Hospitality Fostering Integration
– Reassessing Hospitality in Migration Ethics

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‘I do, indeed, close my door at times and surrender myself to a book, but only because I can open the door again and see a human face looking at me.’

- Martin Buber
ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses the concept of hospitality in the context of migration ethics. The underlying philosophical ideas of Kant, Levinas and Derrida are outlined and critically discussed. The use of hospitality in migration ethics as mainly a concern within the political dimension of society, devalues the concept and neglects the social dimension of hospitality. I argue that migration ethics should be more concerned with integration and that it is more relevant to speak of hospitality in relation to integration rather than migration, since hospitality has to do with interpersonal interactions. In order to view hospitality in the social dimension of society, I present some cases of interpersonal hospitality practiced today. Drawing from those examples whilst using a virtue ethics approach, I consider three virtues that I deem to be prerequisites for hospitality: courage, humility and patience. Hospitality is a rich and multi-layered concept and practice. I conclude that one such layer is hospitality fostering integration. That is, hospitality functioning as social cohesion with a potential to bring different parts together as a whole.

Keywords: hospitality, integration, migration ethics, Kant, Derrida, Levinas, virtue ethics, courage, humility, patience
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INTRODUCTION

Most of us have experience of what a good welcome is like, or of inhospitable treatment. The common understanding of hospitality does not mean that a host opens a door and then leave guests to fend for themselves. Instead, a host is assumed to make space for and engage with the guest. A very different portrayal of hospitality is found in migration ethics, where hospitality has become related to a state’s migration policies. The state is portrayed as a host, the migrant as a guest and the country border as a door which can be opened or closed. This discourse has developed via ideas of hospitality in philosophy and can be referred to as the political dimension of hospitality. These differing views of hospitality raise questions about the meaning and value of hospitality. How is hospitality used in migration ethics? Is the use valid? If not, are there more suitable areas of application for the concept of hospitality?

I argue that when ‘the door’ has been opened, it is beneficial for all involved parties to strive for integration between the different parts in society. It is therefore more relevant to speak of hospitality in relation to integration rather than migration, since both hospitality and integration takes place amongst people in society and has to do with interpersonal encounters, over time. Surprisingly, migration ethics seem to show limited interest in the relation between hospitality and integration wherefore this thesis aim to begin explore that relationship.¹ How can hospitality be understood in relation to integration? What does hospitality look like and entail, when shown towards strangers? Exploring those questions can enhance our understanding of hospitality as practiced in the social dimension of society and reveal important features of the process of integration.

The outline of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 describes the use of method and theory, gives an overview of multiple uses of hospitality in other contexts than migration ethics, distinguishes between the seemingly related concepts of solidarity and tolerance, and gives a definition and description of how integration is understood today. Chapter 3 depicts hospitality as understood in migration ethics by briefly sketching hospitality as portrayed by philosophers Immanuel Kant, Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. The migration ethics discourse is explained and evaluated. Chapter 4 move on to discuss the relationship between hospitality and integration. It is suggested that hospitality foremost should be viewed in the social dimension of society. Hospitality is further described as a practice which involves a welcome towards friends as well as strangers, summoned as interpersonal hospitality.

¹ There is not much scholarly literature on hospitality and integration. One example is: Matthew Kaemingk, Christian Hospitality and Muslim Immigration in an Age of Fear (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2018).
Examples of how this hospitality is practiced today is portrayed, followed by a suggestion that the virtues of *courage, humility* and *patience* are prerequisites for and central features of hospitality. Further, these is a discussion on how reciprocity plays out in hospitality. The next to last section discuss a possible Kantian objection to the depiction of the migration ethics discourse as impoverished. Chapter 4 ends by portraying how hospitality can be understood as fostering integration. Lastly chapter 5 concludes the thesis.

2. BACKGROUND
This chapter begins with a section on the method and theory used in this thesis. In order to give a broader view on hospitality, than does the common use of that concept within migration ethics, section 2.2 displays multiple uses of hospitality. The concepts of ‘solidarity’ and ‘tolerance’ are related to, but sometimes confused with, hospitality. Hospitality, I argue, is distinct from those concepts and section 2.3 explains how I understand them to differ. Lastly, the concept of integration is central to the argument, wherefore this chapter ends by presenting the way in which I use that concept.

2.1 Method and Theory
The migration ethics discourse mainly refers to hospitality in relation to states and their migration policies. Arguably, this is an impoverished understanding of a rich concept. To clarify the meaning of hospitality, it will be distinguished from the related concepts of solidarity and tolerance. Then, the use of hospitality in philosophy is described as a backdrop to how hospitality has become a migration ethics discourse. This discourse is evaluated by critically discussing how the philosophical ideas on hospitality are applied in migration ethics. That discussion is followed by a suggestion of a more reasonable understanding of the concept of hospitality.

A virtue ethics approach is applied to explore the relation between hospitality and integration. Virtue ethics focuses on the character of the moral agent and how humans form habits, and therefore fits well with the topic of this thesis since it intends to strengthen the link between hospitality and integration. Both those concepts are understood as foremost being displayed in interpersonal interaction, over time, between different people living in a community. A focal point of virtue ethics is to deal with the issue of what makes a society flourish, by which is meant a well-functioning society in which people live in well-being. The virtues are considered contributing to achieving such a society. Since this thesis suggests that
hospitality plays an important role in social cohesion, a virtue ethics approach is superior to other normative theories in discussing the subject.\(^2\)

Normative ethical theories that focus on the right moral action in terms of duties and consequences, are not as well equipped to talk of what makes people live well together. They focus on principles that are basis for laws, obligations and rights. But they do not sufficiently consider contextual, emotional and relational aspects of morality, aspects that are central to human life. Virtue ethics, on the other hand, considers those aspects and is therefore better suited to use as a means to consider hospitality and integration.

My interest in this subject stem partially from my previous work in a ‘study-community’ for people interested in philosophical and theological issues, where I, together with others, held the role of host. It also stems from my work in an integration project with migrants, following the peak of immigration to Sweden in 2015, due to the conflicts in the Middle East. When discussing features of hospitality, I give examples of what the practice of hospitality can look like today. The examples are gathered from people I know who live, work or have visited places of hospitality and some are based on my own experience. These illustrations of hospitality give insight into what hospitality can entail for people involved, and to depict values related to hospitality. Thus, this thesis deals with hospitality from both a theoretical and empirical point of view.

2.2 Multiple Uses of Hospitality
Hospitality is considered a universal practice.\(^3\) **Traditional hospitality** refers to welcoming one’s friends and includes also the welcome of strangers. Even if it today is less common to host a stranger as guest, at least in northern Europe, we foremost relate hospitality to everyday social life.

Much has been written on themes of hospitality within **Christian Theology.\(^4\)** Common themes are: the sharing of bread around the table; portrayals of both hospitable welcome and inhospitable acts; the twofold role of host and guest as a theme found in the person of Jesus. Mona Siddiqui has explored **hospitality and Islam** and points to the common root of

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\(^2\) My understanding of virtue ethics is mainly informed by studying Alasdair MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum and Shannon Vallor.

\(^3\) Chandran Kukathas, "Are Refugees Special?" in Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership, ed. Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2016), 3.

hospitality shared by Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The Hizmet movement, which is a strand of Sunni Islam, considers hospitality to be an important virtue in social interaction.

Hospitality is also a key notion commonly referred to in the hospitality industry, (e.g. hotels, restaurants and travel agencies). A majority of academic publications on hospitality comes from the management sector. ‘Hospitality studies’ deals with ‘the study of hospitality as a human phenomenon and the study for hospitality as an industrial activity embracing the service of food, drink and accommodation in commercial and non-commercial settings.’

2.3 Distinguishing Hospitality, Solidarity and Tolerance

Debates on migration includes statements such as: ‘We should be tolerant and have a generous and hospitable migration policy’. Also, hospitality towards strangers is described as an expression of solidarity. In order to reach conceptual clarity, this section aims to distinguish hospitality from the seemingly related concepts of solidarity and tolerance. The three concepts will shortly be analysed in relation to hospitality.

