Lost in Mobility?

Labour Migration from Baltic Lithuania to Sweden

Indre Genelyte
At the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Linköping University, research and doctoral studies are carried out within broad problem areas. Research is organized in interdisciplinary research environments and doctoral studies mainly in graduate schools. Jointly, they publish the series Linköping Studies in Arts and Science. This thesis comes from Institute for Research on Migration, Ethnicity and Society (REMESO) at the Department of Social and Welfare Studies.

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Norrköping, 6th October
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1. Introduction

Rationale and aim
Since the inception of its independence in 1990, Lithuania underwent a post-communist transformation and multiplex transitions. It changed from a one-party Soviet republic to an independent liberal democratic state and went from state socialism to a market economy, becoming a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). From 1990 to the present, Lithuania has become an emigration country. In recent years, Lithuania exhibited the highest negative net migration (the difference between emigration and immigration) rates in the EU, exceeding even Poland and Romania, which recorded the highest outmigration in real numbers (Eurostat 2018a). Mainly due to the extensive emigration, especially among younger people, Lithuania has also become one of the fastest ageing countries in the EU (Sipaviciene 2015). These demographic trends have further implications for the labour market and the welfare system as well as for economic development (Article III).

Baltic and Lithuanian migration became a subject for international academic debates relatively recently, with scholars focusing on the patterns, causes, and effects of the mobility of labour, often comparing Lithuania with other Central and Eastern European (CEE) states (Galgoczi et al. 2009; Kahanec and Zimmermann 2010). More recent studies focus on migration policies in response to the effects of extensive emigration (Hazans 2013; Kaska 2013; Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2013). Interest in migration from the Baltic countries surged preceding the EU enlargement in 2004, with various studies estimating possible immigration rates from the CEE countries (Bauer and Zimmermann 1999; Dustmann et al. 2003) and debating the possible effects on presumptive host countries’ labour markets and welfare systems via ‘social dumping’ (Krings 2009; Friberg and Eldring 2013; Lillie and Simola 2016) and the ‘abuse of welfare’ (Boswell and Geddes 2011; Eurofound 2015). Thus, when it comes to the free movement of people, both the benefits and the challenges of the single European market and the national policy responses to these challenges in the old member states (OMS) are far from new topics in academic debate (Dølvik

1. In 2004, eight CEE countries (EU 8) joined the EU: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In 2007, two more CEE countries (EU 2) joined the EU: Bulgaria and Romania. All of these countries together are also denoted as New Member States (NMS).

2. These are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
One of the most important EU policy responses was the implementation of transitional rules— that is, imposing barriers for citizens of the NMS to access the national labour markets and welfare systems of the majority of OMS, with exception of Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (UK).

Even though Sweden did not implement the transitional rules for the ‘free movers’ from the eight member states that joined the EU in 2004 (EU 8), Sweden has not received the same number of EU migrants as did Ireland and the UK. Consequently, most research has addressed the two latter countries, while Sweden has received less attention. Nevertheless, Baltic and Lithuanian labour migration to Sweden is important to study for several reasons. First, after the EU accession and then again after the economic crisis in 2008, emigration from Lithuania (and the Baltics in general) to Scandinavia accelerated (Friberg and Eldring 2013). Second, immigrants attempting to access the Swedish labour market confront specific barriers, such as a highly-regulated labour market and a comparatively more difficult language barrier than in the Anglophone UK and Ireland (Gerdes and Wadensjö 2013). Third, Sweden constitutes a valuable study through which various forms of migration can be analysed. This migration is facilitated by developed migration channels and the close geographical proximity between Sweden and the Baltic countries. These various forms of migration include traditional settler migration, seasonal and posted work, and labour transfers within international companies. These forms of migration are not always visible in the official migration statistics. Finally, depending on the outcome of the CEE migrants’ right to work after ‘Brexit’, another shift in migration trends towards Scandinavia and Sweden might occur.

Research on emigration from Lithuania usually stresses the economic reasons (often employment opportunities or wage differences) for emigration. Since the time of Lithuania’s independence from the Soviet Union in the 1990s it has been common for studies to designate all emigration as ‘economic’ (Barcevicius and Zvalionyte 2012; Klusener et al. 2015; Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2011). The vast majority of Lithuanians are leaving for work (IOM 2011; Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2013). In the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis and the

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3. These rules were enforced from 2004 until 2011, with Germany and Austria being the last countries to remove them.
4. It is organized via collective agreements and at the same time Sweden does not have minimum wages.
5. Posted work is a practice, where individuals, employed in a company, registered in one Member State (MS), provide services in another (see more in the second chapter).
6. A study by International Organization of Migration finds that 85% of all emigrants experienced long-term unemployment before departure (IOM 2011).
fortified austerity policies, however, macroeconomic indicators such as GDP, unemployment, and wage rates have proved to be inadequate in deciphering the trends of mass emigration, prompting public and academic debates on the main causes of the departure and the lower return rates (Jakilaitis 2017; Hazans 2016).

Against this backdrop, this thesis seeks to make both empirical and theoretical contribution to the understanding of East-West labour migration, so-called intra-EU mobility, from the NMS to OMS. Inspired by a critical realist perspective, this thesis aims to explain the dynamics and individual decision-making behind mass labour emigration from the Baltic states, its socioeconomic consequences and policy responses. It does so from the perspective of the sending country and from the testimony of the migrants themselves. Hence, the objective is to help explain why and how the emigration of individuals has become a mass emigration with social consequences. The focus is on the Baltic states, and, in particular, on Lithuanian migration to Sweden.

I address, from a critical realist perspective, the causes and socioeconomic consequences of the Lithuanian labour migration to Sweden in the context of wider social transformation. My objective is to contribute to a reframing of a dominant public and academic discursive construction of migration from Lithuania as a largely economic survival strategy, induced by macroeconomic ‘root causes’.7 Instead, I argue for an understanding of a multiplex and dynamic migration system involving various purposes, motivations, groups of migrants, migration trajectories, experiences, and causal mechanisms that are inducing, shaping, and sustaining Lithuanian labour migration to Sweden. The thesis draws on the social transformation approach to migration put forward by Castles (2010) and (Castles et al. 2014).8 Here migration is seen as a dynamic process, which is an ‘intrinsic’ part of the socioeconomic, political and cultural changes occurring within sending and receiving societies (Castles et al. 2014). The social transformation of the ‘structures and institutions … arises through major changes in global political, economic and social relationships’ (Castles 2010: 1566). Migration is seen as a collective action ‘embedded’ in a complex social context, rather than as a decision taken by an individual in an isolated environment (Castles et al. 2014). At the same time, migration develops its own ‘internal dynamics’ and influences the further transformation of social, political, and economic frameworks (ibid.).

7. Van Hear et al. (2018) define ‘root causes’ as ‘the social and political conditions that induce departures’ (cf. Carling and Talleraas 2016: 6)
8. ‘Social’ is used here in a broad sense, encompassing economic, political, and cultural dimensions.
Accordingly, this thesis addresses two overarching research questions:

- Why and how have social transformations, which were brought about by independence, the EU accession, and the global economic crisis, caused the mass labour emigration from the Baltic Lithuania?

- How have institutional frameworks and social actors’ discursive and social practices constituted various migrant categories and how has the emigration of individuals generated perpetuating migration dynamics?

In order to address these questions, this thesis links the theoretical perspective that embeds migration in broader social transformations to Hirschman’s (1970; 1993) seminal work on exit, voice, and loyalty. The model is refined by re-reading Hirschman’s ideas from a position inspired by critical realism and current theories of migration by incorporating the concept of migration channels (McCollum et al. 2013), which connects sending and receiving countries. Hirschman’s model is further extended by identifying the concept of inequality as intertwined with perceived quality of life. Finally, this refined model is used to explain contemporary emigration patterns from Lithuania, while the sending state’s policy responses to the socioeconomic consequences of migration are also discussed in terms of the organizational responses conceptualised in the model.

The thesis includes a historical perspective on Lithuanian development and focuses on the period since 1990 when it gained independence from the Soviet Union. The choice of studying the long-term perspective following its independence is based on the particularities of the Lithuanian historical context. While Lithuania was a part of the Soviet Union, its migration policy and patterns had a different character. After 1990, official migration statistics demonstrate two peaks of emigration that coincide with its EU accession in 2004 and the economic crisis starting in 2008/9 that implemented austerity.9

While focusing on Lithuanian labour migration to Sweden, this dissertation takes into consideration the individual’s perspective and the decision-making ‘embedded’ in the social context by aiming to explain:

- How did Lithuanians perceive their quality of life before the departure, and which situations and structural-institutional factors, induced by the above-mentioned social transformations, affect this perception? (Articles I and II).

- How did this perception turn into action, i.e., why and how did Lithuanians decide to leave and how did they choose Sweden as a country of destination? (Articles I and II).

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9. For a detailed discussion, see the second chapter.
The subject of the study is broadly concerned with Lithuanians who, when they were interviewed, were working in Sweden or who were unemployed (or on parental leave or sick leave), having had previous experience working in the country and/or looking for job opportunities (with or without registration with Arbetsförmedlingen – the Swedish Public Employment Service).

In considering the sending country’s perspective on emigration out of the Baltic states, the thesis accounts for demographic and socioeconomic consequences of mass emigration for the sending countries. Thus, it poses the question:

- How are the Baltic states’ policy makers and relevant social actors responding to this mass emigration and its challenges? (Article III).

I address responses to the problem of mass emigration from the Baltic states by policy makers and also by other social actors, who hold specific knowledge relevant to migration or who work in institutional contexts important to migration and labour in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania).

Throughout the thesis I use ‘labour migration’ as a broad term, since I also consider the period before Lithuania became a part of the EU. When discussing migration within the EU, I followed the general trend in the research that uses ‘intra-EU mobility’ and ‘intra-EU migration’ interchangeably. Consequently, I use both terms: migrant workers and labour migrants. ‘Emigration’ and ‘emigrants’ refer to migrants from a sending country’s perspective. I turn to ‘immigration’ and ‘immigrants’ when I emphasize the receiving country’s perspective. Otherwise, I use the broad terms ‘migration’ and ‘migrants’, because my main focus lies on the ‘migratory process’, which, according to Castles et al. (2014: 27), ‘sums up the complex sets of factors and interactions which lead to migration and influence its course.’ Finally, I use ‘mobility’ as a broader term that refers to all types and trajectories of migration. For a further discussion of these issues of terminology, see the third chapter.

The empirical work on which the thesis is based proceeds from a mixed methods design. I scrutinise migration from different angles by combining different data sources and different approaches to collecting and analysing data (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011). I use data from interviews with experts in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the field of labour and migration as well as with Lithuanian labour migrants in Sweden. I also employ a variety of statistical data from national statistical offices and institutions as well as international databases such as Eurostat, the World Bank (WB), and European Social Survey (ESS). I look at Lithuanian migration within the broader context of the Baltic states, but only Lithuanians who are working in Sweden are interviewed. Yet
the thesis’ title refers to ‘Baltic Lithuania’ in order to stress the importance of Lithuanian labour migration for a wider Baltic context, referred to throughout the thesis. Article III explicitly draws on a comparison of the emigration patterns, characteristics, impacts, and policy responses in all three Baltic states. The extensive discussion on the previous research indicates that the migration causes and motivations are often analogous among emigrants from the Baltic states, with Latvia and Lithuania sharing most of the similarities.

This thesis has a number of potential contributions to make, which mainly point to the field of migration studies, but also touch upon the fields of the welfare state and industrial relations. The thesis contributes to the knowledge of East-West labour migration in a specific Baltic-Scandinavian region. The broad and instrumental definition of labour migrants allows one to explore a whole range of types of labour migration from Lithuania and includes the movements that are usually ‘invisible’ in the official statistical registers, particularly the movements of seasonal and posted workers and intra-company transfers. By choosing informants according to this variability, the study intends to provide a more detailed picture of the labour migration from Lithuania to Sweden.

The focus on the perspective of the sending Baltic states and the labour migrants’ decision-making allows this thesis to contribute to the explanations of the dynamics of emigration, to address migration channels, and to explore the role of the EU, the states, and private companies in shaping this movement. It also provides insights into how this emigration affects the Baltic states and their political responses, situating them in a broader context of an East-West migration debate. The context of the receiving countries is addressed in previous research and is included in all of the three articles to different extents, but this thesis cannot be seen as a systematic analysis of both contexts. With this in mind, and given that the analytical focus is specifically on labour migration, the applicability of the research results for understanding migration in general, from Lithuania, the Baltic countries, and the NMS should be treated with care.

**Outline**

This thesis is a compilation thesis comprised of a summarizing cover essay and three articles. The thesis begins by setting out the context of the study. It brings in a historical perspective on Lithuanian development and focuses on the period since its independence in March 1990. I review transformations in the country’s politics, economy, welfare regime, formation of the nation, and migration waves. I also present patterns and characteristics of Lithuanian labour migration to Sweden.
INTRODUCTION

The third chapter introduces the definitions of migration, labour migration, and mobility used in the thesis. It then provides an extensive review of the literature on East-West migration dynamics within the EU, including migration patterns, their general characteristics, and the consequences for both sending and receiving states. This dual focus, in its attentiveness to how migration dynamics affect both migrants’ countries of origin and destination in differentiated, though interconnected ways, addresses the lack of attention given to the consequences for the sending country and reactions therein. It also situates the results from the empirical material in a broader context of the sending and receiving countries’ dynamics. Lastly, a review of ‘classic’ and ‘new’ theoretical approaches to migration is presented.

The chapter that follows presents an extended theoretical-methodological discussion and provides an overview of the research design. It begins by introducing critical realist and morphogenetic methodological approaches, including the ASID (agency, structure, institutions, and discourse) model. Within this broad framework, I situate Hirschman’s analytical model on exit, voice, and loyalty, and then revise and extend it. This chapter then presents the research design and methods used in the thesis.

The fifth chapter summarizes the articles and presents the results of the empirical data analysis. This thesis builds on three articles that went or are still going through the peer-review process. Article I is titled ‘The Two Sides of the Baltic Sea: Lithuanians as labour migrants and mobile EU workers in Sweden’, and has been submitted to the volume Changes and challenges of cross-border labour mobility within the EU, edited by Anna Ann Klitgaard and Trine Lund Thomsen (Peter Lang Publishing). Article II, ‘(In)eQuality of Life: Lithuanian Labor Migration to Sweden during the Economic Crisis and its Aftermath (2008-2013)’, is a journal article accepted with minor revisions for a special issue, Baltic states after the crisis? Transformation of welfare systems and social problems, edited by Jolanta Aidukaite and Sven Horst for the Journal of Baltic Studies. Article III is titled ‘Policy Response to Emigration from the Baltics: confronting “the European Elephant in the Room”’, and was published in Labour Mobility in the Enlarged Single European Market, edited by Jon-Erik Dolvik and Line Eldring.

Finally, following the summaries of the articles, the discussion and conclusions are presented.
2. Contextualizing Lithuanian emigration, migration waves, and labour migration to Sweden

Following the proclamation of restored independence in 1990s, the citizens of the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, celebrated their freedom from Soviet occupation, which also implied their partial freedom of movement to the ‘West’. At the same time, the newly elected governments instigated the process of transitioning to a market economy and democracy, along with other former communist CEE countries. Those countries were named ‘countries of transition’, implying that they were facing simultaneous economic, political, and social changes over the next two decades, moving from state-planned economies to open market (neoliberal) economies and from authoritarian one-party states to pluralist democracies (Bohle and Greskovits 2007; Norkus 2012).

On the one hand, research at the micro level of post-communist countries engaged with wide debates to name the ‘winners and losers’ of the transition (Bonell 1996; Kornai 2006; Leyk 2016; Rona-Tas 1996). On the other hand, there were studies exploring macro socioeconomic indicators and investigating the similarities and differences among the countries in an attempt to fit them into the already existing groupings of the ‘western’ countries or to create new clusters. While all the countries could be clustered into one group due to their shared legacies of a Soviet past, as is the case for studies on the post-communist welfare regime transformations (Lendvai 2010), a few studies indicated different paths and outcomes for these multiple transitions. During the transition period, the CEE countries made many decisions and implemented various reforms in order to accomplish, in the words of Karl Polanyi (2001 [1957]), ‘the great transformation’, with a vision of constructing a ‘disembedded’ market economy (Bohle and Greskovits 2007).

Drawing on a variety of capitalism literature, Bohle and Greskovits (2007) identify three different types of capitalism emerging in the post-socialist transformation landscape: the ‘embedded neoliberal type’ (Visegrad state, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Czech Republic); the ‘neocorporatist type’ exemplified by Slovenia, and the ‘neoliberal type’ of capitalism in the Baltic states. Taking into account various macro socioeconomic indicators (e.g. foreign direct investment rates, expenditure on social protections, governmental fiscal balances, and debts,

10. Morkevičius and Norkus (2017) point that this transition had ended by the beginning of the economic crisis of 2008.

11. There is a wide acceptance among scholars (see Aidukaite 2017; Norkus 2012) that the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian transition started under very similar conditions, but the path and outcomes diverged over the years.
LOST IN MOBILITY?

As reflections of reforms in the countries, authors describe the Baltic states as ‘neoliberal capitalist type’ societies (ibid.). Instead of enhancing equality and regulating the employment and participation in the labour market, the neoliberal state keeps people from poverty by providing the basic security from life-cycle and labour market risks (Drahokoupil and Myant 2011; MacEwan 1999).

In the pursuit of independence, nation state-building, and the implementation of the neoliberal model, the Baltic states have experienced predicaments, such as falling output, deindustrialization, increasing unemployment, falling wages, increasing poverty, and inequalities (Nowak and Nowosielski 2011; World Bank 2002). According to the abovementioned indicators, the post-transformation crises in these states were even more severe than in other CEE countries (World Bank 2002). Yet, the Baltic states were praised for their persistent implementation of radical market reforms, so-called Shock Therapy, with Estonia as a showcase, while Lithuania was initially one of the countries that pursued more gradual reforms (Norkus 2012). Nevertheless, Lithuania has endured several severe economic crises following its independence, bringing forth multiple social and political challenges, and also public and individual responses. One of these challenges is a demographic crisis, brought about by two interconnected responses to the structural transformations. First, there was a dramatic reduction in the birth-rate, and an increase in deaths due to external causes (suicides, homicides, injuries and traffic accidents), which especially affected the life expectancy of men (Krumins 2011). Second, there was an increase in mass emigration, whose causes, patterns and consequences are addressed in this thesis.

In order to address and explain the trajectory towards Lithuanian mass emigration, the thesis uses the transformational approach to migration, which sees migration as ‘embedded’ in the broader processes of social transformations (Castles 2010). Accordingly, the coming sections will review the post-communist transformations of the economy, labour market, politics, and welfare state from the 1990s until the present, focusing on Lithuania with occasional comparisons to the Baltic states and CEE countries. Then the developments of the Lithuanian nation-building and citizenship formation are presented in relation to changing migration patterns and characteristics.

12. Neoliberalism as a set of economic policies is based on the liberal ideas of a free market, which should be the core that individuals organize their economic lives around. What is ‘new’ is that the neoliberalism agenda includes more extensive deregulation and diminishes the role of the state by the ‘loosening or dismantling of the various institutional constraints upon marketization, commodification, the hyperexploitation of workers, and the discretionary power of private capital’ (Brenner and Theodore 2002: vi).

13. These demographic changes have also led to the problem of ageing and its impact on society (presented in the literature review and Article III).
Towards the political economy of inequality

The Lithuanian transition to a market economy has encompassed the restructuring of the economic and labour markets and the related transformation of a welfare regime and industrial relations. The making of its neoliberal political economy has been accomplished throughout three consecutive periods: (1) from independence in 1990 to EU accession in 2004; (2) from 2004 to the 2008/9 financial crisis; and (3) from 2008/9 and the implementation of the austerity measures to the present. These periods also correspond to changing patterns of Lithuanian migration. It has been a crisis-ridden transformation, punctuated by the three significant crises: the 1992 recession, the 1999 downturn related to the Russian oil crisis, and the 2008/9 global financial crisis. These events will be described further in the coming section.

Economic and labour market restructuring: the three crises

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the most important issues for Baltic countries besides political independence was economic independence. During the years of Communism, the Soviet Republics were very much tied, not just to the state-planned economy of the Union, but also to the central allocation of resources (e.g. gas and raw materials). The Baltic countries were considered to be a prosperous region (Ubareviciene 2017). They were not highly industrialized compared to the other CEE states like the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland), but they had a large agriculture sector (Bohle and Greskovits 2007).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the majority of the factories established in the Baltic states went bankrupt, since they were designed to fulfil the needs of the Union and were not able to compete in the global market, even though there was a huge privatization programme and attempts to turn this industrial heritage into successful businesses (Norkus 2012). The unsuccessful industrial restructuring especially affected the peripheral regions. Due to the spatial planning policies under the Soviet Union, the population and employment opportunities were quite evenly spread throughout the country; Lithuania

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14. The Baltic states were Soviet Republics, which meant that their political, economic, and social relations with other European countries were very restricted (Ubareviciene 2017).

15. The state-planned economy meant that the state was planning demand and supply. Their forecasts were falling short, bringing about huge deficits in some areas and oversupply in others (Kornai 2006; Leyk 2016).

16. As Ubareviciene (2017) notes, the employment share in the agriculture sector in the Baltics was more than 20% before the collapse of the Soviet Union; in the industrialized Western states, it was around 5%.
was known as the most homogeneous among CEE countries at the time. The shift to a market economy considerably affected the distribution of work opportunities (Ubareviciene 2017). These changes led to the first post-communist transformation crisis and were reflected in the country’s GDP, which indicated a decline in the first years after the 1990s. It is difficult to estimate the reliability of the GDP measurements during this first period because of the structural makeover in the production system and labour market; changes included shrinking industry and agriculture, growing services, reductions in the public sector and growth in the private sector, as well as increasing share of the informal economy. Lithuanian output is estimated to have fallen for the first five years after independence, accumulating to a 44% decline. Only Latvia fared worse among CEE and Baltic states (World Bank 2002). The publicly available statistics from the Lithuanian national statistical office begin in 1996 and signal the recovery in subsequent years (Figure 1).

![Graph](image)

**Figure 1. Socioeconomic indicators in Lithuania, 1996-2017**

Source: Lithuanian statistics 2018. Note: the real GDP and real wages are expressed in percentage change compared to the previous year.


18. In addition, the statistical systems also underwent a transition and needed to reorient their calculations to the new reality and western standards (World Bank 2002). Statistics in the publicly available database on World Bank on GDP are provided only from 1996, and the same applies for the Lithuanian official statistics.
For the labour market and the people, the first years after independence meant sharply diminished work places and vast unemployment. Ubareviciene (2017) notes a 40% loss of jobs, mainly in such sectors as industry, construction, and agriculture, in Lithuania from 1989 to 2001. The unemployment rate in Lithuania climbed over 17% in 1991 and remained high until 1995 (World Bank 2018). Authors Kornai (2006) and Leyk (2016) name the biggest ‘losers’ – the most disadvantaged groups that emerged after the economic restructuring in the 1990s – as workers in industry and agriculture, the unemployed, the elderly, and people with less education. The ‘winners’ comprised the new elites, also called the oligarchs, the young, well-educated, and business-oriented.

On the state level, reform was very rapid and radical. In a short period of time, these countries established their national currencies, created fiscal institutions, and reoriented their external trade market towards the ‘West’ (Kornai 2006; IMF 1997). The latter was accelerated by the economic crisis in Russia in 1998, which led to the second post-communist recession in all three Baltic states. It mainly affected food processing, but also oil, because Russia was the main supplier of it, and general trading. Lithuania and the other Baltic states not only exported most of their goods to Russia, but also provided services for the trade that travelled through their countries (for instance, goods transported between the West and Russia) (Taro 1999). Thus, the recession in Russia in 1998 affected the GDP of Lithuania in 1999, but especially impacted wages and raised the unemployment rate back to the levels of the beginning of the 1990s (Figure 1).

In early 2000s, a recovery of the GDP and a gradual increase in wages were followed by a decrease in unemployment (Figure 1). It earned Lithuania and other Baltic states an opening to join the EU and the name of ‘Baltic Tigers’ (Woolfson 2010). The spectacular GDP growth was accompanied by an even larger rise in real wages and the unemployment rate falling to 4% in 2007. All the Baltic countries were open to trade and had flat tax rates, which were relatively low compared to the EU averages and have been comparatively decreasing even more during the years preceding the crisis, especially the corporate tax rates (Bohle and Greskovits 2007). According to a variety of indicators, such as the foreign direct investment (FDI) levels, industrial outputs, exports, protectionism measures, government balances, etc., the Baltic countries showed not only the most far-reaching reforms in the market transition, but also created a balanced and stable macro economy (Bohle and Greskovits 2007; Lendvai 2010).

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19. Abovementioned rate is estimated by the ILO, which strongly diverges from national estimation, used by the WB. The national estimations state that the unemployment rate in 1991 was 0.3%, between 1992-1993 it went to 3.5%, and spiked to 17.3% in 1994. From this year on both the national and ILO estimations match (World Bank 2018).
But the economic stability fell short in the face of the global economic crisis in 2008. The crisis resulted in multiple bankruptcies and lay-offs in both the private and public sectors (see Article II). The real GDP and wages plummeted drastically, and the unemployment rate returned to the heights comparable to the previous two crises, making Lithuania one of the countries most affected by the crisis in the world (Eichhorst et al. 2010). After 2010, the unemployment rate gradually started to decrease and in recent years it has fluctuated around 7%, but it has not returned to a pre-crisis level. Real wages gradually increased, and the GDP resumed growth the year after the drastic fall in 2009. In the last few years, the GDP grew around 3-4%, which resembles the EU average, as opposed to the previous years of the ‘Tiger economies’ (a detailed discussion about the crisis period and the socioeconomic changes is provided in Article II). Despite its currently more moderate growth, Lithuania met all the economic criteria and joined the Eurozone in 2015.

