources.

Sweden is a developed country and the DRC is a developing country. Active cooperation between these two counties is desirable to enable Congolese improvement to migration policy, poverty levels and development. Congolese high-skilled and entrepreneurial migrants in Sweden can act as agents of development via social and political remittances, and not just money transfers. Yet, for that to be realised, their rightful and equal integration into the Swedish labour market is necessary.
How do migration policies hamper or facilitate well-functioning labour markets and enable migrant workers to foster development, in terms of competitiveness and remittances in the DRC and Sweden?

As constituted by Sweden in 2009, a parliamentary committee released a statute on “relationships between circulant migrants and development” (Ministry of Justice 2010). Between 1969 and 2009, a total of ‘850,000 persons had been considered as circulant migrants related to Sweden’. Sweden, EU member states and other industrialised countries worldwide should permit a managed and effective sub-Saharan African, including Congolese migrant mobility, hiring foreign highly skilled workers and unskilled migrants alike. This is without discrimination and regardless of ethnic origin, age, religion, gender or sexual orientation. Receiving countries must then, as Schierup (2016) expresses, “allow people to work and enjoy living standards, independent to pure market force”. This thesis encourages the new trends of North-South, South-North, South-South and North-North mobility for sharing and exchanging new information technology, culture and experiences.

In 2017, with Sweden issuing approximately 15,500 work permits to persons from non-European countries, the country already demonstrates efforts to attract highly-skilled migrants and allow them to access the labour market and university education (in terms of research and student exchange programs).

Concerning migration legislation, “stricter border controls to prevent irregular migration from sub-Saharan African countries to Europe are still poorly informed policies. They have created and continue to create harm. They have not stopped migration flows, but instead led to various migration route alternatives and to much more risk in transit countries and the Mediterranean” (De Haas 2009). Migration is about crossing borders, European Union and African Union politicians have been looking for solutions that could prevent those risks in the Mediterranean for immigrants and economic migrants that cannot afford European visas.

Looking for a solution requires mutual efforts from all actors involved in international migration issues. This joint effort minimises risks of mass graves in the Mediterranean. The major issue is that “policies that ignore both economic realities and the interests of Sub-Saharan African countries as the origin of most of migrants, are unlikely to succeed” (Neergaard 2009: 39). Furthermore, anti-immigrants and anti-migration public opinions and political discourses should change into solidarity discourses. In the context of this thesis, these new discourses apply
to Sub-Saharan African migrants, including Congolese migrants, as a workforce in EU country members, such as Sweden. The United Nations (UN) should also regularly organise dialogues, as was done in 2013 to discuss international migration and development at the UN General assembly (ILO 2013). It requires more effort to assess and improve protection of human rights for migrant workers according to UN and ILO work standards. Receiving countries should recognise non-citizens’ rights and guarantee them better working conditions, despite xenophobic discourses that consider migrants as a threat, source of insecurity and as a socioeconomic loss (Likic-Brboric and Schierup 2011: 2, Miller 2008: 71, Dhamba 2017).

Nonetheless, the DRC faces challenges in implementing labour migration and immigration policies. Therefore, the IOM’s project activities in the DRC are necessary, but hardly sufficient. The DRC’s political and economic instability have negatively impacted Congolese institutions and administrations. Poverty among the Congolese is at a high rate, requiring global and especially Congolese leader efforts to combat poverty and corruption.

Having said this, it is painful for conscious researchers to understand how and why the DRC lacks peace. The country’s political instability has pushed many of its people to leave the country and look for refuge, asylum or job opportunities in neighbouring countries and beyond Africa, while the DRC itself is recognised as one of the richest countries in the world. These paradoxical, precious resources attract international migrants, while most Congolese citizens are unemployed.

The DRC lacks competence and modern materials to efficiently control its borders, shared with nine neighbouring countries, and manage its migration flows. This situation has been a primary challenge for the country, its partners and international institutions and organisations that assist the second largest country in Africa.

Sweden implemented a new immigration labour policy in 2008 that allowed employers to hire migrant workers from outside the EU and EEA (Asiedu 2014). This thesis suggests that all EU member states should follow and open their doors to share the quota of refugees and asylum seekers in the name of humanitarianism.

These pages also present findings and knowledge to a large, multilevel audience of migration policymakers to reconsider migration as a socioeconomic development factor, and not only that, but also a cost to receiving countries. Policymakers should understand not only the South-North factors of international managed migration, but also South-South relations. This thesis reserves
a considerable space for further discussion on whether international managed migrants contribute to socioeconomic development, in the DRC and Sweden in particular.

International migration must be viewed on both national and international levels, which involves transnational corporations in global labour markets. These corporations require not only skilled migrants, but also the DRC’s natural resources, which are exploited illegally. Transnational corporations have coveted this country’s minerals, though even land grabbing is not a new phenomenon in the DRC. Struggles rooted in a history of violence, rural exodus and poverty also threaten Congolese resource development, and mismanaged ethnic group conflicts also worsen the issue.

This thesis strongly suggests that the DRC should recreate strong and effective national institutions, and a stable political system that implements active cooperation systems with industrialised countries such as Sweden. The DRC will not be saved by a black or a white messiah, but by turning ordinary people into champions of peace-making, by promoting human rights, migration management, combatting poverty and corruption. The DRC should be a country where international migrants are welcome and have a free space of information technology and culture exchange, a country that should apply and respect democratic principles and good governance. A country that promotes the efforts of rural development, where all Congolese have access to decent housing, insured medical care and free education. The DRC should create rehabilitation services for persons with disability and elderly care services as well. It is wholly possible for a country such as the DRC to create peace in the Central African region, and good relationships with its neighbouring countries through the help of active cooperation with Sweden and other OECD countries.

On the other hand, Sweden is a stable country that chose neutrality in the First and the Second World Wars and has experienced labour migrant policies since the end of the Second World War. But what is more interesting is that Sweden is an industrialized country with a good labour migration policy model attractive to international migrant workers. If Sweden and the DRC actively cooperated, then Sweden could help the DRC create strong national institutions, fight corruption and illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources, and improve immigration and labour migration policies through international student exchange. A Swedish team of migration specialists deployed to the DRC would work best to build a system of efficient Congolese elites, and political and entrepreneurial leaders.
Nonetheless, migration development impacts should not be analysed in a policy vacuum. New theoretical and empirical research should be conducted to promote a better understanding of how these impacts face immigration influences and integration policy regimes. Few cross-country analyses have been done to improve the image of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, including from the DRC. This thesis has provided analyses, critiques and perspectives on the existing literature as well as ideas that lead to further research on migration and development in developing countries compared with developed nations.
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