2.3.1 Hospitality

A common understanding of hospitality is: ‘The friendly and generous reception and entertainment of guests, visitors, or strangers.’ Historically, private households hosted travelling strangers and cared for the sick. In Europe in the early Middle Ages, monasteries began functioning as guesthouses and hospitals. Over time, these functions became more institutionalized and nowadays, we mainly seek shelter and healthcare from the big institutions of society, like hospitals, hotels and migration agencies.

Judith Still lists three areas of hospitality: hospitality between friends, (which I call the everyday use); traditional hospitality between stranger-guest and political hospitality between nations, or between nations and individuals from other nations. Still makes useful

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distinctions between these, calling the nation and state-related hospitality the political dimension of hospitality, and inter-individual hospitality, the social dimension of hospitality.\(^\text{13}\)

I favor an understanding of hospitality viewed within the social dimension and refer to that as interpersonal hospitality. This hospitality includes the welcome to friends and to the unknown stranger. Hospitality further means that the welcome is done without assuming reciprocity. Therefore, the use of hospitality within the hospitality industry is problematic since in that context, the host always assumes a payment of the guest. It is apt to ask to what degree establishments of hospitality, such as hotels and restaurants, can be hospitable.\(^\text{14}\)

2.3.2 Solidarity
Solidarity is related to questions of equity and justice. Solidarity is defined as: ‘unity (as of a group or class) that produces or is based on community of interests, objectives, and standards’\(^\text{15}\). The unified group often has political connotations, such as ’the workers’ in socialism or ’the sisters’ in feminism. Individuals in these groups show solidarity to each other in their strife for equity. The concept is generally used in sociology and philosophy as well as in Catholic social teaching. Avery Kolers defines solidarity as a ‘reason-driven, consummated, political action on others’ terms’\(^\text{16}\) and considers it to be an important political phenomenon. He discusses crucial movements in modern political struggle such as, indigenous peoples’ rights during colonialism, the labor movement, and the African American Civil Rights movement.

Dan Bulley examines the ‘value of solidarity’ with the EU. This value has been around in Europe since the 1950’s but is still an unclear concept. Bulley asks the question to whom solidarity is shown. Is it to the EU member states or to the migrants who seek refuge in Europe? In 2014, the EU’s Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmström appealed to the ideal of solidarity between EU member states to share the responsibility of refugees knocking on the door of Europe. The pressure put on Hungary to host refugees, although a majority of voters were against it, could be seen as a destruction of solidarity between member states.\(^\text{17}\)

\(^\text{13}\) Still, Derrida and Hospitality, 7. Whilst using Still’s distinction I am not promoting a sharp distinction between the political and the social. The two dimensions are merely a way to describe society as we understand it today.

\(^\text{14}\) A critique also posed by Wrobleski in The Limits of Hospitality, 40.


Even if a somewhat unclear concept, one main feature of solidarity is its political aspect. As such it has lots of potential to raise awareness and make change for groups in society. Woman’s emancipation had likely not come to pass, had not woman supported each other in political action. But whether all human kind could be considered a ‘group’ to show solidarity towards, is debatable. Those arguing that solidarity can extend to all humans, comes close to Kant’s idea of hospitality, which is a cosmopolitan account of human rights.\(^{18}\)

In contrast to solidarity, interpersonal hospitality involves engagement with people who are strangers with no previous connection to oneself. It is a practice that extends beyond mere rights. Hospitality will for most of us be practiced with more ease towards people we know and towards people we feel solidarity with. But, a hospitable community does not open the door only to those with whom they share common political goals and interests. If that is how solidarity is understood, it has little to do with interpersonal hospitality.

2.3.3 Tolerance\(^{19}\)
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states that toleration: ‘generally refers to the conditional acceptance of or non-interference with beliefs, actions or practices that one considers to be wrong but still “tolerable,” such that they should not be prohibited or constrained.’\(^{20}\) An important element of toleration is that the tolerated beliefs are in some sense, provocative, difficult to understand or considered wrong. Toleration is a voluntary practice. If one had to endure things that one actually rejects, it is not considered toleration.

Four different normative reasons are presented as the specific conceptions of toleration. a) The permission conception means that the majority tolerates the minorities beliefs and practices as long as the minority accepts its inferior position. b) The coexistence conception regards toleration as a means to avoid conflict and pursue one’s own goals. c) The respect conception view toleration as differing parties equally accepting one another and not favoring any specific community. d) The esteem conception takes a step further and view tolerance as not only respecting but also viewing members of other cultures, religious or political beliefs as ethically valuable and to some degree ethically attractive.\(^{21}\)

\(^{18}\) Kantian hospitality is further developed in section 3.1.1.
\(^{19}\) In everyday language, the word tolerance refers to the above described concept. In political terms, tolerance is often referred to as ‘toleration’. I use the latter when referring to the Stanford Encyclopedia, which uses that term, and ‘tolerance’ when otherwise discussing it.
\(^{21}\) Forst, "Toleration."
Contemporary debates on tolerance often focus on questions concerning religious beliefs and practices such as manners of dress and demands from certain groups to be free from religious insults. It also concerns discussions around social conflicts, involving groups claiming recognition in the legal and social sphere. For example, gender equality or groups affected by past injustices. Toleration further includes the much-debated issues of free speech and ‘hate speech’. Rainer Forst points out that: ‘As much as a politics of toleration aims to express mutual respect, it also involves disagreement, mutual criticism, and rejection.’

In sum, tolerance means refraining from hindering others in their activities and utterances but can be based on different normative reasons. Tolerance thus is an attitude which on the individual level does not have to be actively expressed to others. A tolerant person can accept that migrants settle in ‘their’ country, but is not obliged to engage with them. Thus understood, tolerance is far from related to interpersonal hospitality.

The respect and the esteem conception of toleration should be sought after when striving for a well-functioning society. A relationship between tolerance and hospitality is that in order to reach the respect and the esteem conception of toleration, hospitality will likely play a role. Because, in order to show respect for others one needs to personally engage with those others, and such interactions are likely to be nourished in a hospitable setting.

2.4 Integration

Political theorist Joseph Carens argues that integration is a mutual process between immigrants and the receiving society. Since the immigrant need to adapt more, there is a great responsibility on the receiving society to promote equality between the minority and majority group.

Whichever migration policy one proposes, once migrants have been admitted into a country, I deem it beneficial for all citizens to work for a safe society where everyone can be active participants. Media reports on migrants living in segregated, low socio-economic areas. Strife between different groups draw young people into criminal organisations. That is costly for society and for individuals, which is why integration between all sorts of people should be sought after. But, integration is a debated concept and needs explaining.

An overarching definition of integration is that it has to do with different parts coming together as a whole. Integration is thus the process that leads up to a state of wholeness,

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22 Forst, "Toleration."
without thereby dissolving difference between the parts. I use integration in this broad sense and refer both to integration of immigrants in the host-society\textsuperscript{25}, but also in reference to integration between people in society at large. This is done in order to stress that if we strive for some kind of wholeness in society, there is a need for \textit{all} people to be integrated.

There has been a shift in integration policies in Europe since the late 1990’s. Prior to that, European countries mainly adopted two models of integration.\textsuperscript{26} The assimilation model\textsuperscript{27} aimed to have immigrants come to resemble and eventually totally adapt to the dominant group, and the multiculturalist model\textsuperscript{28}, aimed to have immigrants be well-functioning in the new society without thereby having to change their beliefs and practices. Nowadays, most Western European states practice a civic integration policy.\textsuperscript{29} Political Sociologist Christian Joppke points out two main features of this policy.\textsuperscript{30} First, integration has moved from being mainly a local concern to become a state concern. Secondly, the measures to promote integration of immigrants have been fused with the measures to select and control who is allowed to settle in a country, ‘so that integration and immigration policy are no longer separate domains.’\textsuperscript{31} Some examples of civic integration policies are obligatory integration and language courses, tests and contracts set up with the immigrant.\textsuperscript{32}

With the above displayed uses of hospitality, related but also differing concepts to hospitality and a definition and current discussion of different models of integration, I turn now to discuss the migration ethics discourse of hospitality.

3. HOSPITALITY IN MIGRATION ETHICS

This chapter displays that hospitality is commonly used within migration ethics and discusses the validity of such a use. First I give a short overview of three philosophers who have been

\\textsuperscript{25} It is not unproblematic what to call the society people migrate to. Some call it ‘receiving country’, but that implies that someone is sending migrants, which mostly is not the case. ‘Host-society’ is problematic since it can imply that the immigrant will be kept in the category of ‘guest’ and not be fully included in the new country. I still choose ‘host-society’, since it corresponds to the language used in the migration ethics discourse.