To summarize, since the beginning of the 1990s, economic stability and sustainable growth were seen as an important goal for ensuring political independence. In order to establish and maintain a successful economy, neoliberal policies and reforms were implemented. After the first decade of transition, which witnessed two economic crises, Lithuania and the other Baltic states experienced substantial growth and were accepted to the EU, a union of developed capitalist societies. Paradoxically, the economic crisis in 2008 showed that even though Lithuania is capable of maintaining a steadily growing economy, it is still very much dependent on the global economy and is especially vulnerable to its fluctuations. Therefore, the economic situation in the Baltics and Lithuania seems to be uncertain and carries a higher risk; in times of growth, the economy could be very profitable, but a crisis might bring higher losses. Thus, it is important to turn to the social costs of this radical opening of the markets and the role of the state in regulating the labour market and mediating those costs. The political changes and the welfare system transformations will be overviewed next.

**Political changes and the transformation of the welfare regime: the re-commodification of labour**

Under the Soviet Union’s regime, the Baltic states were fully incorporated into the centralized and highly hierarchical governing system. All the decisions were made in Moscow and all the spheres of state life were controlled by one Communist Party. As Budryte (2005) points out, after the independence Lithuanian officials had to pivot being from ‘policy-takers’ in a one-party authoritarian regime to ‘policy-makers’ in a pluralist democracy. In addition,
they had to redefine the role of the state in controlling the market, which also meant transforming the welfare systems.

In the wake of independence, there were high hopes for the new system and great trust in the political institutions and decision-making (Gaidys 2012). Having in mind the leftist ideology in the communist system, it is not a surprise that the political elites in the Baltic states shifted to more liberal ideologies. These ideologies were in line with the ones of the ‘West’, conveyed via their involvement with international actors such as the IMF, the World Bank, and later the EU and their expert advisors present in the Baltics (Aidukaite 2009). The emerging industrial relations in the Baltic states were characterized by weak trade unions, which were largely discredited by their previous association, not with the protection of labour rights, but rather acting as a distributor of goods within the workplaces of the soviet system (Ashwin and Clarke 2002). Thus, when the state-owned companies privatized, it also meant rolling back the guarantee of full employment previously provided by the state and state-owned companies. Even though the new elites became ideologically more liberal, there were initial unmaterialized plans to transform the Soviet social system into a well-functioning, Scandinavian-like welfare state (Guogis 2014).

The abovementioned economic crises before the EU accession contributed to high levels of poverty and income inequalities (Nowak and Novosielksi 2011; Lauristin 2011). But neither of the crises brought any major protests in Lithuania, nor in other CEE states (Kornai 2006). Instead of protests, the Lithuanian voters elected a left-wing party in 1992. In contrast to Estonia and Latvia, the ‘de-Sovietization’ period in Lithuania resulted in a strong ex-communist party remaining (Norkus 2012). In the absence of strong trade unions, there was a reconciliation with the ‘new capitalist class of former nomenclature entrepreneurs’ (Aidukaite 2009: 102) and a reorientation towards more liberal ideology. An important change reflecting these events was the declining trust in the political institutions. The trust in the Seimas (the Lithuanian Parliament) was higher just after independence, but the situation changed dramatically between 1991 and 1994 – with the percentage of those

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20. For example, it was the trade unions who had the power to decide if the employees were entitled to receive housing. This resulted in some employment places having a greater likelihood of offering these entitlements than others (Ashwin and Clarke 2002).

21. In Estonia and Latvia, most of the Communist party leaders and governing officials were Russian-speakers, whilst Lithuania had a much higher percentage of Lithuanian nationals participating in the governance of the country (Norkus 2012).

22. Nomenclature was a privileged social class in what was seen as an egalitarian communist society.

23. Markova (2004) highlights that one of parameters reflecting the level of democracy in the country is social (or generalized) trust.
expressing distrust in the government increasing from 17% to a remarkable 71% (Gaidys 2012).

According to Aidukaite (2009) and Guogis (2014), there are a number of factors that shaped the transformation of the Lithuanian welfare system towards the (neo)liberal model since the 1990s. These are: the absence of a strong trade union movement; ageing; the low affordability of the welfare state due to the economic crises, the vast informal economy, and corruption;24 the lack of clear visions in the area of social policy reforms among all the parties in Lithuania; the generally more liberal-oriented policies; and the impact of international organizations and experts.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the post-communist countries, including the Baltic states, were classified as the ‘liberal’ welfare model, according to Esping-Andersen’s typology25 (Abrahamson 2000), or as developing an additional regime, specifically called ‘post-communist’ (Deacon 2000). The classification of these welfare capitalisms is still ambiguous (Aidukaite 2017). Some scholars group all post-communist countries into one block (Fenger 2007; Leibrecht et al. 2010), while other authors highlight the differences between the countries and ascribe the three Baltic countries to the neoliberal welfare regime (Bohle and Greskovits 2007; Lendvai 2010). There is a wide discussion in the area of welfare studies that draws on the latest liberalization trend in all the European welfare regimes and questions the future of the welfare state under the imperatives of ‘retrenchment’, suggesting a wider ‘neoliberal convergence’, even in the previously universalistic social democratic Scandinavian models (Andersen 2007; Schierup et al. 2006).

The neoliberal welfare regime is not a simplistic outcome of social policies introducing lower public spending; rather, it is a more structural understanding of the essence of welfare provision, mainly implementing the wider deinstitutionalization and deregulation of existing arrangements and the higher privatization of public services. It is believed that individuals can create their own well-being, acting in a free market (Ellison 2006). Although the market has an important place in the Baltic model, the state is also an

24. These factors inhibit tax collection and redistribution.

25. This typology is based on the degree as well as the forms of de-commodification (the degree to which a person can lead a decent life without depending on the market or being supported by the state) and the level of stratification (how social policies divide people into different groups based on their social provisions, e.g. pensioners, parents, etc., and how much solidarity they provide among the population). The liberal type is characterised by means-tested social assistance, which usually covers only the basic level of benefits. The market plays an important role and the degree of de-commodification is low (Esping-Andersen 1990).
important player.\textsuperscript{26} While in this model there is a minimal amount of income redistribution through the tax system, there is a basic floor of social insurance. The majority of social services are provided by the public sector and the state funds the health and education systems (Aidukaite 2009).\textsuperscript{27} In these Baltic welfare regimes, the social dialogue between workers and employers is weakly developed, trade unions are weak,\textsuperscript{28} and the unemployment rates are generally higher\textsuperscript{29} than in OMS (Aidukaite 2004; Bernotas and Guogis 2006; Woolfson 2010). With respect to the main social indicators of income inequality, expenditures on social protection, poverty levels, etc., which are usually used to compare welfare regimes, all the Baltic countries fall behind other EU member states, with the possible exceptions of Romania and Bulgaria. Furthermore, the de-commodification level is low, meaning that the social benefits and statutory minimum wages (especially compared to average wages) are relatively low, while old-age pensions and unemployment benefits are also at minimal levels of subsistence, though the situation in Estonia is better (Aidukaite 2009; 2017; Karel 2018). The Lithuanian welfare model exhibits high income and wealth inequalities that are further discussed in Article II.

Even though Lithuania and the other Baltic states experienced the so-called ‘fat years’ starting around the time of their EU accession (Woolfson 2010), the quality of the public services provided by the welfare state and also the general political rights and level of democratization were still lagging behind. The low quality of the public services is also reflected in the high share of the informal economy, which was around 30\% of the GDP in Lithuania during the latest years (Medina and Schneidder 2018). The high share in informal economy, a non-compliance with the taxation system, can be interpreted as a low support for the state’s policies (Aidukaite 2009).

The socioeconomic situation was exacerbated in the wake of the third, and latest, economic crisis in 2008, described above and in Article II. As a response,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} Aidukaite (2017) suggests that under the typology developed by Esping-Andersen (1990), the Baltic states have features of all three regimes. Although Estonia mostly resembles the social democratic model, especially in the area of family support, Latvia could be grouped under the conservative-corporatists regime due to its extensive social insurance programs, and Lithuania is the most liberal with its low support for children and the unemployed.
\item \textsuperscript{27} The higher education reform in Lithuania in 2010 reduced the support for higher education substantially.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Welfare regimes are closely connected with industrial relations.
\item \textsuperscript{29} While high unemployment is a general characteristic of the Baltic welfare model, it is interesting to observe that the Baltic states currently have one of the lower unemployment rates in the EU, but the Southern countries record the highest rates (Eurostat 2018b).
\end{itemize}
the governments of the Baltic states have implemented harsh fiscal adjustment policies – austerity measures – that have reduced living standards on a broad scale. These austerity measures in Lithuania included cuts to social spending, affecting the unemployment benefits, old-age pensions, and family support (Aidukaite 2017; for a detailed analysis see Article II).

In Lithuania and Latvia, the reduction of social rights caused by the austerity measures induced unprecedented social unrest, at least since the independence movement of the late 1980s. Protests and riots took place in front of the respective Parliaments, which were suppressed by tear gas and rubber bullets, and there were widespread arrests and restrictions on the civil rights to organize meetings and protests (Juska and Woolfson 2012). In Lithuania, the protests were mainly organized by the trade unions and largely encompassed such groups as pensioners, the unemployed, a ‘Union of Mothers’, and students. The state’s responses to the unrest were more similar to the actions of an authoritarian regime, a reference to the legacies of Soviet past, rather than of democratic governments, which provide citizens with the right to exercise their freedom to dissent and of voicing that dissent (ibid.). Indeed, the highest point of the distrust in the Seimas (79%) was reached in January of 2009 when the impact of the economic crisis and the austerity measures provoked the first episode of abovementioned mass social unrest. The unrest resulted in the signing of the ‘National Accord Agreement’ among the leading parties and trade unions, stating that the latter will be included in the dialogue and decision-making about future responses to the economic crisis (Nakrosis et al. 2015).

These events did not pass unnoticed in the general population. Subjective indicators from the opinion polls at the time were revealing. The European Social Survey (ESS 4) data from 2009 at the height of the crisis showed that more than a half (64.3%) of Lithuanians were not satisfied with the way democracy works in the country. The overwhelming majority (83%) was not satisfied with the national government, 42% of population had no conviction that the country would be able to develop as a democracy, and 49% doubted the possibility of developing a civil society. Moreover, 79% of the population expressed negative views regarding trust in institutions (ibid.).

The aftermath of the economic crisis and austerity caused debates among social partners (the state, employers’ organizations, and trade unions) about the reform of the Lithuanian Social model. Upon the open invitation of the Ministry of Social Security and Labour, a working group consisting of well-known Lithuanian scholars proposed a ‘Labour relations and national social insurance legal-administrative model’, which is available on the
specially designated website (Socmodelis.lt 2018). It proposes reforms in four main areas: labour relations, social insurance, combat with poverty, and employment/activity.

The first of the proposed reforms that materialised was changes to the Labour Code. The initial proposal from the abovementioned working group identified the need for more flexible and secure labour relations, active social dialogue, more extensive collective agreements, increased protection against discrimination, and more attention to small and micro-companies (Socmodelis.lt 2018). The suggested amendments to the Labour Code prompted big debates in the media among politicians and social partners. After all the discussions and changes, the final law seemed to have equally disappointed the social partners and the commentators in the media. Juska and Woolfson (2017) conclude that the Labour Code makes labour rights and protection even weaker and indicate a further neoliberal turn towards more flexibility, rather than security for the workers, which is a ‘post-crisis’ strategy to resume moderate economic growth (see Figure 1).

The next major controversial legislative change was the amendment of the pension regulations passed in December 2017 (LR Seimas 2016b). Besides the mass debates in the media, it is important to take into consideration the opinion presented by Romas Lazutka (LRT 2018), a leading economist and a well-known researcher in the area of the welfare state. He was also one of the authors behind the proposal of the abovementioned social model. According to Lazutka, the law that was passed by the government redirects the income from the Social Insurance Fund Board (SODRA), which pays for the pensions for current pensioners to the so-called ‘second pillar’, privately operated pension funds. This benefits the pension funds and risks further reducing the current and future pensions.

While the debates over who is behind these reforms are widespread in the media, scandals about political parties being involved with and even bribed by

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30. In contrast to other areas, no legislation amendment proposals were ‘ordered’ for combating poverty and inequality.
31. It also suggests more possibilities to balance between work, life-long learning, and family (Socmodelis.lt 2018).
32. It pointed to the EU rhetoric on flexicurity as a balanced mix between the flexibility of the labour market and the security of the workers (Gruzevskis et al. 2011).
33. For instance, trade unions had a big protest initiated in 2015 (Juska and Woolfson 2017).
34. The Labour Code was enforced on 1 January 2017 (LR Seimas 2016a).
35. From the very beginning of the independence, the World Bank propagated the privatization of the pensions and largely facilitated this implementation in the Baltic states. It consists of three pillars, in which the first one is public and forms the basis of the pension and, in Lithuania, it is administered via SODRA. The second and third pillars are administered by private funds, often banks. The contributions to the second pillar are co-funded by the state and taxation from salaries. The third one is voluntary and is based on private contributions (Aidukaite 2009; Casey 2004).
large companies keep coming to the surface.\textsuperscript{36} It is very difficult to measure the real levels of corruption in the country (Aidukaite 2009), but the perception of corruption in Lithuania has remained high during recent years – it was lingering between 50\textsuperscript{th} – 60\textsuperscript{th} place on the world rank (Transparency International 2018). Interestingly enough, the opinion of the citizens has changed in the last year and perceived corruption was lower in 2017, ranking the country as number 38\textsuperscript{th} in the world and closing the gap with the OMS, which mostly clustered in the first 20 places (ibid.).\textsuperscript{37}

The political economic changes since the independence and the ‘return to the West’ have thus been marked by economic crises and the social costs of ageing, poverty and inequalities. In the process of ‘de-Sovietization’ and democratization, the main concerns have gathered around economic growth and prosperity, while the social problems were left unaddressed. This tendency is visible in all the periods since the independence up to the current reforms of the Lithuanian social model and citizenship. It is still a question if Lithuanian politics is more of a ‘policy-making’ or ‘policy-taking’, keeping in mind the role of the international organizations and supranational bodies (World Bank, IMF, EU) in developing the socioeconomic and democratic elements so far (Aidukaite 2009; Budryte 2005). Lithuania and the other Baltic states were accepted among the advanced capitalist democratic societies; this integration resulted in the flexibilization of the labour market, the recommodification of labour, and the rise of a political economy of inequality, constituting a kind of citizenship in which the market overrides social and labour rights.

The next section will look at the patterns and characteristics of migration strategies as a response to these structural and institutional changes, the redefinition of the nation, and the formation of the citizenship politics.

\textsuperscript{36} The latest scandal considers Liberal party, but there were previous similar scandals during the last few years (Kazakevicius 2018).
\textsuperscript{37} Among CEE countries, only Estonia is ranked at the 21\textsuperscript{st} place (Transparency International 2018). However, all the Baltic states are considered developed democracies even though they have their own ‘flaws’ (Lauristin 2011). This is a reference to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, which for the last decade (from 2006 to 2018) has called the Baltic states ‘flawed democracies’, not ‘full democracies’. It should be noted that not all the OMS are considered to be ‘full democracies’. For instance, Southern Europe (France, Italy, Portugal, Greece) are also defined as ‘flawed democracies’. The CEE countries also end up in this category.
Redefining the nation in times of migration: ‘We’, ‘the Other We’ and ‘the Other’

There are many ways to define contemporary citizenship due to the multiple dimensions of this phenomenon. Citizenship often refers to membership, belonging, and both formal and substantial rights, as well as obligations (Shachar et al. 2017). Hence, a variety of factors shape citizenship policies and constitute various citizenship regimes. According to Brubaker (2011), the nation-building process shapes citizenship policies in post-Soviet states; defining who is entitled to citizenship rights, thus reconstituting the ‘We’ and ‘the Other’. Further, several authors note the importance of immigration and emigration processes and the diaspora’s role in denoting who belongs to the ‘imagined community’ (Joppke 2003; Anderson 1991; Kivisto and Faist 2007). There are also processes of globalization and Europeanization at play (Hansen and Hager 2010), which have challenged existing social citizenship models supported by generous welfare states (Marshall and Bottomore 1992), projecting a narrow ‘market citizenship’ (Root 2009). This section will bring together the socioeconomic trends discussed above with analysis of migration trends and in doing so, will consider the interplay between citizenship and migration policies to show the definition and redefinition of various groups and the (re)constitution of identities.

Lithuanian history is marked by emigration (Klusener et al. 2015). It has experienced two major emigration waves in relation to the two World Wars. These are largely defined as a flow of refugees escaping because of political reasons (Budginaite 2012). All emigration that started after gaining independence in 1990s is largely considered to be ‘economic’, characterised by the departure of the young, working age population (Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2011; Figure 2).

38. There was also migration between the Two World Wars, when Lithuania had its short independence, which is considered ‘economic’. Lithuanian authors do not agree on how many migration waves there were before the 1990s, but it is common to mark a difference between the migration that took place before and after the 1990s (Budginaite 2012).
Figure 2. Emigration, immigration, and return, 1990-2017

Source: Lithuanian statistics 2018. Note: ‘return’ here refers to the immigration of Lithuanian citizens back to Lithuania; ‘immigration’ refers to all immigration, encompassing the total number of people coming to Lithuania, including ‘return’, every year.

Drawing on previous research on Lithuanian (and Baltic) migration waves used in all the Articles of this thesis (Lulle 2009; Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2011), the following sections describe the different migration waves corresponding with the abovementioned phases of Lithuanian post-communist transformations and related structural changes. These structural changes already were presented at the beginning of this chapter. The historical and contemporary emigration and immigration flows are significant enough to affect the migration policies in Lithuania; according to Plataciute (2012), they have also shaped the country’s citizenship politics. Therefore, the following section considers not only the characteristics of the emigration waves after 1990, but also the policy response: the citizenship and identity politics that redefine who belongs to the newly restored nation-states.

From independence to the EU accession (1990-2004)

From the very outset of the independence struggles in the Baltic countries, ethno-nationalist promises of creating (or restoring) the nation-states were central. Strong ideas of national identity and later identity politics spread the message of the exclusionary redefinition of nations through the filter of ‘We’ and ‘the Other’. Intrinsic to this process of (re-)constituting national identities was ‘returning back to Europe’ (Leyk 2016) by identifying with Western European countries
and aiming to become part of the EU, NATO, and a variety of international organizations and platforms. On the other hand, re-definition of the nation was rejecting everything held in common with Russia, including the remaining part of the Russian-speaking population in these countries (Bohle and Greskovits 2007; Woolfson et al. 2011).

During the Soviet period, there was a vast, regulated intra-migration; many came and left the Baltic countries, but there were always more immigrating than emigrating. After the independence, this dynamic changed (Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2011). During the first few years, an extensive repatriation took place. It consisted mainly of people who were associated with the Soviet Union’s governing bodies (often in army) or who were born in other Soviet states\(^39\) who had left (Klusener et al. 2015). Some of the previous immigrants remained and formed ethnic minorities that constituted quite substantial parts of the current population of Estonia and Latvia, while Lithuania remained mostly homogeneous.\(^40\) In theory, all the immigrants who did not repatriate in the 1990s had a right to reside in the Baltic states or to acquire citizenship. However, the Latvian and Estonian governments gave citizenship only to individuals who were citizens before the annexation of their countries in 1940, or their descendants (Article III). Thus, in the process of ‘redefining’ the nation, the Baltic states turned to their diaspora, the previously departed people. By granting citizenship rights to individuals who had left decades ago, or even their descendants who have never been in Lithuania or the Baltics, the government acknowledged them as a part of the nation and the state, just living in other countries. These individuals were constituted as ‘the Other We’, in this way reinforcing the exclusion of the Slavic and Russian ethnic minorities. Due to these ‘identity politics’, very strict citizenship policies were introduced right after independence in Latvia and Estonia, and an already fractured polity was created. In Lithuania, exceptionally, citizenship was granted as a right to all who resided in the country at the moment of independence. Even though under pressure from the EU during accession period to make the laws of citizenship acquisition more open (Hughes 2005), barriers still remain for the significant share of non-citizens in Latvia and Estonia. This means that many individuals

\(^{39}\) This repatriation was mainly of Russian nationals or persons belonging to other Slavic ethnic groups, who were returning to their countries of origin. There was also a group of Lithuanian nationals returning from other Soviet states back to Lithuania (Klusener et al. 2015).

\(^{40}\) The official statistics on the ethnic composition in the countries reveal that Lithuania has 13% ethnic minorities, Estonia has 32%, and Latvia has 38%. In Lithuania, the largest minorities consist of Poles (around 6%) and Russians (4.5%). In Estonia and Latvia, the largest ethnic minority is Russian, constituting 25% and 26% of the population (Estonian statistics 2018; Lithuanian statistics 2018; Latvian statistics 2018).
from ethnic minorities have fewer rights than other nationals (e.g., restrictions on voting in elections), which creates higher stratification and inequalities along ethnic lines within society and causes the exclusion of part of the population from participating in the democratic processes, decision-making, and employment in the public and private sectors (Lulle 2009; Woolfson 2009).

Some previous emigrants returned from the “West”41 and other ethnic Lithuanians came back, who left or were relocated to other Soviet Republics under Soviet rule or who were exiled (Budginaite 2012). These two groups were addressed not only in the citizenship laws,42 but also in migration policy, in which separate institutions assisted in solving practical and bureaucratic matters and provided financial support for relocation (Budginaite 2012). The state programmes were aiming at making and fostering contacts with Lithuanian communities abroad and provided financial support for the communities in the neighbouring countries (ibid.).

At the same time, the removal of the strict regulations after the Soviet period gave opportunities for the revival of “economic” emigration to the “West.” This share of emigration is difficult to estimate due to its informal character: many Lithuanians entered foreign countries on temporary conditions and overstayed; others were engaged in so-called “exploratory” migration, in which employed people, housewives, and students were leaving for short periods or looking for business and trading opportunities (Klusener et al. 2015; Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2013). This kind of migration started to get policy attention only around the turn of the century, first by addressing the problem of “brain drain” and “denoting emigration of the labour force, especially young people and highly skilled as a threat to the country’s demographic situation and social development” (Budginaite 2012: 175). Nevertheless, it was only after the EU accession, that the emigration got onto political agenda and was addressed in the migration policies.

**From the EU accession to the economic crisis (2004-2008/9)**

The EU accession coincided with the economic boom, the anticipation of new freedoms, and an overall optimism. Lithuanian citizens together with other CEE countries were soon to become citizens of the EU and gain access to the Single European Market, which is based on four freedoms of movement; of

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41. Often pensioners from the United States, Australia, and Canada (Budginaite 2012).
42. Granting or restoring citizenship for this population ensured the continuity of the citizenship as an institution based mainly on *jus sanguinis* principles (Plataciute 2012).
goods, capital, services, and people.\textsuperscript{43} It was Ireland, the UK, and Sweden that opened their markets without any substantial restrictions beginning in 2004. Thus, for most of the OMS, entrance remained conditional. Even in cases of totally free entrance, there are a variety of regulations at the EU level that are implemented by the member states and that govern the freedoms of movement.

The freedom of movement of persons is one of the fundamental rights of the EU (Boswell and Geddes 2011) brought together in 2004 in the ‘Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’ (2004/38/EC). This Directive includes the right for EU citizens and their family members to freely move and reside in any Member State (MS) without any conditions for a period of up to 3 months. After this period, particular authorities must be informed about the residency. The EU citizen has to be either employed or self-employed, or able to show that sufficient means of support and health insurance are secured. Family members can accompany a citizen who meets the above conditions. Moreover, citizens and family members are entitled to permanent residency after an uninterrupted legal stay in the host country for 5 years. The Directive affirms the equal treatment of EU citizens, providing equal access to welfare and social services, though not for the first 3 months (2004/38/EC, Chapter III, Articles 6-8). It also ensures the transferability of the social entitlements in order to facilitate the migration of an economically inactive population (e.g. retired persons).

Thus, the economic activity and self-support requirements are very much emphasized in order to avoid pressure on the welfare system of the host country (Boswell and Geddes 2011). The abovementioned Directive was reinforced in 2014 (taking effect in 2016) and called for member states to ensure the equal rights of workers and implement ‘judicial procedures’ that would help workers and their family members in cases of unfair treatment and discrimination. The workers’ rights encompass access to equal employment and working conditions; tax and social advantages; training, housing, education and apprenticeships; membership of Trade Unions; and assistance from employment offices (2014/54/EU, Articles 2-4). Hence, the main emphasis here is on the workers, not all citizens who are taking advantage of the freedom of movement.

The other three Directives regulating the labour movement of the citizens within the Union are the Directive on Services in the Internal Market, the

\textsuperscript{43} These four freedoms date back to 1992 and were formulated in the Maastricht Treaty (Europa.eu 2018).
Posted Workers Directive, and the Directive on Temporary Agency Work\textsuperscript{44}. The first Directive sets the frame for the others by targeting certain forms of employment within the remit of the provision of services. The Directive on Services in the Internal Market constitutes the freedom of establishment and the provision of services between MS, ensuring non-discrimination based on the ethnicity or nationality of the establisher or of the country where establishment is originating from (2006/123/EC). All the directives are based on the principal of free movement and encourage more flexible, temporary, and circular characteristics of work and employment.

