Learning To Be (come) A Good European

A Critical Analysis of the Official European Union Discourse on European Identity and Higher Education

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Abstract
During the year 2007, when this thesis was completed, the European Union could look back at fifty years of collaboration, which began with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and which has developed from being mainly economic in character to incorporating a political as well as a social dimension at the European level. In 2007 the European Union also commemorated the twentieth anniversary of Erasmus, its higher education mobility programme. It is this relatively new political dimension which I have been interested in investigating in this thesis. More precisely it is the political construction of a common European identity which is analysed using a critical discourse analysis approach. The major aim of this thesis has been two-fold. The first aim has been to investigate how the European is constructed in the discourse contained within the official European Union policy documents. I have been interested in analysing the various structures, in the form of ideas and norms which are used in order to construct ‘the European’. The second aim has been to explore whether the role of higher education, as constructed in the official European Union discourse, is given a similar identity-making role as education is argued to have in the nation-state according to the theory on national identity. I argue that there are three version of European identity construction, i.e. cultural, civic, and neo-liberal, with their own relationship to higher education, present in the empirical material analysed, consisting of official European Union documents. Further, this thesis is also a study of the power of modern government. I argue that there is an increase in normative soft power where ‘The Good European’ is not something ‘you’ are but something ‘you’ become by being a responsible active citizen. Through the use of critical discourse analysis I illuminate the power which resides in the language in the discourse analysed. Thus, I have been interested in investigating how the official European Union discourse on European identity and higher education works to both include and exclude individuals.

Keywords: identity, higher education, ‘Unity in Diversity’, ‘European dimension’, language, citizenship, activity, mobility, neo-liberalism, competitiveness, ‘Knowledge Economy’, flexibility, Lifelong Learning, skills.
"Study is to study what cannot be studied. Undertaking means undertaking what cannot be undertaken. Philosophizing is to philosophize about what cannot be philosophized about. Knowing that knowing is unknowable is true perfection."

- Chuang Tzu (c. 360 BC – c. 275 BC)

This is my story….

It was at school that my interest for the world first developed. I loved reading about children my own age in other parts of the globe. Also, it was through one of my teachers that I got my first pen pal when I was around ten years old. It was a little freckled boy from Australia, who just like me lived on a farm and had his own horse. In the following years, as I learnt English at school, I would write to many more boys and girls from all around the world and learn about what their lives were like, what they liked to do in their spare-time, what their ambitions for the future looked like, etc. By writing to them I realised that even though their everyday lives might differ from mine we also had many things in common, such as hopes about the future and values, which made it possible, despite differences, for us to relate to each other. I can still remember the amazing feeling of receiving letters with exotic stamps from places far away. Remember, this was the time B.C., i.e. before computers. However, as I grew older reading about the world was no longer enough. This interest in the world outside Sweden brought me to England when I was twenty years old. I came across the North Sea with a dream of living and experiencing another culture and way of life first hand. After a few years there I decided that I wanted to study at the university, and why not in England. For the next three years I took advantage of coming from an European Union Member State and got to study there for free, and then a further year completing a Masters at my own expense. When I started this research process I knew I wanted to write ‘something’ about identity since it is a subject which has fascinated me since my undergraduate days, which was also when I first became intrigued by the relationship between the nation and the nation-state under the conditions of globalisation and how these new circumstances have affected the role and nature of national identity. However, with this thesis, I saw an opportunity to broaden my investigative horizon by moving outside the nation-state borders. Having lived in the European Union’s two most Eurosceptic Member States, i.e. Sweden and Great Britain, I had followed the public debate on European Union membership which often contained critical arguments in relation to a common European identity which made me curious about what is actually meant by a European identity.
I would like to thank the people who have influenced me and encourage me over the years in my academic career. I would like to begin by thanking Dr. Christopher May, at University of the West of England in Bristol, who introduced me to the subject of International Relations and Dr. Hazel Smith, at Warwick University in Coventry, who furthered this interest and who has served as an inspiration, both as a scholar in International Relations and as a woman in academia. In addition I would like to thank Ben Rosamond whose course on European Integration I took during my Masters at Warwick University and who opened up my eyes to the wonderful world of European studies.

I would also like to thank Peo Hansen who has not only read various versions of my script and commented on them but who has also shared with me his great knowledge on issues on the European Union and identity. I also have to pay gratitude to Marianne Winter Jörgensen for her perceptive comments on my script which gave me a lot of food for thought and which forced me to think hard about what was the main issue that I wanted to purvey with my thesis. I am also grateful for the thorough reading and insightful comments I received from Jacob Westberg on my script which were of great help in finishing stages of the research process.

I am also grateful for all the support and constructive criticism which I have received from all my colleagues during my years at the Politics department at Linköping University. I want to thank my supervisor Geoffrey Gooch for having confidence in me and giving me the opportunity to do what I dreamt of doing. Special thanks also goes out to Mikael Baaz, whom I consider to be both a colleague and a great friend, for giving me encouragement when I doubted myself and inspiring me to think about what I can and want to do career wise once this thesis was finished. I am also grateful that you lured me out of the office once in a while and was prepared to listen to me ranting about my thesis and making me laugh over a beer or two. I also have to mention fellow PhD student Rickard Mikaelsson, with his rough Northern charm, whom I shared an office with for two years. I have missed our debating and bickering but I did get a lot more done once I got my own office. In addition, I would like to thank our department secretary, Kerstin Karlsson, who has been a fountain of knowledge and a great support in my role as a teacher during these years, which has meant one less thing to worry about on top of the thesis. Further, I am forever grateful for the in-depth reading, encouragement and emotional support which I have received from my colleagues Elin Wiborg and Maria Alm. I am not sure how I would have reached the finishing line without you. I also want to thank Amanda Rafter for all the help she has given me in relation to the layout of the
thesis. It has been invaluable for a technically challenged person like me. I also want to thank Johanna Nählinder for taking time to listen to me, cheering me up and putting things in perspective. I have really appreciated our talks on life, love and literature. A special ‘thank you’ also has to be given to the present and future doctors at the Economics department. I have treasured our spirited dinners, whether there has been quiche or cray-fish on the menu. I am still worried about inviting you back to my flat though in case I get evicted because of the loud laughter... Whoever said that academics are boring? A final ‘Hurray’ I would like to bestow upon my fellow PhD students at the (no longer existing) Economics Institution. I don’t know how I would have survived the last five (well almost six) years without being able to share my highs and lows with you over lunch or a beer.

Last but not least I would like to thank all those people who have reminded me of the fact that there is life outside the University and beyond this thesis. These include my darling friends Cina, Cilla, Linda and Sofia, whom I have known since we studied together for our Swedish equivalent of A-levels in Vänersborg many years ago. Thank you for being so forgiving and patient with me when I have been caught up in my work and been bad at keeping in touch. I hope we will get to see each other more often now that I have finally managed to complete this thesis. I also want to send my love to my sisters, Anna and Linn, whom have always been there to support me. Also, lots of hugs and kisses goes out to my nieces and nephew who have reminded me, when I have lost perspective, of what is really important in life. Thank you Tilda, Hannes and Siri! And finally, to those persons without whom I would not have been here, thank you Mum and Dad for always believing in me. You brought me up to be the curious, inquisitive, investigative and reflective person that I am today. I could not have done this without your love and support.
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- Chapter One -

Setting the Stage

- Placing European Identity and Higher Education in a Context -

“All the world is a stage, And all the men and women merely players. They have their exits and entrances; Each man in his time plays many parts”
- William Shakespeare (‘Jaques’, As You Like It, Act II, Scene VII)

Introduction

When the finishing touches were added to this thesis in the spring of 2007 the European Union could look back at fifty years of collaboration, which began with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and which has developed from being mainly economic in character to incorporating a political as well as a social dimension at the European level.¹ In 2007 the European Union also commemorated the twentieth anniversary of Erasmus, its higher education mobility program.² It is this relatively new political dimension which I am interested in investigating in this thesis. More precisely it is the political construction of a common European identity which is analysed using a critical discourse analysis approach. This study is critical in the sense that it does not take what it means to be European to be set in stone but rather views it as a continuous, never ending process of construction. To pinpoint the focus of this study further, it investigates which role higher education is given in the construction of European identity and in extension ‘the European’. Questions of identity are intimately linked to education, which is a fact which has informed me in my choice of research questions.³ In the modern state school plays an important role as it reproduces power positions within society.⁴ In addition, education is used as a tool to create and recreate national identity thus generating a sense of continuity from generation to generation.

¹ For simplicity the term ‘European Union’ is used consistently throughout this thesis even though I am aware that the term ‘European Community’ was used up until the Maastricht Treaty came into force in 1993 after that the Maastricht meeting took place in 1991 and the Treaty was signed in 1992.
However, this does not mean that identity is fixed and constant. Rather, the nature of identity is fluid and sensitive to time and place; it is affected by political climate and prevailing norms. Hence, identity is an ongoing process of construction and reconstruction accomplished through social interaction in the form of language and communication. This means that while ideas, associated with identity, prevail their meanings can and do change over time which is due to constant discursive struggles taking place between different actors as to who gets to decide what is seen as ‘true’. I have been curious to investigate whether education is argued, in the European Union discourse analysed, to play the same role at the European level. In the nation-state education, in the form of compulsory primary and secondary levels, has been seen as an essential tool in shaping children into good citizens. In this thesis I have chosen to look at higher education rather than lower levels of education since it is post-compulsory education, which is increasingly being emphasised at the European level. According to the European Union “[h]igher education plays a central role in the development of both human beings and modern societies as it enhances social, cultural and economic development, active citizenship and ethical values.” The European Union’s reason for stressing higher education rather than lower levels, I argue, is due to practical problems. For mobility to work at the European level it requires the student for example to be able to speak a foreign language fluently and be comfortable and willing to spend time away from her/his family, which is a quality which is acquired with age. In addition, it might seem more effective to target students, rather than pupils, since students are on the brink of becoming workers and one of the main goals of the European Union and European integration is to make the common market work through the mobility of workers.

The more precise purpose of this thesis is two-fold. The first aim is to investigate how ‘the European’ is constructed in the discourse contained within official European Union policy documents. I am interested in analysing the various structures, in the form of ideas and norms, which define who ‘the European’ is. Special attention is paid to the myths and symbols present in the discourse. The second aim is to explore whether the role of higher education, as constructed in the European Union policy documents analysed, is given a similar identity-making role as education is argued to have in national identity discourse. Further, in relation to these aims, this study is concerned with the nature of power and how power is used to construct identities. Discourses can be seen as structures but they also shape structures.

1. Ideas on European Identity and Higher Education Evolving in Tandem

The overreaching aim of this thesis has been to analyse how the European identity discourse has developed in tandem with European Union higher education policy field from the early 1970s up until the present day. I have been interested in investigating what, if any, relationship exists between European identity and higher education. The reason for taking the empirical starting point in the early 1970s is the fact that education was not mentioned in the Treaty of Rome but was solely in the hands of the Member States until the early 1970s when the European Union Member States began to discuss the issue. However, Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the European integration process, is rumoured to have said that if he had had the chance to start over again he would start with education. After initial talks on cooperation in higher education had taken place further initiatives were put on the back-burner as the Member States had more urgent tasks to deal with, such as the crisis relating to capitalist economics and structural changes. The initiatives that were taken during the 1970s mainly dealt with transparency of degrees for specific professions, ranging from medicine to architecture, in other words vocational training rather than higher education generally. In the 1980s, the economic situation improved and the Single European Act (SEA) was adopted in 1986, and further actions were taken, such as the introduction of Erasmus, as mentioned above. In the beginning of the 1990s cooperation in the area of higher education gained new momentum when both education and European citizenship were written into the Maastricht Treaty. In addition, during the 1990s there was an emphasis on the importance of a ‘European dimension’ in education. At the end of the decade the Bologna Agreement, which deals with

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7 Bieler, A. & Morton, A.D., “A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and historical change: neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations”, Capital & Class, No. 82, Spring 2004, pp. 85-114, p. 85. There were two oil crises during the 1970s, i.e. one in 1973-1974 and another one in 1979. The first one was caused by the fact that the OPEC countries stopped their supply of oil to the West as a reaction to the USA taking the side of Israel in the Yom Kippur war. The second crisis occurred in the wake of the Iranian revolution. See Rubin, A., “The Double-Edged Crisis: OPEC and the Outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War”, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 7, No. 4, December 2003, pp. 1-14.

8 The SEA came into force on the 1 July 1987.
streamlining of higher education structures to aid international mobility, was signed. One of the main aims of the Bologna Agreement is to create a European Higher Education Area (EHEA). Higher education has been given an increasingly elevated position on the European Union political agenda, which can for example be seen by its prominent inclusion in the Lisbon Strategy, agreed on in 2001, is an example of a wider neo-liberal political rationality, which has become hegemonic in many parts of the world. This strategy is not solely concerned with educational questions but is rather interested in issues of increasing growth and the number as well as quality of jobs. It also puts an emphasis on the need for the citizen to be an active, flexible lifelong learner. One of the aims of the Lisbon Strategy is to make the European Union the world’s leading and most dynamic Knowledge Economy by 2010, is included, a goal which the Member States today are far from realising. This led the European Union decision makers to re-launch the Lisbon Strategy in 2005.

However, the European Union has also been faced with problems and set-backs in the last few years, what the Economist referred to as a midlife crisis, such as the increasingly low turn out numbers in European Parliament elections and the rejection of the proposed Constitution by the French and Dutch public. In the words of Barroso, the present President of the European Commission (hereafter the Commission), the latter stumbling block “has undoubtedly cast a shadow over Europe”. These problems raise questions about the future governance of the European Union; in this context it has been suggested, by both academics and policy-makers, that a common European identity would add legitimacy to the European integration process generally and make the European Union institutions more democratic more specifically. However, it is not an all together easy task and European Union policy-makers are faced with a number of questions. How could/should this common European identity be constructed? This question raises further questions. Who is “the European”? Who should be able to claim

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10 The Bologna Agreement is not a European Union initiative but was initiated by a group of European Union Member States and has later been signed by all Member States as well as a group of countries that are not part of the European Union.

11 Higher education is sometimes also referred to as ‘tertiary education’, i.e. the third level of education after the initial primary and secondary levels.


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membership? And perhaps most importantly, what kind of a political community should the European Union be? In other words, how European identity is constructed depends on what kind of European Union is seen as desirable. Is it a cultural and/or civic community? Or are Europeans mainly connected through economic interests? Discussions on what it means to be European gained momentum after the fall of Communism in 1989 and the end of the Cold War as there was uncertainty about how to define Europe and the European.15 The issue of identity has increasingly also been discussed in relation to the last two enlargements in 2005 and 2007 when the number of Member States increased from fifteen to twenty-seven and the borders of the Union moved outwards and eastwards, to what is sometimes referred to as the ‘soft underbelly’ of Europe, or what is sometimes referred to as the Other Europe, which has meant an increase in diversity.16 The question is how much diversity can be contained within the European Union before the European Union motto of ‘Unity in Diversity’ becomes untenable.

2. Relevancy of the Study

The purpose of critical discourse analysis is to challenge the status quo. I believe this thesis can contribute to the critical analysis of how the European and his/her Others are constructed. Further, I hope that it can help us think about how to construct identities differently in the future in order to make them less marginalising and excluding. An additional reason for looking closer at European identity is the fact that despite increased attention given to questions of identity and citizenship in contemporary Europe the issue of European identity is still fairly under-researched and especially concerning its relationship to education. As Schlesinger would have it, Europe became a new cultural battlefield.17 However, identity is not only a cultural category even though this is the most common way to define it. Through citizenship identity becomes a political concept. At the European level this happened with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty where both a citizenship and education were written in. As I will show in this thesis, when analysing European Union documents dealing with European

16 One of the most famous references to the idea of the ‘soft underbelly’ was made by Winston Churchill in a speech in 1942. However, this idea has also become part of academic discourses on security and/or migration. See for example Debeljak, A., “European Forms of Belonging”, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2003, pp. 151-165, pp. 151, 160. For an interesting discussion on the Balkans as the soft underbelly of Europe and the use of anatomical metaphors generally in European security discourse see Luoma-Aho, M., “Body of Europe and Malignant Nationalism: A Pathology of the Balkans in European Security Discourse”, Geopolitics, Vol. 7, No. 3, Winter 2002, pp. 117-142. However, it is not always Eastern and Central Europe which is deemed the ‘soft underbelly’. Sometimes it refers to Mediterranean countries such as Spain, Italy or Greece, which are the destination for many illegal immigrants. See for example Brochmann, G., “The Current Traps of European Immigration Policies”, Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations, 1/03, 2004, School of International Migration and Ethnic Relations, Malmö University, Sweden, (http://dpace.mah.se/bitstream/2043/696/1/Willy%20Brandt%202003-1.pdf, accessed 2007-10-03), pp. 1-21, p. 14.
identity and higher education three versions of European identity crystallise, i.e. cultural, civic, and neo-liberal, each with a specific relationship to higher education. And as I will show in chapter five, six and seven, these three forms of identity do not exist in a vacuum but they have shared points of reference. To distinguish these three versions of European identity from the official European Union discourse on European identity and higher education I have used the theory on national identity as a blueprint to compare the European identity discourse against and to make it possible to accentuate similarities and divergences between the two discourses.

I am not alone in my interest in questions of identity. The term ‘identity’ became part of the social science vocabulary in the 1950s, i.e. approximately fifty years ago and it has been a popular object to study for decades. However, the term ‘identity’ is so frequently used in political discourse, as well as colloquial language, that it is at risk of losing its’ meaning all together. Put another way, since ‘identity’ seems to mean so many different things to so many actors it is at risk of meaning nothing. This means that the concept of identity is notoriously difficult to define, or as Stråth would have it, sticky and unstable, even when it is qualified as collective and cultural. This means that there are power struggles taking place over who gets to define identity and how it is defined. More precisely, the identity making process is an act of power in the sense that certain truth claims about who ‘we’ are are made which become hegemonic while other versions of ‘reality’ are excluded. I believe identities are important to study since they both tell ‘us’ who ‘we’ are and who ‘the Other’ is. In other words, identities are a source of meaning and experience for the individual. At the same time identities work as strong and sometimes absolute forms of exclusion, especially in its cultural form. Generally, by being aware of how identities exclude we can work towards creating more open and democratic forms of identity. Further, I am convinced that research into European identity can have a wider use. It is often argued that the European Union is trying to export the idea of large-scale regional integration of which the European Union is an example. If other parts of the world decide to mimic the European integration process they will probably also attempt to construct a sense of a common identity as well. In that sense the conclusions put forward in this thesis could apply to these areas as well. A further reason for my choice of research topic

is the fact that, despite interest in questions of identity in Europe, the issue of ‘the construction of the European’ has been under researched so far.21 I therefore believe my research can contribute to a deeper understanding of who ‘we’ Europeans are and how the different forms of identity has its own forms of exclusion. An area, which has been granted a fair bit of scholarly attention, is that of what kind of European identity that the European integration process needs. There is often a distinction made between ‘thick’ versus ‘thin’ versions of identity, both with their own sets of pro’s and con’s.22 A ‘thick’ European identity is cultural in character while the ‘thin’ version is based on a minimal set of shared values. Hence, there is a contest between particularism versus universalism. Hence the latter would be less excluding and more democratic but it would not have the strong binding qualities that a ‘thick’ cultural version. As will be argued later in this thesis, a common civic and neo-liberal European identity can also be classified as ‘thin’ versions of belonging while still making clear divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

3. The Structure of This Thesis

Concerning the structure of this thesis, after this introductory chapter where I have positioned my research, in chapter two the theoretical foundations of this thesis are presented. After an initial brief introduction to the main constructivist assumptions there is a discussion on the meanings of discourse and power and how different actors and discourses attempt to gain the power to define what knowledge is seen as ‘true’ or not. As has been mentioned earlier, it is these ‘truths’ about who the European is and the role higher education should play which I am interested in illuminating in this thesis. This is followed by a discussion on the normative power contained within the art of modern government, i.e. governmentality, a concept which was introduced by French philosopher/historian Michel Foucault. I argue that this theory can help explain the power of modern government generally as an art of seduction. Hence, power is not simply negative and oppressive but also constructive. More specifically it can contribute to a deeper understanding of the power of education, as a governmentality
technology, in the process of constructing European identity and the idea of who the European ought to be.

In chapter three the reader is guided through the methodological maze, which I have gone through to reach my final conclusions. Hence, an overview of the research process and how I have come to the conclusions, which I have, is given. In other words I show how I have developed methodological tools to fit with my theoretical frame. However, I begin by problematising the ideas associated with identity and citizenship by looking at the theory on national identity and citizenship. Of special importance are the questions of how and why a common identity has been constructed and continuously re-constructed through various governmental ‘tools’, one of the most important being that of education, in the nation-state. The reason for looking closer at the national level is the fact that national identity discourse is claimed to serve as a blueprint for the construction of the European version. Therefore, in order to be able to argue that various specific identity versions are present in the official European Union documents analysed, it is necessary to be able to define what identity is and what ideas that are associated with the identity making process.

The fourth chapter investigates the role education generally and higher education more specifically has played over the centuries, since the Middle-ages, both at an international scale and in the nation-state. It shows how international mobility is not a new phenomenon but has been a reality in Europe for over eight hundred years. In addition, this chapter outlines how the education system in the Member States have developed in the years after the second world war to finally result in cooperation at the European level from the early 1970s and onwards. I argue that there has been a shift from creating mainly ‘hard’ law to making ‘soft’ law. In other words, there has been a move from mainly emphasising the need for comparability of diplomas to stressing the usefulness of the Open Method of Coordination when creating higher education policy in the European Union. What this means is that pressure is put on the European Union Member States to adapt to certain standards and strategies suggested at the European level. This shift is compatible with the idea of power as seduction.

In the fifth chapter the presentation of the results of the empirical analysis undertaken for the purpose of this thesis begins and is then continued in chapter six and seven. Each of these three chapters attempts to show how the different versions of European identity are constructed using various ideas and myths and which role is given to higher education.
Looking closer at the content of chapter five, I argue that present in the European Union documents analysed is the construction of a European cultural identity, in the form of appeals to a common European cultural heritage including shared values. However, the differences which exist among the Member States are also emphasised through the use of the concept of ‘Unity in Diversity’, including the diversity of languages, which exists within the European Union. Concerning the role of higher education in the process of constructing a cultural European identity, a ‘European dimension’ is stressed. The much reiterated importance of learning languages can be seen as one of the most important aspect of said dimension. Hence, in relation to European cultural identity the emphasis is on ‘Learning to be European’. In other words, ‘we’ need to be made aware of what it means to be European. In this sense, ‘you’ either are European or ‘you’ are ‘the Other’. However, as I will show, language learning is increasingly seen, not only as a right, but as a duty.

In chapter six the construction of a common civic or political European identity, in the form of a European citizenship, is highlighted. I argue that there has been a shift from speaking mainly of citizenship as rights to promoting the idea of active citizenship which means the European is expected to participate in civil society which in turn is hoped to lead to increased support for the European integration process in general and the European Union institutions more specific. In other words, both rights and obligations are needed for a social contract, similar to that in the nation-state, to appear. One of the rights, associated with European Union citizenship, which I investigate, and which is emphasised in European Union discourse is that of mobility. It is hoped that by taking advantage of the rights associated with European citizenship the individual will look more positively at the European integration process. Further, in relation to higher education the assumption is that by going abroad to study the individual will both experience the common European culture and the diversity of cultures first hand. In order to make mobility possible and an attractive option to the citizens the European Union has worked towards creating transferable degrees. For mobility to work it is important to students that the qualifications they attain in one European Union Member State will also be acknowledged in the other twenty-six Member States. Further, it is hoped that mobile students will become mobile workers and make a truly common market a reality. This form of identity is normative in the sense that it makes a distinction between the ‘Good’ versus the ‘Deviant’ European. The latter being the individual who are not supportive of democratic values and participates actively in public life and who do not actively use the rights offered to him/her through the European Union citizenship. This form of European
identity also implicitly constructs an ‘External Other’ in the form of all those outside the European Union/Europe who are deemed undemocratic.

In chapter seven I argue that there are appeals made to a neo-liberal European identity present in the documents analysed. In these documents it is argued that in today’s globalised world there exists a ‘Knowledge Economy’ where individuals are expected to become ‘Lifelong Learners’ to make sure that the European Union Member States stay competitive on the world market. In the Lisbon Strategy it was stated that the aim is to make Europe the world’s leading ‘Knowledge Economy’ by 2010. This can be linked to the stress on both individuals and higher education institutions to be flexible and adapt to the changing demands of the market. In addition, ‘quality’ is being emphasised. This applies both to the teaching provided by the higher education institutions and the results of the individuals. This has entailed an increase in the need to audit higher education institutions and to grade students. Finally, there are specific skills and competences being promoted from the European Union, ranging from learning languages to being able to use Information Communication Technology. This form of European identity is closely connected to the idea of the active citizen and it is similar to the civic version normative in character. This form of European identity also constructs an internal and an ‘External Other’. The former is the individual who does not adapt to ‘the Knowledge Economy’ and participate actively in ‘Lifelong Learning’ and is therefore seen as a ‘Deviant European’. ‘The External Other’ are all those individuals outside Europe who have failed to adapt to the ‘Knowledge Economy’ or at least have not been as successful as the European citizens to do so.

In the eighth and final chapter I deliberate on what I have learnt about my empirical material during the research process. I ponder over what I have learnt from using governmentality theory when analysing the construction of identity. How useful has it been? Further, I consider what I have learnt about using discourse analysis as a method. Has it worked as well as I had hoped? To show how it has helped me I will look specifically at those ideas and norms which I argue are used to construct the European in the official European Union discourse. In addition, I consider what the general implications of my study are. Can my research results inform others that want to study the construction of identity or the role of education or even modern government more generally? Finally, I deliberate on possible future research in relation to the topic of this thesis.
Chapter Two
Discourse, Power and the Art of Seduction

Theoretical Foundation

“He who loves practice without theory is like the sailor who boards ship without a rudder and compass and never knows where he may cast”

- Leonardo da Vinci

Introduction

This chapter outlines, in three main parts, the theoretical assumptions which have guided me in my analysis of the European Union discourse on European identity and higher education found in official European Union documents. One of the foundational convictions I hold as a researcher is that discourses are constructions which means identities are too. This idea, that identities are constructed and not ‘natural’ or primordial, is not original but is rather a widely accepted assertion among social science scholars. Therefore a lengthy discussion on constructivism is not necessary. However, I believe it is helpful, both for me in my analysis and to guide the reader, to look closer at what kind of assumptions social constructivism makes about the world. Therefore, in the first part I explain how constructivism has informed my analysis. The constructivist approach carries with it specific beliefs, the most important one, in my mind, is that structures, in the form of for example ideas, limit what can realistically be said and thought. The second part of this chapter outlines the meaning of discourse and how a critical discourse analysis approach has helped me in my analysis. This discussion is important since there is no universal agreement on the meaning of ‘discourse’; it is rather a contested, or as sometimes argued, elastic, concept. I claim that it is useful to study discourses, and thereby the constructive process, since language not only “mirrors the world but constructs social reality” as well. Thus, it is a question of “representing reality” or creating a “social imaginary”. Consequently there is no ‘reality’ for us to find ‘out there’, rather, social ‘facts’ are constructed through discourse. This is what leads me to argue that there is nothing ‘natural’ or primordial about identities but rather formed in “historically

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3 For a discussion on social facts as constructions see for example Finn, C., “Social Reality”, (Routledge: London and New York, 1997).
specific relational settings” and that they are both fluid and multiple in character. I maintain that identities are socially constructed through discourses which shape the way we think about ourselves and the world around us and that they are therefore interesting topics of research. This leads on to the third and final part of this chapter, which investigates which role power, and associated ideas such as ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’, play in constructivist research. There is a specific constructivist power conception, which is often influenced by the work of Foucault and Lukes. “Forget Foucault” or rather “Oublier Foucault” – Baudrillard, a critic of the post-modern/post-structural French philosopher, proclaimed in the mid-1970s, over a decade before Foucault’s death. However, I believe, together with many other scholars, that Foucault’s thoughts, especially on power, are still as relevant today as they were during his lifetime. In Marshall’s words, Foucault is an enigma and I argue that Foucault’s writing on power in many ways has revolutionised the way scholars view the world. Foucault introduced the idea of modern government, also referred to as governmentality, which is associated with a specific conception of power as both restrictive and productive. Compared to older forms of disciplining power, modern government largely depends on a softer form of power where the individual is convinced that a specific behaviour is in her/his own best interest. Hence, there is an expectancy of activity. I believe this discussion can help to explain what I see as a ‘normative turn’ in relation to who the European is, or rather, should be, and what role higher education ought to have in this process.

1. The World According to Constructivism

Constructivism has become increasingly popular, or trendy as Checkel would have it, in social science research generally and in discourse analysis more specifically since the early 1990s. It has also attracted its supporters in the European integration studies area.

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However, while constructivist research in the social sciences generally and European studies more specifically have become increasingly accepted, there has been comparatively little attention paid to the idea of ‘la construction européenne’, which is a shortcoming I hope to help rectify with this thesis.11

I hesitate whether to use the term ‘social constructivism’ or simply ‘constructivism’.12 In academic literature these two headings often seem to be used interchangeably. Personally I am in favour of speaking of ‘social constructivism’ since it clearly states my conviction that social reality is humanly made. Social constructivism can be seen as a critical stance toward taken for granted knowledge.13 In relation to the aim of this thesis this means that the ‘Europe’ and the European do not exist as a reality or a ‘truth’ but are rather social constructs and so is European identity.14 However, for simplicity, I often merely refer to ‘constructivism’. In addition, I have elected to speak of the ‘construction’ or ‘creation’ of identity rather than to use a concept, such as ‘fabrication’, which carries with it negative connotations.15 The reason for this is that I want to illuminate that even though there is nothing ‘natural’ or primordial about identities, neither at the national nor the European level, they usually seem natural and important to the individual.

As was suggested above, constructivism comes in many shapes and sizes but one thing all approaches have in common is the conviction that structures matter. In Adler’s words: “constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations

13 I speak in singular here but I am aware that there is no such thing as a social constructivism. The multiple character of social constructivism is further discussed by Smith, S., “Social Constructivisms and European Studies” in Christiansen, T., Jorgensen, K.E. & Wiener, A., “The Social Construction of Europe”, (Sage Publications: London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, 2001), pp. 189-198. In addition I would like to highlight the fact that there are other forms of constructivism, or a continuum of constructivism, which can be used, such as for example radical/epistemological constructivism and cognitive constructivism. For an example of the former see Diez, T., “Speaking ‘Europe’: The Politics of Integration Discourse” in Christiansen, T., Jorgensen, K. E. & Wiener, A., “The Social Construction of Europe”, (Sage Publications: London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, 2001), pp. 85-100.
of the material world". Further, constructivists see actors as fundamentally social by the fact that their identities are made up of the institutionalised norms, values and ideas of the social environment within which they function. But what forms do structures take? Hence, what can be considered a structure? According to Wendt the social structure will contain three constituent parts: material conditions, interests, and ideas. He contends that “[w]ithout ideas there are no interests, without interests there are no meaningful material conditions, without material conditions there is no reality at all”. Institutionalised norms and ideas are important since they influence the actor as to what s/he sees as necessary and possible, both from a practical and ethical viewpoint. When looking at the interests of actors, these are not seen as constant (as realists might claim) by constructivists, but formed by communication, reflection on experience and by the performing of roles. Society, as a social structure, is the place where actors become knowledgeable political and social actors. Further, concerning the constructivist preoccupation with ideas as structures, Ruggie asserts that:

“Constructivists hold the view that the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place”.

Hence, structures shape actors’ identities through forms of imagination, communication and constraint. Looking further at the importance of structures, Reus-Smit suggests that structures shape the behaviour of social as well as political actors, individuals or states. In this situation normative or ideational structures are equally important as material structures. My focus, in line with discourse analysis in general, is on ideas. It is therefore important to understand how the non-material structures condition actors’ identities since they shape interests and as a result also the actions of the actors. In other words, identities constitute interests and actions. One of the hypotheses of constructivism is that the structures of human

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16 Adler, E., “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 319-363, p. 322. However, the degree of emphasis put on structures depends on which version of constructivism one adheres to. For example, radical constructivism mainly focuses on structure while social constructivism is more interested in analysing meaning while still taking structure into account.
17 Jupille et al. argue that moderate constructivists are interested in researching the role of what they call social facts, i.e. norms and culture, in the creation of the interests and identities of agents as well as states which they claim come about through vigorous processes of persuasion or social learning. See Jupille, J., Caporaso, J.A., & Checkel, J.T., “Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union,* Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 1 & 2, February/March 2003, pp. 7-40, p. 15.
association are primarily cultural rather than material phenomena, as materialists would claim, and that these structures do not simply regulate behaviour but also construct identities and interests, a view that rationalism would oppose. A final proposition is that agents and structures are mutually constituted. As is claimed by Reus-Smit, “[n]ormative and ideational structures may well condition the identities and interests of actors, but those structures would not exist if it were not for the knowledgeable practice of those actors”. It is these structures, in the form of ideas, present in the official European Union discourse on European identity in relation to higher education which I have been curious to investigate and illuminate in my analysis. Further, I have been interested in tracing changes in meaning of the ideas associated with the construction of European identity and the rationalities behind higher education.

Despite being increasingly popular, constructivism has not been without its critics. Checkle is critical of what he sees as constructivism’s lack of a theory of agency and early constructivist approaches’ tendency to put too much emphasis on the importance of social structures and norms while failing to give enough credit to the agents who facilitated their creation and change to begin with. Also, early constructivists tended to focus primarily if not solely on the norms and discourses of public actors, institutions, and elites, and thus reinforce the public vs. private dichotomy. In addition, it has been suggested that constructivism has been fairly poor at transcending the false dichotomy of ‘good’ and ‘bad’. This dichotomy exists in two forms: first, the subject of inquiry, such as for example norms, discourses, and ideas, and secondly, the demarcation of agents and according to Cowles-Green there is a tendency to look at ‘ethically good norms’.

2. The Power of Discourse Analysis

Besides being based on the constructivist assumptions highlighted above, this thesis is a critical discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is both a theory and a method; it is mainly its role as a theory which is discussed here while its role as a method is mainly investigated in chapter three in relation to the research process. Discourse analysis, or textual analysis, as Howarth et al. prefer to call it, is used within many different academic disciplines. In the beginning it was a research tool mainly utilised by linguists but today various fields of study, such as cultural studies, psychology and political science, also employ the approach. Further, discourse analysis is increasingly being used when analysing the European Union and European integration since, as suggested by Diez, Europe is a discursive battleground. Important to point out though is that there is no universal form of discourse analysis which is suitable in every circumstance. The reason for this is that different discourse analysts ask very varied questions and propose very different solutions. This means that rather than attempting to apply an existing theory discourse analysts attempt to articulate their concepts in every separate case of concrete research. This, however, involves certain risks, and has led discourse analysts to formulate warnings of the danger of falling into the trap of finding a theory first and then trying to find empirical proof to fit into, i.e. conduct inductive research, rather than to let the empirical material speak for itself through deductive studies. Further, rather than using discourse analysis on its own, they suggest that discourse analysis should be used as a complement to other more developed theories and methods in social sciences.
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The concept of discourse has been argued to be ‘an essentially contested concept’.\(^{32}\) I therefore believe it is important that I illuminate how I interpret the concept of discourse. But first I want to say something about language. Language plays an important part in discourse analysis and this thesis is no exception. One of the main ambitions of critical discourse analysis as a theory is to illuminate the power struggles over meaning that take place. Critical discourse analysts, including myself, view language and the use of language not only as a way of mediating information about perceptions and behaviours but also as social practice. In other words, there is a relationship between language and power. More specifically, language is essential in the production, maintenance and change of social relations of power.\(^{33}\) Further, language is seen as a tool that shapes people’s perceptions about their own and other’s identities, social relations and how things are related in the world. In other words, it is through language that we gain access to the world. The physical world exists without language but it is through discourses that it carries any meaning. As Grimshaw argues: “[t]he language is a uniquely human attribute, discourse is the language in use that allows human social life”.\(^{34}\) In this sense discursive practice can be seen as both constituting and constituted, i.e. we both produce and are produced by the discourse. Put differently, language and context are closely linked and context does not simply act as a constraint on language. Rather, context produces language and is produced by language.\(^{35}\) It is this relationship, between language and power, which critical discourse analysts, myself included, are interested in investigating.

As has been argued above, ‘discourse’ is a contested concept. My perception of discourse has been largely influenced by French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault’s ideas on ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’, but also by other, perhaps more specialised, discourse analysts. I argue that discourse in a general sense can be seen as a specific way of talking and understanding the world or a specific part of the world.\(^{36}\) Further, as argued by Hayward, discourse is about defining “the (im)possible, the (im)probable, the natural, the normal, what


counts as a problem”.

In other words, the role of discourses is to organise knowledge systematically and thereby put limits on what can and cannot be meaningfully argued. This is achieved by creating a discursive field. This idea that discourse defines what is ‘normal’ plays an important part in my analysis. As I have suggested earlier, I maintain that the official European Union discourse on European identity and higher education increasingly contains normative ideas about who the ‘normal’ and ‘Good’ European is, or rather, should be. Returning to issue of how the concept of discourse can be viewed; it can also be seen as a text, spoken or written, that has a purpose, to meet some social ends. Further, as argued by Fairclough, discourse can both be used as an abstract noun and a count noun. In the first instance this means language use conceived as social practice in the form of the production, distribution and consumption of a text. In the second instance it is a way of signifying experience from a particular perspective. Important to remember is that there is no such thing as a prejudicing language but rather prejudiced language use. It all depends on in which context it is used. Further, in the words of Ball, “[d]iscourses are about what can be said, and thought, but also about who can speak, when, where and with what authority”. Hence, it is a question of power; an issue that Foucault picks up on when arguing that:

“…it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together…discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it”.

I have also been influenced by Masschelein’s description of the idea of discourse which gives insights into what to study as part of the discourse analysis process; he argues that discourse can be defined as:

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“. . . a nexus of categories of thought and of language which, together with the rules and practices for the naming and description of objects and subjects and of their relation, allow us to have and to formulate certain kinds of intentions, allow us to make some things visible and sayable, allow us to read our ‘reality’. The discourse offers the terms, categories and practices which we can relate to ourselves and our experiences and to other people, and in which we can speak the ‘truth’ and represent valid knowledge. These practices also contain the mentalities and attitudes that participants in the discourse are meant to internalise. They position bodies and persons in a distinctive way…” 44

Of special importance in my analysis is this idea that there are certain things that the individual is supposed to internalise. I believe this can be linked to the normative power expressions which I argue are increasingly visible in the official European Union discourse on European identity and higher education. It can also be linked to the idea of ‘conduct of the self’, introduced by Foucault in relation to power of modern government, discussed later in this chapter.

Looking closer at the issue of power and the role it plays in the construction of discourse; Jacobsson suggests that power over language also gives power over which actions are seen as possible. Power is therefore not just about getting your own way but also about setting the agenda.45 Moreover, discourse creates a specific version and interpretation of a certain part of the world and all knowledge has to be viewed as specific to a particular cultural and historical circumstance. In other words, discourse analysts are critical of the idea that there exists an objective truth and they do not claim to possess a universal truth but rather to provide an interpretation among others.46 ‘Truth’, according to Foucault, is “something that can and must be thought”.47 In other words, decision-makers have the power to define what shall be seen as ‘the truth’, hence:

“Truth isn’t outside of power, or lacking power: contrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, truth isn’t the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves.

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Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its régime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true”. 48

In this sense, a person’s interpretation does not mirror a reality but is rather a result of his/her way of interpreting the world.49 It is through social interaction that we construct common ‘truths’ and compete over what is seen as true and false and thereby also create knowledge.50 Scholars suggest that the way that we talk about and what we call things shape our views concerning what can be taken for granted and what can be seen as true. What this implies is that depending on ones worldview different forms of actions are seen as natural and good, while others are seen as bad and maybe even unthinkable. In addition, as has been suggested earlier, discourse analysts would argue that while the concepts included in a discourse are fairly constant their meanings are flexible and changing. Thus, the purpose of discourse is to help construct meaning in the social world and that meaning is never fixed permanently.51 Thus, in the words of Humes, “[t]he management of meaning is an important instrument in professional, institutional and ideological control”.52 This means that dominating or hegemonic discourse becomes what Foucault would call a ‘regime of truth’ which gets to decide whether statements are ‘true’ or ‘false’, as well as whether they have a meaning at all or can be dismissed as nonsense.53 The ‘regime of truth’ also decides which actions and identities which are possible and which subjects are authorised to speak and act. Hence, there is a strong relationship between power and ‘truth’. The discourse identified within the social structures brings power to exist in social relations and gives credibility to the ideology that the exercise of power is created by.54 Foucault’s aim was to investigate what affects different discourses had on social practitioners and how discourses relate to and support

49 It has been argued that discourse analysts are not foremost interested in how things are but rather in how things are about to be in the future and how and why things are perceived the way they are. How we acquire knowledge about ‘reality’ is at the centre of this type of analysis. Neumann, I., “Mening, materialitet, mak:…”, (Studentlitteratur: Lund, 2003), p. 14.
leading or dominant systems. In other words, discourse is intrinsically linked to the idea of ‘truth’. As Foucault argued, we are all subjected to the production of ‘truth’ through power and it is not possible for us to exercise power except through the production of ‘truth’. Foucault argues that there are two forms of limits to power, namely the rules of right, which limits power, and the effects of the ‘truth’ which is produced by the exercise of power. In other words, there is a triangle of power, right and truth. ‘Truth’ is seen as being inside power and not simply something, which is the possession of the free mind. Rather, what Foucault calls the ‘political economy’ of truth is linked to scientific discourse and the institutions, which produces it, it is referred to as support in the name of economic production and political power, it is distributed to the social body through apparatuses of education and information, it is produced mainly by political and economic apparatuses, such as for example the University and the Media, and it is the issue of ideological struggles. Looking at the European level, Lawn claims that education can be seen as playing a key role in the transmission and construction of European identity and education and universities can also be seen as political symbols, as well as tools. Looking closer at the issue of ideology, Grimshaw argues that discourse can be seen as “an ideological “bundle”. Ideology can play an important role in the maintenance of unequal power relations. By studying these dominant discourses and their structures of meaning we can gain insight into how they are made intelligible and legitimate. For example, Fairclough draws a link between ideology and hegemony by arguing that:

“It is useful to think about discourses and power in terms of hegemony, both because control over discursive practices can helpfully be seen in terms of hegemonic struggle over orders of discourse, and because hegemony and hegemonic struggle in a broader sense may involve discourse to a substantial degree”.

Discourse analysis gives us a sense of the world-view that is present in this discourse since world-views also shape what is seen as arguments and actions are possible. Every discourse belongs to an episteme which establishes what narratives are plausible and which are not. These episteme change over time and what was seen as politically correct arguments a hundred years ago might not be seen as such today. For example, slavery and colonialism was once deemed to be perfectly acceptable behaviour among Western European nation-states. Looking at my own home country Sweden it was not that long ago that Swedish scientist talked in terms of ‘race typical’ characteristics and attempted to assimilate the Sami people into Swedish society rather than accept diversity. To conclude, discourses contain norms about acceptable ideas and behaviour change over time and ‘truths’ and meanings are fluid and flexible. Power defines ‘truths’ and ‘knowledge’ about what/who we are/should be and what/who we should be afraid of, etc. There are certain truths about the world and who we are expressed in the European Union discourse on European identity and higher education while others are excluded.

3. The Discourse on Power

The Nature of Power

An interest in questions of power is an inherent part of any form of discourse analysis and especially within critical discourse analysis. The reason for this is that power plays a significant role in the construction of identity in relation to which ideas and norms become hegemonic and what behaviour and actions are seen as necessary and possible, as was highlighted earlier in this chapter. I therefore believe it is important to look closer at ‘the power of power’ so to speak. As has already been stated earlier, one of my main research interests is that of power, and specifically that of ‘soft’ and normative power expressions. Questions of power lie under the surface, as a foundation for the analysis and arguments put forward in this thesis. However, power is often described as a problematic idea over which there has been reached no agreement. In other words, as suggested by for example Lukes


and Gallie, it is one more of these ‘essentially contested concepts’, which different actors attempt to define. This can be linked to the earlier claim that power is contained within language and that there is a relationship between power, knowledge and ‘truth’. As Foucault argues, one form of government in the Western world is that of ‘government in the name of truth’.

As was highlighted in the introduction of this chapter I have been heavily influenced by the work of Foucault and his view of power, I would therefore like to look closer at his perception of power in the modern nation-state and how it has developed over time. In the beginning of his academic career Foucault discussed power mainly in negative and repressive terms. He wrote about the use of power within different modern state institutions, that had appeared in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such as for example prisons, mental institutions, the army, and to a lesser extent the school. In his early work, such as for example *Discipline and Punish*, power is in the hands of the king or later, the state. In other words, power was disciplining and repressive in character. In Foucault’s mind discipline is a specific, modest technique of power that views individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise. In this sense, discipline makes individuals. Adding to the argument on discipline, Rose maintains that discipline can be viewed as a moralising technology used to create docile subjects “through the calculated distribution of bodies, spaces, time, gazes”. However, in later volumes Foucault sees power as something which is possessed by everyone in different spaces/places in society. However, this doesn’t mean that disciplinary power has disappeared. Rather, the state has gone from wielding its power to using a more subtle form of discipline. It is no longer necessary for the state to threaten with physical punishment since the individual is disciplining him-/herself. Hence, there has been a shift away from governing
the body of the individual to seducing the soul. Further, compared to old form of power the new version is “not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control”. Looking closer at power as both constructive and repressive, Simons has described this janus faced character of Foucault’s power conception as stretching “between the poles of unbearable lightness and heaviness”. Thus, Foucault saw no antagonism between individual freedom and subjectivity on the one hand and power and domination on the other. Further, power produces power at the same time as “nothing can function as a mechanism of power if it is not deployed according to procedures, instruments, means, and objectives which can be validated in more or less coherent systems of knowledge”. In this sense, power struggles might not necessarily be a bad thing since power, in Foucault’s opinion, can also bring development forward. Mayo supports this idea of the dual character of power, arguing that “[p]ower does not act as repression, but rather produces responses to discourse that may conform to or resist power”. In addition, Foucault suggests that power can be viewed as something which is not possessed but rather employed. Further, in relation to the nature of power, Foucault asserts that “power is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised, and … only exists in action”. In other words, power is always already there and it is not possible to be outside or on the periphery of power. In addition, power is not fixed but rather circulates, and only functions in the form of a chain, and it is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. Power implies a will to know and is not situated in one place but rather formed as a net covering all society and all actions. Individuals are at all times in the position of concurrently experiencing and employing power. As Foucault argued, they can be seen as ‘vehicles of power’, and not its

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74 See for example Dean, M., “Liberal government and authoritarianism”, Economy and Society, Vol. 31, No. 1, February 2002, pp. 37-61, p. 37; and Lukes, S., “Power: A Radical View”, (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke and New York, 2005), p. 88. Lukes himself is interested in the idea of power and distinguished between three types of power. First, there is the view that sees power as one-dimensional and is mainly interested in analysing how decisions are researched as part of the policy process. It sees conflict as an important part of power struggle. The second view of power perceives it as two-dimensional and while it also views conflict as an important part of power exertion it also believes that the control of the policy agenda is vital. In other words, those in power get to decide what is to be considered a political issue or not. This view also argues that conflict and interests might not be openly declared but hidden. The third and final view of power, which Lukes himself supports, views power as three-dimensional. Here power is not only limited to being wielded in the political room by individuals but is rather possessed by and exerted by groups in society.


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points of application. The discourse identified within the social structures brings power to existence in social relations and gives credibility to the ideology that the exercise of power is created by. This view has meant a redefinition of how we think about power in contemporary society.

Modern Government as an Act of Attraction and Seduction

"Tis meet that noble minds keep ever with their likes; for who so firm that cannot be seduced."
- William Shakespeare (Caius Cassius, Julius Caesar, Act I, Scene II)

As has been suggested above, modern government depends on a specific form of power. The governmentality theory, which is often referred to as a theory of modern government, was first introduced by Foucault who never got to develop the idea in any depth though. However, after his death, other scholars from a wide variety of academic disciplines, including educational studies, have developed and used this research tool. As suggested by Tuschling and Engemann, in the last fifteen years governmentality studies have increasingly been used to analyse how present political programs interconnect with modern government and its’ associated subjects. This increased interest in governmentality studies can be linked to changes in government, including the dismantling of the welfare state and the rise to

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83 Tuschling, A. & Engemann, C., “From Education to Lifelong Learning: The emerging regime of learning in the European Union”, Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2006, pp. 451-469, p. 451. Gunn argues that there has been a shift, at least within social historical studies, from using hegemony theory to drawing on Foucault’s governmentality idea, especially since the 1990s and onwards.
hegemony of neo-liberal political rationality, which are issues that are discussed further mainly in chapter seven. According to Munroe, Foucault’s idea of governmentality has played an important role as to how western states have acted in various policy areas, including education and as a result also both culture and language. In contemporary society with its post-industrial and modern capitalist character citizens are expected to make themselves competitive on the labour market. The State will come across as acting in the best interests of its citizens while at the same time construct a common public subjectivity which in turn can help increase productivity.\(^8^4\)

In the writings of Foucault the level of analysis was mainly the nation-state and later scholars using governmentality theory have continued on this track. Foucault argued that what was truly fascinating about the contemporary world was not the statization of society but rather the governmentalization of the state which has had consequences for our political subjectivity.\(^8^5\) However, I argue that governmentality theory is also suitable for the analysis of governance in the European Union. In relation to European identity, Walters suggests that governmentality theory is original in the way it helps us analyse the European Union in terms of which subjects, objects, arts and spaces are created by its discourse.\(^8^6\) Governmentality is often linked to neo-liberal politics. However, a governmentality analysis is not only useful in understanding the neo-liberal version of European identity. It is also helpful in explaining the power behind civic and cultural European identity and offers an in depth understanding of the role education plays generally in the identity-making process as a governmentality technology. What Foucault wanted to achieve by the idea of governmentality was to comprehend the character of governmental rationalities related to particular technologies. In other words, he wanted to understand how collective power was employed on individuals.\(^8^7\) Argent is on a similar tack, arguing that:

“…to elucidate the complexity of government, including its relationships with civil society, and the many specific tactics, strategies and techniques used to control and/or cajole populations to act and think in a particular way”. \(^8^8\)

Further, there are certain forms of normative power, in the form of various technologies, techniques, practices, etc., used to create the ‘European’ present in the discourse analysed. In addition, education is one of the most powerful technologies that the modern state has at its disposal. Hence, I believe it is helpful to use governmentality theory to explain the political rationality of modern government and to explain the power of education. Governmentality theory is a theory about modern government and how it uses its power, mainly of a soft, non-forceful variety. Or, as Nye would have it, it is an act of seduction. This argument can be linked to the discussion on power earlier, where it was argued that power is not only suppressive but can also be seen as constructive and a positive force. To seduce the citizens the State uses soft power by encouraging ‘the conduct of conduct’ which includes both the governing of others and the self. In this sense governmentality is more than simply political processes or state agencies. It is the art of guiding people and motivating them to act. In other words, modern government is not perceived simply as state politics but also as ‘governance from a distance’ by making individuals into self-governing ethical beings. This means that to understand how the European is constructed through the official European Union discourse entails investigating how Europeans are governed from afar.

I have been interested in exploring how the theory on governmentality can help us understand the power inherent in each of the three versions of European identity. In other words, I argue that these three discursive forms of identity can be seen as different, but interconnected, approaches to the governing of the citizens of the European Union. I have also wanted to illuminate how education is used to govern the citizens both as individuals and as a group. I view European Union higher education policy as a governmentality technology with the help of which individuals are encouraged to practice ‘conduct of the self’. In other words, the power is not of a disciplining kind but rather depends on the individual wanting to adapt to fit into the norm. Central to my analysis and inherent to the idea of governmentality are concepts such as for example power, knowledge, and truth, which can be linked to the idea of ‘conduct
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of conduct’/’conduct of the self’.93 Foucault himself stated that what he was interested in was “to see how men govern (themselves and others) by the production of truth”.94 Following in Foucault’s footsteps by analysing how European identity has been linked to higher education in European Union discourse since the beginning of the 1970s up until the present day. I argue that the European Union discourse on European identity and higher education has its own ways of seeing and interpreting the world and it makes its own truth claim based on its own forms of knowledge. In other words, it has its own perception of what can be known. I also argue that policy-makers define, through the discourse contained in the documents analysed, what it means to be ‘European’, i.e. what traits to stress and what kind of behaviour to promote.

Let us now look closer at the theory of modern government, often referred to as governmentality theory, governmentality being a conflation between the words of ‘government’ and ‘mentality’. Lukes captures the essence of governmentality very well when describing it as:

“…a neologism referring to the ways in which in modern societies various authorities administer populations, to the ways in which individuals shape their own selves, and to the ways in which these processes get aligned”.95

Mitchell, another academic who has developed the governmentality concept, defines it in a similar way to Lukes, as:

“…a way of explaining the establishment and exercise of political power, one in which the concept of government is broader than management by the state; it also involves the regulation of populations through multiple institutions and technologies in society…Governmentality…takes many forms in society, from guidance of families to the ethics of care and the management of the soul”.96

Thus, with modern government came the need for and possibility to create the population. In post-feudal society there has been an emphasis both on the community of the population and the singling out of the behaviour and well-being of the individual. Governmentality is about creating governable subjects and it can be used both as a tool to promote and to police the individual and/or the community. In this sense, governmentality is the exercise of power by the political elite, and a form of discipline. In Burchell’s words:

“When we are governed, when our behaviour is managed, directed or conducted by others, we do not become the passive objects of a physical determination. To govern individuals is to get them to act and to align their particular wills with ends imposed on them through constraining and facilitating models of possible actions. Government presupposes and requires the activity and freedom of the governed”.

Thus, modern governing is concerned with gaining consent from individuals to govern them. There is a stark difference from the oppressing power exerted during feudal, pre-modern times. There has been a shift from mainly emphasising discipline to increasingly encouraging self-government. Foucault paints a vivid picture of how the art of government developed during the 16th century when feudal structures were replaced by the invention of the territorial administrative state. In relation to my study, the importance of territory, space and borders was discussed in chapter six in relation to what I see as Europe defined in geographical terms and the idea of mobility, which is important to education as well as economic prosperity. Returning to the idea of modern government, before the idea of governmentality was introduced national wealth had been measured according to territorial might and fortune possessed by the king. However, with modernity parallels came to be drawn between national wealth and the rational management of the national population. There was also a shift in the 17th and 18th centuries, from power being connected to wealth and commodities to being concerned with time and labour. This new form of power was no longer connected to sovereignty but was rather a great invention of bourgeois society. However, sovereignty has not become completely obsolete in modern society; in Foucault’s mind:

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“We need to see things not in terms of the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a disciplinary society by a society of government; in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government”. 99

This disciplining can be carried out by various means. Modern government has various disciplinary technologies at its disposal, which originate from techniques such as examination, observation, and statistical normalisation, which are used to make populations and individuals perceptible and calculable. 100

Seducing the Soul Through the Power of the Gaze

I have already hinted to the fact that modern government is geared towards moulding people into desirable citizens, I now want to examine this process more closely. Individuals in modern society need to be convinced of the importance of being “the self-policing subject” who perform both the “conduct of conduct” and the “conduct of the self”. The latter idea, what is sometimes seen as the egotistical individual, is especially emphasised in neo-liberal governmentality. 101 According to Rose what we are witnessing today, as a result of neo-liberal political rationalities is “a new politics of conduct that seeks to reconstruct citizens as moral subjects of responsible communities”. 102 This, I argue, can be linked to the idea of ‘competitive solidarity’ and private rather than public responsibility for personal welfare, an issue that is discussed further in chapter seven. This idea of seduction, rather than coercion, is an example of how power can be seen as productive and not simply oppressive and negative which means that governmentality should not be viewed as something forceful and negative either. As rhetorically asked by Wolin:

“What if power’s defining trait were its productive rather than its negative or suppressive capacities? In that case, power’s uniqueness would lie in its ability to shape, fashion, and mould the parameters of the self, potentially down to the infinitesimal or corpuscular level. Following Descartes, we have typically been taught to conceive of the self as a locus of

autonomy or freedom. But what if this autonomy were in fact illusory, concealing potent, underlying, and sophisticated mechanisms of domination”.