\textsuperscript{30} Joppke, “Civic integration,” 1153.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{32} Goodman, "Integration Requirements for Integration’s Sake?” 753.
influential in crafting this concept. Namely, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) and Jacques Derrida (1930-2004). Section 3.2 moves on to describe how their ideas on hospitality are applied in migration ethics, followed by my analysis of that use.

3.1 Hospitality in Philosophy
Ideas on hospitality which for some time has been present in discussions on migration ethics is hugely influenced by Kant’s emphasize on a right to hospitality, Levinas’ idea of the ‘Other’ and Derrida’s double law of hospitality. Before an analysis of hospitality as used in migration ethics can take place, it is pivotal to give an overview of those ideas. I am well aware that this overview is brief but I am confident that it will suffice in order to guide the reader into the remainder of this thesis.

3.1.1 Kant’s ‘Right to Hospitality’
Kant’s essay Perpetual Peace is to this day influential in discussions on hospitality. Kant’s third definitive article states: ‘The rights of men, as citizens of the world, shall be limited to the condition of universal hospitality.’ Kant makes clear that when he speaks of hospitality, it is not to be confused with philanthropy, to be charitable, but that it has to do with rights.
He states that every human has a right to visit any place, ‘in virtue of our common right of possession on the surface of the earth’ Political philosopher Seyla Benhabib explains that the right to hospitality dwells in the area between what Kant considers to be a human right of moving freely in the world, and civil rights which deals with rights related to members of a republic. The civil right to be a permanent visitor in a country does, according to Kant, move beyond what a person can morally claim, and has to do with an arrangement which is set up between the visitor and the republic. The human right of a stranger to visit a foreign territory, means a moral claim ‘to be treated by its owner without hostility.’

Kant describes the behaviour of European states when visiting foreign lands, as inhospitable. He talks of the injustices done to inhabitants of America, Africa and Asia. The bad behaviour of the guests is according to Kant the reason why the empires of China and

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34 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 137.
35 Ibid.
39 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 137.
Japan became very closed in not allowing European states to visit their shores. Kant argues that the increasing trade and travel between nations meant that violations of rights in one place would be felt in all places, which is why he called for a cosmopolitan right of all people.\(^{40}\) Today's live issue of globalisation and discussions on cosmopolitanism, has revived an interest in Kant's *Perpetual Peace* and its plea for peace among nations.\(^{41}\)

3.1.2 Levinas and the ‘Other’

Continental philosopher Levinas, belonging to the school of phenomenology, drew attention to the everyday experience of human activities such as eating, drinking and being at home. Our search for happiness, which often revolve around those activities, is a necessary condition to become autonomous beings.\(^{42}\) All parts of life which can be described as *phenomenon*, are parts of human self-centeredness and dominates her consciousness. This is what Levinas and others phenomenologists referred to as *egology*.\(^{43}\) But, Levinas stressed that all there is, is not the existence of the human ego. There is something else, which is not phenomenon. This is what he called ‘the Other’. The ‘Other’ is that which breaks, pierces, destroys the horizon of my egocentric monism, that is, when the other’s invasion of my world destroys the empire in which all phenomena are, from the outset, a priori, condemned to function as moments of my universe. The other’s face (i.e., any other’s facing me) or the other’s speech (i.e., any other’s speaking to me) interrupts and disturbs the order of my, ego’s world; it makes a hole in it by disarraying my arrangements without ever permitting me to restore the previous order. For even if I kill the other or chase the other away in order to be safe from the intrusion, nothing will ever be the same as before.\(^{44}\)

According to Levinas, it is irrelevant *who* looks at me or speaks to me. What matters is the *otherness* of the ‘Other’ which interrupts my self-centred way of viewing the world. Levinas put special focus on the nakedness of the others face, since the ‘human face has no defence’.\(^{45}\) In seeing the ‘Others’ face, the self comes in relation with the infinite. In this immediate experience of another lies, according to Levinas, a fact and a norm. Namely, that I have obligations to that ‘Other’. That obligation consists in being generous and showing love to the

\(^{40}\) Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, 139-142.
\(^{43}\) Peperzak, *To the Other*, 46.
\(^{44}\) Ibid, 19-20.
\(^{45}\) Ibid, 64.
other.\textsuperscript{46} When loving the ‘Other’ unconditionally, when being hospitable, the ego is disturbed and the idea of an autonomous self is questioned.\textsuperscript{47}

A central idea in Levinas is that all humans are strangers in this world, that all are rootless and stateless. But, we only come to see this in the open encounter of the ‘Other’. Thus, ‘Hospitality abolishes all forms of earthly and planetary property, opening up the Ego to the proximity of the Other.’\textsuperscript{48} That in turn leads, ‘through unlimited responsibility, care and justice, to a state of charity, indulgence and forgiveness.’\textsuperscript{49}

In the last decade of his life, Levinas developed the idea of the Rights of the Other Man. Levinas said that: ‘The right of man, absolutely and originally, takes on meaning only in the other; as the right of the other man. A right with respect to which I am never be released! Hence, infinite responsibility for the other: the radical impossibility of immanence!’\textsuperscript{50} Thus, Levinas’ hospitality, the ethics of welcoming the ‘Other’, became explicitly related to ‘the work of justice’\textsuperscript{51}. This demand for absolute hospitality was both an inspiration for and questioned by Derrida, to whom we now turn our attention.

3.1.3 Derrida’s ‘Double Law of Hospitality’

The absolute hospitality that Levinas talked of is what Derrida named the Law of hospitality.\textsuperscript{52}

This hospitality requires of the host to give an unconditional welcome.

\begin{quote}
Let us say yes to who or what turns up, before any determination, before any anticipation, before any identification, whether or not it has to do with a foreigner, an immigrant, an invited guest, or an unexpected visitor, whether or not the new arrival is the citizen of another country, a human, an animal, or divine creature, a living or a dead thing, male or female.\textsuperscript{53}
\end{quote}

Derrida describes absolute hospitality as opening up once home for the anonymous other ‘without asking of them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their names.’\textsuperscript{54}

Whilst viewing the Law of hospitality as the central criteria for welcoming a stranger, Derrida recognises that in the real world of people, inhabited space, borders and countries, we ask the stranger about his name. But as soon as we ask this, there is no longer an

\textsuperscript{47} Makris, “Emmanuel Levinas on Hospitality,” 89-90.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid, 86.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, 87.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, 93.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, 82.
\textsuperscript{52} Still, Derrida and Hospitality, 5.
\textsuperscript{54} Derrida, Of Hospitality, 25.
unconditional welcome. The asking of someone’s name sets a condition on the welcome. All such conditions, norms, rights and duties that are related to both the host and the guest, is what Derrida named the laws of hospitality. The Law and the laws of hospitality, which constitutes the double law of hospitality, are related in a paradoxical way and stand in constant tension with one another. The Law is impossible to act out in the real world. Hospitality needs conditions like, knowing who is coming (knowing their name), who is in need, what are their needs, what is possible to give and what is not. But, as soon as these conditions, these limits are set in, unconditional hospitality cease to exist. This means that the Law and the laws of hospitality cannot exist without the other and at the same time they exclude each other.55

From this point onwards, I will not try to explain if and how Derrida solves this tension. Because, as I understand him, there is no solving. Both Levinas and Derrida claimed that hospitality is ethics because ethics coexists with the experience of hospitality.56 At the same time, Levinas hospitality is, I believe, unrealistic, and Derrida’s hospitality is an enigma. But one important feature in both Derrida’s and Levinas’ understanding of hospitality is the focus on the encounter in the moment.57 Hospitality takes place in an instance between the Law and the laws and between the I and the ‘Other’. This temporal aspect of hospitality is, I believe, important in understanding how hospitality is used in migration ethics today and I will come back to that when evaluating the discourse.

3.2 Hospitality and Politics
Hospitality is a frequently used concept among political theorists in the area of migration.58 As mentioned above, the underlying ideas primarily stem from Kant, Levinas and Derrida. Some theorists also refer to Greco-Roman views on hospitality.59 In the following section I portray how these ideas come across in migration ethics in what I interpret as a discourse that has been around over the last three decades;60 I then move to an evaluation of that discourse.

