Constructed Realities

Framing an inclusive, multicultural Australia’s exclusion of people seeking asylum

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Abstract
Since 2001, Australia’s increasingly securitised and exclusionary asylum policy has been legitimised through a damaging discourse surrounding people who seek asylum. This discourse, reinforced by successive Australian Prime Ministers, has been instrumental in shaping policies which have a devastating human impact. While political elites across the West are distancing themselves from a discourse of inclusive multiculturalism, Australia continues to celebrate its multicultural success despite the ongoing tension between a rhetoric of inclusion and one justifying exclusion. Since discourse is both productive and reflective of the social world, shaping discourse can be understood as a means to shape reality. This thesis explores how discourse is constructed and reproduced through framing; a discursive practice that influences how certain issues are understood. The texts analysed are those in which Australian Prime Ministers and senior political figures defend policies of exclusion against people who seek asylum by boat as part of a broader policy vision for a Safe, Secure & Free Australia. In order to contrast the frames, narratives and discourses associated with exclusion, communications promoting the policy vision of an inclusive Multicultural Australia have also been analysed. The frames identified in the material reproduce particular narratives which help to maintain the hegemonic position of discourses which present Australia as a humanitarian, welcoming and inclusive multicultural society and situate people who seek asylum by boat as illegal, seeking an unfair advantage, and as a threat to national security. By identifying frames that consistently appear in the messaging of Australian political elites, we can understand how certain narratives have come to be accepted as truth.

Key terms: multiculturalism; asylum policy; inclusion; exclusion; immigration; discourse analysis; framing; asylum seekers; Australian politics;

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I dedicate this to my friends who have endured so much at the hands of our government. You came to us seeking safety, and we put you in a cage. This is for you.

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Acronyms

ABF  Australian Border Force
ALP  Australian Labor Party
AMC  Australian Multicultural Council
BV   Bridging Visa
CAAIP Committee to Advise on Australian Immigration Policy
DHA  Department of Home Affairs
DIBP Department of Immigration and Border Protection
DIMIA Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
DIIMA Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
EU   European Union
IDC  Immigration Detention Centre
IMAs  Irregular Maritime Arrivals
LP   Liberal Party of Australia
NP   National Party of Australia
OSB  Operation Sovereign Borders
PNG  Papua New Guinea
SHEV Safe Haven Enterprise Visa
SIEV Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel
SRSS Status Resolution Support Services
RRT  Refugee Review Tribunal
TPV  Temporary Protection Visa
UN   United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNAA United Nations Association of Australia
1. Introduction

Successive Prime Ministers have branded Australia as an ‘inclusive’ multicultural society with a ‘generous humanitarian program’ whilst shirking their obligations under international law and perpetrating human rights abuses against people who seek asylum (John Howard 1a 2001; Kevin Rudd 2d 2010).\(^1\) The Australian Government’s draconian asylum policy – characterised by indefinite mandatory detention, offshore processing, temporary protection, cuts to welfare and work rights, the absence of a fair and dignified asylum process and the suppression of reporting on abuse and trauma – has been widely criticised both domestically and internationally. In spite of this, political elites across the West are looking to Australia as a model for secure borders, hoping to reduce the number of people seeking asylum in their territories through deterrence measures such as ‘external processing’ and limiting paths to citizenship (Brandt & Higgins 2018; McNamara 2018).

Political elites in the Australian context play a pivotal role in shaping and maintaining a social world which legitimises certain policies of inclusion and exclusion. This is partially achieved through the subconscious or deliberate act of framing, a discursive practice which ‘shapes the way we see the world’ (Goffman 1974; Entman 1993; Lakoff 2004, p.xv). The reality we perceive is ‘socially and discursively’ constructed and when particular words, phrases or images are used, frames are activated, reinforcing a particular understanding of reality (Laclau & Mouffe 1985, p.111; Burr 1995, p.4; Gergen 1985, p.268 cited in Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, p.5, Lakoff). If discourse not only reflects the social world, but generates it, then shaping discourse to suit a particular agenda through the discursive practice of framing can be seen as an attempt to shape reality (Jørgensen & Phillips).

Over nearly two decades, successive Australian governments have simultaneously pursued two key policy visions. The first policy vision is for an inclusive Multicultural Australia, while the second, Safe, Secure & Free Australia, positions exclusionary policies towards certain groups as necessary to the defence of ‘our nation, our people and our values’ (Malcolm Turnbull 6c 2017; Scott Morrison 7e 2019). In this thesis I will identify frames that frequently appear in communications about these seemingly contradictory policy visions.

Since 2001 – when the Tampa affair, 9/11 and the Children Overboard scandal provoked a paradigm shift in asylum policy – successive Prime Ministers have necessitated

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\(^1\)Texts used as empirical material will be referenced as 1a, 1b, 2a etc. The number reflects the Prime Minister – 1. John Howard, 2. Kevin Rudd, 3. Julia Gillard, 4. Kevin Rudd (2\(^{nd}\)), 5. Tony Abbott, 6. Malcolm Turnbull, 7. Scott Morrison while the letter organises the texts chronologically. For a full list of empirical material see Appendix 1.
the exclusion of people who seek asylum – particularly those who come by boat – by shaping discourse. This thesis will use Norman Fairclough’s (1993) Critical Discourse Analysis as a starting point, building on the assumption that the establishment, maintenance and legitimation of power imbalances in the social world are discursively produced and reflected. Frame analysis will then be used to explore how policy narratives that have come to be accepted as ‘universal truths’ are constructed through discursive acts (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.65; RAC 2019). Understanding the relationship between discourse and the social world is central to challenging hegemonic discourses and is critical in the ’struggle for radical social change’ (Jørgensen & Phillips, p.61; Lakoff 2004, p.xv).

1.1 Research Aims & Questions
While multiculturalism is regularly celebrated as central to Australia’s economic, social and cultural achievements, the Government’s pursuit of increasingly exclusionary policies contradicts the spirit of multiculturalism; an ‘ethic of acceptance of, and respect for, cultural diversity, community harmony and inclusion’ (Henry & Kurzak 2013, p.1). This thesis seeks to investigate the apparent contradiction in the messaging around two key policy visions:

*Multicultural Australia* is what I will call the policies and rhetoric linked to the Australian Government’s vision for a unified, harmonious and inclusive Australian society in which mutual-respect and diversity are vital to Australia’s achievements and collective identity. Whilst policies of multiculturalism received bipartisan support until the election of the Howard Government in 1996, this vision now experiences varying degrees of support.

*Safe, Secure & Free Australia* is the name I have given to the policies and rhetoric related to the Australian Government’s vision for an Australia with strong borders, tightly controlled immigration, and fiscal stability in order to ensure the protection of Australian values and an Australian way of life. In recent years, this policy vision has become increasingly prominent and successive governments have sought to emphasise the urgent need to build up Australia’s defence capabilities, strengthen anti-terrorism efforts and fortify Australia’s borders. The phrase ‘safe, secure and free’ was used by Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull (6c 2017) and current Prime Minister Scott Morrison (7e 2019) regularly refers to his Government’s goal of keeping Australians – and their freedoms – ‘safe and secure’.

A frame analysis will be used to explore the following research questions:

- Which frames can be identified in political communications relating to the exclusion of people seeking asylum by boat in pursuit of Safe, Secure & Free Australia and in references to the vision for an inclusive Multicultural Australia?
- How do the frames identified reinforce particular narratives or discourses?
2. A System ‘Designed to Break’ People

‘For those who come across the sea we’ve boundless plains to share’ [but] for some who have come across the sea in recent years, we offer razor wire and misery […] For those who come across the seas seeking protection, we offer exile to the bankrupt Pacific Republic of Nauru.

Julian Burnside (2007, p.15)

In Australian Values – an essay published in The Quarterly in 2007 – prominent barrister and refugee advocate Julian Burnside points to a contradiction between the inclusive, welcoming nation that Australia presents itself as and the harsh exclusionary measures the Australian Government deploys to deter people who seek asylum.

The ‘generous, open-hearted’ Australian Government – which has ‘one of the largest’ humanitarian programs ‘on a per capita basis’ (John Howard 1a 2001; Malcolm Turnbull 6e 2017) – has established what former Human Rights Commissioner Gillian Triggs describes as a system ‘designed to break [people]’ (The Guardian 2017b). Triggs continues to assert that the ‘inhumanity has reached a level where we, as a nation, have to respond’ (ibid).

As of December 31st, 2018, the Department of Home Affairs (p.11) reports;

- The average amount of time spent in detention for someone seeking asylum is 511 days.
- 1285 asylum seekers are detained in onshore immigration detention centres (IDCs), with nearly 16,000 people seeking asylum living in the community on Bridging Visas (BVs).
- Ten people are reported to still be detained offshore on Nauru and roughly 500 men are assumed to still be ‘in transition centres’ on Manus Island (Asylum Insight 2019).

Successive Prime Ministers have made their mark on Australia’s draconian asylum policy; subjecting people who seek asylum to indefinite mandatory detention,² authorising boat turn-backs, granting only temporary protection visas (TPVs), limiting paths to family reunion, cultivating a fear of people who come by boat in the public imagination and orchestrating regional processing regimes such as the Pacific Solution where people who seek asylum are transferred to third countries such as Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Nauru.³

Over (AU)$5 billion has been allocated for offshore processing on Manus Island and Nauru in the last seven years (Asylum Insight 2019), and secrecy provisions embedded in the Border Force Act 2015 prohibit those contracted by the Government from revealing ‘protected information’; suppressing the reporting of child, sexual and physical abuse, self-

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² Indefinite mandatory detention was legislated in 1992 under a Keating Labor Government, ordering the detainment of those without valid visas until health and security checks could be processed (Migration Amendment Act 1992).

³ Offshore processing centres were established on Manus Island - in Papua New Guinea (PNG) – and the Republic of Nauru. The Pacific Solution reduced the number of people ‘who would otherwise have been detained onshore’ but was ended by the Rudd Government in 2008 – with those who arrived by boat instead processed on the Australian territory of Christmas Island – however regional processing was reintroduced by the Gillard Government in 2012 (Phillips & Spinks 2013).
harm, suicidal ideation and other mental health concerns (Australian Border Force Act 2015, p.37; Asylum Insight 2019). The tight control of offshore detention centres also includes the restriction of media access and an absence of independent monitoring.

There have now been forty-five deaths in immigration detention centres since 2010, of which more than half are known suicides (Asylum Insight 2019). In 2016, more than 2,000 incident reports from the Nauru processing centre were leaked, revealing the ‘devastating trauma and abuse’ inflicted on people seeking asylum (Farrell, Evershed & Davidson 2016).

Figure 1: Locations of Australia’s offshore processing centres (SBS News 2019)

2.1 Policies of Exclusion

Australia’s asylum policy is not only constantly changing but it affects various cohorts of people seeking asylum and refugees differently, depending on the date and mode of their arrival. This thesis will focus primarily on policies of exclusion directed towards those who seek asylum by boat. However, there are a broad range of policies and structures in place which cause refugees and people seeking asylum living in onshore immigration detention centres or in the Australian community to experience exclusion. Policies of exclusion refers to government policy which socially, economically and, in some cases, physically, excludes certain groups. In the case of people seeking asylum who come by boat, policies of exclusion are those designed to pressure people to ‘go back to where they came from’, to deter future asylum seekers from coming and send a message that they are not welcome (RAC 2019).

While policies of inclusion improve ‘the terms of participation in society’ by removing barriers to access and promoting rights, policies of exclusion prevent the realisation of this principle, keeping people in a ‘state’ of exclusion and limiting their participation in
‘economic, social, political and cultural life’ (United Nations 2016, pp.17-18).4

Despite claims from politicians that Australia is an ‘inclusive’ multicultural society (Kevin Rudd 2d 2010), up to thirty per cent of the population were, in 2009, found to experience ‘marginal exclusion’ while up to six per cent were ‘deeply excluded’ (Scutella, Wilkins & Kostenko 2009, p.61). Indigenous Australians and people born in non-English speaking countries were among those groups found to be ‘most prone to exclusion’ (ibid, p.62), while the exclusion experienced by people seeking asylum is regularly compounded by visa uncertainty, limited work rights, reduced access to welfare and housing, and experiences of racism and discrimination (Osando 2013, p.86; Haw 2019).5,6

Since July 2013, the Australian Government has declared that ‘[people who come by boat] will not be settled in Australia’ (Kevin Rudd 4d 2013).7 Those aboard intercepted boats – deemed ‘illegal maritime arrivals’– are ‘turned back when safe to do so’ or transferred to ‘rat-infested, cramped and very hot’ offshore detention facilities (UNHCR 2018; Asylum Insight 2019b, p.26). Protection claims are assessed in these offshore IDCs and, if found in need of protection, refugees are then settled in PNG or Nauru. There is also a cohort of over 400 men, women and children who came by boat to seek asylum but were brought to Australia from Nauru and Manus Island for medical treatment. This group – known as the #LetThemStay cohort due to an ongoing campaign to keep them in Australia - are detained in onshore IDCs or are living in community detention in a state of limbo, unable to lodge an application for asylum in Australia and unwilling to return to PNG or Nauru (ASRC 2019).

2.2 Australia’s Immigration Intake

Each year the government sets immigration targets and assigns the number of available places in each visa category – i.e. skilled, family, humanitarian – which will make up that total. Since the 1990s, skilled and temporary migration have increasingly become the focus of Australia’s immigration scheme, however, political and public debate around immigration is disproportionately focused on the immigration of people seeking asylum and refugees which ‘accounts for a relatively small proportion’ of the overall intake (The Conversation, 2016).

189,097 permanent visas were granted under the migration program in 2014-15, consisting of 61,085 in the Family stream, 127,774 in the Skill stream and 238 in the Special

4 Exclusion particularly affects those who are disadvantaged ‘on the basis of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, and economic and migration status’ (United Nations 2016, p.17)
5 Mitchell and Kirsner (2003) found ‘the denial of work and access to welfare’ was linked to increased debt, isolation, mental health issues, homelessness and health problems commonly experienced by people seeking asylum.
6 To read more about budget cuts to Status Resolution Support Services (SRSS) and the impact on people seeking asylum see this review from the ASRC (2019) https://www.asrc.org.au/2019/04/18/srss-cut/
7 People who arrived by boat after 13th August 2012 but before July 2013 are subject to ‘fast tracking’, a process in which critical parts of the protection visa application process have been eliminated.
Eligibility stream (DIBP 2016 cited in The Conversation 2016). In that same year there were only 13,750 places designated for the Humanitarian program, with 13,756 visas granted (ibid). By contrast, the number of international students, working holiday visa holders, and temporary migrants outnumbers permanent migrants ‘more than three-fold’; increasing to over 800,000 in June 2018 (ABC News 2019). Against the backdrop of a ‘global refugee crisis’, Australia has expanded its humanitarian intake to 18,750 places with a one-off intake of 12,000 Syrian and Iraqi refugees in 2017 under the Abbott Government (ibid).

2.3 Countries of Origin

In 2015-2016, the majority of refugees brought to Australia as part of the humanitarian resettlement program came from Iraq and Syria, followed by Afghanistan, Myanmar, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bhutan, Somalia, Iran, Ethiopia and Eritrea (SSI 2016).8 The primary countries of origin for people who come by plane to seek asylum are Pakistan, Iran, China, Egypt, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe, Turkey, Fiji and Lebanon, while people who seek asylum by boat largely originate from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Sri Lanka, in addition to a substantial number of stateless persons (Asylum Insight 2016; 2019).

2.4 Why People Come by Boat

While some people who seek asylum are able to obtain temporary visas and come to Australia by plane to apply for protection, for people without documentation, for those who are stateless, and for those denied short-term visas by the Australian Government, making the perilous journey to Australia by boat is the only alternative. Many boats depart from Indonesia and Malaysia, major transit points for people fleeing Middle Eastern and South Asian countries. In 2018 there were over 150,000 refugees and asylum seekers living in Malaysia, ‘unrecognised’ by a government which is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention and makes ‘no distinction’ between ‘undocumented labour migrants’ and ‘asylum seekers’ (Wurscher 2018). People seeking asylum, and those found by the UNHCR to be refugees, not only have no ‘legal status’ in Malaysia, but are not permitted to work or access healthcare and are extremely ‘vulnerable to […] arrest, detention, prosecution, imprisonment […] and deportation’ given the frequency of ‘immigration raids’ (ibid).

Fiske (2019) describes the Indonesian Government’s approach towards asylum seekers as one of ‘benign neglect’. Given that Australia is increasingly tightening immigration

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8 People can gain protection in Australia by applying for asylum once they have arrived in Australia, or they can be resettled as part of the humanitarian resettlement program. This program involves bringing a quota of refugees from another country who have already been found by the UNHCR to be in need of protection. Refugees who applied for asylum once they had arrived in Australia made up roughly twenty per cent of those granted protection visas in 2016 (Asylum Insight 2016).
controls, many thousands of registered asylum seekers and recognised refugees are being advised by the UNHCR to ‘prepare to assimilate into Indonesian society […] or consider returning to their strife-torn countries’ (*New York Times* 2018). People seeking asylum in Indonesia receive no financial or health support, cannot obtain visas, residency or citizenship, hold no work rights and cannot attend school. Though people are at risk of deportation, given the rates of homelessness, many people self-surrender into detention (Fiske 2019).

In the interests of maintaining strong bilateral relationships with Australia, Indonesia and Malaysia continue to take steps to prevent people from travelling by boat to Australia. However, given that many refugees and asylum seekers ‘hear from the United Nations that they may never leave’ Indonesia or Malaysia, it is clear why people choose to pay a people smuggler to take them to Australia. A passenger of the intercepted vessel SIEV5 – which capsized with 418 people seeking asylum on board in October 2001 – explains the reality:

> One year and one month waiting for a reply from the United Nations, I waited with my family of 15. I went to the United Nations, they told me to find a way to get to Australia, anywhere I went in Indonesia, I get told to find a boat to Australia, the UN guards, the UN officials, everyone talks of finding a way to Australia.

Ahmed Hussein (Kevin 2002)

### 2.5 Australia’s Obsession with Boat Arrivals

While debate about asylum policy has disproportionately focused on ‘boat arrivals’, most people who seek asylum in Australia arrive by plane (Asylum Insight 2016). Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull proudly announced there were no boat arrivals in 2017-18, yet there were 27,931 asylum applications lodged by people who arrived by plane (Collins 2019).

Marr and Wilkinson (2003, p.38) observe that ‘the problem for boat people was always the boat: the symbol of Australia’s old fears of invasion’. Australians ‘have a long antipathy to boat people and are uncomfortable with *any* arriving on their shores’, despite the fact that, compared to other countries, the number of people reaching Australia is minimal (ibid, p.30). Fiske (2019) suggests that the ‘theatrics’ and dramatic imagery of people coming by boat serves as better political ammunition than the arrival of people through an airport, while the Refugee Action Coalition (RAC 2019) contend that Australia’s ‘boat fetish’ is linked to the perceived illegality of arriving by boat without documentation.
3. Background

3.1 Global Context
In an era of rapid globalisation, the transformation of state-controlled immigration policies points to a ‘clash’ between a ‘national logic’ which dictates policy agendas, and a ‘transnational logic’ that drives migration (Castles 2004, p.212). States across the world are simultaneously attempting to benefit from dissolving barriers whilst fortifying borders, illustrating ‘the contradiction [of globalisation] that free trade in capital, goods, services and information has rarely meant free trade in people’ (Jupp 2002, p.209). While governments have embraced increased human mobility when it involves the controlled immigration of highly skilled migrants, many are resistant to the immigration of unskilled migrants, particularly those deemed to be culturally ‘incompatible’ (Balibar 1991a, p.20; Fiske 2019).

A global discourse of interconnectedness and cosmopolitanism is in constant tension with one of state sovereignty and national security. This tension is amplified in the area of mass global migration, a phenomenon which has become ‘amorphous and complex’ given the increasing ease of movement and communication, enabling people to live their lives across borders and form ‘transnational communities’ (Castles 2004, p.211). While historically, migrants have been treated as ‘permanent settlers […] to be assimilated’, in an increasingly globalised world, the relevance of the notion that people maintain social relationships in one place and ‘owe their allegiance to just one state’ has expired (ibid, p.212). The maintenance of transnational communities clashes with the presumption that ‘newly arrived migrants ought to attempt to blend into mainstream society as much and as quickly as possible, removing the traces of their former identities’ (Henry & Kurzak 2013, p.1).

After several decades of attempted multiculturalism, the United Kingdom and states across the European Union are entering an ‘era of post-multiculturalism’ and actioning ‘an increased control of diversity’ (Gozdecka, Ercan & Kmak 2014, p.54). A discourse of tolerance and mutual respect has come to be ‘replaced with the notions of national identity and belonging’, fuelling anti-immigrant sentiments and establishing a mandate for securitised management of immigration (ibid). While Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States of America – states comprised predominantly of people of diverse migrant heritages – continue to identify as multicultural, the securitisation of immigration in several of these contexts suggests that they may follow the same path. Refugees and people seeking asylum are one group of migrants who have been particularly affected by the securitisation of discourse and policy. The arrival of those in search of safety has regularly been presented by
Western political elites as a threat; referred to as a ‘crisis’, a ‘security risk’ and a ‘national emergency’ by Australian former Prime Minister Tony Abbott (5b 2013), Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz (Brady 2016) and United States President Donald Trump (2019) respectively. At present, the cultivation of discourses around who does and does not belong is legitimising various actors’ implementation of policies intended to ‘intercept, hold, and redirect migrants before they can reach their destinations’ (Nethery & Silverman 2015, p.1).

