War on ‘the poor’

– The Construction of Begging as a Social Problem within Swedish Policy

Joakim Blomqvist

Supervisor: Mathias Martinsson
Abstract

In recent years EU-citizens living in poverty exercising their right to free movement within EU have gained increased political interest. Some vulnerable EU citizens travel to Sweden in order seek livelihood, some of them engage in begging. The presence of vulnerable EU citizens engaged in begging has generated the emergence of a new policy area with increased political activity at both national and municipal level. Here, a state public report, policy proposals and problematization of the issue at municipal level are analysed. The analysis reveal how begging is constructed as a social problem and how the vulnerable EU citizen is positioned. The political discourse in this policy area is characterized by securitization and individualisation of responsibility, begging is problematized based on notions of welfare nationalism. People who beg are positioned as undeserving and associated with criminality, with few exceptions, the social rights approach is silenced. Begging is mainly constructed as an individual problem and linked to personal deficiencies. Thus, the structural issues such as inequality, discrimination and poverty are also subordinated in the political discourse. Further, the analysis exposes that human rights issues are not taken into account when policies targeting begging are formulated.

Key words

Begging, human rights, social rights, governmentality, securitization, policy, poverty, vulnerable EU-citizens, WPR
Tack Klara, Edith och Ivar, ni är bäst!

Tack Mathias Martinsson för alla goda råd på vägen.
# Table of contents

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 PURPOSE AND AIM ........................................................................................................................... 2
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................................................................................... 2
1.3 EMPIRICAL MATERIAL .................................................................................................................... 3
1.4 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ............................................................................................................ 4

BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................................ 5

2.1 BEGGING AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM ................................................................................................. 5
2.2 DISCOURSES OF THE POOR ............................................................................................................. 6
2.3 ANTIZIGANISM ............................................................................................................................... 6
2.4 HISTORY OF PROBLEMATIZATIONS OF BEGGING AND THE MOBILE POOR................................. 7
2.5 THE SWEDISH WELFARE MODEL ................................................................................................ 8
2.6 HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL REGULATIONS ................................................................................. 9

PREVIOUS RESEARCH.............................................................................................................................. 12

3.1 NEO-LIBERALIZATION AND INDIVIDUALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES................................... 12
3.2 SECURITIZATION AND IRREGULARIZATION OF THE MOBILE POOR ........................................... 14
3.3 WANDERING THREATS AND THE REVIVAL OF MYTHS AND RITUALS .......................................... 15
3.4 UN-FREEDOM WITHIN THE EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP .................................................................. 15
3.5 THE benevolent violence of the welfare state .............................................................................. 16

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................................ 17

4.1 GOVERNMENTALITY ....................................................................................................................... 17

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................................................................... 20

5.1 EPISTEMOLOGICAL STARTING POINT ............................................................................................ 20
5.2 METHOD OF POLICY ANALYSIS: WHAT’S THE ‘PROBLEM’ REPRESENTED TO BE? .................. 20
ANALYSIS

6.1 SOU 2016:6

6.1.1 NEOLIBERAL GOVERNANCE AND INDIVIDUALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY

6.1.2 THE BENEVOLENT VIOLENCE OF THE WELFARE STATE

6.2 POLICY PROPOSALS ON BEGGING 2010-2019

6.2.1 SECURITIZATION

6.2.2 THE SOCIAL RIGHTS POSITION

6.3 THE CASE OF VELLINGE MUNICIPALITY

6.3.1 INTERFERENCE WITH THE LOCAL ORDER

DISCUSSION

REFERENCES
Introduction

During the 2010s, poverty, social exclusion and begging have become increasingly evident in many European countries. In the article ‘EU-medborgarna, tiggeriet och den synliga nöden – en kunskapsöversikt’ Swärd (2015) argue that poverty have been made more visible for the public due to an increased mobility among the most vulnerable within EU. With the EU ‘free movement directive’ (Citizens' Rights Directive 2004/38 / EC) it has become possible for all EU citizens to move freely within the EU, as a consequence of that, also EU-citizens living in poverty are exercising their right to seek livelihood in other EU countries. Poverty and socio-economic vulnerability drive some of these people to Sweden, where the question of how the group of vulnerable EU-citizens should be managed has sparked political debate.

The National Board of Health and Welfare (2017) estimated the group of ‘vulnerable EU-citizens' residing in Sweden to be a couple of thousands, in 2015 the approximation was 5000 (SOU 2016:6). According to Amnesty International (2018) many EU-citizens live in a state of marginalization and extreme poverty in Sweden, some are also exposed to harassment and potentially discriminatory treatment by the police. Vulnerable EU-citizens who beg in Sweden are also exposed to hate-related crime; a notable example is the assault where a Romanian citizen was killed in the city of Husqvarna in August 2018 (Bolling, 2018). A large share of this group is engaged in street-begging outside of shops, railway stations and other public spaces, thus their vulnerability and poverty is fully exposed to the public, a fact that might have contributed to the intensity of the political debate and to the emergence of a new field of policies targeting begging at national and municipal level.

In 2015 The Social Democratic government’s response to this issue was to appoint a State Public Report 'Framtid sökes' (SOU 2016:6) with the stated purpose of investigating the current situation for the vulnerable EU-citizens residing in Sweden and to highlight how society’s efforts for this group could be coordinated and improved. The political debate regarding vulnerable EU-citizens have revolved around the issue of begging, and the dominant question in the debate on begging has been the proposed national prohibition of begging. In the Swedish Parliament the number of policy proposals suggesting a prohibition of begging has increased during the last couple of years. The issue of Prohibition of begging has also been pursued in a number of municipalities in Sweden, where Vellinge municipality in the southern part of Sweden is the most noteworthy case. Thus, in recent years the issue of begging have risen on the political agenda.

The origin and the starting point of this thesis is a reflection concerning the ways begging seems to be represented as a social problem within the political discourse.
Therefore problem representations of begging in Swedish policies targeting begging will be scrutinized. In order to gain deeper understanding and to capture the underlying rationalities of the policies the governmentality approach constitutes the theoretical base of the thesis. The Governmentality approach is based on foucauldian discourse analysis and the aim is to identify different mentalities or rationalities of rule and thereby shed light on the different kinds of thinking associated with the policies developed to govern ‘vulnerable EU-citizens’. Also, the analysis will pay attention to perspectives that are subordinated and silenced. Furthermore, the effects of problem representations within the policies will be discussed. Bacchi (2009) have created a methodological framework called 'What’s the problem represented to be?' (WPR) based on the governmentality approach. The basic idea is that policies always reflect deep seated cultural assumptions and imply a certain understanding of what needs to be changed, 'the problem'. Thus, by putting the problematizations within policies targeting begging under critical scrutiny we are able to track down the underlying rationalities of governance. By using WPR as a methodological framework, this thesis adhere to the idea that policies should be seen as problematizing activities, and that it is therefore of paramount importance to scrutinise what the policymaker produce as the 'problem'.

1.1 Purpose and aim

The overall purpose of this thesis is to establish an in-depth understanding of how begging is represented as a social problem within policies targeting begging. As mentioned above, a basic assumption is that policies imply certain understandings of what needs to be changed, 'the problems'. Thus, the ambition is to shed light over the discursive problem representations in Swedish governmental policy on begging. By identifying and scrutinizing the problematizations occurring within the policies targeting begging the aim is to track down the underlying rationalities of governance and thereby establish an in-depth understanding of how begging is represented as a social problem. Further, the aim is to analyse how begging is governed through the problem representations found in the policies.

1.2 Research questions

In order to understand how begging is represented as a social problem in Swedish policy and to track down the underlying rationalities the questions originally formulated by Bacchi (2009) will be used. These questions are as follows;

- What’s the ‘problem’ represented to be in the Swedish policy targeting begging?
- On what underlying assumptions are the problem representations based?
- What is left unproblematic in this problem representation?
- What effects are produced by this representation of the 'problem'? 
- How is the person engaged in begging positioned as a subject?

1.3 Empirical material

According to Bacchi (2009; 20), the selection of empirical material is a crucial part of the research process, the choice of empirical data is an interpretive activity and thus a part of the analysis. Bacchi (2009; 20) argue that the analysis should start with a specific government report, but in order to get a richer picture of the problem representations in the policy area the analysis should be supplemented with related texts. The selection of empirical material is characterized by the attempt to understand the dominant political discourses in the policy area begging. Therefore, the selection is limited to official sources such as the State Public Report and policy proposals launched in the Swedish parliament during the 2010s. Also, the governing of begging on municipal level is examined in the case of Vellinge.

The Social Democratic government's response to the issue of vulnerable EU-citizens' staying in Sweden was to appoint a national coordinator with a mission to support municipalities, authorities and other actors working with the group 'vulnerable EU-citizens'. The assignment was formulated in January 2015 and one specific task expressed in the Committee Directive (2015:9) was to disseminate knowledge about the rights of EES citizens when they stay temporarily in Sweden without fulfilment of the rights of residence. The result of this directive is the State Public Report 'Framtid sökes' (SOU 2016:6), this report is considered to be a key document in the analysis. The report purports to examine the current situation for the vulnerable EU-citizens residing in Sweden and to highlight how society's efforts for this group could be coordinated and improved. The report (SOU 2016:6) is considered to be particularly relevant as it captures the Swedish state approach and problematizations of the group of vulnerable EU citizens, poverty, begging and order. Furthermore, the report have a dominant position in this policy area and therefore presumably have a strong influence on how social problems relating to vulnerable EU-citizens are understood and problematized in other contexts. One assumption is that the national level and the municipal level interact in production and dissemination of discourses. In the report SOU 2016: 6, 'deterrent' examples from individual municipalities are highlighted, further, the report is relevant as its aim is to produce policy recommendations for the municipalities.

Close to two-thirds of all policy proposals relating to begging presented to the Swedish Parliament during the period 1869-2019 were launched during the 2010s. Thus, begging is an issue thus that has really activated some of the MPs. One contributing factor
to the rise of begging as a political issue seems to be the entry of the Sweden Democrats into the Swedish Parliament in the year 2010. The selection of empirical material is naturally limited to the time when the issue has been raised on the political agenda, thus this thesis have reviewed policy proposals that were submitted during the period 2010-2019. The political debate regarding vulnerable EU-citizens have centred on the issue of begging, and many of the policy proposals advocate a national ban on begging.

The issue of prohibition has also been pursued in a few municipalities in Sweden, where Vellinge municipality in southern Sweden is the most noteworthy case. After a long legal process with several appeals, in December 2018 The Supreme Administrative Court (case no 2149-18) granted the municipality the right to prohibit begging in certain places within the municipality. The case of Vellinge can be seen as an effect of the political discourse on national level. However, what make the case of Vellinge interesting and relevant as it to some extent is used as a pretext for introducing a ban on national level, as in proposal 'Nationellt förbud mot tiggeri' (2018/19:2866) from the Moderate Party. Also, as shown by Åsgård (2019) in the article ‘Här är kommunerna som kan införa förbud’, when prohibition of begging is introduced in Vellinge other municipalities might follow. Thus it seems to have impact on the development of repressive policy on begging at different levels. The potential spill-over effects will be discussed in the analysis.

1.4 Ethical considerations

In ‘Good Research Practice’ The Swedish Research Council (2017) argue that research has to be ethically motivated, research can certainly be valued in their own right, however when conducting research one should also consider whether it is important and relevant for the society and its citizens. In order to meet the research criterion, the purpose of the research must be important and relevant. The choice of research issue has been influenced by a drive to gain greater understanding of how the political discourse constructs "begging" as a social problem. It is assessed as relevant and important for society to highlight how a specific social problem is constructed and renegotiated and also to expose the effects it may have. Further, the research criterion needs to be balanced against the criterion of protection of the individual, individuals who in one way or another are affected of the research should be protected from harm. Swärd (2015) highlights the ethical issues in research on groups that are regarded as 'strangers'. The majority society tends to define the 'stranger' based on a certain behaviour, race, culture or other characteristics. The risk when a group is defined based on one of their activities (begging) or on their ethnicity is that the relationship between the majority and the minority tend to be characterized by a simplified and negative perspective. Using the epithet 'beggar' can be a way to dehumanize certain individuals, the formulation-'people who beg' is preferred as it is less stigmatizing (Swärd, 2015). In this thesis, the concept beggar is used to the extent that it occurs in referenced material. In the scrutinized policies, the target group is often defined as
\text{vulnerable EU-citizens}, in some research the group is referred to as ‘the mobile poor’ or ‘Romas’, in order to avoid conceptual confusion in relation to the empirical material, the term vulnerable EU citizens will be used in this thesis. In the debate this group of EU citizens is sometimes referred to as EU-migrants, social tourists or burdens (Chatty, 2015). The problem with this type of rewriting is that the group is disconnected from their actual rights as EU citizens. Thus, these aspects should be considered and related to the criterion of protection of the individual.

The choice of topic and the approach has been coloured by a silent wonder regarding the fierce tone of the political debate on begging and by considerations regarding what seemed to be a subordination of a rights based perspective. Thus, this thesis is permeated by a critical approach to how begging is represented as a social problem and lean on an emancipatory knowledge interest, a concept introduced by Habermas (1972) in ‘Knowledge and human interests’. Knowledge is seen as contingent on the need for emancipation, by critical scrutiny of policies it is possible to expose and revoke power relations and oppressive structures, which by extension might enable human emancipation. The ‘emancipatory knowledge interest’ imply a normative position and it should be taken into account that this may affect the thesis in different ways. Although the aim is to tackle the subject with an open mind, it is important to be self-reflective and recognize one’s own subjectivity. Among other things, the emancipatory knowledge interest might generate a bias in favour of a rights-based perspective. This thesis adheres to the fact that the stranger or the person who beg, first and foremost is a human being and a citizen with the rights that follow from that.

\section*{Background}

\subsection*{2.1 Begging as a social problem}

In research on begging, begging is often defined as an effect of homelessness, social exclusion and marginalization (Swärd, 2015). In the public discourse, begging has come to be defined as a social problem, which raises demands on measures and solutions from the society. According to Swärd (2015), the choice of solution is dependent on how begging is constructed as a social problem. If the problematization focus on the level of perceived safety in the streets and squares for their own citizens, the solutions tend to land in bans, rejections, evictions. If the problematizations is based on the idea of begging as an expression of acute poverty, the solution might be to provide soup kitchen and/or shelter. If the problematization defines the issue of begging as a structural problem then structural measures such as poverty reduction and anti-discrimination work are preferable.

Further, Swärd (2015) describe some problems as intractable or 'wicked', which means that actors in the debate establish a notion of the problem as difficult to
master. This is common when social problems cut through different policy areas, when governance takes place at several levels in society, when several countries are involved and when many organizations and authorities are activated by the problem. 'Wicked' social problems are often resistant to solutions.

Of the solutions and measures that deal with begging mentioned above; prohibition, philanthropy or social reforms, history shows that it is social reforms and strengthening of the most vulnerable people's political, civil and social rights that have the best effect (Swärd et al. 2013).

2.2 Discourses of the poor

This thesis is based on the assumption that begging can be seen as an effect of poverty and that the understanding of poverty influence how begging is represented as a social problem. In 'the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism' Esping-Andersen (1990; 23) argue that society's way of problematizing poverty and from that formulating solutions is a defining part of the social system. In 'The Inclusive Society? Social Exclusion and New Labour' Ruth Levitas (2005) propose three different and competing understandings / discourses of poverty. The moral underclass discourse (MUD) explains poverty based on an idea that the structures of society are loosening in a process of demoralization, and that the poor simply lack morality. Only through remoralization and strengthened social structures poverty can be contested. The social integration discourse (SID) combats poverty through labour market integration and market solutions, the problem in this discourse is that the poor lack jobs. The redistribution discourse (RED), on the contrary, state that poverty is a structural problem that is based on market structures and basic problem in this discourse is that the poor people lack money.

2.3 Antiziganism

Since the group of vulnerable EU citizens who engage in begging to a large extent consist of people who are defined and/or define themselves as Romas, it is reasonable to assume that antiziganism is a central dimension in the formulation of problem representations within policies concerning vulnerable EU citizens. In the article ‘Tiggarna och vårt ansvar […]’, Hammarberg (2017) argue that Antiziganism forms the basis of the systematic discrimination that leads to exclusion and poverty and that it would therefore be a mistake to see poverty among Roma as merely a social problem. Antiziganism is undeniably an important dimension of how poverty, homelessness and begging is problematized and, among other things, Engebrigtsen (2012) shows that myths and stereotypes regarding Romas are active in the context of vulnerable EU citizens. Antiziganism has a crucial role in how the group of vulnerable EU citizens is problematized in policies targeting vulnerable EU-citizens and begging. In the State Public Report 'Romers rätt – en strategi för romer i Sverige' Antiziganism is defined in the following way;
Antiziganism is a permanent latent structure of notions hostile to Roma as a collective, manifested on an individual level as attitudes and in culture as myths, ideology, popular traditions and imagery, and in acts - social or legal discrimination, political mobilization against the Roma, and collective or state violence - which results in and / or aims to distance, drive or destroy Roma precisely because they are Roma (SOU 2010: 55; 166).

This definition of antiziganism expresses a structural perspective that demonstrates the vulnerability and the rights of Romas, as the group of vulnerable EU citizens mainly consists of Romas, antiziganism necessarily constitutes a factor affecting how the policy targeting vulnerable EU citizens is formulated.

2.4 History of problematizations of begging and the mobile poor

In the book ‘crime, punishment and migration’ Melossi (2015) argue that coercive measures such as criminal law, border controls and penal power since long time is applied in capitalist economies in order to control migrants in general and especially the mobile poor. In the article ‘De fattigas rörlighet som socialpolitiskt problem’ Dahlstedt et al. (2018) describe how the mobility of the poor at different times have been constructed as a social problem. In the 2010s, the debate has revolved around vulnerable EU citizens, in the state report Framtid sökes (SOU 2016: 6), the poor EU citizens are described as a problem for Sweden and for the Swedish welfare systems. According to Dahlstedt et al (2018), the vulnerable EU citizens are presented as a group of outsiders in relation to the Swedish community and that the responsibility for their welfare does not rest upon the Swedish welfare state. Furthermore, Dahlstedt et al (2018) argue that the report emphasizes the ability for self-sufficiency as a condition for being resident in Sweden and that the poor EU citizens who cannot support themselves thus become a problem and an undesirable element in Sweden. There is therefore a moralizing dimension in which questions regarding the employability and livelihood of the individual EU citizen is placed at the forefront.