Even though Foucault wrote widely on the issue of power as has been shown earlier in this chapter it was not the main object of his studies. Rather, as he argues, his primary interest was “to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects”. Foucault places emphasis on the body, both the individual and the societal. In the modern state the trained and mobilised body replaces the tortured body of the condemned that existed before the Enlightenment. His argument is that the body can be subjected, used, transformed and improved through the use of bio-power. In other words, the docile body is part of disciplined society. Discipline becomes the ideal medium for the reform of criminals as well as control of workers, pupils, students and staff. This modern discipline uses a double mode of binary division and branding, also known as ‘dividing practices’, such as for example mad/sane and normal/abnormal, or in relation to this thesis divisions between European/Non-European and ‘Good’/Deviant’ European. In other words, it is the process by which the individual divides within her/himself or from others, and by which s/he is made into an object, i.e ‘dividing practices’ can be seen as part of the process of Othering outlined in chapter three. In addition, bio-power means that power is exercised on the body trying to normalise the practices of the individual on for example health and sexuality. With the use of statistics, public-health guidelines and by setting norms for sexual behaviour, the subjects are governed.

Marshall has developed the concept of busno-power out of Foucault’s thoughts on bio-power. While bio-power is exerted on the body of the individual busno-power is part of neo-liberal rationality and aimed at the subjectivity of the individual through her/his mind. As suggested by Ford, busno-power can be seen as a turn away from a ‘will to truth’ to a ‘will to choose’. Important to the idea of busno-power and busno-cric rationality is the vision of

the free, autonomous chooser, which will help shape the individual into particular kind of
subject that will choose act in certain ways that those in power have decided on:

“Busnocratic rationality is closer to technocratic rationality than busno-power is to bio-
power. Central to busnocratic rationality are these emphases: the concepts and stances taken
in promoting skills, as opposed to knowledge; information and information retrieval, as
opposed to knowledge and understanding; and the view that it is the consumers (especially
industry), as opposed to the providers, that define and determine quality in education. It is
the particular ways in which business values concerning skills, important “knowledge,” and
quality, are intertwined into this form of rationality which distinguish it from technocratic
rationality.” 110

Hence, one of the sites of this new form of power is education.111 The ideas of knowledge,
quality and skills will be discussed further in chapter seven where I argue that they structure
who the ‘Good European’ is. Returning to the idea of the population and how it is governed.
Foucault himself argued that the modern state has been modelled on a form of pastoral power,
where the state can be seen as a Shepard who is interested in the welfare of the population.112

This is achieved through the employment of a variety of arts of government, which include
‘reasons of state’ and ‘the theory of police’. The idea of ‘reasons of state’ means that the State
is not simply representing the interests of a ruler, as was the case in feudal society, but has its
own interest. As suggested by Foucault, the modern state is both individualizing and
totalitarian. Deacon agrees with Foucault arguing that it is important for the individual to both
have a sense of being a responsible individual and part of a large whole:

“Via techniques of confession and ascetic conduct, faith and empiricism, and self-reflection
and everyday reality, western political rationalities, in the form of combined totalization and
individualization technologies whereby some (struggle to) discipline others even as all (are
exhorted to) discipline themselves, have come to dominate the globe”.113

‘The theory of police’, on the other hand, is the idea that the purpose of government is to
intercede to guarantee the prospering of all aspects of the individual, such as the body, soul,
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and wealth, through supervision and if necessary through intervention. In other words, modern government is a rational and thoughtful activity. In a similar vein, Dean suggests that:

“Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes”.

Hence, the purpose of modern government is twofold. First, it is supposed to improve and sustain the happiness and quality of life of its citizens. Second, to achieve these results it has to exert an increasing level of control and surveillance of its citizens.

As argued above, modern government is about trying to win the citizens over, to seduce them. This is partly achieved through the mutually constitutive processes of ‘conduct of conduct’ and ‘conduct of the self’. As suggested by Dean, the idea of ‘conduct of conduct’ is related to “particular mentalities arts and regimes of government and administration that have emerged since ‘early modern’ Europe” while the related idea of ‘conduct of the self’ can be seen as ‘governing at a distance’ where the nature of the governed is of concern. Hence, what I attempt to do in this thesis is to draw attention to higher education as a governmentality technology, with its associated techniques, and the role, which it plays in the governing and subjectivisation of the ‘European’. Concerning the idea of ‘conduct of the self’, it means that the individual practices power on the body and the self, rather than having it inflicted by some other party. In other words, correction works from within. It is more economical and efficient, Rose maintains, to let people control themselves rather than to expect the state try to coerce them.

Through the technologies of the modern government, including education, the individual is constituted and ruled as a neo-liberal subject. The role of education is to contribute to “collective ethical self-creation”. According to Foucault modern government and the idea of ‘conduct of the self’ includes the notions of individualization and subjectivisation of citizenship, which Foucault sees as a ‘political double-bind’. It is important to look at the idea of subjectivity since it creates and constrains subject positions with the use of norms. As part of his analysis of the process of objectification in the development of modernity in Western Europe, Foucault identified a mode of objectification that he named subjectification. Foucault’s main interest was not to examine power but rather to chart the means by which the individual is being constituted as a subject. Further, in Foucault’s opinion, we should attempt to understand how subjects are constructed and given substance through the use of different forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts etc. He argues that “[w]e should try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects”. According to Rose liberal states attempts to craft individuals that do not have to be governed directly but who are responsible and govern themselves. As Fitzsimons asserts, through self-constitution the subject becomes involved in her/his own governance. This is what Foucault terms ‘conduct of the self’ which is the process through which the individual turned him/her self into a modern subject. With modern government came a new form of pastoral power where we confess to ourselves through the ‘conduct of the self’. In this new reality where self-reliance and self-government are premiered morality and ethics are revered. We are expected to be ethical and moral beings where our responsibility and solidarity towards the rest of the community entails taking responsibility for our own well-being. It is possible to

120 Olssen, M., “Michel Foucault: Materialism and Education”, (Bergin & Garvey: West Port, Conneticut, 1999), p. 6.

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speak of neo-liberal normalisation, of making the values of neo-liberalism the norm. If an individual does not abide by these standards s/he will be deemed a ‘Deviant’ European. Here the panopticon plays a part as it makes the individual internalises the gaze so that s/he can survey her-/him-self, as is suggested by Proudhon:

“To be governed is to be under surveillance, inspected, spied on, superintended, legislated, regulated, restrained, indoctrinated, watched, controlled, appraised, assessed, censored, commanded...To be governed is to be noted, registered, enumerated, accounted for, stamped, measured, classified, audited, patented, licensed, authorized, endorsed, reprimanded, prevented, reformed, rectified, and corrected, in every operation, every transaction, every movement”.128

Together with the introduction of ‘conduct of the self’ came the particular organisation of space and time. Space has become compartmentalised. Within this process surveillance plays an important role. Sometimes this surveillance can take the shape of the gaze. The gaze could be turned inwards, so that the individual can reflect on his/her behaviour and perhaps repent and change. There is a normalising judgement, which defines what can be seen as normal and the individuals are compared and ranked against each other.129

“The individual is the effect and object of a certain crossing of power and knowledge. He is the product of the complex strategic developments in the field of power and the multiple developments in the human sciences”.130

In modern society it is no longer necessary for the State to use visible power. Rather, it has developed hidden forms of disciplining through surveillance. Surveillance is not only important in the prison, as mentioned above. There is also an increased use of surveillance in society as a whole, which can be seen, for example, in the architecture of our cities. It has become important not only to control the criminal but also the public in general. Foucault draws from Bentham’s idea of the modern prison, the panopticon when he develops his ideas of discipline, surveillance, and ‘conduct of the self’ in modern society. According to Winokur the purpose of what he terms neo-Foucauldian criticism is to show how individuals are constituted as either prisoners or jailors through the use of surveillance technologies.131 Winokur highlights the fact that there is a difference between surveillance and panopticism.

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As he suggests, “[t]he panopticon does not use information just to know us; it also deploys information to create us, to constitute us as compliant workers and consumers”.132 I argue that the European Union can be seen as a panopticon using various technologies, one of these being education. Education is in turn made up of various surveillance techniques, such as comparable degrees, mobility through Erasmus contracts, the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (which are part of the Bologna Process), ‘international offices’ at the universities, etc.

Foucault describes how different forms of power are at work within the school, such as for example the role of surveillance of the teacher over pupils/students and of pupils/students over each other, and the role of assessments and the keeping of records.133 These ideas can also be applied to the emphasis of ‘European dimension’ as content of education in the construction of European Union discourse on European identity. Surveillance is also used at the European level. Leonard even goes as far as to claim that Europe can be seen as a surveillance society.134 In other words, European Union officials are working towards both creating ‘the European’ and controlling her/him through a specific discourse with specific forms of power, knowledge and ‘truths’. To be able to practice the various forms of normalising techniques associated with education specific knowledge is required. In Foucault mind this can be linked to the development of the role of the intellectual and the expert in the West. However, the intellectual can also be seen as a political threat since s/he utilises her/his knowledge of ‘the truth’ in the field of political struggles. Foucault makes a distinction between ‘the general intellectual’ and ‘the specific intellectual’, such as for example the nuclear scientist, computer expert, pharmacologist, etc., with the latter version of scientist growing in importance in contemporary society.135 We see, for example, how economists, sociologists and political scientists talk about globalisation. As laymen the public take what they are told as fact, ‘the truth’.

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133 To give an example of how power is used in society Foucault argues that the prison was meant to act as an instrument, similar to that of the school, the barracks, or the hospital, in the creation of individual subjects. Foucault argues that the prison has gone form being a place where penalties were exercised to a place where surveillance is taking place. At the same time there has been a shift from punishing the body to disciplining the soul. The prison, that Foucault describes, did not manage, or perhaps even attempt to, create law-abiding citizens. Rather they managed to create new criminals and make ‘old’ criminals more hardened criminals. However, delinquents were not only a negative thing. They could be useful since they created new forms of criminality, which there was a demand for, such as for example organised prostitution. In addition, criminals were used to carry out surveillance of the working class and could be used as cheap labour. Working class people were the most common victims of crime and therefore politicians could make use of their fear of crime. In addition, Foucault argues that there is a link between the medical system and the penal system. We see this in courts when it has to be decided whether the accused should be sentenced to prison or be confined to a psychiatric institution. Foucault, M., “Prison Talk” in Gordon, C., (ed.), “Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977”, (Harvester Press: Brighton, 1980),pp. 37-55, p. 40.


Governing Through Risk and Fear

So how does the modern state get people to conform? In my mind happiness can be linked to the avoidance of risk. I believe it is possible to draw a parallel with the work of Ulrich Beck who argues that in the contemporary world we are living in a risk society. I claim that ‘risk’ can and is used as a governmentality technology to justify decisions by politicians both in the nation-state and at the European level and I argue that risk plays an important role in the European identity discourse. All three versions of European identity that I have identified in this thesis have a conception of Europe as a community of risk; in other words, each form of identity is justified as a protection against certain clear or fuzzy threats. As has been shown earlier in this thesis, various references have been made to different threats are present in the European Union discourse, both in relation to European identity and to education. The political rationality behind attempts to instil fear in citizens, according to Aldama, is that:

“The propagation and internalization of fear in the social body attempts to keep people docile, numb, silent, and afraid of to challenge the status quo of racist, sexist and global capitalist orders in the United States and other Euro-western nation-states…. Fear is both the justification that drives the disciplinary apparatus of the nation-state (police, INS, military, school) and the intended effects on the body politics.”

This rimes well with Foucault’s suggestion that the art of government is linked to the issue of security and it is possible to see the creation of fear and insecurity as a form of governing technology even though it is perhaps less obvious than such technologies as the prison, asylum, military or education. As argued by Castel there is a ‘new space of risk’ and that there has been a shift from emphasising danger, which occurs as a result of the presence of a named group or individual, to speaking of risk, which is the consequence of abstract factors that might have unwanted consequences. The idea of risk management is part of the neoliberal discourse. The threat also sometimes seem to come from within; Grillo et al. argue that the enlargement of 2004, when the European Union went from fifteen to twenty five

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140 Hall has written an interesting article where she argues that during the 1980s and 1990s “the paternalistic myth of women’s vulnerability donned the neoliberal cloak of risk management”. Hall, R., ““It Can Happen to You”: Rape Prevention in the Age of Risk Management”, Hypatia, Vol. 19, No. 3, Summer 2004, pp. 1-19, p. 1.
Member States, was one of the main reasons why the citizens of France and Holland voted ‘no’ in the referenda on the proposed European Union Constitution. The no vote was justified by the claim that further enlargement would threaten the social openness and secular society in contemporary European Union. A sense of uncertainty can also be seen in the Laeken Declaration from 2001 where the European Council stated that “the Union stands at a crossroads, a defining moment in its existence”. With enlargement towards the east a European identity defined in western terms is increasingly put into question. However, how to define European identity in these new and sometimes turbulent times is not obvious. As Biedenkopf et al. contemplate:

“…what moral concepts, which traditions, what goals are capable of bringing together the Union’s diverse inhabitants in a democratic structure, and so underpin and anchor the European constitution?”.143

According to some critics, in the attempts to move towards a supra-national identity national identity becomes unclear and people are uncertain of where the power that will decide their destiny, is to be found. This makes people feel insecure and they may well feel more comfortable with their own national identities. According to Cameron:

“As the European Union becomes more unified through its legislation and interstate trade and movement, there is a centrifugal movement in a number of Member States as individuals begin to feel threatened and to think that they are losing their national identity”.144

This may be seen in the way that, before the referendum on the proposed European Union Constitution in France, the French public voiced concerns about how the Constitution would lead to the loss of the French national identity. It has been argued that by placing Europe and European identity on the political agenda questions of national identity have become more popular at the national political level. We can see examples of nationalist political movements in Denmark, France and Austria. At the same time, a steep increase in immigration and the incorporation of multi-ethnic, multi-cultural societies in most countries

in Western Europe, confronts Europe with the fact its nation-states are not culturally homogeneous.\textsuperscript{146}

**Governing Through Higher Education**

“Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world”

- Nelson Mandela

Education is not discussed at any length in Foucault’s writings. It is mentioned mainly as an institution that the State uses to control and survey so as to make the pupils into good members of society. However, in Foucault’s writings generally there is a double emphasis on the role of education. On the one hand he analyses the discourses that perform an educative role in the creation of the subject. The aim of the various technologies, such as education, which the State has at its disposal, is to create good subjects. In other words, the State wants to fashion mouldable subjects that will make up a docile and pliable workforce. On the other hand, he argues that education can play an important role in collective self-creation.\textsuperscript{147} In this sense education plays a role of both individualising and totalising. The student both becomes aware of whom s/he is as an individual and that s/he is part of a larger group of individuals with whom s/he shares a common identity. The purpose then, according to Mitchell, when carrying out a governmentality analysis on the technology of education is concerned with how citizens are educated to be members of their community.\textsuperscript{148} Also, as suggested by Popkewitz, looking at education, the construction of knowledge creates a sense of Otherness:

“…the very systems of reasoning that are to produce equality, justice, and diversity may inscribe systems of representation that construct “otherness” through the concrete principles of pedagogical classification that normalize, differentiate, and compare”.\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{146} Castells, M., “European Cities, the Informational Society, and the Global Economy”, *New Left Review*, No.204, March-April 1994, 1/204, pp. 18-32, p. 24. According to Miller immigration might cause problems in especially two circumstances. First, where the rate of immigration is so high that there is no time for mutual adjustment to each other's identities to occur. During these circumstances, the education system and other forms of integration mechanisms may be stretched beyond their capacity. In this situation the population of the country of settlement might feel threatened and cultural accommodation cannot take place, at least not in the short run. The other form of threat from immigration occurs when the immigrant group is strong and united enough to declare itself an independent nation. This is only likely if the group has been expelled, all at once, from somewhere else. So this is not a very likely scenario for any nation-state to fear. Miller, D., "On Nationality", (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1995), pp.128-129.


\textsuperscript{149} Popkewitz, T.S., “Restructuring of social and political theory in education: Foucault and a social epistemology of school practices”, *Educational Theory*, Summer 1997, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 287-313, p. 292. Popkewitz looks at the school level in the USA but I believe the same arguments can be used when looking at higher education at the European level.
Looking at the role of education as a governmentality technology, some academics would argue that it serves the purpose of managing others and making them capable of governing themselves. In Foucault’s mind:

“Any system of education is a political way of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses, along with the knowledges and powers which they carry...What, after all, is an education system, other than a ritualization of speech, a qualification and a fixing of the roles for speaking subjects, the constitution of a doctrinal group, however diffuse, a distribution and an appropriation of discourse with its powers and knowledges?”.

Education, with its various techniques, can be used as a technology to create specific subjects. As Sawyer and Kamali suggest:

“It has been a known fact for a long time that modern education plays a decisive role in the creation of a sense of ‘us’ through belonging to ‘a nation’ with ‘a common history’, ‘a common language’, ‘a common culture’, and sometimes even a ‘common religion’. The schools democratic ideal, however, is an area which has been given attention and discussed only in the last few years”.

Education plays an important role in constructing the Other and our own identities. According to Sayer and Kamali the process of Othering can be seen as one of the governmentality practices of the school:

“School is an arena which is characterised by the struggle over the legitimate knowledge and the construction of accepted models through which the pupils can understand the world and their place in it”.

In other words, education is a site of power/knowledge struggle over who gets to define what is seen as true or not. Certain norms, values, imaginations and perceptions are reproduced through education. This applies both to school and university level education. There is a
tension here between the emphasis on democratic values as well as the fact that ‘we’ are different from ‘you’ in cultural terms.

Later, in relation to the construction of the civic version of European identity, a closer look was taken at the mobility of students, which is one of the most promoted ideas in European Union discourse in relation to education. Mobility, as defined in relation to European Union higher education policy, is seen as an advantage for students and the future of the European Union as a whole. However, by defining what it is and how it should be operationalised, the European Union policy-makers control and survey the population/social body. In other words, at a first glance mobility seems to be simply a way of assuring the freedom of movement of students, as well as workers, persons and individuals. However, there are limits to mobility. By introducing education programmes, such as Erasmus, European Union policy-makers can control where students go to study abroad. Further, according to Shore, the University can be viewed as a panopticon in charge of surveillance:

> “Like Bentham’s prisoners, university staff become more or less unwitting accomplices in the setting-up of a wider system of imprisonment. In Foucauldian terms, this is a classic example of the moulding of subjectivity through the internalisation of externally-imposed norms”.155

Thus, the technology of education is itself made up of a number of techniques and practices that help mould the student. Just to give an example, one form of technique which is used both at educational institutions and is referred to in European Union higher education policy is that of the time-table. To create a time-table is about the organisation of time and space and to exert some kind of control and power.156 In other words, it is an exercise of bio-power. Many of the ways in which the subject is being surveilled can be found in the area of education, also outside the class-room. Another form of control, which Foucault discussed, is that of the record, which plays an important role in education. For example, universities keep records of students’ results and issue transcripts and proof of degrees gained. This can be seen as a way of controlling their results as well as their knowledge. In addition, in relation to the European Union, ‘tools’ related to mobility, such as the passport, can be seen as effects of power over the social body, in other words the population/citizens of the Member States. In European Union higher education policy this social body is made up of students.

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Further, with the modern school system came the national curricula which can also be seen as a governmentality technology. Hence, designing curricula is an act of power exertion, an argument which can be seen in Bernstein’s suggestion that “[h]ow a society selects, classifies, distributes, transmits and evaluates the educational knowledge it considers to be public, reflects both the distribution of power and the principle of social control”. 157 According to Kamens and Benavot in Europe, until the nineteenth century, there had been an emphasis on reading, writing and recitation in both the national language and classical languages. However, in the beginning of the century arithmetic was given a prominent position on the curriculum in both Europe and America. On the question of why this change came about it has been suggested that it had become clear to national politicians that if they wanted to achieve political mobilisation a new kind of individual would have to be constructed, one which was “rational, positive, and actively engaged in the polity” and this could only be achieved through state-run school system adhering to a updated curricular content. 158 Power in contemporary society takes the form of normalisation rather than coercion and discipline rather than punishment, which had been the case in feudal society. Modern governance is aimed at normative ways of conduct. The Bologna Process, which will be discussed further in chapter four, is a good example of this non-forceful, normative form of governing. As suggested by Fejes, the Bologna Process concerns the governing of higher education in Europe through techniques of standardisation. Following the introduction of such neo-liberal discourses as knowledge society, employability, lifelong learning, quality assurance and mobility, joining the Bologna Process was considered as the rational choice of action. Those countries that do not participate in the Bologna Process are excluded and defined as ‘the Other’ who is inferior concerning quality and effectiveness of education. 159

Conclusions

In this chapter I have shown how this study can be seen as constructivist in the sense that I believe that what can reasonably be said and thought in a society at a specific time is restricted by certain ideational structures. Further, I have explained how this thesis is based on


a critical version of discourse analysis; discourse analysis which is both a form of theory and
methodology, an issue that will be further discussed in the next chapter in relation to the
outlining of the research process. As a theory discourse analysis makes certain assumptions
about how language is used to define what is seen as ‘the truth’. This study is critical in the
sense that I do not take discourses and identities to be constant but rather argue that while the
structures they contain are fairly stable the meaning of ideas, which they are built on, change
over time as a result of power struggles and changes in the political climate and hegemonic
political rationalities. I have also suggested that the power used in modern government is
often normative in character. In other words, the purpose of modern government is to large
extent concerned with convincing the individual to act a certain way, thus seduce her/him.
According to this normative power ‘the Other’ can be found within in the form of those
individuals in the society that choose not to conform to the norm, who do not perform
‘conduct of the self’.
Methodological Considerations and Reflections – Challenging Identity

- Chapter Three -

Challenging Identity

- Methodological Considerations and Reflections -

"The opposite of love is not hate, it is fear"

- Pickford, G.

Introduction

In this chapter the reader is guided through the methodological maze which I have navigated as part of the research process undertaken in order to write this thesis. Whether people feel ‘European’, as a personal identity, or not, is not at the heart of my investigation. Rather, it is ‘identity’ as a political elite construction, which is the focal point of this thesis. But how can I be sure that it is signs of identity construction that I see? Or to put it differently, what is the stuff which identities are made of? In the official European Union documents analysed there are few direct references to a common identity. However, this does not mean that an identity is not being discussed and constructed. Rather, I argue, it is useful to think of ‘identity’ in metaphorical terms as a container filled with certain ideas, myths, symbols and norms. Therefore my main concern is on exploring how these are used when constructing both the national and European subject, and how they also work to exclude ‘the Other’. We are witnessing a ‘boundary turn’ in social sciences with an increasing popularity as regards to spatial metaphors. This development can be linked to the popularity of constructivist research and ‘the Other’ is constructed through identity discourses, at both the national and the European level, through the construction of boundaries. Boundaries are symbolic linguistic creations of our minds. In other words, they can be seen as structures which put limits to what can reasonably be thought and argued. Further, boundaries can be seen as points where something becomes something else; they exist both within nation-states and between them. Boundaries can, similar to identity generally, be defined as either ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ or perhaps more suitably as ‘clear’ and ‘vague’. Boundaries are constructed with the help of certain ‘check-points’ where ‘we’ are separated from ‘the Other’. Also important to this process is the establishing of ‘mental maps’, which help us navigate in a world of insecurity and
This chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part looks closer at the idea of identity as a construct and how this is achieved through the process of Othering, building on the theoretical perspectives presented in the previous chapter. Further, it charts how the idea of national identity and the nation entered the scene by giving an overview of the academic literature which discusses the roots and character of national identity. In addition, it highlights the ideational structures, such as myths, memories, symbols and values, which are part of the national identity construction process, also resound at the European level. Special attention is paid to the power of education and language as both governmental technologies and symbols. The reason for looking closer at the literature on national identity is that it is often claimed that the European Union policy-makers are modelling European identity discourse on its national counterpart. In the second part of this chapter the meaning of citizenship is analysed in order to show that it is more than a simple legal marker. Often the concepts of identity and citizenship are used interchangeably. However, even though citizenship can be perceived as a form of identity this is not the only meaning that it has. I concur with Delanty who argues that identity entails the recognition of common ties while citizenship is a membership of a polity. As was suggested in the introductory chapter, through citizenship identity becomes a political concept. The discussions and problematising of identity in these two first sections are useful when describing the research process in the third and final part of this chapter.

1. The Modern State and the Construction of Identity

“Knowing Me, Knowing You” – The Process of Othering

In the previous chapter I asserted that discourses shape the way we think about ourselves and the world around us. In this section I would like to look closer at how this is done. I begin this discussion on identity construction by looking at the process of Othering since it is universally used, whether it is identity discourse on regional, national, European or personal level which is being formulated. The process of Othering is the way ‘we’ construct ourselves, through discourse, as different from ‘the Other’. The word ‘identity’ finds its root in the Latin word ‘idem’ meaning ‘sameness’. However, it is more complicated than that; this ‘sameness’ can...
be distinguished through a variety of ways. When analysing the construction of national identity it is possible to distinguish four important characteristics which are also relevant when analysing the construction of European identity. First, it is an ongoing process that never ends. Hence, as was argued in the introductory chapter, identities are not fixed but rather fluid. Second, it is a non-essential category, which belongs to a specific time and place. Third, ‘the Self’ is always related to ‘the Other’. Finally, and related to the previous, stories are told about ‘the Self’ and ‘the Other’.

Another way to look at national identity is to highlight the fact that inherent in the idea of nationhood are two deep human values. First, part of the national identity discourse is a sense of belongingness. Second, there are claims of originality, i.e. ‘we’ have a place, a geographical space, and a social home and that ‘we’ are different from ‘them’, i.e. ‘the Other’. ‘We’ in this sense is the nation. In other words, in the modern nation-state system identities are constructed through clear and unambiguous inside/outside and self/other distinctions. These characteristics and human values are also used in the construction of identity at the European level. However, the distinctions are not always as clear when constructing and studying European identity as this thesis will show.

I believe it is useful to look closer at the process of Othering and meaning of identity, since it is a clearly contested concept. I have let myself be influenced by Mayer and Palmowski who define identity as:

“…a distinctiveness of an object or a person, a specificity which marks out, but is not necessarily unique to, an object or a person. Identity is essentially janus-faced: it is as much about differentiation and individuality as it is about commonality”.

I pick up especially on this idea of the dual nature of identity and citizenship. They can both be seen as social markers defining who is a citizen and who is ‘the Other’. In other words, they both contain a mode of differentiation by both saying something about who ‘we’ are and who ‘we’ are not, i.e. ‘the Other’. In this sense the formation of subjects is always and
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necessarily relational, i.e. there always has to be an ‘Other’, against which subjects can be related and defined.\(^8\) In addition, to reconnect with the short quote by Pickford earlier, common identity is to a certain degree about sharing a common fear.\(^9\) This implies that it is important to analyse which subjects are included in a discourse and which are excluded.\(^10\)

This means that discourses are generally organised in binary oppositions, like for example Western/Eastern, with one of the constituents in the binary being seen as superior.\(^11\)

Generally, the idea of Othering is used to justify the inequalities we see in society between different groups. First, by employing a positive representation of the own group, and secondly by portraying ‘the Other’ in negative terms. However, it is important that the negative evaluation of ‘the Other’ seems credible and true. Arguments should be based on ‘facts’ and emphasis should be put on ‘our’ positive actions (and understate ‘our’ negative ones) while the actions of ‘the Other’ are portrayed as negative. Also, it is important to use words that imply positive (for ‘us’) or negative (for ‘them’) valuation.\(^12\) Thus, an analysis of the construction of identity focuses on the positive and negative ideas contained within the discourse. However, this contention, that identity generally speaking only seems possible to create in comparison to ‘the Other’ has been criticised by, among others, post-modernists. Critics claim that it should be possible to avoid negative forms of identity creation and that there ought to be possible to create an identity without using an ‘Other’ as a comparison. There have been attempts to work out an identity without excluding ‘the Other’, by social scientists lately.\(^13\) But despite this, the process of Othering prevails.


The Origins of the Nation and National Identity

There are a variety of different approaches used when analysing and discussing the nation and national identity. Some approaches are mostly interested in finding out how identities were created in the first place, while others are more concerned with understanding how identities are continuously recreated. However, there is today a fairly accepted view among scholars that identities and their boundaries are social constructs. The idea of the nation and national identity has attracted a lot of academic attention with some of the most renowned scholars being Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and Anthony D. Smith, whose discussions and debates have been dominant for over twenty years. One of the main ways in which their views diverge is in relation to the nature and origin of the nation. As Delanty and O’Mahony would have it, it is a question of the modernity of the nation. They represent two different approaches to the definition of the nation, i.e. modernism and primordialism. The first three writers adhere to a modernistic perspective, which argues that there is nothing natural about the nation or national identity, or European identity either for that matter. As Gellner states: “[n]ationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist”. Put another way, nations do not have navels. Rather, nations and national identities are both very much political constructs and have been part of modernity since the industrial revolution and the changes it brought with it. And, as Gellner suggests, industrialism brought with it a form of homogenisation. In a similar way I argue...

14 See for example Conversi, D., “Mapping the Field: Theories of Nationalism and the Ethnosymbolic Approach” in Leoussi, S.A. & Grosby, S., (eds.), “Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism: History, Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations”, (Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, 2006), pp. 15-30, pp. 16-17. Some of the most commonly used are modernism, constructivism, instrumentalism (which is sometimes equated with constructivism), primordialism, ethno-symbolism, and perennialism. For an insightful account of how the modernist approach has developed since the 1960s up until the present day see Smith, A.D., “History and national identity: responses and clarifications”, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 10, No. 1 & 2, 2004, pp. 195-209. Some scholars do not make a clear distinction between modernism and instrumentalism but rather argue that modernism can be seen as a form of instrumentalism in the sense that it argues that what the elite is interested in is to maximise their material interests. This is also why modernism has faced criticism. Modernism can be argued to have an instrumental view of agency. In other words, modernists argue that the elite create identity in order to gain power and money. Brown, D., “Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural, and Multicultural Politics”, (Routledge: London, 2000). Kornprobst makes the categorisation slightly different. He argues that there are three main schools of thought, i.e., modernism, ethno-symbolism and social constructivism. See Kornprobst, M., “Episteme, nation-builders and national identity: the re-construction of Irishness”, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2005, pp. 403-421.

15 What is interesting is the fact that these authors often referred to and discussed each others work. See for example “The Warwick Debates on Nationalism” between Gellner, E., and Smith A.D. (former student of Gellner’s), which took place in October 1995, just a week or two before Gellner past away. The Warwick Debate is available from (http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/Government/gellner/Warwick0.html , accessed 2007-09-06).


17 Often approaches to the nature of the nation speak of Modernism versus Primordialism. Hutchinson, however, argues that there are three main approaches to defining the nation, i.e. Primordialism, Modernism and Ethnicism. For a further discussion see Hutchinson, J., “Modern nationalism”, (Fontana Press: London, 1994), p. 3.


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that European Union policy-makers are inventing Europeans. Anderson builds on the modernist approach with his famous idea that nations are ‘imagined communities’ in the sense that most of the members of the community have never met but still feel that they are united.21 For the ‘imagined community’ to work, according to Taylor, there is a need for some form of social imaginary:

“…the ways in which people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations”. 22

How this imagining is achieved will be discussed further below but let us turn to Smith, the cat among the pigeons, who is said to have one foot in the primordialist school, which argues that there is something inherently natural and eternal about nations, and the other in the ephemeral approach which argues that nations are a modern phenomenon.23 Even though I adhere to the modernist approach myself I believe that some of Smith’s discussions, specifically on the idea of myths and the role of education, are relevant to my study. Smith’s approach to national identity is often referred to as ethno-symbolism which attempts “to establish relations between the different kinds of collective cultural identity by focusing on elements of myth, memory, value, symbol, and tradition”.24 While Smith agrees with the other writers mentioned here that modern society has meant extensive changes to peoples’ feelings of belonging and that the industrial revolution, the bureaucratic state and secular mass-education have all represented a watershed in human history he suggests that this does not mean that they have been obliterated or rendered obsolete many of the cultures and identities formed in pre-modern eras. Rather, the content of these identities and cultures, i.e. the myths, memories, symbols and values, has often been adapted to new circumstances by being given


21 Benedict Anderson agrees with both Geller and Hobsbawm that the idea of the nation is tied to the start of modernity. There are some differences though. Both Geller and Hobsbawm argue that the concepts of the nation and nationalism are connected to the introduction of the Industrial Revolution. Anderson, however, is more concerned with the anthropological consequences of modernity such as for example, what are the mass psychological factors which support the idea of the nation. Anderson, B., “Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism”, (Verso: London, 1991), p. 6, and Sörlin, S., “Benedict Anderson” in Sörlin, S. (ed.), “Nationens Röst: Texter om nationalismens teori och praktik”, (SNS Förlag: Stockholm, 2001), pp. 219-220, p. 219.


new meanings and functions. Smith argues that where an ethnic community managed to preserve its memories in documentary form and in sufficient quantity, the intellectual task became one of 'reconstruction' rather than 'invention'. Reconstruction was carried out by selecting, rationalising and codifying the variant traditions and documents handed down, and reinterpreting the meaning and the role of for example well-known religious events and persons. These myths were then spread through a network of educational institutions and the professionals that manned them. This way the young were inculcated with the correct national outlook and purpose. This would help the former passively acquiescent community out of its subordinate position and turn it into an activist, politicised nation which in turn would force the powers to recognise the autonomy of the re-born nation and accord it full honours in the circle of nations. In other words, primordialists, such as Smith, maintain that the state only has a limited role in the identity-making processes, in comparison to the conviction of the modernist approach, since ethnies constrain the elites in their identity-makingendeavour. However, critics argue that one of the weaknesses of ethno-symbolism is that it fails to give any insight into what motivates the elite to take part in the identity-making process and construct a specific version of identity.

The Importance of Space

So far we have looked at the history of the nation, where it has its roots, let us now move on to look at how the nation and as a result also national identity are discursively constructed. One objective way of defining a nation is through territory. As Foucault claims: “[s]pace is fundamental to any exercise of power”. By speaking of a certain historic territory and space the discourse creates a sense of belongingness and originality. Hence, important to the national identity constructing process is the idea of a shared homeland. According to Smith, the nation is a human population that is territorially bound with mobility throughout that territory and whose members belong to a particular territory that is recognised as their’s by right. This description of the nation suggests a working definition that unites objective

29 This shows how the state is part and parcel of a wider international system, one in which the whole world is divided into separate national units that are then related to each other by common ideas and practices, including those implicit in nationalist ideologies. Smith, A.D., “When is a Nation?”, Geopolitics, Vol. 7, No. 2, Autumn 2002, pp. 5-32, p. 7.
elements, such as territory, law, and public culture, with subjective elements, such as shared memories and heritage, which characterise any collective identity. From this Smith draws the conclusion that a nation can be defined as:

“…a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members”.

However, since some of these criteria admit a degree or invoke concepts that are vague, such as culture, and because many of the criteria are also characteristic of other collective entities, such as tribes, clans, ethnic groups, certain political associations, it is not surprising that there are frequent disputes about whether certain groups are actually nations. From the arguments made above about both objective and subjective definitions of the nation it becomes obvious that both can be fuzzy and difficult to define.

Looking further at the importance of defining the territorial boundaries of the nation-state; according to Giddens a nation only exists when there is a state administration that reaches over the territory over which the state has a claim of sovereignty. The nation-state is, according to Horsman and Marshall, a pact between citizens and governments within geographically distinct borders. It is through this territorial element that the nation and the nation-state have become connected.

Outside Europe until fairly recently, and in Europe before the seventeenth century, most states were not nation-states but rather empires or relatively loosely consolidated territories. The idea of the territorial state emerged gradually and neither boundaries nor sovereignty were sharply defined attributes of ‘public’ authority until the eighteenth century. In the modern world, with higher standards of living, wider

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education, and improved communication, people have become more politically conscious.\textsuperscript{37} The nation-state has capitalised on this development. By mobilising the masses nationalism intensifies and, by combining nation and state, pushed the nation-state to the forefront of human loyalties.

Further, for a state to be seen as a nation-state it requires a self-conscious belief on part of its citizens that the collective has a power greater than the mere agglomeration of a given country's population. In other words, mutual recognition has also played an important part in the modern state system. Central to this recognition is the fact that each state is the sole political authority with exclusive possession of a defined territory. By exploiting the autonomy from external interference sanctioned by this mutual and international agreement, states were thus able to impose sovereignty on their societies.\textsuperscript{38} Linked to the idea of the territorial nation-state and its use of an administration is the passport, introduced in the early nineteenth century, not simply as a symbol of belonging but also as a tool to control who enters and leaves the territorial nation-state. In other words, the passport can be seen as an exercise of power in the sense that it is a governmentality technology and a form of social surveillance. As Soysal suggests, this in turn led has to “formalizing the status of the national citizen and, by contrast, the alien”.\textsuperscript{39} In other words, by constructing the national subject, with the help of, among other things the passport, something is also said about who ‘the Other’ is. The importance of territory and the passport will be discussed further, in relation to the European civic identity and mobility, in chapter six.


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The Power of Myths, Memories and Symbols in Identity Construction

"Britannia, she’s half English, she speaks Latin at home
St George was born in the Lebanon,
how he got here I don’t know
And those three lions on your shirt
They never sprang from England's dirt
Them lions are half English and I’m half English too"  

As was argued above, identity is a narrative, which contains certain myths, symbols and claims of memories, which in turn plays an essential part in the process of creating a sense of continuity. In relation to continuity, when discussing the nation and identity the term ethnicity is often used. Ethnic groups are seen to share cultural rather than biological attributes, and ethnic identity means that individuals feel a sense of wider kinship and part of what Smith calls a ‘super-family’, which is similar to Anderson’s idea of the ‘imagined community’, mentioned earlier. This means that people feel that they share a sense of belonging with people they have never met because of distance both in time and space. In other words, group belonging is dependent on shared memories according to Smith. This feeling of belonging and sentiments of solidarity are enforced by the use of common codes and shared symbols and myths of a common descent. However, Smith’s idea of shared memories has been criticised by for example Bell who argues that since memory is supposed to be anchored in a common experienced and that memories can only be shared by those that actually experienced the event. This means that the memories which Smith argues are important would not suffice and that what Smith sees as memories should rather be called myths.40 In my mind, the idea of ‘memories’ carries with it a sense of being ‘the truth’ and is perhaps therefore more excluding than the concept of myths. Myths and symbols are not specific to the national identity discourse, as will be argued later, in particular in chapter five. They are also present in European identity discourse in order to create a European imagined community with a suggested shared history, culture and civilization.41 In other words, I believe it is important to

look closer at the idea of myths since they play such a powerful role in the identity-making process generally, as is suggested by Hobsbawm:

“...myth and invention are essential for the politics of identity by which groups of people today, defining themselves by ethnicity, religion or the past or present borders of states, try to find some certainty in an uncertain and shaking world by saying, ‘We are different from and better than the Others’”.42

Leoussi puts forward similar arguments to Hobsbawm by asserting that myths of distant origins, memories, symbols and values serve the purpose of creating a sense of common ancestry, heritage, tradition, destiny and uniqueness.43 This means that successive generations are linked by the idea of a common history. Or as Hobsbawm puts it: “the past is essentially the pattern for the present”.44 Symbols are, similar to myths, shared by the people within a community, and they are meaningful because all members of the group understand them. In other words, these symbols can be seen as a visual discourse on identity. As Jacobsson suggests, social representation is made up of imaginations, claims and explanations filled with emotion and value that unite people.45 The most important symbols of the nation-state include for example the flag, anthem, passport, and currency.

Returning to the concept ‘myth’, it is sometimes used interchangeably with ‘lie’ in colloquial language. Or as Deutsch argues: “(a) nation is a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbours”.46 However, historical myths are not so much lies or errors as they are interpretations of the past. In other words, constructing a common past entails a process of ‘pick and mix’ of possible historical events. According to Hobsbawm, history is often replaced by myths and invention. This is not difficult to achieve, he argues, since politicians decide school curricula and what goes into the schoolbooks.47 The historical accuracy of national myths matters less in its own right than for

45 However, generally speaking, to share a symbol doesn’t mean that all people interpret it in the same way. Precisely the fact that a symbol’s meaning can be inexact makes them so effective. For example, the flag can be seen as a social representation; it can be simply a piece of cloth but it also carries a lot of emotional meaning to people. Jacobsson, K., “Så gott som demokrati – om demokratifrågan i EU-debatten”, (Bokförlaget: Umeå, 1997), pp. 31-32.
the effect it has on the nation's present self-understanding. What is important is not the authenticity of the historical event on record but the emotional sentiment that it manages to stir up. Even though beliefs are proven to be, strictly speaking, false, it may not be rational to discard them. The reason for this is that they, even though false, still contribute significantly to the support of valuable social relations. They do so in at least two ways. First, they provide reassurance that the national community/Europe is solidly based in history, that it embodies a real continuity between generations. Second, they perform a moralising role by holding up before us the virtues of our ancestors and encourage us to live up to them. If one accepts the nation (and Europe) as an ethical community it seems very likely that their ethical character will be strengthened by the acceptance of such myths as people's sense of solidarity with and obligation to their compatriots will be increased.49

The Power and Symbolism of Education and Language

Education plays an essential role in helping to spread these particular state sponsored myths discussed above. However, considering a possible European identity, Smith is critical, since there exists, in his opinion, no pan-European education system, at least not comparable to that within the Member States. A further obstacle is the fact that European Union policy-makers do not control the curriculum of the schools in the Member States. The content of education is still in the hands of each individual Member State. Bologna will only streamline the length of university degree programmes. In addition, Smith claims that there are no European shared myths and symbols, which in Smith’s view are essential for the maintenance of identities at the national level. This causes Smith to pose the question of: “… who will feel European in the depths of their being, and who will willingly sacrifice themselves for so abstract an ideal? In short, who will die for Europe”?50 I do not fully agree with Smith on the issue of lack of European myths. Rather, in my own opinion, and as I will show in the analysis chapters, there are European myths, albeit not as powerful as those of the nation, but since the Member States still control the content of education, education cannot play as influential and powerful a role as it does at the national level.

Methodological Considerations and Reflections – Challenging Identity

As argued earlier claims to a specific territory is one of the objective ways to define a nation. There are others too, such as language or ethnicity or a combination of criteria such as language, common territory, common history, cultural traits, etc. Although most nations are united in several of these ways, no single objective commonality or any particular combination of these commonalities is necessary for the existence of a nation. All such objective definitions have usually failed; the reason being that only some members of the large class of entities that fit such definitions can at any time be described as nations. Moreover, the criteria used for objective definitions, like for example language and ethnicity, are themselves fuzzy, shifting, and ambiguous. The alternative to an objective definition of a nation is, as mentioned above, a subjective one, which defines a nation by its members’ consciousness of belonging to it. In other words, subjectively a nation can be defined by the simple fact that the people who make up the nation feel that they, as a group, are a nation. This is however, as Hobsbawm suggests, tautological and provides only an a posteriori guide to what a nation is. It can also lead to the assumption that all that is needed to be or create a nation is the will to be one. Therefore, neither objective nor subjective definitions will suffice. Rather, what is needed is a combination of both, tailor-made for each aspiring or existing nation.

As has been suggested above what constitutes culture is still under discussion. However, in many definitions of culture language plays a part and I believe it useful to look closer at what role language, as part of culture, plays in the identity-making process in the nation-state since language is also given a prominent position on the European Union agenda. Language has acted as a powerful marker between different cultures and ethnic groups within the nation-state. There is even talk sometimes of linguistic nationalism and linguistic culture. However, languages are not ‘natural’ or value-free but rather constructed “organised systems with centrally defined norms, each language ideally expressing the spirit of a nation and the territory it occupies”. So how have languages been constructed in the nation-state? Among

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modernists, such as myself, there is a conviction that with Industrialism it became possible to control the masses with the help of mass media and education through a national curriculum, with the purpose to spread the idea of a national identity. Modern education plays an essential role by helping to create a sense of a community, i.e. a nation, with a common history, a shared culture, including language, and sometimes even religion.59 Hence, cultural assimilation has taken place. The modern state has used the school to create a monolingual society. In other words, the norm is to have one state sponsored homogenised language.

Looking closer at the role of mass education has played in teaching generation after generation of children a standardised national language. Hobsbawm argues that before there was any general primary education there was and could be no spoken national language.60 Through modern mass education pupils were taught a standardised written language that made it possible to communicate more easily with other individuals within the nation-state borders.61 This is important since being part of a linguistic and cultural community is argued to be one of the corner stones of nationalism.62 Mass literacy has led to the development of the languages of the people. However, it is not only the people, the masses that benefit from a standard national language. Hence, besides being seen as a tool used to make communication easier it can also be viewed as a symbol of the power and status of the elite.63 Throughout history there is evidence of how states have constructed nations by, for example, imposing a language, and maybe prioritising a specific dialect, and by giving privilege to a specific historical narrative and by creating myths and symbols.64

Important to point out is the fact that language is rarely seen as constructed. Rather, it is seen as intimate and natural. As such it is thus very deeply associated in the minds of an overwhelmingly monoglot humanity with which one essentially is a part of. On top of this, the permanence and tangibility of these cultural formations generate an image of the nation as an eternal collective. And yet despite this intimacy, it defines a form of collective membership, which, unlike race or even possibly ethnicity, can be acquired. However, it has


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also been argued that language is not a very useful concept when defining the nation as all over the world the boundaries of nation-states and the boundaries of linguistic distributions rarely overlap. In other words, many nations share the same language, are officially multilingual, and/or in some the most official language is no one's mother tongue. In addition, national languages are more often than not the consequence of nationalistic efforts rather than their foundation. With these facts as proof Anderson’s use of language as criteria for definition of nation seems to fail. The two latter points mentioned suggest that language is only one dimension of the nation. It makes one question as to whether there are any cultural attributes that uniformly makes a nation.65

Let us look closer at how a standardised language has been spread in the modern nation-state after the Industrial Revolution. With the switch from a feudal to a modern society it became possible to print large quantities and these texts, including newspapers as well as novels, helped encourage a standardised language and literacy. Especially important in the nation-building process was the epic.66 In Brennan’s mind:

“…the novel historically accompanied the rise of nations by objectifying the ‘one, yet many’ of national life, and by mimicking the structure of the nation, a clearly bordered jumble of languages and styles”.67

Another change that made it possible to ‘think’ the nation, according to Anderson, was the change from a medieval ‘simultaneous-along-time’ to a modern ‘homogeneous-empty-time’.68 This shift can be easily seen by comparing two novels, one from before the change to one after:

“The idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogeneous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which is also conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history”.69

This change in perception had not been possible, however, if there did not already exist a common standardised national language. What this means is that it was through, what

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Anderson calls print capitalism, and the fact that the masses read the same texts, that the foundation for a national consciousness was created. In addition, Hobsbawm argues that the press, cinema and radio have helped to standardise popular ideologies. They have aided the attempts to make national symbols part of the masses everyday lives. Population counts, maps and museums have also played an important part in creating these imagined communities that Anderson speaks of.

The Myth of the Culturally Homogeneous Nation-State

Earlier in this chapter I discussed the general power of myths in the construction of national identity. I would now like to look closer at perhaps the most important myth of the nation-state, i.e. the myth of its own homogeneity. This discussion will help explain why the myth of ‘Unity in Diversity’, so much revered by the European Union institutions, which is discussed further in chapter five in relation to the cultural version of European identity, has been promoted with such energy at the European level and what European Union decision-makers hope to achieve by it. Further, I believe this discussion can help to highlight problems and weaknesses in the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’. As I will question, can diversity play the same unifying force as homogeneity does? In addition, the role that education plays in promoting the idea of the culturally homogeneous nation-state will be highlighted.

As was suggested above, one of the major arguments and aims of the modern state is to portray itself as homogeneous in the hope of bringing unity and uniformity. It is homogeneous in the sense that it has a culturally homogenised and administered citizenry. Hence, official myths play an important part in creating the image of the nation-state as homogeneous. More precisely, by portraying the nation-state as nationally homogeneous and the nation as culturally homogeneous, the nation-state attempts to put forward a picture that the nation and the state coincide, by the nation-state defining itself as the nation. This homogenising is often the work of the state elites. However, post-modern theories argue that

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culture is not homogeneous, and maybe not hegemonic, but rather fractured and contested. As suggested by Coulby this conflict can be seen in the struggle for control, formation and assessment of the school and university curricula.\textsuperscript{75} States utilize the curricula and culture as a way of portraying itself as homogenous. Nations, on the other hand, use culture to define themselves as distinct from states. The nation-state is heterogeneous in the sense that it usually houses more than one nation within its territory. It is obvious that they are not nation states but could maybe be argued to be national states. The proper definition of a nation-state should be a state with a single ethnic and/or cultural population within its boundaries, and the boundaries of that state ought to be co-extensive with the boundaries of that ethnic and/or cultural population. However, only approximately ten percent of all states in the United Nations are nation-states.\textsuperscript{76} So to say that the nation-state is culturally homogenous does not mean that there are no minority cultures within its territory. It does, however, mean that there will be one official, state maintained, culture, which will be the official. In a multi-national nation-state usually the national culture will be that of the largest nation.\textsuperscript{77} And there is strong evidence to suggest that national cultures will be protected most effectively when nurtured by states of their own. There are of course exceptions to the rule. Some states go to great lengths to support the cultures of national minorities. As argued above, nation-states are not identical, they all deal with situations differently. For example, a state promoting a civic notion of the nation it will act differently from one promoting a conception of the nation based on ethnic criteria.\textsuperscript{78}

Why is it important for the nation-state to portray itself as culturally homogeneous? According to Gellner there is an objective need for homogeneity inherent in nationalism. Industrial society needs a moveable, literate, culturally standardised and replaceable public.\textsuperscript{79} However, it is not only the nation-state that is portrayed as homogenous. Anderson argues that the modern idea of the nation is also homogenouss.\textsuperscript{80} All members are described as equals and citizens. Members of a nation are replaceable.\textsuperscript{80} And as has been argued before, for a national community to work it is not only necessary that there is a connection or link between all

\textsuperscript{78} On the subject of accommodating national minorities, the civic nation offers a view of the nation or national community, supposedly rising above any particular group or culture, to which immigrants have to assimilate, sacrificing their own culture and identity to achieve citizenship rights and attain membership of the nation. But even so, this supposedly universal culture will always see them as outsiders. An ethnic nation, on the other hand, would be much less likely in the first place to even include immigrants, unless they share the same ethnicity. See Schwartzmantel, J., "The State in Contemporary Society: An Introduction", (Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf: Hemel Hempstead, 1994), p.190.
living members of the nation. There is also a need for a bond with past and future generations. This is what Anderson calls ‘the imagined community’.

This means that in one hundred years when most of the people that are part of the nation today are dead the nation will still have very much the same character. With the idea of the nation the masses, for the first time, get a clear role. But how are the speechless, faceless individuals tied together? According to Smith there are collective historical experiences, part of ethnicity, that give each nation a specific ‘language’ in common.

This more or less universal portrayal of the nation as the cultural unit of the nation-state is not, however, how it was in the beginning of the history of the modern state. First, the claim to sovereignty was made on behalf of a particular, territorially defined unity of humanity. After that it seemed natural to relate the claim to the particular attributes of the unit. At first this was confined to certain political characteristics and did not extend, at least explicitly, to cultural characteristics, which did not already have some explicit political meaning.

In the modern world, however, the state has created a national public culture as part of its project of forming a national identity. The reason for promoting one single culture is that, it has been argued, the consequence of the acceptance of more than one culture within the nation-state is usually that each national culture receives less protection than the national culture would in a culturally homogeneous state. The reason for this is that the protection of one national culture will often be met by protests from the other nations living within the nation-state. Linking culture with nationalism, it has been argued that nationalism can be seen as a by-product of the industrialised society, where social structure is replaced by appeals to a shared culture, what can be known as a mass-culture.

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85 There seems as if, in today's globalised world, that there have been challenges to the nation-state's self-appointed role of provider of a cultural identity. Smith argues that there is a new depiction of cultural minority claims as communitarian rights deriving legitimacy from the previous depiction of the majority culture as the core of the assimilating nation. The counter-élites of disadvantaged cultural groups thus are merely employing for themselves the language of communitarian ethnic rights that the state elites have formerly used in the service of the nation-state. Smith goes on to argue that what has brought the issue of the nation-state to a head has been its predominantly plural ethnic character, the arousal of previously dormant and submerged minority ethnicities by social penetration and cultural regimentation of the scientific state' ran by elites from the dominant ethnie, coupled with the unfulfilled popular expectations, and the resulting growing pressure of discontented minorities on the political arena of the centre and its dominant ethnic community. However, the opportunities to travel or in other ways experience culture in other parts of the world are not evenly distributed among the world's people and included there, the European peoples. This in turn leads to different experiences of globalisation and different responses to it. From these facts, some scholars have made the judgement that, in a world where the responses to globalisation vary significantly, it seems unlikely that there will be a unified global culture. Rather, it seems more likely that what will occur are global cultures in the plural. See Smith, A.D., "Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era", (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1995), p. 102. Also see Brown, D., "Why is the Nation-State so vulnerable to Ethnic Nationalism?", Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1998, pp. 1-15, p. 11, and Finlayson, A., "Nationalism as ideological interpellation: the case of Ulster Loyalism", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, January 1996, pp. 88-112, pp 89-90.
What repercussions do the fact that the nation-state is heterogeneous rather than homogeneous have in the relationship between the nation and the nation-state? Cultural nationalism does not summarily exclude individuals on the basis of their ancestral or racial background. However, it defines the nation as a cultural community. Immigrants, from cultural backgrounds different from that of the nation they seek to be admitted to, are expected to shelve their distinct cultural identities and assimilate to the culture, values, and belief systems of their prospective national community. The primary concern of the cultural nation is to preserve its cultural integrity. This is a feature that sets it apart from both ancestral and territorial nationalism. 86 One problem the state has to face if it is nationally heterogeneous is that there will sizeable minorities that are uncomfortable with the idea of living within a culturally or ethnically defined political community. 87 That is why the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’ is more suitable than homogeneity in the heterogeneous Europe.

2. Contemporary Citizenship

From Passivity and Rights to Activity and Responsibility

Similar to the concept of ‘identity’, citizenship is a frequently referred to and contested idea. 88 As is suggested by Birzea: “[c]itizenship belongs to the category of concepts that stand to lose its meaning as a result of popularity”. 89 I argue that the concepts of identity and citizenship are closely linked but not necessarily identical. Citizenship is often seen as a legal status but it can also be seen as a specific form of identity and sense of belonging bestowing membership on the citizen, both in the nation-state and in the European Union. Further, citizenship is a descriptive idea in the sense that it says something about who the citizen is and what s/he does. However, it is also normative since it also says something about what the citizen should do. In addition, citizenship entails a relationship between the citizens, i.e. the members of the community, and those that govern. This means that citizenship forms a social contract or a bond between the citizen and the State which is achieved through the attachment of rights and

duties, which can be civic, political and/or social in character, to the citizenship. It is these two interpretations of the idea of citizenship, as an identity and as a status, which are investigated further in this section. The arguments put forward here will primarily serve as a theoretical foundation for the analysis carried out in chapter six where the idea of a common civic European identity is examined, but also when analysing the construction of neo-liberal identity, which I see as intimately connected to the civic version, in chapter seven. I maintain that civic European identity and its associated citizenship can be seen as a political identity where the aim is to make citizens ‘fall in love’ with the European Union institutions. Thus, it relates to what kind of imagined political community the European Union should be. Further, I argue that there has been a revival of the idea of the active citizen, both in the nation-state and at the European level. In other words, we are witnessing what has been referred to as a romantic turn, in relation to citizenship, where the participatory, or active, citizen is being emphasised. This means that there is a push for viewing citizenship not simply as a status but increasingly also as a practice. What policy-makers at the European level are trying to do is to recapture a lost world, to recreate a community, a Gemeinschaft, to substitute the egotistical, self-centred civil society, i.e. Gesellschaft, which exists today.

Citizenship can be viewed as the oldest institution in Western political thought, with its roots in ancient Greece. However, in this section it is citizenship in its modern form which is contemplated. Considering the romantic revival or ‘activity turn’, as I prefer to refer to it, Burchell suggests:

“With the rise of the market society in early modern Europe the classical ‘active’ civic ideal was progressively replaced by a modern ‘passive’ or ‘liberal’ ideal which crucially weakened or distorted the vitality of the original civic impulse: thus, an important strand in

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90 Burchell discusses a republican and a liberal version of citizenship. According to the republican approach citizenship should, in a romantic way, be seen as the very core of our lives. Citizenship is seen as a responsibility, a duty, which the citizen should be proud to perform. On the other hand, liberal citizenship is passive and only serves as an outer frame in our lives, consisting of a right or set of rights, which the citizen is entitled to passively enjoy. Burchell, D. “The attributes of citizens: virtue, manners and the activity of citizenship”, Economy and Society, Vol. 24, No. 4, November 1995, pp. 540-558, p. 544.