3.2 Historical Context

3.2.1 Excluding Indigenous Australians

The exclusion of particular ethno-cultural groups has characterised Australian society since colonisation in 1788. Australia’s First Nations peoples – Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders peoples – are ‘refugees in their own land’ having been displaced, dispossessed and repeatedly subjected to dehumanising and exclusionary policies (Shannon 2016).

*Terra nullius* – land legally deemed as belonging to no one – was a doctrine established under British rule that remained in Australian law until 1992; a concept which denied Indigenous Australians ‘custodianship of the land’ and established a narrative which erased ‘a history of invasion, extermination and violent displacement’ (Renes 2011, p.33; Ogleby 1993, p.171). Despite being overturned following the historic Mabo case, *terra nullius* ‘still persists in the collective Australian psyche’ as evidenced by the structures, policies and attitudes which continue to ‘impact harmfully’ on Indigenous people and informs their ongoing exclusion (Shannon 2016).

The discriminatory discourse that supports the exclusion of Indigenous Australians is a product of, and reflected in, actions such as the forced removal of many Indigenous children from their families between 1905 and the early 1970s (Renes 2011, p.35). Known today as the Stolen Generations, the forced removal of children was part of a broader policy of assimilation which was rooted in the belief that Indigenous people should either be left to ‘die out’ through a process of natural selection, or should be forced to embrace White culture (Australians Together 2019; Renes 2011, p.33).10 While this policy ended half a century ago, its shadow remains in contemporary policies and institutions.11

Indigenous Australians were officially considered subhuman until the National

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9 The Mabo case (1992), judged by the High Court, recognised the rights of the traditional owners – the Meriam people – to their lands in the Torres Strait and extended this recognition to all Indigenous Peoples. The *Native Title Act* (1993) codified this decision, establishing a legislative framework by which Indigenous Australians could pursue their native title rights.

10 Many of the children forcibly removed were of ‘mixed-descent’. They were seen as a ‘threat’ to the ‘neat racial borders and white prerogative on economic resources’ and became part of eugenics programs aimed at ‘absorbing part-white children into the mainstream’ (Renes 2011, p.35).

11 In 1996, 20 per cent of Indigenous children had been removed from their communities. By 2016 this number had risen to 35 per cent (UNAA 2017).
Referendum of 1967 and even throughout periods of mass immigration and social diversification this group have remained largely left out of inclusive policies intended to facilitate social cohesion (Renes 2011, p.31). Many Australian scholars (Castles 1987; Jupp 2002; Koleth 2010; Henry & Kurzak 2013) question if multiculturalism can be considered a success in Australia when First Nations people continue to experience social, economic, physical and cultural exclusion at such disproportionate levels. Today, Indigenous Australians are ‘among the most incarcerated people on the planet’ and the United Nations (UNAA 2017) has criticised the Government’s continued ‘failure to respect [Indigenous Australians’] right to self-determination and the right to full and effective participation’ in society (Finnane 1997; Wahlquist, Evershed & Allam 2018).

3.2.2 Immigration Restriction & White Australia

Policies intended to restrict the immigration of those who are not seen as White defined Australia’s immigration policy for nearly two centuries. In the decades following the arrival of the First Fleet, settlers and convicts originated almost exclusively from the British Isles. In the 1830s, as the colonies began to receive fewer convicts, the labour force began to decline rapidly. Importing labour from India was one solution put forward, however, at a time when the anti-slavery movement was gathering support, the British Government were apprehensive about exporting Indian labourers. This apprehension was also rooted in a fear that ‘racial intermixture between Indian and British colonists would result in the contamination and degradation of the British race’ and that importing Indian labour migrants would discourage British migrants from settling in Australia (Curthoys 2003, pp.11-12). Colonial liberals argued that a ‘degraded sub-class’ would threaten the liberty of entire society given that realising equality ‘depended on shared civilisation, aspirations and assumptions’ (ibid, p.19).

The trade of indentured Chinese labour began in the 1840s, with the subsequent discovery of gold in 1851 emptying properties of their workers and fuelling an even greater demand for Chinese labour.12 Again, colonial liberals argued that the Chinese lacked morals, Christian values, and were incapable of assimilation, warning that their presence ‘would inhibit the much more desirable British immigration’ (Wang 1969; Curthoys 2003, p.16). There was mounting pressure from European colonial society to restrict and exclude Chinese migrants from the gold fields and the colonies more broadly, leading to the implementation of a number of exclusionary policies such as the Colony of Victoria’s 10-pound entry tax for Chinese immigrants and the permittance of only one Chinese migrant per ten tons of a ship’s

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12 Roughly 3,500 Chinese labour migrants joined the colony of New South Wales between 1847 and 1852, however – with the Gold Rush – by 1861 there were over 11,000 Chinese immigrants in New South Wales (Wang 1969).
In 1858 a *Chinese Immigration Bill* was proposed to the parliament of New South Wales, making reference to questions of racial contamination. In 1860, Legislative Assembly member John Lucas called for a need to protect against the ‘pollution of the pure Anglo-Saxon blood’ which he feared could occur by ‘allowing its admixture with this degraded race’ (*Sydney Morning Herald* 1860, pp.3-4).

This discourse of racial degradation was, however, challenged by discourses of economic value and one of Christian brotherhood (Curthoys 2003, p.29). Supporters of Chinese immigration in the 19th century – mostly pastoralists and conservatives – ‘resisted the language of race and racial purity altogether’ instead focusing on the economic value of the Chinese as labourers, gold-seekers, and consumers (ibid, p.28). The *Chinese Immigration Act* was passed in 1861 then repealed in 1867 as Chinese immigration declined with the end of the Gold Rush. However, with a second boom in Chinese immigration in the 1870s came mounting pressure to pass a new *Chinese Immigration Act* (1881) which restricted entry.

In April 1888, the *Afghan*, a ship carrying 268 Chinese passengers, was denied entry into Melbourne and Sydney ports. While the majority of people on board were immigrants, more than fifty passengers were ‘bona fide’ returning residents ‘who spoke fluent English’, ‘dressed in European attire’ and were legally entitled to land (Curthoys 2003, p.59). New South Wales Premier Henry Parkes denied residents and immigrants the right to dock, justifying his decision on the basis that the passengers of the *Afghan* ‘were but the forerunners of thousands more on their way’ (Price 1974, p.195). Australian citizens were told to think of themselves as ‘in a state of siege, with a foe in front of us’ and, following the Intercolonial Conference on the Chinese Question, in June 1888 all colonies but Tasmania passed legislation preventing almost all Chinese immigration (*New South Wales Parliamentary Debates* 1888, p.4878 cited in Price, 195; Curthoys, p.31). Curthoys (ibid) writes that it was with this act that the White Australia Policy was born and, ‘though not enshrined in nationwide legislation until the passing of the Immigration Act in 1901 by the new Commonwealth Government’, it marked the beginning of the legislated exclusion of non-White immigrants.

Central to ‘White Australian anxiety’ was a fear of invasion (Ang 2003, p.56). Given that White colonists violently took Australia for themselves, it was widely feared that what was done to the Indigenous owners of the land could be done to the colonists by another power. The desire to protect territorial boundaries from an influx of Others was therefore not just about race but as much about preserving the nation’s space (Ang 2003, p.53). The invasion narrative – in which an unspecified Asian power ‘threatens Australia’s future as a homogenous White nation’ – began to permeate the Australian psyche in the mid-1800s, with
debates about being ‘overrun’ and concern about Australia’s isolation – ‘far from Europe and in the midst of Asia and the Pacific’ causing settlers to feel ‘vulnerable’ (Ang 2003, p.56-57).

Federation took place in 1901, and the Commonwealth of Australia became a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy. One of the first acts of the Federal Government was to pass the Immigration Restriction Act (1901); a culmination of ‘at least forty years of agitation during which the idea [of White Australia] was fully shaped’ (Gungwu 2003, p.vii). At a time where intellectuals and political elites across the West widely supported theories of eugenics and racial biology, Australians were given ‘a daring mission’; the task of securing the future of the White race, ‘as guardians of precious territories and as forerunners of a coming race of newly energised Europeans’ (Walker 2003, pp.42-43).

The White Australia policy is an umbrella term used to describe various historical policies designed to prevent the immigration of people of non-European descent. The policy began as a ‘vehement effort’ to protect White culture and society, beginning with the ‘rigid exclusion’ of Chinese migrants and going on to subject culturally and ethnically ‘different’ migrants to ‘impossible’ tests and criteria until the 1970s (Bean 1968; Hafez, 2011, p.3). Under the White Australia policy, immigration and citizenship were often beyond reach for those deemed to be non-European.13 This was most clearly exemplified by the Dictation Test – administered between 1901 and 1958 to all ‘non-European’ prospective immigrants – which involved a fifty-word writing task in a European language (Hafez 2011, p.4). Since immigration officials were given the power to administer the test in the language of their choice, and as many times as they felt necessary, the failure of ‘undesirable’ migrants was therefore guaranteed, providing ‘legitimate’ grounds for rejection (ibid, p.4). In 1958 the Migration Act replaced a number of these exclusionary policies, abolishing the Dictation Test and other discriminatory provisions and establishing a visa system.

In 1973 the Whitlam Labor Government dismantled the White Australia policy, but the vision of White Australia was not one willingly abandoned.14 Instead it was denied, replaced by a ‘progressive shift to multiculturalism’ (Jayasuriya, Walker & Gothard 2003, p.2).

3.2.3 Mass Immigration & Australian Multiculturalism

While there was a steady increase in immigration – mostly Anglo-Celtic – in the first half of the 20th century, it was not until after the Second World War that the large-scale immigration of a diverse range of migrant groups to Australia began (Jones 2003, p.110).

13 Non-Europeans at this time often included Europeans from Southern and Eastern parts of Europe such as Italy, Greece, Poland and the Czech-Republic.
The Second World War re-awakened an anxiety about Australia’s vulnerability to foreign invasion, encouraging the development of the campaign ‘populate or perish’ which sought to increase the population through large-scale immigration. Labour demands were high and increased immigration was touted as an opportunity to ‘build up manufacturing’ and expand the domestic market (Castles 1987, p.5-6). Many persons affected by the War came to Australia, including refugees and labour migrants. Following the Second World War, the refugees Australia accepted were pre-selected, with the Government tightly controlling who qualified as a humanitarian entrant. The majority of these migrants were European and Christian and there was an assumption that their integration would not be ‘a major challenge’ to ‘the expectation of social cohesion and rapid assimilation’ (Clyne & Jupp 2011, p.44).

Australia first looked to Britain as a source of young people and families willing to migrate and established an Assisted Passage Scheme. However, with immigration targets not being met, by the late 1940s, more migrants from outside of Britain began making the journey to Australia. Migrants of Eastern European, Southern European, Middle Eastern and Asian background were increasingly accepted, especially after the introduction of the new visa system in the late 1950s. Australian immigration policy gradually came to focus on how migrants could contribute to Australia – in particular, which skills – granting visas to migrants ‘irrespective of race, colour or nationality’ (Racial Discrimination Act 1975).

As the number of non-European settlers grew, the Australian Government attempted several approaches to absorbing these new migrants into society. In the 1940s and 50s the Government actively encouraged assimilation, believing that ‘newly arrived migrants ought to attempt to blend into mainstream society as much and as quickly as possible, removing traces of their former identities to become like other Australians’ (Henry & Kurzak 2013, p.1). Under policies of assimilation, migrants were expected to ‘take on the Australian lifestyle, learn to use the English language, and quickly become indistinguishable’ (Castles 1987, p.9). However, it soon became evident that assimilation was not occurring, with migrant groups building their ‘own communities’ and ensuring the continuation of their ‘language and cultures’, often living together in industrial suburbs given their concentration in manufacturing jobs (ibid). This resulted in the emergence of an accidental ‘pluralist society’ and a growing need to recognise the ‘cultural pluralism’ that now characterised Australian society (ibid, p.10).

In the 1960s, policies of integration were embraced as a means to foster migrant

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15 ‘Populate or perish’ was a campaign slogan of Labor leader Arthur Calwell in the 1940s.
16 The Assisted Passage Migration Scheme was established in 1945, a scheme which facilitated the migration of British citizens to Australia by subsidising processing fees and passage, charging only £10 per adult and children travelling for free.
participation in Australian society whilst acknowledging the importance migrant communities placed on maintaining links to their histories and cultures. Policies of integration were designed to facilitate the transition from migrants’ previous way of life to the ‘ultimate goal of full acceptance of the Australian way of life’ (Castles 1987, p.10).

After several decades of diverse immigration multicultural Australia emerged, both as a policy and as a ‘demographic reality of cultural diversity’ (Kolet 2010, p.2). Policies of *multiculturalism* were pursued with bipartisan support in the 1970s and 1980s as a means to maximise the success of this – now inevitable – diversity. The various ethnic groups which comprised Australian society at this time ‘were to be permitted a large measure of cultural autonomy’, with ‘access and equity’ for ‘all Australians irrespective of their origin’ to be secured through policies of inclusion in the form of specialised institutions and initiatives (Castles 1987, p.1). These policies were based on the ethic of multiculturalism; an ‘acceptance of, and respect for, cultural diversity, community harmony and inclusion’ (Henry & Kurzak 2013 p.1).

Jupp (2011, p.42) observes that, since its inception, Australian multiculturalism has been presented as a ‘national responsibility’ for all Australians but in practice it is directed at migrants of non-English speaking background. Though in times of economic growth and improving living standards policies of multiculturalism and mass immigration were accepted, by the 1980s, ‘economic difficulties made many people question the benefits’ of these policies and those perceived as ‘outsiders’ began to be ‘scape-goated’ (Castles 1987, p.24).

These sentiments were amplified by the arrival of Vietnamese refugees in the late 1970s. The first people to seek asylum by boat arrived in 1976 on the Kein Giang which had originally departed from South Vietnam after the fall of Saigon – a war Australia took part in. Under a Fraser Coalition Government, Australia accepted 95,000 Vietnamese refugees, however this move was met with public resistance (Marr & Wilkinson 2003, p.37).

Australia’s immigration policy had transformed by the 1980s, with the assisted passage scheme abolished and an ever-increasing number of family-reunion migrants arriving (Betts 2003, p.169). Return migration was decreasing and more people arriving on temporary visas were staying permanently and becoming citizens (DIMA 2002). During this decade, the subject of immigration became more ‘politically’ and debate on the ethnic ‘composition’ of society became more prevalent (Betts 2003, p.171). John Howard, then leader of the Coalition in Opposition, suggested that the number of migrants arriving from Asia was ‘higher than the...
majority of the public preferred’, resulting in protest from those who judged Howard’s comments to be ‘legitimising racism’ (ibid, p.171). In the context of an Australian society that had been so dramatically transformed in the space of several decades, anxieties about immigration and race began to re-emerge in the public consciousness.

Forty years after Australia’s decision to embark on a ‘populate or perish’ immigration scheme, more than half of the population of new immigrants came from Asia (Castles 1987, p.7), and more than two thirds of the Australian public felt that too many migrants, particularly Asian migrants, were arriving (Betts 1999, p.114, pp.127-130). The Fitzgerald report (1988) – produced by the Committee to Advise on Immigration Policies (CAAIP) – recommended that pathways to family reunion should be ‘set aside’ in favour of increased skilled migration (Betts 2003, p.175). The report (CAAIP 1988, p.2) named ‘confusion and mistrust of multiculturalism’ as a contributing factor to public resistance to immigration, and called for ‘immediate reform’, stating that ‘Australia’s immigration policies are not managing the increasing demand’. While the Fitzgerald report suggested an increase in skilled migration, Birrell and Betts (1988, p.264) predicted that the report would lead to decreased migrant intake overall, as it reinforced unwarranted public concerns about immigration, leaving the Government ‘hamstrung’. Since it is not ‘acceptable or ethical’ to divide migrant groups by race or nationality, a government wanting to cut down on Asian migration would then have to cut immigration ‘universalistically’ (ibid).

Many Australians had begun to feel that ‘their identity as Australians [was] threatened’ by mass immigration from Asia (Birrell & Betts 1988, p.265). Opposition leader John Howard ‘correctly judged’ that he could take advantage of this emotional response the to report and to the broader immigration debate, taking a stand for ‘One Australia’; the reduction of Asian immigration and a step back from policies of multiculturalism (ibid p.274).

Very few people seeking asylum arrived on boats in the 1980s, but in the early 90s several hundred people seeking asylum per year began to arrive; a small number, but ‘such were the passions they aroused’ that the Keating Labor Government legislated an ‘unprecedented’ system of indefinite mandatory detention (Marr & Wilkinson 2003, p.37).

The election of a Coalition Government and Prime Minister John Howard in 1996 brought to an end ‘government advocacy of multiculturalism’ (Jones 2003, p.117). Under Howard, Australia’s immigration scheme and policies towards the inclusion of migrants in society shifted, the former towards an emphasis on skills and the latter towards an emphasis on citizenship and Australian values. Howard cut permanent migration substantially – though the number of temporary visas continued to grow (Elton-Pym 2018; Betts 2003, p.179).
Howard years marked a decisive return to a controlled immigration policy focused on economic interests and Australia’s sovereign right to defend its borders.

3.2.4 The Year 2001

In 2001, a seismic shift took place in the political discourse around national security and the immigration of people seeking asylum (Marr & Wilkinson 2003; Fiske 2019; RAC 2019). This shift was catalysed by a convergence of three major events in the months leading up to the November federal election. The effects of the Tampa affair, the 9/11 attacks and the Children Overboard incident helped to secure an election win and a third parliamentary term for the incumbent Howard Government.

On the 23rd of August 2001, the Norwegian freighter MV Tampa rescued 438 people – predominantly Hazara people of Afghanistan intending to seek asylum in Australia – from an Indonesia fishing vessel in distress (Reilly 2017). Captain of the Tampa, Arne Rhinnan, informed the Australian Coast Guard of his intention to take those rescued to Christmas Island, an Australian territory in the Indian Ocean and the closest available port, but his request was denied and the Australian Government threatened to charge Rhinnan with people smuggling if he disobeyed. Concerned for the wellbeing of those on board, Rhinnan eventually entered Australian waters without permission. This resulted in the boarding of the Tampa by specialised Australian troops and increased pressure on Rhinnan to return to international waters (ibid). Norway reported Australia to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for denying its humanitarian obligations while the Howard Government tried to rush through the Border Protection Bill 2001 to give Australia authority to remove any ship in its territorial waters, though this Bill was blocked in the Senate. The rescued asylum seekers were ultimately transported to Nauru where they formed the first group of ‘boat arrivals’ to be detained as part of Howard’s Pacific Solution (Marr & Wilkinson 2003; Reilly). The Australian Government’s refusal to allow the Tampa to dock ‘provided an opportunity for the Government to take a public stand against asylum seeker arrivals’, a move which more than three quarters of Australians supported at the time (Curthoys 2003, p.8; Nethery & Holman 2016, p.1020). Since this event, a ‘desire to protect Australia’s borders from refugees’ has dominated conversations about immigration and national security (Curthoys, p.8; Reilly).

9/11 was a watershed event. The terrorist attacks themselves, and subsequent response, catalysed the securitisation of policy and political discourse across the West and significantly reshaped Australia’s security agenda. A post-9/11 world was one ‘utterly changed’, and it
wasn’t long before those terrorists responsible for the attacks were ‘linked’ in the public imagination to ‘the Muslim asylum seekers forcing their way into Australia’ (Marr & Wilkinson 2003, p.145). From this point forward, ‘terrorism became the defining threat facing the Western world’ and Prime Minister John Howard would be ‘awarded the electoral advantage of being Prime Minister in wartime’ after leading Australia into a War on Terror (ibid, p.143, p. 283).

In early October 2001, the HMAS Adelaide intercepted a fishing vessel carrying 223 people and attempted to turn it back to Indonesia. The turnback of the vessel – SIEV 4 (Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel 4) – and the political messaging around this event sparked a political controversy which considerably influenced the federal election and the perception of people who seek asylum. As a result of a Navy communications error, Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock declared to the public that people seeking asylum on the SIEV 4 had thrown their own children overboard in order to secure passage to Australia. As the boat sank, Prime Minister John Howard condemned the ‘sickening behaviour’ while Ruddock ‘accused asylum seekers of destroying it deliberately’ (Dellit 2002). In the following days, the Government was informed that there ‘was no evidence that children had been thrown overboard’ with subsequent investigations disproving the allegations (ibid). However, ‘false information’ continued to be circulated by senior political figures in Howard’s Government in the weeks leading up to the election (ibid).

These three events marked a turning point in the damaging discourse around, and exclusionary policies towards, people who seek asylum; particularly those who come by boat.

3.3 Labor, The Coalition & the Revolving Door of Australian Prime Ministers
In the last ten years, no Australian Prime Minister has served a full three-year term before being deposed by their own party. Leaders are swapped in an attempt to improve opinion polls and elections chances, but the Australian public have criticised the turbulent in-fighting conducted by the two major parties – the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Liberal Party of Australia (LP) – with many voters feeling ‘hoodwinked’ when they vote for ‘one national leader, then later [have] another imposed upon them’ (Stuff 2018).