Even in the 20th century, the mobile poor were in various ways constructed as a social policy problem. Dahlstedt et al (2018) emphasizes that the public state report ‘Zigenarfrågan’ (SOU 1956: 43) had a strong focus on assimilation. In the desired assimilation process, residency was crucial. The problem representation revolved in the 1950’s political discourse on the ambulatory lifestyle, the solutions to this problem were in part structural, for instance, housing policy initiatives. In the report ‘Proposal for an Act on the Treatment of Detainees’ (SOU 1923: 2) in the 1920s, the mobility of the poor (vagrancy) was defined as a threat to the cohesion of society. The problematizations of
vagrancy were at the time strongly influenced by the logics of the racial hygienic ideology and the solutions consisted primarily of rejection, sterilization and detention.

2.5 The Swedish Welfare model

One ambition in this thesis is to shed light on how begging is constructed as a social problem within the Swedish welfare state. Swärd (2015) argue that the Swedish Social Democratic welfare model with emphasis on universalistic and egalitarian values has, in the twentieth century, by virtue of social reforms, in principle, eradicated begging. However, during the 2010s 'street-begging' as a social problem has returned to the political agenda.

In the thesis 'Vulnerability and deviance: individual reasoning about the proposal to ban begging in Sweden' Zelano (2018) argue that the case of EU citizens who engage in begging in Sweden illustrate tensions in the social-democratic universal welfare regime. Evidently, there are strong aspirations for equality and solidarity, however at the same time there is a strong emphasize on insider's privilege and excluding tendencies based on nationalism. Zelano (2018) argue that welfare-regimes characterized by high level of redistribution tend to have a stronger solidarity among insiders. Thus, the distinction between insider and outsider is particularly evident in this context.

In the book ‘Arbete, konsumtion och den nya fattigdomen’ Bauman (1998;67) describe the welfare state as an expression of the notion that it is a state obligation to not only guarantee the pure survival of its citizens but also their well-being. In the book “The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism’ Esping-Andersen (1990; 18) provide a similar definition; “The welfare state involves state responsibility for securing some basic modicum of welfare for its citizens”. Further, Esping-Andersen classify three different welfare-regimes; the liberal, the conservative and the social democratic. The Social democratic welfare regime is traditionally characterized by the pursuit of increased equality and voluminous ambitions regarding the standard of the public welfare systems.

In order to finance well-developed and solidaristic welfare systems, the social democratic welfare regime established a strong link between work and welfare. Esping-Andersen (1990; 28) believes that the ideal of full employment is particularly prominent in the social-democratic welfare regime because the system is generous in nature and completely dependent on the fact that a large majority of the population is in work and contributes and that only a small minority live on social transfers. The high level of welfare in the social-democratic model is thus considered to be based on a strong idea that everyone should be involved and contribute to the common, systematic revenues is required to maintain a solidaristic and universalistic welfare regime.

Bauman (1998) argue that the welfare state, as well as other social models, is based on a norm of work ethics, this norm rests on two premises; firstly, we need to do something (work) that in others’ eyes is considered as valuable and worth paying for (wage
work), secondly; we should constantly strive to increase our assets. The essence of work ethics is that wage work is assigned an inherent moral value and is regarded as a normal condition for all people, to be outside of the labour market is defined as deviant. Work ethics as the norm is maintained by the welfare state and characterizes our view of wage work as the normatively correct, while we expect that the welfare state will provide security for those who do not live up to the norm and are placed outside the labour market. According to Bauman (1998) control and subordination are key features of the work ethics and the moral dimension is strong. People who are out of work is constructed as morally weak and wage labour is given moral value and dignity. Furthermore, the work ethics have been seen as a cure for social problems, and Bauman (1998) argue that exposure to poverty and vulnerability has historically acted as a deterrent, which may have generated incentives to engage in wage work. In line with this reasoning, the open exposure of 'street-begging' would act as a deterrent and thereby justify wage work. The primacy of work principle is a fundamental part of the Nordic welfare model, Swärd (2015) believes that the logic of the welfare state, self-responsibility and the obligation to contribute to the common goods through work, influence how people in Sweden relate to those who provide in alternative ways (begging).

2.6 Human rights and legal regulations

Dilemmas and conflicts of interest that may arise when rights principles are imposed on each other. In the policy area of begging the principle of free movement can be placed against the residents' right to security or settlements can be perceived as to be contrary to environmental regulations or property rights (Swärd, 2015). This thesis does not claim to provide a full and comprehensive picture of the legal landscape that regulates the issue of vulnerable EU citizens residing in Sweden. The presentation of the right to free movement and the right of residence is followed by a discussion of social and human rights. In addition, a brief review of legislation (Order Act, Social Service Act) that is relevant to how begging is problematized in policies is presented.

In the essay ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ Marshall (1950) launched the concept of 'social rights', arguing that the development of citizenship is synonymous with the development of three types of rights; the civil, the political and the social. The individual's freedom to move within the EU is a fundamental civil right that all EU citizens have (Citizens' Rights Directive 2004/38 / EC). In order to stay in another EU country for more than three months, a person must meet the conditions of the right of residence, basically an EU citizen meet the conditions by being employed, self-employed, student or by having sufficient means to support oneself. Thus, the right of residence is largely connected to labour market integration and the fundamental right of free movement is somewhat conditional.

In 'the Origins of Totalitarianism' Arendt (1968) highlights the complex contradictions between, on the one hand, states' sovereignty and particular rights based on
citizenship and on the other hand the universal human rights. Based on an analysis of statelessness Arendt conclude that rights are conditional on belonging to the state or other institution and that there is a hierarchy between citizens and non-citizens. In ‘Medborgarskap i globaliseringens tid’ Delanty (2002; 33) argue that citizenship is, by its very nature, strongly dividing between on the one hand citizens and on the other hand, excluded and subordinated non-citizens. In ‘Rätten till rättigheter’ Arendt (2017) problematizes human rights in relation to national, civil rights and formulates the thesis that human rights can only be realized through civil rights, where, as a citizen, one can assert his rights claims against a specific state. Anyone who is not actually given the opportunity to exercise his or her civil rights does not, in practice, have any human rights, this lack of rights, Arendt strive to counteract by giving the human rights a new foundation - 'the right to rights'. According to Arendt, the fundamental right is the right of every person to belong a political community. Arendt’s analysis of rights is based on a study of statelessness and argue that the loss of a home and the loss of governmental protection imply a lack of rights. Arendt conclude that human rights only can be materialized within a given political context and that the fundamental right to have rights only can be ensured by international courtesy (2017; 94f).

In ‘Jämlikhet och mångfald’ Benhabib (2004; 224) emphasizes the moral dimension of how sovereign states treat non-citizens, where the distribution of rights draws boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and defines the level of moral conscience of the liberal democracy. In the article ‘Critique of humanitarian reason’ Benhabib (2014) defends a moral and legal cosmopolitanism where every human being is given the right to basic human rights. Benhabib (2014) believes that sovereign states by signing human rights treaties bind their own legislation and their regulations to international commitments. The nation state is thus still an important player in ensuring respect for human rights. Further, Benhabib argue that a human rights policy have emerged at transnational and international level, in which international human rights instruments have created a normative space in which a ‘Juris generative’ (creation of legal norms) struggle between international human rights and institutional civic and political rights is taking place, this struggle giving rise to what Benhabib call 'democratic iterations'. Democratic iterations occur through interaction between domestic judicial authorities, transnational sources for norm interpretation and the political opinion formation among the citizens. The courts are through their legal interpretation a primary place for norm iterations. Furthermore, organizations such as Amnesty International are an important player in 'democratic iteration' and can, through expert reports, mobilize opinion on human rights issues (Benhabib, 2014).

In the report ‘A Cold Welcome’ published by Amnesty International 2018 Sweden’s approach to ‘vulnerable EU-citizens’ were examined. The report highlight that the basic rights and needs of the group ‘vulnerable EU-citizens’ are not met due to inadequate policy frameworks. Amnesty International calls on Swedish authorities to improve the situation.
in accordance with Sweden’s international and national human rights obligations. Amnesty emphasizes that the EU has acknowledged a shared responsibility to improve the living conditions of the Romas in EU and to fight discrimination, this obligation falls on the EU as a whole but also on respective member state, not only on the countries of origin. This EU commitment also corresponds with Sweden’s obligations to human rights. "Human rights apply to all within a state’s jurisdiction, regardless of citizenship or migration status, and the government has obligations to that end". The human rights instrument prescribes that the rights should be exercised without any discrimination, with reference to citizenship, ethnicity and nationality. Furthermore, obstacles that prevents the enjoyment of social and economic rights for non-citizens should be eliminated. Amnesty International (2018) argue that there is a widespread confusion among municipalities as to what obligations they have towards 'vulnerable EU-citizens' therefore the treatment differs between different parts of the country, however, based on national guidelines, most municipalities have determined that 'vulnerable EU-citizens' have no rights to social services. Thus, the government policies have not provided sufficient guidance to the municipalities on how to establish a rights-based approach in line with Sweden’s obligations to international human rights law. Amnesty International (2018) argue that criminalization of begging would imply discrimination, rights restrictions and increased social marginalization.

According to the Social Services Act (2001: 453), there is leeway for the Social Services to assist anyone who is residing in the municipality. The municipality is responsible for providing support and social services, given that it is not clear that another municipality bears this responsibility, in these cases the municipality is only obliged to provide emergency assistance. The Social Services Act makes no distinction between citizens and non-citizens and the right of residence is not a requirement to receive support and social assistance. However, in 2017 the National Board of Health and Welfare published ‘Guidance for social services considering EU/EEA citizens’ with guidelines for the social services where the social rights of vulnerable EU citizens is interpreted quite differently, they argue that the right to social assistance is dependent on whether you are considered to hold a right of residency or not. Thus, through this guidance, the assistance is conditional in a way that is contrary to the formulation in the Social Service Act, stating the municipality’s responsibility for all who is residing in municipality. An objection to the interpretation made by the National Board of Health and Welfare is that it does not take into account the binding human rights obligations that Sweden has committed to.

The Order Act (1993: 1617) aims to secure order and security in public places such as streets, roads, squares, parks and other places. At municipal level, specific additions to the Order Act can be made. The City Council has the authority to decide on local order regulations. A local order regulation must not be in conflict with national legislation, and all local regulations must be reviewed and approved or revoked by the
Previous Research

A basic assumption in this thesis is that the way a social problem is problematized in policy determines which ways the problem can be dealt with, thus the selection of previous research is also characterized by a social constructive approach. The focus is on research on how poverty, homelessness and begging is problematized.

Swärd (2015) argue that if the description of a phenomenon is based on a problem formulation where the consequences are costs and decay, it might seem reasonably that the outcome will be to forbid the phenomenon. If the phenomenon is described as a symptom of poverty and inequality, it will be a reasonable outcome that it is faced with increased humanitarian efforts and a stronger focus on social rights.

In ‘Romani mobilities in Europe: Multidisciplinary perspectives’ Sigona and Zetter (2010) argue that policies regarding the mobility of Romas often is coloured by fear and intolerance toward Romas. The political discourse on vulnerable EU citizens have been dominated by two positions, on the one hand control and security and on the other hand, a humanitarian position that promotes minority rights (Sigona and Zetter, 2010). In the article ‘Disputes about the prohibition of begging – The example of Hamburg’, Nagel (2007) claim that both positions might be problematic, the humanitarian position based on care and mercy may contain elements of paternalism and the position focused on control and security represent vulnerable EU citizens as external threats and criminals is based on black painting and leads to a discourse where responsibility is exempted. Instead, Nagel promotes a third position emphasizing the importance of fundamental political, civil and social rights for all, also for poor people. In the case of Hamburg, Nagel (2007) argue that the social rights of the persons concerned tend to get curtailed when policies and measures against begging are negotiated. Nagel describes the process in which a municipal elite through ‘quiet lobbying work’ between different actors creates compromises and negotiates what should be sanctioned as deviant behaviour. In this process, the issue of social rights is overshadowed by the desire to maintain good cooperation between different actors within the municipality.

3.1 Neo-liberalization and individualization of responsibilities

In the article ‘the Punitive Regulation of Poverty in the Neoliberal Age’ Vacquant (2012) argue that the neoliberal re-coding of poverty as a self-inflected personal
failure is related to the revamping of social policies, whereas punitive measures targeting
the most impoverished constitute an increasingly essential part. Thus policies of austerity
plays a crucial role in policy problematizations and individualization of social problems
relating to poverty. The construction of poverty as an individual problem rather than a
political issue is also evident in the study ‘Local representations of Homelessness in
Copenhagen, Glasgow and Gothenburg [...]’, where Petterson (2017) discuss local policies
on homelessness. The analysis uncovers how policies, despite good intentions, reproduce
homelessness as a social problem rooted in certain individuals personal failures. Further,
the policies create hierarchies of deserving and underserving. Thus, the underlying
economic structures that regulate homeless people’s access to social rights are hidden by
placing the problem on an individual level. Petterson (2017) conclude “that dominant
official discourses of inclusion and equality thus reproduce, rather than challenge, socially
structured relations of inequality”.

In the dissertation thesis “Det känns fel” Om det svenska samhällets
reaktioner på närvaron av tiggande EU-medborgare 2014-2016” Hansson (2019)
highlights that the Swedish society reacts to the presence of begging EU-citizens in a
contradictory way, on the one hand, Swedish authorities deny social support to EU
migrants and on the other hand they seek to represent Sweden as a promoter of solidarity,
welfare, equality and anti-racism. Hansson (2019) argue that the contradiction is based on
the political deadlock regarding the housing and the labour markets, furthermore allowed
access to welfare for this group is considered to result in political turmoil. Instead, the
political solution is to expunge the EU migrants framing it as a measure for poverty
reduction.

In the article ‘No country for poor people: The Case study of the Romanian
Roma Migrants in Poland’, Kostka (2018) show how the neo-liberalization process tend to
create a situation where social rights for EU citizens are undermined and replaced by
individualization of poverty and repressive policies. Kostka (2018) argue that the cuts in
social services and the trend of welfare state retrenchment contribute to a rampant
‘othering’ of poor people.

Kostka (2018) draws attention to the fact that deportations of Roma EU
citizens within the EU's internal borders do not appear to be fully compatible with the
alleged egalitarian and universalistic regime of free movement and argue supported by,
Yildiz and the De Genova (2018) that national policy is used to regulate the free movement
and limit the influx of EU citizens deemed as problematic. Even though the Romas are
constructed as the icon of the 'other' within Europe (Yildiz and De Genova, 2018), Kostka
believes that the focus on deportations and evictions of Roma EU citizens tends to neglect
that similar strategies are used for other impoverished groups, thus without ignoring the
specific discrimination of Romas it’s important to identify the greater trend towards a
repressive policy towards poor people in general. Kostka (2018) argue that the disciplining
measures to 'preserve' social order is morally charged and that all people living in poverty
is victimized in a process of othering. Anti-poverty rhetoric and xenophobic attitudes characterize the approach to the Roma community in Poland, the debate is strongly influenced by prejudices and stereotypes, Romas are perceived as uneducated, lazy, unemployed, carriers of deviant norms, predisposed to criminality and exploiters of social rights and charity, thus threatening the social order and national unity. Kostka (2018) argue that the neoliberal regime in Poland is complex, it underline the importance of basic human rights at the same time as they engage in authoritarian interventions such as surveillance, evictions and removal of children are dispatched. The morally charged antipoverty rhetoric target the poor, problematic and unproductive individuals rather than promoting structural reforms aimed at reducing poverty and inequalities, the stigmatization of street-begging is an example of this strategy. The stigma is reinforced by allegations that beggars are criminals and that they actually could choose another activity for generating their income (Kostka, 2018). Further, Kostka (2018) states that the increased intolerance and stronger focus on law and order is largely due to the elimination of common goods. Othering and discipline of the poor aim to reduce the visibility of poverty and hide it as a social issue. Kostka (2018) argue that policies focused on criminalization and expulsions of migrants living in visible poverty is used to appease a public opinion characterized by insecurities, also these policies draw the attention from the state responsibilities to uphold human rights for its residents.

3.2 Securitization and irregularization of the mobile poor

In the article ‘the Perpetual Mobile Machine of Forced Mobility: Europe’s Romas and the Institutionalization of Rootlessness’ Van Baar (2015) argue that the freedom of movement is the foundation of EU citizenship and that the mobility of EU-citizens need to be encouraged in order to strengthen the European identity. However, some forms of circulation is regarded as threats and needs to be controlled. The control is exercised through framing of the mobile poor as a security issue. Van Baar argue that poverty is problematized in the same way as migration and asylum, it is framed as a security issue and as a threat to the stability of the EU.

Van Baar (2015; 9) have analysed the French expulsions of the Romas and conclude that there are two different representations of the Romas forming a key to the justification of the expulsion. Firstly, it is the representation of the Romas as a security problem and as disturbing to public order. Secondly, it is the representation of their mobility as ‘irregular’. Romas exercising their right of free movement are represented as nomads or irregular migrants with a tendency to excessive mobility. The process of irregularization is undermining social rights and legal protection of Romas and contributes to the production of illegality. Thus, these problematizations generates certain strategies of exclusion.

Through the construction of Roma as excessively mobile they are framed as uncontrollable and thus more inclined to undertake illegal activities. The interconnection
with criminality reinforces the representation of the Romas as a public order or as a security problem. The securitization of the Romas is also reinforced by the use of stereotypes and discourses. By attributing "illegality" and "rootlessness" to the Romas, a harsher treatment is legitimized. Measures such as evictions and detentions are legitimized through a variety of processes of securitization. In order to succeed with a 'de-securitization' the Romas must be represented in another way, for instance in terms of human rights (van Baar, 2015; 9).