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the contemporary civic revival is a kind of extended lament for the lost ethos of the active
citizen and a rousing exhortation for his or her revival in a new ‘radical’ civic ethos’.

Hence, with the modern nation-state came a need and possibility to create a docile,
manageable population. Viewing citizenship further in a historical perspective, according to
Birzea membership in the nation-state has developed in three phases. First, in feudal society
the individual was seen as a subject under the rule of the king. With the modern nation state
came the second phase whereby the individual was defined according to nationality. The
American Revolution brought on the third phase of the development of membership. With its
Constitution citizenship, in legal and political terms, was created. Thus, around the same
time as the nation was created the technology of citizenship was introduced. Modernists argue
that the French Revolution can also be seen as something of a turning point with its
introduction of the civic ideas of ‘every man being equal’, even though it at the time only
included the landowning and educated male part of the population. However, it took some
time before the masses felt any deeper emotional attachment to the nation in the form of
national identity. Some academics of the modernist school would argue that the people didn’t
have any real national sentiment until the twentieth century. The idea of citizenship is
central to the concept of the nation in the sense that citizenship claims became an important
proof of how the nation became institutionalised. In the beginning it was more of an idea
which was nurtured by the elite and it took quite some time before citizenship, with its rights
and duties, became a reality for the masses. Up until the nineteenth century citizenship was
typically either restricted to a relatively narrow group within the political community or
completely absent. What gave the masses citizenship was the introduction of mass education
and with it the imposition of a standard language, discussed earlier this chapter. Mass
education and language are of course also important elements in the creation of a national
identity, so in this way citizenship is tied to national identity. Considering the purpose of
citizenship further, it can be seen as the foundation of the modern liberal-democratic state. It
provides a framework within which individuals are part of a political community. As such, it
is strongly limited to conceptions of the nation-state and sovereignty. It has been suggested
that the modern idea of citizenship has, however, been challenged by globalisation. There has

been an erosion of the nineteenth century conception of national citizenship as universal, classless, and irrespective of ethnicity, which has exposed deep faults in Western society. In the absence of rights that all can claim, social division is becoming more entrenched, the reverse of what was intended by the pioneers of citizenship. The introduction of citizenship was seen as an attempt to superimpose a universal community, that of the nation, onto a divided society. Now when this process is being reversed these divisions are showing again, destroying the sense of social solidarity and cohesion that has been so crucial to the modern nation-state. In addition, given that the concept of sovereignty is in crisis, an issue that will discussed in more detail below, it is not surprising that it has been argued that citizenship too is a beleaguered idea. The reason for this is that it was the sovereign state that gave the people citizenship. It can be argued that this was done by the state to pay off the nation for granting the state sole possession of sovereignty.

So far I have mainly discussed how the idea of citizenship has developed over time and which role it has in the creation of the nation-state. Let us now turn to look more closely at what citizenship entails. I have already hinted that it often refers to formal universal rights. However, it is also possible to view citizenship in substantive terms. Substantive citizenship implies a sense of identity and belonging while formal citizenship is made up of rights. This means that to have been granted citizenship in theory does not necessarily mean that the same applies in practice as Brubaker maintains:

"Formal citizenship is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for substantive membership....That it is not a sufficient condition is clear: one can possess formal state membership yet be excluded (in law or in fact) from certain civil, political, or social rights."

Thus, simply giving people rights will not gain their love and support. Some form of 'emotional glue' is needed as well. Looking closer at the distinction between formal and substantive citizenship, according to Haas:

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“Individuals and groups belonging to a community are connected to two, often interrelated dimensions. In the first place it deals with the formal status of the citizens, constituted by the legal framework of citizenship rights and duties. According to this dimension individuals and groups are bound together by the institutionalisation of rights and duties on different political levels. Secondly, citizenship is closely linked to the creation and reproduction of the political and socio-cultural identities of the community members.”

Thus, the most common way to define citizenship is as a legal classification providing status and rights and responsibilities and participation. This form of definition is often linked to the idea of a political citizenship, which connects legal and political status. When it comes to the issue of participation academics disagree concerning to what extent it is necessary. Looking closer at citizenship as a legal and formal form of association, in Dell’Olio’s opinion: “citizenship is an ‘idea’ that finds its expression in law”. However, it is important that citizenship becomes more than a legal definition and marker. What is needed is a set of rights, civil, political and social, and a sense of membership and participation. In addition, cultural, symbolic and economic practices play an important role in giving citizenship substance.

Considering the rights associated with citizenship, according to T.H. Marshall, perhaps the most renowned scholar on questions of citizenship, contemporary citizenship is concerned with civil, political and social rights and is bestowed upon members of a specific community. The strength of citizenship is the fact that it functions as a demarcation between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Hence, it is an institutionalised form of Othering. If citizenship could be bestowed upon everyone and anyone its value would decrease. Looking closer at what is meant by these rights, civic rights can be defined as those rights that allow the individual freedom-liberty, such as the freedom for the individual to live where s/he chooses, freedom of speech and religion, the right to own property and the right to equal justice before the law.

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concern the right to vote and stand for public office, etc. Often there is an emphasis on the political aspects of citizenship, as Closa suggests:

“…the defining and primordial element of citizenship is the enjoyment of political rights. In domestic law, the term ‘citizen’ applies only to persons in possession of full political rights. Political rights guarantee the possibility to influence state policy, which is exclusively reserved to nationals”.

Social rights also relate to the right of citizens to expect a certain level of economic welfare and security, including the citizen’s entitlement to education, social security, etc. As will be shown in chapter six, the importance of education is also acknowledged by the European Union. This can for example be seen by the fact that education has been written into the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which made up part of the proposed Constitution. Returning to the issue of social rights; when citizenship is based on social rights it is possible to speak of a social citizenship, which Faist defines as:

“…the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society”.

On the advantage of social rights, Hansen suggests that “[s]ocial rights always harbours the potential of cutting across ethnic and cultural divides”. However, as will be argued in chapter six, European citizenship is made up of mainly civic and political rights while social rights have lagged behind in practice. However, citizenship as practice does not only consist of rights. There are also certain duties that the citizen has towards the state. Duties attached to citizenship include doing the military service and paying taxes. There is also an increased emphasis, both at national and European and perhaps global level, on the need for citizens to be active, which is a neo-liberal idea. At a first glance duties might seem to be simply a negative aspect of citizenship. However, they serve as bond between the people and the state. Through rights and duties the relationship between the people and the state becomes a two-way connection. As I will argue later, this bond is weak at the European level but European Union decision-makers are working towards strengthening it through a common European

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citizenship. Further, citizenship can be used as a classificatory device and identity-marker to show who belongs to the **polis** and are therefore subject to its laws and those that are not.\(^{112}\) It has been argued that citizenship has always been a dividing line for those that are included and those that are excluded.\(^{113}\) Through a citizenship one also constructs the idea of the ‘Other’, someone who is not like us, and who is not entitled to the same rights and duties as ‘we’ are. The European citizenship is not different from a national one in this respect.

Further, citizenship can also be viewed in cultural and social terms, providing the citizen with an identity and a social role. Through a citizenship one becomes a member of a specific political community.\(^{114}\) In this sense, citizenship is not simply rights and responsibilities but also an identity in its own right.\(^{115}\) Craith draws a parallel between culture and citizenship by arguing that while the former relates to a communal form of identification while the latter is more individualistic in character they are both concerned with the relationship between the individual and community. In addition, both culture and citizenship presupposes active rather than passive actors.\(^{116}\)

So far in the section above we have looked at how citizenship can be defined. I would now like to look closer at the question of how it is decided who will be granted citizenship or not. How citizenship is defined and on what grounds it is granted differs from country to country but there are two main versions when it comes to defining and creating citizenship, i.e. the distinction between an ethnic definition based on ‘blood’ and a republican model based on ‘civic’ values. Important to point out here is that these forms of citizenship do not exist in a pure form but are however usually more heavily influenced by one than the other. According to the first definition citizenship can only be acquired by blood, in other words, if you are born as one of us. The ethnic model therefore gives citizenship to members of the nation, whose boundaries do not necessarily coincide with those of the state. Here the nation is defined in terms of ethnic origin and birth. Nationality is based on the idea of **jus sanguinis**,\(^{112}\) Shore, C., “Whither European Citizenship? : Eros and Civilization Revisited”, *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 27-44, p. 28.


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i.e. a common ancestry and not on residence, choice or commitment. This means that a person can be a citizen in a country that he or she has never set foot in. This is a concept of citizenship that has been popular in for example Germany, Poland, and the Baltic countries.\textsuperscript{117} Civic citizenship, on the other hand can, according to Craith, be seen as an example of ‘culture blind’ citizenship where civic rather than cultural values are stressed by the state.\textsuperscript{118} The civic version of citizenship is based on the idea of \textit{jus soli}. What this means is that if an outsider decides to live in a country and fulfil his/her civil obligations then he/she can obtain citizenship there. This form of citizenship has been associated with the American and French Revolutions and this form still exists in France today.\textsuperscript{119} The nation is seen as providing a sense of belonging through language, culture, history or politics. Here ethnic origin is not necessarily that significant.\textsuperscript{120} However, cultural citizenship can be hidden in the political correct cloak of civic citizenship, as is the case in for example France. France is often argued to be an example of a state adhering to a civic version of citizenship. However, there is a strong emphasis on the French language by the state, and language, as I argued earlier, is part of a country’s culture. This begs me to ask myself, how civic self-proclaimed civic states are.

Voices have been raised, both at national and European level, concerning what kind of citizenship would be suitable for the future as the world is becoming increasingly global and western nation-states increasingly multi-cultural. Questions of what which form of citizenship to appeal to and what kind of political community one wants to create are closely related. There is a great debate taking place at present among European studies scholars as to what forms of citizenship, for example Communitarianism, Constitutional Patriotism, and Cosmopolitanism, exist in the European Union today and what might be a suitable way to go in the future. These three general forms of citizenship can within themselves have great variety. However, generally speaking Communitarianism argues for the rights and responsibilities of the individual towards the community, an issue I look closer at later in this thesis, especially in relation to the neo-liberal version of European identity. With the attention given to the creation of a European Union Constitution at the beginning of this decade the

\textsuperscript{119} Kofman, E., “Citizenship for some but not for others: spaces of citizenship in contemporary Europe”, \textit{Political Geography}, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1995, pp. 121-137, pp.123-125. It has also been argued that there is a third important model of citizenship that emphasizes social citizenship. Here the stress is on consolidating the citizenship and solidarity through extending social rights. According to T.H. Marshall, there was a shift from civil and political rights to social rights in many nation-states after the 2nd world war.
idea of Constitutional Patriotism came to the fore, vigorously promoted by German scholar Jurgen Habermas. While Constitutional Patriotism tries reconcile ideas of human rights and peace with cultural inclusiveness, Cosmopolitanism takes it a step further by arguing for a ‘Community of Values’ on a larger, even global scale. The European citizenship which exists today is mainly based on various rights, such as the freedom of movement and the right to vote in European Parliament elections, but there are few obligations to create a European social bond. However, European Union policy makers are trying to change this, as will be shown in chapter five, six, and seven, by introducing an expectation of activity from the European citizens.

3. The Research Process

Discourse Analysis as a Methodological Tool

Speaking in metaphorical terms, discourse analysis is part of my methodological tool box. As a researcher I use the idea of discourse as a frame to understand reality. In other words, discourses can be seen as something researchers construct rather than a limited area that already exists in real life. Part of this construction entails carrying out discourse delimitation. The task of the researcher is to put forward reasonable arguments for the choice of discourse delimitation. However, as has been mentioned before, this is not an easy task. There are no clear-cut rules for how this is done, and as we have seen, not even for what a discourse is. What this means is that I, as a researcher, have to make clear what belongs to the discourse and what falls outside of it; this is known as a discourse order, a concept taken from Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis. According to Fairclough, the discourse order is the frame of the analysis, the common platform for the different discourses, i.e. discourse order is a configuration of various different discourses. Hence, a discourse order is the totality of discursive practices of an institution, and relationships between them.

Looking more in detail at the purpose of discourse analysis; it examines how discourses are produced, how they work and how they change. This form of research is carried out in the

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hope that the researcher will discover and understand how discourses structure social practitioners. According to Foucault the aim of discourse analysis is to examine the procedures of control and limitations of discourses, which in turn might illuminate the mechanisms and instances necessary for their existence. In the words of Waever:

“Foucauldian discourse analysis studies logical spaces; how meaning is governed by specific rules, and thus how a number of seemingly contradictory and opposed enunciations can be seen as regulated by some system defining possible, meaningful speech. One of the advantages of the concept of a layered structure is that it can specify change within continuity”.

To be explicit about how scientific results have been reached is important to all form of research but perhaps even more so when it comes to discourse analysis. One of the reasons behind this emphasis on transparency of the research process is the fact that discourse analysis is sometimes vague about which methodologies to use when carrying out research. It is therefore important that I provide an account of how the research for this thesis has been carried out and how I have reached the conclusions that I have. The account provided here is a simplification of the research process, since during data collection and analysis there have been many sidetracks, which have been explored but later abandoned and which are not part of the finished product. At a practical level, discourse analysis is about analysing empirical data, in my case mainly official European Union documents, dealing with a common identity and the role of higher education, which can be seen as groups of significant actions that in turn make up a discourse and its reality. For a discourse analyst, a starting point is the methodological conviction that the text makes up the main source of knowledge about social structures, relations and processes of change. When words and concepts get new meanings and become part of the public discourse social life changes as well. Codd makes an insightful comment on the analysis of policy documents:

“…policy documents legitimate the power of the state and contribute fundamentally to the ‘engineering’ of consent. Such texts contain divergent meanings, contradictions and structured omissions, so that different effects are produced on different readers. An important task for policy analysis is to examine those effects and expose the ideological...”

methodological considerations and reflections – challenging identity

processes which lie behind the production of the text. Thus, it is suggested that the analysis of policy documents could be construed as a form of textual deconstruction.130

While Codd looks at education policy in the nation-state I do not believe that European Union higher education policy differs considerably from those in the Member State since the final decisions on policy are taken by the Council where the ministers of education from the Member States reside. There is no reason to believe that they would take fundamentally different decisions at the European level as compared to the national level.

Discourse analysis reads texts and reads social processes as texts. I use a fairly simple definition of what a text is, i.e. it can be defined as either spoken or written discourse. In the case of the material analysed for the purpose of this thesis have all been in the shape of written text. However, in cultural analysis the definition is often broader as to include such things as for example music, pictures and buildings. Fairclough is critical of this broader definition since he argues that it makes the concept too vague. The simpler definition still provides the researcher with interesting topics to analyse. Fairclough mentions that texts are becoming increasingly multi-semiotic, i.e. they combine such things as for example written text with pictures, graphs and perhaps even music. But texts can also be seen as multisemiotic in the sense that the layout of documents has become an increasingly relevant factor when analysing a text.

As suggested by Neumann I began the research process by getting acquainted with the secondary literature relating to identity and education, both generally and more specifically to the European level, as well as reading about the European Union and the European integration process in general. I did this in order to be able to judge where problems and interesting questions could be found, and to obtain some hints about which specific texts/documents were considered important, indicated by the ways that they were referred to and cited.131 In addition I wanted to identify which different debates could be distinguished and perhaps also the gaps that existed in the literature. My second step was to decide what the research question(s) should be. This is not uncomplicated but a useful argument to keep in mind, as a guiding light, is Bergström’s and Boréus’ argument that a good textual analysis is one that properly carried out will help illuminate a specific social scientific problem. However, it is also important to remember that a well-performed textual analysis can be irrelevant if the


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A researcher has not used the right tools for the task. I started out my analysis asking the questions of who, how, and why in relation to European identity and higher education. During the analysis it became clear that there was not just one form of European identity allured to in the official European Union discourse, but rather three, i.e. a cultural, civic and neo-liberal European identity. In addition, it became obvious that they were constructed by using different political rationalities. The third step was to choose the empirical material to be analysed as when carrying out research usually the amount of available material is often considerable and the researcher has to limit the research. My own work is no exception in that case. This is what is known as a discourse limitation and the researcher has to consider what can/ought to be counted as part of a discourse and what can/ought to be perceived as part of a new/different discourse. These are complicated questions since, as we have seen earlier, many discourses are interlinked. Also, discourse theory doesn’t provide the researcher with any clear-cut rules for what is right or wrong concerning discourse delimitation. I have made limitations to the material both in terms of time-span, i.e. 1973-2007, and how I define higher education. I have made a conscious decision not to include documents dealing specifically with European Union research policy in my analysis. The reason for this is three-fold. First, the material on higher education is already extensive so I have been restricted by time. Second, higher education and research relate to higher education institutions differently. The role of higher education institutions, or universities, which I have been interested in, is that of a knowledge provider. Research on the other hand related to higher education institutions’ role as knowledge creators, which is an equally interesting question to analyse, in terms of power and truth. Third, I have chosen to leave research out of this analysis since research and education (together with associated issues such as culture and language) are dealt with by different Directorate Generals. I would like to point out though that the aim of this thesis has not been to show specifically how the Commission discourse creates truths about European identity and higher education. Rather, I have set out to analyse and establish what general trends are visible.

A further action was taken to limit the discourse field. After having carried out an initial reading of documents from the beginning of the 1970s to the present day it became clear to me that there were certain normative statements about who the European subject is contained in these documents. In addition, several forms of governmentality techniques were discussed, many of them of surveillance character. Therefore I decided to concentrate on those European Union documents dealing with these specific issues in order to see how they developed over
time. Worth mentioning in relation to the choice of texts, I have made a conscious decision to look generally at education but with the main emphasis on higher education. I have made reference to school level education when I have felt that it has had something to add to my argument. As mentioned above, I have also made a conscious decision not to delve too deeply into the policy dealing with research and science. I do touch upon it when discussing the changing role of the University in chapter seven since innovation, which is part of the neo-liberal vocabulary, can be linked to change. Push for a common European Research Area began around the same time as the Lisbon Strategy was signed. In other words, I have chosen to look at the University’s role as a knowledge distributor rather than knowledge creator. As the Commission argues, the University has three intimately linked roles, i.e. education, research and innovation, and I have chosen to look at the former.132

The Nature of the Texts Analysed
The texts which I have used are official policy documents produced by the European Union institutions, with an emphasis on documents created by the Commission during the period from 1973 to the present day, i.e. 2007. However, I have also analysed a substantial number of documents from the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, and the European Council. The documents produced by the first two institutions, often in unison, are less deliberative than those produced by the Commission. Rather, they are often in the form of ‘hard law’. The documents produced by the European Council, the institution in charge of the over all direction of the European integration process, frequently discuss issues generally and pass on suggestions for action to the other European Union institutions. Further, the documents analysed are mainly produced by the Directorate General of the Commission in charge of education. The reason for this choice is that the Commission is in charge of policy initiation (at least officially, however, much policy actually originates at the initiative of the Member States) and is therefore a place for much discussion and deliberation on the topic of the role of education. In metaphorical terms, the Commission is the heart of the Union pumping blood into the policy process.133 In addition, Commission document tend to be more deliberative, ideational, argumentative and varied in character than documents produced by the other European Union institutions and therefore more fruitful to analyse than the very standardised and streamlined decision documents from the European Parliament and the

Council. Many of the documents produced by the Commission are not proposals that the other institutions have to decide to accept or reject, but are rather a way to of bringing a topic onto the agenda to be discussed and reflected upon while other documents are evaluations of and contemplations on earlier initiatives set in motion.

The Commission documents analysed are of a varied character, such as general papers (which illuminate specific issue areas or problems), communications, decisions, and White and Green papers. A large proportion of the documents analysed are COM documents which are draft legislation and pre-legislative policy documents. Draft legislation can also be published in the Official Journal (OJ) C series. In addition, some important proposals and consultation papers are published as Green and White papers. Green Papers are published by the Commission and they address specific policy areas of significant importance. Primarily they are documents addressed to interested parties, such as organisations and individuals, who are invited to participate in a process of consultation and debate. In some cases they provide an impetus for subsequent legislation. White Papers, on the other hand, already include precise legal proposals from the Commission. They are documents containing proposals for Community action in a specific area. They sometimes follow a Green paper published to launch a consultation process at European level. While Green papers set out a range of ideas presented for public discussion and debate, White papers contain an official set of proposals in specific policy areas and are used as vehicles for their development. These reports play a crucial role, especially for local governments, as they are able to submit opinion papers directly to the Commission without the national government as a go between. I have also studied policy documents produced by the European Council, which is in charge of overall developments within the European Union, in order to gain understanding of how and why the idea of a European identity and European Union policy in the area of higher education became possible with the Maastricht Treaty. When it comes to the reports from the European Council meetings I have studied all from the early 1970s to the present day. With the Commission it is more difficult to know whether I have read all or not since they are issued at different rates and by different directorates and divisions within the Directorate General dealing with Education. Documents produced by the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament, including declarations, directives, recommendations, resolutions, and reports, and to a lesser extent documents produced by the European Council and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Committee of the Regions (CoR) have also been analysed.
Looking closer at the difference between different kinds of documents produced by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament:

“Regulations are directly applicable within the member states once promulgated by the EU institutions. Directives have to be transported into national law, which allows some flexibility to member governments, but within limits set by the ECJ. Decisions are more limited legal instruments applied to specific circumstances or specific addressees…All three kinds of law may be made by either by the Commission (under delegated powers), or by the Council, or jointly by the Council and EP (under co-decision). And all are subject to challenge through the national and European courts”. 134

One of the questions which needs to be asked when reading for example an official document or an article, is who controls the discourse and who is the intended audience. The European Union and its constituent institutions are often accused of lacking transparency and that the decision-making process is too secretive and difficult for the public to grasp. Even though the European Union has attempted to combat this problem by making many of its documents available to the public we might wonder how many people actually know where and what to look for. I would therefore argue that most of the audience for the official documents made up of policymakers, from the Member states as well as the European Union institutions.

European Union policy-documents, irrespective of which institution has issued them, are fairly streamlined in layout and content. Often the same exact passages of text are used in consecutive documents. There are rarely any synonyms used, which I see as a sign of the importance of the meaning of the document not getting distorted through the many translations that documents have to go through in today’s European Union of twenty-seven. When looking at European Union documents from the 1970s they are less strict in form and content, and more deliberative in character. As argued above, the documents analysed very rarely contain any direct reference to European identity so the task has been to ‘read between the lines’. In other words, I have established which concepts I see as linked to the idea of European identity. Practically, the research was conducted in the following way. First official European Union documents dealing with identity and higher education were identified and studied. These preliminary studies indicated that a limited number of conceptions of identity were present in the discourse.

The Identification of Different Ideas Emerging

"For people are different and so are nations
You can borrow ideas, but you can't borrow situations."
- Billy Bragg, "North Sea Bubble" (1991)

Let me recap what I have argued about national identity discourse earlier in this chapter. I have suggested that part of this form of identity is a sense of belonging and originality. Hence, ‘we’ are different in comparison to ‘you’. By looking inwards at what ‘we’ have in common, it is argued that ‘we’ share a common past, present and future by making reference to a shared history (past), culture (present) and destiny (future). As part of this research process, I have analysed the texts to see if there are any claims of continuity. If yes, what ideational structures have been used to create this sense of a shared history and destiny? Further, the aim has been to see what forms of European identity constructions are expressed in the official European Union discourse. In addition, I have been interested in showing how there have been changes in relation to which form of identity is being emphasised at different times. I am also interested in showing how there are changes as to what is being stressed in relation to each of the three different forms of European identity that in my mind exist within the European Union identity discourse. In addition, I want to see how each of the different forms of European identity relates to higher education.

In the beginning of the process of analysing documents which are part of the discourse on European identity and higher education I mainly saw the similarities with the discourse on national identity. For example, I found that appeals were made to a cultural version of European identity by arguing that there existed a common European history and culture. Special emphasis was and still is placed on the importance of learning languages in a similar way that the nation-state has done since its beginning. However, while at the national level there is a state supported, standardised language, at the European level the diversity of European languages is emphasised. There were also references made to a European citizenship and the European citizen, which fitted well in with how identity and belonging are created in the nation-state too. As has been mentioned before, from the literature on how the nation and national identity are constructed by the nation-state it was evident that education plays an important role in the creation of the national subject. However this literature did not explain the power of education sufficiently. Therefore I looked for those explanations elsewhere and came across the governmentality literature which also opened up my eyes to
other forms of European identity. According to governmentality theory the modern state is trying to create a specific kind of individual who is entrepreneurial and active. Reading through the European Union documents it became evident that these spoke of a specific kind of moral and ‘Good European’.

As was argued earlier, much of the analysis has meant reading between the lines of the European Union documents since there are very few direct mentions of ‘European identity’ per se. Perhaps this can be seen as a sign of the sensitive nature of identities. In addition, it can be viewed as indication of the way that European Union policy-makers are aware of the reservations that individuals in the European Union Member States have for the prospect of a European identity, and of how it might do away with national identity. In other words, people may be afraid that they will lose one of the strongest forms of identification and be thrown into limbo, not knowing who they are and where they belong. On the issue of reading between the lines, Humes suggests that texts should be analysed:

“…not just in terms of their surface meaning but also in terms of their underlying purposes. Sensitivity to the nuances of language, to the relationship between the speaker or writer and audience(s), and to the social and cultural dynamics of the institutions which generate and receive ‘text’, is at the heart of the process”.135

Within the text, content can be both explicit and implicit and Fairclough argues that the latter can be seen as somewhere between presence and absence; by analysing implicit content the researcher can uncover what is taken for granted or seen as the truth. What is absent in a text can also be linked to the issue of intertextuality, i.e. it can refer to something, which has been written or said somewhere else136. Waever adds to this argument by emphasising the need to remember that the aim of research is not to try to understand what thoughts and motives the actor had when producing the text.137 Rather, it is to analyse the power wielded through the words used. Building on Foucault’s ideas on the relationship between power and knowledge and truth claims I have looked for different versions of European identity and thereby different ideas or definitions of the European subject arguing that these subject positions are constructions created by those who have power to design the official European Union discourse on a common European identity and higher education. Further, it is possible to

distinguish ideas that pertain to the link between the different versions of European identity and higher education.

Conclusions

This chapter began with a discussion on the process of Othering which is the process whereby a distinction is made between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Thus, it is a way of constructing boundaries between those that belong and those that are excluded. The process of Othering is used whenever an identity is constructed, whether in the national, European or other realm. This was followed by an overview of the academic discussion on the origins of the nation and how a national identity has been created and is constantly recreated. This was done in order to show how the modern state has used the process of Othering. One of the main arguments is that a common identity contains a sense of continuity, i.e. that ‘we’ share a common past, present and future. Implicit in this claim is that ‘the Other’ does not share in this continuity. Further, this sense of continuity and unity is imagined through the use of various state-sponsored myths and symbols. This is where education comes into play, by passing on these myths and symbols to generate after generation of children. As I will show later in this thesis the official European Union discourse on European identity and higher education contains the same form of claims. I have also shown how identity can also be viewed in political terms in the form of citizenship with associated rights and duties. The latter is increasingly being emphasised both in the nation-state, and as I will suggest later in this thesis, at the European level. Hence, both national and European citizens are expected to be active.
Introduction

As has been suggested earlier, within the European Union discourse education is seen as a cornerstone of the European integration generally, and in the construction of European identity more specifically. In other words, if the European integration process is going to be a stable construction and not collapse it will need its building-blocs in place. This conviction fits in well with Shore’s contention that European Union officials seem to believe that: “true Europeans will only emerge among future generations of children who have been educated to see the world through a non-nationalistic lens”. The purpose of this chapter is to illuminate how education came onto the European Union agenda and how it became possible to delegate power to the European level in such a sensitive policy area as education. I argue that higher education in Europe has come full circle, i.e. returned to the past, by the fact that it is increasingly ‘knowing no borders’ as the European Union is working towards the free movement of students and academic staff. This chapter is divided into four main parts. The first part places education in a context by showing how higher education in Europe, in the form of mobile scholars and students, and in the nation-state with the development of a national school and higher education system. I argue that universities have always had an international character, both in relation to their academic and intellectual point of reference. The second part of this chapter examines how education came onto the European Union agenda. In other words, the most significant initiatives taken and documents produced over the last thirty odd years are presented. The third part examines the European Union higher education
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programmes Erasmus, Socrates and Lingua and also examines Eurydice, a system for collecting and spreading information concerning higher education in the different European Union Member States. The fourth and final part looks toward the future by investigating two of the most important initiatives in the area of higher education at the European level in the last decade, namely the Bologna Agreement, with its aim of creating a European Higher Education Area, and the Lisbon Strategy which links higher education to the objectives of economic growth and competitiveness and both with a strong emphasis on quality. Finally, there is a discussion considering the fact that European Union higher education policy has moved from having mainly a ‘hard’ law character to one of ‘soft’ law in the shape of the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) policy model, introduced with force by the Lisbon Strategy. OMC can also seen as a governmentality technology which uses soft power to seduce Member States and higher education institutions to act a certain way.

1. The Dawn of the University and International Mobility

“All who have meditated on the art of governing mankind have been convinced that the fate of empires depends on the education of youth”

- Aristotle

Later, in chapter five, it is shown how European Union policy-makers construct a cultural version of European identity by for example making claims concerning a common European cultural heritage. I argue that higher education can be seen as part of this shared European cultural heritage. As was suggested in chapter three a sense of continuity is part of national identity discourse. At the European level a sense of continuity is constructed by referencing, among other things, to a long and glorious past in the area of education. It might be too far to call the European Union an empire but as is shown in the quote above, education has been seen as highly influential for millennia, and universities, as we see them in Europe today, are not a new phenomenon either. Actually, the University, as an institution, has been a reality in Europe for around nine hundred years. The oldest universities in Europe, such as Bologna, Oxford and Prague, can trace their history as far back as the middle ages, back to the twelfth century. As Pedersen poetically puts it, the universities in present day Europe are the legitimate children of medieval parents. Many of their customs and prerogatives were founded at that time as stated by De Rudder:

3 That the University was first created nine hundred years ago is a position held by for example Aaviksoo. However, some scholars would place the birth of the first universities a little later. For example Zaharia, S.E. & Gibert, E. argue that the first European universities appeared during the 13th century. This is an opinion shared with for example De Rudder who argues that the university is one of the durable European institutions, with its roots in 13th century Bologna, Paris, and Oxford, which has later been exported to other parts of Europe and the rest of the world. Both Pelikan and Pedersen agree with this view. However, according to Pedersen, there is uncertainty about dating universities since
“The medieval universities were truly European, and they were a system: the disciplinary matrix, curriculum, methods of instruction, degrees, certification, governance and control, organizational structures, and funding arrangements were basically the same. For quite some time, the jus ubique docendi conferred on every Master or Doctor of any university the right to teach at any other university in Europe. And there was one common language: Latin”.

Hence, through Latin Europe became connected. However, there was only a small group of people that mastered the language and it was not serving as the same unifying force as the standardised, state-sponsored language in the modern nation-state discussed in chapter three. Despite this, Latin survived as the language of the learned people until the nineteenth century.

In contemporary Europe the lack of a common language is a problem area for European Union policy-makers. However, a common lingua franca for the European Union Member States seems like an unrealistic idea. Instead they stress the importance of studying other European Union languages so that mobility will become easier. The emphasis on language in the European Union discourse analysed for the purpose of this thesis is discussed further in chapter five of this thesis in relation to the idea of a cultural European identity while the idea of mobility is analysed further in relation to the construction of a civic European identity in chapter six in this thesis.

The idea of internationalisation is generally accredited to late modernity but within the area of education, among others, it has been a reality for centuries though at a different scale. Already in medieval times there was “international student mobility” since students went from university town to university town, from for example the University of Coimbra in Portugal to Heidelberg or Prague. De Wit speaks of “the wandering scholar looking for knowledge and understanding of other cultures”. As Neave argues, this can be seen as the beginning of a
“European higher education space”\textsuperscript{8}. During the fifteenth century, at the time when Erasmus of Rotterdam, a famous humanist who has given name to the European Union higher education programme, was active there was already international mobility but with less problems of recognition of qualifications than we have today.\textsuperscript{9} By the beginning of the sixteenth century there were eighty universities in Europe.\textsuperscript{10} The idea that Europe has a long history of mobility of students and teachers is not only claimed by academics but is also emphasised by the European Union institutions and their officials as can be seen in the statement below from Ján Figel, Commissioner of Education, Training, Culture, and Multilingualism:


The idea of free movement will be examined further later in this chapter in relation to the European Union education programmes Socrates and Erasmus while the idea of transnational mobility will be discussed further in chapter six when analysing how European civic identity in the form of (active) citizenship and education is constructed in European Union discourse.

Before looking at how higher education came onto the European Union agenda I believe it is useful to investigate how education developed in the nation-state after the creation of the modern state and government. Here links can be drawn to the arguments concerning the nation and national identity put forward in chapter three where it was suggested that throughout the history of the modern state the nation has been the glue that installs a sense of common identity in the citizens within the state borders.\textsuperscript{12} One important tool in the process of creating the nation has been and still is education. It has been suggested that identity, citizenship and education are closely linked and that the idea behind mass education has partly been to instil a

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European Higher Education Policy Set In A Context: Past, Present, Future

sense of citizenship in the members of the community. During the sixteenth century Europe went through an educational revolution in the sense that the number of pupils and students rose as well as an increase in the number of institutions offering education. In many European countries the number taking part in education was at an all time high that would not be exceeded until the late nineteenth early twentieth century. Already in 1763 Louis-René Caradeuc de La Chalotais made a connection between the nation and education by stating:

“I claim the right to demand for the Nation an education that will depend upon the State alone; because it belongs essentially to it, because every nation has an inalienable and imprescriptible right to instruct its members, and finally because the children of the State should be educated by members of the State”.

The idea that education can play an important part in the advancement of the nation-state began in the mid eighteenth century Europe. It was part of a mix of political liberalism and absolutism. In Lawn’s opinion the nation-state developed in tandem with its education systems. However, it was not until the Enlightenment that education came to play a central role for the general public. Earlier, during the Middle Ages, those educated were mainly part of the clergy or members of the learned professions. The ideas and values that were part of the Enlightenment project were spread across Europe with the help of educational institutions.

Before the Industrial Revolution religious institutions had been the places where young rich men went to get education. What the Industrial Revolution did was to bring the micro-regions of the agricultural society into larger units of trade and information exchange. Labour and goods became more moveable and this in turn led to the creation of new infrastructures that made trade, education and information possible at a completely different scale. Also, the Industrial Revolution saw the introduction of new classes. A small group of intellectuals appeared and also a larger group of an intelligentsia. Smith maintains that the changes in, for example, trade and inter-state relations and the development of a secular intelligentsia, mass-


culture and public education nationalism grew in importance. This in turn led to a state that was increasingly dependent on scientific expertise. In the process of mobilising the masses, the intelligentsia and mass public education played an important role by providing both ideology and leadership in the modern and industrialised societies.

Considering why this extensive educational change came about, one important reason was the fact that after the introduction of industrialism religious institutions lost a great deal of their power, both in the areas of politics and education. The extent of this loss varied between different states and this can explain why the Church is more powerful in some states than others even today. However, already during the sixteenth century John Amos Comenius, a Czech educator and bishop, suggested that university education should be available to all, irrespective of wealth and gender. Another reason, according to Kagan, is that it was partly made possible because of the spread of mass-produced books which in turn were made possible because of the decreased cost of book thanks to Johannes Guttenberg and his invention of the printing press. This is what Anderson refers to as ‘print capitalism’ which led to a literate mass audience and which in turn led to the development of the languages of the people. Being part of a linguistic and cultural community is one of the cornerstones of nationalism. Anderson speaks of a systemic, even Machiavellian, introduction of nationalistic ideologies through educational systems, mass media, and administrative regulation. In addition, population counts, maps and museums have also played an important part in creating these imagined communities, according to Anderson. In Western Europe the modern school system came under way during the nineteenth century and was a means by which the State could link the individual to the nation. Grosvenor argues that at the end of the nineteenth century there was a shift from education on a voluntary basis to a system where by the state

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could control most children or control the masses as Anderson would have it. In addition, education was seen to play an important role in making individuals good citizens and building a stronger society. Thus, education during the early nineteenth century was strongly linked to moral education of the masses.

2. Higher Education Initiatives at the European Level

...a common cultural and education policy to foster a sense of European identity in the European Union and its member states, promoting unity in diversity and common values for all citizens. Being a European is not a question of birth, but of education..." — A Charter of European Identity (1995)

This section deals with how cooperation in the area of education has developed over time at the European level. I argue that this development can be divided into four different phases: ‘The Early Years—i.e. 1957 to the mid-1970s’, ‘The Take-off Phase—i.e. the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s’, ‘The Speed-up Phase—i.e. the mid-1980s to the Maastricht Treaty’ and finally ‘The Substantive Action Phase—i.e. 1993 and onwards’. Hingel also sees four separate historical periods when it comes to involvement in the area of education at the European level. He suggests that the first period ran from 1971 until 1992 when co-operation mainly consisted of Community action program. However, in 1993, when the Maastricht Treaty came into force, a new period started which ran until 1996 where the Member States worked together to identify what challenges lay ahead and how to face them together. From 1997 until 1999 the European Union stressed the mainstreaming of education in its policies. The fourth and final stage, which deals with the building of a European higher education area, began in the year of 2000 and is still under way.


27 Hunter, I., “Personality as a vocation: The political rationality of the humanities” in Gane, M. & Johnson, T., (eds.) “Foucault’s New Domains”, (Routledge: London, 1993), pp. 153-192, p.184. Foucault argued that the Church has played an important role also in the modern world in the sense that Christianity possesses what Foucault refers to as pastoral power, i.e. the relationship between the Shepherd and the sheep, and which is exercised on the individual and his/her soul. However, part of this moral interest could be related to physical health and the body too. See for example Foucault, M., “Politics and Reason” in Kritzman, D.L., (ed.), “Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and other writings 1977-1984”, (Routledge: New York and London, 1988), pp. 57-85.


These changes did not occur in a vacuum but were influenced by other trends and developments of the European Union, such as the growth in the number of Member States, the increased powers delegated to the institutions and the legal bases for action, the changing environment of the economy and the labour market, and the changing way of looking at the causes and nature of unemployment. In addition, the European Union Member States are themselves undergoing extensive transformation concerning both their functions and organisation. Looking at the Member State level, national education systems have also evolved and they underwent a lengthy period of expansion and structural reform in the decades that followed the end of the Second World War. During the 1950s to the 1980s more and more young people began to partake in secondary education. Economic aspects of education have also been important and according to Teichler at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s education was regularly discussed in relation to economic progress. Higher education has been prioritised in Western Europe since the late 1960s and the results of this increased interest in higher education in the Member States can be found in the extensive restructuring which took place in higher education at the time. This was followed by further extensive changes in higher education during the 1980s and 1990s. All this change is taking place in a world of external challenges including: the development towards a knowledge economy and society, the Europeanization, internationalisation and globalisation of the economic, social, political and cultural environment in which higher education institutions have to act. Education is itself also part of a process of Europeanization, an issue which has increasingly become a topic of investigation for academics. Often the term refers to those changes in the Member States which have been caused by policy decisions at the European level. However, in Trondal’s opinion it can be defined as:


transformational change in general, and with respect to government policies in particular.
Transformational change denotes both the emergence of new supranational policies at the EU level and national adaptation towards these.\textsuperscript{37}

Worth mentioning is that when looking at education policy, academics often prefer to speak of internationalisation rather than Europeanisation.\textsuperscript{38} The internationalisation of education can imply the admission of foreign students and academics. However, it can also mean something more than simply mobility within the European Union borders and beyond. It also covers the substance of courses and research carried out, and it has been suggested that the task for the future is to link these two aspects of internationalisation.\textsuperscript{39} Important to point out is the fact that evidence has shown that different countries deal with the internationalisation of education differently.\textsuperscript{40} In De Rudders'\textsuperscript{41} opinion while there has been some Europeanisation of higher education, it has only occurred in modest terms, which means that fairly varied national systems of higher education still exist.\textsuperscript{41} A few Member States see internationalisation as a central issue, for example, Sweden and the Netherlands, while others, such as Greece and Portugal, have just started this process. In a third group of countries, such as Germany and France, it is often up to academics and academic institutions to decide whether they develop an international profile.\textsuperscript{42} In other words, decisions over higher education are decentralised.

Looking at the extent of cooperation among European Union Member States in the area of higher education, the European Union has only limited direct influence over education policy in the Member States. According to De Witte the Europeanization of education policy which has been achieved so far has been based mainly on inter-state cooperation and attempts to create a European strategy for education have been resisted by the Member States. The reason for this is that they may feel that a European Union run education policy would be a threat to
their sovereignty. However, as is argued later in this chapter, this is changing since the introduction of a new form of policy-making method based on the soft power of attraction and seduction.

The Early Years (1957 to the mid-1970s)

"If I were to set the process of uniting Europe in motion once more, I would start with education"
- Jean Monnet

These words are reported to have been uttered by Jean Monnet, one of the Founding Fathers of the European integration process. However, in reality, education played a very marginal part in the beginning of the integration process in Europe. The Treaty of Rome that came into force 1957 does not even refer to education per se but does make some provisions for training. It has been argued that social issues and education in particular, had been excluded from the Treaty of Rome as a matter of political expediency. The reason for this, Sprokkereeef argues, was that in its initial stages the European integration process was mainly geared toward economic cooperation. This meant that measures were mainly taken in the area of education in order to make the movement of workers run more smoothly. Another reason for why the European Union played no part in education in the beginning of the European integration process was, according to Livingston, that this policy area was seen as too sensitive since education is generally linked to national culture and the construction of national identity. The European Union also clearly spells this out in Article 235 of the Treaty where it is stated that the Member States remained responsible for policy on education.

A few years after signing the Treaty of Rome, in 1963, informal meetings took place between ministers in charge of training where they discussed a number of issues in relation to possible

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cooperation on education at the European level. The result of these meetings was the creation of two working groups by the Commission whose task was to reflect on possible future cooperation in the field of education. However, it took until the early 1970s before any substantial initiatives were instigated. In 1971 the first formal meeting between the six ministers of education on the future cooperation in education took place, with a representative from the Commission, Mr Altiero Spinelli, present. In relation to this first formal meeting the Commission stated that educational issues should thereafter be seen as common and should be resolved at the European level. In addition, it was stated that the Commission hoped that the convergence of national education policies in the Member States would lead to a harmonious development within the Community. Also in 1971, the Commission decided to set up two bodies to look more closely at the issue of education and to establish what the overall needs of the Community in the area of education were. The results of this study can be found in the report "For a Community Policy on Education", also known as the Janne Report, which was issued in 1973. This report can be seen as the first major attempt to add a ‘European dimension’ to education by providing guidelines for the development of a European Union policy in education which can be seen as the first official claim of the European Union in the area of education. In other words, this report can be seen as the introduction of the idea of a “European dimension” in education, further discussed in chapter five in relation to European cultural identity and language. Special emphasis was placed on the learning of foreign languages, an issue that is still one of the most emphasised techniques with the aim of installing a sense of European identity in the students. Also in 1973, the Directorate General XII on Research, Science and Education was set up. During this period the idea of the construction of Europe and the need for a common European identity appeared. In 1973 during the Copenhagen Summit, where the Heads of State met up to discuss broader questions about the future of the European Community, the idea of a common Community identity was discussed. During this meeting a report named “the Declaration on the European Identity”

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49 Wallace argues that during the early years there were few attempts to create any common policies and ministers met ‘within the Council’ without being the Council. This meant the meetings took place outside the treaty’s formal framework. In the end ministers of education, particularly during the 1970s did not know if they were the Council or not. See Wallace, H., “National Bulls in the Community China Shop: The Role of National Governments in Community Policy Making” in Wallace, H., Wallace, W. & Wegg, C., (eds.) “Policy-Making in the European Communities” (Wiley: London, 1977), pp. 33-68.
51 Janne, H., “For a Community Policy on Education”, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 10/73, Luxembourg, pp. 1-60. This report is sometimes also referred to as “Towards a Common Education Policy”.
was presented. This declaration contained a description of various elements of the European identity. These included common European ideals and objectives, such as ‘defending the principles of representative democracy’, ‘the rule of law’, ‘social justice’ and ‘respect for human rights’.55 Around the same time the Council of Ministers adopted a series of guidelines concerning vocational training, the objective of which was to provide the access to general and vocational education to all.56 The important word here is general, since it can be seen to include higher education as well. As mentioned above, most measures in the early days were in the area of vocational training and nothing was mentioned about higher education specifically. However, as Sprokkereef suggests, it has been very difficult to make clear distinctions and boundaries between vocational, professional and university training. The Commission and the European Court of Justice fought for a more liberal interpretation of the concept ‘vocational’ and the European Union’s legal competence to act in the policy area of education.57 The Commission’s first communication to the Council, entitled “Education in the European Community”, was issued in 1974. In this communication it was stated that cooperation within the area of education should be considered essential for the future growth and functioning of the European integration process. The importance of mobility, for students, teachers, research staff, and administrators, was stressed. This document also stressed the idea of a ‘European dimension’, in a similar way to the Janne Report, and argued that learning foreign languages was one of the most important aspects of this dimensions. Learning about the other Member States and their people as well as about the history of the European integration process or ‘the study of Europe’ as it is referred to in the documents, was also seen as part of the proposed European dimension in education.58 Later the same year, the Council stressed the need for diversity of the Member States’ educational systems and that harmonisation of educational policies and systems should not be seen as an end in itself. The ministers of education argued that there is a need to institute European cooperation in the field of education and that this cooperation should:

“…be based on the following principles:- the programme of cooperation initiated in the field of education, whilst reflecting the progressive harmonization of the economic and social policies in the Community, must be adapted to the specific objectives and requirements of this

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55 European Council, “Declaration of the European Identity”, Copenhagen Summit, 14 December 1973, Bulletin of the European Communities, December 1973, No. 12, pp. 118-122. (At this time the European Council did not officially exist but equally it was the heads of state or government of the then nine Member States of the European Union that took part in the meeting).
field…Harmonization of these systems or policies cannot…on no account must education be regarded merely as a component of economic life…educational cooperation must make allowance for the traditions of each country and the diversity of their respective educational policies and systems…harmonization of these systems or policies cannot, therefore, be considered an end in itself”.59

This, I argue, can be seen as an early mentioning of the idea of “Unity in Diversity” that has become something of a mantra for the European Union in recent years. The issue of the myth of “Unity in Diversity” will be discussed further in chapter five in relation to the cultural version of European identity discourse. Also in 1974, the Education Committee was set up and its role was to prepare positions for the ministers of education. There were no clear guidelines as to what form the cooperation should take although the ambitions were closer relations and increased cooperation between educational systems and institutions of higher education in Europe, collection of statistics on education, work towards improved possibilities for academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study, encouragement of the freedom of movement and mobility of teachers, students and research workers. It was hoped that this could be achieved by the elimination of administrative and social obstacles to the free movement and the improvement of language skills among students as well as teachers. 60

The Take-off Phase (the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s)

After almost two decades of little substantial progress in the area of education, cooperation began to gain momentum by the mid-1970s even though in modest terms. A turning point was the resolution of the Council of Ministers of Education meeting of 9 February 1976 concerning a programme of action on education. 61 The purpose of this programme was to encourage studies, research, educational visits and documentation and statistics in the area of education. 62 Similar to the earlier report in 1974, the concept of a ‘European dimension’ was emphasised. 63 In addition, the same year the ministers of education decided to set up an information network. This, they hoped, would lead to a better understanding of the education policies and structures
and their comparability in the, then nine, Member States. In addition there were calls for improved language teaching, since language was seen as important for better mutual understanding. The Commission has argued that this resolution from 1976 represents the real foundation for cooperation. Placing education in an historical context, the lack of extensive developments in the area of education during the 1970’s might not seem so strange considering that Europe in the 1970’s and 1980’s is said to have been suffering from a general bout of Eurosclerosis and Europessimism. As Gellner argues, it is common for states to be content with status quo when going through economic contraction, which was the case during the 1970s when the Western European countries and the world in general were suffering from economic instability as a result of the collapse of the Bretton Woods System and two oil crises.

The Speed-up Phase (the mid-1980s to the Maastricht Treaty)

Let us now look more closely at the developments that did occur from the time when the Single European Act was introduced until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. As we have seen, only tentative steps were taken towards a common education policy at the European level during the 1970s. However, this changed during the mid-1980s, and the European integration process moved away from being mainly about an economic trading-block. There was growing political integration and this in turn led to awareness that social as well as economic links between the Member States were needed. There seemed to be a wish among the Member States to add a cultural dimension to the European integration process, and education, as well as science and research, played an important part in that process. In June 1983 the Stuttgart Declaration was proclaimed, which recommended cooperation between higher education institutions. In addition the declaration emphasised the importance of improving information on European history and culture as a way of promoting a European awareness. A year later, at


On the issue of who or what institution was responsible for the initiatives taken, in the area of education, during the 1970s, it has been argued that during the early 1970s the Commission, at some occasions, was the institution that pushed for extended powers for the EC in the area of education. This was also a time predominated by decisions with no real effect. Beukel, E., “Reconstructing Integration Theory: The Case of Educational Policy in the EEC”, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 29, No. 1, 1994, pp. 33-54, p. 37.


the Fontainebleau European Council, it was argued that it was important to promote the Community identity both for its citizens and in the rest of the world.  

The Commission, in its “Green Paper on the European Dimension of Education”, later, in 1993, argues that it was out of these two declarations that the idea of the European citizen developed. The next important development was the “Ad Hoc” Committee for a people’s Europe, also known as the Adonnino committee, which produced the Adonnino Report in 1985. This report deliberated on the idea of European citizenship, and maintained that young people would play an important role in the creation of a new Europe. At the time the Member States were completing the internal market they also started up a number of different education programmes, such as Erasmus, Lingua and Comett which incorporated the ideas of the Adonnino Report and which, in Jones’ mind, were possible because a new political consensus had emerged. Erasmus and Lingua will be discussed further later in this chapter.

Many of the discussions in the European Council from the mid-1980’s dealt with economic issues. In 1985 the European Council reaffirmed its intentions of creating a full internal market by 1992. Training became interesting as a way of making the European population and their countries more competitive on a global market. Training, linked to blue-collar jobs rather than higher education, was of special interest. The European Council also emphasised the need for the creation of full freedom of establishment for the professions. To avoid high unemployment and to create a flexible work force was a priority for both Member State governments and the European Union institutions. When talking about unemployment the European Council was especially concerned about long-term unemployment and youth unemployment, and combating long-term unemployment and supporting occupational integration of young people, also two of the main objectives of the Structural Fund. This emphasis on flexibility can be seen as an early example of neo-liberal rationalities entering the official European Union discourse. The idea of ‘flexibility for competitiveness’ is discussed further in chapter seven.

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72 ERASMUS stands for “The European Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students” and is the programme concerned with higher education, Lingua deals specifically with promoting the learning of foreign languages, i.e. the languages of the other Member States, and Comett is the programme on cooperation between universities and industry regarding training in the field of technology. See Jones, C.H., “Promoting higher education’s contribution to the developing European Community”, Prospects, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1991, pp. 443-453, pp. 445-449. Also see Sprokkereef, A., “Developments in European Community education policy” in Lodge, J. (ed.), “The European Community and the Challenge of the Future”, (Pinter Publishers: London, 1993), pp. 340-347, p. 343.
While research has its own set of policies it is closely linked to higher education policy, and the emphasis the European Union places upon research demonstrates how important experts and their knowledge are viewed to be. One indication of the increased linking of economic incentives and higher education was the aim expressed by the European Council to establish a close link between technological development and the effort to unify the internal market. The European Council also stresses the need to increase Community resources earmarked for research and development. Later on the European Council goes even further by urging the Research Ministers in the Member States to reach an agreement on the Framework Programme for Community Action in research and technological development. The European Council argues that this is an important step “towards enabling the Community to reinforce the internal market and compete in the worldwide market for high technology products.” At the same summit the European Council endorsed suggestions put forward by the Commission, for example the need of making better use of human resources. This included increasing the mobility for students and researchers and recognising certain high-level establishments as Community “centres of excellence”. The importance given to research (which can maybe be seen as connected with higher education) highlighted by the European Council in 1987 requesting that the European Union institutions ensure that the scientific research and development appropriations in the budget for the 1987 financial year could be used for the programmes already in place while waiting for the adoption of the multi-annual framework programme provided for in the Single Act. However there seem to be other reasons behind the Single Market. The European Council suggests that:

“The completion of the Single Market cannot be regarded as an end in itself; it pursues a much wider objective, namely to ensure the maximum well-being of all, in line with the tradition of social progress which is part of Europe’s history.”

The tradition of social progress, the European Council argues, should be a guarantee that all citizens will experience the benefits expected from the Single Market and the hoped economic

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European identity, in one of its many forms, is also referred to, and according to a resolution produced by the Council of Ministers in 1988 the purpose of the European Union’s educational objectives are:  

“…to strengthen in young people a sense of European identity and make clear to them the value of European civilisation and of the foundations on which the European peoples intend to base their development today; that is in particular the safeguarding of the principles of democracy, social justice and respect for human rights…”

In this resolution it is argued that both the Member States and the European Union should be active when it came to incorporating a European dimension into the national educational systems. This can be seen as a move away from earlier emphasis on subsidiarity. Also issued in 1988 were a directive on a general system for the recognition of higher education diplomas by the Council of Ministers and a communication from the Commission entitled “Education in the European Community - Medium-term perspectives: 1989-1992”. The later report contained a clear neo-liberal discourse arguing that it was necessary “to make education systems more responsive, and more quickly responsive, to change”.

In addition it was suggested that “education and training experiences which foster enterprise and adaptability” were to be emphasised. It is argued that the recent completion of the Internal Market and the adoption of the Single European Act had placed “education and training in a new context in the construction of the European Community”. Further, it is suggested that:

“Without investment in the present and future workforce, and their skills, versatility and entrepreneurial capacity, Europe’s capacity to innovate, to compete, to create wealth and prosperity will be impaired. In this sense, education and training lie at the heart of the process of European construction”. 

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As will be further discussed in chapter seven ideas such as skills, flexibility, or versatility as is suggested above, entrepreneurship, and capacity to compete on the global market are all part of contemporary neo-liberal discourse, which has come to the forefront with the promotion of the Lisbon Strategy which will be analysed further later in this chapter.

**The Substantive Action Phase (1993 and onwards)**

By the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, which gave the integration process a political dimension, it became transparent that education was expected to play an important part in the creation of a European identity. At this time the Community began to include references to the European people, a European identity and a European culture. Emphasis was put on the role education could play in preparing young people for a European citizenship.\(^89\) Besides the establishment of education programmes, the late 1980s and early 1990s also saw an increase in the number of resolutions produced by the Council of Ministers on the topic of education. This development can be seen, in Beukel words, to “place educational cooperation in a general European and ideational context, thus shaping a new ideological form of the Community’s involvement in educational matters”.\(^90\) This increased faith in the power of education can been seen in the Maastricht Treaty which opened the doors for education to enter the European stage and which provided the legal basis on which the European Union education programmes could be developed further during the 1990s.\(^91\) Since then the European Union has reformed its education policy, reorganised the programmes, and expanded the opportunities of promotion geographically.\(^92\) In this sense the Maastricht Treaty can be thought of as a milestone in the European Union’s involvement in the area of education.\(^93\) Article 126 of Chapter 3 of the Treaty was groundbreaking in the sense that it introduced interest groups and other actors’ involvement in the education policy process at the European level, by stipulating that the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions should be consulted by the Council. However, many would argue that these committees have little influence in the policy process. Further, Article 126 of the

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Maastricht Treaty clearly states the independence of national education policy by arguing that education and training systems and the content of learning programmes are the responsibility of the Member States, or in some cases, their constituent regions. In addition, Article 126 of the Maastricht Treaty emphasises the idea of ‘quality’ by suggesting that “the Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States…” 94 Once again the importance of improving language teaching, student and teacher mobility, cooperation between educational institutions, exchange of information and experiences and the development of distance learning is stressed. The European Union can support and complement the actions of the Member States in certain areas of education and training where the European Union can foster quality by generating ‘European value added’. The before mentioned co-operation should be achieved by a wide range of actions. These actions range from promoting the mobility of citizens, designing joint study programmes, establishing networks, to exchanging information or teaching languages of the European Union. These actions are supported by the ‘subsidiarity’ principle which was written into the Maastricht Treaty. What it means, simply put, is that decisions should be taken at the lowest level possible and suitable as a way of bring decisions closer to the people of Europe again. 95

In the wake of the Maastricht Treaty, in 1993, the “Green Paper on the European dimension in education” was issued, which has played an influential role in the development of the European Union higher education policy. The Green Paper emphasised the education of young people yet when outlining the general objectives of the European dimension of education the paper only speaks of schools and pupils. 96 I still argue it has played a significant role in the area of higher education since it was the first major official discussion of the idea of a European dimension. Looking closer at what the Green Paper had to say about the role of the European Union; it is supposed to promote seven major areas. First, it should encourage cooperation between Member States and higher education institutions through mobility and exchanges. Second, it should pay special attention to the training of teachers and others involved in education. Third, the development of language teaching warrants special attention. Fourth, the European Union should stress the importance of distance learning through multimedia systems. Fifth, the promotion of innovation in teaching is seen as especially

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important. Sixth, the exchange of information and experience between Member States and higher education institutions should be encouraged. Finally, the experience of the European Schools should be used as an example for the future development of education in Europe since “through the multicultural mix and the introduction of foreign languages into the teaching of different subjects, these schools have a potential for innovation which should be developed”.97

Worth mentioning is the fact that this emphasis on school-level education is contradictory to how the Socrates programme later developed, giving higher education at least 55% of the total budget while for school-level education, in the shape of the Comenius Programme, the minimum was set at 10%. In addition to this at least 25% of the funding should be spent on horizontal measures.98 In later documents there is a turn to a broader view on education, to involve adult education, open education, distance learning, etc. These different forms of education and learning can be seen as part of the idea of “life-long learning” which later became something of a buzz-word in the area of education at the European level. In 1995 the Commission issued its “White Paper on Teaching and Learning- Towards the Learning Society” which lead to the introduction of five major education objectives. The emphasis was on, among other things, the recognition of skills, mobility, languages, training, combating exclusion through education.99 I will return to this ‘substantive action phase’ later in this chapter when I look at the aim and results of the Bologna Agreement and the Lisbon Strategy.

