Promoting Democracy
Sweden and the democratisation process in Macedonia
Rickard Mikaelsson
At the Faculty of Arts and Science at Linköping University, research and doctoral studies are carried out within broad problem areas. Research is organized in interdisciplinary research environments and doctoral studies mainly in graduate schools. Jointly, they publish the series Linköping Studies in Arts and Science. This dissertation comes from Political Science at the Department of Management and Engineering.

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Rickard Mikaelsson
Promoting democracy: Sweden and the democratisation process in Macedonia

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Abstract
This dissertation contributes to an increased understanding of democracy promotion. Empirically, the study focuses on the multi-faced democratisation process in Macedonia; the official Swedish policy for democracy promotion; and actual Swedish attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia in the period 2000–2006. Theoretically, the study advances an analytical framework, which serves to bring clarity to democracy promotion as a concept. It is argued that democracy promotion embodies six structural components, and should be understood as activities adopted and/or supported by foreign actors, as part of a relationship between the democracy promoter and the recipient country, based on a set of motives and shaped through the use of different strategies, methods and channels. Moreover, the issue of impact is investigated, primarily because of its possible influence on democracy promoter’s strategy choices. The analytical framework is used to investigate the character of Swedish democracy promotion, and to develop a typology of the roles of democracy promotion in democratisation processes. It is argued that the Swedish policy for democracy promotion is permeated by a Swedish democratic self-image, eclectic theoretical reflection, and flexibility. In addition, it is argued that Sweden is primarily driven by altruistic and ideological motives, and acts to promote legal and societal democracy, and that the allocation of democracy promotion resources is based on theoretical as well as practical considerations. The study describes Macedonia as a grey-zone democracy with a future political trajectory largely dependent on the ability to improve upon the conditions in three different transitional dimensions. On the basis of the analysis of Sweden’s attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia, the study advances a typology of the roles of democracy promotion in democratisation processes, these being: educator, initiator, and supporter. Together with the analytical framework, this role typology provides new possibilities to study, and understand, democracy promotion.

Keywords: Democracy promotion, democracy assistance, democracy, democratisation, Sweden, Macedonia, development cooperation, foreign policy, role theory.
Dedicated to my parents

Roland & Britt-Inger
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In the 1960s, Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson, two young radio astronomers working for the Bell Labs, accidentally discovered a faint microwave background radiation across the sky using a small, but very effective, antenna. They quickly realised that it did not matter in what direction they pointed the antenna; the radiation seemed to emanate evenly from all directions of the sky. Initially, they could not find a satisfactory explanation for these findings, and considered the possibility that their signal may have been due to some undetermined systematic noise. They even considered the possibility that it was caused by pigeon droppings on the antenna. It was, however, finally determined that the microwave background radiation they had discovered was nothing less than the cooling remains of the energy released during the creation of the universe, serving as one of the strongest pieces of evidence to date validating the Big Bang theory.

The discovery of this cosmic microwave background radiation was a sensation and provided Penzias and Wilson with world acclaim. They were awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1978 for their discovery. The story of Penzias and Wilson is also a telling description of how a research process can proceed. Doing research is to some degree to venture out into the unknown, in the search for answers and knowledge. To analyse and contemplate issues, questions and approaches that previously gone overlooked. Such journeys can produce amazing results that alter the perception of the world in a very significant way, as the story involving Penzias and Wilson has shown. But it can also lead to the realisation that results that first were thought to be intriguing and path-breaking in fact only were the consequence of pigeon droppings on the antenna. At the very least, I am hoping that the conclusions generated throughout this study will not face such accusations.

A winding path brought me to the topic at hand. Initially, I wanted to continue to explore the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) because it had served as the topic of choice for my master’s thesis. The initial thought was to develop the previously conducted study concerning the CFSP by investigating the few examples where field operations had been conducted within the CFSP framework. This thought brought Macedonia into attention because one of these CSFP managed operations had been conducted there. During the process of investigating the situation in Macedonia my interest started to change. The complexity of the social and political situation in Macedonia was intriguing and the study increasingly focused on the attempts made to uphold the fragile peace in Macedonia. Macedonia experienced a period of violent armed conflict in 2001 that brought the country to the brink of full-scale civil war. A UN mandated conflict prevention operation had been present in Macedonia since 1993 with the objective to protect Macedonia from becoming implicated in the armed violence that had erupted elsewhere in the Balkans following the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The problems originating from Macedonia’s past and the prospect for the future increasingly became centre of attention. Conflict prevention surfaced as a possible topic of choice and during the process of investigating the dynamics of conflict prevention I found that
conflict prevention has at least two dimensions. The first dimension of such operations concerns the actual military prevention of armed conflict. The actors of such operations are mainly soldiers serving as peacekeepers. The other dimension of such operations concerns the establishment of social and political structures through which current and future social and political conflicts can be mitigated. This latter dimension captured my interest. This dimension bear close resemblance to democracy promotion activities, which brought me in contact with a vast literature dedicated to democracy and democratisation. It was soon realised that only a limited amount of literature focused on the influence of external factors on democratisation processes. Hence, there seemed to exist an academic void in need of further contributions. Conflict prevention was accordingly dropped from the study in favour for democracy promotion. In the process of designing the study and deciding which actor to study, the focus fell on Sweden for a number of reasons. Firstly, because Sweden had positioned itself as one of the main bilateral donors in the country; secondly, few studies to date had attempted to investigate Swedish democracy promotion in the manner that was envisaged; and thirdly because the choice of Sweden would provide relatively easy access to empirical material related to these activities. The inclusion of Sida appeared natural as democracy promotion often serve as a dimension of development cooperation, and Sida is the main Swedish state aid agency. With these three components in hand, democracy promotion, Macedonia, and Sweden and Sida, the study was then initiated.

Looking back on the process of writing this dissertation, the prominent feeling is that of a struggle. I have found the process to be lonesome, tiresome, and frustrating. It is hard to convey the feeling, but writing a dissertation is a life of unwavering agony. It is constantly on your mind and therefore disturbs any feeling of harmony that otherwise can be felt on a quiet Sunday afternoon. At the beginning, I refused to accept that the commonly expressed opinion, that being a PhD candidate is not a job, it is a lifestyle, would apply to me. Now, at the end, it feels difficult to refute what appears to be a fact. Even though it has felt like a lonesome process, this dissertation would not exist without the support that I have received from a large number of people. First, I want to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Per Jansson, and my assistant supervisor, Joakim Ekman, for all of your comments, suggestions, and words of encouragement. Your comments and suggestions have always shed new light on the topic and provided me with ideas for improvements. I want to thank Peter Håkansson, with whom I have spent more time during the last four years than anybody else. You have become a really dear friend during these years and I really appreciate all of your support. I am also grateful for all of the support and encouragement that I have received from my other colleagues at the Political Science division. Jonna Johansson, Ronnie Hjorth, Elin Wihlborg, Kerstin Karlsson, Maria Alm, Geoffrey Gooch, Mikael Baaz, Bo Persson, Edmé Domínguez, and Johanna Nählinder, thank you all. My appreciation also goes to the Sida officials in Skopje and Stockholm who took the time to discuss these issues with me and provide useful documents to the study; Astrid Melcher, Roger Mikaelsson, and especially Pamela Vang, for language reviews; to Jörg Winterberg, Johan Holmgren, Daniel Silander, Gissur Erlingsson, and Anders Larson for comments on different manuscripts; to all of my colleagues and friends at the
Department for Management and Engineering; and to all members of tPR for your moral and financial support. Finally, I want to thank my family. Mum and Dad, Britt-Inger and Roland, you have always been there for me and I feel really blessed to have you as my parents. You have always believed in my abilities and your support has probably been the source of my confidence and determination. My brother and sister, Roger and Erika, thank you for all of your encouragement and support. Hopefully I will be able to spend more time with you all from now on.

Linköping, 11 August 2008

Rickard Mikaelsson
CHAPTER ONE

The growth of democracy promotion

Democracy and democracy promotion have developed into pivotal world values within the international community. In a meeting held 25-27 June 2000 in Warsaw, Poland, foreign ministers and other distinguished representatives from a majority of the world’s countries congregated to discuss the shared desire to support a continued global advancement towards an international “community of democracies”. In the resulting Warsaw Declaration, the 106 signatories pledge commitment to a large set of pro-democratic activities, ranging from the continued preservation and strengthening of existing democratic institutions and processes, to the promotion of democracy where it is currently absent. In the closing remarks of the conference, Kofi Annan, the then serving UN Secretary General, uttered his delight about the Warsaw Declaration’s expressed support for the universality of democratic values.

One of the greatest challenges to humankind in the new century will be the struggle to make the practice of democracy equally universal. In that struggle, nations in which democracy is already well established will need to be vigilant in preserving that achievement, and to work together to help those where democracy is still new or emerging. That, I know, is the main purpose of your new coalition, and I warmly salute it.

The Warsaw Declaration was received with both scepticism and support and has since the Warsaw conference developed into an intergovernmental organisation, which has attracted additional supporting countries and conducted a series of international conferences. The importance of the Warsaw Declaration and the wide commitment to the basic principles held within it, is the fact that it captures two norms that have become firmly consolidated within international relations since the end of the cold war: the hegemonic status of democracy as the only acceptable form of political government within a largely Westphalian nation state system, and the emergence of democracy promotion as a acceptable and necessary component of international behaviour. Democracy, in all its different forms, has received significant scholarly attention and generated a vast amount of literature. Democracy promotion on the other hand remains surprisingly overlooked. Peter J. Schraeder declares that, “the international dimension of democracy promotion remains at best understudied and poorly understood”. Knowledge about the role and character of democracy promotion is still mainly in the hands of practitioners and in the words of Thomas Carothers, “democracy promotion remains remarkably understudied, and the gap between what we want to accomplish and what we really know about how to accomplish it remains dauntingly wide”. The world has meanwhile seen a rapid increase in democracy promotion activities since the end of the cold war.
The Global Trend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year under Review</th>
<th>Free</th>
<th>Partly Free</th>
<th>Not Free</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1 The global trend of democracy
Source: Freedom House website: http://www.freedomhouse.org
Freedom House is a non-profit, non-partisan, organisation that annually monitors the political rights and civil liberties conditions in all countries around the world. Within its survey, it measures countries political rights and civil liberties along a seven-point scale, going from 1, which is the best score, to 7, that is the worst score. Countries are then divided into three different groups, in which countries that have received an average rating of between 1.0-2.5 are regarded as free countries, 3.0-5.0 as partly free countries, and finally 5.5-7.0 as not free countries. Through these survey ratings, Freedom House are then able to statistically show that the world seems to become increasingly democratic. Free countries are countries that score well with regards to both political rights and civil liberties. They therefore qualify as democratic, and even as liberal democracies. Examples of these countries are Sweden, the United States, and Australia. Partly free countries on the other hand, are countries that are rated as partially democratic. They have shortcomings with regards to political and civil rights that disqualify them from being labelled as democratic. It is within this group we find the countries that at times are labelled as transitional countries, hybrid regimes, or illiberal democracies. Examples of such countries are Macedonia, Albania, and Turkey. Not free countries are authoritarian states that have such large deficiencies in regards to political and civil rights that they cannot be regarded as even partially democratic. Examples of such countries are North Korea, Iran, and Egypt. From this classification and the statistics provided in the figure above it is possible to read out a positive global trend for democracy, in which the number of free countries has more than doubled during the last 30 years from 42 in 1976 to 90 in 2006. During the same time period, the number of not free countries has decreased from 68 in 1976 to 45 in 2006. The number of partly free countries has slightly increased during the past 30 years but also remained relatively constant during the past 20 years.

Another approach to measuring the global spread of democracy is to track the development of electoral democracies. Electoral democracies utilise a limited definition of democracy, where the focus is placed on the existence of basic institutional features for a democracy. Within the Freedom House classification of a electoral democracy the following criteria must be satisfied:

- A competitive, multiparty political system;
- Universal adult suffrage for all citizens (with exceptions for restrictions that states may legitimately place on citizens as sanctions for criminal offences);
- Regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy, reasonable ballot security, and in the absence of massive voter fraud, and that yield results that are representative of the public will;
- Significant public access for major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning.

Electoral democracies are thereby bound to acknowledge basic political rights and provide ample room for political oppositional groups. There are however no extensive requirements incorporated into this classification insisting on for instance respect of human rights and the
rule of law. This means that some electoral democracies can be regarded as democratically flawed if such demands are connected to the definition of democracy. The concept electoral democracies, has however, gained increased acceptance as a tool of measurement and it can be used to provide insight into the ongoing increase in democratic practices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year under review</th>
<th>Number of electoral democracies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>123</td>
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Table 1.2 Tracking electoral democracy
Source: Freedom House website: http://www.freedomhouse.org

As shown by figure 1.2, the number of electoral democracies has significantly increased during the last 20 years. More and more countries around the world are adopting the basic, minimum, requirements connected to democracy, thereby signalling a growing international acceptance and recognition of these practices.

Explaining the global spread of democracy

Scholars dedicated to studying democracy have traditionally discussed whether specific countries are “fit for democracy” or not. This line of thinking changed dramatically following the growth of democratic practices during the final half of the twentieth century. The collapse of communism and rapid increase in democratic practices around the globe brought increased recognition and support to the belief that democracy was not exclusively a western value, dependent on a western culture. Instead, democracy started to be viewed as a universal value that could take root in all areas of the world. With the establishment of democracy as a world value, the discussion among academics and policymakers slowly shifted towards bringing improved understanding to the causes behind this development. A central feature of this discussion has been the impact of internal versus external factors on democratisation. The traditional scholarly wisdom in the field has been that domestic factors are the decisive factors for democratic transition and consolidation. Only limited attention has been dedicated to the study of external factors. This domination of internal factors as explanatory reasons behind democratic transition is plainly visible in the main body of literature that has followed the third wave of democratisation. Factors such as the level of domestic economic development, the possible existence of a vibrant civil society, unity among political elites, institutional and social traditions, institutional design, and the extent of state control, have all been included in different explanatory studies of the global spread of democracy.
It would however, be unfair to proclaim that external factors to democratisation have gone totally unnoticed. A growing awareness can in fact be traced within the academic literature to the importance of external factors to democratisation, as indicated by the quote below.

Perhaps, it is time to reconsider the impact of the international context upon regime change. Without seeking to elevate it to the status of prime mover, could it not be more significant than was originally thought?18

This growing academic awareness followed to a large extent from comparative studies of the democratic transitions that took place in Latin America and Southern Europe between 1974 and 1989, and of those transitions that mainly followed in post-communist Europe following the collapse of communism. When comparing these different regions it became apparent that the democratic transitions of post-communist Europe had explanations that were missing in Southern Europe and Latin America. The analysis of the democratic transition in post-communist Europe indicated that external factors could have significant influence on domestic politics, most noteworthy example being the fall of the Berlin wall together with the disintegration and collapse of the Soviet Union.19 This realisation brought increased attention to the role of external factors on democratisation and resulted in a number of studies that have tried to come to grips with these factors.20 There is nevertheless a need for further studies in the field because knowledge about most aspects of democracy promotion is still relatively limited.

Democratic political theory is as old as ancient Greece, but theorizing democratization, and practical endeavors by the international community to promote democracy, are both relatively new.21

Additionally, the need for increased knowledge of the role of democracy promotion and external factors on democratisation is not limited to the academic world. The rapid increase of democracy promotion projects around the world has brought renewed demand for further knowledge among practitioners as well. Democracy promotion has mushroomed over the globe since the beginning of the 1990s. This development reflects the combination of three factors: the global spread of democracy, the end of the cold war, and new thinking about development.22 The spread of democratic practices around the world was followed by a growing need for democratic assistance. Developing and transitional democracies sought help with election procedures, newly established independent newspapers required support, and the growing civil society organisation looked for aid and contact with democratic counterparts. The global spread of democracy thereby developed a need for democracy assistance that was hard to ignore for democratic countries and organisations. In addition, the collapse of communism and the end of the cold war removed an ideological hindrance for democracy promotion. By establishing democracy as the dominating ideology worldwide, countries and organisations no longer needed to consider the implications of democracy promotion in
relation to the cold war conflict. Democracy promotion was also not only ideologically motivated, but also had pragmatic reasons. Democratic development was regarded as the gateway to a more peaceful international co-existence. The democratic peace theory and the globalisation process served as foundation for this perception. Finally, there was also some new thinking about development and the importance of institutional structures. It had previously been believed that political development could be reached through economic development, and this motivated development cooperation with authoritarian states. In the latter parts of the 1980s, it started to become clear that this approach was not resulting in political development. The authoritarian states remained authoritarian and significant portions of development resources were lost in corruption. It therefore became increasingly ethically questionable to continue to support developing countries with authoritarian regimes. A significant portion of the donor community hence took a collective stand during the 1990s that political development was connected to economic development and that democracy and good governance should be incorporated into all development programmes.23

It is difficult to measure the growth of democracy promotion since the beginning of the 1990s precisely. The reason for this is that democracy promotion is often connected to other forms of development cooperation, which complicates a possible deconstruction of official development assistance figures into more precise categories. The spending of the United States government on democracy assistance during the 1990s can, however, serve as an example. The largest recipient of United States government funds dedicated to democracy assistance is the USAID, and its funding for democracy assistance rose from 165.2 million dollars in 1991 to 637.1 million dollars in 1999.24 A similar trend to increasingly emphasise the importance of democracy is noticeable worldwide among most other donor countries and organisations. Moreover, this growth has given rise to new questions. What has democracy promotion achieved? How has it been managed? What works and what does not work? How can we improve existing democracy promotion programmes? It seems clear that democracy has been the source of increased democracy promotion activities, but has democracy promotion proved to be the cause for continued spread of democracy?25

Challenges for democracy promoters

These questions are even more important in the context of the new challenges that international democracy promoters are facing. During the last 30 years, the world has seen an increase in democratic practices, often referred to as the third wave of democratisation. It is now more frequently argued that the third wave is over.26 New democracies are not emerging to the same extent as immediately following the end of the cold war. The ones that do seem to have questionable democratic quality. Being regarded as an electoral democracy, within Freedom House classification, is not synonymous with being a free country. The distinction derives from the inclusiveness of the democratic definition used for the two concepts. The definition of an electoral democracy focuses on the existence of the minimum structural conditions for democracy, while the definition for a free country utilises a wider democratic
definition. Free countries are electoral democracies that also respect an array of civil liberties besides providing the minimum requirements for being an electoral democracy. In distinction, electoral democracies that are not classified as free have shortcoming in regards to civil liberties and may have limited channels for public participation, which have prompted these countries accordingly, to be conceptualised as for example semi-democratic, quasi-democratic, electoral authoritarianism or illiberal democracies. The statistics provided by Freedom House indicate that illiberal democracies constitute a significant portion of the electoral democracies that are currently being established, growing in number growing from 12 countries in 1986 to 33 in 2006. This fact has provoked statements declaring that illiberal democracy is a growth industry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Electoral democracies</th>
<th>Free countries</th>
<th>Illiberal democracies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.3 The growth of illiberal democracies

Source: Freedom House website: http://www.freedomhouse.org

A well-established belief about democratisation, among scholars and practitioners alike, is that democratisation is a process of stages. With this conviction, illiberal democracies can be understood to be transitional countries in the process of a democratic transition towards becoming liberal democracies. External support and pressure, together with internal modernisation processes, could hence lead these transitional countries to finally consolidate as liberal democracies. But as the number of illiberal democracies increases, this hypothesis has become more intensely disputed. It seems that many of these illiberal democracies have stalled in their democratic transition and are not making any significant progress towards consolidating as liberal democracies. Some scholars have argued that most countries regarded as transitional are not clearly heading towards becoming liberal democracies, and instead should be perceived as consolidated grey-zone democracies in which illiberal practices have become normality. This is a deeply disturbing development for any actor that wishes to see a development of liberal democracy around the world. It has also given renewed energy to the discussion that the third wave of democratisation will be followed by a reverse wave of democratic breakdown, something that has been found to occur after all previous waves of democratisation.
Parallel to this development, another challenge has emerged. There seems to be a growing suspicion concerning the underlying motives for democracy promotion. One important source of this growing suspicion is the connection that has been made, foremost within US foreign policy, between the war on terrorism and democracy promotion. The world is currently following the mainly American attempt to bring democracy to Iraq, Afghanistan and the entire Arab Middle East with scepticism and concern. US foreign policy has traditionally always held an idealistic element and democracy promotion abroad has been one of its main goals, going back to at least the time of Woodrow Wilson. But following the events of September 11, the emphasis on democracy promotion within US foreign policy has been merged with US security goals, causing democracy promotion to be regarded as “high politics” on the international stage. The Bush administration advocates that spreading democracy will not only spread American values, it will also provide an institutional foundation that will improve American security from rogue states and international terrorism. This rhetoric has emphasised the impression that democracy promotion is not a purely altruistic and idealistic endeavour, but rather a new disguised form of western imperialism. Hence, democracy promotion has become tarnished because of its connection with the war on terror.

The war on terror therefore can be seen to be pushing both the Bush administration and the Arab region in the opposite direction from democracy promotion. This is all the more so because the war on terror has made Arabs, and other Muslims, defensive about identity and has further radicalized Islamist movements. Ultimately, the war on terror, far from promoting democracy in the Middle East, may be pushing the Arab world since 2001 towards more, or less, authoritarianism.

A backlash against democracy promotion can therefore be found among authoritarian countries and illiberal democracies. This backlash is visualised through a strengthening resistance within such countries against democracy promotion programmes directed towards empowering the civil society, developing free media, and strengthening opposition parties, institutions and processes. Russia can serve as an example of this trend. In January 2006 Russia introduced a new law that increased state control over local and foreign NGOs operating in the country. Through the new legislation, all NGOs are forced to inform the government in advance of every project they intend to conduct and get prior approval for its operation. The Russian authorities were also given the authority to close down foreign NGOs if they are considered to threaten “the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, unique character, cultural heritage, and national interest of the Russian Federation”. The implementation of this law, which seriously restricts the freedom of association in Russia, is not an isolated incident. This step should rather be regarded as one of several measures taken to “dismantle any meaningful institutional checks on the Kremlin’s power”.
A similar trend can be found in other illiberal democracies and authoritarian states. Countries like Uzbekistan, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Venezuela and China have all introduced similar measures. A number of explanations can be given for this development, the main one being that the political regimes in these countries are concerned about the possible political influence that democracy promotion can have. The orange revolution in Ukraine, the rose revolution in Georgia, and the ousting of President Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, can all serve as examples of incidents when democracy promotion has supported the mobilisation of people, and thereby participated in overthrowing incumbent regimes. These events have not gone unnoticed around the world and regimes in illiberal democracies and authoritarian states have gained awareness of the possible threat posted by these organisations towards their powerbase. These measures are however often motivated as a resistance against western imperialism, and commonly specifically against American influence; thereby returning to the Bush administration rhetoric of a freedom agenda, connecting democracy promotion with the war on terror.

This behaviour has made many states, nondemocratic and democratic alike, uneasy with the whole body of U.S. democracy-building programs, no matter how routine or uncontroversial the programs once were. It also makes it easier for those governments eager to push against democracy aid for there own reasons to portray their actions as noble resistance to aggressive U.S. interventionism. And the more President Bush talks of democracy promotion as his personal cause, the easier he makes it for tyrannical leaders to play on his extraordinarily high levels of unpopularity abroad to disparage the idea. These developments, the growth and consolidation of illiberal practices and the backlash against democracy promotion, raise concerns regarding the future spread of democracy. The desired outcome of democracy promotion for most international actors is not illiberal democracy or elective authoritarianism, but rather some form of liberal democracy. International democracy promoters should therefore be aware of these tendencies and adjust to the new conditions when necessary in order to reach the desired outcome, which is to support the continued development of liberal democracy around the world.

The aims of the study

This is a case study of democratisation and democracy promotion. The ambition behind this study is to advance the understanding of the democratic difficulties that transitional countries may be confronted with, and how democracy promotion can contribute to democratic transition and consolidation. The main research question guiding this study is: How can we understand the role of democracy promotion in democratisation processes? A primary purpose of the investigation is to contribute to a development of the analytical tools available, in order to strengthen the theoretical understanding about democracy promotion and its role
within democratisation processes. In order to do so, this study will utilise established theories of democracy, democratisation and democracy promotion, and develop an analytical framework that will serve to provide increased insight into the role that democracy promotion can have during democratisation. This insight is however dependent on an understanding of the democratic difficulties that transitional countries and international democracy promoters may encounter during the process.

The chosen research design is a case study, involving one international democracy promoter, Sweden, and a grey-zone democracy, the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, or Republic of Macedonia. A long democratic history has provided Sweden with a strong normative commitment to the structures, practices and values connected to democracy. Sweden has also a strong commitment to international development cooperation, and has been praised for this commitment as a respected and generous donor, and a pacesetter and leader within international development cooperation.

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Table 1.4 Commitment to Development Index 2007
Source: Center for Global Development

The Center for Global Development has published an annual index since 2003 where 21 rich countries are rated on how much they help poor countries to build prosperity, good government, and security. The table above is the index for 2007, demonstrating the fact that
Sweden is a dedicated international actor in regards to development cooperation. Sweden’s commitment to global development is moreover reflected in the proportionally large annual official development assistance (ODA) and innovative policies and procedures. Through its development cooperation commitment Sweden has established an influence that stretches beyond the actual ODA volumes that it can provide. These features, a strong normative commitment to democracy together with a strong normative commitment to international development cooperation, have merged in Swedish foreign policy, thus making democracy promotion into a central objective of Swedish development cooperation. These policies and activities have however not been placed under any noteworthy amount of scholarly scrutiny, which warrants additional studies on this issue. This sort of analysis is furthermore of relevance to the overarching objective of investigating the role of democracy promotion in democratisation processes because democracy promotion is not a standardised activity. The actual design and content of democracy promotion depend on the concerned actor and its time-spatial context and can therefore vary notably. The chosen subjects of investigation influence the theoretical knowledge that is developed from this form of study. This methodological problem is however an unavoidable feature of case studies. The strength of the theoretical contributions developed in this study can primarily be determined when applied to other actors and environments. The inclusion of an analysis of Swedish democracy promotion will nonetheless provide empirical contributions, which has value in and of itself.

Macedonia also serves as an interesting subject for this form of investigation because it is a “third wave” country that has struggled to consolidate its democratic transition, and therefore remains classified as a partly free, semi-consolidated democracy, or transitional society. The role of democracy promotion in these forms of environment is generally more appealing to investigate than similar activities undertaken in countries that have rapidly progressed into democratic consolidation or relapsed back into some form of non-democratic rule. Democracy promotion directed towards grey-zone democracies “is neither a dispensable supplement to a strongly self-propelling process nor a futile ricochet off an impenetrable wall. Instead, the assistance becomes more deeply drawn into the local process of the attempted political transition”. It can consequently be argued that it is more relevant to investigate democracy promotion in such settings, because the possible role of such activities is more likely to have relevance for the process. As an independent country Macedonia has struggled to complete the “triple transition” after emerging out of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Macedonia as a result remains at the crossroads of three possible future political trajectories. The first path would lead them towards democratic deepening and finally consolidation as a liberal democracy with a future in the European Union; the second path would move them towards indefinitely consolidation as an illiberal democracy or hybrid regime; and finally the third path, which would send the country towards a democratic regression back into authoritarian rule. Which of these three political trajectories Macedonia will follow is in the process of being determined, bringing further relevance to an analysis of the ongoing development. The additional fact that Macedonia has received very limited scholarly attention in the past, in comparison to other countries in the region, serves to justify the choice further. However, the
comments made earlier concerning the choice of Sweden as a subject of study can be made regarding the choice of Macedonia. The theoretical contribution developed from this environment will be influenced by the characteristic of the environment. This problem is equally unavoidable and the strength of the theoretical contribution is primarily left to be determined in future studies. The empirical contribution provided by the analysis of Macedonia’s democratisation process should nonetheless be regarded as a valuable contribution because of the relative shortage of studies on the subject.

To recapitulate, the main research question guiding this study is *how can we understand the role of democracy promotion in democratisation processes?* In the process of answering this question this study will attempt to provide three scientific contributions. The first contribution is theory building and involves a pursuit to further develop and strengthen the theoretical foundation and the analytical tools available for studies of democracy promotion. The theoretical contributions take the form of an analytical framework and a typology of the roles of democracy promotion in democratisation processes. The second and third scientific contributions are empirical and involve an attempt to shed further light upon, and thereby advance, the understanding concerning Swedish democracy promotion and the ongoing democratisation process in Macedonia. Neither of these subjects has received any noteworthy amount of scientific interest in the past. The empirical contribution made by discussing and analysing these subjects will therefore help to fill a scientific void.

**Significance of the study**

Starting with the theoretical contribution, as has been previously outlined, democracy and democratic transitions have been the subject of an abundance of scholarly literature. Attention has traditionally been mainly devoted to analysing the influence and importance of domestic factors for democratic transitions; meanwhile, external factors have remained relatively understudied. It is now possible to see a growth in scholarly literature dedicated to the influence of external factors, such as democracy promotion, but this field is still relatively new, and few, if any, core theories exist. This study aims to contribute to the development of such theories. Firstly, in the form of an outlined analytical framework of the structural components of democracy promotion, which serves as the foundation for the analysis of Swedish democracy promotion; and secondly, in the form of delineated ideal role types for democracy promotion in democratisation processes. As ideal types, these roles will be analytically constructed from a collection of abstract elements that have been detected in the observed empirical reality. An ideal type can therefore be considered as a theoretical model of reality, which is developed through generalisation, and simplification, and thereby focusing on certain features of the observed empirical reality at the expense of others. Following chapters will be dedicated to discussing previous research on democracy, democratisation, and democracy promotion. These fields will therefore not be further discussed underneath this heading. The focal point is instead placed upon discussing the empirical contribution of this
study in relation to previous research dedicated to Swedish democracy promotion and the democratisation process in Macedonia.

It appears to be only a few scientific studies that have been dedicated to analysing Swedish democracy promotion. The main body of studies devoted to analysing the policies and activities of democracy promoters have instead focused on other actors, such as the United States, the UN, and the EU. There are however, a number of studies that have investigated Swedish democracy promotion that deserve to be mentioned. One example is Anna Brodin’s dissertation *Getting politics right: Democracy promotion as a new conflict issue in foreign aid policy* from 2000. Brodin’s study investigates to what extent the content of Swedish democracy promotion has become a conflict issue in Swedish foreign aid, and focus is placed upon Swedish political parties and their behaviour in the parliamentary arena. The empirical content of the study consists consequently primarily of documentation of the positions taken by different political parties in these questions. The study additionally follows the policy out into project implementation in an attempt to analyse the possible extent of disagreement in this arena, but the focus remains on exploring the possible existence of political disagreement. Another study that deserves to be mentioned is *Promoting a special brand of democracy: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden* by Liisa Laakso. Laakso’s study from 2002 is presented as part of a larger research project dedicated to investigating the international dimension of democratisation and compiles an analysis and discussion of the Nordic countries perceived attempt to promote their special brand of democracy. The study takes no special interest in any specific country and focuses mainly on analysing general policy strategies. The third and final study introduced here was conducted by a research team headed by Richard Youngs, called *Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000-2006*. The starting-point of this project is similar to mine, that democracy promotion has grown in importance globally but that few studies exist that analyse these activities. They also perceive there to be a disproportional focus upon the activities of the United States while many other actors have been overlooked. Their study therefore set out to “provide a baseline, factual information on European democracy policies” involving the EU and seven member states. Sweden is included among the countries that are described. All of these studies are interesting on their own merits, but none of them is designed to dissect Swedish democracy promotion to the same extent as this one. There also exist additional studies that have included Swedish democracy promotion, but these have almost exclusively taken a comparative approach, in which Sweden has served as one of many different countries. This study however distinguishes itself from previous studies by placing a stronger focus upon analysing both the policies and actual field activities of Swedish democracy promotion. The conviction is therefore that this study can provide a valuable addition to a largely understudied subject.

The democratisation process in Macedonia is also largely understudied. Most of the studies that have been conducted on Macedonia focus upon the ethnic conflict. Alice Ackermann’s *Making peace prevail: preventing violent conflict in Macedonia*; Abiodun Williams *Preventing war: the United Nations and Macedonia*; and John Phillips *Macedonia: warlords and rebels in the Balkans* are a few examples of studies that primarily focus upon this
aspect. Other studies have placed the issue of national identity and culture in the focal point. Hugh Poulton’s *Who are the Macedonians*; Jane Cowan’s *Macedonia: the politics of identity and difference*; Keith Brown’s *The past in question: modern Macedonia and uncertainties of nation*; and Loring Danforth *The Macedonian conflict: ethnic nationalism in a transnational world* serve as examples of such studies. The democratisation process has, however, gone largely overlooked and there subsequently exist few studies dedicated to the subject. Occasional research papers have been published that focus on different aspects of the democratisation process in Macedonia and different regional comparison studies at times dedicate a chapter to a country analysis, but these contributions are scarce and hard to find. The Macedonian democratisation process has, consequently, hardly been placed under any notable scientific scrutiny and my conviction is therefore that this study can provide a valuable contribution.

**Methodological reflections**

As part of the process of conducting a scientific study, a researcher faces a number of methodological considerations. These include the epistemological departure-point of the study, research strategies, and the data collecting techniques. This section will discuss and attempt to position this study in relation to these questions.

**Explaining or understanding**

Social science research has long been regarded as polarised between a positivist ideal founded in the natural sciences where research studies are designed to produce explanations, and a hermeneutic ideal founded in the study of history where research studies are designed to produce understanding. Positivistic studies ask *why* and attempt to find general patterns and universal knowledge, while hermeneutic studies ask *how* and attempt to increase an understanding of the particular subject. These two research approaches have often been seen as incompatible, but this perception has become increasingly challenged. Many scholars today recognise that there is an interaction between explaining and understanding.
The division between positivist and hermeneutic research should thus not be exaggerated. These different research approaches can be, and commonly are, combined. This study will attempt to utilise both approaches, even if the primary ambition is hermeneutic. The present study is a hermeneutic in the sense that it is rooted in its particular context. The conclusions generated concerning the role of democracy promotion in democratisation processes are primary valid to the case of Macedonia and the democracy promotion activities conducted by Sida in this context during the investigated timeframe. Caution is therefore advisable when attempting to generalise these conclusions to all democracy promoters and all democratisation processes around the globe. Primarily because the approach of democracy promoters and the demands of different contextual setting vary between different circumstances. It is additionally a hermeneutic study in the sense that it attempts to bring increased understanding concerning the different dimensions of Macedonia’s democratisation process and the main characteristics of Swedish democracy promotion. There is however positivist elements to this study as well. Many of the analytical tools and theoretical conclusions that are utilised and developed can be characterised as being nomothetic and the aspiration is that these theories could be utilised as a foundation for future research studies in shifting empirical contexts.

Case studies

A baseline foundation for this study is the belief that the particular features of the contextual environment have significant importance for any attempt to create increased understanding of the role of democracy promotion in democratisation processes. It seems self-evident that there are significant contextual differences between the political situations in Iraq and Macedonia, even though both countries are currently receivers of democracy promotion and are to some extent undergoing a democratisation process. These contextual differences are likely to affect the role that democracy promotion have within these respective democratisation processes. Democracy promotion is not a standardised activity. Different actors may utilise significantly different strategies and have different objectives for their activities. It is therefore important to provide room for the particular in the study in order to be able to gain understanding of the characteristics and interaction between these different factors; hence a case study seems most appropriate.

A case study is expected to catch the complexity of a single case. A single leaf, even a single toothpick, has unique complexities – but rarely will we care enough to submit it to case study. We study a case when it itself is of very special interest. We look for the detail of interaction with its contexts. Case study is the study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances.
A case study can be defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.” The main benefit of a qualitative single case study, as opposed to a multiple case comparative study, is that it allows the researcher to study a chosen case more intensely, which provides increased possibilities to capture the particular features of that case. Contextual factors that by research design necessity are left out of broader comparative studies can therefore be taken into account. As a result, a case study increases the possibilities for establishing better understanding about the specific characteristics of the chosen case. As this study takes the need to connect the activity, democracy promotion, with its particular contextual environment, the democratisation process in Macedonia, as a foundation for the study it appears that the case study method is a suitable methodological approach.

Case studies additionally allow more analytical flexibility to adjust to preliminary conclusions. It is not uncommon for researchers in the process of conducting a case study to find that their preconceived views, assumptions, and hypotheses were wrong and that the preliminary conclusions gained from the case has compelled them to revise their hypotheses. Case studies allow the researcher this analytical freedom and therefore provide increased possibilities to generate increased understanding of the case. Comparative multi-case studies are more difficult to adjust during the research process and furthermore it is less likely that these preliminary conclusions arise, because comparative studies rarely allow the researcher the same level of closeness to the research subjects. Case studies are consequently commonly regarded as a suitable research approach for explorative studies, in cases where previous research findings about the research subject are less developed. This study can be regarded as explorative. As has been previously discussed, there exists relatively little previous research that incorporates the particular actors investigated in this study.

The case study approach has however been criticised. One of the more common arguments levied against case studies is that it is impossible to generalise on the basis of an individual case, which makes the approach useless with regards to scientific development. Lijphart’s declarations that “the scientific status of the case study method is somewhat ambiguous, however, because science is a generalizing activity. A single case can constitute neither the basis for a valid generalization nor the ground for disproving an established generalisation” can serve as an example of this position. My opinion is that these sorts of arguments are basically incorrect. Case studies can be used for both valid generalisation and to disprove established generalisations. Many scientific revelations have in fact been the product of a single observation. As argued by Flyvbjerg, “Galileo’s rejection of Aristotle’s law of gravity was not based on observations across a wide range, and the observations were not carried out in some number.” Case studies can additionally be used for falsification and the search for “black swans”. The discovery of a deviant case could most certainly serve to disprove established generalisations. Flyvbjerg therefore argues, “formal generalisation is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas the force of example is underestimated.” I generally agree with Flyvbjerg on these matters even if I am more cautious about regarding
this particular case study as suitable for generalisations. My opinion is that democracy promotion and democratisation processes are a highly context dependent activity that makes it risky to attempt generalisations from a single case. It can serve to spawn general hypotheses and theories to be evaluated in following studies, which is a commendable scientific contribution in itself. A single case is always a case of something, and by asking the question “of what is this an instance”, new questions can be raised and knowledge developed that propel the scientific community forward. I also agree with Flyvbjerg and others that context-dependent knowledge has scientific value of its own, even if I am uncomfortable with the statement that such knowledge is more valuable than generalisations and nomothetic theories. My position on the matter is more in line with the statement earlier from King et al in regarding both activities as essential and mutually interdependent. It is not necessary or even advisable to attempt to depict one as superior to the other.

The closeness and flexibility of case studies have also received criticism. The criticism has been that case study research has a bias towards verification, in that researchers adjust the study to confirm their preconceived notions. Such behaviour would diminish the scientific validity of the study, because if the research question and the used theories are allowed to change in order to suit the empirical reality, anything can be proven. This is a valid and important argument, but the problem of subjectivity is not exclusively a concern for case studies. It is a problem that all researchers, regardless of scientific approach, have to struggle with. Structural, quantitative, large sample studies can also be influenced by subjectivism, for instance through the choice of categories and variables. Flyvbjerg additionally argues that “the field” functions as a powerful disciplinary force. The study objects can for instance “talk back”. Imaginary conclusions generated in this study concerning the democratisation process in Macedonia and Swedish democracy promotion activities can be evaluated and criticised by the people involved in these activities. The problem of verification should therefore not be exaggerated.

**Deduction, induction, or abduction**

Another methodological discussion that needs to be explored is whether a scientific study should have its point of departure in a deductive, inductive, or abductive approach. With a deductive approach, the researcher enters the empirical context with an ambition to test a logically derived hypothesis, based on limited prior knowledge about how the empirical context is constructed. The researcher starts from theory and enters the empirical context to test the validity of that theory. With an inductive approach the researcher starts the scientific journey without a theoretical foundation and instead utilises observations and knowledge of the empirical context as the departure point. After gathering observations and data from the empirical context, the researcher then attempts to discover and determine empirical patterns that can serve as a foundation for generalisations. The final research approach, abduction, is a combination of induction and deduction. A scientific study utilising an abductive approach starts with observation of the empirical context and then turns to those established theories
that are deemed suitable for increasing the understanding of these observations. A scientific study which uses abduction accordingly alternates between observation of the empirical context and theory based analysis. This research approach is commonly used within case study research.69

![Deduction, Induction, Abduction Diagram](image)

This study primarily takes an abductive research approach, as this allows for the interaction and theoretical flexibility deemed necessary to conduct an explorative case study into the role of democracy promotion in democratisation processes. The scientific point of departure is not based exclusively in the empirical context or in established theories. The departure point has instead been influenced by an interaction of the two, where established theories have structured the observations of the empirical context and these in turn have influenced the choice of theories to be included in the analysis. Knowledge about the democratisation process in Macedonia and the established theories of democracy promotion were used to develop the contextual framework needed for the analysis of Swedish democracy promotion activities further. The conclusions generated from this analysis will later serve as the foundation for the development of ideal types for the role of democracy promotion in democratisation process. It can therefore be argued that the above figure, depicting abduction, lacks an arrow that lifts the generated results of the analysis back to theory-building. The analysis of the democratisation process in Macedonia also employs an abductive research approach even if it has elements of being a deductive investigation. Democratisation is a well-established research field with a wide range of theories, which makes analysis of such processes highly suited for deductive analysis. Knowledge of the empirical context nonetheless influences the choice and design of the theoretical foundation employed in this study, which results in it becoming an abductive study.

**Material**

A characteristic of case studies is that they rely on multiple sources of evidence.70 This study uses a variety of different sources, mainly in the form of written material. A primary source of
information concerning the ongoing democratisation process in Macedonia is the evaluation reports that have been produced by different international organisations. One such organisation is Freedom House, and the surveys Freedom in the World, which annual rankings and reports of the political rights and civil liberties in all states in the world, and Nations in Transitions, which provides analysis of the democratisation processes in the post-communist countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern. Other importance sources for information about the conditions in Macedonia has been the documents and reports produced by the International Crisis Group, a non-profit, non-governmental organisation dedicated to conducting field research that can be used to prevent and resolve deadly conflicts. Additional information concerning the political and economic conditions in Macedonia have been provided by organisations such as the World Bank, the IMF, the EU, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This study have also made use of newspaper articles produced by the Balkan Investigation Reporting Network (BIRN), a network of investigating reporters in the Balkans that publish articles and reports on the political and economic situation in the Balkans in English, and various other newspaper sources, such as MakNews and Southeast European Times. The study have also been helped by receiving the Daily Media Summary that the European Union Police Mission (Proxima) sent out to their officials and member country embassies and councils to inform them about the main news in the local Macedonia media. This study has also used a number of different theoretical analyses that has been conducted upon different aspects of Macedonia’s democratisation process.

Documents compose the main empirical source regarding the Swedish policy for democracy promotion. Examples are government bills passed through parliament and ministerial documents that delineate the national policy on development cooperation. These documents guides Sida and therefore serves as principal sources for Swedish democracy promotion. Another source for empirical material is Sida’s internal policy documents. These documents are of relevance because they also serve to guide Sida officials. There are, however, a large array of internal policy documents in use within Sida. A choice has therefore been made to primarily focus attention on overarching policy documents that have been developed with the entire agency in mind and policy documents specifically dedicated to different features of democracy promotion. As a complement, this study also includes a few interviews with key officials within Sida that have been active in the management of activities in Macedonia. The aim of these interviews has been to add insight into the process that underlines Swedish democracy promotion. The interviews were semi-structured and based on thematic areas of interest, which were briefly presented to the interviewee in advance. The interviews were additionally open for suggestions from the interviewee and the interview allowed for deliberation on areas that the interviewee indicated to be of particular interest. Documentation of the interviews was achieved by tape-recorders and notes. None of the respondents has explicitly requested to remain anonymous. However, since precise knowledge of the identity of the respondents is not deemed necessary in the context of this research, this information will be withheld.
Outline of the study

This study is structured around two parts. The first part of the study is chapters 2 – 4, which can be described as an interpretative case study of the democratisation process in Macedonia, while the second part of the study are chapters 5 – 7, which is an interpretative and a hypothesis generating case study of Swedish democracy promotion in the Macedonian context.71

An interpretative case study utilises established theoretical propositions and apply them to a specific case with the objective of increasing the understanding concerning the case. The objective of such studies is not theory-building or generalisation, rather a version of applied science where interest in the case take precedence. The ambition of this first part of the study is therefore not to generate any theoretical generalisations, rather to provide a base for the second part of the study.

Chapter two provides a theoretical overview of the main bulk of literature dedicated to the study of democracy and democratisation. It introduces democracy as a concept and theory by discussing its definition and different possible perceptions of its content. The discussion is constructed upon a spectrum, where emphasises is placed on the differences between minimalistic and maximalistic definitions of democracy. Chapter two also provide an extensive discussion concerning different factors for democratisation. This discussion attempts to continue the division between internal and external factors for democratisation
and outlines the primary factors within each dimension. Democracy promotion is thus positioned as one of several factors for democratisation. These discussions concerning democracy and democratisation serve as theoretical foundation not only for the analysis of Macedonia’s democratisation process but also for the following investigation of the objectives and methods of Swedish democracy promotion. Chapter three continues the theoretical discussion concerning different factors for democratisation and attempts to move the study closer to the empirical context. The discussion centres on the main dimensions of the democratisation processes in European former communist countries; commonly described as a “triple transition”. The content of these three transitional dimensions is discussed and a theoretical foundation is outlined that both position the Macedonian democratisation process in its regional context while providing a structure for the coming analysis. This theoretical foundation is linked to the previously discussed theories in chapter two. Chapter four carries the theoretical discussion over to the empirical context and subsequently contains the analysis of the democratisation process in Macedonia. The analysis is structured round the different dimension of the triple transition. The development within each dimension is discussed on the basis of the previously outlines theories in an attempt to bring increased understanding concerning Macedonia’s democratisation process.

The second part of the study can be described as a mixture between an interpretative and a hypothesis-generating case study of Swedish democracy promotion in the Macedonian context. A hypothesis-generating case study start with vague notions of possible hypotheses and attempt to develop theoretical generalisations to be tested in future studies. The hypothesis-generating dimension of the study involves the attempt to develop a analytical framework for the following analysis of Swedish democracy promotion and the effort to define theoretical ideal types for the role of democracy promotion in democratisation processes. The interpretative dimension of the study is found in the ambition to increase the understanding concerning Swedish democracy promotion both in general and in regards to the specific activities undertaken in Macedonia.

Chapter five focuses on discussing and developing the analytical framework utilised to analyse Swedish democracy promotion. Attention is placed on defining and discussing the main structural components of democracy promotion. The starting point for the theoretical discussion is previously established theories, which this study then attempts to refine. Chapter six places the focus upon Sweden and the state aid agency Sida as democracy promoters. This chapter discusses and analyses the main Swedish policy documents concerning development assistance in an attempt to capture the essential policy components of Swedish democracy promotion. The overarching analytical structure originate from the structural components of democracy promotion that was outlined in chapter five while the analytical tools used to analyse the content of these different structural components, concerning for instance Sweden’s model of democracy and the favoured methods for democratisation, is derived from chapter two. Chapter seven moves the study back into Macedonia and focuses on the projects initiated and supported by Swedish development cooperation during the period 2000-2006. An attempt is made to increase the understanding concerning these different projects and their
interaction with the surrounding democratisation process. The conclusion generated from this investigation is then carried over to chapter eight, which conclude the entire study with a discussion on the roles of democracy promotion in democratisation processes. The results of this discussion will be presented in the form of a typology, consisting of three ideal role types that have been derived from the analysis of Sweden’s attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia. In the process of developing this typology, the results generated by the framework analysis will be presented with the help of role theory. The use of role theory is believed to provide an additional perspective on the character of democracy promotion. Furthermore, it is a new approach to the study of democracy promotion, and may therefore present new theoretical possibilities. The advanced role typology, and the analytical framework for democracy promotion, serves as the theoretical contribution of the study, while the conclusions produced by the analyses of Macedonia’s democratisation process, the Swedish policy for democracy promotion, and the Swedish attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia during 2000-2006, serves as the empirical contributions of the study.

Notes:

4 For comments regarding the Warsaw Declaration and the Community of Democracies, see Democracy holds a party (2000), Dobriansky (2004). For more information concerning the Council for a Community of Democracies, visit their homepage at http://www.ccd21.org
5 Schraeder (2002) p. 1
7 Carothers (2004) p. 3
8 Carothers (2004) p. 2
9 Diamond (2005)
10 Huntington (1991)
12 Visit Freedom House homepage for more information concerning their methodology, http://www.freedomhouse.org
13 Liberal democracies are democracies that beyond having the minimum requirements for a democracy in place also respect and protect a number of traditionally liberal values. Visit Freedom House homepage for more information concerning their methodology, http://www.freedomhouse.org
18 Schmitter (1996) pp. 27-28
21 Burnell (2004) p. 100
22 Carothers (1999) p. 44, see also Burnell (2000c)
The former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, or Republic of Macedonia, will henceforth be referred to as simply Macedonia. It is understood that this decision can be regarded as controversial in some circles, because of the name dispute with Greece. It has however become standard practice in scholarly literature to refer to the country simply as Macedonia, and this study will not make an exception from this practice.
CHAPTER TWO

Democracy and Democratisation

In order to investigate the role of democracy promotion in democratisation processes, it is of importance to have a understanding of the desired objective for such activities; democracy, and the process and factors causing non-democratic countries to become democratic; democratisation. As has been previously explored, the world has seen a global spread of democracy during recent decades, but question marks can be raised concerning the democratic quality of some of these new democracies. It seems as if a number of these “third wave” democracies have stalled as hybrid regimes, and can be classified as belonging somewhere in between authoritarian and democratic rule. This realisation and classification however provokes questions concerning the actual content of democracy. What are we to understand democracy to be? This is not only relevant with regards to classifying these countries, but also to allow us to analyse the desired objective of democracy promoters. Hence, in order to avoid possible confusion on the subject, this chapter will explore different definitions of the concept. It should however be emphasised that the description provided here is not a complete account of all different definitions and models of democracy. The subject has been covered in detail elsewhere and the description here should instead be viewed a sample of this large body of work. This chapter will also provide a description of the main theories dedicated to democratisation. The focal point of this study is democracy promotion as a concept and activity, but the contextual surroundings of these activities need to be considered in order to advance the understanding about the role of democracy promotion in democratisation processes. This chapter will therefore highlight the main internal and external factors for democratisation and the theoretical schools dedicated to the field.

Democracy as a concept

Democracy can be understood as a system, an ideology, a theory or a concept, depending on the context in which the word is used. The definition of democracy is hence highly contested and its meaning has changed over time. This has added to the confusion about what democracy actually means. What we today understand democracy to be differs quite substantially from the original meaning, which was defined in ancient Greece, even if the original core of the definition still remains close to what is commonly understood as democracy.

Democracy is derived from demokratia, the root meanings of which are demos (people) and kratos (rule). Democracy refers to a form of government in which, in contradistinction to monarchies and aristocracies, the people rule. Democracy
entails a political community in which there is some form of *political equality* among the people.\(^3\) (Italics in original)

According to David Beetham, democracy should be understood as an end of a spectrum, in which the other end is a system where people have no influence at all over the decision-making process.

![Governance spectrum](image)

Disagreements about democracy are consequently disputes concerning the desired and practical extent of democracy along this spectrum. Beetham claims that we should distinguish between democracy as a concept, which he believes is indisputably *rule by the people*, and different theories about democracy, which involves contestable claims about the desirable and practical institutional form of the concept.\(^4\) It is however here that the controversy concerning the definition of democracy starts. Who are to be regarded as part of the people? What is meant by rule? In what way are the people to rule? Are there limitations to what should be included within this rule? The questions that can be raised are almost endless. So even if we accept Beetham’s claim about the definition of democracy as a concept, we run into problems when attempts are made to translate the abstract theoretical concept, rule by the people, into a real world phenomenon. It is also here that desirability and practicability come into play, aspects that are also prominent features within democracy promotion as described later on.

**Theories of democracy**

Beetham describes democracy as broadly relying on two different values, *political equality* and *popular control*.\(^5\) The principle of political equality is rooted in a liberal perception that all human beings are inherently born free and equal, and they should therefore also be regarded as equals within the political community of a society. Each individual holds the right and ability of self-determination and the principle of popular control is the manifestation of this right through the institutional framework of a political community. Democracy maximises the freedom of self-determination by providing and securing opportunities for individuals to live under laws of their own choice.\(^6\) Governments within a democracy are therefore based on the consent of the governed and consequently also accountable to them. These basic values can be traced in numerous theories on democracy, which describe and define different desirable and practical institutional forms embodying the ambition rule by the people. The two classical theories concerning democracy are the minimalist and the maximalist definition of democracy. The minimalist definition of democracy refers to democracy as a procedural model, or institutional arrangement, for reaching decisions. The focus is on the electoral process, and the possibility for the public to choose between different
competing political elites. The exact origin of the minimalist model of democracy is an issue of dispute, but a significant foundation was laid through the work of Max Weber. Weber advocated a parliamentarian democracy because it provided a channel towards political leadership that he believed the masses needed. In his view, the masses are unable to choose between different policies and they need the guidance of a more knowledgeable political elite. Hence, democracy should be viewed as a market place for potential political leaders and political programs from which the masses should have the possibility to choose between the presented options. This line of thought received widespread support and other early proponents of a minimalist definition of democracy include Lord Bryce, who declared, “… democracy really means nothing more or less than the rule of the whole people expressing their sovereign will by their votes”, and Ernest Barker, who declared:

Democracy does not mean the well-being or prosperity of the people, but a method of the government of the people; and a democratic measure is a measure which originates from, or tends to promote, such a method of government – not a measure which tends to increase the amount, or to rectify the distribution, of prosperity or well-being.

The best-known proponent of the minimalist definition is Joseph Schumpeter. Following the footpath of his predecessors, Schumpeter describes democracy as an institutional arrangement in which individuals have the power to choose between different competing governing options.

The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote. […] democracy does not mean and cannot mean that the people actually rule in any obvious sense of the terms “people” and “rule”. Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them.