3.3 Wandering threats and the revival of myths and rituals

In the article ‘Tiggarbander og kriminelle bankmenn eller fattige EU-borgere?’ Engebrigtsen (2012) stresses how certain old myths regarding Romas are activated in the context of vulnerable EU citizens, for instance; beggars are in fact not poor, they are fooling us, they make a lot of money and they are just victims of trafficking. In the article ‘Key figure of mobility the nomad’ Engebrigtsen (2017:44f) argue that the nomad is represented as a threat and a challenge to the order of things is embedded in the European understandings of mobility. In the European context the Romas are the primary representatives of the nomad and is constructed as ‘wandering threats’. The mobile poor are just like nomads in all times seen as threats to state stability today, the mobility for this unwanted category of people are therefore subject to severe restrictions. Engebrigtsen highlights that this group of people is regarded and treated as a threat despite the fact that they have been and still are settled.

In the book ‘Beständig ojämlikhet’ Tilly (2000) argue that we report on vulnerable groups in a certain way, according to a known standard or a predetermined pattern. The deviant other are defined in contrast to the norm, the othering of the vulnerable group tend to form a ritual that are continually cemented in legitimizing myths. These myths are reinforced by other similar narratives, Tilly argue that the myths contribute to maintain the difference and inequality between groups. In the article ‘Hemlöshet, medborgarskap och skuld’ Arnold (2013) argue that the citizenship based social rights for the homeless and people who beg often are restricted also within modern welfare states, the restricted rights are in part explained by the stereotypes and degrading myths regulating the approach to these groups.

3.4 Un-freedom within the European citizenship

In ‘Liquid Modernity’ Bauman (2000) draws a distinction between tourists and vagabonds. Tourists move because they want to, vagabonds because they have to. The division between tourist and vagabond is also a division between privileged and unprivileged. The privileged tourist is always welcome while the treatment of the unprivileged vagabond (the mobile poor, the vulnerable EU-citizens) often is harsher. The mobile poor are defined as 'global vagabonds' and their movement is not a manifestation of freedom but rather as a necessity,
due to poverty and miserable living conditions in their local community. The global vagabonds are defined by the fact that they leave a local community where their basic needs are not met and their mobility can be regarded as a struggle for more viable living conditions.

In the article ‘Un/Free mobility: Roma Migrants in the European Union’ Yildiz and De Genova (2018), argue that the European citizenship is contradictory, for Romas and other poor EU citizens the 'right' of 'free movement' coexist with a fundamental socio-political un-freedom. For the poor people in Europe mobility is neither purely free nor strictly unfree. They argue that in the play between autonomy and control, processes of rebordering and re-racialization take place and often undermine the rights of mobility for the vulnerable EU citizens. The elements of control and un-freedom within the European citizenship is often manifested by denying of employment rights and social welfare entitlements, which primarily affects the most vulnerable EU-citizens.

Swärd (2015) argue that the conditions concerning the social rights of vulnerable EU citizens are disputed but that there are provisions in the EU Constitution which aim to ensure that member states ensure economic safety for all EU citizens.

In the article ‘Are there fundamental rights for Roma beggars in Europe?’ Mäkinen (2013) answers the title question with a no and argue that neither the home country nor the recipient country live up to the provision to ensure economic safety for the Romas travelling between EU countries in order to improve their lives.

### 3.5 The benevolent violence of the welfare state

In the article ‘Nordic vagabonds: The Roma and the logic of benevolent violence in the Swedish welfare state’ Barker (2017) argue that there is a duality inherent in the Swedish welfare state. The inclusionary dimension of the welfare state is expressed through the government’s no to ban on begging, while their nationalistic and exclusionary tendencies is exposed by, for instance, the facilitation of evictions. This duality is conceptualized by the term benevolent violence. This occurs when the state implements ameliorative practices that generate violent effects and when coercive measures are used to uphold the ameliorative goals of the state. The benevolent violence of the welfare state is expressed in the case of begging Romas. The welfare state express a degree of tolerance towards the Romas by not banning begging at the same time a certain level of violence is used to ‘protect’ the Romas from an 'undignified' life situation and protect the welfare state from erosion by marking that its use is strictly reserved for its citizens (Barker, 2017).
Theoretical framework

4.1 Governmentality

Governmentality (govern-mentalities) is a concept coined by Michel Foucault, it refers to the rationalities or mentalities embedded in practises of governing. In ‘Regementalitet’ Foucault (2008; 201) describes "governmentality" as the totality created by the institutions, tactics and procedures that enable a specific but at the same time complex form of exercise of power where the governing of the population is the goal. The governance has the political economy as the primary form of knowledge in which the purpose among other things is to produce riches and to provide the people with sufficient means for their living (2008; 193). Foucault further describes that apparatuses of security constitute the basic technical means of achieving these objectives. The aim of the governmentality approach is to identify different rationalities or mentalities of rule and thereby shed light on the different kinds of thinking associated with particular approaches to government (Bacchi, 2009; 26). We are governed through problematizations and therefore the task is to analyse the dominant problem representations in policy.

Governmentality studies seek to make the different forms of political reason embedded in governing explicit. The rationality and mentality of government are changing by the introduction of new social policies, by new techniques of governing and by new objects and subjects of governance. Governmentality studies raise questions of who and what is supposed to be governed and how (Walters & Haahr, 2005).

Governmentality is a form of rule focused on 'population', and economic and social policies are used to maintain a certain order in the population (Bacchi, 2009; 26). In the article ‘Sovereign Power, Disciplinary Power and Biopower: Resisting what Power with what Resistance’ Lilja and Vinthagen (2014) describe control and categorization of people as central features in this form of rule and argue that the categorizations made in policies effect how people identify themselves and influence their actions in everyday life. Walters & Haahr (2005) raise the case of EU migration policy and argue that the EU’s treatment of non-EU migrant populations seems to be focused on dividing and ruling population and expelling the unwanted. Governmental power is exercised through a whole complex of knowledges, regulations and policies that seek to optimise the condition of the population. Policy can be defined as the organising framework for practice of rule (Walters & Haahr, 2005). Governmentality is a historically specific form of power and its essential technical means is the 'apparatus of security'. The concept 'apparatus of security' was coined by Foucault and refer to complex of laws, administrative procedures and policies that are developed in order to protect and secure certain economic and social processes (Walters & Haahr, 2005). Walters (2004; 241) coined the concept domopolitics which rationalises a series of security measures in the name of a particular conception of home: 'We may invite guests to our home, but they come at our invitation; they begging stay
indefinitely’. Domopolitics include a domestic (access to welfare) as an international (migration) dimension. According to Walters (2004) security as an important governmentality and the analysis of securitization raise questions of what it mean to make people secure, secure from what and which group of people the securitization is targeting.

Governmentality is a specific mode of power which differs from the concept of sovereign power which focuses on territory and primarily is based on law (expression of sovereign will), regulation and violence (Walters & Haahr, 2005). The third element of Foucault’s triangle of rule is disciplinary power which governs through surveillance and normalization, self-surveillance and self-regulation create and maintain discipline and desired behaviour (Bacchi, 2009; 27-29). Governmentality, sovereignty and discipline form a triangle of rule, each one can work separately or can or can be intertwined in hybrid forms of rule (2009; 28). Governmentality is a form of rule that use social policies to ensure order and security, which is the reason it forms the theoretical base in this policy analysis.

By practicing genealogy, the risk of naturalization of a certain practise or policy is minimized, by relativizing policy content it is possible to think beyond it (Walters, 2012;140). As a form of policy analysis the method of governmentality studies aims to disclose hidden ethical assumptions and to denaturalise concepts otherwise taken for granted. By making certain forms of governing and the terms and concepts in use less familiar, it will become possible to engage in other forms of reasoning and action (Walters & Haahr, 2005). Walters and Haahr (2005) make a comparison with Marxism in order to illustrate the point of denaturalisation. When Marxism defines capitalism as a particular mode of production, capitalism becomes comparable to other modes of production, it becomes clear that it is possible to organise the production in different modes, thus it is possible to challenge it theoretically and politically. Governmentality studies are in a similar way determined to situate the present in the context of long-term historical transformations. It has a political and analytical value to historicize and denaturalise the present. By denoting a form of governing as governmentality, it becomes possible to see this exercise of power in the same way as capitalism, not as the natural order of things but the dominant form of power in modern politics.

Neo-liberalism is studied as an inventive regime of governance. Walters & Haahr (2005) use the concept 'self-esteem' to illustrate the logics of neo-liberal governing. In governmentality of 'self-esteem' a wide range of social problems seems to be solved through the promotion of 'self-esteem' of various groups, for instance the unemployed. When the concept of self-esteem is introduced into the policy, there is a tendency to define the problem as an individual one rather than a political one, the responsibility to solve the problem tend to shift from the political level to the individual level. This process of individualization is a fundamental feature of neoliberal governance.
Walters (2012; 35) emphasizes that liberal governmentality is based on a new attitude toward governmental activity. Technologies of security focus on probabilities and risks rather than on finalities and absolutes. Social problems such as crime or poverty are perceived as embedded in complex social and economic processes. The goal is not to eradicate these problems, but the question is rather about adjusting policies based on how much poverty or crime a given society can handle.

While disciplinary power operates by building walls and creating boundaries, liberal governmentality is based on a certain degree of openness. A territory is opened for the circulation of people, goods and money, the intention is to create interchange and commerce. However, there is no absolute openness, liberal governmentality must handle new risks such as displacement and vagrancy. The policing becomes specialized and limited to certain groups and specific problems. The case of vulnerable EU-citizens forms a good example of this kind of specialized policing. Studies of governmentality should strive to expose the hybrids of different logics underpinning a certain policy, furthermore it is important to register that liberalism can be co-present with tendencies of illiberalism, violence and force within policies even in liberal democracies (Walters, 2012;74). Walters (2012; 147) argue that liberal governance has always been intertwined with practices of power, domination and violence.

Walters (2012; 36) argue that liberal governmentality operates with a more targeted form of policing which is an essential feature of its 'apparatus of security'. Foucault coined the term 'apparatus' to show that analysis of power relations should not be limited to the study of discourses alone. 'Apparatus' refer to the entire context in which discourses intersect with other elements, such as administrative processes, laws or architecture, with inclusion of concepts like 'apparatus', the analysis of governance get less programmatic (Walters, 2012;146).

Foucault (1982; 208) has shown how people through 'dividing practices' are constructed as subjects in our culture. Subjects are categorized and separated from each other through the construction of dichotomies such as 'the criminals' and the 'good boys' or 'the sane' and 'the insane'. Walters (2004; 249) highlights that the access to the social benefits of the welfare state is restricted and include dividing practices, for instance social insurance is often constructed with conditions that imply that only regular workers are eligible for social insurance benefits, thus those who are not considered to have 'contributed' to the social economy are weeded out from certain social benefits. This dividing practice seems to be increasingly evident and Lewis (2004) describes this trend of linking welfare access to self-responsibility and work obligations as 'social policy of conditionality'. The welfare is reserved for self-reliant and active citizens, Lewis (2004; 25) argue that this notion of welfare have weakened the idea of a welfare system obliged to meet the actual needs of the population. Bacchi (2009; 168) conclude that there is a dividing practise at work in the Australian policy for work permits and immigration. The division of, on the one hand skilled workers who is considered to contribute to economy is
welcomed with warmth, and on the other hand, the policy is creating fear of the migrants and unskilled who is considered to burden the economy.

Methodological framework

5.1 Epistemological starting point

The method in this thesis draws upon constructionist premises. In ‘Samhällsvetenskapliga metoder’ Bryman (2018; 58) describe the constructionist approach as based on an ontological presumption that social phenomena and their meaning are something that is created in social processes. An epistemological presumption is that our understanding of the world is formed by social processes and that knowledge is a human construction. In the article ‘the good, the Bad and the Ugly: The Many Faces of Constructivism’ Phillips (1995) argue that socio-political processes have a particularly important role in the production of knowledge. This thesis adheres to the idea that knowledge is constructed through social process, therefore the 'What’s the problem represented to be?' approach (abbreviated to WPR) is used. The WPR approach designed by Bacchi (2009) is designed for critical policy analysis and aims to capture how policies form our understanding of society. The WPR approach challenges the idea of policy as a response to problems that lie in the outside world and is waiting to be resolved, instead (Bacchi, 2009; 33) argue that the policy maker is active in the actual production of policy 'Problems'. Policy problems can be constructed in different competing ways, in the WPR approach the government is regarded as an especially important and privileged player in the construction of policy problems, the reason for this is that their understanding 'stick' through legislation, reports and technologies used to govern (2009; 33). The focus on the political dimension of 'problem' creation makes the approach poststructuralist. A social constructive approach has great relevance as it provide insight on how problems are represented and also shed light on who benefits and who is harmed by specific problem representations (2009; 34).

5.2 Method of policy analysis: What’s the ‘problem’ represented to be?

Bacchi’s (2009) WPR approach is theoretically rooted in Foucauldian discourse analysis. The discursive basis distinguishes the WPR approach from other types of policy analysis, which in many cases rather focus on the evaluation of efficiency of certain policies. The method is devised to identify the rationalities or mentalities underlying policies. Bacchi argue that policies always reflect deep seated cultural assumptions and imply a certain understanding of what needs to be changed, 'the problem'. By putting the problematizations within a specific policy under critical scrutiny
we are able to track down the underlying rationalities of governance. In the WPR framework, policies is regarded as problematizing activities and the governing occurs through the problematization rather than through policies, thus it’s important to scrutinise what the policymaker produce as the ‘problem’. Bacchi (2009; 35) argue that problem representations are created through discourse.

In ‘Diskursens ordning’ Foucault (1993) uses the term discourse in two different ways, partly in a general sense as a term for all phrases that are written or uttered and partly to specifically denote the entire practice that produces a particular type of statements that produce a certain meaning or knowledge. Discourse is organized through internal and external exclusion mechanisms that determine the production of knowledges. One mechanism, described by Foucault is ‘the comment’. The comment contributes to establish a hierarchy between different texts or statements within a policy field. A policy proposal can get an elevated position and become privileged if many comment or refer to it, the commenting text is subordinated in relation to the commented text. The knowledge production described by Foucault (1993) regulates the possibilities to speak or think about a certain phenomenon, in this case, begging and the persons engaged in begging. Problem representations refer to the understanding of the problem implied in the policy. The aim of the WPR approach is to interrogate the problematizations in government policies by scrutinising premises and effects of the problem representations. The WPR approach often start with national policy texts, however the analysis often extends into other modes of governance (Bacchi, 2009; 156). The WPR method is based on the highlighted questions below;

- **What's the 'problem' represented to be in a specific policy?** The goal is to identify implied problem representations in specific policies or policy proposals (2009; 4)

- **What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the 'problem'?**

The goal is to identify and analyse the rationalities that underpin specific problem representations. Rationality refers to the kind of thinking that lies behind particular styles of governing. These are the 'mentalities' referred to in the concept of governmentality. Policies are elaborated in discourse. A central task of the analysis is to identify binaries, dichotomies such as responsible/irresponsible, legal/illegal when they appear in policies and how they function to shape our understanding. Further, identification of key concepts such as welfare in problem representations in order to see which meaning is given to these concepts. Categories are concepts that play a central role in how governing take place. The task is to see how categories function to give particular meanings to problem representations. Categories such as – citizens, welfare dependents, migrants, refugees are particularly relevant (2009; 7-9).
What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the problem be thought of differently? The purpose of this question is to highlight what is actually not problematized in a certain problem representation and to expose that there are issues and perspectives silenced in identified problem representations (2009; 13).

What effects are produced by this representation of the 'problem'? The purpose is to identify the effects of specific problem representations, Bacchi argue that there are three kinds of effects; Discoursive effects, that regulate what can be thought and said. Subjectification effects, relate to the ways subjects are constituted in discourse by 'dividing practises'. In policy members of a targeted group might be constructed as subjects with an own responsibility for their problem, thus the effects of the implied attributions of responsibility deserve certain an attention in the analysis of policy. The subjectification process might also involve a stigmatization of targeted minorities, which give a signal of what the government regard as desired and undesired behaviour. Finally, Lived effects relate to the material impact of certain problem representations, thus attention is directed towards how the problem representation made affects the living conditions of the targeted group.

How has this representation of the 'problem' been produced, disseminated and defended? How could it be questioned, disrupted and replaced? The attention is directed to the means through which some problem representations become dominant. Further the question of whether it’s possible to challenge the dominant problem representations should be considered (2009; 19).

**Analysis**

This section begins with the analysis of the key document, the State public report SOU, 2016: 6. Subsequently, analysis of policy proposals submitted to the Swedish parliament follows, finally, the case of Vellinge municipality and the governing at the municipal level is analysed. For clarity reasons, the analysis is loosely structured by the research questions retrieved from the WPR method. The empirical material contain several different problematizations, some of them are considered to contain common features and are presented thematically. The analysis contains, to some extent, quotes from the empirical material in order to support of the argumentation all of these quotes are translated from Swedish to English by the author of this thesis. The analysis is accompanied by key concepts from the governmentality approach and from previous research.

**6.1 SOU 2016:6**

The report (SOU 2016:6) capture the general governmental approach to begging and 'vulnerable EU-citizens' and the problem representations identified here probably have a great effect on constructions of begging as a social problem within the Swedish political
discourse. The Social Democratic government’s response to the issue of ‘vulnerable EU-citizens’ staying in Sweden was to appoint a national coordinator with a mission to support municipalities, authorities and other actors working with the group ‘vulnerable EU-citizens’. The assignment was formulated in January 2015 and one task for the coordinator was to disseminate knowledge about the rights of EES citizens when they stay temporarily in Sweden without fulfilment of the rights of residence (2015:9). The stated purpose of the assignment is to support actors meeting with vulnerable EU-citizens and create improved conditions for collaboration. In the Committee directive (2015:9) it is noted that EES citizens who have no right of residence have limited rights to social support during their temporary stay in Sweden. The directive state that the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the UN Convention on the right of the child should be taken into account in the work of the coordinator.