The Prime Minister of Australia is the leader of the party with the most members in the House of Representatives thus in order to form a majority government, parties form coalitions, such as the long-standing alliance of the Liberal Party of Australia (LP) and the National Party of Australia (NP), commonly referred to as The Coalition. The Liberal-National Coalition and the Australian Labor Party are opponents in a well-established two-party system.
The Coalition is usually described as centre-right, with the National Party seen as more conservative than their Liberal counterpart. The Liberal Party (2019) puts first the ‘inalienable rights and freedoms of all peoples’, advocates for minimal government interference and the reduction of ‘bureaucratic red tape’, and believes in ‘free enterprise’ and the ‘facilitation of wealth so that all may enjoy the highest possible standards of living, health, education and social justice’. The National Party (2019) is focused on the ‘future of regional Australia’, building strong economies and communities, promoting Christian ethics, defending the security of the nation and maintaining individual liberties. The leader of the Liberal Party serves as overall leader of The Coalition and, depending on their individual ideological position, is representative of the more conservative or more moderate factions of the alliance.

The Australian Labor Party (ALP 2019) have, historically, been labelled as centre-left, representing the interests of ‘middle-and working-class Australia’, maintaining a close relationship with the unions and standing for ‘fairness at work’, ‘access to quality education’ and equal opportunity for all members of society. Despite their ideological differences, Labor and The Coalition are both committed to ‘stopping the boats’ (Tony Abbott 5d 2015), and policies of indefinite mandatory detention and offshore processing continue to receive bipartisan support.

For many months, polls were predicting a Labor victory in the May 2019 federal election (ABC News 2019). However, in the days following the election it became clear that The Coalition’s negative campaign aimed at ‘[convincing] people they should be afraid of change’ had secured an election win and a majority government for The Coalition and incumbent Prime Minister Scott Morrison (BBC 2019).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>25. <strong>Howard</strong>, John</th>
<th>Lib</th>
<th>11-03-96</th>
<th>03-12-07</th>
<th>11 years, 8 months, 22 days</th>
<th>Defeated at General Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26. <strong>Rudd</strong>, Kevin</td>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>03-12-07</td>
<td>24-06-10</td>
<td>2 years, 6 months, 21 days</td>
<td>Derosed as Party Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. <strong>Gillard</strong>, Julia</td>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>24-06-10</td>
<td>27-06-13</td>
<td>3 years, 3 days</td>
<td>Derosed as Party Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rudd</strong>, Kevin</td>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>27-06-13</td>
<td>18-09-13</td>
<td>2 months, 22 days</td>
<td>Defeated at General Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. <strong>Abbott</strong>, Tony</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>18-09-13</td>
<td>15-09-15</td>
<td>1 year, 11 months, 28 days</td>
<td>Derosed as Party Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. <strong>Turnbull</strong>, Malcolm</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>15-09-15</td>
<td>24-08-18</td>
<td>2 years, 11 months, 9 days</td>
<td>Derosed as Party Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. <strong>Morrison</strong>, Scott</td>
<td>Lib</td>
<td>24-08-18</td>
<td>present</td>
<td>incumbent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 2: Australia’s Prime Ministers 1996 – present (Australian Politics 2018)*
4. Theory & Methodology

4.1 Discourse

Discourse analysis is based on the principle that language not only enables ‘our access to reality’ but produces ‘representations of reality that are never mere reflections of a pre-existing reality but contribute to constructing [it]’ (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, pp.8-9). While Laclau & Mouffe (1985) position ‘individuals as subjects of discourse’, critical discourse analysts perceive individuals as ‘products of discourse and as producers of discourse’ meaning that discourse ‘both constitutes the social world and is constituted by other social practices’ (Fairclough 1992; Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, p.7, p.61, emphasis in original). This discussion understands the term discourse as something which contributes to the construction of social identities, relations and ‘systems of knowledge and meaning’ (Jørgensen & Phillips, p.67). My chosen methodology draws on the principles of Fairclough’s (1992) Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) but focuses on framing as a discursive practice which reflects and shapes the social world.

For Fairclough (1992, p.66) discursive and non-discursive elements inform the social world, with non-discursive practices being those such as ‘the physical practice that is involved in the construction of a bridge’ while discursive practices refer to the ‘active deployment of discourse’ in areas such as journalism and public relations which contribute to ‘knowledge formation’ (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, p.67; Bacchi & Bonham 2014, p.176, p.177).

Politics – characterised by written and spoken communications projecting particular knowledges and realities – is central to the establishment and reproduction of dominant discourses. Foucault (1972, p.163) posits that there are multiple realities but politics plays a ‘pivotal role’ in ‘the coordination of specific (singular) realities’ informing which discourse, and subsequently which knowledges, are understood as ‘real’ (Mol 1999, p.vii; Bacchi & Bonham 2014, p.176). Analysis of the discursive practices of political elites is therefore critical to challenging power imbalances that are discursively constructed and reflected.

4.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) refers to the ‘critical linguistic approach of scholars who find the larger discursive unit of text to be the basic unit of communication’ and analyse discourse in an attempt to better understand power struggles in the social world (Wodak 2001, p.2; Wodak & Meyer 2009, p.5). Fairclough (1993, p.14) contends that ‘people should become aware and more self-aware about language and discourse’ and believes that CDA
should have an impact beyond research, taking ‘the side of oppressed social groups’ (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, 63). Given that CDA aims to ‘make explicit power relationships which are frequently hidden’, the traditional lines between social scientific research and political argumentation are often blurred (Meyer 2001, p.15).

I have chosen to ground my methodology in CDA as it is a ‘well established approach for scrutinising texts’ – particularly policy documents – which closely relate to a set of established principles and statements of intent (Lewin-Jones 2016, p.76). Critics of CDA have raised concerns that analysts have a ‘biased interpretation’, choosing to ‘cherry-pick’ texts and segments for analysis which will ‘support the preferred interpretation’ (Widdowson 1995, p.169 cited in Meyer 2001, p.17; Lewin-Jones 2016, 77). Lincoln and Guba (1985, p.40) argue that this ‘deliberate selectivity’ and ‘purposive sampling’ in fact ‘exposes more directly’ the ‘nature of the communication’ between the communicator and the receiver and is thus of critical importance. CDA theorists state that the importance of research comes from placing the analysis in a ‘broader ideological context’ and establishing a foundation for further discussion (Wodak 2006; Lewin-Jones 2016, p.77).

4.3 Framing

4.3.1 Theory

Framing can be understood as a discursive practice which contributes to the ‘[formation]’ of the social world (Goffman 1974; Foucault 1989, p.74; Jäger 2001). Entman (1993, p.52) describes the act of framing as the selection of ‘some aspects of a perceived reality’ in order to ‘make them more salient in a communicating text’. This promotes ‘a particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and / or treatment recommendation for the item described’, one which reflects the agenda or ideological standpoint of the communicator (ibid p.52). Since frames ‘select and call attention to’ specific aspects of a described reality, they are powerful in what they ‘omit’ as much as in what they include (ibid, p.54).

Framing can be subconscious or deliberate, though researchers focused on the use of framing by political elites regularly describe it as ‘an important tool’ used as part of ‘political strategy’ intended to ‘bias’ discussion ‘towards their particular stance’ (Kinder & Hertzog 1993; Chong 2000; Johnson, Lee & Goldwasser 2017, p.90). Lakoff (2004, pp.xi-xii) describes frames as ‘mental structures that shape the way we see the world’; neural pathways that cannot necessarily be accessed consciously, but which are activated by certain stimuli, such as language;
all thought is physical, carried by neural circuitry [...] the meaning of every word is defined in terms of the frames that structure our thought. All of this matters for politics. The more a neural circuit is activated, the stronger it gets. [...] At some point, those frames become permanent. Those permanent frames constitute a conceptual system, a brain structure necessary for understanding. If the facts don’t fit the frames, they will be ignored. And if you negate a frame, you activate it.

Lakoff (2011, p.185)

Zaller (1992, p.95) problematises the fact that ‘framing and symbol manipulation by elites are sometimes discussed in conspirational tones, as if, in a healthy democratic polity, they would not occur’. This notion that political elites ‘manipulate citizens’ judgements’ through framing, while repeatedly demonstrated, denies the agency of the audience (Druckman 2001 p.226, p.246). Druckman (p.246) suggests that citizens ‘consciously weigh’ the considerations put forward by political elites and compare this to their existing knowledge. Chong & Druckman (2007, p.112) explain that the ‘strength’ of frames ‘depends on whether other information is available to the audience’, describing knowledge as an ‘individual-level moderator’ regulating the efficacy of frames.

Most studies of framing assume that the role of the communicator is occupied by ‘elite actors such as politicians, the media, experts and other opinion leaders’ while the audience is made up of ‘members of the general public’ (Chong & Druckman 2007, p.117). The presence of frames in a text ‘does not guarantee their influence in audience thinking’, as for frames to be effective they must be compatible with existing frames or schemata– categories, stereotypes and scripts – which determine the salience of particular notions (Entman 1993, p.53). Salience is central to the concept of framing. It involves making certain information more ‘noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences’, increasing the likelihood that the audience will ‘perceive the information, discern meaning and [...] store it in memory’ (Fiske & Taylor 1991 cited in Entman 1993, p.53).

Opinions are drawn ‘from a set of available beliefs stored in memory’ therefore, if the frame presented is incompatible with existing beliefs, the impact of the frame is limited (Chong & Druckman 2007, p.111). Words have the power to create and reinforce a particular worldview, hence politicians and political parties regularly repeat certain words and phrases in order to strengthen particular frames. However, while facts are important, ‘to be meaningful they must be framed in terms of their [...] importance’ and linked to existing schemata (Lakoff 2004, p.xii). Lakoff (p.xiii) demonstrates that negating certain frames does not counteract them but activates the original frame and strengthens it through repetition. ‘Thinking differently requires speaking differently’, asserts Lakoff (p.xiii), thus in order to avoid reinforcing certain frames, new language is needed.
4.3.2 Framing Effects & Public Opinion

Frame analysis offers ‘a way to describe the power of communicating text’, enabling us to understand how ‘influence over human consciousness is exerted’ (Entman 1993, p.52).

Studies of framing (Kahneman & Tversky 1984; Iyengar & Kinder 1987; Rasinski 1989; Sniderman & Theriault 2004 cited in Chong & Druckman, 2007, p.104) demonstrate that public opinion is malleable, indicating to political elites that they can shape perceptions of reality through discursive acts.

The lack of stability in the general public’s views has been linked to a phenomenon in public opinion research called ‘framing effects’; change in opinion in response to how an issue is presented. Kahneman and Tversky’s (1984) widely cited study recorded a framing effect when giving participants differently represented versions of identical scenarios;

Imagine that the USA is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows:

If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and a two thirds probability that no people will be saved.

Which of the two programs would you favor?

(Kahneman & Tversky 1984, p.343)

When presented with this choice, 72 per cent of subjects chose Program A. Participants were then presented with identical scenarios which were ‘framed in terms of likely deaths rather than likely lives saved’ (Entman 1993, p.53);

If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. If program D is adopted, there is a one third probability that nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die.

(Kahneman & Tversky 1984, p.343)

The ‘reframing’ of the scenario caused a reversal in the percentages, with only 22 per cent of subjects choosing Program C, the identical scenario to Program A (Kahneman & Tversky, p.343). Framing was shown to impact problem comprehension and have a ‘common effect on large portions of the receiving audience’ (Kahneman & Tversky; Entman 1993, p.54).

Rasinski (1989, p.391) then demonstrated the ‘effect of question wording’ in relation to public opinion on government spending, finding that while 65 per cent of the American public thought ‘too little [was] being spent on “assistance to the poor”’ only 20 per cent believed that ‘too little [was] being spent on “welfare”’, highlighting the negative associations the term welfare has amassed. Sniderman and Theriault (2004 cited in Chong & Druckman, p.104) further illustrated the power of framing when asking participants if they would ‘favor or oppose allowing a hate group to hold a political rally?’. When prefaced with ‘Given the importance of free speech’, 85 per cent of subjects answered that they were ‘in favor’, while
when ‘Given the risk of violence’ preceded the question, only 45 per cent of subjects were ‘in favour, demonstrating the activation of established ideas and values by particular frames (ibid, p. 104). In this case, existing schemata connected to notions of the right to free speech and political violence were shown to be activated by the framing of the question.

4.3.3 Framing & the Media

The mass media can be used as a tool for circulating the frames and narratives propagated by elites and can ‘impact on policy outcomes’ by ‘shaping and amplifying public attitudes’ (Branton & Dunaway 2008; Cooper et al. 2017, p.79). Greussing and Boomgaarden (2017 p.1763) posit that the media provides ‘an essential backdrop’ for ‘public opinion, political mobilisation, and policy support’ as media coverage contains frames which act as a ‘cognitive shortcut’ to help the audience – usually the general public – to make sense of presented issues.

Framing scholars typically analyse mass media sources to identity and determine the prevalence of a set of frames connected to particular issues. Chong & Druckman (2007, p.109) observe that frames commonly identified in mass media communications often ‘mimic those used by politicians, social activists [and] other media outlets’ while Entman (1993, p.56) warns that an absence of frame-awareness in journalism ‘allow the most skilful media manipulators to impose their dominant frames on the news’. Cognitive linguist George Lakoff (CNN Business 2018) explains that United States President Donald Trump has ‘turned words into weapons’, frequently using ‘linguistic frames’ to ‘control the public narrative’. In a discussion of Trump’s framing of immigration issues, Lakoff (ibid) describes the mass media as ‘a marketing agency for Trump’s ideas’ as they repeat his frames without thought, reinforcing damaging narratives which construct those crossing the border as ‘illegals’.

Entman’s (2004) ‘cascade model’ assumes that frames ‘originating from the administration shape the frames’ used by others political elites, the mass media and the public (Chong & Druckman 2007, p.117). Entman’s model also suggests that the frames chosen by elites are selected with the audience and their ‘preferences’ ‘in mind’ (ibid). Consideration of the ‘preferences’ of the general public is at odds with the traditional view that the influence of political communications on public opinion is ‘exclusively one-way’, instead contending that the beliefs and priorities of the public will ‘have a bearing on the position taking’ of political elites (Chong 1996; Entman 2004; Egres 2018 p.475). Given that media communications are ‘both formed and formative’ of public opinion, policy makers ‘presume [the media’s] representativeness of public opinion’ causing a response in the policy agenda (Dekker &
Scholten 2017, p.217). This means that shifting public opinion from the ground-up ultimately has the potential to impact the decisions and policy agendas of political elites.

### 4.3.4 Framing & Policy

Framing is central to political communications as it involves presenting a policy issue from one perspective while excluding alternative perspectives (Schaffner & Sellers 2010 cited in Boydstun et al. 2013, p.1). Boydstun et al. (pp.1-2) contend that understanding the frames that ‘define’ policy issues is a ‘crucial task for advancing our understanding of politics’. In order to provide ‘a common framework for cross-project comparison and replication’ Boydstun et al. developed a Policy Frames Codebook; ‘a system for categorising framing cues across policy issues’. The Codebook was tested on a random sample of media stories in order to ‘identify and assess empirical patterns’ in the use of framing in policy discussions in the United States. The findings indicated the ‘cross-issue applicability and comprehensiveness’ of the Codebook (ibid, p. 20).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Economic frames</td>
<td>The costs, benefits, or monetary/financial implications of the issue (to an individual, family, community, or to the economy as a whole).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Capacity and resources frames</td>
<td>The lack of or availability of physical, geographical, spatial, human, and financial resources, or the capacity of existing systems and resources to implement or carry out policy goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Morality frames</td>
<td>Any perspective-- or policy objective or action (including proposed action)--that is compelled by religious doctrine or interpretation, duty, honour, righteousness or any other sense of ethics or social responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Fairness and equality frames</td>
<td>Equality or inequality with which laws, punishment, rewards, and resources are applied or distributed among individuals or groups. Also, the balance between the rights or interests of one individual or group compared to another individual or group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Constitutionality and jurisprudence frames</td>
<td>The constraints imposed on or freedoms granted to individuals, government, and corporations via the Constitution, Bill of Rights and other amendments, or judicial interpretation. This deals specifically with the authority of government to regulate, and the authority of individuals/corporations to act independently of government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Policy prescription and evaluation</td>
<td>Particular policies proposed for addressing an identified problem, and figuring out if certain policies will work, or if existing policies are effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Law and order, crime and justice frames</td>
<td>Specific policies in practice and their enforcement, incentives, and implications. Includes stories about enrollment and interpretation of laws by individuals and law enforcement, breaking laws, loopholes, fines, sentencing and punishment. Increases or reductions in crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Security and defence frames</td>
<td>Security, threats to security, and protection of one's person, family, in-group, nation, etc. Generally, an action or a call to action that can be taken to protect the welfare of a person, group, nation sometimes from a not yet manifested threat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Health and safety frames</td>
<td>Healthcare access and effectiveness, illness, disease, sanitation, obesity, mental health effects, prevention of or perpetuation of gun violence, infrastructure and building safety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Quality of life frames</td>
<td>The effects of a policy on individuals’ wealth, mobility, access to resources, happiness, social structures, ease of day-to-day routines, quality of community life etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Cultural identity frames</td>
<td>The social norms, trends, values and customs constituting culture(s), as they relate to a specific policy issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Public opinion frames:</td>
<td>References to general social attitudes, polling and demographic information, as well as implied or actual consequences of diverging from or 'getting ahead of' public opinion or polls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Political frames</td>
<td>Any political considerations surrounding an issue. Issue actions or efforts or stances that are political, such as partisan filibusters, lobbyist involvement, bipartisan efforts, deal-making and vote trading, appealing to one's base, mentions of political manoeuvring. Explicit statements that a policy issue is good or bad for a particular political party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. External regulation and reputation frames</td>
<td>The United States’ external relations with another nation; the external relations of one state with another; or relations between groups. This includes trade agreements and outcomes, comparisons of policy outcomes or desired policy outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Other frames</td>
<td>Any frames that do not fit into the above categories.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 3: Boydstun et al.’s Policy Frames Codebook (2013, p.6)*
Johnson, Jin & Goldwasser (2017, p.556) write that ‘by emphasising specific aspects of [an] issue, politicians create an association between the issue and a specific frame of reference, allowing them to influence public perception’. Borrowing the fifteen policy frames outlined by Boydstun et al. (2013), Johnson, Jin and Goldwasser (p.556) conducted an in-depth analysis of frames used by politicians to influence political discourse through Twitter. Boydstun et al.’s first fourteen frames were found to be ‘directly applicable to the tweets of US politicians’ but Johnson, Jin & Goldwasser (p.557) proposed that three more frames should be added to the list; Factual, Promotion, and Personal Sympathy and Support.18

Johnson, Lee & Goldwasser (2017, p.92) performed further analysis on the data and observed that, despite their ideological differences, Democrats and Republicans ‘use similar frames both when discussing similar and different issues’. This was exemplified in an analysis of tweets from Republicans and Democrats relating to the 2015 church shooting in Charleston;

(Tweet 1) Our thoughts and prayers must be with 9 innocent men and women murdered in Charleston, SC. Every effort must be made to capture the killer. RIP

(Tweet 2) My thoughts are with those impacted by the #CharlestonShooting. I pray that the perpetrator is brought to justice soon.

(Johnson, Jin & Goldwasser 2017 cited in Johnson, Lee & Goldwasser 2017, p.92)

Both tweets frame the shooting with Frame 6 – Crime & Punishment – and Frame 17 – Personal Sympathy & Support despite occupying conservative and progressive standpoints. The first tweet calls for the ‘killer’ to be captured, while the second ‘[prays] that the perpetrator will be brought to justice soon’, pointing to the use of the Crime & Punishment frame (Johnson, Lee & Goldwasser 2017, p.92). Both politicians express their sympathy – triggering the Personal Sympathy & Support frame – but despite the similarities the word choice of each politician reveals more about the ‘ideological base of the speaker’ (ibid p.70).

Various studies have looked at the role of the press in ‘shaping’ political discourse around the policy issue of immigration (Boomgaarden & Vliengenthart 2009; Boswell 2012; Caviedes 2015). Studies of discourse in the contexts of Europe and the United Kingdom highlight a trend of securitisation, the frequent mention of borders in news coverage relating to migrants, and identify that dominant policy narratives about immigration and the ‘refugee crisis’ in the media often reflect the messaging of political elites (Caviedes 2015; Greussing & Boomgaarden 2017, p.1758).

18 Frame 15: Factual (facts presented without apparent ‘spin’), Frame 16: Promotion (refer to appearances, political friends), and Frame 17: Personal Sympathy and Support (offer condolences, stand in support) (Johnson, Jin & Goldwasser 2017)
4.3.5 Framing in the Australian Political Context

News coverage of ‘asylum seeker and refugee stories in Australia has historically been negative’ with public perceptions of refugees ‘[increasing in] negativity over time’ (McKay et al. 2011; Phillips & Spinks 2013; Cooper et al. 2017, p.78). McKay et al. (2012) observed that the frames used in political and media communications focus on the legitimacy and illegality of people who seek asylum. Several analyses (Bleiker et al. 2013; Laughland-Booy et al. 2014; Pedersen & Hartley 2015) exploring the role of framing in the dehumanisation of asylum seekers found that this group was regularly positioned as a threat – to security, to employment opportunities and to national unity. This was connected to the use of ‘loaded language’ such as ‘boat people’ and ‘illegals’ (Pedersen & Hartley 2015; Cooper et al. 2017).

In the Australian context, where media is ‘heavily influenced by the state’, Cooper et al. (2017, p.79) found that ‘the Australian Government determines media reporting on refugees and asylum seekers’. In a discourse analysis of texts relating to Australia’s asylum policy, Holtom (2013, p.10) demonstrated that the messaging from politicians both shapes and reflects public opinion, with this constant transaction facilitated by the mass media.