The minimalist definition thereby emphasises the establishment and behaviour of a free and fair electoral processes. This is not only because it guarantees the citizens the ability to choose their representatives, but also because it functions as a safety valve through which citizens have the ability to hold political elites accountable for their actions. However, the minimalist definition excludes all aspects of outcome in the sense that the policies produced within a democratic system should not, in their view, be included in the system definition. One reason for this is the methodological disadvantages that follow such definitions. According to Samuel Huntington, there are three different ways of defining democracy, “… in terms of sources of authority for government, purposes served by government, and procedures for constituting government.” When source of authority or purposes are included within the definition, a
large degree of ambiguity arises because such issues are normative in nature and, as Huntington declares, “[f]uzzy norms do not yield useful analysis.”\textsuperscript{12}

Governments produced by elections may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by special interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good. These qualities may make such governments undesirable but they do not make them undemocratic.\textsuperscript{13}

Certain freedoms nevertheless need to be respected in order for the system to be viewed as democratic according to the minimalist standard. Freedom of speech, of assembly, to organise and to publish, are basic freedoms which need to be respected within democracies because they are necessary in order to allow an open and free political debate and to conduct electoral campaigns, the bedrock of free and fair electoral processes.\textsuperscript{14} So we can say that three features emerge as pivotal for the minimalist definition of democracy, namely competition, participation and a minimum level of civil liberties and political rights, centred on the electoral process.

One of the main advantages of the minimalist definition, which is often pointed out by proponents of the minimalist definition, is its analytical usefulness. Freedom House for instance uses a minimalist definition in classifying countries as “electoral democracies”. The following criteria have to be met in order for a country to qualify as an electoral democracy, according to Freedom House.

1. A competitive, multiparty political system
2. Universal adult suffrage for all citizens (with exceptions for restrictions that states may legitimately place on citizens as sanctions for criminal offences.)
3. Regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy, reasonable ballot security, and in the absence of massive voter fraud that yields results that are unrepresentative of the public will.
4. Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigns.\textsuperscript{15}

The proponents of a maximalist definition of democracy, on the other hand, warn of the dangers of equating democracy simply with free and fair elections.\textsuperscript{16} When restricting the definition of democracy to the electoral process, a number of countries are recognised as democracies just because they hold elections regularly. Thus, in this way, the definition misses the possibility of human rights violations that take place within the society and the possible presence of non-elected actors who, to some extent, control the elected politicians.\textsuperscript{17} There are also numerous ways of manipulating an elections process, which Andreas Schedler eloquently describes. For example, rulers can reserve positions by excluding important offices from the elections, restrict access to media for political opponents, exclude some political
opponents from participating in the electoral process, prevent elected officials from exercising their constitutional powers, restrict suffrage through legal measures and harass and intimidate voters from voting for their preferred representative. The counterargument is that such incidents of election manipulation would violate the minimal definition of democracy because the elections would not be regarded as free and fair. Such rebuttal raises the question about what factors constitute a free and fair election? This question is not easily answered and demands careful and nuanced judgement. The proponents of a maximalist definition however regard the focus, on the election process, taken by the minimalist definition, as too narrow a view of democracy.

The origins of the maximalist definition are to be found among scholars that viewed democracy more as a way of life than simply a system. Philosopher John Dewey viewed democracy as a society in which the government is only the expression of the political community and that it would be a mistake to reduce the concept only to the procedural form of making decisions. According to Dewey “… democracy is a wider and fuller idea than can be exemplified in the state even at its best. To be realized it must affect all modes of human association, the family, the school, industry, religion.” Individual proponents of a maximalist definition extend the concept of democracy to include different aspects, but what unites them is a shared belief that a substantially more inclusive approach is needed with regards to the concept of democracy, compared to what is recognised by the minimalist definition. Features such as free and fair elections are certainly important parts of the definition but the maximalist theory extends the definition to a network of political institutions and procedures that to a significant extent emphasises civil liberties and rights. These civil liberties and rights are today usually conceptualised as liberal, which according to Larry Diamond, in connection with democracy, refers to the following issues. Firstly, the absence of reserved domains of power that are not accountable to the electorate, directly or indirectly. Actors such as the military, for instance, should not restrain political representatives in their legislative role. Secondly, state officials should be both vertically accountable to the electorate and also horizontally accountable to one another, thereby constraining executive power and promoting a system that secures constitutionalism, legality and the deliberative process. Third, political and civic pluralism should be protected, securing the rule of law and an array of individual and group freedoms. These rights and freedoms should extent beyond the electoral process, assuring features such as multiple channels of expression, political equality between citizens, minority rights, the existence of a non-discriminatory judiciary and freedom of religious belief, opinion, discussion, assembly, demonstration, publication and petition.

The key distinction is whether the political process centers on elections or whether it encompasses a much broader and more continuous play of interest articulation, representation, and contestation. If we view the latter as an essential component of democracy, then there must be adequate freedoms surrounding that process as well.
Liberal democracy has become a concept commonly used to refer to democratic states that besides reaching the minimum procedure standard presented by the minimalist definition, also have institutionalised these liberal civil liberties and rights within their systems. Freedom House distinguishes between what they refer to as electoral democracies and free countries, which are liberal democracies, by using such standards that focus on different aspects of political rights and civil liberties.\textsuperscript{23} The definition can therefore be used to classify democracies even if the definition is open for more disputes about the criteria. The main advantage of the definition is that it aims to capture what has commonly come to be recognised as democracy through the example of the mature consolidated democracies in the western world.

Robert Dahl has presented an influential definition which can be regarded as a compromise between the minimalist and maximalist definition of democracy. Dahl argues, however, that democracy as a term should be reserved for a political system that is characterised as completely responsive to all its citizens. Furthermore, he questions whether such a system ever has existed and ever will exist. Dahl instead calls his model \textit{polyarchy}, meaning rule by the many, and specifies seven institutions that must exist for a government to be classified as a polyarchy:

1. \textit{Elected officials}. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.
2. \textit{Free and fair elections}. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
3. \textit{Inclusive suffrage}. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.
4. \textit{Right to run for office}. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective office in the government, though age limits may be higher for holding office then for the suffrage.
5. \textit{Freedom of expression}. Citizens have the right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socio-economic order, and the prevailing ideology.
6. \textit{Alternative information}. Citizens have the right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by laws.
7. \textit{Associational autonomy}. To achieve their various rights, including those listed above, citizens have the right to form relatively independent associations or organisations, including independent political parties and interest groups.\textsuperscript{24}
Dahl’s polyarchy model has received wide acceptance as a suitable description for what is commonly understood as a democracy, even if Dahl himself has chosen not to use this term. Scholars such as Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl have however, added to Dahl’s list of institutions in order to further refine the definition. Schmitter & Karl have added two attributes to Dahl’s list. Firstly, they emphasise the importance of elected officials having the ability to freely conduct themselves within the power of their office without being constrained by unelected officials, such as the military. Secondly, the polity must be self-governing and sovereign, in the sense that they must be able to act independently of constraints imposed by some other overarching political system. O’Donnell agrees with Schmitter & Karl about the first added attribute, but emphasises a different second attribute, namely the importance of elected officials not being arbitrarily dismissed before the end of their constitutionally mandated term.

The relevance of the debate about the features that are necessary in order to qualify as a democracy have intensified in recent years. This development follows in the wake of more countries in the world fulfilling the minimum conditions for being recognised as electoral democracies while the growth of liberal democracies are more modest. According to Freedom House’s classification the number of electoral democracies in the world has gone from 76 in 1990 to 123 in 2006. During the same period, the number of liberal democracies has increased from 65 to 90. When comparing these figures, we find that only 11 countries qualified as an electoral democracy without reaching the standards as a liberal democracy in 1990 while in 2006, that number had grown to 33, causing Fareed Zakaria to point out that it seems like these sorts of states are a growth industry. These hybrid states have been labelled with numerous definitions, such as illiberal democracies, semidemocratic, pseudodemocracies, electoral authoritarianism and electoral democracies, leading to conceptual confusion.

Without exploring the topic at any great length, it is worthwhile to notice that attempts have been made to develop democratic country classifications, which seem to be based on a similar theoretical foundation as Beetham’s spectrum theory. Larry Diamond uses a six-fold classification, through which countries are classified as politically closed authoritarian, hegemonic electoral authoritarian, competitive authoritarian, ambiguous regimes, electoral democracies, and liberal democracies, depending upon how democratic they are. Another shorter four-fold classification has been developed by Andreas Schedler, drawing inspiration from David Collier and Steven Levitsky, diving countries into authoritarian, electoral democracies, liberal democracies and advanced democracies. Thirdly, Freedom House uses a number of different classifications; for instance the three-fold Freedom in the World classification that labels states as Not Free, Partly Free or Free; and the Nations in Transit classification that labels countries as consolidated authoritarian regimes, semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes, transitional governments or hybrid regimes, semi-consolidated democracies, and consolidated democracies. Thirdly, Freedom House uses a number of different classifications; for instance the three-fold Freedom in the World classification that labels states as Not Free, Partly Free or Free; and the Nations in Transit classification that labels countries as consolidated authoritarian regimes, semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes, transitional governments or hybrid regimes, semi-consolidated democracies, and consolidated democracies.

The relevance of this discussion in the context of this study is the fact that Macedonia belongs to this growing group of countries that is difficult to definitively classify. Macedonia launched a democratic transition as part of the “third wave” and consequently adopted many
important features of democracy, but has yet to consolidate as a liberal democracy. This topic will be further explored in the coming pages and chapters, because it serves as an important foundation for understanding both the democratisation process in Macedonia and the role of democracy promotion in this setting.

Theories of democratisation

Based on the ideas of David Beetham, democratisation can be understood as the movement along a spectrum which has democracy at one end and undemocratic rule at the other.

![Diagram showing democratisation as movement along the governance spectrum]

Democratisation is a process in which a country transforms and thereby moves along a spectrum towards a more inclusive and substantial democratic institutional arrangement. A difference can therefore be found between those theories that are concerned with democracy and those theories that are concerned with democratisation, in that the former focus on democracy as a state of being while the latter theories focus on the causes and process of democratisation.33

The transition paradigm

Democratisation can be understood as a process of different transitional stages, from undemocratic rule, towards democracy and eventually to consolidation of democracy.34 This line of thinking, or transitology as the theoretical school on the subject is often loosely labelled, has been very influential. It fostered the notion that democratic development is possible in all countries and that democratic transitions progress according to a universal and linear development path. The challenge for continued democratic transition consists therefore of responding to the concerns of respective transitional stage in order to progress towards democratic consolidation. There exist some competing definitions of these transitional stages, but one influential division defines these stages as liberalisation, transition, and consolidation.35

The liberalisation stage of the democratisation process refers to the stage when a non-democratic society is going through a process of increased socio-economic liberalisation, openness and growing pluralism. Such dynamics unleash increased demands for public representation and public control, a process that can launch a democratisation process. There is a difference to be found between consolidated non-democratic countries and countries in the liberalisation stage. The latter have started a process of opening up and thereby embarked
on a possible democratic transition, while the former have not. The classification of consolidated authoritarian regimes, semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes, and transitional governments or hybrid regimes, which is used by Freedom House, originate from this difference. It is however important to notice that there is a difference between liberalisation and democratisation. Liberalisation involves “a mix of policy and social changes”, such as increased freedom of speech, increased freedom of association, the strengthening of rule of law and tolerance of an opposition.\textsuperscript{36} Democratisation, on the other hand, is a process where by a country moves towards increased \textit{rule by the people}, which entails the democratic features that have been mentioned earlier, such as competitive elections. A non-democratic country can therefore go through a liberalisation process and at the same time not relinquish any control of the decision making process to the people. Hence, democratisation does not necessarily have to be a part of a liberalisation process while liberalisation has to be a part of a democratisation process. Democratisation without liberalisation would produce a version of an illiberal democracy where the electoral process is more of a public spectacle than a means of public control and influence. Schedler refers to such countries as electoral authoritarian regimes and claims that it is misleading to refer to them as democratic in any sense of the word.

\textit{[\ldots] it makes no sense to classify them as democracies, however qualified. These electoral regimes do not represent limited, deficient, or distorted forms of democracy. They are instances of authoritarian rule. [\ldots] Electoral authoritarian regimes neither practice democracy nor resort regularly to naked repression. By organizing periodic elections they try to obtain at least a semblance of democratic legitimacy, hoping to satisfy external as well as internal actors.}\textsuperscript{37}

One important feature in the liberalisation stage that has received significant academic attention concerns the importance of social or national unity. Rustow refers to national unity as the single background condition for his model. The people of a society must not have any reservation as to which political community they belong to in order for a spirit of unity to develop.\textsuperscript{38} Within this perception of unity we can find the virtues of trust and acceptance, both towards other individuals and groups within the political community and also towards the system. Barry Buzan refers to this aspect as “the idea of the state”, claiming that it is this largely abstract notion that forms the bedrock of a political community.\textsuperscript{39} Without agreement about the idea of the state and the perception of community among its citizens, a state will experience difficulties in establishing a legitimate bond with them. If this happens, the future existence of the state can be questioned.

When thinking about transitions to democracy, many people tend to assume that what is challenged is the nondemocratic regime and that with democracy a new legitimate system is established. However, in many countries the crisis of the nondemocratic regime is also intermixed with profound differences about what
should actually constitute the polity (or political community) and which demos or demoi (population or populations) should be members of that political community. When there are profound differences about the territorial boundaries of the political community’s state and profound differences as to who has the right of citizenship in that state, there is what we call a “stateness” problem. Aspirant modern democracies can vary immensely on this variable from those polities that have no stateness problem to those where democracy is impossible until the stateness problem is resolved.40

Liberalisation and democratisation are processes of change, and when non-democratic countries embark on the path of change, latent issues of conflict may surface. Domestic ethnic division can be a source of such conflict which could impede or prohibit democratic transition. The point is that democracy, per definition, needs the agreement of citizens in a territory in order to have the legitimate claim of their compliance.

Therefore, if a significant group of people does not accept claims on its obedience as legitimate, because the people do not want to be a part of the political unit, however democratically it is constituted, this presents a serious problem for democratic transition and even more serious problem for democratic consolidation.41

The transition stage of the democratisation process signifies the movement away from undemocratic rule and refers to a democratisation process towards democracy. The core is transition, in effect, movement along the spectrum towards increased democracy. Countries in this stage differentiate themselves from pre-transitional countries by the fact that political liberalisation has started alongside the continued socio-economic liberalisation process. Commonly used events which signify a transitional country are the introduction of political power-sharing measures; a competitive election process for public office; and through these measures the institutionalisation of the minimum definition of democracy. Countries that have recently moved from being classified as authoritarian regimes to electoral democracies can be regarded as countries within the transitional stage or as transitional countries. It is these so called transitional countries that have grown in number during recent years and thereby nourished the debate about the definition of democracy and the classification of these countries.

The consolidation stage is the last stage of the democratisation process, and this stage has also received significant academic attention. There exist numerous different definitions of what democratic consolidation actually is, which has led to conceptual confusion. This confusion has caused Schedler to declare, “as matters now stand, the concept’s classificatory utility is close to zero. Its boundaries are fuzzy and fluid.”42 The consolidation stage is however, important when democratisation is being viewed as a process of stages, and we therefore need some conceptual understanding of the meaning of democratic consolidation.
Guillermo O’Donnell argues that we should view democratic consolidation as something conceptually different from transition and therefore divide the democratisation process into two transitions rather than one, the first being the transition from authoritarian rule into democratic government and the second transition being the consolidation of this new democratic regime. In relation to the stages used in this study, the liberalisation and transition stages are found within what O’Donnell refers to as the first transition and the consolidation stage is what O’Donnell refers to as the second transition stage. Democratic consolidation is also commonly separated into a “negative” version and a “positive” version. The negative version of consolidation focuses on the process of protecting the democratic transition that has taken place from democratic breakdown or democratic erosion, no matter where on the democratic spectrum the democracy in question finds itself. The aim of the negative version of consolidation is to stabilise the new democratic system so it will persist in its present form and not become the subject of authoritarian reversal. The positive version of consolidation on the other hand presupposes an existing minimalist democracy and views democratic consolidation as a continued movement along the democratic spectrum by deepening or refining the political system towards the features of advanced democracies. Positive consolidation focuses therefore not solely upon prohibiting democratic breakdown or democratic erosion within newly established democracies, but also on the continued transformation towards becoming a more refined democracy.

Just as there is academic disagreement as to what democratic consolidation is, there is also academic disagreement as to when consolidation has actually taken place. A well-known definition provided by Juan J. Linz claims that democratic consolidation has occurred when democracy in fact has become “the only game in town”. Linz later developed “the only game in town” definition together with Alfred Stepan to mean behaviourally; when no significant group of political actors attempts to act outside of the democratic system, create a non-democratic regime or leave the state; attitudinally when a strong majority of the citizenry holds the view that democracy is a superior political system and when the support of non-democratic alternatives are small; constitutionally when all significant political actors has become accustomed to settling disputes within the democratic system and also accept and respect the democratic institutions in place. Another definition, called the “two-elections-test” or the “transfer-of-power-test”, has been developed by Huntington. Huntington is an advocate of a minimalist definition of democracy and focuses on the electoral process as a key indicator for a consolidated democracy. According to Huntington, a democracy can be regarded as consolidated when the first democratically elected government is defeated in a free and fair election and accepts the defeat by peacefully transferring governmental power to the new regime. A third approach, advocated by Beetham, is the so called “generational test” or the “longevity test” which aims at capturing the process of consolidation by measuring stable continuation of core democratic institutions, advocating that if these institutions have been maintained over a period of time, measured in years, democracy is to be regarded as consolidated.
There are many more definitions of democratic consolidation than those presented above. This disagreement has roots going back to the disagreement about the definition of democracy and the more universal scientific problem of establishing indicators for something as elusive as democracy. It is even difficult to clearly distinguish between the transition stage and the consolidation stage, especially with regards to the positive version of consolidation that even goes so far as to include continued democratic transition in the consolidation definition. In reality, there are clear aspects of overlapping between being in democratic transition and being in a process of democratic consolidation, but conceptually, it can be fruitful to attempt to distinguish between the two processes, which the negative version of democratic consolidation seems to accomplish most forcefully. During actual democratisation, the process of consolidation begins as soon as some level of regime transition has occurred, which leads to some level of co-existence of the two processes, but at some stage, the democratic transition can be regarded as completed, or at least continues with seriously diminishing effect, and it is at this point, that we can make the separation between a country being in transition and a country entering a consolidation stage. It should also be emphasised that the consolidation of democracy does not prohibit a continued democratic refinement in the future. We should also distinguish between consolidation and democratic consolidation in that any state, authoritarian or democratic, can consolidate, but only democratic states can go through a process of democratic consolidation, meaning that the definition of democracy used guides the decision of which states that can be recognised as democratically consolidated or as in the process of democratic consolidation.

The end of the transition paradigm?

The transition paradigm has faced mounting resistance during recent years. The critique has mainly been raised against the notion that democratisation can be described as a linear process, during which countries are to pass through a set of predefined stages in order to become democratic. Additionally, critique has been given to the notion that transitional countries have a predestined endpoint, democracy. The argument is instead that democratisation should be viewed as an extremely complex process that usually takes different paths in different contexts and which has an uncertain destination. The notion of a predestined endpoint for transitional countries is hence dismissed in favour of a more open-ended perspective on the transition. Transitional countries should be regarded as being in the process of transition away from something and to a lesser extent in a transition towards something. The growing number of grey-zone democracies often serves as a justification for this perspective. These countries have clearly transformed away from something, socialism and communism in the case of most countries in the third wave. The endpoint of their transition on the other hand, is yet to be determined, and any assumption of endpoint can distort an analysis of their transformation. This critique interlinks with the argument that it is wrong to classify many of these grey-zone democracies as transitional countries. Thomas Carothers has accused advocates of what he refers to as “the transition paradigm” of
mislabelling these countries, because many of these are in fact no longer in a process of transition. They rather seem to have “entered a political grey zone” somewhere in-between dictatorship and democracy, which has become “a state of normality for many societies” and that their future trajectory is difficult to foresee. Carothers therefore questions the usefulness of this line of thinking.50 These arguments have received support, for instance from Guillermo O’Donnell, although O’Donnell claims that Carothers has short-changed the academic literature on democratic transition and based his arguments on issues that already have large academic support, for instance concerning the question of the uncertainty of the transition process with regards to the final destination for countries launching a transition process.51 The critique of transitology is especially common among scholars dedicated to the study of former communist bloc, so called area-specialists, regionalists or former Sovietologists.52 They particularly protest against the notion of a universal approach towards the study of democratisation. In their view, the democratic transition in the former communist bloc has unique characteristics, which reduces the usefulness of comparative and universal approaches. This topic will be further explored in chapter three.

Factors and causes behind democratisation

Democracy promotion activities are designed and conducted in conjunction with the conditions of the recipient country. In order to get an insight into the role of democracy promotion in democratisation processes, it is therefore useful to have a general understanding of what other factors influence democratisation. Democratisation is a process that is driven by both internal and external factors. Most academic attention has been devoted to analysing the importance of internal factors for democratic transition and consolidation. These factors have been perceived as the decisive factors for the process, while the possible influence of external factors has been considered to have secondary importance. The main body of literature on the field has therefore been dedicated to analysing internal factors, such as the level of domestic economic development, the possible existence of a vibrant civil society, unity among political elites, institutional and social traditions, institutional design, and the extent of state control.53 The influence of external factors has not gone completely unnoticed in the past, but these factors have gained increased recognition since the end of the cold war, in part motivated by the global growth of democratic promotion.54

Besides the division between internal and external factors for democratisation, another distinction can be made between the influence of actors and structures on democratisation. The line dividing actors and structures is often blurred, but it can nonetheless be theoretically useful to make the distinction. The established terminology in the field also distinguishes actor-oriented theories from structural theories. Figure 2.3 is an attempt to visualise the interwoven influence of these different factors on democratisation.55 Democratisation takes place in a national context but is affected by both internal and external factors. The international context can have a direct effect on democratisation, for instance through the initiation of the process as in the case of Iraq or post Second World War Germany and Japan.
The international context can also have an indirect affect on democratisation by influencing actors and structures in the national context. Examples of domestic actors are for instance, local decision-makers, politicians, religious leaders, and other politically influential people. The category domestic actors also include institutions such as media companies, the police, the military, or a political party. What constitutes an actor in one setting can be viewed as a structure in another. Domestic structures are for instance socio-economic conditions, cultural traditions, institutional legacy and institutional design. The term international actors refer, for instance, to foreign or international non-governmental organisations, foreign countries or agencies thereof as well as international organisations, such as the OECD, the UN or the EU. Sweden and Sida, as examples of democracy promoters, can be placed within this category. International structures are for instance the combined influence of the international development assistance community, procedures on the global market or informal foreign cultural influence, for instance, through popular culture.

![Diagram showing the factors behind democratisation](image)

**Figure 2.3**  The factors behind democratisation

**Internal factors for democratisation**

There are numerous internal factors that can be considered as important causes or influences for democratisation. The ambition of the following presentation is therefore not to provide a complete account of all the internal factors, but rather to present a list of the internal factors that have been given most attention within the academic field on democratisation and can thereby be regarded as the internal factors that are perceived by the academic community as most influential for democratisation.
Economic factors: A large body of work has been dedicated to analysing the connection between different economic factors and democratisation. Factors such as a country’s level of economic development, their economic systems, industry structures, and system of economic distribution have been under academic scrutiny and served as explanatory causes for democratisation. The most well-known connection is between a country’s level of economic development and its level of democratic development. Numerous empirical studies have found a correlation between the two, in which countries with a higher level of economic development are considered more likely to be democratic, while countries with a low level of economic development tend to be authoritarian. The very influential modernisation theory, in which economic development is seen a pivotal cause for democratisation, is to a large extent based on this correlation. The modernisation theory did not only view economic development as the source of democratisation, but it is also viewed as an important factor for sustaining democracy. This argument is captured by the widespread generalisation that claims that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.”

This argument has been used at times to advocate the promotion of economic development and modernisation before democratisation. Seymour Martin Lipset has made important contributions to this theoretical school. His published study from 1959, Some social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, and, Political Man, the social bases of politics, can be regarded as required reading in the field. Lipset’s study was conducted through the examination of the relationship between development and democracy in 48 different countries in Europe and Latin America, linking material progress to democracy and modernisation and comparing different factors that he regarded to be symbolic of wealth and democratic progress, such as per capita income, the number of persons per motor vehicle and the number of radios, telephones and newspapers per thousand people. This method of study has been widely copied in succeeding empirical examinations.

Another economic factor that often is connected to democracy and democratisation is what system of economic organisation is utilised. Empirical studies have found a strong correlation between capitalism and democracy while authoritarian regimes are most often linked to centrally directed command economies. The control of politics and the economy in a sense seem to go hand in hand. Countries that have significant diffusion of political power and influence are commonly market economies with considerable private ownership. In authoritarian countries on the contrary, where political power is highly concentrated, the economy is also often centrally controlled. Democratisation and capitalism are believed to have a mutually reinforcing relationship, through which both processes can serve as the cause for the other. The underlining assumption is that the introduction of capitalism and a more diverse private ownership of economic resources in authoritarian societies will strengthen previously subordinated groups and produce increased demands for political influence, which in turn will lead to democratisation. Increased distribution of economical influence is regarded to be a natural component of democratisation.

The connection between capitalism and democracy is widely supported. It is for instance a fact that all consolidated democracies in the world utilise different forms of capitalist
economies, although the causal relationship between the two is more uncertain. Francis Fukuyama regards the relationship to be indirect, in that capitalism in itself does not generate democracy. He in fact claims that capitalism is perfectly compatible with many forms of authoritarianism. The strength of capitalism can be found in its ability to serve as an engine of economic growth and socioeconomic development, which in turn, favour the development of democracy. Or as Peter Berger declares, “capitalism creates space and opportunity for civil society”. The connection between capitalism and democracy is not linear. Unregulated and unrestrained forms of capitalism are believed to hamper democratisation because it can cause a development where too much economic power and influence are controlled by a privileged few. Such situations could cause public resentment and social unrest. Democracy is based on collectively held perceptions of equality and commitment to a shared community, and that notion can be seriously damaged if the benefits to the society are too unevenly distributed. The actual political influence and equality of all citizens can also be tilted in a favour of this small resource rich minority, because economic power provides political power. Hence, the issue of redistribution systems and social welfare have become connected to democracy and democratisation. It is claimed that mixed economies, where the state provides degrees of market regulation and redistribution of resources, are more beneficial for democratic performance than both unregulated capitalism and socialism. The restriction of economic freedom could consequently be favourable to democratisation. This conclusion can also be drawn from the fact that all democracies in the world to date have introduced and utilised some degree of state intervention on the market. The actual degree of regulation differs between countries, but no democracy operates with a completely free market.

The final economic factor described here is the effect of a country’s industry structure. Studies of democratisation have shown that agrarian societies are less likely to be democratic compared to industrialised societies. This factor serves as another feature of the modernisation theory, in which it is argued that industrialisation can be regarded as a cause for democratisation, because it breaks previously dominating economical and political structures, provides socioeconomic development and establishes new opportunities for political organisation. Industrialisation has commonly been followed by the development of labour unions that have organised the workers around demands for increased political influence. On the other hand, a privileged few are commonly in control of political and economic resources in agrarian societies. Additionally, agrarian societies are more scattered and therefore fractionised, so it is more difficult to politically organise the peasantry and poor agrarian workers. These structures are consequently believed to inhibit democratisation.

Capitalism brings the subordinate class or classes together in factories and cities where members of those classes can associate and organize more easily; it improves the means of communication and transportation facilitating nationwide organization; in these and other ways it strengthens civil society and facilitates subordinate class organization.
To summarise the arguments concerning the influence of different economic factors on democratisation, it should be noted that economic development, the introduction of mixed market economies, systems of redistribution and social welfare programs, as well as industrialisation are all internal economic factors that are believed to promote democratisation. On the other hand, the existence of low level of economic development, a centrally directed command economies, significant economic differences, and a dominating agrarian production sector are economic factors that are believed to hamper democratisation.

**Social factors:** The influence of social factors on democratisation has also received significant scrutiny. The modernisation theory, for instance, includes this factor as a cause for democratisation. Modernisation and industrialisation are believed to lead to urbanisation, and urbanisation in turn is believed to provide improved opportunities and needs for social and political change. Urbanisation brings people in close vicinity to each other, thereby establishing improved possibility for communication, which serves as an important factor behind social mobilisation. Additionally, urbanisation and industrialisation create demands for new services. The transformation from agrarian societies to urbanised industrial societies changes old habits and traditions and creates new patterns of consumption and occupation. These new demands for housing, employment, education and other social welfare programs are unlikely to be met by traditional societies, thereby forcing both the society and the state to undergo considerable political and administrative reforms. Karl Deutsch belongs among the pioneers who emphasize the role of social factors on democratisation. His study, *Social mobilization and political development*, from 1961 is often cited in studies that focus on the social factors of democratisation.70

There are primarily three different social factors that are emphasised in connection with democratisation. The first social factor, *urbanisation*, has already been covered to some extent. Urbanisation requires internal migration and this process breaks traditional structures and provides increased opportunities for citizens to develop democratic attitudes and practices. The second factor comprises changes to a country’s *social composition*.

![Figure 2.4 Transformation of the social composition believed beneficial for democratisation](image)

Seymour Martin Lipset has contributed to the development of this line of thought. Lipset argues that economic development produces a growing educated middle class, which changes the social composition structure of the society from the shape of an elongated pyramid, with a large lower-class base, to a diamond where the middle class becomes more politically
powerful, as visualised in figure 2.4. The development of this politically empowered middle class serves to temper social conflict between the lower classes and the upper classes within the society while at the same time pressures the upper class into implement a process of political liberalisation, thereby launching a democratisation process.71

Another theoretical school on democratisation that emphasises the importance of social composition and social struggle is historical sociology, or structuralism. Advocates of this theoretical school stress social conflict over time as the main cause behind democratisation. Barrington Moore’s study, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, from 1966 is commonly referred to as the starting point for historical sociology. Moore analyses the development towards modernity in eight countries, Britain, France, the US, Germany, Russia, Japan, China and India. From the results, Moore develops what he believes to be three different paths to modernity, namely: the Bourgeois revolution, in which the bourgeois was able to control the aspirations of the peasantry, reduce its size and redirect them to industrial employment, limit the landowning upper classes control over agricultural production and thereby promote a capitalistic and democratic development.72 Finally, there is Revolution from above, in which the landowning upper class was able to keep its control over peasantry and the agricultural production and thereby keep the society highly hierarchical. The bourgeois joined the upper class in the modernisation process and the revolution was the ability to strengthen the state while undergoing industrialisation and establishment of capitalism, leading to the rise of militarism and ultimately to fascism.73 Revolution from below, in which the upper class fails to commercialise the agricultural production successfully leading to the survival of the peasantry, both culturally and numerically, and the failure to establish a commercially oriented population. The state is then unable to deal with the demands of the peasantry as the modernisation process continues and together with a divided and weak bourgeois the society becomes conflict prone and the end result, according to Moore, is usually a communist or a socialist state system.74

Theda Skocpol’s study States & social revolutions from 1979 together with Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens & John D Stephens study Capitalist development and democracy from 1992, are commonly regarded as the two most important contributions to the field after Moore’s study. Skocpol main conclusion is that state transition is a process over significant time and claims that it is dependent on state weakness, caused by structural intrastate or transnational reasons. Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens come to similar conclusions and emphasise three clusters of power as being important for the development of a society, namely class power, state power and the transnational structure of power. The development of a state thereby depends on the combination and interaction of these three factors.75

There is one essential difference to be noticed here. Lipset and Moore both emphasise the importance of the middle class, or the bourgeois, for democratisation. Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens to the contrary regard the working class to be the most consistent pro-democratic force.
The working class was the most consistently pro-democratic force. The class had a strong interest in effecting its political inclusion and it was more insulated from the hegemony of dominant classes than the rural lower class. Exceptions to the pro-democratic posture of the working class occurred where the class was initially mobilized by a charismatic but authoritarian leader or a hegemonic party linked to the state apparatus.76

The middle class on the other hand plays an ambiguous role in democratisation according to Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens. They can push for increased political influence for themselves but at the same time take a more hesitant and reluctant position towards the inclusion of the lower classes. The view of Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens is therefore that the middle class can even function as an obstacle to democratisation. The willingness of the middle class to include the lower class in a process of increased political influence depends on the need and possibility to form an alliance with the working class.77 Another social group that receives attention by Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens as being the most anti-democratic force, are large landowners.

Large landlords, particularly those depended on a large supply of cheap labor, consistently emerged as the most anti-democratic force in comparative studies. If an economically significant class of labor-dependent landlords had control or, at least, very significant influence on the state in a given period, the state resisted demands for the expansion of democratic rights.78

The third social factor that is commonly connected to democratisation is education. The basic foundation for democracy is a set of values and practices that is socially learned, and education serves as an important tool to socialise and fostering the public into accepting and recognising these democratic values and practices.79 Education also has the ability to generate a general social awareness among the public, and this facilitates social mobilisation. Education can hence be seen as both a cause for socio-economic development and a result of the same process. Processes of modernisation result in increased demands for education and education has a tendency to create more socially aware and mobilised citizens, which in turn drives the process of modernisation. The modernisation theory is hence a strong proponent for the influence of education on democratisation.80

Education presumably broadens man’s outlook, enables him to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrain him form adhering to extremist doctrines, and increases his capacity to make rational electoral choices. […] If we cannot say that a “high” level of education is a sufficient condition for democracy, the available evidence does suggest that it comes close to being a necessary condition.81
Recent empirical studies have confirmed the connection between education and democracy, but there is still some disagreement about the required level of education. Some scholars argue that the important threshold to pass is widespread literacy, because this enables increased communication and information capabilities among the public. Other scholars claim that widespread literacy is not sufficient, and that the public also needs to gain an all-round education, which would provide them with increased capabilities for gathering and evaluating information about the surrounding social and political environment. The final set of scholars sees a linear correlation between education and democracy, meaning that increased education levels result in more socially and politically mobilised citizens that are willing and interested in participating in the political process.

To conclude the arguments concerning the influence of different social factors influence on democratisation, it should be noted that urbanisation, high education levels, and the growth of a middle class willing to ally itself with the working class are all internal social factors that are believed to promote democratisation. The lack thereof, in other words the existence of a fractionalised agrarian society with a low level of education and presence of large landowners, are social factors that are believed to hamper democratisation.

**Psychological factors:** The political orientation of the public, in other words the values held by the public concerning the political system and their willingness to participate in the governance process, has also been advocated as a cause for democratisation. The principal proponents of this approach, or the political culturist school, have been acknowledged to be Gabriel A. Almond & Sidney Verba. Their study from 1963, *The Civic Culture*, is regarded as path breaking. Almond & Verba analyse the influence of political culture on democracy and democratisation. They recognise that the usage of the term “culture” causes some confusion because culture has so many meaning, but they stress that they employ the term culture as solely “psychological orientation towards social objects.” More specifically, they define political culture to be “the specific political orientations – attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system”.

A political culture has a number of structural components. Almond & Verba systematically structure their analysis of different political cultures by defining different modes of political orientation and different classes of social objects. They utilise three different types of political orientation.

1. “cognitive orientation”, that is, knowledge of and belief about the political system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs, and its outputs;
2. “affective orientation,” of feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel, and performance, and
3. “evaluational orientation,” the judgements and opinions about political objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings.

Further, these different political orientations are also emotionally charged. Citizens can have three different emotional feelings towards the political system; they can have a high frequency
of positive feelings towards political objects; they can have a high frequency of negative feelings towards them; and they can finally have a high frequency of indifference towards them. These feelings are directed to different features of the political system. Almond & Verba define these features as “system as general object”, “input objects”, “outputs objects”, and finally “self as object”. Depending upon the frequency of different kinds of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations towards these features, Almond & Verba are then able to develop three different core political cultures; parochial culture, subject culture, and participant culture.87

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Table 2.5 Congruence/Incongruence between Political Culture and Structure

Source: Almond & Verba (1963) p. 22. (+) Indicate a high awareness, or of positive feelings, or of evaluation toward political objects. (-) Indicate a high frequency of negative evaluation or feelings. Finally, (0) indicate a high frequency of indifference.

A participant culture is primarily manifested by a high awareness of political objects and positive affective and evaluative orientations towards them. Members of a participant polity therefore have a tendency to take an activist approach towards the political system and reflect feelings of allegiance. A parochial political culture can be seen as the opposite of a participant culture. Members of a parochial polity have an awareness of political objects but they hold negative affective and evaluative orientations towards them. This is reflected through alienation, low expectations, and even possible resistance towards political objects. The third and final core type of political culture is the subject culture. Members of a subject culture are aware of political objects, but they remain mainly passive towards them. These core cultures can co-exist. According to Almond & Verba, most societies have some form of mixed political culture. Some political cultures have a stronger congruence with democratic structures than other political cultures, thereby serving as a cause for democratisation. The mixture of these cultures that Almond & Verba finds to be most congruent with democratic structures is the so called “civic culture”; which they define as mainly an “allegiant participant culture” that is balanced by features of both subject and parochial orientations.88

Other scholars have also analysed the influence of psychological factors on democratisation. One noteworthy example is Ronald Inglehart. Inglehart has worked extensively in the field of political culture and in the study *The Renaissance of Political Culture* from 1988 he argues that there exist distinct and constant cross-cultural differences between societies, with regards for instance to interpersonal trust and life satisfaction, and that these differences can be measured and linked with the viability of democratic institutions. According to Inglehart, it is
also likely that these differences can be connected to the possible emergence of democracy, which means that societies which have embodied these civic values are more likely to become democratic than societies that have not. Robert D. Putnam has also made an important contribution. Putnam takes this line of thought a step further and has attempted to trace the importance of the civic community and civic values on the establishment of political institutions historically. In his study Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy from 1993 Putnam analyses the change to a new structure for regional public administration that was introduced in Italy in 1970 and attempts to explain regional differences in administrative efficacy between these new regional governments by exploring variations in civic traditions. Putnam argues that the different Italian regions have adopted different approaches to dealing with collective action through history and that these differences affected how the new institutions worked, making the regions of north Italy more efficient than those of the south.

The inability of political institutions to perform to public expectations has also received attention as a psychological factor for democratisation. Citizens that perceive that their expectations are not met by the political establishment are more prone to strive for political change than are satisfied citizens. Gaps between the capabilities of political institutions and the expectations of the citizenry can therefore facilitate democratisation of non-democratic societies. It has been found that public expectations are primarily created in relation to previously recorded experiences. From such a perspective, the failure of political institutions can be understood as relative deprivation. This relative deprivation is most often the result of three different scenarios. Firstly, frustration can arise if public expectations are stable but the capabilities of political institutions to uphold current standards decreases. Secondly, frustration can follow if progress is followed by setbacks, and the citizenry has grown accustomed to expecting continued progress. Thirdly, frustration can arise if the expectations of the public increases while the capabilities of political institutions remain fixed at previous levels. The inability of newly established democratic political institutions to perform in accordance with public expectations could have negative ramifications on democratisation. Citizens in such societies can be prepared to trade liberal democratic institutions, like freedom of the press or freedom of association, for political stability and economic growth. Authoritarian and/or populist political leaders can receive significant public support in such environments, thereby creating public legitimacy for political reforms that aim to scale down the democratic system.

To recapitulate, a strong congruence between political culture and democratic institutions and similarly the ability of democratic political institutions to provide in accordance with public expectations is believed to promote democratisation. The lack thereof, or incongruence between political culture and democratic institutions and the inability of democratic political institutions to provide in accordance with public expectations, are psychological factors that are believed to hamper democratisation.

Cultural factors: The influence of a vibrant civil society has long been believed to be an important cultural factor for democratisation. Alexis de Tocqueville, in the studies Democracy
in America from 1835 and 1840, is among the first to describe and emphasise the connection between civil society and democracy. Tocqueville’s famous study has been followed by numerous studies that have come to the same conclusion. Civil society has actually positioned itself as one of the most favoured factors for democratisation, and is hailed by academics and practitioners alike. Civil society is most often seen as the space separating the state and the private sphere, in which citizens can engage in voluntary collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. The lines separating civil society from the state, family life and the market are, however, often blurred in reality. Civil society is composed of a diverse set of different actors and institutions that can take shifting degrees of formality, autonomy and power. Examples of such organisations are registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women’s organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups. There exist a multitude of competing definitions of civil society because of the multifaceted character of the concept.

A vibrant civil society is believed to support the development, deepening, and consolidation of democracy in numerous ways. For instance, civil society is believed to limit the power of the state and subject authorities to public scrutiny; civil society provides new arenas for political participation, thereby increasing citizens political awareness and skills; civil society encourages the development of democratic values and practices; civil society provide alternative channels for interest articulation, aggregation and representation outside of political parties; civil society generate new opportunities for political influence and participation on local level, which serves to break traditional patron-client relationships; civil society increases overlapping social memberships and mitigates political conflict; civil society serves as a forum for recruiting and training political leaders; civil society serve as a non-partisan source of information and a public watchdog; and finally, civil society lowers the burden on the state by providing public services.

The argumentation concerning the influence of civil society ties together with other cultural concept that are considered to influence democratisation, such as social capital, civic communities, mass attitudes, and political culture. There is believed to exist a connection between a population with a high degree of social capital; that is to say established patterns of social interaction beneficial for cooperation, communication and compromise, and the existence of a vibrant civil society. Civil society promotes and strengthens a population’s social capital and a high social capital serves to promote and preserve a vibrant civil society. In a similar manner, civil society ties in with civic communities and democratically beneficial mass attitudes and political cultures, all believed to serve as factors for democratisation. One important point deserves, however, to be made here. It has been increasingly recognised that civil society organisations are not necessarily instilled by democratic values and practices. A country can consequently have an “uncivil society”, which then serves as a hindrance for democratisation, because the nature and ambitions of large segments of the civil society are undemocratic. The mere existence of a civil society is consequently not sufficient, but it needs to be permeated by a democratic civility in order to promote democratisation.
Two other cultural factors that have received attention as possible factors for democratisation are religion and secularisation. Different studies have found a correlation between Christianity and democracy, while all other major religions lack this correlation. These findings have served as the foundation for the claim that religion can influence the possibility for democratisation. It is foremost Protestantism that has been found to correlate strongly with democracy. The theoretical argumentation in support of this correlation emphasise features of the Protestant Church, such as its less hierarchal structure and its recognition of the rights of independent individuals, as possible explanations for the adoption of democratic practices and values in protestant societies. The Catholic Church has also received recognition for its part in supporting the democratisation process in Latin America and East-Central Europe during the third wave. The fact that most Christian countries are secularised has also been highlighted as a possible cause for democratisation. It is argued that there exist a conflict between religious beliefs that dictate the rightness of an absolute divine law and the tolerance of diversity and openness that is necessary for democracy. Increased secularisation has thus often been regarded as one of the first steps towards modernisation and democratisation.

The social, ethnic, and cultural composition of the population is thought to influence democratisation. A well-established doctrine declares that social, ethnic, and cultural diversity complicates democratisation. Robert Dahl, for instance, declared in his study Polarchy, participation and opposition from 1971 that “subcultural pluralism often places a dangerous strain on the tolerance and mutual security required for a system of public contestation seems hardly open to doubt”. Subcultural pluralism becomes a problem when social fragmentation is taken to far. All societies need to handle diversity and social fragmentation to some degree, in its most basic form as individual preference, and democracy actually builds on allowing and handling diversity within the decision making process. However, in most cases, democracies function through a process of shifting majorities, in which an individual at times is found among the majority and at times among the minority, in relation to any given democratic decision. This process, which in many respects is an important feature of democracy, might not be easily attainable in a plural society with “segmental cleavages”, where minority groups can be trapped in a constant minority position. Individuals are connected to different social and cultural groups, such as family, region, culture, religion, ethnicity, ideologue and all of these connections contribute both to the establishment of self-perception and individual identity and also to the establishment of social and cultural groups. In a homogenous society, individuals share identity traits to a significant extent with other members of that society, and by doing so, they also divide their sympathies between different social and cultural groups. This feature, the sharing of traits, is called “overlapping memberships” by Gabriel A. Almond and “crosscutting memberships” by Seymour Martin Lipset, and is perceived to help to stabilise a society.

The available evidence suggests that the chances for a stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of...
crosscutting, political relevant affiliations. To the degree that a significant proportion of the population is pulled among conflicting forces, its members have an interest in reducing the intensity of political conflicts.\textsuperscript{105}

In a society whose members to a significant extent have overlapping memberships, an individual will at times belong to the majority and at times to the minority in any given decision and this process of shifting majorities will not only stimulate moderation from the majority but also acceptance from the minority. In a plural society on the other hand, people might only share traits with other people within smaller groups in the society and there will be a low percentage of overlapping memberships outside that given group. Seen from the perspective of the society, there will therefore be groups within the group, where one group might share one set of regional, religious and ethnic traits, while another group shares a different set of regional, religious and ethnic traits. This can lead to a situation, as mentioned earlier, where certain groups are trapped in a constant minority position and therefore feel marginalized. This aspect of segmented cleavages, or cumulative cleavages, is commonly found in multinational societies where the different national groups share traits within the group but where there is no, or low level of, sharing of traits between the different national groups, creating a situation where tension can arise.\textsuperscript{106}

There exist institutional solutions to the concerns of subcultural pluralism. Dahl emphasises three conditions as essential if a country with considerable subcultural pluralism is going to successfully uphold democracy. First, representatives of all the main ethnic, religious and regional subcultures should be denied access to the governance process. Secondly, some form of mutual security arrangements, that protect the rights and identity of these subcultural groups, should be installed. Thirdly, the political system must convey the impression that it can effectively respond to the demands and wishes of the population.\textsuperscript{107} Arend Lijphart comes to similar conclusions as Dahl and argues in favour of “consociational democracy”.\textsuperscript{108} The four main characteristics for consociational democracy are; firstly, that the government is made up of a grand coalition of political leaders from all the significant segments of the plural society. Secondly, that there is mutual veto, or “concurrent majority” rule, which protects the vital interests of all groups. Thirdly, that proportionality is the principal standard for political representation, allocation of public funds and civil service appointments, and fourthly, that each segment is given significant degree of autonomy to handle their internal affairs.\textsuperscript{109}

To summarise, the established hypothesis in the academic field is that the following four cultural features serve as factors for democratisation; the existence of a vibrant civil society, instilled by a democratic civility; high levels of social capital; Christianity; secularisation; and social, ethnic and cultural homogeneity. The absence or opposite of these features, such as; the lack of a civil society, or the existence of a uncivil society; low levels of social capital; lack of Christianity; religious fundamentalism; and social, ethnic, and cultural heterogeneity; are therefore perceived as obstacles for democratisation.

Political factors: A democratisation process never starts from scratch. It is a process built upon existing institutional traditions. It has consequently become recognised that institutional
traditions have implications for the paths available and the tasks different countries face when attempting to undergo a democratisation process. In further detail, institutional tradition refers to the following factors; the legacy of predecessor regimes; prior democratic traditions; socio-economic development; and long-term state-society heritage. These factors mould collective identities and shape social interaction within the political community. The democratisation process mostly builds on these existing structures and institutions, and their transformation or adaptation actually constitutes the democratisation process. The length and difficulty of this democratisation process is believed to be heavily dependent upon the starting-point of the journey, as social institutions are often characterised by stiffness, leading to incremental development and path dependence, thereby inhibiting rapid social transformation.\textsuperscript{110}

When one regime collapses and a new one is formed, the structure of political power is up for grabs. However, the legacy of the political past remains. Theories of political culture emphasize that the past does not disappear when one constitution supersedes another; it persists in the values and beliefs of politicians and citizens socialized to accept the cultural norms of the previous regime.\textsuperscript{111}

A new regime can receive a “soft” or “hard” legacy from its predecessors according to Richard Rose, William Mishler & Christian Haerpfer. The ideal point of departure for a democratisation process is a soft legacy, which Rose \textit{et al} describe as an oligarchic regime where civic institutions of representations are already in place, the rule of law is publicly accepted and civil society exists and is recognised. Rose \textit{et al} claim that western European societies developed democratically from this starting point of a soft legacy. Post-communist Europe on the other hand, has been left a hard legacy where all the basic institutions of democracy is either weak or absent, which seriously complicates the democratisation process.\textsuperscript{112} Post-communist Europe can to some degree be described as having started its democratisation process backwards, in that these countries very rapidly introduced free competitive elections before having many democratically important social institutions in place, such as rule of law and an active civil society.\textsuperscript{113} It is therefore presumed easier to complete a democratisation process when starting with an authoritarian institutional legacy, than a totalitarian or sultanistic institutional legacy.\textsuperscript{114}

Most of the internal factors mentioned so far are structural, but attention has also been given to the influence of actors, most noteworthy, to the influence of \textit{political elites} on democratisation. Dankwart A. Rustow belongs among the pioneers of this approach, and in his study, \textit{Transitions to democracy: Toward a dynamic model} from 1970, he argues that it is misleading to assume that democracy is a product of a given set of preconditions. Democracy is instead built on the existence of national unity and the political will for such a development among political elites.\textsuperscript{115} Similar conclusions have been drawn by a number of other scholars. Linz & Stepan organised a study that analysed the role and actions of political elites during the breakdown of democracy in countries like Germany, Italy, Spain, Argentina and Chile.

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They do not dismiss the importance of structural conditions, but argue that it is unsatisfactory to limit the study to such factors. The actions and strategies taken by democratic political elites, in the face of growing non-democratic opposition, allegedly affect the outcome of the process. They consequently come to the conclusion that these countries were not destined to suffer democratic breakdown, and that such a development could have been avoided if the democratic political elites had adopted different political actions and strategies. O’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead, have made another important contribution to this approach. They cooperated in a wide study of democratisation that resulted in four volumes, concerning the transition process in South Europe, the transition process in Latin America, comparative perspectives, and finally theoretical conclusions drawn from the study. The final volume, Tentative Conclusions from about Uncertain Democracies, has become a key reference for actor theories on democratisation. In this volume, O’Donnell & Schmitter describe democratisation as a transition process, constructed in phases, where the actions of different political groups within the political elites play vital roles for the development process. According to O’Donnell & Schmitter, a democratic transition is predominantly caused by internal, domestic factors and “there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence – direct or indirect – of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners”. Hard-liners are described as being composed by several factions, all with the common objective of resisting political liberalisation in favour of the protection and continuation of the existing authoritarian rule. Some act out of opportunism and are mainly interested in their own survival in office and thereby their access to power and wealth. The core of hard-liners however, as O’Donnell & Schmitter describe them, principally reject democracy as something undesirable and this group will stubbornly resist change and establish the source of attempted coups and conspiracies if a democratic transition is launched. The soft-liners also commonly hold important positions within the incumbent authoritarian regime, but they are more open to the demands of domestic oppositions and international public opinion. They recognise the importance of gaining some level of electoral legitimacy in order to dampen criticism and please moderate segments of the domestic opposition. Democratisation should therefore be viewed as a negotiation between the opposition and the authoritarian regime, in which the strength and positioning of different factions determine the transitional outcome. This theory has later been further developed to include different factions of the opposition as well.

The opposition is regarded as being most clearly divided between “radicals” and “moderates”. What unites the opposition is the desire for change and political opening and what divides the radicals from the moderates is their view of how to reach this end. The radicals reject any notion of compromise with the incumbent authoritarian regime and instead support a quick and substantial governmental reform. The moderates on the other hand, are more open to the notion of compromise, especially with the soft-liners of the authoritarian regimes, in order to move the process forward. Taken together, the actions and strengths of these four different factions are believed to affect the transition development. The most beneficial scenario for a successful democratic transition is believed to be if the soft-liners are
able to take control over the regime and then cooperate with the moderate opposition, who in turn are able to subdue the radical fraction of the opposition.\textsuperscript{120}

![Figure 2.6](image.png)

Figure 2.6  Actors within a democratic transition  

The possibility for a successful democratization has also been connected to political institutionalisation. When thinking about democratization, it is easily assumed that the process involves the transformation of a functional undemocratic institutional structure into a functional democratic institutional structure. However, this is not always the case. Not all states have functional and effective institutional structures to transform. Some countries are instead marked by institutional underdevelopment and disorder. In his study \textit{Political order in changing societies}, Huntington warns that societies that lack a high degree of political institutionalisation and the ability to adapt could suffer complete political breakdown if a democratization process is launched. He believes that a gap will develop between public aspirations and expectations and what the political system can provide, which will lead to social frustration and political instability. Increased public discontent with the inability to provide is believed to erode the legitimacy of the system and serve as source for political radicalism.\textsuperscript{121} Political institutionalisation is hence not a cause for democratization as such, but rather an influential factor for the development and possible success of the process.

The issue of political institutional design and institutional engineering also deserves to be mentioned. There exists a quite extensive literature dedicated to analysing the affects of different political institutional designs. This literature has also been connected to the process of democratization, because the design of the system affects the trajectory of the democratization process. The chosen design of the democratic system, such as the electoral system, a federal or centralist government, a parliamentary or presidential system, all have ramifications on the actual functionality of the political system and the public commitment to the democratization process. A short example of the possible importance of institutional design has already been given with regards to subcultural pluralism and consociational democracy. The literature dedicated to analysing the influence of institutional design on democratization is diverse, and covers a number of debates. One dominant conclusion worth mentioning concerns the perceived superiority of parliamentary systems over presidential systems.\textsuperscript{122} Presidential systems have been found to be more polarizing and hence more
dividing than parliamentary systems, in which the structure of the system promotes cooperation and compromise. This characteristic of parliamentary systems is believed to benefit the democratic consolidation process by providing stability and moderation. A presidential system on the other hand, functions more as a “winner-take-all” system, which can serve as a source for tension and conflict. There exist similar discussions about the functionality of other democratic institutional design features, but none produce the same level of agreement regarding the advantages and disadvantages of a parliamentary versus a presidential system.  

To recapitulate, the political factors that are believed to promote democratisation are, the existence of democratically beneficial institutional traditions, the presence of moderate and compromising political elites, a high degree of political institutionalisation, and finally a parliamentary system. Political factors that are believed to hamper democratisation include; the absence of democratically beneficial institutional traditions, radical and hard-line political elites unwilling to compromise, a low degree of political institutionalisation, and a presidential system.

Geopolitical factors: Two geopolitical factors for democratisation deserve to be mentioned here. These factors are rarely included in studies of democratisation, but they provide an interesting new approach to the subject. The first factor focuses on the size of the state. A classical argument among political philosophers has long been that a democracy must be small in both territory and population, the reason being that it is presumed easier to create the political climate of solidarity, cooperation and compromise, needed for democracy to survive, in a small state. Smallness also simplifies political administration. Axel Hadenius is one of few scholars that has actually empirically examined this hypothesis and his conclusion is that real micro states, with less than 100,000 citizens, have a surprisingly high correlation with democracy. The connection is increasingly depleted at higher populations and above 1 million the tendency is uneven. A similar pattern is found in relation to area.

The second factor focuses on island states. The argumentation here is similar to the one regarding size, namely that island states are more likely to be democratic because of their natural isolation, which is believed to favour the development of a democratic culture. This hypothesis has also been tested, and island states do correlate strongly with democracy.