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55 Derrida, Of Hospitality, 75-83.
56 Still, Derrida and Hospitality, 7-8.
57 Peperzak, To the Other, 33-34; Derrida, Of Hospitality, 125-127; Bulley, Migration, Ethics & Power, 8-9.
59 E.g. Kukathas, ”Are Refugees Special?”.
60 Still, Derrida and Hospitality, 1.
3.2.1 A Migration Ethics Discourse

In ethical discussions on migration, the everyday and the traditional use of hospitality has been transferred to the level of international politics and policies. The threshold of the home has become the border of a country, the host become the state and the guest become the migrant. Political philosopher Heidrun Friese\(^61\) trace this change to the rise of the nation state. Prior to that, hospitality was a religious and ethical duty of charity towards strangers but, Friese states, those obligations ‘have been inscribed into the procedures of public political deliberation, legal procedures and administered law that determine rights and duties’\(^62\). Dan Bulley, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, remarks that ‘Most studies of international hospitality maintain the state as the central space and agent of welcome.’\(^63\) An example which displays this understanding is found in writings of Benhabib, who use Kant’s idea of a right to hospitality as her backdrop when discussing migration and the issue of citizenship.\(^64\)

Friese makes an example of Italian immigration law to make a point of the ambiguity in the use of hospitality in today’s politics and policymaking. She states that the law: ‘reiterates the language of hospitality and the ambivalences of the stranger that oscillates between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’: the alien is officially considered a ‘guest’ (ospite) to be ‘received’, ‘accommodated’ and taken care of and yet as a potential enemy, has to be kept under surveillance.’\(^65\)

An example of how the migration ethics discourse can be used when referring to international relations, is Bulley’s elaboration on Jordanian hospitality.\(^66\) Jordan is perceived as a country showing great hospitality to refugees from surrounding countries in the Middle East. Bulley problematizes this when discussing the traditional Bedouin hospitality and the self-understanding of many Jordanians as being hospitable. He describes tension between the view of hospitality as a gift which demands no reciprocity in contrast to the growing tourist industry described by some as ‘Jordanian hospitality’ (which of course includes exchange of money for services). He further discusses the postcolonial state as a host which has been disciplined by the imperial guest of Britain. This power relation exemplifies how hospitality is used in international politics. Bulley means that the praise Jordan now receives from the international community for its hospitality towards refugees, is being enabled by outsiders:

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\(^61\) Friese, “The Limits of Hospitality”, 324.
\(^62\) Ibid.
\(^63\) Bulley, Migration, Ethics & Power, 2.
\(^65\) Friese, “The Limits of Hospitality,” 333.
\(^66\) Bulley, Migration, Ethics & Power, 88-116.
‘Primary amongst them is the EU and its politics of protection which funds postcolonial states such as Jordan to contain refugees far from Europe’s borders.’

The use of hospitality in migration ethics and political theory, is problematic for several reasons and will be discussed in the following section.

3.2.2 Evaluating the Discourse

A main concern with the hospitality discourse in migration ethics is the almost exclusive attention payed to hospitality within the political dimension of society. If it is of interest that newcomers to a country also become integrated, should not hospitality in the social dimension, the interpersonal encounter and engagement over time, play a central role in migration ethics? As is now portrayed, it seems to be only the state, and the immigrant, acting as host and guest. On top of this main concern, (which I will return to), I take issue with the content of some of the philosophical understandings of hospitality as well as with some interpretations and uses of the same and will in the following evaluate them.

Kant’s hospitality is very limited. It only gives the visitor a right to ‘not be treated as an enemy’ but does not give a right to be treated as a guest. Benhabib, who works from the Kantian viewpoint, critiques Kant’s hospitality since it only gives a right to entry another country, but does not give rights to citizenship. Benhabib instead want to extend the right of hospitality to include a right to citizenship and suggest that even if not having fully open borders, we should at least have porous borders.

What is clear when reading Benhabib is that, whilst critiquing Kant, she moves exclusively in the political dimension of hospitality. Her discussion revolves around political and civil rights but does not discuss hospitality in any other way. Thus, Benhabib’s hospitality, even if a more generous account than Kant’s, stays in the political dimension of hospitality. In other words, Benhabib’s account of hospitality is not generous enough since it limits the understanding of hospitality to the political dimension.

There is also reason to question the way in which ‘Levinian’ and ‘Derridaean’ hospitality has been interpreted and applied. Let me mention a few such queries.

Firstly, the encounter of the ‘Other’ can according to Levinas not be a universalized experience and practice, it is a unique encounter between two people. His idea of the ‘Other’

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67 Bulley, Migration, Ethics & Power, 114.
68 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 137.
69 Benhabib, The Rights of Others, 221.
70 Ibid.
is not suggesting an encounter between immigrants and states. When Peperzak elaborates on Levinas view of the relation between personal encounters and collective structures, he emphasizes that the inspiration of Levinas thought and his philosophical legitimation of a just and liberal society find their source exclusively in the original relationship of the-(unique-)one-for-the-(unique) Other, that is, in the moral “principle” explained above. Administration and politics have their true source in the high esteem of individuals for other individuals. All social tasks are consequences of, and preparations for, the possibility of adequate face-to-face relationships and good conversations. If they are not directed toward this end, collective measures lose their human meaning because they have forgotten or masked real faces and real speech.  

Further, the idea of all humans as strangers, even stateless, in the world, brings out the huge contrast between Levinas’ understanding of humans, compared to liberal ideals of individual autonomy and of individuals right to owning property and setting up boundaries to say, ‘this is mine and not yours’. A plausible understanding is that Levinas himself would disapprove of the idea of ‘hospitable states’. He would first enquire if the individuals of that state act hospitably.

Secondly, there is a tendency in political philosophy to focus on Derrida’s unconditional Law of hospitality. When trying to apply the Law of hospitality on practical political problems, (for example in migration), and failing because it is not possible to apply, critics of Derrida point to his hospitality as inadequate. This interpretation is misrepresenting Derrida, since he stressed the interplay between the unconditional Law and the conditional laws of hospitality. Still points out that if Derrida’s critics to a higher degree had considered the laws of hospitality, they might find his hospitality less inadequate.

Thirdly, both Levinas and Derrida emphasizes the short temporal aspect of hospitality. They consider hospitality to be an encounter that happens in a short moment, thereby leaving out the spatial and ‘over-time-engagement’ with others as an important feature of hospitality. This temporal aspect may explain one feature of the migration ethics discourse. Namely that hospitality and inhospitality has become equivalent to opened or closed borders. Hospitality has come to mean a stepping over a threshold. That threshold is the country border and stepping over a threshold does not take much time. It takes a moment. Feasibly, the temporal aspect of Derrida’s and Levinas’ hospitality has thus influenced

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71 Peperzak, To the Other, 31.
72 Still, Derrida and Hospitality, 10-11.
73 Peperzak, To the Other, 33-34.
74 Derrida, Of Hospitality, 125-127.
migration ethics. Hospitality has become all about opening or closing a door, about admitting migrants over the border or not, but near to nothing about engaging, enjoying, learning and struggling with other people over a longer time.75

There are however strengths in Levinas’ and Derrida’s portrayal of hospitality. Levinas’ openness towards the ‘Other’, although extremely demanding, still brings light on what is needed in order for us to really welcome. It does point out just how much we need to set our own preconceived ideas about other people to the side, if we really want to have a mutual encounter and welcome without pretence. Derrida, through his conditional laws of hospitality, helps us to see that hospitality cannot be as unconditional as Levinas tells us. Human life and society includes limits.