After the EU accession, the above Directives were implemented into the Lithuanian national legislations. The newly created National Population Policy Strategy (LR Vyriausybe 2004) addressed the issues related to the EU accession, namely, the importance of ensuring free movement and establishing a border control to prevent immigration from countries outside the EU. The same strategic document acknowledged the downsides of emigration but did not introduce any action plan to deal with them. All in all, emigration was not yet defined as a national issue at the time (Budginaite 2012). This was not only because of the virtues of free movement, but also due to the already mentioned undeclared emigration (Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2011). The declared emigration from 1994-2003 was low and amounted for about 20\% of the numbers pictured in Figure 2.\textsuperscript{45} The EU accession slowly provided the opportunity to legalize the stay for people who had left under more restrictive immigration policies of the OMS, which boosted the declared emigration statistics (ibid.). In addition, emigration during the previous years created links between Lithuania and the OMS which together with the removal of the institutional barriers, made it easier to emigrate. It all led to increasing rates of emigration, both in reality and in the official statistics. It was the time when ‘the big debates about emigration’ started (Budginaite 2012). The labour shortages started to emerge, which, combined with the intensified emigration, have accelerated the introduction of the first Lithuanian migration policy measure directed towards emigration after 1990; the Economic Migration Regulation

\textsuperscript{44} According to the EU’sPosted Workers Directive, individuals, employed in a company, registered in one Member State (MS), but providing services in another are entitled to the conditions applied in the receiving country; a minimum wage level (where such exists in law), working hours, vacation, occupational health and safety rules (2014/67/EU). The same main regulations to ensure equal treatment are also set in the Directive on Temporary Agency Work implemented in 2008 (2008/104/EC).

\textsuperscript{45} These were later adjusted based on Population and Household Census and other special studies and reported in Figure 2 (Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2011).
Strategy was introduced in 2007 (Sipaviciene and Jersovas 2010).\footnote{These and other migration policies were implemented until 2013; Article III presents an evaluation of them by experts.} It aimed at return migration, attracting citizens from other EU countries and, if the labour shortages prevailed, allowing the immigration of third country nationals.\footnote{These are citizens of the countries from outside the EU and EEA (European Economic Association).} This clearly showed the hierarchical selectivity of Lithuanian migration policies. Other CEE countries have been experiencing similar trends and started policy initiatives to encourage return migration during 2007-2008 (Budginaite 2012).

After the initial rise of emigration, the rates lowered and the return migration increased. These trends were largely unrelated to the effectiveness of the Economic Migration Regulation Strategy (see Article III), but rather stemmed from the positive economic trends of a growing GDP, rising wages, and lowering unemployment (Sipaviciene and Jersovas 2010). The situation changed dramatically with the onset of the global economic crisis.

\textit{Economic crisis with austerity and its aftermath (2008/9) to the present}

As already discussed in the previous sections on the economic situation, as a result of the economic crisis of 2008/9, the GDP in Lithuania declined by almost 15\%, real wages fell by 7\%, and unemployment reached 17\%, which reflected the levels of the previous two crises in the transition period. The increase in emigration is visible by 2009 (Figure 2), but it was in 2010 that record numbers of the population departed. At first, the emigration rates of 2010 were thought to reflect a new health insurance regulation\footnote{It was a part of the reform made by the SODRA, discussed in Article II. It meant that all the citizens who were not covered by health insurance through employment or another status were obliged to pay personal contributions. The official declaration of departure was a way to avoid this duty. The declaration of de facto emigration could encompass up to five years before 2010.}, but the emigration rates of the subsequent years made this assumption unlikely (Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2013). At this time, the highest emigration was among the unemployed and also people who had previous emigration experience. Moreover, Russian-speaking minorities were more prone to emigration than ethnic Lithuanians, while the Polish minority was least likely to depart (Klusener et al. 2015).

In the face of these migration trends, the Economic Migration Regulation Strategy was terminated and a new program, Global Lithuania, was launched in 2011, which also marked a further reorientation towards diaspora politics coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Article III). In comparison to the period after independence, the ‘redefinition’ of who are the Global Lithuanians, who are ‘We’ and ‘the Other We’, was further expanded to include Lithuanian
nationals who departed after the 1990s. For instance, Lithuanian communities in the OMS were invited to join a special governmental committee responsible for keeping relations open with the Lithuanian diaspora (Budginaite 2012). The amendments in the Lithuanian Citizenship Law expanded the group of people who were entitled to the simplified acquisition of Lithuanian citizenship and dual citizenship. The latter to date is very conditional and encompasses mainly persons and their descendants, up to the fourth generation, who left or were exiled before the proclamation of independence on 11 March 1990 (Plataciute 2012); since 2015, it also includes children born abroad, if at least one of the parents is a Lithuanian citizen (LR Seimas 2015).

Since 2010, the socioeconomic indicators started showing a recovery and, from 2011-2014, emigration slowed down, encouraging increased immigration that mainly consisted of returning Lithuanian nationals. In 2015, Lithuania entered the Eurozone, but there are no big reflections of this period in the socioeconomic statistics, except the slight lowering of the GDP levels and the decrease in real wages in 2016 (Figure 1). Yet this period coincides with changes in migration statistics. Figure 2 shows that emigration increased since 2015 and return migration went down in the last few years. The latter has previously accounted for the majority of the immigration, but in 2017, constituted only half of it.

The period of economic recovery also witnessed a new document in migration policy. In 2014, the Migration Policy Guidelines were adopted. They bring together all the areas of migration policy under one umbrella, namely, emigration, return, and immigration. In this document, the issues of labour shortages are again emphasised and there is more attention to immigration issues concerning not only the ‘threat of illegal immigration’, when the borders need to be controlled, but also the questions about the potential labour force and immigrants’ integration are raised (LR Vyriausybe 2014). The integration is important to have in mind for the changing immigration statistics and the fact that the Lithuanian migrant integration policy in 2015 (the latest year available) in the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) study was evaluated as one of the worst in the whole EU (MIPEX 2018). The still remaining lack of attention to immigration issues were raised by multiple research projects (Zibas and Petrusauskaite 2015).49

It is interesting to note that the current migration trends unfolded during the time of writing this introductory chapter. From the beginning of 2018, the monthly preliminary numbers of emigration and immigration were on an equal level; in May, immigration rose slightly higher than emigration (Lithuanian statistics 2018). These results are preliminary and it is not clear what part of

49. See also projects by Diversity Development Group diversitygroup.lt.
the immigration consists of people returning, but the news was spread in the media and debates started about the possibility of changing migration trends and the reasons behind it. At the same time, the Lithuanian Government has accepted the Project for the Restructuring of the Migration System. Its target group are third country nationals and indicates a need to differentiate between asylum seekers, ‘illegal migrants’, and labour migration. For the labour migrants, there is an indicated need for legal residents to have more freedom to change employers or to work for several employers at the same time. Employers should also ensure the health insurance coverage for their employees. In addition, the posting of workers and the work of temporary working agencies should be more controlled. Posted workers should be required to have a work permit and foreign nationals cannot be employed in temporary working agencies (Ministry of Inferior 2018). The latter largely concerns third country nationals, who are conducting work in Lithuania via labour market mediators. A practice where Polish companies are posting Ukrainian workers was already addressed in the media (Verslo Zinios 2017). It is made possible due to the bi-national agreements between Poland and Ukraine that allows labour migration between these two countries (Duszczyk 2013).

Even though the raising immigration trend is an interesting topic, it should be left for the future research. Accordingly, this section and the whole thesis focused on the emigration trends and showed how they were an intrinsic part of the other social changes caused by global and European political economic processes. Migration trends and patterns were sensitive to economic crises and political and institutional changes instigated by the collapse of the Soviet Union, ‘de-sovietisation’, and the EU accession. The social costs of poverty and inequalities caused by the process of transition were not properly dealt with by the welfare state, which did not soften the effects of the economic crises to a great extent. The outcomes of these processes, as mentioned above, were vulnerability to fluctuations in the global market, flexibilisation, and the recommodification of labour. These outcomes indicate the weak social citizenship (Marshall and Bottomore 1992) and some authors propose to call it ‘market citizenship’ instead (Reiter 2010). This is described as a form of citizenship that has the labour market as the institutional and organizing principle at its core and relies upon participation in the labour market as the main source of recognition and membership. Furthermore, the foundation of this citizenship is ‘individualized market based competition and individual responsibility in the context of residual (basic) welfare’ (ibid.). Such market citizenship brings uncertainties and insecurities about the relationship between state and citizens
in terms of their rights and responsibilities. The balance between these is recalibrated towards responsibilities rather than entitlements. The individual right to freedom in classical liberalism turns into a *responsibility* to decide and exercise one’s freedom in neoliberalism.

Another internal process of the social change after the 1990s was migration. As discussed above, redefinitions of the Lithuanian nation and its citizens were highly affected by migration, especially emigration. The citizenship that was formed in Lithuania and the other Baltic countries was also called ‘ethnic citizenship’ (Plataciute 2012), which was largely shaped by broader ‘ethno-national’ policies and ‘identity politics’ after the independence (Juska et al. 2011).

This juncture of the neoliberal political economy and the conservative ethno-national and citizenship politics forms a very interesting setting to further analyse the emigration patterns and causes and to go back to a more detailed analysis of policy responses to it. But, before that, a more detailed contextualization about Lithuanian migration patterns and characteristics in Sweden is presented.

**Lithuanian migration to Sweden: patterns and characteristics**

The selection of migration to Sweden in exploring Lithuanian emigration is valuable for several statistical reasons. First, official statistics of long-term and registered migration indicate similar age and gender characteristics of a general emigration from Lithuania and Lithuanian immigration to Sweden. Second, Lithuania has long and short-term emigration by posted and seasonal workers and Sweden receives both types of immigrants. Lastly, despite their geographical proximity and the open labour market since the EU accession in 2004, Sweden is less popular among Lithuanians than Ireland or the UK.

Zelano et al. (2014) report that, within the period from 2000 to 2012, the number of individuals born in NMS and residing in Sweden increased from 8124 to 148 998, though it was a small change when considering the total share of the foreign-born population in Sweden. Lithuanians and Estonians are among the largest groups of immigrants from NMS in Sweden, but their groups are significantly smaller than those of the Poles or Romanians (Statistics Sweden 2018). Figure 3 shows the gradually growing number of registered and long-term Lithuanian ‘settlers’ in Sweden. In 2017, they accounted for 13 659 persons.
Both the Lithuanians living in Sweden and the Lithuanians departing from Lithuania are mainly young, working age people. Out of all Lithuanians residing in Sweden from 2003 to 2017, the biggest groups were those aged 25-34 and 35-44 years. In comparison to the overall emigration from Lithuania, the trend for these years indicates that around one third of the departing individuals are 25-34 years old and another third is 15-24, but the younger group (15-24) of Lithuanians in Sweden constitutes a smaller share.

The yearly number of Lithuanians moving to Sweden increased after the EU accession (see Figure 4), rose again with the economic crisis, and made another leap in the most recent years, reaching 1647 in 2017.
Before the EU enlargement in 2004, more Lithuanian females went to Sweden than males. In 2005 and 2006, the numbers were about equal, but since 2007, more males have been immigrating. For example, among Lithuanians in 2014, 58% were men and 42% were women, but in 2015, it was already 62% of men and 38% of women (Statistics Sweden 2016). The gender gap was pointed out by Apsite et al. (2012) and Olofsson (2012); the migration distribution among the genders depends on the reason for migrating. Baltic females more often intermarry with Swedish partners and relocate to Sweden than Baltic males, which could explain the slightly higher immigration among females before the EU accession and opening the borders to labour migrants. Females also migrate to reunite families and follow their co-ethnic male partners. The migration pattern based on gender lines saw a shift among the male migrants starting in 2005 and especially by 2009 (Figure 4). In comparison to emigration from Lithuania, the ratio between departing males and females is more even, 55% of emigrants were males in 2009 and 51% in 2017 (Statistics Lithuania 2018). Thus, in the Swedish case, we can observe the change from slightly more female dominated migration to more male dominated migration. Another possible explanation could be the labour market dependency. During the economic crisis in 2009 when the Lithuanian construction sector crashed, a large number of male workers became unemployed, which could have increased their departure to Sweden.
This reason, for example, was the case for Estonians, who went to work in Finland (Sippolla and Kall 2016).

Lithuanian labour migration to Sweden

The statistics of Lithuanian citizens coming to Sweden to work\(^50\) shows that the numbers in comparison to the overall immigration statistics from Lithuania to Sweden are considerably lower. They differ in a factor of two (in the period 2004-2006) to even four or five times (in 2007-2014). Various interpretations can be drawn from these statistics; the most likely is that the data is not accurate, a fact already acknowledged by other researchers in the field (Gerdes and Wadensjö 2013; see also the fourth chapter). This data is based on self-reporting to the Swedish Migration Agency that was removed after 1 May 2014. Thus, what happened after 2014 cannot be regarded as reliable statistical data. The available data based on the category of the immigration with work purposes before 2004 is available by the country of birth for 2001 to 2003. In that period, it shows that there were from 30 to 50 persons who were registered under this category (Statistics Sweden 2018). It is hard to evaluate how much these numbers reflect existing labour migration patterns at the time.

The data on the sectoral distribution among Lithuanians working in Sweden is very scarce. The data from 2010 (Gerdes and Wadensjö 2013) indicates that 18% of Lithuanians employed in Sweden that year were working in the construction sector and 13% were in agriculture, forestry, and fishing. These were unusually high proportions in comparison to the whole Swedish population and to the Estonians and Latvians. The second biggest group of Lithuanians was employed in the financial and business services sector (17%) (ibid.). This number should be treated with some caution, because temporary working agencies are often grouped under this category. They employ individuals with a broad range of skills (Joona et al. 2013); thus, it is difficult to say what jobs those Lithuanians were actually doing. There were 12% working in the trade and communications and in the health sector; less than 10% worked in manufacture and mining and in personal and cultural services, which encompass the domestic and cleaning sector (Gerdes and Wadensjö 2013).

When it comes to the level of education of the emigrating Lithuanians, it is difficult to obtain reliable data, though some studies show that 70% of them have higher education (Sipaviciene 2014). Similar issues arise in the Swedish statistics; the data is scarce and a report from 2010 indicates that information for 20% of

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Lithuanians was missing. Many Lithuanians in Sweden are highly educated, however, since around 50% had some higher education (Gerdes and Wadensjö 2013). In general, Baltic migrants in Sweden are highly educated, more educated than those born in Sweden (Gerdes and Wadensjö 2013). Migration of the highly-skilled affects the sending and receiving countries. The third chapter and Article III address these challenges in more detail.

The variety of temporal migration and irregular/undeclared work

Posted workers. According to the EU’s Posted Workers Directive (96/71/EC), individuals employed in a company, who are registered in one MS but provide services in another, are entitled to the conditions applied in the receiving country. These conditions include a minimum wage level, working hours, vacation, occupational health, and safety rules. The posting of workers should be based on temporary work abroad; social security contributions and other taxation is paid to the sending country where the posting company is registered and supposedly has its main activities (EC No 883/2004).

Until July 2013, posted workers did not have to be registered in any Swedish institutions. The Lithuanian media covered the new requirement of the Swedish Working Environment Authority (Arbetsmiljöverket) to register the posted workers if they work in the country for more than 5 days. It warned that the companies failing to report them will be subjected to ‘solid fines’. The situation was compared to the Norwegian regulations (Karaliunaite 2013). Soon it will not be possible to work in Sweden without paying taxes even for a short period. The posting of Lithuanian workers to Sweden was denoted as ‘tax evasion practices’ (ibid.).

The accessible and limited data on posted workers comes from the Lithuanian SODRA and the Arbetsmiljöverket.

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51. Initially, the East-West migration was characterised by an irregularity created by having legal entry without a work permit, thus enabling the practices of the informalisation of labour marked by undeclared work, such as various forms of non-standard, atypical, and alternative employment (Slavnic 2010).


53. If the duration of work in another country does not exceed 24 months and the person is not sent to replace another posted worker (EC No 883/2004).
Lithuanian companies are highly engaged in posting workers and Lithuanians constitute one of the main sources of this kind of labour in Sweden (Arbetsmiljöverket 2018). As indicated in the Table 1, the number of posted workers has been steadily growing every year. In 2017, it amounted to close to 6000 workers, which is almost five times bigger than the officially registered long-term departures. The data from Lithuania indicates that out of all 657 workers posted to Sweden in 2012, a third of them (242) went into the construction sector and a half went to industry. Only 27 people were posted to the agricultural sector and 62 fell under the broad category labelled ‘services’. In 2013, the posting to Sweden doubled (1379) and posting to the construction sector increased by 2.5 times (618). Hence, almost half of all posted workers were going to work in the construction sector, while the other half was in other industrial sectors. Agriculture consisted of a moderate 34 workers and services accounted for 127 (SODRA 2014).

Temporary and seasonal workers. There is the least amount of statistical information regarding temporary migrant workers, who come to work only for a season, for example, to pick berries or harvest in agricultural sectors, and who stay less than 1 year. Some of them are circular migrants, who work short periods every year or return every few months. And a part of them is not visible in any registers of the authorities. For example, a study on immigration from the CEE to Norway estimates that there were as many individuals coming on a short-term basis and as posted workers as the ones who come for a long-term stay (6 months) and register (Tronstad and Joona 2013). The available data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of postings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>4128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>4812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>5861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20679</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

complementing the official registers in Sweden is very vague. The Swedish Union of Forestry, Wood and the Graphical Workers (GS) have estimated that there were around 4,000 workers from the whole EU in 2013 in the sector, but it is difficult to estimate the proportion of CEE migrants among them. (Zelano et al. 2014). Another seasonal type of work is berry picking, which was very commonly performed by people from the Baltic states in the 1990s, though after the EU accession, they got access to other sectors and were replaced by workers from Asia. Although there was still a portion of people from Poland and Baltics in the sector in 2013, they were mainly working as ‘free-pickers’ (self-employed). It is difficult to estimate the numbers of these workers; the guessing by experts in the sector is that the total number of immigrants from the EU consists of thousands (Swedwatch 2013). A large portion of them were Roma people from Bulgaria in 2012. The rest were mainly coming from the Baltics, Poland, Ukraine, and Thailand. Due to their type of employment, individuals among the ‘free-pickers’ had more opportunities to do undeclared work (Mesic and Woolfson 2015; Swedwatch 2013).

To conclude, one can observe two patterns in the presented data. First, the relationship between the EU accession and the economic crisis with austerity and increased officially registered long-term emigration. Second, there was a variety of migration, encompassing both, long-term as well as high levels of short-term labour migration from Lithuania to Sweden, that of posted workers. Seasonal workers and a range of irregular and undeclared workers are especially difficult to account for. These patterns and characteristics are discussed in Articles I and II, where they meet the lived experiences of Lithuanian labour migrants in Sweden.

54. From a critical realist perspective, they are called demi-regularities. Here the statistical data consists of only one part of the possible ways to know about the phenomenon. It presents the trends that indicate the possible existence of causal mechanisms, instead of constituting a direct cause and effect relation.
3. Definitions, previous studies, and theoretical approaches

This chapter reviews the definitions, concepts, and theories of contemporary migration. It discusses the definitions of migration and labour migration in the global institutional perspective. The chapter then turns to the specific domain of the East-West migration before and after the EU enlargement, and finally it reviews the studies done in the area of the Baltic and Lithuanian migration. It discusses the East-West migration patterns, characteristics, causes, and the migrants’ purposes as well as the impacts of this migration and policy responses to it. Lastly, it reviews the ‘classical’ and ‘new’ theoretical approaches to the inception and perpetuation of migration. The definitions and theoretical perspectives used in this thesis are the outcome of these discussions.

Defining migration, labour migration, and mobility: institutional perspectives and conceptual issues

This section presents institutional definitions of migration and labour migration that shape the policy-making, implementation, and follow-up purposes and practices of migration management. Both academic research organizations and international organizations and bodies, such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the WB, and the ILO, contribute to knowledge production, including research and data collection, and the normative and political construction of the migration research agenda (Feldman 2012; Pecoud 2018). Most of these organizations use academic research and the concepts developed within the academic discourse. Various researchers are commissioned to write reports for the international organizations, which have their own research institutes, including databases available for the use of researchers (e.g. World Bank or the ILO). Thus, these practices contribute to the discursive construction of the definition of ‘migrants’ and ‘migration’, often focusing on three dimensions: spatial, time, and causes and purposes.

Starting from the spatial dimension, the IOM website (2017) defines migration as a persons’ change of ‘habitual place of residence’. It is not just any place, since it is determined in relation to states. According to the IOM, migration is ‘[t]he movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State’ (IOM 2017). Along the same lines, King and Skeldon (2010) have pointed out that the theoretical and empirical migration research is divided

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55. For instance, the United Nations (UN) quotes the work of Stephen Castles in defining migration (UN 2017).
between concepts of international and internal migration. They suggested that migration trajectories often include both types of movement; therefore, the concept of migration should incorporate various spatial dimensions.

The UN (2017; italics in original) brings forward the dimension of time and defines a migrant as ‘any person who lives temporarily or permanently in a country where he or she was not born.’ Accordingly, European Commission (EC) (2017) defines a long-term migrant as a person who comes to another country for at least a year. The majority of migration statistics (and this is the case in the Baltic countries) cover only the long-term and declared emigration, which is called de facto migration in the literature (Hammar and Tamas 1997; Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2011). Short-term migrants, on the other hand, are defined as persons who stay in the destination country for at least three months, but less than a year (Lemaitre 2005; Fron et al. 2008). When mapping human migration experiences, time can also be conceptualised as a person’s age in relation to their life’s course and transitions, as in ‘youth mobility’ or even ‘ageing-migration nexus’ (King et al. 2016; King and Lulle 2016).

Elaborating on their definition of migration, the IOM (2017) suggests that migration ‘is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification.’ Thus, one more important dimension of migration is the causes and purposes of migration. The institutional definitions of migration are often constructed in relation to the state and the legal status of the migrant, which usually leads to a certain type of residence permit being issued and determines the rights of migrants in the receiving country. Another category that is largely determined not only by the state, but also by international law, is that of refugees. While the IOM included this group into their definition of a migrant, the UN (2017; italics in original) has a further specification: a migrant ‘should be understood as covering all cases where the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual concerned, for reasons of personal convenience and without intervention of an external compelling factor.’ The most recent research takes up the discussion on the discursive and analytical distinction between voluntary and forced migration (Bivand Erdal and Oeppen 2018). When these categories are used in a discursively dichotomous way, they tend to sort migrants into ‘free-willing’ agents, who choose to migrate and who are in control of this process, and ‘forced migrants’, who are passive receivers of the help from the international community or who depend on the host state (for example, refugees). But once people discursively categorized as ‘forced migrants’
try to act on their own behalf, public dissatisfaction rises (De Genova 2016). Thus, categorizing people as ‘forced migrants’\textsuperscript{56} is disciplinary and deprives individuals from asserting their power of agency (ibid.). This position counters the critical approaches that see all migration, even that of the highly skilled, as forced migration, since its ‘root causes’ are structural, such as engrained poverty, inequality, and the deprivation of life-chances (Delgado Wise 2018).

The EU legislation differentiates between the migration of ‘third country nationals’ and the ‘mobility of the EU citizens’ (Boswell and Geddes 2011). As defined by the EU, a ‘third country national’ is ‘a person who leaves from one country or region to settle in another, often in search of a better life’ (EC 2017). Thus, while ‘third country nationals’ are looking for a ‘better life’, ‘EU nationals’ are exercising their freedom of movement. This movement, emphasising the privilege and highlighting the migrant hierarchies (Likic-Brboric 2011; van Hear 2010), is also addressed as ‘intra-EU mobility’. The EU institutions’ use of the term ‘mobility’ to refer to the free movement of people within the EU should not be conflated with the definition of mobility in the migration theorisation discourse, which encompasses all types and trajectories of human movement on a global scale (Massey 2005; Urry 2007). The latter definition includes people made immobile due to ending up in the legally or institutionally ‘wrong category’, similar to the category of ‘forced migrants’ or the EU-specific ‘third country nationals’ (see: Schapendonk and Steel 2014).

Based on the purpose of migration, the IOM (2017) defines labour migration as a ‘[m]ovement of persons from one State to another, or within their own country of residence, for the purpose of employment. Labour migration is addressed by most States in their migration laws.’ This definition closely reflects the relation to the state and what the state is denoting as labour migration, thus the legal or political aspects. From this perspective, it is common to categorize migrants’ purposes as seeking protection, education, family reunions, and jobs (Collett et al. 2016). Yet, some individuals might fit into two or even three categories. Moreover, if one is to consider the purpose that individuals would name, the research on life-style migration provides a valid critique for this narrow categorization of purposes (Saar 2017). The UN (2017; italics in original) gives a much wider definition: a labour migrant is a ‘person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national.’ The ILO (2017) clarifies, ‘It comprises all international migrants … who are currently employed or seeking employment in their country of current usual residence. The intentions or conditions of their entry into their current

\textsuperscript{56} This is not to ignore the criminal elements in the migration process, such as human trafficking.
country of residence are not relevant … [it] thus includes unemployed migrant workers as well as migrant workers whose status in employment is employer or own-account worker or contributing family worker. This definition of a labour migrant is thus the broadest that acknowledges an engagement in the labour market, not only through variety of possible types of employment, but also via a person’s intentions to be employed.