The report contain several different problematizations, some of them are considered to contain common features and are presented thematically, the first theme is neoliberal governance and individualization of responsibility and the second theme is the benevolent violence of the welfare state.

6.1.1 Neoliberal governance and individualization of responsibility

In the first section of the analysis the problematizations with a tendency to construct the issue of begging as an individual problem is scrutinized. In the report begging is recurrently problematized in a way placing the responsibility at the individual level. The first problematization relate to a construction of active citizens as a solution to the problem of poverty. The report refer to a contemporary view of how poverty should be combated, where vulnerable people should be defined as active independent actors with rights and obligations rather than passive receivers of support (2016:6; 90), in this context begging seems to be defined as a ‘passive’ activity. In this problematization, the vulnerable EU-citizens are constructed as active citizens that shouldn’t be passive receivers of support. Thus, the responsibility is passed on to the individual, as argued by Kostka (2018) the individualization of poverty can be seen as a part of an on-going neo-liberalization process where social rights for EU-citizens are silenced. Also, welfare state retrenchment and cuts in social services might explain the weakened interest in offering social support for vulnerable EU-citizens and instead establish a conditionality of social rights through the construction of active citizens. As argued by Dahlstedt (2018) vulnerable EU-citizens are constructed as outsiders in relation to Swedish society, and their welfare does not rest upon the Swedish welfare state. The report makes it clear that Vulnerable EU citizens are only entitled to limited support from the Swedish welfare system, in many cases only emergency support (2016:6; 57). The report make an interpretation of the right to welfare for vulnerable EU-citizens where the state responsibility for this group consequently is scaled down, the possibility for the social services, by support from Social Service Act(2001:453), to assist anyone residing in the municipality neglected.
The second problematization constructs vulnerable EU-citizens as generators of criminal activity. In the report, vulnerable EU citizens are associated with various forms of criminal activity. The report refers to a description of the current situation presented by the Police Authority in 2015 where various types of crime are linked to the group of vulnerable EU citizens. It is stated that it is likely to be a growing proportion of the people who are begging who are exploited by criminal actors who engage in human trafficking (2016: 6; 28). The report (2016: 6; 47) also highlights how the presence of vulnerable EU citizens in certain municipalities has promoted the dynamics of polarization and increased extremism. The existence of vulnerable EU citizens has generated a mobilization of xenophobic forces devoted to hate crimes and violations directed towards the group. Reported crimes against vulnerable EU-citizens committed by others are often different kinds of abuses, assaults and unlawful threats (2016:6; 72). The report also presents vulnerable EU citizens as perpetrators. A crime that is frequently problematized in the report is the illegal settlements. According to the report, activists who sympathize with the cause of the EU citizens chain themselves to prevent evictions. Also, these activists facilitate new crimes by locating new (illegal) settlements for the group (2016: 6; 48). The problem concerning illegal settlements takes up much space in the report (SOU 2016:6; 62-66).

The message from the Swedish society should therefore be clear: All EU citizens are welcome here but they must as anyone else follow our laws. Thus, legal housing should be used. It is forbidden to settle in parks, in other public spaces or on private property (SOU 2016: 6; 63).

According to the report, vulnerable EU-citizens commit crimes such as petty theft and arbitrary conduct (2016:6; 73). The report also highlights the problem of littering, which is criminalized according to the Environmental Code. It also happens that individuals engage in vandalism and disorderly conduct. Furthermore, the report states that the crimes committed by vulnerable EU-citizens rarely generate any legal sanctions (2016:6; 68). Further, the vulnerable EU citizens also violate the traffic regulations. As a rule, vehicles should only be parked for 24 hours in urban areas, despite this regulation, vulnerable EU citizens settle in cars and caravans parked over time (2016:6; 69). Furthermore, train stations are used in a way that they are not intended for. Reportedly, vulnerable EU citizens devote themselves to sleeping, washing themselves, eating and littering inside the station buildings. This has led to increased costs for the real estate company due to the perceived need for monitoring guards (SOU 2016:6; 80). Through the linking of begging with various criminal acts, begging is represented as a social problem with criminal connotations.
The third problematization constructs ‘exposure of misery’ as a problem for the individuals that pass by the people who engage in begging. Here the bystander is attributed with the responsibility, and the state responsibility is dimmed. A recurring theme in the report is that the visible misery and open poverty primarily pose a problem for those who are forced to witness this precariousness, it is argued that people in Sweden are unaccustomed to seeing misery and that it is upsetting to be confronted with such an open vulnerability and poverty.

In Sweden we are not accustomed to meeting such a striking misery on a daily basis. Seeing these vulnerable people sitting on the ground, even in the rain and cold, has been both surprising and upsetting for many (SOU 2016:6; 20).

Thus, the problematization positions the bystander as the victim of ‘exposure of misery’. The actual vulnerability of those who are forced to engage in begging is neglected in this problem representation. The problematization revolves around the fact that it is difficult for the bystanders to be exposed to the vulnerability of others. The report claims that the visibility of the vulnerable EU citizens in the street and their appeal for money challenges the Swedish self-image. Our self-image is assumed to be shaped by the construct of the Swedish welfare state, where everyone is expected to contribute through employment and where social authorities will eliminate the risks of open poverty and begging (SOU 2016: 6; 23f). A difficulty imposed on the bystander is the need to take a personal stand.

Through the meeting with a poor person who is not entitled to the same social benefits as Swedish citizens, each of us is forced to take a stand. It is in these cases not possible to refer responsibility for this misery to the Swedish welfare system (SOU 2016: 6; 24).

When the vulnerable EU citizen is constructed as a figure with limited access to social rights, each individual is forced to take a stand. It is made clear that in the case of vulnerable EU citizens it is not possible to rely on the Swedish welfare society. In this reasoning, the question of responsibility is passed on to the ‘bystander’, the issue of begging is depoliticized and the responsibility is individualized. Further, the report provides some recommendations to the ‘bystander’. The giving of money to vulnerable EU-citizens is represented as something undesirable. By putting a coin in the poor man’s cup we contribute to consolidate the unworthy and destructive role of the beggar (SOU 2016: 6; 90).

The fourth problematization in the report constructs the vulnerable EU-citizens as reluctant to be in Sweden, which contribute to put Sweden’s efforts to complicate the stay
in Sweden in a more positive light. We help them to go back to their home country where they really want to be. In this problematization the home country is attributed with the responsibility of these people, the fact that they have left their home countries because their social rights have not been met there is neglected in this problem representation. The report presents a picture that vulnerable EU citizens do not really want to be in Sweden. According to the report the intention of the vulnerable EU citizens is not to settle permanently in Sweden and eventual employment is stated to be temporary (SOU 2016: 6).

- I would like to go back to Bulgaria and get a job there. Be close to my children. They feel abandoned, betrayed by us. It's awful (SOU 2016: 34).

Most people who come here to beg do not see their future here. They want to return to their home countries (SOU 2016: 91).

The above quotes help to construct the vulnerable EU-citizens as social tourists or vagabonds with an inner wish to live in their home countries. This image contributes to establish a nationalistic notion that people really want to stay in their home countries and that each country should be imposed with a responsibility for the welfare of their own citizens. A construction where responsibility for vulnerable EU-citizens is primarily attributed to the home country may seem reasonable, however in a situation when it is quite obvious that the responsibility is not taken, other options might be considered. However, the report sends a clear message that the option that Sweden should take over the responsibility is not a desired option. The report (2016: 87) state that Romania and Bulgaria should fight poverty and exclusion among its citizens, this responsibility Sweden cannot take over. Furthermore, the report takes note of the fact that within the group of vulnerable EU citizens, parents are separated from their children, the illumination of this aspect can be perceived as empathic. However the focus on the personal dimensions of this issue help to blur that there is an economic reality that forces these people to seek livelihood in other EU countries.

By constructing an image of the fact that vulnerable EU citizens do not really want to be in Sweden, a silence is created around the fact that the vulnerable EU citizens have an even more difficult situation in their home countries. Further, the fact that Sweden actually believe that vulnerable EU citizens constitute a burden for Swedish welfare and a threat to public order is also silenced in this problem representation. Thus, the assumption that the vulnerable EU citizens really want to travel home give legitimacy to the restrictive measures that the report advocates, also it brings support to the idea that it is the home country that bears the responsibility for the well-being of these people. Through the problematization that the vulnerable EU citizens do not want to be in Sweden, the shift of responsibility from Sweden to Romania or Bulgaria appears to be empathic. Proposed
measures in the report are to a large extent based on obstructing the stay of vulnerable EU citizens in Sweden, given the problem representation that they do not want to stay in Sweden; it may appear that this is done for the vulnerable EU citizens' own sake. Thus, the statement that vulnerable EU citizens do not want to be in Sweden contribute to a justification of the repressive tendencies in the report, making the livelihood in Sweden complicated for vulnerable EU-citizens.

The problem representations described above rest on some underlying assumptions, they are in different ways underpinned by a neo-liberal logic, emphasising individualization and activation. The report constructs the vulnerable EU-citizens as active and independent actors, thus attributing them with responsibility to solve their own problems. The promotion of active and independent actors should be understood in the same way as the promotion of 'self-esteem' discussed by Walters & Haahr (2005) in order to illustrate the logics of neo-liberal governing. When concepts like this is introduced in policy texts there is a tendency to define the problem as an individual one rather than a political one, the responsibility to solve the problem tend to shift from the political level to the individual level. This process of individualization is a fundamental feature of neoliberal governance. As argued by Vacquant (2012) the neo-liberal re-coding or poverty as a self-inflected personal failure rather than a structural problem is related to an on-going revamping of social policies, whereas punitive measures targeting the most impoverished constitutes in an increasingly essential part. The report expresses the need for harder measures against the group of vulnerable EU citizens. For instance, illegal settlements are frequently questioned on several grounds, inter alia that they generate sanitary inconveniences, thus the report advocate the facilitation of evictions of vulnerable EU citizens. In neoliberal governing, housing is not defined as a right, it is rather the individual's obligation to arrange with a roof over the head. However, legislation and regulations 'apparatuses of security' create a situation whereas most forms of housing/settlements that are possible for the poor to arrange on their own are defined as illegal.

As mentioned earlier, some municipalities have chosen to provide designated housing for the purpose of curbing illegal settlements, but this is a solution that the report doesn’t recommend. The report believe that the solution might be appealing in the short term, since a vulnerable group gets a decent dwelling and littering and sanitation problems associated with illegal settlements decrease, however, in the long term it is defined as an unsustainable solution. The report argue that the municipalities ability to offer welfare to vulnerable EU-citizens is limited and that it is therefore doubtful whether municipalities have the right to grant, for example, long-term camping for a group that has limited right to support (2016:6; 69-70) The report conclude that municipalities only have legal support to provide short-term emergency housing after an individual examination of the need for emergency assistance (2016:6; 71). Thus, the report dismisses both the housing solutions (illegal settlements) arranged by the vulnerable EU-citizens themselves and those provided
by some municipalities, in both cases with reference to a weave of legislation and regulations. Recurrently, an image is constructed of the fact that society's responsibility is extremely limited, implicit in this construction, is the notion that the individual should be active, responsible and thereby solve the situation.

Further, the home countries of the vulnerable EU-citizens are constructed as carriers of responsibility, which can be seen as a way for Sweden to escape political responsibility for vulnerable EU-citizens residing here. As argued by Walters (2012) liberal governmentality is based on a certain degree of openness. A territory is opened for the circulation of people, goods and money, the intention is to create interchange and commerce. However, there is no absolute openness, liberal governmentality must handle new risks such as displacement and vagrancy. The policing becomes specialized and limited to certain groups and specific problems. The case of vulnerable EU-citizens constitutes a good example of this kind of specialized policing. EU-citizens that is considered to contribute to the economy is welcomed, but the poor and vulnerable are constructed as undesirable, thus policy signals that they should return to their home countries and that they should take own responsibility of their situation.

As shown in the second problematization above, the activity of begging is repeatedly associated with different types of crime which contribute to a black-painting of poor people who engage in begging; also these people become objects of suspicion. The construction of begging as a somewhat criminal activity can be understood in relation to the process of securitization. In some cases people who engage in begging is position as victims of crime and in some cases they are positioned as offenders, regardless of which, they are as a group interconnected with criminal activity. As argued by Van Baar (2015; 9) 'illegality' and 'rootlessness' is attributed to the Romas and thereby a harsher treatment is legitimized. By linking begging to other forms of criminality, vulnerable EU-citizens who engage in begging is represented as a security problem, this securitization process is also reinforced by the use of stereotypes. As highlighted by Engebrigtsen (2012) the figure of the nomad challenge the order of things and in a European context the Romas and the vulnerable EU – citizens are positioned as 'wandering threats' and is therefore subject to especially severe restrictions. It seems as vulnerable EU-citizens is defined as the deviant other in contrast to the norm, as argued by Tilly (2000), the process of othering tends to form a ritual that is continually cemented in legitimizing myths that contribute to uphold the difference and inequality between insiders and the deviant outsider.

In order to counteract the development of myths where vulnerable EU-citizens are linked to criminal activity its necessary to make a sharp distinction between on the one hand begging as an own social phenomenon and on the other hand different crimes that might arise in relation to the occurrence of begging. Further, as argued by van Baar (2015; 9), the vulnerable EU-citizens should be represented in terms of human rights in order to succeed with a 'de-securitization'.
In the problematizations presented above, the responsibility for the issue begging is in different ways positioned at the level of the individual or in a land far away who already shown that they are not prepared to bear that responsibility. What is left unproblematic in these problem representations is the political responsibility to combat poverty and discrimination and to uphold social rights. The report seems to silence the structural perspective and depolitize the issue of begging. As argued by Swärd (2015) if begging is represented as a structural problem then structural measures such as poverty reduction and anti-discrimination work would be the adequate response. The tendency in the report is to represent begging as an individual problem, thus the report contribute to a silencing of the structural perspective neglecting the political responsibility.

As argued by Bacchi (2009) the problem representations produce effects on different levels. The discursive effects regulate what can be said and thought. The analysis shows that the policy is characterized by dividing practices, securitization and individualisation of responsibility, and that a rights-based approach and political responsibility are actively subordinated. Thus, a discursive effect of the policy is that it is more difficult to speak and think in terms of rights when it comes to vulnerable EU citizens and people that engage in begging. Further, the subjectification effects of the policy relate to the ways subjects are constituted in discourse (Bacchi, 2009). One subjectification effect of the policy relate to the way vulnerable EU-citizens are positioned as subjects with an own responsibility for their predicament. The report states that vulnerable EU citizens should be defined as independent and active actors rather than passive receivers of support (SOU, 1016:6; 90). The implied attributions of responsibility also contribute to the legitimization of the reports recurrent statements concerning Sweden’s limited responsibility for poverty reduction and reforms targeting structural inequality. Also, the subjectification process also involve a stigmatization of vulnerable EU citizens, the engagement in begging is repeatedly linked to criminal activities and is defined as an undesired and unworthy activity (SOU, 2016:6). By attributing illegality to the vulnerable EU-citizens they are stigmatized and positioned as deviant and undeserving subjects. In this policy the government signals what is regarded as desired and undesired behaviour, which effects the positioning of insiders and outsiders. Finally, the problem representations of the policy also generate lived effects. The material impact of the problem representations relate to the actual influence on the living conditions of the group vulnerable EU citizens. Through the subordination of a rights-based discourse and by the lack of political ambition to combat structures that create social injustice, the lived effects tend to be characterized by continued exposure and exploitation.

6.1.2 The benevolent violence of the welfare state

The Swedish welfare state has an inherent duality with both an inclusionary dimension and exclusionary tendencies, as argued by Barker (2017) this duality is evident in the
mixed responses from the Swedish welfare state in the case of begging and vulnerable EU-
citizens, Barker term this duality benevolent violence. The report express a benevolence and a certain degree of tolerance towards the vulnerable EU-citizens that come to reside in Sweden, the inclusionary, benevolent dimension is expressed through a general welcoming of EU-citizens (SOU 2016:6; 63) also the report do not propose a ban on begging. However exclusionary tendencies and dividing practices are also evident in the report. In the following, a couple of relevant problems representations will be analysed.

In the first problematization, the vulnerable EU-citizen is constructed as a burden for the social services. The report states that the cases concerning support for vulnerable EU-citizens create difficulties and dilemmas in the exercise of authority, it is considered to be highly challenging to handle a group of people who actually have limited rights to support.

The fact that a very vulnerable group, which is also visible in the streets, is considered as less entitled to welfare benefits than most people who live in Sweden, have resulted in new kinds of challenges for case officers, politicians and actors representing civil society (SOU 2016:6; 45)

Lack of knowledge about what applies to handling and decisions for vulnerable EU citizens, as well as an uncertainty as to what it may mean to intervene, may also have been a reason why social services have sometimes awaited and failed to act (SOU 2016: 6; 47).

As illustrated by these quotes, the report argues that it is difficult to handle a group of people that are less entitled to welfare benefits. Some municipalities are generous with municipal resources and some have a more restrictive attitude towards the group of vulnerable EU citizens (SOU 2016: 6; 45) The fact that there are no clear guidelines for management of cases involving vulnerable EU citizens creates a situation where individual case officers find it difficult to navigate between legislation and humanitarian considerations. The report describes that some municipalities is guided by the Social Services Act and the paragraph stating of the municipality's responsibility for everyone who is staying in the municipality, thus these administrations tend to take a more humanitarian stance, focusing on supporting and alleviating the needs of the target group (SOU 2016: 6; 46-47).

The social services face difficult considerations between, the individual EU citizen's responsibility to finance his own expenses, such as food, lodging and possible home trips, and the municipality's limited responsibility for them when staying without a right of residence in
Sweden. It can also be resource-intensive to process each application for emergency assistance (SOU 2016: 6; 46).