Having discussed the philosophical understandings of hospitality and the way in which they have been applied in migration ethics, let us return to the main concern of the hospitality discourse. Namely, the transferal of hospitality to the political dimension. Friese, when discussing the development of the nation state and its effect on ethical obligations says: ‘we might wonder if the nation state is the requisite vehicle for enacting the virtues of hospitality’76 Similarly, Bulley puts voice to the concern that the sole agent of hospitality has become the state, ‘the central space and agent of welcome’77. He continues: ‘Looked at in such a way, the possibilities of hospitality are profoundly disheartening.’78 He suggests that we need to explore ‘the interaction of ethics and power in a range of spaces of hospitality that operate at the margins of the international state system.’79

It is not surprising that the language of the French philosophers became common in the migration ethics discourse. The language of opening one’s door to the ‘Other’, of welcoming and hosting, is a call to act humanely, a call we should appreciate. But I wonder if not Friese is right when saying about hospitality: ‘Without being rooted, without reference and without the political participation of the local arena and its various actors, renewed concepts of hospitality and transnational justice will remain a merely normative-moralistic academic exercise.’80 Friese raises the question of who should respond to people who are in need of hospitality. She gives the example of Turkish fishermen whose traditional ethos of hospitality made them rescue and care for people in danger of dying on the Mediterranean.

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75 Bulley supports this analysis when pointing out that hospitality should be viewed as a practice which takes time and effort and which takes place in a certain space. Bulley, Migration, Ethics & Power, 8-9.
76 Friese, “The Limits of Hospitality,” 324.
77 Bulley, Migration, Ethics & Power, 2.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid, 3.
But because of legal norms which sanctions human trafficking, spontaneous rescues like that were hindered by bureaucracy which put the fishermen at risk of losing their work and income. Those who wanted to respond to the demand of hospitality were hindered to practice hospitality. As is obvious by now, I find several problems with this discourse and aim in the following to suggest a different route.

4. HOSPITALITY AND INTEGRATION

Hospitality should be viewed from a people’s perspective rather than from an institutional one. Political theorist Chandran Kukathas points out that hospitality is a human relation act and that in order for a society to receive asylum seekers well, they should try to mirror that relational hospitality.

If refugees and asylum seekers are to be welcomed into any society, and shown a measure of hospitality, this will not be because the polity is welcoming but because society is so. Hospitality is, as Homer shows us in the Odyssey, a human relation rather than an institutional one. To the extent that we try to design institutions that perform a function that only people can, it seems unlikely that our efforts will meet with much success.

In line with these observations, I aim in this chapter to return hospitality to the social dimension and explore ways of understanding hospitality and its relation to integration. Interpersonal hospitality is presented as a practice which features three virtues as necessary but not sufficient conditions for hospitality. A possible Kantian objection to my argument is rebutted and lastly, connections between hospitality and integration are exemplified and critically discussed through the lens of virtue ethics. (The reader should remember that I work with a broad definition of integration, as portrayed in section 2.4.)

4.1 Hospitality in the Social (and Political) Dimension

The concept of hospitality is best applied in the social dimension of society because it is a practice that takes place in the interpersonal encounter between two or more people. That encounter includes hospitality shown to friends - the everyday use - as well as the traditional view of hospitality as shown towards strangers. Traditional hospitality highlights elements of hospitality which are central to the concept and which may not be found in the everyday use. Interpersonal hospitality emphasizes the practical side of hospitality and thus avoids making hospitality into a mere metaphor in an academic discourse. However, emphasizing the social

81 Friese, “The Limits of Hospitality,” 332.
82 Kukathas, "Are Refugees Special?", 22.
dimension of hospitality does not exclude politics from hospitality. In fact, if my claim that hospitality is closely related to integration is sound, then it has much to do with politics since migration and integration are related and both a societal, and therefore political, concern. My point is that integration takes place amongst people in society. Therefore, I suggest that a more reasonable understanding of integration is that it is intertwined with both the social and the political dimension of society, with an emphasize on the social dimension.

These two dimensions overlap with the distinction between the private and the public sphere. Peter Haldén describe the private-public distinction as a "cognitive grid in Western political thought". One might say that the political dimension overlaps with the public sphere, and the social dimension with the private sphere. Where the line is drawn, differs between western countries where: ‘Scandinavian countries, have had a stronger distinction between the two spheres and only reluctantly allow non-state actors like churches and charities to assume political tasks’. Haldén remarks: “If we can alter the ways we observe societies, which it is obvious that we can, we may also be open to more flexible institutional arrangements, more sensitive to local conditions, perhaps even shaping greater blends of the public and the private into efficient, viable, and legitimate amalgams. Outlining how they would look is, however, definitely the task of future research.”

Paying attention to the intertwined relation between the political and social dimensions of hospitality and integration, corresponds well with a virtue ethics approach, in which the social interplay between human beings are central to how morality is to be understood and fostered. It also corresponds well with the virtue ethics interest in how to live in order to have a flourishing society. The following section will closer explore the practice of hospitality and virtues related to that practice.

4.2 Hospitality in Practice

The everyday use of hospitality is not displaying all aspects of hospitality, but it points to an aspect which is lacking in the migration ethics discourse. Namely, that hospitable welcome does not only mean opening a door and leaving people to fend for themselves. It means hands-on tasks like making space, serving food and engaging with the guest. Most people are to varying degrees showing hospitality to others, it is a practice central to human society.

84 Haldén, “Fundamental but not eternal,” 218.
85 Ibid, 221.
Now, ‘practice’ needs some explaining in a virtue ethics context. It is not to be confused with ‘practical’, often understood as the opposite of ‘theoretical’. A practice is not just a set of technical skills that serves a set goal, but every practice requires skills. So for example, playing football well is not a practice, but the game of football is. Pruning trees is not a practice, but gardening is. Neither is cooking, cleaning and making beds a practice, but hospitality is. Alasdair MacIntyre explains that a practice does not have a set goal for all times, but ‘the goals themselves are transmuted by the history of the activity. It therefore turns out not to be accidental that every practice has its own history and a history which is more and other than that of the improvement of the relevant skills.’

This chapter focuses on traditional hospitality. We may wonder if and where that hospitality is practiced today? In the next section I give four examples of practitioners of traditional hospitality. Several of these examples are gathered from intentional communities which have developed in such a way that traditional hospitality is possible even today. Pohl, who studied such communities, state that: ‘practitioners of hospitality also become teachers of hospitality.’

4.2.1 Traditional Hospitality Today

The L’Arche organization is represented in 151 intentional communities in 37 countries. These communities host adults with and without intellectual disabilities. Jean Vanier (1928-2019) founded these communities in order to help people with intellectual disabilities not becoming isolated, and those without disabilities to be drawn out of a different kind of isolation, an isolation due to living in a high-achieving context where being independent is the norm. L’Arche describes itself as ‘striving for unity in our diversity’ which is done in ‘a spirit of encounter, listening and empathy and solidarity’. They emphasize lifelong learning in community with others. Life is shared in for example meals, work and leisure-time. Every person, whether with intellectual disability or not, is considered having gifts that can be shared with others. The sharing of abilities in a community is considered enabling transformation both in the individual and in the world. In society, there is often a focus on the neediness and ‘otherness’ of the intellectually disabled and the role of society is considered as

87 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 225.
88 Pohl, Making Room, 11.
serving their needs. L’Arche exemplifies a setting in which the ‘stranger’, the intellectually disabled, becomes familiar to those who do not have a disability. The setting of L’Arche flips the conditions and makes the disabled become sometimes host sometimes guest, since they both give and receive in the community. Likewise, the non-disabled are sometimes guest, sometimes host.

In recent years, Sweden has received many young people from Afghanistan. Many of those were given accommodation in homes for under-aged people, but had to move to completely new settings once they turned 18. Some were moved to a different county, a new school and unfamiliar social settings. Many such young persons, choose to stay in the familiar context rather than being moved to an unfamiliar setting, even if it meant living as homeless. In response to this situation many Swedes have opened up their homes in order to help these young people. Some of those contacts were formed through civic society.91 I know of several households which for the last 1-2 years have had a young Afghan staying with them. These situations give a clear benefit for the young person in terms of staying in a known place, keeping friends and the little sense of community they have there. They get to see how Swedes live and work, what family life can look like and what Swedish customs are like. The benefit is not one-sided. There is often a mutual sharing of cultural customs which leads to better knowledge and appreciation of the unknown.

The nuns at Alsike kloster, a small Swedish convent, have since 1978 received refugees to stay in their midst.92 Many refugees who were not granted asylum have been in hiding at the convent. The nuns see it as a Christian responsibility to show hospitality for those who knock on their door and need help. They have by now learnt a lot about Swedish migration law and about living together as a community of people with different faiths. They know what it means to host many people with very small means and to help children get some schooling, in a room which at night is filled with matrasses and functions as the classroom as well as dining room during the day. If you visit them you may be served coffee and cake in this room, where beds have been rolled up and stored under blankets. The nuns have many people supporting their work in different ways and co-work with other organisations.