To sum up, the established hypothesis is that the existence of a small territorial state and a small population will promote democratisation while a large territorial state and a large population may hamper democratisation. Additionally, island states are expected to be more democratic than other forms of states.

External factors

In addition to these above described internal factors for democratisation, it has been increasingly recognised that there are also external factors to democratisation, democracy promotion being one. Democracy promotion has however been purposely left out of the following description because it will be given more attention in a later chapter. The following
description will instead focus on the other main external factors for democratisation, namely democracy diffusion and international structures.

Democracy diffusion: Values, norms and ideas are not constrained by territorial borders, but have the ability to travel transnationally and influence people and societies over distance. The strong current influence of American popular culture on people and societies all around the world, through music, movies and television, is just one example. A more classic example is the strong influence that the French revolution had on the world. The globalisation process with its development of global communications, global markets, and the compression of the time-space divide, has only enforced this process and established the foundation for global cultures.\textsuperscript{126} Demands for different forms of political reforms can be transmitted across significant distances and have political ramifications far from its place of origin. This process, through which people and societies are influenced by the surrounding international context, can be conceptualised as diffusion. There are a number of different definitions of diffusion, but one commonly quoted definition declares that “diffusion refers to the process by which institutions, practices, behaviors, or norms are transmitted between individuals and/or between social systems”.\textsuperscript{127}

As the world is becoming increasingly democratic, it has become gradually more recognised that a process of diffusion can serve as a driving force behind this development. Democracy diffusion has consequently been perceived as a possible external factor for democratisation. This line of thinking serves in part as the foundation for the “wave theory”, in which Huntington claims that the world has gone through three sets of democratisation waves and reverse waves.\textsuperscript{128} Each of these waves consists of a simultaneous occurrence of political transformation in a group of countries. A possible explanation to this simultaneous development is a form of democracy diffusion called snowballing, through which political events can cause a political development in one country, which then in turn triggers a chain-reaction of simultaneous transformation in other countries.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{snowball.png}
\caption{The snowballing effect}
\end{figure}

Source: Huntington (1991)

The snowball theory dictates that the occurrence of a political event, a\textsubscript{1}, in one country causes a reaction, x\textsubscript{1}, which then has a demonstrating influence on the surrounding context, triggering a similar reaction in other countries. The triggering political event can be some form of public uprising in an authoritarian country that causes a democratisation process to be launched, which then has a demonstrating effect on people in other authoritarian countries, thus mobilising them to take similar action. There have been a number of empirical studies conducted that have attempted to analyse the possible existence and influence of democracy...
diffusion. These studies have all drawn the conclusion that democratisation is affected by external factors and that patterns of democracy diffusion can be found in the international system.\textsuperscript{129} It has also become generally accepted that the almost simultaneous democratisation in East and Central Europe can in part be explained as an example of democracy diffusion and snowballing.\textsuperscript{130}

Democracy diffusion is understood as a process that can take many different forms. It can be a spontaneous or planned process, controlled or uncontrolled, contain a general or specific content, be directed towards a political elite or against the general public, disperse slowly or rapidly, and affect a regional or global context.\textsuperscript{131} A further distinction is made between democracy diffusion driven by agents or structures. Most studies to date have focused on structural diffusion, but there are also studies that emphasise the existence and importance of agents of diffusion.\textsuperscript{132} The notion of democracy diffusion in that sense blurs the theoretical line separating democracy diffusion from democracy promotion. Democracy diffusion, according to Uhlin, is a process involving four components. Firstly, a source or emitter, secondly an adopter or receiver, thirdly an object that is diffused, and finally a channel of diffusion.\textsuperscript{133} Concrete actors in this process, both on the sending and the receiving end, have been referred to as agents of diffusion. Other scholars, not specifically dedicated to study of democracy diffusion, but rather to norm diffusion more generally, speak about the existence of norm entrepreneurs. These norm entrepreneurs are viewed as the agents that actively build and transmit norms.\textsuperscript{134} A high presence of agents of democracy diffusion is consequently perceived as a factor for democratisation, while the absence of such agents is perceived as an obstacle for democratisation.

To summarise, the established hypothesis is that a widespread presence of democracy and agents of diffusion in the world, both regionally and globally, is believed to promote democratisation through democracy diffusion. The absence thereof, both regionally and globally, is consequently perceived as an obstacle for democratisation.

\textit{International structures:} Another external factor for democratisation is international structures and the relationship patterns that countries have with each other. Different theories argue that certain forms of relationships are either beneficial or harmful for democratisation. The so-called dependency theory focuses on the relationship between the poor developing world and the rich industrialised world. The theory divides the world into three different segments; the peripheral countries, the semi-peripheral countries, and the core. The core consists of the rich, developed, industrialized countries of the world, foremost located in Western Europe and North America, while the peripheral countries are the poorer developing countries of the world, foremost located in Africa. According to the dependency theory, the core dominates the world, both economically and politically, and this has trapped the peripheral countries in a structure of systematic exploitations. This systematic exploitation and subordination is upheld through strategic support by the core of sympathetic political elites in the developing world, which then serve to hamper the democratisation of these countries.\textsuperscript{135}
There is also a theory that opposes the dependency theory, which argues that integration, globalisation, and mutual interdependency actually serve as factors for democratisation. The theoretical foundation for this claim is mainly that the globalisation process has brought with it the emergence of a global political economy and global governance mechanism, which in turn, have promoted a development of increased market liberalisation and democratisation. Countries are no longer able to develop behind closed national borders. Production, trade and finance have all become part of an international economy that is designed upon the same values and structures as the capitalistic, liberal democratic, western states. Democratisation and market liberalisation are thus regarded as being interlinked. The fortunes of the developed world have also become bound together with the developing world. Western Europe can be seen as being dependent upon the development of Eastern and Central Europe and the Balkans, while the United States and Canada have become increasingly dependent upon Mexico through NAFTA. This has raised the interest taken by the developed world to try to shape and influence political systems elsewhere. The world has also seen the emergence of new forms of global governance mechanisms, which has affected the autonomy of individual states. The rise of international agencies and institutions has been followed by an increased belief and recognition that norms and values have global legitimacy. Claims of state sovereignty are no longer regarded as sufficient arguments to shield individual states from pressure to comply with these norms. As these international agencies and institutions have largely been developed by western states, the ideological foundation for them is predominantly western. Many of these agencies and institutions have conducted different forms of campaigns to promote democratic values and systems, for instance through the promotion of global human rights.\textsuperscript{136}

Finally, the issues of geographic diffusion and spatial dependency have received attention as possible factors for democratisation. This hypothesis has been developed by political geography and is sometimes referred to as the “friends and neighbours” effect. The belief behind this hypothesis is that “behaviour in a place is related, in part, to conditions in neighbouring places and that spatial diffusion occurs when these conditions are present”.\textsuperscript{137} With regards to democratisation, the consequent assumption is that geographical proximity or distance to democratic states, or to the west, affects the possibility of democratisation. Countries are influenced by neighbouring states through different forms of interaction and this connection establishes the foundation for geographical diffusion and spatial dependency. The influence should also be understood in a broader historical context. Countries in close territorial proximity often share a historical legacy of interaction, which has a tendency to provide them with similar institutional traditions.\textsuperscript{138}

To conclude, the three established hypotheses about the influence of international structures, declare that the following factors promote democratisation: independency, high level of global integration, and close geographical proximity to the west and democratic states. The following causes are regarded as factors that hamper democratisation: dependency, low level of global integration, and geographical distance to the west and democratic states.
Summary

This chapter has described different approaches to defining the concept of democracy. It has been claimed that the major distinction, in relating to the definition of the concept, can be found between the so-called minimalist school and maximalist school. The minimalist school utilises a narrow institutional definition that focuses on the election process while the maximalist school takes a wider approach to the concept and views democracy more as a way of life than simply a system for reaching decisions. The ambition of the chapter has not been to provide a definitive definition of democracy, but rather to describe the spectrum of different definitions and theories regarding democracy, and thereby provide a theoretical foundation for an analysis of what perception the actors at hand, Sweden and Sida, have of the concept.

This chapter has also outlined and described democratisation as a process of transition. It has been argued that democratisation is a process in which a country transforms and thereby moves towards a more democratically inclusive system. Special attention has been given to the different internal and external factors that are believed to influence the process. These factors have been delineated and discussed. This presentation of the factors of democratisation is justified by mainly two reasons. Firstly, based on the belief that democracy promotion is an activity designed and undertaken in conjuncture with the contextual demands of the recipient country. In order to get an insight into the role played by democracy promotion in a democratisation process, it is hence useful to have an understanding of what factors are in play. Secondly, the description also provides a theoretical foundation for analysing the actions undertaken by democracy promoters. Democracy promoters take action not only in relation to contextual demands. Theoretical convictions also have influence on what form of democracy promotion activity that is supported. The description provides a theoretical foundation for analysing the activities of democracy promoters in an attempt to capture these beliefs. Table 2.8 provides a compact presentation of these factors.
<table>
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<th>Factors</th>
<th>Factors promoting democratisation</th>
<th>Factors hampering democratisation</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Economic factors</td>
<td>• High level of economic development</td>
<td>• Low level of economic development</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>• Command economy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Market regulators and redistribution systems</td>
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<td>Social factors</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• High education levels</td>
<td>• Low education levels</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Existence of a strong middle class, willing to cooperate with the working class</td>
<td>• Large landowners, passive and weak middle class, and radical working class</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psychological factors</td>
<td>• Strong congruence between political culture and democratic institutions</td>
<td>• Weak congruence between political culture and democratic institutions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Ability of the system to respond to public expectations</td>
<td>• Inability of the system to respond to public expectations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural factors</td>
<td>• A vibrant civil society, instilled by a democratic civility</td>
<td>• Absence of a civil society, or the existence of a uncivil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• High levels of social capital</td>
<td>• Low levels of social capital</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Christianity</td>
<td>• Absence of Christianity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Secularisation</td>
<td>• Religious fundamentalism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Social, ethnic and cultural homogeneity</td>
<td>• Social, ethnic and cultural heterogeneity</td>
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<td>Political factors</td>
<td>• Existence of democratically beneficial institutional traditions</td>
<td>• Absence of democratically beneficial institutional traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Existence of moderate and compromising political elites</td>
<td>• Existence of radical and hardline political elites</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• High degree of political institutionalisation</td>
<td>• Low degree of political institutionalisation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Parliamentary system</td>
<td>• Presidential system</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geopolitical factors</td>
<td>• A smaller population and territory</td>
<td>• A larger population and territory</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Island states</td>
<td>• Non-island states</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diffusion</td>
<td>• High presence of democracy in the region and globally</td>
<td>• Low presence of democracy in the region and globally</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• High presence of agents of diffusion</td>
<td>• Low presence of agents of diffusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>International structures</td>
<td>• High level of independence</td>
<td>• Low level of independence</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• High degree of regional and global integration</td>
<td>• Low degree of regional and global integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Geographic proximity to the west and democratic states</td>
<td>• Geographical distance to the west and democratic states</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.8   Factors promoting or hampering democratisation
1 For a more in-depth discussion on democracy, see for instance Dahl (1989), Dahl (1998), Held (2006)
4 Beetham (1992) p. 40
5 Beetham (1999) p. 5
6 Dahl (1999) p. 89
7 Held (2006)
8 Bryce (1921) p. ix
9 Barker (1942) p. 315.
10 Schumpeter (1942) p. 269, 284.
15 Information accessed at the homepage of Freedom House.
17 Karl (1990), pp. 1-23.
23 Information accessed at the homepage of Freedom House.
24 Dahl (1989) p. 221
27 Zakaria (1997), Zakaria (2003) and figures provided by Freedom House survey about Freedom in the world
29 For further inquire, Ekman (2007) has compiled an extensive collection of different measuring scales for
democracy and development.
30 Diamond (2002)
32 Classification provided by Freedom House Nations in Transit study.
33 Allison (1994)
34 Rustow (1970), Rostow (1956), Rostow (1959), Rostow (1971)
36 Linz & Stepan (1996) p. 3.
38 Rustow (1970) pp. 350-351
39 Buzan (1991)
40 Linz & Stepan (1996) p. 16.
41 Linz & Stepan (1996) p. 27.
44 Schedler (1998)
45 Linz (1990a). Linz have later stated that the expression “only game in town” is owed to Guiseppe di Palma,
but in most references the expression has been connected to Linz and Alfred Stepan and not to di Palma.
47 Huntington (1991)
48 Beetham (1994)
50 Carothers (2002)
51 O’Donnell (2002)


Comments by Joakim Ekman, with regards to a previous figure, were helpful when designing this scheme.

The inspiration for this presentation design was provided by Denk & Silander (2007).


Lipset (1959a) p. 75.


Lipset (1959a), Lipset (1959b)


Rueschemeyer et al (1992)

Fukuyama (1992a)

Berger (1992)


It should additionally be noted that international capitalism has been accused of inhibiting development and democratisation by the so-called dependency school. This is however somewhat of a sidetrack here because this argumentation is based on the perception of a world system, where richer countries systematically exploit poorer countries. I will instead return to this issue in connection to the discussion and analysis of possible motives of democracy promotion. For more information concerning the dependency school, see Frank (1969), Wallerstein (1974)

Rueschemeyer et al (1992)


Lipset (1959b) pp. 50-52


Rueschemeyer et al (1992) p. 8


Dewey (1916; 2005)


Lipset (1959a) p. 79-80


Almond & Verba (1963)


Almond & Verba (1963) p. 15

Almond & Verba (1963) pp. 12-42

Almond & Verba (1963) pp. 12-42

Inglehart (1988), see also Inglehart (1977), Inglehart (1990), Inglehart (1997)


Russia under Putin can serve as a good example of this form of political development.

Tocqueville (1998)


Dahl (1971).


Almond (1956), Lipset (1959b).

Lipset (1959b) pp. 77-78.


See also Horowitz (1985).


Rose et al (1998) p. 44.


Linz & Stepan (1978).


For a more in-depth discussion about how these four fractions can interact and affect the development of the society, see Przeworski (1991) pp. 51-95, Share & Mainwaring (1986), Linde & Ekman (2006). For examples of the critique directed against the actor-oriented theories on democratisation, see Baker (1999), Remmer (1991), Grugel (2002), Carothers (2002).

Huntington (1968).


CHAPTER THREE

Post-communist Europe: A divided development

The countries of post-communist Europe faced a “triple transition” after the collapse of communism, comprising a state/nation transition, a political transition, and an economic transition.\(^1\) As a result, the democratisation process in this region incorporates a number of unique transitional features compared to previous democratisation processes around the world. These features deserve attention and an attempt will be made to bring them into the theoretical framework that underpins this study. The following discussion will outline a theoretical foundation that combines more traditional theories on democratisation with the main elements of each of these three transitional dimensions. The objective is to further develop the theoretical argumentation of the previous chapter and at the same time connect the study more closely to the post-communist region. The discussion will provide increased insight into the transitional concerns of post-communist Europe and place Macedonia in a regional perspective. It will be shown that post-communist Europe is composed of a somewhat heterogeneous group of countries, and the differences that divide them affect their ability to consolidate as democracies. Some post-communist countries, such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia, have managed to consolidate as liberal democracies, while other countries, such as Macedonia, Albania and Serbia, continue to fall short of the required demands. Various causes and explanations for this difference in development will be described and discussed.

What theories can be used?

The factors for democratisation that were outlined in the previous chapter summarise to a great extent the main bulk of theories about the field of democratisation. Many of these theories were developed from experiences gathered through analysis of earlier democratisation processes around the world. So how useful are these theories with regards to studies of post-communist Europe, and more specifically, the Balkans and Macedonia? Can the democratisation processes in post-communist Europe be analysed and understood through the use of hypothesis and conclusions established in studies of these fairly different contextual settings? Would we then in fact be comparing apples with apples, or would we be comparing apples with oranges, or even kangaroos?\(^2\)

There is widespread agreement that the democratisation process in post-communist countries has unique features, but there are disagreements about the significance of these differences compared to earlier democratisation processes. One side of the debate, most prominently represented by Terry Lynn Karl & Philippe Schmitter, claims that the established democratisation theories can, and should, be used in studies of the post-communist European countries, despite, or in some cases because of just these differences. According to Karl &
Schmitter, the established theoretical framework is valid enough to be useful and regional difference could possibly help to improve the theory and support the development of new knowledge.³

Which is the better strategy: should the scholars of post-communist transition rely primarily on the unique cultural, structural or behavioural features inherited from the “marxist-leninist-stalinist” past in their effort to understand what the outcomes of these momentous transformation will be? Or, should they focus on a more generic set of issues and utilize primarily non-area-specific concepts that presume a less historically constrained range of choices and hence a greater autonomy for actors? When and where the study of contemporary democratization is concerned, we still most emphatically favor the second strategy.⁴

The other side of the dispute, most prominently represented by Valerie Bunce, argues that the democratic process in post-communist Europe is distinctly unique in character, which seriously complicates cross-cultural analysis and diminishes the usefulness of the established democratisation theories. Bunce instead supports area studies and intra-regional comparison as the preferred method of analysis.⁵

The existing research on transitions to democracy does not travel well to the post-communist world. If the assumptions, concepts, and arguments of this research are problematic, then so, assuredly, are its predictions. Using the experiences of the South as a yardstick for the East, as is the proclivity of some “transitologists”, is a serious mistake.⁶

Both sides of this dispute have valid claims for their positions. Because of its unique features, post-communist Europe provides a distinctly challenging environment to study with traditional theories. The institutional legacy left by the communist period, for instance, served as a radically different institutional foundation to build democracy upon, compared to the institutional legacy inherited by countries in Latin America and Southern Europe. The need for a complete and widespread economic reconstruction is another unique feature of post-communist Europe. But the existence of these features does not automatically invalidate all previous knowledge concerning democratisation processes. The lessons drawn about the role of most of the factors that have been previously outlined, such as the role of political elites, civil society, level of economic development, and the composition of the population, can be valuable for investigating democratisation processes in post-communist Europe. In addition, the academic field dedicated to the study of democratisation process has a strong nomotetical tradition, where the aim is to establish general and universal theories and models for democratisation, and not strongly context-dependent theories. It is therefore well in line with the established methodology to actually utilise these traditional theories in order to investigate
the extent to which they continue to serve their purpose in the context of post-communist Europe. Such investigation could serve to provide new knowledge, not only regarding the case at hand, but also of the usefulness of these established theories and hypothesis.

Traditional theories will therefore be combined with more context dependent theories. The overarching structure that will be utilised is Claes Offe’s conceptualisation of a “triple transition”, which argues that the democratisation process in post-communist Europe in fact incorporated three different dimensions. The first dimension concerns the state/nation transition, in which these countries have to determine and consolidate the borders of both state and population. Following their emergence from behind the iron curtain, the countries in post-communist Europe faced a process of state-building. The process involved the answering of questions concerning nationhood, collective identity, and even territorial boundaries. This is a dimension that has been largely absent from democratisation processes in other regions of the world, where such questions had largely been resolved prior to entering a democratisation process. The division of Czechoslovakia, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the re-establishment of the three Baltic states are noteworthy examples. The second dimension concerns the strictly political transformation and refers to the development and introduction of those democratic institutions and practices that shape the governing process and the relationship between the state and the public. The third dimension is the economic, in which these countries have to go from plan to market by dismantling a previously almost exclusively state-owned production sector and introducing market competition, private ownership, and an entirely new class of entrepreneurs. It is the combination of these different features that makes the democratic transition in post-communist Europe so unique.7

In the process of outlining the features of each of these dimensions, reference will be made to different traditional theories of democratisation. With regards to the first dimension, the state/nation transition, reference is mainly made to the theoretical literature dedicated to analysing the affects of subcultural pluralism on democratisation. This literature will help to explain the democratic problems that can follow from having a multicultural population. With regards to the second dimension, the political transition, focus is mainly upon the influence of institutional traditions and the role of institutional design. This literature will draw attention to the institutional heritage left to these countries and how this heritage can be seen to have affected the democratisation process of the respective country. Attention will also be given to the role of institutional design during the process of democratisation. Finally, with regards to the third dimension, the economic transition, reference is mainly drawn to literature that emphasises the role of economic factors for democratisation, such as the role of entrepreneurs and the free market. The role of these factors in the democratisation processes is often overlooked in favour of traditional political institutions. However, these economic factors often have significant influence on development process, which may be missed if they are not incorporated into the analysis.

The combination of these theories will provide a theoretical framework that will be utilised to conduct an empirical analysis of Macedonia. It will also bring increased understanding to a number of important features of post-communist democratisation processes, while placing
Macedonia in a regional perspective. Post-communist Europe is not a homogenous group of countries. Despite sharing a similar socialist heritage and facing a number of similar transitional problems, these countries in fact constitute a rather heterogeneous group of countries. Macedonia belongs to the group of South-East European countries that has faced considerable transitional obstacles and hence made less democratic progress than many other countries in the region. This is for instance shown in Freedom House ranking *Nations In Transit*, see table 3.1, where Macedonia is classified as a semi-consolidated democracy. This chapter will attempt to explain and explore the factors behind these differences in democratic development.
## Nations In Transit 2007

### Table 3.1 Democracy score ratings, rankings, and score summary

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>EP</th>
<th>CS</th>
<th>IM</th>
<th>NGOV</th>
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<th>JFI</th>
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</table>

Source: Freedom House, Nations In Transit 2007. The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score (DS) is an average of ratings for Electoral Process (EP); Civil Society (CS); Independent Media (IM); National Democratic Governance (NGOV); Local Democratic Governance (LGOV); Judicial Framework and Independence (JFI); and Corruption (CO).
The state/nation transition

The interaction between state, nation(s), and democratisation is often overlooked in studies of democratisation. It is commonly assumed that the transition to democracy only involves a challenge of the non-democratic regime and the transition towards the establishment of a legitimate democratic system. What then can be missed is the possibility that the process might have awakened an even more fundamental issue, namely the question of the foundation of the state itself. The people within a society that is undergoing a democratisation process might have conflicting views on what should actually constitute the polity and what demos shall be regarded as members of this polity, and this is a question that needs to be resolved if the democratisation process is to be consolidated. The state could otherwise suffer a so-called “stateness problem”, in which the processes of state-building and nation-building become conflicting logics.8

Before investigating this issue further, it is important to have a conceptual understanding of what constitutes a state and a nation. A state is a political organisation that possesses authority and autonomy to rule over a population residing within a defined territory, and the authority implies for instance the monopoly to use force within the territory. The authority held by the state is binding on the population, who is therefore viewed as subjects to the state. A state shall also hold a sovereign position in relation to other states. The state can be described as consisting of three structural components; the idea of the state, the physical base of the state, and the institutional expression of the state.

![Diagram of the component parts of the state](image)

Figure 3.2 The component parts of the state
Source: Buzan (1991) p.65

The central component of Buzan’s model of a state is “the idea of the state”, but it is also the most abstract component.9 The idea of the state refers to a collectively shared perception of social unity and acceptance that joins people together in a political community. This perception of a collective social unity is an important source for the legitimacy of the state. A division can be made between the horizontal and vertical legitimacy of the state. Vertical legitimacy refers to the public’s consent and compliance of state decisions, decrees, actions
and policies, while horizontal legitimacy refers to the existence of a single community constructed upon a shared social contract of solidarity, unity and acceptance. The physical base of the state, the territory of the state, and the set of institutions performing the actual exercise of governing serve as the concrete manifestation of this political community. These three components compose the structural components of the state. Two additional factors should however be added in order to clearly distinguish states from other entities, such as village communities, a factory, or an agricultural commune, and that is size and sovereignty.\textsuperscript{10}

A \textit{nation}, in contrast, is best described as a “imagined community” of individuals based around a national identity, that is created on both internal and external identification of membership, most usually based on ethnicity and a common cultural and social identity.\textsuperscript{11} The national character is not static but is constantly evolving, and the conditions for identification may change over time. Different communal groups, which at one time have distinct differences, might in fact become indistinguishable from each other. One such example is the English, who no longer make any difference between Anglo-Saxons and Normans. The reverse can also occur. Two such examples are the Sardinians in Italy and Hurons in Quebec. Both groups have reasserted their distinct group identity during the second half of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{12}

The concepts \textit{nation} and \textit{state} are often used interchangeable with each other in common usage, but they are distinctly different concepts. As has been shown above, both states and nations can to some degree be regarded as a collectively held idea of unity, but what distinguishes the two, is the fact that the state also has organisational characteristics, officials, autonomy, and clear rules of memberships, while a nation is solely constructed upon a common sense of identity and a common sense of belonging. A nation does not have officials, agents, or rules. It is hence much more elusive in character than a state and depends exclusively on individual and group perception.

Using this knowledge, we can now start to explore why state-building and nation-building can become conflicting logics during democratisation processes. Historically, the two processes have been tightly overlapping and almost inseparable. In the process of developing modern states, most countries have called upon nationalistic characteristics. By doing so, the characteristics of the titular nationality have been closely connected the identity of the state, thereby merging “the idea of the state” with the collective perception of national identity. This process has led to the creation of \textit{nation-states}, in which the state serves as the political manifestation of the nation. The nation serves as an important source of the required feelings of solidarity and unity needed to develop the political community and most states also become the principal tool used for continued nation-building. Hence, state-building and nation-building have a tendency to serve as interchangeable processes that strengthen each other through a combined top-down and bottom-up relationship. Sweden, Germany, Japan, and France are all examples of countries where state-building and nation-building have gone hand in hand. These countries could also be regarded as homogeneous societies when they launched into the combined process of state-building and nation-building, which was an important reason for their respective abilities to combine the two processes. There are also
examples of occasions when the state has preceded the nation and served as the principal source for its development. This form of evolution has lead to the development of state-nations, where the state supports the establishment of a nation through a top-down process. Australia and the United States are good examples of state-nations in that their national identities have to a large extent been constructed after the establishment of the state. Both of these states are migrate societies where the state became the joining force for people coming from different national groups.13

Difficulties to combine state-building and nation-building occur primarily in countries that have segmented social cleavages and few overlapping memberships, such as multinational societies. These social and cultural settings complicate the development of a shared perception of unity that incorporates all individuals in that society. It is these segmented social cleavages that can cause disagreement about the composition of the polity during democratisation processes. Before continuing, it can be useful to explore social cleavages as a concept. The concept cleavage lack an academically agreed upon definition, but it can be described as having structural and substantive components. There are three structural components: first, division, separating people within a society based on social characteristics such as ethnicity, religion, ideology, occupation, and so forth; second, consciousness, that joins individuals together with fellow holders of such social characteristics; and third, organisation, that gives these social groups the ability to present their interests.14 In addition scholars commonly make a distinction between social and political cleavages. Social cleavages are to be understood as social attitudes and behaviours, reflecting traditional division based on social characteristics, while political cleavages are to be understood as divisions based on political attitudes and behaviours, which take political form, even if these may, or may not, be connected to a social group. The lines separating these different concepts are often blurred, which makes the debate at times somewhat confused.15 This study borrows features from both of these sides, but the emphasis however is on social cleavages and how they take political form and consequently affect democratisation processes. It is also useful to talk about social fragmentation, which is to be understood as a concept limited to the first structural component of cleavages, division based on social characteristics, without the presence of collective identity and institutional structure. To clarify, a society is to be understood as a political community of individuals, in which all individuals carry a distinct set of social characteristics. A socially fragmented society is a society where there exist a great variety of social characteristics, creating the source for differences between individuals. In order for these differences to take the form of social cleavages they need to be structured and channelled through institutional structures. Hence, social fragmentation can turn into social cleavages through the activities of political actors, and via this process, become a problem for democratic consolidation.16

Countries that have a population marked by segmented cleavages and few overlapping memberships will have difficulties developing a social unity that incorporates all the groups within the society. The existence of feelings of social unity and shared bonds among individuals, establishing the foundation for the shared perception of a collective we, is a
fundamental precondition for the establishment of a political community. In fact, before there can be a state, there must be a people. This is especially true in democracies where the legitimacy of the state rests on the voluntary consent and support of the people, or as it has been phrased, “the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people”. As the development of social unity is hampered by these segmented cleavages, it will therefore become a problem for democratic consolidation.

A stable democracy requires relatively moderate tension among its contending political forces. And political moderation is facilitated by the system’s capacity to resolve key dividing issues before new ones arise. If the issue of religion, citizenship, and “collective bargaining” are allowed to accumulate, they reinforce each other, and the more reinforced and correlated the sources of cleavage, the less likelihood for political tolerance.

Non-democratic regimes can suppress disagreements caused by segmented cleavages through dictating the conditions for the state, thereby forcing the population to accept the rules of the political community. Such disagreement is, however, bound to surface during a democratic transition when the people are given increased possibility to voice opposition. Democratisation also involves a process of a redefinition of the identity of the state, and disagreement can arise as to the content of this new identity. Minority groups can feel that the state does not serve as a representation of their interests, but instead as a representation of the majority group’s interests. This development is especially likely in multinational societies if the titular nationality connect the identity of the state to the identity of their nation. The minority nationality could then question the legitimacy of the state because they don’t feel included in the “idea of the state”. This development could lead to demands for increased cultural recognition, guaranteed political influence, or even autonomous self-determination. If a significant amount of people reject the state and its claims of legitimacy on the grounds of self-determination, then the state as such will be under threat. Such states could become “weak”, with the result that the state has turned into a theatre of authority where rule instead is localised and clan leaders or other forms of local power centres hold the loyalty of segments of the population. This form of development could place the state in what has been called a “state-strength dilemma”, in which the state is unable to provide the basic services citizens can demand of a state and is therefore unable to regain their confidence and acceptance. The state thereby gets locked into a negative spiral that can lead to civil war and finally to the disintegration of the state.

Experiences drawn from divided societies around the world indicate that there exist three different approaches to handling internal national division and combining the process of state-building and nation-building; domination, power-sharing, or integration.

**Domination** is an approach in which the titular nationality creates a nation-state and where minorities are handled through exclusionary or inclusionary policies or by granting them minority rights. Exclusionary domination can be formal and/or non-formal and is a structural
discrimination against minority groups whereby they are not provided with equal rights, status and opportunities compared with the majority group. The discrimination is definitive in the sense that an individual from the minority group will never be able to escape this subordinated position within the society. One’s ethnic heritage can, for instance, be the determining factor for the subordination. Inclusionary domination involves the same process of creation of values and norms within the society, but minority groups are encouraged to join the mainstream identity through assimilation, for instance through adopting the official language and by intermarriage. The purpose of these actions is to deplete the minority groups and strengthen the majority group. Minority groups can also be dominated within a society by being officially defined as minorities. Their rights are protected and they are officially granted equal opportunities and rights as full citizens, and the majority makes no attempts of assimilation, but these peoples are also in most practical respects regarded as second-class citizens through non-formal discrimination and through the fact that the state is so clearly defined by the majority.\(^{22}\)

**Power-sharing** systems, institutionalised through for instance federalism and consociationalism are another approach towards handling internal division. Federalism refers to a territorial arrangement of the state that provides certain degrees of autonomy and self-government to its units and thereby divides power within the state. This approach is argued to be most suitable in divided societies where different ethnic groups are clearly regionally located and therefore more easily separated. Ethnic aspirations for national self-determination can be accommodated through such arrangements without completely dividing the state. Federalism is not without its flaws and increased tension can be caused through the implementation of such institutional arrangements. Federalism can serve as the first step towards a definitive severing of the state. States such as India, Canada and Switzerland, which have a strong internal division, seem however to have been helped by federalism. Consociationalism, or consensus democracy as it later has been labelled, is a power sharing system that joins different groups within a divided society through mutual recognition and a shared governmental framework, in which they, as groups, are able to co-exist, despite their differences. Arend Lijphart has been recognised as the founding father of consociationalism and he describes the type or model as being based on four characteristics. First, that the government is a grand coalition of political leaders from all the significant segments of the divided society. Second, that there is mutual veto, or “concurrent majority” rule, which protects the vital interests of all groups. Third, that proportionality is the principal standard for political representation, allocation of public funds and civil service appointments. Fourth, that each segment is given a significant degree of autonomy to handle their internal affairs.\(^{23}\) Over the years, Lijphart has also established what he considers to be nine “favourable factors” for consociational democracy; 1) the absence of a solid majority, 2) cross-cutting economic cleavages, 3) a moderate number of segments, 4) segments of equal size, 5) small population size, 6) external threats to the nation, 7) overarching loyalties, 8) geographic concentration of segments, and 9) a tradition of compromise and accommodation.\(^{24}\) Consociationalism and
elements of consociationalism has been attempted in a number of divided societies, such as Belgium, Lebanon and Bosnia, with varying results.

Some states mix federalism and consociationalism, for instance through defined representation for minority groups within different state bodies. These measures are introduced to guarantee the minority influence in central government within federal states and thereby temper any feelings about domination. Such measures can be found, for instance, in Canada, where three out of the nine supreme court justices need to be French speaking, all national cabinets must have French speakers, and any serious candidate for prime-minister needs to be fluent in both official languages. Power sharing processes can also be non-formally institutionalised, in the sense that minority groups are always invited and encouraged to participate within state institutions without the state being required to do so.25

Integration is the final approach towards handling pluralism and diverges from the earlier approaches in that it disqualifies social and cultural groups as units of importance. Integration is based on the principles of liberal individualism, in which the individual, not groups, are regarded as the appropriate unit to focus on. It is individual rights and duties that should be protected and promoted within a society and groups have no place within such a framework. There is a fine line between integration and domination, as described earlier, in that both approaches strive for a common national identity through the creation of a state-nation, but as Esman describes it:

Assimilation, however, implies that newcomers as well as indigenous minorities are to be absorbed by the host society without leaving any mark on that society. Integration, by contrast, is closer to the melting pot metaphor, implying that each wave of new arrivals makes its unique contribution to the ever-evolving whole.26

The integration process is to be understood as being cultural and social, with cultural integration usually preceding social integration. Cultural integration is the adoption and/or contribution to the mainstream lifestyle, while social integration refers to aspects such as mixed neighbourhoods, intermarriage and participation in mainstream institutions. The integration process is aimed at incorporating minorities into a civic identity, and is based on aspects such as love of country, belief in an ideology and a common way of life. The aspiration is to join all citizens of the society within this civic identity, built around citizenship and commonly held civic attitudes, while at the same time allowing diversity, for instance with regards to ethnic identity. There is a spectrum among scholars ranging from those supporting the liberal approach to integration, to those that argue that societies should be built on equality and that exceptions should be avoided, to scholars that argue that even if equality is important and should be respected, so should for instance aspects of ethnic diversity, establishing what Will Kymlicka calls a “multicultural citizenship” in which diversity is recognised and protected in order to create, in their words, true equality.27

The advantages and disadvantages of these different approaches are heavily debated, but there exists on the other hand strong agreement around the position that it is important to
search for measures that can bridge existing cleavages within a society in order to create a more stable foundation for the society and democracy. The problems that follow with social fragmentation and segmented cleavages can otherwise have a lasting effect. Identities, both individual and collective, have a tendency to be reproduced through a process of political socialisation in which individuals learn the behaviour patterns of the community in which they live. The process of socialisation takes different forms during the span of an individual’s life and the process is conducted through agents, such as the family, friends, schools, religious institutions, the mass media, political parties and so forth. All of these agents contribute to the establishment of an individual’s self-image on different levels, and will influence the behaviour of that individual. We should also be clear about the fact that an individual’s self-image is not static, but that it evolves as the individual gains new experiences. Nevertheless, values and attitudes that are acquired early tend to be the more durable and can stay with an individual for life. It can consequently be difficult to overcome segmented cleavages within socially fragmented societies because they are often reproduced by coming generations. 

It should not be overlooked that social and political cleavages also can have some positive effects, for instance by serving as an important component for the possibility to develop a stable party system, something which affects the quality of the democratic system. The role of political parties within democracies is to integrate and channel diverse interest and social forces into state institutions and thereby regulate social conflicts and formulate political alternatives. Without the underlying structure of social cleavages to develop the characteristics of political parties the linkage between state and society might become weak, especially if civil society is not able to take up the slack, and the society will thus become the breeding ground for constant political fluctuation, political populists and demagogic leaders. Such a development will further inhibit the creation of long-term policy, something which is especially serious during a transitional period. Economic reforms, for instance, need time in order to become successfully implemented and political fluctuation, based on voter volatility, can threaten such reforms. A political society in constant political fluctuation can therefore stall in its development, leading to political frustration among the general public and legitimacy problems for the state.

Turning our attention to post-communist Europe we find that social fragmentation is the hallmark of the region, both within countries and also between countries. Parts of the explanation to this diversity can be found in the historical development of the region. Throughout history, post-communist Europe has been geographically exposed, stuck as “lands in between”, dominated by the German, Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. Through conquest, borders and rulers have changed, sending successive waves of migration throughout the region. These developments caused an ethnic jigsaw puzzle, producing a situation where hardly any of the post-communist countries entered the democratisation process as ethnically homogenous. However, the existence and importance of cleavages in post-communist Europe is a much more debated issue. Some scholars, who commonly use a rather strict definition of cleavages, claim that cleavages are weak or absent in the post-communist region. This is regarded as one important factor behind the difficulty to establish a
stable party system throughout the region. One important reason for this development according to these scholars is the atomization of the public during the communist period. Kay Lawson, for instance, argues that the totalitarian heritage of the region destroyed old divisions in these societies and that the recent democratic transition has been unable to bring these divisions back to life. Lawson also argues that it is difficult to find any new and contemporary cleavages that shape the choices made by voters. Instead there seems to be a strong tendency for electoral volatility, where voters in the region jump ship, changing from party to party, candidate to candidate, depending on the candidates or party’s perceived ability to respond to current socio-economic concerns. According to Lawson, this has also affected party formations, as these are not shaped by “structural cleavages but to the chance for gaining power”. The dominant opinion, supported by most empirical studies, is on the contrary that social cleavages exist in post-communist Europe and that there is a growing correlation between social cleavages and political attitudes, voting patterns and election results. Cleavages may vary between countries both in nature and in strength with some countries being more homogenous than others. Cleavages have, nonetheless, been found in each post-communist country, reflecting that country’s historical inheritance as well as its post-communist socio-economic experiences. According to a list compiled of the most important cleavages in the region, there are at least three major ones to be found; ethnicity, region (meaning the urban-rural division), and religion. The study underpinning this list was based on data from 12 different post-communist countries, mainly in Central Europe and the Baltic. A similar study, including 15 different post-communist countries, confirmed the theory about economic voting, which assumes that voters punish or reward incumbent parties based on their ability to successfully manage the economy, but found only weak effects of ethnic cleavages.

The weak effect of ethnic cleavages remains rather puzzling given that many societies in Eastern Europe have clear divisions along ethnic lines. These ethnic divisions may simply not have manifested themselves in the party-political arena and people turn to cues other than their ethnic origin when making political decisions.

This disagreement about the effects of ethnic cleavages in post-communist Europe intensifies the importance of continuing to evaluate and analyse the role and impact of cleavages, and especially ethnic cleavages, in the region. As was noted above, there are clear divisions along ethnic lines to be found in post-communist Europe, something which seems to complicate the processes of nation-building, state-building, and democratisation. None of the studies mentioned included data from former Yugoslavia because of lack of data, which further motivates the inclusion of this factor into this study.

This study will use the theories about the interaction between state, nation(s), and democratisation in the following analysis of the democratisation process in Macedonia. It will be suggested that the existence of social cleavages, segmented cleavages, and multiple nations
has a hampering effect on democratisation. The existence of multiple nations does not automatically mean that democratisation processes will fail, but rather that the process becomes more complicated in such social settings because of the possibility that state-building and nation-building develops into conflicting logics. Strategy choices therefore become important when dealing with a multinational setting. Divided countries that implement inclusive state policies, thereby trying to function more as state-nations and/or liberal individualism, are believed to be more likely to consolidate as democracies than are multinational countries where the titular nationality attempts to transfer their national characteristics upon the state, and thereby create a nation-state. The figure below, developed by Linz & Stepan, has been included to function as a compressed description of the possibilities and limits of reconciling nation-states and democratisation.
### Table 3.3 The inter-relationship between state, nation(s), and democratization (assuming no irredenta)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of presence of other “nations” besides titular nation in state territory</th>
<th>Policies and actions of state-leaders of “titular nation”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No other nation exists and there is little cultural and/or ethnic differentiation</td>
<td>Democratic nation-state can easily consolidate and be strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No other nation exists but extensive cultural diversity</td>
<td>Democratic state-nation can easily exist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nation(s) present but not awakened</td>
<td>Democratic state-nation possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nation(s) present and awakened</td>
<td>Generates conflict, making democracy difficult but not impossible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nation(s) present and militant</td>
<td>Generates so much conflict or repression that democratic consolidation is highly implausible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No group has sufficient cohesion and identity to be a nation-builder</td>
<td>No state possible so democracy is impossible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Linz & Stepan (1996) p. 36
The political transition

The second dimension of the triple transition concerns the transformation of political institutional structures. As has been previously outlined, democratisation is a process in which a country transforms and thereby moves along a spectrum towards a more inclusive and substantial democratic institutional arrangement. An important factor determining the length and difficulty of this journey is what form of institutional traditions the countries bring with them into the transition. Democratisation never starts from scratch. It is built upon existing structures and institutions, and the transformation or adaptation of these structures and institutions actually constitutes the democratisation process. Discrepancies with regards to existing institutional traditions affect the paths available for transition and the challenges incorporated into the process. Consequently, this study will include an analysis of what form of institutional traditions are prominent in post-communist Europe and the consequences that follow from such traditions. It will be shown that the countries of post-communist Europe both have similar and dissimilar institutional traditions. They all share the institutional traditions left by the communist period, but they differ from each other with regards to pre-communist institutional traditions. These similarities and differences provide both similar challenges for all the countries of the region, and also present a partial explanation as to why democratic progression has differed throughout the region.

The following will also describe and investigate the role of institutional design during the process of democratic consolidation. Focus will be placed upon the possible influence of different decentralisation measures. Political power was centralised to a significant extent during the communist period, and this created a vast void that separated the general public from the actual policymakers. Policies and information flowed from the top-down, establishing a political culture where policymakers rarely attempted to seek public input into the decision-making process and the general public grew apathetic and distrustful of political processes. Decentralisation measures can serve as a possible vehicle for changing this political culture by diffusing political power within the society, while at the same time, they can help to establish new channels and arenas for political influence that allow the public to become increasingly involved in the political process. The introduction of such institutional structures could therefore change the state-society relationship and provide a more stable foundation for democratic consolidation. The theories about institutional traditions and institutional design, discussed in the following pages, will later be utilised to analyse the democratisation process in Macedonia.

The role of institutional traditions

There exist a number of different categorisations of non-democratic state systems, which were briefly explored in chapter two. The categorisation that will be used here is drawn from the work of Linz & Stepan, who define and categorise four different, non-democratic regime types from which a democratisation process can commence; totalitarian regimes, sultanistic-
regimes, post-totalitarian regimes, and authoritarian regimes. This categorisation will be used to fulfil two purposes. The first of these is to place communism and the institutional legacy left by this system into a wider conceptual framework. The placing of communism within this categorisation will support the description of the transitional challenges left by the communist institutional legacy. Secondly, this categorisation will also be utilised to describe the pre-communist legacy of these post-communist countries. Some of the post-communist countries have had brief encounters with democratic traditions before becoming communist while other countries have a long history of authoritarian or sultanistic regimes. These interregional differences will be given as a partial explanation to the variation of democratic transition that can be detected in the region, see table 3.1.

Let us first turn our attention to the classification developed by Linz & Stepan. According to Linz & Stepan, a totalitarian regime is a political system where almost all forms of pluralism have been uprooted and systematically suppressed. The system is guided by a unified and articulated utopian ideology, from which leaders, individuals and groups derive their sense of mission. This ideology also provides legitimacy to suppressive actions. Totalitarian leaders, who are often charismatic, control their respective polity within undefined limits and through significant unpredictability. Political influence is reached through success and commitment to the party organisation. The state actively mobilises the public to enter regime-created obligatory organisations and places importance on activism within this framework. Extensive private life activities and other forms of organisation outside the state controlled framework is condemned and suppressed. The Soviet Union under Stalin can serve as an example of a totalitarian regime.

A post-totalitarian regime can be seen as positioned in-between totalitarian regimes and authoritarian systems. In a post-totalitarian regime, there are elements of social pluralism which cannot be found in a totalitarian regime. This pluralism can be found both within the state apparatus and within the general public culture. Reference can thus be made to the existence of a “second-” or “parallel culture”, through which voices of dissent can be heard. The governing party still has a monopoly over political power and provides no legitimacy to oppositional voices. The second or parallel culture can therefore be described as a shadow culture that exists behind the official, state sponsored, culture. Post-totalitarian regimes also have a guiding ideology, similar to totalitarian regimes, but there is a weaker commitment to its ideological foundation. The state attempts to mobilise the population within state-sponsored organisations, but many participate within these activities solely as opportunists and careerists. Political leaders within these systems are rarely charismatic and are mainly occupied with securing their own position within the system. Leaders are still produced by the party apparatus in control of the state. Countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia during the 1980s, can serve as examples of post-totalitarian regimes.

An authoritarian regime differs from totalitarian and post-totalitarian systems in a number of different ways. A totalitarian regime can be regarded as an extreme form of an authoritarian regime. Authoritarian regimes are not guided by an elaborated ideology to the same extent as totalitarian regimes. Authoritarian societies are characterised by hierarchy and
state oppression, and citizens are subject to state authorities in ways that infringe on their civil liberties. But in contrast to totalitarian regimes there, are elements of political, social, and economic pluralism. Economic pluralism is especially a hallmark of this non-democratic system. There is often private ownership and elements of rule of law, which can allow a market economy to develop. The state does not attempt to politically mobilise the public as in totalitarian regimes, and political control is manifested through a single leader or a small political elite. Spain under Franco can serve as an example of an authoritarian regime.

The final category of non-democratic regimes that Linz & Stepan define is sultanism. Political power in sultanistic regimes is highly personalistic and arbitrary. There are no external restraints on the political power of the leader, who instead, rules in accordance with personal preference. A sultanistic regime is therefore an extreme form of patrimonialism where the private and the public are fused and the sultanistic polity has become the personal domain of the sultan. There is consequently no rule of law and a low institutionalisation. Sultanistic regimes are not guided by any form of overarching ideology and do not attempt to politically mobilise the citizens. The mobilisation that can occur is parastate groups who are used by the sultan to suppress the citizenry. The sultan and friends and family of the sultan compose the political leadership, and their position is dependent on the good will of the sultan. Political, social, and economic influence is gained through favourable contacts with this political elite. The Ottoman Empire and more modern societies such as the Philippines under Marcos and North Korea under Kim Il Sung can serve as examples of sultanistic regimes.39

The extent and difficulty of the tasks facing a non-democratic country during a process of democratic transition is dependent upon which of these non-democratic ideal types a country most resembles. Authoritarian regimes that already have elements of social, political, and economic pluralism in place, such as vibrant civil society, rule of law, a professional state bureaucracy, and market economy, face a less daunting challenge than does suppressive totalitarian or sultanistic regime, where all of these elements are largely missing. The authoritarian regime can focus on developing the political institutions necessary for democracy while the totalitarian or sultanistic regime will encounter the profound challenge of simultaneously developing the social, political, and economic institutions needed to support a democratic system. The process is further complicated by the fact that institutional changes are often characterised by institutional stiffness, leading to both incremental development and path dependence that inhibit rapid social transformation.40 Table 3.4 provides an attempt to outline the implications of previously non-democratic regime types for the task of democratic consolidation in relation to five democratic arenas. The figure shows the variation in transition difficulty that faces these different ideal types of non-democratic regimes, with totalitarian regimes facing the most comprehensive challenge while authoritarian regimes are seen to have the most advantageous starting-point. It is therefore possible to speak about the legacy which is left to a regime as being either “hard” or “soft”.41 The most favourable position for a successful democratisation process is a country that has been left with a soft legacy, exemplified by an authoritarian regime in which a vibrant civic society is already in
place, where the rule of law has universal legitimacy, and the economic society has developed a high degree of plurality and market autonomy. Being left with a hard legacy, that is to say, one where these different elements of pluralism are missing, provides a less advantageous departure point for a successful democratisation process.42

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena characteristics</th>
<th>Authoritarian</th>
<th>Totalitarian</th>
<th>Post-totalitarian</th>
<th>Sultanistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil society autonomy</td>
<td>Medium to low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political society autonomy</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutionalism and rule of law</td>
<td>Low to high</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional norms and autonomy of state bureaucracy</td>
<td>Low to high</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic society with a degree of market autonomy and plurality of ownership forms</td>
<td>Medium to high</td>
<td>Low (communist) or medium (fascist)</td>
<td>Low to low-medium</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4 The implications of prior non-democratic regime type for the tasks of democratic consolidation
Source: Linz & Stepan (1996) p. 56

Most of the countries in communist Europe, during the years prior to the collapse of communism, can be referred to as being either totalitarian or post-totalitarian, according to this classification.43 They were all developed on a formal commitment to Marxism-Leninism, which served as the guiding ideology for the entire society, and which shaped all the social, political, and economic structures, institutions and policies of these societies. This domination of Marxism-Leninism caused them at times to be labelled as “ideocratic”.44 Communist Europe was also marked by a high degree of state ownership and a state controlled command economy, through which the communist party leadership and the state apparatus controlled most aspects of the economy, such as allocating resources and determining prices and wages. Therefore, the state was, to a large extent, synonymous with the communist party, giving the party leadership a broad mandate to exercise power. There was no division between the government and the bureaucracy, making features such as the rule of law virtually non-existent. Instead, the political elite had supreme authority to shape the political outcome of these societies, based on arguments such as “communism means not the victory of socialist law, but a victory of socialism over any law” and “under socialism, policy and plan would replace law”.45 Political power was centralised and often concentrated to the top leadership within the communist party. In addition, these political leaders employed different practices to protect themselves from their members, giving them the ability to hold office for lengthy terms, thereby gaining far-reaching personal influence. Post-communist Europe can consequently be regarded as having been left with a hard legacy, and in need of a
simultaneous triple transition. It is also in this sense that post-communist Europe can be regarded as having started their democratisation process backwards, by rapidly introducing free competitive elections before having other fundamentals, such as rule of law and a vibrant civil society, in place.46

It should also be acknowledged that post-communist Europe has internal discrepancies with regards to its respective pre-communist heritage and that these differences can serve as a partial explanation to the variation in democratic transition that is detectable in the region. Some countries in the region have had previous experience of democratic practices while others lack any such experience. In order to further describe these differences, it is useful to divide the countries of post-communist Europe into three major groups.

The first group comprises the Central European countries, incorporating Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia. These countries have traditionally shared borders with western European countries which has resulted in a rather close contact throughout history; they share an imperial heritage from the German and Austro-Hungarian empires, with their resemblance of a Rechtstaat; they share historical religious bonds with Western Europe; and the central European countries experienced a short period of democratisation after the end of the Second World War and showed tendencies of resistance against state socialism during the communist period (Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, Poland 1980).47

The three Baltic countries, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, constitute the second group. These countries distinguish themselves from the central European countries by not having retained independence during the communist period, but instead, being incorporated into the Soviet Union; the Baltic countries have also been influenced by being located at the crossroads of Scandinavian, German, Polish and Russian cultures and they share a western Christian heritage, even if Estonia and Latvia are predominantly protestant while Lithuania is predominantly catholic.48

The third group, which is the main interest for this study because Macedonia belongs to this group, are the countries of South Eastern Europe, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and all the states of the former Yugoslavia federation, with the exception of Slovenia. These countries distinguish themselves from the other two groups by sharing the heritage of formally being part of the Ottoman Empire. They have a mixed religious heritage, an absence of democratic traditions, are ethnically diverse with belated national independence and have tendencies towards political conflict and territorial disputes.49

The Central European and Baltic countries have historically experienced periods of both western and eastern influence, described as periods of “travel to the west” and “travel to the east”. The countries of South Eastern Europe meanwhile, belonged for five centuries, without interruption, to the Ottoman Empire.50 This historical difference has affected the institutional tradition of South Eastern Europe and provided these countries with a distinctly different long-term state-society heritage than the rest of post-communist Europe. The Ottoman Empire functioned as a sultanistic regime and the defining features of this political system spread through the region and reached all levels of governance, enforcing the sultanistic logic of governance as a tool for personal use in collective and elite attitudes towards the state. The
lingering presence of these practices and understanding of the relationship between state and society can serve as a factor that has complicated the democratisation process in this region and affected the pace and quality of the process." The Central European countries, on the other hand, as former parts of the German and Austro-Hungarian empires, experienced features such as a rule of law and state-society separation long before state socialism was introduced. These countries also experienced a short period of actual democratisation following the end of the Second World War and did not introduce state socialism until 1949, when the system was imposed upon them by the Soviet Union. It can therefore be claimed that the Central European countries actually faced a re-democratisation process following the collapse of communism while South Eastern Europe faced a democratisation process, in which democratic institutions had to be built without any support from historical precedents.

Another feature that separates South Eastern Europe from the rest of post-communist Europe is that these countries, as former parts of the Ottoman Empire, never experienced the main social changes in society that shaped the development of the modern world, such as the Renaissance, the Reformation and the counter-Reformation, the Scientific Revolution, the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. South Eastern Europe has thus been labelled as “late, late developers”, characterised by having predominantly agrarian societies with low levels of industrialisation where the poor, illiterate landless masses were controlled by a powerful, anti-modern, landowning class. South Eastern Europe consequently entered the communist period as structurally underdeveloped and plagued by political conflict, and the four decades under communist rule only led to a gradual modernisation. Through centrally planned industrialisation the rural-urban balance was shifted in favour of the latter and lead to some economic development of the region. The state socialist system however inhibited the development of any form of pluralist structures in politics, economics or society, leaving the people of South Eastern Europe ill prepared to face a democratisation process. South Eastern Europe also remained poor and economically underdeveloped in comparison to the Central European and Baltic countries, having the lowest per capita income in post-communist Europe. The Central European and Baltic countries, on the other hand, participated in the previously mentioned modernisation process and developed accordingly. In that sense, the slogan “return to Europe” is more fitting in relation to the Central European and Baltic countries than for the countries of South Eastern Europe, that to a large extent have been isolated from the cultural development of western Europe for most of history.