The issue of lifelong learning will be discussed further in relation to the neo-liberal European identity and the idea of the ‘Knowledge Economy’ in chapter seven. But before that I would like to look at how such education programmes as Socrates and Erasmus have developed over time and how they work towards fulfilling the aims associated with education earlier. The reason why I discuss them separately is the fact that their development spans over more than one phase of the development of European Union involvement in higher education.

3. The European Union Higher Education Programmes

In the 1990s there was an increased stress on the idea of ‘internationalisation’ and ‘globalisation’ of higher education policy from both policy-makers and in academic circles.100 The reason for this, according to González and Wagenaar, could be that internationalisation

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and the idea of quality are often seen to be related. In other words, the idea is that the quality of education will be raised if students and teachers partake in a mobility scheme and in addition they will become more competitive on the job-market and will contribute to the competitiveness of the Member State economy. The result of this idea of quality is that the ‘Good European’ is constructed as a citizen who partakes in mobility to gain quality education an issue which is further discussed in chapter six in relation to the construction of a civic form of European identity. The European Union has developed a variety of education programmes and those relating to higher education will be discussed below. I will examine the Erasmus programme which deals with higher education specifically before deliberating on the role of the now scraped Socrates programme under which the Erasmus programme was placed. The reason for beginning with the Erasmus programme is the fact that it was created before the Socrates programme. I argue that said programmes can be seen as important components in the European Union’s rationalities of government. In other words, they can be seen as governmentality technologies. By analysing the documents concerning these programmes certain ideas crystallised as to what the purpose of higher education is and how it should be organised.

Erasmus - a Symbol for the European Integration Process

"The diversity of the education systems of the EU notwithstanding, there is a European approach to education based on common historic roots, from which stems the success of cooperation between higher education establishments, for example, in the ERASMUS programme."

- The Commission

The most public evidence of the existence of a common European Union higher education policy are the various education programmes which have become ‘flagship’ symbols for European integration generally. As was highlighted in the introductory chapter, in 2007 Erasmus, the European Union programme for higher education, celebrated its twentieth anniversary. According to the Commission Erasmus students contribute to shaping a common European identity or a European awareness. Also, it is argued by the Commission that

students who have taken part in the Erasmus scheme have had it easier to find employment after graduation. Considering the purpose of Erasmus, Beukel maintains that:

“The objective was substantially to increase the number of students spending an integrated part of their study period at an institution of higher education in an other member country, thereby ensuring the development of a pool of trained personnel with direct experience of intra-Community cooperation and contributing to the strengthening of a “People’s Europe””.

Whether this is simply because of their studies abroad might be questioned. In my opinion it may also be that students who choose to study abroad have some other qualities or personal traits; perhaps they are more outgoing and less afraid of trying the unknown. However, whether education actually makes students feel a sense of a shared European identity, though an interesting and highly relevant question, is beyond the scope of this thesis. Looking closer at how Erasmus has developed over the years, the initiatives taken up until the 1980s, as discussed above, laid the ground for a common European Union higher education policy but cooperation in education really took off in 1987 with the creation of the Single European Act and the launch of the Erasmus programme. Both the Erasmus and Socrates programme played an important part in introducing the idea of human resources as a central policy objective.

Erasmus I came to be replaced by Erasmus II in 1989. They differed, among other things, in relation to how decisions concerning them were taken; the former referred to Article 128 and 235 of the EEC Treaty while the latter only referred to Article 128. This meant that it became easier with Erasmus II to reach decisions since Article 128 requires a simple majority while Article 235 requires unanimity.

Above I mentioned that the over all aim or desired end result of Erasmus is to create mobile individuals that will come to share a common European identity. However Erasmus also has a

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set of specific and operational objectives. One specific objective is “to support the realisation of a European Higher Education Area”, which is an issue that will be discussed further later in this chapter in relation to the Bologna process. A second specific objective is to “reinforce the contribution of higher education and advanced vocational education to process of innovation”. When expressing the operational objectives of Erasmus II “quality” and “volume” are emphasised. This includes quality and volume of student and staff mobility, multilateral cooperation between higher education institutions in Europe as well as cooperation between higher education institutions and enterprises. The need for increasing the transparency and compatibility between higher education qualifications gained in Europe is also being highlighted. A further aim of Erasmus is to develop the ‘European dimension’ of higher education.

To gain an idea of the scale of Erasmus let us first look at participation levels. In 1987 11 countries and 3.500 scholarship-holders took part in the programme. Today, twenty years later, Erasmus is the primary and best-known mobility scheme in Europe, maybe even in the world. In the academic year of 2004/2005 144.037 Erasmus students participated, which was an increase with 6.3 % from the previous year. During the same period 20 877 university teaching staff benefited from the mobility scheme, which was an increase of 12.9 %. From its start in 1987 until 2003 more than a million students had benefited from Erasmus through studies abroad. In addition to this, tens of thousands of teachers had taken the advantage of an Erasmus grant during the same time span. In 2006 nine out of ten European, meaning 2199 universities in 31 countries, took part in the Erasmus programme. The participating countries are the 27 European Union Member States, the 3 countries of the European Economic Area (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) and Turkey. Looking towards the future, in October 2002, when the European Union institutions celebrated the fact that a million students had participated in the Erasmus programme, Viviane Reding, then

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Commissioner for education, stated a new objective, e.g. that by 2007 the total number of Erasmus students should be two million and by 2010 three million. However, when this thesis was completed it was clear that the goal for 2007 had not been reached. 114

When examining Erasmus in economic terms, it is the largest sub-programme within the framework of Socrates. It gives out € 200 million annually in grants for students and teachers to go abroad to study or to fund specific projects. 115 In 2007, as Erasmus celebrated its twentieth anniversary, Jan Figél, European Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture, and Multilingualism stated:

“Among the challenges left, the ERASMUS grant remains far too low to allow students from less favourable financial backgrounds to enjoy the benefits of the Programme. Also the Commission is calling for Member States to increase their support for ERASMUS, to open it up to even more students, especially those from less privileged backgrounds.” 116

Here we seen how education is viewed as a tool, or a governmentality technology, to avoid social exclusion and as a result aid social inclusion. Whether or not this aim is compatible with the neo-liberal desire for competitiveness is further discussed in chapter seven. In addition, the financial role of the Member States in covering the cost of Erasmus is being emphasised. Here the general funding of higher education in the different Member States plays a role. In countries, such as for example Sweden, where there exists a longstanding and well-developed state run loan system, children from working class and immigrant backgrounds are encouraged to enter into higher education. Worth mentioning is that very often the European Union institutions speak of the Member States as if they were homogeneous actors. However, sometimes their heterogeneity is acknowledged and stressed. For example, in 1989 it was suggested by the Commission that:

“Some sections of the potential ERASMUS “market” suffer from almost all handicaps: geography, language, social structure (socio-cultural level of students), university structure


115 To put European education policy generally, and Erasmus more specifically, into perspective it could be useful to know that one third, or approximately 120 million people, of the total population of the European Union is younger than 25. See Wielemans, W., “European Education Policy on shifting sand”, European Journal for Education Law and Policy, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 2000, pp. 21-34, p. 21. Also see Du Bois-Reymond, M., “European Identity in the Young and Dutch Students’ Images of Germany and the Germans”, Comparative Education, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1998, pp. 27-40, p. 27.

As I argue later in this chapter, the European Union is trying to iron out these differences or this heterogeneity of higher education systems in the Member States by working towards creating a European Higher Education Area and by pushing for the use of Open Method of Coordination where Member States, in Foucauldian terms, are encouraged to perform ‘conduct of the self’ to fit into an image of the ‘Good’ Member State.

**Eurydice – Higher Education Under Surveillance**

Eurydice is a figure from Greek mythology, who was in love with Orpheus, but it is also an invention by the European Union. As was argued in the chapter two, modern forms of government depend on surveillance which in turn relies on the work of specialists and experts to collect data and produce reports. Higher education at the European level is no exception to this rule. It is through the help of experts that ‘governing at a distance’, i.e. ‘conduct of conduct’ becomes possible. In the case of Eurydice, a system for collecting and spreading information concerning higher education in the different European Union Member States, it is the Member States and their higher education systems that are to be governed and in extension also their students. European level decision-makers, in the form of the European Council, mentioned the need for a network for the exchange of information and experience in organising higher education as early as 1976 but it was not until 1980 that Eurydice was created and became “one of the strategic mechanisms established by the Commission and the European Union Member States to boost cooperation by improving understanding of systems and policies”. Further, on the issue of internal monitoring, in 1989 the Commission issued a communication where it mentioned the introduction of a computerised data-base concerning Erasmus students. An interesting point made by the Commission in the communication was that “[t]he ERASMUS programme has been evaluated in a number and variety of ways. There is a wealth of statistical information available (perhaps too much!)”. Hence, information

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120 Reported there were the annual reports of the grantees and a series of twelve bilateral consultations between the Commission and those agencies responsible for the Erasmus programme in the Member States. In addition meetings between students and university coordinators had been taken place. CEC, “Erasmus Programme - Report on the Experience Acquired in the Application of the Erasmus Programme 1987-1989”, SEC (89) 2051/final, Brussels, 13 December 1989, pp. 1-59, p. 1.

gathering might not always be seen as positive by the European Union institutions. However, with the increased adherence to neo-liberal rationality with its emphasis on for example quality, competitiveness and accountability statistics and information is becoming increasingly important. In 1990, the Council adopted a resolution dealing specifically with Eurydice and this commitment was important to the future of the network. However, it was not until 1995 that Eurydice came under the umbrella of the Socrates programme and became the European Union information network. At the Eurydice website it is possible to find information on how the education systems have developed over time, what the main executive and legislative bodies are, demographic developments over time, official and minority languages, religions, etc. This form of exchange of information on national and Community structures, systems and developments in the field of education provided by Eurydice was made possible and desirable with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, which emphasised the importance of exchanging information and experiences between the Member States. The official picture is that Eurydice has helped to highlight both the diversity of the Member State education systems but also their common trends. The members of the network are the European Union Member States as well as the countries of the European Economic Area, i.e. Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. The aim of Eurydice is to provide information and studies to policy-makers and other individuals involved in higher education, and it focuses on “intentions (decisions made, legislation adopted). However, it never includes recommendations or rankings”. Even though Eurydice, and the idea of bench-marking has been around for some time it has become increasingly important with the introduction of the Bologna Process and the Open Method of Coordination discussed further later in this chapter.

**Socrates - An Umbrella Organisation for Education**

In the mid-1990s the European Union decided that it would be useful to set up a horizontal education programme, which would deal with the general aims of education and training at all levels. Hence, Socrates was a European Union education programme covering all sectors of general education and which brought together and developed existing programmes dealing with education. The result was the Socrates programme, which ran from 1995-2006 in two
cycles and even though it has now been scrapped I believe it is useful to look closer at it since the ideas contained within it have not been abandoned. Socrates was set within the context of Articles 126 and 127 of the Maastricht Treaty, discussed earlier. According to Peck the objective was to allow all European citizens the opportunity to participate fully in society and the building of Europe. European policy-makers believed that this could be accomplished by including European citizens, and young people in particular, the chance to participate in the building of a European culture, identity and citizenship. This, it was hoped, would be achieved by establishing an open European area for education and training.

In its first phase Socrates ran until 1999 involving approximately thirty European countries. The main aim of the Socrates I programme was to create a ‘Europe of knowledge’ and strengthened the ‘European dimension’ in education. In 2000 the second phase of Socrates began and ran until 2006. The aim of the Socrates II programme was:

“…to promote a Europe of knowledge and encourage lifelong education through learning foreign languages, encouraging mobility, promoting cooperation at European level, opening up to methods of access to education and increasing the use of new technologies in the field of education.”

The ideas contained in Socrates’ second phase can be linked to what I term a neo-liberal version of European identity which is discussed further in chapter seven. However, Socrates II also had five more specific aims. The first aim was to strengthen the ‘European dimension’ in education at all levels. The second was to improve knowledge of foreign languages. The third was to promote cooperation and mobility in the field of education. The fourth was to encourage the use of new technologies in education. And finally, the fifth was to promote equal opportunities in all sectors of education. In addition to these five aims Socrates also consisted of seven different actions or measures, besides Erasmus discussed above. The first one was Comenius which is a programme concerned with school education. The second one was Grundtvig which covers adult education and other education pathways. The third one was
Lingua which is the programme promoting the learning and teaching of European languages, discussed further below. The fourth action was Minerva which encourages information and communication technologies in education. The fifth one dealt with observation and innovation of education systems and policies. The sixth one was ‘joint actions’ with other European programmes. And finally, the seventh action covered ‘accompanying measures’. The Lingua programme will be discussed further below since language seems to play such an important role in the nation-state constructing nations and national identities. Further, there is the Leonardo da Vinci action programme aimed at implementing the European Community vocational training policy and thereby “enhance quality, promote innovation and support the ‘European dimension’ of vocational training systems and practices”. Also, there is an initiative called Jean Monnet Action, aimed at promoting knowledge on European integration, and it is hoped to:

“…stimulate academic excellence in the field of European integration through the support for new teaching, research and debate activities at university level. The European Commission’s Jean Monnet action is open to the world and aim to prepare the new generation giving greater visibility, at both international and national levels, to scientific resources and academic activities in the field of European integration and European Union developments.”

The general objective of Socrates is to build up a ‘Europe of knowledge’ and thus provide a better response to the major challenges of this new century. More specifically, Socrates seeks to promote language learning, and to encourage mobility and innovation. In this sense Socrates connects to the construction of neo-liberal European identity as well as a cultural and civic version.

During the first five years, i.e. 1995-1999, approximately five hundred thousand students and ten thousand schools took part in Socrates and thousands of projects were completed to
promote European languages. The official view was that both Erasmus and Socrates programmes were supposed to promote languages by encouraging language courses and intensive programmes. It has even been suggested that the European Union programmes were created mainly to encourage language learning. This in turn, it was hoped, would make people more willing to move abroad to seek employment. In addition, according to official statements from the European Union institutions, Socrates projects set out to stress the multicultural character of Europe as one of the cornerstones of active citizenship. Further, in a report from 2004 the Commission stated that one of the purposes of the Socrates programme was to encourage lifelong learning and quality education “in order to promote, in Europe, a knowledge-based society that is competitive on a global scale”. However, in October 2006 the Council and the European Parliament adopted a proposal for a new action programme in education called the Lifelong Learning Programme which is to run between 2007 and 2013, which has now replaced the Socrates programme. It is a horizontal, over-arching structure which is made up of four pillars, i.e. the Comenius programme (pre-school and school education up to the secondary level), the Leonardo da Vinci programme (vocational education and training), the Grundtvig programme (adult education), and the Erasmus programme. This new programme will replace the current Socrates, Leonardo da Vinci and eLearning programmes.

Despite their success, some criticism has been raised concerning Socrates and other European Union programmes. According to the Court of Auditors there was a lack of clear goals and criteria when it came to Socrates which in turn made it difficult for the Commission to evaluate the results of the programmes effectively. It was also suggested that Socrates and

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other European Union education initiatives carry political associations since they were/are funded by the European Union. However, it is important to point out that the funding available through the various education programmes only covers a small part of the cost. This means that the governments of the Member states are expected to fund the rest. As argued by Berchem, the Community programmes should not be used as an excuse to reduce existing national funding.

**Lingua – A Symbol of the Importance of Learning Languages**

"The more languages you know, the more of a person you are"
- Slovak proverb

For mobility to be possible it is necessary that the students can communicate. As has been continuously argued in this chapter, there has been an emphasis on learning foreign languages from the very beginning of the time-span researched for the purpose of this thesis. However, the emphasis has gone from the ideal of knowing one other language to two. The proverb above was quoted by the Commission in a communication published in 2005. I believe it can be seen as an example of the normative power at work in the official European Union discourse in the sense that it seems to suggest that the ‘Good European’ is someone who knows and speaks foreign languages. And the more languages s/he speaks the better a European s/he is. As argued above, one of the main aims and actions of Socrates generally was to promote the learning of foreign languages. This can be done through the European Union language programme Lingua which was created in order “to promote language teaching and learning, to support the linguistic diversity of the Union, and to encourage improvements in the quality of language teaching structures and systems”.

As it is now foreign language proficiency is fairly low in the European Union Member States. According to a Eurobarometer conducted in 2005, as a follow up to the European Year of Languages in 2001, 50% of respondents claimed to speak one foreign language. If we look at students, 8 out of 10 say they can use a second language. However, the level of foreign

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language proficiency varies substantially between the different Member States, with Luxembourgers at the top of the table while Hungarians and Brits were trailing behind. There is also unevenness when it comes to which foreign languages the European citizens speak. English is far ahead of the other languages with a third of the European Union population naming it their second language, and it is followed by German, French, and Russian and Spanish in joint fourth place. To improve levels of foreign language proficiency the Commission promotes such language learning method as for example ‘Content and Language Integrated Learning’ where students learn subjects such as for example maths or history through another European Union language. In addition language has become linked to Lifelong Learning; as argued above, the European Union now speaks of Lifelong Language Learning. This increased emphasis on language in the European Union discourse can also be seen, among other things, by the fact that the Directorate General dealing with education now also has ‘Multilingualism’ added to its title, and that the first Commission communication on multilingualism was published in November 2005. Further, in April 2006 Jan Figel, the Education, Culture and Languages Commissioner, told the European Parliament that he would present a further communication on how to progress on the issue of multilingualism in the European Union, in 2007. The European Union discourse on language will be further discussed in chapter five in relation to European cultural identity and the idea of a ‘European dimension’ in education.

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145 Educational cooperation is not only taking part between member states or even within Europe. In 1989 the EU expressed its interest in being involved in the development of higher education systems in partner countries, from northern Africa to Mongolia. The result was the introduction of the Tempus programme 1990, in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall, which is open to students and staff from Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus, North Africa, the Middle East and the Mediterranean partner countries in higher education modernisation projects. Initiatives within Tempus take three forms, namely institutional (Joint European Projects), structural (Structural and Complementary Measures), and individual (Individual Mobility Grants). In a question from the European Parliament to the Commission it was pointed out that through the enlargement in May 2004 the EU would get a new eastern border. It was argued that Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova are undeniably part of the European area and that they share European identity. The question posed was should cooperation with these countries be extended and not only limited to the Tempus programme. The official view is that Tempus can be seen as a sign of the European Union wanting to show to the rest of the world that it has got education, which is world-class. See Council of Ministers, “Council Decision 90/233/EEC of 7 May 1990 establishing a trans-European mobility scheme for university studies (Tempus)”, Brussels, 23 May 1990, OJ L 131, pp. 21-26. Also see European Union, “The Tempus programme Changes in higher education through people to people cooperation”, (http://ec.europa.eu/education/programmes/tempus/index_en.html, accessed 2006-10-25) and European Union, “Changes in higher education through people to people cooperation”, (http://ec.europa.eu/education/programmes/tempus/doc/leaflet_en.pdf, accessed 2006-10-25), pp. 1-2. For an academic discussion see, for example Jones, C.H., “Promoting higher education’s contribution to the developing European Community”, Prospects, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1991, pp. 443-453, p. 447.
4. Higher Education in the New Millennium

A ‘Europe of Knowledge’ for the Future

Over the next few pages the Bologna Process and the Lisbon Strategy, two initiatives taken around end of last millennium and the beginning of this, will be discussed. These two initiatives signals a drastic change in the importance paid to higher education at the European level. As has been shown earlier in this chapter, up until then cooperation in the area of higher education between the Member States had mainly taken the form of participating in the various programmes discussed above. However, it has now taken the step into the political lime-light which has meant that the Commission has been given a more prominent position in European Union higher education policy making as well.\(^{146}\) Worth mentioning is that neither the Bologna Process nor the Lisbon Strategy are European Union higher education schemes per se. Rather, the Bologna Process was initiated outside the European Union structure with the specific aim of creating a European Higher Education Area (EHEA). The Lisbon Strategy, on the other hand, while being an European Union initiative, has its main focus on economic growth and employment rather than education.\(^{147}\) In other words, education is largely viewed as a means to an end. Thus, while they are very different forms of initiative, as suggested by the Commission, they have both contributed to, among other things, an increased emphasis on quality, which plays an important part in neo-liberal discourse in relation to higher education.\(^{148}\) In this section the Bologna Process and the Lisbon Strategy will be mapped out chronologically. I will answer the questions of why these initiatives are seen as necessary by highlighting what their objectives are and how, according to the policy documents analysed, these objectives are hoped to be fulfilled.

The Bologna Process – Dreaming of a European Higher Education Area

The foundations to the Bologna Declaration and a common higher education area were laid in 1988 with the signing of the Magna Charta Universitatum, created by Rectors of European Universities who had gathered in Bologna to celebrate the oldest university in Europe turning 900 years old. In the Charta the important, even essential, role of the University, as an institution, was emphasised:


“...the future of mankind depends, largely on cultural, scientific and technical development...this is built up in centres of culture, knowledge and research as represented by true universities”\textsuperscript{140}

However, signs of this idea of a common higher education area could be found in the official European Union discourse of the time as well. Already in 1988 the Commission suggest that:

“Opportunities should be found, and created, to maintain a steady advance towards convergence and coherence wherever this can be done without damage to the rich traditions of the diversity of educational practices in the Community”\textsuperscript{150}

A decade later, in 1998, the Bologna process was set in motion with the Sorbonne Declaration signed by the ministers in charge of education in France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom when they met up at the University of Paris to celebrate its 800\textsuperscript{th} anniversary.\textsuperscript{151} A first initiative to a EHEA was presented and there were two further aims expressed in the Sorbonne Declaration. First, to assist the mobility of students and teachers in the European area and the students’ integration into the European labour market. Second, enhance the international transparency of courses and the recognition of qualifications by means of gradual convergence towards a common framework of qualifications and cycles of study. One way of achieving this was through the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System, commonly referred to as the ECTS scheme, which was first introduced in 1989 as part of the Erasmus programme.\textsuperscript{152} In addition access to opportunity to develop proficiency in languages as well as ability to use new information technologies. However, the Sorbonne Declaration was not a great success and did not attract new members. To save the situation the original four signatories produced a study called “Trends and Learning Structures in Higher Education” and prepared a new declaration, i.e. the Bologna Declaration; which was later, in June 1999, signed by the Councils education ministers and fourteen other countries.\textsuperscript{153} Both


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Learning To Be(come) A Good European
A Critical Analysis of the Official European Union Discourse on European Identity and Higher Education

the Sorbonne Declaration and the Bologna Declaration can be seen as steps towards establishing a EHEA by 2010. Those countries partaking in the Bologna process met again in Bergen 2005 and have one more meeting scheduled in London in 2007. Continues reports on the developments in relation to the Bologna process will be issued up until 2010. In 2006, after the Bergen meeting, 45 countries had signed up to the Bologna Process and the European Commission also has full membership. In this sense the Bologna Process is not a ‘real’ European Union project in the sense that it was initiated outside the European Union structure. This fact has resulted in criticism that decisions taken as part of the Bologna process are in danger of being incompatible with decisions taken in dependent policy areas. There is also a risk of a democratic deficit since it is difficult to control since it lies outside the European Union’s control. Looking at the rationale behind the Bologna Process, it is described as an attempt: “to promote European citizens’ lasting employability and the international competitiveness of the European higher education system.” This aim was to be achieved through the improvement of both the quality of education and the structure of higher education systems. It is sometimes argued that the general aim of the Bologna process is to create a EHEA by 2010. It is hoped that this will lead to high-quality, lifelong learning opportunities without frontiers. As suggested earlier, the idea of quality is increasingly being stressed in relation to higher education and the Bologna Agreement is not an exception from this rule. As Haug argues:

“The evolution, improvement and certification of ‘quality’ are constituents of the ‘Bologna process’ of convergent reforms towards a coherent, compatible and competitive European higher education area”.

The EHEA with its emphasis on diverse systems and shared goals can be seen as a way of applying the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’ to higher education. This idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’
will be discussed further in relation to the construction of a cultural version of European identity in chapter five. As was mentioned above, the leaders of the European Union Member States had long been talking about working towards creating an EHEA and to work towards making European education known and attractive to the world outside Europe. It is hoped that that this EHEA will be attractive to European students as well as students and teachers from other parts of the world. More specifically the Bologna process is meant to create a compatible, coherent and competitive educational system while respecting each other’s cultural diversity, as outlined in the Maastricht Treaty. At the Prague Summit in 2001 some further goals were added to the Bologna agreement. Education as a public good was emphasised and it was argued that education should remain a public responsibility. In order to achieve these goals the Bologna process is meant to create an EHEA. The reason the Ministers of Education of the Member States gave for setting up the EHEA is to make higher education institutions in Europe more attractive and competitive. According to the Commission this area should be based on the idea of diverse systems but shared goals. However, it also entails a form of structural harmonisation regarding the length of each degree. In other words, the aim is that all Bachelors should be three years in length while Masters should take two years to complete. Finally, the standard length of a doctoral degree should be three years.

It has been argued that the Bologna Process can be seen as an attempt to make the most of the positive aspects of globalization. It should be added though that the European countries were late in their reaction. American and Australian universities had realised the benefits of globalization more than a decade before their European counterparts. However, during the 1990’s it became apparent that there existed a global higher education market and the European Union showed signs of reacting to this in the middle of the decade. It was argued by decision-makers that something had to be done if European higher education wanted to be competitive in a globalised environment.

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Let us now look more closely at the aims of the Bologna Declaration. In the early stages of the Bologna Process in 1999 the Member States agreed on six common actions which were extended to nine at the Ministerial meeting in Prague in 2001, and then a tenth and final action line was added at the Ministerial meeting in Berlin 2003. The Bologna process is essentially a plan for structural reforms, such as for example “the architecture of degrees, their internal organisation in credits and outcome-based units and their transparency”. Another important initiative, the work programme “Education and Training 2010” on the other hand is more geared towards higher education policy issues, such as for example funding, governance and attractiveness. With the Bologna Process the ten different action lines were articulated by the European Education Ministers:

1. Adoption of a system of easily readable and comparable degrees
2. Adoption of a system essentially based on two cycles
3. Establishment of a system of credits
4. Promotion of mobility
5. Promotion of European co-operation in quality assurance
6. Promotion of the European dimension in higher education
7. Focus on Lifelong learning
8. The inclusion of Higher education institutions and students
9. Promoting the attractiveness of the European Higher Education Area
10. Doctoral studies and the synergy between the European Higher Education Area and the European Research Area

As we can see above the ideas of quality and comparability are strongly emphasised in the Bologna agreement, and they concepts that are part of neo-liberal discourse and will be discussed further in relation to neo-liberal European identity in chapter seven of this thesis.

The idea of a common European education area did not simply appear with the Bologna agreement, and they concepts that are part of neo-liberal discourse and will be discussed further in relation to neo-liberal European identity in chapter seven of this thesis.
of Knowledge” where “the gradual construction of an open and dynamic European educational area” was argued for.\(^{168}\) It was suggested that:

“This educational area will facilitate an enhancement of citizenship through the sharing of common values, and the development of a sense of belonging to a common social and cultural area. It must encourage a broader-based understanding of citizenship, founded on active solidarity and on mutual understanding of the cultural diversities that constitute Europe’s originality and richness”\(^{169}\)

It is important to point out here that the Bologna Declaration and the Bologna Process in generally have been entered into freely by the different signatories. It is up to each participating country to reform its own higher education system.\(^{170}\) In this sense it can be seen as an example of the neo-liberal idea of the autonomous chooser. I argue that this does not simply apply to the individual but also states. In February 2001 the Council of Ministers adopted the “Report on the concrete future objectives of education and training systems” which was one of the most comprehensive reports undertaken in the area of education. In March 2001 this report was approved by the Stockholm European Council with the request for a detailed work programme to be prepared. After the work programme had been put together it was adopted in February 2002. However, it has been argued that the measures taken so far, concerning national education systems, by Member States to meet the goals of the Lisbon Strategy has been insufficient. This is a view shared by Philippe de Buck, the head of the European employers’ federation, UNICE, and the Commission.\(^{171}\) To rectify this lack of action, the Education Council adopted a joint progress report, i.e. “Education & Training 2010 – the success of the Lisbon strategy hinges on urgent reforms”, from the Commission and the Council on the 26th of February 2004. This report dealt with the results of the implementation of the work programme adopted in 2002. The main arguments of the report were that the European Union should focus reform and investment on key areas. They should also work

\(^{168}\) CEC, “Towards a Europe of Knowledge”, COM (97) 563/final, Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Office of Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 11 November, pp. 1-11, p. 3.

\(^{169}\) CEC, “Towards a Europe of Knowledge”, COM (97) 563/final, Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Office of Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 11 November, pp. 1-11, p.3.


toward making life long learning a reality. Finally, the European Union should establish a Europe of education and training.172

The Bologna Declaration does not only address Member States but also individual universities, by introducing a project called ‘Tuning’, one of the programmes supported by Socrates that is working towards the tuning of educational structures in Europe.173 The name was chosen to reflect the idea that universities do not look for harmonisation of their degree programmes or any sort of unified, prescriptive or definite European curricula but simply for points of reference, convergence and common understanding. The protection of the rich diversity, shown in the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’, of European education has been paramount in the ‘Tuning’ project from the very start and the project in no way seeks to restrict the independence of academic and subject specialists, or damage local and national academic authority.174 However, similar to the Tempus programme, the Bologna Process is not only about promoting educational co-operation in the European Union but also the rest of Europe and beyond. Developing out of the Bologna Declaration, and part of what is known as the Bologna process, is the programme “Networking for the European Area of Higher Education”. This is an attempt to develop the relationship between the European Union and former soviet states in the Caucasus.175

Let us now look more closely at shared ambitions that the Member States have for 2010. On the 14th of February 2002 the ministers in charge of education and training in the Member States, i.e. the Council of Ministers, met up with representatives from the Commission. They agreed on five goals to be achieved by 2010 and that would be beneficial for citizens and the European Union as a whole. The first goal was to achieve the highest quality in European education and training and that Europe would be recognised worldwide for its high standard of education and training. The second goal was that make European education and training systems as compatible as possible as to aid moves between the different systems. Third, that qualification, knowledge and skills acquired within the European Union should be acknowledged throughout the Union. The fourth goal was to make lifelong learning accessible to all ages. Finally, Europe should be open to cooperation to other parts of the world and be

the most-favoured destination for studies abroad for students from outside Europe. The Commission clearly states that these are ambitions and not realistic goals. However, they argue that these goals signal a new phase in the development of education and training in the European Union. This new phase is seen to have its foundation in the idea of having diverse systems at the same time as having shared goals.176

The Lisbon Strategy – Aiming for Competitiveness
In 2000 the European Union Member States sat down and compiled a document, the Lisbon Strategy, which is seen as a turning point in the history of European integration.177 The European Council meeting in Lisbon in 2000 was very significant since it called for closer cooperation within a much wider range of educational areas than before in the hope of improving the quality of education in Europe. As Livingston purports, “[t]he Lisbon meeting was important because it set the agenda for future policy making”.178 Important to point out here is that the Lisbon strategy is not an attempt aimed solely at education and training but they play a very important part in making the strategy work.179 The Lisbon Strategy can be seen as a reaction to the knowledge economy or knowledge society, which will be discussed further in chapter six of this thesis. There are those that argue that the greatest challenge that faces higher education policy is the fact that globalization demands new types of skills and knowledge, because it is the new ‘Knowledge Society’ that the Lisbon strategy is a reaction to.180 In other words, the Lisbon Strategy was initiated as a response to the challenges caused, real or imagined, by globalization. There was a need for a substantially reformed economic system but also drastic changes to education systems to make Europe more competitive on the world market. However, it was felt that the Member States were far from achieving the aims set out in the Lisbon Strategy. Therefore, in March 2005, at the Spring Council it was decided that the Lisbon process needed to be re-launched and that this could be achieved through

"[m]ore focus on growth and employment, simplification and national ownership via national action plans."\textsuperscript{181} However, the Lisbon Strategy and this link between education and economic prosperity did not appear out of thin air. For example, in a communication from 1997 the Commission argues: “In an economic context of globalisation and new forms of competition, improving education and training can help to strengthen growth and competitiveness in Europe”.\textsuperscript{182} Further, according to the European Union, the Bologna process, together with the Copenhagen process, which deals with vocational training, has contributed to realising the goals of the Lisbon Strategy.\textsuperscript{183} After the Bologna Declaration, in 2000, followed the Lisbon European Council where heads of state agreed to the common aim of making the European Union “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” by 2010 as well.\textsuperscript{184} It has been argued that the European Union cannot compete with, for example, the United States, when it comes to both performance and investments in education. This is what education ministers want to change with the Lisbon strategy. A year after the Lisbon Strategy became a reality the Educational Council and the Commission endorsed a ten-year work programme in the area of education. The ministers of education agreed upon three main goals to be achieved by 2010. The first goal was to improve the quality and effectiveness of European Union education and training systems. The second goal was to ensure that they are accessible to all. Finally the Council decided that it is essential to show solidarity to the rest of the world by opening up education and training to the wider world.\textsuperscript{185} The first two goals presented above will be discussed further in chapter seven in relation to the neo-liberal version of European identity. The Lisbon Strategy contained some concrete objectives for the area of education and a detailed joint working plan. Earlier these kinds of comprehensive plans for action had been left to the Member States to work out on their own. Livingston adds that it is important when suggesting and working towards common objectives so that the diversity of the different national systems is not undermined. It is also essential not just to concentrate on what the different Member States have in common but also to let them learn from each other’s


\textsuperscript{183} European Union, “Modernising education and training systems: a vital contribution to prosperity and social cohesion in Europe”, MEMO/05/415, Rapid Press Release, Brussels, 10 November 2005, pp. 1-4, p. 3.


In 2002, in Barcelona, the ideas of the Lisbon strategy were put into action with the creation of a work programme. In the Lisbon Strategy economic issues were discussed, aims were set up and possible solutions to problems concerning growth and jobs were also considered. However, the Lisbon Strategy is not simply an economic initiative but also emphasises a social dimension and the importance of education. Hence, there is not only neo-liberal rhetoric contained within the Lisbon Strategy. Rather, it exists in uncomfortable union with claims appeals to social equality:

“The European Council makes a special appeal to companies' corporate sense of social responsibility regarding best practices on lifelong learning, work organisation, equal opportunities, social inclusion and sustainable development”.

The issue of the uncomfortable co-existence between economic and social goals, in the official European Union discourse analysed in this thesis, of neo-liberalism idea(l)s and the wish for social equality will be discussed further in chapter seven in relation to what I perceive as a neo-liberal version of European identity.

The Open Method of Coordination – A Softer European Union Higher Education Policy

As has been shown throughout this chapter, developments at the European level in the area of education are not a new phenomenon. However, one of the most important transformations in relation to higher education policy, both at the European and the Member State level, relates to a fairly recent change in the policy model used to create it. Increasingly the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), which originates in the Amsterdam Treaty from 1997 where it was included under the Employment title of the EC Treaty under Article 128 EC, and it was first used to create the European Union’s employment policy to help the Member States improve education. It is also true that the OMC model is not without its critics, and that its use in the field of higher education policy has been subject to some controversy.

their competitiveness.\textsuperscript{190} Mitchell suggests that the introduction of the OMC policy model can be seen as evidence for the fact that neo-liberal governmentality is increasingly being applied to policies concerning social and civic life.\textsuperscript{191} Radaelli is of a similar mind arguing that “OMC is embedded in the master discourse of competitiveness”.\textsuperscript{192} Later, at the European Union Summit in Lisbon in 2000, it was decided that OMC would also cover European Union higher education policy.\textsuperscript{193} The OMC is being used in an increasing number of policy areas. Trying to explain why this is de Búrca and Zeitlin argue that:

“The value of the OMC….lies not simply in its general usefulness, efficiency, and flexibility as an instrument of EU policy-making. Because the OMC encourages convergence of national objectives, performance and policy approaches rather than specific institutions, rules and programmes, this mechanism is particularly well suited to identifying and advancing the common concerns and interests of the Member States while simultaneously respecting their autonomy and diversity”.\textsuperscript{194}

OMC can be described as ‘learning by comparing’. Or as Rodriges, the OMC “aims to organise a learning process about how to cope with the common challenges of the global economy in a co-ordinated way while also respecting national diversity.”\textsuperscript{195} The influence of OMC is tied to the fact that it entails setting common objectives and indicators rather than common regulation. Between them the Member States identify which are the main common priorities and best practices. Decisions, as to what these are, are based on information gathered through national reports. But, as Metz argues, objectives are likely to vary depending on which policy field is being dealt with.\textsuperscript{196} The introduction of the OMC can be seen as part of a larger general change in European Union policy making possibly brought on by the increasingly popular neo-liberal political rationalities and the widening of the European Union. In the words of Boyle:
“We take our collective pulse 24 hours a day with the use of statistics. We understand life that way, though somehow the more figures we use, the more great truths seem to slip through our fingers. Despite all that numerical control, we feel as ignorant of the answers to the big questions as ever”. 197

The ideas contained within the OMC are not new however but had earlier been known as ‘soft law’, benchmarking, etc., which has been increasingly used by European policy-makers since the mid-1990s and was emphasised in the Lisbon Strategy. 198 According to Dale, modern governance is about learning more about the problem rather than simply focusing on the solution. There has also been a shift from the national to the supranational level. The OMC is a good example of this trend. Dale argues that it is the Commission which constructs the problems which the Member States are argued to be suffering from as well as suggest solutions to the problem.199 Over the years there has been a shift from employing negative integration to promoting positive integration. Negative integration, sometimes also referred to as ‘old regulatory policy’, is linked to the actions taken to prohibit violations of the principles that apply to the specific policy area, i.e. deregulatory or market making initiatives, and were used, for example, to make the Common Market run smoothly, since it prohibits discriminatory measures, restrictions on the free movements and distortion of competition.200 It restrains, with its various initiatives, the ability of Member States to regulate certain products or economic activities, and as a result may promote economic integration by breaking down the barriers to integration. Positive integration, also known as “new regulatory policy”, on the other hand, is a legislative-type process rather than a judicial process. It is made up of European directives, regulations or soft instruments like the OMC, which prescribe harmonising or regulatory measures that specify the goals to be reached and prescribe measures to reach them. In other words, positive integration can include such actions as for example the market shaping initiatives taken to intervene in the economy, and they involve broader institutional adaptation at the domestic level to a specific European model.201

198 The OMC was emphasised by a variety of working groups as part of the European Convention, such as for example those dealing with Economic Governance, Simplification, Complementary Competencies and Social Europe. The working group on complementary competencies was renamed “supporting measures. See Radaelli, C.M., “The Open Method of Coordination: A new governance architecture for the European Union?”, Report No. 1, March 2003, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), pp. 1-65, pp. 5, 7. De la Porte, C., “Is the Open Method of Coordination Appropriate for Organising Activities at European Level in Sensitive Policy Areas?”, European Law Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2002, pp. 38-58, p. 38.
Common rules, which will apply within the European Union on specific issues, are agreed upon by the Member States, which results in Member States losing the ability to apply their own different rules, unless the European Union measure allows them to do so. The OMC can also, as suggested by Tuschling and Engemann, be described as ‘participative management by objectives’. As Miller and Rose suggest, there is a variety of “mechanisms through which the actions and judgements of persons and organizations have been linked to political objectives”.203

Looking at European education policy generally, there has been a shift from negative integration to positive integration, i.e. from ‘old regulatory policy’ to ‘new regulatory policy’. As mentioned earlier, the Treaty of Rome only mentioned education, or rather vocational training, as a subject for the European Union in connection with the primary negative integration. However, the Maastricht Treaty changed that.204 According to Vink:

“…something like the non-binding Bologna Declaration on the European Space for Higher Education, which seems to be an important inspiration for transformation of European higher education systems, could be a good example of ‘weak’ positive integration with a substantial domestic impact”.205

OMC is an example of ‘soft law’ in the sense that it does not lead to binding European Union legislative measures but rather entails the spread of best practice and aims at achieving greater convergence towards the main goals of European integration. In the Lisbon Strategy it is argued that:

“Implementation of the strategic goal will be facilitated by applying a new open method of coordination as the means of spreading best practice and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals”.206

In addition it is argued that the Member States should agree on a set of guidelines and timetables for the short, medium and long term in the area of higher education. It is also suggested that the Member States should agree on a set of quantitative and qualitative

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indicators and benchmark to make it possible for them to compete with “the best in the world”.
To achieve this it is seen as necessary to introduce “periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning process”. The European Council does acknowledge that different Member States have different needs and that these should be considered. In addition the Lisbon Strategy states that:

“A fully decentralised approach will be applied in line with the principle of subsidiarity in which the Union, the Member States, the regional and local levels, as well as the social partners and civil society, will be actively involved, using variable forms of partnership. A method of benchmarking best practices on managing change will be devised by the European Commission networking with different providers and users, namely the social partners, companies and NGOs”.  

At the Lisbon Council meeting it was argued that a new method should be introduced which included already existing instruments, processes and strategies. Wincott argues that the OMC can be seen as a reaction to the Community Method and its increasingly regulatory character. Which policy-model to use in a specific policy area is not decided on an ad hoc basis but has been decided by official decisions. For example, the Lisbon Strategy states that its work programme will be implemented under the OMC.

Policy-making in the European Union involves many different actors and institutions. The different actors and institutions involved in the policy process have different strengths and power to influence depending on what policy model/s the policy area is based on. European Union higher education policy is mainly based on the OMC. Part of the OMC policy model is that the different actors should learn from each other and to do this efficiently information about the different national education policies is needed. This task has been given to Eurydice, discussed earlier in this chapter, which is an office/institution that the Directorate General for Education and Culture is in charge of and that publishes reports on educational issues in the

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European Union, i.e. it is “the Information Network on Education in Europe”. Furthermore, it has been argued that OMC is a sign that there exists a European identity. As Haahr’s articulates it: "the OMC can be seen as expressing the existence of a European identity, in so far as the method embodies a conception of a certain ‘community of destiny’ between the member states of the EU”.

The European Council argued that it was important to have a general framework even though each Member State should freely choose the means they find most effective in their own individual institutional and legislative circumstances. According to Hingel education is an ideal-type of policy area where to use the idea of subsidiarity to ensure that specific, sensitive policy areas stayed in the hands of the Member States. The Commission argues that the optimal level of decision-making in the area of education is at the national and/or sub-national level as it ensures that the policy is custom made to fit into the different institutional set ups and also consider the specific cultural and historic traits that each Member State and its regions have. However, as Livingston argues, the idea of subsidiarity draws attention to a paradox contained within the idea of European integration, i.e. the fact that European Union decision makers calls for ‘Unity in Diversity’ and at the same time attempts to achieve greater unity. This is an issue which is discussed further in chapter five in relation to what I perceive as the construction of a cultural European identity.

In the wake of the Lisbon Strategy much of the efforts of European Union decision-makers have been centred on creating a Constitution which has failed to win the hearts of the European citizens. However I still believe it could be useful to briefly look at what the Constitution has to say about education. As Valle suggests, the Constitution does not diverge much from the path of the Maastricht Treaty in the sense that they share their aims and content. Education is discussed in two places in the document; first, as a form of freedom; and secondly under the heading “The Policies and Functioning of the Union” where the

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actions available to the European Union are defined. It is argued that the Union “may take coordinating, complementary or supporting actions”. What is being emphasised in the Constitution as well as in discussions on OMC is that the aim is not to harmonize education policies and laws in the Member States but rather to come up with incentive measures. However, as pointed out by Valle, it might still lead to Member States’ governments working towards harmonization out of free will in order to make mobility and educational exchanges work more smoothly. This reaction can be seen as part of neo-liberal thinking. In the very last stage of completing this thesis the heads of state and government of the European Union Member States agreed on the Lisbon Treaty, which is a slimmed down version of the earlier rejected Constitution with some of the most sensitive issues removed. One of the points which did not make it into this new document was the Charter of Fundamental Rights, of which education is one. What the reason for this diminished role for education is I cannot say for certain. But perhaps it can be seen as a reaction to the increased involvement by the European Union in a policy which lies so close to the heart of the nation-state and its citizens. The issue of education as a fundamental right is discussed further in chapter six as a part of European Union citizenship.

The OMC has not been without criticism. According to Radaelli the method holds “elements of endemic tension” since it promotes “cooperation and imitation” as well as “diversity and competition”. In Radaelli’s mind, “[i]t is a means to achieve competitiveness, but some advocates of ‘the European social model’ see it as a way to balance economic logic with the logic of solidarity and protection”. However, those in support of a European social model see the OMC as incapable of supporting and promoting equality. This is an issue which will be discussed further in chapter seven in relation to neo-liberal European identity an the increasing emphasis in European Union discourse on flexicurity, or what academics refer to as embedded neo-liberalism.


Conclusions

The aim of this chapter has been to place higher education in Europe in a context by looking at the past, present and towards the future. This chapter started off by placing European Union interest in education in a context and a historical continuation. In this sense education generally, and higher education more specifically, can be seen to be part of a European cultural heritage and, in extension, a shared European identity, which is an idea discussed further in the next chapter. However, it is also an idea used in relation to the neo-liberal version of European identity. It does so by implying that being European means being highly educated and that ‘we’ have a long history of education to look back at and with the help of the Lisbon Strategy, and its aim of making the European Union the world’s most competitive knowledge Economy by 2010, it is implied that the Europeans are destined to be well-educated in the future as well. In other words, education helps create a sense of continuity. In addition, this chapter has shown that internationalisation of education is not a modern phenomenon either. European mobility and universities have existed for over eight hundred years. This is a fact that is sometimes used as a reason for action in the higher education area by European policy-makers. In a sense they are saying that ‘we’ have a history of cooperation and a destiny to carry on this legacy. In other words they are creating a myth, a sense of continuity, which, as argued in chapter one, plays an important role in the identity-making process. In other words, higher education belongs in ‘our’ past, present and future. As Haahr suggested, Europe is a community of destiny.
"European integration is more than just an economic or geographical challenge, it is a question of values, civilization and cultural heritage"

- J. Figel

Introduction

“If I had to start all over again I would start with culture” Jean Monnet, one of the Founding Fathers of the European integration process, proclaimed at the later stages of his political career. I believe this can be seen as proof of the fact that the idea of a common culture, often in the form of a shared heritage but increasingly also in the shape of common values, has become seen as progressively more important to emphasise in the European Union discourse as the integration process has proceeded. In other words, the idea of ‘culture’ has been moved to a more prominent position on the political agenda. Another form of proof of this is the fact that both Prodi and Barroso, former and present President of the European Commission (in 2007), have argued that what is needed is ‘A Soul For Europe’ and a spiritual and cultural dimension of Europe. In Barroso’s words: “...the EU has reached a stage of its history where its cultural dimension can no longer be ignored”. A further example of the increased emphasis on culture is the European Union Programme Culture 2007, which is to run until 2012. The reason behind this action, according to Figel, the Commissioner responsible for Education, Training, Culture and Multilingualism, was the fact that “[w]e need to create conditions so that the peoples and countries of Europe fall in love again with our process of cultural diversity.”


integration”. Thus, European cultural identity is portrayed as a destiny for those that are perceived as European. However, ‘we’ have to be made aware of who ‘we’ are. Hence, ‘we’ Europeans need to learn of ‘our’ common past, present and future; this is where education comes in to play. Therefore, I argue, there is no coincidence that education and culture are dealt with by the same Directorate General in the Commission.

There is also an increased interest in culture among scholars. In academic circles it has been suggested that what we are witnessing today is a cult of heritage or even a heritage crusade, or as Jepperson and Swidler so poetically put it: “culture’s ship has finally come in, and the time is ripe for an inventory of its cargo”. Bugge adds to this line of arguing by suggesting that “Europe is in vogue today, as are the concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘heritage’”. Questions concerning a collective cultural identity are especially topical today considering the fact that the European Union has increased considerably both in geographical and demographical size, as the number of Member States has risen from fifteen to twenty-seven in the last few years, most which are Eastern European. However, it is not only the number of Member States that has increased but also the diversity. Questions have been raised concerning how much diversity the European integration process can take. To put it in metaphorical terms, what will be the last straw that will break the camel’s back? Or as Glyptis hypothetically asks: “[h]ow many degrees of separation actually annul kinship?” I argue, in unison with other scholars, that certain forms of diversity are accepted, even celebrated, while others are not, and to discover which forms of diversity are, and are not, seen as acceptable it is often necessary to read between the lines; by looking at which forms of diversity are emphasised it is also possible to say something about what and who is being excluded. In Schlesinger’s words, the process of defining what it means to be European has become a cultural battlefield where power struggles are taking place over who gets to define what it means to be a European in

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cultural terms and what forms of diversity are seen as okay and which are not. In other words, different actors are eager to get the chance to define ‘the truth’ about the European.

As was argued in the introductory chapter, contained within the official European Union discourse on European identity, in relation to higher education, are three forms of European identity construction, i.e. cultural, civic, and neo-liberal, which are examined separately in this and the following two chapters. The reason for starting with cultural identity is two-fold. First, it is the most prominent form of identity in the nation-state, as was shown in chapter three where I argued that the myth of cultural homogeneity has played an essential role in the creation and maintenance of the nation. And secondly, even though the civic and neo-liberal versions of European identity are powerful in themselves they do not seem to provide sufficient emotional attachment for the European integration process. Hence they can be seen as ‘thin’ versions of identity while cultural identity is ‘thick’ and thus creates more substantial support and emotional attachment. This is especially true in relation to neo-liberal European identity; as Jean Monnet once rhetorically asked: “who will fall in love with a common market?”. Thus, I contend that a common European cultural identity is seen as a necessity and acts as a foundation and justification for the neo-liberal and civic versions of European identity.

In this chapter I have been interested in investigating whether European cultural identity is constructed using the same form of rhetoric as in the nation-state. In other words, has it got its own myths, memories and symbols? If yes, how do these compare to those highlighted in the theoretical discourse on how national identity is constructed? Further, does it attempt to create a sense of continuity through claims of a common past, present, and future, similar to national identity discourses? This chapter is made up of two main parts; in the first of these the ideas/myths and symbols of are discussed. Myths, as was argued in chapter three, play an important part in the construction of national identity and are not so much lies as a choice about how to portray the past. Symbols, on the other hand, are visible signs of belonging, such as the national flag, passport, hymn, etc. In the official European Union discourse there are claims of a common European culture while at the same time asserting that what makes Europe so special is its ability to cope with and maintain ‘Unity in Diversity’. I will show that

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within the European Union discourse a thicker and a thinner version of the meaning of unity coexist. The former consisting of claims to a common culture and civilization while the latter refers to a common set of values. For European Union policy-makers it becomes a precarious balancing act when defining what unites ‘us’. Too much of the former might be seen as too harshly excluding and politically incorrect and could undermine the image of Europe as a democratic community while too much of the latter will not suffice to create the desired emotional attachment. Turning to the meaning of ‘diversity’, there has been a shift over time, from being seen as a hurdle to be seen as the very essence of what it means to be European. I ask myself however how the idea of a common European culture can be combined with this strong emphasis on unity in diversity. The second part of this chapter looks at the role which higher education is given in the construction of a cultural version of European identity. This is done by investigating the idea of a ‘European dimension’ in relation to higher education. The concept of a ‘European dimension’ has been left more or less undefined by the European Union policy-makers, thus allowing each higher education institution and/or Member State to define it.

1. The Myths and Symbols Constructing Cultural European Identity

"Diversity is our wealth, unity our strength"
S. Weil

As has been argued earlier in this thesis, identity discourses generally attempt to create a feeling of continuity, i.e. a sense of that ‘we’ are sharing a common past, present and future. In national identity discourse this is achieved by appealing to specific myths and the use of political symbolism. In this section I want to both give a general overview of how cultural issues have been dealt with at the European level over time. I have been especially interested in investigating what myths and symbols, if any, exist within the official European Union discourse. In other words, does it attempt to evoke ‘memories’ of a common past, present and future in a similar way to how it is done in the national identity discourse? Myths, as was argued in chapter three, are not so much fictional events as a selective memory, or rather

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common amnesia as some would argue. One of the most powerful myths of used in the construction of national identity is that of the homogeneous nature of the nation, through the elite promotion, through for example education, of a uniform culture and standardised language. Some of the most potent myths relate to distant origins, which together with memories, symbols and values serve the purpose of creating a sense of common ancestry, heritage, tradition, destiny and uniqueness. This means that successive generations are linked by, among other things, the idea of a common history and a cultural heritage. As was argued in chapter three, besides myths, the nation-state has created symbols to appeal to and construct a common identity. The symbols used to construct national identity, such as the flag, national anthem, currency, etc, make up a distinct form of political symbolism, sometimes also referred to as banal symbolism, which is used to support state-sponsored myths. I argue that symbols play the same role at the European level. In other words, despite, or perhaps because of, diversity, leaders and policy-makers have tried to instil some sense of ‘Europeaness’ in European citizens by introducing a common currency, flag, newspaper, sports teams and universities.

When analysing the official European Union discourse it becomes clear that the European Union has its own mobilising myths. First, the European Union discourse analysed refers to

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14 Borneman, J. & Fowler, N., “Europeanization”, Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 26, 1997, pp. 487-514, pp. 487-488. Also see Hutchinson, J. “Modern Nationalism”, (Fontana Press: London, 1994), p. 138. However, some scholars are hesitant concerning the existence of European symbols. See for example Thélier, T., “Political Symbolism and European Integration”, (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 2005), p. 2. What constitutes European identity seems sometimes a bit vague or farfetched. Naranjo Escobar, Member of the European Parliament, wonders if the Commission is thinking of making it mandatory for ‘the Union’s airlines’ to display the Community symbol of the blue flag with yellow stars. The Commission representative, de Palacio, argues that the Union’s logo helps in a positive manner and in many different contexts to make the European identity known throughout the world. However, she argues, the Commission has no wish to make it compulsory to display it. For the question see Naranjo Escobar, J. (MEP), “Written question to the Commission on the subject: Airplanes displaying the EU logo”, presented 24 October 2001, Brussels. 29 August 2002, OJ C 205 E, p. 14. For the answer see CEC, “Answer given by Mrs. de Palacio on behalf of the Commission”, Brussels, 29 August 2002, OJ C 205 E, p. 15.