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91 For example, local Red Cross groups, churches, “Agape”: https://www.agapegoteborg.se/omoss, (an organization started by former social worker in Gothenburgh, Matilda Brinck-Larsen, who resigned from her job in protest against the cities treatment of young immigrants.)
"L’Abri is a Christian organization which can be found in 9 countries and 4 continents. L’Abri communities consist of permanent residents, volunteers and temporary guests. The aim of the community is to offer shelter for a time in order for people to grapple with questions of life and faith. Guests often come with an intertwined mix of personal and philosophical and theological enquiries. Some are ‘existentially homeless’ whilst others are physically not rooted in any place or community. All are welcome, whether believer or not and whichever belief one profess. The permanent workers and the volunteers are hosts who make space for the guests and serve them in different ways. At the same time, guests are asked to join in the practical tasks of the community and thus there is a sharing of life and work. Also, in conversations around meals and during work, there is a giving and receiving of experiences, of ideas and insights. During the ten years working at L’Abri, I witnessed some remarkable moments of encounters between people. One example is when a homeless alcoholic man, who sometimes stayed with us during his sober periods, was in deep conversation at the dinner table, discussing literature with a high up solicitor in the US White House administration. Or during the two-hour walk in the countryside when some young guys helped the huge man, who was drugged by psychopharmaca, to cross fences and ditches as he stumbled forward. These encounters are examples of the ‘stranger’ becoming familiar and of guests serving each other.

From the above examples, and many others like them, we can learn something about hospitality, what it entails and demands of people involved. In the next section I present three virtues which I deem prerequisites for the practice of hospitality: the virtues of courage, humility and patients. The choice of virtues is based on my reflections on hospitality, gained through observing hospitality in readings and in real life. It is not an extensive list, but shows some necessary conditions for hospitality.

4.2.2 Virtues Prerequisite for Hospitality
The talk of virtuous action invokes in some people the idea that virtue equals always being kind, generous, meek and other character traits assumed in a ‘nice’ person. This view is mistaken. Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian ethics hold that the ‘good’ and the ‘right’ are intertwined. Sometimes the right action is to be angry, to avoid excessive generosity, to not let

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others trample on one self and so on. Aristotle did not for example count ‘kindness’ as a virtue.\textsuperscript{95} Instead, the virtues are reflecting a person’s character. These character traits are not due to genes or circumstances, but have to be cultivated. They organically grow out of habits and practices that one learns from one’s surroundings. Virtues are seen as character traits that stand in between two vices. For example, the virtue of courage is seen as standing between the vices of acting rash and acting cowardly.

An overarching intellectual virtue, which guides the person’s individual moral virtues, is, \textit{phronesis}, practical wisdom.\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Phronesis} entails a practical reasoning which the virtuous person habituate and helps her make the good moral choice in a specific situation. Circumstances may differ much. Therefore, in one situation one may tell the truth up-front, in another the right thing to do may be to lie or at least to not tell the full truth and that all depends on to who one tells it, or in what way its told. The virtue ethics approach thus underlines, that acting morally good cannot be done by following rules only since rules cannot be applied without discernment to all contexts. Instead, the virtuous person has to use her judgment and consider the context for moral action. The capacity to make wise judgments evolves over time and becomes a habit. ‘Habit’ in virtue ethics refers to actions that have motivating reasons and are considered having positive normative value. The habitual actions are continually shaping one’s moral cultivation.\textsuperscript{97} Virtue ethics thus stress reason in considering morality. But, moral action is not only judged by reason. Emotion and desire are also considered to play integral parts in moral decision making. If the intention of the acting person seems generous but in fact they only give for appearances sake, she is not deemed a virtuous person.

Moreover, virtues are not character traits that are static traits in all cultural contexts. Martha Nussbaum has argued that there are core meanings in virtues like courage, justice and wisdom, but that ‘the concrete or “thick” meaning of each virtue is determined by the distinctive shape of that domain in our present cultural context, and what specific dispositions enable us to flourish there.’\textsuperscript{98} In other words, to answer the question of what makes our society flourish at \textit{this time} is not fully dependent on Aristotle’s view of the virtues. On the

\textsuperscript{95} Spezio, Petersen and Roberts, ”Humility as openness”, 28.
\textsuperscript{96} Shannon Vallor, \textit{Technology and the Virtues: a philosophical guide to a future worth wanting} (New York: Oxford University Press 2016):18-19. Vallor works in the area of Philosophy and Technology and may seem a strange choice to use in this context. But her writing style, and summary of virtue ethics, has been most useful as an example of how to apply virtue ethics when dealing with a subject within Applied Ethics. Much has been written on virtue ethics, but less so directly linking the approach to issues in Applied Ethics, like Vallor does.
\textsuperscript{97} Vallor, \textit{Technology and the Virtues}, 66-69.
\textsuperscript{98} See Vallor, \textit{Technology and the Virtues}, 119.
other hand, Nussbaum reminds us that ‘tradition is frequently a sounder guide than current fashion’.  

Virtue ethics considers what constitutes a good person as well as what is demanded in a certain practice. Therefore, I will now move on to consider three virtues that I deem central to the practice of hospitality. I suggest that the virtues of courage, humility and patience correspond to different stages of hospitality. It takes courage to open the door to a stranger and courage to knock on the door. One needs humility to get engaged with and reach understanding between the host and the stranger. Finally, interpersonal interaction over time takes patience. Looking at these virtues illuminates that hospitality is a complex practice, an interplay between guest and host. The virtues are not to be exclusively looked upon as prerequisites for the host. Because hospitality is not only a practice ‘done’ by the host, it is a practice that involves both guest and host.

In contrast to Levinas’ demanding, unconditional welcome, this set of virtues are realistic and says something about what hospitality entails. They portray that hospitality involves reasoning about the situation, that hospitality involves setting some limits and it portrays a situation which will give rise to frustration. This may be viewed as a demanding practice. But, I would argue not an overly demanding such. The practice of hospitality is flexible in that the possibilities and the limitations depend much on the context, as will be clear in the examples to follow. Even so, if a society wants to achieve integration, then hospitality and the virtues necessary for that practice, should be strived for. Anyone who tries to practice hospitality towards strangers, will know that failure is inevitable in some way, because it is a fact of life that we make mistakes and misjudge a person or a situation. But, that is not to inhibit us since there is much to gain from hospitality when it is well practiced.

a) Courage: taking considered risk

Courage is the virtue that stands between the vices of rashness and cowardice. Opening one’s door to a stranger involves not knowing, to some extent, who one will receive and what that meeting will entail. Most people know something about the insecurity and anxiety of being amongst strangers, be it at a dinner, in a conference room, the class room or when sitting in a train cabin. Whatever level of anxiety before the unknown people around has to be overcome by some level of courage. If one retreats to cowardice, one leaves the room or choose not to attend. If one acts rashly, not considering who people are and without thinking twice about

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consequences in engaging with them, one may end up being harmed. Acting courageously means in these situations to overcome one’s anxiety at the same time as one considers the risk in engaging with the unknown people.

Whilst considering to take a risk, one also weighs the needs of the other and oneself. Depending on the circumstance the choice of action may look very different. When asked if my husband and I could house a former member of a well-known criminal motor cycle gang in Sweden, (the question being posed since we worked for an organisation which name meant ‘shelter’), the right thing to do was to say no. Being a family with two small children and at the time not living in a community of other people, to consider having criminals with weapons looking for this man, had not been courageous, but rash. On the other hand, housing very troubled people with addiction or psychological problems can be possible when sharing the work in a community of other responsible adults, with many ears and eyes to make it a safe venture. To not welcome some of those people may have been showing signs of cowardice, it would be to shrink away from showing care and concern.100

The total openness to the ‘Other’, demanded by Levinas, and the unconditional welcome, described by Derrida, would certainly include huge risk. A courageous person on the other hand considers risk-taking and is open to the stranger, but does not show limitless hospitality.

b) Humility: knowing oneself and one’s limits.