In the following chapter, the political transition of Macedonia will be investigated from the vantage point of the institutional traditions left by the communist- and pre-communist period. Attention will paid to the demonstrated ability of Macedonia to complete the task necessary to improve on the shortcomings, take from the first four arena characteristics of table 3.3. It will be suggested that institutional traditions serve to explain many of the transitional developments and constrains that can be found within these arenas.
One feature of the institutional design left to most countries in post-communist Europe after the collapse of communism was a highly centralised state apparatus. The political leadership dominated the decision-making process and the general public was provided with few channels for political influence. Macedonia, as part of former Yugoslavia, has a slightly different institutional legacy. Yugoslavia operated through a system of communal federalism, where different territorial organisations were provided with significant degrees of autonomy, so Macedonia, instead, went through a process of intense centralisation after declaring independence from Yugoslavia. What unites Yugoslavia with the rest of post-communist Europe, is a suppression of any political mobilisation outside of state controlled organisations. Independent unions, agrarian collectives, cultural societies and other forms of organisations that could serve as a joining force for individuals outside the state controlled sphere were therefore, to a large extent, lacking in the region. This suppression created a political culture where the citizenry become “atomized”, meaning that they established a culture of minimal interaction between each other, both as citizens and towards the state. This culture of individual seclusion was developed both by choice and by outside pressure, and led to a “negative integration”, where citizens stuck to their private spheres and ignored the public.

A political culture of negative integration serves as a counterproductive force in a democracy. The ideological foundation of a democracy is rule by the people, so in order for a democracy to function properly, there must be a higher degree of interaction and dialog between policymakers and the general public. Consequently, post-communist Europe needed to act to change this collective mindset. In a sense, curing homo sovieticus from the traumatic communist experience and instead nourishing the development of more inclusive governance structures that could support democratic consolidation. Different decentralisation measures could be utilised to accomplish this ambition. Such measures could diffuse political power in a society while at the same time develop new channels and arenas for public political influence. In this way, reform of the institutional design would therefore become the vehicle for transforming the political culture.

Decentralisation measures can be designed according to three different models; deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. These three decentralisation models differ due to the degree of transfer of authority from the central state apparatus down to subnational levels of government. Deconcentration involves decentralisation of policy administration and implementation, while the decision-making process is still kept at a central level. Delegation incorporates some transfer of total decision-making authority, although the state still remains in control over key policy decisions. Devolution entails total transfer of decision-making authority from central level to subnational governments over given policy areas, and by necessity, includes some degree of financial autonomy, either through guaranteed fiscals transfers from the central state or by local taxation by the subnational government themselves. Decentralisation is to all regards and purposes a multidimensional process, having political, administrative and fiscal dimensions, that takes different shapes in different context. For the
The purpose of this study, decentralisation is to be understood as the transfer of political powers to different subnational levels of government by the central government.59

The arguments in favour of a decentralisation process can be divided into either normative or instrumental. The normative arguments in favour of decentralisation have their core essence in the belief that decision-making processes within democracies should be controlled by the people that are affected by the outcome of the processes. Decentralisation in itself, therefore, has a value because it moves political decisions closer to the affected citizenry and establishes increased opportunities for public participation in the decision-making process. The belief is that decentralisation will raise public interest and participation in public affairs because the process is increasingly available to them. Decentralisation will break down the system into parts that the people more effectively can manage, in a sense creating a purer democracy. Furthermore, decentralisation is believed to increasingly enable transparency and public accountability, something which will be beneficial for the acceptance and effectiveness of the system. The instrumental arguments in favour of decentralisation are an array of expected positive outcomes of such a system. Decentralisation is believed to be the means for overcoming the shortcomings produced by centrally controlled national planning, by transferring the decision-making process closer to the problem. By keeping the decisions local, the decisions-makers are more likely to have knowledge of and sensitivity to local needs, thereby being able to increasingly protect the interests of local and regional minorities. Decentralisation can also be a useful strategy in societies with segmented cleavages, as was previously explored, because it can provide minority groups with some degree of self-determination without definitively dividing the society. Decentralisation will also, of necessity, lead to the establishment of a more capable local administration that will be better suited to manage and coordinate local projects, while remaining flexible to respond to changed circumstances and public needs.60

If decentralisation actually leads to all of these desired outcomes is disputed. There clearly exist arguments against decentralisation. Decentralisation can cause a situation where the citizens of a society are not given the same opportunities or governmental treatment in similar circumstances because they belong to different local communities, thereby eroding the principle of equality before the law. Farmers in one community can, for instance, be forced to implement high environmental protection standards while farmers in other neighbouring communities are not placed under the same restrictions. The same logic can be transferred to other policy fields, such as education, social security and so forth. Decentralisation can also lead to decreased governmental efficiency. Policy decisions that are made centrally only need to go through the process once, and can be taken based on what has been established to be in the best interest of the whole society. If policy decisions are decentralised, each local government has to individually go through the decision-making process, which is time consuming and expensive. The final decisions risk also differing between the different local governments and thereby create a tragedy of the commons situation. Local governments can simply be unable or unequipped to handle complex policy fields.61 Such arguments were used to justify the centralisation of policy in most societies during earlier periods of development.
and democratisation. Furthermore, decentralisation can spark a development that can threaten the future existence of the state through the development of a stateness problem. The decentralisation of divided societies can cause increased ethnic tension by making national ethnic majorities become local ethnic minorities, and local ethnic majorities can use decentralisation as the first step towards demanding definitive partition of the society. Decentralisation can also be used by political elites in order to prohibit more far-reaching demands of central democratisation, by providing some degree of political participation to the public in local governments and on issues of lesser importance. Around the globe, it is however possible to find a worldwide trend during the last 30 years that has promoted an experimentation with decentralisation reforms, independent of the political system and socio-economical development level of the affected countries.

Decentralisation in many post-communist countries nonetheless involves a more comprehensive transformation than simply the decentralisation of political powers to autonomous regional or local authorities. It would also incorporate the construction or strengthening of local governments so that they can take on the increased responsibility that follows with a decentralisation process. These new local governments need to become politically and administratively capable of providing the mandated public service that as a consequence will be entrusted to them, otherwise the whole decentralisation process can become a source of public frustration and decreasing political trust. The actual shape of these local governments is dependent on the contextual demands that are placed on them. It is consequently difficult to provide a definitive answer to the question; what is a suitable territorial size and administrative structure for a local government? It is however of relevance that the local governments are provided with adequate financial funds, or taxing powers, to finance the public services it has been entrusted. The quality of the public service can otherwise deteriorate, trapping local governments in a downward spiral where the financial base is not sufficient to provide the quality of public services that is demanded by the public, thereby making the public increasingly unwilling to financially support the system, which then erodes the financial base even further.

Action should also be taken to improve the political accountability of local governments, both horizontally and vertically. Policymakers need to be made horizontally accountable to each other, creating an internal structure of checks and balances, but also vertically accountable to the public, where the public in frequent and fair competitive elections are able to support different governing options. In order for the vertical accountability to function, an increased openness needs to be implemented that ensures that the public can obtain information about the actions of public officials. An unbiased and professional media, serving as a public watchdog, has an essential role to fill here. The implementation of this form of institutional structure could support the transformation of the political culture left by the communist period and close the void separating policymakers and the general public. Public officials need to learn to increasingly see themselves as public servants, to some degree empowered to cater to the needs of the public. Policymakers in former communist regimes were often isolated from the demands of the public and have therefore grown accustomed to
implementing policy decisions without any prior public consultation. This can easily lead to policies that are out of tune with the demands and wishes of the public. In the process of consolidating as a democracy, new channels of interaction between the public and public officials can be created in which information and opinions can be more effectively communicated between the different parties. The success of decentralisation measures does not rest solely on organisational structures or the willingness of policymakers to listen to the public. It also needs a public that is politically capable and willing to voice such needs and demands, both as individuals and as members of different social or political groups. Institutional arrangements that provide opportunities for the public to become politically active might, however, stimulate the creation of a growing civic culture. Political participation has a socialising effect through which participants become more likely to participate politically in the future. It also provides citizens with an increased understanding of different political positions and the process of political communication and compromise, which can have a stabilising effect on the society as a whole.

The design of the government system in Macedonia has shifted back and forth. From previously operating through a system of communal federalism, Macedonia has adopted a highly centralised government structure after becoming independent and has since launched a process of decentralisation. The above discussed theories serve as foundation for the discussion about the development within Macedonia regarding institutional structure and the consequences of different institutional structures.

The economic transition

The third and final dimension of the triple transitions concerns the transformation of the economic sector from a command economy to a market economy. This transition is closely interconnected to the political transition, thereby influencing the progression of democratic consolidation. The collapse of communism was to a significant extent caused by the failure of the socialist system to deliver in accordance with the economic and material expectations of the people. Evidence of the failure of the system had been mounting for a significant period of time before the actual collapse of the system, in the form of chronic shortages of consumer goods, rampant inflation, rising levels of external debt, a widening technological lag in comparison to the west and widespread environmental devastation. These shortcomings contributed to slowly eroding the legitimacy of the communist system and served as a strong motivator for the general public to aspire for an alternative, represented by the more prosperous western democracies. The progression of the economic transition is relevant for democratic consolidation principally for three reasons. Firstly, the transition from command economy to market economy is an important component of breaking the monopoly position of state authorities. Economic power is political power, turning privatisation measures into elements of political power diffusion. Secondly, market economy has proved to be superior to all other economic systems in producing economic growth, something which is an important foundation for generating socio-economic development and modernisation. The failure to
adopt market economy structures can thus be seen as factors that hamper modernisation and consequently also democratic consolidation. Thirdly, the economic situation plays a prominent role in the everyday lives of people the world over. The ability of government institutions to provide in accordance with the expectations of the public influences the levels of legitimacy and support that are bestowed upon them. The destabilisation of the communist system can to a great extent be explained as being caused by its failure to provide in accordance with public expectation. A possible failure of the new regimes of post-communist Europe to provide an economically more stable and prosperous future than their predecessors could destabilise the region again and serve as a foundation for authoritarian and populist political leaders, thereby becoming a source for democratic regression. The description and theoretical framework outlined in the following pages will serve as the foundation for an analysis of the economic transition in Macedonia.

Privatisation as power diffusion

In order to understand the role of privatisation as a possible power diffusion measure it is useful to first have insight into the main features of the communist economic system. The communist economic system was introduced in East-Central Europe after the end of the Second World War. It was implemented in accordance with the economic system that had been developed in the Soviet Union. Its basic features dictated an almost complete nationalisation of industrial and land assets, together with a replacement of the market, based on supply and demand, with a system based upon extensive central planning. The basis for production was changed from market driven indicators of consumer demands and replaced with compulsory, centrally decided, production targets, which were developed to cover timeframes of up to five years and which incorporated almost all aspects of production. Prices for consumer goods were also determined by the state. Enterprises were thereby transformed from being independent economic actors within the society into being part of the state apparatus, serving at the bottom level of the chain and directed towards the fulfilment of the political ambitions of the governing regime. Company managers were politically appointed and held accountable by different industrial branches of the state apparatus with regards to how well they were meeting the plans of the central government. This system fostered a spirit of conformity among company managers because their salaries and career prospects became dependent on them satisfying their political superiors, no matter how economically irrational the demanded practices were in reality. It also led to the development of large-scale enterprises with an emphasis on heavy industry instead of consumer goods. From the workers point of view, the new system had both benefits and disadvantages. Worker discipline was harsh and labour unions functioned only as tool for the communist party to mobilise workers. But the socialist system also incorporated an ambition to guarantee work and workers were often provided with lifetime employment if they so wished. The government also subsidised necessities such as housing, energy and food, and salaries were distributed in an egalitarian manner, providing a foundation for low economic differences within these societies.64
Macedonia, as a former part of the Yugoslavian Federation, partially distinguishes itself from the communist economic model. Yugoslavia abandoned central planning as early as in the early 1950s, and introduced a unique form of market socialism where control over means of production was decentralised to “groups of organised labour”. The society at large remained the owners of all means of production, but the management of the production was left to the workers and the production executives. Profits were either reinvested into the company or channelled through taxation into collective funds for social consumption. There was no stock exchange and no large private owners, but groups of citizens could join together and gain approval to start an enterprise by convincing authorities and the state banking system of the viability of their endeavour. Through this system, workers became the caretakers of social property on behalf of the society, and internal competition, based to some degree on market mechanisms like supply and demand, regulated the production sector. Because of these features, the Yugoslavian economy was for a period used as an example of a third way, somewhere between capitalism at one extreme and command economy at the other.

Consequently, the belief is that privatisation reforms in post-communist Europe can function as political power diffusion because they serve to depoliticise the economic sector. Privatisation separates the state from the corporate sector and produces an entirely new corporate management structure, which operates independently of the state. This new corporate management structure, composed by a new social class of business entrepreneurs, can then function as a balance to the dominance of state authorities. Economic influence can in most cases be translated into political influence, and by relinquishing control over the corporate sector, the state in effect, disperses political influence into the hands of private business entrepreneurs. These business entrepreneurs can function as a source of opposition against authoritarian forces and serve as a catalyst for increased liberalisation and democratisation, by pressuring state authorities for political influence. Economic liberalisation and the development of a new class of business entrepreneurs can also function as a source for a growing middle class, something that has been claimed to be a factor that promotes democratisation.

Privatisation has nonetheless proven to be a very complicated task. The first challenge these post-communist countries encountered was the difficulty of determining who actually owned the countries companies. In Poland and Yugoslavia, the workers had been entrusted with certain rights of self-management and therefore argued that the ownership of the companies should be transferred to them. The problem with this approach is that it would leave pensioners, civil servants and other similar groups within the society without a stake in these companies. The transfer of ownership to workers of companies would provide workers of efficient and prosperous industries with valuable stakes while workers in less productive industries would in fact obtain useless company stakes. The privatisation method of choice therefore differs throughout the region, but three general methods stand out; forms of insider privatisation through management
and/or employee buy-outs, vouchers distributed to the entire population, and state organised direct sales.\textsuperscript{68}

Finding interested private entrepreneurs suitable, capable and willing to purchase these companies was the second challenge. Selling valuable and vital state resources to foreigners was a sensitive issue that was met with nationalistic resistance and finding suitable domestic investors has been difficult because of the severely strained economic situation. Simultaneous implementation of different privatisation reforms across the region would also risk devaluing the market value of these companies, because of the sheer number of companies available for purchase. Many state-owned industries were furthermore ill suited to handle the demands of the international market. Most enterprises had become very large during the communist period and were using outdated technology, making them too large and too inefficient to compete efficiently on the world market. The post-communist states therefore needed to find ways to break the monopoly role that some enterprises had acquired domestically during the communist period, in order to establish a competitive market.\textsuperscript{69}

There are indications that the implemented privatisation reforms actually contributed to a reinforcement of already established positions. Driven by the need to implement economic reforms and privatise a large amount of valuable state assets were sold at bargain basement prices to shady businessmen or the management administrators of the communist-party leadership, or nomenclature, who used their political positions to gain private ownership of these companies. These groups belong to the few that could raise the resources needed to bid on these state companies and had the political connections necessary to gain approval. The consequence has been that instead of going from plan to market, some countries have more gone from plan to clan. Where this happened, the new business entrepreneurs that emerged through these privatisation reforms either already belonged to the political elite or quickly developed new networks connecting themselves with the political elites. This has created examples of insider/outsider problems since these actors have cooperated to secure their newly acquired positions and profits, thereby functioning as obstacles for further economic and political reform.\textsuperscript{70}

Instead, the most common obstacles to the progress of economic reform in postcommunist transitions have come from very different sources: from enterprise insiders who have become new owners only to strip their firms assets; from commercial bankers who have opposed macroeconomic stabilization to preserve their enormously profitable arbitrage opportunities in distorted financial markets; from local officials who have prevented market entry into their regions to protect their share of local monopoly rents; and from so-called Mafiosi who have undermined the creation of a stable legal foundation for the market economy.\textsuperscript{71}

This development has contributed to the establishment of widespread corruption, both within politics and business, which is still plaguing the region and serving as a hindrance for
democratic consolidation, foreign investment and fair market competition and practices. The severity of the problem is, however, more prominent in some countries than in others. The economic leaders of Central Europe experienced an explosion of entrepreneurs and small-scale businesses following the economic transition. Poland had 350,000 sole-proprietor firms in 1989 and by 1998 this figure had risen to 2.1 million. Many of the South Eastern European countries have not experienced the same development of entrepreneurs and small-scale businesses, and the reason for this development can to some extent be explained by the insider/outside problems. Small firms in South Eastern Europe have often been required to pass through numerous administrative barriers before gaining approval and the necessary funds for operation, for instance different forms of licenses, which has resulted in the development of a corruptive system that is systematically misused by political and economic elites to extort bribes and block economic and political competitors from gaining access to the market, thereby securing established positions.

Macedonia belongs to the group of European post-communist countries where the growth of small and medium-size enterprises has been modest. Questions can therefore be raised concerning the possible interaction between privatisation reforms and democratisation in this country. What privatisation reforms, if any, have been implemented and what effect have these possible reforms had on political power diffusion? If implemented, have these privatisation reforms contributed positively to the democratisation process in Macedonia or have they only served to reinforce the positions of the nomenclature? The following analysis of the transitional process in Macedonia will attempt to shed some light on these questions.

The interaction of economic reforms, modernisation, and democracy

One of the most widespread generalisations within the field of democratisation is the main slogan of the modernisation school: “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.” Economic development and modernisation have long been connected to democracy and democratisation and there is reason to believe that this connection is valid in the post-communist countries as well. When comparing the level of economic prosperity, in the form of GDP per capita, with the level of democratic progress in 25 post-communist countries for the year 2005, there seems to be a connection between the two factors, as figure 3.5 aims to show. Countries that have made significant democratic progress also have high GDP per capita, while countries that have made modest democratic progress have low levels of GDP per capita. Democratisation, liberalisation, economic reform, and economic development are processes that are believed to be mutually interdependent, and as economic prosperity has often been used as a measurement of modernisation, it consequently seems valid to state that these findings support the hypothesis that modernisation and democracy interact even in this region. The connection between economic reforms and modernisation comes from the fact that capitalism and market economy have historically shown themselves to be superior to any other economic system in generating economic growth. The collapse of the communist system was to a significant extent caused by
its economic system’s inability to compete with the economic development of the western capitalist economies.

The communist command economies functioned with some success in the beginning, but as the production demands became more complex, it became increasingly difficult for these economies to live up too expectations. Central planners could not keep up with the increased demands for innovation that were placed upon them, which deprived them from serving as engines of change, and it became increasingly recognised that this shortcoming of the system was hampering the economic development of these countries. Demands for economic reforms that could remedy this shortcoming and make the system more economically efficient started to be raised in the mid 1950s. Attempts were also made to introduce elements of the market within the framework of a socialist economy. The state continued to produce long-term plans, all property continued to remain in the hands of the state, and company managers were still accountable to the state, but company managers were, for instance, provided with greater autonomy to respond to customer demands, state controlled pricing was relaxed, and wages and salaries became attached to enterprise profitability. These reforms were never successfully implemented. The failure of the reforms lay mainly in the resistance within the system towards these forms of reforms, for instance from the bureaucracy put in place to supervise the production, who feared to become redundant if these reforms proved successful, and among workers who feared the social impact, in the form of loss of job security and declining salaries, that could follow. As these reforms failed, and the shortcoming of the socialist system in comparison to the systems in the west became increasingly apparent and recognised, the demands for reforms changed into demands for a complete economic transformation.\textsuperscript{75}
The Yugoslavian economic system differed to some extent from the traditional communist economic model, as has been previously described, but this system suffered many of the same economic problems as the rest of the region. Yugoslavia was plagued by a low level of labour productivity, a deteriorating infrastructure, and a growing black market. By 1981 Yugoslavia had accumulated a foreign currency debt that equalled their gross domestic product. Furthermore, political leaders were unwilling, for political and ideological reasons, to introduce reforms. Instead, any criticism was viewed as dissent and the different republics of the federation started to introduce measures to protect their regional production against domestic competition, locking the country into what best can be described as an economic civil war. The economic debacle became extremely visible due to the rampant inflation that rose to around 300 percent at the end of the 1980s, wiping out personal savings, eliminating investments, impoverishing pensioners and turning different social groups against each other and against the regime.  

Economic reforms and a transition from command economy to market economy were therefore required in order to produce the economic growth necessary to support continued socio-economic development and modernisation of these countries. This connection makes economic reforms an important factor for democratisation. Looking at the region again, it is possible to find a connection between the post-communist countries level of economic reforms and their level of democracy, as shown by figure 3.6.

![Image of figure 3.6: Economic reforms and level of democracy in post-communist countries 2005.](image)

Figure 3.6 Economic reforms and level of democracy in post-communist countries 2005
Source: Freedom House, Nations in transit; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

When comparing the degree of economic reform that has been implemented in 29 post-communist countries with their respective democratic progress, it is possible to find that countries that have implemented the most significant economics reforms are also the countries
that have made the most democratic progress; meanwhile, countries that have made a low degree of democratic progress have implemented few economic reforms. Consequently, there seems to exist a connection between these two factors. It is difficult to say which factor is the dominant, but my argument would instead be that these processes are mutually reinforcing. Democratic transitions, liberalisation, and economic reform seem to go hand in hand, and when comparing figure 3.6 with figure 3.5 it is also possible to see that economic development can be added to the list. The countries that have introduced the most significant economic reforms are also countries that position themselves highly with regards to GDP per capita. It is difficult to find the exact pattern of interaction between these factors but there are a significant amount of studies that have connected democracy, economic development, and market economy.  

The process of implementing the economic reforms necessary to transform the post-communist command economies into market economies is not without problems. The most commonly recognised problem involves the short-term transitional cost that follows from these economic reforms, known informally as the J-curve. What this theory in short declares is that things will get worse before they get better. This is also the situation that resulted across post-communist Europe. These countries faced increased unemployment, higher prices, production decline, and significant drops in GDP per capita as a result of the economic reform packages that were introduced across the region. Different countries adopted different approaches to the process. Some countries, most often exemplified by Poland, utilised the so-called shock-therapy approach. The shock-therapy approach aims at simultaneously introducing macroeconomic stability through tight monetary policies and fiscal restraints, while at the same time liberalising prices and opening up the market for foreign trade, thereby exposing the domestic production sector for competition with the global market. The process also involves a large-scale privatisation of state owned enterprises. The argument on behalf of this approach is mainly that necessary reforms should not be delayed. It has been argued to be unwise to linger with necessary changes because many of these measures are socially painful and painful steps should not be stretched out. Such changes should be made in one decisive move, thereby serving as a decisive leap into market economy for these countries; or “if you are going to chop of a cat’s tail, do it in one strike, not bit by bit”. This approach was strongly advocated by western experts and institutions around the time of the collapse of communism.

Other countries, exemplified for instance by many of the South Eastern European countries, adopted the so-called gradualist approach. The gradualist approach is based on the belief that it is more advantageous to gradually introduce necessary reforms over a period of time, in order to minimise possible negative transitional effects. Economic savings can soften the negative economic short-term consequences that follow on comprehensive economic reforms, but most countries of post-communist Europe lacked such resources because of the economic hardship prior to the transition. The economic transition was therefore bound to be socially painful and concerns were raised that it could be dangerous to place further economic hardships on the people in a time of political turmoil. From this point of view, the issue of
sequencing became important because policy makers wanted to follow some sort of policy chain by first implementing policies that were necessary for following policies to function properly.\textsuperscript{79}

The consequence of the economic transition, regardless of the utilised approach, was a recession, or economic depression across post-communist Europe. This development was expected and it has been argued that the region had to make a necessary journey across the “valley of tears” in order to introduce the necessary economic structures that would generate economic growth for the future.\textsuperscript{80} The ability to economically recover from this passage has nonetheless differed, creating economic leaders and stragglers. Poland and Slovenia are examples of countries that made a speedy economic recovery while many of the South Eastern European countries, such as Macedonia, can be referred to as the economic laggards of the region. Macedonia has in fact had an extraordinarily lengthy journey through the valley of tears. The country is almost unique in the respect that it had not regained the GDP per capita level of 1990 by the year 2005, as indicated in table 3.7. The inability of Macedonia to generate economic development and growth can serve as a partial explanation as to why the country has struggled to complete the democratic transitions. It is also a worrying sign for the future as the failure to generate economic growth can function as threat towards Macedonia’s upcoming ability to sustain democracy. The inability to generate economic growth will hamper continued socio-economic development and modernisation, both processes that are believed to support and sustain democracy. A partial explanation to this failure to economically recover and generate economic growth can be found in the fact that Macedonia has only implemented partial reforms of its economic system. The completion of the process and the implementation of more comprehensive economic reforms could provide increased economic growth. The question is why Macedonia has only implemented partial economic reforms?

A partial explanation could be that Macedonia has become stuck in a situation where early winners of the implemented partial reforms are resisting the further advancement of reforms because this would deprive them of their relative advantages.\textsuperscript{81}

Actors who have enjoyed extraordinary gains from the distortions of a partially reformed economy have fought to preserve those gains by maintaining the imbalance of partial reforms over time. [...] In each case the winners from an earlier stage of reform have incentives to block further advances in reform that would correct the very distortions on which their initial gains were based. In effect, they seek to prolong the period of partial reforms to preserve their initial flow of rents, though at a considerable social cost.\textsuperscript{82}

The ability to provide these early winners with a stake in advancing the reform process could then serve as a possible solution to the problem. But the reason why Macedonia has only implemented partial reforms can have other explanations. Macedonia used a more gradualist approach to economic reforms and can have encountered unexpected difficulties during the
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Table 3.7 Development of GDP per capita in post-communist Europe from 1990-2005
sequencing process. There can also exist other reasons to the shortcomings of Macedonia to recover pre-transition economic standards. These shortcomings can nonetheless be regarded as obstacles for democratic consolidation. This interaction between economic reform, modernisation, and democracy will be revisited in the following analysis of the democratisation transition in Macedonia. The investigation will focus upon the search for factors that explain the economic development the country has gone through and what effects this development can be regarded to have had on the democratisation process.

*The interaction between economic performance and political confidence*

Failure by government institutions to perform in accordance with public expectations is commonly referred to as a source for decline and possible loss of political confidence. Government institutions are constantly evaluated by the general public and persistent failures to meet public expectations is likely to result in eroding political support, political indifference, and political opposition. Failure to perform in accordance with public expectations contributed to the collapse of communism and possible failure of the new democratic regimes in post-communist Europe to generate better results than their predecessors could again cause public frustration and result in democratic backsliding.

The connection between economic performance and political confidence can be found the world over. There is however an important difference between dissatisfied citizens in consolidated democracies and dissatisfied citizens in newly established democracies. The former have been socialised since childhood by the values and norms that uphold democracy and through this process have come to regard democracy as the only legitimate regime type. Dissatisfaction with government performances is therefore rarely, if ever, transformed into democratic opposition. Citizens can distrust and be dissatisfied with the incumbent democratic regime and its performance, but their dissatisfaction should be interpreted as a demand for democratic reform and not as democratic opposition. Dissatisfied citizens in newly established democracies have on the contrary only lived for a short period of time within a democratic system, and may therefore evaluate the performance of the newly established democratic regime in light of plausible alternatives, most noticeably the undemocratic predecessor. These citizens have not been socialised into regarding democracy as the only legitimate regime type, thus making their support of it relative to its performance.

The people of post-communist Europe entered the democratic transition with exaggerated expectations of both the speed of the transition and the benefits and cost involved in the process. For the general public, the negative effects of the transition were felt first. The erosion of social safety nets, the dramatic economic decline, the rise of permanent high unemployment levels, and growing social polarisation took people by surprise. The peoples of the regions had been socialised by the communist system and grown accustomed to a life in security within a paternalistic state where social differences were relatively small and employment was almost guaranteed. Suddenly, people had to adopt an entirely new system of
values and social behavioural patterns, where they had to learn to provide for themselves in competition with others.

Instead of working for a company for life and counting on a fixed pension, it became advisable to change work places, permanently looking for new opportunities to save money and make your own pension insurance. In the old regime, there were only a few paths to success; now several ways opened and required mobility, flexibility, entrepreneurial attitude, and risk taking. All of these new behavioural patterns were difficult to learn. Most of the adult population was unprepared to adequately behave in this situation, and became paralysed and bitter.85

These feelings of frustration caused by the new demands are still present across the region but they have also been dampened by the social, political, and economic development that has taken place in many countries. A significant number of Europe’s post-communist countries have entered the EU and NATO, and seen an economy recovery that is now starting to generate many of the material benefits that were expected before the transition. Other countries, such as Macedonia, remain on the doorstep to the EU and have not seen the same development as many other countries in the region, see figure 3.7. They have instead been forced to struggle, case in point being the persistent high unemployment rate.

Figure 3.8 Unemployment in Macedonia, 1992-2005
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

This combination of eroding standards of living and still distant rewards can accordingly serve as a source of public frustration, where the acceptance by the public of political alternatives gains momentum. The looming danger is that the economic shortcomings of the governing institutions of Macedonia can undermine public support for democracy by triggering a new search for governmental alternatives, for instance in the form of a strong authoritarian political leader that promises to provide and secure a stable and better economic future; and in the process progress the country further away from genuine democracy.86
The following investigation of Macedonia’s democratisation process will analyse to what extent the difficult economic situation has contributed to a possible decline in the general public’s support for democracy. The analysis will also highlight the perceived importance of the economic situation among the general public.

Summary

This chapter has attempted to add to the theoretical framework that was outlined in the previous chapter by combining traditional theories about democratisation with more context-dependent theories. The post-communist democratisation process holds a number of unique transitional features compared to democratisation processes in previous regions, which warrants this form of approach. It has been argued that the democratisation process in post-communist Europe should be understood as a “triple transition”, composed of a state/nation transition, a political transition, and an economical transition.87

Within the first dimension, the state/nation transition, attention has been placed on the interaction of state, nation(s), and democratisation. State-building and nation-building processes can become conflicting logics, which then hamper and possibly prohibit democratic consolidation. The following analysis will investigate to what extent the multinational character of Macedonia has affected the democratisation process. Within the second dimension, the political transition, attention has been placed on the influence of institutional traditions and institutional design. Post-communist Europe has been left with a hard legacy and it is suggested that this legacy has significantly affected the starting-point and the transitional task incorporated into the democratisation process. Attention has also been placed upon the role of institutional design. Centralised states can become an obstacle for democratisation by inhibiting power diffusion and the transformation of the wall of indifferences separating the political elite from the general public. It has been discussed how different decentralisation measures can serve as a vehicle to remedy these problems, and it will be investigated to what extent this discussion is relevant to the case of Macedonia. And finally, within the third dimension, the economic dimension, attention has been placed upon the importance of transforming the economic society of these former communist societies. It has been suggested that the transformation from command economy to market economy can function as a vehicle to diffuse political power; that market economy has proven to be superior to all other economic systems in producing economic growth, which is important for generating socio-economic development and modernisation; and finally that the ability of government institutions to provide in accordance with the expectations of the public influences the level of legitimacy and support bestowed upon these institutions by the public. A possible failure of the new regimes of post-communist Europe to provide an economically more stable and prosperous future then their predecessors could inhibit democratic consolidation and even serve as a factor for a democratic regression.
Notes:

2 This argument has been borrowed from the debate between Karl & Schmitter and Bunce in Slavic Review.
6 Bunce (1995) p. 98
8 This aspect has been forcefully pointed out by Linz & Stepan (1996), from whom this subchapter borrows significant influence.
9 Buzan (1991) pp. 57-107. A similar argumentation to Buzan’s “idea of the state” can be found in Easton (1965) with regards to public support of the political community. See also Norris (1999) for a further development of Easton’s model.
10 Buzan (1991). For a more classical definition of a state, see Weber (1964)
11 For a more indepth discussion concerning the characteristics of a nation, see Anderson (1991), Gellner (1997)
12 Gurr (1998)
13 Buzan (1991)
15 For a short and to the point description of these concepts, see Römmele (1999) pp. 3-18.
16 A common approach towards measuring the impact of social cleavages is to correlate the social characteristics of individuals with electoral choice, exemplified for instance in Lipset & Rokkan (1967), Evans & Whitefield (2000).
17 See for instance Rustow (1970) for this line of argument.
18 Jennings (1956) p. 56
21 Esman (2004)
22 Esman (2004) pp. 120-135
23 Lijphart (1969), Lijphart (1977)
27 Kymlicka (1995)
35 Tavits (2005) p. 295
37 Linz & Stepan (1996) pp. 38-65
38 Linz & Stepan (1996)
39 Linz & Stepan (1996)
40 Pierson (2004)
41 Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer (1998)
43 Poland and Hungary serve as possible exceptions, as they could instead be classified as authoritarian. See Berglund & Aarebrot (1997)
44 White (1993)
45 Quotations found in Linz & Stepan (1996) p. 248.
See the discussion concerning the modernisation school in chapter two.


Hellman (1998)


Hellman (1998)

CHAPTER FOUR

Macedonia: The struggle to complete a triple transition

The previously discussed theories will now be used to analyse the democratisation process in Macedonia. The ambition is not to provide a complete and in-depth analysis of all the possible factors that influence the ongoing democratic development in Macedonia, but rather to sketch a foundation upon which Swedish democracy promotion activities can be better understood. Democracy promotion, as an external factor that influences democratisation processes, is developed and implemented in conjunction with the demands of the contextual environment, which therefore warrants the inclusion of an analysis of Macedonia’s democratisation process. The overarching structure of the following analysis is adopted from the previous chapter, which concerned the triple transition of post-communist Europe.

Macedonia long served as a beacon of hope in an otherwise troubled region. While many areas of the Balkans were being ravaged by armed ethnic violence following the disintegration of the Yugoslavian Federation, Macedonia remained relatively peaceful in spite of its multiethnic character. The country was therefore regarded as a positive example and the international community took a significant interest in supporting the small country in its continued democratic transition. Macedonia has however fallen short of consolidating as a liberal democracy. The requirements for being classified as an electoral democracy are in place, but a democratic culture have yet to permeate the society. Consequently, Macedonia has remained a grey-zone democracy, and its future democratic trajectory remains uncertain. The ratings that Macedonia has received by Freedom House during the period 1993 - 2007 function as an indication of this democratic stagnation.1

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Table 4.1 Freedom House rating of Macedonia, 1993-2007

Another serious worry for Macedonia’s future political trajectory is the fact that the basic foundation of the state remains in question. Macedonia is divided along ethnic lines and armed ethnic conflict has at times brought the country to the brink of full-scale civil war. Macedonia thus remains at the crossroads. The country lingers on the hopes of one day gaining entry into the EU, but still falls notably short of fulfilling the requirements.
Historical overview

Macedonia emerged out of the disintegration of Yugoslavia as a small land-locked country located in the middle of the Balkan peninsula. Neighbouring states are Greece to the south, Albania to the west, Kosovo and Serbia to the north, and Bulgaria to the east. Historically, the geographic area defined as Macedonia can be divided into three regions; Vardar Macedonia, which correlates well with the borders of present day Macedonia; Pirin Macedonia, which is a small region of present day western Bulgaria; and Aegean Macedonia, which is a region of present day northern Greece. Because of its location in the middle of the Balkans, Macedonia has throughout history been regarded as a strategically important territory and consequently seen successive waves of occupation forces. The Macedonian nation has never existed within a sovereign state until independence from Yugoslavia was declared in September 1991.

Tracing the origins of the Macedonian state and nation involves a controversial interpretation of history. During the first millennium B.C, an ethnic group identified as “the Macedons” occupied the region of present day Macedonia. Greece claims that the Macedons were in fact of Greek ethnicity, which would hence refute any claims of a Macedonian ethnicity based on heritage to the ancient Macedons. The Macedonians, on the other hand, claim that the Macedons were a distinct ethnic group, distinguishable from Greek ethnicity. The Macedonians therefore regard themselves as having a legitimate claim to the heritage of the Macedons and Alexander the Great. Both sides of this dispute have basis for their arguments. There exists ancient documentation that describes the Macedons as having their own separate culture and being regarded as foreigners by the Greeks. Modern day Macedonians are however a Slavic people, which the Macedons were not. The Slavic expansion into the Balkans from the northeast did not commence until 600-700 A.D. The influence of this expansion was considerable, both linguistically and culturally. Macedonians therefore refer to themselves as Macedonian Slavs, which they claim to be a distinct ethnic identity in relation to other Slavic groups like the Serbs and the Bulgarians. This identity is in part drawn from regional ties as well as to partial heritage to the Macedons. What is important for this study, regardless of what position one takes on the dispute outlined above, is the fact that the Macedonians perceive their own history accordingly. Additionally, this adopted position influences modern day Macedonian politics, for instance through strained international relations with neighbouring countries like Greece. Greece has officially protested against the creation of a Macedonian state and called Macedonia an “invention of Tito”, “an artificial creation”, and “a counterfeit nation”. Greece refuses to date to recognise Macedonia by name and actively attempts to block international recognition of that name.

Macedonia was the subject of outside domination from 600 A.D. and onwards. Bulgarian, Byzantine, and Serbian Kingdoms ruled this region until the Ottoman Turks invaded and occupied most of the Balkans in the 14th century. The Ottoman Empire remained in control of the region for the next five centuries, from 1355 to 1878. With the demise of the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century, Serb, Bulgarian and Greek rivalry intensified. Macedonia,
located in the middle of this geographical dispute, became the centre of attention. Bulgarian and Serbian nationalists refused to recognise a separate Macedonian national identity and instead regarded them as ethnic kinsmen. These claims were then used to gain legitimacy for occupation of the territory. Greece made similar declarations, mainly motivated by fears of a Slavic expansion that could threaten their territory. Macedonia therefore became the battleground for strategic and national ambitions, which led to numerous armed conflicts between 1878-1918. During this time, the Macedonian population were forced to endure extensive periods of ethnic repression by Turkish, Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian occupation forces. With the end of the First World War, Macedonia was divided into three parts. Pirin Macedonia was annexed by Bulgaria, Greece annexed Aegean Macedonia, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later renamed as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, annexed Vardar Macedonia. Macedonia did not receive recognition as a separate region with a distinct ethnic population in Yugoslavia during the period between 1918-1945. The Macedonians were instead considered as southern Serbs and strict sanctions were imposed on the use of the Macedonian language in both spoken and written form. Macedonians were also prohibited from participating in political life, at least in the form of establishing Macedonian political parties.

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established following the end of the Second World War. Within the federation Macedonia was granted status as one of six constituent republics. Yugoslavia’s new leader, Josip Broz Tito, also encouraged the development of a distinct Macedonian identity. An intense period of nation building followed in which the Macedonian language was officially recognised, Macedonian cultural societies were developed, the Macedonian identity was promoted in the educational system, and an autonomous Macedonian Orthodox church was created. Tito’s reasons for encouraging and supporting the development of a Macedonian identity were primarily two. Firstly, recognition of Macedonia provided an opportunity to balance the influence the different republics within the federation, thereby undercutting the dominance of the Serbs. Secondly, he had learned from the historical turmoil that had plagued Macedonia because of earlier failures to recognise the distinctness of the region. Recognition became a tool to undermine separatist movements and any attempts of annexation by Bulgaria and Greece. A distinct Macedonian identity, connected to the Yugoslavian Federation, would provide stability and political security. This policy was very successful and the Macedonians developed a high level of commitment to Yugoslavia. The political crisis that followed the death of Tito in 1980 revitalized nationalist demands in all six republics. Macedonia first took a cautious approach to the issue of secession and independence. The political elite in Macedonia supported a proposal for a renovated confederate Yugoslavia, based on a looser relationship between Belgrade and the different republics. This proposal was however met with resistance, mainly from Serbian political circles. Yugoslavia therefore started to disintegrate. Slovenia and Croatia declared independence and armed conflict erupted in both republics in the summer of 1991. The Macedonian parliament decided at this time that Macedonia would not remain in a Serb dominated Yugoslavia and a process aimed towards securing independence was launched.
national referendum on the issue of independence was called by the Macedonian parliament to be held in September 1991. Roughly 75 percent of the registered electorate participated in the referendum and approximately 95 percent voted in favour of independence. The Macedonian parliament subsequently declared independence from Yugoslavia little more than a week later and called for international recognition. Belgrade’s first response was to declare that secession was unacceptable, but during the spring of 1992 a peaceful withdrawal of the Yugoslavian army was successfully negotiated. Securing international recognition was found to be more difficult. Greece claimed exclusive rights to the name “Macedonia” and successfully blocked international recognition by many organisations of the international community. Macedonia was finally granted UN membership in April 1993 under the name the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, pending the ongoing name dispute with Greece. This dispute is still not solved and Macedonia is to date called FYROM in a number of international organisations.

The establishment and recognition of a sovereign Macedonian nation and state was however only the first steps in the democratisation process. Serious democratic difficulties have since continued to confront Macedonia. The state building process and the democratic transition is for instance still deficient, which gives good reasons to believe that continued progress is needed before the country will be able to experience political stability and economic prosperity.

The state/nation transition

The state-building process and the nation-building process have developed into conflicting logics in Macedonia. One of the main reasons for this development is the lingering presence of ethnic tension that can be found within the heterogeneous population. This tension serves as a barrier against the development of feelings of social unity among the citizens, that is the foundation of a democratic community. Citizens of Macedonia have yet to develop strong horizontal links of solidarity between each other and vertical links of solidarity with the state. These links are important democratic traits because they enable compromise and discussion. Macedonia is instead plagued by “segmented cleavages” in which the different ethnic communities to a large extent have come to isolate themselves. There are few, if any, “overlapping memberships” or “crosscutting cleavages”. Macedonia is thus socially divided along ethnic lines, and this division has also been transmitted into politics. The political debate is therefore coloured by ethnic traits, which only serve to preserve and on occasion heighten the ethnic tension. There have been some disputes concerning the actual percentage of different ethnic groups within Macedonia. The Albanian community have at times claimed to represent about 40 percent of the entire population. These claims have however not been supported by any of the censuses that have been conducted. The most recent census, conducted in 2002, found that 64.2 percent of the population were ethnic Macedonians while the Albanian community constitute 22.5 percent of the population. These findings confirm the results of previously conducted census in both 1991 and 1994 and have additionally received
international endorsement.\textsuperscript{16} As the census show, the two main ethnic groups in Macedonia are ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians.

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<td>Serbs, Vlach and others</td>
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Table 4.2 Macedonian census 2002
Source: Republic of Macedonia State Statistical Office.

It is primarily between these two ethnic communities that the ethnic tension exists. The origins of the tension can be found in national aspirations and demands for self-determination. The Albanian community was never officially recognized within the Yugoslavian Federation as a founding nationality. Instead, they were constantly referred to as a minority group, even though they constituted the majority in some areas, like Kosovo and the northwestern parts of Macedonia. This was a steady source of dissatisfaction for the Albanian community and demands for recognition and self-determination were occasionally made. One such example is the request made by the Albanian community in 1968 about the possible establishment of a seventh republic, combining areas of Kosovo and Macedonia that were heavily populated by Albanians. Both the Serbian and Macedonian community received this request with scepticism and resistance. The belief among these communities was that such a development would only serve as the first step towards separation and annexation of that region with Albania. Both sides were also protective of their respective republics for nationalist reasons. The dispute never sparked any serious violence, but the simmering discontent was present under the surface among the Albanian community and simply grew over time.\textsuperscript{17}

Signs of ethnic tension and national aspirations became increasingly common after the death of Tito in 1980. The political debate took ethnic tones and regional media started to explain the economic problems of the Federation on ethnic grounds. Rising nationalist feelings among the Albanian community in Macedonia prompted the authorities to take action by increasing the number of hours devoted to teaching Macedonian in Albanian language schools. This measure, and other similar actions taken by the Macedonian authorities, only increased the ethnic tension and in 1988 the situation boiled over into large demonstrations in Kumanova and Gostivar where the mainly Albanian student population demanded language rights.\textsuperscript{18} The question of the Macedonian constitution also became a serious sore point in relations between the two ethnic communities. Various proposals had been made to amend the existing
Macedonian constitution and prepare Macedonia for statehood. These amendments came to a decision in the national assembly in 1989 after months of intense discussion. The most controversial amendment redefined the foundation of Macedonia as “the national state of the Macedonian nation”, hence altering the previous constitution from 1974 which declared that Macedonia was the state of the “Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish minorities”. The Albanian community perceived this change as a degradation of their position into second-class citizens. Albanian leaders therefore voiced strong opposition. Increased demands for the protection of Albanian cultural rights followed, for instance the right to use the Albanian language in education, but the Macedonian government, which wanted to protect the Macedonian identity, rejected these demands.

The Albanian community therefore boycotted the referendum on independence that was held in Macedonia in 1991. The argument for this boycott was that the Albanian community’s opinions had not been respected in the past and that they risked becoming a vulnerable minority in a sovereign Macedonia. They instead organised their own referendum in January 1992, on “political and territorial autonomy”. The turnout exceeded 90 percent and over 95 percent voted in favour of political and territorial autonomy. The referendum was not recognised as valid by the Macedonian authorities and the Albanian community did not press the issue of autonomy. This serves, however, as a clear indication of the dissatisfaction that was felt by the Albanian community. It was also a reaction to the new sovereign constitution that had been established in November 1991. This new constitution declared Macedonia to be a citizen state, where rights and duties are vested in individual citizens and not ethnic groups. The aim of this constitutional design was to signal that the state belonged to all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic identity. But the constitution also referred to the historical struggle of the Macedonian people, “taking as a starting point the historical, cultural, spiritual and statehood heritage of the Macedonian people and their struggle over centuries for national and social freedom as well as the creation of their own state”. The constitution also continued to connect the state to the titular nationality, as indicated by the quote below.

Macedonia is established as the national state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanies and other nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia.

The Albanian community was not satisfied with this change. They argued that the constitution should either refrain from mentioning ethnicity all together and instead focus on citizenship, or stipulate that the Albanian community is a nation with equal rights to other nations. They were further aggravated by the connection made within the constitution to additional Macedonian ethnic traits. For instance that the official state language was declared to be the Macedonian language, written in the Cyrillic alphabet; and that many of the state symbols were drawn from the Macedonian ethnicity. The Albanian community primarily desired recognition as a founding nationality and wanted their language to be granted the same status.
as the Macedonian language. These demands were connected to additional demands of the right to education in Albanian, for example, within Albanian language university education. The Macedonian authorities remained reluctant to granting the Albanian language such status because they viewed the education system as an important basis for integration. Worries existed that the creation of a parallel education system would only increase division between the different ethnic communities. The Macedonian authorities also refuted the demands for recognition as a founding nation by stating that all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, were in fact constitutionally granted the same rights and duties. Another argument used was that the Albanian nation already had a nation state in Albania.24

Macedonia therefore manifested itself as a nation-state by declaring in the constitution that the ethnic Macedonians were to be regarded as the titular nationality. The identification of minorities and specifications of minority right indicates a dominating approach towards ethnic minorities. The rationalization behind this decision is linked to the historical experiences of the Macedonian people and in the prevailing political climate at the time. The ethnic Macedonians had previously been denied their own state and therefore perceived it as important to visualise their national identity through the state. The Macedonian ethnic identity was under threat during the formation of the sovereign Macedonian state; foremost from Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece, which refused to recognise their ethnic distinctness. These national desires for recognition clashed however with similar desires from the Albanian community. They had been denied official recognition with the Yugoslavian Federation and had therefore developed desires for national recognition and increased possibilities for self-determination. Macedonia consequently developed a stateness problem, most clearly represented through the boycott by the Albanian community of the national referendum on independence and the subsequent Albanian referendum concerning political and territorial autonomy. The two ethnic communities were not united behind a shared “idea of the state”, and therefore have weak vertical and horizontal connections to each other and to the state.25

Perhaps the most serious consequence of the high level of mistrust that has developed has been the almost complete separation of both ethnic groups. Most of the ethnic Albanians enclose themselves with their ethnic group, taking into consideration only the interest of their own group. The same has happened to the ethnic Macedonians: Most have retreated into their ethnic group to unite in defending themselves against the Albanians. As a result, communication between the two ethnic groups has broken down in many areas of everyday life.26

The democratic difficulties that follow from having a stateness problem have continued to plague Macedonia. There continued to be signs of ethnic tension within Macedonia during the whole of the 1990s. The tension at times resulted in violence, for instance in the clashes in Gostivar and Tetovo in the summer of 1997, during which three people were killed and 320-400 people were arrested. The violence was sparked by a feud over the right to hoist the
The Albanian community continued to object to being discriminated against by the ethnic Macedonian majority. The ethnic Macedonians, meanwhile, mistrusted the Albanian community, and feared that they aspired to split the country and wanted to see the establishment of a Greater Albania or Greater Kosovo through joining parts of Macedonia with Kosovo and/or Albania. Macedonia has also continued to be influenced by situations and events in neighbouring countries. The presence of armed ethnic conflict in the Balkan region serves as a destabilising factor for Macedonia. Concerns of possible spill over effect from these conflicts for instance motivated the deployment of a UN preventive peacekeeping force to Macedonia in the spring of 1993. Most noticeable is that Macedonia has been affected by the unstable political situation in neighbouring Kosovo. The Kosovo crises in 1998-1999 resulted in large refugee movements, mainly of Albanian ethnicity, who crossed the border into Macedonia. Some figures claim that approximately 360,000 refugees entered Macedonia during this time. This influx of Albanian refugees affected the sensitive ethnic balance in Macedonia, causing political tension and compelling the citizens of Macedonia to contemplate the essential questions of their own identity. The Albanian community in Macedonia have close historical ties with the Albanian community in Kosovo and the conflict in 1998-1999 served to strengthen those ties. Macedonian Albanians even took up arms to fight together with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The Kosovo conflict ended quickly and most, if not all, of the refugees returned to Kosovo. The connection between the two communities had nevertheless been revitalised. The international community then failed to provide the people of Kosovo with the prospect of a future and thereby stem the continued presence of Albanian extremest in the region. The KLA, who had fought guerrilla warfare against Serbian forces during the conflict, were not disarmed and incorporated back into the society. The uncertain status of the province left the society in limbo; the economic situation was in shambles, and in this environment criminal activities, corruption and extremist ideologies blossomed. This situation serves as one of several components that explain the armed conflict that followed in Macedonia in 2001.

There were repeated skirmishes along the Kosovo – Macedonia border between different Kosovo militants and Macedonian border guards following the end of the Kosovo conflict. None of these skirmishes evolved into a serious incident, but there was tension along the border. The fact that large numbers of weapons, originating from the different conflict areas in former Yugoslavia and the extensive ransacking of Albania armories in 1997, were present in the region provided ample hardware. This tense situation was intensified when a self-propelled rocket was launched into a police station in an ethnically mixed village in northern Macedonia in January 2001, killing one policeman and wounding three. A shadowy organisation named the National Liberation Army (NLA) claimed responsibility for the attack, and in different communications declared themselves to be fighting against the discrimination of the Albanian community and for the liberation of the Albanian people. This was the first time this organisation came to public knowledge. This incident was also the start of a spiral of events that led Macedonia rapidly into a situation that can be described as
civil war. The Macedonian authorities however did not perceive the conflict to be a civil war, but rather as acts of terrorism by “Albanian militant extremists”.

Was this brutal act carried out with the purpose of increasing the participation of Macedonian Albanians in the state institutions? Was this brutal act carried out because somebody was not satisfied with the preamble of the constitution? It never was and will not be related to the rights of the Macedonian Albanians or anyone else in Macedonia or to any political talks. This should be clear to everyone, including the international community. These terrorists are not fighting for the rights or institutions of anyone. They are fighting for their own criminal aims and they are fighting for territory.33

The conflict lasted until August 2001 and resulted in total casualties estimated up to 1000 people and about 140,000 people left their homes through either voluntary flight or forced displacement. The Macedonian security forces lost control of approximately 20 percent of the country during the duration of the conflict.34 The conflict was officially ended by Macedonian and Albanian leaders signing a peace agreement at the village Ohrid, with strong international support by different representatives of the international community, who had reacted relatively quickly to stop the conflict. It is difficult to clearly outline the reasons behind the conflict because it interlinks a number of factors in a complex web. Some of these factors however deserve to be mentioned. One factor behind the conflict was the latent frustration caused by the discrimination of the Albanian community within Macedonia. A majority of the Albanian community in Macedonia therefore sympathised with the objectives of the NLA, even if opposition was raised about the choice of methods. Another factor was the existence of armed, radical Albanian extremists in the region, which had come to believe that armed violence functions as the path towards political change and international engagement. Ex-KLA soldiers from Kosovo comprised the core of these extremists. Some additional factors were the existence of organised and armed criminal elements that stood to benefit from destabilising the situation, as well as groups aspiring for the establishment of a greater Albania or greater Kosovo.35

The conflict and its outcome did not bring the different ethnic communities any closer, but instead, polarised Macedonia further. The principal content of the Ohrid peace agreement was a new institutional setting for Macedonia, including the development of decentralised government, the removal of any reference to a nation-state in the constitution; equal representation measures, special parliamentarian procedures, and a number of reforms establishing increased cultural recognition and declaration of the multi-ethnic character of Macedonia, for instance in the acceptance of minority languages as official languages in certain contexts, and the usage of community symbols and education opportunities conducted in native languages.36 These amendments and reforms were generally well received by the Albanian community. The ethnic Macedonian population on the other hand, was by and large disappointed by the outcome. They regarded the peace agreement to be rewarding acts of
terrorism and a significant loss to their national identity. They also regarded the peace agreement to have been forced upon them by the international community.\textsuperscript{37} Implementation of the peace agreement and other important reforms consequently progressed slowly. By 2004 the government had implemented all but one of the major reforms that was required in the Ohrid peace agreement. This reform, the decentralisation of political power and the redrawing of municipality boundaries to increase representation of the Albanian community, sparked the most controversy. This development would change the ethnic balance in some municipalities by transforming ethnic Macedonians into regional minorities. These reforms were therefore strongly resisted by segments of the ethnic Macedonian community, not only because of the transformation of their own regional status, but also because it was viewed as a possible first step towards a division of the country. The issue was even forced to a national referendum, which later was deemed invalid because of low voter turnout.\textsuperscript{38} The inter ethnic atmosphere has improved slightly over the years following the conflict of 2001, but the different ethnic communities remain mainly isolated and view each other with suspicion. The political development in Kosovo also remains a possible source of increased ethnic tension.\textsuperscript{39}

Ethnic tension and discrimination have also been felt by the other ethnic minorities in Macedonia. These communities for instance have expressed frustration that neither the Macedonian or Albanian ethnic communities respect their individual or collective rights. Complaints have also been raised about the lack of interest and attention from the international community to their situation.\textsuperscript{40} The Romani population deserve a special mention because of their precarious situation in the region as a whole. They appear to be in a permanent state of poverty and are perceived by titular ethnicities as outsiders. The Romani community in Macedonia has voiced complaints of being abused by both the ethnic Macedonian and Albanian communities. The complaints concern structural discrimination by state authorities, through which segments of the Romani community have been left stateless, and incidents of policy abuse. The Albanian community has been accused of pressuring the Romani community to support Albanian political leaders and even to assimilate into the Albanian community in order to strengthen the political position of the Albanian community.\textsuperscript{41}

Drawing a conclusion from this discussion, and related to the theories discussed in chapter three, there are ample explanations as to why democratic consolidation has proved to be problematic in Macedonia. Positioning Macedonia within the previously outlined model, figure 3.3, it can be found that Macedonia has an ethnic minority, the ethnic Albanians, within its borders that is both nationally awake and at times militant. However, the titular nationality, the ethnic Macedonians, have also advocated different set of policies that have intensified the situation. The attempts to classify Macedonia as a nation-state, most clearly indicated through the constitutional declaration that Macedonia is the nation-state of the Macedonian people, contributed to a polarisation of the society. It is recognised that the Macedonian state also has shown willingness to recognize cultural diversity and has even implemented a number of institutional arrangements that protect the rights of ethnic minorities, but as the model indicates, there still exist reasons for concern. A possible continuation by the Albanian
community to aspire for complete self-determination is likely to stand in the way of the development of a shared idea of the state and subsequently, of the development of horizontal bonds of unity stretched across ethnic borders, without which genuine democratic consolidation is impossible. Additionally, persistent demands for self-determination could lead to intensified ethnic tension. It is very unlikely that the Macedonian and Albanian ethnic communities would be able to separate peacefully as there is no clearly demarcated territorial base for the different ethnic groups. Macedonia is currently attempting to promote measures that will ensure that these different ethnic communities can continue to co-exist within the same state structure in the future. Attempts are being made to emphasise a citizen nationality, based on values and norms, and not ethnicity. These measures could possibly merge state-building and nation-building, while at the same time allowing the different ethnic communities ample room to express their distinctness within this framework. Such measures have functioned in other ethnically divided societies and could therefore prove useful in Macedonia as well. Failure to remedy the problems connected with the state-building process in addition to the nation-building process becoming one of conflicting logics, can otherwise indefinitely hamper democratic consolidation and even pose a threat to the future existence of the state.42

The political transition

There are many different approaches that can be taken to shed light on the political transition that has developed in Macedonia since the country became independent. This analysis will approach the issue using the theories that were outlined and discussed in the previous chapter. With regards to the influence of institutional traditions, the discussion will be structured around the four arenas for democracy that were outlined in model 3.4; civil society, political society, constitutionalism and rule of law, and finally a professional and autonomous state bureaucracy. The discussion about the development in each of these arenas will use the institutional legacy left by previous regimes as the starting point. The ambition is to investigate to what extent the institutional legacy left in each of these arenas can serve as a source of an improved understanding of the democratic progression within each of these arenas, and subsequently, for the country as a whole. Concerning the role of institutional design, the following analysis will investigate the transformation that has taken place in Macedonia, through which the government structure has started to transform from being highly centralised to decentralised. The motives for and consequences of this development will be discussed.