Thus, the report argues that it is both difficult and resource-intensive for the social services to handle cases involving vulnerable EU citizens. The problem is derived from dilemmas concerning the municipalities level of responsibility for the vulnerable EU citizens who are staying in the municipality, the problematizations is based on the notion that the lack of clear guidelines creates dilemmas where the question of to what extent one should help people in distress and poverty arise in the exercise of authority. The report is highlighting the type of expenditure that burden the municipalities, it concerns emergency assistance, contributions to civilian actors, coordination and clean-up costs after removal from illegal settlements (SOU 2016: 6; 49). Furthermore, Swedish welfare is described as a potential pull - factor, and therefore the recommendation is that Swedish society should not act in a way that encourages vulnerable people to seek livelihood in Sweden (SOU 2016: 6; 50). For example, municipalities that give accompanying children access to shelter and food service, as well as offering school or other educational activities, are problematized. The report state that the municipality’s actions then signal an acceptance for the children to accompany their begging parents, and that municipalities that provide support to children tend to have more children staying in the municipality (SOU 2016: 6; 51).

The second problematization engages in ‘dividing practices’ and represent ‘unjust positive treatment of vulnerable EU-citizens as the problem. The report emphasizes that the ability of the municipalities to support the group of vulnerable EU citizens without right of residence is limited to emergency assistance and highlight the risks that municipalities offer more support than they should do (SOU 2016: 6; 70), an unjust positive discrimination of the group of vulnerable EU citizens is problematized.

In many parts of the country, there is a shortage of housing and a number of homeless citizens already exist. To lend a kind of campsite against a symbolic rent, exclusively to a specific group of homeless people, which is also not a municipal citizen, can therefore be questioned legally (SOU 2016:6; 70).

The report describes how certain municipalities offer assigned housing to vulnerable EU citizens and that this is problematic since there may already be homeless people in the municipality who do not receive the same housing opportunity. Providing benefits to people who are citizens of another country is presented as problematic in relation to having Swedish citizens with legal rights, whom, hypothetically, are not given the same opportunity to enjoy these benefits. Also, the report claims that one can (should) make the assessment that the vulnerable EU citizens have a weak connection to the municipality, and therefore should not be given benefits and support with housing (2016:6;70).
In the report, different vulnerable groups are put against each other, on the one hand, municipal citizens who hold Swedish citizenship and on the other hand EU-citizens who are staying in the municipality temporarily. Foucault (1982; 208) termed this phenomenon 'dividing practices', a dichotomy where the 'deserving' is separated from the 'undeserving' is established. Vulnerable EU-citizens are constructed as 'undeserving' subjects due to their weaker connection to the municipality, despite the fact that their need for support is as great as anyone's. Walters (2004; 249) highlights that access to social welfare is often limited and often includes dividing practices, in this case the restricted access to welfare is justified by, among other things, the weak connection to the municipality. In this context, the ambition of the report seems to be to communicate that the municipalities should ensure that the vulnerable EU citizens should be weeded out of certain social benefits. Lewis (2004) refers to this kind of conditionality on access to welfare as 'social policy of conditionality'. The conditionality contributes to weaken the idea of a welfare system obliged to meet the actual needs of the population.

The report argue that the efforts to enforce evictions in some municipalities is characterized by a wait-and-see approach, the report believe that this may be due to a sensitivity linked to the Swedish authorities negative treatment of Romas and the history of evictions during the 20th century. Further, the report claims that unjust discrimination, both positive and negative, constitute a major problem (SOU 2016: 6; 62). In this context, it is suggested that Swedish authorities' awareness of the 20th century's history of oppression and discrimination of Romas can lead to an omission to apply Swedish legislation against this group, which in turn is assumed to lead to risks for unjust positive treatment of vulnerable EU citizens. The report emphasizes that legal housing should be used and that it is prohibited to settle in parks, on private land or in other public spaces (SOU 2016: 6; 63). Municipalities that take a cautious stance on evictions of such settlements are problematized and instead the report depicts quick evictions as an ideal image. Furthermore, municipalities that provide assigned housing in order to curb settlements in parks or other public spaces are questioned in the report, it is considered to be doubtful, with reference to laws of competition, whether the municipality has the right to grant campsites to a group of homeless people who, moreover, are not municipal citizens.

If you have a high level of service, the municipality risks being illegally competitive with private campers. If a simpler level is selected the municipality risk to contribute to the establishment of slum areas. Regardless of the standard of living at the designated housings, it becomes difficult for a municipality to justify why a certain vulnerable group should get access to this solution, but not others. (SOU 2017; 70)
The report makes an assessment that it is fundamentally wrong to create assigned housing for a particular vulnerable group as there may be other groups that do not have access to the same solution. In addition, the assigned housing might be either too qualitative, which is considered to create undue competition with private camping contractors or the service level of the provided housing might be considered too low which tend to create deterioration. The report argues that it's very difficult for the municipalities to administrate welfare efforts for this group. The report convey an image of municipalities with a pronounced ambition to help this group often tend to land in a situation of positive discrimination, something which is considered as per se problematic, but which is also questioned with reference to other legislation, among others; the Order Act and the Competition Act. Furthermore, a polarized opinion in the matter is considered to create dilemmas and complicate the work with vulnerable EU-citizens.

Politicians in many municipalities describe several dilemmas. It is seen as positive that residents engage in a vulnerable group in society. At the same time, it is an educational challenge to explain that the vulnerable EU citizens have limited rights and not full access to the welfare system. In a legal society it is important to maintain the laws and regulations that apply. [...] Some citizens lack knowledge of what the municipality's resources may be used for and argue for a very generous approach. Other citizens monitor the actions of the municipality so that that regulations regarding illegal settlements and order issues are applied in the right way (2016: 6; 47).

The third problematization constructs the donating of money as a problem, since it contributes to consolidate the role of the beggar. In the report, no national ban on begging is advocated, which can be seen as benevolent, on the other hand, the giving of money to vulnerable EU-citizens is presented as something undesirable.

By donating money to the beggar we risk cementing the beggar role which doesn't imply any long-term change for the group. Children's schooling risks suffering and the there is a risk that the beggar role is passed on to the next generation. (SOU 2016: 6; 10)

By donating money to vulnerable EU citizens, it is stated that we contribute to a consolidation of the beggar role. The giving is not supposed to generate any lasting improvements for the group. Also, According to the report, there are a number of problematic side-effects due to a donor pattern characterized by compassion. People tend to give more money to women than to men, and in particular it is the pregnant or disabled
persons who receive larger sums when begging. Thus, it is often the most vulnerable that
tend to be over-represented within street-begging and risk to get stuck in an 'unworthy'
situation (2016: 6; 91). The report refers to a contemporary view of how poverty should be
combated, where vulnerable people are defined as active independent actors with rights
and obligations, that must be given the rights conditions to improve their own lives.
According to this view, you do not help the vulnerable group in the long term by donating
money to passive beggars. By donating, a destructive and unworthy beggar role is
cemented (2016:6; 90).

The report fixate the role of the beggar as something entirely negative, it may seem logic at
first, but it is problematic in that it contribute to a de-contextualisation of the activity
begging. Given the political circumstances in Europe with austerity, neo-liberalization and
racial discrimination, street-begging might be the only option available for a large portion
of the group vulnerable EU-citizens. However, the report is focused on eradicating the
begging role, rather than its premises, thus the eradicating of poverty does not seem to be a
priority.

By putting a coin in the poor man’s cup we contribute to consolidate the
unworthy and destructive role of the beggar (SOU 2016: 6; 90).

The description of begging as unworthy can only be understood in relation to other
'dignified' jobs such as wage work or social support for livelihoods. Reasonably, the
existence of begging can be understood as an effect of poverty, exclusion from the labour
market and restrictions in the social security systems. In this context, it may be reasonable
to define begging instead as an activity that generates a redistribution of funds from those
who have to those who do not and that it is a way of remedying the most acute poverty. If
begging instead is understood as a way of survival, it appears to be wrong and obviously
stigmatizing to call it unworthy and destructive. Our lack of ability to establish solidarity
and inclusive systems could in this interpretation be seen as the truly 'unworthy'.

When begging is presented as an unworthy and destructive activity the
combating of begging can be placed in an empathic screw, where repressive measures are
advocated with regard to the best interest of the target group. According to this problem
representation, the direct giving of money will contribute to consolidate an 'unworthy'
situation for the vulnerable EU-citizens, since it forces them to continue to beg. The
recommendation not to donate money is constructed as something benevolent. The
empathic and benevolent grant is evident in many parts of the report, e.g. evictions are
presented as a measure aimed at protecting vulnerable EU citizens from various health risks associated with the settlements.

It was considered to pose serious health risks to the people living at the illegal settlement [...] (SOU 2016:6; 67)

In the report, a benevolent narrative is created, stating that evictions take place for the vulnerable EU citizens' own sake. The problem representation seems at the first glance to be characterized by empathy, evictions take place with regard to the health of the vulnerable EU citizens. However, it is not entirely clear that the persons concerned perceive the benevolence and the goodwill of evictions. Further, this problem representation contributes to silence other problem representations that need to be taken into account in order to fully comprehend the issue. Presumably, the drive to facilitate evictions might rather be related to an ambition to appease a part of the public opinion.

Dividing practices is a common feature of the problematizations described above, the policy establishes a hierarchy between the deserving and the undeserving, whereas vulnerable EU citizens are defined as undeserving. The vulnerable EU citizen is constructed as a figure with limited access to basic social rights. The underlying assumption is that Swedish welfare should be reserved for Swedish citizens, the European citizenship does not seem to be assigned much weight in the report, and the right to support from the Swedish welfare society needs to be earned. The report clearly states that EU citizens have limited rights and that access to the Swedish welfare system should be restricted. According to Dahlstedt et al (2018), the vulnerable EU citizens are presented as a group of outsiders in relation to the Swedish community and that the responsibility for their welfare does not rest upon the Swedish welfare state. Furthermore, Dahlstedt et al (2018) argue that the report emphasizes the ability for self-sufficiency as a condition for being resident in Sweden and that the poor EU citizens who cannot support themselves thus become a problem and an undesirable element in Sweden. Thus, a moralizing dimension in which questions regarding the employability and livelihood of the individual EU citizen is placed at the forefront.

The element of benevolence is expressed through an emphasis on all EU citizens' right to come to Sweden. This can be linked to an inclusive and solidarity dimension of the Swedish welfare state. However, as argued by Bauman (1998) the welfare state is based on a norm of work ethics, a norm characterized by control and subordination, thus the moral dimension is significant. People who do not engage in wage work are constructed as deviant and exceeding of social norms. Thus, the idealization of wage work is a central element in the welfare state construct, which give rise to ideas that tend to exclude and discriminate those who stand outside of the labour market. As argued by Bauman (1998) the people who are unemployed are constructed as morally weak and undignified. The
logic of the work ethics, inherent in the welfare state construct, seems to influence how begging is constructed as a social problem in the public state report. Swärd (2015) believe that the primacy of work principle, characterized by self-responsibility and an obligation to contribute to the common good influence the view of those who provide in alternative ways (begging). Assumptions that are influenced by work ethics tend to result in forms of governing that establish a division between those who work and those who do not work. Further, the category "those who do not work" is later divided into the category of deserving citizens and the category of underserving (non-citizens that do not meet the criteria’s for right of residency).

The welfare is assumed to be a pull factor, therefore the report emphasizes the importance of signalling that welfare is for us and not for them, in order to deter them from coming here. Begging is presented as an economic burden and the report argue that each country has a responsibility for their own citizens, and that Sweden should refrain from taking a responsibility that really rests on the country of dispatch.

Each EU Member State must combat poverty, exclusion and discrimination among their citizens. Romania and Bulgaria have responsibility for their own citizens, this responsibility Sweden could not and should not take over (SOU 2016: 6; 87).

Municipalities that establish assigned housing are problematized, since it gives a signal that it is ok to reside in Sweden. The report has a strong emphasis on the facilitating of evictions which can be understood as a deterrent for poor people to come to Sweden at all. The governance at national level seems to be aimed at reducing the number of vulnerable EU-citizens travelling to Sweden, thus limiting the right to mobility in conflict with the EU directive promoting free movement. Municipalities that allow children in shelters are problematized based on the idea that child allowance is a ‘pull factor’.

The Swedish welfare system is based on the notion that all people that can contribute to the common good should do so through wage work. Also, no person should be so exposed so that he or she has to engage in begging. Then the social service is expected to intervene. Through the meeting with a poor human being who is not entitled to the same social benefits as Swedish citizens, each and every one of us is forced to take a stand. In this case it’s not possible for us to claim that the Swedish welfare society should take care of the misery (SOU 2016: 6; 23f).

Through the repetition and emphasis on the clear boundaries of what the Swedish society can provide through the municipal social services (2016: 6; 73), the report paint a picture
of a gap between what society has the right to offer and the obvious need for support in the group of vulnerable EU citizens. This illustrates how the notion of a welfare system obliged to meet actual needs of the population has been weakened, in line with Lewis (2004; 25) analysis, the welfare is reserved for the self-reliant and active citizens. Thus, the report chooses to define the task of society as something else than actually helping people in need. Basically the welfare is reserved for active Swedish citizens. Actually, the vulnerable EU-citizens who travel to Sweden could be understood as particularly ‘active’. However the activity requested is probably related to labour market participation. The report makes recurrent reference to the criteria’s (employment, self-employment or studies) of the right of residency when it comes to categorizing who deserves and who do not deserve welfare support. The actual need for support seems to be a subordinated question.

Further, the difference between the category of deserving (Swedish citizens) and the category of undeserving (vulnerable EU citizens) is also reproduced through the division between different providers of support. While public welfare is reserved for Swedish citizens, the needs of the vulnerable EU citizens are dependent on the goodwill of civil society actors. The report argues that the gap between what society can offer and the great needs of vulnerable EU citizens can be bridged by the promotion of involvement from the civil sector (2016: 6; 73). By delegating responsibility for vulnerable EU citizens to civil society actors, such as churches, the report seems to express an ambition to further reduce the state’s responsibility.

The concept benevolent violence coined by Barker (2017) capture the complexity in the approach to vulnerable EU citizens. There is a duality in the Swedish welfare state, with both inclusive and exclusionary dimensions, in the report (SOU 2016: 6), the exclusionary and nationalist tendencies appear through dividing practices where vulnerable EU citizens are presented as undeserving. The Swedish state implements ameliorative practices such as facilitating evictions that generate violent and excluding effects. The inclusion consists of the fact that vulnerable EU citizens can actually stay in Sweden and that the state (not yet) banned begging at national level. Furthermore, the benevolent aspect of the report is also expressed by an apparent empathic and caring position probably aiming at hiding coercive measures, an example of the on-going whitewashing is the presentation of facilitating of evictions as a way to ‘protect’ the vulnerable EU-citizens from an unworthy existence in sanitary inconvenience. Thus, the report advocates the implementation of coercive measures with reference to the best interests of the vulnerable EU citizens. However, the exclusionary and violent tendencies are most obvious, probably an ambition to protect the welfare state from erosion by repeatedly signalling that its use is reserved for the deserving, the Swedish citizens. In the problem representations described under the heading – benevolent violence of the welfare state – the vulnerable EU-citizens engaged in begging is constructed as a burden and as undeserving of social support. The social rights issues are left unproblematic in these problem representations and human rights issues are actively silenced in the report. The
Very far-reaching interpretations run the risk of putting the officials and politicians who have to deal with the issues of vulnerable EU citizens in difficulty in interpreting which regulations apply to vulnerable EU citizens (2016:16;54).

Thus, the report expresses loyalty with the case officers who face vulnerable EU-citizens rather than with the people who are vulnerable. Human rights issues occupy a subordinate position within the report, despite the fact that the importance of human rights considerations was particularly emphasized in the directive from the government. According to the Committee Directive (2015:9) the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the UN Convention on the right of the child should be taken into account in the work of the coordinator, however in the final report the human right issues seem to have been subordinated.

The benevolent violence of the welfare state is expressed through the problem representations described above, these problematizations have discursive effects similar to those described in previous section of the analysis. The problem representations regulate the way we talk about begging and vulnerable EU-citizens. Given the above problematizations where vulnerable EU-citizens is constructed as a burden and undeserving of Swedish welfare, a discursive effect is that becomes difficult to think and speak about vulnerable EU-citizens engaging in begging in terms of social rights. The discursive effect is intertwined with the subjectification effects, in the report vulnerable EU-citizens engaging in begging are constituted as problematic, economic burdens and undeserving. The vulnerable EU-citizens are positioned as a group with restricted access to Swedish welfare in opposition to Swedish citizens and who instead are constructed as deserving. Also, the dividing practices generate lived effects. By promoting the facilitation of evictions, emphasizing the limited responsibility of the social services and also recommending the passers-by to avoid donating money to people engaging in the unworthy activity of begging, the report tend to create lived effects characterized by continued exclusion and poverty. Thus, the problematizations of the report are not likely to create improved living conditions for the vulnerable EU-citizens, rather the opposite.