Humility is considered developed as a Christian virtue and not a virtue recognised by Aristotle. It is sometimes mistakenly confused with being meek and having low self-esteem. C.S Lewis once wrote that: ‘thousands of humans have been brought to think that humility means pretty women trying to believe they are ugly and clever men trying to believe they are fools.’101

A common way of describing humility is as a virtue standing between self-abasement and a too high view of oneself. Dag Hammarskjöld (United Nations Secretary-General 1953-61), gave a good definition in his Waymarks (Vägmärken): ‘Humility is just as much the opposite of self-abasement as it is of self-exaltation. To be humble is not to make

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100 MacIntyre says that: ‘Courage, the capacity to risk harm and danger to oneself, has its role in human life because of this connection with care and concern.’ After Virtue, 224.
comparisons. Secure in its reality, the self is neither better nor worse, bigger nor smaller, than anything else in the universe."102

The self-knowledge that Hammarskjöld portrays, would make a person well aware of their limitations and would also make the person more open to receiving and engaging with others, because they would see beyond them self. This kind of openness has been observed in research related to the L’Arche communities.103 The study, conducted by Michael Spezio, Gregory Peterson and Robert C. Roberts, was an attempt to come closer to a definition and assessment of humility. The researchers point out the challenge and yet the importance to substantiate the concept of humility with empirical examples.104 The study was a semantic network analysis. It made a comparison between understandings of humility, based on interviews with L’Arche Assistants and writings of Jean Vanier on the one hand, and ‘a large corpus of texts reflecting standard English usage’105 of humility, on the other. In the L’Arche related part of the study they found a theme of ‘humility as openness to others’, where openness meant ‘the inclusion of the other as valued together (inseparably) with the self’.106 The standard English usage showed no such relation between humility and openness. The authors argue that humility understood as closely related to openness, should be viewed as a primarily interactive virtue, having to do with personal relationships.107

Humility as openness, in combination with knowing oneself and one’s limitation, I deem as a prerequisite for practicing hospitality. Knowing one’s limits can be interpreted both as not overstepping certain boundaries for oneself and one’s near community, thus making the host aware of when they can receive a guest and in what way. Further, it means knowing that one is limited in one’s understanding of oneself and others, wherefore one needs to learn and take time in engagement with others in order to meet as equals.

c) Patience: overcoming frustration

‘Aristotle defines patience (praoes) as a “slowness to anger”; more broadly, a disposition to moderately forbear frustration, disappointment, injury, or insult’108 The opposite of patience is

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103 Spezio, Peterson and Roberts, “Humility as openness”.  
104 I assume, they would argue that for any virtue. There is much written on the virtues, but seems to be much less so in conjunction to applied ethics.  
105 Spezio, Peterson and Roberts, 38.  
106 Ibid, 32.  
107 Ibid, 33.  
108 Vallor, Technology and the Virtues, 145.
impatience, which can come out as irritation and anger. Another opposite would be to show extreme forbearance\textsuperscript{109} which some identified with being morally and socially disengaged\textsuperscript{110}. For example, if a person would not react to injustices done to them. Matthew Pianalto argues that that kind of disengagement is not patience:

\begin{quote}
part of the value of patience is that it enables us to remain fruitfully attentive and engaged when adversity or distraction would otherwise lead us to try to flee a situation, or to give in to despair or anger in the face of what seem to be insurmountable problems. In patience, one endures, and patience create space for reflection, imagination, and vision – all of which may be necessary for adhering to our own goals and ideals.\textsuperscript{111}
\end{quote}

Understood thus, there are many times in a day when we practice patience to some degree. Certain contexts and times require more patience than others. Parenting toddlers is for example commonly known as demanding a good deal of patience. So is dealing with difficult colleagues or living with illness and, in practicing hospitality.

For hospitality is not to be considered a cosy and easy practice, but takes effort. One aspect of that effort is to be patient with guests since the guest, the stranger, may display all sorts of inappropriate, ungrateful and maybe harmful behaviour. The harm may lie in not being careful of material things in the hosts house and space, rearranging furniture at will, throwing away your precious old mugs without asking and replacing with new ones from IKEA, assuming that you will be available for a conversation at all times or sowing seeds of distrust in other guests because their own agenda was not followed. And on it goes.

Hospitality, at least in a community context like those described in section 4.2.1, also requires patience when working practically with people who have little skill and needs basic learning or whose attitude is not geared towards being helpful. Patience in conversation is likewise of great importance when having discussions between people of different beliefs and backgrounds.

Having considered some virtues in hospitable practice, let us now turn to another feature of hospitality, namely the aspect of reciprocity.

4.2.3 Reciprocity in Hospitality

Does hospitality demand a response of kindness or some kind of reward from the guest? In my definition of hospitality, I state that the gift of welcome is done without assuming

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\item \textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
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reciprocity. Some may think that it sounds close to Derrida’s *Law of hospitality*, the unconditional welcome.

I would argue that not assuming reciprocity, means that the host does not practice hospitality *in order to get* a reward. But, it does not exclude the possibility that reward of some kind may be an outcome of hospitality. In fact, from my experience, there is much to gain from acting as host even if that is not originally what is sought after. The ungrateful guest as described in previous section, is of course not the average guest. On the contrary, most guests show gratitude. That can enhance the host’s self-esteem, which becomes like a reward. More importantly though, a hospitable setting fosters a mutual sharing of experiences, ideas and skills. That is not only benefitting the guest, but also the host. This benefit can of course, over time, for the host become a known aspect of showing hospitality. That knowledge then may be expected as an outcome, but is not necessarily the reason for being hospitable. How this plays out in practitioners of hospitality looks different in each individual. Some may continually be acting hospitably without assuming reciprocity. Others may come to assume reciprocity in a demanding fashion. If so, they would cease to be hospitable.

Now, if reciprocity is an aspect of hospitality, is hospitality possible if there is no reciprocity? That is, if the guest show no sign of gratitude for the gift and if there is no mutual sharing of any kind, can the host continue showing hospitality? I believe not. Hospitality is an interpersonal encounter between two or more people. If the host is totally overlooked by the guest, there is no interpersonal relationship. Aspects of such situations are well known, like when some people constantly give of their time and energy and the receiving party only takes. Situation like that is often thought to lead to burnout.

This discussion on reciprocity begs the question of what responsibility we have to each other. Does the guest have any responsibility or only the host? Although an important question, it is beyond the limits of this thesis to delve into that. I merely reiterate that hospitality is an interpersonal practice. It is not a one-way street, wherefore there has to be responsibility on behalf of both guest and host. The question of responsibility brings me back to duties and to what we have a right to claim. In the next section I come back to Kantian hospitality and discuss a possible objection to my thesis.

4.3 Is Kantian Hospitality Right?
Some readers may ask if I argue that we shouldn’t view hospitality as a right at all? Does hospitality have nothing to with rights? Such questions assume a false dichotomy, which places the view of a right to hospitality in opposition to hospitality viewed as an interpersonal
practice. My problem with Kantian hospitality is not the idea that all humans have a right to visit any place, ‘in virtue of our common right of possession on the surface of the earth’\textsuperscript{112}. Nor do I find it problematic to consider a right to citizenship for asylum seekers as suggested by Benhabib\textsuperscript{113}. The problem is rather how the concept of hospitality is used by Kant. He clearly makes a new definition of hospitality, in which hospitality is no longer ‘to be understood as a virtue of sociability, as the kindness and generosity one may show to strangers who come to one’s land or who become dependent upon one’s acts of kindness through circumstances of nature or history’\textsuperscript{114}. Kant’s and Benhabib’s definition, limits hospitality to the dimension of state law and policies. As I have displayed previous in this chapter, I believe that hospitality is a much richer concept and practice than Kantian hospitality give room for. My understanding of hospitality does not exclude rights. On the contrary, I would argue in line with Nussbaum that we have every reason to consider human rights on the basis of human dignity and sociability.\textsuperscript{115} The dignity of persons and their sociability can be viewed as a fundamental basis for hospitality. This view puts emphasize on the dignity of both guest and host, which makes the point that neither should take advantage of the other and that both have responsibilities to one another. It also reiterates that humans are social beings and that the practice of hospitality is central to human existence. Therefore, considering hospitality in the social dimension includes rights as one aspect of hospitality.