While advocacy organisations and human-rights-based political parties ‘present alternative discourses to debunk myths about asylum seekers’, the mass media regularly present ‘particular interpretations or understandings of issues’ which influence ‘prejudicial attitudes’ (Hodgetts & Chamberlain 2013; Rowe & O’Brien 2014; McHugh-Dillon 2015; Cooper et al. 2017). Cooper et al. (p.83), in their discourse analysis of regional local news coverage on refugees and asylum seekers, found that there was ‘a strong positive tone’ across the majority of stories. Contrasted with the negative discourse identified in metropolitan news (McKay et al. 2011), local articles in regional news frequently ‘framed’ people seeking asylum and refugees in ‘humanising ways’ by focusing on individual’s ‘refugee story’ (Cooper et al., p.83). However, Cooper et al. (ibid) note that stories focused on local topics – such as the ‘integration’ of refugees in the local area – were more positive than those stories on national topics which were ‘more reliant on government sources’.

In a research collaboration with independent non-profit the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre (ASRC), Shenker-Osorio et al. (2017, p.1) aimed to find ‘words that work and change the debate around people seeking asylum’. An analysis of public debate was combined with interviews with refugee advocates, surveys and focus groups with Australian voters to ‘delve into public perception’ (ibid). Shenker-Osorio et al. (ibid) identified three opinion groups in their research; the support base – who ‘already agree with our message’, the steadfast opponents – who are opposed to ‘our message and who will never change their minds’ and the persuadables – ‘the bulk of the population whose minds can be changed’. Seizing ‘the moral
high ground by talking about what’s right’, values-based messaging around the ideas of family, fairness and freedom, and providing ‘aspirational calls to create something good’ were shown to be critical to changing the conversation around people seeking asylum, and shifting ‘persuadables’ opinions (ibid, p.2). A focus on what people come for – safety – rather than why they are fleeing from – persecution – was shown to make messaging more relatable, while referring to ‘Australians’ or ‘the nation’ appeared to damage rights-based arguments, thus Shenker-Osorio et al (p.4, Appendix 2) recommend using the term ‘people’ and linking to a common humanity.

Dial testing and focus groups provided essential insights into which terms and phrases contained within messaging actually move the persuadables towards and away from a pro-asylum seeker position. Emphasising Australia’s human rights obligations, stating seeking asylum is ‘not illegal’ and ‘[not] an issue of border security or defence’ only reinforced the frames of the opposition – defence, security, illegality (Shenker-Osorio et al. 2017, p.3).

4.4 Study Contribution
Existing literature (McKay et al. 2011; 2012; Bleiker et al. 2013; Hodgetts & Chamberlain 2013; Holtom 2013; Rowe & O’Brien 2014; Laughland-Booy et al. 2014; Pedersen & Hartley...
2015; McHugh-Dillon 2015; Cooper et al. 2017) on the discursive practice of framing in relation to the portrayal of people seeking asylum in Australia has largely focused on the role and effect of media reproduction of policy frames. Other research (Shenker-Osorio et al. 2017) has shown the importance of framing in countering dominant discourses, seeking to improve frame-awareness as a means to disrupt the dominant narratives constructed through policy frames employed by politicians. Discourse analysis of the language used by political elites reveals that frames relating to illegality as well as Australia’s security appear regularly in the messaging from political elites in defence of harsh policies. However, there is a lack of literature contributing to an understanding of frames used by Australian political elites across different policy issues, as Boydstun et al. (2013) have achieved in the American context.

It is hoped that by identifying frames that frequently appear in communications relating to the policy visions of Multicultural Australia and Safe, Secure & Free Australia, I can identify frames that carry across policy issues and understand how these frames are used in combination with one another to support dominant discourses. By examining these two policy visions side by side, I hope to draw attention to the tension between Australia’s ‘inclusive’ rhetoric and ‘exclusionary’ actions, establishing a foundation for further research.

4.5 Empirical Material

My empirical material consists of policy documents, speeches, press conference remarks and interviews from successive Prime Ministers of Australia and their respective governments and senior cabinet ministers. I chose to include a variety of communication mediums in order to examine which frames appear in thoroughly drafted and proofread documents as well as in those instances where comments are less rehearsed. In the vast majority of the material, the Prime Minister of the time is the primary communicator, however, in some cases the primary communicator is either a senior cabinet minister, or the communicator is a former or future Prime Minister not in office at the time.

The majority of empirical material was collected by searching key terms within a particular date range on online databases hosting archival government texts. I predominantly used the online archives PM Transcripts, Parliament of Australia, and Prime Minister of Australia. Google searches were also used to find transcripts of particular texts that were referenced in news articles, academic literature and other empirical material.
4.6 Method
In order to determine the relevance of the texts, I searched (Ctrl + F) for the following key terms within digital transcripts: ‘asylum’, ‘Australian values’, ‘boats’, ‘borders’, ‘border security’, ‘citizenship’, ‘diversity’, ‘immigration’, ‘migrant’, ‘multicultural’, and ‘multiculturalism’. The texts selected explicitly engage with the policy visions of Multicultural Australia or Safe, Secure & Free Australia and, in some cases, make reference to both. Texts which did not tangibly engage with either policy vision were not considered relevant to the analysis and were excluded. References to social cohesion, citizenship, integration, national identity, Australian values and diversity were seen to fit under the umbrella of Multicultural Australia while discussions of immigration, migrants, borders, asylum seekers and humanitarian intake were included under the banner of Safe, Secure & Free Australia.

Forty texts were selected for analysis after the first reading of a wide range of texts. During the second reading excerpts of the texts which directly related to the policy visions of Multicultural Australia and/or Safe, Secure & Free Australia were compiled. I deliberated whether removing sentences and paragraphs from the original text would remove them from their context, or somehow change the meaning of the language used. However, I took care to make notes of the context when copying across and kept the original documents for reference when reading the separated excerpts. By collating the relevant passages in one document, the observation of patterns and themes was facilitated. During this process I began recording the frames identified, building a list of frames based on Boydstun et al.’s (2013) Policy Frames Codebook. I then completed a third reading, coding the identified frames in the excerpts.

I considered whether selecting the more poignant excerpts of particular texts meant I was ‘cherry-picking’ and finding evidence to support a preconceived hypothesis (Lewin-Jones 2016, 77). However, it is undeniable that the frames identified are both present and consistent across the texts and therefore, despite the subjective nature of discourse analysis, an analysis and discussion of the presence of such frames remains relevant and worthy of focus.

4.7 The Paradox of Language
Researchers analysing the use of language to construct reality – and the impact of this constructed reality on language – paradoxically, must use language to communicate their research problems, questions and findings. Fairclough (2008, p.208) advocates for greater consideration of how language is used by researchers and warns critical discourse analysts to ‘be careful about how we write ourselves’. I have taken this into consideration, taking steps to offer alternatives when reproducing frames and narratives which support dominant discourses.
5. Analysis

The discursive practice of framing appears frequently in communications from Australian Prime Ministers and senior political figures on the topics of inclusive multiculturalism and the exclusion of people seeking asylum. Not only is framing a constant feature, but certain frames themselves are constant and appear repeatedly in texts from both major political parties and across the time period of analysis. A list of the texts used as empirical material can be found in the Appendices (Appendix I).

The technique of frame identification is based on research into the use of framing in political discourse (Boydstun et al. 2013; Shenker-Osorio et al. 2017; Johnson, Lee & Goldwasser 2017), framing theory (Goffman 1974; Entman 1993; Lakoff 2004; Chong & Druckman 2007) and the foundations of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1993; Wodak 2001; Jørgensen & Phillips 2002; Wodak & Meyer 2009).

The act of framing can be subconscious, or it can be deliberate (Lakoff 2014, p.xv). In my analysis, I have assumed that political elites consciously choose to present policy issues in a particular way, but do not assume that they consciously apply a strategy that reflects framing theory. However, it should be noted that throughout the analysis I state that communicators ‘use’, ‘employ’, ‘activate’, ‘trigger’ certain frames, but this should not necessarily be understood as a conscious decision on the part of the communicator, but as an observation of the presence of frames in the texts. Throughout the analysis, references to an audience are also made. The audience is understood to be the general Australian public.

Due to the time restrictions of a master’s thesis, and the high volume of empirical material available for analysis, I have chosen to narrow my focus to identifying frames and analysing how they are combined to necessitate and legitimate certain policy agendas. During my analysis, it quickly became clear that the frame dimensions outlined in Boydstun et al.’s (2013) Policy Frames Codebook – while providing necessary foundation and inspiration – are not directly applicable to the Australian political context, particularly when discussing the policy visions for Multicultural Australia and Safe, Secure & Free Australia. Boydstun et al. (2013, p.6) intended for their Codebook to ‘be applicable to any policy issue’, to aid with the categorisation of frames and advance frame identification in communications research in a United States context. However, the frames observed in my empirical material were more complex and context-specific so, in order to improve the quality of my analysis, I developed a list of nine frames which appear regularly in the analysed texts.
The frames identified in this analysis are labelled with the letters A to I so as to avoid being confused with Boydstun et al.’s (2013, p.6) numbered frame codes (#1-15). Throughout the analysis, the presence of a frame will be indicated in brackets i.e. (A).

5.1 Identified frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Fairness</td>
<td>Relating to the distribution of rights, opportunities and resources among groups; connected to Australian idea of ‘a fair go’; rooted in the notion of equal opportunity and the general value of fairness; linked to the perception that some are more deserving than others; notions of entitlement;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Relating to mentions of threats, either real or constructed, to the safety and wellbeing of the nation, a certain group, or way of life; emphasis on the need to defend, protect and secure; calls to action; references to the sovereign right to defend the nation-state; references to defence; militaristic tone;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Moral &amp; Humanitarian</td>
<td>Relating to the justification of action on the basis of moral /ethical grounds; relating to humanitarian obligations; references to wellbeing; doing what’s ‘right’;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Australian Values</td>
<td>References to Australian values; a collective cultural identity; values as a basis for national identity and belonging; democratic values; Anglo-Australian way of life;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Crime &amp; Legality</td>
<td>References to criminality, legality and illegality, justice, the rule of law; links to law enforcement; punishment and consequences; criminal activity;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Liberal Rights &amp; Freedoms</td>
<td>References to liberal ideals, rights and freedoms, their importance and fundamental nature; safeguarding, fulfilling and promoting these rights and freedoms;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Successful Multiculturalism</td>
<td>Relating to the success of multiculturalism in Australia; celebrations of diversity, unity and social cohesion as a result of multicultural policy; multiculturalism as a national achievement, a cornerstone of national identity and source of pride;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Australian Way of Life</td>
<td>References to the quality of life enjoyed in Australia (generally high quality); how certain actions or circumstances will improve or worsen this quality of life; a way of being as a collective; the ‘way’ of life being one based on the dominant Anglo-Australian culture and Australian Values; linked to ideas of Australian-ness;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Citizenship &amp; Obligation</td>
<td>Relating to citizenship as a mutual obligation entered into by citizens; allegiance to Australia; privilege of Australian citizenship; citizenship as a unifying force;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: Frames identified in communications relating to Multicultural Australia and Safe, Secure & Free Australia

Before conducting my analysis, I expected that the frames identified in discussions of Safe, Secure & Free Australia and those identified in discussions of Multicultural Australia would be distinct and disparate. However, my findings indicate that many of the frames identified are present in communications across both policy visions. Furthermore, the identified frames are regularly used in combination with one another – in order to necessitate and legitimate
certain policies – and thus cannot be disentangled and analysed in isolation. For this reason, I have chosen to present my findings chronologically, facilitating an understanding of the transformation of discourses over time, and giving a sense of the repetition of certain frame combinations across successive governments.

The frames identified indicate that political elites repeatedly present the exclusion of people seeking asylum by boat – as part of a strategy for ensuring a Safe, Secure & Free Australia – as moral, justified, necessary, and in line with Australian values. The framing of the idea of an inclusive Multicultural Australia is, too, frequently linked with Australian values, as well as notions of citizenship. Australia’s inclusive society is, at times, even positioned as contingent on secure borders and migrants’ subscription to Australian values.

The Howard Government

*Liberal-National Coalition (11th March 1996 – 3rd December 2007)*

John Howard served as Prime Minister of Australia for more than eleven years, leading a Liberal-National Coalition government through a period characterised by a rapidly transforming domestic and international environment. The Howard Government continues to be praised by contemporary Liberal Party leaders for its tough stance on the arrival of people seeking asylum by boat and for renewing a focus on Australian values and citizenship.

[This campaign] is also about having an uncompromising view about the fundamental right of this country to protect its borders. [...] It’s about this nation saying to the world we are a generous open-hearted people taking more refugees on a per capita basis than any country except Canada. [...] We have a proud record of welcoming people from 140 different nations. But we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come.

*Howard (1a 2001)*

In this excerpt from Howard’s 2001 election campaign launch speech (1a), two of the most commonly used frames in government communications on the issue of people seeking asylum by boat can be observed. Firstly, Howard frames the issue in terms of Security (B), referencing the sovereign right Australia has to ‘protect its borders’ whilst implying there is a threat to be protected *from*. Secondly, Howard activates a Moral & Humanitarian frame (C) when describing Australia as a ‘generous and open-hearted people’. Not only does this frame situate Australians – and the Australian Government – as ‘welcoming’, the use of Frame C in combination with Frame B nullifies a seemingly tough stance, balancing it with an emphasis on compassion, justifying the Government’s right to ‘decide who comes’. By combining these frames, Howard argues that exercising the ‘fundamental right’ to protect Australia’s borders enables Australia to be an inclusive, ‘welcoming’ nation.
In November 2001, John Howard responded to journalists’ queries about his comment that ‘illegal entrants on boats may […] be linked with terrorist organisations’ (1b);

When Tony Blair spoke to me after September 11, and we talked about the impact of this on both of our societies, one of the things he said to me during that conversation was that Great Britain would have to look at tightening of laws in relation to asylum seekers. […] I’m not alleging that there have been terrorists on boats but what I am saying I can’t guarantee that there aren’t people on those boats, that who could if they got into this country without being properly screened, be inimical to our interests […].

Howard (1b 2001)

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Islamophobia was burgeoning both across the West and domestically. Therefore, introducing the idea that people who come by boat might have terrorist links capitalises on a fear of Islam and terrorism, bolstering the construction of this group as both criminal (E) and a threat to national security (B) in order to justify a more securitised approach to asylum seekers. By repeatedly mentioning ‘terrorists’ alongside ‘boats’, Howard conflates the two, securing this link with comments that he ‘can’t guarantee that there aren’t people on those boats’ who could be a threat, strengthening the frame through negation (Lakoff 2004, p.xiii) By introducing the idea that people who arrive by boat might have terrorist affiliations, Howard forms a connection in the public’s mind between ‘people on boats’ and Islamist extremism.

The Howard Government’s 2003 multicultural policy statement – Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity (1d) – outlines the strategic directions for the policy vision of Multicultural Australia in a ‘changed global environment’; following 9/11 and the 2002 Bali bombings. In his foreword, Howard outlines his government’s commitment to ‘nurturing our inclusive society’ and ‘promoting diversity, understanding and tolerance’. Here, Australian multiculturalism is framed as ‘one of the greatest strengths of [the] nation’ and diversity is labelled as a ‘unifying force’. However, these statements about inclusion and mutual-respect are underscored throughout the text with a clear emphasis on the ‘reciprocal responsibilities’ that come with Australian citizenship;

The key to the success of Australian multiculturalism is inclusiveness. Every Australian benefits from our diversity and all Australians have the right to be active and equal participants in Australian society, free to live their lives and maintain their cultural traditions.

[…] The freedom of all Australians to express and share the cultural values is dependent on their abiding by mutual civic obligations […] All Australians are expected to have an overriding loyalty to Australia and its people, and to respect the basic structures and principles underwriting our democratic society. […] Australian citizenship involves reciprocal responsibilities and privileges and enables

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19 On October 12th 2002, violent Islamist group Jemaah Islamiyah carried out a series of bombings in Kuta, Bali (Indonesia), killing 202 people, of whom 88 were Australian citizens. Kuta is a regular tourist destination for Australians, and the Bali Bombings were purportedly an act of retaliation against the War on Terror and Australian involvement in the liberation of East Timor, a territory formerly controlled by Indonesia.
individuals to become fully contributing members of the Australian community. Citizenship is a strong unifying force in our diverse multicultural community.

Australian Government (1d 2003)

The Successful Multiculturalism frame (G) appears constantly throughout this document, positioning Australian multiculturalism as a source of pride for the nation. This frame reinforces links between multiculturalism and ‘inclusiveness’, ‘diversity’ and equal opportunity, presenting Multicultural Australia as a positive for all Australians. The Liberal Rights & Freedoms frame (F) is also observable, with references made to the ‘right to be active and equal participants in Australian society’ and the ‘[freedom]’ to ‘maintain […] cultural traditions’. The activation of the Citizenship & Obligation (I) frame, however, suggests that embracing Australian values and laws takes precedence over previously mentioned ‘cultural traditions’. Despite multiculturalism relating to the co-existence, and mutual respect for, multiple distinct cultural and ethnic groups in society, the Howard Government’s vision for Multicultural Australia appears to be one with an ‘overriding loyalty’ and ‘respect’ for Australian ‘democratic society’. Here, the Liberal Rights & Freedoms frame (F) and the Citizenship & Obligation frame (I) are played off against one another, legitimising the limitation of rights & freedoms in the name of fulfilling the requirements of Australian citizenship. While in the Prime Minister’s foreword ‘diversity, understanding and tolerance’ (p.1) are described as a ‘unifying force for our nation’, several pages later (p.6) it is citizenship that is described as such. Throughout the document, the obligations entailed in citizenship (I) are positioned as a prerequisite for Successful Multiculturalism (G), further entangling these two frames.

[...] the citizenship pledge should be a big flashing warning sign to those who want to live under sharia law. A person who does not acknowledge the supremacy of civil law laid down by democratic processes cannot truthfully take the pledge of allegiance. [...] Before entering a mosque, visitors are asked to take off their shoes. This is a sign of respect. If you have a strong objection to walking in your socks don’t enter the mosque. Before becoming an Australian you will be asked to subscribe to certain values. If you have strong objections to those values don’t come to Australia.

Costello (1e 2006)

In this excerpt from his address to the Sydney Institute (1e 2006), Federal Treasurer Peter Costello demonstrates the Howard Government’s mounting emphasis on the importance of Australian Values (D) and Citizenship (I). Earlier in the address, Costello discusses the protection of Australian values, ‘a predominant culture’ and established ‘political and cultural institutions’ as a necessary precursor to ‘harmony and tolerance’. Costello states that people come to Australia to ‘embrace’ ‘Australian values and suggests that those who do not wish to
‘subscribe to certain values’ should not come. By making direct reference to Islamic faith and traditions, Costello addresses his ultimatum to a particular group, insinuating that it is this group who will be asked to leave their cultural traditions behind. While multiculturalism is about tolerance, respect and understanding of one another’s cultures and beliefs, it is clear that the Australian Government perceives a hierarchy of culture in their vision for Multicultural Australia – one where the English language, Anglo-Celtic culture, and established Western democratic institutions come first. Costello frames his argument in terms of Australian Values (D) and Liberal Rights & Freedoms (F), explaining that the subscription to certain values and laws – not the ideals of multiculturalism – is what enables Australia to have a ‘robust tolerance of difference’ (1e 2006).

At a press conference in January 2007 (1g), Howard responded to a journalist’s question about his decision to remove the term ‘Multicultural’ from the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs which had been renamed as the Department of Immigration and Citizenship; ‘do you believe that the term is now defunct? That it’s now over?’ (Ig 2007);

No, I don’t think the term is defunct. I think the desired progression is that an immigrant becomes an Australian, simple as that. I think the title of the new department expresses the desire and the aspiration and that is that people who come to this country who emigrate, immigrants become Australians. […] this is not designed to kick multiculturalism; it’s designed to better reflect the pathway to becoming an Australian […].

Howard (1g 2007)

Here, Howard justifies the abandonment of the term ‘multicultural’ with the Citizenship & Obligation frame (I), emphasising that those who immigrate ‘become Australians’. Towards the end of the Howard years, immigration is increasingly linked to ‘becoming […] Australian’ rather than forming part of a ‘diverse’ multicultural society (1d, p.7). Howard reaffirmed his personal position on multiculturalism after his defeat in the 2007 election following this question in a public Q & A (1h 2008);

When you said, anyone is welcome to come and live in Australia as long as you can live by our rules, and if you feel like you need to change them you can just go back to where you came from […] how do you feel in terms of Australian policy this was then integrated?

Audience member (1h 2008)

[…] Australia has been very open to people from all around the world. […] We used to have a discriminatory immigration policy up until the 1960s – we had the White Australia Policy and that was changed in the 1960s– and [now] we have people from everywhere. […] When you come to Australia my philosophy [is] you become an Australian, I mean, the Americans call it the ‘melting pot’; where you come from everywhere and all become part of the community. […] My view is simply this, we’ll take people from anywhere providing they meet the criteria, and we won’t discriminate on the grounds of nationality or ethnicity or race or religion. But we’ll decide who
comes, and we’ll also decide and determine, that they’ll live according to Australian law.

[...] this idea that you can have a federation of cultures inside one country is not workable.