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the myth of unity in the form of a shared European cultural heritage. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the same discourse stresses the myth of diversity in the sense that each of the cultures of the Member States are unique. Language, which is an important component of national culture, also plays an important role in the construction of the European cultural identity even though the European Union discourse tends to speak of culture and language.18 Hence, there is a myth of Europe as a community of ‘Unity and Diversity’, or as the European Union slogan says, ‘Unity in Diversity’. 19 In other words, in contemporary European Union discourse diversity is seen in terms of plurality rather than division. Diversity has become a main concern of European Union policy and can be seen as a central political project.20 The idea of a unified yet diverse Europe has been voiced through the time-span which this thesis covers and has been included as a motto for the European Union in the proposed Constitution.21 The idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’ was officially proclaimed by the European Parliament on the 4th of May 2000 and has found its expression in a variety of initiatives at the European level in the last few years. In 2003 the European Commission initiated a European Union-wide five year campaign called “For Diversity – Against Discrimination” in order to “promote the positive benefits of diversity for business and for society as a whole”.22 In relation to the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’ the concept of ‘intercultural dialogue’ has become something of a mantra among the European Union institutions. In 2002 a conference on Intercultural Dialogue was organised with the hope of “encouraging tolerance, better knowledge and mutual understanding.”23 However, the European Union is not alone in stressing the need for intercultural dialogue. At the time this thesis was completed, in 2007, the Council of Europe was in the process of producing a White Paper on the issue and UNESCO also emphasised the need for intercultural dialogue.24 Considering why it is seen as necessary and what is hoped to be achieved through intercultural dialogue, Figel, speaking in 2005 on the issue of making 2008 the ‘European Year of Intercultural Dialogue’, argues that:

“Over the past few years, Europe has seen major changes resulting from successive enlargements of the Union, greater mobility in the Single Market, and increased travel to and trade with the rest of the world. This has resulted in interaction between Europeans and the different cultures, languages, ethnic groups and religions on the continent and elsewhere. **Dialogue between cultures** would therefore appear to be an essential tool in forging closer links both between European peoples themselves and between their respective cultures.”

Thus, Figel acknowledges that the multicultural character of the European Union might cause some problems which have to be bridged through meeting and cooperating over national borders if the European integration process is to run smoothly. A year later, in 2006, Figel spoke of participation in intercultural dialogue as a destiny for the European Union and its citizens since the European Union, and its Member States, will always remain multicultural in character:

> “Intercultural dialogue is very much a domestic agenda for the EU. Europeans will always be busy getting to know each other because the Union is not- and never will be- about erasing the differences between its countries and peoples.”

The importance of maintaining an intercultural dialogue, and in extension also the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’, was stressed even further when it was decided, by the European Parliament and the Council in December 2006, to dub 2008 the “European Year of Intercultural Dialogue”. The idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’, besides being a catch-phrase for the European Union and the European integration process the concept can be described as a rhetorical tool where a common European culture is being emphasised at the same time as it is argued that the Member States are diverse. In this sense the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’ can be seen as a discursive method used to convince the citizens of the Member States not to fear that a European identity is meant to replace the national identities. On the other hand, talk of a common civilization, culture, history, heritage etc. can be seen as a way to add some ‘thickness’ to the common identity. Delanty suggests that the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’ is

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a myth that is lacking in philosophical depth. On the other hand, he adds, the idea is harmless and fairly pointless.29

Let us leave the myth of ‘Unity in Diversity’ for now to deliberate on the myth of ‘unity’ which seems to have been put on the back burner in favour of that of diversity. The official European Union discourse contains a number of ideas which relates to the myth of ‘unity’ and which are appealed to in order to construct a cultural version of European identity. These include culture, civilization, history and heritage which are intimately linked and all point towards a common past.30 These ideas are all very powerful when it comes construct a ‘we’ and exclude ‘the Other’. ‘Our’ shared past is a myth in the sense that the manner in which we perceive it is not the way it happened but the way that policy-makers want us to understand it. Hence, the past is discursively constructed. In a sense European Union policy actors argue that we have a past and a present and are therefore destined to have a future together as well. In other words, it is something, which is inevitable.31 Culture and civilization are closely linked but should not be used interchangeably. Even though I will not go into any lengthy discussion on the idea of civilizations, since it is outside the scope of this thesis, I believe it can be useful to make the reader aware of its presence in European Union discourse in relation to a European cultural identity since the concept of civilization carries with it a sense of superiority.32 In other words, appeals to a common cultural heritage and civilization discursively excludes and creates ‘the Other’ by saying that ‘our’ western civilization is richer, better and more developed than ‘theirs’. As Coulby contends, European Union policy makers, by trying to create a European identity through difference, i.e. ‘we’ versus ‘them’, suggest that there exists a European civilization that is superior to that in for example Eastern Europe and Anatolia and Africa.33 Thus, by speaking of a European civilization the official European Union discourse on European identity makes moral statements suggesting that Europeans are civilized while ‘the Other’ is not.34 Further, often Europe is defined as a ‘Christian Club’.35

31 Metallinos argues that while ancient Greece is revered in the definition of a common European identity, present day Hellenism is not. He also claims that there is a return to the idea of Charlemagne by France and Germany. Criticism has also been raised concerning how the historical experiences of eastern and northern Europe are ignored. Metallinos, G.D., “Orthodox and European Culture – The struggle between Hellenism and Frankism”, excerpts from the speech of Fr. Georgios Metallinos, Professor at the University of Athens, during the February ‘95 Theological Conference in Pirgos, Greece, (http://www.romanity.org/mi/me04en.htm , accessed 2006-11-13).
32 Like so many other concepts ‘ civilization’ is a contested one. According to Cox terms such as empires, cultures, even societies have been used to be synonymous or related to the idea of civilization. Cox, R.W., “Civilisations in World Political Economy”, New Political Economy, Vol. 1, No. 2, July 1996, pp. 141-156, p. 143.
However, if Turkey, and possibly other states as well, are to join the European Union in the future this view would have to change. As Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan asserts, the European Union “is not really a Christian club, but a place where civilizations meet”.36 The idea that European civilization is not a fact, or a ‘truth’ in Foucauldian terms, but something which has been discursively constructed, is nicely captured by Mahatma Gandhi who when asked what his thoughts were on European civilization answered that “[i]t would be a good idea”.37

The main purpose of this discussion on the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’, present in European Union discourse, is to show how its meaning has changed from the early 1970’s up until the middle of the first decade of the 20th century.38 As was suggested in chapter two, while discourses are fairly stable when it comes to which ideas they contain the meaning of these ideas often change over time as a reaction to changes in political climate. As Delanty and Rumford rightly observe, it is possible to make a distinction between ‘diversity as derivative of unity’ and ‘unity as derivative of diversity’. The first approach, the Euro-federal notion, emphasises what ‘Europeans’ have in common and argues that a European identity can be built on this basis and that diversity is not an obstruction to this process. Evidence of this idea can be found in the arguments presented in this chapter concerning a common past, culture, civilization, history, etc. In other words, the argument is that a sense of European identity already exists. ‘We’ Europeans only have to be made aware of it and what it means. In addition, the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’ can be viewed as something, which has already been achieved and which is based on common values. Seen this way, a European identity can only be a ‘weak’ or ‘thin’ identity based on the common values that exist. Looking closer at the idea of ‘unity as derivative of diversity’, according to this liberal approach unity comes about through overcoming diversity and it does not assume that there is a pre-existing identity to build on. There is also a third approach, which is becoming increasingly common in the such countries as Russia and Ukraine, which should include ‘partnership of cultures’. He argued that he was: “tempted to suggest for a new and more ambitious commitment towards the Mediterranean, where we Europeans are dedicated to promoting a new, exemplary harmony between peoples of the three religions of Jerusalem. A resounding ‘No’ to a clash of civilisations”. Prodi, R., “Address by Mr Prodi to Parliament, 14 September, Bulletin of the European Union, 9-1999 (en): 2.2.1., (http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/9909/p202001.htm, accessed 2006-11-01).

European Union identity discourse, which emphasises diversity as an important part of European identity. Hence, it is the very essence of what it means to be European. Diversity is that which makes Europe unique and that it is necessary to recognise this diversity and to appeal to common values that are compatible with this diversity.\textsuperscript{39} Jones adheres to this view by arguing that instead of emphasising the existence or not of friction between unity and diversity, European Union policy makers have chosen to regard diversity as a positive force in the integration process. This change, Jones claims, can be linked to the Maastricht Treaty and the completion of the single market that followed.\textsuperscript{40}

After this theoretical introduction to the ideas of ‘unity’ and ‘diversity’ I want to turn to look at how these ideas have co-existed since the early 1970s, where I start my analysis, up until the present day. Let us begin by looking at the idea of ‘unity’ since it was ‘unity’ rather than ‘diversity’ which was emphasised in the beginning. As was shown with the quote by Jean Monnet in the introduction of this chapter, culture, like education, was no preoccupation of the Founding Fathers; it was only mentioned in passing in the preamble of the Treaty of Rome, where it was suggested that culture is important in the uniting of people as well as encouraging social and economic development.\textsuperscript{41} However, this would all change in the beginning of the 1970s. In “the Declaration on European identity”, issued in 1973, appeals are made to a ‘common European civilization’ based on a ‘common heritage’, ‘converging’ attitudes and ways of life and an emphasis on human rights and democratic rule.\textsuperscript{42} Further it states that the nine Member States, which made up the European Union at the time, shared the same views on the individual, democracy and rule of law. It also claimed that the process of defining the European identity involves reviewing the common heritage, interests and special obligations of the Member States. European unity is seen as a necessity to insure the survival of the civilization, which they have in common. The ultimate goal is to achieve social justice through economic progress and the respect of human rights.\textsuperscript{43} In addition, it is argued that:


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“The diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the construction of a United Europe, all give the European Identity its originality and its own dynamism”.44

A year later, in 1974, the European Parliament issued a resolution, which discussed the need for initiatives to be taken at the European level in the cultural sphere generally and the protection of cultural heritage more specifically.45 In relation to a common European identity, the Tindemans Report, adopted in 1976, and which can be seen as something of a starting point in cooperation in the area of education at the European level, argues that the Member States had recognised the existence of a common destiny.46 In other words, through these two documents the European Union decision-makers attempted to create a sense of continuity, i.e. both a sense of a shared past and future. Looking more closely at how the role of education was defined in relation to a common European cultural identity in the Tindemans Report. It was contended that education, together with the symbol of a uniform European passport and a passport union, and collaboration in the area of media, could act as an external sign of solidarity. For this to work the European Union would have to:

“…encourage greater integration in educational matters by promoting student exchanges. The aim is to give Europeans of tomorrow a personal and concrete impression of the European reality and a detailed knowledge of our languages and cultures since these constitute the common heritage which the European Union aims specifically to protect”.47

Here we see how culture and language are discussed separately. However, I argue that language is part of culture, and perhaps even the most powerful cultural markers of them all. Further in the Tindemans Report we can find an example of what Delanty and Rumford referred to as ‘unity as derivative of diversity’:

“The aim of European Union should be to overcome the age-old conflicts which are often artificially maintained between nation States, to build a more humane society in which,
along with mutual respect for our national and cultural characteristics, the accent will be placed more on factors uniting us than on those dividing us”.

Looking closer at the argument that there is a need to increase awareness of both what unites and separates Europeans, a Commission report issued in 1977, discussing the establishment of a European Foundation dealing with cultural issues, highlighted the need for:

“…clear guidelines for encouraging a greater knowledge of the cultural and artistic heritage of our countries … One possible scheme could be to organize joint exhibitions and events in museums and cultural centres within the Community, so that the citizens of Europe can distinguish their common links from among the wealth of their cultural diversity. Links which despite the adversities and enmities of their history make them joint inheritors. All rhetoric aside, the Community is more than a geo-political entity, neither is it for mere geo-political reasons that we are attempting to make the citizens of our countries into responsible Europeans with a sense of their common”

In other words, Europe is not simply a geographical area which is often the common way to describe Europe, but also a cultural community which is unified through a common culture which, as I have argue earlier, is a European myth similar to that of the homogeneous nation-state discussed in chapter three. The proposed European Foundation mentioned above, which would be independent of the other European Union institutions, was hoped to help “develop the European citizen’s sense of belonging to one and the same community with a common heritage from the past and a common destiny for the present and the future.” Again, by appealing to a perceived common past, present and future it becomes clear that a sense of continuity is important to the identity making process both at the national and European level. In the same report it is further argued that “[o]nly by increasing cultural contacts can we help European citizens to recognize those ‘common heritages’ which are made so much of in attempts to define European civilization.” This cultural contact can take place through mobility via Erasmus, the European Union higher education mobility programme, discussed in

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50 Tourism, as a form of mobility, is also emphasised in relation to culture. It is argued that one of the roles of the proposed European Foundation was to “give tourism a more cultural aspect, with a Community orientation, aided by public and professional bodies in the different countries, so that the people of Europe learn to see the countries they visit, to know more about their past, as well as their present”.” CEC, “Commission Report on the Establishment of a European Foundation”, COM (77) 600, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 5/77, 17 November 1977, pp. 1-24, p. 14.
chapter four, but also through cultural exchanges not connected to education. The idea of mobility will be discussed further in relation to civic European identity in chapter six. As has been argued earlier, there are certain things that are seen to unite Europeans and others that show their diversity. As was argued earlier, one of the ideas that can be related to the ‘unity’ in ‘Unity in Diversity’ is that of common European values, i.e. of Europe as a community of shared values. However, it is only a thin version of a common identity. The report on the establishment of a European Foundation also discussed the issue of political symbols to reinforce or create sense of common identity:

“… the Community remains invisible to most of its citizens. Unlike nation states it neither offers direct services to, nor makes direct demands on, the great majority of them. Nor does it have even a symbolic presence in their midst: no flag, no currency, not even (as yet) a common passport. It is hardly surprising that, in spite of the efforts made by the institutions themselves to provide information about their activities, the Community for many remains a remote and bureaucratic structure”.

Here we see how the European Union is described as unloved and ignored by the citizens of the Member States. One of the reasons for this is that there exists no social contract consisting of the exchange of rights and responsibilities. Neither does the European Union have any of the banal but powerful symbols of the nation-state. On the importance of the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’ and what form of diversity is being emphasised, in 1977 the Commission argued that:

“It has become almost a commonplace to say that part of Europe’s great wealth is, and should remain, the diversity of its cultures. Each people within the Community has a past, rich in history, as well as a lively cultural scene today”.

The diversity referred to concerns historical heritage and culture. However, diversity is also seen as problematic, as the Commission argues for the need to improve foreign language skills:

“Their very diversity can indeed be one of the main obstacles, hence the need which we have emphasized for people to improve their command of languages and thereby learn more of each other’s countries”.

Once again the importance of language is being stressed. Education may be seen as a way to alleviate the problems caused by diversity, yet the fact that language proficiency is still a problem in the European Union demonstrates that diversity is not without its problems. However, it seems highly unlikely that there will be a common European language in the future, similar to standardised national versions. The reason for this, I argue, is two-fold. First, because language is such a strong symbol for the alleged homogeneity of the nation. Second, it would undermine, if not irreparably damage, the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’.

However, there have been other symbols discussed in the official European Union discourse. During the 1970s the European Union highlighted the fact that it lacked powerful symbols. Early 1980s this began to change as the European Parliament, in 1983, took the initiative for a common flag by adopting the one that the Council of Europe had been using since 1955. A year later, in 1984, the European Council, at its meeting in Fontainebleau, stressed the importance of promoting the European image and identity in the eyes of its citizens and the world. In addition it is argued that an ad hoc committee should be set up to produce a report discussing, among other things, “symbols of the Community’s existence, such as a flag and an anthem”, a flag which has now, according to the Council of Europe, “become the symbol par excellence of united Europe and European identity”. In 1985 a report entitled A People’s Europe was produced by an ad hoc committee, best known as the Adonnino Committee after its president. This document can be seen as something of a water-shed in the history of both the construction of European identity specifically but also the European integration process generally. It suggested that a set of symbols, similar to those in the nation-state, were needed to make people feel more emotionally attached to the European integration process. It imagined:

(i) symbols of the Community’s existence, such as a flag and an anthem;
(ii) formation of European sports teams;
(iii) streamlining procedures at frontier posts;
(iv) minting of a European coinage, namely the ECU”.

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This is an early mention of a common currency, which is often argued to have an extremely powerful symbolic value since it is something we literally come in contact with on a daily basis. At a later date the Committee returned to the issue of a common currency arguing that “minting could only be of value to collectors”. In other words, at that time the European Union, or at least the Adonnino Committee, did not believe that a common currency would play any significant role in creating ‘A People’s Europe’ and bringing the citizens of the European Union closer together. In hindsight this position seems somewhat odd considering the fact that the European Union appeared to have accepted other forms of symbolism borrowed from the nation-state without any hesitation. As it is today, the common currency, the Euro, is perhaps the most powerful symbol available in the European Union arsenal, at least in those Member States which have abandoned their national currencies in favour of the Euro. As suggested by Risse the simple fact that many Europeans hold this symbol in their hands daily makes it so potent.58 Looking more closely at the arguments for the invention of a flag for the European Community, in the report ‘A People’s Europe’, it is argued that:

“There is clearly a need, for both practical and symbolic reasons, for a flag and an emblem to be used at national and international events, exhibitions and other occasions where the existence of the Community needs to be brought to public attention…The European Council should express the hope that the emblem and flag will be used at appropriate places and on suitable occasions, without of course affecting the use of national flags, and ask the institutions to agree to regulate the use of flag and emblem”.59

The common symbols of the flag and the emblem became a reality in early 1986. Furthermore, the Adonnino Report’s suggestion of using “Ode of Joy” as the Union anthem was agreed upon in 1985.60 As with European identity generally the anthem is not supposed to replace the national versions but “celebrate the values they all share and their unity in diversity, it expresses the ideals of a united Europe: freedom, peace and solidarity”.61 It has been argued

60 When choosing an anthem for the EC the choice fell on ‘Ode to Joy’ by Beethoven, which was already being used by the Council of Europe and seen as “representative of the European idea”, see Adonnino, P., “A People’s Europe- Reports from the ad hoc Committee”, Bulletin of the European Communities, 1985, Supplement 7/85, pp. 1-32, p.29, and CEC, “A People’s Europe- communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, COM (88) 331/final, pp. 1-37, pp. 5-6, Brussels 7 July 1988.
61 Council of Europe, “Flag, anthem and logo: the Council of Europe’s symbols”, (http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/About_Coe/emblems/emblemes.asp , accessed 2006-10-30). Both the hymn and the flag are also symbols used by the Council of Europe. According to the report issued by Adonnino Committee there are four areas of culture, which are of specific interest. These are the areas of television, an Academy of Science, Technology and Art, a Euro-lottery and access to museums and cultural events. These areas of culture are connected to both education and media. In relation to the idea of an Academy of Science, Technology and Art, the Committee argues that: “Europe needs an institution with international influence to highlight the achievements of European science and the originality of European civilization in all its wealth and diversity” Also, linked to the argument of the importance of symbols. The Committee suggested that the Community should produce stamps highlighted “the Community or its underlying values, or which commemorate particularly important events in Community history.” See Adonnino, P., “A People’s Europe – Reports from the ad hoc Committee”, Bulletin of the European Communities, 1985, Supplement 7/85, pp. 1-32, pp. 21-22.
that the political symbolism that was used to encourage European citizens to identify with and support the European integration project during the 1970s and 1980s, as was shown in the previous section, was replaced by the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’. However, ‘Unity in Diversity’ is not only a mobilising myth it can also be seen as a governmentality technology aimed at constructing an image of a specific kind of European, i.e. a tolerant and open-minded individual. In this sense the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’ links the cultural and civic versions of European identity since the whole argument is founded on the democratic values that are argued to be part of Europe’s cultural heritage.

Leaving the issue of political symbolism for now to look closer at the idea of ‘unity’ in the form of a common European culture, in the report on ‘A People’s Europe’, mentioned above in relation to the promotion of symbols at the European level, it was argued that:

“European culture is one of the strongest links between the States and peoples of Europe. It is part of the European identity. The promotion of the European cultural identity should be a comprehensive expression of the cultural variety and each nation’s individual values which form an integral part of it”.62

Here we see how it is acknowledged that a common European identity might not only be cultural in character but that it is an essential part of it. Further, in this document diversity is also stressed as an important part of a common European identity. Further, it is argued that the promotion of a common cultural identity, and in extension the creation of ‘A People’s Europe’ is important if the European integration process is to succeed:

“It is also through action in the areas of culture and communication, which are essential to European identity and the Community’s image in the minds of its people, that support for the advancement of Europe can and must be sought. The European cultural heritage is not however confined to the territories of the Member States of the Community, nor, for that matter, to the frontiers of the States of the Council of Europe. We must therefore avoid any exclusivity in this area and seek cooperation with other European countries”.63

Here we see appeals being made to a common heritage rather than civilization. As was shown earlier cultural heritage is what to a large extent defines a civilization. I would also like to point to the fact that the use of the word ‘we’ can be seen as a way of making the reader feel a

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sense of personal involvement, solidarity and equality. However, by involving some people through the use of a ‘we’ we also exclude others. This argument can be linked to the discussion earlier, in chapter three, on the process of ‘Othering’. Looking further at the arguments put forward in the Adonnino Report, reflecting on itself and its role it argues that:

“… the proposals, limited as they are by the nature of the report, deal with important aspects of special rights of citizens, of education, culture and communication, exchanges, and the image and identity of the Community; they are meaningful to the citizen in various aspects of his daily life and are a substantial contribution to the realization of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. The Committee has kept in mind that most of what has been achieved until now in Europe has been work of those who experienced the horrors and destruction of war. Continuation of this venture rests on the assumption that future generations will also understand and appreciate one another across borders and will realize the benefits to be derived from closer cooperation and solidarity”.

Despite all the work the European Union did in the area of European identity during the 1980s, in the late 1980s the European Union was still emphasising the need to raise ‘Europeans’ awareness of their common identity and to fulfil the goals expressed by the Adonnino Committee and the Fontainebleau European Council. In a communication from the Commission, issued in 1988, it is stated that:

“European identity is the result of centuries of shared history and common cultural and fundamental values. But awareness of it can be strengthened by symbolic action, consciousness-raising campaigns and the growing convergence of European ambitions”.

The Commission is arguing that a European identity, based on both ethno-cultural and civic ideals, already exists and that it has done so for centuries but that the European citizens have to be made aware of all that they share in cultural terms.

Even though the European Union, as we have seen in this chapter so far, has discussed the issue of culture since the early 1970s it was not until the Maastricht Treaty that cultural policy gained its own legal framework. Culture finds its legal basis in four articles there, i.e. 3, 30, 87

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At that time it was the importance of preserving the diverse national cultures that was being emphasised and only built heritage was being referred to. According to Article 151:

“…the Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States while respecting their national and regional diversity, and shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of the Treaty. Among the cultural aspects, matters pertaining to languages are of great importance.”

In other words, the diversity of culture in the European Union is emphasised. Also in Article 151, it is stressed that the Community should supplement the actions taken by the Member States in order to conserve and safeguard cultural heritage of European significance. In the wake of the Maastricht Treaty, during the 1990s, the European Union introduced a variety of programmes in the area of culture, which might be referred to as ‘first generation’ cultural programmes, which give us an idea of the narrow definition of culture within the European Union. First there was the Kaléidoscope programme, running between 1996 and 1999, which was meant to promote artistic and cultural creation and cooperation with a ‘European dimension’ and “to promote awareness and dissemination of the culture of the peoples of Europe”. In addition, there was the Ariane programme, running from 1997 to 1999, which was aimed towards the field of books and reading. More precisely, it was hoped “to promote a wider knowledge of literary works and history of the European peoples by means of translation”. Finally there was the Raphaël programme, running from 1997 to 1999, the aim of which was to complement Member States' policies in the area of cultural heritage of European significance and dimension. As a result of these pioneering programmes came an increased awareness of the importance of culture at the European level as can be seen in the introduction of the programme ‘Culture 2000’, which ran from 2000 to 2006, and which was one of the flagship programmes of the European Union and which can be seen as an example of the European Union’s increased interest in culture. The purpose of this programme was to help in the creation of a European cultural area. Among other things it was hoped to play a part in the developments in the area of art and literature. A further aim was to “promote knowledge of European history and culture within the EU and beyond”. It was also hoped that the

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programme would support the development of “heritage sites and cultural collections of European importance”. Finally, it was hoped to stimulate intercultural dialogue and social integration. The ‘Culture 2000’ programme was followed by the ‘Culture 2007’ programme running from 2007 until 2013.

Returning to the idea of unity through claims of a common past, present and future to create a sense of continuity which plays an essential role in the identity-making process both at national and European level; the idea of a common future or destiny can for example be found in a working paper issued in 1999 by the Forward Studies Unit that argues that European integration is anything but a natural phenomenon. Rather it is something “willed by the nations of Europe”. The paper goes on to claim that “Europeans have woken up to their shared destiny, in order to shape it”. In this paper we can also see proof of the view that diversity is the very essence of what it means to be European and that the role of the European Union is to make sure that this plurality is maintained that:

“…even if the construction of the Community seems to be a harmonisation process, this harmonisation is just a necessary step towards the realisation of a European market-place which should allow underlying diversity to flourish. Diversity is truly Europe’s richness”.

Turning once again to the idea of ‘unity’, in the Laeken Declaration, from 2001, appeals are made to a ‘thinner’ version of a common European cultural identity in the form of common values, emphasising the need to be accepting of diversity, while also making reference to ‘our’ shared past:

“Europe as the continent of humane values, the Magna Carta, the bill of Rights, the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, solidarity and above all diversity, meaning respect for others’ languages, cultures and traditions. The European Union’s one boundary is democracy and human rights. The union is open only to countries which uphold basic values such as free elections, respect for minorities and respect for the rule of law… At long last, Europe is on its way to becoming one big family, without bloodshed, a real transformation… a continent of humane values…of liberty, solidarity and above all diversity, meaning respect for others’ languages, cultures and traditions”.

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It seems that to describe Europe as a Community, or as in the quote above, continent of common values acts as an exclusionary device by the fact that it is also linked to the idea of Europe as a geographical area discussed earlier. Furthermore, in the proposed Constitution it was argued that the European Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity and it was suggested that the Union shall encourage social cohesion and solidarity while at the same time respecting the diversity of culture and language that exists between and within the Member States of the European Union.  

Further, according to the Laeken Declaration it is also seen as important to protect and promote Europe’s cultural heritage. When looking at the common European cultural heritage one of the aims has been to increase public access to it and this has been achieved with the help of the European Union education programmes and the joint information programmes with the Council of Europe. For example, in cooperation with the Council of Europe the Commission has helped organise a European Heritage Day once a year for the last fifteen years. The aim of this day, according to its own webpage is to give “an opportunity to celebrate the unity and diversity of a shared cultural heritage which is Europe’s most distinctive feature.” A Member of the European Parliament posed a question to the Commission about the protection of a ‘European cultural heritage’ and the possibility of the European Union creating a concept by that name. In 2001 Mrs Reding, then Commissioner of Culture and Education, answered on the behalf of the Commission. She made reference to a report produced by the European Parliament, on how Member States have applied the Convention for the Protection of the World Heritage. In this report the European Parliament expresses a hope that the Member States can be encouraged to work together with the Council of Europe to create a classification system for European heritage based on common definitions and identification criteria. In Reding’s opinion:

“This would help to identify the cultural, linguistic and natural heritage, the importance of which goes beyond national level, and to give this heritage and identifiable European label

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in order to underline the diversity and wealth of European heritage and to emphasise the fact that it is shared”.84

Looking closer at what is included in this idea of a common cultural heritage, the European Union makes a distinction between movable and immovable heritage, including museums, collections, libraries and archives. In addition there is archaeological and architectural heritage, as well as linguistic and gastronomic heritage. Also emphasised are traditional occupations.85 A slightly wider definition of what kind of diversity that the European Union is celebrating can be found in a communication from the Commission dated 2003:

“The peoples of Europe are building a single Union out of many diverse nations, communities, cultures and language groups; it is a Union built around the equal interchange of ideas and traditions and founded upon the mutual acceptance of peoples with different histories but a common future”.86

Here we see how ‘ideas and traditions’ are being emphasised, an approach which belongs more to a sociological than anthropological definition of culture. Also in 2003, then Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi also makes claims about a common European cultural past:

“Europe’s true identity is not delineated by changing geographical borders. Nor is it determined by a political history that all too often been scarred by intestine wars and tragedy. Europe’s true identity is shaped by its culture…Being European means something: it means sharing a common culture, a common heritage of values and civilisation”.87

Here we see a great example of the ‘pick and mix’ attitude when creating the myth of a common past trying to fit in as much as possible. A positive view of the past is often applied, not completely ignoring the less positive aspects of the past but downplaying them, as if policy-makers are suffering from common amnesia. Despite the bloody past, Europe is seen to have a common past and a common culture as well as containing a multitude of nation-states with their own cultures. Ones again we see a how the idea of a cultural version of European identity is linked to common values, and thereby a weaker form of cultural identity. The work

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to promote the perceived European common values reached a high with the signing of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, issued in 2004, where it was suggested that:

“The Peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values…Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice".88

Arguing that the European civic values are part of the common European heritage the European Union policy-makers once again make the cultural and civic versions of European identity seem inseparable. However, it is also argued that each Member State has its own individual history. Barroso has suggested that European cultural identity is made up of “its multiplicity of histories and of languages, of its diverse literary, artistic and popular traditions.”89 This argument can be linked to the earlier discussion on ‘Unity in Diversity’. Ján Figel, Commissioner in charge of Education, Training, Culture and Multilingualism points to the importance of conserving the European heritage by suggesting that: “[i]nvesting for the future of our past, i.e. preserving the European Union’s heritage for a better understanding for future generations, is one of the goals of the Commission’s action in the cultural area”.90 Returning to the proposed Constitution also describes Europe as a community of common humanistic and democratic values:

“DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law…BELIEVING that Europe, reunited after bitter experiences, intends to continue along the path of civilisation, progress and prosperity, from the good of all its inhabitants, including the weakest and most deprived; that it wishes to remain a continent open to culture, learning

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and social progress; and that it wishes to deepen the democratic and transparent nature of its public life, and to strive for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world".  

There is not always a denial of the violent and bloody past that European’s share as can for example be seen in the quote above where it is argued that Europe is “reunited after bitter experiences”.  

In the proposed Constitution we also see that the common heritage is perceived in a wider sense than is often otherwise the case, including religion and humanist values. Even though not stated I take religion to mean Christianity, which works as a clear, and in my mind a euro-centric and western form of identity construction. This definition of whom the European is works not only to exclude those living outside Europe, however defined, but also disqualifies millions of people living within the European Union Member States. The statement above also gives a sense of continuity which, as argued before, plays such an important role in the identity making process, by suggesting that Europe will continue on its already trodden path of civilization, progress and prosperity. In addition, this once again implies that Europe is superior to its others. According to Olsen, the inclusion of the ideas of European culture, history and civilization in the proposed Constitution, can be seen as an overt effort to re-define the balance between unity and diversity in the European Union.  

It has also been suggested that a European Constitution could serve as a symbol for the European integration process and European identity. As Barroso argued in relation to the proposed Constitution:

“A sense of belonging to Europe is essential to forge that “common destiny”…Forging this destiny will be a process based both on the autonomy and on the bringing together of European citizens and civil societies".

In addition, Barroso maintained that this common European destiny will not happen by chance but needs the commitment of the Member States and its citizens to make the European integration process a success. By stressing the need for a common destiny Barroso is pointing out the importance of having a future in common when constructing identity. In the Preable of the Constitution it is stated that:

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“While remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their former divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny.” 95

Looking towards the future, claims have continuously been made that the European integration process needs a cultural dimension. As was shown in the introduction to this chapter, in his opening address at the Berlin Conference in 2004 the Commission President Barroso suggested that “[t]he EU has reached a stage of its history where its cultural dimension can no longer be ignored.” 96 Further he argued that “[w]e need common ground, and common reflection about what the EU can be, and what it will be, cannot succeed without a proper look at Europe’s cultural dimension”. 97 Further, although not speaking for the European Union as a whole, Silvio Berlusconi, President of the Council, at the opening of the Intergovernmental Conference on the 4th October 2004, stated that: “[t]he future of Europe springs from its centuries old civilisation. In a globalised world, Europe must rediscover its ancient leadership role, revitalising the roots of its civilisation.” 98 This provides us with an idea of the opinion among leaders in the European Union, and it seems as if Berlusconi is arguing that it is in Europe’s destiny to play an important role in world politics. In 2006 it was decided that 2008 would be dubbed the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. 99 In addition, as mentioned before, as a result of the positive achievements of Culture 2000, the European Union Member States have decided to continue their cooperation in the cultural sphere and have established the Culture 2007 programme to run from 2007 to 2013. 100 Also in 2005, in a speech given by Jan Peter Balkenende, Prime Minister of the Netherlands refers to a less glorious past when looking at the relationship between European common values, such as for example democracy, and diversity. In his opinion:

“Europe is a continent of many peoples, historical events, cultures and religions. But what we have in common is the belief that some values are fundamental and universal. Peaceful
diversity prospers only when it is firmly anchored in respect for human dignity, democracy and the law. That is the lesson one brutal chapter of our history has taught us”.

In other words, the proper functioning of the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’ rests on the acceptance of democratic values. However as we saw earlier in this chapter there has been an increase in nationalistic sympathies in many of the Member States of the European Union, which undermines the idea of Europe as a democratic community. In other words, ‘we’ are only practicing and adhering to democratic values if ‘you’ are also considered as part of our shared imagined community. The brutal chapter referred to above is that of the two world wars of the 20th century.

As argued before cultural diversity is increasingly being seen as what makes ‘us’ European. In other words, it is seen as a shared treasure consisting of language, literature, performing arts, visual arts, architecture, crafts, the cinema and broadcasting, etc. While belonging to a specific country or region, they also represent part of Europe’s common cultural heritage. The aim of the European Union, as it is expressed today, is double: to preserve and support this diversity and to help make it accessible to others. In 2005 Berlusconi, then prime minister of Italy expressed this positive view on diversity, as something, which is enriching:

“Europe has room for every belief, religion and culture. Attempts to put a fence around European identity would weaken Europe. Such a defensive attitude would not make it stronger, on the contrary, Europe’s strength has always been the free exchange of ideas”.

In 2006, José Manuel Barroso, President of the Commission, emphasised the importance of culture both for the workings of the European integration process and the creation of European identity, by stating that “[c]ulture should play a strategic role in Europe’s agenda. It is a crucial factor in the success of European integration and is, at the same time, inextricably linked to our sense of identity”. Ján Figel is of the same opinion, arguing that since there is a lack of love for the European integration process, what is needed are substantial policies that will help

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cultivate cultural and civic integration making them seem almost inseparable. In other words, no one will fall in love with the market, as was suggested earlier in this chapter. In 2007 the Commission was preparing a communication on culture since it is argued that people are increasingly experiencing feelings of insecurity brought on by rapid economic and technological change and the forces of globalisation. People also feel a loss of identity and little connection to the European Union. Hence, what is needed is a ‘Soul for Europe’. With this idea of ‘a Soul for Europe’ the European Union is very clear about the fact that it sees it as important to continue working towards ‘an ever closer union’ in the European Union discourse on European identity. By speaking of ‘belonging’ the European Union shows that it is not happy with simply an objective definition of identity. Rather, it is aware that there is also a need for a subjective definition if Europe is to become an imagined community similar to that of the nation. When visiting and speaking at Georgetown University, Washington DC, in 2006, Ján Figel, the Commissioner in charge of Education, Training, Culture and Multilingualism stated that:

“We regard our wealth of cultures, languages and traditions as a precious gift from the past to be cherished and preserved. We regard the Union’s increasing diversity as an asset, not as a threat or a problem.”

I finish off this discussion on unity and diversity by returning to the idea of political symbolism. There seem to be a hesitation today among Member States concerning the promotion of a common European cultural identity, which could for example be seen in the spring of 2007, during Germany’s presidency, when it was suggested that the mention of such European Union symbols as the flag and the anthem, usually associated with the nation-state, should be struck from the proposed new version of the European Constitution. In the Lisbon Treaty which was agreed upon in October the same year, instead of the earlier proposed Constitution, the references to common symbols had been removed. This I argue can be seen as further evidence that ‘unity’ has become politically sensitive to emphasise, at least in its ‘thick’ version. However, symbols of ‘unity in diversity’ are seen as more acceptable. In March 2007,

on Commission’s official webpage, Platini, former player for the French national team was quoted saying:

“Football brings people together…In a continent so proud of its cultural diversity, football offers a common language. It helps bridge gaps between different communities. At its best, football conveys some of Europe's basic values: the rule of law, respect for others, freedom of expression, teamwork and solidarity”.108

In other words, football is seen as part of the idea of a Europe united by diversity, as well as an expression of the common values that make up part of the European cultural heritage.

2. Unity, Diversity and Higher Education

A European Dimension in Higher Education

As has been argued above, increasingly what is being emphasised in the European Union discourse is that diversity is what makes ‘us’ European. It is a very versatile concept which can and is used to include many different forms of diversity with culture, and especially language, being the dominant form. For example, Europe consists of 32 different nations that speak 67 languages, not including different dialects. I argue that education can also be seen as part of this idea of “Unity in Diversity”, and the idea of a common European culture, both concerning structure and content. Or as Volker argues, looking at it from the other direction, diversity is part of the European education tradition.109 In the words of the Commission:

“A key feature of Europe, which is often mentioned, is its diversity. This is particularly true in the area of education, where systems and practices vary enormously from one country to another. This diversity is a source of enrichment for everyone and offers fertile ground for innovation and the quest for quality. Together we can be stronger and more creative”.110

The European Union is not trying to create a homogenous European education system, in the sense that they are identical, through its education policies. However, as was argued in chapter three in relation to the Bologna Process, what European Union decision-makers are trying to create is a European Higher Education Area where the lengths of degrees are being streamlined while the content of education is still left in the hands of the Member State

governments and higher education institutions. In other words, unity relates to structure while diversity is associated with content.

Difference is accepted and even encouraged and the European Union seems to be attempting to create a European identity by building up a network of different education programmes, as seen in chapter two. We seem to be witnessing a struggle between the idea of becoming more alike in different areas but still being different and original. Delanty and Rumford argue that the perception of a common European identity has gone out of fashion. In its place a more liberal view of ‘Unity in Diversity’ that emphasises ‘a thin order of European values’ such as democracy, freedom, etc. developed. However, this view also declined since it became obvious that the European Union, with its growing legal competencies, could no longer be seen in liberal terms. Globalization has meant an increased emphasis on diversity and a world order of multiple centres and there have also been increased calls for cultural relativism. There were also problems within the European Union, where decision-makers had to try to accommodate both the ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’ of the Union.\footnote{Delanty, G. & Rumford, C., “Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the implications of Europeanization”, (Routledge: London, 2005), p. 59.}

The term ‘dimension’ is often used in European Union discourse; it is for example often argued that there is a need for a ‘European dimension’ in education.\footnote{For a discussion on European dimension see European Council, “Solemn Declaration on European Union”, European Council Stuttgart, 19 June 1983, 
_Bulletin of the European Communities_, Supplement 7/85 pp. 1-32. The idea ‘European dimension’ is not specific to the European Union but is also present in the discourse of the Council of Europe. See Council of Europe, “Resolution on the European dimension of education: teaming and curriculum content” (N1), (http://www.coe.int/t/e/cultural_cooperation/education/standing_conferences/117thession/enma1991.asp?P11_353, accessed 2007-05-0).} In this section I look closer at what is meant by the concept and what it is hoped to achieve, in other words why it is seen as necessary. Worth mentioning is that the idea of the ‘European dimension’ is related mainly to primary and secondary education but also to the tertiary level. European dimension has been left largely undefined and open to interpretation by the different European Union Member States. For example, it can mean simply a knowledge of Europe, i.e. its geography, history, culture, etc. When the European Union discusses ‘European dimension’ there is often an emphasis on curriculum. In addition there is talk of the need to reinforce the European dimension in teaching material in the Member States. Similar arguments are put forward by academics, such as Caie, who argues that ‘European dimension’ can be viewed as “the increase of the European content in existing courses and the awarding of joint degrees between
During the 1980s and early 1990s there was an emphasis on the need to consider the ‘European dimension’ in education. Among the documents that stressed the idea are ‘the Solemn Declaration on European Union’ issued in 1983, the conclusions of the European Council in Fontainebleau, in 1984, and ‘the report on ‘A ‘People’s Europe’’ adopted by the European Council in Milan 1985. On the issue of why this idea has been promoted, in a resolution issued in 1988, the Council argued that it was:

“Considering enhanced treatment of the European dimension in education to be an element contributing to the development of the Community and achievement of the objective of creating a unified internal market by 1992”.¹¹⁴

At the same time as the University (and schools) can be seen as part of this common European heritage; as noted in chapter four, the University is an old institution created some eight hundred years ago. At the same time the importance of preserving the diversity of the different systems is emphasised and in 1989 the Commission issued a communication to the Council where it argued that:

“It is vital to preserve and respect the rich diversity of educational traditions in the Community, and to draw the best from this common heritage in promoting higher standards for the future. Blanket harmonisation or standardization of the educational systems is entirely undesirable; it is not the Commission’s objective in this field. The efforts of all Member States and the Commission should be designed to improve the overall quality of educational provision by bringing the different systems into a long-term process of contact,”


Looking at the relationship between education and history Banús suggests that education is still national in orientation and in the area of history there is a national perspective prevailing both in content and approach in the literature used. In a report published in 1977 the Commission argued that at the higher education level at least, teaching about the European Union was fairly good. Further, it suggested that:

“The cultural education of Europe’s citizens must not be forgotten. For instance, the history of the Community countries is still inadequately covered and is often presented from a national point of view. We do not propose a uniform popularized history of Europe for all the children in the Community, but rather an increase in their knowledge of other countries of the Community through studies and publications in history, geography and the history of arts, encouragement being given where possible to translations in the various Community languages”.

However, the content of history education, and education generally for that matter, has been largely left to the Member States to decide but this is perhaps about to end. In early March 2007 during the German presidency of the Council it was proclaimed that education unites and suggestion were put forward concerning a possible common European history book.

Why is it then important to promote the idea of Europe through education? In the academic literature it has been argued that promoting a ‘European dimension’ in education and training has become important for the Member States in their attempts to fend off internationalism.

The concept of a ‘European dimension’ was mentioned already in 1974 in the Commission’s first communication to the Council, titled “Education in the European Community”.

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According to this document to create a ‘European dimension’ in education would mean the learning of foreign languages, as well as the study of other European countries and peoples, and getting a grasp of what the European integration process entails. After its introduction the idea of a ‘European dimension’ in education was further dealt with in “the Solemn declaration on European union” from 1983, the conclusions of the European Council in Fontainebleau in 1984, and the Adonnino Report from 1985. Also issued in 1985 was the Dooge Report which argued that:

“The contemplated European Union will not rest on an economic community alone. The logic of integration has already led Member States to cooperate in fields other than economic ones and will continue to lead them still further along that path. The accentuation of this essential process will give a European dimension to all aspects of collective life in our countries….To that end a number of measures must be undertaken, whenever possible in close operation with European countries which are not members of the Community and with the Council of Europe, which makes a valuable contribution especially with regard to the promotion of human rights and the common cultural identity”.

Also in 1985, the Council and the Ministers published a resolution where they reaffirmed their determination to strengthen the ‘European dimension’ in education. When describing the general role of education, in creating a European identity, the Committee speaks of the importance of “the European image in education” and that the European Council should work towards giving “new impetus to a European dimension in education”. Further the Committee argues that “[t]he past achievements and the future potential of Europe are an integral part of education in the Member States and in many other countries”. As can be seen in the quote above, by talking about past achievements and future potential, the European Council is linking education to history, and to European history. This idea of a shared past, present and future plays an important role in identity construction. Talk of a common future, I argue, provides a sense of destiny, discussed earlier in this chapter. In 1988 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament issued a resolution on the ‘European dimension’ in education where it was argued that the presence of such a dimension in education was “an element contributing to the development of the Community and achievement of the objective of creating a unified internal market by 1992”. In addition, it was argued that a ‘European

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dimension’ in education would help to “strengthen in young people a sense of European identity and make clear to them the value of European civilization”. There are of course those that are critical of the ideas of a ‘European dimension’ a common European identity since they are fairly loose and ‘fuzzy’ ideas and therefore difficult to define. In Neave’s opinion the idea of a ‘European dimension’ is a ‘mobilizing myth’, one among many, which has been used by European policy-makers to attempt to construct a European identity.

Important here is the fact that ‘European dimension’ is left undefined and open to a wide range of interpretations by policy-makers in the Member States. It can mean anything from ‘European’ issues, such as a common history, being taught to taking part in mobility schemes. In 1988 a resolution was issued which stressed the important role that a ‘European dimension’ can play in the development of the Community and in achieving the objective of creating a unified internal market by 1992, i.e. the time leading up to the creation of the Maastricht Treaty. It was argued that the image of Europe in education, as mentioned in ‘the report on ‘A People’s Europe’’, could be reinforced by organizing specific events at national and European level. In addition, the importance of learning other Member State languages and the role this knowledge could play in the creation of a ‘European dimension’ in education, were emphasised. It mainly talks about education in terms of educating young people. The Green Paper on the European dimension in education’, issued five years later in 1993, also speaks mainly of educating the young. Further, the Green Paper looks at possible future directions of action at Community level in the area of education. It can be seen as a response to the Maastricht Treaty where education for the first time was given a prominent role and the Community was given new competences. The Paper argues that to make it possible to introduce a ‘European dimension’ into teaching teachers have “to learn about the different aspects of Europe today and its construction for tomorrow”. In other words, to teach and learn about other European cultures are seen as essential to build a ‘European dimension’ in education. It is also seen as important that language training should be improved. It is therefore important that teachers during their studies are introduced to this idea. It is argued that the development of a ‘European dimension’ of education is an important factor when it comes to
adjust education to the new economic, social and cultural environment that followed after the
creation of the Single Market.

“In the new context afforded by the Single Market, education has as one of its aims the
preparation of young people to exercise their responsibilities in a wider social and economic
area. It is in this perspective that the development of a European dimension of education
must be seen as an important factor in the adjustment of the educational process to the new
economic, social and cultural environment”.131

The purpose of the Green Paper, as is stated in its conclusions, is not to put forward a proposal
but rather to highlight those actions already undertaken by the Member States, which can be
developed and encouraged even further. Once again linking education to economics, the Green
Paper argued that if the Single European Act, introduced in 1986, was going to be successful
there was a need for a ‘European dimension’ in education. This perceived need led the Council
of Ministers of Education to adopt a resolution on the ‘European dimension’ in education in
1988. In this resolution it was argued that one of the objectives of a ‘European dimension’ of
education was to:

“… strengthen in young people a sense of European identity and make clear to them the
value of European civilisation and of the foundations on which the European peoples intend
to base their development today, that is in particular the safeguarding of the principles of
democracy, social justice and respect for human rights”.132

In addition, in the Green Paper it is argued that for the first time there was a legal framework
in place to allow the Community an active role, especially in the area of school-level
education.133 It should be noted however that education is and has been taken into account in
other policy areas, such as research and development, health and the environment. The Green
Paper also stresses the importance that structural policies have played in the least affluent
areas of the Community.134 Vivien Reding answers that the promotion of the ‘European
dimension’ within the schools is within the competence, and the full responsibility, of the
Member States as written into the Maastricht Treaty Article 149 (ex- Article 126):

"The Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by
encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and

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supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity".135

Further, Article 149 also states that Community action, among other things, is aimed at “developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching and the dissemination of the languages of the Member States”.136 This, I argue, can be seen as an obvious form of boundary-making, drawing a clear line between those languages which are accepted and those that are not, and in extension also making a division between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

The Socrates programme was adopted by the Council and the European Parliament with the purpose of encouraging cooperation in the area of education within the Community. As part of a joint question to the Commission on the new eastern border of the European Union, two Members of the European Parliament argued that:

“By promoting cultural exchanges and the establishment of a common educational area, these programmes form the basis of a shared European identity and awareness, thus furthering mutual understanding and a sharing of common practices”.137

There seems to be a fear among some critics, however, that a ‘European dimension’ of education could threaten national identity and the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’. Coulby argues that school and university curricula could be seen as an attempt by the modern state to control cultural reproduction, which may or may not be perceived as a legitimate aspect of government policy. However it is seen as serious when the same people that control the state also control the press and television, as is the case in for example Italy.138 In relation to this, Ms May, the UK Conservatives’ education spokeswoman attacked the changes made to the national curriculum for England to be introduced in 2000. She accused the Labour government of taking away the sense of national identity from history education in schools since the new curriculum put less emphasis on kings, queens and battles that have “made the country what it

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is today”. A ‘European dimension’ in education doesn’t however mean that the content of education has to be the same in all the member states. The idea of ‘unity in diversity’ is still very important. But it becomes a careful balancing act so as not to turn any of the already won over against the European integration process generally and the idea of a common European identity and European Union education policy more specifically.

Language as part of a European Dimension

As was argued in the discussion on national identity discourse earlier, language is a powerful marker of belonging. With modern forms of education a homogenised state-sponsored language appeared. Not only did it make communication easier between the people living within the borders of the territory, but it also became a tool for the State to control the masses. In comparison, the European Union Member States and citizens do not have a shared language in common. Rather, it has institutionalised the idea of linguistic diversity by including it under Articles 21 and 22 in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which was completed in 2000. In European Union documents language is sometimes dealt with as just another form of culture and at other times it seen as separate. The report issued by Adonnino Committee in 1985 argues that “the languages spoken in the Community form an essential part of its cultural heritage and contribute to its richness and diversity”. The importance that the European Union bestows upon language can be seen in the fact that 2001 was named the European Year of Languages. In the document establishing that decision it was stated that:

“The languages question is a challenge that must be tackled as part of the European integration process and the European Year of languages may therefore prove to be highly instructive as far as the formulation of measures to encourage cultural and linguistic diversity is concerned”.

As an international organisation the European Union is unique in the sense that it has so many working languages. The question is whether it is feasible for the European Union in the future

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to continue to be based on the idea of multilingualism. In the last few years there has been an immense increase in the official languages of the European Union, from 11 before the enlargement in June 2005 to 23 after the latest enlargement in January 2007. This increase has been one of the most debated changes brought on by these two enlargements. To use one’s own mother tongue when communicating with or within the European Union institutions is one of the foundational rights associated with being a European citizen. However, this multitude is not only seen as an example of the diversity that makes Europe so special. It also contributes to making the European institutions seem bureaucratic and less democratic than what is desired. A solution to this, which has been discussed, is the introduction of a Lingua Franca, within the European Union institutions. So far though, no serious attempts have been made to make it a reality. Rather there has been a turn in the other direction with an increased stress on the importance of respecting and supporting minority languages. Further, there has been a fairly consistent stress on the importance of teaching and learning foreign languages. Hence both the preferred choice of action of the higher education institutions and the individual is being emphasised. I argue that there is an increased emphasis on minority languages, which can be seen as consistent with the increased importance of the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’ within European Union discourse generally. A growing interest in minority languages can also be seen as a result of the introduction of a European citizenship with its associated fundamental rights, of which the right to use one’s own language is part of. This increased emphasis on minority languages can also be seen as a reaction to the creation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which was adopted in Nice in 2000, and which will be discussed further in chapter six. In Article 22 of the Charter the importance of respecting “cultural, religious and linguistic diversity” is stressed. The question is whether the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’ can help create a ‘thick’ form of common identity at the European level similar to the homogenised, hegemonic and state sponsored language of the nation-state.

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For a long time the issue of language was out of bounds at the European level. As De Swaan puts it, "[t]he subject of languages has been the great non-dit of European integration".148 However, as the number of European Union Member States drastically increased, from 15 to 27, with the last two enlargements, in 2005 and 2007, the problems of linguistic diversity have begun to be discussed even though not solved as yet. The increased interest can be seen in the fact that in 2003 the Commission proposed an Action Plan on Language Learning and Language Diversity.149 The link between language policy and the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’ can also be seen in the fact that language, or rather, multilingualism, has been given a more prominent position within the Directorate-General that also deals with education.150 According to the European Union webpage “[t]he European Union is founded on the principle of ‘unity in diversity’: diversity of cultures, customs and beliefs - and of languages”.151 However, despite haven emphasised the importance of learning the languages of the other European Union Member States only half of all Europeans speak a foreign language.152 Van Els points out the importance of making a distinction between language policy and practice. In addition, Van Els speaks of institutional and non-institutional aspects of European Union language policy. Institutional aspects of the European Union language policy relates to decisions concerning language use in the various European Union institutions and their official contact with the Member States and their citizens. Non-institutional aspects on the other hand refer to the language use that take place between different Member States and their citizen, without the direct involvement of the European Union institutions.153

Let us now look at how the European language policy has developed over the last thirty years or so. When analysing European Union documents dealing with language specifically or, more often, as part of a general European Union policy on education it becomes clear that the importance of learning foreign languages, meaning more specifically other European Union

150 From January 2007 to October 2009 the Commissioner for Multilingualism is Leonard Orban.
Member State languages, has been emphasised since the early 1970s, although at that time it was knowledge of one rather than two other languages that was promoted. Referring to Article 126 of the Maastricht Treaty it was argued in “the Green Paper on European Dimension”, that Community action should be geared towards “developing the European dimension in education”, particularly through the teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States.” However, even though this is an aim, which has been part of the European Union discourse for over thirty years, most pupils in the Member States do not achieve this goal. In 2002 the average number of languages spoken was 1.3 in lower-secondary education and 1.6 at upper secondary education. The importance of learning other Member States’ languages is linked to mobility and the improvement of language skills is also linked to understanding different cultures. In 1973 the Commission argued that the “[e]ncouragement of an “active second language, and a passive third language” can …make freedom of movement easier, and can advance the integration of Europe at a practical level.” Later, in 1997, the Commission developed the idea of the link between mobility and language by suggesting that “knowledge of languages and cultures is an essential part of the exercise of European citizenship”. In other words, being able to speak other European Union languages and being open to other Member States’ cultures will make the European more likely to take advantage of the right to move freely within the European Union.

Looking closer at the relationship between language and education, language learning can be seen as a cultural dimension in education policy. However it is not only language learning that is emphasised but also the teaching of languages. The need for improving and diversifying both is stressed, as can be seen in a Council resolution from 1995. In March 2002 the Commission and the Council stated their aim for the future is that all European citizens should learn at least two Member State languages besides their own mother tongue. As argued by Viviane Reding, then European Commissioner for Education and Culture:

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“...the command of at least two foreign languages by the time young people complete school should be a central objective enabling all citizens to derive full benefit from their right to free movement and actively contribute to better mutual understanding among the peoples of Europe”.160

For this to become anything more than a dream, Member States have to improve the quality of language teaching. In addition, learning languages has to be made attractive. In other words it has to become obvious for learners what the advantages of speaking foreign languages are.161 For example European citizens with good foreign language skills are more likely to become mobile students and as a result also workers:

“The European Union is built around the free movement of its citizens, capital and services. The citizen with good language skills is better able to take advantage of the freedom to work or study in another Member State”.162

As has been shown in this chapter ‘Unity in Diversity’ works as a mantra in the official European Union discourse and linguistic diversity is one of the most emphasised diversities. Diversity has gone from being a hurdle to being seen in a more positive light, which is a position which can be found in a report published in 1977, where the Commission states that:

“A special feature of the European Community is its diversity of languages and cultures; this is a source of wealth, but also of difficulties. Paradoxically, however, although the need for knowledge of languages is growing with the increase in contacts between countries and the enlargement of the Community, the shortening and rationalization of educational syllabuses in all countries has led to an alarming reduction in the time devoted to foreign language teaching”.163

As was argued earlier, linguistic diversity is recognised in Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.164 It states that “[t]he Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity”.165 To show further the importance given to respecting and encouraging linguistic diversity, at the official European Union webpage it is

stated that “[l]inguistic diversity is a cultural and democratic cornerstone of the European Union”.

This linguistic diversity which exists in the European Union Member States is highlighted as:

“… an essential aspect of the European dimension and identity and of the common cultural heritage…Linguistic diversity is also a source of employment and occupation and a factor of integration. It is an asset for the Union’s influence in the outside world, since most European Union languages are used in a large number of non-member States”.

On the issue of linguistic diversity as something enriching, Ján Figel, Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture, and Multilingualism, suggests that “Europe…has always been a mosaic of languages, cultures and institutions in constant interaction.” By stating that Europe has always been diverse, Figel creates the feeling that Europe’s diversity is ‘natural’ and unavoidable, it is its destiny. In the same speech he adds that:

“Our multilingualism policy is a deliberate tool of government. The EU sees the use of its citizens’ languages as one of the factors which make it more transparent, more legitimate and more efficient”.

Thus, language teaching can be seen as a form of governmentality technology and a way of performing ‘conduct of conduct’. There has been an increased emphasis on language learning and teaching and in 1995 the Council issued a resolution on improving and diversifying language learning and teaching within the education systems of the European Union.