Civil society

The institutional traditions left by the previous communist and sultanistic regimes had to a great extent, eroded any notion of a civil society in Macedonia. The political culture in place during the time of the Ottoman Empire was that the state apparatus and political power served
as the political leader’s tools for personal use. Any opposition to political commands was subsequently seen as opposition to the political leader in person, which hampered any development of a civil society to speak on behalf of special interest groups. The Ottoman Empire additionally acted in such a way as to hinder any development of a landowning class, independent of the centralised state. Consequently, the Balkans was socially relatively underdeveloped, and a dominant and centralist state apparatus ruled over a society constructed on small farm peasantry, a weak bourgeoisie, and a nonexistent aristocracy. The authoritarian and communist regimes that followed the Ottoman Empire did little to change the situation. The communist regimes suppressed any development of an independent civil society outside of state control. People were only allowed to organise themselves within party approved organisations, which effectively hampered any development of pluralism or public incitement for activism. Consequently, people in the Balkans lack historical experience of the positive effects of public engagement. Engagement in such activities could instead result in some degree of punishment from state authorities. The political culture that subsequently became adopted by many people was some level of political isolation where the general public actively refrained from political activism. Political discussion was not only regarded as unnecessary, but also dangerous. The people in the Balkans have also acquired a deeply ingrained distrust of political institutions. Over the centuries, political institutions have only been used to suppress and dominate the general public, and have therefore never been perceived as primarily sources of service to the citizenry. This culture has further hampered the development of a political culture in which citizens regard it as natural to turn to state authorities with their concerns. Political authorities rarely asked for the opinions of the public and the public rarely took it upon themselves to convey their opinions. The people that actually engaged themselves in politics often did so out of career motives rather than actual conviction.

Macedonia consequently entered the democratisation process with a relatively undeveloped civil society. Some increase in the numbers of civic groups was noticed during the 1980s, when Yugoslavia entered a period of liberalisation, but the real increase came after Macedonia had declared independence and officially launched a democratic transition. Macedonia has since seen a rapid increase in both the number and scope of NGOs. Estimations of the number of NGOs in Macedonia place the figure around 2500-6000, which are impressive numbers considering Macedonia only has a total population of approximately two million. These organisations are by the people, but rarely for the people. NGOs instead are generally viewed as potential employers in Macedonia, especially following the arrival of the international donor community. This development can in part be explained on the grounds of historical experience. The established political culture has been shaped by previous political experiences, and these experiences have undermined the support of altruistic community engagement. Instead, the historical experience in Macedonia is that political engagements serve as a vehicle for personal gain, and collectively held social behaviour patterns are often difficult to change rapidly. They become deeply embedded in accepted social behaviour and are transferred to new generations through a process of political
socialisation, causing “institutional stiffness” or “path dependence”.45 People learn these behaviour patterns and it is difficult to replace them with new democratic behaviour patterns during a democratic transition. So even if the extent of the civil society in numbers seems promising, the actual content of many of these organisations leaves much to be desired.46

Philanthropy and volunteerism, both prerequisites for a vital nongovernmental sector, are alien to Macedonia. Notions of self-help are highly localized, rarely crossing traditional boundaries of personal responsibility. These factors constrain civil society, including nongovernmental, voluntary, and charitable organizations.47

Returning to the increase of NGOs, following the declaration of independence, it is possible to see that the number of NGOs in Macedonia increased exponentially as a reaction to the influx of funding provided through international donors. Therefore, some of these NGOs are nothing more than briefcase NGOs, elaborate paper constructions by a small number of people whose sole purpose is to secure funding and employment.48

The concentration of donors, boasting multiple agendas and unprecedented levels of funding, reached such a high level during the period from 2000 to 2002 that behaviour among local NGOs was seemingly shaped more by the pursuit of abundant funds than by their own missions. Not surprisingly, the number of new NGOs exploded at this time, challenging donor capacity to distinguish serious NGOs from schemers claiming to be engaged in democracy work.49

Most Macedonian NGOs are as a result dependent on funding from international donors for their very existence. Without these contributions, most NGOs would be forced to close. The grave economic situation in Macedonia, with extreme levels of unemployment, has probably contributed to this development. It has, however, been noticed that private interest often precedes any notion of public good in Macedonia. People seem more likely to ask, “what can I get”, than “what can I do”, and this culture serves to inhibit the development of a vibrant civil society.50 Many of the existing NGOs also have serious shortcoming with regards to organisational capacities. They are often plagued by an absence of professionalism and have few experienced practitioners. NGOs have therefore partly been unable to become a noteworthy actor on either the national or local arena.51 Political leaders have also inhibited the development of a vibrant civil society by responding to the expansion of NGOs with scepticism and criticism of their legitimacy.

Elected political leaders in Macedonia criticized NGOs publicly, especially when they perceived that the NGOs were gaining credibility or influence with citizens. Their criticism typically took the form of posing one simple question to the public: “Who elected them (i.e., NGOs)”? This pattern was extremely
frustrating on a number of levels: it reflected the confounding need for political leaders to control events, and it eroded the confidence of emerging NGO leaders. Additionally, such criticism served to further foster a climate of adversarialism, turning the space of civil society into an extension of politics as usual.\textsuperscript{52}

This resistance by political leaders to the possible influence of NGOs is to a large extent a leadership culture in Macedonia. Positions of authority are protected with vigour. This is a culture that has its foundations in Macedonia’s institutional traditions. Political leaders are not accustomed to being questioned or to be held accountable by the public. Neither are they familiar with seeking the advice of the public before taking action, which has resulted in a gap between the general public and its political representatives. So, although political leaders respect the rights of NGOs, they are rarely receptive to their input during the policy process.\textsuperscript{53}

The democratic progress in Macedonia, in the field of civil society, can consequently be regarded as hampered by the country’s institutional traditions. Macedonia has implemented the required legal protections for an autonomous civil society and seen a rapid increase in the numbers of active civic groups, but the quality of many of the civic groups that have sprung up can, however, be questioned. Macedonia has in fact fallen short of developing a vibrant civil society that is able to sustain itself without the support of international donors. The most serious obstacle for democratic development in this arena seems to be the prevailing political culture with regard to political engagement.\textsuperscript{54}

\textit{Political society}

Macedonia’s institutional tradition with regards to its political society is one of domination. During the period of the Ottoman Empire, political leaders exercised unrestrained political rulership. There was no autonomy for a political society outside the political leader’s sphere of control. Moreover, there was limited political pluralism or institutional channels for the public to gain access to the political decision making process. The communist political system operated in a similar manner. The communist ideology was adopted as the guiding ideology for the entire society and the communist party became fused with the state apparatus. Macedonia, as part of the Yugoslavian Federation, operated as a one-party-state with limited acceptance for a political society outside of the control of the communist party. It can consequently be argued that Macedonia entered the democratisation process with a defectively developed political society.

The democratic progress in this arena has in part, been rapid, at least in the sense of the implementation of formal democratic institutions. In connection to declaring independence from Yugoslavia in November 1991, Macedonia introduced most of the formal requirements for being classified as an electoral democracy. A democratic constitution was adopted that stipulates that Macedonia should function as a multiparty, electoral parliamentarian democracy, which is divided into three branches, the legislature, the executive, and the
judiciary. The parliament is the sole legislative branch of the Macedonian political system. The Macedonian parliament, Sobranie, is a unicameral body consisting of 120 members. Members of parliament are elected for four-year terms through direct and universal suffrage. The electoral system in Macedonia has changed twice since Macedonia became independent. All seats in parliament were distributed in a two-round majoritarian system during the period 1991-1998, and a mixed system was utilised between 1998-2002. Since 2002, all members of parliament are elected through proportional representation. The election takes place in six electoral districts, where each district elects 20 members by proportional representation, utilising the D'Hondt formula. The distribution of seats is subject to a five percent threshold. Predominantly free, fair, and regular elections have been conducted ever since Macedonia became independent and political power has been transferred peacefully in accordance with the election result in each election.

Macedonia’s executive branch functions as a semi presidential system. The main executive power is vested in the government. Head of the government is the prime minister, who is ceremonially nominated by the president but approved by the parliament. It is the prime minister, together with representatives of the main political parties in parliament, who designates the remainder of the cabinet. All Macedonian governments to date have been formed by a coalition of parties, together holding the majority vote in parliament. Typically the main Macedonian political party and a main Albanian political party have composed the core of these coalitions. There is no constitutional requirement to incorporate both ethnic communities into the government. The ethnic Macedonian community could therefore in fact dominate the Albanian community politically. An informal rule has, however, been established, declaring that the government should always be composed of a multiethnic coalition. This informal rule was introduced simultaneously with the establishment of the first Macedonian government, as an attempt to commit the Albanian community to the idea of the state. The president functions as the head of state and is elected through direct ballot to serve five-year terms, with the right to one re-election. The authority of the president is largely ceremonial and symbolic, but the president represents the country abroad and functions as the commander in chief of the armed forces. The president can also veto any legislation passed in parliament with a simple majority. The parliament can however override a presidential veto by a two-thirds majority vote within 30 days, thereby forcing the president to sign the decree into law. The third branch, the judiciary, will be further discussed in the following subchapter but in short it is structured around three levels of courts and one Constitutional Court.

Macedonia can consequently be regarded as having made significant democratic progress in this arena. A democratic culture has however yet to permeate society, and different features of the Macedonian political society do not operate in a democratically desirable manner. A multitude of different political parties operate in Macedonia, but these parties do not provide a number of the functions that can be desired by political parties in a consolidated democracy. Political parties rarely function as channels connecting political elites with a larger segment of the general public. Many political parties have a slim, or nonexistent, membership base and
are instead developed as career-projects driven by a small group of political elites. Some of these parties can therefore be referred to as “followings” instead of parties. The ethnic tension between the ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian communities have also been carried over into the political arena and become an obstacle for communication and compromise. Political positioning is often completely indistinguishable from ethnic positioning, creating a situation where the political debate can serve as both a manifestation of and an engine for, the ethnic conflict.

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Table 4.3 Do you think politicians are contributing to ethnic tension?

Politics has to some extent come to be viewed as a zero-sum game, where the different ethnic communities vigorously protect their respective spheres of interest. There are also examples of intra-ethnic tension, as was seen in September 2007, when a debate in Parliament concerning amendments to the Electoral Code escalated into physical violence between different members of ethnic Albanian parties. All political parties in Macedonia are connected to different ethnic communities and the electorate have continuously shown a reluctance to cross the ethnic divide. The two largest political parties are consequently ethnic Macedonian; the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation - Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE). The SDSM was established through a reformation of the communist party and the political platform of the party combines democratic socialism and market economy. The party has served in government between 1992-1998 and 2002-2006. The VMRO-DPMNE, on the other hand, can be described as a centre-right party with a strong nationalistic strand, taking for instance a very confrontational approach towards the Albanian community during the conflict in 2001. The party served in government between 1998-2002 and is currently serving as the main governing party for the period 2006-2010. Additionally, there are a number of Albanian political parties that compete for the Albanian votes. Four parties can be regarded as the most influential; the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA), the National Democratic Party (NDP), the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI). DUI was established following the conflict in 2001 and is by many regarded to be the political successor of the National Liberation Army (NLA). Other ethnic minorities also have their respective political party, such as the United Party of Roma in
Macedonia, Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia, Democratic Party of Turks in Macedonia and Democratic League of Bosniaks.

Lingering institutional traditions, in the form of clientelism, are also visible with regards to how public officials utilise their position in public office. Political leaders and other officials of authority demonstrate similar social traditions to large segments of the public by placing personal gain before public good. The marriage of this social tradition with a lingering authoritarian leadership style serves as a partial explanation to the development of widespread corruption in Macedonia.

<p>| Macedonia, Corruption Perception Index (perfect score 10.0) |
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</table>

Table 4.4  Macedonia, Corruption Perception Index  

Transparency International conducts evaluations and produces country rankings of corruption around the world. Countries with low levels of corruption score around the perfect mark, which is ten; meanwhile, countries with high levels of corruption receive scores closer to the bottom mark, which is zero. Macedonia belongs among the countries with the worst scores. Globally, Macedonia is placed 105th by the Transparency International index for 2006, better only than Albania, in 111th position, among the European post-communist countries.

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<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>111</td>
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Table 4.5  Corruption Perceptions Index 2006  
Source:  Transparency International Annual Report 2006

Corruption has become internalised and normalised and reaches all levels of the society. Some observers even claim that Macedonia is plagued by state sponsored racketeering. State officials, regardless of ethnicity, participate in these actions. Reforms have been adopted in
attempts to remedy the problem, but these reforms have been half-heartedly implemented and not resulted in any significant improvement. Corruption has permeated the society and central authorities have only weak incentives to combat the problem. The resignation of the then serving prime minister, Hari Kostov, in November of 2004 on the grounds of cooperation difficulties within the government caused by corruption, nepotism and ethnic positioning can serve as an indication of the severity of the problem.66

These practices, and other shortcomings of the political institutions, have affected the level of confidence bestowed upon them by the general public. Most people in Macedonia have a low level of confidence in public officials and different forms of political institutions; which for instance is shown in two World Value Surveys conducted in 1998 and 2001. As many as 69.8 percentage of the respondents declared that they were fairly or very dissatisfied with the people in national office in 1998 and the same figure for 2001 was 78.9 percent.67 Similar tendencies of distrust were found with regards to the main political institutions.

<table>
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Table 4.6 Level of confidence in political institutions: Percentage of population with not very much confidence, or none at all.

The level of confidence bestowed upon political institutions has remained relatively stable in following surveys, as exemplified for instance by the South East Europe Public Agenda Survey conducted in 2002 and the Early Warnings Reports produced on behalf of the UNDP during the period 2003 – 2007.68

Public political confidence levels are not perfect measurements of political performance, because even successful western political institutions have recorded low confidence levels.
There can also be factors other than performance involved in these measurements. The general public in Macedonia seems nonetheless, clearly dissatisfied with their political representatives, which is detrimental if they are going to function as democratic representatives of the people. There are numerous different explanations to these figures, but the public perception that politicians and political institutions are corrupt should be taken into account. In fact, when asked, the general public quite openly discloses the opinion that they don’t feel that the country is governed based upon the will of the people.

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Table 4.8 Would you say that Macedonia is governed by the will of the people?
Source: UNDP, Early Warning Reports; Mehmeti et al (2005). N: 1057

In conclusion, Macedonia can therefore be regarded to have made significant democratic progress with regards to the implementation of the formal institutional requirements for democracy, but only sluggish democratic progress with regards to adopting a democratic culture. Lingering old social behaviour patterns can serve as a partial explanation to this development, and it would in part account for the high corruption levels and why there continues to exist a wide gap separating the political elites and the general public. Neither side is familiar with sustained interaction and a barrier of distrust and indifference instead separates the two. Attempts to close this gap are likely to generate increased legitimacy for the political system. One of the main driving forces in Macedonia for continued democratic transition is the possibility of future EU-membership. Macedonia signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in 2001 and was granted the status of candidate country in December 2005. The admission demands placed upon Macedonia by the EU function as important mechanism for reform and the prospect of future membership serves as a uniting force, bridging the ethnic cleavage. EU-membership is to a large extent regarded as a beacon of hope, representing the prospect for an improved future.

Constitutionalism and rule of law

Macedonia’s institutional traditions have limited references to rule of law. Political leaders were free to rule unchecked in accordance with personal discretion during the Ottoman Empire. Rule of law was therefore none existent. The private and the public were fused and governance served as a tool in the hands of the ruler. These practices were also replicated on all levels of government, ranging from the regional pashas down to local ayans, who all
exercised power within their respective jurisdiction according to personal preference. The communist period to some degree continued this practice by placing policy and plan above any notion of rule of law. The state and the communist party became inseparable entities and law was dictated by the communist leadership and never functioned to restrain them. Macedonia subsequently entered the democratisation process with a low degree of constitutionalism and rule of law.

The democratic progress in this area has been slow moving, by some accounts even nonexistent. The judicial system has remained largely unreformed and dysfunctional. The Macedonian Constitution defines and protects individual rights, equality before the law, and the independency of the judicial system. Prevailing practices however fall systematically short of these commandments. Before discussing the factors behind this sluggish development and the extent of the problem further it is useful to have a general insight into the structure of the Macedonian judicial system. The basis of Macedonia’s judiciary is the Macedonian Constitution, adopted in 1991, and the Law on Courts, adopted in 1995. According to these documents, judicial power is vested and exercised in 27 Basic Courts, three Courts of Appeal, one Supreme Court, and one Constitutional Court.

Figure 4.9 Macedonia’s judicial court structure

According to the Macedonian Constitution these courts are to operate autonomously and independently. Judges are nominated by the Judicial Council, appointed by the Parliament, and serve lifetime terms in office. They can be dismissed by the Parliament under certain conditions, and again on the proposal of the Judicial Council. The Constitutional Court consists of nine judges, all appointed by the Parliament to serve nine-year terms. The Constitutional Court is responsible for supervising acts of Parliament and the Government and holds the authority to annul legislature that are found to violate the constitution. The judiciary branch also include, as previously mentioned, a Judicial Council consisting of seven members of the legal profession who provide oversight of the court system and the judges. These seven people are appointed by the Parliament. Civil and penal cases are heard within the main judicial structure and only a limited number of cases come before the Supreme Court, which however, functions as the entry-level court for administrative disputes.

Macedonia’s judiciary is fraught with problems, and lingering institutional traditions explain this sluggish democratic progress. Political leaders have traditionally intervened in the procedures of the judiciary and these practices still prevail in Macedonia. Politicians intervene
in the appointment of judges on all levels of the judiciary and accusations of nepotism and political favouritism are common. Since the Parliament controls all judicial appointments, judicial selection has systematically reflected party politics. The judicial system in Macedonia can therefore be regarded as highly politicised. Politicians and other powerful interests systematically influence judiciary procedures and pressure them into ruling in accordance with their orders. The lack of judicial independence is frequently mentioned as a significant problem for continued democratic transition.73

The weakness and inconsistencies of the existing system of the selection and dismissal of judges and prosecutors place severe constraints on the development of an independent judiciary and a merit-based career system. One key issue is the politicisation of the Republic Judicial Council and the politicisation of the judiciary system. This issue must be promptly addressed, including, if necessary, by amending the constitutional framework.74

The judicial system simply does not function as the guardian of the rule of law and the constitution. Judicial officials are instead permeated by the same political culture of setting personal gain before public good. Subsequently, the general public have a very low level of confidence in the judicial system, which is perceived to be controlled by powerful interests and functioning as the extension of the police. Individual rights and due process is constitutionally protected, but individual rights continue to be violated, foremost by the police.75 The most notable incident is the so-called Rastanski Lozja case from 2002, in which six Pakistanis and one Indian illegal immigrant were arrested by Macedonian security officials and later executed. Three police officers and one businessman were charged with the murder of the seven and for planting evidence indicating that they were terrorists. Despite strong evidence of guilt, the four accused were acquitted in May 2005.76 The ethnic Albanian community in particular distrusts the police and judicial system as a whole. Both the police and the judicial system have predominantly been composed of ethnic Macedonians and the ethnic Albanian community has often complained about ethnic discrimination. The legitimacy of the Macedonian police was so undermined following the conflict in 2001 that it was impossible for them to retain a presence or patrol in all areas of the country. Increased representation of ethnic Albanians in the Macedonian police and improved police practices have since improved the acceptance of the police among ethnic minority groups.77 Another shared source of the low confidence in the judicial system is its inability to prosecute corrupt public officials. There are numerous examples of high-level officials that have been accused of corruption, with significant evidence backing the accusations, without most of them being sent to trial. The inability of the judicial system has consequently contributed to making corruption a high reward, low risk activity in Macedonia.78 The corruption accusations also include the judicial system. The popular perception in Macedonia is that court officials can be bought and that prices vary with regards to the severity of the charge.79
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Table 4.10 Do you believe that corruption, misuse of public funds or abuse of position exists in: Judicial Sector?
Source: UNDP, Early Warning Reports; Mehmeti et al (2005). N: 1057

Moreover, the judicial system in Macedonia is also notoriously inefficient. There is a huge backlog of cases. The number of pending cases in 2006 was 937,756, and this is a country with a population of just over two million.\(^{80}\) This portrayed inefficiency has four main explanations. Firstly, the structure of the judicial system overburdens the court system with misdemeanour cases and cases that have previously been adjudicated but which require law enforcement. Secondly, the administrative side of the judiciary is poorly developed and managed. Thirdly, the funding provided to the judicial system is inadequate, and fourthly, many judicial officials are insufficiently trained for their profession. Both foreign evaluators and Macedonian authorities agree on this analysis of the problems of the judicial system. Macedonia has officially responded to the problem by introducing a reform strategy that incorporates a substantial law reform, a procedural law reform, and a structural law reform.\(^{81}\) These reforms aim to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, to improve both administrative and procedural practices, strengthen the training of judicial officials, and the establishment of new specialised courts and a reshuffling of judicial responsibilities. The pace of the implementation of these reforms has nonetheless been slow. One reason for this can be found in the lack of political will to implement the required reforms. The executive can simply be regarded as reluctant to relinquish control over the judicial system. Another important core of the problem is generational, in that institutional traditions still shape the social behaviour patterns of large segments of the existing judicial body and it is difficult to persuade them to adopt new ways.\(^{82}\) Significant reform is therefore still needed in order for Macedonia to make any real democratic progress in this arena. In the words of the Commission of the European Communities, “judicial reform remains a major challenge, and a sustained track record of implementation has yet to be established.”\(^{83}\) What can possibly drive the process further, and create the incitements for a broad political commitment behind an actual comprehensive judicial reform, is the fact that judicial reform is necessary in order to gain EU membership, which is an objective with a broad political support base in Macedonia.

In conclusion, Macedonia entered the democratisation process with no previous experience of the rule of law and has only made sluggish democratic progress in this field. The durable presence of institutional traditions serves to explain many of the problems that have been encountered during the process of reforming the judicial system. Historically, politicians have always interfered with the procedures of the judicial system and this behaviour pattern seems
to linger. Further, the judicial system has never operated independently and has of yet failed to adopt its new role of guardian of the rule of law. Judicial officials instead systematically utilise their positions for personal gains, which seriously undermines the credibility of the judicial system in the perception of the public.

Professional and autonomous state bureaucracy

Historically, Macedonia has never experienced an independent and professional civil service in any western or Weberian sense of the word. The Ottoman Empire, in general, functioned as a centralised government where political power rested in the hands of the Sultan and state administration was conducted on behalf of the Sultan downwards in a hierarchical system. Government employees were regarded as personal servants of the Sultan and advancement in the Ottoman bureaucracy was mainly based on patronage and to a much lesser extent on merit.84 The communist period extended these institutional traditions. Public administrations within the communist system were politicised and an intertwining relationship existed between political, administrative, and economic positions. Political reliability and loyalty to the communist party were demanded of all state employees. Career paths were not exclusive to one of these sectors. Administrative civil servants did not rise through the ranks of the bureaucracy alone, but involved a simultaneous rise in rank in all of these sectors. Advancement within the system was consequently heavily dependent on showing loyalty to the communist party, and more specifically to the nomenclature, who in effect controlled state appointments. Subsequently, this system continued the practices of patronage as a means for advancement instead of applying meritocracy. Political institutions in communist societies were also developed in horizontal isolation from each other. Institutional communication channels, and career paths, very structured vertically. This resulted in a highly fragmented state apparatus.85

In short, the communist executive inheritance included a lack of governmental functions; an institutional setting ill-equipped for cross-sectional co-ordination; a fragmented and party-politicized personnel system; and, perhaps most importantly, an executive that was not used to having to build broad political and societal acceptance around the political objectives pursued.86

Most countries in communist Europe developed into heavily centralised states but Yugoslavia was an exception in this regard. Yugoslavia first functioned as a centralised communist totalitarian state from 1945 to 1953, but then departed from previous traditions of centralisation by adopting a federal structure, where political power was diffused to different territorial organisations. This system, communal federalism, reflected the desire to see a “withering away of the state” in an attempt to develop a more genuine socialist society.87 It also reflected the need to recognise the existence of different nationalities within the Yugoslav Federation, and served as an attempt to hamper possible separatist movements.
This structure resulted in less centralised political control but also in a weak and largely inefficient state administration. Yugoslavia had a less politicised civil service than many other communist systems, but the Yugoslavian Federation still operated as a system with strong connections between the political, administrative, and economic spheres.88

Macedonia did not only launch a democratisation process after declaring independence from Yugoslavia, they also launched an intense state-building process. Macedonia in effect went through an extensive process of centralisation as part of the state-building process, by which the previously existing structure of local governments was largely dismantled. From having 6003 administrative officials responsible to local governments in 1990 only 270 remained in 1992.89 The efficiency of local government was further eroded when a new law on local self-government was implemented in 1996, dividing the previous 34 municipalities into 123 municipalities plus Skopje.90 This reform effectively destroyed many of the public institutions and infrastructures of these municipalities.91 Simultaneously, the central state administration grew rapidly in size, which by the end of the 1990s had become a serious financial problem for Macedonia’s limited state budget. Macedonia’s post-communist public administration can accordingly be characterised as an oversized and very hierarchical and centralised public administration, with little delegation within ministries. Administrative capacities have remained largely undeveloped and few ministries routinely prepare and implement strategic plans. Civil servants have a low level of responsiveness to public demands and hence a limited service mentality. Corruption is widespread throughout the public administration and in practice functions as a complementary source of income for state officials, who are generally poorly paid.92

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Table 4.11 Do you believe that corruption, misuse of public funds or abuse of position exists in: Ministries? Source: UNDP, Early Warning Reports; Mehmeti et al (2005). N: 1057

Many public bodies continue to withhold information that can be of public interest, thereby prohibiting transparency and political accountability. The training of public servants is poorly developed and only utilised in an improvised manner.93 The state administration also remains highly fragmentised, in that ministries are vertically isolated. Communication between different ministries remains underdeveloped and the different ministries further complicate horizontal cooperation due to the scattered reformation processes in which different ministries adopts different administrative systems.
The system has also become intensely politicised. The centralisation of state administration has secured control by the political elite over the state apparatus and appointments to serve in the public sector are routinely made based on patronage and nepotism, and not on meritocracy. The incumbent regime thereby rewards political supporters, friends and relatives by securing them employment within the public sector. This behaviour reflects again entrenched institutional traditions of utilising political office to secure personal gain before public good. These practices have also resulted in serious administrative difficulties because changes in the political regimes is usually followed by a complete restructuring of the entire state apparatus, in which the existing core of civil servants are routinely dismissed in order to make room for new appointments. These large-scale dismissals disrupt the functions of the state and deprive it of valuable personnel.

The large-scale dismissals of officials following the change of government in 2006 illustrated the politicisation of appointments at all levels in the public administration and disrupted its functioning well into 2007. Time and expertise were lost in reorganisation and extensive changes of personnel in the public administration. This contributed to the build-up of a legislative backlog and deprived the government of valuable expertise which could have ensured better drafting of legislation and timelier implementation. Recruitment and promotion should be regulated by objective and merit-based criteria and a clear distinction between political and the administrative level should be observed.\(^9^4\)

The political elite has shown a general unwillingness to accept the notion of being restrained by the rule of law, and resists the idea that state administration should be designed to constrain arbitrary use of state power. The political elite does not trust professional administration and is therefore reluctant to release political control or to perceive it as having a legitimate role to play in the policy process.\(^9^5\) This can be understood as a residual institutional tradition from both the Ottoman Empire and the communist period. Political leaders in Macedonia have always guarded their positions of power and never developed a clear distinction between office and person. Power is utilised to secure personal benefits and these practices cut across all ethnic groups. Political reforms have been outlined, which should transform the public administration, but progress remains limited.

Overall, reforms are gradually being implemented in the area of public administration. However, there have been limited results, in particular due to a lack of a strong commitment to meet the announced objective of a more transparent, professional and depoliticised public administration and better organised public services. Public administration remains weak and inefficient. Implementation of the policy reform is underway but still at an early stage.\(^9^6\)
The slow development of Macedonia’s economy in connection with an oversized state administration has resulted in a need to downsize the state administration. Such a process is difficult in any setting, but it is even more difficult considering Macedonia’s situation, with firstly, a very high level of unemployment, and secondly, a need for reforms that increase the proportional representation of ethnic minorities in state administration. Ethnic Macedonians have been proportionally overrepresented in the public sector and the Ohrid peace agreement included reforms to amend this distortion. It is mainly the ethnic Albanian community that has been underrepresented in the public sector. These reforms therefore entail increased recruiting of Albanian staff. A rapid implementation of such reforms, simultaneous with the downsizing of the state administration, would result in the dismissal of ethnic Macedonian staff and recruiting of ethnic Albanian staff, a development that would most likely increase the ethnic tension between the two groups. Moreover, the Albanian community are in general less well educated than the ethnic Macedonian community, which would cause problems locating and acquiring qualified Albanian staff.97

To summarise, Macedonia entered the democratisation process with weak and inefficient state institutions. After declaring independency, Macedonian has developed into an oversized, highly centralised, and politicised bureaucracy that remains fragmented and inefficient. It is perceived as widely corrupted, with a low degree of service mentality, and therefore retain a low level of public confidence. Macedonia’s institutional traditions provide a useful theoretical approach to analyse this development, as many of the features of Macedonia’s institutional past remain strong to date. Macedonia has subsequently made limited democratic progress in this arena and is in dire need of further reform.98

**Institutional design: Centralisation vs. decentralisation**

This issue has already been briefly touched upon in connection to the discussion about a professional and autonomous state bureaucracy. As has been previously described, Macedonia implemented a rapid centralisation of state administrations following its declaration of independence in 1991. As a result, the number of public officials in local administrations rapidly declined while political responsibilities and resources were moved to central administration. The justification for this reform was that many local governments had not functioned properly in the old government structure and centralisation would remedy these concerns. Macedonia also felt pressured by unfavourable domestic and external circumstances to implement these reforms in order to secure institutional survival.99 The new law on local self-government that was implemented in 1996 eroded the working efficiency of local government, by dividing the previous 34 municipalities into 123. Central state administration was strengthened by this reform, but the efficiency of local governments seriously diminished. The reform effectively depleted the resource base of all local governments, that after losing personnel, funds, and responsibility, became weak and inefficient. There already existed a gap between the state and the public and this reform only intensified the feeling through the transfer of political responsibility further away from local communities. It also
served to hamper and complicate public access to the policy-process, as the arenas for decision-making became more distant. People were no longer able to turn to local governments as channels for resolving local community concerns. This fact especially frustrated the ethnic Albanian community. The central state bureaucracy has traditionally consisted of predominantly ethnic Macedonians and the centralisation process was therefore perceived as ethnic domination because it decreased local Albanian self-determination. The centralisation process also contributed to an increased politicisation of state administration, as has been previously described. The strong centralisation finally affected the efficiency of the bureaucracy. The central political institutions became overwhelmed with operative duties, such as the appointment of primary school principals and supplying teaching materials. The state bureaucracy therefore became inefficient and slow. Inappropriate decisions were often taken because of insufficient knowledge of the specific conditions of the local context.

This adopted centralised government structure was consequently fraught with democratic problems and there existed a growing awareness within Macedonia about these problems. Decentralisation was described as a reform priority as early as 1999, but it was mainly two factors that brought increased emphasis to the issue. The first of these was the demands for a decentralised government set out in the Ohrid peace agreement. The ethnic Albanian community wanted to transform the governance structure and strengthen local governments in order to secure increased self-determination. The ethnic Albanian community is the ethnic majority in many areas of the country and therefore regarded decentralisation as a means of increased political influence. The Ohrid peace agreement therefore includes a paragraph that outlined the development of a decentralised government.

A revised law on Local Self-Government will be adopted that reinforces the powers of elected local officials and enlarges substantially their competencies in conformity with the Constitution (as amended in accordance with Annex A) and the European Charter on Local Self-Government, and reflecting the principle of subsidiarity in effect in the European Union. Enhanced competencies will relate principally to the areas of public services, urban and rural planning, environmental protection, local economic development, culture, local finances, education, social welfare, and health care. A law on financing of local self-government will be adopted to ensure an adequate system of financing to enable local governments to fulfil all of their responsibilities.

The second factor that brought increased emphasis to the adoption of a more decentralised government was the demands placed upon Macedonia by different representatives of the international community, foremost the EU. Centralisation clashed with the idea of subsidiarity that serves as an important principle of the EU. Subsidiarity briefly means that political decisions should be handled at the lowest, closest level of the specific issue at hand. Local government should consequently handle the concerns of their respective communities if they
are capable of doing so. Macedonia was therefore encouraged to launch a decentralisation process in order to assimilate these governance practices.

Decentralisation has thus functioned as a strategic goal for the Macedonian government after 2001. The expressed motives behind the process are both instrumental and normative, ranging from hopes of creating a more effective state administration to beliefs that this process will revitalise the democratic system and increase public participation in the governance process. Decentralisation is also regarded as a requirement for possible future EU-membership and a necessary reform for establishing an ethnically balanced state. The decentralisation process has however not been unproblematic. Four issues can especially be mentioned.

First, the issue of territorial division. The municipality boundaries outlined by the law on local self-government from 1996 was deemed inappropriate because of the limited size of many municipalities. It was therefore decided that the number of municipalities would be reduced from 123 to 85. The new boundaries of these municipalities however were received with a public outcry from the ethnic Macedonian population, as has been previously described, because it in effect reshuffled the ethnic balance in many of these new municipalities, turning local ethnic Macedonians, who are members of the ethnic majority in the country, into local minorities. Violent protests erupted throughout Macedonia following the announcement of the new municipality boundaries in 2004. The issue was even forced to a national referendum before it could be finally resolved in 2005.

Secondly, was the issue of municipality finance. Three different sources for municipality finances are envisaged, own revenue sources, government grants, and loans. The problem for many municipalities is that there is only a very limited sector from which the municipality can draw own revenues, because of the economic situation, and most municipalities lack effective tax administration. Further, the transfer of grants from central authorities down to local governments has not functioned smoothly and loans are not a viable long-term solution. Many of these new municipalities have consequently been left with limited resources at their disposal and have therefore been unable to effectively shoulder the responsibility placed upon them. Many municipalities have in fact run up large public debts, partly because of their inability to secure finances.

Thirdly, the issue of administrative capacity within local government. Local government structures were almost completely eroded of human resources during the process of centralisation and it has been problematic to rectify these shortcomings. Personnel have been transferred from central level to local governments but there is still a gap between the actual capacities of local administrations and what is expected from them with regards to social services. Poor municipality management is a regular occurrence, which the general public often expresses dissatisfaction about. Decentralisation has not immediately served to create a more effective state administration. Shortcomings in regards to transparency, accountability, and capabilities are still serious concerns.

Finally, there is the issue of meaningfully engaging citizens in the local governance process. This is a two-dimensional problem. The institutional traditions of Macedonia have left the
country with a largely pacified citizenry, who are not accustomed to taking political initiatives. Further, Macedonian policymakers are not familiar with inviting local stakeholders into the policy process. This lingering political culture has resulted in the failure to communicate and has therefore not produced the envisaged increase in public participation.\textsuperscript{105}

In conclusion, Macedonia, as an independent country, has gone from having a highly centralised state structure to having an increasingly decentralised state structure. The decision to transform the structure had two main driving factors, the Ohrid peace agreement and pressure from the international community, but there also existed extensive domestic recognition of the shortcoming of the centralised state structure. The decentralisation process that was initiated in 2005 has been slow but stable. It is however, still too early to evaluate the benefits of this process. What seems clear is that decentralisation is not without its own set of concerns. Creating institutional capacities that can efficiently manage the responsibility bestowed upon local governments has proved to be a significant challenge. It is also uncertain if this decentralisation process will lead to a revitalisation of Macedonia’s democratic culture.

The economic transition

The absence of any significant improvement in economic conditions following the decision to introduce democracy and capitalism has undermined the democratisation process in Macedonia. The public in Macedonia expected to see a general improvement in living standards following the introduction of democracy and capitalism. These hopes have yet to be fulfilled. Instead, Macedonia has remained stuck in the “valley of tears”, struggling even to reach pre-transitional GDP levels.\textsuperscript{106} The few improvements that have been experienced have primarily benefited small segments of the population. In many cases, members of the former political elite, who through insider privatisation reforms, have strengthened their grip on both political and economic resources. Consequently, Macedonia has not seen a universal socio-economic development that could underpin the process of democratic consolidation. Instead, improving the economy and decreasing poverty and unemployment remain at the top of the list of priorities for the Macedonian population. Macedonia’s chances for democratic consolidation can as a result be regarded as being undermined by the economic situation. Concerns can even be raised about a possible future public backlash against the already weakened political institutions, if the situation does not improve.

Privatisation reforms as power diffusion

The Macedonian privatisation process has not succeeded as a means for effective power diffusion and revitalisation of the economic sector. It has instead, strengthened previously established power structures through the preference for insider-privatisation. The Law of Social Capital from 1990, enacted by the last federal government in Yugoslavia, created the foundation for the early period of Macedonian privatisation. The law provided for the corporatisation of enterprises and their privatisation through “internal shares”.\textsuperscript{107} Employees
and management teams were, under the law, granted the opportunity to purchase shares in their own companies at usually substantial discounts in relation to the actual market value, and under very beneficial conditions of payment. Some payment periods lasted up to ten years. This law came partly as a consequence of the institutional tradition of social ownership and worker’s self-management that had previously been in operation in Yugoslavia. Before the law was declared invalid on August 19, 1991, roughly 67 large and medium-sized enterprises in Macedonia had been fully privatised and hundreds more partially privatised. The Macedonian government had expressed a desire to declare the law invalid at an earlier stage, but strong corporate interest groups had been able to block any such decision. These corporate interests groups were the main beneficiaries of these early insider-oriented privatisation reforms. Macedonia was in fact, the last republic of the other former Yugoslavian federation to invalidate this law.

The Macedonian government enacted a new privatisation law, the Law on the Transformation of Social Capital, in June 1993. The actual privatisation process, however, did not get started until early 1995. The new privatisation law was based upon the idea of selling enterprises on a case-by-case basis and the privatisation programme was entrusted to the Agency for Transformation. During the period 1995-1998 approximately one thousand enterprises were privatised. Different insider groups purchased approximately 87 percent of these enterprises, mainly through management buy-outs or employee buy-outs. The public expressed serious dissatisfaction with the process, because it was regarded as a nomenclature privatisation. The Agency for Transformation was accused of cooperating with the old managerial elite in securing the control of the most profitable and potentially profitable enterprises. The fact that half of the board of the Agency for Transformation was composed of managers of large socially owned enterprises and the secretive selling of enterprises at substantial discounts was taken as evidence of a nomenclature privatisation. A large public demonstration was held in Skopje in protest of the ongoing privatisation process during 1995. There were also examples of employee buy-outs, but this usually occurred in weaker and smaller enterprises and often at inflated prices. So despite the appearance of radical reform the implemented privatisation programme only served to preserve positions of power and influence for the ruling elite. Management groups, even those of profitable enterprises, have utilised corporate resources to increase their own revenues short-term and relied on soft loans and government subsides to keep the company going. Assets and products for instance have been sold at submarket rates to business associates in order to generate profit. Furthermore, these insiders have used their political connections to oppose reforms that would deprive them of their relative advantages. Many of the remaining enterprises that were privatised through employee buy-out have also functioned poorly. The governance structure of these companies has become too widely dispersed and employees have been primarily concerned with securing their own employment short-term instead of implementing necessary long-term industrial reforms. They have also adopted a sceptical attitude towards more comprehensive economic reforms for similar reasons. For that reason, the Macedonian labour
market has been described as a heaven for those that have a job and a hell for those that are left without.\textsuperscript{115}

High and persistent unemployment statistics reflect low new creation in the formal sector. In part this is due to an overly restrictive labor market and high tax wedge. It is also due to the poor corporate governance which emerged following mainly insider-oriented privatisation process in the mid-nineties, which brought neither adequate knowledge and capital transfers, nor access to markets or finance. On the contrary, FYR Macedonia’s corporate structure still tends to favour status quo over encouraging new entry and increased competition.\textsuperscript{116}

The privatisation reform has also generated a slow but steady growth of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs).\textsuperscript{117} A continued and possible increased growth of SMEs can become an engine for both economic growth and continued democratic reform through the development of a stronger middle class that can place increased scrutiny and demands upon the political elites.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of SMEs (including micro-enterprises)</th>
<th>Number of micro enterprises</th>
<th>Number of large enterprises</th>
<th>Number of SMEs per 1000 inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>56,237</td>
<td>54,145</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>25,600</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>224,211</td>
<td>207,643</td>
<td>741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>63,135</td>
<td>41,988</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>27,938</td>
<td>25,985</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>612,862</td>
<td>311,260</td>
<td>1,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>66,968</td>
<td>64,002</td>
<td>742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selected CEB countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>876,990</td>
<td>830,601</td>
<td>1,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>858,981</td>
<td>827,806</td>
<td>1,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>3,368,367</td>
<td>3,206,452</td>
<td>6,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>365,783</td>
<td>354,373</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>26,915</td>
<td>22,285</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe-19 (2000)</td>
<td>20,415,000</td>
<td>19,040,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.12 Number of enterprises in South East Europe

Source: EBRD (2004). Europe-19 is composed by the then 15 EU-members plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. The entire dataset was compiled during the period 2000-2002
Measured in the number of SMEs per 1000 inhabitants, Macedonia is close to the average for South Eastern Europe in regards to SME density, but lags considerable behind both the established western European economies and most Central European and Baltic countries (CEB).\textsuperscript{118} To what extent the growth of SMEs serve as an explanation for variations in democratic progress is hard to determine. It is interesting to notice that countries such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which have made considerable democratic and economic progress, have undergone a rapid growth of SMEs. Macedonia’s modest growth of SMEs can serve as a partial explanation as to why the democratic progress has been more restricted there. It is also worth noting that Slovenia has a relatively low SME density. Slovenia has made significant democratic progress despite this fact, so a high SME density should obviously not be perceived as a requirement for democratic development.\textsuperscript{119} The continued growth of SMEs is nonetheless emphasised as a priority in Macedonia, by both the Macedonian government and international organisations like the World Bank and the EU.\textsuperscript{120} The density of SMEs in Macedonia has in fact continued to increase since the above study was conducted, reaching 22 SMEs per 1000 inhabitants in 2005. To what extent this development will serve to revitalise the otherwise crippled Macedonian economy and function as an engine for continued democratic deepening is still too early to determine.

\textit{The interaction between economic reform, modernisation, and democracy}

Democratisation, liberalisation, economic reform, and economic development are processes that are commonly perceived as mutually interdependent. In the case of Macedonia, indicators point to the existence of a connection. Macedonia was the least developed and poorest republic in the former Yugoslavian federation. In 1990, its GSP per capita was 36.6 percent lower than the Yugoslavian average and only a third of Slovenia’s GSP per capita.\textsuperscript{121} The bulk of the Macedonian economy was composed of large industrial enterprises involved in energy-intensive manufacturing of intermediate goods. These enterprises were often connected to companies in other Yugoslavian republics and more than 75 percent of the goods manufactured in Macedonia were sold within the inter-republican market. The Yugoslavian economy had started to deteriorate during the 1980s. At the time of independence the Macedonian economy had been contracting for more than six years, the inflation rate reached staggering 608.4 percent in 1990, and the unemployment level was hovering around 20 percent.\textsuperscript{122}

Macedonia’s industrial sector was deemed largely inefficient and in dire need of reform following the declaration of independence.\textsuperscript{123} But Macedonia adopted a gradualist and prolonged approach to economic reforms. The government, mainly composed of former communists, had a cautious attitude to comprehensive and rapid transformation, not only for ideological reasons, but also because the country was undergoing an all-inclusive process of transformation and state-building that together with external factors was believed to hamper the readiness for reform. The Macedonian economy therefore continued to contract during the first five years of independence, due to a number of factors. The violent disintegration of
Yugoslavia together with the UN imposed trade sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro prohibited Macedonia from accessing roughly 60 percent of its former export market. Further market shares were lost through the collapse of the CMEA trade zone that had provided Macedonia access to many other traditional east European markets. A unilateral Greek trade embargo that lasted for almost two years, 1994-1995, caused by the historical heritage dispute between Greece and Macedonia, further disrupted Macedonian foreign trade. This continued contraction of the economy and declining revenue inflows undermined the financial base for the necessary industrial reforms. Macedonia also failed to attract any noteworthy amounts of foreign direct investments. Part of the explanation for this failure was the unstable area Macedonia was located in, but it was also the result of unfavourable domestic conditions. Weak or undeveloped state-institutions, the absence of stable property protection laws, deficiencies within the bank and court system, high levels of corruption, and the late implementation of direct sales reforms, served as main reasons why foreign investors turned their attention elsewhere.

![Graph: Macedonia: GDP at prices and PPPs of 2000, growth rate](source: UNECE Statistical Division Database)

Economic growth was first experienced in 1996, but it remained weak. The removal of the UN trade sanctions on Montenegro and Serbia, and Greece’s decision to retract its trade embargo, provided Macedonia again with access to previously important markets. These economic positives were in part offset by the simultaneous economic collapse in Bulgaria and Albania. Macedonia, compared to other countries in the region, was relatively late in implementing its privatisation programme, but once this began in 1995, it progressed rapidly and was almost completed by 1998. The limited number of enterprises under direct sales resulted in continued low levels of capital or know-how being injected into the Macedonian economy. Instead, most companies remained relatively unchanged. Macedonia’s economic institutions, both private and state controlled, consequently continued to function poorly and together with the negative ramifications of the Kosovo crisis in 1999, contributed to hampering the economic development in Macedonia. The economic situation was nonetheless slowly improving around the turn of the century until the conflict in 2001 threw the economic development into reverse. A recession hit in 2001, and even if economic growth returned in 2002, the ramifications of the conflict were felt during the following years. Macro-
economic stability and fiscal discipline were maintained during the period 2003-2006 but the economic growth rate was poor. Macedonia has only averaged a 3.5 percent growth annually, which places the country among the most slowly growing economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The informal sector is believed to be over 40 percent of GDP, foreign direct investments have remained disappointingly low and the export sector has performed badly. Macedonia’s economic development can therefore hardly be called a J-curve. It resembles more a flat line.

![Macedonia’s J-curve. GDP development 1990-2006, 1990 = 1](source: UNECE Statistical Division Database)

Macedonia’s slow, and still inadequate, implementation of economic reforms and industrial modernisation, together with the dominance of insider privatisation, has most likely had a negative effect on both the economic and democratic development of the country. Macedonia is currently suffering under a severe insider-problem. Early winners, mainly consisting of the former nomenclature, were provided with opportunities to strengthen their grip over both political and economic resources. It also contributed to the growth of corruption, which in turn has produced a hostile environment for economic growth. The influence of other factors, such as the violent disintegration of former Yugoslavia, the Greek trade embargo, the undeveloped industrial sector, and the internal conflict of 2001 should not be trivialised. These factors have had a significant influence on the economic development in Macedonia, and in turn on the political development. It seems clear however that Macedonia needs to make progress in both the political and economic sphere simultaneously in order to generate the socio-economic development required to underpin democratic consolidation. In comparison to the more successful CEB countries, Macedonia has made much slower progress with regards to economic reforms. The country still lags behind regional leaders like Poland and Hungary in regards to banking reforms, enterprise restructuring, and competition policies. These shortcomings have contributed to positioning Macedonia as one of the least competitive economies in post-communist Europe. World Economic Forum conducts annual international evaluations of the competitiveness of countries. What these evaluations indicate is that the main causes for Macedonia’s failure to become internationally competitive can be found in its institutional shortcomings, and in a low degree of labour market efficiency and business sophistication.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rank in 07/08</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Rank in 06/07</th>
<th>Rank in 2006</th>
<th>Rank in 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Macedonia</strong></td>
<td><strong>94</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.73</strong></td>
<td><strong>84</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
<td><strong>75</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The high degree of corruption and low level of service mentality that can be found within Macedonian state institutions provide for an uncertain investment environment. Additional concerns are the poor development of property rights, the inadequacy of the judicial sector, and poor access to credit. Poor enterprise management has delayed necessary reforms and conserved Macedonia’s inefficient production sector, which remain predominantly specialised in low-value added goods. Macedonia introduced some reforms during 2006-2007 to improve the business climate, but the outcome of these reforms is yet to be determined. The connection between institutional quality and economic performance is however repeatedly confirmed and emphasised as an essential challenge for progress moving forward.

**The interaction between economic performance and political confidence**

Public support of government institutions is often relative to their ability to perform in accordance with public expectations. A government that is able to meet these needs and demands is likely to gain public support and confidence while failure to do so is likely to erode any such feelings. With regards to political performance few issues gain more public attention than the governments ability to generate economic growth and thereby increase the general prosperity of the nation. The economic situation becomes the core of everyday politics and serves as the primary political dimension that the public evaluate the government upon. This is a conclusion that gives reasons for concern in the case of Macedonia. Which has been previously discussed, the Macedonian economy has failed to gain momentum since the democratisation process was initiated. Large segments of the population have in fact experienced a deterioration of their living standards. The percentage of households in
Macedonia living below the national poverty level has increased continually since independence, reaching 30.2 percent in 2003. On average, 55.1 percent of the population is suffering from some form of human poverty and an estimated 21 percent of the population is unable to meet its basic food and non-food needs. The main causes for this increase in poverty is the poor economic development and the previously described insider problem, by which large segments of the population have become trapped in long-term unemployment and thereby been excluded from gaining access to the generated profits of the democratisation process. Unemployment and not low income is therefore the major factor for poverty and social exclusion in Macedonia. This poverty growth has resulted in increasing social inequality between transitional winners and losers, exemplified through the rise of the UN gini-index from 28.2 in 1998 to 39 in 2007. It is mainly the younger generation that has suffered from this development, as they are unable to gain a foothold in the labour market.

Improvement of the economic situation has become the top priority of the public. It is persistently placed at the top of different public survey rankings of the most pressing needs for the country. The Macedonian people in fact seem to indicate that they want to see an improved economic situation rather than anything else. Concerns can therefore be raised about a possible spill-over effect, where public support for democracy, as a system, becomes eroded because of the dire economic situation. As a newly established democracy, the citizens may evaluate the performance of the current system in relation to plausible alternatives, first and foremost, its communist predecessor. The failure to meet the economic expectations of the public might increase acceptance for authoritarian leaders, who might be perceived as better suited to provide the much-desired economic development, but who, in the process, steer the country further away from democratic consolidation. Investigating the data available on the subject presents a mixed picture. When asked by the World Value Survey 71.7 percent of the respondents in 1998 and 82.2 percent in 2001 answer that it is fairly good, or very good, to have a democratic political system. Most respondents in Macedonia also imply that they perceive democracy to be the best governing system, despite its problems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree strongly</td>
<td>n = 219, % = 22.0</td>
<td>n = 299, % = 28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>n = 402, % = 40.4</td>
<td>n = 455, % = 43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>n = 177, % = 17.8</td>
<td>n = 128, % = 12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>n = 32, % = 3.2</td>
<td>n = 46, % = 4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>n = 165, % = 16.6</td>
<td>n = 126, % = 12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>n = 995, % = 100</td>
<td>n = 1055, % = 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.16 Democracy may have problems, but it’s better than any other form of government
Source: World Value Survey database
This would indicate that democracy has gained a foothold in Macedonia and that it might not be seriously undermined by the poor economic development. It is however worth noticing that approximately 20 percent of the respondents disagree with the statement and that a sizable portion is unsure. This offers some reasons for concern, something which is strengthened when adding the answers of a number of other questions. 31.7 percent in 1998 and 39.3 percent in 2001 agree with the statement that the economy works badly in democracies. 80.6 percent of the respondents in 2001 are dissatisfied with the way democracy is developing. All domestic political institutions are distrusted. Indications are given for a significant acceptance of authoritarian governing systems. 24.4 percent in 2001, an increase from 11.0 percent in 1998, give the communist predecessor system top marks as being very good; and the idea of having a strong leader, or experts in charge, that are allowed to make decisions without being restrained by parliament and elections is strongly supported.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base = 2050</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Macedonia (1998)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Macedonia (2001)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>n</strong></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly good</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very bad</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.17 Rate different government types: Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.