4.4 Hospitality fostering Integration

In contrast to the migration ethics discourse, hospitality should be viewed more in relation to integration than to migration. The discussions on laws and policies which are set up to regulate migration, deals with country borders, with asylum-seekers and the process that lead up to the point when the migrant gets a residence permit. Hospitality used within the migration discourse can be thought of as referring to opening of a door to the stranger, but stops at that. Traditional hospitality does not stop at the opening of a door. A hospitable person also takes care of and engages with the guest. That is why hospitality should be considered in the context of integration. Hospitality takes place in a certain space and context

\textsuperscript{112} Kant, Perpetual Peace, 138.
\textsuperscript{113} Benhabib, The Rights of Others, 221.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid, 26.
\textsuperscript{115} Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species membership (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 78. For an interesting discussion on human rights, see page 284-291.
and it is not a passing moment, but is done over time. Integration likewise, is a process in a certain context which takes time.

Courage, humility and patience, as portrayed above, is not only needed in the context of hospitality but also in the process of integration. It is not only a prerequisite for the host to hold those virtues, but also important for the guest. It takes courage to knock on a stranger’s door and enter into an unfamiliar space. Here we have to remember, that from the migrants point of view, the hosts are strangers. Entering into the new space is a risk-taking, which most migrants from a situation of dire need, probably has considered.

Humility, as openness to others and knowing oneself, is likewise important in the process of integration. A society in which people were neither self-exalting or self-abasing, but instead secure in themselves would surely be better equipped to receive immigrants from very different cultural contexts than their own. Openness to others, means a welcoming attitude which is not only about taking care of and serving the needy stranger. It also means a measure of curiosity and interest in learning of what is outside of the self.

Humility in terms of knowing oneself will of course look different between all individuals, but the situation of forced migration probably changes a person’s self-knowledge. Many have been traumatised and the situation will for some cause deep crisis of identity. On top of that crisis, not knowing the language in the new context will probably make the migrant well aware of their limitations. Being in such a situation and meeting people in the host-society who are interested and ready to learn about the newcomer, is more likely to help the immigrant find their place in the new society, with somewhat more ease. When met with attitudes that does not reinforce their ‘strangeness’, the immigrant will probably be helped in dealing with their identity crisis and thus build up the self-knowledge and therefore humility, in the right sense of the word.

The process of integration, learning a language and cultural customs, takes time. It is a process that can cause much frustration. The frustration can be directed at a person, for not understanding or trying hard enough to understand, or it may be the circumstance which creates frustration in both parties. Therefore, patience is needed both on part of the host-society as well as the stranger.

Now, if the reader agrees that it is reasonable to consider patience as an important aspect in the process of integration, the reader may disagree with the civic integration model, (described in section 2.4), which is critiqued by some scholars in political science and sociology. They point out that the civic integration policies have made integration fuse with
requirements to settle in a country\textsuperscript{116}, like language courses and different kinds of contracts set up between immigrant and the host-society\textsuperscript{117}. Also, integration has moved from being a concern for the local community to become mainly a state concern.\textsuperscript{118} This is problematic in that it does not take into account the social bases for integration.\textsuperscript{119}

Interestingly, this means that both hospitality and integration have followed a similar pattern in political and social theory discourses. Both concepts have gone from a local and social dimension, and moved to the realm of state policy. This move is unfortunate and the understanding of integration needs revising. This thesis does not attempt to show exactly what that could look like, but rather attempts to point out that there is a need to look more to the social interplay between people in the host-society and immigrants settling in that country. One way to do that is to return the concept of hospitality to the dimension where it is best applied, that is, the social, and to look at what can be learnt from the practice of hospitality as interpersonal interaction over time, in the process of integration.

Connecting hospitality and integration is not a utopian ideal that all people can live in a cosy community and agree on everything. The point is that without a measure of hospitality understood as interpersonal, there is less chance of reaching the understanding and esteem between people, which will be needed for a flourishing society. Hospitality works as social cohesion and is therefore, when practiced not only to friends, but also to strangers, a good basis for integration between people of all sorts. In other words, the value of hospitality lies in its purpose. One aspect of that purpose is that it can further integration.

The very idea of integration, different parts coming together as a whole, implies the idea of community. Both hospitality and integration takes place in a community. It is also in communities that we are fostered to hold certain ethical beliefs and where we practice our morals. Since hospitality is bound up with social interactions it is also a practice which is learnt in community. The learning is habitual, we learn from practicing and the practice becomes habit.\textsuperscript{120} This is what virtue ethics refers to as \textit{fostering virtues}.

A community has to practice hospitality in order to learn how to do it well. In a similar vein, in order for integration to take place, there needs to be practices in place that will foster integration. The practice of hospitality overlaps with integration on several fronts. The same

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{116} Joppke, “Civic integration,” 1153.
\item \textsuperscript{117} Goodman, “Integration Requirements for Integration’s Sake?” 753.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Joppke, “Civic integration,” 1153.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Vallor, \textit{Technology and the Virtues}, 66-69.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The virtues necessary for hospitality are important also for the process of integration. Therefore, a society that practices hospitality can be said to foster integration.

If it is in society’s interest to reach integration between people of different contexts and beliefs, we should firstly leave aside the idea that integration mainly is a state concern. Secondly, the state may in some ways be able to promote a hospitable society, how that could look should be closely considered. Thirdly, members of a community should take responsibility to promote integration amongst them. That is, not only integration between the host-society and the unfamiliar migrants, but also integration between people of differing beliefs and practices that have lived there for generations. Thus understood, the practice of hospitality with its outcome of social cohesion and integration, is in the best interest of all society and not to be viewed as a method to ‘fixing the integration of immigrants’.  

5. CONCLUSION
The current migration ethics discourse is impoverished. Hospitality has become all about admitting migrants over a border or not. Instead, I suggest that hospitality mainly is related to integration and have explored aspects of that relationship.

Understandings of hospitality in the migration ethics discourse is influenced by ideas of philosophers Kant, Levinas and Derrida. Their ideas were briefly outlined and the migration ethics discourse portrayed. An evaluation of the discourse pointed to the main concern that migration ethics almost exclusively pay attention to hospitality within the political dimension of society. On top of this main concern, there is reason to question the content of some of the philosophical understandings of hospitality and with some interpretations of the same. By neglecting the social dimension of hospitality, individuals in the host-society are left out from responsibility for migrants and there is no attention payed to hospitality as playing an important role in what takes place after stepping over the country border, that is, the process of integration.

In line with virtue ethics, I suggest that the social interplay between human beings is central to how morality is to be understood. Therefore, we should pay attention to the intertwined relation between the political and social dimensions of hospitality and integration.

Traditional hospitality is still practiced today and some examples of that were displayed. Following that, I suggested three virtues as prerequisites for hospitality. Namely:

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121 This is what MacIntyre would call the ‘internal good’ of a practice. ‘External goods’ are those things that is the property of or to the benefit of an individual. ‘Internal goods’ are things that enriches the whole community. *After Virtue*, 222-228.
the virtue of *courage*: as taking considered risk, the virtue of *humility*: as knowing oneself and one’s limits and finally the virtue of *patience*: as overcoming frustration. These virtues are necessary but not sufficient conditions for hospitality. (The topic of virtues in hospitality is a large subject that needs developing further.) The practice of hospitality was described as a gift which does not assume reciprocity, but some kind of reward can be an outcome of hospitality and this may be a well-known aspect amongst practitioners of hospitality. Further, the possible Kantian objection that this understanding of hospitality does not consider the *right* to hospitality, was rebutted. The problem with Kantian hospitality is that it is limited, since it only considers hospitality in the political dimension. Considering hospitality in the social dimension can include rights as one, amongst several, aspects of hospitality.

It is unfortunate that both the concept of hospitality and that of integration has become mainly a state concern. Therefore, the understanding of integration needs revising. I argue that the idea of integration implies the idea of community, wherein both hospitality and integration takes place. I suggest that hospitality works as social cohesion and therefore is a good basis for integration between people of all sorts. In order for integration to take place, there needs to be practices in place that will foster integration. The virtues prerequisite for hospitality are important also in the process of integration. Therefore, a society which practices hospitality can be said to foster integration.

Hospitality is a rich concept which has much to tell us about interpersonal engagement over time, both to friends as well as strangers. If we have an interest in being a hospitable society, we have reason to explore all the layers of hospitality and consider how that might be promoted in order to further integration.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