As argued earlier, there has been a shift within the European Union discourse over time away from describing diversity as a hurdle to overcome to claiming it is what makes the European Union so exceptional and unique. On a communication on multilingualism, issued in November 2005, the Commission claimed that:

“The European Union is founded on ‘unity in diversity’: diversity of cultures, customs and beliefs – and of languages… it is…not a ‘melting pot’ in which differences are rendered down, but a common home in which diversity is celebrated, and where our many mother tongues are a source of wealth and a bridge to greater solidarity and mutual understanding”.171

Thus, diversity is seen as plurality which should be promoted and preserved and multilingualism is especially emphasised.

Let us go back in time to consider a specific aspect of the European Union language policy. In the official European Union discourse on European identity and higher education there is not only an emphasis generally on language diversity. Rather the importance of minority languages has been given an elevated status.172 Already in 1979 the European Parliament began issuing a set of motions and resolutions where it called for measures to be taken to benefit regional or minority language communities.173 Interesting to mention is that Irish and Lëtzebuergesch may be viewed as minority languages despite the fact that they have official status in their Member States.174 In 1994 the Commission issued a communication called “Lesser Used Languages of the European Union”.175 It is argued that minority languages are protected by the Maastricht Treaty’s emphasis on the importance of the diversity of European cultures. When discussing language learning specific languages are emphasised and there are warnings raised against English becoming a lingua franca, with its prominent role on the Internet, and decision-makers rather emphasis the need for less widely spoken languages being taught and learned. In addition, it is argued that learning the classical languages of Latin and

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172 In 2003 there were “over 60 known indigenous regional or minority language communities in the EU.” With the last enlargement in 2004 this number substantially rose. See European Parliament, “Report with recommendations to the Commission on European regional and lesser used languages – the languages of minorities in the EU- in the context of enlargement and cultural diversity”, Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport, Rapporteur: Michl Ebner, Final A5-0271/2003, 14 July 2003, pp. 1-13.


175 CEC, “Lesser Used Languages of the European Union”, COM (94) 602/final, Communication from the Commission, Brussels, 15 December 1994, pp. 1-22. The minority languages mentioned were Catalan (spoken in Spain, France and Italy (Alghero on Sardinia)), Basque (in Spain and France), Breton (in France), Corsican (in France), Frisian (in the Netherlands), Friulan (in Italy), Galician (in Spain), Occitan (in France), Ladin (in Italy), Sard (in Italy), Sorbian (in Germany), and Welsh (in the United Kingdom). Important to mention is that this is not an exhaustive list. Also important to mention is that there are also non-territorial languages, i.e. Gypsy and Yiddish languages that are spoken across Europe.
Greek can help in learning other languages. Also, it is argued that people living in border areas should learn neighbouring country’s language.

As will be suggested in chapter seven, under the conditions of neo-liberal discourse and the idea of the Knowledge Economy, and Lifelong Learning, skills are increasingly being emphasised. Language is no exception in this case and Lifelong Language Learning – the language part of the basic skills is emphasised in the Lisbon Strategy and Knowledge Society. The argument that language should be seen in a Lifelong Learning perspective is increasingly being used and to be able to understand and communicate in another Member State language is seen as a basic skill. In the words of the Council:

“…the knowledge of languages is one of the basic skills which each citizen needs to acquire in order to take part efficiently in the European knowledge society and therefore facilitates both integration into society and social cohesion”.

Learning other European Union languages has been an important objective of European Union higher education policy and higher education discussions since the early 1970’s. At that time the objective was that pupils should learn at least one other Member State language and that those studying to become language teachers would spend some time in the country that s/he was studying. In addition, language learning outside the school system was also encouraged, which can perhaps be seen as an early version of the idea of Lifelong Learning. In a report from 1989 the Commission draws attention to the fact that students in the Member States usually when studying a foreign language choose from a small group of languages. This asymmetry in language learning in extension causes lopsided mobility as well. Therefore, it was suggested, there was a need for investment in the teaching of less commonly studied languages. This can be seen as a nascent version of the later stress on multilingualism and emphasis on minority languages that we see in the Commission today. Also in 1989 one of the first substantial initiatives taken in the area of language learning and teaching saw the light in

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the shape of the Lingua programme, the education programme dealing specifically with language learning and teaching, which was initiated in 1989.\textsuperscript{180} Four years later, with the creation of the Maastricht Treaty language was further emphasised and in Article 126 of Chapter 3 of the Maastricht Treaty it is stated that Community action shall be aimed at “developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States”.\textsuperscript{181} Hence, learning languages is linked to the idea of a European dimension in education discussed above. In “the Green Paper On the European Dimension of Education”, discussed earlier, it is claimed that:

“Indeed, the improvement of linguistic competence, the mutual understanding of the practices and cultures of other Member States, and even the ability to work with those of other nationalities or another setting, are among the most important factors which help young people to become integrated into society and to accept more readily their responsibilities as European citizens. At the same time, the new possibilities available in the context of building the European Community, in particular the greater range of educational opportunities, are a bonus which Member States should recognise”\textsuperscript{182}

Not only was language given its own education programme, i.e. Lingua, but it was also given a special role in the education mobility programmes of the European Union. It was hoped that the Socrates programme, of which Erasmus was a part, would improve language skills so that mobile students would later become mobile workers prepared to move to another European Union Member State in search of work:

“…enhance quality and develop the European dimension in studies at all levels and to promote knowledge of the languages of the Community so that its citizens may take advantage of opportunities arising from the completion of the European Union, while at the same time reinforcing solidarity between the peoples of the Community”.\textsuperscript{183}

Later, in chapter seven, I will argue that the mantra of neo-liberal governmentality is Lifelong Learning. In other words, the individual is expected to be flexible and entrepreneurial. Language learning is no exception. The idea of language learning and linguistic diversity has


been the base for a variety of documents. The European Year of Languages 2001 highlighted this idea and on the 13 December 2001 a European Parliament resolution was issued on the same topic and was followed by the Education Council, on 14 February 2002, that invited Member States to “take concrete steps to promote linguistic diversity and language learning, and invited the Commission to work on a proposal on the issue. In 2004 the document “Promoting language learning and linguistic diversity – An Action Plan 2004-06” was issued by the Commission. Multilingualism really came of age when it was given its own separate portfolio in the commission in January 2007. According to the Commission this can be seen to “reflect its political dimension in the EU given its importance for initial education, lifelong learning, economic competitiveness, employment, justice, liberty and security”.

Conclusions

In this chapter the construction of European cultural identity in the official European Union discourse on European identity, has been analysed with special emphasis on its connections to higher education. I have argued that cultural identity is a ‘thick’ version of European identity. As was argued in chapter three, an important characteristic of the national identity is its use of myths and symbols to create a sense of belonging. Through the analysis of the official European Union discourse on European identity and higher education it becomes clear that it has its own myths and symbols. In this chapter I have highlighted a specific myth, i.e. ‘Unity in Diversity’. Further I have argued that ‘unity’ and ‘diversity’ can themselves be seen as separate but related myths. Looking closer at the myth of ‘unity’, earlier, in chapter three, I stressed the importance of creating a sense of continuity, i.e. that we are connected to our ancestors as well as to future generations through a shared culture, when constructing identities. Here I have argued that the cultural form of European identity construction is the one which most resembles national identity in the sense that it makes similar claims of continuity through appeals to a common history and destiny, which make up the myth of ‘unity’ in its ‘thick’ version. Hence, ‘Europe’ is defined as a cultural community with a shared European cultural heritage. However, there is also a ‘thinner’ version of the myth of ‘unity’ consisting of claims of shared values, such as democracy, rule of law, etc. This version of the myth of ‘unity’ is increasingly being appealed to, perhaps since it is seen as more politically


correct than the ‘thicker’ version in the form of cultural heritage. However, these values are also argued to be part of the European cultural heritage which makes me question whether it is more politically correct to appeal to a ‘thinner’ rather than ‘thicker’ version of ‘unity’. In my opinion the idea of Europe as a community of values also plays an important role in the civic version of European identity in the sense that it makes it possible for ‘us’ to think of ‘ourselves’ as good, democratic human beings while ‘the Other’ then has to be lacking in these qualities since there would be no point in emphasising characteristics ‘we’ see in others as well. In addition, by linking ‘our’ common values to the past what ‘we’ are saying or implying is that ‘we’ are inherently good democratic individuals that are part of a good democratic community. European Union decision-makers are faced with a precarious balancing act. While a common cultural heritage has proved to be the strongest emotional glue in the nation-state when making appeals to it at the European level many people seem to feel threatened. So far they seem reluctant to give up the idea that culture can play the same role at the European level as it does at the national.

From the discussion above it is clear that the myth of ‘unity’ is mainly related to the past. However, identity discourses is about creating a sense of continuity not only through the past but also the present and the future. When looking at the official European Union discourse there are not as many references made in the documents to the future, in the form of a shared destiny, as there are to a common past. This, I argue, is because it is easier to constructing a strong and lasting common identity on what has happened than what might occur. The idea of a common destiny can be linked to normative power and the idea of ‘conduct of the self’. Hence, it is not so much about who ‘we’ are as who ‘we’ ought to be. It has a stronger presence in the construction of the other two versions of European identity but can increasingly also be found in the construction of cultural Europena identity in the form of a stress on the need for Europeans to learn more languages; not just any languages but of those of the European Union Member States. In addition, there has been a shift over time from mainly stressing the advantages of learning one or two of the other official European Union languages to increasingly emphasising the benefits of learning those languages not so widely spoken today, i.e. minority languages. This, I argue, can be seen as an example of the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’ has been applied to European Union language policy and discourse. Thus, a ‘Good European’ is someone who speaks many languages and partakes in continuous language learning. The problem in relation to language in Europe is that even though literacy levels are high, there is no European education system similar to that of the nation-state, and
no European mass media, no European novel or common language. A further problem, in relation to European Union policy on culture generally and language more specifically is the fact that there is no official European Union definition for either of them. The result is that when the European Union for example speaks of the need to promote cultural and linguistic diversity it becomes unclear what is meant by this as well.186

Turning to the myth of ‘diversity’, here the European identity discourse strays from the path of its national counterpart. While the idea of homogeneity plays an important part in the construction of national identity within the construction of cultural European identity it is the diverse character of the European Union Member States which is being increasingly stressed. It is argued that diversity is what makes ‘us’ European. However, this has not always been the view. As was argued in chapter two, while ideas stay fairly constant in discourses their meaning might change over time. In the early 1970s ‘diversity’ was seen as a hurdle which ‘we’ had to get over. Later it was seen as not hindering cooperation at the European level and a common European identity, before being seen as something which is truly enriching. The question for the future, I argue, is how much diversity the European integration process can take. We have witnessed how the French and Dutch citizens have rejected the proposed European Constitution perhaps as a reaction to what they see as a threat to their national identities. European Union decision-makers seem to have taken note of this fear when they in the spring of 2007 have proposed that all mentions of cultural political symbols, such as for example the European Union flag and anthem, should be deleted in the proposed European Constitution. However, in my opinion, the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’ might at the moment be the only option available to European Union policy-makers. If they tried to push to homogenise the Member States and their citizens instead the risk would be that the whole European integration process would collapse before the benefits of a strong, common cultural identity could be created.

- Chapter Six -

Civic European Identity and Higher Education

- Learning for Active Citizenship -

"At the dawning of the «knowledge age», we are moving into a new phase of European development… innovation, research, education and training are to become core axes of internal policy… the primary aim of education is the development of human potential, of the whole person, enabling all citizens to participate as fully as possible in cultural, economic, political and social life. It should go without saying that learning for active citizenship lies at the heart of our civilisation’s aspirations in this regard."

Edith Cresson

Introduction

In the previous chapter I suggested that the cultural version of European identity construction is seen as the most powerful emotional glue available to the European integration engineers. However, increasingly a common European political identity is being appealed to in the official European Union discourse, which can be perceived as a reaction to the fact that the European integration process is picking up speed. This has resulted in that the idea of ‘A People’s Europe’ has increasingly given way to the concept of ‘A Citizen’s Europe’ in the official European Union discourse. I argue that this civic identity is a political identity which finds its most obvious expression in the European citizenship. What is being attempted through the appeals to a common civic identity is a form of trans-national socialization with the aim of creating a common European community and a common European public space, in other words a gemeinschaft, similar to that which exists in the nation-state, rather than the gesellschaft, hence association, which exists today. This process is taking place at the same time as there is a continuing discussion on the “to be or not to be” of European Union legitimacy. It has been suggested that in order to create a civic identity and combat the perceived legitimacy crisis what is needed is a European demos, which can be defined as “an

2 This is an argument put forward in for example Lacroix, J., “For a European Constitutional Patriotism”, Political Studies, Vol. 50, No. 5, 2002, pp. 944-958, p. 944.
ethno-cultural, organic and static concept, characterised by a certain degree of homogeneity". In Nicolaides’ mind, what we are witnessing in Europe today is a form of demoi-cracy rather than democracy. In other words, there is no single European demos comparable to that which exists in the nation-state. She hypothetically asks: “if democracy requires a demos – a group of individuals who have enough in common to manage their affairs collectively – is there, or can there be, a single European demos? This raises questions concerning whether it is possible to construct a European citizenship which is not based on a shared European culture but which rather emphasises diversity.

European citizenship can be seen as a symbol of ‘our’ uniqueness, i.e. ‘our’ democratic values. Further, it can be viewed as an institutionalised form of ‘Othering’. However, these values seem to be under threat. During the German Presidency in 2007 the importance of a common civic European identity was emphasised as a way of safe guarding civil rights which are seen as vital in order to create an area of freedom, security and justice in order to ensure protection for the European citizens. This interest in civic values can be seen in the attempts which have been made to legitimise the European integration process generally and the European Union institutions more specifically through the proposed Constitution, which Shaw describes as a “power map” to legitimate majority rule. In academic circles there has been a debate on what kind of polity the European Union is or should be and in extension how civic European identity should be conceived. One form of citizenship which has been emphasised is that of constitutional patriotism. Adherents to the constitutional patriotism approach have suggested

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7 Nicolaïdis, K., “‘We, the Peoples of Europe...’”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 6, November-December 2004, pp. 97-110, p. 100.
8 For a discussion ‘thin’ versus ‘thick’ definitions of European identity see for example Benhabib, S., “In Search of Europe’s Borders”, Dissent, Fall 2002, (www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=559 , accessed 2007-03-02).
11 In addition to Constitutional Patriotism sometimes Cosmopolitanism is suggested as an alternative to often sharply excluding cultural version of European identity. Cosmopolitanism has become a popular topic in academic discourse while being ignored in official European Union discourse. This can, among other things, be seen in the increased interest in the social dimension of European integration, Rumford argues. A Cosmopolitan European identity would be based on democracy, human rights, rule of law and a commitment to peace through integration and these are reiterated in various European Union documents. Lord argues that these values are both essential for European Union Membership and consequential, in other words they answer the question of what the Union is for. One of the main tasks of the European Union is to work out how the citizens of the Member States of the European Union can be made to feel and act as European Union citizens and thereby form part of the European Union public. See for example Calhoun, C., “Imagining Solidarity: Cosmopolitanism, Constitutional Patriotism, and the Public Sphere”, Public Culture, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2002, pp. 147-171; Calhoun, C., “Is it Time to Be Postnational?” in May, S., Modool, T. & Squire, J., (eds.), “Ethnicity, Nationalism and Minority Rights”, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge and New York, 2004), pp. 231-256; Rumford, C., “Editorial – Cosmopolitanism and Europe – Towards a new EU studies agenda?”, Innovation: The European Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2005, pp. 1-9; Lord, C., “Legitimacy, Democracy and the EU: When abstract questions
that rather than devising a liberal form of pan-European nationalism a ‘thicker’ version of constitutional patriotism ought to be promoted. However, in Habermas’ mind, a European Constitution could and should not be compared to for example the American Constitution, which introduced new ideas in a young nation-state:

“…the challenge before us is not to invent anything but to conserve the great democratic achievements of the European nation-state, beyond its own limits. These achievements include not only formal guarantees of civil rights, but also levels of social welfare, education and leisure that are the precondition of both an effective private autonomy and of democratic citizenship”.

The newfound interest in a civic European identity can also be seen in the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights at Nice in 2000, later included in the proposed Constitution and the Laeken Declaration from 2001. In the proposed Constitution education was emphasised as a fundamental right, which means that education is constructed as a fundamental right which all citizens should have access to. Further, in the spring of 2007 a specific programme, entitled “Fundamental Rights and Citizenship”, was adopted to run between 2007 and 2013. European citizenship, it is argued, is supposed to be an inclusive citizenship, in the sense that learning should be available to all to avoid economic and social exclusion. Hansen suggests that “[s]ocial rights always harbours the potential of cutting across ethnic and cultural divides”. However, as will be further discussed in chapter seven, this idea of education as a fundamental right has to compete with the neo-liberal idea that education should be seen as a commodity that can be bought and sold in the interest of competitiveness. In addition, Valle is critical of the fact that education is placed under the heading of ‘freedoms’ rather than that of ‘dignity’ since education can be seen as a necessity to be able to grasp and take advantage of other freedoms. What the European Union policy-makers are hoping to achieve with the European citizenship is the creation of a European civil society that will be both
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supportive of and actively taking part in European Union political life. In this sense citizenship can be seen as a political symbol, which, as was argued in relation to national identity earlier, can be used as a powerful governmental tool. With the idea of the active citizen the individual is encouraged to become entrepreneurial and self-reflective. I argue that the emphasis on the active citizen can be linked to the general decline in citizens’ participation in public life in the Western world, Europe being no exception. Therefore, both at the Member State and European level the need to create the active citizen has been emphasised.

These attempts to construct a viable civic European identity have taken place in a context of both success and failure. In the last few years the European Union and the European integration process have taken some major steps forward with the introduction of the European Monetary Union and two enlargements, in 2005 and 2007, growing from fifteen Member States to twenty-seven. On the other hand, the integration process has also suffered setbacks, such as for example the public rejection of the proposed Constitution. This rejection of the proposed Constitution was seen as a warning sign by European Union decision-makers and in 2003 Pat Cox, then President of the European Parliament, proclaimed that if an agreement could not be reached on the Constitution there was a risk of “a European political identity crisis”. It has been suggested that the ‘no’ to the proposed Constitution can be seen as a reaction, by the Dutch and French public, to what they see as ‘too much, too soon’.

Looking at the structure of this chapter, it is divided into three main parts. The first part aims at contextualising European citizenship by answering the question of why a common citizenship is desirable. This is done by investigating the academic debate on the perceived legitimacy crisis and democratic deficit of the European Union, i.e. what are the different meanings given to these concepts and how could the problems associated with them be alleviated. In addition it looks at the idea of a common European citizenship by examining

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20 However, the fact that the Swedish public voted ‘no’ in the referendum on joining the European Monetary Union in 2003 can be seen, together with a series of referendums from 1993 up to the Irish referendums on the Nice Treaty in 2001 and 2002, as a set back and perhaps part of a larger public dissatisfaction with European integration. See for example, Mayer, F.C. & Palmowski, J., “European Identities and the EU - The Ties that Bind the Peoples of Europe”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2004, pp. 573-598.
21 In France the ‘no’ vote gained 54.8 % of the vote (with a turnout rate of 70 %) while in the Netherlands the ‘no’ vote amounted to 61.7% (with a turnout of 63%). On the plus side, in July the same year the citizens of Luxembourg voted ‘yes’ (56.2% in an obligatory vote) to the proposed Constitution. See, Editorial, “A Constitution for Europe and Other Constitutions”, European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 3, October 2005, pp. 335-337, p. 335.
how it compares to citizenship generally, as presented in chapter three in relation to the nation-state. It is suggested that the European Union is hoping to create a community similar to that which exists in the nation-state. In the second part it is shown how there has been a shift from an emphasis on European citizenship generally to an increased emphasis on the idea of an active citizenship which can be linked to education and learning through for example Lifelong Learning which is discussed further in chapter seven.²⁴ It is also closely linked to neo-liberal rationality, which expects the individual to be active and responsible for his/her own well-being. Hence, if the individual takes part in higher education generally and Lifelong Learning more specifically s/he will find it easier to become an active citizen since her/his knowledge level is higher and as a consequence perhaps s/he will feel more confident to participate in civil society. In the third part of the chapter I look at mobility, which is portrayed as freedom but it is a freedom under control, in Foucauldian terms, since the mobile individual is under surveillance in various ways. In addition, it is a conditioned freedom since the individual is expected to be mobile, to be flexible in geographical terms, in order to be accepted as a ‘Good European’. By taking part in a mobility scheme, such as Erasmus, it is hoped that the citizens will feel more emotionally attached to the European integration process. In relation to mobility this chapter will also discuss the issue of recognition of diplomas and professional education and training, which can be seen as ‘tools’ that aid mobility. I also look at the processes of introducing a common European passport which not only serves to make mobility easier but which can also be seen as a symbol of belonging and a technology of exclusion.

1. European Citizenship to the Rescue

In the official European Union discourse the project of constructing a European identity has become increasingly emphasised in relation to serious internal and external challenges. There are two different versions of internal problems, i.e. those that the European Union as an institution is said to be suffering from and those which affect the Member States internally but which also have repercussions for the European Union.²⁵ The aim of the discussion in this

section is to put European civic identity in the form of citizenship in a context by looking at some of the problems a common citizenship is hoped to alleviate. The European Union’s legitimacy crisis and democratic deficit have been defined. This also shows how closely these two concepts are related without being identical, and how they are important when discussing identity, as suggested by Hansen who argues that identity politics should be discussed in the context of a legitimacy crisis. In Lord’s opinion the concept of ‘political legitimacy’ is abstract, or as I would argue, a contested concept that different discourses and actors try to define. In addition, not only is it useful to try to understand what is meant by legitimacy crisis and democratic deficit but also to attempt to gain some understanding of their roots and causes if we want to find a solution to them.

The question of legitimacy is not simply the topic of an academic debate, and it is not only in academic circles that the legitimacy crisis and democratic deficit are being discussed. Sometimes the legitimacy crisis is connected to the lack of public support for the European integration process caused by the fact that the European citizens do not understand or feel emotionally attached to the European Union institutions. This view can be found in the Laeken Declaration also produced by the European Council in 2001:

“…the European institutions must be brought closer to its citizens. Citizens undoubtedly support the Union’s broad aims, but they do not always see a connection between those goals and the Union’s everyday action”.28

The national referenda in 2005 in France and Holland, saying ‘no’ to the proposed Constitution, mentioned earlier, can both be seen as examples of this lack of public support. However, it is not only a problem for the European Union when the public shows its disdain; it is also considered a problem when it shows limited interest in the European Union, its institutions, and the integration process generally. What the European Union decision-makers need to do is seduce the European public, make them ‘fall in love’ with the European Union institutions, to use the emotional language of the European Union. Proof of lack of love could,

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29 In the Netherlands the turn out at the referendum was high, 62.8%. 61.6% votes ‘No’ while 38.4% votes ‘Yes’. In France the ‘No’ side received 54.8% of the votes. See Phillips, D., Editorial, “Mapping the European Union agenda in education and policy”, Comparative Education, Vol. 42, No. 1, February 2006, pp. 1-4, p.1.
for example, be seen in the latest European Parliament election in 2004, which had the lowest voting numbers in its twenty-five year history. However the lack of political identification and interest in taking part in the political process as well as decreasing levels of people voting in elections is not specific to the European Union but is endemic to advanced liberal states.

In addition, democracy is challenged generally. In Eastern Europe, since the end of the Cold War, countries have introduced market economy and democracy. At the same time Western European countries were faced with economic recession, high levels of unemployment and the prospect of an influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe, together these changes seem to have led to a resurgence of nationalism in the Member States. In addition to the increasing levels of public support for right-wing parties in most European Union Member States there are also tendencies among some social democratic governments, in for example Great Britain and Germany, “to cater to more xenophobic sentiments”. In many, if not all, of the Member States nationalistic/racist parties have won an increasing number of seats in local, regional and national parliaments. These tendencies are however not only present domestically in the Member States. In January 2007, when Romania and Bulgaria became the latest Member States, it became possible to create an extreme right wing political group in the European Parliament. Perhaps this can be seen as ironic that, in light of the European Union’s emphasis on the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’, as the European Union is becoming ever more diverse extreme sentiments also increase. I argue that this undermines the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’ and the view that diversity should be seen as plurality rather than division.

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32 García, S., “Preface” in García, S., (ed.), “European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy”, (Pinter Publisher: London, 1993), pp. xi-xii, p. xi. Hansen suggests that European integration has been pushed forward by two forces. The first one was external, in the shape of the threats perceived as a result of the Cold War, which has now been replaced by the idea of globalisation. Related to this fear during the Cold War was the anxiety over what would happen after the fall of Communism and the reunion of the two Germanies. European politicians in charge of the integration process were worried that after the fall of the Berlin Wall Germany would loose interest in ‘Europe’. This worry can be seen in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) where an aim is expressed of “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen”. Treaty of European Union (TEU), Article A. For an academic discussion see for example Hansen, P., “European Integration, European Identity and the Colonial Connection”, European Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2002, pp. 483-498, pp. 483-484.
34 The limit of nineteen members from at least five Member States which is needed to be allowed to create a political group in the European Parliament was achieved as Romania and Bulgaria joined.
Looking closer at the idea of public support; it has been argued that to become legitimate the European Union has to gain the love and support of the citizens of the Member States. Put another way, what is needed is a European public. As Olsen suggests, it is the people that affords the political system, whether national or European, authority and thereby legitimacy. 35

Another form of criticism, which the European Union has had to face, is that the European integration process is mainly an elite-driven project with little support among the European citizens. This is a view held not only by Eurosceptics but also by supporters of European integration and can be found in official documents, such as “the White Paper on Governance”, published by the Commission in 2001. 36 The White Paper discusses the legitimacy problem arguing that it is important to make the workings of the European Union institutions more transparent to both the Member States and their citizens. 37 This argument can be linked to the suggestion that the European Union is lacking in substantial legitimacy, in other words “the political, social and civic values embodied in its institutions and basic policies”. 38 It can be seen as an output deficit which can perhaps be solved with the help of more transparency, growing power of European Parliament, a directly elected Commission, etc. in the future. Further, according to Chyssochoou the European Union has failed to muster up any significant sense of emotional support from the European citizens with its treaties:

“Maastricht's (top-down) polity-creation, the Amsterdam and Nice reforms failed to provide a sense of civic attachment to the larger polity and create a normative order sustained by an independent source of input-oriented legitimacy 'to forge a common identity able to sustain a shared sense of the public good …” 39

According to Habermas identity and legitimacy are interconnected, and “[a] legitimacy crisis is at the same time an identity crisis”. 40 In other words, political legitimacy depends on an existing collective political identity. On the other hand, the increased popularity of nationalism

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in many Western countries can be seen as proof of the mobilising power of other forms of political identities. Fearing increased nationalism in the Member States and lack of emotional attachment to the European integration process, European Union policy-makers continue to work towards creating a common European identity. Higher education is seen by European Union decision-makers as one of the most important tools in this process since education has played a major identity-constructing role in the nation-state.

The Commission argues that while in the beginning of the European integration process initiatives were mainly economic in character this has changed over time and today actions are increasingly justified in political and social terms. The reason for this change is that it is perceived by decision-makers that if the European Union is to become a feasible polity it has to work towards greater political cohesion and a European identity and a sense of solidarity. However, the European Council argues that “the European Union derives its legitimacy from the democratic values it projects, the aims it pursues and the powers and instruments it possesses”. In addition, to increase legitimacy, it is seen as important to involve civil society in the European integration process yet the numbers of voters in the European Parliament elections has steadily dropped. One of the reasons for this, as proposed by Smith, is that in many European Parliament election campaigns the emphasis is on national rather than European issues. Moravcsik on the other hand believes that peoples’ disinterest in European Parliamentary elections depends on the fact that the issues dealt with at European Union level are far removed from people’s everyday lives. They are simply beyond their grasp. It is however worth pointing out that participation levels in general elections in the Member States have also decreased during the same time.

Looking closer at the idea of a legitimacy crisis; as noted above, it seems to be an accepted fact among many politicians as well as academics that the European Union is suffering from a legitimacy crisis. Part of this legitimacy crisis is said to be the much discussed ‘democratic deficit’, which can be defined as the lack of democratic control mechanisms within the

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European Union institutions. Lucarelli refers to this as a problem of input/formal legitimacy. Fear has been expressed concerning the fact that national parliaments have lost much of their powers to intergovernmental institutions such as the Council, and the decision-making process in the Council is also seen as being too secretive. Another perceived problem is that national parliaments are not required to scrutinise ministers representing their country at the European level. In addition, the fact that the co-decision process still only applies to a limited number of policy areas is seen as problematic. The Commission has also been criticised because of the fact that Commissioners are nominated by their national governments and not elected by the people. According to Hansen and Williams the democratic deficit and legitimacy crisis are not simply a result of institutional weakness but also the consequence of the fact that during the 1980s and 1990s the integration process was greatly speeded up. Viewing the legitimacy crisis slightly differently, Beetham and Lord see it as containing a twofold ideological division; first, there is a disagreement concerning what the European Union should be doing and to what extent. The second problem area concerns the European Union institutions’ capacity for creating successful policy. This is related to what Lucarelli refers to as output/efficiency oriented legitimacy.

As argued earlier, closely related to the legitimacy crisis is the issue of democratic deficit, which is a much debated issue in academic circles. However, the European Union institutions are also aware of the problem of democratic deficit as can be seen in this statement issued by the European Council at Laeken in 2001:

“The Union needs to become more democratic, more transparent and more efficient. It also has to resolve three basic challenges: how to bring citizens, and primarily the young, closer to the European design and the European institutions, how to organise politics and the European political area in an enlarged Union and how to develop the Union into a stabilising factor and a model in the new, multipolar world”.


Democratic deficit is however not specific to the European Union. Rather, there has been a loss of democracy and democratic accountability generally on a global scale as a result of neo-liberalism.54

There are however scholars who do not share this bleak view of the present situation. One of these is Moravcsik who responds to the accusation of democratic deficit by arguing that it is a myth and that the European Union is democratic enough, that it is only when one compares it to some form of utopian or ideal democracy that the European Union seems to be lacking something. It is important not to look at and analyse the European Union as separate from the other levels of national governments and parliaments. According to Moravcsik it should suffice that the governments of the Member States are democratically elected. Furthermore, he argues that the checks and balances which exist in the European Union today are enough to safeguard its legitimacy.55 Schmidt adds to this line of argument by maintaining that the European Union can be seen as undemocratic but only because it is viewed in comparison to the nation-state. She argues that “conceptions of the democratic deficit, and therefore of its problems and solutions, are grounded in the wrong model: that of the nation-state.”56

Dreaming of A European Imagined Community

To solve the problem of a legitimacy crisis and a democratic deficit critics argue that social integration has to be enhanced. As it is now it has been put on the back burner while the political dimension has been emphasised. In the 1980s then Commission president Jaques Delors pushed for a ‘Social Europe’. However, this initiative has to a large extent been deserted in favour of neo-liberal thinking. Despite this, civil society is increasingly being emphasised. In Rumford’s opinion a shared European society is “the missing piece of the integration jigsaw without which ‘ever closer union’, European governance and European democracy are not possible”.57 This need for an improved sense of community and the recognition of shared cultural values, in other words a common European civil society or public sphere, has increasingly been discussed and worked towards at the European level.

Also, as suggested by Delanty, a common public sphere is increasingly important as peoples, goods, capital, images and communication are becoming evermore mobile.58

This section will look at the concept of ‘society’ and the role it could play in the European integration process as a remedy for the before mentioned democratic deficit. Whether or not a European society exists has been debated. To be able to answer that question it is necessary to look at what is meant by ‘society’. Both academics and decision-makers suggest there is a need to make the European Union institutions and the European integration process more democratic. It has been suggested that the European Union institutions hope to alleviate the ‘democratic deficit’, defined as lack of popular consent through the creation of a European civil society and a European public space.59 Based on Benedict Anderson’s ideas presented in chapter three in relation to national identity I argue that these two ideas can be seen as an imagined community and imagined space respectively.60 Another way of looking at the idea of society is put forward by Gramsci who argues that society in the West is a “site where consent is engineered, ensuring the cultural ascendancy of the ruling class and capitalism’s stability.”61 In addition Cox purports that civil society can be seen as an alternative to a revolution to cope with the forces of globalisation.62 Linked to the idea of society is that of polity and it is argued that a European polity where European citizens could take part in the formulation, deliberate upon, and consider various views of justice and rights, is missing. As Bellamy puts it, it is important for the citizen to have ‘Right to Have Rights’ rather than be given a specific set of rights.63 Regarding the purpose of the idea of civil society, in Rumford’s mind, it “occupies a central place in the sociological imagination, bringing together as it does ideas of the state, society, citizenship, democracy, participation, stability, and peaceful political change.”64

How are then democracy and society discussed in European Union discourse? According to Margot Wallström, Vice-President of the European Commission and responsible for Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy:

“Healthy democracy at European level requires genuine two-way communication between the people and the policy-makers. We need a European public sphere in which the citizens of all member states can access the information they need, discuss the issues together and make their views heard in dialogue with decision-makers”.

Thus, for a public sphere to work what is needed is an active citizenship. Further, for a society to function properly some form of solidarity is necessary. In a sense solidarity becomes a form of emotional glue which keeps society from disintegrating. In the official European Union discourse, there is an emphasis on the need for a European level civil society, defined by the Economic and Social Committee as “a society that embraces democracy”, to add legitimacy to the European integration process within it. Further, solidarity can be defined as:

“...a willingness to place limits on one's own interests and take on obligations as the prerequisite for acting in the common interest. People’s actions are determined by their own lives (culture, upbringing, education, experience) and they benefit from their interaction with others”.

Further, the concept of solidarity can be seen as: “[u]nity resulting from common interests, feelings, or sympathies” according to the Oxford Dictionary, is linked to the idea of a European demos rather than the European telos we have today. Appeals to a common solidarity can be found in the official European Union discourse in for example the Tindemans Report from 1976 where it is argued that the European Union requires a properly functioning solidarity among its peoples. Further, on the role of a future European Union, the Tindemans Report argues that it is important to “give an organic form to the existing solidarity of our economies, our finances and our social lives”. In this sense solidarity is both creating the European Union and being created by the European Union. Linked to the idea of solidarity is that of affinity, which can be seen as 'a community of interest based on attraction and shared

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values, etc." Lawn argues that there is a problem of affinity in today’s society generally; in the past affinity was seen as a must if one wanted government to run smoothly. In this situation education, along with cultural strategies, plays an important role in the creation and/or re-creation of affinity and a national identity. Education may also be able to play a similar role at the European level. Lindblad and Popkewitz argue that new ways to see governance have also meant new ideas of what solidarity is. From the perspective of the self-reliant individual in neo-liberal thinking, and as is further discussed in chapter seven, solidarity today mainly means to take responsibility for your own economic well-being. Hence, if you wish to be considered a ‘Good European’ by your fellow citizens then you cannot depend on them for financial help. Education is here central and plays an important role in the creation and the maintenance of civil society. The Economic and Social Committee argues that:

“The basic values of human society are communicated through education. Those involved in education establish the principles according to which civil society develops. On no account therefore should education policy be the sole preserve of the state”.

Waltzer maintains that only a democratic state can create a democratic civil society and only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state. Where does this leave the European Union? There seems to be an inherent need for people to feel as sense of belonging, to have a social home. This home can either take the form of a community that is built on social bonds, shared loyalties, norms, values, kinship or ethnic ties. In other words a social contract is agreed upon between the citizens of this community. This form of association is seen as being organic, i.e. natural, in Tönnis’ words, as discussed in chapter three in relation to the nation and national identity, a gemeinschaft. It is also possible to feel a sense of belonging through mechanical and artificial construction that exists in the mind. Here people remain independent from each other and only conduct transactions that can be seen as profit making and will only continue as long as it is seen as mutually beneficial to all. This is what is known

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as the gesellschaft.76 Looking at the nation-state, somewhat simplified one can argue that civic nations, such as France, are based on the idea of the gesellschaft whereas ethnic nations, such as Germany, adhere to the idea of gemeinschaft.77 If we look at the European Union today, it has been argued that so far the European Union Member States have managed to create a European level gesellschaft but what they really want and need to achieve is a strong, living, organic bond between the citizens, namely a gemeinschaft. Linked to the discussion on gemeinschaft and gesellschaft is the idea of demos, which, according to Weiler, can be seen as the people of a specific polity, in other words its Volk. The feeling of belonging to this Volk has deep-rooted socio-psychological effects that are rooted in objective and organic conditions.78 A common language, common history, common cultural habits, common ethnic origin and common religion, i.e. subjective manifestations, are important to a demos. So is the idea of social cohesion a shared destiny and a collective self-identity that will lead to loyalty from the members. A more general definition is given by Nicolaides who states that a demos could be argued to be “a group of individuals with enough in common to want to and be able to decide collectively about their own affairs”.79 Pribán, however, is of the opinion that there is no European demos, which in turn leads him to argue that a European identity would have to be viewed as the ‘future in process’.80 Delanty and Rumford argue that since it is so difficult to define Europe simply in cultural terms or by reference to a shared history or territory, as was argued in the previous chapter of this thesis, some other form of identification is needed. There is a need to move from the idea of a European ethos to a European demos.81 A European demos, can, according to Greven, be explained as:

 “…the idea of a European society that is willing across all divergences of opinion and interests to share the same basic liberal, political and social rights with all other members of the community and to live under the common to which the European citizens have consented voluntarily”82


Here we see how a demos is defined in terms of civic values and ideas. However, whether there is or even can be a European demos has been questioned by many scholars. There are those that argue that the European Union should be an intergovernmental institution where sovereign nation-states meet to cooperation when it is mutually beneficial for all of them. In this sense there exists a European telos but not a European demos. Considering the heterogeneity among the European Union member states and their societies a European demos seems far off. Kohler-Koch argues that the diversity of national languages, cultures and traditions may be overcome by the cosmopolitan elite but not by the ordinary citizen. However, it has been argued that the European integration process is not about creating a European nation or people but should rather be seen as an attempt to create an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe. It has also been argued that the Commission is aware of the lack of a European people, i.e. demos, and that this is undermining the legitimacy of the European integration project. However, there are those that argue that the European Union should be a supranational institution and that a European demos is both possible and desirable. They believe that European Union policies, in the areas of employment, education, culture, etc, help in creating a trans-national bond between the peoples of the European Union. This European identity is not exclusive but is added to the already existing national one. A question which has been asked is whether demos in general and a European demos more specifically has to be defined and understood in organic cultural homogeneous terms or whether it is possible to imagine a polity where ethnicity is separated from the idea of the demos, and where the demos is defined in civic, non-organic or primordial cultural terms. Weiler draws up an image of what a possible European citizenship might look like:

“…the substance of membership (and thus of the demos) is in a commitment to the shared values of the Union as expressed in its constituent documents, a commitment, inter alia, to the duties and rights of a civic society covering discrete areas of public life, a commitment

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Civic European Identity and Higher Education: Learning for Active Citizenship

to membership in a polity which privileges exactly the opposite of nationalism – those human features which transcend the differences of organic ethno-culturalism. On this reading, the conceptualization of a European demos should not be based on real or imaginary trans-European cultural affinities or shared histories nor on the construction of a European “national” myth of the type which constitutes the identity of the organic nation. The decoupling of nationality and citizenship opens the possibility, instead, of thinking of co-existing multiple demos. 90

Hence, Weiler is critical of the construction of a ‘thick’ European identity based on ethnic markers, such as culture, history, a common civilization, etc in order to create a common society. Instead he proposes a ‘thin’ identity based on common values as well as shared rights and responsibilities. In other words, what is desirable is a combination of a ‘thin’ cultural version of European identity and a European citizenship.

2. From Simply Rights to Expectations of Activity

‘What Have You Done For the European Union Lately?’

As was argued in chapter three the idea of citizenship has long been part of the vocabulary of the nation-state but it is now also a reality at the European level, at least to a certain degree. Academics and European Union policy-makers alike ask themselves what kind of citizenship this European Union citizenship should be. 91 Questions of citizenship are far from new but they came onto the agenda of the academic studies of the European Union in the late 1980s, around the same time as the European Union Member States began to prepare for a European citizenship, in the wake of the Single European Act and the years leading up to the Maastricht Treaty. 92 And as the nation-state appears to be weakening in the global era, both European Union citizenship and other forms of post-national citizenship are being increasingly discussed in academic circles. 93 It has been suggested that citizenship, together with identity, has been

91 According to Painter the idea of ‘European citizenship’ can be interpreted in two different ways. First, it can be seen as ‘citizenship of Europe’, i.e. membership of a European polity. Second it can be understood as ‘citizenship in Europe’, which Painter defines as “the multifarious webs of citizenship relations in which Europeans are enmeshed”. Painter, J., “European Citizenship and the Regions”, Queen's Papers on Europeanisation, No 7/2003, (http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofPoliticsInternationalStudiesandPhilosophy/Filestore/Europeanisation/Files/Uploads/18407_en.pdf , accessed 2007-08-02), pp. 1-20, p. 1.
one of the most vigorously discussed and debated topics in social science during the 1990s and early 2000s although some political theorists ask whether it is useful to use the concepts of ‘identity’ and ‘citizenship’ outside the discourse of the nation-state. What kind of a citizenship should the European citizenship be? Should the European citizenship, similar to national citizenship, be based on membership of a solidaristic community, or should it be founded on a more abstract and less exclusivist conception of the relationship between citizenship and identity?

In this section I will show how European Union citizenship has evolved since its inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 up until the present day, almost fifteen years later. I argue that there has been a shift, brought on by the neo-liberal rationalities which have developed in the last few decades and which are contained within the Lisbon Strategy, from mainly emphasising citizenship rights to increasingly stressing the need for the citizen to be active. In other words, citizenship can increasingly be seen as a normative quest undertaken by the European Union decision-makers. Thus, what they are trying to create is ‘the Good European citizen’, who in their opinion is an active individual. And as a result they also construct ‘the Internal Other’ in the form of ‘the Deviant European’ as someone who does not partake actively in civil society. By arguing that ‘the Good European citizen’ is an individual who behaves a certain way European Union decision-makers regulate how the individual views her-/himself and others around her/him and this has effects on how the individual behaves in specific situations. According to the Commission active citizenship can be defined as “[t]he cultural, economic, political/democratic and /or social participation of citizens in society as a whole and in their community”. As will be shown in chapter seven the idea of ‘the Good European’ also exists in relation to the construction of a neo-liberal version of European identity, where s/he is defined as a flexible, self-reliant individual, partaking in lifelong learning.


Considering why a European citizenship was initiated and why it is still very much revered, the most important role of a European citizenship seems to be to solve the legitimacy crisis and democratic deficit, as was discussed earlier. However, it has also been suggested that the introduction of a European Union citizenship is of symbolic value as it gives the European Union increased state-like features. The passport, which is discussed further later in this chapter in relation to mobility, can be seen as part of this symbolic character of citizenship. In addition, Ms Reding, then Commissioner to Culture and Education, suggested that a ‘Europe of citizenship’ would be useful if the European Union wanted make the people in the Member States feel like citizens and not simply like consumers; this ties in with the claim that I have put forward earlier in this thesis that ‘no one will fall in love with the market’. 98 In today’s world, however, which is becoming increasingly globalised, the idea of citizenship has been challenged. As we have seen above, citizenship is often explained in terms of containing both rights and an identity and some scholars argue that if one is going to create a European citizenship there is a need to separate these two. Hence, a post-national citizenship should not be based on emotional attachment to territory and cultural affinities. Rather, this new citizenship should be made up of the rights and values of civil society. 99 Edith Cresson, when discussing the nature and role of a common European citizenship maintained that:

“Citizenship with a European dimension is anchored in the shared creation of a voluntary community of peoples, of different cultures and of different traditions – the creation of a democratic society which has learned to embrace diversity sincerely as a positive opportunity, a society of openness and solidarity for each and every one of us”.100

Further, it has been suggested that the initiatives taken in the area of a European citizenship can be seen as a step towards a common European demos and a wish to create a common civic identity. Others are more critical and contend that citizenship should simply be considered a tool to aid the free movement of people which is necessary to make the common market work.101

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The development of Citizen’s Rights and Duties at the European level

Looking specifically at European citizenship rights, work began already with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 where the idea of freedom of movement for workers was included. This was mainly linked to economic incentives at the time. Over thirty years later, with the Schengen Agreement from 1989, the freedom of movement was further extended and made easier. When European citizenship rights first gained legal status with the Maastricht treaty in 1993 the freedom of movement and residence was included as was the right to vote and stand as a candidate in European Parliament elections. In addition, the right to request diplomatic protection and petition the European Ombudsman was included. Five years later, in the Amsterdam Treaty, the Schengen Agreement was incorporated into a European Union Treaty text and citizenship rights were extended. Further, the Amsterdam Treaty reorganised cooperation between the Member States in the area of Justice and Home Affairs and aimed at establishing a European area of freedom, security and justice. At the European Council in Tampere in 1999 a European Charter of Fundamental Rights, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, which contained an ethical dimension, including an emphasis on dignity, solidarity and citizenship, was decided upon. Further, it was suggested that the area of freedom, security and justice should be based on the principles of transparency and democratic control, involving an open dialogue with civil society. A few years later, at Laeken in 2001, citizenship issues were further discussed. In January 2004 the Council issued a decision establishing an action programme to promote active citizenship, seen in terms of civic participation. The programme has five main objectives. First, it should aim at promoting and disseminating the values and objectives of the European Union. The second aim is to bring citizens closer to the European Union and its institutions and to encourage them to engage more frequently with its institutions. Thirdly, citizens should be encouraged to be involved closely in reflection and discussion on the construction of the European Union. Fourthly, there is a need to intensify links and exchanges between citizens from the countries participating in

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102 Maas argues that there are two sorts of scholarly work in relation to European rights. The first group is mainly interested in analysing legal European Union documents, such as treaties, directives, regulations and court cases. The weakness of this approach is that they fail to take into account the economic and political context in which these decisions were taken. The second group of academics have rather concentrated on studying the relatively recent development of European rights. As Maas points out, these scholars are in disagreement concerning how recent these European rights are. The suggestions range from the mid-1970s to the 1980s. Maas, H., “The Genesis of European Rights”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 43, No. 5, 2005, pp. 1009-1025, pp. 1010, 1021.


the programme, notably by way of town-twinning arrangements. Finally, the programme should aim at stimulating initiatives by the bodies engaged in the promotion of active and participatory citizenship.105

Looking closer at how citizenship is discussed in the official European Union discourse. Even though a common European citizenship did not become a reality until the Maastricht Treaty the aspirations to work towards creating citizenship rights have existed for longer than that, as is suggested by the Adonnino report:

“So106 14 December 1973 at the Copenhagen Summit, the Heads of State or Government adopted a report on European Identity. That report set forth some guidelines and objectives which might be taken as pointers for the development of special rights for citizens in that it gave expression to a determination to defend the principles of representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice and respect of human rights”.106

After the early 1970s work towards a common European citizenship was put on the back-burner but was brought up again in the 1980s. Perhaps the most important initiative was the Adonnino Report on the idea of ‘A People’s Europe’, quoted from above and analysed earlier in relation to the construction of a cultural version of European identity. However, as Hall suggests, discussions on a common citizenship moved away from the idea of ‘a People’s Europe’.107 Still, work continued towards a common citizenship and the 1990s which has been argued to be the decade of citizenship. As mentioned above, the European citizenship was officially introduced with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 where it was stated that:

“…the Treaty on European Union marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe...one of its tasks is to organize, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the peoples of the Member States...its fundamental objectives include the strengthening of the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union”108

In this sense, the European citizenship means that the different Member States’ citizens should have similar rights when approaching the European public courts and public officials. However, the political rights attached to European citizenship are limited compared to those connected to national citizenship. Considering the relationship between the individual and the state, a government can give or withhold the status of citizenship and in this way allow or forbid the articulation of a national identity. This power is not available to the European Union since the European citizenship is based on national citizenship. It is only by the removal of national citizenship by national officials that European citizenship can be withdrawn. After its initial inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty, the European citizenship was further developed in the Treaty of Amsterdam from 1997 where it is argued that “[e]very person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship.” This emphasis on the fact that European citizenship is only an added bonus to national citizenship, and by no means a substitute, was added at Amsterdam, one might assume after fears being voiced after the introduction of a European citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty. In 2000 Edith Cresson, then Commissioner in charge of education, among other things, was careful to emphasize that European citizenship is not simply a set of rights, but also about:

“…helping the citizen to identify with the European Union and its institutions. Ultimately, it is about involving the citizen in the functioning and development of the Union to best achieve its fundamental objectives and goals.”

In other words, duties should not be seen simply as something constraining but also a positive bond between governing and governed; rather, they should make citizens emotionally bond with the European Union integration idea:

Looking closer at the idea of the active citizen, the European Union and associated networks of experts argue that to promote active citizenship and the active citizen it is important to establish certain common indicators and systems of monitoring to be able to assess what level of activity in civil society and politics exist in the various Member States. Ruud Veldhuis, who is a participant in the European Commission indicators research project argues that there is a need to:

“…stimulate citizens to take responsibility for participation in politics and in civil society. Abstention from voting, the lack of trust in politicians and the belief that governments do not have enough control in a globalized world, is a growing concern in Europe. In addition there are concerns with respect to terrorist activities, the rise of racist acts, and the social and violent unrest (in the French suburbs) in relation to the exclusion of youngsters with migrant backgrounds. After the ‘no’ votes to the so called European constitution in France and the Netherlands and the low turn-out at the elections for the European Parliament, it is clear that citizenship should receive extra attention, including European citizenship”.

Thus, it is not simply enough to be a citizen, the individual should also be an active citizen. This is true both in national and the European Union discourses. The idea of ‘the Active Citizen’ is part of neo-liberal governmentality in the sense that it is about encouraging the individual to practice ‘conduct of the self’. In other words, it expects the Good European’ to be an active participant in European civil society. One way of being an active citizenship is through participating in higher education. According to the European Commission:

“The 1997 Commission Communication Towards a Europe of Knowledge places lifelong learning at the centre of an integrated approach to future policy action, based on the conviction that in a rapidly changing world, our society must offer all its citizens opportunities for acceding to the knowledge which will enable them to progress throughout their lives – and this importantly includes encouraging a process of construction and..."
The active citizen is not a completely new idea however. Already in ancient Greece there was an idea of the active citizen, yet even though the idea did not disappear completely it moved into the shadows for centuries. With the introduction of modern liberal government citizens became increasingly passive. It was not until the 1980s that the idea of the active citizen came onto the political agenda again in many countries in Europe and the western world generally. Concerning learning for active citizenship the Commission emphasises that it is important to involve both young people and adults and that this learning process can take place both in formal and non-formal learning contexts. European Union policy-makers emphasise the need for Europeans to become active citizens and that education could play an important role in this process. In this sense, education is a governmentality technology. It was hoped that this would lead to a stronger affinity to the European Union institutions:

“Citizenship education has a high priority because of social, economic, cultural and political changes that affect the lives of citizens. Active citizenship with a European dimension or European citizenship is defined as the membership of the European community of states which has the following dimensions: political/legal, economic, social, cultural”.120

According to the Commission Active European Citizenship can be defined as “the involvement of citizens and civil society organisations in the process of European integration”. In 2006 the European Union Member States decided to set up a new programme to work towards active citizenship called ‘Europe for Citizens Programme 2007-2013’ which has got four aims. First, it should give the European citizens “the opportunity to interact and participate in constructing an ever closer Europe, which is democratic and world-oriented, united in and enriched through its cultural diversity, thus developing citizenship of the European Union”. Second, it should help develop “a sense of European identity, based on

common values, history and culture”. Third, it should facilitate the “fostering a sense of ownership of the European Union among its citizens”. Finally, it is hoped that the programme will “enhancing tolerance and mutual understanding between European citizens respecting and promoting cultural and linguistic diversity, while contributing to intercultural dialogue”.

As argued above, the idea of the active citizen is increasingly being used within European Union discourse and is based on the neo-liberal idea that the individual should be an ethical subject that takes responsibility for her/his own wellbeing. I argue that by promoting the idea of the European subject as an active citizen the, European Union is coercing individuals to become responsible for their own wellbeing when the state or the European Union can no longer provide for them economically. In this sense, European citizenship is closely linked to neo-liberal European identity. When reading what is written about the active citizen in European Union discourse on European identity and higher education, a picture of Foucault’s ethical, self-reflecting individual that is performing conduct on the self comes to mind. It is argued that citizenship should be reflexive while the individual should be reflective and self-critical. However there is also reference made to a more traditional view of who the citizen is, as it is argued that active citizenship should be associated with alternative forms of political representation and involvement in ‘civil society’. The emphasis on the active citizen is not specific to the European Union but part of the neo-liberal discourse. McDonald and Marston suggest that there has been a shift in the last two decades from liberal welfare regimes to governance based on advanced liberalism. For example, looking at Federal Government in Australia Herbert-Cheshire and Lawrence argue that there has been a rolling back of the protective welfare state and a move towards community self-help and active citizenship.

Looking closer at the idea of the active citizen, Warburton and Smith claim that:

“The continual articulation of the “good” norm, compared with the alternative “bad”, deviant citizens creates and enforces in our minds how it is to behave appropriately within society. We therefore situate ourselves in relation to, these discourses, either reacting to or incorporating the ideals of good and bad citizenship into our own behaviour. We then in turn

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use these discourses to position those around us, thereby perpetuating and strengthening ideals of citizenship within the community".126

Let us now look closer at how the idea of citizenship is discussed among academics and what criticism they have expressed. A European citizenship based on civic values has however been criticised as it is only granted to those who already have national citizenship in one of the European Union member states. If this member state, for example Germany, bases its citizenship on cultural or ethnic ideas then by proxy European citizenship also becomes ethnical in character and excludes ‘the Other’ on the grounds that ‘he’ is culturally different from ‘us’. Meehan, being influenced by Marshall, suggests that citizenship should consist of both political rights and “material well-being and ‘belonging’”. If an individual feels part of the group/society and has access to education and the employment market s/he is capable of using the rights and opportunities that are open to citizens.127 According to Wiener one of the weaknesses of European Union citizenship is exactly this, that it is based on Member State nationality rather than on European nationality. In addition, European Union citizenship in terms of participation or representation is still underdeveloped compared to the national counterparts. Further, it is argued that the political and socio-cultural dimensions of European Union citizenship appear to be missing. This in turn has resulted in European Union citizenship, as an identity and a community of belonging, still being weak.

Let us now study the relationship between citizenship and education further. In both national and European discourses dealing with citizenship, education is seen as important. This can take the form of teaching about citizenship, with its rights and obligations, at schools and higher education institutions, as well as providing citizenship education for those that are no longer in the education system:

“… the primary aim of education is the development of human potential, of the whole person, enabling all citizens to participate as fully as possible in cultural, economic, political and social life. It should go without saying that learning for active citizenship lies at the heart of our civilisation’s aspirations in this regard”.


128 Cresson, E., foreword to “Learning for active citizenship: a significant challenge in building a Europe of Knowledge”, (http://europa.eu.int/com pete/education/archive/citizen/citiz_en.html, accessed 2005-10-01). Henry, et. al. are pessimistic concerning the possibility of democratic forms of education dedicated to aiming at providing social justice and improvement under the conditions of
Thus, not only is education supposed to make students aware of the diversity that makes Europe unique, education is also seen as a useful tool in making Europeans into European citizens, in other words help create a civic European identity:

“… the role of education in transmitting the values of society – democracy, citizenship, community – though this also underlies the comments made by all the Member States on the role of education as a whole”.

In the 1990s neo-liberal ideas, such as quality, entered the citizenship discourse. In “the Green Paper on the European Dimension of Education” it was argued that European citizenship can be seen as an ‘added-value’ of a ‘Europeanisation’ of education. The Paper argues that:

“This “added value” would contribute to a European citizenship based on the shared values of interdependence, democracy, equality of opportunity and mutual respect; it would also help to extend the opportunities for improving the quality of education; and working life”.

Here we see how quality education is emphasised together with citizenship, an issue which is discussed further in chapter seven in relation to neo-liberal European identity. It is hoped that by promoting mobility of both staff and students so that they can experience other European cultures and languages first hand will result in them becoming more supportive of the European integration project and the quality of education will be improved. In addition, education is argued to play an important role in combating all forms of chauvinism and xenophobia”. The Commission stated that:

“Educational systems are not limited to ensuring the continuation of their own cultures; for the fight against inequality, to be tolerant and to respect diversity. They should also educate for citizenship; and here, Europe is not a dimension which replaces others, but one which enhances them”.