Source: World Value Survey Database.

These survey answers indicate that democracy has not firmly established itself as the “only game in town” and that there exists a significant amount of acceptance for authoritarian political alternatives. The democratic culture in Macedonia appears to be fragile and continued failure to improve the economic situation might further undermine the democratisation process. The possible rise of a strong and charismatic authoritarian leader might not be far-fetched, as has been exemplified in Russia under the political leadership of Putin. Economic development should therefore be regarded as being connected to political development and measures taken to support economic development in Macedonia can be just as important as more direct democracy aid.

Summary

Macedonia has encountered obstacles in all three dimensions of its triple transition. A serious stateness-problem developed which was caused by ethnic heterogeneity, segmented cleavages, and a conflicting logic between nation-building and state-building. The ethnic
Macedonian population’s desire to manifest its own national identity through state institutions conflicted with the desires among the minority Albanian community for recognition and self-determination. Unable to unite behind a shared idea of the state, these two ethnic groups became locked in a zero-sum game that generated increased ethnic tension. The violent conflict in 2001 brought the country to the brink of civil war and measures have since been taken to attempt to strengthen the connections between the two different ethnic groups. Significant tension and distrust still remain between the two groups and further measures should be taken to increase the horizontal bonds between citizens, regardless of ethnicity. In a formal sense, the political dimension of the triple transition has progressed rapidly, but a democratic culture has not yet permeated the society. The operational standards of the established political institutions therefore leave much to desire. Corruption is widespread and state administrations and the judicial sector lack service mentality and effective practices. Institutional traditions adopted under the control of communists regimes and the Ottoman Empire serve to explain the difficulty to instil democratic practices. The final dimension of the triple transition, the economic dimension, has been equally disappointing. Macedonia has been unable to recover from the transitional hardships and has therefore remained stuck in the valley of tears. Delayed reforms and a dominance of insider privatisation have contributed to the development of transitional winners and loser, which has resulted in an increased economic polarisation of the society. Public frustration with the economic development is widespread and there are concerns that the current situation is undermining the entire democratisation process. Macedonia consequently remains at the crossroads and its future political trajectory largely depends on the ability to improve upon the conditions in all three of these transitional dimensions. It is also this contextual setting that foreign democracy promoters need to adjust to in order to increase the likelihood of having an impact. Democratisation processes is intrinsically connected to local conditions and failure to recognise this is likely to hamper to possible effect of implemented activities. With this knowledge, we can now turn to the second part of this dissertation, in which the Swedish policy for democracy promotion and the conducted activities in Macedonia will be investigated.

Notes:

1 Freedom House ranks countries according to their level of political rights and civil liberties. Each of these features is awarded with a grade, of which 1 is the best possible grade and 7 are the worst possible grade. Countries are then rewarded with a status as Free (F), Partly Free (PF), or Not Free (NF), according to the grades. As the figure shows, Macedonia has consistently been classified as Partly Free ever since becoming independent.
4 Shea (1997), Phillips (2004) p. 54,
5 Hupchick (2002)
8 Pavkovic (2000)
A joint statement by representatives for the EU, the USA, OSCE and NATO endorsing the census was presented on a press conference on 1 December 2003.

One of the main reasons behind the low voter turnout was the timely announcement by the USA, just two days before the referendum, that they would recognise Macedonia under its constitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia. That announcement was met with celebrations in Macedonia and served to dampen the interest in the referendum. Almost all of those that actually voted in the referendum voted against the reform. ICG (2005)

Return to figure 3.1 to see how the democratic progress of Macedonia, with regards to civil society, compares with other post-communist countries. See also Blair et al (2003) for a USAID assessment of the civil society sector in Macedonia.

Article 62 of the Constitution for the Republic of Macedonia declares that the parliament should have between 120-140 members, but all Macedonian parliaments to date have had 120 members.

A fact that some scholars utilise as sign of democratic consolidation. See chapter two.

Article 88 of the Constitution for the Republic of Macedonia.
Return back to figure 3.1 to investigate how the democratic progress of Macedonia, in regards to corruption, compares with other post-communist countries

Transparency International (2006). In comparison it can be mentioned that Macedonia shared ranking position 105 with Bolivia, Iran, Libya, Malawi, and Uganda.

ICG (2002)


Return to figure 3.1 to see how the democratic progress of Macedonia, with regards to national governance and electoral process, compares with other post-communist countries

ICG (2006)


Commission of the European Communities (2004) p. 8

Reference to different incidents can often be found in the annual evaluations conducted by Freedom House.

Jovanov (2005)


ICG (2002)


Commission of the European Communities (2007) p. 11

Weiker (1968)


Goetz & Wollmann (2001)


Verheijen (1999)

Willemsen (2006)

Todorovski (2001)

ESI (2002)


Commission of the European Communities (2007) p. 10


Return back to figure 3.1 to investigate how the democratic progress of Macedonia, in regards to national and local governance, compares with other post-communist countries

Todorovski (2001)

ESI (2001)

UNDP (2004)

The Ohrid Framework Agreement (2001)


See figure 3.7

Slaveski (1997)

IMF (1998)

Slaveski (1997)

IMF (1998)
SMEs are companies with fewer than 250 employees. Three subgroups can be found within the SME definition. Micro-enterprises with less than 10 employees; small enterprises with between 10-49 employees; and medium-sized enterprises with 50-249 employees.

Slovenia distinguishes itself from the South East European countries in a number of other categories. Slovenia is for instance ethnically homogeneous, it had a technically more efficient industry when entering the democratisation process, and its institutional heritage can be found in the Habsburg Empire, and not the Ottoman Empire.

Yugoslavia measured Gross Social Product (GSP), which represented the total value of domestic production and services during one year.

This conclusion is based on comparison of the EBRDs transition indicators for respective country.

The respondents answer two questions, one relating to experts in charge, and one relating to a strong leader in charge. But of these question are given strong public support in both survey rounds.
CHAPTER FIVE

Democracy promotion

After leaving the analysis of Macedonia’s democratisation process, the focus of this dissertation will now be transferred to democracy promotion as a factor for democratisation. Traditional democratisation theory has mainly emphasised the influence of different domestic factors on the possibility for democratisation. Nevertheless, it has become increasingly recognised that democratisation processes do not occur in an international vacuum, but that they take place in an international context that can significantly influence the political processes of individual states. International factors can therefore influence the democratisation process and accordingly deserve attention. This realisation of the need to study the influence of foreign factors coincides with the worldwide democratic revolution that followed with the end of the cold war. Democracy promotion became an intense interest for policymakers all around the globe, propelling democracy and democracy promotion into an international norm or world value. Democracy promotion activities mushroomed during the 1990s and by the end of the millennium, had become a natural part of development aid and foreign policy the world over. As has been discussed earlier, only a limited body of work has so far been dedicated to democracy promotion. Knowledge about the role and process of democracy promotion is still mainly in the hands of practitioners and in the words of Thomas Carothers, “…democracy promotion remains remarkably understudied, and the gap between what we want to accomplish and what we really know about how to accomplish it remains dauntingly wide”.

Defining democracy promotion

There are relatively few studies that have attempted to clearly define the term democracy promotion. Usually, the term is simply used with the assumption that the reader will understand its meaning, or as part of a larger theoretical discussion about different forms and aspects of democracy promotion. Such casual use of the term can cause confusion, especially as other terms can also be used to describe similar phenomenons; such as democracy assistance, democracy aid, democracy support, political development aid and so forth. The term democracy promotion will therefore be elaborated upon in the following pages, leading to a definition that will be used for this study.

One of the few attempts that have been made to define the term democracy promotion is a contribution by Philippe C. Schmitter & Imco Brouwer. Schmitter & Brouwer advocate the use of an umbrella term, “democracy promotion & protection (DPP)”, in which they distinguish between “democracy promotion” and “democracy protection”. Schmitter & Brouwer connect these activities to different phases of the democratisation process. “Democracy promotion”, according to Schmitter & Brouwer, is activities undertaken during
the first two phases of the democratisation process; which they call *political liberalisation* and *democratisation*, in order to contribute, encourage and support a democratic transition away from authoritarian rule. “Democracy protection” on the other hand, comprises activities undertaken during the final phase, the so-called *consolidation* phase, in order to secure and preserve the democratic progress that has been made within that society. Schmitter & Brouwer provide the following detailed definition of the two terms:4

Democracy Promotion consists of all overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes and the subsequently democratization of autocratic regimes in specific recipient countries.

Democracy Protection consists of all overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to consolidation of democracy in specific recipient countries.5

Opposition can be voiced about this separation and these definitions. By limiting the term democracy promotion to activities undertaken during political liberalisation or democratisation of autocratic regimes, Schmitter & Brouwer consequently make democracy promotion directed towards electoral democracies, or grey-zone democracies, into a theoretical impossibility. It seems plausible, that democracy promotion can be designed to target grey-zone democracies, with the ambition of encouraging further movement along the democratic spectrum towards a more inclusive democratic system. Another objection can be raised concerning Schmitter & Brouwer’s belief of when the “democratisation” phase has ended and what “democratic consolidation” actually involves. According to Schmitter & Brouwer, the democratisation phase ends with the introduction of minimal conditions for democracy. This is a rather strict and limited definition of the democratisation process and democracy. As was previously mentioned in chapter two, any state can consolidate but only a democratic state can undergo a democratic consolidation, thereby making the applied definition of democracy into a essential determining point for when the democratisation process, the movement along the democratic spectrum, can be regarded as being finalised. By using a wider definition of democracy than the minimal conditions for democracy the line for declaring the “democratisation” phase as finalised is naturally moved.

By applying a positive version of democratic consolidation, where democratic protection could include support for continued democratic improvement, Schmitter & Brouwer could have offset some of this critique against their rather strict definition of the ending of the democratisation stage, but they do not. Schmitter & Brouwer seem to apply a negative version of democratic consolidation, whereby democratic consolidation “aims at sheer survival of a (newly) established democracy by introducing elements of predictability in an effort to avoid,
first of all, a relapse into autocracy”. By defining democratic consolidation in such a manner they consequently leave no room within their concept DPP for activities that aim towards supporting and encouraging a continued democratisation of a grey-zone democracy.

Opposition can also be voiced about the distinction made by Schmitter & Brouwer between the terms “democracy promotion” and “democracy protection”. The argument for this distinction is that different measures can have different impacts during different stages of the transitional process, making it important to distinguish between “the promotion of, on the one hand, political liberalisation and democratisation and, on the other hand, the protection (consolidation) of democracy”. It can be theoretically useful to distinguish between activities undertaken to support continued democratisation and activities undertaken to support democratic consolidation, but this distinction can be captured by the theoretical separation of the democratisation process into stages. Democracy promotion can instead be viewed as the umbrella term that incorporates all those activities that aim to support the democratisation process and the consolidation of democracy. The foundation for democracy promotion is the support of a system, democracy, and not the processes of political liberalisation and democratisation. Political liberalisation and democratisation, as Schmitter & Brouwer call the stages that lead to democratic consolidation, are only the means to an end, and that end is stable democracy. Possible differences in the approaches applied are therefore not the defining feature. Instead they should only be viewed as different approaches used by democracy promoters to reach the ambition of securing the establishment of stable democracy.

Democracy assistance and democracy aid are to be regarded as subcategories of democracy promotion. Democracy assistance is based on actual support, for instance in the form of aid, which is provided to a recipient country with the overarching ambition to support or encourage the launching of a democratisation process or consolidation of a stable democracy. What separates democracy assistance from democracy promotion is that activities undertaken to promote democracy do not necessarily need to include some form of aid. As will be shown later, democracy promotion for instance can also include political and economic pressure, placed on the recipient country to trigger a desired development. What distinguishes democracy assistance from democracy aid, are the more specific intentions of democracy aid. Whereas democracy assistance has a general ambition to support a democratic development, for instance through economic and social aid programmes; democracy aid has the specific intention to support and foster democracy. The primary objective of democracy aid is therefore to support or encourage the introduction or consolidation of democratic institutions, whereas democracy assistance can have this as a secondary objective, seen as a desired outcome that follows, for instance, from economic reforms. Democracy promotion is therefore a theoretically wider concept than democracy assistance, which in turn is a theoretically wider concept than democracy aid. These different concepts therefore fit into each other like Chinese boxes, see figure 5.1.
Democracy promotion consists of all activities that are adopted, supported, and directly or indirectly implemented by public or private foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to democratic transition and democratic consolidation in a specific recipient country.

Based on this definition, the following pages will address the structural components of democracy promotion in order to bring further theoretical clarity to the concept. As the definition implies democracy promotion is to be understood as activities adopted and/or supported by foreign actors, as part of a relationship between the democracy promoter and the recipient country, based on a set of motives and shaped through the use of different strategies, methods and channels. The impact that democracy promotion has on the recipient country should not be viewed as a conceptual component of democracy promotion; but rather the outcome, the result or the effect of such activities. The perceived impact of democracy promotion is of importance however, because it can influence the legitimacy and support of such activities. The desire to have impact can therefore have ramifications on the strategic choices made by democracy promoters with regards to the methods applied and the channels used for the promotion of democracy.9

Actors

An external factor influencing democratisation processes is not always constructed around the deliberate activities of foreign actors. Huntington’s snowballing theory can serve as an example of external factors unintentionally influencing development in other countries.10 Another example is the influence that international regimes can have on domestic actors. In these cases it is instead some degree of norm diffusion that takes place, where domestic actors are influenced by the development or norms outside their country and decide to attempt, or demand, a similar development or norms. The influence of such factors should however not
be confused with democracy promotion. In order for the external factor to take the form of democracy promotion, the influence has to be constructed as explicitly designed activities based on intent, and by default such activities can only be conducted by an actor or actors.

A large number of different types of actors involved in democracy promotion can be found around the world, but it is a daunting task to provide a complete review of all the various types. Neither is such a review required for this study. Instead the purpose here is to identify and describe the principle types of actors involved in democracy promotion. All of the below mentioned types of actors have been emphasised as important democracy promoters in other studies, making my theoretical contribution in this aspect limited.11

**Bi-lateral state aid agencies.** The principal actors in international relations are states; similarly states and state agencies are the primary actors involved in democracy promotion, seen as both sovereign actors and as part of different institutions. Democracy promotion is often connected to development aid thereby making state aid agencies into a central type of international actor in democracy promotion. State aid agencies operating bilaterally towards recipient countries can be seen as a distinct type of actor. State aid agencies such as the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) are two examples of two state aid agencies involved in different democracy promotion projects all around the globe. The efforts supported and/or conducted by bi-lateral state aid agencies cover almost the entire spectrum of different measures to promote democracy, such as funding and supporting NGOs at the global, regional, and local level, gender programs, election assistance, constitutional reforms, legal assistance, civic education and so forth.

**Multi-lateral donor organisations.** States and state aid agencies can pool their resources and channel them through multi-lateral donor organisations. The European Union has a significant influence as a democracy promoter through its conditionality on democracy governance for membership in the union. This is particularly the case in relation to the states of Eastern Europe, which have to conform to the democratic conditions set by the EU in order to gain membership. In addition, the European Union has slowly become a multi-lateral donor organisation that is increasingly involved in the worldwide promotion of democracy through development aid. Numerous projects have been supported by the EU through forms of democracy promotion measures that are similar to those used by bi-lateral state aid agencies.12

**Global organisations.** States also cooperate within and support the actions taken by global organisations. The most influential global organisation involved in democracy promotion is the United Nations. Christopher Joyner argues that the UN has actually gained a position as the main international agent for democratisation and that their efforts have been largely neglected and unappreciated.13 The UN was significantly hampered in its attempts to advocate democracy during the cold war but through the increased support of democracy that followed with the end of the cold war the UN was provided with the opportunity to become involved. During the later parts of the 1980s and continuing up to present day the UN has increasingly endorsed and advocated democratic practices and principles as important vehicles for the continued development of the world. Hence, the UN has become increasingly involvement in
democracy promotion activities around the world, mainly through the projects supported and implemented through the United Nations Development Programme. Furthermore, the UN has organised and conducted numerous peacekeeping operations that have had the expressed objective of supporting the democratic development of the recipient state. One recent example is the UN-sponsored referendum in East Timor. The UN is also commonly involved in election monitoring missions.

*Regional organisations.* Organisations such as the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organisation of American States (OAS) also belong to a type of actor involved in democracy promotion. The OSCE dedicates a significant effort foremost towards the assistance and monitoring of election processes in new democracies. The OSCE has been especially active in the Balkans, assisting in the establishment of fair election procedures and the evaluation of their outcome.

*Global Non-Governmental Organisations.* States, and/or state based organisations, are however not the only types of actors involved in the promotion of democracy. The activities of non-governmental organisation with global agendas have become increasingly influential. Examples of such an organisations include Freedom House, and the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES). Freedom House mainly conducts evaluations of the democratic condition of countries around the world and different advocacy and education initiatives to promote democracy. The IFES is known foremost as one of the main organisations in the world with regards to election assistance, but the organisation also dedicate themselves to projects that aim to strengthen government institutions, support public participation, and increase public accountability within the system.

*Regional non-governmental organisations.* Some NGOs limit themselves to promoting democracy within certain regions of the world. One such example is the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (IDEE). IDEE aims to support and encourage the transition into stable democracy in Eastern Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union and pays significant attention to the development of regional trans-national networks of local NGOs, the interaction of independent journalist within the region, and support of different measures to strengthen the role of women.

*Local non-governmental organisations.* More country specific NGOs are also a commonly found type of actor that is involved in democracy promotion. Regional and global organisations frequently cooperate with local organisations in the promotion of democracy. One example of a local non-governmental organisation is the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA). IDASA was established in 1986 with the ambition to find alternatives to the politics of segregation and repression that was official state policy in South Africa at the time. The organisation participated during the democratisation process with projects aimed towards helping the new democracy take root. IDASA are active in such fields such as accountability, good governance, election and electoral systems.

*Philanthropic foundations.* The final type of actor that will be described here is the philanthropic foundation. Democracy promotion is not necessarily dependent on states or organisations; at times even a single person can have a significant impact. Examples are the
Open Society Institute & the Soros Foundations Network, which is a foundation that was established by the successful financial speculator George Soros, and whose ambition was to promote democracy globally, and the Ford Foundation, established by the successful automobile manufacturer Henry Ford. Both of these charity-based organisations have global programme for the promotion of democracy and they command significant economic resources donated to them by their respective benefactors. Based on these resources, these foundations have been able to play a noteworthy role in the promotion of democracy around the globe, supporting a wide array of projects which are dedicated to the promotion of democratic institution.19

The distinction between these different types of actors can at times become a bit blurred. The EU for instance can be regarded as both a multi-lateral donor organisation and a regional organisation, and regional and local NGOs cooperate within networks that take the form of global NGOs. We could also view all of these actors as part of a global democracy promotion network that has evolved both horizontal and vertical lines of cooperation. Organisations such as OSCE, cooperate with both local NGOs and the UN in areas such as the Balkans, whereby establishing a vertical line of cooperation, while at the same time cooperating with the EU, thus establishing a horizontal line of cooperation. Together, they pool resources, exchange experiences, and establish shared strategies that reinforce and increase the effectiveness of their individual efforts. It is however, useful to attempt to think about them as separate entities that to some extent can be viewed as global actors, regional actors, and local actors, depending on the scale of commitment that they take in their activities.

Motives

Sigmund Freud argues that all actions taken by actors, conscious or unconscious, are based on some form of motive. This all-inclusive statement concerning the existence of motives are subject of some debate, but it seems reasonable to argue that actions based on intent, such as democracy promotion, are subject to motives. To determine what these motives actually are, on the other hand, is quite difficult. It is in fact an impossible mission for an outside party to determine with certainty what thought process and what real motives another actor has, or had, in taking a specific action. The actor can provide reasons that seem to explain the action taken, but how are we to know that these are the true motives behind the action? From a theoretical perspective the most appropriate approach seems to be to focus the discussion and analysis around conceivable motives for a specific action. Such an approach allows the development of analytical tools that can be used for an analysis of the possible motives for democracy promotion. Before turning to a description of what will be seen as conceivable motives for democracy promotion it is important to distinguish between motives, reasons and objectives for political actions. The general objective of democracy promotion is to promote democracy, but this sort of declaration is rather vague. A more specific objective for the democracy promoting activity, in almost all cases, can be determined, for instance as a desire to support or oversee the implementation or construction of a free and fair elections process.
The development and existence of a free and fair election process is the objective of the activity in this case. The reason for the activity is the openly declared explanation provided by the democracy promoter in support of the action, for instance that the people should have the right to choose a government of their liking in a free and fair election process. Motives are the underlying causes for the actions, for instance an ideological commitment to democracy as the best governing system and feelings of global responsibility. The motives and the reasons provided for the activities in that sense can overlap, but there can also be discrepancies between the two. The motives for democracy promotion can also be to serve different forms of strategic interest for the actor and such motives are often not as openly declared. Organisations dedicated to promotion of democracy often provide ideological reasons for their activities. Democracy promotion can however also be a business strategy, providing income and employment for the people that are engaged in the administration and implementation of these activities.

The possible motives for democracy promotion described below should not be considered as a complete review. In my view, the following conceivable motives are the main ones that can be ascribed to the activities of democracy promoters. They aim to be general in description even if it is recognised that the motives for a specific action need to be understood in context. Arguments, which resemble these motives, can often be found in literature dedicated to analysing democracy promotion but few studies have taken the time to deconstruct and clearly outline these conceivable motives. Silander (2005) belongs to the few studies that have attempted this feat, even though he refers to “interests” instead of motives. According to Silander, there are three main “interests” behind democracy promotion, “a democratic norm”, “economic” and “security interests”. Silander’s categorization appears unsatisfactory, in part because it leaves some conceivable motives unmentioned, for instance identity motives. In this study, it is therefore suggested that his categorization can be improved. The motives categorisation outlined below, is influenced by different motives that can be found in established literature on democracy promotion, as well as studies analysing development assistance. As democracy promotion often serves as a part of development assistance programmes, it is suggested that the underlying motives for these activities strongly overlap. Because these conceivable motives can be found in earlier studies, my theoretical contribution here is primarily found in the compilation.

Altruistic motives. One conceivable motive for democracy promotion is that of unselfish concern for the well-being of others. In most cultures this form of ethical behaviour is encouraged and valued, and development assistance and democracy promotion often serve as a manifestation of such feelings. People, groups, states and organisations act in support of democracy promotion because they are moved by a concern for the people of the recipient country. Democracy functions as a means to an end, in this case some loose definition of well-being. It is perceived by the privileged to be a moral obligation to support the less fortunate on their path towards increased well-being, and democracy promotion is the channel used to help. Democracy is consequently promoted because it is believed to secure other values and benefits that are regarded as essential factors for the well-being of individuals, for
instance human rights, freedom of expression, sustainable economic development and so forth. It is hence not democracy as a government system that the promoter has as an objective, but rather the socio-economic benefits that commonly follow with democracy for the population of the recipient country. Because of this strong fusion between development assistance and a widespread notion of human empathy, it is very common to find references to altruistic motives within the official justification of development assistance programs all around the globe. Philanthropy is the classical example of an act based on altruistic motives.

**Ideological motives.** The promotion of democracy can be based on ideological motives, whereby democracy as a system of government, in and of itself, can be seen as a value worth promoting. Democracy promotion based on ideological motives is often combined with altruistic motives. Therefore, the objective is not only to support the less fortunate in their pursuit for increased well-being, but the understanding of human well-being is influenced by a strong ideological commitment to democracy. Democracy is not only viewed as a means to an end, but it is perceived as an end in itself. Arguments like the one given by Kofi Annan, then serving as the secretary general of the UN, that “the right to choose how they are ruled, and who rules them, must be the birthright of all people” can be seen as a reason based on ideological motives because no other governing system than democracy provides the people with such rights. Democracy and the well-being of a people are perceived as two sides of the same coin. The collapse of communist systems around the world and the establishment of democracy as a global hegemonic norm have contributed to an increased usage of this motive.

**Economic motives.** Different forms of self-interest can also serve as motives for democracy promotion, for instance economic motives. Donor countries can view development assistance and democracy promotion as tools to gain influence in the recipient country that will result in economic benefits for themselves, the donor. Democracy promotion can be used as an export lever that convinces the recipient country to buy products from the donor. Democracy promotion can also lead to increased economic development in the recipient country and an opening of formerly closed markets, thereby creating new markets for the exports of the donor country. Democracy promotion can also be used to politically stabilise a recipient country and thereby secure access to important resources within the country for the donor. The existence of democracy promotion activities can additionally serve as important sources of income for NGOs, state aid agencies and other organisations involved in such activities. By aligning with the norm of democracy promotion, increased access can be gained to those resources dedicated to official development assistance, which then finances their existence.

**Security motives.** During the cold war, democracy promotion was used as a tool in the conflict between communism and democracy. It was strategically important for the western democracies to support and promote democracy around the world because of the fear of communism. With the end of the cold war the fear of communism has largely disappeared, but democracy promotion can still serve security motives. In the post cold-war era the ideas surrounding democratic peace have become highly influential and they seem to influence the agenda and foreign policy of both states and organisations. Democracy promotion is believed to contribute to the construction of a more stable and peaceful world. Democratic states are
alleged to not go to war with each other; they are supposed to be better capable of handling internal conflicts, thereby less likely to suffer civil wars; and they are believed to be less likely to become a breeding ground for extremists and international terrorism, thereby removing a possible security threat for the international community. Democracy promotion can therefore be seen as part of the war against terrorism, and a tool for conflict prevention and conflict resolution; and these arguments can all be regarded as reasons indicating that democracy promotion can serve security motives. This is a motive that is very noticeable in the current US foreign policy for instance.26

*International positioning.* Democracy promotion serves as a part of a country’s foreign policy and can therefore be understood as part of that country’s ambition to position itself internationally. Democracy promotion can, for instance, be understood as an attempt to signal the cultural characteristics of a state, nation or organisation.27 This is done to gain recognition, acceptance, influence and admiration from other international actors. It is also possible to argue that states and organisations that want to be perceived as respected and important international actors adjust to the strong international support around democracy as a concept. They portray their commitment to the cause and to the international community by becoming an actor that promotes democracy. By committing to the cause, the actor itself is therefore more likely to gain acceptance, respect and influence in the international community. Democracy promotion can additionally serve as a means for gaining political influence within recipient countries, something which can be of strategic political importance. Democracy promotion can also serve as means to uphold strong political contacts for instance between imperial states and former colonies.

*Internal positioning.* Democracy promotion can also be understood as an attempt to signal the cultural characteristics of a state or organisation inwards. By committing to promoting democracy the actor establishes an internal self-image that people are expected to unite behind. It forms people’s perception of what is expected of them as part of that nation or organisation; in this case, to support and be committed to democracy. Democracy in that sense is not only the answer to what we want, but also to who we are. In short, it can be understood as a part of a constantly ongoing nation-building process, where declarations of support for democracy promotion serve to reinforce democracy as a desired community norm.28

These different conceivable motives for democracy promotion are not in any way mutually exclusive. Actors can base their actions on different combinations or sets of these conceivable motives. Different motives may also have shifting importance as the driving force behind the undertaken activity. Conceivable motives and the perceived importance of these different conceivable motives, for the actor concerned, can most easily be traced with the help of reasons provided for the activity, and through analysis of the actual activities conducted. It is however advisable to adopt a cautious and humble approach when attempting to determine what the conceivable motives for a specific activity can be. As we never will be able to access the actual thought process involved, we will never be absolutely sure that we have pinpointed the correct motives underlying the activity.
Strategies

Democracy promoters do not wander into the world without a compass directing them in their choice of activities. Following Carothers, this compass is conceptualised as strategy and comprises two definable aspects. Firstly, the actual character of the desired goal, in this case what the actor perceives democracy to be; and secondly the process of political change the actor believes necessary to reach that goal, or the beliefs held concerning the “causal relations and expectations about reciprocal behaviour that underpins a chosen course of action”, in this case, how the democracy promoter perceives the process of democratisation.29

The definition of democracy that is put forward by actors involved in democracy promotion is of importance because it influences the activities that the actor will implement, advocate and support. Democracy promoters that perceive democracy along the lines of a maximalist definition would be more open to implement, advocate and support a large array of different activities, ranging from the establishment of formal institutions to civil society and civic education, because they believe that all of the political features served by such activities are of importance in the establishment of democracy. Democracy promoters with a minimalist perception of democracy in contrast would limit their attention to the introduction and consolidation of elections and formal democratic institutions, because they view these formal institutions as the criteria for a democracy. Democracy promoters with a minimalist perception are therefore also more likely call the mission completed and move on to other recipient countries earlier than those with a more maximalist perception. Individual studies of democracy promoter are subsequently needed in order to establish a deeper insight into the perception of democracy held by each respective actor. Democracy promoters are often influenced by their own democratic system, bringing with them a perception of democracy that resembles the democratic culture of their respective homeland. This can cause problems when attempts are made to push for specific political attributes of the democracy promoter’s particular democratic culture to be implemented in recipient countries as universal democratic attributes. Political institutions that function well in one cultural context might not function as well in others, and it can be a serious mistake to assume that institutional experience from one country can be used to create institutional settings in others. The United States has been accused of working according to this misconception.30 The United States promotes a liberal democratic model that is constructed around basic features such as regular, free, and fair elections, a democratic constitutions enshrining a full set of civil and political rights, a governmental system built around division of power, a representative legislature, a lawful and accountable executive branch, local government structures, and some independent trade unions, independent media and independent NGOs. On paper, this democratic model is not specifically controversial or American, but when these political attributes are translated into actual institutions, the US democracy promoters often use the political system of the United States as a model, advocating the implementation of political attributes that are distinguishing features for this system.
They confuse American democracy with liberal democracy itself and promote a form of democracy that is over-specific and strongly rooted in particular political traditions that may not apply in other countries, even countries that may fully intend to be democratic.\footnote{31}

Different scholars have argued that similar patterns of constructing democracy assistance programmes, based on a country specific democracy models, can be found among other donor countries.\footnote{32} The Germans advocate a social-market approach as a model for developing democracies, Dutch officials view their political system, which incorporates consociational features, as particularly suitable for transitional democracies, and the British campaign on behalf of the Westminster model as the model for countries aspiring to become democratic.

It seems an endemic feature of western democracy promotion efforts that assistance providers promote what they know and admire most, which is almost always their own country’s particular approach to democracy.\footnote{33}

Sweden is not regarded as an exception on this issue. The few studies that have analysed Swedish democracy promotion or development assistance in general have indicated that Sweden uses its own political system as an ideological reference point.\footnote{34}

As any traveller knows, it is not enough to know where you want to go, you also need to know how to get there. The same can be said about democracy promotion. The journey in this case is the process, democratisation, which democracy promoters construct some awareness about that guides them in their activities. A democracy promoter that views democratisation as strongly connected to socio-economic development, along the lines of the modernisation school, is probably more likely to support and uphold activities that are believed to lead to such a development. While democracy promoters that believe that political elites are pivotal for democratisation, along the lines of the more actor oriented theories on democratisation, are probably more likely to try to influence and interact with political elites in the recipient country in order to launch or support a democratisation process. The perception that the democracy promoter has of the process can therefore be seen as one of the pivotal factors underlying any activity undertaken or supported. Democracy promoters are however not always guided by a clear model or theory for democratisation. It has been found, for instance, that it is somewhat unclear what model of democratisation that is used as a foundation for the US democracy promotion.\footnote{35} One cannot find any model or theory explicitly stated in any documents or speeches, but instead it has to be implicitly deduced from the content and the activities as such. The model underlying the US democracy promotion is rather constructed on two components; firstly a notion of natural sequence of political steps, where liberalisation is followed by democratic transition and consolidation, and secondly, institutional modelling, which means that US democracy promoters have a tendency to model socio-political institutions on similar institutions in already established democracies.
Each area of democracy assistance aims to help reshape a particular institution: trade union assistance seeks to make the recipient unions take on the key characteristics of Western unions; legislative programmes aim to mould legislatures in the form of Western models; elections assistance seek to produce elections that resemble Western democratic elections; and so forth. The idea is that if each major socio-political institution in a transitional country can manage to attain the basic features of such institutions in democratic societies, the political system as a whole will become democratic.36

In contrast to the model of democracy, the US democracy promoters do not appear to use their own historical experience of democratisation processes as a model for democratisation. The model used is neither drawn from academic literature on democratisation. Instead, the impression is that a model has been developed through a common-sense design. US democracy promoters evaluate recipient countries from an institutional checklist and then go about remeding eventual shortcomings that they find.

In other words, aid providers assess transitional countries in terms of what they themselves know best – which are the endpoints rather then the processes of democratisation. They then create programmes to reproduce those endpoints with the assumption that the achievement of the correct endpoints will solve the problem of process.37

This institutional modelling approach has its strengths, but it has also serious flaws in that it forms a pattern of ignoring underlying structures and democracy promotion turns into the treatments of symptoms and does not address the actual causes behind the democratic shortcomings. Without dealing with the underlying structures and the entrenched interest of the current system, democracy promotion activities have a tendency to be hampered by the lack of any real will to reform.

The strategies chosen by democracy promoters are further influenced by bureaucratic structures and organisational cultures, according to Schmitter & Brouwer. Differences can primarily be found between governmental and non-governmental democracy promoters. In their overall strategies, governmental agencies are more likely to be constrained by domestic political calculations, whereas non-governmental organisations are less constrained and therefore enjoy greater flexibility for strategic adjustment. Governmental organisations in general have a more complex, slower and more cautious decision-making process than non-governmental organisation, which instead are more likely to respond quickly, adopt flexible strategies and take risks. Governmental agencies have larger financial and technical resources at their disposal and are therefore able to support and/or implement activities that non-governmental organisations, or any democracy promoters with smaller budgets, are unable to fund. Non-governmental organisations are therefore more likely to adopt strategies that call
for smaller and more cost efficient activities. Governmental agencies however, spend more money on administration, research and evaluation than do non-governmental organisations. Budget size also influences the decisions made by the democracy promoter to either subcontract or use their own personnel in the field.38

Democracy promoters are restrained by the fact that the world is a very complex environment and that the process of democratisation can be very different from one country to another. Lessons learned in one recipient country might not be transferable to other recipient countries. It can therefore be seen as unwise to attempt to develop a grand strategy to democracy promotion, because adjustments always have to be made to the context.39 Taken too far, this line of thinking however brings with it a new set of concerns because it leaves democracy promoters with few suggestions for how to develop suitable democracy promotion activities. Democracy promoters are therefore forced to establish a structured awareness of democratisation that can serve as a foundation for their activities. Otherwise they would be forced to develop the wheel at every turn, being lost in a world of relativity.

Methods

At the end of the day, democracy promotion comes down to somebody doing something. There are numerous different methods that can be used to encourage the development of democracy in a recipient country, such as election assistance, diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, military intervention and development assistance. Carothers categorises most policy measures aimed at promoting democracy in other countries as either stick or carrot methods. Besides these various stick and carrot methods which will be outlined below, Carothers perceives democracy assistance and democracy aid as a distinct third option. According to Carothers, this support should not be regarded as punishment or a possible reward, but rather as something aimed to function as a democratic medicine.40 Carothers’ categorisation is good in many ways, but it seems strange that he argues that democracy assistance should be regarded as distinctly different than stick or carrot method. My belief is that democracy assistance can be conditional, and should therefore not be excluded from the possibility of being perceived as either a stick or a carrot method. It is instead suggested in this study that this third option should be categorised as rational persuasive method, in which the ambition is to convince or encourage a political change without connecting these activities to either rewards or punishment. The three different methods for democratisation would consequently be categorised as stick, carrot, or rational persuasive methods.

Stick methods should be understood as coercive activities undertaken through the use of some form of punishment, or at least threat of punishment, towards the recipient country in order for it to comply with the wishes of the democracy promoter. Three different types of stick-methods can be identified.41 The democracy promoter can exercise political pressure on recipient countries for their democratic shortcomings. This can be accomplished for instance through critical remarks by high public officials; critical reports and other activities that stir public awareness about the political condition of the recipient country, and an official cooling
of political relations between the recipient country and the democracy promoter. The political pressure that was placed on South Africa during the apartheid era can serve as one example. Other similar examples can be found for instance in Latin America and East Asia. Furthermore, economic pressure can be applied, where the recipient country is for instance denied trade benefits or loans by international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Another form of economic pressure is the reduction or denial of development aid, for instance through making development aid conditional to democratic progress. Sweden had an economic embargo on South Africa during the apartheid era as a means for placing pressure on the country to reform. The most extreme form of stick-method that can be exercised by a democracy promoter is military intervention, where military action is undertaken to restore, or install, democracy in a country that has either experienced democratic reversal, for instance through a military coup, or is simply non-democratic. The US military interventions in Panama 1990, Haiti 1994, and Iraq 2003, can serve as examples of such operations. The primary motive in all of these examples might not have been to promote democracy, but it was used and included, as one of the official reasons behind these interventions.

In contrast to these stick-methods, democracy promoters can also apply approaches based on rewards, or carrot methods, in an attempt to encourage the launch or completion of a democratic transition. Recipient countries can receive political rewards through launching a democratisation process, for instance official praise, defrosting of political relations and more favourable evaluations of the political conditions in the country. Democratisation can also be a key to gaining access to international organisations that in the past have been closed for the recipient country, for instance EU membership. The prospect of future EU membership has served, and still serves, as a very strong incitement for countries in the neighbouring region to transform and be recognised as democratic. Economic rewards can also be used to promote democracy, and the possibility of EU membership can again be used as an incitement for democratic transition. By becoming a EU member, the recipient country gains access to the internal EU market and can possibly also receive different EU grants that can be economically beneficial. The tying of development aid and granting of loans to democratisation and democracy are other incitements can be used as economic rewards to encourage a desired development. Finally, security rewards can be connected to democratisation and democracy. By launching a democratic transition or consolidating, a country can establish stronger ties to the strong and power democratic countries of the world, which can provide them with military support that strengthen the security position of that country. NATO-membership can be seen as a possible security reward that can be drawn from democratisation and democracy. The Baltic countries for instance, viewed democratisation and democracy as the path towards NATO membership and thereby the military support that has strengthened their position in relation to Russia.42

The final democracy promotion method can be categorised as a rational persuasive method, because it primarily serve to convince the recipient to change, without connecting cooperation and political transformation to either sticks or carrots. Democracy promotion activities,
regardless of whether these take the shape of actual assistance or fo diplomacy, can be
designed as attempts to persuade the recipient to recognise the merits of democracy and
thereby encourage the recipient to launch a democratisation process. It could also be used to
support pro-democratic forces within a non-democratic country, in an attempt to influence the
political development of that country. Democracy assistance and democracy aid can therefore
be directed towards a non-democratic, or grey-zone, recipient country regardless of their prior
democratic record, as a form of pro-democratic medicine. In non-democratic countries it can
be used as a tool to encourage and support a process of political opening and launching of a
democratisation process. In semi-democratic, grey-zone countries, it can be used to support
the country’s continued democratisation and consolidation as a stable democracy, and in
backsliding countries, democracy assistance can serve as a means for inhibiting a continued
movement away from democracy. In these cases, democracy assistance is not viewed, at least
in the eyes of the democracy promoter, as either stick or carrot, but rather as a democratic
boost.43

Channels

There are different possible channels that can be used when democracy promotion takes the
form of either assistance or aid. Starting with democracy aid, whose primary objective is the
fostering of democratic institutions, Carothers argues that there are three general categories
that such activities usually fall within.44

Political processes. The most common type of activity that is directed towards the political
process is aid connected to the promotion of free and fair elections. Election aid is a primary
activity of many democracy promoters, such as the UN and the OSCE, and is usually aimed
towards designing the electoral system, implementing good administration of elections, voter
education, election observing and election mediation. Aid connected to strengthening political
parties, as political institutions, can also serve as examples of democracy aid aimed towards
political processes.

Governimg institutions. Democracies are highly dependent on the functions of their
governing institutions, and democracy aid is commonly connected to the implementation or
strengthening of such institutions. It can take many different forms, from the rewriting of the
constitution, to judicial reforms, strengthening local governments, strengthening state
institutions, police training and so forth. Activities aimed towards improving civil-military
relations and promoting democratic acceptance and understanding within the military are also
to be regarded as democracy aid.

Civil society. In order to support the development of a stronger civic culture and to balance
the political influence of dominating state institutions, democracy promoters are also directing
their attention towards civil society. Support of non-governmental organisations, women’s
rights, free and independent media, labour unions, and different forms of civic education,
which are aimed towards increasing the understanding of democracy among the citizens, can
serve as examples.
Another common way of describing the different channels by which democracy assistance or democracy aid can approach the process of democratisation, is through the use of either top-down channels or bottom-up channels. The ideological foundation for the choice involved when deciding between these different channels is rooted in the idea of strategies that was presented earlier. With a top-down perspective, a significant emphasis is placed on the role of political elites and the governing institutions as the source of a successful democratisation. By supporting the development of a democratic structure of governing institutions and of democratic acceptance among the political elites, the democracy promoters believe democracy is more likely to take root. Ordinary citizens will adjust to the new institutions and democratic consolidation will follow from the establishment of a democratic institutional structure, which is supposed to function as the backbone of the society. Five principal targets for democracy aid with a top-down perspective can be identified, 1) the constitution, 2) the judiciaries, 3) the legislatures, 4) local governments, and 5) civil-military relations.

The bottom-up perspective emphasises values, norms and the strengthening of individual citizens as the source of democratisation and democracy. This is accomplished through supporting different features of the civil society, thereby creating and/or supporting institutions that can counterbalance the influence of the state. As democracy is based on the people, and the values held by the people, the bottom-up approach targets the ordinary citizens in an attempt to promote the establishment of a democratic culture which forces political elites and governing institutions to change. Democracy promoters often discuss the merits of these different perspectives, but they rarely, if ever, subscribe to solely one perspective or the other. Instead they recognise the merits of both perspectives and take the position that they should be combined.

Democracy assistance is a wider theoretical concept than democracy aid and it extends the definition of which types of activities can be regarded as having a democratic objective. While democracy aid has democratic institutions as its primary objective, democracy assistance can have the support of democratisation or democracy as its partial objective. Activities supported or implemented with the objective of encouraging a greater ethnical acceptance between different ethnic groups in a divided society can, for instance, be viewed as democracy assistance. Its primary objective for instance can be to establish the foundation for peaceful co-existence between different ethnic groups in a community, but such activities also serve as the foundation for a democratic political community. The idea of the state is dependent on a perception among the people of a vertical and horizontal legitimacy, and a democratic state cannot be developed without these features. Other activities, such as the construction of a school in a small village, can also be regarded as democracy assistance if the villages have to cooperate in a democratic manner in order to receive the support of the democracy promoter. The primary objective of such projects, at least on the surface, can be to build a new school, but by cooperating as a group, in democratic ways and with the support of aid workers, the village community also learn democratic practices. Such activities can be seen as civic education in disguise and in many instances can be more influential than pure
civic education projects. Lessons learned by doing can have a stronger educational effect than information provided by foreign actors.

The actual form that democracy assistance and democracy aid takes differs. At times, it is restricted to financial support, provided in the form of grants for instance to non-governmental organisations, while at other times it is provided through training or technical assistance, where the democracy promoter provides advice, counsel, knowledge and information to the recipient. Experts brought in to rewrite a recipient country’s constitution or to support judicial reforms by training court officials and lawyers are examples of such activities. The democracy assistance or democracy aid does not necessarily need to take place in the actual recipient country. Parliamentarians, police officials, journalists, judges and so forth can be invited to the donor country in order to participate in education programmes, seminars or merely inspirational visits. The democracy promoter can choose to implement the projects with its own staff or can take a more administrative and advisory role, relying on subcontractors, such as non-governmental organisations, to implement the projects in the field.

Relationships

A number of studies have investigated the relationship between the recipient country and the democracy promoter as a factor for democratisation. Silander outlines a model developed upon two relational dimensions, the level of support and the level of demand from the democracy promoter. Depending upon whether the level of these dimensions is high or low, Silander then creates four different relations types. The main shortcoming of Silander’s model is that it is exclusively focuses on the democracy promoter, while the recipient country remains largely absent from the model. A relationship is built upon the interaction between two or more parties, and it is therefore of importance that the recipient country is incorporated into a possible theoretical model. Way & Levitsky on the other hand, primarily focus their attention on the recipient country in their conceptualisation of western leverage and linkage to the west as important foreign factors for democratisation. By leverage, they refer to a “regimes bargaining power vis-à-vis the west, or their ability to avoid Western action aimed at punishing abuse of encouraging political liberalization, and the potential economic, security, or other impact of Western action on target states”. Leverage is high when non-democratic regimes have low bargaining power against the west and when they are heavily influenced by western punitive actions, and leverage is low when the opposite situation applies. By linkage, they refer to “the density of ties (economic, geographic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people, and information) between particular countries and the United States, the European Union, and Western-dominated multilateral institutions”. High linkage is the existence of considerable density of ties, while low linkage is the absence of a significant density of ties. High leverage and high linkage increase the likelihood for political influence, while low leverage and low linkage decreases the likelihood for political influence. Way & Levitsky’s theory was
primarily developed to analyse shifts in democratic transition between post-communist countries, but it can also serve as a theoretically rewarding way to think about the relationships incorporated into democracy promotion. However, the theory has shortcomings when applied in such a way, for instance because it fails to incorporate possible shifts in the degree of democracy promotion resources and commitment. It also focuses on “western actors”, thereby excluding other actors from being perceived as democracy promoters. This study therefore, will suggest a different theoretical way to understand the relationship between a democracy promoter and a recipient country.

The recipient country, seen as one of the parts of a strictly two-party-interaction, can generally speaking, be located on a sliding scale of acceptance for democratisation and the activities supported or implemented by democracy promoters, ranging from low acceptance, or hostility, at one end of the spectrum, through ambivalent/tolerating in the middle, and reaching high acceptance, or supportive, at the other end of the spectrum. The acceptance of a democratic transition within a recipient country is mainly to be understood as the attitude adopted by the governing regime, but also includes the democratic acceptance of other domestic actors, the internal balance of power within the country, and the ability to withstand international pressure. A hostile recipient country is a non-democratic country where the governing regime, together with the other main domestic actors, either has an ideological resentment towards democracy and/or an unwillingness to participate in any process that could lead to a democratic reform based on a fear of being deprived of political power. These types of countries can still be influenced and pressured into launching a process of political change, and Iraq or Afghanistan can serve as examples of these. Democracy promotion operations towards these types of countries however are very difficult and can even prove to be dangerous. An ambivalent/tolerating country can be both non-democratic and semi-democratic. Governing regimes in such countries are not openly hostile towards democracy promotion, but they are neither supportive of the process. The causes behind such behaviour may shift. The regime might be concerned with the possible repercussions that can follow, from both external and internal actors, if they take an openly hostile approach to democracy promoters. The domestic political balance is therefore an issue. Non-democratic governing regimes that have a solid economic base and no or little domestic political competition are less likely to be concerned with possible repercussions than weak non-democratic regimes with a small economic base and strong domestic political competition. The governing regime of non-democratic or grey-zone countries may therefore feel pressured into taking a more accepting attitude towards democracy promotion, and this pressure is not only applied by domestic factors. Foreign factors also apply pressure. Non-democratic regimes are influenced by the combined pressure of the entire surrounding international community, but with regards to democracy promotion and the relationship between two parties, it is more interesting to include the influence and pressure of the democracy promoter at hand. The resources and commitment that a democracy promoter places behind the ambition to promote democracy towards a specific recipient country serves as a pivotal factor for the pressure felt by the recipient country. The governing regime and the political elites might also be indifferent to
democracy as a system, as long as the democratic reforms do not politically undermine them. The concern for a democracy promoter when dealing with such a regime is how the activities will be received. Without having the genuine acceptance or support of the governing regime and political elites, it might be difficult to have impact. The most favourable reaction a democracy promoter can receive from a recipient country is a supportive attitude, from both the governing regime and all the main domestic actors of the recipient country. In such instances, the promotion of democracy will be seen as a joint venture between different representatives of the recipient country and the democracy promoter.

The other party in this two-party-interaction is the democracy promoter. In this interaction, the democracy promoter is characterised by two aspects; firstly the commitment that the democracy promoter has to the objective of promoting democracy towards the recipient country and secondly the amount of resources that are placed at his disposal for reaching the objective. The actual definitions of the terms commitment and resources are wide. Some of the factors that can influence the commitment of the democracy promoter include the international climate at the time, the extent of other activities that the democracy promoter is involved in, the internal politics of the state or organisation, historical relations to the recipient country, perceived consequences and rewards of pursuing democracy promotion towards the recipient country and so forth. Resources on the other hand, can be specified around three main categories. These can be in the form of political resources, such as political influence, rewards and penalties that the democracy promoter has at its disposal; economic resources, in the form of financial resources that can be used to finance different activities or economic benefits that can be withheld from the recipient country; and finally military resources that can be used to conduct a military intervention or be withheld from supporting the recipient country. Different combinations of the attitude of the recipient country and the commitment and resources provided by the democracy promoter will establish different relationship-scenarios in which democracy promotion can take place.

The democracy promoter’s commitment to the objective of promoting democracy in the recipient country can be located on a sliding scale, going from a low commitment at one end of the spectrum to a high commitment at the other end. This difference in level of commitment is exemplified in the model by the Y-axis, where the level of commitment increases further away from position A, see figure 5.2. The level of commitment that the democracy promoter has for the objective is an important factor for determining the amounts of resources that are placed at his disposal for reaching the objective. But actors are also limited in the amount of resources that they actually can have at their disposal. Some democracy promoters are powerful and have access to significant resources while others have limited resources to draw from. Similar to acceptance and commitment, the level of resources at the disposal of promotion of democracy is located on a sliding scale, shown in the model by the X-axle, where the amount of resources increases further away from position A. The vertical axis in the model, the Z-axle, symbolises the attitude that the recipient country has towards democracy promotion and democracy, defined as acceptance of democracy. The scale starts from zero in position A, when the recipient country has no acceptance for democracy, or is
openly hostile towards democracy promotion and democracy, and then slides through ambivalent/tolerating into supportive at the end of the Z-axis.

Figure 5.2 Different relationship-scenarios

Eight different relationships-scenarios extremes can be constructed from the interaction between these factors. **Scenario A** is the least favourable relationship-scenario for democracy promotion, in that the democracy promoter has low level of commitment, low level of resources at its disposal and faces a hostile recipient country. Such instances are to be regarded as very challenging for democracy promoters and it is not likely that any activities are undertaken. Under these conditions, the most conceivable outcome from such situations is that the democracy promoter simply chooses to take a passive approach towards the recipient country. **Scenario B** is the direct contrast to scenario A, in that the levels of commitment and resources are high and the recipient country is supportive of the objective. It is conceivable that the objective becomes a joint venture in scenario B and the democracy promoter is free to utilise a wide range of different democracy promotion approaches. Stick-methods should not be needed. **Scenario C** can be exemplified as the scenario facing a resource poor non-governmental organisation, that is highly committed to promote democracy against a hostile dictatorship. In this scenario, the democracy promoter is not limited by commitment, but instead by lack of the resources needed to match that commitment. In **scenario E** the limitation is not the amount of resources at the disposal of the democracy promoter, but rather the commitment to the objective. Facing a hostile recipient country the democracy promoter can decide to place the promotion of democracy as a secondary motive and instead focus on social or health objectives in order to gain access in the first place. In such instances, the democracy promoter may overlook limitations of democratic impact from the activities undertaken based on the perception that it will be difficult to have impact in any case. The democracy promoter can also have other motives for not forcefully pursuing the objective of democracy promotion towards the recipient country. The recipient country can for instance be
regarded as an important strategic ally and even if the political conditions demand that promotion of democracy is included in any support provided to the recipient country, the actual objective is rather to keep strong political ties with the recipient country. Scenario D can be exemplified with the relationship between a strong pro-democratic state or powerful international organisation and a hostile dictatorship. In this scenario, the state or organisation has both the resources and commitment needed to forcefully promote democracy. It is in this relationship-scenario that military interventions are most likely to occur. In scenario F the limitation is not with the willingness of the recipient country to reform, rather it is the commitment and resources of the democracy promoter that are lacking. A conceivable situation that leads to such a scenario is when the democracy promoters have dedicated their resources towards other recipient countries, or for some other reason have a low commitment to the specific recipient country that leads to a unwillingness to put existing resources to work. Scenario G has both willingness from the recipient countries side to reform and a high level of commitment from the democracy promoter. The limitation here is existing resources. A conceivable situation where such a scenario can develop is when a grey-zone democracy is open for further reforms, but the democracy promoter, a non-governmental organisation, has a limited budget to spend. Strategy choices open in this scenario are dependent on cost, which often leads the democracy promoter to smaller and more cost-efficient strategy choices. Finally, there is scenario H, where the democracy promoter has resources and the recipient country has willingness to reform, but the democracy promoter has a low commitment to reform. This scenario can unfold when a grey-zone democracy interacts with a democracy promoter that is rather satisfied with the democratic situation in the recipient country and prefers to leave the choice of strategy and implementation to the recipient country. Unspecified budget grants provided to grey-zone developing democracies can serve as an example. In this scenario, the driving force behind the democratic reform is the recipient country itself, while the democracy promoter is satisfied with merely providing resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship scenario</th>
<th>Level of resources</th>
<th>Level of commitment</th>
<th>Level of acceptance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
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<td>B</td>
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<td>G</td>
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<td>H</td>
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<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3 Different relationship-scenarios
These eight different relationship-scenarios extremes can be helpful when analysing the relationships of democracy promoters and recipient countries. Such analyses are of importance because different relationship-scenarios are likely to affect both the impact of the activities and the strategy choices open for the democracy promoter. As is well known, social interactions are never static, something which the model allows for, but it is useful to have an awareness of the limitations that can follow from different relationship constellations. Table 5.3 is an attempt to display these different relationship scenarios more clearly.

Impact

Two questions have a tendency to come up in relation to the issue of democracy promotion; does it work, and what works best? These questions are relevant because they serve to justify the very existence of democracy promotion. If democracy promotion does not work, why should resources be placed at its disposal? If it works, it is natural to pursue the most efficient options. These questions can therefore have ramifications on the strategies, methods and channels adopted made by democracy promoters, which is one of the reasons why attention is given to the issue here. The problem however is that these seemingly straightforward and natural questions concerning the impact of democracy promotion in recipient countries are in fact very difficult to answer.52

Impact is to be understood as the outcome, the result, or the effect that the undertaken activities has on the internal democratisation process of the recipient country. The outcome of democracy promotion can be defined along a sliding scale from very positive at one end of the spectrum, to very negative at the other end. A positive outcome generally means that the activities undertaken by the democracy promoter have resulted in a change in the political environment in the recipient country through the adoption of democratic values, norms and institutions, thereby propelling the democratisation process forward. A negative outcome generally means that the activities undertaken by the democracy promoter have caused a reinforcement of existing non-democratic values, norms or institutions in the recipient country, or that the activities have resulted in a democratic setback. In the middle of the spectrum, the outcome can be negligible, meaning that no real political change has resulted from the activities undertaken by the democracy promoter.