Most of the migration definitions presented by the international organizations are encompassing a great variety of characteristics and types of migration and migrants in terms of the time and purpose dimensions. In terms of space, the starting point for all the definitions is the state, indicating the political and legal aspects that define internal and international migration and migrants.

These definitions contribute to the categorisation of people into different groups of migrants that show the differences in the degree of agency they can assert and also that contribute to a discursive construction of the often-dichotomous migrant hierarchies. These categories are used to govern people and their movement (Kalm 2010). A constitution of the variety of these categories of migrants is one of the key themes in the thesis, detailed in Article I.

**East-West migration and free movement: migration or mobility?**

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 mark the revival of the East-West migration in Europe. The East-West migration increased significantly following the EU accession of the CEE countries in 2004, which included the Baltic states. This accession gave the CEE countries the core freedoms of the EU: the free movement of services, capital, goods, and people.

Researchers agree that it is very difficult to estimate the flow of this migration before the EU enlargement, but some sources claims as many as 3.2 million people came from the CEE to the OMS between 1989 and 2004 (Engbersen et al. 2010a). The push and pull theoretical approaches predominated this research, pointing to the gaps in wages and employment possibilities, which were enormous between the sending and receiving countries after 1990s (Dølvik 2013). Hazans (2013) indicates that these gaps still remain substantial and notably increased during the economic crisis. The discussion on how to account for this movement introduced a concept of ‘incomplete’ migration, developed by Okolski (2001). It tried to describe the labour migration from the CEE to the

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OMS as encompassing temporary and circular migration patterns without long-term settlement – a trend that resembled global changes in international migration. In addition, there is an irregular side of this migration (ibid.), which is described by the more nuanced concept of ‘compliance’, coined by Anderson and Ruhs (2010). The term points out that the CEE migrants in the EU were often using legal channels to enter the country (compliance), but were breaching the employment rules (non-compliance), in this way making them ‘semi-compliant’ (ibid.). King (2002) writes that entering the OMS on ‘tourist’ or ‘student’ visas, for instance, was combined with short-term work and trade.

After the EU accession, the CEE citizens transitioned from ‘third country nationals’ to ‘EU mobile citizens’. In spite of that, the free movement of people has encountered barriers. Previous research denotes that pre-accession discourses in the OMS indicated the anticipation of a ‘threat’ to their labour markets and welfare states by the estimated post-enlargement inflow from the CEE. Such public and media discourses as ‘social dumping’ and ‘welfare abuse’ were followed by most of the OMS’ implementation of transitional arrangements – temporary restrictions to access their labour markets and welfare states (Boswell and Geddes 2011; Krings 2009). Boswell and Geddes (2011) describe the transitional arrangements as conditioning and limiting the NMS nationals’ right to free movement, which was established in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.\footnote{It gave a rise to the Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the MS.} Despite the similar discourses in the public and political debates in Ireland, the UK, and Sweden (ibid.; Olofsson 2012), these three countries did not introduce considerable transitional restrictions and opened up their labour markets to the citizens of the NMS. Sweden has had the most liberal policies towards citizens from the NMS and later the Romanians and Bulgarians (Berg and Spehar 2013). All the other OMS gradually removed the transitional barriers, with Austria and Germany being the last ones in 2011. As expounded upon in Articles I and III in this thesis, implementation of the transitional arrangements did not come without effects on migration patterns. According to Brucker et al. (2009), the implementation of transitional rules has affected the movement from the NMS and shaped the choice of destination countries.

There were many attempts by the researchers to forecast the inflows to the OMS. Most of them were anticipating moderate inflows (Bauer and Zimmermann 1999; Dustmann et al. 2003) and underestimated them; thus, the vast immigration from the NMS to Ireland and the UK came as a surprise. It has to be noted that not all people who registered their immigration were newly
arrived. For instance, Recci and Triandafyllidou (2010) highlighted that 40% of EU8 citizens’ requests for working permits in the UK came from individuals already residing in the country. Thus, the pre-accession migration previously described in research is related to the secondary informal labour market, often invisible in the official registries (Engbersen et al. 2010a).

Recci and Triandafyllidou (2010) point out that migration patterns did not change overnight: the EU enlargement did not immediately translate into social mobility possibilities in the labour market in receiving societies. In spite of their choice to implement transitional arrangements, the EU member states have a rule of ‘sufficient means’ (see the second chapter). Accordingly, Recci and Triandafyllidou (2010: 145) claim that ‘labour market conditions continue to override citizenship rights, paradoxically “re-converting” mobile EU citizens into migrants.’ Therefore, intra-EU mobility can instead be called a ‘first class migration’ (ibid.).

Indeed, even though the EU discourse addresses the movement of people from the CEE to the OMS as the ‘mobility of the citizens’, the majority of the scholarship continues to analyse this movement in terms of ‘migration’, with the main focus on labour migration and also using the concepts mobility and migration interchangeably. The same is noted in the discourses of the receiving EU member states. For instance, van Ostaijen (2016) finds that the authorities of the Netherlands discursively define CEE citizens as ‘migrants’. The same discourses on immigration from the NMS were central in the mobilization for Brexit.59

The debate about a new global international migration described in the previous section is also reflected in the context of the EU and free movement. According to Favell (2008a), it is changing the face of East-West migration. To account for it, Engbersen et al. (2010b) introduced the concept of ‘liquid’ migration into the academic debate. It echoed the idea of ‘incomplete’ migration and proposed that due to the uncertain and temporary nature of CEE labour migration to the Netherlands, the NMS nationals are not likely to settle (ibid.).

There is a vast body of research considering temporary labour migration from the NMS to the OMS, including the recruitment practices and working conditions for migrants in the host societies. Probably the most attention has been paid to Polish and Romanian migrants in the UK and Ireland, but here I will highlight the studies about the Scandinavian and Swedish contexts. These studies on temporary migration often consider the disadvantaged labour conditions that the CEE migrants face in the informal part of economy (Likic-

59. The media and policy discourse in Lithuania is also dominated by such terms as emigration, even when considering movement to the OMS (Budginaite 2012; Genelyte 2011).
Brboric et al. 2013) or in specific sectors in the OMS. There are quite a few studies that consider the situation for posted workers in the construction sector, where the discussion on the employment conditions (Thörnqvist and Woolfson 2011) is also enriched by migrant experiences and motivations (Thörnqvist and Bernhardsson 2014). Refslund and Thörnquist (2016) emphasize the need to consider other highly informalized sectors where migrant work is prevailing: namely, domestic and cleaning work, agriculture, and transport. As these sectors often presuppose more informal and exploitative labour relations, as well as the fraudulent contracting of work (Mesic and Woolfson 2015; Thörnquist 2013, 2015a, b), various authors note that domestic and care sectors are also highly feminized, while the construction and transport sectors are dominated by male workers (Gavanas 2010; Shmulyar Green and Spehar 2014; Thörnquist 2015b). The gender and ethnic divisions in the Scandinavian labour markets were previously discussed in the literature as stemming from the deteriorating socioeconomic conditions in the CEE countries, the privatization of the welfare sector and other public services, growing female employment in the OMS (Shmulyar Green and Spehar 2014), and the related commodification of labour. The latter issue in the context of the East-West migration is further addressed in the debate over the commodification of migrant labour by van Ostaijen et al. (2017) and Likic-Brboric et al. (2013).

More critical studies point to the similarities between this new migration and the old ‘guest worker’ programs, in which the supposedly mobile labour force from southern countries actually evolved into settlement patterns (Castles and Ozkul 2014). The same conclusion was drawn by Friberg (2012) in his research on labour migration from Poland to Norway. He claims that the temporary and circular migration gradually turned into settlement (ibid.). This is also echoed by Bygnes and Bivand Erdal (2017), who find that Polish and Spanish migrants in Norway express a will to have more ‘grounded lives’ and less ‘ongoing mobility’. Lastly, a good example is the recent economic crisis. The idea of a single market assumes that mobile workers would follow the labour demand. Since both the sending and the receiving countries experienced the economic turbulence, it would be expected that migrants would leave the receiving countries, especially because research finds that labour migrants were more likely to get unemployed than natives (Brucker et al. 2009). However, during the economic crisis there was no massive return migration to the NMS, even though many receiving

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60. The same pattern is reflected throughout the EU, revealing the gaps between the sending East and the receiving West (see Gavanas 2010 and Shmulyar et al. 2014 for domestic and care work and Lillie and Greer 2007 for the construction sector).
countries of the OMS were also experiencing a recession. According to Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2012), some of the NMS nationals moved to other countries, and Bratsberg et al. (2014) finds that some also remained in the destination countries and claimed benefits there.

This research questions the institutional construction of circular migration schemes, mobile employable citizens, and usable migrants (Likic-Brboric 2011) that is comparable to the current revision of the EU refugee policy in terms of ‘permanent temporariness’. This institutional construction of the EU policies is part of the context of the contemporary institutionalisation of temporariness as it relates to changing citizenship and migrants’ and refugees’ rights and its impact on living and working conditions across the globe (Latham et al. 2014).

Despite the debates about the temporariness and settlement, Burell (2010) and Saar (2017) emphasise that another characteristic commonly ascribed to the East-West migration is the migrations’ economic nature and motivations, often leaving aside the reasons of self-development or life style. The authors King et al. (2017) and Parutis (2014) note that the majority of the migrants from the NMS are young and often highly skilled. Nevertheless, the main debate among the scholars of the receiving countries for a long time was predominated by a discussion on the low-skilled migration and deskilling in the host labour market, where the NMS migrants were descending the occupational ladder by taking lower skilled jobs than their education merited (Engbersen et al. 2010a; Kaczmarczyk and Okolski 2008). King (2012) noted on the global international level that there is a certain invisibility of privileged migration. Saar (2017) discusses this invisibility of the intra-EU movement of career migrants in recent research. This sort of migration is still predominantly discussed in the context of what Favell (2008b) called the ‘Western Eurostars’ moving between ‘Eurocities’.

These debates intensified further and spawned attempts to categorize the movement and make typologies of the migrants. For instance, Engbersen et al. (2013) review a variety of these typologies based on migrant motivations, migration strategies, and patterns of migration. They build on the previous categorisations of mainly Polish migrants, employ a transnational approach, and conclude that these typologies have two dimensions: on the one hand, attachment to the country of origin, and on the other hand, attachment to the country of destination. Charting them on the horizontal and vertical axes produces four types of patterns of labour migration and labour migrants: (1) temporary, circular, and seasonal migration; (2) transnational migration (bination orientation); (3) footloose migration; and (4) settlement migration. The first group consists of mainly low-skilled workers, who often do a seasonal
DEFINITIONS

job, work in construction, domestic service, and agriculture, and are engaged in a circular migration. It also includes people who go abroad to accumulate capital for investment in the country of origin. Transnational migrants stay in the countries of destination for long periods, but retain strong relations to the country of origin, often due to their family remaining there (ibid.). Footloose migrants are highly mobile cosmopolitans, usually highly skilled individuals having very few family obligations, and who want to ‘intentionally keep their options open’. They are also, ‘nomads’, who have an urge to go ‘somewhere else’ to see the world and have no problems working in lower-skilled jobs (e.g. in bars). Lastly, settlement migration denotes the traditional migration of moving with intention to settle in the country of destination for the long term or for good because of marriage, work, or life style. Thus, it seems that the newest tendency is to address the diversification and complexity of peoples’ motives to move and the variety of labour migration patterns, i.e. alongside temporary and circular migration, scholars highlight the settlement trends (Engbersen et al. 2017). There is a tendency to see even new mobile citizens as EU migrants, in the public and media discourses, to be addressed in the next section.

Despite all the debates about migration from the NMS to the OMS being diverse in terms of the motivations, skills, and occupations of the migrants, there is a lack of studies about highly-skilled migrants, who have positions corresponding to their educational and skill attainments (‘professionals’ or ‘career movers’). Second, the migrant motivations beyond economic determinism, such as an eagerness to experience the world and use carrier opportunities, just recently started to gain ground to be recognized as valid reasons, both main and complementary, to migrate (King et al. 2017). As Saar (2017) observed, there is still a tendency in the academic discourse to separate mobile ‘Westerners’ from migrating ‘Easterners’ by applying separate concepts to denote their movement (for exceptions, see King et al. 2017; Parutis 2014). Third, there is still a visible tendency to focus either on the ‘disadvantaged labour migrants’ or on ‘successful European Union citizens’ (Ciupijus 2011) when discussing the migration from the NMS to the OMS. Lastly, the research discourse is predominated by the focus on the Polish migration and

61. This characteristic was also described by the concept of ‘intentional unpredictability’ (Eade et al. 2007).

62. The complexity and diversity of migration makes it difficult to categorize all types of migration. Engbersen et al. (2013) note that the so-called ‘career’ migrants could be placed in a few categories. Moreover, people switch from one category to another throughout their migration process.

63. In the case of migration from the Baltic states to Sweden, Apsite et al. (2012) and Oloffson (2012) point out that social reasons for migration were more important among Baltic females. It was more common for the period before the EU enlargement and also for females following their co-ethnic or Swedish partners.
situation in the OMS, especially the UK. Therefore, Articles I and II in this thesis focus on labour migration from Lithuania to Sweden, accounting for a variety of migrants’ skills, occupations, and the causes and motivations of this migration. The same tendency to focus on the OMS is also visible in the studies on the socioeconomic consequences of migration from the CEE.

**Socioeconomic consequences of the CEE migration to the OMS and policy responses: a receiving country’s perspective**

The body of literature examining the socioeconomic consequences of the CEE migration into the single European market, both the challenges and benefits it poses as well as the corresponding national policy, focuses primarily on the OMS, emphasising the costs of immigration for the receiving countries (Dølvik 2013; Menz 2005). After the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements, these costs are primarily oriented towards the pressures on the labour market and welfare state, the so-called ‘social models’, and the overall economic growth (Carmel et al. 2012; Friberg 2016; Wagner and Hassel 2016). Furthermore, the discussion of the regional impacts and reactions of the local authorities is also gaining its ground in the debate, particularly in the Netherlands (van Ostaijen and Scholten 2018), Austria, and Sweden (Bucken-Knapp et al. 2018).

The discourses in the receiving societies on the CEE migrants’ possible ‘abuse of welfare’ and ‘stealing of jobs’, causing ‘social dumping’ (Barych 2006) before the EU enlargements, continued when these countries became members. Even though the migration-welfare state nexus in this context was examined quite broadly by the scholars, the main focus of this research was on immigration’s impact on the welfare of the OMS (Aidukaite and Genelyte 2012; Kurekova 2011; Lendvai 2010); it aimed to determine whether immigrants would help develop the welfare state or would burden it (Brochmann and Hagelund 2011; Carmel et al. 2012). One body of literature looks at welfare migration (de Giorgi and Pellizzari 2006) and a possible welfare state retrenchment because of the negative public attitudes towards growing immigration (Albrekt Larsen 2011; Crepaz and Damron 2009). This research thread gained more ground after the economic crisis and implemented austerity, when ‘welfare chauvinism’ – the popular belief that national public funds belong only to nationals – became more debated (Ferrera and Pellegrata 2018). Other studies concentrate on ‘care migrants’ and their positive impact on the provision of social services, especially for the elderly, disabled, and children, in the OMS (Gavanas 2013; Lutz 2008; Shutes and Chiatti 2012; Williams 2012).
Studies assessing the socioeconomic consequences of ‘poverty migration’ (Hansen 2015) and ‘cheap labour’ coming from the ‘peripheries’ of the EU (Woolfson 2009) did not find any significant EU migrants’ dependence on the host welfare states (Giulietti 2014; see also Gerdes and Wadensjö 2013 for Swedish case). Between 2004 and 2008, the rising GDP of the EU was registered and no long-term disadvantages in terms of employment or wages in the EU were identified (Kahanec et al. 2010). However, Kahanec et al. (2010) note that this economic growth hides the uneven distribution of benefits and pressures among and within member states. Dølvik (2013) warns that rising inequalities in the EU’s labour markets profiling the OMS as capital rich and the NMS as sources of ‘cheap labour’ may create a ‘two-tiered Europe’, where these unequal dynamics would bring more pressure on the receiving countries’ welfare states, resulting in increasingly differentiated access to social rights based on national belonging. This process was addressed by Andor (2014) in a call to prevent the unequal treatment of NMS nationals and the formation of ‘second class citizens’, relating to the overall debate about lack of functionality of the EU citizenship (Hansen and Hager 2010; Recci and Triandafyllidou 2010).

Hence, the overall win of the EU’s GDP growth does not reflect the full picture of the abovementioned ‘new face’ of the East-West migration and its consequences. The research on the policy response and the multi-level governance in the EU (van Ostaijen and Scholten 2018) maintains that, in the public sphere, pressures at the national and local levels are often more pronounced, as they present more realistic problems for MS than the abstract notion of the EU’s GDP growth. Policy responses to the free movement from the NMS to the OMS depend on the governance and context of each state (and/or situation). In their multi-level governance approach, van Ostaijen and Scholten (2018) include the EU, national, and city authorities, the latter being active actors either directly responding to the consequences of migration or lobbying to affect governance from below. The governance context encompasses both the labour market and the welfare state institutions, and the politico-administrative institutional model points to a degree of (de)centralisation in the governance process in the country (ibid.). According to Ruhs and Palme (2018: 1481), the labour market and welfare state institutions can ‘affect national policy actors’ positions on free movement directly, and/or indirectly via interactions with normative attitudes and the characteristics of EU labour immigration’; thus, these attitudes and characteristics are crucial for understanding countries’ differences concerning their openness to immigration and their social and labour rights for migrants. The authors show that, even after the transition period, several OMS retain certain institutional and administrational barriers to
the migrants’ welfare access; however, only the UK has opted to restrict the labour market access that resulted in Brexit (Ruhs and Palme 2018). These latest events have highlighted the conflict between national welfare states and labour markets and the intra-EU free movement (ibid.) and have been described as ‘attack[s]’ on (Kramer et al. 2018) and even a ‘crisis’ of free movement (Hansen 2015).

According to Zelano (2018), European policy-making concerning free movement generally does not respond to a multi-level governance approach, indicating a gap in the political decision-making between the EU and the local and regional levels. In a few top-down governing examples, concerns over the MS’ posting of workers were addressed by reinforcing the Posting of Workers Directive, the coordination of social security for posted workers, and the introduction of the ‘European Pillar of Social Rights’ (ibid.). Similar gaps exist between the EU’s Commission and the MS. In particular, the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has increased because of the political complications in modifying the laws for free movement within the EU. According to Lillie and Simola (2016), the ECJ is the main European institution reinforcing the right to free movement. One of the examples is, the so-called ‘Laval case’, a verdict that banned Swedish national trade unions from striking against what they considered to be social dumping and the unequal wages paid to Latvian posted workers in Sweden (Malmberg 2010). Drawing on this and other cases included in the so-called ‘Laval Quartet’,64 Dølvik and Viser (2009: 505) raise critical aspects of the ‘European trilemma’65 and conclude that it is important to correct ‘the economic bias of the European integration project as manifested in the subordination of worker rights and equal treatment to the right of free movement and competition.’ This ‘trilemma’ is echoed in the wider research on industrial relations, which emphasises a failure to implement the European social model in the NMS (Likic-Brboric et al. 2013; Meardi 2012).

Besides the responses induced by so-called ‘mobility of services’ (Dølvik and Eldring 2006), other local and national actors’ responses concerning the CEE migrants in Sweden are encompassed in two other cases. The responses consider a specific group, the Roma, who came to Sweden from Romania and Bulgaria following the last EU enlargement, and their experience of poverty, homelessness, and poor working conditions.66

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64. The Laval Quartet refers to four cases in the ECJ: the Viking, Rüffert, Laval, and Luxembourg cases (Malmberg 2010).

65. Here authors include three ‘fundamental rights: a right to free movement of services and labour, non-discrimination and equal treatment, and the rights of association and industrial action’ (Dølvik and Viser 2009: 491).

66. This group in the public debate was called ‘beggars’ (Bucken-Knapp et al. 2018). Another group is ‘berry-pickers’ (Mesic and Woolfson 2015).
Most of the research on the East-West labour migration focuses on the cases in the UK, Ireland, and continental Europe, but there is a body of studies about the Nordic countries; this research review aimed to highlight these perspectives by putting more emphasis on the Swedish context. However, there is a flagrant lack of research on the NMS’ perspectives on the mass (e)migration and the related socioeconomic and political consequences. In the next section’s overview of the previous research on the East-West migration from the perspective of the sending country, the NMS states and their migrant workers are detailed by the presentation of previous research on Lithuanian migration.

**Post-communist transformation and migration**

Corresponding to the overall debate on the East-West migration, research on emigration from Lithuania usually points to labour emigration driven by economic reasons (often employment opportunities or wage differences) or even sees all emigration as economic, starting with Lithuania’s independence from the Soviet Union in the 1990s. Similar to the CEE migration to the OMS, Lithuanian emigration mainly consists of young, working-age persons, reflecting the exceptionally high levels of potential emigration among young people (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2011). Furthermore, the diverse patterns indicate that temporary emigration is occurring alongside a newer tendency of families to depart or to reunite in the host country (Hazans 2013; Sipaviciene 2015). A prominent feature of Lithuanian emigration is its long-term mass departure, registered in the official statistics, which in terms of net migration rates during the latest years exceeded Polish and Romanian emigrations (Eurostat 2018a). Whereas return and circular migration patterns are common only for approximately 10% of the population in Lithuania (Barcevicius and Zvalionyte 2012).

As presented in the contextualizing chapter, there are two peaks in Lithuanian emigration coinciding with the EU accession and the economic crisis. Research analysing migration before the EU accession often exemplifies its short-term nature, motivated by a desire for quick earnings, and paints migration as a complementary family income strategy to the earnings from a stable, but low-paid job in Lithuania. During this period ‘male breadwinner’ migration was also accompanied by female (often housewives) departures (Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2011, 2013). This was made possible by the already mentioned wage and employment gaps between the OMS and the CEE countries (Maslauskaitė and Stankuniene 2007).

The period after the EU accession accelerated and facilitated migration and the research presented migration more as a choice to freely move rather than emphasising the ‘survival strategies’ before enlargement. Economic reasons
were still prevailing, including dissatisfaction with exploitative labour conditions (Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2011; Woolfson 2010). As the living standards increased due to the booming economy, the increasing inequalities in the society were addressed in the discourse of ‘social serfdom’ (Donskis 2006), in which the emigration of socially disadvantaged groups, often those living on the periphery, denoted lack of a social security, weak social rights, and exploitative, informalised labour relations (Juska and Woolfson 2014; Likic-Brboric et al. 2013). During this period, such motivations as ‘self-realisation’, a will to experience the world, and a desire to enhance career opportunities came into surface, which were later addressed in the debate over the individualisation of migration (Saar 2015). This individualisation mainly encompassed young, highly-educated, single persons. Addressing the same group, more critical research based on institutional approaches (Kurekova 2011) and the dual labour market (Juska and Woolfson 2014) point out that this migration was largely due to a problematic education and labour market transition of young people at the time. These studies, also presented in Article I, point not only to the gap between skills provided by education and the demand on the labour market (Kurekova 2011), but also to nepotism and corruption, when one needs to have contacts in addition to skills in order to get a job (Juska and Woolfson 2014).

In addition, this period was facilitated by ethnic network migration, when many established themselves in the OMS during the period after 1990s, but also kept up relations to their country of origin (Maslauskaite and Stankuniene 2007). Migration research in Lithuania often focuses on traditional network studies that emphasise the role of ethnic relations in facilitating employment, or deals with diaspora studies, identity formation, and change (Bucaite-Vilke and Rosinaite 2010; Ciubrinskas 2011; Geciene 2009; Maslauskaite and Stankuniene 2007). Broader systematic research concerning recruitment practices and focusing on migration channels (see McCollum et al. 2013 for Latvian case) – intermediaries, connecting migrant self-selection, and structural selectivity of the host countries’ policies – is still fragmented. As stated in Article I, there is a lack of consideration over the workings of the migration industry, in which a variety of the recruitment and temporary working agencies operate,67 as well as an analysis of the migration of posted workers and the self-employed, which is a gap addressed in the article.

With the onset of the economic crisis and austerity measures, economic reasons for departure increased, since many individuals experienced unemployment, lower earnings, and indebtedness to banks (Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2011). Klusener et al. (2015) from 2011 to 2012 indicates that there was a 50–60%

67. For some examples, see Thörnquist (2013).
higher propensity to emigrate among the unemployed. More critical research details these connections, suggesting the term of ‘austeriat’ (Juska and Woolfson 2014), which signifies the situation for people ‘at the very bottom of the labour market hierarchy, for whom the crisis has exacted an especially heavy price in terms of employment informalization and reductions in living standards’ (Mesic and Woolfson 2015: 40). This study resonates with the scholarly debate over the disappointment with the state and its neoliberal policies as reasons for emigration. It encapsulates the failure of the state to create more and better paid jobs, ensure decent labour conditions, and provide comprehensive social security for all (Hazans 2016; Kesane 2011; Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2011).

Recently, these findings invigorated two strands of research: inequalities-migration and welfare-migration nexuses. Some recent studies (Juska and Woolfson 2014; Lazutka et al. 2017; Nowak 2011; Ubareviciene 2017) point to the income, wealth, and social inequalities in Lithuania – not only unemployment and wage gaps between the CEE and the OMS as indicated previously – as drivers of mass emigration. Others (Aidukaite and Genelyte 2012; Lulle 2013) call for an account of the role of social policies in shaping emigration decisions. Despite the broad research on the migration-welfare nexus in the EU context, there is agreement among scholars that it is biased by the countries of destination (Kurekova 2011; Lendvai 2010); the role of social policies in shaping the forms and patterns of emigration remains highly under-researched. Accounting for the inequalities in the labour market and the inability of welfare states to correct them, Nowak and Novosielski (2011) conclude that emigration is an overdue reaction to the transformation processes that started after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a position shared in this thesis by adopting the transformational approach to develop an explanation of the Baltic Lithuanian migration from the perspective of a sending state and of the migrants themselves.