6.2 Policy Proposals on begging 2010-2019

In order to capture the political discourses on begging, a number of proposals on begging are analysed. In a review of all proposals in the Swedish Parliament during the period 2010-1019 (April) that relate to begging as a social problem, a general increase in the number of proposals can be found. Furthermore, during the period one can discern a shift in how MPs problematize the issue of begging. During the last couple of years, the number
of proposals aimed at introducing a ban on begging has increased significantly. In part it can be explained by increased activity from MPs representing the Sweden Democrats and in part due to the fact that the Moderate Party during the last few years has taken a rather different stance on the issue of begging. The shift is illustrated by two proposals from the Moderate Party. In 2014 the proposal ‘EU-medborgares sociala utsatthet’ (2014/15:2485) from the Moderate Party relate begging as a social problem to deficiencies in the social security systems within some EU-states and that the issue of vulnerable EU-citizens is a responsibility and a concern for the whole of EU, also for Sweden. Further, this proposal dismisses the idea of prohibition of begging as difficult to implement and also doubtful from an ethical perspective. The representation of begging as an effect of deficiencies in social security systems, seems to be based on an understanding of begging as a structural problem. In this proposal (2014/15:2485), the structural representation of begging leads to suggested solutions where the EU requires each EU country to introduce social security systems resembling the Swedish social support system, jointly funded through EU social funds. As argued by Swärd (2015) when the issue of begging is represented as a structural problem, the measures taken will in most cases naturally address the structural deficiencies found, in this case, deficiencies in social security systems. However, a few years later the MPs representing the Moderate Party construct begging as a completely different kind of problem. In proposal ‘Brottslighet kopplad till tiggeri’ (motion 2017/18:2919) the understanding of begging as a structural problem has been replaced by problematizations that link begging to criminality and problematization of begging as an activity that in itself create exclusion. Further, in the proposal ‘Förbjud tiggeri’ (motion 2017/18: 1425) the Moderate Party communicate that begging should be prohibited. This shift illustrate that problematizations of begging are increasingly linked to order issues and crime, which also correlates with the issue of prohibition becoming more dominant on the political agenda. The adoption of a new stance in the moderate party seems to reflect a deeper shift in the political discourse on begging. Also the new position produces a new understanding of begging as a social problem, and it can also contribute to legitimize attitudes towards begging that were previously only held by representatives from the Sweden Democrats. As argued by Sigona and Zetter (2010) the political discourse on vulnerable EU-citizens have been dominated by two positions, on the one hand a position underlining control and security and on the other hand a humanitarian position promoting human rights. In this context the former is evidently and increasingly dominant, primarily driven by the right wing parties.

However, policy proposal ‘Närodlad integration’ (Motion 2015/16:3245) from the Centre Party and the proposal ‘Hemlösa EU medborgare som tvingas tigga’ (Motion 2017/18:2784) from the Swedish Green Party take a position where the issue of begging is framed as a social rights issue, a position described by Nagel (2007) whereas the importance of fundamental social rights for all is emphasized. In the following analysis of policy proposals on begging, the discoursive position focusing on security and control will
be scrutinized first, then a counter image is given in the form of an analysis of proposals that problematize begging from a rights-based humanitarian perspective.

6.2.1 Securitization

The concept of securitization come in handy when trying to understand the policy proposals linking begging to different kinds of criminality. As argued by Van Baar (2015) the circulation of poor people within EU is regarded as a threat that needs to be controlled and the control is exercised through the framing of the mobile poor as a security issue. The aim is to identify the problem representations in the scrutinized policy proposals. The analysis will show how vulnerable EU citizens and begging is problematized. In a number of policy proposals in recent years begging is interlinked with different kinds of criminal activity. The construction of begging as an activity mainly run by criminal actors seem to rest on a recurring figure of thought in a number of policy proposals from MPs representing the Moderate Party and the Sweden Democrats. In Proposal ‘Förbjud Tiggeri’ (2017/18:1425) the Moderate Party argues that ‘organized begging’ entail illegal settlements on private or public land. Proposal ‘Brottslighet kopplad till tiggeri’ (2017/18:2919) from the Moderate Party state that the number of people begging in Sweden has increased dramatically and that some of them commit crimes in order to support themselves. In the group proposal ‘Ett nationellt förbud mot tiggeri’ (2018/19:2866) the Moderate Party argue for a prohibition of begging with reference to claims that beggars are exploited and that there are criminal networks controlling groups of beggars. In proposal ‘Nationellt förbud mot tiggeri’ (2018/19:2638) the Moderate Party claim that female beggars often are forced to prostitution. As shown by the quotation below, The Sweden Democrats also engage in the construction of begging as a criminal issue.

Organized begging occurs and is intimately associated with human trafficking and other crime (proposal ‘Tiggeriförbud’ 2017/18:3389, S).

Also, in the group proposal ‘Krafttag mot brottsligheten’ (2018/19:133) The Sweden Democrats advocate a prohibition of begging. Further, it is claimed that a ruthless form of human trafficking follow in the tracks of organized begging. Here, organized begging is constructed as a phenomenon giving rise to really serious criminality. In all of these policy proposals, begging as a social problem is represented as intertwined with crime and vulnerable EU-citizens are represented as generators of criminal activity and disturbance of public order. The policy proposals reproduce a discourse where begging, in particular organized begging is connected to other types of crime and therefore should be banned.

In the proposal ‘Brottslighet kopplad till tiggeri’ (2017/18:2919) the influence is made explicit, the MP refers to a newspaper article claiming that criminal actors control the vulnerable people engaged in begging, also they engage in human trafficking and street
related crimes linked to begging. Thus, in this case the media discourse on begging seems to have a direct influence on the political discourse. Further, begging is constructed as an operational area within organized crime as shown in the quote below begging is represented as yet another source of income for criminal gangs.

There are organized gangs of criminals who make money from exploitation of beggars while they also withdraw big money from thefts, drug sales and prostitution (Proposal ‘Motion om att lokalt begränsa tiggeriet på vissa platser’ 2018/19:2970).

Given this construction of begging, the ambition to restrict or even prohibit the phenomena might seem reasonably. The notions of begging as interlinked with criminal activity do not only generate proposed prohibition of begging, in the context of securitization the mobility of the poor is also problematized. In the group proposal ‘Ett nationellt förbud mot tiggeri’ (2018/19:2866) from the Moderate Party the activity of begging is in multiple ways strongly linked to different forms of criminality, hence concluding that begging should be prohibited in Sweden. Further, due to the increased levels of begging, the proposal claims that Sweden's interpretation of the free movement directive needs to be reviewed in order to expose deficiencies in the implementation of the regulation.

The purpose of the right to free movement has never been to allow people to stay for longer periods in other EU-countries without providing for themselves (Proposal 2018/19:2866).

A point is made that the right to free movement within the EU should be conditional on capacity for self-sufficiency, thus the proposal seem to contain a dividing practice where self-sufficient EU-citizens are welcome to reside in any EU country but the poor and vulnerable EU-citizens should stay in their home country. The above quote seems to illustrate an ambition to restrict the right of free movement for the mobile poor. Apart from representing vulnerable EU-citizens as criminals, their mobility is specifically problematized here. As argued by Van Baar (2015) the Romas are constructed as excessively mobile and framed as uncontrollable and thus more inclined to undertake illegal activities. As shown by Dahlstedt et al (2018) the mobile poor is problematized in (SOU 1923:2) and in SOU 1956:43), thus, the tendency to construct the mobility of the poor as a specific social policy problem is by no means a new phenomenon.
In some of the policy proposals the foreigner is explicitly constructed as the problem. The opinion that begging should be criminalized was initially driven solely by the Sweden Democrats. In 2011 they presented a policy proposal ‘Förbud mot tiggeri’ (2011/12:Sf344) primarily problematizing foreign people engaging in begging. The proposal to ban begging only for foreign nationals was motivated by the fact that foreign people engaging in begging constitute an unpleasant feature on the street scene and also they trouble the honourable (Swedish) citizens. Furthermore, all aliens who are caught engaging in begging or under vagrancy shall be deported from the country immediately with a lifetime ban on return. The proposal makes a distinction within in the group beggars between, on the one hand, the foreigners (who according to the proposal should be deported) and on the other hand Swedish citizens with social problems engaging in begging (which society should take care of). The assumptions underlying this dividing practice will be discussed in the next paragraph. The problem representation described above, whereas begging is constructed as a criminal activity appear in most of the policy proposals concerning begging which have been presented in Sweden’s parliament in recent years, thus the securitization discourse seem to have a dominant stand in this policy field. In the following section the assumptions underlying this problem representation will be analysed.

The proposals make a connection between begging and different types of criminal activity, according to van Baar (2015) this link reinforce the representation of the group as a public order and security issue. Thus, vulnerable EU-citizens and begging is constructed as a threat that needs to be controlled. Van Baar (2015) argue that control is exercised through framing of the mobile poor as a security issue, poverty is problematized as a threat to stability within the EU. The attributing of ‘illegality’ to the persons engaged in begging is an obvious part of the processes of securitization. The proposals seem to rest on an underlying assumption that the vulnerable EU citizens constitute a security issue and a threat to stability. Foucault (2008) describe the apparatuses of security as the basic technical mean in the practices of governing the population and Walters (2004) argue that securitization is an important form of governmentality. It seems obvious that the policy proposals targeting begging problematize vulnerable EU-citizens as some kind of threat and security issue, in the process of securitization something seemingly innocent as an outstretched hand seem to be in need of control and criminalization. Thus, the vulnerable EU-citizens are constructed as a threat and a security issue. It may be appropriate to clarify what is considered to be threatened by the outstretched hand, exactly what do we need to secure. Walters and Haahr (2005) refer to ‘apparatuses of security’ as laws, policies and administrative procedures that are developed in order to secure certain economic and social processes.

The proposal ‘Nationellt tiggeriförbud’ (2018/19: 1890) from the Moderate Party describe how the Swedish social model today is challenged by poverty and a new form of exclusion. Thus, it seems to be the Swedish model that needs to be 'secured' from...
the challenge of poverty and a new exclusion. Begging appears here as a manifestation or a symbol of poverty and exclusion and is constructed as a threat to the Swedish social model. Thus, the ban on begging is based on an assumption that the Swedish social model needs protection. The proposal does not specify exactly what is meant by the Swedish model. Probably the Swedish model refers to certain economic processes such as access to welfare benefits and perhaps also to social processes such as the work ethics inherent in the welfare state. As argued by Bauman (1998) the work ethics is a central part of the welfare state’s construct and control and subordination constitutes key features of the work ethics. The moral dimension is strong and wage work is assigned an inherent moral value while the person who is outside the labour market is constructed as morally weak. In the group proposal ‘Bekämpa brott och otrygghet I hela landet’ (2017/18: 3569) the Moderate Party argue that the proposed prohibition of begging should aim specifically at situations when begging has become a form of livelihood, it should still be accepted to ask someone for money when forgetting the wallet at home. In this proposal begging is problematized as an unacceptable model of income. Also in proposal ‘Straffskärpningar’ (2016/17: 2303) from the Sweden Democrats, begging is problematized as an unacceptable form of livelihood, since the alien through begging cannot be assumed to support himself in an honest manner. Furthermore, a distinction is made between, on the one hand, foreigners ‘occupational’ form of begging which should be banned and the begging which Swedish citizens are engaged in which is related to social problems and should continue to be legal. These proposals specifically target the form of begging that could be regarded as occupational, the form of begging where one is suspected of providing for oneself is questioned. Implicitly, the proposals establish a dichotomy between on the one hand the outsider’s livelihood arrangements through begging and on the other hand the insiders morally elevated wage work. A corresponding distinction is also reproduced in the proposal ‘Tiggeriförbud’ (2016/17: 2655) where begging is described as a way to support for oneself that needs to be stopped.

Begging on the streets in Sweden is a way for poor migrants to arrange their livelihood, often coordinated with human trafficking and other crime. The goal must be to eradicate begging (2016/17:2655).

Begging could be seen as an alternative and acceptable way to arrange livelihood and provide for oneself in a context where labour market integration is seemingly impossible. However, in these proposals begging is an activity strictly separated from regular work, instead begging is linked to different types of criminal activities. The construction of begging as a criminal activity, strongly separated from legal income bringing activities contributes to a continued subordination of vulnerable EU-citizens. The primacy of work principle is a fundamental part of the Nordic welfare model and Swärd (2015) believes that the logic of the welfare state, self-responsibility and the obligation to contribute to the common goods might influence our understanding of those who provide themselves
through begging. Thus, work ethics and the inherent logics of the welfare state seem to contain a certain understanding of work that might generate negative assumptions regarding vulnerable EU citizens engaging in begging. Notions from work ethics might nourish the process of securitization and thereby contribute to the problematization of begging as criminal activity and the continued exclusion of vulnerable EU-citizens. Another implicit dichotomy that contribute to position the vulnerable EU-citizen as deviant is made clear in the proposal ‘Nationellt tiggeriförbud’ (2018/19:1890) from the Moderate Party, stating that Sweden should convey a clear signal that begging is an activity that is undignified for humans to engage in, and that it is therefore not accepted in our society. Thus, people engaged in begging are constructed as undignified. According to the proposal this undignified activity is unacceptable in our society, implying that in Sweden we only do dignified things. Further, begging and prostitution should according to proposal ‘Åtgärder mot tiggeri och prostitution’ (2017/18:3879) from the Sweden Democrats be regarded as dishonest ways of providing for oneself and foreign nationals engaged in such activities should be rejected and expelled from Sweden. As mentioned earlier, in the group proposal ‘Ett nationellt förbud mot tiggeri’ (2018/19:2866) from the Moderate Party the fundamental right of free movement (Citizens Rights Directive 2004/38/EC) is questioned. Here the mobility of the poor is problematized through the expression of the idea that when a person for a long time and without the possibility of economic self-sufficiency resides in other EU countries, it constitutes a violation of the original purpose of the fundamental right of free movement. The proposal represents the right of free movement as conditional on economic self-sufficiency. Thus, the proposal seems to rest on an underlying desire to further circumvent the mobility of poor people. The proposal expresses a ‘dividing practice’ where those who cannot provide for themselves is placed in one category and those who are considered to contribute to the economy is placed in another category. In line with Bauman’s (2000) distinction between tourists and vagabonds, the proposal construct a dichotomy, where the EU-citizens who can support themselves are welcomed and those who cannot are positioned as vagabonds, problematic and undesirable. As shown by Foucault (1982:208) people are constructed as subjects through ‘dividing practices’. In this context, the poor EU citizens (who engage in begging and stay for longer periods in other EU countries without providing for themselves) are separated from other EU-citizens. As shown by Walters (2004:249) those who are not considered to have 'contributed' to the social economy are often weeded out from certain social benefits. By the questioning of the free movement regulation, it seems as the ambition is not only to exclude vulnerable EU-citizens from welfare access, but also to prevent them from travelling in the first place. Those who contribute to the economy are welcomed while the poor are problematized as a security issue, a threat and an economic burden. Swärd (2015) describes the dilemmas and conflicts of interest that may arise when rights principles are imposed on each other. In this case the principle of free movement is presented as a problem as it is perceived to be in conflict with, for example, the residents right to security (since begging is presented as a crime generator). Walters & Haahr (2005)
raise the case of EU migration policy and argue that the EU’s treatment of non-EU migrant populations seems to focus on dividing and ruling population and expelling the unwanted. The analysis of group proposal ‘Ett nationellt förbud mot tiggeri’ (2018/19:2866) provide indications that similar ambitions of dividing, ruling and expelling unwanted populations seems to be at work also in policies concerning EU-citizens. The ambition seems to be to expel those EU citizens who are defined as undesirable from a market economy perspective.

As described earlier, the foreigner is constructed as a problem. Foreign people engaging in begging is continually attributed with characteristics such as undignified and dishonesty. Thus the underlying assumptions forming the problematization of begging as a security issue can be linked to a logic where begging as a social problem is related to deficiencies in individuals rather than to a structural context and political shortcomings. Thus, it is not far-fetched to relate this construction of begging as undignified and dishonest to Levitas (2005) morality underclass discourse (MUD), where poverty is explained by the fact that the poor simply lack morality. Esping-Andersen (1990; 23) state that to a certain extent society is defined by the way policies problematize poverty and formulate certain solutions. In the policy proposal representing begging as undignified (2018/19:1890) and dishonest (2017/18:3879) the suggested solution is repressive measures targeting poor people. According to Swärd et al. (2013) this is not the best solution, instead social reforms and strengthening of social rights is regarded to have the best effect. Thus, thus the problematization of begging (and poverty) as undignified or dishonest can probably be seen as a defining feature of a society which in a sense do not do anything at all in order to combat poverty and inequality.

When begging is constructed as undignified and associated with criminal activity, the vulnerable EU-citizens engaging in begging come to be perceived as deviants in relation to the norm. As argued by Tilly (2000) the deviant other are defined in contrast to the norm, the othering of the vulnerable group is described as a ritual that are continually cemented in legitimizing myths that contribute to uphold difference and inequality between groups. In the case of vulnerable EU citizens, the attribution of characteristics such as undignified and dishonest can be linked to a long history of antiziganism. Engebrigtsen (2012) believes that these kind of negative stereotypes constitute building blocks in the construction of begging as a deviant activity. When the securitization of begging and vulnerable EU citizens is analysed, it is not possible to ignore the fact that a large part of this group consists of people defined as or defining themselves as Romas. It is necessary to take into account the permanent structure of hostile notions directed towards Romas throughout history and today (SOU 2010:55). Engebrigtsen (2017) argue that in a European context the Romas are the primary representative of "wandering threats", challenging the order of things and threatening the state stability. However, in this context, it should be noted that all vulnerable EU citizens do not define
themselves as Romas, and as Kostka (2018) emphasizes, it is important to highlight that repressive measures are used for other impoverished groups, thus the greater trend towards repressive policy towards poor people in general should not be neglected.

Previously, the problematization and distinction between non-nationals and nationals in proposal ‘Förbud mot tiggeri’ (2011/12:Sf344) was described. Begging is constructed as a crime and a security issue when the outstretched hand belongs to a foreigner, and as a social welfare issue if the person engaging in begging is a Swedish national. As shown by Foucault (1982; 208) people are constructed as subjects in our culture through ‘dividing practices’. Through the construction of dichotomies such as ‘the criminal’ and ‘the good boys’ subjects are categorized and separated from each other. The kernel in the proposal (2011/12:Sf344) is the problematization of the foreigner, the prohibition of begging should only cover non-nationals, thus it seems as it is the alien itself that is regarded as the problem, rather than the activity of begging. The foreign beggar is problematized as an unpleasant feature and a troublemaker while the Swedish citizen instead is attributed with the epithet honourable (2011/12:Sf344).

A distinction should be made between the kinds of begging [...] which has increased in recent years and is made up of foreigners, occupational beggars and the like, compared to the begging that is possibly carried out occasionally by Swedes with alcohol problems or the like. I believe that society should take care of its own citizens who cannot be considered to be engaged in occupational begging. However, we should be very clear that other (foreign) beggars should immediately be rejected from the country with a lifetime ban on returning (2011/12:Sf344).