The extent of the outcome is also connected to the impact it can have. The extent of the outcome can also be defined along a spectrum, with limited at one end of the spectrum and extensive at the other. Limited, means that the activities conducted have only caused some minor outcome in a small setting, for instance the influence that a small democracy promotion project have in a remote and largely isolated village, while extensive indicates that the outcome has repercussions that affect larger segments of the political community, for instance through the adoption of an electoral system or democratic constitution. Finally, impact is also determined by which domestic actors are affected by the activities, and by their respective political influence. Citizens in a society do not have equal influence over the political development of a society. Some groups, such as political leaders, ethic leaders, religious
leaders, military leaders and so forth, usually have more influence over the political development than do ordinary citizens, which makes their commitment to democracy and democratisation more important. The actual influence that such groups has is highly contextual, and societies can change through public uprising that does not include traditionally important groups, so it is difficult to make any general statements about the influence of different groups. This fact also complicates the construction of any theoretical model that can be used to describe the different impact scenarios of democracy promotion.53

The only reliable way of determining the impact of democracy promotion is through extensive evaluation. Evaluations of democracy promotion are however, extremely difficult to conduct, as Carothers eloquently explains. The challenge is mainly connected to two aspects of the evaluation, firstly establishing the criteria for success and secondly establishing causality between the democracy promoting activities and political changes in the recipient country.54 The criteria that are used for determining the success of different kinds of democracy promotion activities need to be objective, clear and easily measured, but the elusiveness of most aspects of democracy promotion seriously complicates the establishing of such criteria. What objective criteria can then be used to determine the success of projects aimed to strengthen civil society? Are there objective criteria that can be used to determine what form of local governments that are most successful? How is legislative efficiency measured? What further complicates matters is the fact that democracy promotion often aims to affect the society as a whole and not only the formal institutions that are targeted. But how are such effects measured? This discussion is linked to the question of causality between the activities and possible, measurable effects. How can the actual effects that follow from a specific democracy promotion activity be evaluated? The political environment of a society is developed through a complex mixture of different actors, events, institutions, and so forth; pin pointing the origin of a certain political outcome is therefore an extremely difficult task. Because of these difficulties, Carothers means that democracy promoters have traditionally shied away from conducting evaluations based on a belief that their work cannot be evaluated in any systematic way. Their work is regarded to have unquestionable value and should therefore be taken, to some degree, on faith.55 This line of reasoning has not, however, been accepted in most state aid agencies and democracy promotion has been placed under different evaluations methods. One method that has been used is the indicator system, which forces democracy promoters to clearly describe and express what they aim to do in order to create measurable indicators. Phrases such as ”strengthening civil society” and ”increasing governmental accountability” provide fuzzy indicators, forcing democracy promoters to abandon such concepts for indicators that are more easily evaluated, often in quantitative terms. It is however almost impossible to efficiently deconstruct democratisation into small measurable indicators. In addition, such attempts can have repercussions on the strategies, methods and channels used by democracy promoters. In order to present their own activities as legitimate and worthwhile investments, democracy promoters can start to strive primarily for favourable indicator results, creating a situation where “the evaluation tail begins to wag the program dog”.56 Such a development could seriously damage the actual efficiency of
democracy promotion. The solution to the problem is not to abandon evaluations, because these are needed as a tool for learning, transparency and accountability, but rather to establish and utilise an evaluation method that is more accepting of the complex processes that are democratisation and democracy promotion.

Summary

It has been argued that democracy promotion should be understood as “all activities that are adopted, supported, and directly or indirectly implemented by public or private foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the democratisation and democratic consolidation of a specific recipient country”, and that this concept also functions as an umbrella term for sub categorisations, such as democracy assistance and democracy aid. Democracy promotion has also been deconstructed into six structural components; namely actors, motives, strategies, methods, channels, and relationship. It has been suggested that democracy promotion is activities undertaken by actors, and that the primary ones are bi-lateral state aid agencies, multi-lateral donor organisations, multilateral aid agencies, global organisations, regional organisations, global non-governmental organisations, regional non-governmental organisations, local non-governmental organisations, and philanthropic foundations. These actors support or undertake democracy promotion activities based on some set of motives, such as altruism, ideology, economic gains, security, international positioning, and internal positioning. In the process of conducting their activities, democracy promoters are guided by a strategy, which has two components in the form of a desired outcome, a definition or model of democracy, and secondly a theoretical understanding of democratisation processes. The actual democracy promotion activities however are created through the use of different methods and channels, which are the different approaches to actually promoting democracy. The adoption of different methods and channels are influenced by the relationship that the democracy promoter and recipient country share, defined through different levels of democratic acceptance from the recipient country and different levels of commitment and resources from the democracy promoter.

In order to fully understand the design of democracy promotion it can additionally be worth considering the question of impact, which is to be understood as the outcome of democracy promotion. The issue of impact should not be regarded as a structural component of democracy promotion. The reason why this aspect should be considered is because of its possible influence on the design of democracy promotion activities. Democracy promoters can place importance on producing measurable outcomes, and such ambitions can have ramifications on the chosen design of democracy promotion activities.

These analytical dimensions, which are summarised and presented in a table below, will provide the structure and part of the theoretical foundation for the coming analysis of the Swedish policy for democracy promotion and the Swedish attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia. Chapter six will focus upon analysing and discussing the general and overarching characteristics of the Swedish policy for democracy promotion, as described within Swedish
policy documents on development cooperation and democracy promotion. Chapter seven will transfer the focus to the Sida sponsored democracy promotion activities in Macedonia. Country strategies and project documentations will serve as the empirical foundation for this analysis. As previously stated, the conclusion generated from this investigation will then be carried over to chapter eight, which conclude the entire study with a discussion on the roles of democracy promotion in democratisation processes. The results of this discussion will be presented in the form of a typology, consisting of three ideal role types that have been derived from the analysis of Sweden’s attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia. In the process of developing this typology, the results generated by the framework analysis will be presented with the help of role theory. The use of role theory is believed to provide an additional perspective on the character of democracy promotion.
Table 5.4 Analytical dimensions for the study of democracy promotion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Bilateral state aid agencies</th>
<th>Multilateral donor organisations</th>
<th>Global organisations</th>
<th>Regional organisations</th>
<th>Global NGOs</th>
<th>Regional NGOs</th>
<th>Local NGOs</th>
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<td>Altruistic motives</td>
<td>Ideological motives</td>
<td>Economic motives</td>
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<td>International positioning</td>
<td>Internal positioning</td>
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<td>Definition of democracy</td>
<td>Theory/ies of democratisation</td>
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<td>The influence of bureaucratic structures</td>
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<td>Economic pressure</td>
<td>Military intervention</td>
<td>The carrot</td>
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<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>Hostile</td>
<td>Democracy promoter</td>
<td>Level of commitment</td>
<td>Level of resources</td>
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<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>The extent</td>
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Notes:


2 Carothers (2004) p. 3

3 Carothers (1999), Burnell (2000b), Burnell (2007)

4 Notice that Schmitter & Brouwer refer to the stages as political liberalisation, democratisation and consolidation while I refer to the same stages as the liberalisation stage, the transitional stage, and the consolidation stage, which are all parts of what I call the democratisation process or the democratic transition.

5 Schmitter & Brouwer (1999)

6 Schmitter & Brouwer (1999)

7 Schmitter & Brouwer (1999)

8 Thomas Carothers has explored the subject of division between democracy promotion, democracy assistance and democracy aid that I have used in constructing my own understanding of the different concepts, see Carothers (2000).

9 These structural components of democracy promotion have been defined by Silander (2005) pp. 89-106. I have chosen to speak about motives instead of interests, which are the term used by Silander, because I find the term motives more suitable. I have also chosen to add strategies to the list because I believe it to be an important feature that Silander somewhat overlooks in his description.


12 More information about the activities of the EU can be found on their homepage, europa.eu

13 Joyner (1999)


15 More information about the activities of the OSCE can be found on their homepage, www.osce.org


18 More information about the activities of IDASA can be found on their homepage, www.idasa.org.za.

19 More information about the activities of the can be found on their homepage, www.soros.org.


22 Silander (2005) p. 91-95. See also Burnell (2000c)

23 See for instance Lundgren (1998) for an example of a study that includes identity motives for democracy promotion. Lundgren’s study however, uses a hypothesis-deductive research approach where three conceivable motives are used as hypotheses and analytically tested. Lundgren does therefore not attempt to outline a more complete picture of the main conceivable motives for democracy promotion.


25 *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, Report of the Secretary-General, Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, 21 March 2005, paragraph 148


27 See for instance Nau (2000)

28 For a more extended discussion on these matters, see for instance Bloom (1990), Lundgren (1998)


30 Carothers (2000)

31 Carothers (2000) p. 194


35 Carothers (2000)

36 Carothers (2000) p. 192

37 Carothers (2000) p. 193

38 Schmitter & Brouwer (1999)


44 Carothers (1999), Carothers (2000) p. 188.
46 Carothers (1999) p. 158
49 Way & Levitsky (2007)
50 Way & Levitsky (2007) p. 50
51 Way & Levitsky (2007) p. 53
56 Carothers (1999) p. 294
CHAPTER SIX

Democracy promotion in Swedish development cooperation

This chapter serves two purposes. The first purpose is to provide an analysis of the principal characteristics of the Swedish policy for democracy promotion in an attempt to increase the understanding concerning these activities, and the second purpose is to provide a foundation for the ensuing analysis of Swedish democracy promotion activities in Macedonia. What model of democracy, if any, does Sweden attempt to promote worldwide? What factors are regarded as important for democratic progression? Are certain methods and channels perceived to be especially useful? What reasons are given to justify Swedish democracy promotion? These questions will be discussed in order to create increased understanding concerning the ideological foundation for Swedish democracy promotion. The Swedish policy on democracy promotion is delineated in the following core policy documents, that will serve as the primary empirical material for the investigation: Democracy and human rights in Sweden's development cooperation (Gov. Comm. 1997/98:76), Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s policy for global development (Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122), Human rights in Swedish foreign policy (Gov. Comm. 2003/04:20), Globkom, the committee on Sweden’s policy for global development (SOU 2001:96), Mänskliga rättigheter i svensk utrikespolitik (Gov. Comm. 1997/98:89), and two Sida policy documents Justice and Peace: Sida’s programme for peace, democracy and human rights, and A democracy and human rights based approach to development cooperation. These documents will be investigated with the help of the analytical framework that have been outlined in the previous chapter. As the actual content of policies is always difficult to definitively pinpoint, the investigation will be constructed on an interpretation of how democracy promotion is depicted in these core Swedish policy documents. The underlining theoretical structure of the analysis is adopted from the previously discussed structural components of democracy promotion. The issue of relationship is not included, because it only be analysed in interaction with a recipient country, which consequently excludes this component from the investigation. The subsequent investigation will additionally make use of the theories and factors, which concern democracy and democratisation, that were discussed in chapters two and three.

A short theoretical discussion of the concept of development and a historical background to Swedish development cooperation will precede the analysis. The ambitions of these introductory parts of the chapter are to position democracy promotion within the general notion of development and show that democracy promotion and development cooperation is most often intertwined and therefore largely indistinguishable from each other. Sweden’s development cooperation history will be briefly explored, providing insight to the current global development doctrine and the progression of Swedish development cooperation up to this point.
Understanding development

As this study focuses on democracy promotion within the framework of development cooperation, it is appropriate to investigate the connection between these two different processes and provide some insight into the notion of development. It should be noted that the notion of development is intensely disputed and that no generally agreed definition exists.1 This rather extensive discussion will however be left aside in this study and focus will instead be placed upon increasing the understanding for the role democracy promotion has in the larger process of development cooperation. Development can be understood as both a process and an outcome. As a process, development, with regards to countries, involves a transition, in which the country progresses towards a defined and preferred outcome. The reverse process, or the opposite of development, is also possible and can be conceptualised as de-development. This is when the country regresses or backtracks away from the defined and preferred outcome. Development can also be an outcome or a state of being, in the terms of a country’s level of development. Both of these interpretations of development are nonetheless dependent on the definition of development, a definition that is bound to have clear normative dimensions.2

From the western perspective, which has come to be the dominant perspective on the subject among international development cooperation agencies, development and being developed can be said to comprise two essential features. Firstly, the western definition of development is attached to the economic and material well being of the country. A less developed or developing country has a poor population, with a low standard of living and access to only inferior production technologies, while a developed country has a wealthy population, with a high living standard and access to advanced production technologies. From this perspective, development is an economic transition away from poverty towards increased economic and material wealth. Economic development is perceived as the outcome of industrialisation and modernisation, whereby rural, low technical, and primary agriculturally based economies move towards increased specialisation of labour and production together with the development of a more urban based, capital and technology intense, economy. This includes the abandonment of barter trade, tariffs against foreign products, and centrally planned production, on behalf of capitalism, market economy, and global trade.3 This perception of economic development is significantly influenced by the modernisation theory developed by Rostow and Gerschenkron, in which developing countries are believed to be able to follow the same growth pattern as the westerns countries and pass through five different stages in the process of becoming developed. Economic development is thus viewed as a linear process with strong similarities between countries. Developing countries need only to implement the right sequence of policies in order to launch the transition towards improving their standard of living.4 Two other importance ideological sources for this perception are neo-liberal thought and the widespread support for the globalisation process. The influence of neo-liberal thought is mainly noticeable through the emphasis on comparative advantages and developing market solutions, free from state interventions, while
arguments in support of closer economic integration between countries and open trade over borders can be understood to be part of the general agreement concerning the benefits of the globalisation process.\textsuperscript{5} When it comes to measuring economic development, there are numerous indicators that can be used. Examples of such measurements are the \textit{World Development Indicators} or per capita GDP.\textsuperscript{6}

Secondly, the western definition of development also incorporates social and political features. One dimension of being socially and politically developed is determined by the existence, functionality and stability of formal institutions, the most pivotal being the state itself. The existence of a state can be perceived as a prerequisite for social and political development. Failed states, where central authority no longer functions effectively, are regarded as socially and politically underdeveloped in relation to countries that have stable and effective central authorities. The level of social and political development in stable states on the other hand is determined in relation to state authorities abilities to perform their duties; for instance the states ability collect taxes, the level of state corruption, and the states capability to provide public health care services. A well-developed state functions efficiently and professionally and is able to exercise its duties and provide basic services to the people, while a less developed state functions inefficiently and is therefore unable to exercise the duties, and provide the services, that can be expected of it. Another aspect of social and political development focuses on the political culture of countries, where preference is on the existence of processes and institutions that provide and secure human rights and democratic practices, rights and freedoms. Authoritarian countries are consequently perceived as less developed in this area than democratic countries because of their failure to meet these demands.\textsuperscript{7} The ideological foundation for this perception upon social and political development is the strong support for democracy and human rights that can be found among wealthy western countries and the main international donor organisations. Democracy and human rights are viewed as important values in and of themselves, but these values and practices are also regarded as important for the establishing of an institutional structure that is beneficial for economic development.\textsuperscript{8} Numerous different measurements are used to determine the level of social and political development. Examples of such measurements are \textit{Freedom in the World} and \textit{Nations in Transit} from Freedom House, the \textit{Bertelsmann Transformation Index}, and the \textit{Worldwide Governance Indicators}, provided by the World Bank.\textsuperscript{9}

Democracy promotion can therefore be regarded as a natural part of western development cooperation, mainly as an approach towards supporting social and political development in recipient countries. Criticism has nevertheless been levied against this western perception of development, based on the argument that the suggested development path is nothing less than “westernisation”, being forced upon poor developing countries without concern for local traditions and cultures.\textsuperscript{10} This criticism brings attention to a built in conflict that can be found within development cooperation, where the interests of respecting local traditions and cultures and the promotion of democracy and human rights can collide.
Background

Democracy promotion has always been a part of Swedish development cooperation, but it became more emphasised after the end of the cold war. The ambition to promote democracy however has long been marginalised in relation to the main objective of materially improve the living standards of poor people worldwide. In the past, a democratic development has been regarded as desirable, but a western style democracy was primarily considered as a long-term objective. More concrete material development objectives, such as the abolishment of world hunger and mass poverty, the elimination of epidemic diseases, lowering of infant mortality and the overall creation of decent living conditions, instead took precedence. The first Swedish governmental bill concerning official development cooperation (ODA) that was adopted in 1962 and has served as the main cornerstone for Swedish development cooperation ever since, mentions the importance of contributing “as far as possible to the development of society in a politically democratic and socially egalitarian direction”. A democratic development has thus been desired, but the bill also indicates caution about an uncritical exportation of western values and norms with development cooperation.

Western values and approaches to development cannot be uncritically transferred and applied to developing countries […] it is not evident that social and political systems and principals that we ascribe to are suitable and reachable for developing countries.

Subsequent government bills have continued this line of reasoning by mentioning the importance of supporting the development of democracy in developing societies. It has been argued that self-determination and civil liberties are just as important for people in these countries as they are for people in the industrialised world. A cautious approach was adopted, however, with regards to the actual extent of the democratic development. Different previous policy documents on Swedish development cooperation have argued that it can be difficult to implement a western style democracy in many developing countries, because of the economic and social situation. One-party state structures for instance have been referred to as a satisfactory system for public engagement and participation in decision-making procedures as recently as in a governmental bill from 1988. This definition and perception of democracy stands in sharp contrast to the position taken by Sweden after the end of the cold war.

This lenient and broad definition of democracy and the emphasis on material development before actual democratisation, partly reflected the prevailing development ideology within international circles until the end of the 1980s. Socio-economic modernisation, influenced by the ideas advocated by the modernisation school, was perceived as a necessary precondition for democratisation. Most poor developing countries were consequently not regarded as having reached the modernisation level required to sustain democracy. It was even argued in some circles, that authoritarian regimes would better serve to provide economic development in poor developing countries than would multi-party democracies. The reason for this was that authoritarian regimes would be better able to maintain political stability while focusing on
implementing measures to generate economic development. Multi-party democracy on the other hand, would face intense public demands for immediate improvement and therefore feel a need to provide in accordance with these demands in order to secure political re-election, which would hamper the implementation of necessary reforms that would produce long-term economic development. Developing countries therefore faced a “cruel dilemma” where democracy was perceived as a luxury that these poor developing countries could not afford. Development cooperation was therefore designed to improve socio-economic situations in poor, developing countries, regardless of their political system, in the hopes that it would improve the material well-being of poor people in the short-term and in the long-term spur a democratic transition. Towards the end of the 1980s, it started to become clear that this approach was not having the desired effects. The authoritarian states remained authoritarian and significant portions of development resources were lost in corruption. It therefore became increasingly ethically questionable to continue to support developing countries with authoritarian regimes. In line with this belief the international donor community increasingly started to connect political development to economic development during the beginning of the 1990s. One influential source for this line of thinking was the new World Bank doctrine concerning the importance of “good governance” for development.

Sweden was influenced by this international policy shift. An intensified domestic debate concerning the role of democracy promotion within development cooperation caused the government to commission a study into the issue in an attempt to clarify the Swedish position. The outcome of this commission study, conducted mainly by Sida, was a new government communication, *Democracy and human rights in Sweden’s development cooperation*, which was presented in 1998. In this policy document, Sweden describes democracy as an essential component for the completion of a successful development process.

Democratic forms of government and a democratic culture are crucial for all development. It is therefore natural that Sweden should place additional emphasis on the democratic development of society in its international development cooperation programme.

Sweden thereby adopted the new international development model where institutional development in the form of good governance, in essence, democracy, was regarded as an essential foundation for development. Reference is also made to the end of the cold war and the creation of “new and favourable opportunities to promote democracy and human rights” as reasons why democracy promotion should take a more prominent position with Swedish development cooperation. Sweden had previously been forced to consider the possible ramifications of democracy promotion in the light of the east-west rivalry, but the collapse of communism left democracy as the dominant ideologue worldwide. It therefore appeared natural to more stringently incorporate democratic promotion into development cooperation. It is also worth noticing that Sweden adopted a narrower and more typical western liberal definition of democracy in this policy document. As has been previously mentioned, earlier
policy documents had described one-party state structures as a satisfactory system for public engagement and participation in decision-making procedures in the short term, while a more western liberal democracy was regarded as a long-term objective. This new communication described multiparty elections and multiparty systems as essential components of democracy and not simply as long-term objectives.  

Sweden adopted a new development cooperation policy in 2003. The reason for the new policy was that complaints had been raised about policy fuzziness with regards to Sweden’s development objectives. The government bill of 1962 had emphasised improving the living conditions of poor people around the world as Sweden’s primary objective, but later policy documents had placed emphasis on other objectives. Sweden had in fact identified the following six objectives in different policy documents and given them equal significance.

- the growth of resources (1962, 1978)
- economic and social equality (1962, 1978)
- economic and political autonomy (1962, 1978)
- the democratic development of society (1962, 1978)
- the sustainable use of natural resources (1988)
- equality between men and women (1996)

This growth of development objectives was claimed to have caused an indistinct policy direction, and it was thought to be unclear how these six development objectives were connected. Furthermore, the core objective, to improve the standard of living for the poorest people, had lost its focus. The development cooperation review of Sweden that OECD-DAC conducted in 2000 made reference to this problem and suggested that Sweden should reconfirm poverty reduction as its overarching development cooperation objective. Sweden subsequently introduced a more coherent and consistent policy for global development in 2003 where the aim is to “contribute to equitable and sustainable global development” with the ultimate goal “to eradicate poverty”. This will be accomplished via the establishment of an “environment supportive of poor people’s own efforts to improve their quality of life”. The previous six developments goals received renewed endorsement and were given equal importance, but instead of being labelled goals for Swedish development cooperation these factors were now regarded as directions, characteristics, or necessary building blocks for Swedish development cooperation. Two additions were also made to the list: conflict management and human security; and global public goods. The main reason for including conflict management and human security into the policy for global development was the devastating effect that armed conflict can have on development processes. A connection is made between democracy promotion and conflict management by arguments that democracy can function as a measure to deal with internal tension by peaceful means. With regards to global public goods, it is suggested that global development is not simply a process that is affected by domestic factors. As a result of the globalisation process, global development is
also affected by the normative and regulatory frameworks for systematic cooperation between countries and people that are established on an international level.\textsuperscript{28}

It is furthermore declared that two perspectives shall permeate Swedish development cooperation, including the eight thematic areas; “\textit{a rights perspective} based on international human rights conventions; and \textit{the perspective of the poor}”.\textsuperscript{29} \textit{The rights perspective} is constructed upon a normative foundation, in which democracy and human rights are necessary components. Swedish development cooperation shall promote and uphold certain values and norms, and the key value is the belief of the equality of all human beings in dignity and rights. Democracy and human rights are described as essential components for securing these values. Sweden thereby takes the position that all human beings have the right to influence and participate in the governance of their community, and this is accomplished through democracy “in the principles of one person, one vote and equality before the law”.\textsuperscript{30} This perspective further means that Sweden shall focus on helping discriminated, excluded, and marginalized individuals and groups. The rights of these groups are often violated and Sweden aims to support such groups to enjoy their rights, regardless of sex, age, disability, ethnic background and sexual orientation. Discrimination is declared to be an obstacle to development and Sweden aims to support a development where equal rights of all people are recognised and respected. Special focus is placed on gender equality and the rights of children.\textsuperscript{31} From \textit{the perspective of the poor}, Sweden argues that poor people shall not be regarded as passive recipients of aid, rather as active participants in the development process.

Development can never be externally created or imposed on people. It is a dynamic process. The perspective of poor people should therefore complement the rights perspective. Poor people must shape their own development.\textsuperscript{32}

Sweden’s development cooperation with developing countries shall therefore be constructed through a dialogue with the people in the recipient country, and the “perspectives, needs, interests and capacities of poor people should determine the nature of the measures taken”.\textsuperscript{33} As poor people are not a homogenous group, this approach also demands that efforts are made to reach the desired target groups. Sweden declares that this means a shift in the balance of power, from rich countries to poor ones, and from governments to individuals and groups.\textsuperscript{34}

To what extent this new development cooperation policy has provided a new and clear policy direction is debatable. It has been claimed that Swedish development cooperation has always been characterised by change on the surface while it is more uncertain that substantial change has been accomplished deeper down.\textsuperscript{35} The core of Swedish development cooperation seems to be the same over time, placing emphasis on the needs of the recipient, the idea of help for self-help, and a poverty focus. The new development cooperation bill incorporates all of the previous emphasised development dimensions and they are all regarded as important. It is therefore somewhat unclear how this new policy has improved upon former policies. The OECD-DAC however called it “an innovative and ambitious agenda for action” in its peer review of Sweden in 2005.\textsuperscript{36} Despite this praise, OECD-DAC continued to express concerns
about policy fuzziness by placing attention on the extensive number of subordinated policies that exist for the actual implementation of the new policy for global development. It is argued that Swedish field offices face a “forest” of different policy documents coming from Parliament, the Foreign Ministry, and Sida, which can cause policy confusion. Sweden has also been recommended to review possible reforms for measuring results of aid, for instance through the development of clearer operational targets on country and regional levels. Sweden has attempted to develop such operational targets. For instance, a new government funded institute, the Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation (SADEV), was opened in 2006. SADEV conducts expert analyses and evaluations of international development cooperation and its overarching objective is to contribute to increased efficiency in Swedish development cooperation. It should also be noted that Sida has an internal department dedicated to the evaluation of its activities, the Secretariat of Evaluation and Internal Audit.

The increased steps towards international donor harmonisation have also affected Swedish development cooperation policies. International development assistance has been plagued by a lack of harmonisation between donor countries and organisations, and for a long period of time attempts have been made to remedy this situation. Most of these efforts have been largely unsuccessful, but significant steps forward were taken through the Rome Declaration on Harmonization in 2003 and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005. Both of these declarations were the result of high-level forums incorporating most development cooperation donors and recipient countries in the world. Sweden participated at both of these forums. One important outcome of these meeting is the agreement among donor countries and organisations to divide labour, and to focus on specific sectors within development cooperation, according to their comparative strengths and weaknesses. In the case of Sweden, this agreement has been used to justify an increased focus of Swedish development cooperation on democracy and human rights, as Sweden is regarded to have comparative advantages in these fields. These declarations have also resulted in a country focus process. This means that Sweden and other donors are limiting the number of recipient countries in order to increase development cooperation efficiency. Sweden presented a new development approach in the autumn of 2007, where the actual number of partner countries is reduced and increased focus is placed on Africa and the countries of South Eastern Europe.

Actors

The Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (Sida) is the main state aid agency responsible for handling Swedish development cooperation. Sida therefore functions as the primary vehicle for Swedish democracy promotion. Around half of the total Swedish budget for international development cooperation, some 15.9 billion SEK or 54 percent of the total amount, was channelled through Sida in 2006. Sida serves under and reports to the Swedish Foreign Ministry. Like all Swedish Government agencies, Sida nonetheless enjoys considerable independence in its executive role within the policy framework provided by the Foreign Ministry and the Parliament. This policy framework consists of two forms of
instructions, firstly long-term ordinances that establishes the basic framework for operation. Governmental bills, country/region strategies and international agreements such as the Swedish Policy for Global Development, the Millennium Declaration and the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights are examples of long-term ordinances. Secondly, annual appropriation directives, which apply to the agency for the following financial year and include for instance, the financial allocation and specifications concerning the goals and purposes of these allocations.

Sida has additionally developed numerous policy documents that are supposed to guide its officials within the policy framework provided by the Foreign Ministry and Parliament. These policy documents are organised in a hierarchal structure. Some documents have the entire agency as target while others are sector specific. The fundamental principles and values of Sida, with which the entire agency should be familiar, are outlined in three documents; Sida’s policy for poverty reduction, Perspectives on poverty; a guide to principles, procedures and working methods for Sida, Sida at work; and a document outlining a new direction for Swedish development co-operation, Where we are. Where we are going. The second hierarchal level of policy documents comprises the so-called overarching policies for the development cooperation process. These policy documents have also been developed with the entire agency as target group and all members of Sida have to be familiar with these documents. There are currently five of these policy documents, three of which can be regarded as being primarily connected to democracy promotion, namely Sida’s support to civil society in development cooperation; Promoting gender equality in development cooperation, and Promoting peace and security through development cooperation. The lowest hierarchal level of policies involves position papers and thematic and specific sector policies. These documents target major areas of work and apply mainly to personnel that are active within these areas. There are currently 37 such policy documents available. The documents most closely connected to democracy promotion are Justice and Peace, Sida’s programme for Peace, Democracy and Human Rights, Parliamentary strengthening, and Education, democracy and human rights. Sida also conducts projects where so-called method reports are produced in an attempt to develop methodologies in different operational areas. Four such methods reports within the operational area of democratic governance were published in 2002: The Political Institutions, Participation in Democratic Governance, Good Governance, and Legal Sector. However, these method reports fall outside of the hierarchy of policy documents described above and therefore have dubious standing as official Swedish policy documents. The reports mentioned above nonetheless belong to the most detailed and comprehensive documents produced by Sida on democracy and democratisation, which makes them relevant for this study. These documents additionally serve to illustrate that besides the magnitude of different official policy documents there are numerous other documents that guide Sida officials, such as different methodological documents, evaluation documents, methods reports, department reports, and so forth. Sida’s publication database is packed with documents dedicated to different areas of Swedish development cooperation. It is therefore understandable why OECD-DAC referred to the existence of a “forest” of different
policy documents guiding Swedish field activities. This multitude of different policy
documents is also something that Sida personnel at times find confusing. One important
document that guides Sida personnel in the field, and which has not yet been mentioned, is the
country strategies for recipient countries. These are taken in collaboration between the
Foreign Ministry and Sida. These strategies discuss and outline the main areas of cooperation
for Sida over a determined period of time. Field activities are subsequently designed and
adjusted in accordance with the directives that are outlined in these country strategies.

Figure 6.1 Chart of Sida’s organisation
Source: Sida

Sida has three different management levels as chart 6.1 attempts to show. The director general
is the head of Sida and holds the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the agency
implements the policies and decisions taken by parliament and the government. The director
general also serves as the chairperson of the mainly advisory Sida board, which consists of a
total of eleven persons that have all been appointed by the government. Below the director
general there are two managerial levels, the heads of departments and the heads of divisions.
The heads of departments join the director general in the so-called agency management
group. Sida currently has 13 departments: four regional departments, Africa, Asia and the
middle East, Latin America, and Europe, five sector departments; democracy and social
development, infrastructure and economic cooperation, natural resources, research
coopetration, and cooperation with non-governmental organisations, humanitarian assistance
and conflict management, and four support departments; finance and corporate development,
information, human resources, and policy and methodology. Besides these 13 departments,
there is also a secretariat for evaluation and an internal audit that reports directly to the
director general and the Sida board.
Democracy promotion activities within Sida fall primarily within the jurisdiction of the sector department dedicated to democracy and social development. This department has the overarching responsibility for developing policies, methods, and Swedish competence in areas related to democracy promotion, and provides advice and support when needed. The actual implementation of democracy promotion activities within the frame of development cooperation, however, is primarily handled by the different regional departments. In the case of Macedonia it is therefore the regional Europe department that controls Swedish democracy promotion activities. The Europe department is further divided into five divisions: the division for Black Sea Region (BSR), the division for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA), the division for South Eastern Europe (SEE), the Baltic Sea Division, and the division for Administration and Planning (EVA). It is the division for South Eastern Europe that works with the Balkan region, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo, Croatia, and to a lesser extent, Bulgaria and Romania.

The Europe department has personnel in Stockholm and field representation in the different recipient countries. Swedish field representation in Macedonia is managed through the newly established Swedish embassy in Skopje, where during the later parts of 2006 Sida had four employees within the development cooperation sector. Field personnel serve as administrators and representatives of Sida on location, but the responsibility for contextual activities in the case of Macedonia is shared within the division, incorporating both field representatives and staff back in Sweden. The process of designing activities and decisions that concern support for new activities or continued support for existing activities, therefore involves both the field representatives and concerned division personnel back in Sweden. The field office in Skopje has therefore only received partial or limited delegation of authority over local activities, which distinguishes it from other larger field offices that have been given full delegation. The process of delegating authority from Stockholm and out to field organisation has been an ongoing process within Sida during recent years. The belief is that a strong field organisation is needed in order to provide a holistic and cross-disciplinary perspective of the poverty context in each country. Additionally, Sweden wants to become more involved in advanced dialogues at the field level and believes that by strengthening the field organisations, it will be possible to shorten the decision-making process, something which would make Sweden more capable of adjusting to contextual demands. The activities in Macedonia have however not been of the magnitude to require a larger field organisation capable of handling the responsibilities that follow with full delegation. The field office has therefore not been given full delegation and instead continues to work in close contact with division staff at the head office in Sweden.

The responsibility for Swedish democracy promotion activities thus flows from Parliament, via the Government and the Foreign Ministry, down to Sida, and then out to field organisations through regional departments and divisions. The personnel involved at the organisational levels, down to the Sida officials in the field offices, can all be seen as Swedish representatives entrusted with the duty of promoting democracy on behalf of Sweden. A more comprehensive analysis of this implementation chain will not be conducted in this study but it
is important to have a general understanding of the organisational structure of Swedish democracy promotion within the frame of development cooperation. Further discussion on the matter will be conducted in following chapters, where it will be shown how Sida collaborates with other organisations in the management and implementation of field projects.

Motives

Let it be stated from the outset, that it is impossible to accurately describe the motives for Swedish democracy promotion. This study instead focuses on capturing and discussing conceivable motives for Swedish democracy promotion, based on the reasons for Swedish democracy promotion that are provided in official policy documents, together with the actions taken by the actor implementing the policy. The purpose of the following pages is to dissect and discuss the main Swedish policy document on development cooperation and democracy promotion with the ambition of providing an interpretation of the conceivable motives for Swedish democracy promotion. It is recognised that only using official documents as the source for conceivable motives has limitations. The actor under scrutiny, in this case Sweden, may only give certain reasons for their actions in such documents and restrain from mentioning others. Statements from the actors themselves regarding the activity and reasons for them, cannot however be simply dismissed on the basis of such concerns. The reasons provided by the actors concerned are still to be regarded as relevant sources in the pursuit of conceivable motives. In addition, there is value in analysing what sort of reasons the actors themselves provide. These reasons can be compared with those provided by other democracy promoters, which could result in interesting differences. Officially provided reasons can also serve as the basis for a continued study if they are compared with the actual actions taken by the actor in the implementation of the policy. Strong discrepancies between official rhetoric and the observed field activities would provide a foundation to challenge the official doctrine. Consistency between the two in contrast, would provide support for the official rhetoric as an accurate depiction of the actual motives. The analysis provided below will therefore be contrasted with the analysis of the field activities that are discussed in the following chapter.

Another dimension of this analysis that is worth mentioning beforehand, is that democracy promotion, the promotion of human rights, and development cooperation, are activities with a strong level of overlap in Swedish foreign policy. They can therefore be understood as different dimensions of the same foreign policy. Sweden subsequently provides very similar reasons for justifying the pursuit of each of these three objectives. In this study, the reasons and conceivable motives found for the promotion of human rights and global development are therefore viewed as having equal validity for democracy promotion.

Sweden has gained an international reputation as a respected and committed donor, at times even referred to as “the darling of the Third World”, because of an established tradition of providing foreign aid on favourable terms. The conventional wisdom is therefore that altruistic motives primarily serve as the driving force behind Swedish development cooperation. However, there are studies that have reached conclusions that challenge this
assumption. Schraeder et al have found indications to suggest that trade and the ideological stance of the recipient country have a stronger influence on Swedish development cooperation than was previously thought. The official justification for Swedish democracy promotion is nonetheless permeated by altruistic motives. Sweden subscribes to the dominating international doctrine of democracy as an important foundation for economic and material development. Democracy is believed to underpin the socio-economic development needed to lift the poor people of the world out of misery and provide them with a life of dignity. Sweden shows a willingness to support such a development, primarily based on humanitarian and altruistic motives. Swedish policy documents concerning development cooperation and democracy promotion are filled with arguments that can be interpreted as a general desire to help poor people in the world. The strongest indication of this is the frequent mentioning of solidarity with other people in the world as the main justification for Swedish development cooperation.

The primary justification and rationale for Sweden’s policy for global development is solidarity with people in other countries. This rationale reflects the basic values in accordance with which Swedish society has evolved and that are also expressed in the UN charter and the Universal declaration of Human Rights. The firm conviction that everybody has a right to a life in dignity is the basis of the solidarity with poor, oppressed and vulnerable people that has been an important element of Sweden’s domestic and foreign policies for many years. Solidarity is reinforced by the realization that security, equality and sustainable development are not an exclusively national concern. Nowadays, the world’s countries are interconnected as never before. The major challenges of our own time and of the future concern everyone. This is particularly true for poverty and injustice. No part of the world is insulated from what happens in the rest of the world. Increasingly, we have common interests.

The origins of these feelings of global solidarity appear to have sprung from a social consciousness that has extended from the local and national community to include the global community. Origin of this ethical behaviour is also traced to the social and political development of the Swedish society. The rationale for Swedish development policy is stated to have derived from “the basic values in accordance with which the Swedish society has evolved”. The historical development of Swedish society has instilled values such as community, solidarity and equality, and these values resonate through the Swedish policy for global development. Domestically, these values have contributed to the development of the Swedish model, mainly characterised by an extensive welfare state, and in foreign policy, these same values serve as the bedrock for active engagement in the process of constructing a better world. In doing this, Sweden shows that it has adopted a normative stand concerning the existence of natural rights and the moral responsibility for the able to help. Democracy promotion is an important part of the Swedish strategy to support a desired socio-economic
development in the developing world. Democracy is regarded as the political framework necessary for securing a sustainable development that will include everybody and reach all segments of society, including the poorest of the poor. Besides protecting individual rights and freedoms as guaranteed by international human rights conventions, democracies are also regarded by Sweden as being more likely to implement economical liberalisation and other economic reforms that are perceived to be necessary to reduce poverty and produce a sustainable economic development in many developing countries. Sweden also regards democracies as being more likely to implement equal distribution systems for incomes and resources and establish social welfare systems that would benefit the entire society. Democracy in that sense is considered as a platform for a more comprehensive development process.

Democratic development of society contributes to achieving the other five development cooperation objectives – growth of resources, economic and social equality, economic and political independence, far-sighted management of natural resources and consideration for the environment and equality between the sexes.

Closely interlinked with these altruistic motives for Swedish democracy promotion, are indications of ideological motives. Throughout these policy documents, Sweden shows that it has adopted a normative and ideological stand that democracy and human rights are important values by themselves, perceived to be natural rights of every human being in the world. References to this perception, for instance, serve as a pivotal component of the rights perspective, which is said to permeate all parts of Swedish development cooperation. In the context of the rights perspective, democracy and human rights are emphasised as fundamental features.

The rights perspective comprises democracy and respect for human rights. Democracy and human rights are mutually reinforcing, and one cannot exist without the other. [...] Human rights cannot be fully respected without a democratic form of government. Conversely, human rights contribute to, and to a large extent are an essential condition for, democratisation.

The main foundation for the Swedish rights perspective is the international human rights conventions that Sweden considers have become the common standard and universal norms. The strong ideological support for democracy therefore seems to be partly developed from this normative foundation, as the only political system within which human rights can be fully respected. According to Sweden, the social and political rights that are included in the international human rights conventions, freedom of speech, freedom of association, the right of political participation and so forth, demand a democratic political system. The increased ideological support of democracy promotion as a pivotal component of Swedish foreign
policy has also been the result of the changed international political climate. Sweden has a long democratic tradition that has shaped the perception of what constitutes a life of dignity and the end of the cold war made it increasingly acceptable to promote such values.

The ending of the cold war created new and favourable opportunities to promote democracy and human rights. Sweden must take these opportunities. Our country has a long and rich democratic tradition, but we recall how those that who wanted democracy had to fight for it, and for the implementation of social justice. [...] Ultimately, our development cooperation policy is a question of equal dignity for all human beings, common security and joint responsibility for the conditions under which people live, in the broadest sense. This is clearly expressed in the UN declaration of Human rights and the conventions based on the Declaration. These values and principles provide a normative basis for all Swedish development cooperation.66

Statements therefore imply that Sweden not only regards democracy as a means to an end, but that it is viewed as an important objective in its own right. Swedish democracy promotion has an ideological foundation that resonates through these policy documents and this is based on a firm conviction that democracy is the only political system that provides the necessary conditions for an equitable and sustainable global development. Further, Swedish democracy promotion can be understood as actions taken to strengthen the growing support of democracy and human rights worldwide. Sweden takes the position that the world faces common challenges and that there is a need for a common basis of values and sense of responsibility in order to effectively handle these challenges. These common values, according to Sweden, should be based on human rights and democracy.

Democracy promotion can also serve different self-interests for the actor concerned, and for instance provide economic or security benefits. The study conducted by Schraeder et al showed that trade relationships can have a stronger influence on Swedish development commitment than has been previously acknowledged.67 Such motives are often not as openly declared in official documents, and Swedish policy documents concerning development cooperation, and democracy promotion are relatively free of references to economic self-interests. There are, however, a few examples of such reasoning. For example, Sweden acknowledges that the socio-economical development that hopefully follows Swedish development cooperation and democracy promotion can also be beneficial for Swedish companies.

Favourable development in developing countries benefits not only these countries and regions but also enterprises in Sweden. This is one of the areas in which the interest of global development policy and industrial policy coincide. The opportunities for Swedish enterprises to become involved in development processes in the poorest countries could be further improved by enhanced
cooperation between public authorities and the private business sector, better exchanges of experiences and knowledge and more effective integration of development and industrial policy.\textsuperscript{68}

In this respect, democracy promotion is connected to globalisation and free trade and is regarded as an approach that will not only promote a social-economic development in the recipient country, but also trade openness and market economy, things which Sweden believes to be beneficial for the development of recipient countries but also for Swedish companies and investors. Democracy promotion is part of establishing a good investment climate in these countries.\textsuperscript{69} It can therefore be argued that democracy promotion serves a two-fold end. The altruistic reason for democracy promotion, that is to establish a democratic institutional framework that would benefit the local community, has been covered earlier. However, Swedish democracy promotion can also serve economic motives by supporting the development of a beneficial business climate for foreign investments, which could be advantageous for Swedish companies. Participation by the recipient country in the globalisation process and the opening of trade towards global markets is in that sense not only beneficial for the recipient country, but also for the international community as a whole.

Development cooperation and democracy promotion can also be used as a bargaining chip or an investment in future beneficial relationships with important groups in the recipient countries. The Swedish policy however is free from explicit reasoning along these lines. What the documents seem to indicate, is an acceptance for the notion that development cooperation and democracy promotion also can generate economic benefits for Sweden. This acceptance seems to rest on the precondition that the recipient country is not exploited and that development cooperation is provided in accordance with local needs.

Democracy promotion can generate increased security, both domestically, within the recipient country, and internationally, through the development of a more stable and integrated international community. Armed conflicts are generally considered to have devastating effects on development processes. Democracy promotion can therefore be justified from an altruistic perspective as a means to support the development of a political system in which conflicts are more likely to be handled through peaceful means. This perceived connection between democracy and peaceful conflict resolution has been emphasised in a number of studies, and three features of democracy are commonly stressed as being especially valuable in the pursuit of security. First, the political culture within democracies, the norms and values that uphold such political communities, emphasises peaceful conflict resolution approaches such as compromise and negotiation. Secondly, democracies are based on political structures that distribute power throughout the society. This feature, together with public accountability and openness establishes increased opportunities for conflict mediation. Thirdly, the people are the supreme decision-makers in democracies and it is believed that the people are less likely to advocate armed conflict and thereby jeopardize their own security.\textsuperscript{70}
In a democracy, political, social and economic conflicts are publicly revealed, not suppressed as they are in a dictatorship. One of the main advantages of democracy is its ability to handle conflicts in institutionalized forms. Hence, democracy is one way of resolving armed conflicts.71

Democracies tend to be able to deal with internal tension by peaceful means. Efforts to promote democracy are therefore also a form of conflict prevention and management.72

These citations indicate that Sweden associates democracy with conflict management. Swedish democracy promotion can be used to prevent violent conflicts, which is not only beneficial for the country concerned, but which can in turn, prevent negative ripple effects of an erupted conflict to reach countries far outside of the original conflict zone. Democracy promotion can thus be carried out in order to respond to the concerned actor’s own security needs. The United States, for example, are candid about this connection, arguing that spreading democracy worldwide provides an institutional foundation that will improve American security from rogue states and international terrorism.73 Sweden is not as outspoken about connecting democracy promotion with the desire to respond to perceived Swedish security needs, but nonetheless, recognises the connection and values the possible influence that democracy promotion can provide with regards to increasing security both with the recipient country and also globally. Armed conflicts for instance can politically destabilise neighbouring countries, and become the source of international terrorism, cause immigration, and result in proliferation of weapons ranging from small arms to weapons of mass destruction. All of this can affect the security situation of other countries negatively. The impression provided through these policy documents is that Sweden has adopted the position that global interdependence has produced a situation where local problems can quickly become worldwide concerns.

The threats to our security are becoming increasingly complex. International terrorism and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and weapons of mass destruction are the most serious threats to security, but global crime syndicates also pose a threat. […] Poverty, oppression and discrimination have a bearing on security. International development cooperation helps to strengthen security, both in the immediate region and globally.74

Sida has developed operational definitions of “peace promotion” that emphasis two features. Firstly a culture of non-violence, “characterised by the public internalisation of the value that conflict should never be resolved by violence, but always by peaceful means”, and secondly, a legal and institutional framework in support of peace, “which encompasses all citizens, both women and men, with equal rights and duties, and protects them from the violence of other citizens and of the authorities.”75 The content of these two features is to a significant extent
constructed on the basis of human rights and democracy. Sweden expresses a strong commitment to global cooperation with regards to, for instance, global security threats, such as international terrorism and proliferation of weapons, places demands on some form of common basis of values. The ideological foundation for such cooperation should according to Sweden be commitment to democratic values and institutions. Democracy promotion is thereby not only regarded as a tool for the prevention or management of specific and local armed conflicts, but also viewed as a measure for the development of a international political climate and structure through which armed conflicts in the world can hopefully be avoided. It should also be noted that Sweden recognises that democratisation may unleash conflicts that can lead to armed conflicts if not handled correctly.

As a small country, Sweden is at a natural disadvantage with regards to having political influence globally. But by gaining a position as a global leader in development cooperation and democracy promotion, Sweden has been able to gain recognition, credibility, and influence well beyond its size in different international forums. Statements show that Sweden aims to keep this position and that international positioning can therefore partly serve to explain Swedish democracy promotion.

Sweden is a small country. This should not prevent us from playing a significant role. […] Our long and broad experiences of development cooperation, not least the assistance channelled through popular movements and NGOs, has given us insights and knowledge. […] We enjoy great trust, and membership in the EU has strengthened our voice in the world. The power of initiative gives us great leverage. We shall use our best efforts to ensure that the EU assumes its full share of responsibility for equitable and sustainable development in its policies. We have traditionally been among those that in the forefront in the struggle for justice and sustainable development. […] Sweden has played a leading role in these efforts. We will continue to pioneer the shift to sustainable development. […] Sweden will strengthen its international commitments. The proposals in this Bill would make Sweden one of the first countries in the world with a coherent policy for global development.

It is still important to promote the Swedish knowledge base in order to maintain Sweden’s position in an environment that is often dominated by considerable larger and more influential countries.

These citations indicate that Sweden is not satisfied with simply being one among many. Sweden instead seems to take pride in being a pioneer and a leader within the field of global development, having the trust and respect of both recipient countries and the international community alike. The actual benefits of this position are not explored in the policy documents, but the argumentation appears to indicate that Sweden regards the position in itself, as important. It is also reasonable to assume that Sweden can draw other political
benefits in different contexts from its international reputation. The existence, extent, or importance of such benefits is however not mentioned in these policy documents. The content and commitment of Swedish development cooperation also functions to signal the cultural characteristics of the Swedish society globally. In this regard, Sweden is participating in the construction of international norms, and attempts to promote a given set of values and norms that would make the world a better place if they gained universal acceptance. Sweden is not only displaying itself as a leader of global development but also as an example of the result of such a process.

Similar arguments concern the possibility that Swedish development cooperation signals the importance of certain political structures and cultural values to a domestic audience. The values, norms and political structures that Sweden emphasises in its development cooperation or within international organisations are at the same time regarded as important and valued features of the Swedish system. Democracy, human rights, accountability, openness, gender equality, solidarity, international cooperation and so forth, serve as examples of such features. So by declaring what Sweden want to accomplish through its development cooperation and democracy promotion, the country also declares its own political and cultural identity. References to such a motivational foundation can be found all through the different policy documents, depending upon how critically the document text is read. It seems clear that all of the main objectives of Swedish development cooperation and democracy promotion are components that are commonly perceived as important cultural features of the Swedish political system. The actual importance of internal positioning as a motivational foundation for Swedish development cooperation and democracy promotion is however difficult to determine.

To conclude, the reasons that are most forcefully depicted throughout Swedish policy documents as being the justification for Swedish democracy promotion, must be classified as a mixture of altruistic and ideological. It is possible to find indications of different types of Swedish self-interest, but the dominating impression provided by these policy documents is that Swedish democracy promotion is primarily driven by global solidarity and ideological belief.

Strategies

Sweden’s core strategy, or compass, of democracy promotion consists of two components. Firstly the actual character of the desired goal, in this case what Sweden perceives democracy to be; and secondly the process of political change that Sweden believes necessary to reach that goal, or the beliefs held concerning the “causal relations and expectations of reciprocal behaviour that underpin a chosen course of action”, in this case how Sweden perceives the process of democratisation.81 As the core strategies can differ among democracy promoters, the following pages will attempt to outline and discuss the core strategy that guides Swedish democracy promotion. This objective will be accomplished through an analysis of how these two components are described in the main Swedish policy documents.
Understanding of democracy

Democracy is obviously a highly contested concept. No universally agreed definition exists, and practice varies considerably among consolidated democracies. Individual democracy promoters can therefore be presumed to have their own perceptions of democracy guiding their activities. Studies of the US democracy promotion have for instance shown that the United States core strategy incorporates a model of democracy consisting of a set list of key institutions and processes, conceptualised as the “democracy template”. This template is constructed on three categories: elections, state institutions, and civil society. Thus, the US democracy promotion tends to emphasise the implementation of free, fair, and regular multiparty elections; accountable and professional state institutions; and a vibrant civil society serving as alternative channels for public interest articulation. A similar list of key democratic institutions and processes can be detected in Swedish democracy promotion policies. In Democracy and human rights in Sweden’s development cooperation, democracy is described as consisting of two integral elements. Firstly, as a system for collective decision-making, through which the people of a polity are able to control the legislative and executive branches of that community and thereby, in fact, govern themselves. The mere existence of such institutions however is not a sufficient requisite for a democracy. A democracy is also a system that upholds and protects individual and collective freedoms and rights. Liberal values, such as human rights, respect and acceptance of pluralism, political and legal equality, and divisions of power between the state and the civil society, are emphasised. Democracy is a political system that safeguards such individual rights. “The former category involves the way in which power is to be mustered and utilized, while the latter is concerned with the way in which power is to be constrained”. Democracy is thereby considered as system that has a built-in tension between the rule of the majority and individualism that defines the limits of collective decision-making. A similar description of democracy is provided in Justice and Peace: Sida’s programme for peace, democracy and human rights where democracy is argued to have two dimensions; “democracy as a set of laws and institutions, and democracy as a set of cultural values and social relationships”. These dimension are also given operational definitions, where the first dimension is defined as legal (constitutional) democracy and the second societal democracy:

Legal (constitutional) democracy: a form of government involving the formal and universal participation of the adult citizenry of a country in the competitive choice of its representatives, who rule within the framework of a constitutional state backed up by the rule of law.

Legal democracy may be regarded as comprising a particular set of formal processes and functioning institutions, some of them official and some in civil society, which may vary from country to country, but in general comprise and operate four interrelated systems:
1. A system of regular, free and fair competitive elections;
2. A system of open, accessible and accountable government;
3. An independent judiciary;
4. A system that observes and enforces civil and political human rights, upholding the principle of non-discrimination and allowing inter alia free speech, freedom of association and assembly, and the free action of an independent media.

This basic definition of democracy is regarded by Sida as being of universal application. Sida seeks to promote legal democracy in all countries of cooperation as a minimum condition for social justice, realisation of human rights, gender equality, and sustainable social development.

*Societal democracy*: a democratic culture of egalitarian co-existence expressed through relations of tolerance, willingness to compromise, respect for the differences between public and private life, and participatory opportunities in all institutions of the state and civil society.87

Similarities can be detected between these basic definitions of democracy in Swedish democracy promotion policies and the democratic template outlined by Carothers. Election processes, state institutions, and the civil society are emphasised by both. A possible difference however is that Sweden emphasises the importance of establishing a democratic culture, or a so called societal democracy, while the United States primarily seems to focus on the introduction of formal democratic institutions, or a legal democracy in the terminology used above.88 Before investigating the notion of societal democracy, a closer examination will be conducted of the formal institutions incorporated into the Swedish definition of a legal democracy.

The US democracy promotion has been criticised for advancing characteristics of the specifically American political system as universal democratic attributes.89 Besides overlooking the flaws of the American democratic system, this approach fails to recognise the influence of institutional traditions. The institutional design of consolidated democracies differs globally as they have been developed in a cultural context and carry the mark of local traditions. The American presidential system for example, which has a clear division of power between different branches of government and a first-by-the-post electoral system, differs significantly from the Swedish unicameral parliamentarian system with a proportional electoral system. Overlooking the influence of institutional traditions may complicate establishment of local ownership and acceptance of democracy in developing countries. Democracy promotion should therefore not be based on a universally applicable model for democracy. Swedish democracy promotion polices show a recognition and acceptance that the institutional design of democracies can vary in different contexts.90 This acceptance towards different institutional designs is however not unconditional. Sweden emphasises the
existence and practices of numerous formal institutions as essential features of a well-functioning democracy, and explicitly refer to the Swedish democratic system:

In this document, it seems natural to refer to Swedish conditions and views about the meaning of democracy. And the values which, in Sweden, we associate with democracy are the values which we want to promote in other countries too. Experiences of Swedish practice provides a natural reference point when we enter into dialogue with representatives of other countries and cultures, even if specific aspects have to be adopted to the situation in the country concerned and must have their support.91

A conflict can therefore be detected between remaining completely open and respectful to local traditions and practices, and a strict promotion of a perceived Swedish model of democracy at the other extreme. It is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions concerning the position of Swedish democracy promotion along this spectrum, but the difficulty of combining local traditions, cultures and practices with the Swedish perception of democracy seems to be a challenge that Swedish democracy promoters have to tackle. It is nevertheless emphasised that some democratic institutions have universal legitimacy for the establishment of a well-functioning democracy.