Howard (1h 2008)

Howard first speaks of Australia’s ‘extraordinary diversity’, activating the Successful Multiculturalism frame (G) Australia and the Moral & Humanitarian frame (C) as he reminds his audience that Australia is ‘open to people from all around the world’. After establishing that Australia is an open, welcoming and non-discriminatory society, Howard explains that people who come to Australia ‘become Australian’– but only if they meet ‘the criteria’ (I). Howard repeats his 2001 election speech tag line, emphasising – once again – the right and need for governments to decide ‘who comes’ and to ensure that they ‘live according to Australian law’ (B & I). Howard then states that the ‘idea you can have a federation of cultures inside one country’ is ‘not workable’ – a comment directly contradicting the essence of multiculturalism; ‘an ‘acceptance of, and respect for, cultural diversity, community harmony and inclusion’ (Henry & Kurzak 2013 p.1).

The [1st] Rudd Government

Labor (3rd December 2007 – 24th June 2010)

The Labor Party defeated the Liberal-National Coalition in the 2007 election, promising a ‘new government who understand and respect the values upon which [Australia] has been built; values of decency […] fairness […] and respect’ (2a 2007). The Rudd Government committed to reforming Australia’s detention policy and ending ‘the inhumane, unfair and wasteful Pacific Solution’ in order to practice the Australian values of fairness and decency whilst ‘returning strong and effective border security’ (2b 2008).

Both Australian Values (D) and the spirit of Fairness (A) are regularly referenced in government communications about Safe, Secure & Free Australia and Multicultural Australia. Fairness, particularly, is cited by numerous Prime Ministers as the fundamental Australian value; the bedrock of Australian-ness. Both the Australian Values frame (D) and the Fairness frame (A) appear in politicians’ attempts to justify policies of exclusion against people seeking asylum by boat as well as in discussions pertaining to the centrality of these values in producing an inclusive multicultural society. However, in relation to the arrival of people by boat, in order for Frames D and A to be effective, people seeking asylum must first be constructed as undeserving, linked to ideas of criminality and illegality (E), and positioned as a threat to the security of the nation (B).
In his inaugural National Security Address (2c 2008), Rudd designates ‘national security’ as the Government’s ‘first priority’, labelling the prevention of the ‘unauthorised arrival of people by boat’ as an area of paramount importance;

The Government is committed to deploying all necessary resources to prosecute those criminals who seek to undermine Australia's border security. We will work with our partners in the region to shut down the illegal operations of people smugglers and [...] the organised, unauthorised arrival of people by boat to Australia. [...] The Government has decided therefore to move quickly to better enable the existing Australian Customs Service to meet this resurgent threat to our border integrity.

Rudd (2c 2008)

While it is to be expected that a speech focused on National Security (2c 2008) will contain more overtly militaristic language, the shift in tone from Rudd’s statement (2b 2008) on the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights two days earlier – where he spoke about ‘advancing human rights’ and ‘restoring fairness and humanity to our treatment of people seeking asylum’ – is dramatic. In this speech, instead of framing the challenge of people who come by boat as a Moral & Humanitarian (C) question again (2b 2008), Rudd’s comments about asylum seekers in the excerpt above come immediately after outlining the need for urgent action to combat the ‘direct threat’ of terrorism (B). By presenting plans to prevent people from seeking asylum by boat alongside aggressive action plans to protect against the ‘[threats]’ of terrorism and people smuggling, people who seek asylum by boat become, by association, a security concern (B) and inherently criminal and illegal (E) whilst their humanity and reasons for seeking safety are erased from the conversation. Compared to the United Nations statement (2b), the term ‘people seeking asylum’ is glaringly absent in this address, with people who come by boat only once directly referred to – as ‘unauthorised arrival[s]’–otherwise not explicitly mentioned at all. Here we see a narrow focus on people smuggling as a criminal act (E) and a threat to ‘border integrity’ (B), while the people who are smuggled warrant little to no mention and become almost invisible.

In a doorstop interview in May 2010 (2d), Rudd responded to a comment from Australian Conservatives Senator Cory Bernardi that the burka should be banned, and that ‘new arrivals to this country should not come here to recreate the living environment they have just left [...] they should come here for a better life based on the freedoms and values that have built our great nation’ (ABC News, 2010a);

I believe Australians pride themselves in having a diverse society, one which is characterised by tolerance, one where we don't stand up and give people lectures about what they should be wearing and what they should not be wearing.

[...] What I want to see is a diverse, tolerant Australia for the future, based on mutual respect and a
common obligation to adhere to the laws of the nation. I believe in a tolerant, diverse Australia. One where we actually embrace the diversity within our community and where we have no interest as a nation in setting one group against the other […] let's ensure that we keep this a great country that we all believe in, that I believe in. One marked by tolerance and respect and adherence to the law.

Rudd (2d 2010)

In these comments, the Successful Multiculturalism frame (G) is combined with the Australian values frame (D), with Rudd arguing that Australian values support the very diversity on which Australia’s ‘pride themselves’. Here, Rudd celebrates Australia’s multiculturalism (G), but establishes that ‘tolerance’, ‘respect’ (D) and a ‘common obligation to adhere to the laws of the nation’ (I) make possible a harmonious ‘diverse society’.

The Gillard Government

Labor (24th June 2010 – 27th June 2013)

On the 24th of June 2010, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd resigned following a decline in popularity ‘from stratospheric highs to disastrous lows in just a few months’ connected to the failure of a Government insulation program, resistance to the mining tax, the erosion of a promised emissions trading scheme, and heated policy debate on the topic of asylum seekers (ABC News 2010b). Julia Gillard, Australia’s first female Prime Minister, stepped up to ‘take control’ of a Government she believed was ‘losing its way’ (Brisbane Times 2010). A federal election in August 2010 resulted in a hung parliament, but Gillard was able to secure a minority government which set about pursuing negotiations with regional neighbours to return to offshore processing. In her speech to the Lowy Institute in July 2010 (3a), Gillard proposes that Australians should agree on certain principles;

That we should be prepared to accept people in legitimate need […] that there is nothing humane about a voyage across dangerous seas with the ever present risk of death in leaky boats captained by people smugglers; that Australia's basic decency does not accept the idea of punishing women and children by locking them up behind razor wire or ignoring people who are fleeing genocide, torture, and persecution, nor does it allow us to stand back and watch fellow human beings drown in the water, but equally that there is nothing inconsistent between these decencies and our commitment to secure borders and fair, orderly migration. […] That no one should have an unfair advantage and be able to subvert orderly migration programs; […] that hardworking Australians who themselves are doing it tough want to know that refugees allowed to settle here are not singled out for special treatment; that people […] who have worked hard all their lives can't abide the idea that others might get an inside track to special privileges; And that finally, if this were to happen, it would offend the Australian sense of fair play.

Gillard (3a 2010)
The Fairness frame (A) – which constantly appears in Labor governments’ communications on the topic of people seeking asylum by boat – is used here to construct some refugees as less deserving than others. The concept of ‘a fair go’ is closely tied to the ‘queue jumping’ narrative whereby people seeking asylum are framed as acting ‘unfairly’ and thus are not deserving of Australia’s compassion or the opportunity to settle in Australia (Haw 2019). In an essay in The Quarterly, prominent barrister and refugee rights advocate Julian Burnside (2007, p.16-20) condemns the ‘astounding hypocrisy’ of this justification for harsh policies of exclusion, drawing attention to the irony of – ‘[jailing] innocent people as a “deterrent”’ – in the name of fairness. Gillard submits that Australians should agree that only ‘people in legitimate need’ should be accepted, asking the audience to question the legitimacy of those who come by boat. In this passage Gillard initially frames the issue of people arriving by boat as a Moral & Humanitarian concern (C) and a test of Australian Values (D), stating that ‘Australia’s basic decency’ does not allow for the inhumane treatment of ‘fellow human beings’. Gillard uses evocative language, describing the ‘voyage across dangerous seas’ and the ‘locking up’ of people behind ‘razor wire’ to provoke an empathetic response in her audience (C). Gillard further strengthens Frame C by using terms such as ‘people’ and ‘fellow human beings’, even referring to ‘women and children’ in order to emphasise vulnerability.

However, after establishing herself, her government and Australians as compassionate (C), Gillard frames the arrival of people by boat as a security issue (B), arguing ‘theseencies’ and a desire for ‘secure borders’ are not mutually exclusive. Gillard confirms that those who ‘subvert orderly migration programs’ are not to receive ‘an unfair advantage’ (A), framing – once again – those who arrive by boat as attempting to ‘subvert’ a ‘fair, orderly migration’ system. Gillard repeatedly states that Australians are opposed to ‘the idea that others might get an inside track to special privileges’ (A), fuelling public anxiety that refugees might receive more resources than ‘Australians’. By combining different frames, Gillard is able to establish that awarding asylum to people who arrive by boat not only ‘offend[s] the Australian sense of fair play’ (A), but is inhumane and irresponsible (C), provides incentives for people smugglers (E), and impacts Australia’s national security (B). In her concluding remarks, Gillard echoes Howard, positioning refugees’ ‘welcome’ as contingent on their embracing of Australian values (D);

I believe Australians are prepared to welcome those who are genuine refugees, but they also expect them to learn the rules under which we live and abide by those rules. That means that when newcomers settle in our community, they accept their responsibilities as members of the community – to learn English, enter the workforce, and send their kids to school like everyone else.

Gillard (3a 2010)
By emphasising that only those who are ‘genuine refugees’ will be welcomed, an invisible category of *ingenue refugees* is conjured up. Gillard then establishes that subscribing to an Australian way of life (H) and fulfilling ‘responsibilities as members of the community’ is the path that those refugees who are resettled in Australia are expected to take, choosing to frame refugee resettlement in Australia with the Citizenship & Obligation (I) frame instead of pointing to how those newly arrived might contribute to diversity and multiculturalism (G).

By contrast, in the Gillard Government’s multicultural policy statement, *The People of Australia: Australia’s Multicultural Policy* (3b 2011), the Successful Multiculturalism frame (G) appears frequently, celebrating migration and multicultural policy as complementary to Australia’s ‘national characteristics of equality and a fair go for all’. In her foreword, Gillard rejoices in the ‘breadth and diversity of Australian society’, positioning her government as fully supportive of the vision of Multicultural Australia (A);

> This policy recognises the amazing breadth and diversity of Australian society and reaffirms the Government’s unwavering support for a culturally diverse and socially cohesive nation. […] Australia’s multicultural policy complements our national characteristics of equality and a fair go for all. It flows from our deep and abiding commitment to our democratic values.  
> Gillard (3b 2011)

> The Australian Government is unwavering in its commitment to a multicultural Australia. Australia’s multicultural composition is at the heart of our national identity and is intrinsic to our history and our character. […] Multiculturalism is in Australia’s national interest and speaks to fairness and inclusion.  
> Australian Government (3b 2011, p.2)

Here, the Successful Multiculturalism frame can be observed again, with multiculturalism itself labelled as ‘intrinsic’ to a collective sense of identity, and as part and parcel of national ‘history and character’. A common theme within the Successful Multiculturalism frame (G) is that is appears in attempts to foster a sense of national identity. The terms ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘diversity’ appear frequently alongside references to ‘unity’ (1d, 1e, 2d, 3b, 5c) with multiculturalism often positioned as a ‘unifying force’ for the nation (1d). However, in *The People of Australia*, the success of Australian multiculturalism is again also framed as a product of respect for the obligations and responsibilities ‘enshrined in [Australia’s] citizenship pledge’ (I). It appears that the Gillard Government, like the Howard Government, wishes to communicate that ‘[pledging] loyalty to Australia and its people’ is a prerequisite for enjoying the freedom to maintain cultural traditions, language, and beliefs;

> Australia’s successful multicultural society and our democracy are built around shared rights and responsibilities that are fundamental to living in Australia. These key rights and responsibilities are
enshrined in our citizenship pledge which requires future citizens to pledge their loyalty to Australia and its people, uphold our laws and democracy and respect our rights and liberties.

[…] Australia will continue to have an ever evolving and ever diversifying population. We will continue to be multicultural. Multiculturalism is our shared future and is central to our national interest.

Australian Government (3b 2011, p.6)

Rudd and Gillard both emphasise the centrality of policies of multiculturalism in fulfilling the Labor philosophy that ‘opportunity for all’ and ensuring ‘no one gets left behind’ can only be achieved in a cohesive and equal society (Gillard 3c 2011). At the launch of the Australian Multicultural Council (AMC) in 2011, Gillard states;

Belief in equality stands proudly at the heart of this country's character. [...] And in building a nation, we've developed a work ethic that's about putting in your fair share. You have a go; you earn the fair go. [...] Australians have a proud history [...] of finding common ground. [...] Multiculturalism is the word that we use to capture our love of the things that bind us together and our respect for the diversity that enriches us. A concept caught so well by the words school children sing: “We are one, but we are many.” A fierce determination that we share opportunity and we don't leave any one behind. [...] Our new Council will ensure multiculturalism lives in the heart of government. [...] The people who have come here, the people we have become, makes us who we are. Australians, together.

Gillard (3c 2011)

The Fairness frame (A) is reinforced here, positioning ‘a fair go’ as central to national identity. Gillard then describes ‘multiculturalism’ as ‘the word that we use to capture our love of the things that bind us together and our respect for the diversity that enriches us’, going on to quote the first line of the Australian national anthem to reaffirm that Australians are one collective, unified people. Here the Successful Multiculturalism frame (G) is again linked to national unity but is instead connected to ‘putting in your fair share’ (A & I).

At a press conference in September 2011 (3d), Gillard again presents the image of the deserving refugee, using the idea of fairness (A) in order to justify her Government’s policies;

[...] we were intending to seek an arrangement [...] to transfer asylum seekers to Malaysia. We determined that that was the best course of action to smash the people smuggler's business model [...] to make sure that we sent the maximum message of deterrence and stopped people getting on leaky boats where they could lose their lives – men, women and children – and tragically we've seen men, women and children lose their lives on our shoreline. [...] We are a political party that has always been prepared to take the steps necessary to have border protection and to ensure that we had an orderly migration system.

[...] This is an innovative proposal that brings together the maximum possible deterrence effect to smash what is truly an evil – people smuggling – whilst holding true to the Refugee Convention and extending our compassion to people who are beyond our line of sight, that is the people who are waiting in Malaysia, as genuine refugees seeking a chance of a new life [...] 

Gillard (3d 2011)
In Gillard’s presentation of her ‘innovative’ regional processing plan, several frames can be observed; the Crime & Legality frame (E) which turns arriving by boat into something criminal, the Security frame (B) which positions harsh deterrence measures as essential to border protection, and the Moral & Humanitarian frame (C) which further justifies these measures in the name of stopping ‘people getting on leaky boats’ and ‘[losing] their lives’. Again, terms such as ‘men, women and children’ are used when stopping the boats is framed as an ethical necessity, strengthening the Moral & Humanitarian frame.

In 2012, at a press conference following the release of the Houston Report (3e 2012), a set of recommendations from an expert panel on preventing asylum seeker deaths at sea. the Fairness frame appears again when justifying the exclusion of people who seek asylum;

[...] people who travel to Australia by boat should not receive advantage in terms of their processing and chance of resettlement in Australia. [...] The key principle here will be that somebody who arrived in Australia by boat would have family reunion applications processed on the same basis as every other Australian who is seeking to sponsor somebody into this country. That passes the fairness test [...].

[...] We need to have a hard head and a soft heart as we try and deal with all the issues of resettling people into Australia and dealing with people who are seeking to come to Australia. But it’s got to be done in a way which does not provide an advantage to those who seek to come by boat. [...] you need to equalise treatment for asylum seekers so you don’t get a better deal if you get on a boat.

Gillard (3e 2012)

In this excerpt, Gillard repeatedly activates the Fairness frame (A) by stating that those who seek asylum by boat will not ‘receive advantage’, implying that those who come by boat choose to do so in order to ‘get a better deal’ instead of partaking in Australia’s ‘orderly migration system’ (3d). While we know that the majority of people seeking asylum who come by boat do so because they have no other choice – as ‘orderly migration’ pathways are often not available to them (Fiske 2019) – Gillard implies that those who come by boat are seeking to sidestep the established channels for resettlement, and should not be rewarded for disrespecting the Australian value of fairness.

**The [2nd] Rudd Government**

*Labor (27th June 2013 – 18th September 2013)*

In the wake of the slew of challenges Gillard faced in leading both a minority government and a Labor Party experiencing political division, Gillard was defeated in a leadership ballot in June 2013 and replaced by former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in the hope that he might lead Labor to an election victory. The tone of the 2nd Rudd Government’s messaging on asylum seekers arriving by boat is decidedly tougher, though his emphasis on the importance of
international law and humanitarianism remains. In a National Press Club address in July 2013 (4a), for example, Rudd stated that ‘Australia’s acceptance rate for bona fide asylum seekers is very high by global standards’, reinforcing the Moral & Humanitarian frame (C) by outlining Australia’s commitment to receiving refugees. However, by calling those receiving protection ‘bona fide asylum seekers’, Rudd creates an invisible category – *non-bona fide* asylum seekers –reproducing the perception that many asylum seekers who come by boat are not genuinely in need of protection.

In July 2013, the Rudd Government broadcast a video in which the newly re-appointed Prime Minister addressed the nation on the topic of asylum seekers (4b);

> We […] have to do everything possible to protect our orderly migration system and the integrity of our borders. […] we have to protect lives by dealing robustly with people smugglers. Australians have had enough of seeing asylum seekers dying in the waters […]. They’ve had enough of people smugglers profiting from death, and like me they worry about the safety of our brave servicemen and women involved in rescue operations when boats get into distress.

Rudd (4b 2013)

Here, we can observe Rudd’s emphasis on ‘[protecting] lives’ and borders through promoting an ‘orderly migration system’, activating the security frame (B) and thus positioning the arrival of people by boat as a threat. Rudd chooses to stress the role of people smugglers and their criminal behaviour – instead of the passengers and their plight – in order to justify that ‘people who come by boat now have no prospect of being resettled in Australia’. Like his predecessors, Rudd activates the Moral & Humanitarian frame (C) to justify this harsh stance as a means to prevent people from ‘dying in the waters’. In this video, Rudd repeatedly uses the term ‘asylum seekers’ when explaining that Labor’s new policy will help to prevent deaths at sea. Arguably the Prime Minister with the most faith in internationalism and the greatest interest in appearing to meet humanitarian obligations, Rudd regularly positions stopping the arrival of boats as in line with Australia’s humanitarian commitments while other leaders emphasise it as the morally ‘right’ thing to do (C). The terms used to recognise – or render invisible – the legal status and legitimacy of people seeking asylum are inconsistent across political communications and communicators, with certain terms for people seeking asylum appearing within particular frames, and the tone dependent on context. This inconsistency is exemplified in Rudd’s comments at a press conference in 2013 (4d);

> […] those seeking safe haven will have the opportunity to settle and reside in Nauru […] Unauthorised maritime arrivals to Australia will now be sent to Papua New Guinea or Nauru for assessment of their refugee claims. If they are found to be genuine refugees under these arrangements they will be […] able to settle and reside in Papua New Guinea or they may settle or reside in Nauru; both countries being
signatories to the UN refugee convention. [...] No matter where people smugglers try to land asylum seekers by boat in Australia, they will not be settled in Australia. This is our core principle. [...] This is our core unshakeable position: that if people smugglers try and bring asylum seekers to Australia by boat those people will not be settled in Australia.

Rudd (4d 2013)

Here, Rudd activates the Moral & Humanitarian frame (C) when discussing the Nauru resettlement plan. Rudd calls people who arrive by boat ‘people seeking safe haven’ and presents resettlement as an ‘opportunity’, constructing regional processing as both positive and safe. However, this is immediately contrasted by the use of the term ‘unauthorised maritime arrivals’, to refer to the same group in a later comment, activating both the Security frame (B) and Crime & Legality frame (E). Here we can see the Fairness frame (A) and the idea of deservingness come into play, where only ‘genuine refugees’ will be the ones to receive this ‘opportunity’. Here, Rudd creates a positive image of how regional processing will fulfil Australia’s international obligations, provide ‘those seeking safe haven’ with a place to resettle where their rights will be recognised, whilst also appearing tough on people smugglers. When using the Security frame (B) the subject of focus is the people smugglers rather than their passengers. By constantly conflating people smugglers and their ‘unauthorised’ activity with people seeking asylum on these vessels, the passengers themselves become ‘unauthorised’ and criminal (E).

After establishing his tough stance on people smugglers, Rudd combines the Fairness (A) and Moral & Humanitarian frame (C) – to confirm that Australia is committed to its ‘international responsibility to care for those in need’ whilst reproducing the idea that those who wait patiently in camps are more genuine and deserving than those who come by boat;

Australia continues to fulfil its international responsibility to care for those in need of international protection or humanitarian need. Australia increased its humanitarian program to 20,000 places in 2012-13, up from 12 or 13,000 places and has maintained that program level into this year. This increase allows Australia to concentrate on refugees who have spent many years in UN camps, around the world, some for many decades.