The policy proposal makes a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, foreigners who are begging and who should be severely punished and, on the other hand, Swedish citizens who engage in begging and where the Swedish welfare society should offer its support. Evidently, this policy proposal suggests that social rights should be reserved for Swedish citizens. Further, non-citizens do not only lack rights they should also be punished. In a context where a large proportion of the people who according to this proposal should be punished and deported are Romas, it is not farfetched to assume that antiziganism and stereotypes regarding Romas have influenced this policy proposal. The proposal obviously discriminates against people based on citizenship, and in this context where the majority of the category, non-citizens, that should be punished are Romas, presumably elements of antiziganism play a crucial role in the dividing practice. Both Hammarberg (2017) and Engebrigtsen (2012) mean that Antiziganism and myths about Roma occur in the context of vulnerable EU citizens and policies regarding begging. The alien who beg is attributed illegality while the Swedish citizen who begs is considered legal and deserving of welfare efforts. The establishment of this dichotomy shapes our understanding of the issue and
contribute to exclude the Romas. The proposal can be seen as a part of a political mobilization against Romas and the expression of state violence in the form of rapid deportations with lifetime ban on return can be understood as a manifestation of the permanent latent structure that antiziganism constitute. Walter & Haahr (2005) raise the case of EU migration policy and argue that the EU’s treatment of non-EU migrant populations seems to be focused on dividing and ruling population and expelling the unwanted. The analysis of these policy proposal provide indications that similar ambitions of dividing, ruling and expelling unwanted populations seems to be at work also in policies concerning EU-citizens. The ambition seems to be to expel those EU citizens who are defined as undesirable.

As shown above, the problem representation of vulnerable EU-citizens and begging is influenced by the process of securitization. Securitization is identified as governmentality embedded in the policy proposals targeting begging. Thus, vulnerable EU-citizens and begging is constructed as a security issue, which generate a specific understanding of the issue in which EU-citizens engaged in begging are constructed in a category associated with crime and separated from the social norm. Further, the assumptions underpinning the securitization process is related to personal deficiencies such as dishonesty and indignity. As a consequence other understandings of the issue are silenced.

By constructing people engaged in begging as part of a criminal context, political responsibility to support this group is hidden and overshadowed by demands to punish this group. The proposals ignore the structural perspective and issues such as combating of poverty and anti-discrimination efforts is surrounded by a complete silence. Also, the role of market liberalism as a cause of poverty and global inequality, thus forming a push factor for the poor people in EU, is left unproblematic in this problem representation.

In order to counteract the development of myths where vulnerable EU-citizens are linked to criminal activity it is necessary to re-code begging and establish an understanding of begging as a social issue and an expression of poverty. Further, a sharp distinction should be made between on the one hand begging as a separate social issue and on the other hand different crimes that might arise in relation to the occurrence of begging. Many of the crimes that people who beg are associated with, such as human trafficking, are with good reason already criminalized. As argued by Van Baar (2015; 9) a successful ‘de-securitization’ requires another problem representation. In order to succeed with a ‘de-securitization’ vulnerable EU-citizens who engage in begging must be represented in another way, for instance in terms of human rights.

The problem representations within the securitization process give rise to different kinds of effects. The discursive effects relate to the regulation of what can be thought and said. Foucault (1993) uses the term discourse to denote the entire practice
that produces a particular type of statements that produce a certain meaning or knowledge. The policy proposal analysed above is characterized by securitization and dividing practises were the vulnerable EU-citizen engaging in begging is constructed more or less as a criminal. The problem representations contain certain statements that produce meaning or knowledge generating discursive effects. The vast majority of the reviewed proposals are strongly characterized by securitization, which create discursive effects where vulnerable EU citizens and poor people are considered to be criminals, hence there is a tendency to think and talk about poor people as deviant outsiders with a tendency to commit crimes. As a consequence, it is increasingly difficult to speak and think about vulnerable EU citizens and begging from a humanitarian rights-based perspective. Further, the subjectification effects of the policy relate to the ways subjects are constituted in discourse (Bacchi, 2009). One subjectification effect of the policy proposal relate to the way vulnerable EU-citizens are positioned as subjects involved in criminal activities. By attributing illegality to the vulnerable EU-citizens they are stigmatized and positioned as deviant outsiders. By the use of dichotomies, such as dignified and undignified, the policy proposals signal what is regarded as desired and undesired behaviour. Further, people engaged in begging are positioned as having a destructive lifestyle, which contributes to maintaining poverty and enhancing exclusion.

We also need to ensure that those who are in Sweden to beg, break with their destructive lifestyle and the patterns that maintain their vulnerability (Proposal ‘Motion om att lokalt begränsa tiggeriet på vissa platser’ 2018/19: 2970).

This proposal seems to be based on an understanding of poverty as a self-inflected problem, the destructive lifestyle is supposed to generate vulnerability. This understanding of the problem can be related to Levitas (2005) MUD discourse, where poverty is explained by the lack of moral character among poor people. Thus, this proposal establishes subjectification effects where the vulnerable EU-citizens in accordance with a neoliberal logic are attributed with own responsibility for their exclusion and poverty. In proposal ‘Nationellt förbud mot tiggeri’ (2018/19:2638) the engagement in begging is constructed as an activity that contributes to lock people into poverty.

Begging in other countries is not a solution to poverty, but rather it reinforces an exclusion (Proposal ‘Förbjud tiggeri’ 2017/18: 1425).

By explaining the predicament – poverty and exclusion – as an effect of begging and a destructive lifestyle, the moral responsibility is placed with the vulnerable EU-citizens, thus disclaims us all from political responsibility. Finally, the problem representations of the policy also generate lived effects. The material impact of the problem representations

48
relate to the actual influence on the living conditions of the group vulnerable EU citizens. Through the subordination of a rights-based discourse and by the lack of political ambition to combat structures that create social injustice, the lived effects tend to be characterized by continued exposure and exploitation. Further, if repressive policies such as a prohibition of begging would be implemented the right to free movement would likely be undermined. As argued by Yildiz and De Genova (2018) there are elements of control and socio-political un-freedom within the European citizenship that regulate the right to mobility for Romas and other EU-citizens living in poverty. The process of securitization, and the construction of vulnerable EU-citizens as more or less criminal are likely to make it difficult for this group of people to move freely within the EU.

6.2.2 The Social Rights Position

In the review of policy proposals relating to the issue of vulnerable EU-citizens and begging a vast majority take the securitization position described above. However, there are exceptions, a few proposal challenge the problematizations that frame begging as a security issue and take a humanitarian position stressing the importance of fundamental political, civil and social rights for vulnerable EU-citizens. In proposal ‘Hemlösa EU-medborgare som tvingas tigga’ (2017/18:2784) MPs representing The Swedish Green Party comment on the proposed ban on begging as a starting point and rejects it, arguing that it would exacerbate the vulnerability of those concerned. The group proposal ‘Närodlad integration’ (2015/16:3245) from the Centre Party also use the ban on begging and the problematizations featured in the securitization discourse as an offset for a reasoning that instead highlights the importance of social rights. These proposals can be seen as a response to the proposals characterized by securitization described above. The reactive approach indicates that the policy proposals permeated by securitization seem to hold a hegemonic position in the political discourse and also seem to have the problem formulation privilege. Foucault (1993) describes ‘the comment’ as a mechanism that contributes to produce a hierarchy between statements within the discourse. When proposals influenced by humanitarian thought refer to proposals characterized by securitization a hierarchical relation, where proposals marked by humanitarian concerns is subordinated, is established.

In proposal ‘Hemlösa EU medborgare som tvingas tigga’ (2017/18:2784) begging as a social problem is represented as a denial of fundamental rights. The MPs representing the Swedish Green Party, argue that attitudes based on antiziganism have led to discrimination and marginalisation of Romas. Further, they argue that negative sentiments towards Romas have been institutionalized in policies, leading to the denying of their basic human rights and therefore they end up in a situation resembling of statelessness. In the group proposals ‘Närodlad integration’ (2015/16:3245) from the Centre Party and ‘Gemensamt mål för fattigdomsbekämpning inom EU’ (2014/15:2158)
from the Social Democratic Party begging as a social problem is related to the widespread poverty within EU. Poverty, inequality and discrimination are described as the reasons why people are forced to leave their home countries. The issue of begging and vulnerable EU-citizens is in these proposals framed as a social rights issue.

In these proposals begging as a social problem is understood as an expression of widespread poverty. An initial observation is that the target group of these policy proposals are consistently referred to as humans and/or EU-citizens and are recurrently attributed to social or human rights. Thus, there is an evident difference in relation to the representation within the securitization discourse where the target group is described as, for example, beggars (proposal 2017/18: 886) or as poor migrants (proposal 2016/17: 2655). As argued by Chatty (2015), the rewriting of a group of people as migrants or beggars imply a disconnection from their actual rights as EU-citizens. This difference is important, as the different subject positions imply different understandings of begging as a social problem. In proposals ‘Hemlösa EU medborgare som tvingas tigga’ (2017/18: 2784) and ‘Närodlad integration’ (2015/16:3245) the discrimination of Romas is emphasized as a variable that contribute to the vulnerability of the target group. Thus, these proposals seem to rest on the assumption that antiziganism play a crucial role in the development of policies targeting vulnerable EU-citizens. In these proposals, discrimination against Romas is presented as a cause of poverty and vulnerability. As argued by Hammarberg (2017) antiziganism forms the basis of a systematic discrimination that reinforces exclusion and poverty and Engebrigtsen (2012) expose that stereotypes and myths regarding Romas are activated in polices targeting vulnerable EU-citizens. Linked with the assumption of antiziganism as a racist discriminatory structure, the proposal ‘Hemlösa EU medborgare som tvingas tigga’ (2017/18: 2784) seem to be based on the assumption that human rights should be taken into account in the formulation of policy. Since denial of fundamental rights is represented as the basis of the problem, human rights are also defined as the answer.

The Swedish Green Party stand up for the safeguarding of human rights for everyone in Sweden and in Europe. This applies when we pursue policies in the EU because countries such as Romania are forced to live up to human rights requirements, and this applies when the consequences of poverty and racism appear on our own streets (2017/18:2784).

The assumption underlying this proposal is that human rights is not only applicable in policies on vulnerable EU-citizens and begging, it’s the actual solution. When Human rights is applied in a policy proposal the dichotomies (criminal – good boys, non-citizen – citizen, undignified – dignified) prevalent within the securitization discourse between outsider – insider, etc. seem to weaken. The underlying idea is that everyone should be included and get their rights met. Further, the proposal ‘Hemlösa EU medborgare som tvingas tigga (2017/18:2784) the vulnerable EU-citizens are described as practically
stateless, due to the fact that their civil rights are not being met in their home countries. Arendt (1951) highlight the contradictions between on the one hand state sovereignty and particular rights based on citizenship and on the other hand the universal human rights, based on an analysis of statelessness Arendt argue that human rights only can be realized through civil rights, where, as a citizen, one can assert his rights claims against a specific state. According to policy proposal ‘Hemlösa EU medborgare som tvingas tigga’ (2017/18:2784) the vulnerable EU-citizens lack the possibility to exercise their civil rights and interpreted from Arendt’s perspective it is almost impossible for them to enjoy basic human rights. Arendt (2017) strives to counteract this lack of rights by giving the human rights a new foundation - 'the right to rights'. According to Arendt, this fundamental right to rights is the right of every person to belong a political community (Arendt, 2017). The ambition in proposal (2017/18/2784) seems to be that the EU should be given the opportunity to sanctions against individual member states that do not respect human rights for their citizens.

We generally want to strengthen the work for human rights within the EU. We look at how the EU can get more and stronger tools for sanctions against a member country that violates basic demands for democracy, respect for human rights and protection of minorities. These may include tools such as imposing fines, invalidating discriminatory legislation, or facilitating the temporary suspension of voting rights in the EU (Proposal ‘Hemlösa EU medborgare som tvingas tigga’ 2017/18:2784).

Also, proposal ‘Närodlad integration’ (2015/16:3245) highlight that EU has a crucial role to play in the procurement of social rights and therefore argue that EU should be equipped with authority to implement sanctions against countries that engage in structural discrimination or fail to act on widespread poverty. Arendt (2017: 94) argues that the materialization of human rights can only take place within a given political context and that the fundamental right to have rights can only be ensured by international courtesy (2017: 94f). Thus, there is a need for courtesy from the individual state in order for human rights to be realized. But, if, in line with this proposal, a supranational actor like the EU is given an extended toolbox to ensure that individual member states respect human rights, the possibility of human rights influencing policies for the most vulnerable EU-citizens might increase. If this proposal would be realized, the EU could function as the political context, described by Arendt (2017), in which human rights are materialized for the most vulnerable EU citizens. However, as argued by Yildiz and De Genova (2018) there is an inherent un-freedom and elements of control within the European citizenship that regulates and restricts social rights, which mainly affects the most vulnerable EU citizens. Thus, human rights issues seem to be placed in the backseat in European citizenship project and policy proposals that strive to safeguard human rights for all EU-citizens by giving the task of ensuring these rights to the EU can be perceived as naive. However,
proposals that highlight the importance of social rights and human rights for all can be seen as part of a struggle that give rise to what Benhabib (2014) calls ‘democratic iterations’.

Policy proposal ‘Hemlösa EU medborgare som tvingas tigga’ (2017/18:2784) is characterized by inclusionary ideals and formulate guidelines that imply an expanded responsibility for Sweden to provide social welfare for vulnerable EU-citizens residing in Sweden. One objection that can be directed against this policy proposal is that the boundaries and scope of the nationally organized and financed welfare are left un-problematised. As described by Esping-Andersen (1990) the social democratic welfare regime established a strong link between work and welfare in order to finance a well-developed and solidaristic welfare system. The high level of welfare require that a vast majority of the population is engaged in wage-work and thereby contribute to the common good, systematic revenues is needed to uphold a solidaristic and universalistic welfare regime. This contributes to establish a notion of wage-work as an implicit condition for welfare access. The legitimacy of the system is based on the idea that everyone who can contribute must contribute to the common. In light of that ideal, the inclusionary ideas of the policy proposals adopting a social rights approach might be difficult to implement, especially in times when the opinion is characterized by nationalistic tendencies.

According to Zelano (2018) welfare regimes with a high level of distribution tend to have a stronger solidarity among insiders and the distinction between insider and outsider is particularly evident in this context. Thus, vulnerable EU-citizens who engage in begging contribute to expose the inherent tension in the social democratic welfare regime, the strive for solidarity is expressed but at the same time the emphasis on insider privilege and excluding tendencies based on nationalism is strong. The good intentions within the social rights position cannot be missed, but the difficulties in implementing social benefits in Sweden also for vulnerable EU citizens when the political discourse is so marked by securitization and when the welfare state seem to have an inherent division between insider and outsider are unfortunately left un-problematised. In order for the social rights position to gain success, possibly, the relatively abstract statements about human rights should be supplemented with discussion on implementation possibilities where the difficulties relating to nationalistic tendencies within the social democratic welfare state are problematised. Also, the subjectification of vulnerable EU-citizens within the securitization discourse, where they are constructed as burdens should be addressed and questioned. In particular, the contradiction, highlighted by Arendt (1951) between, on the one hand, particular social rights based on citizenship and on the other hand universal human rights needs to be addressed. In the case of vulnerable EU-citizens engaged in begging in Sweden the hierarchy between citizens and non-citizens is evident. In order to break down the hierarchy, the solution proposed by Arendt needs to be further elaborated. In the new foundation for human rights – ‘the right to rights’ Arendt’s ambition was to make it possible also for stateless people to assert their rights claims to a specific political
community. Policies that strive to abolish the division between citizen and non-citizen should in a more precise manner define how the social/human rights for vulnerable EU-citizens should be asserted when the political discourse seem to uphold and reinforce the dichotomy between citizen and non-citizen. Policies on begging seem to place vulnerable EU-citizens in the non-citizen category. However, the proposals representing begging as a question of social rights can also be interpreted in a more positive way. On the basis of the reasoning of Benhabib (2014) they can be defined as ‘democratic iterations’, by highlighting the nation state as an important player in ensuring respect for human rights they contribute to elevate the position of the human rights approach. Although these proposals do not seem to generate any direct solution for the vulnerable EU citizens engaged in begging, their problematizations might contribute to defending a moral and legal cosmopolitanism, where every human being is given the right to basic human rights. As argued by Benhabib (2014) statements that emphasize the idea that nation states through signing of human rights treaties bind their regulation and legislation to international commitments can mobilize political opinion on human rights issues. In the long run, statements highlighting human rights issues, might contribute to improve the situation for the vulnerable EU citizens engaged in begging.

In the following, the effects that might be produced by the problem representation within in the social rights position are discussed. The discursive effect relate to the regulation of what can be thought and said about vulnerable EU-citizens and begging. In the policy proposals that frame vulnerable EU-citizens and begging as a social rights issue vulnerability is represented as an effect of discrimination and poverty and begging is defined as;

[...] a desperate attempt to support themselves and their families, who often remain in their home country and live far below the subsistence level (Proposal 2017/18:2784)

In proposal (2015/16:3245) the widespread poverty in Europe is described as the primary cause behind the phenomenon of begging, and the reason for people to leave their home countries. The analysis of the economic system that generates the widespread poverty is omitted. The political reason embedded in this policy proposal seems to be based on a rationality where human rights are introduced as a solution to the poverty issue. In line with the logics underpinning this discourse we learn to think and talk about vulnerable EU citizens as individuals who simply lack rights.

In terms of subjectification effects, vulnerable EU citizens are in these policy proposals represented as victims of discrimination and poverty. According to Nagel (2007), this humanitarian position can be problematic in that it might contain elements of paternalism. Furthermore, in these policy proposals, the dividing practice between
vulnerable EU citizens and, on the other hand, Swedish citizens in need of social welfare is implicitly maintained. By creating a specific policy for this group that differs decisively from social policy for Swedish citizens, vulnerable EU citizens are as subjects still constituted as outsiders. In proposal 'Närodlad integration' (2015/16:3245) the division is upheld by the introduction of civil society as an important player in assisting the vulnerable EU-citizens, by this construction social support is conditional on whether there are people who engage in non-profit organizations to help these people, this signals that access to Swedish welfare systems remain reserved for Swedish citizens. Since the policy proposals that highlight the importance of social rights also contribute to reproduce the division between citizens and non-citizens, the social rights position does not seem to fully improve the living conditions of the targeted group.