The last strand of research addresses the latest economic crisis with austerity as an outcome of the post-communist transition and is important for this thesis; it employs Hirschman’s (1970) analytical framework of exit, voice, and loyalty. Sippola (2014) indicates that the Estonian labour market, as an outcome of its labour market policies, is exclusionary along the lines of ethnicity (i.e. Russian-speakers) and skills; the economic crisis brought to light the inability of citizens (including those of the titular nation) to voice their problems and influence the state and the recuperation of their quality of life. Moreover, the government’s

68. The study is based on the Population Census and encompasses the period from 1 March 2010–31 December 2012. The age group is 20-64, and all variables except age are constant.

69. This topic relates to the discussion on nation-formation and citizenship rights in the second chapter.
response to use austerity pushed even further on the understanding that citizens and workers (as well as a state) are totally dependent on the international market forces and are only carriers of the ‘individualized risks and intensified uncertainties’ that were brought forward by the economic situation (Sippola, 2014: 131). Under these circumstances, Estonians chose the option of exiting through emigration. While analysing the same situation in Lithuania, Woolfson (2010) concludes that the implemented austerity measures and unresponsive government’s reaction to the public protests caused a break in loyalty to the state. It is operationalised by lowered trust in the governing bodies and the broken contract between citizens, whose voice was not heard and addressed, and the state on its turn caused alienation and an exit. The author claims that this exit is a reaction not only to the quality decline induced by the crisis, but also a deeper critique of the prevailing economic and social system (Woolfson 2010). In other words, both abovementioned authors address the more general situation in Estonia and Lithuania that evolved since the transformation, including the lack of labour and social rights available for the people, indicating the low quality of a citizenship.

Following this research strand that addresses the whole spectrum of economic, personal, social, and political causes of Lithuanian and Baltic emigration, the thesis develops and extends the Hirchmanian exit, voice, and loyalty model in order to better understand Lithuanians’ decisions to emigrate, and the policy responses to mass emigration. Concerning the latter, we now turn to the previous studies on the consequences of and policy responses to this complex process.

**Socioeconomic consequences of the CEE migration to the OMS and policy responses: a sending country perspective**

As it was presented in the second chapter and in Article III, one of the most pronounced problems in current Lithuanian society is ageing. These demographic changes, caused by declining birth rates and high mortality, appeared after the 1990s and were further perpetuated by emigration that lately has accounted for 80% of the demographic change (Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2013). Research reports that migration is altering Lithuania’s demographic structure with prevailing ‘ageing from below’ (in contrast to the OMS countries, where ageing takes place due to extended life expectancy). Since the majority of emigrants are young people, society has a higher share of older people due to departure of the youth (Sipaviciene 2015). This departure raises further discussions on the labour demand and supply and the possible implications of emigration for the labour market shortages. The analysed
impact is not so much about the general level of the labour supply. On the contrary, Sipaviciene and Stankuniene (2013) claim that intensified emigration tempered rising Lithuanian unemployment rates during the economic crisis. The issue concerns the debate over a labour mismatch, in which the shortages are visible only in particular occupations, such as among medical doctors (Eurofound 2013). Hazans (2013) notes that labour shortages can impede foreign direct and local investment. However, further research is needed to support the causal relation between emigration and labour shortages (Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2013). There are further implications that stem from ageing and the labour market changes, namely, that the emigration of the working-age population has already made an impact on the welfare system (Hazans and Philips 2010) and, in particular, the pension system (World Bank 2015). This was one of the reasons to instigate the larger reforms of the whole Lithuanian social model (Socmodelis.lt 2018). According to some studies, ageing with all its consequences will impact the economic growth in Lithuania and Baltic states for the coming years (Moody’s 2015). According to Hazans (2013), remittances are not enough to compensate for the loss in the Latvian GDP.

Furthermore, the emigration of young highly-educated people is raising debates of ‘brain drain’ from the Baltics and ‘brain waste’ as they enter lower skilled labour markets in the OMS (Hazans 2013; Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2013). This debate is particularly sensitive in the Baltic states and all the NMS because of the departure of medical doctors to the OMS (Eurofound 2013).

Young people are often considered to be potential future parents; thus, their departure can impact birth rates. Moreover, emigration is changing family relations and roles. Such issues as children being left behind and even old parents being left behind are being brought into the research (Simanskiene and Pauzuoliene 2013). There is a tendency for families to reunite in the country of destination (Hazans 2013; Sipaviciene 2015).

The establishment of ethnic migrant networks provided several feedback mechanisms: an increased amount of information about the possibilities in the ‘West’ and a continuous flow of remittances after the EU accession. The latter was reported to soften the impact of the economic crisis for individual households and was used mainly for consumption (Migracija skaiciais 2011). Researchers note that establishment of ethnic networks was the beginning of a formation of migration culture, a certain ‘social mind-set’ aligning migration with a ‘social norm’ (Thaut 2009; Maslauskaite and Stankuniene 2007). All of these factors contributed to perpetuation of migration.
Besides the debates and reforms of the Lithuanian social model, another policy response to this mass departure is migration policy. Lithuania fostered its relations to diaspora since the 1990s, but the EU accession and economic boom introduced policies aiming to encourage return migration, which, after the economic crisis, was changed again to fostering relations with diaspora (Budginaite 2012). Budginaite (2012) notes that the effect of these policies on regulating migration – both emigration and return – are very moderate.

Thus, it appears that the socioeconomic consequences of mass emigration from Lithuania largely resemble those named in the context of the OMS; namely, emigration affects the labour markets and welfare states of all the countries involved. However, the complex socioeconomic and political problems brought about by mass emigration from the NMS and these countries’ policy responses need to be explored further, which this thesis has addressed.

The above review demonstrates that the Lithuanian migration is characterised by a complexity and diversification of motives, patterns, and experiences of migration (Snel and Engbersen 2013), in line with recent research that depicts the East-West migration as ‘new’ (Favell 2008a; King 2012).

Towards a theorisation of a ‘new’ migration

King (2002; 2012) maps the ‘new’ European migration, which was also addressed as a ‘turn to mobility’ (Urry 2007), the ‘age of migration’ (Castles et al. 2014) and ‘mixed’ (van Hear 2010) migration. Drawing on these studies, it is possible to identify the following characteristics of this ‘new’ migration: (1) the diverse and hybrid types of migrants; (2) the various locations of origin, destination, and transition; (3) patterns of circular and other kinds of temporary movements alongside the traditional settler migration; and (4) the invisibility of some mobilities of privileged career movers or undocumented migrants.

Having in mind these characteristics of the contemporary migrations, general migration theory should include the explanations of the whole migratory process: emigration, immigration, return, circulation or transition migration, and settlement. Somewhat paradoxically, migration theory should allow us to explain not only why people move, but also, why they do not move (Hammar and Tamas 1997). Consequently, these complex phenomena require a nuanced theory in order to account for the diversity of experiences, patterns, and contexts of migration (Castles 2010).
**Inception and perpetuation of migration**

The variety of theoretical approaches and concepts exploring and explaining migration can be grouped according to various aspects: the scale of analysis, the object in focus, and the main assumptions, which are usually shaped by the academic discipline (Castles et al. 2014). There are many comprehensive accounts and various classifications of those frameworks and concepts (Arango 2004; Castles et al. 2014; King 2012; Massey et al. 1993), but all of them make a distinction between the inception and perpetuation of migration. The inception is often denoted as ‘the causes of migration’; a perpetuation is mostly known through the cumulative causation thesis developed by Massey et al. (1993) and often relies on ‘networks at a mezzo level’ (de Haas 2010a). Even though most of the theories were empirically and analytically used to account for both the initiation and sustaining of migration, some of the theories are better equipped to explain one or the other.

I begin with introducing the inception of migration which is also based on ‘root causes’. Van Hear et al. (2018) depict this phenomenon as rather static and rigid. The ‘root causes’ also implies the Humean cause and effect relationship, in which, because of the constant conjuncture, the same cause would always lead to the same effect (Iosifides 2011). Many theories and concepts struggle to account for immobility even though the ‘root causes’ for the departure are in place.

The functionalist migration theory considers that economic, demographic, and environmental factors ‘push and pull’ on individuals in this way, contributing to the equilibrium in the society. It sees migrants as rational individual actors, whose movement is driven by supply and demand mechanisms (e.g. wage and employment gaps), and who want to get a return for the previous investments in their human capital (Castles et al. 2014). Another strand of theories, also denoted as ‘grand theories’ (Castles 2010), are historical and structural approaches. They encompass the dual labour market, world systems, and dependency theories (Castles et al. 2014). These frameworks presuppose unequal relations between the ‘wealthy and developed core’ and the ‘poor periphery’, where the latter is a supplier of cheap labour. The mobile labour force from the periphery is pulled towards the lower segment of the dual labour market in the core, which is split between the primary and secondary sectors.70 This process funnels immigrants towards the less desirable and more unskilled jobs, especially if their migration is temporary (Likic-Brboric et al. 2013; Piore 1979). The historical and structural

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70. The primary sector is characterised by secure employment for mostly high-skilled and native workers, while the secondary sector is marked by insecure, precarious, low-paid jobs for low-skilled workers, further differentiated according to ethnicity, gender, race, and age (King 2012).
approaches often focus on the ways that countries and supranational bodies govern and manage the subjects (in contrast to agents) and their movement. They shed light on the effects of the global processes concerning human mobility, which countries and supranational bodies are struggling to control (e.g. during the economic crisis). In other words, migration is ‘what happens to us.’

On the other hand, migrant agency theories stem from the opposition to functional, structural, and historical theories and examine the migrant as an individual, who is reacting to and overcoming the social, political, and economic structural constraints. Theories such as the livelihood approach and the new economics of labour migration (NELM) can be grouped here. They assume that migration is a strategy by which the migrant household is trying to keep a balance between costs and benefits by seeking not just to maximize utility, but also to control risk (Castles et al. 2014; Stark and Bloom 1985). In addition, King (2012) brings up the importance of migrants’ experiences, feelings, and expectations – the ‘existential’ side of migration, in addition to the migrants’ lives and livelihoods.

Besides the theoretical frameworks highlighting the structure-agency impasse (Bakewell 2010), there are attempts to connect people, countries (and supranational bodies), and migration processes into networks, migrant systems, and transnational spaces (Faist 2010; King 2012). These theoretical frameworks encompass the networks, transnationalism, migration systems, and transitional theories as well as more specific cumulative causation mechanisms. They advance a more dynamic character of migration and emphasize the perpetuation of migration. They focus on so-called mezzo level and aim to explain the way migration becomes sustainable through transnational spaces and connections, the (trans)formation of structures via feedback mechanisms, the social relations that are increasingly institutionalized with time, changing values, norms, identities, and attachments. Here concepts of social capital and trust are ‘embedded’71 in the migrants’ networks, the culture of migration, and the links between the mobility of people and the flow of capital, goods, and information are often used (Castles et al. 2014). While most of the authors disregard the development of a grand theory of migration, they agree that there is a need to develop broad, middle-range theoretical frameworks that let us understand both migration’s inception and perpetuation, considering different units and levels of analysis (King 2012). In the often-quoted words of Massey et al. (1998), a satisfactory theoretical framework for migration needs to have

71. This theory suggests that social capital cannot be owned by an individual (as, for instance, human capital can), but can be accessed through the networks one is a part of (de Haas 2010a).
four basic elements: a treatment of the structural forces that promote emigration from [sending] countries; a characterisation of the structural forces that attract immigrants into [receiving] countries; a consideration of the motivations, goals and aspirations of the people who respond to these structural forces by becoming international migrants; and a treatment of the social and economic structures that arise to connect areas of out- and in-migration (Massey et al. 1998: 281).

Even when the latter structural connections are accounted for, they are often taken for granted; in addressing the migration system, they draw an automatic circular relationship between the links and feedback mechanisms (especially the networks) and the departure of the individuals and a surge in emigration (de Haas 2010a). In other words, there is a need to account for mechanisms that explain a process of inception by the pioneer migrants that leads to a perpetuation of migration and the establishment of networks and migration systems (ibid.)

Additional shortcomings for arriving at the unified migration theoretical framework include the greater focus on the receiving countries and mechanisms of ‘pulling’ and integration (Castles 2010). Furthermore, the ‘dis-embeddedness’ of the migration theory from broader social theory fails to account for all the parts of migratory process (ibid.) and to explain the immobility. Lastly, there is a lack of attention given to the intersection of migration processes and social change at various levels (Castles 2010).

The above critique was lately addressed in theorising and conceptualising the migratory process in four ways. It is employing ‘mid-range’ social transformations and development theories embedded in the interdisciplinary social sciences and wider social theory (Castles 2010; de Haas 2010b) and draws on institutional approaches (Friberg 2016; Kurekova 2011). There has been an increasing interest in analytical frameworks explaining the migration process (Carling and Schewel 2018; van Hear et al. 2018) and the consideration of critical realist meta-theory (Bakewell et al. 2011; Iosifides 2011; Saar 2017; Tshabalala 2017; Vathi 2011). The old theorisations of migration that focus only on the inception of the migration process appear to be ill-fitted for the current versatile and complex nature of the ‘new’ migration. Therefore, the

72. Developing the social transformation approach to migration, Castles (2010) is drawing on the work of Karl Polanyi (2001 [1957]). As presented in the second chapter of this thesis, Polanyi notes that ‘dis-embedding’ the economy from the society has caused the ‘great transformation’. Castles (2010) is pointing out that our understanding of migration process is ‘dis-embedded’ from the understanding of the societal processes, which leads to the migration theory also being ‘dis-embedded’ from the broader social theory.
more dynamic mezzo level and mid-range transformational approaches relating migration and social change need to be further developed, which this thesis attempts to do.

Conclusion

The presentation of various definitions of migration and labour migration as well as the theoretical discussion about the ‘new’ migration, focusing on various conceptualisations, demonstrate that the concepts of migration and labour migration are dominating the debate of the East-West migration, but are interchangeably used with mobility. I have already discussed in the introduction that I refer to emigration and emigrants when the sending country’s perspective is more visible, and immigration and immigrants when the focus shifts to the receiving country. When considering a migrants’ perspective and decision-making, the sending and receiving countries inevitably are connected. Here, broader terms of migration and migrants are employed. Moreover, within the context of the EU, I address both intra-EU mobility and intra-EU migration. Lastly, I focus on labour migration, which also encompasses the East-West migration before the EU enlargement towards the NMS. I use the broadest terms of labour migration and migrant workers, in part following the definition of the ILO (presented above), which focuses on a person’s current engagement in the labour market in a broad sense (employed and employment seekers and various types of employment and occupation) despite the reasons and motivations for entering a host country. This term applies also to the intra-EU migration. The main difference of my focus is that individuals, who currently are not employed, should be not only willing to get employment (or return to it, i.e. in cases of parental leave), but also need to have a previous employment experience in a host country (in the context of this thesis, in Sweden).

The literature review identified several gaps in the studies of East-West ‘new’ (labour) migration. First, there is a lack of focus on diverse or hybrid types of migrants, encompassing a variety of motivations, skills, and occupations, especially addressed in the same study. Also, these types are not static because motivations, skills, and occupations change during migratory process. Second, there is a predominant focus on the receiving countries in the OMS, especially the UK and, to a lesser degree, Ireland, and on Polish migrants. The research for the Swedish context is addressed, but still lacking. Third, there is a need for more studies on diverse migration patterns (both temporary and settlement), and also a better understanding of what shapes this migration, namely, the mobility and immobility patterns. Fourth, there is a large and growing debate
on the effects of the migration from the NMS into the receiving OMS and their response to it, especially after Brexit. But the impacts of mass emigration for the sending NMS and their policy responses are addressed to a much lesser extent.

The three articles address these research gaps by focusing on labour migration from Lithuania to Sweden. They consider this migration in a longer time-frame that spans from independence in the 1990s to the EU enlargement and the economic crisis with austerity and its aftermath. Taking into consideration the sending country’s perspective and migrants’ perspective, they address the decision-making, the questions of why and how Lithuanians left, and how they chose a country of destination. Article III focuses on the effects of the mass labour emigration for Lithuania (and the Baltics) and its policy response to it.

Lastly, the majority of the studies of Lithuanian (but also Baltic and broader CEE) migration focus on the inception of the migration processes and apply a classical ‘push and pull’ model. Another important body of literature employs institutional, historical, and structural approaches, but very few studies consider a transformational approach. There are some applications of transnational theory and migrants’ networks theory as well as combinations of theoretical approaches and concepts. Yet overall, there is a lack of studies on the perpetuation of migration or accounting for the relationship between migration and social transformations.

Thus, the coming section will focus on the mid-range theories, particularly, Hirschman’s exit, voice and loyalty framework, which offers an appropriate, heuristic, point of departure to investigate the Lithuanian migrant workers’ decisions, experiences, migration patterns, and the reaction of the state to this migration.
4. Methodological approach, theoretical-analytical model, and research design

This chapter discusses methodological and theoretical-analytical considerations that were not possible to fit into the articles. In addition, it could be seen as an expanded meta-reflection based on the articles. This chapter is divided in several sections. It starts with a note on critical realism and an iterative process of abstraction in building a theoretical-analytical model. It is inspired by a modified version of Grounded Theory (Bakewell 2010; Vathi 2011), which critical realists draw upon. Here the process of theory formation considers both the theorisation from the results of empirical data analysis as well as comparing it constantly with other existing theorisations and conceptualisations of migration.

The following section lays out the main components to look for in theories and empirical theorisation as they are described in the critical realist meta-theoretical framework of ASID. Accounting for relationships between these components, I introduce the meta-theoretical concept of morphogenesis, which depicts the dynamics of interplay among these social entities that drive the social transformation (Archer 1995). Drawing on Bakewell (2010; 2014), Iosifides (2017) and Hedberg (2004), I identify how these components are used in the migration research. The chapter presents Hirschman’s model as an example of a critical realist analytical framework. Consequently, I ‘re-read’ Hirschman’s analytical framework on exit, voice and loyalty with ASID dynamics in mind and consider other migration theorizing as an intrinsic part of the societies and social change (Castles et al. 2014). I undertake to bring together the four already mentioned ways to respond to a call for new theorisations of a ‘new’ migration. Those are the ‘mid-range’ theories ‘embedded’ in broader social theory (Castles 2010); institutional approaches; theoretical-analytical frameworks; and the critical realist approach. Accordingly, I re-conceptualise migration as an exit and further extend it (in the already described process of abstraction) so that it is more refined for explaining labour emigration from Lithuania to Sweden. Lastly, I present the research design and methods.

Critical realism: abstraction in a process of model construction

Critical realism developed from Roy Bhaskar’s (1997 [1975]) philosophy of science as a response to both the post-positivist and post-modern constructionist

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73. It implies that a social reality ‘exists’ and is stratified to the real (in which mechanisms operate and make events happen); the actual (in which events happen); and the empirical (which is observable and can be experienced). Despite the ‘existence’ of a social reality, our knowledge about it is constructed; therefore, it is contingent and fallible (Iosifides 2017).
approaches (Iosifides 2017). Some of the core ideas in critical realism are those on causality. The theory rejects the post-positivist Humean type of causality, in which the same cause would lead to the same effect, but it also criticizes post-modern approaches which give up causality totally (ibid.). Instead, it ascribes causal power not only to structure, but also to agency, and thus, to individuals as well. Individual action becomes one of the elements constituting the social reality. Consequently, in critical realist approach, statistical data is only one of the ways to know about reality and, therefore, the patterns observed in the statistics indicate demi-regularities. Instead of revealing the direct cause and effect relationship between immigration and criminality, demi-regularities signal about patterns that might lead to causal mechanisms behind them (Iosifides 2017). Those mechanisms emerge from the interplay between the structures and the social agents and have a causal power that can potentially shape further action. With this thesis, I am aiming to address the emerging causal mechanisms behind the mass emigration from Lithuania.

In the process of identifying these causal mechanisms, the concepts of ‘migration’ and ‘migrant’ are being defined and redefined (Bakewell 2010). This is done not only inductively with the particular empirical research, but also deductively. In other words, I rely on a modified version of Grounded Theory (Bakewell 2010), which Vathi (2011) addresses as a Grounded Theory approach. It departs from the strictly inductive classical Grounded Theory developed by Glasser and Strauss (1967) and is based on the iteration between theory-building from the empirical material and the pre-existing concepts and theories (Vathi 2011).

Thus, in conceptualising and re-conceptualising ‘migration’ and ‘migrant’, I was constantly asking, what do these definitions, concepts, and theories hold as real? What is needed for migration and migrants to exist? Focusing on a migrant’s perspective, I also asked what my informants said they experienced as causal in their migration decisions.74 As a part of this iterative process of abstraction, I used the inference of abduction, which implies moving between the theoretical understandings of migration and the results of my empirical data in order to reach and define the causal mechanisms and their dynamics.

Finally, inspired by the critical realist epistemology, I note that all knowledge is constructed through scientific knowledge production. This thesis constructs knowledge, a certain discourse that is aiming to contribute to the academic debate.

74. The above questions also define retroduction.
The morphogenesis and theoretical ‘building blocks’: agency, structure, institutions and discourse (ASID)

The already discussed critical realist way of theory formation through iterative abstraction, which relies on a modified version of Grounded Theory, can be further detailed by employing the methodological guidance that defines what to look for in various theories; in the words of Bakewell (2010), these are the ‘building blocks’ of theory construction. Here, the ASID heuristic framework is a helpful tool to use (Moulaert et al. 2016). First, it is based on a critical realist view. Second, it is constructed for analysing socioeconomic development in capitalist societies, which Lithuania developed into (for more details, see the contextualizing chapter), through time and space. Third, it directly speaks to the re-conceptualisations of migration as a part of a broader social transformation and development, the employment of mid-range theories, institutional approaches, and theoretical-analytical frameworks (see the section on the theorisation of migration).

Thus, in order to analyse socioeconomic development,

one must refer to the actions that steer or interfere with the development processes, the structures that both constrain and enable action, the institutions that guide or hamper action and mediate the relation between structures and action, and the discourses and discursive practices that are part of these interactions (Moulaert et al. 2016: 2; emphasis in original).

These ‘building blocks’ have already been introduced in a critical realist migration research (Bakewell 2010; 2014; Iosifides 2017). Agency was defined as the formation of ‘individual and household strategies; policies of governments, private businesses, and civil society organizations’ (Bakewell 2014: 310); ‘migration industry, transnational identities, migrant niche businesses, labour recruitment strategies’ (ibid.: 311). Finally, migrants themselves are denoted as ‘social actors’ (Bakewell 2010).

Structure in critical realist migration studies is defined more vaguely than agency (Bakewell 2010), but Iosifides (2017: 136) gives such examples as ‘structural emergent properties’: ‘labour market structures with special emphasis on divisions along ‘ethnic’, gender and age lines, global, regional, national and subnational economic structures including patterns of relations among different sectors and spatial units’, or the ‘systemic socio-spatial inequalities at different spatial levels.’

In critical realist migration studies, institutions are least clearly defined and often seem to be addressed more implicitly (Bakewell 2010; Hedberg 2004; Iosifides 2017). For instance, Bakewell (2014: 310) presents a broad definition of institutions ‘in the sense of discourses and associated practices (e.g. “culture of
migration”, smuggling, inequality). He also defines them as ‘income distribution, marriage practices, labour market structure, migrant networks, segregated labour market, asymmetric assimilation, migrants’ community organizations’ (ibid.: 311).

The last note in the ASID model looks at the time and space or scale. In order to account for the relations among agency, structure, institutions, and discourse, it is necessary to acknowledge that ‘space-time dynamics’ is inherent (Moulaert et al. 2016). These dynamics is also crucial when looking at the social change stemming from these dynamics. Here, a morphogenetic cycle consisting of three stages in time and space or scale should be introduced, encompassing ‘structural conditioning’, ‘social interaction’, and ‘structural elaboration’ (Archer 1995: 89-92; King 2012). The ‘structural conditioning’ denotes systemic and structural features which have emerged from the previous actions. ‘Social interaction’ defines the current social actions and interactions that are ‘constrained’ and ‘facilitated’ by the structural conditions. The outcome of these social actions and interactions is either maintaining the current structure or concluding in ‘structural elaboration’. The latter in the thesis is addressed as social transformation. According to Bakewell (2010), one of the main implications of the morphogenesis approach for migration studies is the ability to explain how migration at one point in time affects further migration. Bakewell (2010: 1703) has adapted this cycle for migration studies, describing the structural condition (structural forces shaping emigration and immigration), social interaction (of those who migrate), and structural elaboration (evolution of networks and migration systems). The puzzle for research is to unpack that cycle to understand both its elements and the causal mechanisms that drive it.