In other words, education is seen as a tool that can be used by the individual to make it easier to actively practice her/his citizenship rights. In a manner similar to how the issue of national
versus European identity has been dealt with, European Union policymakers seem very eager to emphasis that they are not attempting to create a United Europe where European citizenship would supplant national citizenship.

Looking closer at the relationship between education and the idea of active citizenship, is was argued earlier one of the problems linked to the legitimacy crisis is the lack of public support of the European Union and the European integration process. One of the ways to solve this, it has been argued, was for citizens to become more involved in public life. In other words what is asked for is for citizens to be active. The European Union’s discussions on active citizenship are not only centred around learning to be an active citizen but also they also speak of teaching active citizenship. It is possible for educators to learn how to teach active citizenship through TEACH courses, funded by national agencies of Socrates. The aim of these courses is to "explore what it means to belong to europe (sic.), discover your own values and attitudes, and learn of the competencies for active citizenship as well as methods and tools for transferring them". One way of finding out what it means to be European is through mobility, an issue which is discussed below.

3. Educating the Mobile European

The Active Citizen in Action

The right to be mobile within the European Union area is a right bestowed upon the European by the European Union. However, this right has increasingly been articulated as a duty in the construction of European identity in the official European Union discourse. In other words, "the Good European" is someone who takes advantage of this right. In the official European Union discourse it is argued that those students and teachers that partake and experience other European Union Member States and their cultures will feel more emotionally attached to the European Union. However, questions have been asked concerning whether it is possible to

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make higher education more European through student mobility. Hence, will mobility add a ‘European dimension’ to education?

In this section I investigate how the idea of mobility within the European Union, with special emphasis paid to the mobility of students, has developed over time. The goal, set by European Union officials, that by 2010 10% of all students in every Member State should go abroad for at least a part of their higher education studies, was also the proportion of mobility during the middle-ages. I argue that mobility is a technique which is part of the modern art of governing. The idea of mobility carries with it a sense of freedom and the right to move around freely and easily. However, I would argue that this is a deception in the case of European Union discourse. Rather, the concept of freedom is used by European Union policy-makers as a means to reach specific goals set by the governing powers. Foucault argued that “individuals are the vehicles of power” which in Packer’s view means that personal mobility must therefore be viewed as an act of power. Mobility is not specific to Europe and the European Union. All over the world higher education institutions are becoming more fluid and less tied to a specific geographical and cultural region and part of a market driven, i.e. neo-liberal, system of higher education that knows no borders. I argue that the idea of mobility can be linked to all three types of European identity. First, it is linked to cultural identity by the fact that through mobility the individual will gain first hand experience of other Member States’ cultures, i.e. diversity, as well as feel a sense of unity. Second, it can be seen as a neo-liberal idea, making the market work, by making the individual into an entrepreneurial self. Finally mobility also helps citizens experience the benefits of being a European citizen by benefiting from advantages not open to all people, i.e. ‘the Other’. Generally, the European Union encourages and stimulates mobility but at the same time it governs and controls it. The mobility promoted in the area of education is not a completely free movement but rather a controlled version. Mitchell speaks of neo-liberal governance technologies, which train the mobile subject; in the case of this thesis, the mobile subject equals ‘the Good European’.

other words, ‘the Good European’ is not only well-educated s/he has also been mobile during her/his studies. The European Union uses various technologies to carry out surveillance and control the mobility of student. For example, students are encouraged to take part in mobility schemes such as Erasmus, not go abroad to study at any university at random. Mobility schemes become a form of surveillance which makes it possible to speak of the European Union as a panopticon. The European Union has also worked towards making comparable and moveable degrees and later through the creation of the Bologna Process, with its European Credit Transfer S scale, discussed earlier in chapter four.

Mobility has been part of the European Union discourse from the very beginning. In the Treaty of Rome, from 1957, it was the movement of workers and services and the right to establishment which were emphasised. 142 This can be linked to the early push for ‘comparable degrees’, for professions such as doctors, dentists and veterinaries, which can be seen as an early involvement in educational matters. However, in the Single European Act from 1986 there was a shift from ‘the free movement of workers’ to ‘the free movement of persons’. This, I argue, can be seen as a shift away from viewing people simply in economic terms. One of the main initiatives taken to aid mobility is the Schengen Agreement signed in 1985 by only five Member States, i.e. Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 143 Similar to the Bologna Agreement, in the area of education, the Schengen Agreement was taken outside the European Union structure and has gained more members as time has passed. In 1990 the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement was signed and in 1995 the


Schengen Convention came into force. In the Amsterdam Treaty from 1997 it was decided that internal borders were to be abolished at the same time as it was argued that stronger, common policies concerning external borders were necessary. At this time Schengen was incorporated into the so-called First Pillar which deals with economic and social issues at the European level. Within Schengen security and mobility are what Salter calls ‘powerful governmental desires’. To achieve both mobility and security the Schengen Agreement includes a variety of computerised control systems to monitor ‘undesirable’ third country nationals. There is also an enormous database called ‘Schengen Information System’ (SIS). In this sense Schengen can be seen to use the idea of risk as a governmentality technology. Also, with its control systems Schengen is an example of Foucault’s idea of surveillance and the European Union acting as a Panopticon. Also, it is important that the Member States have suitable information technology infrastructures. This has been a problem for some of the last Member States that joined. Looking closer at the idea of the technology of risk (or rather insecurity since the aim seems to create insecurity to justify certain actions), in the Vienna Action Plan presented by the European Council in 1998 on how best to implement the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty it was argued that:

“Freedom in the sense of free movement of people within the European Union remains a fundamental objective of the Treaty, and one to which the flanking measures associated with the concepts of security and justice must make their essential contribution. The Schengen achievement has shown the way and provides the foundation on which to build. However, the Treaty of Amsterdam also opens the way to giving ‘freedom’ a meaning beyond free movement of people across internal borders. It is also freedom to live in a law-abiding environment in the knowledge that public authorities are using everything in their individual and collective power … to combat and contain those who seek to deny or abuse that freedom”.

Here we see how freedom of movement is discussed in relation to security and a sense of risk possibly coming from ‘the Undemocratic Other’ who might try to enter into ‘our’ space.

144 The first five Member States to join were Belgium, France, Holland, Luxembourg, and Germany. Similar to the Bologna Agreement, in the area of education, Schengen Agreement was taken outside the European Union structure. Italy joined the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement in 1990, Spain and Portugal 1991, Greece 1992, Austria 1995, and Denmark, Finland and Sweden joined in 1996. Also signatories, but not Member States of the European Union, are Norway and Iceland.
The Mobile Student

As argued earlier, in the beginning of European cooperation, after the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, mobility was mainly linked to employment but later on we see how employment, education and mobility become linked.\footnote{However, mobility does not have to be geographical but can also be virtual. New technology, such as for example the Internet has opened up new opportunities. Many higher education institutions now offer web-based distance education. The Future Project: Policy for Higher Education in a Changing World, Brown University, “The Universal Impact of Competition and Globalization in Higher Education”, October 2000, pp. 1-18, p. 5.} Even though the European Union has been working to improve mobility as it is seen to be beneficial to a variety of policy areas, e.g. employment, economy, etc, it is still felt that mobility is not working smoothly. It was hoped that by aiding mobility one would be able to create a true European social area and a ‘citizens’ Europe. However, so far the European Union has not been very successful in promoting the idea of going abroad to live and work. Less than two percent of the European Union population works in another European Union Member State.\footnote{Toggenburg, G.N., “Minorities (…) The European Union: Is the Missing Link an ‘of’ or a ‘within’?”, European Integration, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2003 September, pp. 273-284, p.275. According to Rational Choice Economic Theory the number ought to be much higher than it is. This, Van Houtum and Van Der Velde argue, depends on the need of people to belong. Van Houtum, H. & Van Der Velde, M., “Outlook on Europe: The Power of Cross-border Labour Market Immobility”, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, Vol. 95, No. 1, 2004, pp. 100-107, pp. 103-104.} When it comes to student mobility it is claimed that there remain three main obstacles. First, there is a lack of information on the exchange programmes and the recognition processes for course etc. Second, the cost of studying abroad is still high, despite the fact that the European Union offers grants. This is especially true for students from countries that don’t offer complementary funding. Finally, there is a lack of language skills. The UK and other countries offering courses in English, as well as Spain, are the most popular countries for studies abroad through the Erasmus scheme.\footnote{CEC, “Programme for Student Mobility under the Erasmus Scheme”, Brussels, 26 September 2001, pp. 1-20, p.7.} In 1996 the Commission issued “The Green Paper on ‘Education – Training – Research: The Obstacles to Trans-national Mobility’”. The reason the Commission gave for preparing this paper was that it saw a need to promote mobility. The idea of free movement was hoped that by aiding mobility they would be able to create a true European social area and ‘a Citizens’ Europe’. The paper stated that capital, goods and services still move more freely across the borders of the European Union Member States than people do. This meant that on a daily basis the European Union’s different education programs were facing problems when it came to the implementation stage.\footnote{CEC, “Green Paper – Education – Training – Research: Obstacles to Transnational Mobility”, COM (96) 462/final, Brussels, 2 October 1996, pp. 1-63, p. 1.} In relation to the idea of the free movement of people and ‘a People’s Europe’, not specifically in relation to education, in 1989 the European Council argued that:
“All Community policies in the economic and social spheres contribute directly and indirectly to consolidating a common sense of belonging. This movement must be broadened and accelerated by the adoption of concrete measures which will enable European citizens to recognize in their daily lives that they belong to a single entity.”  

The European Council, at the same summit, goes on to argue that it is important to remove all obstacles to the free movement of people. Thus, the internal borders were seen as symbolic divisions that hindered ‘a People’s Europe’ from becoming a reality in people’s minds. But at the same time as the internal borders were seen as unnecessary the European Council emphasised the need for proper protection of external borders. In relation to the free movement of people, the right of Community nationals, to choose their place of residence freely among the Member States, was also seen as an “important step towards the integration of the peoples of the Community”. In this sense mobility can be seen as a way of experiencing ‘Unity in Diversity’ personally. Once again we see how mobile students are linked to the idea of mobile workers:

“Mobility activities are highly effective and beneficiaries are largely satisfied with their results. The European added value is significant, in terms of awareness of cultural diversity and greater understanding and tolerance of differences. There is a probable benefit in terms of employability and a definite one in terms of professional skills. Teacher and trainer mobility, which is considered to be highly desirable for all categories of staff, is not as high as it could be, however. Solutions should be sought together with the Member States in order to reduce the obstacles”.

Not only is it important to teach students about the greatness of Europe and its history. It is also important that students get a chance to travel abroad to study and to experience another national (European) culture. When talking about exchanges between schools in different countries the Adonnino Committee ties this up with culture by arguing that “(t)he aim is also to promote cultural and human links across frontiers”.

Learning To Be(come) A Good European
A Critical Analysis of the Official European Union Discourse on European Identity and Higher Education

In relation to the benefits of mobility, hence why mobility is promoted, in the Commission’s paper “Europe by Degrees: EU Cooperation in Higher Education”, from 2003, it is argued that travel broadens the mind. This idea of first hand experience of studying abroad is seen as a fundamental part of European Union’s higher education policy. It is argued that students, as well as teachers, widen their horizons by experiencing education systems different from that in their home country. It is hoped that individuals, through taking part in the educational mobility schemes, such as Socrates, get “a direct and specific European experience”, which will help create a European citizenship. Looking specifically at the by now abandoned Socrates programme, it was suggested that it:

“…favoured the development of key skills in European citizenship, particularly on the language front, but also in terms of communication and countering cultural prejudice and stereotypes”.

Here we see once again how the civic and cultural versions of European identity are intimately associated by linking language, which is part of culture, to citizenship. Even though the European Union has been working to improve mobility as it is seen to be beneficial to a variety of policy areas, e.g. employment, economy, etc, it is still felt that mobility is not working smoothly.

From Bilateral Agreements to a common European Higher Education Area

Linked to the idea of mobility are other forms of governmentality technologies/techniques. According to the European Union discourse one of the most important ways to aid and encourage mobility is to increase the transparency of qualifications. I argue that the agreements on recognition of diplomas and professional education and training can be seen as examples of surveillance since, as was argued in chapter two in relation to the power of modern government, surveillance is supported by, among other things, records and the collection of data and statistics. Students who have wanted to study in another European Union

country have come upon some difficult hurdles on the way. One of them was that diplomas from one European Union country might not be accepted in another European Union country. This obviously also affected their chances of finding a job after graduation. Therefore one can say that education is also linked to the idea of the free movement of workers. These attempts to streamline diplomas have been going on as long as the European integration process but really took off during the preparation for the Single European Act. To make mobility more attractive and run more smoothly the European Union has been working towards recognition of diplomas and professional education and training since the very beginning of European integration. In the future when the Bologna Strategy, discussed in chapter four, is properly implemented there will be no need to think about these problems since at least the length of all courses should be the same. However, difference in content might still cause a problem, which is an issue which is largely left unmentioned by the European Union institutions.

The process of working towards transparency and recognition of diplomas and recognition of professional education and training has been dealt with by the European Union for the duration of the time-span covered in this thesis. In the Tindemans Report from 1976 it was argued that a pragmatic solution should be found on the sensitive matter of equivalence of diplomas and studies, which were seen as hurdles for the integration of educational systems in Europe. It was argued that integration of educational systems should be achieved by “fostering bilateral or multilateral agreements between universities and educational institutions under which the latter would undertake to organize student exchanges”. Worth mentioning is the fact that at the time that the Tindemans Report was written education was not a priority among European Union decision-makers; instead research was seen as a policy-area that should be promoted. It was suggested that by making progress in scientific and technological research the member states would continue to be competitive. The Adonnino report, from 1985, develops the ideas put forward in the Tindemans Report by claiming that studying abroad has been quite problematic, especially at university level. Therefore, the Adonnino Committee suggests changes that need to be done to make things run more smoothly. For example, there is a need for “a general system of recognition of the equivalence of university diploma”. Further, the Committee argued that even though:

\[\begin{align*}
163 & \text{Adonnino, P., “A People’s Europe - Reports from the ad hoc Committee”. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 7/85, pp. 1-32, p. 7.}
\end{align*}\]
“…a certain degree of adaptation may be desirable in specific cases, a full-scale harmonization is not a practical way of implementing the objectives of the Treaty of Rome in the field of the right of establishment. The European Council should decide that the general approaches should be based on a mutual recognition of diplomas or other examinations without prior harmonization. This seems the only possible way of achieving a general system for ensuring the equivalence of diplomas in line with the conclusions of the Fountainebleau European Council”. 164

Comparable degrees have also been strongly linked to market incentives, which can be seen as part of neo-liberal rationality. During the 1980s the idea of the European citizen was mainly mentioned in relation to making the internal market work properly. The free movement of European citizens was seen as especially important. 165 The Adonnino Committee also made reference to the importance of education and links it to the development of the economic sector. It argues for the development of vocational education and training as well as the need to encourage universities and research institutes to become more geared towards the commercial sector. 166 The Adonnino Committee suggested that:

“In some branches of the liberal professions the mutual recognition of diplomas or other examinations and/or formal requirements for the purpose of establishment and for the freedom to provide services has been reached (e.g. doctors, dentists, veterinary surgeons). In other branches the mutual recognition still encounters considerable difficulties. This depends, on the one hand, on the variety of higher education diplomas (e.g. architects, engineers), and on the other hand also on the variety of branches of training which have arisen in the individual Member States (e.g. lawyers, charted accountants, tax consultants). For many years there have been inconclusive discussions on proposals for these branches, which would lead to an equivalence of diplomas in all Member States by way of harmonization of training courses, diplomas and rules for access to professional life”. 167

In June 1986 the European Council encouraged the Council of Ministers to work towards easing the restrictions on border area passenger traffic, right of residence and a general system of mutual recognition of diplomas. 168 In December 1986 the European Council pushed for a

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faster progress with the creation of ‘a Citizens’ Europe’, which would mean freer movement of people and the mutual recognition of professional qualifications. For workers to be able to go and work in another European Union country their skills and qualifications would have to be accepted in these other countries. This argument is also linked to what the Adonnino Committee calls ‘the Right of establishment’, ‘the Right of residence’ and the acknowledgement of professional qualifications. In its ‘Activities’ report in June 1988 the European Council expressed its contentment over the fact that decisions had been taken or were under way in strategic areas, for example the mutual recognition of diplomas. The European Council argued that a large market cannot work properly if access to vocational training is not improved in all Member States. Once again the European Council emphasised the importance of mutual recognition of qualifications. On the issue of mobility, in the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in 1993, it was argued in Article 126 that Community action should be aimed at “[e]ncouraging mobility of students and teachers, inter alia by encouraging the academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study”. As was shown in chapter four, with the Bologna Agreement in 1999 the idea of transparency gained new momentum and this could be seen in the Lisbon strategy from 2000 and the European Council in Barcelona in 2002. A further and recent step towards increasing transparency regarding diplomas and grades has been the Europass, which can be seen as a governmentality technique linked to the governmentality technologies of education and mobility. I argue that another way to practice surveillance. In 2004 the European Parliament and the Council “established a single framework for the transparency of qualifications and competences” known as the Europass. The aim of the Europass is to “[o]pening doors to learning and working in Europe”. It was created in order “to encourage mobility and lifelong learning in an enlarged Europe. It aims to help three million citizens make their qualifications and skills easily understood throughout Europe by 2010”. Here we see how mobility is linked to Lifelong Learning which is part of neo-liberal rationality discussed further in chapter seven.

other words, mobility is linked to all three versions of European identity, i.e. as a tool to make it possible to travel abroad to experience other cultures and languages, as well as it becomes a sign of citizenship since mobility is only open to citizens of the European Union Member States. Looking further at the Europass, it consists of five different documents. First, the Europass CV which helps the individual make his/her competences visible and understood by employers and education institutions in other Member States; second, the Europass Mobility which shows where and for how long the person has stayed in another Member State in order to study. Third, the Europass Diploma Supplement which helps make higher education qualifications more easily interpreted and understood in other Member States; in other words, it increases the transparency of qualifications. Fourth, the Europass Certificate Supplement which shows which vocational experiences the individual has had. Finally, the Europass Language Portfolio/ Eurolanguage Passport which helps the individual demonstrate which language skills s/he has got.176

The European Union Passport

A further tool to help the European citizens, whether it is students, workers or tourists, become more mobile is the passport. The Tindemans Report argues that in relation to the movement of persons various measures were under discussion, such as for example uniformity of passports and in the end a European Union passport. Other important external signs are a greater uniformity of educational matters, such as for example student exchanges, and collaboration between information media to encourage spreading of information and better knowledge of each other.177 The European passport also plays an important role as a direct sign or symbol of citizenship, as discussed more in length in chapter five. Looking closer at how the European passport became a reality it can be seen that the process started in the early 1970s, when the first steps towards a common European identity were taken, and continued up until the early 1990s. A common European passport became a reality in 1992. The process began with a passport union being discussed, to later be developed into the aim of creating a uniform passport shared by all European Union Member States and citizens.178 The purpose of the passport was partly to have a common political symbol to show the rest of the world. The Adonnino report, discussing the idea of ‘A People’s Europe, stated:

Civic European Identity and Higher Education: Learning for Active Citizenship

“Finally the Committee will examine symbols of the Community’s identity, here the Committee would again urge the European Council to take all necessary steps to ensure that the European common-format passport will be available in all of the Member States as soon possible, not only, as at present, in the minority of States”. 179

On the purpose of the common passport, it is argued to have a symbolic value in that “it is the first identity document issued to all citizens of the Member States, and the words ‘European Community’ will precede the name of the Member State”.180 However, the passport also has a practical role in the sense that “it is the keystone of a passport union aimed at putting an end to all identity checks at the Community’s internal frontiers”.181 In other words, a common passport would also help streamline procedures at the frontier posts.

Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that increasingly the cultural idea of ‘A People’s Europe’ has given way to the political idea of ‘A Citizen’s Europe’. I have highlighted the fact that there has been a shift from primarily stressing citizenship rights to increasingly emphasising both duties and obligations, i.e. the citizen is expected to participate in civil society to make citizens ‘closer to Europe’. One of the main rights is that of education. The increased dignity of education can be seen by the fact that education was written into the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was later incorporated into the proposed European Union Constitution.

The shift from speaking mainly about citizenship rights to talking about the active citizen occurred a decade ago with the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. More specifically, there has been, as argued by Bellamy and Warleigh, a shift from an ethics of integration to an ethics of participation where ‘the Good European citizen’ is expected to be an active member of civil society.182 The aim is to make the citizens more emotionally attached to the European integration process generally and the European Union institutions more specifically. Hence, it

has been suggested that a European civil society can be seen as “a mediating device in relation to the problems posed by European integration”. In other words, it will help create a European version of the social contract which exists in the nation-state. In order to achieve this it is important, perhaps even necessary, for the individual to improve his/her skills levels and become a lifelong learner, an idea which is discussed further in relation to neo-liberal European identity in chapter seven. Also in relation to education, in recent years there has been an increased emphasis on the notion of ‘learning for active citizenship’. Hence, the idea of activity is put forward as the norm in European Union discourse on European identity and higher education. Through education individuals are disciplined into becoming active and self-reliant citizen meaning that the self becomes something to work on. Thus, becoming active can be seen as a form of ‘conduct of the self’.

However, the idea of active citizenship is not unproblematic since it is an uncomfortable mixing together of identity discourse and neo-liberal rationalities. In addition, the idea of a common European citizenship has been criticised for being based on Member State citizenship. If these Member State citizenships are ethno-cultural in definition so will European citizenship also be in extension. As Hansen has suggested, European citizenship is an uncomfortable gelling of neo-liberalism and ethno-culturalism. There has also been criticism concerning the type of citizenship which is being supported by the elite. Van Ham poses the question of whether it is possible to think of a European citizenship, not in the homogeneous terms of the nation-state, but rather towards some form of polycentric, civic form of Europeanism. In addition, Mouffe warns against returning to a pre-modern concept of the political and ideas of Gemeinschaft type of community. Lehning adds to this argument by claiming that it is difficult to imagine a European citizenship based on the communitarian or Gemeinschaft idea could develop. Instead he suggests that European citizenship ought to be based on Liberal democratic values, such as the equality of every

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185 Elm Larsen, J., “The active society and activation policy” in Andersen, J. & Elm Larsen, J., (eds.), “Coping with social polarization in the urban landscape – reflections upon the politics of empowerment”, GEP-Report no. 1-2002, pp. 79-108. Also see Fejes, A., who looks specifically at the construction of the adult learner and argues that the adult learner is governed by various techniques such as for example guidance, risk, auditing, assessment, diversity, etc. Fejes, A., “Constructing the Adult Learner- a Governmentality Analysis”, PhD-thesis, Linköpings Universitet, 2006.
individual despite differences. In other words, the European citizenship ought to be based on
the idea of ‘Unity in diversity’. 189

Chapter Seven

Neo-liberal European Identity and Higher Education

Learning for Life and the Market

"The Union must become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion"

European Council, Lisbon, March 2000

Introduction

So far this thesis has analysed the construction of the relationship between the ideas of a cultural and civic version of European identity and higher education. Now it is time to look at “the new kid on the block”, i.e. neo-liberal European identity, which is increasingly being stressed by European Union policy-makers in relation to higher education in the official European Union discourse. A pivotal moment for this version of European identity was the agreement on the Lisbon Strategy in the early 2000s. At the Lisbon European Council in 2000 it was argued that the European Union was facing “a quantum shift resulting from globalisation and the knowledge-driven economy”. I claim that globalisation can be seen as a modern myth which argues that it is a question of ‘united we stand, divided we fall’ in a Europe portrayed as a ‘Risk Society’. However, it is not ‘thick’ enough to carry the whole European integration process since, to repeat Monnet’s rhetorical question: “who would fall in love with the common market?” Put differently, in contemporary European Union discourse this version of European identity is constructed as necessary but not sufficient to create a sense of belonging. Further, according to this version of European identity higher education is not simply a tool used by policy-makers to make the individual aware of her/his heritage or give her/him the competencies to become an active citizen. Rather, here education is seen as the very essence of what it means to be a ‘Good European’.

1 Hansen makes a similar distinction when he speaks of a Neo-liberal Communitarian Citizenship, see Hansen, P. “‘European Citizenship’, or Where Neoliberalism Meets Ethno-Culturalism: Analysing the European Union’s citizenship discourse”, European Societies, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2000, pp. 139-165.


Neo-liberal European Identity and Higher Education - Learning for Life and the Market

The industrial economy has disappeared, which has led to the weakening and partial dismantling of the welfare state. The Member States of the European Union have all, to a greater or lesser degree, created institutions to even out social inequalities; however, we have recently experienced a scaling back of the welfare state in many of the Member States. Moravcsik suggests that different forces of globalisation, such as trade, immigration, foreign investment and capital flows, have been the cause of this scaling back of welfare provisions.

In addition he suggests that:

“The EU cannot respond effectively to this tendency, despite overwhelming support for the maintenance of welfare systems, because of a neo-liberal bias in the constitutional structure of the EU, and the rhetoric that surrounds it, which favours market liberalization (‘negative integration’) over social protection (‘positive integration’)”.6

Higher education can be seen as a cornerstone in the shift from an industrial society to one based on knowledge. In many states, conservative governments came to power in the late 1990s, and they cut spending on the social welfare apparatus, such as welfare provisions, social service care and social housing (but not education), while leaving costs for the army and the polity, in other words the control state apparatus, largely intact.7 The shift away from an industrial economy has meant changes in how the European is discursively constructed. We are argued to live in a ‘Learning Society’ with an emphasis on ideas such as a ‘Knowledge Economy’ and an ‘Information Society’.8 It was in the 1990s that the ideas of a ‘Europe of Knowledge’ and ‘Lifelong Learning’ were introduced into the official European Union discourse, at least to any serious extent.9 This shift has led to cut backs in welfare spending in the European nation-states which has affected education as well, even though academics

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4 There does not seem to be any clear agreement among academics concerning to what agree the welfare state has been affected by neo-liberal politics. For example, Hemerijck argues that claims that the welfare state has experienced “retrenchment”, “roll-back”, “retrait”, and “demise” do not go far enough and that in reality the changes have been much more extensive than that. Also important to point out is the fact that different states are affected differently. This is a problem for the European Union when creating policy. See for example Hemerijck, A., “Europe’s Semi-sovereign Welfare States as Evolutionary Systems”, Inequality Summer Institute 2006, Kennedy School of Government, June 15-16, 2006, (www.ksg.harvard.edu/inequality/Summer/Summer06/papers/Hemerijck.pdf , accessed 2007-11-29), pp. 1-29, p. 2; and Hemerijck, A., “Recasting Europe's Semi-Sovereign Welfare States and the Role of the EU”, 2004, (http://www.europeanddisillusion.org/calendar/fall04events/hemerijckPaper.pdf , accessed 2007-08-13), pp. 1-53.


disagree on the extent of these cuts. However, this is not the only change in the relationship between the state and the mass education system. There has also been a change in what the state and the European Union expect from education and the student. Hence, the role of education has changed as we have moved from the industrial economy to a knowledge economy. This shift has meant a change in the meaning of ‘solidarity’ as well and some would even argue that there has been a ‘solidarity-decline’. In today’s Europe ‘competitive solidarity’ is being championed in favour of more traditional versions. This means that there has been a shift from public to private responsibility for social protection. In other words, showing solidarity in Europe today does not mean being prepared to pay for others but rather that each individual takes responsibility for his/her own economic well-being. Showing solidarity today means pulling one’s own weight and not being a burden on society. One of the ways in which the individual can take this responsibility is through the active participation in education, in other words ‘Lifelong Learning’. As the European Union discourse suggests, we have entered into the ‘Knowledge and Learning Age’. Hence, in contemporary society, with its post-industrial and modern capitalist character, citizens are expected to make themselves competitive on the labour market. The State will come across as acting in the best interests of its citizens while at the same time construct a common public subjectivity, in the form of the flexible Lifelong Learner’, which in turn can help increase productivity. In 2004, the European Commission issued a report called “Getting into the spirit of the union” where it was argued that “Europe’s capacity for constant change and renewal was and remains the most important source of its success and its unique character”. Hence, in contemporary society, with its post-industrial and modern capitalist character, citizens are expected to make themselves competitive on the labour market. The State will come across as acting in the best interests of its citizens while at the same time construct a common public subjectivity, in the form of the flexible Lifelong Learner’, which in turn can help increase productivity. In 2004, the European Commission issued a report called “Getting into the spirit of the union” where it was argued that “Europe’s capacity for constant change and renewal was and remains the most important source of its success and its unique character”. In other words, flexibility is constructed as an innate part of European identity and of who the European is.

This chapter is divided into three major parts. The first section looks at the meaning of neo-liberalism and how it came onto the political agenda in Western Europe. In addition, this section looks at how neo-liberalism in the European Union discourse is of an embedded kind

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where market ideas are cushioned by a social dimension and an emphasis on the need to improve access to higher education so that all Europeans can become active participants in the ‘Knowledge Age’. The importance of competitiveness is stressed together with the ideas of ‘quality’ and ‘efficiency’. These ideas coexist with what might seem as an impossible match, i.e. the concept of ‘equity’. In other words, aspirations of competitiveness and social inclusion go hand in hand. The second part of this chapter looks at the changing role and structure of the University; as the environment in which it exists has altered so have also the expectations on the University. As was argued in chapter four, after the Second World War the education systems generally of Western nation-states have undergone substantial remodelling. From the 1960s onwards, the University, and thereby also education, has gone from being available mainly to a small elite clique, to opening its doors to the wider public. At the same time, there has been a commodification of education, where education is seen as a product which can be bought and sold, and universities are increasingly adopting market strategies. 16 This can be linked to the idea that education is increasingly being seen as ‘a sign’ rather than ‘a thing’. In other words, students increasingly choose a university because of what that university represents, its reputation, rather than what is taught. The third part presents the ideas of ‘Lifelong Learning’ and ‘Flexibility’ which have a prominent position in the official European Union discourse. It also looks closer at the emphasis on ‘Skills’, which can be linked to higher education and more specifically to the aim of Lifelong Learning. I argue that the stress on the continuous updating of skills shows that there are normative expectations on the European. To be seen as a ‘Good’ and normal European, or as Mitchell would have it, a strategic cosmopolitan, s/he ought to take active part in these activities.17

1. Flexicurity - More Than Simply Paying Lip Service?

There seems to be an agreement on the fact that neo-liberalist rationalities have gained a hegemonic position in European politics. As Peck and Tickell argue, neo-liberalism is the new religion and they describe neo-liberalism in metaphorical terms as a form of ‘ideological software’ which came onto the political agenda in the 1980s when there was a shift in politics in the western world, and neo-liberal rationality came to play an important role in many...
countries. Keyesian politics lost their popularity during this period and the welfare state was scaled back. In contemporary European political discourse, both at the national and European level, there are claims made that we are living in an increasingly globalised and insecure world. The answer to this situation has been a shift away from Keynesian politics to neo-liberalism. This has led to the national welfare state and social democracy largely being abandoned, or, in Storey’s words, dismantled, in favour of a market state adhering to neo-liberal rationality in Western Europe. In other words, there has been a shift from a welfare state to a competition state where the main aim of government is to increase international competitiveness through the mobilisation of society and creation of the active citizens. Often neo-liberalism is connected to economic policy but it has had an influence on other policy areas as well. In other words, as suggested by Peck and Tickell, neo-liberalism seems to be everywhere. Giroux develops this idea by suggesting that:

“Neo-liberalism is not simply an economic policy designed to cut government spending, pursue free-trade policies, and free market forces from government regulations; it is also a political philosophy and ideology that affects every dimension of social life.”

In the early 1980s Western countries began to feel pressured to compete on a global market. This was also the time when education and the economy became strongly linked by putting pressure on educational institutions to monitor pupils’ and students’ performance and provide


‘quality’ education, which at the European level can clearly be seen in the Bologna Agreement and the Lisbon Strategy, as shown in chapter four.\footnote{24}

However, neo-liberalism in Europe is of a specific kind, influenced by the fact that the Western European countries have a long history of being welfare states. Neo-liberalism is embedded by a social dimension. A sign of the embedding of neo-liberalism can be seen in the fact that at the same time as neo-liberal rationality became increasingly popular in the 1980s Jacques Delors and his Commission started working towards a ‘Social Europe’.\footnote{25} This is what can be seen as a ‘double bind’ of the flexibility and security nexus, which is sometimes referred to as flexicurity which aims at increasing the performance and as a result also the competitiveness of companies, sectors, Member States as well as the European Union as a whole.\footnote{26} At the same time there is an awareness of increasing levels of social exclusion, segmentation and poverty which threatens social integration and cohesion in the European Union and its Member States.\footnote{27} The first the idea of flexicurity appeared in European Union discourse was in “the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment”, adopted in 1993, and later clearly spelt out in “the Green Paper – Partnership for a New Organisation of Work” from 1997.\footnote{28} In the end of 2006 the Commission launched a public consultation, entitled “Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century”, which ran until June 2007. When the finishing touches were added to this thesis, in the summer of 2007, the

\footnote{24 For an account on how neoliberal ideas have affected Canadian education policy see Spencer, B.L., “The Seduction of the Subject/Citizen: Governmentality and School Governance Policy”, paper presented at the Foucault and Education Special Interest Group “Re-examining What We Know and the Knowing Subject” Session, 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Education Research Association, Seattle, Washington, 18-14 April 2001, pp. 1-20.}


Commission had produced a proposal for a communication dealing with ‘flexicurity’. In addition, the European Parliament created a proposal for a resolution, adopted in July 2007, in which it was argued that:

"...at a time of globalisation and rapid technological progress, demographic change and significant growth of the services sector, improvement of European labour law where necessary to take account of the requirement for increasing flexibility demanded by employers and employees alike, as well as a desire for greater work security, will ensure that both undertakings and workers are able to adapt successfully, thereby reinforcing the values of the European Social Model."  

In chapter two it was suggested that modern government governs through risk in the sense that they justify decisions as solutions to different forms of risks or uncertainties. The idea of risk and the management of risk also play an important role in neo-liberal discourse at the European level. The risk of poverty and other forms of social exclusion can be managed through adding a social dimension to the neo-liberal agenda in the European Union. In this sense education and training are seen to play an important role in creating and maintaining an inclusive society. However, there is a perceived need for urgent reforms of Europe’s education and training systems if Europe is to meet its social and economic objectives. In other words, even though neo-liberalism is becoming increasingly influential decision-makers in the European Union seem aware that it is not feasible to leave the citizens to fend completely for themselves as the welfare state provisions are diminishing. Therefore, a social dimension is being emphasised in unison with neo-liberalism, which is especially clear in the Lisbon Strategy.

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Despite the process of dismantling the welfare state, education and training policy and budgets have been left reasonably untouched. In Levin’s words there has been and still is an epidemic of educational policy. The reason for this according to Scholte is the fact that they are both seen as tools that can enable countries to become more competitive on the global markets. Looking closer at the embedding of neo-liberalism, it can be seen in the emphasis on access to higher education and the fact that education is a part of the welfare state’s provisions which has remained fairly untouched. As it is today access to higher education varies substantially between different Member States with Finland and Sweden being at the top of the score table while Luxembourg and Malta fall behind. However, increasing the number of citizens that take part in higher education is not simply a question about social equality. Rather, as Fuller argues, there is increasing global pressure to open universities to a wider audience. The reason for this is not simply to give people access to knowledge for the sake of it but is also seen as important to support economic growth. These new circumstances have also increased the need of knowledge management. Universities, in comparison to such organisation as for example McDonald’s, has over qualified but badly managed staff. Part of neo-liberal rationality is also the idea of marketisation of universities through the introduction of fees for higher education which critics argue would mean that access would become more difficult for students from working class back grounds. According to Giroux it is inherent in neo-liberalism that economic cleavages will deepen, which he argues has been the case in the USA. However, fees would probably also affect different Member States’ citizens differently. Countries, such as for example Sweden, with good student loan systems would probably be less affected than in those where students depend on private funds. These are issues that will be discussed further later in this chapter in relation to the changing role and organisation of the University.

38 There has also been criticism raised concerning the idea of social equality generally. Ohlendorf suggests that a European identity should be based on the idea of equality but questions whether this is possible since what constitutes Europe is unclear and not properly defined. Ohlendorf, E., “European Identity as a subject for teaching and learning”, (http://www.eudinev.de/eudinev/id08.htm , accessed 2006-10-10), pp. 1-8, p. 1.
Let us now look closer at how the European Union discourse on European identity and higher education discuss the issue of embedded neo-liberalism. According to a Commission communication entitled *Towards a Europe of Knowledge*, which was published in 1997, “our societies must offer all citizens greater opportunities for access to knowledge, irrespective of their age or circumstances”. Further, on the idea of a social dimension generally, in a communication from 2000, the Commission argues that:

“The new Social Policy Agenda revolves around a series of actions designed to ensure that the full benefits can be reaped from as well as contribute to the dynamic interaction between economic, employment and social policy. A key message is that growth is not an end in itself but essentially a means to achieving a better standard of living for all. Social policy underpins economic policy and employment has not only economic but also social value”.

Thus, it is argued that both employment and social policy can help the Member States become more productive and more adaptable to change. In addition, it is suggested that these policies will play an essential role when the European Union Member States fully embrace the knowledge-based economy. In 2001, in a report to the European Council, the Council argued that one of the main strategic objectives for the next decade is to improve access of all to the education and training systems. According to the Commission if this is to become reality what is needed is both a “radical transformation of the European economy” and “a challenging programme for the modernisation of social welfare and education systems”. Part of the process of modernising education systems is to make them more efficient while at the same time emphasising the need for equity. In Welch’s mind, there is a cult of efficiency associated with education. In a communication published in 2006, the Commission discussed the issue of the efficiency of education:

“Efficiency involves the relationship between the inputs and outputs in a process. Systems are efficient if the inputs produce the maximum output. Relative efficiency within education

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systems is usually measured through test and examination results, while their efficiency in relation to wider society and the economy is measured through private and social rates of return.”

Ergo, the idea of efficiency, which can be linked to the idea of quality, can be seen as part of modern government where testing and examining are emphasised. Thus, some sort of measuring is needed to decide whether someone or something has met the quality standards. In other words, it is seen as important to be able to rank both students and universities in accordance to their quality, an issue which will be discussed further later in this chapter. Universities and students are under the gaze and surveillance of modern government. As argued above, the idea of ‘efficiency’ is discussed together with the concept of ‘equity’:

“Equity is viewed as the extent to which individuals can take advantage of education and training, in terms of opportunities, access, treatment and outcomes. Equitable systems ensure that the outcomes of education and training are independent of socio-economic background and other factors that lead to educational disadvantage and that treatment reflects individuals’ specific learning needs.”

The fact that ‘equity’ and ‘efficiency’ are discussed together can be seen as an example of embedded neo-liberalism. As has been shown in the discussion in this section, embedded neo-liberalism, or flexicurity as the European Union discourse prefers to call it, has become a hegemonic political rationality in Europe. There is disagreement in academic circles concerning whether neo-liberalism necessarily means greater social cleavages. Those that do not believe that greater social inequality is a natural and inevitable result of neo-liberal policies speak of ‘embedded neo-liberalism’ where neo-liberalism is cushioned through a social dimension in economic and political thinking and/or ‘welfare capitalism’. However, questions have been raised as to whether it is possible to reconcile neo-liberalism with ideas of social equality. Furthermore, it has been suggested that there has been an asymmetry between initiatives taken to support market efficiency and those promoting social protection and

equality, and the social dimension has been left on the back burner in favour of an emphasis on such neo-liberal ideals as economic growth and competitiveness.

“When Knowledge Became King” – The Construction of ‘A Europe of Knowledge’

In 2000 Cresson, then Commissioner responsible for education, spoke of “the dawning of the ‘knowledge age’ where innovation, research, education and training will be an essential part of internal policy.” This can be linked to the goal of the Lisbon Strategy to make the European Union the world’s leading knowledge economy by 2010. Barroso even goes as far as to argue that knowledge, together with innovation, forms the beating heart of European growth.

Further he suggests that knowledge is “a critical factor with which Europe can ensure competitiveness in a global world where others compete with cheap labour or primary resources”. The European Union is not alone in emphasising knowledge. In today’s world, with globalisation and the reorganisation of the world economy, knowledge and information are also becoming increasingly important and it has been one of the most discussed and debated topics in academic literature. Some scholars would even go so far as to claim that there has been a knowledge revolution as a reaction to globalisation.

In other words, the ideas of a ‘knowledge economy’ and a ‘knowledge society’ can be seen as part of the neo-liberal discourse. What we see today is a knowledge intensive or even knowledge driven economy


50 Humes draws attention to the fact that the term ‘Learning Society’ is sometimes used instead of ‘Knowledge Economy’, which in his words can perhaps be seen as a more reassuring idea. Humes, W., “The Discourses of Educational Management”, Journal of Educational Enquiry, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2000, p. 35-53, p. 40.


54 Delanty argues that the concept of “Knowledge Society” is contested and linked to new ideologies, such as for example postmodernism, neo-liberalism and third wayism. These ideologies in turn have a great impact on higher education. Delanty also asks the hypothetical question of what is meant by knowledge and whether we can speak of a society where knowledge is the main structure. He argues that there are various forms of knowledge, such as for example professional, academic and self-knowledge, with the latter meaning self-realisation or creation. Delanty, G., “Ideologies of the Knowledge Society and the Cultural Contradictions of Higher Education”, Policy Futures in Education, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2003, pp. 71-82, p. 71.

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where individuals as well as firms are encouraged to cultivate and improve their knowledge capital. It has been suggested that the intention of the knowledge economy and innovation policies is to reshape the future role of universities, in the economy as well as within culture and the society in general. Lee argues that “[c]oupled with identity politics, the politicization of knowledge amounts to a crude postmodernist rendition of Bacon’s old dictum that “knowledge is power”. As argued by the Commission at the half-way mark in 2005:

“In advanced economies such as the EU, knowledge, meaning R&D, innovation and education, is a key driver of productivity growth. Knowledge is a critical factor with which Europe can ensure competitiveness in a global world where others compete with cheap labour or primary resources”.

It has been argued that the economic importance of education has been rediscovered and that this can help us understand the global knowledge economy. Arguments have been raised concerning the need for ‘knowledge policies’ to go with the developing ‘knowledge society’.

Knowledge policies, according to the Commission, are those policies, innovation, research, education and training, which drive the contemporary knowledge society forward.

Looking more closely at the idea of knowledge; the beauty of knowledge is that it is a renewable resource, which exists in abundance. Knowledge has both a private use-value and a societal economic value, i.e. it can increasingly be bought and sold. As Harvie suggests the rationality behind neo-liberalism is to strengthen the link between money and work. It is a question of ‘training for employability’, which can be linked to the idea of ‘flexibility’ also present in the contemporary European Union discourse.

Knowledge is a product of education
but can also be seen as an economic commodity in itself. Today knowledge is one of the major products of world trade. This can be linked to the aim of making the European Union more competitive on the world market and thereby able to challenge the United States. Knowledge and culture can be seen as economic wealth and political power.\(^6^6\)

Thus, in contemporary European Union discourse one of the most common ways to describe Europe is as a ‘Knowledge community’. I argue that there has been a shift away from emphasising ‘learning’ to stressing ‘knowledge’. On the issue of the idea of learning in 1995 the Commission published the White paper “Teaching and learning: towards the learning society”, which was followed up by the communication “Towards a Europe of Knowledge”, from the Commission in 1997 where the reactions to the White Paper were reviewed.\(^6^7\) In the communication there was a strong emphasis on the relationship between knowledge and employment. It was argued that “everything must be done to build that **Europe of knowledge which we need in order to face into the twenty-first century**”.\(^6^8\) Hence, European Union action in the area of education was constructed as a necessity to face the risks in our contemporary society:

> “Economic competitiveness, employment and personal fulfilment of the citizens of Europe is no longer mainly based on the production of physical goods, nor will it be in the future. Real wealth creation will henceforth be linked to the production and dissemination of knowledge and will depend first and foremost on our efforts in the field of research, education and training and on our capacity to promote innovation. This is why we must fashion a veritable ‘Europe of knowledge’”.\(^6^9\)

Considering why the idea of ‘knowledge’ has been awarded a hegemonic position within European Union discourse, in 1998, Cresson argued that behind the idea of ‘a Europe of knowledge’ and ‘a European area of lifelong learning’ lies a deeper motivation namely to affirm the shared values, which I argued in chapter five is a thin version of cultural European

\(^6^8\) CEC, “Towards a Europe of Knowledge”, COM (97) 563/1, Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 11 November 1997, pp. 1-11, p. 2. Emphasis in original.
\(^6^9\) CEC, “Towards a Europe of Knowledge”, COM(97) 563/1, Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 11 November 1997, pp. 1-11, p. 1.
identity, and thereby also the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’, as they will provide stability in a world made to feel uncertain as a consequence of globalisation. 70

“When Quality Became Queen” – A Cult(ure) of Competitiveness

Slogan by McKinsey & co. 71

“Everything can be measured and what gets measured gets managed”

As was argued in the section above knowledge plays an important role in the official European Union discourse. Related to the idea of knowledge and education are the ideas of ‘competitiveness’ and ‘quality’. In this section I show how these two last ideas have become an increasingly important priority for policy-makers, international organisations and academics world-wide. 72 This, I argue, can be seen as a result of the shift from Keynesian economics to neo-liberal market forces. In other words, as was argued earlier, the European welfare state is being replaced by the competitive state and in contemporary Europe the idea of competitiveness plays an integral part in socio-political discourse generally. According to Shore and Wright there has been an increase in the emphasis on ‘quality’, ‘performance’, ‘effectiveness’, etc. since the late 1970s in many industrialised states. 73 In Oakland’s terms, we are witnessing a ‘quality revolution’. 74 As was argued earlier, in chapter four, there is a stress on quality in both the Bologna Agreement and the Lisbon Strategy. It is argued that the goal of the Lisbon Strategy, i.e. to make the European Union the world’s leading knowledge economy by 2010, can only be achieved through the provision of high quality education. In other words, it is through ‘quality education’ Europe will produce ‘quality’ workers who in turn will make Europe competitive on the global market. 75  

74 Oakland, J., “Total Quality Management”, (Heinemann: London, 1991). The interest in quality is not only part of political discourses but has also found its way into the academic world and since the 1990s there has been a great interest in researching quality. For an interesting and enlightening article on how academic staff deals with the pressure of continuously being “quality assured” see Newton, J., “Views from Below: academics coping with quality”, Quality in Higher Education, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2002, pp. 39-61. Also see Slaughter, S. for a discussion on the deconstruction of the ideas of quality assurance and accountability. Slaughter, S., “Problems in comparative higher education: Political economy, political sociology and postmodernism”, Higher Education, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2001, pp. 389-412.
75 However, Esko Aho argues that even though Europe wants to be competitive it is not prepared to face up to competition. See Charlemagne, “Winning by degrees”, The Economist, 3 May 2007, (http://www.economist.com/world/europe/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=9112342, accessed 2007-08-07).
In this section I discuss how the ideas of ‘competitiveness’ and ‘quality’ in European Union discourse construct ‘the Good European’. I argue that these ideas are normative and can be seen as governmentality technologies where standards are set so as to make it possible to distinguish between ‘good’ versus ‘not so good’ students, as well as higher education institutions and Member States. Further, within the European Union it is seen as important to make higher education institutions, i.e. universities, compete between themselves. The argument is that in the future universities shall not offer a wide selection of courses but rather specialise, i.e. find their own niche. Hence, it will be a world where only the fittest survive. However, by speaking of the ‘quality’ of higher education in Europe it implicitly means that other parts of the world have poor quality higher education. I believe that it can be useful to study the discourse on quality in higher education since the idea of quality is a social construct and a site of a power/knowledge struggle and a game of truth. I argue that this emphasis on ‘quality’ can be seen as a question of power in the sense that there is no clear definition of what constitutes ‘quality’. I argue that the idea of quality can be linked to the idea of competitiveness in the sense that competitive education is also seen as quality education. Thus, quality of education is linked to the market. In addition, quality is often linked to consumer satisfaction. In other words, quality is not an innate feature of the education provided but rather decided by the consumer.

Let us now look closer at how the ideas of competitiveness and quality entered the official European Union discourse. In 1987 the Council issued a resolution containing one of the first mentions of the idea that by providing quality education the European Union Member States will become competitive on the global knowledge market:

“...the competitiveness of the Community in world markets depends on ensuring that the entire intellectual resources of the universities in the Member States are harnessed to provide top quality levels of training for the benefit of the Community as a whole...the intellectual potential of the individual universities throughout the Community could be much more

76 The USA 38%, Canada 43%, Japan 36 % and South Korea 26 %. See the Bologna Process, “Realising the European Higher Education Area- Achieving the Goals”, Conference of European Higher Education Ministers, Contribution of the European Commission, Bergen, Norway, 19-20 May 2005, pp. 1-5, p. 3.
effectively exploited by providing a network for increasing student and university teacher mobility and other forms of inter-university cooperation throughout the Community.77

To put these arguments into a context, this was a time when the European Union had just created the first education programmes, and we can see how quality is linked to mobility. In other words, education in the European Union Member States will be improved by there being contact and exchanges between universities. It has been suggested that neo-liberalism contains an innate form of economic and social Darwinism which came to the fore through the work of the European Round Table of Industrialists and entered the European Union agenda with force with the "White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment" presented by Delors and his Commission in 1993.78 Also published in 1993 was the "Green Paper on the European Dimension in Education", discussed earlier in chapter five, where it was argued that when deciding on the aims and means that should enable the Community to help in the development of quality education the major aim of the completion of the Single Market had to be taken into account as well as social and technological changes, i.e. post-industrial society.79

In a decision by the European Parliament and the Council issued in 1995 quality education is once again emphasised. It is suggested that the quality of education can be improved if the Member States work together. The role of the European Union

"...is to contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organization of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity."80

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78 CEC, "White Paper - Growth, Competitiveness, Employment - The challenges and ways forward into the 21st century", COM (93) 700,
European Union policy-makers are very careful to stress the fact that European level education policy is involved with the format of education, as can be seen in the Bologna Agreement trying to streamline higher education but not the content of what is being taught at the higher education institutions in the Member States. In addition, the European Union is careful to emphasise that the need for quality of education does not mean that the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’ does not apply. This idea is reiterated in a Council recommendation from 1998 where it is suggested that “[t]he aim is to safeguard and improve the quality of higher education while taking due account of national conditions, the European dimension and international requirements.” Considering the question of why ‘quality in education’ is important, the Commission argues that quality is “the driving force for a thriving economy”. The quality the Commission refers to is that of work, in the form of “better jobs and more balanced ways of combining working life with personal life”. It also refers to quality of social policy meaning “a high level of social protection, good social services available to all people in Europe, real opportunities for all, and the guarantee of fundamental and social rights”.81 Finally, it also refers to quality in industrial relations.82 A few years later, in year 2000, in relation to the European Union education programme Socrates, the European Parliament and the Council discussed the idea of quality education in relation to both a ‘European dimension’ and ‘Lifelong Learning’. It was stated that “measures under this programme should promote the European dimension of education and contribute to the development of quality education with a view to encouraging lifelong learning”.83

To be able to access and decide on quality there is a need for competent people to make this judgement. It is argued that “[a]n adequate supply of scientists is crucial for a competitive knowledge-based economy”. In addition to making Europe the world’s leading knowledge economy by 2010 the Council wants to see a fifteen percent increase in the number of graduates, with special emphasis on mathematics, science and technology, by 2010 as well.84 This emphasis on the need for more scientists can in be linked to the neo-liberal practice of statistical use and the need for experts to carry out all data collection and analysis to manage the neo-liberal culture of ‘governing at a distance’. In 2001, in the wake of the Lisbon Strategy, the Education Council presented a report entitled “The concrete future objectives of

Neo-liberal European Identity and Higher Education - Learning for Life and the Market

education and training systems”, to the European Council, where it proposed three concrete strategic objectives for the next decade. In this document there was a strong emphasis on the quality and effectiveness of education and training systems in the European Union. This link between quality education and competitiveness has continuously been emphasised by the European Union institutions. The emphasis on quality continued at the Barcelona European Council in March 2002 where the Member States “set the objective of making European Union education and training systems a world quality reference by 2010”. The importance put on quality can be seen in the fact that an organisation called the European Association for Quality Assurance for Higher Education (ENQA) has been set up which is in charge of circulating information, experiences and good practices relating to quality assurance in higher education to European quality assurance agencies, public authorities and higher education institutions. Membership to ENQA is open to those states that have signed the Bologna Declaration. The ENQA helped by proposing general standards and guidelines to facilitate quality assurance in the European Higher Education Area. These were later adopted, in Bergen, Norway in May 2005, by the Ministers of Education from the countries that have signed the Bologna Declaration. Further on the importance given to the idea of quality, in a communication from 2006 the Commission argues that “[r]apid progress in other parts of the world shows the importance of innovative, advanced and quality education and training as a key factor of economic competitiveness.” Here we see how the Other is those countries that are competing with the European Union Member States in the area of higher education. The idea of other states perhaps being able to cope with fast change brought on by globalisation creates a sense of insecurity, of feeling threatened.

However, there are those that do not agree with the European Union’s view that to have a highly educated population would necessarily mean that the country/countries would be more prosperous and competitive. The Economist argued that the utilitarian notion that a highly

87 The organisation has got its own website, see (http://www.enqa.eu/, accessed 2007-03-07). There is also a European Network for Quality Assurance in VET (Vocational Education and Training) which was set up by the European Commission in 2005.
educated population makes a state more economically competitive that lies behind much of national as well as European Union higher education policy, and related policy, is not true. According to the Economist there is no proof for this conviction. It argues rather that rich countries choose to spend vast amounts of money on higher education simply because they like it.90

2. The Changing Role and Organisation of Higher Education

“The Universities At the Heart of the Europe of Knowledge”

As was shown in chapter four, universities have existed for many centuries which means they are among the oldest organisations that exist in the world today.91 They have managed to survive and remain fairly unchanged over time, both in organisation and role, despite drastic socio-economic and political changes in the societies where they exist.92 However, they are now facing transformations more radical than ever before.93 In today’s world, states are faced by both challenges and opportunities, in other words peril and promise. We have witnessed a move from economies dependent on manufacturing and services to economies increasingly dependent on knowledge. As knowledge becomes more important so does higher education.94

The European Union is not alone in pushing for change in the area of education; OECD has also played an important role in supporting a move to a global post-keynesian education policy consensus. As was argued in chapter six, the role of education as a fundamental right has been challenged by the neo-liberal idea of education as a commodity where students are promoted as human capital.95 This has meant a change in the relationship between the University and society.96

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90 Leaders, “Pay or Decay – If universities are to be truly free and sustainable, most students will have to pay fees”, The Economist, Vol. 370, No. 8359, 24 – 30 January 2004, p. 11.
91 The idea that universities are at the heart of the Europe of Knowledge is taken from CEC, “The role of the universities in the Europe of knowledge”, COM (2003) 58/final, Communication from the Commission, Brussels, 5 February 2003, pp. 1-23, p. 4.
to neo-liberal rationality it is important for both students and higher education institutions to be flexible and adapt to the changing labour market. The idea of flexibility can be linked to the norm of modernisation. The need for modernisation of the University as an institution in Europe has time and time again been reiterated in European Union official documents, especially since the early 2000s when the Lisbon Strategy was agreed upon. The forces of globalisation generally and neo-liberalism, with its emphasis on the knowledge economy and society, more specifically has led to major changes for the University relating to its roles, missions, tasks, and obligations, not only in Europe but there has rather been a global sell-out of education. Questions concerning among other things funding, research, teaching, quality assurance, accountability and governance have been raised. Moreover, theses ideas have to coexist with the idea of the University as a democratic public sphere. Further, the University’s role can be seen as both a knowledge provider, passing on knowledge and skills to students, and as a knowledge creator, relating to performing a research role. It is the former which has been the focus of this thesis.