Rudd (4d 2013)

The Abbott Government

*Liberal-National Coalition (18th September 2013 – 15th September 2015)*

The Liberal-National Coalition defeated the incumbent Rudd Labor Government in the 2013 federal election, with Tony Abbott sworn in as Australia’s 28th Prime Minister. On his first day in office, Abbott set in motion *Operation Sovereign Borders*, a policy designed to implement ‘a military-led response to combat people smuggling and protect [Australia’s]
constructed realities' (5b 2013, p.2). This policy received significant public support and catalysed the further securitisation of the discourse around people seeking asylum. *Operation Sovereign Borders* (5b 2013, p.2) positions the arrival of people by boat as a security threat (B), using militaristic language and the notion of an ‘emergency’ to necessitate strict border controls:

An incoming Coalition government will treat the border protection crisis as a national emergency and tackle it with the focus and energy that an emergency demands.

[...] More than 14,500 desperate people have been denied a place under our offshore humanitarian programme because those places have been taken by people who have arrived illegally by boat. These people are genuine refugees, already processed by United Nations agencies, but they are denied a chance at resettlement by people who have money in their pocket to buy a place via people smugglers.

The Coalition (5b 2013, p.2-3)

The Coalition first frames the arrival of people to Australia by boat as a ‘border protection crisis’ in order to justify their hawkish approach (B). Secondly, those who seek asylum by boat are described as taking the place of ‘genuine refugees’, implying that those who are already processed by the United Nations are more deserving and painting those who come by boat as *ingenuine* by comparison (A). Thirdly, by stating that people ‘have arrived illegally by boat’, asylum seekers who come by boat become associated with illegality (E). The Coalition then asserts that ‘[taking] control’ of Australia’s borders (B) is essential to restoring an orderly migration system and maintaining a ‘generous humanitarian intake’ (C).

To [not control our borders] puts peoples’ lives at risk, disregards the safety and morale of our border protection forces, shows contempt for taxpayer money, and effectively sells-out our immigration regime to the people smugglers. Australians deserve a government that will take control of our borders and restore faith in our immigration system, including our generous humanitarian intake.

The Coalition (5b 2013, p.5)

While serving as leader of the Opposition, Tony Abbott critiqued Labor’s handling of ‘boat arrivals’ in his address to the Lowy Institute in Sydney (5a 2011):

The Howard Government successfully reduced a flood of illegal boat arrivals to a mere trickle. […] It was pretty effective even if it wasn’t pretty. There were disturbances in detention centres. Detainees often engaged in self-harm, sometimes in front of TV cameras. Naval personnel and public servants were swept up in bitter recriminations over whether children had been thrown overboard and who knew what, when.

Abbott (5a 2011)

Abbott does not shy away from comments intended to discredit or slander people who are seeking asylum, describing protests against indefinite detention as ‘disturbances’, and insinuating that the self-harm that some people engaged in whilst detained was for attention and publicity rather than as a result of mental illness or trauma. Abbott then triggers an image cemented in Australian collective memory of a man holding a young child over the edge of a
sinking vessel as part of the Children Overboard affair. 20 Though officially invalidated, Abbott chooses to remind Australians of these allegations, questioning, once again, the moral character of those trying to reach Australia’s shore.

The Abbott Government attempts to cement the idea that the only way to seek asylum ‘legitimately’ is through the humanitarian resettlement program, warning that failure to be tough on borders will encourage opportunistic migrants who ‘want a better life’ to come by boat to Australia (5a 2011). The Abbott Government constantly asserts that people who seek asylum by boat are already safe once they get to Indonesia or Malaysia are not in need of ‘genuine’ protection, but are economic migrants coming to Australia for a better life;

The only way to gain permanent residency in Australia is to arrive legitimately in accordance with the rules. There can be no alternative if the boats are to stop. Why should they when the prize for turning up on Christmas Island is a new life in Australia and material comfort scarcely imaginable for average citizens in most of the countries of the world. […] Australia has a proud history of giving shelter to those facing persecution but the obligation to refugees has to be balanced against our obligation not to become a soft touch for anyone who wants a better life.

Abbott (5a 2011)

In September 2015, Abbott again justifies ‘stopping the boats’ through various frames (5d);

Obviously, there is a humanitarian disaster taking place. […] if you can stop illegal immigration, one of the beneficial side effects is that you don’t have deaths at sea. We had – as you might remember – the harrowing business of people dying on the rocks of Christmas Island just a few years ago as part of that evil people smuggling trade and thank God, we’ve stopped it, because when you stop the trade, you stop the deaths. […] If you do stop the people smuggling trade, […] you end the deaths at sea. The most compassionate thing you can do in the medium and long term is to close down this evil trade, because as long as this evil trade is operating […] we will see the drownings.

Abbott (5d 2015)

In these comments, Abbott argues that ‘[stopping] illegal immigration’ will ‘stop the deaths’. Abbott, again, explicitly names the act of seeking asylum by boat as illegal (E) and identifies shutting down the people smuggling trade as essential to stopping ‘the drownings’ (C). In this text, people who seek asylum by boat are rarely referred to directly, with Abbott repeatedly referring to ‘deaths at sea’, ‘the deaths’, ‘the drownings’ but choosing not to say who is dying or drowning. Instead, Abbott focuses on the act of people smuggling itself, rather than those seeking asylum, further conflating those who come by boat with criminality (E).

In his Margaret Thatcher Lecture (5e 2015), delivered in London after Malcolm Turnbull replaced him as Prime Minister, Abbott again presents ‘stopping the boats’ as moral

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20 As part of the Children Overboard affair, a man was reported to be holding a young child overboard in order to secure passage to Australia. This was later completely disproven, and the man in question explained that the ship he was on was sinking and he was attempting to pass the child to an adjacent rescue boat (RAC 2019).
(C), a security necessity (B), and justified given that those who come by boat are – in his view – ‘economic migrants’ taking advantage of Australia’s generosity (A);

Stopping the boats and restoring border security is the only truly compassionate thing to do.

[...] Because Australia once more has secure borders and because it's the Australian government rather than people smugglers that now controls our refugee intake, there was massive public support for my government's decision [...] to resettle 12,000 members of persecuted minorities from the Syrian conflict – per capita, the biggest resettlement contribution that any country has made.

[...] In Europe, as with Australia, people claiming asylum – invariably – have crossed not one border but many; and are no longer fleeing in fear but are contracting in hope with people smugglers. However desperate, almost by definition, they are economic migrants because they had already escaped persecution when they decided to move again. [...] Our moral obligation is to receive people fleeing for their lives. It's not to provide permanent residency to anyone and everyone who would rather live in a prosperous Western country than their own.

Abbott (5e 2015)

In this speech, Abbott establishes ‘border security’ (B) as a prerequisite for humanitarianism and draws attention to Australia’s ‘compassionate’ humanitarian programme (C). His audience, fellow conservatives, are reminded that people seeking asylum in Europe and Australia have ‘crossed not one border but many’ and are thus not genuinely in need of protection as they have already ‘escaped persecution’, annulling Australia’s responsibilities.

There are very few texts in which Abbott discusses the vision of Multicultural Australia, something which reflects the glaring absence of support for policies of multiculturalism from Abbott’s Government. Abbott regularly praises the Howard Government’s tough approach to immigration and echoes Howard’s ‘emphasis on Australia’s unity’ over ‘diversity’ (5a 2011).

However, in a public lecture in honour of Sir John Downer (5c 2014) Abbott uses uncharacteristically positive language, though, this celebration of ‘unity in diversity’ is contradicted by the notion that multiculturalism, to him, is about ‘becoming Australian’;

Australia has long been an exemplar of how people of different faiths and cultures can not only live harmoniously together but find unity in diversity. [...] No one has been expected to abandon their heritage or conform to any particular ideal of “Australian-ness”. [...] Multiculturalism has turned out to mean people becoming Australian – joining our team if you like – in their own way and at their own pace.

Abbott (5c 2014)

We can observe the Successful Multiculturalism frame (G) in Abbott’s lecture which positions Australia as an ‘exemplar’ of social cohesion. While Abbott here states that ‘no one has been expected to […] conform to any particular ideal of “Australian-ness”’, in the following paragraph he submits that multiculturalism means ‘becoming Australian’ (I) and embracing Australian values (D), something more akin to policies of assimilation and
integration than those of multiculturalism. Abbott’s inclination towards assimilation over multiculturalism is further exemplified in a speech to the Institute of Public Affairs in 2017; Newcomers in hard-to-fill, high wage, high skill jobs make very good migrants […] but they’re not the only ones coming. […] A big slowdown in immigration would allow housing starts and infrastructure to catch up with population. It would give harder-to-assimilate recent migrants more time to integrate with the wider Australian community before many more came in. It would reassure Australians that our country is in our own hands and is being run in our best interests. It would complement the government’s correct insistence that to become a citizen you must be able to speak the national language.

Abbott (5f 2017)

Aside from effectively stating that migrants who are not wealthy or skilled are not desirable migrants, Abbott bolsters an existing perception that immigration is straining Australian infrastructure and negatively impacting on an Australian Way of Life (H). Here, no references to multiculturalism are made, but integration and assimilation are mentioned – two approaches formerly favoured by the Australian Government in the pre-multiculturalism era. By explicitly naming ‘harder-to-assimilate’ recent migrants and arguing for their ‘[integration]’ before ‘many more came in’, Abbott implies that we cannot have too many culturally-different migrants, if a dominant Australian culture – and language – is to be maintained. The Australian Way of Life frame (H) is combined with the Citizenship & Obligation frame (I) and the Australian values (D) frame to give the impression that assimilation of those culturally different to the dominant culture and language is essential to preserving an Australian way of life.

The Turnbull Government

Liberal-National Coalition (15th September 2015 – 24th August 2018)

The ‘political assassination’ of yet another Prime Minister took place in September 2015, with Malcolm Turnbull defeating Tony Abbott in a leadership ballot (Massola & Allard, 2018). Abbott, a conservative Liberal, was replaced by his more moderate colleague who promised to rebuild voter confidence in a Liberal Government and show leadership on more progressive issues. Turnbull is an avid supporter of Australian multiculturalism and regularly celebrates Australia’s multicultural achievements. However, Turnbull also continues the Abbott Government’s emphasis on ‘strong borders’, and regularly positions national security as the foundation of successful multiculturalism (6b 2016).

The greatest thing that we have succeeded in creating, all of us, all of us succeeded in creating the most successful multicultural society in the world. […] we have done so because of an essential ingredient which is so Australian. That of respect.

[…] Mutual respect, a fair go, live and let live. Many ways you can describe it but that mutual respect,
that two-way street of respect is what underpins our great multicultural society. [...] all of us are enriched by that diversity. It is our great, it is our greatest strength. We are enriched and [...] informed by the cultures and the backgrounds of all of our neighbours [...] our multiculturalism is one where we are all enriched by each other's cultures. [...] We learn from each other, and, we do so because we respect them as they respect ours. And, over time, we get a growth and synthesis that is uniquely Australian.

Turnbull (6a 2016)

In this excerpt from a speech made on Harmony Day in 2016 (6a), multiculturalism is celebrated as a national achievement, and diversity as Australia’s ‘greatest strength’. Turnbull names the Australian values (D) of ‘mutual-respect’ and ‘a fair go’ (A) as precipitating the success of Australia’s ‘great multicultural society’ (G) but celebrates the ‘growth and synthesis’ of an Australian society where people are ‘enriched’ by different cultures. However, in other communications Turnbull asserts that the success of Australia’s multiculturalism (G) is instead reliant on the protection of Liberal Rights and Freedoms (F) and Australian Values (D) through controlled borders (B).

In an opinion piece he wrote for The Sydney Morning Herald (6b 2016), Turnbull celebrates Australia’s ‘multicultural success’ and ‘high levels of immigration’ but reminds Australians that ‘strong borders are the foundation’ of these achievements. By combining the Successful Multiculturalism frame (G), with the Moral & Humanitarian frame (C), Turnbull is able to present strict ‘control’ of Australia’s borders as a positive (B), establishing ‘secure borders’ as both humanitarian and integral to the success of multicultural Australia;

[…] barely a day goes past when I don’t celebrate that we are the most successful and harmonious multicultural nation in the world. But we cannot be under any illusions about what our multicultural success is built upon. [...] Australians welcome high levels of immigration [...] [because] we have confidence that our government is thoroughly in control of our immigration and humanitarian program, deciding who can come here and ensuring that when they do, they receive the support they need to integrate into Australian societies. [...] We welcome 13,750 refugees each year – the world's third largest permanent refugee resettlement program – because our borders are secure. Strong borders are the foundation of our high-immigration multicultural success. [...] Secure borders and a well-managed migration system are the bedrock of confidence on which our successful multicultural society is built.

Turnbull (6b 2016)

While the Abbott Government chose not to produce a multicultural policy statement, in 2017 the Turnbull Government released Multicultural Australia: United, Strong, Successful. At the

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21 Harmony Day, so-named in 1998 under a Howard Government, is Australia’s name for International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The renaming of a day that is aimed at renewing a focus on anti-racism and eradicating barriers to inclusion has been criticised of draining the day of its true meaning. By calling it Harmony Day, Australians and the Australian Government can celebrate inclusion rather than shining a light on exclusion.
release of the multicultural statement, Turnbull describes Australia as ‘the most successful multicultural society in the world’ (G) (6c 2017);

Our diversity is extraordinary. [...] We could not imagine the Australia of 2017 and its achievements without the contribution of all those people, everyone a thread in our national tapestry. Each one bringing a rich personal history that we welcome into our country at the same time that they formalise their commitment to our nation, our values and our laws. [...] Our achievement in creating this harmonious nation is not an accident. [...] A necessary precondition for this harmony is national security, a resolute determination to defend our nation, our people and our values.

[...] Security, after all, is the foundation on which all of our freedoms have been built and maintained. [...] Our people are our greatest assets [...] People with so much diversity but united, as patriotic Australians, proud of our nation, the most successful multicultural society in the world – safe, secure and free with a shared destiny.

Turnbull (6c 2017)

In these excerpts, the Successful Multiculturalism frame (G) appears constantly, with diversity and multiculturalism celebrated as central to Australians’ unity and ‘shared destiny’. Yet, once again, Turnbull labels ‘national security’ (B) as a ‘precondition’ for community harmony (G), and the enjoyment of rights and freedoms (F), entangling successful multiculturalism with a rhetoric of defence and security.

In July 2017 the Policy Exchange awarded Turnbull the Disraeli Prize for ‘maintaining a strong non-discriminatory immigration program’ and making Australia a ‘land of opportunity’ for migrants (The Guardian, 2017a); a decision which sparked controversy given Australia’s widely criticised asylum policy. Turnbull delivered a speech upon his receipt of the award in which he argues that security (B) begets freedom (F) (6e 2017);

The area where we must most carefully scrutinise the relationship between individual freedoms and Government intervention is national security.

Security and freedom are frequently represented as binary opposites – as if there exists a universe in which you could have one without the other. But these two principles – prioritising public safety and maintaining individual freedoms– are not mutually exclusive. They can be – in fact, they must be – mutually reinforcing. [...] The question is not what freedoms to forgo for security. It is what security is required to enable our freedom [...] In order to be free a person must first be safe.

Turnbull (6e 2017)

Turnbull then employs the Fairness (A) and Crime & Legality (E) frames to paint people who seek asylum by boat as ‘[illegal]’ and taking the places of genuine refugees;

More than 14,500 refugees waiting in UN camps were denied a place under our offshore humanitarian program in those days – the places going instead to those arriving illegally by boat. [...] The lesson is very clear: weak borders fragment social cohesion, drain public revenue, raise community concerns about national security, and ultimately undermine the consensus required to sustain high levels of immigration and indeed multiculturalism itself. Ultimately, division. [...] In contrast, strong borders and retention of
our sovereignty allow government to maintain public trust in community safety, respect for diversity and support for our immigration and humanitarian programs. [...] Unity. Security. Opportunity. Freedom.

Turnbull (6e 2017)

Turnbull reasons that, with ‘strong borders’, comes ‘unity’, and with ‘weak borders’ comes ‘division’. By doing this, Turnbull secures the endorsement of his security policy by presenting two alternatives; a ‘[fragmented]’ Australia, or a unified, secure and free Australia.

**The Morrison Government**

*Liberal-National Coalition (24th August 2018 – present)*

In August 2018 two Liberal leadership spills took place in a context of declining popularity with voters in marginal seats and ideological differences within the party. While Turnbull retained his position as leader after the first spill, he was defeated by Treasurer Scott Morrison in the second and shortly resigned, leaving Morrison to assume the role of Prime Minister. Morrison also previously served as Minister for Immigration and Border Protection under the Abbott Government, orchestrating the roll-out of *Operation Sovereign Borders*. Morrison regularly frames people who seek asylum by boat as a security concern requiring a hard-line response and links his Government’s policies to ensuring the safety of all Australians.

Unlike his predecessor, Morrison regularly speaks of ‘[integrating]’ ‘new Australians’, as exemplified in a media release relating to a *Review into Integration, Employment and Settlement Outcomes for Refugees and Humanitarian Entrants (7a 2018)*;

> We are focused on keeping Australians together. This means ensuring all new Australians can find their footing and participate in their new home. [...] We want to make sure we are doing everything we can to help people get jobs and integrate into the community.

Morrison (7a 2018)

In February 2019, the Medevac Bill was passed, securing amendments to the *Home Affairs Bill* which would allow for medical opinion to hold greater weight in determining the medical evacuation of people seeking asylum from offshore immigration detention centres on Manus Island and Nauru. 22 Morrison and the Coalition strongly opposed these amendments, warning that this Bill would ‘undermine the Government’s successful border protection regime’ (7d 2019). In a live interview, Morrison framed evacuated asylum seekers as criminals (E);

> [The Medevac bill] doesn’t provide for the usual arrangements which would enable us to reject someone coming to Australia because they have a criminal history. They may be a paedophile, they may be a rapist, they may be a murderer, and this bill would mean that we just have to take them.

22 The *Home Affairs Legislation Amendment (Miscellaneous Measures) Bill 2018*, or the Medivac Bill, is a law designed to ‘ensure timely and life-saving medical care is provided to people in offshore detention’ (Refugee Council 2019). In the event that a refugee or person seeking asylum requires urgent medical care, two independent Australian doctors can recommend to the Minister that they be temporarily transferred to Australia for treatment.
hundreds upon hundreds upon hundreds of single males [...] will have to be transferred to Australia at the direction of doctors – not the government – [...] we’ll have to reopen detention centres that we closed. Like Christmas island – we shut Christmas Island – this will [...] undermine the successful border protection framework that has stopped the boats and ensured the integrity of our borders.

Morrison (7c 2019)

Morrison, echoing the Howard Government’s Children Overboard narrative of nearly two decades earlier, attempts to justify his position against the Bill by painting people who seek asylum by boat as opportunistic criminals (E) who will now be able to sidestep security checks (B) by having themselves declared in need of urgent medical attention (A). By triggering the audience’s existing associations with the labels ‘rapist’, ‘murder’ and ‘paedophile’ and linking them with people seeking asylum in offshore processing centres, Morrison constructs this group as both criminal (E) and a threat to the nation (B). Morrison delivers an impression that Australia will be overrun by ‘hundreds upon hundreds upon hundreds of men’ – who Morrison has described as dangerous criminals – triggering Australia’s invasion anxiety and positioning those who seek asylum as a threat (B).

In a doorstop interview several days later (7d 2019), Minister for Immigration and Border Protection David Coleman asserts that the Medevac Bill would not ‘make our border protection stronger or fairer’, it would only ‘weaken’ it;

Our government has been extremely successful in securing our borders, stopping the boats and getting people out of detention. [...] there were 2000 kids in detention when we came to office, we got them all out. [...] We’ve closed 19 detention centres that Labor opened. The reason we’ve been able to close them is because we’ve secured our borders and stopped the boats.

Coleman (7d 2019)

Morrison and Coleman frame current border protection policy as fair (A), humane (C) and efficient in ‘securing [Australia’s] borders’ (B), frequently listing the Coalition’s achievements in getting kids out of detention, closing detention centres, ‘stopping the boats’ and ‘expanding’ Australia’s humanitarian program (7d 2019). In February 2019 Morrison delivered Our Plan for Keeping Australians Safe and Secure (7e), a speech in which he outlined his government’s commitment to ‘national security’ (B) and the ‘safety’ of ‘the Australian people’. Morrison uses inclusive language, and regularly repeats the phrase ‘to keep Australians safe and secure.’ This notion of keeping Australians safe and secure implies that there is a threat to be protected from. In this speech, Morrison discusses a broad range of security concerns but his plans for managing the arrival of people by boat is presented as a national security (B) and humanitarian (C) priority;

Operation Sovereign Borders has worked, it’s delivered a human dividend that is both compassionate and fair. We’ve stopped the deaths at sea – there were over 1,200 that we know of; We’ve closed 19 detention
centres; We’ve removed all children from detention – remember over 8,000 were put into detention under the previous government […] All the children are off Nauru; We’ve expanded our humanitarian program […] That’s what strong border protection delivers when it comes to human beings.

Morrison (7e 2019)

Here, Morrison argues that tough border policies are ‘compassionate and fair’ (C & A), crediting Operation Sovereign Borders as the policy responsible for the Government’s ability to expand its humanitarian program (C). This is also reflected in the Liberal Party’s 2019 policy statement Our Plan: Securing Our Borders (7g), in which it is claimed that ‘strong border protection policies’ have ‘stopped deaths at sea […] closed 19 detention centres […] removed all children from detention’ and allowed for 5,000 additional places to be added to Australia’s ‘generous’ humanitarian intake.