Both the ASID and morphogenetic approaches were instructive for understanding the transformational approach to migration, their elements, and their relationships in Hirschman’s model of exit, voice, and loyalty. This understanding made it possible to extend the theoretical scope of Hirschman’s model and to account for the interplay between agency, structure, institutions, and discourse in the empirical material. The further section presents a theoretical-analytical model that aims to define the elements and causal mechanisms of this morphogenetic social change in migration studies.
Hirschman’s theoretical-analytical model: exit, voice, and loyalty

Hirschman’s model is based on the classical economic ideas of supply and demand that he attempted to connect to research in the political domain. Hirschman applies his approach to the whole spectrum of social organizations: firms, parties, families, and states. The point of departure for the model is the assumption of a negative change – the perceived decline of the quality of the product, service, or membership. The decline in quality includes a wide range of meanings, from a lowering quality of a product or a service, to a disagreement of a member over certain policies or acts of the organization. This phenomenon induces three types of possible and, at first sight very contrasting, responses – exit, voice, and loyalty. Before going to the definitions of the mentioned concepts, it is very important to state that Hirschman’s (1970) original idea in his book, ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States’, derived from the point of view of free or relatively costless exit as it was coming from the environment of the firms in the free competitive market and primarily liberal democratic organizations.75 Later on, he developed the concepts and their application for two other occasions. First, the paper given in the symposium in Uppsala in 1977, where he presented the framework of Exit and Voice in the context of the state (Adelman 2013); second, his famous article about situation in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the events preceding and following the fall of the Berlin Wall (Hirschman 1993). I use these publications, as well as critical reformulations and applications of Hirschman’s framework developed by other authors, including the research done in the context of the NMS and the Baltic states.

Exit. Hirschman begins with noticing that, in the economic research discourse about the situation in which the quality of goods or services is declining, the studies would predominantly turn to analysing the mechanism of the exit of the consumers as a main possible response. He defines exit as implying an ‘either-or decision’ (Hirschman 1970). ‘Exit is the act of simply leaving, generally because a better good or service or benefit is believed to be provided by another firm or organization. Indirectly and unintentionally exit can cause the deteriorating organization to improve its performance’ (Hirschman 1993: 176). Thus, an exiting individual perceives the decline and is not interested

75. His book ‘Exit, Voice, and Loyalty’ has some examples from outside of the free market and liberal democratic contexts (railroads in Nigeria and voting rights in Mexico), though the main references and ideas are coming from traditionally Western authors or institutions in the US and Europe. The example of the political party system is based on the case of the US, though cases from Japan and Mexico are also mentioned.
in the improvement of the organization; recuperation is simply a side effect. In other words, individualized ‘homo economicus’ aims to maximize one’s benefits through competition in the free market. And indeed, it is stated so even when Hirschman further on conceptualises exit as emigration: ‘to leave for a more satisfactory country – is essentially a private and also typically a silent decision and activity. One can do it alone: there is no need to talk it over with anyone’ (Hirschman 1993: 194). Even though the decision itself is presented as individualized, there is also some space for the relationship to and impact of a group. ‘Nobody can exit for you, however: the fact that others exit may influence one’s decision to do likewise, but it can never substitute for that decision’ (ibid.: 194).

The ideas Hirschman is presenting about the concept of exit mainly lie in the functionalist migration theories and other theories that are very much influenced by the discipline of economy. And it is no surprise, since to Hirschman exit is exactly that – the main reaction considered by economists in the case of a decline in the quality of goods, services, or membership in organizations. The political scientists, in contrast, would opt for the voice.

Voice. Hirschman (1970: 30-31) points out that the voice is a ‘basic portion and function of any political system’ that was long studied in the political sciences. Thus, the main discourse in this domain – under the same condition of quality decline in the organization – was an analysis of the function of voice and its substitutions of ‘acquiescence or indifference (rather than exit)’ (Hirschman 1970: 30-31). The concept of voice is defined far more vaguely than exit, initially even called ‘an art constantly evolving in new directions’ (Hirschman, 1970: 43; italics in original). And later on, it was conceptualised as ‘the act of complaining or of organizing to complain or to protest, with an intent to achieving directly a recuperation of quality that has been impaired’ (Hirschman 1993: 176). In contrast to the definition of exit, voice is actually an action that is consciously aiming to make a change or a perceived improvement. Whilst exit might be more of a side effect on the recuperation mechanism of the organization in question. Loyalty is a different kind of concept than exit and voice. It can be less visible and more difficult to grasp, because it is a feeling, a ‘special attachment to an organization’, rather than a clear action like exit and voice (Hirschman 1970: 77).

Loyalty has a very specific function in the exit-voice relationship: it ‘holds exit at bay and activates voice’ (Hirschman 1970: 78). Loyalty can, to some extent, also postpone voice: an ‘individual member can remain loyal without being influential himself, but hardly without the expectation that someone will act
or something will happen to improve matters’ (ibid.; italics in original). Thus, an individual can be loyal (and stay in the organization), if one sees the possibility for using one’s power and influencing the situation from the inside, or one believes that the organization will recuperate because it has been influenced by the power of others (or their representatives). ‘Loyalty or specific institutional barriers to exit are therefore particularly functional whenever the effective use of voice requires a great deal of social inventiveness while exit is an available, yet not wholly effective, option’ (Hirschman 1970: 80). According to Hirschman, loyalty is especially beneficial when the alternative organizations are very similar; therefore, even the smallest fluctuations in quality can affect the exit positively. He describes it as a paradox: ‘loyalty is at its most functional when it looks most irrational, when loyalty means strong attachment to an organization that does not seem to warrant such attachment because it is so much like another one that is so available’ (Hirschman 1970: 81).

Structures and institutional design. Hirschman brings in greater context, or as he puts it:

While structural constraints (availability of close substitutes, number of buyers, durability and standardization of the article, and so forth) are of undoubted importance in determining the balance of exit and voice for individual commodities, the propensity to resort to the voice option depends also on general readiness of a population to complain and on the invention of such institutions and mechanisms as can communicate complaints cheaply and effectively (Hirschman, 1970: 43, italics in original).

There are two important statements in this quotation. First, the choice of voice over exit depends on how accessible the channels for voice are in the organization. Thus, ‘(1) the detail of institutional design can be of considerable importance for the balance of exit and voice’ and ‘(2) this balance, in turn, can help account for the varying extent of internal democracy in organizations’ (Hirschman 1970: 86). By mentioning the importance of the institutional design, Hirschman draws our attention to the relationship between exit and voice within a particular organization. Second, the earlier quotation also offers insights into the borders of a single organization. For instance, if we consider a particular firm to be the institutional design of the country, the ‘readiness of a population’ in that country to complain and the structural constraints formed by the market and other firms impact the choice between exit and voice. In other words, the available possibilities and facilitations for one option could act as constraints for another.
**Response by organization.** Thus, exit impacts organization by indirectly signalling about the decline and voice is a direct communication intentionally aiming to change the situation. Hirschman (1970) states that authorities are in general redundant to make a change and points out that voice (as well as exit) can be overdone: the organization simply might not be able to deal with all the complaints, if there are too many. In order to define the situation in which the organization does react (there is a sufficient amount of exits and voices providing information about deteriorations) and is still able to recuperate, he introduces the two ideal types of customers or members: alert and inert. The former ones are more sensitive to quality deterioration and informing the organization about it (exiting is also treated as an indirect way of informing). Meanwhile, the latter ones would stay in the organization without voicing and in this way providing the management or authorities with the time needed to recuperate. Therefore, loyalty indirectly gives the opportunity and time needed for the management or authority to mend the situation. It also preserves ‘deterioration from becoming cumulative, as it so often does when there is no barrier to exit’ (Hirschman 1970: 79).

Drawing on the above presented epistemological considerations, theorisations of new migration and social transformation in the age of globalization (Castles 2010), and previous research on East-West migration within the EU, I attempt to make a further extension and refinement of Hirschman’s model in the following section.

**Towards a refinement of Hirschman’s model**

The previous contributions that wanted to bring back Hirschman’s model were ‘revising’ (Hoffmann 2010), ‘reformulating’ (Hirschman 1993) and ‘extending’ (Moses 2011) it. In this thesis, I focus primarily on exit. Inspired by a critical realist approach, I begin with asking a retroductive question: what needs to exist for exit to be observable? Hirschman analyses exit in a social context and stresses the importance of institutional design and structural constrains for the choice between exiting or staying (see the previous section’s description of the model). The staying he basically defines with his two other concepts of voice and loyalty. Consequently, Hirschman’s model is addressing the previous calls to ‘re-embed’ an analysis of migration within the wider understanding of the societies and social transformations (Castles 2010: 1565) by accounting for mobility and immobility (Carling and Schewel 2018; Schapendonk and Steel 2014). Thus, his model does not start with the movement – the exit – but with the choice to stay, since it mainly considers the processes in the societies of origin.
Accordingly, Hoffmann (2010) identifies two shortcomings of Hirschman’s framework. Firstly, methodological nationalism, since Hirschman uses the concepts of ‘state’ and ‘nation’ interchangeably. Secondly, a certain blindness to transnationalism, since Hirschman does not focus on the relations between states and does not consider the transnational constellations of organizations and networks. Although the latter criticism stands, Hirschman (1993) does account for the actions of the surrounding countries in his article analysing the situation in the German Democratic Republic (e.g. in Hungary and West Germany) in shaping the East Germans’ possibilities to exit. In other words, he acknowledges that exit depends on entrance.76 The debates and shortcomings of methodological nationalism were addressed in the migration studies by the ‘turn to transnationalism’ in the 1990s (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; Iosifides 2017) and Hirschman’s original model is from the 1970s. Thus, I suggest that re-conceptualising his model in the light of the latest migration theorisations on social change and the ASID framework would make it into a useful analytical tool for accounting for the role of global structures and institutions in analysing contemporary East-West migration.

Consequently, another important turn that re-conceptualises migration is the mobilities approach (Massey 2005; Urry 2007).77 It attempts to overcome the transnational ‘bipolar’ connectivity to only two places by conceptualising mobility as relational to immobility in more than two places (Schapendonk and Steel 2014). In this way, the Hirschmanian understanding of immobility78 as voice in and a loyal attachment mainly to one state turns into transnational connections to more than two places. A critical view of the mobility approach goes one step further and claims that these connections should not be taken for granted as the transnationalism approach has often done by ‘sampling on the dependent variable’ (Faist 2012: 64).79 Instead, the following should be established and analysed:

1. the ways im/mobilities are produced in transnational processes, (2) the ways mobilities come with power differences in terms of access and speed,

76. Hirschman (1970) is talking about ‘entry’ when he describes barriers to the exit and entry of various organizations. He also mentions ‘re-entry’ as a return to the organization. In the case of the state, he uses examples of Latin American political leaders returning from exile. But he does not focus on an exit from one country and an entry to another in terms of accounting for the role of transnational organizations and migrant networks. I use the concept of ‘entrance’, which is reinterpreted by the migration and mobility enabled by the EU framework.

77. I focus on a more critical approach to mobilities that problematizes agency-structure relation and is currently more commonly used in refugee studies.

78. I refer to it as ‘staying’ and other authors denote it as ‘stasis’ (Schapendonk and Steel 2014).

79. Meaning that studies were often analysing the practices of those migrants, who did have transnational connections.
and (3) how these power differences are reflected in mobility experiences and mobility relations (Schapendonk and Steel 2014: 264).

Having this in mind, we need to describe a context in which these mobilities and immobilities are produced, encompassing a stay-exit-entrance process. In the words of the morphogenetic approach, I will start with structural condition.

**Context: structures and institutional design in time and space**

As mentioned in the presentation of Hirschman’s model above, the probability for voice or exit to occur is framed by the structural setting and the institutional design in the country. In case of the states, the structural constraints can be understood as the availability of a ‘more satisfactory country’ (Hirschman 1993: 194), while the institutional design in the state frames the balance between exit and voice. Looking back at the ASID model, context is defined here as encompassing structures and institutions in time and space or scale. Structures constrain and facilitate the action and institutions shape and impede action by mediating between structures and agency (Moulaert et al. 2016). In migration studies, these are often defined as opportunity structures or opportunities and constraints. Thus, context is a historical context, which enables us to see migration in a certain time and space, and captures the legacies of the past. It goes in line with the social transformation approach discussed by Castles (2010), in which he notes that context is also larger than a state; it is a transnational context, in which social transformations at the global structural or institutional level affect the international, national, and local structures and institutions. Migration is an ‘intrinsic part’ of global social transformations; therefore, it is affected by and, in its turn, influences these transformations (Castles et al. 2014). This relationship is understood here through the causal mechanisms emerging from the interaction between structural and agential powers in a morphogenetic cycle (Bakewell 2010). But to return to the first step of the morphogenetic cycle, the structural condition, the context is forming certain conditions that are framing migration decisions by limiting and expanding a certain set of possibilities.

As was described above and also in Article II, the first and most important condition for Hirschman (1970) was that the exit-voice-loyalty would be activated by the perceived decline of quality. In the domain of the state, it is a quality of membership that Moses (2005) further defines as a quality of citizenship. In other words, quality encompasses the question of the reasons for labour

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80. This goes in line with Bakewell (2010: 1697), where he points out that in the critical realist approach, the action is ‘structurally conditioned’, but not ‘determined’.

81. I understand the ‘state’ to be a set of institutions and a social actor.
migration of why people stay, exit, or enter. These issues have been explored in Articles I and II.

Hirschman (1970) accounts for a variety of organizations, but when referring to the migration domain, he focuses on the sending country. He describes this sort of organization as ‘traditional’, where ‘one fully “belongs” by birthright’ and ‘the price of entry is zero’ (ibid.: 97). Instead, there are high barriers to exit. Hirschman (1970) notes that there can be many ways of putting institutional barriers on exit, but in the case of a free exit, he defines two mechanisms as the outcomes of the institutional design: voice and loyalty. The more complicated the exit is, the more common it should be to use voice and stay.

Thus, stay-exit-entrance is framed by contextual constraints and facilitations and is shaped and impeded by them. It is important to take into consideration not only the question of reasons for migration (why), but also that they go hand-in-hand with the question of how the migration is taking place (these are the main questions considered in Article I). In this sense, they addressing not just the root causes, but also the barriers and facilitations of migration. In other words, how people become mobile and immobile and who can be a migrant.

As an outcome of the context framing migration decisions, the quality of citizenship, barriers, and facilitations have a discursive dimension. Discourse here is inspired by and according to ASID and Fairclough’s (1992) critical discourse theory. ‘Fairclough understands social structure as social relations both in society as a whole and in specific institutions, and as consisting of both discursive and non-discursive elements’ (Phillips and Winther-Jorgensen 2002: 65). Thus, discourse is a part of social practice and a ‘meaningful behaviour’ (see ASID) that reflects, constitutes, and is constituted by the social practices of various actors and social structures, mediated by institutions. It contributes to the construction of social norms and social identities (Fairclough 1992). In the case of Lithuanians working in Sweden, Article I demonstrates how the discursive and social practices of various actors were framing decisions for exit-entrance and, in this way, constituting who could be a migrant. These selective discursive practices were connected with the self-selection of potential migrants; the interview analysis presents their social practices of decision-making, which constituted who is a migrant.

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82. As pointed out above by Hoffman (2010), Hirschman uses ‘nation’ and ‘state’ interchangeably.
83. Hirschman (1970; 1993) mentions very few examples of these institutional barriers. In the context of migration, he talks about legal ones, i.e. closing the borders.
84. Hirschman (1970) mostly talks about the ‘costs’ of exit and entry, but also uses ‘barriers’, ‘price’, ‘penalty’ and ‘sanction’. I use the term ‘barriers’.
**Stay-Exit-Entrance: decision-making and trajectories of migration**

To recall the previous characterizations of current migration as ‘new’ (King 2012; van Hear 2010) – which, among other things, means exhibiting circular and transitional patterns – Hirschman’s model (even in its adaptations, see Adelman 2013; Hirschman 1993) mainly considers only the so-called ‘traditional settler migration’, when a person leaves from one state and settles in another. Thus, in order to account for various kinds of mobilities, it is important to divide the migration process into three elements: stay, exit, and entrance.

Even though this thesis is focusing on exit, people are exiting not only to go somewhere but also leaving from some place. Therefore, the important concept here is stay. As was described above, the concept relates to the conditions of citizenship for individuals, the Hirschmanian quality, and accounts for the barriers to and facilitations of migration. Therefore, the concept of stay is a constituent of explaining the choice to exit and addresses the question of why people move. There is a certain benefit to the ‘two-step’ analytical approaches (Carling and Schewel 2018). The analytical separation between the stay and exit allows us to take into consideration the distinction between the potential and actual migration and to talk about decision-making process.

The exiting individuals here should be defined as both subjects and agents. Along with the barriers and facilitations for migration, Hirschman (1993: 194) emphasises the role of the agent in deciding to move: ‘Nobody can exit for you, however: the fact that others exit may influence one’s decision to do likewise, but it can never substitute for that decision.’ Thus, it is an individual, who ‘self-selects’ in this way that determines who is a migrant. The first assumption in Hirschman’s (1970) model for exit, voice, and loyalty is the perceived decline of quality. Hirschman (1970) does not define perception as he does with exit, voice, and loyalty, but his concept of perception is not about a passive observation, but the potential action and also causality. While discussing migration aspirations, Carling and Schewel (2018) point out that aspirations can be possibly conceptualised in three intersecting ways that are very much in line with Hirschman’s (1970; 1993) usage of perception. First, as a comparison between places and the meanings attached to these places. This is what Hirschman (1993) primarily implies when he says that exit means leaving for a ‘better country’. Second, which is also a second and broader meaning of Hirschman’s exit-

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85. As defined above in a critical realist way, it is also depicted in the morphogenetic cycle. Thus, in the same vein as Iosifides (2017: 132) refers to interpretations, here perceptions ‘stem from certain human powers such as intentionality and reflexivity and can bring change in the world; in other words, they are causally efficacious.’
voice-loyalty, is to see this triad as a “migration project”, a socially constructed entity that embodies particular expectations’ (Carling and Schewel 2018: 953). Third, and what is missing from Hirschman’s model, is to see emigration’s intrinsic value, in which emigration becomes about a personhood and identity, about ‘who you are’ (ibid.: 954). Here emigration is a new experience, a self-development strategy, a life-style (Saar 2017), even a ‘rite of passage’ (Carling and Schewel 2018).

Lastly, migration is a complex phenomenon, where the initial ideas and decision-making in the beginning of migration or during its planning stages are modified throughout the process (Castles et al. 2014). It is due to the ‘double embeddedness’ of migration in society and in a life’s course (King 2012). Thus, migration can be a life-long process that affects future generations (Castles et al. 2014).

Returning to exit, in Hirschmanian understanding, it means leaving for another country that provides a better quality. Thus, exiting in the case of emigration also means entering. It is about a shift of a physical place. That shift can include crossing a border that marks the territory of one state and entering another state, it can be within a state, or in various combinations of the two, in this way closing ‘the gap’ in differentiating between international and internal migration (King and Skeldon 2012) and encompassing a journey in transit migrations (Erdal and Oeppen 2018; Schapendonk and Steel 2014). In the Lithuanian-Swedish migration, I refer to entering another state.

There can be a few possible trajectories of mobilities presented here. The first type, ‘traditional settler migration’, is already mentioned, in which an individual leaves one country and settles in another. The second is when an individual migrates to one country, stays there for a certain period of time, and then emigrates again (re-exits) back to the country of origin, i.e. return migration. The third type of migration describes the case when an individual is moving to one country and after staying there for a certain period, he or she re-exits again and returns to the country of origin, and then moves again to the

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86. For instance, in the case of war-torn zones, where the states are being destructed or formed, one can end up in a territory that ‘belongs’ to none of the states or is ‘claimed’ by a few states. Alternatively, some territories can be state-like but, for instance, not widely recognized as independent states, which used to be the case for Lithuania (and other CEE countries) before it was fully recognized as an independent state.

87. After entering and staying, individuals can re-exit. For the purpose of this study about Lithuanian migration to Sweden, I refer to the international migration, which in turn, brings more focus to states rather than regions or communities. The regional scale is addressed throughout the thesis, especially in the context of unequal socioeconomic development in Lithuania. I also consider transit migrations as defined below.
same host country. This movement is often called ‘circular’, e.g. people going for a seasonal work or who are constantly commuting to another country to work, as in the cases of the people living close to the border of a state (e.g. Estonian migration to Finland, described in Article III). The fourth is emigration that has the most ‘liquid’ characteristics (Engbersen and Snel 2013), when individuals leave the country of origin, then stay in one host country for a certain period of time, and later re-exit to another host country. In between, the individual can return to the country of origin, but for a very short period of time, or can directly move to another country (often called ‘transit’ migration). Finally, all the above types can be combined throughout the individual life-course. The number of different countries is not limited. The presented model gives the possibility of starting at any point in the stay-exit-entrance triangle and it can turn many times at different speeds (Schapendonk and Steel 2014). This thesis focuses on the stay-exit-entrance relationship, especially in empirical terms. The entrance-stay relationship is included episodically and could be developed in future research.

During the process of stay-exit-entrance, a variety of social interactions (the second part of the morphogenetic cycle) of those who migrate and do not migrate are taking place. When a person uses the channel of voice, his or her purpose is to affect the organization, to seek for a change. Thus, the usage of voice actually depends on the perception that the quality can be influenced by an individual or by others in the same group. When a person is exiting, it can mean either a substitute for voice with a deliberate signalling and aiming for the change (‘voting with one’s feet’) or leaving without that aim. Thus, from the individual perspective, the reaction of an organization appears more like as a ‘side effect’. But by employing an understanding of migration as an ‘intrinsic part’ of social change, exit makes an impact on the context. In the understanding of the morphogenetic cycle, exit, as a social interaction among the ones who migrate and do not migrate, leads to structural elaboration – a change in the context that frames the future stay-exit-entrance. Hirschman considers this step in addressing the response of the organization.

The impact on and response by the organization: cumulative causation and internal dynamics of migration

In order to adjust Hirschman’s framework from analyzing a ‘container society’ (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002) to accounting for various mobilities in time and space, we need to introduce a concept of the internal dynamics of migration. It was developed by de Haas (2010b) in order to address
the shortcomings of the cumulative causation thesis and the theorization of networks as presupposing an automatic relationship between pioneer migration, the formation of networks, and the development of full range migration systems. In other words, seeing migration as going ‘ad infinitum’ and ignoring the empirical cases of declining migration directly after its inception or after a period of perpetuation. He differentiates between endogenous (first-order) and contextual (second order) feedback mechanisms. The first group encompasses the direct effects on social (migrants’ networks and migration industry), economic (remittance-financed migration) and cultural (transfers of migration-related ideas and information) domains (de Haas 2010a: 1592). The second group ‘operate[s] through the impact of migration on the sending and receiving contexts, changing the initial conditions under which migration took place’ (ibid.: 1588). In other words, he addresses structural elaboration as presented above.

Structural elaboration is also visible de Haas’ (2010a) theorisation of the inception, perpetuation, and decline of migration and Bakewell’s (2014) re-conceptualisation of migration systems. In the attempt to predict the migratory process, de Haas (2010a) describes five stages of migration: (1) the pioneer migration of early movers; (2) the herd effect of early adopters, when emigration is small and takes place via ‘close ties’ in limited parts of society; (3) the take-off migration as a result of the network effect and contextual feedback mechanisms; (4) the selective formation of the migration systems that denotes migration of the late majority; and (5) the stagnation and migration systems decline, which is expressed as ‘laggard emigration’. De Haas (2010a) points out that the only effect of internal migration dynamics, which leads to a decline instead of a diversification of the migration systems, is that of the impact of contextual feedback mechanisms in considerably reducing ‘opportunity gaps’ between countries of origin and destination. Thus, he points to the conditions for staying. Alternatively, a diaspora model can develop, in which transnational relations are sustained and transnational identities are developed to keep close connections to the country of origin and facilitate emigration for long periods of time. These stages are crucial to understanding how the perpetuation of migration comes to being.

Hirschman (1970) is mainly accounting for the exogenous mechanisms and describes feedback mechanisms as communication between an individual and the state when quality declines. Firstly, voice as intended communication

88. See also the structural elaboration of the morphogenetic cycle, presented above.
89. Where instead of decreasing the exits, other countries of entrance are chosen.
and secondly, exit, when communication is more like a ‘side effect’. He uses a cumulative causation theory to describe the effect of the emigration on the quality in a particular state as going on ‘ad infinitum’, when more exits lead to declining quality, which in turn leads to more exits, to the point where governments would ‘risk to rule over empty states’ (Moses 2011: 68). In other words, the state can manage exits only via the policies that increase quality. Moses (2016) builds on this understanding and suggests using emigration statistical data to signal the dysfunctional states in Europe. Those ‘failing states’ according to him are Romania, Lithuania, Ireland, Croatia, and Latvia. This ‘dysfunction’ also implies the failure of the policy makers to restore the declining quality. Article III engages with emigration management questions in the context of a free exit, and considers the response of the state via migration policy and the alternatives to it.

This analytical model and conceptual discussion have been instructive in structuring and presenting the research results of this doctoral project and its three articles. The centre point of this thesis is about exit. Therefore, the empirical data is organized not around the Hirschman’s proposed exit-voice-loyalty, but instead, the focus lies in his main assumptions regarding exit. Article I extends the concept of exit by arguing for the importance to see it in relation to entrance and analyses why and how individuals exit Lithuania and enter Sweden and its labour market. Article II takes Hirschman’s assumption that exit is a response to a perceived decline in quality and looks at the reasons for emigration during the period of crisis with austerity as an example of the ‘objective’ decline. Article III addresses the organization’s (re)action to exit by taking into consideration the migration policy response. I will now present the research design and methods before continuing to the summaries of the results presented in the articles.

**Research design and methods**

The thesis employs the mixed methods approach (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011). Namely, it uses a variety of data sources and ways of collecting and analysing the data. It indicates the utilization and secondary analysis of the quantitative data within the qualitative design. Thus, it has a qualitative priority and puts a greater emphasis on the data from the interviews, whilst the quantitative data is descriptive and plays a secondary role (see above on demi-regularities).