The gearing towards a knowledge economy and seeing the University as a business that needs managing has meant that advanced educational systems have gone through major reforms in the last two decades. One form of change which the University has had to cope with is the increase of privatisation of higher education generally as a result of neo-liberal politics that

stress the importance of the market.\textsuperscript{103} In other words, there has been a ‘marketisation’ of relationships within the university.\textsuperscript{104} This, in turn, has led to an increase in managerialism in higher education.\textsuperscript{105} As neo-liberalism has gained hegemonic status in public policy there has been a move towards a new form of public management, which can be found in changes both on the organisational and societal levels. In other words, looking more closely at higher education, its administration and its role has changed under neo-liberalism.\textsuperscript{106} Sporn makes similar claims when arguing that the changes in the ways of looking higher education in Europe have been two-fold; both the aim and the organisation of higher education have changed. There has been a deregulation and decentralisation of decision-making in higher education policy in the European Union Member States.\textsuperscript{107} Since the end of the second World War education systems in the Member States have developed from serving the few to catering for the masses.\textsuperscript{108} Further, in relation to the organisation and governance of the University, the role of the state is still strong when it comes to defining the function and form of the University. During the late 1970s and early 1980s the state became more interventionary than it had been before. This meant that the state wanted to control, such things as for example, student output, i.e. for example it wanted to attract more students to the study of science, engineering and technology.\textsuperscript{109} This can be seen as a reaction to the fact that science and technology play a central part if the European states are to stay competitive and sustain economic progress.\textsuperscript{110} Technology is seen as a new basic skill in the European Union discourse on higher education which is discussed more in detail later in this chapter. Skills, I argue, are an integral part of neo-liberal discourse and the art of modern government.

\textsuperscript{108} According to Hume various writers have emphasised how institutions use metaphors to express the core beliefs and values of said institution. Sullivan, for example, argues that school is often referred to as family, as business, as church, as political community and as academy. We can see the same happening in the European Union official discourse when it speaks of a knowledge economy and how universities are increasingly run and managed like companies. Humes, W., “The Discourses of Educational Management”, Journal of Educational Enquiry, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2000, p. 35-53, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{110} Jones, C.H., “Promoting higher education’s contribution to the developing European Community”, Prospects, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1991, pp.433-453, p.444. Linked to Higher Education Policy is that of Research Policy which has a long history in the European Union and its predecessors. However it is only since the early 1990’s that the EU has become an important actor within research systems. The Commission has expanded the range of activities and fields of research that it funds and has created a new kind of programme, the Framework Programme. See Van Der Meulen, B., “Europeanization of Research and the Role of Universities: an Organizational-Cultural Perspective”, Innovation, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2002, pp. 341-355, p. 341.
From around the mid-1980s and onwards there has been an increase in the number of individuals taking part in higher education in many countries, which is what OECD refers to as massification of higher education. This increase appeared on top of the earlier increase which took place after the end of the second World War. Both academics and politicians have envisaged that in the future education would no longer be seen as a scarce good but rather as a requirement for the majority. This can be linked to the idea of Lifelong Learning discussed further later in this chapter. The fact that the University has opened up its door to the masses meant new kinds of students attending higher education who come from less affluent back grounds. The backside is that, according to Hill, neo-liberalism has caused inequality both inside and outside the educational, economic and social systems of the nation-state. He goes as far as arguing that neo-liberalism has caused a deformation of the features of education, such as for example its “goals, motivations, standards of excellence and standards of freedom in education”. Hence, it is profit rather than public or social good which is the driving force behind policy under capitalism. Thus, the role of being open to the masses threatened today as universities are faced with a precarious dilemma in regards to public versus private financing of higher education. Or, as the Economist put it, the University is facing a crisis and it is a question of pay or decay. It is argued that “if universities are to be truly free and sustainable, most students will have to pay”. As it is now, it is a question of “to achieve very little, with not very much”. If universities want to be truly independent and self-governing this also means giving up state subsidies in favour of tuition fees from the students. This change can be linked to what Ovetz refers to as a global entrepreneurialisation of the University. The discursive practices of universities have changed and they are increasingly forced to operate as other forms of businesses. Today universities’ state funding has been decreased and they depend on being able to attract as many students as possible. It is important to be appealing on
the university market, which is becoming increasingly international, even global. There has also been an increase in new ‘knowledge providers’ as a response to the increase in interest in higher education. These new institutions are often private ones interested in making a profit. In addition, looking at universities with their roots in medieval times, they are frequently claimed to have an image of themselves as keepers of knowledge while modern universities, on the other hand, strive to develop new knowledge and innovations. This has meant that national governments and the European Union put pressure on universities to create stronger links with the business world. In this process, according to Fairclough, newer universities have been better than older ones at establishing these contacts.

Let us look closer at what the purpose of knowledge is, or perhaps where its power rests, it has been suggested that knowledge acts as a principle of social stratification or a source of capital development. The modern welfare state and neo-liberalism argue that the role of higher education is to provide short-term, client oriented services. What this means, according to Fuller, in his own words:

“Thus, the rational economic agent is willing to accept a certain price, but only for a certain amount of any good or service. Beyond that point, ‘diminishing returns’ set in and rational agents shift their spending elsewhere. This means that goods and services are judged by the prospect of their impact on the consumer in the relative short term. Such a frame of reference is fundamentally antithetical to the character of the university.”

However, knowledge can also be seen as a public good, i.e. its value does not decrease as access increases. Similar claims are made about the idea of ‘Lifelong Learning’, discussed later in this chapter. However, many European states are hindered by the welfare state ideals of liberal access to universities since this means they cannot charge full student fees and compete with universities in the USA. Stehr argues, in Fuller’s words, that:

“By virtue of their dual role as producers and distributors of knowledge, universities are engaged in an endless cycle of creating and destroying social, that is, the comparative

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120 Pelikan, J., “The Idea of The University: A Reexamination”, (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1992), p. 120. Pelikan himself does not agree with this simplistic view though.
122 Fuller, S., “Can Universities Solve the Problem of Knowledge in Society without Succumbing to the Knowledge Society?”, Policy Futures in Education, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2003, pp. 106-124, p. 120.
124 Fuller, S., “Can Universities Solve the Problem of Knowledge in Society without Succumbing to the Knowledge Society?”, Policy Futures in Education, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2003, pp. 106-124, p. 120.
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advantage that a group or network enjoys by virtue of its collective capacity to act on a form of knowledge”. 125

According to Fuller, access, or the lack of it, to knowledge has created a new type of class society, which is sometimes known as information feudalism.126 Expertise, credentials and intellectual property are all contributing to the individual’s alienation.127 In knowledge society it is not the knowledge itself that is important but the container of knowledge, i.e. knowledge is given status depending on whose knowledge it is.128 This is in line with arguments made by discourse analysts about the relationship between power and truth. Furthermore, the way students look at universities and their own studies has also been influenced by the fact that knowledge is viewed in economic terms. Students used to look at education as a way of improving themselves, while today students are more interested in receiving knowledge that will give them an advantage when looking for work, than they are in personal development.129 Fuller points out that knowledge, in contemporary society, can be seen as a public good, whose value doesn’t decrease as access to it increases.130

The changing role of the University in the official European Union discourse can be related to the increased emphasis on neo-liberal ideas and really took off around the time of the signing of the Lisbon Strategy. In 2002 the Commission issued a communication entitled “Investing Efficiently in education and training: an imperative for Europe” where, in relation to achieving the Lisbon Strategy goal of becoming the world’s leading knowledge economy by 2010 and the future role of Higher Education and its institutions, the future objectives of education systems were discussed.131 Concerning the issue of funding and the question of how money should be spent, the Commission argues that the European Union generally has not spent enough funds on human resources and that if the European Union Member States are adamant to make the ideas contained within the Lisbon Strategy a reality there has to be a change in that area.132 More money has to be spent on education and it has to be spent more effectively than it has in

the past. Talking about efficiency, it concerns both the allocation and management of funds. The latter can be achieved “through educational decentralisation, partnership approaches and better coordinated action”. In addition, it is argued that “investment can only be fully effective if anchored in a European context.” The Commission encourages Member States:

“…to provide the level of public investment called for by the European social model, to put in place partnerships and incentives for more and sustained investment from enterprises and individuals, to focus funding on areas where it is most likely to produce the highest quality of outcomes, and to undertake reforms concerning curricula, quality and recognition with a view to maximising their efficiency in the European context”.

However, there is also a question of where the money should come from, attached to the idea of efficiency. The European Union Member States, similar to the USA, spend just over five percent of their GDP on publicly funded education and training and the level of public spending on higher education has risen very little in the European Union Member States in comparison to the USA and Japan for example. Hence, the private sector still only funds a small proportion of education, hence, under the conditions of globalisation and the knowledge economy this type of funding should be encouraged. In 2003 the Commission produced a further communication, “The Role of the universities in the Europe of knowledge”, where it stated that it wanted to:

“…start a debate on the role of Universities within the knowledge society and economy in Europe and on the conditions under which they will be able to efficiently play that role. The knowledge society depends for its growth on the production of new knowledge, its transmission through education and training, its dissemination through information and communication technologies, and on its use through new industrial processes or services. Universities are unique, in that they take part in all these processes, at their core, due to the key role they play in the three fields of research and exploitation of its results, thanks to industrial cooperation and spin-off; education and training, in particular training of researchers; and regional and local development, to which they can contribute significantly”.

In 2005 the Commission produced a further communication on the role of the University in contemporary European society, “Mobilising the brainpower of Europe: enabling universities to make their full contribution to the Lisbon Strategy” where it argued that “universities are crucial in achieving the Lisbon goals”. Further it was suggested that:

“Europe must strengthen the three poles of its knowledge triangle: education, research and innovation. Universities are essential in all three. Investing more and better in the modernisation and quality of universities is a direct investment in the future of Europe and Europeans”.

However, the Commission is not happy with the speed of change at the university level. In a communication published in 2006 the Commission argued that:

“With 4 000 institutions, over 17 million students and some 1.5 million staff – of whom 435 000 are researchers – European universities have enormous potential, but this potential is not fully harnessed and put to work effectively to underpin Europe’s drive for more growth and more jobs”.

Not all are positive concerning the changing role and organisation of higher education. I have earlier argued that there has been an increased emphasis on quality in higher education discourse both at the European and national level, which, I argue, has negative effects both for higher education institutions and staff. As Ball points out, professionalism and collegiality have been replaced by such values as accountability, competition, costing and surveillance. Hill joins this critical stance by claiming that:

“Teachers are dangerous because they are intimately connected with the social production of labour-power, equipping students with skills, competences, abilities, knowledge and the attitudes and personal qualities that can be expressed and expended in the capitalist labour process. Teachers are guardians of the quality of labour-power!”.
Here we see how teachers are seen as influential pawns in the ‘power, knowledge, truth’ game discussed in chapter two. Hence, teachers can be seen as examples of those experts that modern government depend on.

3. The Good European as a Flexible Lifelong Learner

“The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn, and relearn”

- Toffler, A.

In this section I will show how the idea of ‘bildung’ has had to give way to a society where learning is disposable.143 According to the Commission “[t]he people of Europe are poorly equipped to play a part in a world economy and in societies in which knowledge and qualifications are becoming obsolete more and more quickly”.144 According to the official European Union discourse the solution to this problem is Lifelong Learning and flexibility on the part of the individual. The ideas of ‘Lifelong Learning’ and ‘Flexibility’ permeate the official European Union discourse and the European Union institutions speak of a “lifelong learning paradigm” and state that “permanent training and re-training have become a necessity”.145 The idea of Lifelong Learning can be seen as a strategic objective and a form of flexibility, which is seen as a necessity or the norm under neo-liberalism.146 As Hansen and Hager suggest, neo-liberalism promotes the idea of the flexible citizen.147 It is assumed that the result of flexibilization is an increase in employment opportunities. In other words, more flexibility means more jobs.148 Further, as suggested by Alonso, ‘labour flexibility demands the recycling of the workforce, by means of continuous lifelong training. This process requires a qualitative adaptation of education and a docile workforce used to its own adaptation to the labour market’.149 In this sense ‘the Good European’ is defined as a perpetual

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learner while the individual who decides not to partake in this strategy implicitly becomes the Deviant European. Hence, neo-liberalism has brought with it a ‘self-help’ approach to flexibility.\footnote{Goldstein, D.M., “Flexible Justice- Neoliberal Violence and ‘Self-Help’ Security in Bolivia”, Critique of Anthropology, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2005, pp. 389-411.} Further, Bagnall speaks of the individualisation of educational responsibility.\footnote{Bagnall, G.R., “Lifelong learning and the limitations of economic determinism”, International Journal of Lifelong Education, Vol. 19, No. 1, January-February 2000, pp. 20-35, p. 23.} According to Simons and Masschelein we are, or are at least expected to be, living in a learning society where there are various technologies and procedures that speak to us as lifelong learners. This is not specific to the European Union but has become a global phenomenon in the nation-state:

“The learning society …not only seems to have become a necessary notion in the vocabulary to think and write about ourselves, others and the world, but is related to rather specific technologies and procedures to understand and guide ourselves as a particular kind of subjects i.e. subjects for whom learning is a natural force to live our life”.\footnote{Simons, M. & Masschelein, J., “The Learning Society and Governmentality: An Introduction”, Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2006, pp. 417-430, p. 417.}

Further, the idea of Lifelong Learning is part of nation-state governments’ attempts to actively mobilise civil society, which can be linked to the promotion of active citizenship in European Union discourse.\footnote{Field, J., “Governing the ungovernable: why lifelong learning policies promise so much yet deliver so little”, Educational Management and Administration, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 249-261, p. 250.} In addition, education has gone from being seen as a welfare policy to being viewed as a good to be consumed by the entrepreneurial individual.\footnote{See for example Griffin, C., “Lifelong learning and welfare reform”, International Journal of Lifelong Education, Vol. 18, No. 6, 1999, pp. 431-452, and Edwards, R., “Mobilizing lifelong learning: governmentality in educational practices”, Journal of Educational Policy, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2002, pp. 353-365.} In the words of Lambeir: “[l]ifelong learning is a magic spell in the discourse of the educational and economic policymakers, as well as in that of the practitioners of both domains”.\footnote{Lambeir, B., “Education as Liberation: The politics and techniques of lifelong learning”, Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2005, pp. 349-355, p. 350.} In the knowledge economy it is important to have people who have knowledge and people who can be retrained. Flexibility is the name of the game. This is where, what Preece refers to as the western idea of Lifelong Learning, passionately promoted by the European Union, comes in to play.\footnote{Preece, J., “Beyond the learning society: the learning world?”, International Journal of Lifelong Education, Vol. 25, No. 3, May-June 2006, pp. 307-320, p. 307.} The idea of flexibility is one of the most important components of neo-liberal politics and is not specific to education policy or the European Union. It relates to the changes that have taken place in the workplace and the job market.\footnote{Edwards, R., Nicoll, K. & Tait, A., “Migrating metaphors: the globalization of flexibility in policy”, Journal of Education Policy, Vol. 14, No. 6, 1999, pp. 619-638, and Edwards, R., “Changing Places? Flexibility, Lifelong Learning and a Learning Society”, (Routledge: London, 1997).} Furthermore, in Dehmel’s opinion, the concept of Lifelong Learning is increasingly used by European Union policy-makers and decision-makers...
in order “to justify, summarize, publicize, and popularize its values, ideas, and policies in the field of education and training”.\(^{158}\) However, as with so many other concepts its meaning is far from clear and continuously debated.\(^{159}\) It has even been argued that the meaning of the idea of ‘learning’ is so wide that it has lost much of its power.\(^{160}\) Nonetheless, according to Bagnall it is possible to distinguish between four different interpretations of the meaning of lifelong learning. First, it can deal with the various preparations that the individual undertakes to manage his/her life as an adult. Second, it can mean ‘life-wide learning’, meaning the various educational forms a person comes across at different stages of his/her life.\(^{161}\) A third definition, sees lifelong learning as everything a person learns through his/her life experience. Finally, it can mean “the identification of education with the whole of life”.\(^{162}\)

The idea of lifelong learning is a good example of what Foucault termed ‘the conduct of the self’ and it is part of neo-liberal state reason.\(^{163}\) It is a question of ‘responsibleilation of the self’ and the construction of ‘the Entrepreneurial self’.\(^{164}\) In this sense ‘the Good European’ is a self-managed learner. S/he doesn’t need someone to tell her/him what training or education s/he needs. S/he makes her/his own decisions about learning and career choices. S/he is expected to be a flexible and a ‘self-managed learner and autonomous choosers.\(^{165}\) However, as Lambeir argues, it is only an illusion that learning is for the private good and that it is the choice of the individual.\(^{166}\) Edwards et. al. maintain that it is possible to argue that the claim that we are facing a learning or knowledge society/economy and global forces impossible to resist has simply been engineered to deceive us.\(^{167}\) Fraser makes an interesting observation in relation to the idea of flexibility; as Foucault was writing about disciplinary society it was beginning to dissolve, and in his opinion:


“The irony is plain: whether we call it postindustrial society or neoliberal globalization, a new regime oriented to “deregulation” and “flexibilization” was about to take shape just as Foucault was conceptualizing disciplinary normalization.”

It has been argued that the idea of Lifelong Learning can be seen as a product of economic determinism which is part of a larger postmodern global cultural context. Lifelong Learning is argued to be vocationalist and managerialist in character and mainly geared towards the needs of the market and employers. At the same time, Edwards et al. claim that ‘flexibility’ is “a key metaphor in governing contemporary change process” and that it and its associated changes are based on fabricated needs caused by global economic competition.

Even though the idea of Lifelong Learning has come to the forefront in the European Union discourse about the organisation of the future of education, and in the discourse of other international organisations such as OECD, during the 1990s and onwards it is a concept with a longer history than that. In Hake’s opinion, the idea of Lifelong Learning is far from new, and he points to, for example, bible-reading circles during the Protestant reformation which helped raise adult literacy levels. However the concept was given a new lease of life in the late 1960s and early 1970s when UNESCO published the Edgar Faure report which argued that ‘Lifelong education’ should be incorporated as an essential part of education policies. According to Dehmel it is possible to discern three different phases in the development and use of the idea of Lifelong Learning. The first one took place in the early to mid-1970s supported mainly by such international institutions as UNESCO and OECD. The second phase, what Dehmel refers to as “the valley of decreasing interest”, lasted from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s when its promotion took off again. In a UNESCO report from 1996,
“Learning: The Treasure within”, De Lors et al. emphasise the importance of “learning to be, to know, to do and to live together.” In 2007 the European Union Member States can look back at a peak phase of Lifelong Learning for approximately fifteen years. In Holford’s opinion Lifelong Learning has recently been based on economic incentives but has a long history of having a political dimension. In addition, the idea of ‘Lifelong Learning’ has moved on from being a concern of mainly educationalists and education policy to being discussed by, for example, sociologists and economists. And it is now part of more or less every mission statement issued by the European Union institutions.

Let us now leave the academic discussion on Lifelong Learning and flexibility in order to see how the idea is defined and what role it is given in the official European Union discourse. The Commission has argued that because of the scale of economic and social change in contemporary Europe, with the move to a knowledge based society and the pressures of an aging population, education and training have to adapt as well. Under these circumstances Lifelong Learning plays an important role. As was argued above, the idea of Lifelong Learning is not an all together new idea even though it went under another name. In one of the first European Union documents dealing with cooperation in the area of education, “Working Program in the field of “Research, Science and Education”, adopted by the Commission in 1973, it was suggested that “[p]ossible Community measures to encourage permanent education… at European level must be examined”. The term “permanent education” seen here, is, or at least was, often used as a synonym to lifelong learning. Worth mentioning is the fact that in the mid-1980s and perhaps even before that, the ideas of flexibility and skills had been linked to vocational training rather than higher education. The reason for this, I argue, is that at that time training generally and vocational training more specifically were prioritised...
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before higher education. In the 1990s then Commissioner for education, research, and youth, Edith Cresson claimed that “[e]ducation, research, and job creation are all related, and the latter is our top priority in the long process of lifelong learning”. At its meeting in June 1993 the European Council stated that profound changes were needed in the education systems of the Member States. It placed special emphasis on lifelong learning and training. According to the European Parliament and the Council, in 1993, the purpose of the Socrates programme rimes well with the general objective of Lifelong Learning; it was seen to:

“…contribute to the promotion of a Europe of knowledge through the development of the European dimension in education and training by promoting lifelong learning, based on formal and informal education and training. It shall support the building up of the knowledge, skills and competences likely to foster active citizenship and employability”.

Thus, Lifelong Learning applies to all levels and kinds of education. In 1994 the Commission issued the “White Paper - Growth, Competitiveness, Employment - The challenges and ways forward into the 21st century” where it emphasised the importance of promoting the idea of Lifelong Learning since the citizens can no longer expect to stay in the same profession for life, using the same form of knowledge acquired at a younger age. For this to become a reality the Member States would have to make drastic changes to their education systems. A year later, in 1995, a White Paper on education and training was published, with the title of “Teaching and learning. Towards the learning society”. This was an early example of the promotion of investment in human resources which contained five major objectives. First, it stressed the significance of supporting and encouraging attainment of new knowledge. Second, it emphasised the need to work towards bringing schools and the business sector closer to each other. Third, it highlighted the importance of combating exclusion. Fourth, it accentuated the necessity to encourage European citizens to learn an additional two European Union Member State languages to their own mother tongue, which is seen as a new basic skill. Finally, the White Paper spoke of the prerequisite to value and support capital investment and investment

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in training equally. The Commission argued that investment in education and training should be on equal footing with capital investment.\textsuperscript{187}

The idea of Lifelong Learning is connected to that of accesses, which was discussed earlier in relation to the embedding of neo-liberalism. Viviane Reding, then Commissioner of Education, spoke of Lifelong Learning by stressing the importance of letting people of all ages have access to knowledge. The reason for emphasising the importance of access is that to stay attractive on the job market one has to keep up to date with changes in knowledge and skills required by employers. In a world where globalisation is putting increasing pressure on nation-states as well as companies this becomes ever more important for employees, as well as states and companies, if they want to stay competitive on the world market. As it is today, production is much cheaper in other parts of the world and the European Union Member States can’t compete with that. Instead they have to stay ahead by having a well-educated and well-trained work force. The involvement in the area of Lifelong Learning at the European level really took off when 1996 was named the Year of Lifelong Learning by the European Union. According to Cresson the purpose of this year was to publicly discuss issues relating to Lifelong Learning. These discussions were going to be centred around four main issues. First, a new approach to teaching, learning and training was seen as necessary. It had become apparent that a basic education was no longer enough to be sure to fend off unemployment. Cresson suggested:

\begin{quote}
“Continuing education and training have become an indispensable basis on which to build careers that have become far more complex with increasing mobility and major changes in work location due to technological innovation or changes in work organisation”\textsuperscript{188}
\end{quote}

A further aim with the Year of Lifelong Learning was to introduce the idea of Lifelong Learning into education and basic training. Here the skill of learning how to learn was emphasised. It was seen as important to make young people curious about learning. Cresson argues that “[a]cquiring key skills, developing the ability to analyse and judge, to take decisions and solve problems, and to work in a team are basic principles of lifelong learning.”\textsuperscript{189} The issue of the need for improved skills is further discussed later in this chapter. In addition, it was seen as important to bring schools and businesses closer together, which is

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Cresson, E., “Towards a policy of lifelong learning”, Vocational Training, No. 8/9, European Journal, 1996, CEDEFOP, pp. 9-12, p. 11.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
an issue which was discussed earlier in relating to the changing role of the University under the conditions of neo-liberalism. Finally, not only was it seen as important for the individual to become a ‘flexible lifelong learner’, the higher education institutions had to adapt to this new Lifelong Learning environment by becoming more flexible to accommodate the new learning needs. This can also be linked to the earlier argument about the changing role and organisation of the University. A year later, in 1997, in a report called “Accomplishing Europe Through Education and Training”, produced by a study group on education and training within the Commission, it was maintained that:

“Mobilizing education and training efforts is (…) urgent in the interests of those adults with low levels of education and qualifications, and those who must renew their personal competencies on a lifelong basis. Finally, this task is an urgent one in order to facilitate the best adaptation possible to new employment conditions and the development of the learning society.”

A specific group in society is singled out as specifically in need of taking part in Lifelong Learning, i.e. those lacking higher levels of education. In 1997 there was also a communication paper, “Towards a Europe of Knowledge”, published which introduced the idea of a common, open and dynamic European education area, which is also an idea plays an essential part in the Bologna process. According to the Commission:

“In a rapidly-changing world, our societies must offer all citizens greater opportunities for access to knowledge, irrespective of their age or social circumstances. This is why the notion of an educational area needs to be understood in the broadest possible sense, both geographically and temporally”.

To increase access to Lifelong Learning it is necessary to ‘think outside the box’ and be innovative concerning where and when people learn. The communication also emphasises three important dimensions of this proposed common European educational area. These are knowledge, citizenship and competence. It is argued that the citizens of Europe “will be able to develop their fund of knowledge continually, thus expanding and renewing it on a lasting basis”. In addition, it is claimed that the proposed common educational area “will facilitate an
enhancement of citizenship through the sharing of common values, and the development of a sense of belonging to a common social and cultural area” and that “[i]t must encourage a broad-based understanding of citizenship, founded on active solidarity and a mutual understanding of the cultural diversities that constitutes Europe’s originality and richness”. Finally, concerning competence and skills it is seen as “necessary to promote on a lifelong basis creativity, flexibility, adaptability, the ability to ‘learn to learn’ and to solve problems”.193 The communication pushed for new types of actions in the area of education which should have a limited number of objectives, more focused actions and streamline management.194 Concerning the objectives of actions within the area of education access, innovation of education resources and a wide dissemination of good practice in education and the creation of cooperation networks were emphasised.195 The communication also outlined a number of activities that should help create a “Europe of knowledge”. These were mobility, both physical and virtual. The latter form of mobility includes increased access to information technologies and the development of more and better multimedia and audiovisual products and services at the European level. It was argued that there was a need for “suitable material with a genuinely European educational content which reinforces the cultural identity of the Community”.196 In relation to employment, the importance of “a solid broad-based education” and the need for enhancing the skills, both vocational and social, possessed by “all Europe’s citizens”, were emphasised. It was argued that this would help workers adapt to the changing conditions of the labour market within the European Union. The communication spoke of “transversal competencies”, such as for example the understanding of a diversity of cultures, competence in several languages, and a spirit of entrepreneurship. The communication went on to state that the process of creating a ‘Europe of knowledge’ is directly linked to aim of developing lifelong learning.197

In 2000 the Commission issued a staff working paper entitled “Memorandum on Lifelong Learning” where Lifelong Learning was defined as “all purposeful learning activity,

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undertaken on an ongoing basis with the aim of improving knowledge, skills and competence”. However, this definition was accused of being too much geared towards employment and labour market so a new, more general definition was issued by the Commission in 2002, arguing that “all learning activity undertaken throughout life, with the aim of improving knowledge, skills and competences within a personal, civic, social and/or employment-related perspective”. Looking more generally at what the purpose of Lifelong Learning is, according to the Commission it should be seen as:

“…an overarching strategy of European co-operation in education and training policies and for the individual. The lifelong learning approach is an essential policy strategy for the development of citizenship, social cohesion, employment and for individual fulfilment.”

Thus, the official version of Lifelong Learning is that it should include all kinds of formal, non-formal and informal learning. According to the Commission formal learning includes for example university degree courses, non-formal learning can be made up of vocational skills acquired at the workplace, and informal learning includes such things as inter-generational learning when, for example, parents learn from their children how to use the Internet. The objectives of learning include active citizenship, personal fulfilment, social inclusion and employment-related facets. On the issue of personal fulfilment in relation to education, the Commission suggests that:

“Education and training will increasingly become the main vehicles for self-awareness, belonging, advancement and self-fulfillment. Education and training whether acquired in the formal education system, on the job or in a more informal way, is the key for everyone to controlling their future and their personal development.”

In 2001 the Commission issued a communication which it hoped would contribute to the establishment of ‘a European area of Lifelong Learning’. On the issue of why it is seen as important to think in terms of Lifelong Learning:

“….the current uncertain economic climate places renewed emphasis and importance on lifelong learning. Traditional policies and institutions are increasingly ill-equipped to empower citizens for actively dealing with the consequences of globalisation, demographic change, digital technology and environmental damage. Yet people, their knowledge and competences are the key to Europe’s future”.  

Once again we see how the use of threat, this time some vague economic uncertainty, to try to create the feeling that ‘we’ Europeans have to work together and all pull our own weight if we want to stay competitive on the global market. A good European makes sure that s/he is well educated and flexible enough to retrain if so is necessary. A good European doesn’t expect the State to take care of her/him.

In both academic literature and in the official European Union discourse Lifelong Learning is given a threefold role. First, it is hoped to contribute to economic progress and development. Second, it is supposed to play a part in personal development and fulfilment. Finally, Lifelong Learning is meant to work towards social inclusiveness and democratic understanding and activity. With the introduction of neo-liberalism there has been a shift from viewing education, and knowledge, as argued above, as a public good to considering it as a private good. Lifelong Learning was earlier mainly viewed as preparing the individual for life but there has been a shift to seeing as continuous so that the individual can adapt to the changing economic circumstances, brought on by globalisation and neo-liberal political rationality. Criticism has been raised concerning viewing Lifelong Learning in terms of ‘personal development’ and social cohesion since, as Mitchell points out and I have argued earlier in this chapter, there doesn’t seem to be a perfect fit between the idea of social cohesion and the neo-liberal preoccupation with global competition.

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The Importance of Being a Skilled and Competent European

"Learning for active citizenship includes access to the skills and competencies that young people will need for effective economic participation under conditions of technological modernisation, economic globalisation, and, very concretely, transnational European labour markets. These competencies are not simply desirable for some, they are becoming essential for all".

According to the Commission, “in 2004, 75 million EU citizens were low-skilled (32% of the workforce) but by 2010 just 15% of new jobs will be for those with only basic schooling”. This paints a quite depressing picture of the future for those who are today employed in low-skill jobs. Further, in 2004 approximately sixteen percent of young people between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four left school ahead of time and were therefore “in danger of being on the fringes of the knowledge society”. This leads the Commission to argue that:

“Basic skills should be genuinely available for everyone, including for those with special needs, school drop-outs and adult learners. Validation of basic skills should be promoted to support further learning and employability”.

In this section I will look closer at the importance which has been given to skills in the European Union discourse, especially since the Lisbon Strategy was signed in 2001. I argue that this development can be linked to the aim of competitiveness. Further, I will show how there is a distinction made between ‘old’ and ‘new’ basic skills. Skills, and to a lesser degree competences, and in extension, the skilled worker, are increasingly being emphasised in the official European Union discourse on European identity and higher education. The European Union institutions argue that there is a need for workers within the Member States to raise their skill levels. The reason for this is the fact that for ‘the Knowledge Economy’ to be a success it is necessary to invest in human resources and especially skills. Higher education is seen to or at least hoped to play an essential role in the creation and maintenance of skills as
I will show in this section. It is chronological rather than thematic account of how the various forms of skills appeared, such as knowledge of another Member State language, the ability to use Information and Communication Technology (ICT), especially important in a world where surveillance is becoming increasingly important. The importance of ‘digital literacy’ is increasingly stressed. I suggest that perhaps in the future virtual mobility, rather than spatial, will be emphasised, as part of the sustainable development aim.214

In a communication from 2005, “Working together for growth and jobs – A new start for the Lisbon Strategy”, which the Commission produced as a reaction to the fact that the European Union Member States had not been very successful when it comes to achieving the aims put forward in the Lisbon Strategy in 2000, it was maintained that:

“Structural change, greater labour market participation and productivity growth require a continued investment in a highly skilled and adaptable work force. Economies endowed with a skilled labour force are better able to create and make an effective use of new technologies. Educational attainment in Europe falls short of what might be required to ensure that skills are available in the labour market and that new knowledge is produced that is subsequently diffused across the economy. The emphasis on lifelong learning and knowledge in economic life also reflect the realisation that advancing educational attainment and skills makes an important contribution to social cohesion”.215

Skills associated with Information and Communications Technology (ICT) can be linked to the perception that Europe of today is an Information Society. According to the Commission “[t]he information society has much untapped potential to improve productivity and the quality of life”.216 On the importance of skills and competences generally in ‘the Knowledge Economy’, according to Anna Diamantopoulou, Commissioner responsible for employment and social affairs:

“Skill and competence enhancement in the new economy in Europe requires that the policy emphasis is shifted towards increasing investment in human capital and in raising participation in education and training throughout working life. To keep pace with developments in technology, globalisation, population ageing and new business practices,

particular attention should be given to workplace training – an important dimension of our strategy for lifelong leaning".217

There is a distinction being made between ‘old’ and ‘new’ basic skills. The former group is made up of such skills as reading, writing, and mathematics. The latter group, on the other hand, is made up of such skills as ICT, technological culture, foreign languages, entrepreneurship and social skill. Skills associated with computers are especially unevenly spread since their acquisition requires the access to a computer and their availability differs substantially from Member State to Member State.

At the same time the skill that is seen as most important in the Knowledge Society is that of being able to master Information Technology (IT). This is not specific to the European Union but has become a global phenomenon.218 The importance of being able to use new information technology has been emphasised by the European Union since at least the early 1980s. In a communication from 1981 the Commission speaks of technological determinism and argues that:

“There is relatively broad agreement on the benefits of new information technologies, and that they should be received with an open mind by society. The conclusions of the Standing Committee on Employment underlined their key role in maintaining competitiveness and facilitating society’s internal development”.219

A few years later, in a resolution from 1983, the ministers of education meeting in the Council argue that “education has an important contribution to make in mastering technological, social and cultural changes” which would benefit the individual both in his/her future working life and to help him/her grow into “an independent, creative personality”.220 In 1989 the Commission presented a progress report, which dealt with the introduction of new information technology (NIT) in education systems from 1983-1987. In this report it was argued that “[t]he new information technology that is spreading rapidly across industry and the economic and


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social sectors has, to an increasing extent, become the driving force of our modern society.”

The importance of being computer literate became seen as increasingly important around the mid-1990s when the World Wide Web became a reality. Before the Web computers had mainly been used in the educational setting by students and pupils to use educational computer programs. In a communication issued by the Commission in 1996 called “Learning in the Information Society- Action plan for a European education initiative (1996-1998)” the importance of open access to information technology for all students and pupils, irrespective of background is emphasised:

“It is the duty of education and training establishments to help young people to find a place in the information society by avoiding a situation where only the children of the most privileged families and schools will reap the benefits of educational multimedia. Education and training establishments and, in the longer run, employment and social cohesion in Europe will pay a high price for increasingly inequitable access to these new practices”.

In this sense there is a social as well as economic dimension associated with learning how to use a computer. Interesting here is that there is no mention of a Lifelong Learning perspective when it comes to information technology, no reference made to the need to make the students’ and pupils’ parents computer literate as well. Further, it was suggested that information society technologies and multimedia for teaching could:

“…encourage personal and pedagogical exchanges and, indeed by encouraging intercultural and multilingual communication between 72 million pupils and students and 4.5 million teachers throughout Europe…enhance the European dimension in education and European integration through teaching and learning exchanges”.

Thus, it is believed that information technology could both boost the ‘European dimension’ in education, discussed earlier in relation to cultural European identity, and mobility, covered earlier in relation to civic European identity. So while it is closely linked to neo-liberal ideas


and European identity in contemporary European Union discourse it is also closely interlinked with the other two forms of European identity. The communication argues further that:

“Europe counts among its many assets, its cultural heritage, major intellectual and financial resources and considerable technical expertise which should be exploited by multimedia companies in the European market….If this opportunity is missed, our increased dependence on pedagogical and cultural content originating from its main competitors outside Europe would be particularly damaging for the cultural identity and linguistic diversity of the Community”.\(^{225}\)

Thus, Commission argues that education and culture are closely linked as has been highlighted earlier in this thesis. We can also see how the Commission already in 1996, five years before the Lisbon Strategy, aimed at becoming more competitive in the area of education, or at least when it came to education material. It is a very protective stance we are witnessing here against the threat of non-European competition and superiority. At the same time IT is seen to have a role to play in the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’, i.e. “[t]o reinforce the European dimension of education and training with the tools of the information society whilst enhancing cultural and linguistic diversity”.\(^{226}\) In 1997 a communication called “Towards a Europe of Knowledge” was published by the Commission where it suggests that ‘competence’ is one of three dimensions of the European educational area and argues that:

“Developing employability through the acquisition of competencies made necessary through changes in work and its organisation. This means that it is necessary to promote on a lifelong basis creativity, flexibility, adaptability, the ability to ‘learn to learn’ and to solve problems. These are the conditions we must meet in order to overcome the now-rapid obsolescence of skills. Activities must be developed which help towards anticipating needs and towards the evolution of job profiles”.\(^{227}\)

The ability to ‘learn to learn’, mentioned in the quote above, is perhaps one of the most important skills or competencies that the European could have. In a report published in 2001 the Education Council suggests that:

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\(^{226}\) The other aims mentioned were “To accelerate schools’ entry into the information society by giving them new means of access to the world” and “To encourage wide spread application of multimedia pedagogical practices and the forming of a critical mass of users, products and educational multimedia services”. CEC, “Learning in the Information Society- Action plan for a European education initiative (1996-1998)”, COM (96) 471 final, Brussels, 2 October 1996, pp. 1-22, p. 7.

\(^{227}\) CEC, “Towards a Europe of Knowledge”, COM (97) 563/final, Communication form the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, pp. 1-11, p. 3.
“...society as a whole is less uniform than in the past, so personal competencies (such as adaptability, tolerance of others and of authority, team work, problem solving and risk taking, independence, etc) are more widely required if people are to live together in tolerance and respect for each other. The most important of these competencies is the ability to learn – maintaining curiosity and interest in new developments and skills- without which lifelong learning cannot exist”.228

In a further report published in 2001 by the High Level Task Force on Skills and Mobility discusses flexibility in the form of occupational mobility. In other words, European citizens of today cannot expect to stay in the same profession for life like earlier generations often did:

“Occupational Mobility must be significantly expanded to adapt to changing circumstances and drive economic and social change. This requires relevant and adaptable skills. However, major gaps exist in skills endowments in the European Union, and, moreover, educational attainment varies too much between the EU Member States and between the regions in terms of both levels and quality. Insufficient attention is paid by the education and training systems to the dynamic aspects of change. This includes the certification of acquired initial competences, and the validation of acquired skills and experiences throughout working life”.229

Looking specifically at the new basic skill of learning languages which has been shown earlier in this thesis to be high on the European Union agenda, both as part of a common European culture and proof of its ‘unity in diversity’, and as a tool to make mobility possible, the High Level Task Force suggests that:

“Member States should provide for the early acquisition of language skills in pre-primary and primary schools, and for the strengthening of these language skills in secondary schools, so that by 2005 all pupils would get the opportunity to master at least two EU languages in addition to their own by the end of their compulsory education (at between 16-18 years of age); learning English as one of these languages would be an advantage”.230

The importance of language skills is continuously stressed in the official European Union discourse. For example, the Barcelona European Council in March 2002 “called for action to

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improve the mastery of basic skills, in particular by teaching at least two foreign languages from a very early age.\textsuperscript{(231)}

In the perceived ‘Knowledge Economy’ the old basic skills of literacy and numeracy are not enough to make the individual competitive on the labour market. It is argued that there is a need to update the definition of basic skills for the knowledge society since ‘[t]hese are the key to all subsequent learning capabilities, as well as to employability’.\textsuperscript{(232)} Sometimes there is no distinction made between new and old basic skills. It is rather a question of key skills such as:

“…literacy and numeracy (foundation skills), basic competencies in mathematics, science and technology, ICT and use of technology, learning to learn, social skills, entrepreneurship and general culture.”\textsuperscript{(233)}

In 2002 the European Council called for further action in the area of digital literacy and suggests that it should become standard to learn how to use a computer and the Internet at secondary level education.\textsuperscript{(234)} New basic skills such as for example computer literacy and access to ICT should be provided by Lifelong Learning.\textsuperscript{(235)} In contemporary European Union documents, after Lisbon Strategy, knowledge, skills and competencies are often mentioned in the same sentence. However, sometimes competencies are referred to instead of skills in the official European Union discourse. Competence is a more general concept comprising such ideas as knowledge, skills and attitudes.\textsuperscript{(236)} There is also a distinction made between different kinds of competences. In addition to regular competences there are key competencies in the area of Lifelong Learning which are aimed at “personal fulfilment, social inclusion and active citizenship and employment”.\textsuperscript{(237)} The Commission distinguishes between eight different competences:

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\textsuperscript{236} CEC, “Key Competencies for lifelong learning in Europe: Frequently asked questions”, MEMO/05/416, Brussels, 10 November 2005, pp. 1-2, p. 1.

1. communication in the mother tongue
2. communication in foreign languages
3. competences in maths, science and technology
4. digital competence
5. learning to learn
6. interpersonal, intercultural and social competences, and civic competence
7. entrepreneurship
8. cultural expression

These competences can be linked to both the discussions in this section, as well as to earlier deliberations in this thesis. Being able to communicate in one’s own mother tongue, as well as competences in maths, science, technology and information technologies can be seen as basic skills, of both the old and new version. Together with the ability to ‘learn to learn’ and entrepreneurship these skills are important ideas in relation to the construction of the neo-liberal European identity. Further, proficiency in foreign languages and cultural expression can be linked to the construction of a cultural version of European identity. Finally, interpersonal, intercultural and social competences and civic competences all play an important role in the construction of the civic version of European identity.

Conclusions

In this chapter it has been suggested that Europe is part of ‘a Knowledge Society’ and ‘a Knowledge Economy’. There has been a shift in Europe away from the welfare state to the idea of the competitive state. However, certain welfare provisions have been maintained; one of the most important of these being that of education. The reason for this is that it is seen as important to have a well educated and flexible work force to cope with the strains of globalisation. This combination of neo-liberal rationalities and welfare provisions is known as embedded neo-liberalism. Further, I have argued that the neo-liberal version of European identity is not sufficient on its own. Hence, it is too ‘thin’ to gain and maintain public support for the whole European integration process, as has been suggested earlier, no one will fall in love with the market. However, this is the form of European identity that creates the clearest form of normative exclusion, even among those that would be considered ‘Good’ Europeans according to the cultural and civic definition of identity. As was suggested in chapter three,
identity construction depends on the ability to create a sense of belonging and a feeling of continuity. According to the neo-liberal rationality ‘the Good European’ is someone who is well-educated. But that is not all, ‘we’ also have a history of being well-educated. Further, Europeans are also destined to be well-educated, as expressed in the Lisbon Strategy aim of becoming the world’s leading ‘Knowledge Economy’ by 2010. In other words, the official European Union discourse on European identity and higher education creates a sense of continuity, a feeling of sharing a past, a present and a future. There is also an expectancy of ‘conduct of the self’ present in relation to the construction of the neo-liberal version of European identity. ‘The Good European’ is supposed to be a flexible individual interested in taking part in Lifelong Learning. Hence, s/he is prepared to adapt to the ‘Knowledge Economy’ in the ‘Knowledge Society’. However, according to the neo-liberal discourse it is not only the individual that should conform to the norm of flexibility and perform ‘conduct of the self’, higher education institutions are also expected to adapt to the new circumstances of a hegemonic neo-liberal discourse, with its emphasis on ‘the Knowledge Economy’ and the norm of Lifelong Learning. As was argued in chapter four ‘the Good University’ is one that has adapted to the new circumstances through the introduction of the degree system of ‘3+2+3’ years of study and the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) scale, which are both part of the Bologna Agreement, and who adhere to the Open Method of Coordination principle introduced by force with the Lisbon Strategy. Hence, universities have to be prepared to be more international in their out-look trying to attract non-native students as well. If European Union policy-makers get their way there will be a thoroughly European Area of Higher Education. In addition, the University is expected to make changes to how it is managed. There is an increased pressure on higher education institutions to be run as businesses and think in terms of profit. Hence, there has been a marketisation of the University. There is also an element of ‘conduct of conduct’ in the new management of the University in the sense that there is an emphasis on ‘good management’ and quality assessment, which creates a division between ‘good’ universities and deviant universities which do not conform to the norm.

Looking closer at the process of Othering present in the form of the construction of the neo-liberal version of European identity, the discursive construction of the neo-liberal European subject carries with it forms of exclusion, both internally and externally. As was suggested above, the ‘Good’ and normal European is someone who is an active citizen who takes part in Lifelong Learning to be and remain a flexible worker who can adapt to the labour market which can quickly need to change in order to stay competitive in an increasingly globalised
environment. This means that ‘the Internal Other’ is the individual who, even though deemed a European according to the construction of the cultural and civic versions of European identity, does not take part in Lifelong Learning and who expects the state to come to the rescue in case of emergency in the form of for example unemployment and poverty. ‘The External Other’ is a collective noun for all those individuals outside the territory of the European Union/Europe who have failed to adapt to the new circumstances of ‘a Knowledge Society’ where Lifelong Learning is the norm. In addition, the Lisbon Strategy clearly constructs ‘the External Other’ by stating that the aim of Europe is to become the world’s leading knowledge economy and thereby overtake this position from the United States.
Concluding Discussion and Reflections

- Chapter Eight -

Concluding Discussion and Reflections

Introduction

The major aim of this thesis has been two-fold. The first aim has been to investigate how the European is constructed in the discourse contained within the official European Union policy documents. I have been interested in analysing the various structures, in the form of ideas and norms, constructing the European. Special attention has been paid to the myths and symbols present in the discourse. The second aim has been to explore whether the role of higher education, as constructed in the European Union policy documents analysed, is given a similar identity-making role as education is argued to have in national identity discourse. In this concluding chapter I will deliberate on four different questions in relation to this thesis. First, has governmentality theory shown to be suitable as a theoretical tool when carrying out a discourse analysis? Second, has discourse analysis proved to be appropriate when analysing the construction of identity? Third, what have I learnt about the empirical material? In other words, is there a European identity being constructed in the official European Union discourse and is there a link to be found between the construction of European identity and the role given to higher education in the official European Union discourse? Finally, can this combination of discourse analysis and governmentality theory be used elsewhere? Hence, do my research results indicate any general implications which can be useful in studying identity construction processes and the role given to higher education in these processes more generally?

I feel that this study is especially relevant today as the European Union, in 2007, celebrated fifty years of collaboration and at the same time commemorated the twentieth anniversary of Erasmus, its higher education mobility programme. At the same time the European Union has faced challenges. In the last few years the European Union has gone from fifteen to twenty-seven Member States, which means that the diversity among Member States has increased as well. At the same time there seem to be a public disinterest, or even disdain, in the European Union. This can for example be seen in the decreasing participation in the European Parliament elections and the French and Dutch ‘no’ to the proposed Constitution. These setbacks seem to have moved the idea of a common European identity to a more prominent
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position on the European Union political agenda. As has been suggested throughout this thesis what the European Union policy-makers are trying to achieve through the construction of a common European identity is to make people fall in love with the European integration process generally and the European Union institutions more specifically.

Expressions of Power in the Official European Union Discourse
One of the main ambitions with this thesis has been to investigate the power present in the official European Union discourse on European identity and higher education. I have been interested in finding out what kind of ‘truths’ are told about who ‘the European’ is. Further, besides being concerned with the construction of ‘truths’ about who the European is, I have been concerned with illuminating how modern government depends on a specific form of soft power which is aimed at attracting and seducing the individual. I argue that there is a question of both practice of ‘conduct of conduct’, on part of the European Union, and of ‘conduct of the self’, in relation to the individual. ‘Conduct of conduct’ entails the governing of the individual through various technologies, education being one of the most powerful ones available. Through education the individual is moulded into a citizen who performs ‘conduct of the self’ which means that the individual adapts her/his own behaviour. In other words, the individual will govern her/himself. This is achieved through the power of the gaze. Hence, the individual modifies her/his actions to fit the norm in order to avoid being judged and labelled ‘a deviant European’.

I feel that one of the most interesting findings of my study is how strong normative forms of identity construction are. Hence, the official European Union discourse on European identity and higher education not only speaks of who ‘we’ are but increasingly also about who ‘we’ should be. I have argued that the analysed discourse performs a form of internal Othering by constructing an image of the ‘normal’ and ‘good’ European as someone who not only shares a common culture with other Europeans but who is also an active citizen who, among other things, is both a mobile student and a flexible individual who partakes in Lifelong Learning. In other words, the desirable European is a well-educated and learned person. From this follows that those persons who chose not to participate in the learning and knowledge society are branded as deviant, abnormal and disloyal. The ‘activity turn’ can increasingly also be seen through the construction of the cultural version of European identity in the sense that ‘the
Good European’ is someone who partakes in language learning in order to become a multilingual individual.

**Ideas and Norms as Structures**

On the question of what I have learnt about my empirical material, I believe I have shown, through my analysis, that different forms of identity construction are present in the official European Union discourse. I also believe that the results indicate a strong link between the construction of identity and higher education at the European level. To sum up my research results I will give a brief summery of the ideas and norms present in the discourse analysed and say something about how they have changed over time. By doing this I also show how discourse analysis has aided me in the task I have set for myself.

In chapter five I investigated how a cultural version of European identity was constructed in the official European Union discourse. I argue that the discourse analysed contains certain ideas, in the form of myths and symbols, but also norms. I have highlighted the use of the idea of ‘Unity in Diversity’, which I argue can be seen as a European myth. Further, I suggested that even though the ideas of unity and diversity have been present from the early 1970s, where my study starts, up until the present day, their meanings have changed over time. In relation to the idea of ‘unity’ it comes in a ‘thick’ and a ‘thin’ version. The ‘thick’ version relates to the claims of a common European cultural heritage while the ‘thin’ version, which is increasingly being stressed, is made up of common values. Diversity has gone from being portrayed as a hurdle for closer cooperation to being seen as plurality and what makes ‘us’ European. However, ‘diversity’ is a less clear idea than that of ‘unity’. It relates for example to plurality of national cultures, including languages, and education systems. Further, in relation to the construction of the cultural version of European identity, I investigated how the idea of a ‘European dimension’ plays a significant role when defining the role that higher education is hoped to play in relation to the construction of European identity. I argue that ‘European dimension’ can be linked to the idea of ‘unity’. The meaning of the concept is never explicitly defined, rather, it is up to the Member States and their higher education institutions to fill the concept with meaning. In a way, it means all and nothing at the same time. However, one aspect of ‘European dimension’ which is highlighted in the official discourse, is that of language learning. However, increasingly language learning is emphasised not as a right but as a duty for the European citizen if s/he wants to be considered a ‘Good European’. Hence, there
has been a normative turn in relation to the construction of the cultural version of European identity as well where the individual is expected to perform ‘conduct of the self’ and become an Entrepreneurial European.

Turning to the ideas related to the construction of a civic European identity, it is a discussion in terms of a common European citizenship. I suggested that increasingly the idea of ‘A People’s Europe’ is replaced by that of ‘A Citizen’s Europe’. This might not be such a dramatic shift considering that the ‘thinner’ version of the cultural version of European identity is based on common values and is thus closely connected to the idea of a common citizenship. Further, I have argued that a common European citizenship is seen as a necessity to combat the democratic deficit and legitimacy crisis which the European Union is said to be suffering from. In addition, I have shown how a common European citizenship has gone from being emphasised in terms of right to increasingly stressing the norm of the active European citizen. This, I argue, is due to the fact that in order to create a viable European civil society and a social contract rights as well as duties are needed. Education is linked to this civic version of European identity through the idea of mobility and the mobile European. But mobility should not be seen as simply a right but increasingly also a duty of being active. Thus, to be considered ‘a Good European’ the individual should perform ‘conduct of the self’ and become an active mobile learner.

Looking at the neo-liberal version of European identity construction, I have argued that it is the one which is most closely connected to higher education in the sense that it argues that the very essence of being European is to be well-educated since ‘we’ have a long history of higher education dating back some eight-hundred years or so. According to the neo-liberal discourse Europeans are living in a world where the welfare state has given way to the competitive state. Further, there has been a move away from an industrial economy to an economy based on knowledge. However, the welfare state has not been completely scrapped. Education is one of those welfare provisions which have been left fairly untouched. As knowledge is becoming more important so is the University as an institution. Thus, the form of neo-liberalism which exists in Europe today can be said to be of an embedded kind. In this context higher education is constructed as a weapon to ward off danger in the form of economic competition. The European Union Member States are supposed to become more competitive through offering quality education. Related to the construction of the neo-liberal version of European identity is the idea of flexibility which applies not only to the individual but also to the University. The
Concluding Discussion and Reflections

University is expected to be flexible by modernising its role and structure. The norm is for the University to be run as a business which means new forms of management. Increasingly higher education institutions are subjected to the power of the gaze in the form of quality assessments. Further, they are supposed to think in market terms of profitability which can be achieved introducing fees. I argue that this idea of charging students for their education can be seen as undermining the idea of embedded neo-liberalism. Turning to look at the idea of the flexible European, in relation to higher education s/he takes the form of the Lifelong Learner. Hence, ‘the Good European’ is an individual who actively takes part in higher education, thus upgrading her/his skills, throughout her/his life in order to adapt to the changes in the employment market.

Who are the European Others?

Considering further what I have learnt from analysing my empirical material, in this thesis I have argued that the different forms of European identity appeal to different ‘Others’ which can be both external and internal in character. The most clearly articulated ‘Other’ is external in character and is found in the construction of the neo-liberal version of European identity, i.e. the United States, whom the European Union Member States should overtake in the race to become the world’s leading ‘Knowledge Economy’. However, through the discursive construction of neo-liberal European identity there is also an internal Other being constructed. S/he is the individual who does not conform to the norms of the competitive state. In other words, s/he does not take part in Lifelong Learning and thereby upgrade her/his skills in order to adapt to the changing employment market demands. Hence, ‘the Internal Other’ is the individual which the European Union and the Member States have failed to convince of the attractiveness of being flexible and seduce into the practice of ‘conduct of the self’. Looking at the discursive construction of the civic version of European identity, constructions of ‘the Other’ are also present here. ‘The Other’ come both in an internal and an external form. ‘The Internal Civic Other’ can both be the individual living in Europe who is seen as undemocratic and the individual who does not become an active citizen, who decides not to participate in civil society. ‘The External Civic Other’ is the individual living outside Europe who is deemed less democratic than the European. Turning to the third and final version of the construction of European identity, as I have found through my analysis, cultural European identity has also both internal and external Others. ‘The Internal Other’ is the denizen who lives in a European
country but is considered not to share the common European culture. ‘The External Other’ are all those living outside Europe and are seen as culturally different from the European.

**Relationship Between European Identity and Higher Education**

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<td>Competiveness</td>
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<td>‘European dimension’</td>
<td>Language</td>
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**Definitions of the European Other**

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<th>The Non-democratic External Other</th>
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<tr>
<td>European Denizen</td>
<td>The Non-democratic Internal Other</td>
<td>The Non-flexible European</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Non-active European</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Definitions of Europe**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Europe as a Cultural Community</th>
<th>Europe as a Democratic Society</th>
<th>Europe as a Learning Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘A People's Europe’</td>
<td>‘A Citizen's Europe’</td>
<td>Europe as the World’s Leading Knowledge Economy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Three versions of European identity constructions present in the official European Union Discourse

**What Have I Learnt About Using Discourse Analysis as a Method?**

I feel that discourse analysis has suited the aim of my study which is based on the assumption that power matters. As I have argued, power is what makes the world go round. Without power nothing can function. This method has helped me illuminate the power which resides in the language of the analysed discourse. Further, it fits in well with my conviction that ‘social
Concluding Discussion and Reflections

reality’ is a human construction. In other words, there is no universal ‘truth’ to be found out there. Discourse analysis has also helped me understand the nature of discourse as both structures and a ‘tool’ used to shape structures. With the help of discourse analysis I have been able to make visible the ideas which structure the official European Union discourse in relation to the construction of a common European identity and the role higher education is hoped to play in this process.

What are the general implications of my study?

What do my results indicate? How can it be used by other researchers studying the same or other objects? It has been suggested that the European Union is trying to export its idea of large scale regional cooperation to other parts of the world. This makes me reflect on whether the insights of this thesis can be applied to other parts of the world as well. Or is the European context so original that it is unlikely? I believe that the results of this study have general implications since identities are generally discursively constructed. The ideas and norms utilised might change between different circumstances but identity discourses will always contain certain ideas about who ‘we’ are as compared to ‘the Other’.

Possible Further Research

One area which I believe would be both interesting and useful to study in the future is how, i.e. with what means, Europeans are supporting or resisting the various versions of European identity which are contained within the European Union discourse on European identity and higher education. In other words, what other ways of imagining ‘Europe’ and ‘the European’ could there be? In addition, it would be interesting to study to what degree the ideas contained within European Union higher education policy about the purpose of education are incorporated into Member States’ higher education policies. Also, it would be useful to conduct a comparative study of how national identity and the national citizen are defined in the Member States’ higher education policy versus European identity and the European in European Union’s higher education policy. Leaving higher education aside and looking more specifically at European identity, an area for future research could be the different reasons given, and the specific forms of exclusion that are used to construct certain Others. How is it possible that someone who used to be considered ‘the Other’ is now going to be part of ‘us’? In other words, how far can the idea of ‘diversity’ in ‘Unity in Diversity’ be stretched?
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