Like his predecessors, Morrison only chooses to reference children or refer to people seeking asylum as ‘human beings’ when framing policy as Moral & Humanitarian (C). However, when not activating this frame, the Morrison Government focuses almost exclusively on the act of people smuggling (E) rendering those who seek asylum virtually invisible. People seeking asylum by boat – referred to as ‘illegal maritime arrivals’ – are further conflated with Criminality & Illegality (E) by their association with other security agenda items. In Our Plan, the arrival of people seeking asylum is the first area of focus in a policy document outlining threats to Australia’s security, with the Liberal Party’s plans for ‘Stopping the boats’ immediately followed by plans for ‘Cancelling Visas of Criminals’, ‘Cancelling Citizenship for Terrorist Conduct’, and ‘Stopping Drugs at the Border’.

5.1.1 From Frames to Narratives

Nine primary frames can be observed in the communications of successive Australian Governments from 2001 to 2019; Fairness (A), Security (B), Moral & Humanitarian (C), Australian Values (D), Crime & Illegality (E), Liberal Rights & Freedoms (F), Successful Multiculturalism (G), Australian Way of Life (H) and Citizenship & Obligation (I).

It is important to note that despite Australia’s past and present exclusion of those seen as racially and culturally ‘different’, frames relating to race and otherness were not identified in the empirical material. However, the lack of explicit references to these ideas – and subsequent absence of corresponding frames – does not mean that racism and a fear of the ‘culturally-incompatible’ Other are unrelated to the frames which have been observed (Balibar 1991a, p.20). Racism and a deep-seated fear of those who are ‘culturally different’ can be understood instead as fundamental notions which underpin many of the identified
frames, thus, while not directly observable in the material, their presence and influence can still be felt (Fiske 2019).

Through constant repetition, these frames reinforce dominant discourses by constructing and reproducing narratives which support the policy visions of Multicultural Australia and Safe, Secure & Free Australia. Further research into the framing of policy issues is critical to understanding how particular ‘realities’ described by politicians have come to be accepted as ‘universal truths’ (RAC 2019).

5.2 Narratives
This second analysis component will explore the core narratives produced by the frames identified in the empirical material. Communications from Australian political elites concerning both policy visions contain similar frames and have produced intertwining narratives. The narratives have been divided into three categories; (1) truths – narratives which aim to establish a particular idea as fact; (2) dependencies – narratives which position one policy goal as contingent on the fulfilment of another; and (3) transformations – narratives which have morphed over time. The subheadings reflect the core message discerned through analysis.

5.2.1 Truths
Narrative: Seeking asylum by boat is illegal.
Liberal and Labor governments have linked people seeking asylum with ideas of illegality in order to erase the legitimacy of their plight, negate Australia’s humanitarian obligations, and construct this group as undeserving of empathy and deserving of exclusion. The Refugee Convention states that those who are in need of protection do not require authorisation to seek it (United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, Article 31).23 Despite this, numerous states employ the terms ‘unauthorised’ and ‘illegal’ to refer to those who seek asylum even though seeking asylum is not only legal, but a basic human right (Nethery & Silverman 2015, p.1). Though people who seek asylum by boat ‘are not breaking the law’, Australian political elites continuously frame seeking asylum by boat as such (Refugee Council, 2014). The Crime & Legality frame (E) is activated regularly in the texts by labelling people who seek asylum as ‘illegal entrants’ or ‘illegal boat arrivals’, branding

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23 Article 31 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) prohibits ‘contracting states’ from penalising refugees ‘on account of their illegal entry or presence’, protecting the right of people seeking asylum to ‘enter without prior authorisation’ given ‘they have good cause for entering without a visa’ (ASRC 2013, p.1).
them as inherently illegal (John Howard 1b 2001; 1c 2002; Tony Abbott 5a 2011; 5d 2015; 5e 2015; Malcolm Turnbull 6e 2017; The Coalition 5b 2013; 7g 2019).

This narrative is supported by a distortion of emphasis on the act of people smuggling as a criminal behaviour, marking the passengers of people smugglers criminal by association. Successive Prime Ministers avoid direct references to people seeking asylum when focusing on punishing the ‘criminal’ people smugglers to simplify the narrative that the government is ‘thwarting’ an ‘evil […] trade’, permitting the use of more aggressive tactics without raising questions about the people impacted by these hawkish responses (Julia Gillard 3d 2011; Kevin Rudd 4e 2013; Tony Abbott 5d 2015; Malcolm Turnbull 6b 2016).

**Narrative:** *Australia is an inclusive and successfully multicultural society.*

The Successful Multiculturalism frame (G) is constantly activated in communications which celebrate Australia’s diversity producing a narrative that Australia is a cohesive, inclusive multicultural society. While Australia is, in many ways, a socially cohesive and inclusive society, inclusion is not experienced by all. Ozdowski (2016, pp.3-4) notes that ‘multiculturalism’ is often used as a ‘demographic descriptor of a diverse population,’ and reasons that while Australia may appear to be successfully multicultural given that it *appears* diverse, it is the ‘equality of status and opportunity’ and ‘sharing of power and wealth between different ethno-cultural groups’ that marks the success of multiculturalism. By repeatedly stating that Australia *is* an inclusive and multicultural society, it becomes accepted as truth. Constantly praising Australians’ tolerance and love of diversity can be said to influence public behaviour in a positive way, as it establishes that tolerance and respect are the norm. However, by consistently framing Australia as an inclusive and cohesive society, there is no space to discuss the exclusion experienced by some groups, and attempts to address issues of racism and Islamophobia, for instance, are rebuffed as ‘political correctness gone mad’ (Remeikis 2019).

While we can observe that Labor leaders – Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard – and Liberal leader Malcolm Turnbull largely support multiculturalism, John Howard, Tony Abbott and Scott Morrison tend to avoid mentioning it, with former Race Discrimination Commissioner Tim Soutphommassane (2019a) observing that, for these Liberal leaders the ‘preferred m-word is migrant rather than multiculturalism’. Ozdowski (2016, p.3) also suggests that Australian politicians are able to celebrate diversity and multiculturalism without aiming for ‘cultural pluralism’ as the dominance of the Anglo-Australian ethno-cultural group is firmly established. Jones (2003, p.126) supports this, writing that ‘the ending of the White Australia
came too late for a fully multicultural society to develop,’ making it unlikely that multiple cultures will ever ‘coexist on equal footing’ (Ozdowski 2016, p.3).

**Narrative: Asylum seekers are a threat to national security and an Australian way of life.** ‘What should be a debate about people […] has been deliberately poisoned to become a debate about borders and security’, observes refugee and activist Behrooiz Boochani (2018) who is currently detained on Manus Island. The framing of people seeking asylum as ‘an existential threat to our way of life’ appears regularly in communications from Australian Prime Ministers, drowning out the fact that people who seek asylum by boat do so because regular migration channels are not available to them (Fiske 2019).

The ‘rhetoric of refugees as barbaric monsters’ is part of a strategy to mobilise anxiety (Fiske 2019). From John Howard (1b 2001), planting the notion of ‘links to terrorism’, to Scott Morrison’s (7c 2019) warning about the ‘hundreds upon hundreds upon hundreds’ of potentially criminal men on Manus Island, the Government has consistently positioned people who come by boat as a threat. Concerns that Australia is being ‘swamped by boat arrivals’ have ‘occupied successive governments’ since the 1970s, however, in the context of a substantial migration program, the number of people seeking asylum by boat is ‘very, very minor’ – less than 2% of migrants – marking a massive distortion in focus (Phillips 2015).

The Security (B), Crime & Legality (E) and the Australian Way of Life (H) frames are frequently used, in isolation and in combination, to bolster a narrative which necessitates harsh policies of exclusion in the name of defending Australia’s borders, Australia’s people and an Australian Way of Life. Liberal Prime Ministers tend to place more emphasis than their Labor counterparts on the need to protect the safety of citizens, something they regularly imply is threatened by ‘terrorists’, ‘rapists’, ‘murderers’ and ‘paedophiles’ who could be coming to Australia by boat (John Howard 1b 2001; Scott Morrison 7c 2019).

Given that many people who seek asylum by boat are of Muslim background or originate from countries with a Muslim majority, the construction of people seeking asylum as dangerous is deeply entwined with broader construction of Muslims as a threat to the West. The impact of this damaging narrative can be seen in a substantial growth of public support for far-right politicians such as Pauline Hanson (2017) who encourages Islamophobia and anti-immigrant attitudes through statements such as those made in an interview in which she argued ‘Islam is a disease’ that Australians need to ‘vaccinate […] against.’ It should be

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24 The arrival of people by boat to Australia is comparatively small, particularly when considering that the UNHCR (2014) reported that nearly 350,000 people ‘risked their lives in boats seeking asylum or a better life’ in a single year, with roughly 207,000 of these journeys taking place in the Mediterranean and approximately 54,000 people travelling by boat within Asia.
noted, however, that over the past forty years, with over 70,000 people who arrived by boat settled in Australia, no one ‘has been found to have a link to terrorism’ (Chopra 2015).

**Narrative: Policies of exclusion stop men, women and children from drowning.**
The Moral & Humanitarian frame (C) repeatedly appears alongside the Security frame (B) in order to persuade the Australian public that boat turn-backs, indefinite detention, offshore processing, temporary protection and rights restrictions are essential to stopping ‘men, women and children’ from drowning ‘on our shoreline’ (Julia Gillard 3d 2011). Policies of exclusion are justified in terms of saving lives, the cruel nature of the policies minimised by the argument they are necessary in a ‘humanitarian ‘emergency’ (Julia Gillard 3e 2012).

However, it has been demonstrated that stopping the boats ‘doesn’t save lives’, but actually ‘puts [lives] in danger’ (ABC News 2015b; Amnesty International 2015). In order to save lives, Australia needs to cooperate with regional neighbours to improve access to safe migration channels. Boat ‘turn backs’ violate international law and endanger people onboard when overcrowded boats with ‘insufficient fuel’ are forced to return (Amnesty International, p.6).\(^{25}\) Deterrence measures also fail to address the myriad of push-factors that cause people to come by sea (RAC 2019). Instead, they prevent those fleeing war and persecution from reaching safety, signalling the urgent need for a sustainable and protection-focused approach to Australia’s asylum policy (Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law 2018).

By presenting a security tactic as a humanitarian necessity, harsh deterrence measures come to be perceived as ‘a righteous response’ (Manderson 2016, p.163), allowing politicians to trump other ethical concerns, such as the treatment of people in indefinite detention, by arguing that the Government must first prevent ‘the drownings’ (Julia Gillard 3e 2012).

### 5.2.2 Dependencies

**Narrative: Excluding those who come by boat allows Australia to be more humanitarian.** Political elites regularly present ‘a disclaimer’ before introducing discriminatory arguments (Wodak & Van Dijk 2000; Wodak 2008, p.55). Political liberals, for instance, declare themselves to be ‘tolerant’ and ‘democratic’ in order to ‘justify and legitimise’ discriminatory comments, something which can be observed consistently in the communications of Australian politicians (Wodak 2008, p.55). The Security (B) and Moral & Humanitarian (C) frames are regularly combined in order to justify that a militant approach to deterring ‘boat arrivals’ is necessary for the expansion of Australia’s ‘generous’ humanitarian program

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\(^{25}\) From the moment a state establishes effective control over a boat, all persons on it are within the state’s jurisdiction, and that state is responsible for securing and protecting their human rights (Amnesty International 2015, p 34)
It is repeatedly stated that strict immigration control enables Australia’s to be welcoming to refugees, a narrative closely tied to that of the genuine refugee.

**Narrative: People who come by boat are taking the place of genuine refugees.**

By blaming those who seek asylum by boat for limiting the humanitarian capacity of the Australian Government, this group is further demonised. Marr and Wilkinson (2003, p.35) posit that the origin of this idea that refugees ‘are people who wait patiently in camps far away for us to come and select them’ lies in the selection of refugees after the Second World War; an idea that continues to inform contemporary discourse which positions some refugees as more ‘genuine’ or deserving than others. Tony Abbott (5a 2011; 5e 2015) consistently argues that people who come by boat are already safe once they get to Indonesia or Malaysia, and are then choosing to come to Australia for a ‘better life’, nullifying Australia’s humanitarian obligations and supporting the narrative that people who seek asylum by boat are not ‘genuine refugees’ but economic migrants (Asylum Insight 2019).

By framing those who are ‘waiting’ overseas to be resettled in Australia as ‘genuine’ refugees, those who come by boat are indirectly labelled as ingenuine (Julia Gillard 3d 2011). The narrative of ‘queue jumping’ – subverting regular migration channels to more quickly gain Australia’s protection – is not only false, but heavily informs the perception that those who come by boat are cheating the system, ‘[offending] the Australian sense of fair play’ (Marr & Wilkinson 2003; Julia Gillard 3a 2010).

People who come by boat and by plane are framed as taking the place of genuine refugees though the Government is responsible for designating the number of humanitarian places available, and could expand its humanitarianism by subtracting from other immigration categories, such as permanent skilled migration instead of blaming people who seek asylum in Australia for limiting the places available for UNHCR refugees.

**Narrative: Security enables freedom.**

Ross (2004, p.109) theorises that in order to protect citizens, states must first have strict control of their borders. This view – popular among political conservatives – reasons that security begets democratic rights and freedoms; a view pushed heavily by the Turnbull Government and one which continues to inform Liberal Party policy. Malcolm Turnbull (6e 2017) frequently states that ‘security and freedom’ are ‘not mutually exclusive’, asserting that the freedoms Australians enjoy are ‘enabled by strong national security’. The Liberal Rights & Freedoms frame (F) and the Security frame (B) are combined in this way so as to position
freedom – linked to an Australian Way of Life (H) – as contingent on ‘strong borders’ (Malcolm Turnbull 6b 2016; Scott Morrison 7e 2019).

Repeated assertions that there is a need to pursue policy ‘that will best keep us safe’ implies that Australia is under threat (Malcolm Turnbull 6e 2017). By creating a narrative which entangles the defence of rights and freedoms with ‘secure borders’, opposing policies associated with Safe, Secure & Free Australia becomes complicated (Malcolm Turnbull 6b 2016).

Narrative: Secure borders are the foundation of an inclusive multicultural society.

The Successful Multiculturalism frame (G) is regularly combined with the Security frame (B) to create a narrative that places ‘harmonious multiculturalism’ as a product of ‘secure borders’ and a ‘confidence that our government is thoroughly in control’ of immigration (Malcolm Turnbull 6b 2016.) Under Labor Prime Ministers, the success of Australian multiculturalism was largely attributed to ‘mutual respect’, ‘tolerance’, ‘equality’ and a belief in ‘a fair go’ (Kevin Rudd 2d 2010; Julia Gillard 3b 2011). However, over the last six years, Liberal leaders have increasingly framed exclusion as necessary for inclusion.

Strict immigration controls are presented as necessary for ‘keeping Australians together’ and giving newly arrived migrants a chance to ‘find their footing and participate in their new home’ (Scott Morrison 7a 2018). In the name of supporting the growth of a ‘stronger and more socially cohesive society’, policies of exclusion intended to control who enters Australia become legitimised (Malcolm Turnbull 6b 2016; 6c 2017). In this narrative, an inclusive multicultural Australia is contingent on the exclusion of people who seek asylum by boat.

Narrative: The success of Multicultural Australia is rooted in citizenship, reciprocal obligations and Australian values.

The constant activation of the Australian Values (D) and Citizenship & Obligation (I) frames alongside the Successful Multiculturalism frame (G) establishes a narrative where harmonious multiculturalism is dependent on migrants embracing Australian values and ‘abiding by mutual civic obligations’ (Australian Government 1d 2003) Starting in the Howard years, a focus on tolerance and respect has come to be replaced by an emphasis on citizenship and Australian values as the essential ingredients to social cohesion and unity. Labor Prime Ministers tend to balance the Citizenship & Obligation frame (I) with a promotion of ‘tolerance and respect’, positioning a harmonious multicultural society as dependent on these values and ‘a common obligation to adhere to the laws of the nation’ (Kevin Rudd 2d 2010). While Labor leaders believe that those who come make ‘us who we are’, Liberal leaders prefer migrants to ‘become Australian’ (John Howard 1h 2008; Julia Gillard 3c 2011; Tony Abbott 5f 2017).
5.2.3 Transformations

Narrative: Sovereign right to protect Australia’s borders → the ‘national emergency’ of a ‘border protection crisis’ → taking ‘back control of our borders’

The steady securitisation of the discourse around the arrival of people by boat reflects a shift from positioning the exclusion of this group as an exercise in sovereignty towards the framing of the issue as a ‘national emergency’ (John Howard 1a 2001; The Coalition 5b 2013). Sovereign states are ‘currently perceived to be entitled to decide whom to include and whom to exclude from their territories, with international legal restrictions playing a minimal role in the decision-making process’ (Kritzman-Amir 2009, p.611). John Howard’s (1a 2001) infamous declaration that ‘we will decide who comes into this country and the circumstances in which they come’ is a clear example of this perception that states have the right to ‘close their borders and to banish undesired intruders’ (Kritzman-Amir 2009, p.611). During the Howard years, sovereignty – the ‘fundamental right of this country to protect its borders’ – was regularly cited as the reason to apply tough deterrence measures (Howard 1a 2001). However, during the Rudd and Gillard governments the narrative shifted to ‘[shutting] down the illegal operations of people smugglers’ and reducing the number of ‘asylum seekers dying in our waters’ (Rudd 2c 2008; Gillard 3a 2010; Rudd 4b 2013).

In 2013, when Tony Abbott implements Operation Sovereign Borders, the discourse becomes more militaristic, with the exclusion of asylum seekers supposedly requiring ‘the discipline and focus of a targeted military operation’ (The Coalition 5b 2013). Abbott frequently positions Australia as being on the verge of losing control of its borders, necessitating more aggressive tactics by warning that ‘a country that can’t control its borders starts to lose control of itself’ (5a 2011; 5e 2015). Malcolm Turnbull (6b 2016; 6e 2017) is decidedly less hawkish than Abbott – though he too speaks of ‘control’ – describing his government as ‘in control of our immigration and humanitarian program’ and ‘strong borders’ as central to Australia’s national interests. With Scott Morrison as Prime Minister we see a return to a hyper-securitised rhetoric and an emphasis on keeping Australians ‘safe’ and borders ‘secure’ (7e 2019).

Narrative: Diversity and multiculturalism are a ‘unifying force’ for the nation →
Citizenship and Australian values are a ‘unifying force’ for the nation.

While the ‘progressive shift’ to multiculturalism after decades of the White Australia policy was ‘not so much a popular cause as an official command’, from the 1970s onwards, successive Prime Ministers promoted policies of multiculturalism and came to recognise diversity as a core component of Australian identity (Jupp 2002; Jayasuriya, Walker & Gothard 2003, p.2).
The Australian Values frames (D) and Citizenship & Obligation frame (I) can be seen to steadily replace the Successful Multiculturalism frame (G) in discussions about a collective Australian identity across the time period of analysis. The 2003 multicultural policy statement (Australian Government 1d, p.1), which describes first ‘diversity’, and then, several pages later, ‘citizenship’ (1d, p. 6) as the ‘unifying force for our nation’ exemplifies an ongoing tension about whether multiculturalism and diversity or citizenship and Australian values are central to national unity and identity (Australian Government 1d 2003, p.6; Jupp 2002). Despite statements that Australians are ‘united in diversity’ (1d 2003), the Howard Government set about renewing an emphasis on Australian values and citizenship which would encourage immigrants to ‘become […] Australian’ (1h 2008). Jupp (2002, p.210) describes this assumption that all Australians can ‘share the same [Anglo-Australian] values and attitudes’ as ‘manifestly nonsensical’ and in complete denial of the ‘impact’ of mass post-war immigration and Indigenous Australians. However, John Howard, believing multiculturalism to not be ‘workable’, asserted that a focus on diversity and multiculturalism undermines ‘the national interest’ (Ang 2003, p.65; John Howard 1h 2008). This was echoed in Scott Morrison, who called for ‘a new post-multiculturalism agenda’, arguing that policies of multiculturalism are ‘barriers to social and economic inclusion’ and that emphasis on diversity detracts from a sense of collective identity (Park 2013).

5.2.4 Invisible Narratives
While this thesis has predominantly focused on what is said in communications from political elites, it is important to acknowledge that the discursive practice of framing and the narratives framing produces, are also significantly informed by what is not said. Entman (1993, p.54) contends that frames are defined as much by what they ‘omit’ as by what they ‘include’, and the act of framing regularly silences or distracts from certain realities, knowledges and perspectives. By ‘highlighting some features of reality while omitting others’, framing facilitates the continuation of hegemonic discourses (ibid, p.53).

Australian politicians frequently draw attention away from the humanity, plight and experience of people seeking asylum whilst keeping knowledge about their lived experiences largely suppressed through physical exclusion via indefinite detention and censorship of information. While there is significant pro-refugee and pro-diversity sentiment in the Australian community – with many refugee and minority voices being given space – in a situation where the political mainstream is occupied by those intent on silencing these perspectives, the imbalance in narratives continues to persist.
6. Discussion & Conclusion

6.1 A Fork in the Road
The identification of frames and narratives that legitimate policies of exclusion against people seeking asylum and facilitate a steady shift from a focus on multiculturalism to one on citizenship and Australian values, leaves us with a discouraging view Australian politics.

The current situation for people who seek asylum is dire. Successive Australian governments have been lambasted for their treatment of those who come seeking safety, accused recently by Independent Federal MP Andrew Wilkie of being ‘guilty of crimes against humanity’, yet the harsh policies continue (ABC News 2019). The tension between inclusive rhetoric and exclusionary practice is palpable. If Australian political elites continue down the path of securitisation and fear-mongering – all in the name of a Safe, Secure & Free Australia – the vision for an inclusive Multicultural Australia may evaporate altogether.