Inspired by a critical realist stance, this thesis seeks to identify the causal mechanisms behind the mass emigration from Lithuania by retroductively asking
what needs to exist for this phenomenon to be observable. In combination with
the retroduction, another tool of inference, abduction, is used to explain why and
how the mass labour emigration came into being. These tools guide the research
design of this thesis. It emerged after extensive reading of the migration literature,
which deductively shaped my understanding about migration in a very wide
sense and guided the first approach to the research field. In addition, I used self-
reflexivity and compared the previous research with my own experience and the
experience of many of my friends who have migrated. The inductive approach
shaped the research, because I started pilot studies early in the process, which
urged me to seek for more and alternative explanations in the academic discourse
and led to adjustments to the semi-structured interview questions (see below).

Even though the presentation of Articles I, II, and III above mentions the
analysis of the interview material with Lithuanians working in Sweden, it was
not the order that the data was collected and analysed. I first started with
collecting statistical data on a variety of indicators of migration, demographics,
socioeconomics, and politics in the Baltic states. This step was followed by the
pilot study with migrant workers. I conducted interviews with experts in the
three Baltic states and started analysing. After that, I proceeded with another
pilot study and then the main collection of the interviews with Lithuanians in
Sweden took place. After analysing them, I received an opportunity to submit a
manuscript based on the interviews with the experts that later was published as
Article III. Afterwards, I returned to the analysis and the writing of two other
manuscripts that later materialised as Articles I and II.

**Measurement, sampling, and data collection**

There are two important issues to discuss, which require a researcher to make
choices in every study: *sampling* and *measurement*.

*Sampling* is based on the precondition that it is usually hard or nearly impossible
to collect data about every unit of analysis in the population; therefore, the
units are sampled (Bernard and Ryan 2010). In order to collect the qualitative
data, non-probabilistic sampling methods were used in this project, which
encompassed two qualitative data strands. The decision on the size of the sample
is one of the areas in qualitative research that brings about a lot of discussion.

According to Bernard and Ryan (2010), the sample size is sufficient when
each new respondent no longer provides any new information – saturation is

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90. In a critical realist literature, retroduction is described as way to reason about the causal
mechanisms that produce certain empirical outcomes, for instance, migration (Hedberg 2004).
reached. A theoretical sampling common for the Grounded Theory was also employed (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Various researchers indicate that ‘there is growing evidence that 20-60 knowledgeable people are enough to uncover and understand the core categories in any well-defined cultural domain or study of lived experience’ (Bernard and Ryan 2010: 41). Having in mind these recommendations, the primary goal was to collect at least 20 interviews with Lithuanians working in Sweden and 12 with experts. Considering this goal and having in mind the possibilities and the limitations of sampling listed below, 23 interviews with experts and 42 interviews with migrant workers were collected for this project. Due to specifics of both groups, non-probability sampling was used.

Types of non-probability sampling. Experts are usually visible in the media or the public sphere; they have official positions in public institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other organizations. They hold a very specific knowledge that can be related to their profession or be extra-professional, denoting knowledge that is more local and accumulated by active participants (e.g. members of NGOs and local communities) (Meuser and Nagel 2009).

Having in mind the attributions of expert knowledge laid out by Meuser and Nagel (2009), informants were selected to accommodate the aims of the study, having knowledge and working in the area of migration and labour in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Four groups of experts were identified after looking at the academic contributions; reviewing official documents and websites; looking at the statements in the media; and consulting with other researchers.

- Academics doing research and publishing in the area of migration;
- Policy experts from the policy creation and implementation level;
- NGO, international organization, or think tank representatives;
- Trade unions and employers’ organizations’ representatives.

91. Saturation is one of the key concepts used in the Grounded theory (Glasser and Strauss 1967).
92. The definition of ‘knowledgeable’ is quite complicated. There are even value scales developed to assess a person’s knowledge. The size of the sample varies according to these values. This study does not include an assessment of knowledge of the informants. The main aim of the interviews is to find out about the lived experience of a respondent and the questions are directed to the particular individual. So, the study is based on the assumption that every respondent is knowledgeable about his or her life. For the expert knowledge, I followed Meuser and Nagel’s (2009) characteristics discussed below.
93. At least one expert in each of the four groups identified below for all three Baltic states.
As opposed to experts, migrants might be more difficult to access. Some of them are temporary migrants and work in the irregular part of the labour market or under precarious conditions, as is common in the construction (Friberg 2010), domestic work (Gavanas 2010), forestry, and agriculture sectors (Swedwatch 2013). In order to find the informants, a type of network sampling or snowball sampling was used (Bernard and Ryan 2010). Snowball sampling begins with one or two informants. Later, they are asked to list the people who in some respects are similar to them (e.g. are labour migrants from Lithuania in Sweden). These individuals recommend other relevant informants, which extends the sample. In order to avoid a situation of ‘being trapped’ in one network of common acquaintances and friends, interviews with Lithuanian migrants in Sweden started from the pilot study with two respondents acquainted to me personally or via third person. They – to my knowledge – did not know each other. The third person was recommended by one of them. The process of the sampling for the main data collection could be divided into three tiers in terms of time and channels of contacting and employing informants. It started again with the personal networks; afterwards, I contacted an official organization, called the ‘Lithuanian Community in Sweden’, which has branches in Stockholm and Skåne, in the southern part of Sweden. During the last stage, I was contacting people on social media, particularly on Facebook. This website is very popular among Lithuanians and contains a few groups that are directed particularly towards Lithuanians living in Sweden. I wrote a public note on the so-called ‘wall’ of the three groups. It means that no one was contacted personally, but they were able to see a message informing them about a study, explaining the aim, and inviting them to contact me via private message on Facebook, e-mail, or phone (contact information was provided). Two of the Facebook groups were covering all Lithuanians living in Sweden and were the biggest known to me, and the third one was directed towards the Östergötland region, the eastern part of Sweden.

Here again, I combined snowball sampling with theoretical sampling. The available data on gender, age, education, occupation, and year of arrival was used in order to ensure that the informants would have a variety of backgrounds. This information is further presented in Appendix 1.

Semi-structured interviews were collected with 42 Lithuanians living and working\textsuperscript{94} in Sweden; 24 women and 18 men aged 21–54, coming from various places in Lithuania and living in various places in Sweden. Central, Eastern, and

\textsuperscript{94} Some of the informants were on parental leave and one recently became unemployed, but was registered with the Labour Exchange and actively looking for a job.
Southern Sweden are represented more than Northern and Western Sweden. Many of the informants at the time of the interview lived in Stockholm or its surroundings, but there is quite a good balance among big cities and small towns in the data.

The qualitative data was collected by using the instrument of semi-structured interviews. The quantitative data is collected from various databases (Eurostat, ESS, World Bank, national statistical offices of Lithuanian Statistics, Estonian Statistics, Latvian Statistics, Statistics Sweden) or retrieved from various reports and articles that used secondary data analysis from specific databases or collected their own data.

Measurement deals with a few questions: what to study; when to ask what questions during the interviews; and what questions should be asked (Bernard and Ryan 2010). All of these questions were about making decisions while looking at the framework of a broader project95 and consulting with the results from the pilot studies.

The main questions used from the interviews with Lithuanians in Sweden were96:

1. Could you please tell me your…
   a) age,
   b) education level,
   c) familial status,
   d) place of residence (in Sweden and previous in home country),
   e) briefly about your previous employment before emigration?
2. How did you decide to emigrate and how did you choose your country of destination? Could you name the main reasons for departing from Lithuania? Did anyone advise or help? Did you have a job before coming to Sweden? How did you find it? How did you find accommodation?
3. Please tell me about your employment experience in Sweden:
   a) duration; How long have you worked in Sweden?
   b) sectors; What jobs and in which sectors?

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95. This PhD project is a part of the three-year project, ‘East-West labour migration, industrial relations and labour standards in a Swedish-Baltic context’, funded by Forte (Swedish Council for Health, Working Life and Welfare). The latter examines changing migration patterns and impacts on industrial relations and welfare in sending and receiving countries as part of a wider Baltic-Swedish regional migration cluster.

96. The interviews were conducted in the Lithuanian language, and the following questions were translated from Lithuanian.
c) type/status of employment; *What is your current employment status (is it by hour, piece-work, temporary, or a permanent job)? Are you directly or indirectly employed, or are you self-employed? Do you have a written contract, oral contract, or under-the-table payment? Do you have one or several contracts – written or oral? For how long are you employed?*

d) how you found the current job; *How did you hear of the current job?*

4. What kind of taxes do you pay in Sweden/Lithuania? *Do you pay preliminary tax or the alternative income tax in Sweden or in your homeland? Social insurance: Are you insured in Sweden or in your homeland? Do you pay your own social insurance contributions? If so, in Sweden or in your homeland?*

5. Do you think there are more opportunities here in Sweden than in your home country? If so, in what way? *Have you had to scale back your expectations since coming here? Have you been able to realize new possibilities you haven’t thought of before?*

6. What would you say are the key benefits of having moved to Sweden (to work)? What are the key problems? What are the biggest differences from Lithuania? *Do you feel on balance, taking everything into account, that you made a good or bad decision in coming to Sweden to work? What do you see as the biggest cost and biggest benefits? Are you employed in a lower position than you were in Lithuania? Do you feel the system could have done more to help you find a suitable job in Sweden?*

The main questions used in the interviews with the experts were97 (where the regular font presents the theme and the actual questions asked are in italic):

1. *Impacts of labour emigration from your country. What are the main benefits and challenges of labour emigration from your country? What is the impact on the labour market (its actors and policies)? What is the impact on the welfare state (social policies)?*

2. *Policy response to the emigration situation in the country. What is your opinion about a current policy response regarding the emigration from the country? What alternatives do you see? Could other actors be involved in the formation of this response (the EU, NGOs, other)?*

*Pilot studies. In the framework of this research, both qualitative studies had pilot interviews. The study of the Lithuanian migrants in Sweden had pre-pilot and pilot studies; both included three informants each. One*

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97. Lithuanian-speaking informants were interviewed in Lithuanian, everyone else in English.
interview was conducted for the expert interviews strand. The pilot studies were accomplished in order to test the questions and find out two main issues. Firstly, if the questions are understood correctly. Secondly, another very important reason is implied by the abductive reasoning used in this dissertation work. The questions stemmed from the deductive reasoning from reading the literature. The two studies were designed to be qualitative and based on the semi-structured interviews, due to the possibility that the informants would present their own view, even though a guided one. Abductive reasoning acknowledges that the information gained from the available material might not be exhaustive. So, a crucial role of the pilot studies was to give a voice to the informants and control if any additional information occurred that was not taken into consideration beforehand. In other words, within the scope of the study, it left some space for exploring the matter inductively. After analysing the pilot studies, the questions were adjusted. The pre-pilot study of the Lithuanians in Sweden caused substantial adjustments; therefore, it was not included in the final sample. The changes after the pilot studies with the Lithuanians in Sweden and the experts did not consider the main themes of the project. Consequently, it allowed using the pilot interviews together with the main body of material in the process of analysis.

The pre-pilot study with three Lithuanians working in Sweden took place in Lithuania over the Christmas season – 27-28 December 2012 – when many people went back to visit their relatives and friends. The pilot study was conducted from 2 February-2 March 2013. Two males and one female, who all fell within the category of the ‘most popular emigrant’ in terms of age (20-34), were interviewed. One pilot interview with an expert was conducted in May 2013.

The main body of data. The overall design of the study draws heavily upon the Lithuanian emigration. It is especially visible in the study of migrants in Sweden – only Lithuanians were interviewed (42 in total). The main interviews (1 to 2 hours long) were collected from 30 January-11 March 2014 and were transcribed afterwards.

Another block of data consisted of the expert interviews (on average 1 hour long), collected and transcribed during a few periods: 3-14 June and 25-29 June; 2-10 September; and 28 October-3 November 2013 (23 days in total). It presents Lithuania as the leading case in the number of the collected interviews (10) in a group of three Baltic states. It is closely followed by Latvia (8) and a composition of the informants’ affiliations or areas of expertise. Estonian experts encompassed 5 interviews with missing data from a representative of an NGO.
Methods of analysis

Considering the qualitative difference between the two groups of informants, namely the experts and Lithuanian migrants, a somewhat different method of analysis was applied. I will begin with the expert interviews.

In the process of data collection and analysis, one needs to bear in mind particular characteristics of expert knowledge and its construction. Nagel and Meuser (2009) present an informative account of what needs to be taken into consideration. In particular, they draw on a Foucauldian type of discourse analysis and state, ‘In exploring expert knowledge, the focus remains on the institutional framework within which the expert moves and on the individual actor involved, her or his position and responsibilities within a particular context’ (Nagel and Meuser 2009: 27). Thus, it should be taken into consideration that expert knowledge (as all knowledge) is constructed as a result of a ‘knowledge-power relationship’, in which ‘expert discourses are to be understood as orderly practices of production of meaning’ (ibid. 28).

Two implications for the analysis performed in Article III stem from the above discussion. First, I considered the institutional context of my interviewees and looked at if and how their perspectives of the impacts of emigration are related to their positionality. For example, do academics have a broadly encompassing and less ‘politicized’ stance and government representatives focus more on particular policy areas and effects for the state? Second, I looked for signs of power relations when analysing experts’ views on the (e)migration policies in place. For instance, would representatives of the trade unions be more concerned about the protection of the labour rights and employers’ organization representatives prioritize securing of ‘cheap labour’? Or, when asking about alternatives to current policies and bringing up particular actors (e.g. the EU) and their role in ‘emigration management’, I intended to see how much agency my informants in a particular institutional context have, or rather, how much agency they perceive that they have and where the power actually lies. This was very visible in the discussion of the unequal dynamics between the sending countries of the CEE and the receiving countries in the West.

In the analysis, Nagel and Meuser’s (2009) methodological guidelines were instructive. I examined each interview and did a line-by-line, or rather ‘thought-by-thought’, paraphrasing. I then turned to coding, where I developed categories for every interview. In the last stage, I did a thematic comparison of my developed codes among my informants in the same country; among informants with a similar institutional affiliation, but different countries; and among informants from different countries. At that point, I realized that many
of the themes were not about a mere discussion of the impacts of emigration, which I initially used as the theoretical starting point, but that they corresponded to the larger discourse of ‘multiple winnings’ as presented in Article III. I then selected the two questions mentioned above in the questionnaire for experts, and came back to the coded interviews. I identified the key interviews based on their affiliation (academic, policy expert, trade union representative, and employers’ representative) and the represented country (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). I selected one informant of each affiliation in every country based on the broadest coverage of the codes common among informants in these groups. For example, I interviewed three academics in Lithuania, but I chose one interview that had the widest variety of codes-themes among this group of informants. In this way, I had a comparative sample for all the countries consisting of 12 interviews.

A very similar process of analysis took place for Article I, where inspired by Fairclough’s (1992) critical discourse analysis, I looked at the interplay of the emigrants as agents and the various structures that formed barriers and facilitated their migration. Analysing interviews ‘from the ground’, I found four main ways that my informants utilized to enter Sweden. By further exploring them in the migration research, I came across the concept of ‘migration channels’ and it gave me a tool to account for the whole range of discursive and social practices, not only by the state as I initially thought when reasoning about migration policies, but by variety of other social actors. Moreover, I was able to see how this interplay constitutes and re-constitutes who can be and who is a migrant. Article II drew more explicitly on the social constructivist Grounded Theory (Charmaz 2008). There I started with the ideas about the welfare state and its role in migration with a special focus on the economic crisis with austerity. I selected a limited number of interviews based on the time of arrival of my informants and re-coded them. I was ‘building up’ an analysis and looking for the causes of emigration. I did it by coding a few interviews and then applying those codes to the rest of my sample. I considered the theoretical explanations, went back to my data, and reformulated the causes few times until I found two main categories, inequality and quality of life, that later became a core of the structure and framed the whole article.

Methodological challenges, positionality, and a reflection on ethics

While working on the thesis, I encountered three main challenges: the limitations of statistical data; how to ensure anonymity of my informants; and how the fact that I am a Lithuanian living and working in Sweden would affect the interviews and finding the informants.
Specifics of the migration statistics for Lithuania and Sweden. In the EU and the context of free movement with no inner border control, the accuracy of statistical data largely depends on the ability of the national institutions to register the flows. Many times, official registers fall behind the real situations, since the adjustment of the data takes time. These issues are reported by the studies on immigration from the CEE countries to Sweden (Wadensjö and Gerdes 2013; Zelano et al. 2014), but it most certainly applies to both sending and receiving countries. Many times, the declaration of departure and registration in the host country is left to the individual’s responsibility or, in case of labour migration, is the concern of the employer. The latter is true for the 1 July 2013 regulation in Sweden concerning posted workers.

Gerdes and Wadensjö (2013) indicate these legislative institutional problems in Sweden:

- A lack of coordination on statistics among the different Swedish institutions that register migration flows: the Swedish Tax Agency (Skatteverket) and Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket).

- Differences in institutional definitions of a ‘migrant’ or who counts as a ‘migrant’ and, therefore, who should be registered. If the person is staying for more than 3 months, one should register with the Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket); if staying 6 months or more (180 days), one registers with the Swedish Tax Agency (Skatteverket).

- The different demographic basis of registration, either by citizenship or place of birth.

- A lack of information about various temporary workers.

Thus, the availability and reliability of statistics also very much depend on the national legislation. Even though the EU has a common statistical database, Eurostat, and some of the main statistical values on migration can be compared, there are still some data that are not collected in some countries and part of it might not be comparable.

When it comes to the sending countries, the Baltic states gather data about their departing inhabitants. It includes only long-term emigration (more than 1 year) and only ‘declared’ numbers. These specifics constitutes one of the major problems, raised by few authors researching Baltic migration, i.e. the reliability of data and the failure to estimate and capture all the outward flows (Berger and Wolf 2011; Lulle 2009; Sipaviciene and Stankuniene 2011).

The Lithuanian data since the Census of 2000 was based on self-declaration and some special studies, which assessed the amount of undeclared emigration.
Sometimes the emigration rate would almost double after summing up both types of migration. Beginning in 2010, a newly implemented Law of Health Insurance, which requires an individual payment of contributions if one is not covered by state social insurance, provided a stronger incentive for people to declare their departure; otherwise they would have been obliged to continue to pay health insurance contributions. As de facto emigration, it could also be declared up to a previous 5 years period, so it might not necessarily be the case that more than eighty thousand people left in 2010. However, whether contemporary or previous migrations provide the aggregate numbers, the actual totals show the extent of the population of Lithuanians currently living abroad.

Moreover, the recent Population Census, which took place in all Baltic states in 2011, adjusted the data of the Population Registers quite drastically, especially in Latvia and Lithuania. Since 2010, Lithuania terminated the additional studies on undeclared migration.

Concerning the ethical issues of interviewing, this research received approval from the Ethical vetting (2012/18-31). Moreover, I made every effort to anonymise my informants: changing their names and the names of the places they lived; referring to more general categories of ‘small towns’ or something similar. I also did not employ an extensive biographical analysis; the only exception is in Article I, where I do introduce the socio-demographic characteristics of my informants. But as mentioned above, I anonymised them to the utmost. I have received consent from all my informants and they were aware of the possibility to withdraw their participation at any point of the study. At some points during the interviews, I was asked not to record certain details and I turned off the recorder and did not use this information in my analysis.

I am aware that I might have access to certain parts of their experiences just because my informants felt we shared the same background. For instance, one of the participants in the study contacted me by a private message on Facebook after I wrote a public message about the study. Later on, I learned that it was only because I was born in a particular town and my informant had connections with it. On the other hand, I am also aware that some of the information might have not reached me, because people either assumed that I ‘knew it’, because we were from the same country, or they thought that I might recognize the people or places involved in their experiences. Lastly, I did have an advantage of knowing the language, having migration experience, and being acquainted with the Lithuanian and Swedish contexts.
5. Summaries of the articles

**Article I ‘Exit-Entrance: why and how?’**

Article I is a chapter titled ‘The Two Sides of the Baltic Sea: Lithuanians as labour migrants and mobile EU workers in Sweden’ and has been submitted to the volume *Changes and challenges of cross-border labour mobility within the EU*, edited by Anna Ann Klitgaard and Trine Lund Thomsen with Peter Lang Publishing.

This chapter combines the causes and the channels of migration that often are inseparable. Drawing on the seminal work of A.O. Hirschman (1970), it advances and empirically examines the relationship between an exit (emigration) from Lithuania and an entrance (immigration) to Sweden and its labour market.

The importance of examining this exit-entrance relationship lies at the heart of the idea that it is a combination of the reasons to migrate and possible ways to migrate that make the movement happen. Despite the intentions or plans to move (potential migration), the departure might not happen until an individual finds or uses a way (migration channel) to leave and to access another country, i.e. until one finds or utilizes a possibility to migrate. In the same manner, the mere existence of the migration channels is not a cause of migration per se. Even if one considers the cumulative causation thesis, which presupposes that there is an established migrant network and respective socioeconomic and cultural transformations within the sending and receiving countries perpetuate migration by transcending its original incentives. The network is neither sufficient nor necessary for migration (or immobility), and the same goes for the establishment and flourishing of ‘migration industry’.

Thus, the article focuses on why and how Lithuanians decided to exit from Lithuania and enter Sweden. It examines migration channels and encompasses the emergence and development of them in the more than two decades since the independence of Lithuania in the 1990s. The chapter discusses the social and discursive practices of individuals and the informal social networks, the states and supranational entity of the EU, and the private companies in presenting barriers and facilitations for migration and constructing migration channels. In this process, the constitution and re-constitution of who can be and who is a migrant takes place. The chapter presents a variety of migrations that are long-term and declared or short-term and invisible, in which the same informants experience multiple exits and entrances differing in their duration of stay and the utilization of various migration channels. It also reveals the diverse causes of
exit-entrance and discusses the multiple reasons that affect migration decisions. In cases of multiple exits-entrances, the main reasons vary.

The chapter concludes that migration perpetuation mechanisms are at work to a large extent, because the academic discourses and migrants’ voices on the causes of emigration do not change to the same extent as the variety of channels, which have emerged and developed after independence in 1990s, presenting possibilities to exit-entrance throughout the EU accession and global economic crisis.

**Article II ‘The Decline in Quality?’**

The article is titled ‘(In)eQuality of Life: Lithuanian Labor Migration to Sweden during the Economic Crisis and its Aftermath (2008-2013)’ and is accepted with minor revisions for a special issue, ‘Baltic states after the crisis? Transformation of welfare systems and social problems’, edited by Jolanta Aidukaite and Sven Horst for the *Journal of Baltic Studies*.

This article focuses on the period of the economic crisis with austerity and its aftermath. It begins with a review of the academic discourse that indicates the rising economic and social inequalities and their impact on emigration from CEE after the independence of Lithuania in 1990s. It draws on the Hirschman’s (1970) analytical-theoretical model and its first assumption, namely, that exit is a response to the perceived decline of quality of membership in the state, conceptualised as citizenship by Moses (2005). Extending the abovementioned Hirschmanian assumption, the article attempts to combine two theoretical concepts – inequality and quality of life. The article turns to the theory of the welfare state and defines that de-commodifying state’s role in social provision as potentially correcting the structural social inequalities stemming from the market. Highlighting the importance of how inequality translates into quality of life, the article stresses the importance of individual perceptions about quality of life and how these perceptions turn into emigration decisions.

The empirical part of the article focuses on a particular time period during the global economic crisis and the implementation of austerity measures, which was an ‘objective’ situation in which the economic decline potentially affected the quality of life of individuals. Thus, the article reviews macro and micro socioeconomic indicators of the economic crisis and austerity measures and data from opinion polls on people’s perceptions of the socioeconomic situation in Lithuania. It continues with an analysis of the interviews with Lithuanian labour migrants in Sweden and focuses on the perceptions of their quality of life before departure, as well as their perceived possible quality of life in Lithuania or other
countries in the future in relation to the consequences of the global economic crisis and austerity. The analysis suggests that the global economic crisis and austerity affected informants’ quality of life unequally. Subsequently, these effects are reflected in the Lithuanians’ decisions to leave; for some, emigration was a ‘survival strategy’ because of the sharp decline in their material living standard, whilst for others, it was more ‘a step in their career’.

Lastly, this article points to the role of the welfare state and defines two particular situations in which the socioeconomic re-distribution via taxation system is perceived as not ensuring (e)quality and a decent living standard and contributes to the emigration decisions, namely, unemployment and the anticipation of the retirement.

Article III ‘The (Re)Action of the Organization’

This article is titled ‘Policy Response to Emigration from the Baltics: confronting “the European Elephant in the Room”’ and was published in 2016, in Dølvik, Jon-Erik and Line Eldring (eds) Labour Mobility in the Enlarged Single European Market. Comparative Social Research, Volume 32, Emerald publishing, 45-72.

It focuses on the (re)action of the state to the exit – in other words, the policy response to emigration. The contribution emphasises the EU accession and global economic crisis as a punctuation of the migration patterns in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It spells out a number of consequences for these countries, partly spawned by the ‘free movement’ of mainly young, working age people, and attempts to introduce the discourses of the sending countries.