6.3 The case of Vellinge municipality

The case of Vellinge municipality can be seen as an effect of the political discourse on begging on the national level. As shown in the analysis of the state public report (SOU 2016:6) above, begging is problematized based on a notions of welfare nationalism and constructions where responsibility is individualized and the person engaged in begging in many cases in positioned as a criminal. Further, an explicit aim with the report (SOU 2016:6) is to produce policy recommendations for the municipalities. One assumption in this thesis is that the national level and the municipal level interact in production and dissemination of discourses. Thus, Vellinge should not be seen as merely an effect of national policies. What makes the case of Vellinge interesting and relevant as it is used as a pretext for prohibition of begging on the national level for instance in the group proposal 'Ett nationellt förbud mot tiggeri' (2018/19: 2866) from the Moderate Party. Furthermore, policies targeting begging within a municipality seem to influence policies, positions and decision-making in other municipalities. As shown by Nagel (2007), local disputes and negotiations regarding begging are characterized by compromises where the social rights issues tend to get overshadowed by the desire to maintain good cooperation between different actors within the local community. According to Nagel (2007) there is a 'municipal elite' that produce policies that control and define what will be sanctioned as deviant behaviour. Presumably, the process of prohibition of begging in Vellinge have a great impact on constructions of begging in other municipalities (Åsgård, 2019), in this case the 'begging issue' is governed by relatively few people in a very small municipality. The main reason for including Vellinge in the analysis is that the problem representations of begging made here seem to spill-over and influence other municipalities, thus policy-making on municipal level seem to play a crucial role in the production and dissemination of discourse on begging.
6.3.1 Interference with the local order

In 2017, The City Council of Vellinge municipality adopted local order regulations where ‘passive money collection’ (begging) is prohibited in certain areas of the municipality, in order to maintain public order in public places. A local order regulation is a specific addition to the Order Act (1993:1617), the purpose with the Order Act is to secure order and security in public spaces. Thus, the problematization of begging revolves around the issue of local order. However, when the local order regulations is tried by the County Administrative Board of Skåne in 2017, case no: 213-25584-17, the Administrative Court in 2017, case no: 12327-17 and the Administrative Court of Appeal in 2018, case no: 754-18 the municipality is denied the right to prohibit begging on the grounds that it has not been shown that passive money collection (begging) interfere with the public order, so the municipality appeals to the Supreme Administrative Court. In December 2018 the Supreme Administrative Court case no: 2149-18 granted the municipality the right to prohibit begging in certain places within the municipality. The primary argument is that a municipality should not be required to demonstrate that actual disturbance or interference with local order has occurred in order to implement local order regulations. Thus, the municipality has the opportunity to proactively decide on local order regulations on issues that possibly could imply disturbance.

In the juridical process the municipality continuously represent begging as a social problem interfering with local order. In the appeal to the Administrative Court (case no: 12327-17) the municipality reinforce the problem representation with reference to incoming complaints from individual municipal citizens, stating that people engaged in passive money collection cause disturbance of public order and create a sense of insecurity. [...] money collectors are constantly staying in direct connection with in and outlets at stores, the collection of money takes place continuously, thus causes disturbance such as repeated urination and littering in the public space, which result in municipal members feeling discomfort when visiting the grocery store (Administrative Court, case no: 12327-17).

In the municipality the people who collect money are represented as a threat to the local order. In this problematization the act of collecting money is linked to different types of undesired behaviour. In this case, littering and urination in public space, as noted by the Administrative Court (case no: 12327-17) littering is already regulated by the Swedish Environmental Code and urination in the public space falls under the crime classification disorderly conduct. The persons that engage in begging in Vellinge municipality are attributed with undesirable properties and behaviours. However, the municipality has difficulty in presenting that passive money collection in itself generates inconveniences or disturbance to the public order. Further, the municipality argue that since passive money
collection evidently does not help people out of poverty, they state that the freedom to collect money should be given less weight than the municipality member’s sense of insecurity in a proportionality assessment (A C, case no: 12327-17). The municipality constructs an image that passive money collection does not solve the poverty problem and that a broad opinion within the municipality perceive begging as an interference with public order.

In the municipality, vulnerable EU citizens are constructed as an order problem and people who are engaged in begging are primarily positioned as people who litter and create insecurity. The arguments seem to be vague and it is unclear exactly how the local order is compromised by someone sitting outside the grocery store. However, based on the reasoning by the Supreme Administrative Court, a municipality never need to introduce any support to claim that some phenomena give rise to a disturbance of public order. Thus, the Supreme administrative Court interprets the Order Act (1993) in a way that gives the municipalities a great leeway with regards to introducing local order regulations. Based on the principle of municipal self-government, The Supreme Administrative Court argue for the value of the municipalities being given a larger authority in deciding for themselves what should be regulated through prohibitions in order to maintain public order. The Supreme Administrative Court argue that, according to the Order Act (1993), there is no support for demanding proof from the municipality that certain things is actually causing disturbance and interference to public order.

In Vellinge, the people engaged in begging are constructed as a threat to public order and are linked to undesired and criminal behaviour such as littering and urination. As, argued by Swärd (2015) this kind of problematization, focusing on the level of perceived safety in the streets for the members of the municipalities, tend to result in repressive policies such as prohibition. The case of Vellinge illustrate that the problem representations of begging at the municipality level is made within the framework of ‘the Order Act’, thus the problem representation seem to be even more one-dimensional than on national level. Also, the representation of begging as an order problem is in this case manifested and reinforced through the legal institutions. Begging is constructed as solely an issue of public order completely disconnected from other dimensions such as social rights issues. At municipal level the rights perspective is totally silenced, and so seems to be the case also in the Supreme Administrative Court. As argued by Kostka (2018) policies focused on criminalization of migrants living in visible poverty is used to appease a public opinion characterized by insecurities, also these policies draw the attention from the state responsibilities to uphold human rights for its residents. The ruling in the Supreme Administrative Court, has given rise to a situation where municipalities are given a mandate to make decisions that entail an extreme level of social control without taking into account the social rights of individuals. When begging is constructed solely as a matter of public order, issues of equality, poverty and social rights tend to be shadowed. The legal process and the prohibition of begging in Vellinge municipality illustrate how discourses
intersect with other elements, such as administrative processes and laws, described by Walters & Haahr (2005) as ‘apparatus of security’.

In this case the issue of begging is governed by relatively few people in a very small municipality and their construction of begging as an order problem seems to be reinforced through the legal process and the verdict in the Supreme Administrative Court. As argued by Benhabib (2014) courts are through their legal interpretations a primary place for norm iterations. When the governing of begging take place on the municipal level there seem to be a tendency to disconnect the issue of begging from elements such as poverty, discrimination and social rights. In Vellinge begging is represented as solely an order problem, by support of the Supreme Administrative Court, it is made possible for other municipalities to follow Vellinge and reproduce a one-dimensional problem representation of Begging. Evidently, the issue of begging seem to be reduced to an order problem when governed at municipal level, this is problematic, as begging as an issue lose its social dimension, further it draws attention from the state responsibility to secure social rights.

**Discussion**

As shown in the analysis begging as a social problem is represented in many different ways. However, within the policies analysed it is possible to distinguish some common features that are of relevance in the construction of begging as a social problem. The political discourse on begging seem to be governed by certain rationalities that frame begging as a security issue and position the person begging as a criminal. Another central dimension in the analysed policies is the exclusionary tendencies within the Swedish Welfare state and the dividing practices establishing a hierarchical relation between the deserving Swedish citizens and the undeserving non-citizens. When the mobility of the vulnerable EU-citizens is problematized, the elements of antiziganism seem to have an influence on policies. Further, a neoliberal logic seems to underpin the tendency to place the responsibility with the individual, thus neglecting the political responsibility and the structural causes. Also, the case of Vellinge illustrate that when this issue is governed on municipal level the problem representations tend to reduce the issue of begging to solely a question of local order. The Securitization and the welfare-nationalism within these policies is evident and the effects seem to be continued exclusion and in some aspects probably a worsened situation for the vulnerable EU-citizens. The problematizations of begging mainly focus on the level of perceived order, safety and security for Swedish citizens, increased costs for the welfare system, decay and criminality which imply that the understanding of begging’ as an expression of poverty becomes shadowed. As mentioned by Swärd (2015) in research on the issue of begging, begging is often defined as an effect of
homelessness and social exclusion, this thesis adhere to that view. When begging is understood as merely an expression of poverty, the restrictive measures that characterize the political discourse on begging can be interpreted as a quiet brutal form of politics directed towards people who live in poverty. With incisive words, one could describe it as a war on the ‘poor’. As argued by Kostka (2018) it’s important to identify the greater trend towards a repressive policy towards poor people in general. Clearly, Kostka have a point, however, based on the findings in this thesis it’s particularly the mobile poor that are victimized when policies are permeated by securitization, neo-liberal logic and nationalistic tendencies. The treatment of people who are both poor and mobile seems to be particularly harsh. The mobility of these people seems to raise questions regarding responsibility that many seem reluctant to answer. The cross-border mobility seems to challenge the nationally organized welfare. Unclear responsibilities make liability claims difficult and leads to what Swärd (2015) describe as intractable or "Wicked" problems, thus begging might come to be perceived as an issue difficult to master. When governing, as in this case, take place at different levels, when several countries are involved and when many organizations and authorities are activated by the problem, there is an impending risk that the problem will be perceived as resistant to solutions. The general attitude in Swedish policy is to ignore political responsibility and as a solution construct the vulnerable EU-citizens as active independent actors with obligations (SOU 2016:6; 90) or argue that the home country should solve the situation. The case of Vellinge illustrate that the question of political responsibility for vulnerable EU-citizens is not even on the table at municipal level. The unwillingness to take political responsibility is conspicuous. The mobility of the vulnerable EU-citizens seems to create a great uncertainty regarding the positioning of responsibility. However, the Swedish society seems to react on instinct when it comes to defining non-citizens as undeserving of Swedish welfare, thus escaping a responsibility. As argued by Barker (2017) the measures used against this group can be related to exclusionary tendencies inherent in the Swedish welfare state, by marking that its use is strictly reserved for its citizens, the welfare state is perceived as protected from erosion. This perceived fear of erosion could of course be understood as a part of the securitization process.

This thesis leans on an emancipatory knowledge interest. Thus, the exposure of the securitization process and the exclusionary tendencies within the Swedish welfare state have a certain value, it gives an opportunity to discuss other possible ways of framing this issue. By questioning the dominant problem representations it might be possible to replace them with problem representations that instead could enable human emancipation. By instead situating the issue of begging in a structural context, relating it to market structures and inequality or as a human rights issue the concept of securitization can be denaturalized. As argued by Walters and Haahr (2005) when making a certain form of governing less familiar it will be possible to engage in other forms of reasoning and action. In order to expose potential forms of reasoning and action and put the hegemonic
form of governing into perspective two of perspectives silenced in the analysed policies will be discussed.

As pointed out by Swärd (2015), if begging as an issue instead was defined as a structural problem, than the political solutions would rather be social reforms for poverty reduction and anti-discrimination, which according to Swärd et al (2013) is obviously what has the greatest effect on improved living conditions for the most vulnerable people. Based on Levitas (2005) proposed discourses of poverty, it seems obvious that the policies on vulnerable EU citizens and begging seem to be based on the moral underclass discourse (MUD), poverty is assumed to be due to moral deficiencies in the individual and begging is problematized as an unworthy activity. If the issue of begging instead were placed in a structural context and poverty were understood in accordance with the redistribution discourse (RED), poverty would be seen as a cause of market structures that generate an unequal distribution of financial means. When begging is understood as an effect of poverty which in turn is defined as an effect of economic injustice, policies on begging would get a completely different character. Instead of constructing vulnerable EU citizens as threats, policies would instead be characterized by reasoning revolving equal distribution and the configuration of the labour and housing market. Hansson (2019) argues that the political deadlock regarding the housing and labour market is a reason behind Swedish Authorities denial of social support to EU migrants. When begging is understood as an effect of poverty within global capitalism the exclusionary tendencies in labour and housing market can be questioned. By placing the issue of begging in relation to the underlying economic structures that regulate access to social rights it is constructed as a political issue rather than as an individual problem. When begging is understood as a political issue it might be possible to implement social reforms that can improve the living conditions for vulnerable EU citizens and other poor people, thus enable human emancipation.

Apart from a few policy proposals, the human rights approach is consequently subordinated and silenced in the political discourse on begging. Human rights considerations is actively rejected in the Public State Report (SOU 2016:16; 54), far-reaching interpretations of the scope of human rights are dismissed. Human rights issues occupy a subordinate position within the report, despite the fact that the importance of human rights considerations was particularly emphasized in the directive from the government. According to the Committee Directive (2015:9) the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the UN Convention on the right of the child should be taken into account in the work of the coordinator, however in the final report the human right issues are dismissed. When discussing alternative ways to frame the issue of vulnerable EU-citizens engaged in begging, it’s worth highlighting that human rights considerations initially was defined as a priority. For some reason, the final report has found reason to communicate another message (where human rights are dismissed); this might be due to changes in the public opinion on the issue. The analysis of
policy proposals shows a clear tendency where restrictive measures and prohibition have come to dominate the discursive field. The Political communication in the policies on begging can be seen as a reflection of a general tendency in the political community, where nationalistic ideas seem to gain ground. However hypothetically, if begging as a social issue would be tackled on the basis of a human rights perspective, the living conditions of the vulnerable EU-citizens might improve. Arendt (2017) argue that human rights only can be realized through civil rights, where as a citizen one can assert rights claims against a specific state. Ideally, the vulnerable EU-citizens should be able to assert their rights claims against their home country. When human rights, due to discrimination, do not get materialized in the country of origin, other options must be considered. As proposed in ‘Hemlösa EU medborgare som tvingas tigga’ (2017/18:2784) EU could be given a greater toolbox to ensure that individual member states respect human rights. According to Swärd (2015) there are provisions in the EU constitution which aim to ensure that member states ensure economic safety for all EU-citizens, as shown in the analysis and by Mäkinen (2013), unfortunately neither home country nor recipient country live up to the provision to guarantee economic safety for Romas travelling between different parts of Europe.

Benhabib (2014) assign a great responsibility to the sovereign states, arguing that when sovereign states sign human rights treaties they bind their own legislation and their regulations to international commitments. If Sweden in this case took hold of this commitment, human rights issues would be upgraded. If a rights based approach would be implemented, Sweden could function as the political context where civil rights could be exercised and as a consequence the human rights of vulnerable EU-citizens could be materialized. The possibility of realizing such a solution ought to be discussed in relation to the social democratic welfare regime. As described earlier the Swedish social democratic welfare regime contain tensions between on the one hand aspirations for equality and solidarity and on the other hand an emphasize on insider’s privilege and excluding tendencies based on nationalism (Zelano, 2018). As argued by Barker (2017) the exclusionary tendencies of the welfare state can be understood as a way to protect the welfare state from erosion. The fear of erosion must be taken into account, however in this case it can be dismissed as unreasonable as the number of vulnerable EU citizens residing in Sweden is relatively few. The balance between inclusion and exclusion in the Swedish welfare state is under constant renegotiation and the level of solidarity with ‘outsiders’ vary over time. As shown in this thesis the policies targeting begging make a sharp distinction between insider (Swedish citizens) and outsiders (Vulnerable EU-citizens), however this situation might change. Benhabib (2014) argue that international human rights instrument has created a normative space where a struggle for an upgrading of human rights can take place, through ‘democratic norm iterations’ the current problem representations can be challenged and replaced by problematizations that highlight political responsibility and human rights. In conclusion, if vulnerable EU citizens and begging instead would be problematized in relation to oppressive structures and human
rights considerations, then fundamental political, civil and social rights would be accessible also for poor people.
References


Citizens' Rights Directive 2004/38 / EC

Committee directive 2015:9, National coordinator for work with vulnerable EEA citizens who are staying temporarily in Sweden


Ds 2014:8, Den mörka och okända historien, Vitbok om övergrepp och kränkningar av romer under 1900-talet, Regeringskansliet, arbetsmarknadsdepartementet, Fritze, Stockholm


Foucault, Michel. (1982) 'The Subject and Power', in Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed, Hubert L Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, University of Chicago Press, Chicago


Motion 2011/12: Sf344, Förbud mot tiggeri, av Kent Ekeroth (SD)

Motion 2014/15:2158, Gemensamt mål för fattigdomsbekämpning inom EU, av Per-Arne Håkansson m.fl. (S)
Motion 2014/15:2485, EU-medborgares sociala utsatthet, av Jan Ericson (m)
Motion 2015/16:3245, Närodlad integration, av Johanna Jönsson m.fl. (C)
Motion 2017/18:1425, Förbjud tiggeri, av Erik Andersson (M)
Motion 2017/18:2784, Hemlösa EU medborgare som tvingas tigga, av Maria Ferm och Janine Alm Ericson (båda MP)
Motion 2017/18:2919, Brottslighet kopplad till tiggeri, Jesper Skalberg Karlsson (M)
Motion 2017/18:3569, Bekämpa brott och otrygghet i hela landet, av Ulf Kristersson m.fl. (M)
Motion 2017/18:3879, Åtgärder mot tiggeri och prostitution, av Mikael Jansson och David Lång (SD)
Motion 2018/19:2638, Nationellt förbud mot tiggeri, av Ellen Juntti (M)
Motion 2018/19:2866, Ett nationellt förbud mot tiggeri, av Tomas Tobé m.fl. (M)
Motion 2018/19:2970, Motion om att begränsa tiggeriet på vissa platser, av Christian Carlsson (KD)


Social Services Act (2001:453), Chapter 2 para.1, Chapter 2a paras 1-2

SOU 2010:55, Romers rätt – en strategi för romer i Sverige, Fritze, Stockholm