However, we can find a positive in the findings of this analysis. The identification of frames and narratives clearly indicates that policy is legitimised, and seemingly necessitated, through reinforcing dominant discourses. Therefore, we can assume that ‘agitating a change in discourse’, by reframing and promoting alternative narratives, can catalyse change in the social world and disrupt policies which have a ‘devastating human impact’ (Nethery & Silverman 2015; RAC 2019).

I will now present potential scenarios – some more realistic than others – that could eventuate if hegemonic discourses are either challenged or if they remain unchecked.

Paving the Way for White Supremacy
Australian politicians regularly act as traders in an economy of fear and divisiveness. Continuing this trend could further legitimise racism and facilitate the rise of white supremacy.

In Australia – where Muslims comprise only 2.6 per cent of the population – Islamophobia has become ‘practically enshrined as public policy’, normalised through mainstream politicians’ framing of certain issues (Collins 2019; The Guardian 2019). Members of The Coalition have ‘continued to nourish hostile and insensitive stereotypes about Muslims’ and successive Liberal Prime Ministers have ‘failed to speak out with sufficient force against racism in their ranks’ (Sydney Morning Herald 2019). Former Race Discrimination Commissioner Tim Soutphommasane raises concerns about the prevalence of anti-Muslim rhetoric in the political centre, stating that the Morrison Government is
‘campaigning on fear, seeking to incite hysteria’ about people who seek asylum and other ethnic minorities such as Indigenous Australians and people of colour (The Guardian 2019).

Racism is a driving force behind the legitimisation of policies of exclusion against people who seek asylum and considerably informs the pressure being placed on migrant communities to ‘become […] Australian’ (1h 2008). In August 2018, far-right Senator Fraser Anning called for a ‘final solution to the immigration problem’, advocating a return to the strict controls of the White Australia policy (SBS News, 2018). Soon after, the Australian Senate narrowly avoided passing a motion put forward by One Nation’s Pauline Hanson to acknowledge that ‘it is ok to be White’ in the context of ‘the deplorable rise of anti-White racism’ (Karp 2018).

The ‘mainstreaming of hate’ has increased public ‘tolerance for and encouragement of bigotry’ which only amplifies pervasive narratives about minority cultural groups (Loewenstein 2019). Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton has made repeated references to ‘African gang violence’ and ‘African street gangs’ in attempts to fuel anti-immigration sentiments, stating people are ‘scared to go out’ at night because of ‘criminal gangs’ of Sudanese youths (The Guardian 2018). Dutton’s statements manipulate ‘perception for votes’ and can be seen as part of a strategy to justify strict immigration controls (ibid).

These frames and narratives identified are grounded in an attempt to Other and fuel a fear of people who seek asylum. Othering is a process whereby an ‘imaginary figure of an alien or external collective “Other”’ – is reproduced as the ‘object of domination and knowledge’ – and becomes a ‘threatening double, or an essential enemy’ (Said 1979; Balibar 2005, p.25). These narratives support a burgeoning White nationalism, the growth of which is evidenced by support for alt-right neo-Nazi organisations Reclaim Australia and the United Patriots Front who are strongly opposed to immigration, Islam and multiculturalism.

Australian Greens Senator and Leader Dr Richard Di Natale attributes the rise of white supremacy to the actions of ‘opportunistic politicians’ who have ‘nurtured, encouraged and legitimised hate’ (The Greens 2019). Failure to actively condemn racism has the potential to drag Australia back to a White Australia policy and the unapologetic exclusion of ‘non-Whites’ (Walker 2003).

**Taking a Stand Against Hate**

In order to prevent the normalisation of racism and bigotry, political elites must actively tackle discrimination by changing their language and implementing anti-racist strategies.

Both Liberal and Labor Prime Ministers have benefited politically from the pursuit of policies which encourage racism and divisiveness. Though some politicians have been more
explicit than others, the various frames and narratives utilised to justify policies of exclusion against people who seek asylum all reinforce racist and Islamophobia discourses. In order to counteract this, alternative discourses which emphasise a common humanity and reflect the importance of human rights need to permeate political and public debate.

An essential step to achieving this is through leadership from the political mainstream, actively condemning white supremacism and no longer propagating or benefitting from those discourses which fuel racism. While it is highly unlikely that Liberal and Labor leaders will acknowledge their role in bolstering damaging discourses, it is clear that leadership is an essential ingredient to delegitimising bigotry.

‘Talking about racism isn’t divisive. Responding to it isn’t divisive. Perpetrating it is divisive’ argues Tim Soutphommasane (2019), calling for a ‘reset’ of mainstream politicians’ responses to racism and far-right extremism. In the wake of the Christchurch mosque shootings in New Zealand – an act of terrorism perpetrated by white supremacists in which 50 people, predominantly Muslim, were killed in at attack starting at the Al Noor mosque – far-right political actors in Australia were quick to point to Muslim immigration as the ‘real cause of bloodshed’ (Anning 2019). ‘Does anyone still dispute the link between Muslim immigration and violence?’ Senator Fraser Anning (2019) tweeted on the afternoon of the attack. While Anning was condemned by those in the political centre, successive governments continue to benefit from and feed into a normalised discourse of anti-Islam and anti-immigration. In the aftermath of such attacks, politicians should reflect on how their rhetoric feeds into such atrocities and demonstrate leadership which condemns white supremacism and doubles the emphasis of the importance diversity and tolerance, as exemplified by New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern. Ardern disassociated herself from the ‘traditional script for a world leader reacting to a terrorist attack on home soil’, choosing to focus on victims and fostering unity rather than perpetrators and divisiveness, something Australian Prime Ministers could learn from (Rizvi 2019).

Australian political elites regularly raise the topic of Australian values and frame policy issues in relation to fairness, decency, respect and tolerance yet Government policy does not reflect these values. Human rights lawyer and refugee-advocate Julian Burnside (2007, p.20) points to the ‘supreme irony’ of politicians’ obsession with Australian values, contending that the Howard Government replaced ‘old values with newer, meaner ones: a fair go for me and don’t worry about the rest’, a trend that has continued over nearly two decades.

Successive governments have continued to justify policies in the name of Australian values, however, by ensuring that policies actually reflect these so-frequently-touted values, political elites will be able to counter the disturbing trend that is the normalisation of hate.
Towards Post-Multiculturalism

In recent years, multiculturalism has ‘been declared a failure in both Europe and the Anglophone West’ and ‘the discourse of multiculturalism has begun to be replaced with the notions of national identity and belonging’ (Gozdecka, Ercan & Kmak 2014, p.51, p.53). Despite Australian Prime Ministers continuously declaring Australia to be ‘the most successful multicultural society in the world’ (Julia Gillard 3b 2011; Malcolm Turnbull 6b 2016), it is widely believed that ‘we are now entering a “post-multicultural” era’ (Gozdecka, Ercan & Kmak, p.52). Given the steady development of an emphasis on Australian values and the obligations of Australian citizenship, coupled with a burgeoning anxiety about the loss of Anglo-Australian culture due to large-scale immigration, it may be that the Australian Government increasingly distances itself from the principles of multiculturalism and comes to be multicultural in a ‘demographic sense’ only (Jupp 2002; Ozdowski 2016, p.3).

The ‘securitisation of migration’ is central to this shift away from multiculturalist thinking, a trend which is linked to the ‘emergence of new forms of xenophobia and racism-like practices’ (Guild 2009; Gozdecka, Ercan & Kmak 2014, p.56). A major criticism of multiculturalism has been the ‘ghettoization’ of ethno-cultural communities and the emergence of ‘parallel societies’, a concern shared by several Australian Prime Ministers who feel that multiculturalism is a ‘barrier’ to social cohesion (Goodhart 2004 cited in Gozdecka, Ercan & Kmak, p. 55; Park 2013). Post-multiculturalism is characterised by an ‘increased control of diversity’, as illustrated by a slew of legislative and institutional reforms in the United Kingdom and European Union (Gozdecka, Ercan and Kmak, p.52). A lack of consistent bipartisan support for multiculturalism could lead to the eventual collapse of the policy vision of an inclusive Multicultural Australia.

Championing Multiculturalism & Diversity

In spite of the movement towards post-multiculturalism across the West, policies of multiculturalism still have a place in Australia and should be championed if Australia is to be as ‘inclusive’ and ‘harmonious’ as Prime Ministers have repeatedly stated (John Howard 1d 2003; Kevin Rudd 2d 2010; Malcolm Turnbull 6a 2016).

Given that almost half of Australians were ‘either born overseas or had at least one parent who was born overseas’ the multicultural character of society – demographically speaking – is undeniable (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016). Australian multiculturalism started as a policy framework designed to facilitate the inclusion of migrant communities but grew into a concept ‘that articulated the character of the growing ethno-cultural diversity’ in
society (Koleth 2010, p.1). Hodge and O’Carroll (2005, p.1) observe that ‘not so long ago, most Australians took pride in their multicultural identity’ but in recent years ‘this faith in multiculturalism has been badly damaged’ by a discourse which focuses increasingly on difference. Former Race Discrimination Commissioner Tim Soutphommasane (2019) warns that an absence of emphasis on the benefits of multiculturalism from political elites leaves the rise of ‘far-right nationalism and creeping normalisation of racism’ without a counterbalance.

Only fifty years ago, by transforming discourse and subsequently attitudes, political elites from both major parties led Australian society from harbouring a collective vision for White Australia to a ‘progressive shift’ towards a vision of Multicultural Australia (Jayasuriya, Walker & Gothard 2003, p.3). The People of Australia multicultural policy statement (Australian Government 3b 2011) states that Australia’s ‘multicultural character’ gives it ‘a competitive edge in an increasingly globalised world’ and recognises that ‘multiculturalism is our shared future’. Championing multiculturalism once again would require a shift in discourse, and a renewed focus on tolerance and mutual respect as the foundations of a harmonious society. With bipartisan support and an emphasis on our similarities rather than our differences, an inclusive Multicultural Australia might be realised.

Towards Breaking Point

Australia is unusual in that it continues to promote its ‘generous humanitarian program’ whilst administering draconian deterrence policies against people who seek asylum (Malcolm Turnbull 6e 2017). Hansen and Hager (2010, p.204) question the sustainability of pursuing contradictory policy visions in the context of European Union (EU) asylum policy, asking;

[…] how long can EU asylum policy continue to invoke humanitarian values, the Geneva convention, and other conventions and laws when in practice this asylum policy is increasingly at odds, both formally and rhetorically, with these obligations?

(Hansen & Hager 2010, p.205)

This question has relevance in the Australian context, as there is only so far that the Australian Government can go in pursuing policies of exclusion while promoting an illusion of inclusion until one vision gives way to the other. It may be that Australia follows the EU, with the discourse of security and sovereignty triumphing over that of humanitarianism and international obligations. Alternatively, the hypocrisy of Australia’s dual vision may garner enough domestic and international criticism that the treatment of those who seek asylum may come to reflect the welcoming spirit and humanitarianism that the Australian Government continues to promote.
Returning to a White Australia Policy

The legacy of the White Australia policy tells us that an Australia that explicitly defines who has the right to immigrate based on their cultural and/or ethnic background is not an impossible scenario. Through discourse, Muslims, people of colour, people seeking asylum and other groups of *culturally different* immigrants have ‘come to be understood as enemies of Australia’ whether explicit or implied (*The Guardian* 2019).

If a discourse defined by fear continues to permeate political debate and public opinion it may be that, down the track, Australia’s asylum policy and rhetoric around asylum seekers will come to resemble that of Israel’s. Israel, like Australia, is party to the Refugee Convention (1951) and yet the state and media in Israel have labelled asylum seekers as ‘infiltrators’, positioning them as ‘both a demographic and a security threat’ in order to justify harsh deterrence and asylum policies (*Berman & Ziegler* 2015, p.154). Israel aims to ‘maintain a Jewish demographic majority’ with policy reflecting the view that ‘non-Jewish immigration is [...] a threat’ to the nation (*ibid*, p.155). Since the 1990s immigration detention has been used in Israel as the primary mechanism for managing immigration, used as a tactic to deter prospective asylum seekers, as it has in Australia. Israel essentially determines who is included and who is excluded ‘on the basis of a Jewish/other distinction’ except for a ‘heavily governed and restricted’ guest-worker scheme (*Kritzman-Amir* 2009, p.604).

While Israel may seem an extreme example, we can observe many commonalities between asylum policy and discourse in both contexts. Australia’s history of immigration restriction clearly exemplifies that a return to the explicit exclusion of certain groups is not an impossible scenario and current rhetoric and policy indicates that the legacy of the White Australia policy is alive and well.

Challenging Dominant Discourses

‘Thinking differently’ first requires ‘speaking differently’ (*Lakoff* 2004, p.xiii). Discourse, while regularly used to ‘legitimise the processes and decisions of the politically powerful’, also offers ‘a space in which to criticise, de-legitimate and argue’ (*Wodak* 2008, pp.55-56). Since the ‘dominant negative framing of refugee issues’ has an ‘impact on policy outcomes’ by offering alternative discourses, policy can be influenced (*Cooper et al.* 2017, pp.78-79).

Critical discourse analysts contend that the ‘reality’ produced by, and reflected in, dominant discourses is taken for granted as ‘truth’ unless it is challenged (*Jørgensen & Phillips* 2002, p.22). Furthermore, the work of framing theorists (*Entman* 1993; *Druckman* 2001; *Chong & Druckman* 2007) indicates that knowledge and alternative presentations of an
issue considerably limit the efficacy of frames used by political elites. Rowe & O’Brien (2014) observe that, in Australia, alternative perspectives and discourses are already being consistently promoted by advocacy organisations, political parties and people with lived experience of seeking asylum. The challenge lies in getting these perspectives, stories and experiences heard given that the mass media is highly influenced by political elites. Entman (1993, p.56) reminds us that the mass media has a responsibility to become more frame-aware so as not to regurgitate the messaging of political elites, while Shenker-Osorio et al.’s (2017, p.1) tell us to be conscious of the words we choose, encouraging the use of frames that best communicate a pro-refugee message to ‘persuadables’ without strengthening the frames of ‘the opposition’. Cooper et al.’s (2017, p.87) study shows that ‘despite dominant national negative framing’ local media coverage of refugees and asylum seekers residing in the community ‘tends to be humanising’ and emphasises personal stories and a common humanity. This illustrates the potential of refugee stories and the importance of countering dominant discourses with positive framing and humanising portrayals.

The frames used by political elites are not inherently negative and can be harnessed and used to promote alternative discourses. Fairness (A) – or ‘a fair go’ – for example, is lauded as the core Australian value and parties across the political spectrum regularly activate the Fairness frame. The Australian Greens (2019) regularly employs the Fairness frame, using rights-based language to campaign for a ‘fairer, more equal community’. Similarly, the Australian values frame (D) can continue to be used to promote decency, tolerance and respect as Australian traits that foster a harmonious and inclusive multicultural society.

We need strong leadership from political elites who refuse to be complicit in fuelling damaging discourses. We need responsible journalism that practices frame-awareness. We need public education to improve critical thinking and the public capacity for frame-recognition. We need to push counter-frames and alternative narratives. We need to amplify the voices of people with lived experience of seeking asylum, of exclusion, of racism, and ensure that advocacy and messaging that counters dominant discourses does not remove people’s agency or dignity. By challenging divisive discourses, we can cultivate an environment where the persecution of people who seek asylum is no longer politically viable and where inclusion and multiculturalism are practiced as well as preached.
6.2 Looking Forward

These findings reflect broader trends relating to the securitisation of immigration policy across the West, and a renewed focus on national values and citizenship as a source of unity and collective identity. The state of Australian politics could increasingly come to reflect that of the European Union and United Kingdom, where a rhetoric of inclusiveness and humanitarianism is giving way to one of exclusion and denying human rights obligations. Alternatively, Australia could continue to celebrate its achievements as ‘the most successful multicultural society in the world’ and reembrace the notion of ‘united in diversity’, coming to practice the ‘generous’ humanitarianism it preaches (Australian Government 1a 2001; Malcolm Turnbull 6b 2016).

2001 marked a turning point in the discourses supporting the policy visions for Multicultural Australia and Safe, Secure & Free Australia. The re-election of a Morrison Coalition Government in May 2019, on the back of a campaign which convinced Australians to be ‘afraid of change’, leaves many of us with a feeling of dread (BBC 2019). However, it may be that future transformations in dominant political discourses in Australia are not primarily a product of the actions and rhetoric of political elites. Instead, paradigm shifts might be provoked by the rights-based and people-first messaging of grass-roots movements who refuse to accept that harsh policies of exclusion towards people seeking asylum are necessary or legitimate, and who believe that Australia can be an inclusive, multicultural society for all; regardless of ethnicity, cultural background or mode of arrival.
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**Constructed Realities**

Holly McCarthy


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7.1 Appendices

Appendix 1: *Communications from Australian politicians 2001-2019 (empirical material)*

1b. John Howard, Press Conference (7th November, 2001), Melbourne [transcript]
1c. John Howard, Interview with Neil Mitchell, Radio 3AW (15th February, 2002), [interview transcript]
1e. Peter Costello, Address to Sydney Institute: *Worth Promoting, Worth Defending: Australian citizenship, what it means and how to nurture it* (23rd February 2006), Sydney [transcript]
1f. Andrew Robb, Media Release: *Australia to Introduce Citizenship Test* (11th December 2006), [media release]
1h. John Howard, ‘If you come to Australia, you become an Australian’ (26th October 2008), [video transcript]

2a. Kevin Rudd, Election Speech, (14th November, 2007), Brisbane, [transcript]
2d. Kevin Rudd, Doorstep interview Geelong Hospital, (7th May, 2010), Geelong, [transcript]

3a. Julia Gillard, Gillard’s Asylum Policy Speech at the Lowy Institute (6th July 2010), Sydney [transcript]
3c. Julia Gillard, Speech to the Australian Multicultural Council Launch (22nd August 2011) [transcript]

4a. Kevin Rudd, National Press Club Address Q&A (11th July 2013), Canberra, [transcript]
4b. Kevin Rudd, ‘Address to the nation on asylum seekers’ (19th July 2013), Canberra, [video transcript]
4c. Kevin Rudd, Interview with Andrew Bolt, (28th July, 2013) [transcript]
4d. Kevin Rudd, Joint Press Conference with President of Nauru, Minister for Immigration (3rd August 2013), Brisbane [transcript]
4e. Kevin Rudd, ‘Rudd-v-Abbott: the debate in full’ (11th August 2013), [video transcript]

5a. Tony Abbott, The Hon. Tony Abbott MHR Address to the Lowy Institute (2nd June 2011), Sydney [transcript]
5b. Liberal-National Coalition, *The Coalition’s Operation Sovereign Borders* Election Policy, (July 2013) [policy document]
5d. Tony Abbott & Sophie Mirabella, Joint Doorstop Interview (4th September 2015), Wodonga [transcript]
5e. Tony Abbott, ‘Tony Abbott’s controversial speech at the Margaret Thatcher Lecture’ (27th October 2015), London [transcript]
5f. Tony Abbott, Address to the Institute of Public Affairs, (27th June 2017), Brisbane [transcript]

6a. Malcolm Turnbull, Remarks at Harmony Day Morning Tea, (16th March 2016) [transcript]
6b. Malcolm Turnbull, ‘The truth is our successful multicultural society is built on secure borders’, (20th May 2016) [article]
6c. Malcolm Turnbull, Remarks at the release of the Multicultural Statement (20th March 2017) [Transcript]
6d. Malcolm Turnbull & Peter Dutton, Press Conference with Minister for Immigration and Border Protection the Hon. Peter Dutton MP, (18th April 2017), Canberra [transcript]

7a. Scott Morrison & David Coleman, Media Release– Review into Integration, Employment and Settlement Outcomes, (13th December 2018), [media release]
7b. Scott Morrison, ‘Morrison fires up over border protection: “I will fight them on this”’, (6th December 2018) [video]
7c. Scott Morrison, ‘Morrison says asylum seeker men on Nauru and Manus could be paedophiles and murderers and blames Bill Shorten for opening the door to them’, (6th February 2019) [video transcript]
7d. Scott Morrison & David Coleman, Doorstop (Interview) with the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, (9th February 2019), Penhurst, [transcript]
7e. Scott Morrison, National Press Club Address – Our Plan for Keeping Australians Safe and Secure, (11th February 2019), Canberra, [transcript]
7f. Peter Dutton, ‘Peter Dutton on the medical evacuations vote’, (12th February), Canberra [transcript]
Appendix 2: Words that Work (Shenker-Osorio et al. 2017, p.3)

To read more about Words that Work visit:

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<tr>
<th>Words that Work</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Decided to deny rights</td>
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<td>Government choosing to detain (name)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flourish, prosper, thrive</td>
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<td>Initial conditions worsened</td>
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<td>Injuries, being perpetrator, harm being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survive, not seeking a better life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myth busting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is illegal to seek asylum, it is an issue of basic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is not illegal to seek asylum, not a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling persecuted, violence and torture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be settled in Australia be placed onshore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrating into our communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danger; safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in peace, care for children, live free from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security, survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turn back to harm, denied basic rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do the right thing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treat others the way we want to be treated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examining each (person) case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a fair and efficient process, fairly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should/must/can</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People seeking asylum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Replace

**Embrace Words that Work**