The EU discourse of free mobility as being ‘circular’ and a ‘multiple win’ for all have already been challenged from the receiving OMS with fears of ‘welfare abuse’, ‘stealing jobs’, and ‘social dumping’. The main discourses from the Baltic states challenge the ideas of ‘circularity’ and a ‘multiple win’; the interviewed experts in the fields of labour and migration raised concerns over ‘brain drain’ and ‘brain waste’. Thus, a special focus was put on highly educated people, especially medical doctors, who are being attracted to the OMS in the process of ‘global competition over talents’. These ‘talents’, with prominent state investment in their education, who are attracted to highly skilled occupations or who turn to ‘cheap labour’ in the OMS, leave the sending countries with demographic and socioeconomic ‘losses’. These discourses point to the unequal distribution of ‘losses’ and ‘wins’ among the sending and receiving states of the EU. They also underline that the challenges of the sending countries are mainly not recognized at the EU’s policy level. With the overall positive view and unquestionable necessity of ‘free movement’, different approaches were brought up on how to
deal with the challenges it is posing. Part of the informants were in favour of EU’s role in introducing certain mechanisms that would balance out this inequality. Latvian and Lithuanian informants presented non-materialised attempts to bring up these questions on the EU’s policy agenda during the Presidency periods of these countries in 2013, but the Lithuanian representative from the employers’ organisation was highly critical of such an attempt. This opinion resembled the positions of Estonian informants more closely, who argued for more liberal national responses to the vast emigration and its consequences. The circular movement within the ‘regional single market’ of Helsinki (Finland) and Tallinn (Estonia) was taken up as an example of turning free movement to Estonia’s advantage. The current national response was criticised for not really being a migration policy, but rather a few initiatives addressing the ‘talents’ and supporting the ones willing to return, while guarding the entrance for third country nationals, particularly Russian-speakers. The same held true for the Latvian and Lithuanian policy responses. They were described as the first steps in recognizing the emigration in Latvia or as de facto responses that depend on the election cycle in Lithuania. The legislation and programs already in place were largely targeting a narrow group of people with high social status: ‘talents’ or ‘good migrants’ who can ‘contribute’ to the state, drawing the lines of ‘selectivity criteria’ for returning nationals and immigrants. Even though the Latvian program encouraged return migration, its activities were criticized for being designed to establish and keep relations with the diaspora instead of promoting return. The Lithuanian policies shifted towards relations with ‘Global Lithuania’ after the global economic crisis since the country had ‘nothing to offer’ – meaning no employment places and the lack of a comparable economic living standard – for its population abroad. Thus, the conversation on alternatives to the existing national migration policy response raised the topics of economic growth with more jobs and higher salaries (a typical position of the government representatives); an improvement of labour conditions (a typical position of the trade unions representatives); campaigns for socially responsible business practices and labour immigration of the third country nationals (a typical position of the employers’ organizations representatives); and reforms of the education system with lower investments in higher education and the promotion of vocational education (mentioned by various informants). In other words, emigration and return are seen as a part of the broader economic and labour market policies and at large cannot be affected by the migration policies.
6. Concluding discussion

The overall aim of this thesis was to contribute to the explanation of why and how the mass labour emigration (with its consequences) came into being. The thesis makes both a theoretical and empirical contribution to the understanding of intra-EU mobility with the focus on labour migration from the NMS, particularly Lithuania. Theoretically, it extended Hirschman’s exit, voice, and loyalty model by taking on a critical realist lens and ‘re-reading’ Hirschman’s work from social transformation and mobility perspectives. Hence, the thesis is situated in the field of migration studies, but also intersects with the fields of the welfare state and of industrial relations. Empirically, it focused on explaining the migrants’ decision-making processes of exit (emigration) and entrance (immigration) in a context of structural and institutional social changes that followed (1) independence from the Soviet Union; (2) EU accession; and (3) the latest economic crisis of austerity. These issues were at the core of Articles I and II, while Article III analysed the migration impact and the states’ policy responses, experts’ views on them, and possible policy alternatives.

It needs to be pointed out here that the ‘explanation’ is understood in a critical realist way, in which explaining amounts to uncovering causal mechanisms that lead to the exit-entrance decisions. By combining theoretical and empirical knowledge from previous research, extending Hirschman’s model, and bringing this model to bear on the collected data in analysis, the thesis identified two causal mechanisms that impacted the decisions to emigrate, namely, the ‘(ine) quality of life’ and ‘migration channels’.

Before detailing them below, I want to draw attention to the limitations of this study. Most of these limitations stem from the methodological challenges and choices. The thesis presents a wide and detailed descriptive analysis based on statistical data from a variety of socioeconomic, political, and migration indicators at macro and micro scales. Whilst the statistical data has its shortcomings, the original data is qualitative and based on non-probabilistic types of sampling, which further implies the limitations of the applicability of the results to the general labour emigration from the Baltic states. The theoretical sampling has partially addressed these issues. Constraints in time and ‘word count’ led to further decisions of the informed and careful selection of the interviews, which are presented verbatim in Articles I, II, and III. The selected verbatim quotations reflect events that were perceived as causal in the exit-entrance decision-making for more than one individual or reveal the views of more than one expert. Another, more theoretical, limitation stems from the choice of the theoretical-analytical approaches and concepts that narrowed
down my focus to the intersecting domains of migration, industrial relations, and the welfare state that come together in the (extended) Hirschman's model of exit, voice, and loyalty. Thus, this concluding discussion presents a problematizing discussion about, rather than a definite answer to, the question of why and how labour emigration from Lithuania became massive, with its consequences for demography, the welfare state, the labour market, and further migration.

‘Root causes': a perceived decline in the quality of citizenship and quality of life
As the overview of previous studies on emigration from Lithuania indicated, the majority of persons are leaving with the intention to work because of the problematic socioeconomic situation, poor labour conditions, lack of access to jobs, as well as a more general disillusionment with politics. Fundamentally, these factors may be conceptualised as the socioeconomic and political driving forces that influence the decision to exit. The concept of ‘socioeconomic’ is based on the idea that social and labour rights are tightly connected. For instance, better labour conditions lead to wider welfare state access, pointing to the intersection between the research fields of industrial relations and the welfare state.

The quality in the area of the labour market is largely determined by the state of labour rights, both formal and substantial. Their realization is contingent on the structural and institutional dimensions of the labour market: how equal, just, and inclusive it is (Sippola 2014). Another important set of rights are social rights. They should ‘correct’ the inequalities stemming from the market and enhance income and social equality among all the different groups in society (Esping-Andersen 1990), to provide a social citizenship (Marshall and Bottomore 1992). Article II engages with the issue of the Lithuanian welfare state’s capacity to address the inequalities stemming from the labour market based on one’s age, educational attainment, and place of living.

Lastly, the quality of political rights points to the voice – the possibility to affect and change the quality of rights via democratic election or other channels of representation, e.g. through the trade unions in the case of workers’ rights. Thus, as Hirschman (1970) pointed out, voice depends on the ‘detail of the institutional design’ – for instance, the industrial relations system or the previously mentioned welfare state system. To paraphrase Hirschman (1970), quality of citizenship rights is an indicator of the inclusiveness of the democratic system in the country. Moreover, following the social transformations approach, the quality of rights in the country depends on the international and global dynamics. It was made especially visible in the three events that have
‘punctuated’ the emigration from Lithuania: independence, EU accession, and the global economic crisis and austerity.

Yet the perspectives of individuals tend not to be expressed in terms of rights. Thus, it is important to understand migration in terms of quality of life, whereby the quality of the citizenship translates to the individual and family level and affects people’s livelihood strategies. Even though quality of life can be measured at a macro scale by socioeconomic indicators, it is also perceived, and thus it is important to take into consideration the experiences and voices of the migrants. Lastly, theories of networks, transnationalism, and migration systems state that, due to technological means and extended connections via migrant networks, information about situations in other countries can be gained quite easily. Consequently, the perceived quality of socioeconomic rights in Lithuania is compared with the perceived possible quality of those rights and life in another country, such as Sweden. Next to the spatial dimension of the migrants’ decisions, emphasis is also placed on their current perceived quality of life and the perception of possible improvements to this: in a better future elsewhere.

**Constitution of barriers to and facilitations for migration: who can be a migrant**

Previously addressed migration theories pay attention to a variety of structures that constrain or facilitate migration. Historical, structural, and functionalist theories largely focus on constraints and on the migrants’ agency and networks; whilst transnationalism and migration system theories provide insights on the possible facilitations, mainly via migrant networks. However, in the context of the EU enlargement and the institutional frameworks that have been constructed in order to promote EU labour mobility and flexible labour markets, it is important to address previous studies’ concept of migration channels. Migration channels are mechanisms that connect countries of origin and destination, migrant ‘self-selection’, and the ‘structural selectivity’ of migration policies (McCollum et al. 2013). Article I describes and identifies various actors involved in constructing channels, their practices and the discourses that facilitate the exit-entrance for some and set barriers for others: constituting who can be a migrant and further ‘selecting’ who can use a particular channel.

98. For instance, Sippola (2014) and Woolfson (2010) applied Hirschman’s model to the Baltic states, and reviewed a vast variety of indicators spanning from unemployment and GDP to suicide rates.
Thus combining the points mentioned above and bearing in mind the emerging dynamics of the structuring and institutionalization of these practices and discourses, three types of channels that configure barriers and facilitations can be identified:

- Legal-political channels point to the states and supranational organizations that can make legislation and are entitled to make and implement political decisions. Thus, they also encompass institutional design. In the case of Lithuanian labour migration to Sweden, the most relevant are the Lithuanian and Swedish states and the EU. They are part of the global context and have an impact on the exit-entrance. After the enlargement, the EU institutions increasingly mediated the interplay between global structures and local actors by devising the Directives regulating free movement and migration channels as described in the second chapter of this thesis.

- Socioeconomic barriers and facilitations include the flows of capital and services in the private sector, including a variety of actors such as local and international companies and a ‘migration industry’ consisting of recruitment agencies and temporary working agencies. It also encompasses informal social networks (see Article I).

- Personal or social barriers and facilitations encompass the level of education, skills, and economic resources a person has, so it is tightly related to socioeconomic factors. On the other hand, it also addresses questions about attachment to the place, national identity (as in loyalty), and a broader identity, which is shaped by legal, political (e.g. identity politics), and social factors. Lastly, migration decisions are largely affected by the family situation and norms (Schapendonk and Steel 2014).

Subject(s)/agent(s): perceptions and decisions-in-the-making

At the centre of Hirschman’s (1970) model is an individual, a strategic agent, a social actor, who makes decisions to voice, exit and be loyal. Furthermore, the first assumption for Hirschman’s model to be enabled is a perceived decline of quality. Yet, this very first assumption signals that the agent is subjected to

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99. Even before the enlargement the EU played a big role in changing socioeconomic and political institutions rather than directly affecting the right to free movement. The latter was introduced after Lithuania’s accession and still entailed transition rules with the exception of Ireland, Sweden, and UK (see the second chapter).
certain structural and institutional conditions in time and space that shape the quality, barriers, and facilitations as defined above. Therefore, the model used in this thesis depicts subject(s)/agent(s), who are making decisions to exit-enter-stay contingent on the basis of their perception of the quality of life, barriers, and facilitations (see the above section and also Article I for a more detailed account of the exit-entrance relation). An important reminder here is that this thesis concerns only the exit; in other words, the ones who did actually leave. Thus, the point of departure of this study coincides with actual exit of the individuals and their entrance to another country. Questions on the eagerness of migrants to stay or to re-exit again are largely left for future inquiries, though some of the interviews presented in the articles reveal the multiple exits, entrances and stays.

Recalling the way Carling and Schewel (2018) define aspirations, the Hirschmanian perspective lacks an understanding of emigration as valuable per se, in which, from the individual’s point of view, it becomes about personhood and identity. These debates were addressed in previous research (King et al. 2017; Saar 2017) and described in Article I, where one of the causes of emigration was a desire for adventure and new experience.

This way of understanding perception gives new dimensions and extends Hirschman’s model. A decline in quality of citizenship becomes unnecessary for exit to occur. Moreover, individual decision-making is not a one-time event; thus, it could rather be understood as a decision-in-the-making. It changes across time and space and should always be seen in relation to one’s life-course (King 2002), as well as embedded in institutions, in part constituted by their discourses and other social practices, and interrelated with broader social structures and transformations (Castles 2010).

Stay, Exit, Entrance: from the ‘root causes’ to the perpetuation of migration

Drawing on Bakewell’s (2010) adaptation of the morphogenetic cycle for migration studies, this dissertation found that structures and institutions form the quality of citizenship that further translates to one’s quality of life, sets barriers, and facilitates the stay-exit-entrance phenomena (the structural condition). Individuals respond to these conditions based on their perceptions. Thus, they make strategic choices and actions and develop relations among those who migrate and those who stay (the social interaction). This social interaction gives rise to migration channels and migration systems that further affects the quality, barriers, and facilitations of migration (the structural elaboration). This implies changes in the structural and institutional conditions for the individuals,
who are potentially staying-exiting-entering at a later time. Thus, within this cycle, the thesis considers the migration channels and (ine)quality of life as causal mechanisms, in which migration at one point in time affects subsequent migration and leads to perpetuation of migration.

Accordingly, the thesis uncovered the morphogenetic cycle of changes in Lithuanian emigration and showed how it is embedded in broader global and European social transformations and socioeconomic development. It suggests that the gradual re-commodification of labour and unaddressed income and social inequalities (as a part of neoliberal policies) of post-communist and post-crisis transformations formed the structurally unequal quality of rights that translated into the (ine)quality of life for individuals. As the debate about the re-commodification of labour and rising income and social inequalities was previously addressed (Nowak and Novosielski 2011; van Ostaijen et al. 2017; Slavnic 2010), this thesis focused on how these macro scale mechanisms combine and are translated into emigration decisions, indicating the ‘(ine)quality of life’ as a causal mechanism.

A special focus on the economic crisis and with austerity and its aftermath indicated that the decline in a macro socioeconomic context does not directly lead to emigration decisions. Drawing on qualitative analysis of the interviews with Lithuanian migrants in Article II, there are two explanations behind this finding. First, various sectors were unequally affected by the economic crisis and austerity and second, the changes at the macro scale were not perceived by all of the informants as a decline in quality of life. Instead, a lack of possible improvements in the future in Lithuania was emphasised. The future prospects in Lithuania were, in turn, contrasted to the perceived better quality of life in Sweden and affected emigration decisions. The emigration reasons indicated in the interview analysis in Article II were: (1) income, wage rates, and standard of living gaps; (2) unemployment and/or possible vacancies; (3) family reunions; (4) job/career; (5) (dis)trust in the system; (6) adventure or having a new experience; and (7) Sweden’s accessibility. Informants often gave a few reasons that affected emigration decisions and their choice of destination. The reasons were often complementary to each other, with one reason being predominant. They often were related to the occupation and educational attainment of the individual as well as to migration channel that the individual used to enter Sweden. Those were: (1) informal social networks; (2) recruitment agencies and temporary working agencies; (3) service provision as posted workers and the self-employed; and (4) FDI and outsourcing. Thus, the decision-making about exit-entrance was not only framed by the ‘root causes’, but also by the migration channels.
The removal of the institutional barriers for exit after independence and especially after the EU accession allowed a first-hand experience and a comparison of possible quality of life in other countries; this information was ‘remitted back’ by others who had migration experience. Thus, emigration that initially started as a response of individuals to the perceived (lack of) quality of life or possible (better) quality of life was developing its own ‘internal dynamics’. The emigration initiated due to these ‘root causes’ resulted in perpetuation, where it was reinforced by the development of migration channels that emerged as a result of the activities of social actors: such as individuals and informal social networks, private companies, states, and supranational bodies. The EU accession added two more migration channels: labour migration for employment in other EU countries and the posting of workers. Prior to the accession, many labour migrants from the CEE countries were self-employed, because work permits were needed to work as employees (Thörnquist 2013). The economic crisis of austerity encouraged private companies to turn to look for possibilities abroad and to utilize these channels better. Moreover, starting with an economic crisis, booming and fast growing foreign investments and outsourcing practices facilitated and incentivized the migration of the highly skilled. The changing structures of the Swedish labour market facilitated an entrance into certain niches that were created either by the Swedish state (through tax reductions on domestic and construction services as presented in Article I) and/or by other Lithuanians already staying in the country.

Thus, the consequences of neoliberal policies together with the development of formal channels after the EU accession constituted various migrant categories. Individual strategies of actively looking for channels to exit-enter, combining them in different ways at various points of the migration process, and establishing informal social networks re-constitute who can be and who is a migrant.

This labour migration accelerates demographic challenges to Lithuanian society. Lithuania became one of the fastest ageing countries in the world, where demographic problems further translated to labour market issues and to challenges in sustaining the social security system. It has also affected the migration policy. The current Lithuanian migration policy puts a big emphasis on diaspora politics with low-coverage initiatives for those who return, turning attention to the immigration of low skilled third country nationals. A shift from facilitating the return migration of ‘all economic migrants’ in the period after the EU accession and economic boom to the diaspora politics during the economic crisis and its aftermath in the economic downturn reveals a very interesting paradox. It shows that the Lithuanian state, as a social actor, has accepted
emigration as the ‘new normal’. More than that, a state, via its migration policies and their implementation, discursively and practically constitutes the diasporic identities and practices of those ‘contributing’ to the wellbeing of Lithuania. In Hirschmanian terms, the state cultivates loyalty as an attachment to Lithuania, which instead of being a barrier to exit, partially facilitates it. Being a member of the diaspora becomes something particularly valuable from the side of the state. The Lithuanian migration policies also provide exclusionary facilitations to re-enter that are directed to the ‘talents’ and ‘needed’ migrants, to which in turn might signal to the rest that staying abroad is preferable. The loosened regulations for third country nationals’ immigration after the economic recovery in the latest years discursively present an alternative to return migration. Again, these policies can be perceived as a subtle signal to stay abroad. The situation in which recruitment is largely left for labour market actors, with an emphasis upon the employers, not the trade unions, makes it more likely that the immigration of ‘cheap labour’ from outside of the EU will continue. Time will show the results of the currently unfolding migration dynamics, in which the immigration rate for the first time since 1990s is going hand-in-hand with that of emigration.

Returning to de Haas’ (2010a: 1606-1610) theorisations of migration’s inception, perpetuation, and decline, Lithuania could be placed in the stage of ‘selective formation of migration systems’ that denotes migration of ‘late majority’, or possibly indicating a ‘full-blown’ migration system. But instead of entering a phase of stagnation and migration decline, it will more likely continue with the diaspora model, where emigration would persist, albeit at lower rates. This is especially likely because the whole system, including the Lithuanian state, is actively contributing to the constitution of the Lithuanian diaspora.

Thus, based on the described socioeconomic development, Lithuania should be seen as a developed capitalist society that is well integrated in an unequal capitalist and migration system of the EU countries and beyond. The problem of systemic inequality is addressed in Article III, where the interviewed experts pointed to the structural and institutional inequalities within the EU, for instance by prioritizing the receiving OMS’ interests in the EU political agenda about the challenges and benefits of the free movement. In the context in which the exit cannot be managed at a national level, the informants expressed their limited ability in managing exit to increase the quality of citizenship. This appeared to resemble the conclusions of Sippola (2014), in which he pointed out that the latest economic crisis revealed not only the inability of citizens to mend their quality of life via voice, but also the vulnerability of states to global economic downturns. In other words, authorities are not only reluctant to make changes
(Hirschman 1970) or are failing in national policy-making. This national policy ‘dysfunction’ indicated by Moses (2016) needs to be seen in the structural and institutional global and EU context. The latter was discussed in terms of multi-level governance (Ostaijen and Scholten 2018), in which national ‘policy-making’ joins together with ‘policy-taking’ (Budryte 2005).

Given the continuity of a relatively stable geopolitical and economic situation, the future migration trends – both emigration and immigration – will depend upon the perceived quality of rights and life in Lithuania and the perceived possible quality in other countries in time. It will also depend on the barriers and facilitations of migration via the formed and reformed migration channels and migration policies.

It is important to return to the debate depicting this movement of Lithuanians to Sweden as being between migration and mobility. Here, the previously presented concept of permanent temporariness can be invoked. The EU policy towards regulated temporary labour migration and circular migration schemes has created permanent labour mobility as a way of life. A very telling example presented in Article I considers the changes in the Lithuanian labour market, introducing a new type of employment ‘based on posting’. Some construction companies are informally advertising working positions that require the posting of workers. This affects both family life and loyalty towards the state. Many of these initially mobile EU citizens choose another permanency: just like the guest workers in the 1960s, they choose to stay and continue their life in the receiving country.

As the title of the thesis indicates, this thesis poses the question of whether Lithuanians are ‘lost in mobility’. The results of the interviews with experts in Article III suggest that Lithuanian emigrants can be seen as ‘lost’ from the perspective of the sending Baltic states. Yet, further research is needed in order to give an answer to this question. Based on the results of this thesis, it could be concluded that mobility, even when understood as free movement of citizens within the EU, is a part of a highly ordered, selective, and unequal migration system that crosses the borders of one state and is an ‘intrinsic part’ of broader social changes in time and space. Within the framework of the structurally unequal conditions and opportunities of stay-exit-entrance, the decision to emigrate is essentially bound to an individual’s perception of the (possible) quality of life for oneself and one’s family members across time and in different places.
Prospects for further research

New research ideas can be developed from the presented results of this thesis. They can be grouped in three themes.

First, the focus could be on entrance-stay and stay-(re)exit as well as the circular/transitional migration examples, where the triangle of stay-exit-entrance turns multiple times. The entrance-stay connection could explore social and occupational mobility and the carrier pathways as well as wider patterns of settlement. Stay-(re)exit would focus on return migration by asking what return means in the EU context. What is the meaning of diaspora or the migrants’ social and economic investments and their broader connectivity with the country of origin? How do the new EU citizens relate to their home countries, and what is their sense of belonging, identity, and loyalty?

As for Lithuania and the Baltic states as the sending countries, Article III reveals that their return policies do not effectively address the demographic problems and emerging lack of labour supply. Recently we have seen how the immigration of third country nationals in Lithuania was growing. This trend follows that of other CEE countries, such as Poland, where mass emigration co-exists with high immigration (Kaczmarczyk 2014). At the same time, there is a lack of focus on integration issues and this migration dynamic brings forward rising xenophobia and populism, which are problems shared with the OMS.

A second theme could extend the research focus in time and space, such as further exploration in the temporal sense by crossing the threshold into the past before Independence as well as going further after 2013. This would not only provide a longer time-line, but would also offer some comparison between the ‘two unions’[100] that would inform a broader discussion on social change in Lithuania and the CEE countries. This possible comparison is only partial due to the availability and quality of the data (for instance, statistical data). Going beyond 2013 would allow for inclusion of the impact of the fact that Lithuania joined the Eurozone in 2015. The extension of the space dimension could either involve collecting the same kind of qualitative interviews for another country with similar or different migration patterns than that of Lithuania or the same empirical study about Lithuanians, but in another country besides Sweden (a similar or different case, respectively, could be Norway or the Netherlands).

Last, but not least, the third topic could be that of the interplay between the processes of Europeanization and the changing role of the nation-state. This

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[100] It should be taken into consideration that even though the EU and the Soviet Union are both called ‘Unions’, they were formed and governed in totally different ways, the latter being an authoritarian regime that occupied the Lithuanian territory.
also includes the reformulation of national social citizenship and the welfare state in the context of EU multilevel governance, the present neoliberalization of the labour market, and the transnationalization of industrial relations. This trajectory brings to the fore problems of labour and social rights beyond the EU market citizenship that is based simply on the employability of mobile EU citizens. This last possible topic would delve into the core of the current scholarly debate concerning migration and mobility and, as such, would be well placed to make an important contribution to debates that pose consequences far beyond the academy and concern the very future of transnational relations at large. Finally, it would open the field for research on the social and individual consequences of ‘permanent temporality’ brought about by the normalization of migration and mobility.
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Appendices

Appendix 1. Expert interviews

Research method: qualitative research.
Research instrument: semi-structured interviews.
Sample: informants were selected according to their suitability for the aims of the study, having expertise, and working in the area of labour and migration in the Baltic states (and Sweden).
Informants:

- Academics, doing research and publishing in the area of labour and migration (A is an abbreviation used in the table below to denote affiliation, where A denotes Academic);
- Policy experts from policy creation and implementation level (P);
- Trade unions and employers’ organizations (TU and EO);
- Other NGOs (think tanks, international organizations) (NGO).

The informants are listed according to the schedule of the interview collection.

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<th>Affiliation</th>
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* Note: only pilot interviews that were used in the analysis are listed.
Appendix 2. Interviews with Lithuanian labour migrants in Sweden

Research method: qualitative research.
Research instrument: semi-structured interviews.
Sample: snowball sampling.
Informants: Lithuanians who, at the moment of interviewing them, were working in Sweden or who were unemployed (might be on parental leave or sick leave), having previous experience of working in the country and/or looking for job opportunities (with or without registration with the Arbetsförmedlingen – Swedish Public Employment Service).

The informants are listed according to the schedule of the interview collection.

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*At the time of the interview. Place of living: CS – Central Sweden; ES – Eastern Sweden; WE – Western Sweden; NS – Northern Sweden; SS – Southern Sweden. Occupation, skills, education – shows what skills, educational attainment and occupation a person had before departure and whether it matches the first job in Sweden. HS – stands for highly skilled both in terms of educational attainment and also position in the market; MS – medium skilled, professional workers, who have vocational education. Applicable especially for construction sector or agriculture and forestry; LS – low skilled, high school or lower education, occupations in low skilled sectors. For example, ‘HS-LS’ means that a person with higher education holds a low-skilled position.*
Articles

The articles associated with this thesis have been removed for copyright reasons. For more details about these see:

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