The formal democratic institutions emphasised as essential democratic attributes within Swedish policy documents can divided into the same three categories as the US democracy template. Free and fair multi-party elections are perceived to be fundamental feature of any democracy. No preference is stated with regards to choice of the electoral system, but the existence of a process that provides the public with influence and control over decision-makers is stressed. Electoral systems have a tendency to be imported by developing countries, in many cases from former colonial empires, without any serious discussion about the consequences of the actual choice. The declared Swedish position is that electoral systems should be adopted in accordance with local traditions and that a discussion should precede the decision.92

The policy documents indicate that Sweden subscribes to a well-established doctrine that regards political parties as important features of democracy. Besides serving as channels and forums for public interest articulation and civic education, political parties also provide a source for the recruitment of political representatives. In established democracies, political parties are often based on an ideological foundation and thereby aim to gather support from different social segments of the society. In developing democracies, political parties are often established as a platform for individual leaders, thereby becoming highly volatile. Swedish policy documents describe the political party process as “one of the most crucial aspects of a democratic culture”, thereby emphasising the importance of supporting the development of a stable political party structure.93 Such support can include activities aimed towards raising awareness of the role of political parties, such as forums and channels for public opinion,
support for the establishment of codes of practice in the dialogue between different parties, and raising an awareness of desirable membership cultures and gender representation.\textsuperscript{94}

Well-functioning and professional democratic state institutions is the second category of formal democratic institutions that are emphasised as being important for the establishment of a legal democracy. An elected and well-functioning parliament is first of all needed. In countries where the parliament is not elected, the objective of Swedish democracy promotion is to support a transition towards such practices, but even countries with elected parliaments may need support in order to become well functioning. Developing democracies with weak democratic traditions often suffer from legislative breakdown and serious political tension, because political parties are unable to cooperate in parliament. This type of democratic deficiency often involves the interaction between the opposition and the government, where the opposition is either completely excluded from parliamentarian processes or simply chooses to boycott parliament. The declared objective for Swedish democracy promotion in such situations is to support the development of effective parliamentarian traditions for instance by clarifying and reinforcing the constitutional role of the parliament.\textsuperscript{95}

A legal democracy is also declared to require a democratic government that fulfils its duties in accordance with established democratic practices. The policy documents suggest that the power of the executive needs to be balanced by built in control stations, such as the parliament, the judicial system and auditing bodies, in order to establish transparency and accountability of the executive. The declared objective on these matters of Swedish democracy promotion is to encourage the development of a culture where central government is “permeated by the idea that the state is at the service of the public, not the other way round”.\textsuperscript{96}

Another measure to strengthen the democratic culture and increase the public control over decision-making processes is decentralisation and the establishment of local democracy. Many developing democracies are highly centralised and the development of local democracy and the transferring of political control down from central administrations to locally based authorities are part of the dismantling of a former authoritarian state. In different policy documents, Sweden argues that citizens in developing democracies need to become politically empowered and that the establishment of democratic local and regional authorities are central features of such a development.\textsuperscript{97} The final formal state institution emphasised within Swedish policy document is an effective and independent judicial system, characterised by “the rule of law and the confidence of the general public in the authorities administrating the law”.\textsuperscript{98} An effective and independent judicial system is of democratic importance, because it serves to uphold community rules. Deficiencies in the judicial system, for instance through its failure to protect its citizens from different forms of abuses, can cause an erosion of the social community and political tension and mistrust. In order to function smoothly, a judicial system needs a core of well-trained lawyers and judges that serve in office with a spirit of integrity and respect for democratic principles. Swedish policy documents consequently emphasise the importance of equality under the law and the respect for human rights and aims to support the development of judicial practices and procedures that will guarantee such qualities.\textsuperscript{99}
The third and final category of formal democratic institutions involves mainly a *healthy democratic civil society* and *free and independent media*. Sweden perceives the existence of a vibrant civil society to be a decisive factor for the development of a democratic culture. The civil society is characterised by collective organised activities, performed by motivated individuals in the intermediate area between state and the individual, and such activities can take the shape of trade unions, environmental groups, women’s groups, athletic clubs, and religious organisations for instance. Sweden’s objective is to support such organisations because they are believed to foster and strengthen democratic attitudes and practices within society. Civil society organisations also serve to monitor and check the state while providing alternative channels for public engagement. A *free and independent media* is regarded by Sweden as having an important role in a democracy. The scrutiny of public sector activities that the media can provide contributes to increased levels of openness, legitimacy and accountability. Furthermore, the media is an important forum for free speech and can be used to demonstrate pluralism within a society. Oppositional voices often have difficulties reaching out with their message in non-democratic countries where the media is state controlled. It is therefore important that the media is provided with a large degree of independence from the state. This includes a guarantee that government authorities respect freedom of speech. Well functioning media depend on a body of professional journalists, who are well informed and ethically conscious. Sweden therefore argues in favour of supporting the development of free and independent media, for instance by providing training for local journalists.100

The policy documents in addition indicate that Sweden regards itself as having comparative advantages, compared to other democracy promoters, to support the development of certain types of institutions. These institutions include “the development of democratic organizations and the way voluntary associations work, ombudsman institutions, issues concerning public access to information, the democratization of institutions in the judicial system, the promotion of women in political life, and democracy at the local level”.101 All of these characteristics can to some extent be regarded as typical for the Swedish democratic system, which indicates that Sweden, like the United States, has a predisposition to incorporate features of its own democratic system into the democratic template. It is even declared that these democratic attributes should function as the foundation for the development of specialized key areas where Sweden democracy promotion can make important contributions.102

Swedish democracy promotion does not stop with the introduction of these institutions. Equal importance is placed on supporting the development of the second dimension of Sweden’s perception of democracy, *societal democracy*. Sweden considers democracy to be dependent on a mindset and a pattern of social interaction shared among citizens in a community. These patterns of social interaction serve as the pillars of a democratic culture, which is suggested are vital to reinforce and secure the formal institutions of democracy. According to Swedish policy, “a democratic culture involves the values which determine the way people interact and behave towards each other, both as individuals and in groups”.103 Without this democratic culture, it is suggested that the democratic system will never truly consolidate and operate efficiently.
The actual content and extent of what Sweden perceives to be a democratic culture is only vaguely defined in the policy documents, but a number of values and norms are given particular attention. Egalitarian co-existence among citizens for instance is stated to be one of the most important aspects of a democratic culture.\textsuperscript{104} Citizens of a democratic community should share the view that they all have equal right to govern the country. In addition, equality is not limited to rights, but also incorporates duties, meaning that the rules and norms of the society shall apply equally for all citizens, irrespective of position, connections or wealth. It is therefore important that people in a democracy reject corruption as a legitimate social behaviour in order for the system to remain stable.\textsuperscript{105} Other important values and norms are a shared view of respect and tolerance between citizens and the willingness to compromise and find peaceful solutions to possible conflicts. In order for a political community to function properly, decisions have to be taken and citizens need to have an acceptance of the democratic process. “This means that people and groups must be prepared to take into account and respect agreements which has been reached”.\textsuperscript{106} In order to avoid the tyranny of the majority, there also needs to exist an acceptance of diversity and institutionalised borders separating the public sphere from the private sphere.

It is suggested that a well-functioning democracy is dependent on the active participation of the people in the process of governing the society. Institutional systems are important in order to allow for such participation, but according to Swedish policy there must also exist a willingness to participate in the political process.

A living democratic culture also assumes that people are prepared to become involved in questions which concern them and the society in which they live. One sign of a healthy, strong democratic culture is that people care about their fellow human beings. That is why participatory democracy at the grass root level is a crucial factor in a strong democratic culture.\textsuperscript{107}

In this respect, institutional openness and access to information is regarded as a prerequisite for political participation, because it provides the general public with an insight into political processes and issues, facilitating the possibility of political awareness and thereby political involvement. Formal democratic institutions cannot close themselves off from the general public. Sweden instead argues that these institutions have a responsibility to encourage political involvement on the part of the general public.

Human rights and democracy are two separate concepts, but the two also have close links. It is in many ways indicated that human rights is regarded as an essential part of a democracy and that Sweden has incorporated human rights as an integral part of Swedish democracy promotion. Democracy and human rights are regarded to be mutually reinforcing and essential prerequisites. “Human rights cannot be fully respected without a democratic form of government. Conversely, human rights contribute to, and to a large extent are an essential condition for, democratisation”.\textsuperscript{108} The main link between the two concepts is the shared emphasis on equality and the rights of individuals. “Human rights are based on the principle
of the equal dignity and rights of all human beings. They are based on the idea that individuals have rights and states have obligations. With regards to the definition of human rights, Sweden applies the main international standards on the subject, exemplified primarily through the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The link between democracy and human rights is clearly shown by the declaration that all individuals of a political community have the right to participate in the governance of that community, either directly or through representatives chosen in free elections.

The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held in secret or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Democracy promotion and the promotion of human rights therefore overlap to a significant extent within Swedish development cooperation, and it is difficult to distinguish them from each other. The declared overall objective for Sweden with regards to human rights is to “contribute to helping people in other countries to enjoy the rights established within the UN and in other international forums”. More specifically, this means that Sweden aims to promote and support the development and protection of three different categories of rights and freedoms, as enshrined within the UN declaration of human rights. Firstly, there are the fundamental freedoms, such as the freedom of expression and freedom of association. Within Swedish policy, these rights are regarded to be essential to assure a political climate that encourages political mobilisation and participation. Secondly, there is the right to protection from abuse, for instance the right to not having to fear to be arbitrarily arrested, tortured or deprived of private property. Without such rights, individuals would fear being the target of abuse and therefore refrain from utilising other freedoms and rights. And thirdly, there is the right to satisfy basic needs, such as health care, education and a reasonable standard of living. It is suggested these basic human needs are necessary if “individuals are to have the energy and the means to exercise their political rights”. It is recognised in the policy documents that the inclusion of these fundamental human needs into the general perception of human rights can be viewed as controversial, because it has ramification on domestic policy issues, such as the distribution of wealth, health care, labour, education and family policy. This fact seems not, however, to discourage Sweden from placing emphasis on its inclusion.

Economic, Social and Cultural rights are in some quarters regarded more as aspirations than as proper rights. There is, however, no objective reason to treat these rights as less important or radically different from civil or political rights. They form an integral part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Regardless of how they are presented in the conventions, human rights are universal, indivisible and mutually dependent. It is only possible to live a life in dignity if all rights are respected.
The inclusion of these basic human needs can in part be understood as a component of Sweden’s general development cooperation ambition, which is to raise the living standards of the poor, and therein combat marginalisation of the poor and polarisation within developing societies. The ambition is to support the development of a political system that is characterised by equal distribution of wealth and resources, not only out of solidarity with the less fortunate, but also because such systems are believed to be more stable over time and to provide a better environment for socioeconomic development. The inclusion of these basic human needs also indicates that the aim for Swedish democracy promotion is extended to include the actual political outcome of that system. Sweden, in other words, is not only interested in supporting the development of a democratic system, but also in the development of a system that acts democratically, which for instance means providing basic human needs and being characterised by equal distribution of wealth and resources. These practices are incorporated into the Swedish perception of democracy and human rights, and are features Sweden regards to be non-negotiable components of Swedish development cooperation.

Sweden will pay attention to the necessary cultural and religious variations from country to country and continent to continent in approach to democracy and human rights, and will develop methods to tailor its support to each context. Sweden will not, however, support variations in interpretation which put into the question the universality of human rights, the equality of women and men, or the essence of competitive legal democracy as defined below. Tension will necessarily arise as regards respecting the principle of national sovereignty, but in this field, the universality of human rights will be given precedence.

Sweden should make efforts to ensure that sustainable development is characterised by equitable distribution. [...] Sweden should also support the building up of social security systems that can both enhance people’s own capacity, and also provide support and protection for people in precarious situations. Social welfare and security policy in Sweden is closely linked to economic policy. Although ready-made models cannot be exported, we have throughout our history devised programmes and acquired experiences that justify a special Swedish commitment to and active involvement in this area.

Swedish democracy promotion is therefore not only interested in the establishment of democracy, but also in the establishment of a certain kind of democracy that incorporates political features that provide these populations with some sort of a welfare system. It is recognised that political systems and policies cannot be simply exported, but these different policy documents also indicate that the Swedish political system, with a well-developed social welfare system, serves as the natural reference point for Swedish democracy promotion.
To sum up, Sweden subscribes principally to a standard liberal democratic model of democracy with elements of typical Swedish democratic characteristics. It is a model that is closer to a maximalistic definition of democracy than a minimalistic definition; primarily because Sweden to a significant extent includes the content and outcome of the system into the definition. Sweden often emphasises that democratic structures should have roots in local traditions and not be imposed on recipient countries, but the documents also indicate that Sweden uses the Swedish democratic system as a reference point and that many features of the Swedish system are regarded as normatively desirable.

Understanding of democratisation

During the last 50 years, an extensive academic literature has been dedicated to the study of democratisation processes and the factors that explain these processes, as was outlined and discussed in chapter two. The theoretical contributions made during these years serve as natural analytical tools for analysing and discussing democratisation processes the world over. Much energy is of course still dedicated to refining and testing the established knowledge on the field. What influence these theories has on the actors involved in international democracy promoters is however questionable. Studies of US democracy promotion, for example, have failed to find any references to established academic theories or models explicitly declared within policy documents or speeches. A common-sense model of democratisation, constructed upon two components, seems instead to guide US democracy promotion. These are firstly a notion of a natural sequence of political steps, whereby a country is believed to pass through different transitional phases before becoming a consolidated democracy, and secondly, an institutional modelling approach, in which an institutional check-list is used to identify perceived democratic shortcomings and structure the implemented democracy assistance. The reason as to why the established theories seem to have had only limited influence on many democracy promoters will not be explored further in this study, but instead, the focus is on analysing and discussing how the Swedish policy about democracy promotion depicts democratisation processes. To what extent are references made explicitly or implicitly to established academic theories of democratisation? If such references cannot be found, what sort of model of democratisation seems to guide Swedish democracy promotion? Is Swedish democracy promotion like that of the United States, also guided by a common-sense model for democratisation, or are perhaps Swedish historical experiences of democratisation processes used as guidance?

No explicit mention is made of any established theory of democratisation in the main Swedish policy documents on democracy promotion and development cooperation. Instead, the primary focus is on discussing different desirable democratic endpoints. The social and political processes that underpin the development of these institutions are in contrast hardly mentioned. The attention given to democratic endpoints can be interpreted as an indication that Sweden, like the United States, subscribes to an institutional modelling approach, whereby democratisation is accomplished through a systematic promotion and adoption of the
right set of democratic institutions. There are however, numerous indications that Sweden has a more dynamic understanding of democratisation processes than is incorporated into the institutional modelling approach. One interpretation that can be made from analysing the Swedish policy is that Sweden sees democratisation to be dependent on the political will of the people concerned and generated, firstly, through a struggle against prevailing power situations, and secondly through the ability of different institutional structures to shape social behavioural patterns. One indication of this conviction and a distancing from the institutional modelling approach is the frequent mentioning of the importance of a democratic culture. It is repeatedly stated throughout the documents that the introduction of formal democratic institutions is not sufficient for democratic consolidation. In order for these institutions to function properly, they need to have a foundation in a democratic culture. It is suggested that the development of a democratic culture is a key factor for “real democracy” to take hold. This emphasis on the role and importance of democratic culture can be interpreted as an implicit reference to the political cultural school.

Democracy call for democratic citizens, and perhaps the development of a democratic culture is the most important key to real democracy, where people can exercise their political and civil rights as citizens. [...] Superficially, a society may be a democracy, but the democratic spirit may be missing and the democratic culture weak. Democratic institutions must have popular support if they are to function. A democratic culture is part of a country’s social capital.

The importance placed on democratic cultures is further interlinked with the overarching conviction that development never can be externally created or imposed on people. The people affected in the recipient country are considered to be in control of the possibilities for development. Sweden believes that outside democracy promoters can only support a development process, not dictate it. The Swedish model for democratisation is therefore heavily influenced by the belief that people are the crafters of social and political transformations and that foreign democracy promoters, such as Sweden, only can provide help for self-help.

Development cooperation cannot conform to a single model; it must be adapted to the specific situation in different countries. Needs and the prospects of achieving desired results should determine the extent and forms for development cooperation with individual countries.

Democracy promotion activities therefore need to be implemented in cooperation with the affected people. These convictions resonate in the frequent references to the uniqueness of each country’s development process and the importance placed on local ownership of projects, and it permeates the perspective of the poor mentioned earlier. It can also be regarded as a rejection of the notion that structural preconditions determine the possibility for
democratisation. No indication can be found suggesting a resignation to the mission of democracy promotion on account of structural obstacles. It is recognised that a number of different factors, such as ethnic and social division, can complicate the process, but the policy documents are permeated with the belief that the people in these developing societies hold the key to their own development. Furthermore, human rights, equality, and democracy are declared to have universal applicability, so there is no argumentation concerning a possible scenario where the people of the recipient country in strength oppose these values. The conviction that people, and not structural settings, control the possibilities for democratic development can therefore be interpreted as placing the Swedish model of democratisation closer to actor-oriented theories than to structural theories. The main difference between the main proponents of the actor-oriented theories on democratisation and Sweden, however, is that the latter do not emphasise the role of political elites. The identified actor is usually the “people”, which indicates that Sweden places equal importance on the influence and engagement of all individuals in social and political transformations. This position has many origins. It seems to be partially adopted from a normative commitment to equality and the rights of all people, but also from a clearly expressed development desire to strengthen the position of the poorest of the poor. Placing the focal point on the role of political elites in democratisation processes would undermine the commitment to equality and place the poorest of the poor at a disadvantage. It would also conflict with the Swedish belief in the power of people’s movements. Democratisation is sporadically described as a process involving the distribution of power, whereby democracy has emerged through a struggle against the prevailing power situation. It is suggested that the role of people’s movements has vital importance in such processes, because these function as the platform from which the established power situation can be challenged. Also, it is declared that these processes of power struggle can be extended over a significant period of time, resulting in a need for patience and realistic expectations of the possible impact of democracy promotion. This argumentation bears resemblance to historical sociology, where social struggle and tension between different classes over an extended period of time are used as explanations for democratisation. The Swedish policy documents are, however, relatively silent about the role of different social classes on democratisation processes. The arguments are instead mainly structured around concepts such as people, equality, power distribution, and protracted political struggle. This perception of democratisation processes as a protracted political struggle seems in part to have sprung from Swedish historical experience. References are made for instance to the prolonged power struggles that in Sweden resulted in universal suffrage for men and women. These origins of the Swedish model for democratisation distinguishes Sweden from the United States, where domestic, historic experience instead have been found to have little influence on democracy promotion.

As has been mentioned previously, it is also suggested that the introduction of formal democratic institutions is not only a manifestation of a democratic culture. These institutions also serve to propel the democratisation forward by influencing social behaviour patterns and strengthening desirable democratic values and practices. Democratisation processes are
accordingly are perceived as being constructed on a reciprocal relationship between formal and informal democratic institutions.

In order to flourish, peace, respect for human rights, and democratic governance all require a fertile cultural base which nurtures them, and a framework of institutions which protects and sustain them. The cultural base not only supports peace, democracy and human rights, but also generates the institutional framework. The base compromises the cultural values of non-violence, mutual tolerance and respect, cooperation and equality, which are the bearers of justice and human development.

It is difficult for compatible institutions to arise in society in the absence of these values. However, the creation of institutions represents a big step forward in the protection, strengthening and eventual institutionalisation of these cultural values in society. Institutions thus not only constitute the external form of these values, but also build their content.128

This perspective can in part explain the attention that is given to describing and discussing different democratic endpoints, as they are habitually manifested through formal institutions. The introduction of these institutions is suggested to “represent a big step forward” in the democratisation process, not only because they serve to formalise democratic practices and values but also because they contribute to further facilitate democratic transition and consolidation. The documents refrain from adopting any position on the more common institutional design discussion, which take up for instance, the different merits of parliamentarian versus presidential democratic systems. The Swedish position here falls back to the previously stated opinion, that development processes need local ownership and that democratic institutions should subsequently be designed on the basis of local traditions and desires.

Despite the many references to the uniqueness of development processes there are conflicting indications of a transitional or natural sequence mentality in the Swedish policy documents.129 Democratisation is a process of political transition, in which a political community moves away from authoritarian rule and towards the consolidation of democracy. Democratisation can thus be viewed as a transition along a spectrum, with authoritarian rule at one end and democracy at the other. From a theoretical perspective, developing countries in the process of democratisation can be placed along this spectrum, and the transition theory provides a theoretical approach for classifying transitional countries into groups, depending on how far they can be considered to have moved along this spectrum.130 Besides having theoretical implications, such classifications can also be used by democracy promoters who are in the process of deciding what sort of activities that should be used to promote continued democratic transition. Democracy promoters can develop standardised sets of activities dependent on which transitional category or phase the recipient country is determined to be in. There are indications that Sweden uses such transitional or natural sequence thinking and
advocates different strategy decisions depending on the level of democratic progression. Arguments can be found about management of various types of democratic processes and the possibility to classify previous experience for guidance when designing future activities.\footnote{131}

Although every democratization process is unique and it is difficult to base future activities on past experiences, it is nonetheless possible for donors to classify their experiences to some extent and to draw certain conclusions.

The rudimentary classification that is outlined within the Swedish policy documents show transitional spectrum thinking, whereby democratisation is suggested to be “a movement in the direction of a greater democratic element in society”\footnote{132} One interpretation of this argumentation is that this spectrum perspective frames the uniqueness spectrum. Within Swedish democracy promotion, democratisation is considered to be the transitional movement along a spectrum towards democratic consolidation, but each country has a partially unique journey along this spectrum. A conflict, between contextual uniqueness on the one side and the use of categorisation and different transitional packages on the other, is nonetheless rooted into the Swedish model for democratisation.

There are short, implicit references to a number of other established theories on democratisation in the policy documents. Sweden, for instance, recognises a correlation between the development of a market economy and democratisation, in which economic development is regarded as a possible route towards democracy.

Although successful economic development may help an undemocratic regime in the short run, market economies tend to result in increasingly insistent demands for openness, pluralist forms of government, protection of individual rights, and ultimately democracy.\footnote{133}

This line of argument has similarities with both the modernisation school and the theories that proclaim the positive influence of market economy on democratisation. However, to be sustainable, economic development is thought to be dependent on institutional development. Sweden therefore does not believe that economic development should take precedence over institutional development. The two processes are considered as unavoidably interdependent.\footnote{134} Fears are also expressed about the possible existence of social tension and the possible damaging effect that it can have on a society. The fear is that social tension will lead to violence and lasting socio-political instability, which could serve as a serious obstacle of continued development.\footnote{135} The influence of international actors is also mentioned, but mainly as possible supporters of positive processes and not necessarily as prerequisites for democratic development. The international actors that are primarily mentioned within the policy documents are the UN, the EU, the OECD, and international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank. Sweden regards these organisations as important channels for
implementing or attaining Swedish development cooperation objectives, in addition to the bilateral activities undertaken by Sweden directly.\textsuperscript{136}

To conclude, the Swedish policy regarding democracy promotion includes no explicit references to academic theories on democratisation or a distinctly outlined Swedish model for democratisation. Indications of implicit references to different democratisation theories and the features of a Swedish understanding of democratisation processes nonetheless can be detected. The Swedish understanding of democratisation processes seems in many ways to be constructed upon a mixture of different theories. Two democratic dimensions especially stand out. Firstly, there is the conviction that a democratic culture has essential importance in bringing about democratisation. The argumentation is based on a bottom-up perspective where the people through a protracted power struggles against the prevailing power situation brings about a democratisation process. It is foremost this dimension that seems to have origins in Swedish historical experiences. Secondly, there is the conviction that the introduction of formal democratic institutional structures provides possibilities to shape social behavioural patterns. This line of arguments is constructed upon a top-down perspective. This dimension may also have origins in Swedish domestic experience, but such references are not as clearly visible.

Methods and Channels

Three different methods for democracy promotion were discussed in the previous chapter: \emph{stick}, \emph{carrot}, and \emph{rational persuasion}. The primary Swedish method of operation, when attempting to promote democracy within development cooperation, as interpreted through the main policy documents, appears to be rational persuasion. The principle factor behind this choice of method can be found in the so-called \emph{perspective of the poor}. Sweden has adopted the position that development can never be imposed on a recipient country. This would not only violate the dignity of the people in the recipient country concerned, but Sweden also believes that such attempts have a higher likelihood of being unsuccessful, because local ownership of development processes is considered to be needed in order for the process to be sustainable. Instead, development cooperation should be designed and implemented in conjunction with the people concerned, as a joint venture.\textsuperscript{137} The influence of this perspective in Swedish development policy is further exemplified through the use of \emph{development cooperation} in official terminology instead of similar terms such as development assistance or development aid.\textsuperscript{138}

The position is no different in regards to democracy promotion. It is suggested that in order for a democratisation process to be sustainable over time, the process need to be embedded in a democratic culture that incorporate the whole political community. The Swedish conviction is that external democracy promoters can support and encourage such a development, but that the actual social and political transformation needs to be firmly rooted in the local context. Sweden also believes that a relationship, characterised by trust, is needed in order for the development cooperation processes to function effectively. Without trust, the development
cooperation dialogue would be undermined and the possibility to influence the development process could be lost. Sweden is therefore reluctant of connecting conditions to the provided support. The aim is to establish a development cooperation relationship where the objective is shared, rendering stick or carrot methods unnecessary.

The promotion of democratization involves supporting the intrinsic basis for political life, and may be a highly sensitive issue in contact with representatives of the government concerned. Sweden should therefore adopt a somewhat cautious and humble approach in tackling such questions. Sweden needs to build up confidence and credibility in developing the dialogue process. In addition, we should adopt an unambiguous position on democracy and human rights, as well as consistency in our message.

In the main policy documents, attention is given to dialogue as an instrument in development cooperation, as exemplified above. It is argued that Sweden seeks to establish a shared point of view with the recipient country regarding the causes for poverty and the measures required to reach a sustainable development. This shared point of view is primarily reached through dialogue. It is in this process that Sweden needs to find a balance between remaining humble and respectful to the needs and desires of the recipient country, while at the same time remaining firm and consistent to its normative commitments. In dialogue processes, where Sweden and the recipient country can reach a shared understanding, it also becomes possible to establish a formal partnership on development cooperation. Cooperation can also be possible in relationships marked by differences of opinion, as long as a mutually acceptable compromise can be reached. More problematic is a situation where opinions differ significantly and a satisfactory compromise therefore cannot be reached through dialogue. Such situations render a functioning relationship impossible and Sweden might decide to abstain from cooperating with such a country. Swedish development assistance and democracy promotion is in that sense conditional. However, failure does not automatically result in a discontinuation of efforts to promote democracy in contacts with the recipient country. Instead, the Swedish response is determined on a case-to-case basis. Some cases can result in intensified attempts to influence the recipient country, and other cases can lead to a complete termination of cooperation.

Conditionality in development cooperation has to be considered in the light of our aim of contributing to development. Decisions concerning whether to commence, continue or terminate cooperation must primarily be taken in the light of circumstances in the country concerned and the way in which we, as an external donor, can best promote favourable developments.

The tying of development cooperation to conditions, such as democracy and respect for human rights, can therefore in a sense be interpreted as Sweden using stick and carrot
methods in order to promote democracy. Countries that do not accept the declared Swedish conditions risk losing access to development assistance, and acceptance of these conditions increases the chances of becoming a recipient. There are in fact numerous occasions when Sweden has openly criticized recipient countries and even decreased or discontinued its economic engagement. Sweden, for instance, decreased or suspended the development contributions provided to Ethiopia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe as a reaction to human rights violations, poor governance, and corruption. Nevertheless, failure to meet Swedish conditions does not automatically result in disengagement. Sweden also strives for cooperation and mutual commitment concerning the development objectives. It is therefore not unreasonable to interpret rational persuasion as Sweden’s primary method of choice.

As part of the perspective of the poor, Sweden has a preference for establishing a cordial relationship with the governing regime in the recipient country. In cases where development dialogue processes turn unsuccessful, and cordial partnerships cannot be reached, the development approach can be changed and support instead be redirected towards civil society, or other actors whom Sweden are able to reach common ground with. The democracy promotion approach used by Sweden can thus adjust to the context and the relationship that can be obtained with different actors in the recipient country. Nonetheless, some structure is detectable in the recommended approaches. For instance, a categorization of recipient countries with regards to their democratic progression is in part used to guide the choice of development approach. In the policy document *Democracy and human rights in Sweden’s development cooperation*, a “sensitive approach” is recommended in contacts with recipient countries where the democratic progression has been extensive and only minor democratic improvement is needed in order to reach democratic consolidation. The Swedish democracy promotion approach in contacts with such countries is essentially geared towards supporting “positive processes by contributing resources and experience”. It is also the priorities of the recipient country concerned that mainly determine the content and extent of Swedish democracy promotion. A more active approach is suggested needed in contacts with countries where democracy is beginning to emerge, and where there are political aspirations but where there are insufficient capabilities or a weak civil society.

In such cases, it is important to try to expand the scope of the civil society, encourage the media and develop the prerequisites for active political involvement. A dialogue with both the government and the civil society is important in this context. It is also important to take direct initiatives and contribute to capacity-building by integrating democracy aspects into other development assistance measures, and to eliminate obstacles such as obsolete legislation and weak administrative structures.

Compared to the “sensitive approach” that is recommended in relations with open democracies, the policy document now refer to the importance of being “more active” and taking “greater initiative”. It therefore appear that the role of Swedish democracy promotion
changes between these different categories of countries and that Sweden is willing to take a more pro-active role towards emerging or grey-zone democracies where democratic acceptance is high but capabilities are low. The channels used in such instance are suggested to be both formal democratic institutions and the civil society in a combined top-down and bottom-up approach. The advocated approach towards grey-zone democracies that have become marked by democratic regression or where illiberal practices have consolidated is more ambiguous. It is stated that Sweden should attempt to normalise the relationship between government and opposition if a conflict exist, and that support should be given to democratic forces in civil society. It is however, suggested that a top-down approach is more difficult to pursue because of possible unwillingness of the governing regime in these countries to participate in such activities. Development support to such governments could also serve to strengthen them and that would be counterproductive if they are not committed to the objective of continued democratisation. It is further expressed that Sweden sees multilateral channels, such as UN agencies, as possibly more appropriate, because it is believed to be easier to gain acceptance for sensitive measures through them. The final category discussed is authoritarian countries, where different approaches are recommended depending on the countries willingness to participate in a dialogue about democracy promotion. Dialogue is therefore mentioned as an important starting point for influencing authoritarian countries to embark upon a democratic transition. The channels used to promote democracy are then chosen in relation to their perceived ability to open the way for democratisation. Support of the development of a pluralistic free market, for instance, is mentioned as a possible vehicle for democratisation. In contacts with clearly repressive regimes, it is suggested that the Swedish approach can be to support people working for democracy inside or outside of the country. Caution is recommended in such instances, because of the possibility for violence and oppression. Such risks are nevertheless not considered as an absolute hindrance for Swedish democracy promotion, which has been exemplified through the cooperation between Sweden and ANC during the apartheid period in South Africa.

The channels that are presented as suitable for Swedish democracy promotion span the entire spectrum of different options, from supporting the development of formal democratic institutions to local empowerment and democratic culture projects. This flexibility in regards to choice of democracy promotion channel seems to originate from the two dimensions of the Swedish model of democratisation, democratic culture and democratic institutions, and the conviction that development is contextually rooted. The precise choice of approach is therefore to be based on the actual conditions in the recipient country. Accordingly, the Swedish policy appears thoroughly flexible concerning the choice of channels. Laakso reached the conclusion that the role of the state is especially emphasised in Nordic policy on democracy promotion. This conclusion is rather puzzling, as this study has failed to find any such indications within the Swedish policy documents. The conclusion of this study is that the Swedish policy documents provide ample references to both top-down and bottom-up channels.
To summarise, the primary method of choice for Swedish democracy promotion seems to be rational persuasion, within the frame of a development cooperation dialogue. Carrot and stick methods can be used to place pressure on the recipient country, but Sweden foremost attempt to reach common ground and establish a partnership where the objectives of the democracy promotion activities becomes a joint venture. The policy documents indicates an open and flexible approach with regards to choice of channels. The entire spectrum of options remains open and the actual choice appear to be dependent on what is determined as suitable and feasible in each respective case.

Impact

Swedish development cooperation is conducted with the aspiration of contributing to a continued democratic progression in the recipient countries. The impact of the contributed support is therefore of interest for Sweden. The manner in which Sida monitors and evaluates the progress and impact of conducted development projects has recently gained increased attention. Two reports by the Swedish National Audit Office (SNAO) were published during 2007 in which the Swedish Government and Sida received criticism for shortcomings on these matters. These reports brought renewed energy to a periodically returning discussion on the effectiveness and impact of development cooperation. The possible ramification of these reports and the discussion it sparked about the practices of Swedish development cooperation are still early to determine. Nor is the purpose of this study to explore this issue. What is of interests is the possible effect that evaluation methods may have on the design and impact of democracy promotion activities. Can indications be found within the Swedish policy for democracy promotion suggesting that evaluation demands influence project designs? If such indications exist, is their reason to believe that these demands affects the impact of democracy promotion activities?

A number of different methods and approaches are used by Sida to support project management and provide tools for evaluation. One of the primary methods used is the Logical Framework Approach (LFA). The LFA can be described as an instrument for objective-oriented planning of projects. The primary purpose of the LFA is to provide a logical structure for project planning, which will guide project managers in assessing the “relationship between inputs, outputs, outcome/impact and objectives”. The approach also serves to increase the possibilities for outside evaluation of the outcome produced, because emphasis is given to the need of developing objectively verifiable indicators. These demands are partly the result of an experienced vagueness with regards to the objective of many projects, which have made measurements of goal achievement impossible. As a project planning method the LFA is constructed on nine steps that should be considered in conjunction with each other. These nine steps are; analysis of the project’s context, stakeholder analysis, problem analysis/situation analysis, objective analysis, plan of activities, resource planning, indicators/measurements of objectives, risk analysis and risk management, and analysis of the assumptions.
Sida has also developed an evaluation manual that is intended for both Sida staff and cooperation partners. This evaluation manual emphasises most of the same components as the LFA, such as the importance of incorporating local shareholders and the need for objectively verifiable indicators. The extent of the influence of these methods and tools on Swedish democracy promotion activities is difficult to determine through an analysis of policy documents. The LFA incorporates elements that respond well to other pivotal components of Swedish development cooperation policy. For instance, in the form of demands for the inclusion of contextual analysis and local stakeholders during the project planning phase. These demands can be interpreted as reflecting the perspective of the poor, the uniqueness of development process, and the need for local ownership. The component of the LFA that seem most intriguing in relation to its possible ramification on the implemented activities is the demand for measurable indicators. This demand can be interpreted as an attempt to avoid vague project objectives that may cause inefficient and poorly conducted development projects. As such this demand can be completely justified, but it can also have negative ramifications on Swedish democracy promotion activities, by contributing to a situation where the “evaluation tail begins to wag the program dog”, as Carothers described it. Project managers may risk losing sight of the overarching objective of the implemented activity in the pursuit of clear and measurable indicators. The demand for objectively verifiable indicators can in short influence the core strategy, placing the model of democracy and model of democratisation at a disadvantage. There is, however, no natural conflict between demands for measurable indicators and the other components of a core strategy. All of these components can complement each other in harmony. An awareness of the possible conflict should nevertheless be maintained. The Swedish policy documents indicate a degree of ambiguity on these matters and it is difficult to determine to what extent such awareness exists. No explicit mentioning is given to the possible danger of designing democracy promotion activities to tightly after demands for measurable indicators. There is no indication that the demands for measurable indications serve to diminish the focus on democracy promotion as an overarching objective. The conclusion is therefore that evaluation demands appear to influence the design of Swedish democracy promotion activities, but that the extent and consequence of this influence is difficult to determine.

Concluding observations

Three overarching features of the Swedish democracy promotion policy particularly stand out in this analysis and therefore deserve some additional comments. The first feature is the influence of a Swedish democratic self-image, which is both reflected through these documents but also created through the policy process. It is repeatedly declared by Sweden that local traditions need to be respected and that political institutions need to be developed by the community they are suppose to function in. But when investigating the features of the democracy model that permeates the Swedish policy it becomes clear that the Swedish democratic system is used as a reference point and normative foundation. The legal
constitutional democracy that is depicted in these documents bear close resemblance to standard definitions of a liberal democracy. It is when the features of the societal democracy are included that the impression of an idealised Swedish democratic system becomes more apparent. This is especially noticeable in the emphasis of features such as social welfare, equitable distribution, people’s movements, and equal gender representation. These features are commonly evoked as typical characteristics of the Swedish democratic system and they are present in the general objective of Swedish democracy promotion. The Swedish democratic self-image is furthermore reflected in the Swedish understanding of democratisation processes. Indication suggests that Sweden’s understanding of democratisation process is influenced by the country’s own historical experiences and that these experiences influence the democracy promotion strategies that is used abroad to spread democracy. The emphasis placed on people’s movements and state institutions during democratisation processes can be interpreted as reflecting the influential role that labour unions and strong state institutions had in the development of the Swedish political community. It can therefore be argued that Sweden attempts to spread typically Swedish democratic practices abroad. But as previously pointed out, this democratic self-image is not necessarily compatible with the declared conviction that development process needs to be built upon local ownership and local traditions in order to be sustainable. A balance therefore needs to be reached between these two extremes during the process of designing the supported projects, which places field operatives in a pivotal position to shape the outcome of Swedish democracy promotion activities.

The second feature of the policy that deserves to be further mentioned is the extensive eclectic theoretical reflection that permeates the Swedish policy despite the absence of any explicit reference to established academic theories. This theoretical reflection is for instance found in the discussion concerning democracy, where two operational definitions are outlined: legal and societal democracy. Other examples of this theoretical awareness can be found in the discussions about the role of human rights, the state, civil society, and social struggles over time, and so forth. The theoretical foundation that is outlined in the policy is however eclectic in that it seems to have been assembled from parts of a large number of different theories. Exactly how this theoretical foundation has been assembled remains relatively unclear but it seems likely that the inclusion of certain features have been influenced by the Swedish democratic self-image. The role of state institutions in the top-down approach, and the role of people’s movements in the bottom-up approach are such features that connect the theoretical foundation with the democratic self-image. The eclectic assembly of theories can also reflect an uncertainty about the driving factors behind democratisation processes. Instead of uniting behind one theory for democratisation, Sweden has attempted to include lessons from many theories. This can metaphorically be categorised as a shotgun approach instead of a bullet approach.

The third and final feature of the policy that deserves to be highlighted is the flexibility of the policy. The democratic objectives that are discussed and described in the policy together with the Swedish model of democratisation provide ample room for adjustment to local
conditions. This flexibility is useful in the changing environment that constitutes the field and may have been developed with this purpose in mind. As has been stated earlier, it places significant policy influence in the outer link of the policy chain because of the large assortment of different democracy promotion activities that can be justified on the basis of the policy, which may help to explain the importance placed by Sida on field offices. Moreover, this policy flexibility, together with the conviction that development processes needs to be constructed on local ownership and local traditions in order to be sustainable, places contextual analysis in a pivotal position during the process of determining the areas of the democratisation process to focus democracy promotion support upon.

Summary

This chapter has provided a background to Swedish development cooperation and an analysis of the principal policy characteristics of Swedish democracy promotion. The analysis has identified the state aid agency Sida as the primary actor entrusted with the mandate to promote democracy on behalf of Sweden. The analysis has furthermore found that the main motivations provided as justification for Swedish democracy promotions are of altruistic or ideological nature. Swedish democracy promotion is conducted from a normative position with the ambition of supporting a global development that will provide the people in the recipient countries with better living conditions and a better international climate in general. There are indications of self-serving motives as well, but the dominating motivations within the policy documents are altruistic or ideological.

The analysis has attempted to identify the core strategy, or compass, for Swedish democracy promotion: composed by Sweden’s understanding of democracy and democratisation. It has been established that Sweden principally subscribes to a liberal democratic model of democracy with typical Swedish democratic characteristics. It is a democratic model that is closer to a maximalistic definition of democracy than a minimalistic definition: primarily because Sweden to a significant extent includes content and outcome of the system into the definition. Sweden recognises the importance of local ownership and respect of local traditions in the creation of socio-political institutions, but indications also suggest that Sweden utilises its own political system as a frame of reference. In regards to Sweden’s understanding of democratisation the analysis have been unsuccessful in finding any explicit references to traditional theories on democratisation or a distinctly outlined Swedish model for democratisation. Implicit references to different democratisation theories and the features of a Swedish understanding of democratisation processes can nonetheless been detected. The Swedish understanding of democratisation processes seems in many ways to be constructed upon a mixture of different theories. Two democratic dimensions especially stand out. Firstly, the existence of a democratic culture is suggested to have essential importance in bringing about democratisation. The argumentation is based on a bottom-up perspective where the people through a protracted power struggles against the prevailing power situation brings about a democratisation process. It is foremost this dimension that seems to have origins in
Swedish historical experiences. Secondly, the introduction of formal democratic institutional structures is suggested to provide possibilities to shape social behavioural patterns. The argumentation is constructed upon a top-down perspective. This dimension may also have origins in Swedish domestic experiences, but such references are not as clearly declared.

Sweden’s primary method of choice for democracy promotion seems to be rational persuasion, within the frame of a development cooperation dialogue. Carrot and stick methods can be used to place pressure on the recipient country, but Sweden foremost attempt to reach common ground and establish a partnership where the objectives of the democracy promotion activities becomes a joint venture. The policy documents indicate an open and flexible approach in regards to choice of channels. The entire spectrum of different options are remain open and the actual choice seems to be dependent on what is determined as suitable and feasible in each respective case. The analysis finally found indication that evaluation demands influences the design of Swedish democracy promotion activities. The ramifications of these effects were however not possible to determine.

Notes:

1 Hetne (1995)
2 Kingsbury (2004a), Remenyi (2004a)
4 Rostow (1956), Rostow (1959), Gerschenkron (1962), Rostow (1971)
6 See Ekman (2007) for a comprehensive summary of different measurements of economic development.
7 Kingsbury (2004a), Kingsbury (2004b)
9 See Ekman (2007) for a comprehensive summary of different measurements on democracy and development.
10 McKay (2004)
12 Gov. Bill, 1962:100, pp. 5, 7 (author’s translation)
15 Bhagwati (1966), Huntington (1968)
17 Brodin (2000)
23 OECD (2000)
26 Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 pp. 29-30
27 Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 p. 30
29 Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 p. 1
30 Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 p. 21
32 Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 p. 22
33 Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 p. 22

Gunilla Carlsson, the minister for International Development Cooperation, speaking at a press conference concerning the new direction of Swedish Development Cooperation on 27 august 2007.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2007)

Sida (2002), Sida (2005a), Sida (2006c). New policy documents can be added but this is the situation in November 2007.

Sida (2005c), Sida (2005d), Sida (2007a). The other two policy documents concerns Sida’s policy concerning environmental management system and Sida’s policy concerning private sector development. New policy documents can be added but this is the situation in November 2007.

Sida (1997a), Sida (1997b), Sida (2006b), Sida (2005e). Information concerning the other policy documents can be found on the Sida homepage. New policy documents can be added but this is the situation in November 2007.

Sida (2002b), Sida (2002c), Sida (2002d), Sida (2002e)

Interview with Sida official D

Information provided by Sida (2006) and the Sida homepage.

The information concerning the Sida organisation is taken from Sida (2006), Sida (2003) and the Sida homepage.

Sida (2005a)

Sida (2007b) p. 20

Sida (2005f)


Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 p. 19

Kärre & Svensson (1989) p. 231

Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 p. 7


Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 p. 21


Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 p. 52

Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 pp. 36-39, 51-52

Compare with Johansen (1991), Starr (1992)


Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 p. 30

Dalacoura (2005), Gause III (2005)

Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 p. 35

Sida (1997a) p. 11


OECD (2005) p. 11

Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 pp. 8-9

Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 p. 77


Sida (1997a) p. 12

Sida (1997a) p. 12

For more about US democracy promotion, see Cox et al (2000)


Gov. Bill, 2002/03:122 p. 21

Gov. Bill, 2002/03:122 p. 23


Gov. Comm. 2003/04:20 p. 8


Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 pp. 28-29

Other studies have come to similar conclusions, see Crawford (2000), Laakso (2002), Schraeder (2003)


The methods reports produced by the Division for Democratic Governance however makes references to different democratisation theories: see for instance Sida (2002b). The dubious standing of this document complicates the possible usage of this report in this study. The argumentations included in this document does however not digress from the general findings of this study.

This line of argumentation can also be found in the methods reports, see Sida (2002c), Sida (2002d)


Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 p. 7

Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 p. 61


Sida (1997a) p. 9

This line of thinking is clearly outlined in one of the methods reports where the transitional process is subdivided into “three separate stages: the transition from authoritarian rule to electoral democracy, from electoral democracy to constitutional democracy and, lastly, from the constitutional form to consolidated democracy.” See Sida (2002b) p. 2

212
130 See chapter two for a more in-depth description of this theory and its main proponents and critics.
136 Other organisations are also mentioned, like the International IDEA, Swedish labour and business
organisations, and different regional organisations and bilateral donors, but the organisations mentioned in the
137 Sida (2005a)
138 Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 adopted a more consistent usage of this terminology in comparison to previous policy
documents.
139 For similar conclusions, see Laakso (2002)
141 For a similar conclusion, see Danielson & Wohlgemuth (2005)
151 Laakso (2002)
152 SNAO (2007a), SNAO (2007b)
153 For recent critical contributions to this discussion, see Krause (2007), Mosander (2008)
154 See for instance Sida (2004a), Sida (2004b), Sida (2005a), Sida (2005b)
155 Sida (2005a) p. 73
156 Sida (2004b) p. 29
157 Sida (2004a) p. 7
158 Sida (2004b)
159 Sida (2004a), Sida (2004b)
160 Carothers (1999) p. 294
Swedish democracy promotion in Macedonia

With an awareness of the principle characteristics of the overarching Swedish policy for democracy promotion, the investigation will now focus on the Swedish democracy promotion activities in Macedonia during the period 2000-2006. The study will investigate the manner in which Sweden, through Sida, attempted to promote democracy in Macedonia and thereby support the triple transition. What are the main characteristics of Sweden’s attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia? How can these activities best be understood in relation to Sweden’s overarching policy on democracy promotion and local demands? The empirical material used for this analysis consists of a Swedish regional strategy, *Svenska utvecklingssamarbetet med länderna i OSS och Västra Balkan* (Gov. Comm. 2004/05:109), a Sida policy document, *Guidelines for Sida’s Support to Human Rights and Democracy Projects in the Western Balkans*, the Swedish country strategies for Macedonia during the period 2000-2006, and a number of other documents that present Sweden’s activities in Macedonia. In the process of investigating these activities, the study will attempt to link them to the ongoing democratisation process in Macedonia. By connecting the investigated activities to the different dimensions of the democratisation process the ambition is to increase the understanding about both the activities conducted as such and the role of these activities in Macedonia’s democratisation process. The analysis follows the analytical structure outlined in chapter five. The theories and factors concerning democracy and democratisation discussed in chapters two and three, together with the conclusions presented in chapter six, will also be used as a foundation for the analysis.

**Actors**

Swedish development cooperation in Macedonia is a relatively new phenomenon. The country first became a recipient in 1999 when humanitarian assistance was sent in response to the large refugee movements caused by the Kosovo conflict. However, Sweden was already involved in the country before these events; foremost as part of the UN mandated conflict prevention force that was dispatched in 1993 to the northern borders of Macedonia. During this mission, Sweden cooperated with Finland, Norway, and Denmark in an attempt to prevent Macedonia from becoming entangled in the armed conflicts that erupted during the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The first development cooperation strategy between Sweden and Macedonia was adopted in November 2000 and lasted until December 2002. The second country strategy was adopted in March 2003 and lasted until December 2005, followed by a third strategy for the period 2006-2010. These documents served as the primary directives for Sweden’s development cooperation with Macedonia during the different declared periods. The first country strategy empowered Sida to administrate the Swedish ODA as an active
development partner for the coming 5-10 years. All of the strategies declare that democracy promotion is an important objective for Swedish development cooperation in Macedonia. No set amount of annual Swedish ODA was allocated in these country strategies. Instead, it is declared that the development cooperation with Western Balkan should be financed via Sida’s funding for Europe and the more specific country allocation should remain flexible to regional developments. The financial contributions to Macedonia during the period 2000-2006 hovered around 60 million SEK yearly, which places Sweden among the top ten donors in Macedonia, as shown in table 7.1.

<table>
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<th>Top ten donors of gross ODA in Macedonia (2005-06 average) (USD m)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>IDA⁵</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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Table 7.1 Top ten donors of gross ODA in Macedonia, in millions of USD
Source: OECD Development Database on Aid

Sweden is the actor under scrutiny in this study. By Sweden, this study refers to the combined activities of the Parliament, Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the subordinated state aid agency Sida. However, with regards to the Swedish activities in Macedonia, the focus is on Sida as the representative for Sweden. When analysing Swedish democracy promotion in the field, the issue is complicated by the fact that Sida rarely takes responsibility for the actual implementation of field activities. Sida describes itself as a “development partner” that provides “contributions” to “cooperation partners” who in turn, bear the “full responsibility” to plan and implement programmes/projects.⁶ It therefore means that these cooperation partners who are entrusted with the implementation of the supported programmes/projects, have significant influence over Swedish democracy promotion activities in the field, without being directly subordinated to Swedish state institutions. The quotation below is an indication of how Sida envisages the process that leads to the initiation of a development cooperation concerning a specific programme/project.

“Based on identified development needs, the cooperation partner formulates a programme/project to implement necessary improvements or reforms. The
partner will seek support from development partners if the improvements cannot be financed from their own resources. [...] A programme/project proposal could be presented to Sida and/or other development partners as a request for funding. Upon receiving such a request, Sida will, on its part, assess it and in the case of a positive assessment, prepare a Swedish contribution in support of the programme/project.  

If Sida finds a request or a submitted project proposal suitable in light of the country strategy, and if the financial resources for a contribution are available, a “specific agreement” is signed between Sida and the cooperation partner, in which the undertakings of the signatory partner are defined. It is important to note that Sida declares that it remains actively engaged in the project process during its entire lifespan. The submission of a project proposal is followed by a preparation phase, where Sida officials and the cooperation partner discuss and refine the project plans. When agreement is reached about the project design, Sida takes a decision to allocate a financial contribution to the activity and the project is launched. During the period of the project implementation, Sida remains actively involved for instance through regular reviews, field visits, analyses of reports, and a continuous monitoring of financial management and procurement. This relationship continues until the project has run its course or until Sida, or the cooperation partner, decides to discontinue the engagement. The completion or discontinuation of projects is also supposed to be followed by a retrospective follow-up or evaluation. Sida has adopted this development practice because it is believed to generate genuine ownership by the cooperation partner. Sida regards this to be one of the key conditions for sustainable development. A policy chain therefore connects the Swedish parliament, via the Government, Foreign Ministry, and Sida, down to the respective cooperation partners in the field. The overarching policy directives for Swedish development cooperation are supposed to be passed down through this chain.

The concrete policy flow is more uncertain. The different cooperation partners are not subordinated to Sweden or Sida, and are therefore not obliged to follow Swedish policy. The conditions for the cooperation are instead dictated by the “specific agreement”, in which the cooperation partner and Sida come to an agreement about the terms of the programme/project. Sida supervises and takes responsibility for the inclusion of the main Swedish policy directives concerning development cooperation into the programme/project during the process of reaching such an agreement. But a gap still exists in the policy chain between Sida, the Swedish state aid agency, and the signatory partner organisation, which ranges from local state authorities to a NGO. This study recognises that both Sida and different cooperation partners were involved in promoting democracy in Macedonia on behalf of Sweden. As Sida is directly subordinated to the Swedish Foreign Ministry, and thereby ultimately to the Swedish Parliament, the focus will be on this institution. The cooperation partners will consequently only be included into this study as a means for investigating the content of the Swedish activities in Macedonia.
Sida worked with a number of different cooperation partners in Macedonia during 2000-2006. A number of these organisations were classified as partner organisations, meaning that Sida have an institutionalised cooperation with them. Three of these organisations, the Women to Women foundation (KtK), The Swedish Helsinki Committee (SHC), and Olof Palmes International Centrum (OPIC), were contracted through framework agreements to cooperate with Sida in the thematic area of human rights and democratic governance. Sida transferred resources to these three organisations annually and they in turn, took responsibility to coordinate and distribute these resources into smaller projects. Sida also cooperated with other cooperation partners, for instance PEP International, ACTED-IRDU, and ALKA. These three NGOs were responsible for managing the two largest projects within the thematic area of democratic governance, AMPEP and Integrated Rural Development Programme. Within the framework of Swedish development contributions, AMPEP and Integrated Rural Development Programme together had the financial size of all the other projects within the thematic area of democratic governance put together. This will be discussed in greater detail later, but it should be noted that this study refrains from discussing the content of all the projects in detail. The primary objective is rather to examine general patterns in the Swedish activities in Macedonia and the factors behind these patterns.

Motives

A number of possible motives can drive actors to engage in democracy promotion, ranging from altruistic and ideological motives to different self-interests, such as economic, political, and security motives.\(^1\) The Swedish policy for democracy promotion, as discussed in the previous chapter, primarily indicates that altruistic and ideological motives serve as the driving force for Swedish engagement. When investigating the Swedish attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia a similar pattern emerges. The documentation concerning these activities frequently provides indications that the Swedish engagement can be connected to altruistic and ideological motives.\(^2\) In the case of Macedonia, the Swedish engagement took a starting-point in a contextual understanding, where Macedonia was understood to be a grey-zone democracy in the process of carrying out a triple transition. This contextual understanding resembles the conclusions reached in the analysis of Macedonia’s democratisation process presented in chapter four. The three transitional dimensions can subsequently be used when presenting the Swedish understanding of the contextual setting. The transitional process is illustrated as causing serious upheaval in all three dimensions, something which has put the country in need of external development support. Starting with the political dimension the documents describe the Macedonian democratisation process as remaining in a transitional phase. The democratic institutions are described as fragile, with unclear boundaries separating politics and administration, and lacking an established democratic culture. Other political deficiencies mentioned include a high rate of corruption, a flawed judicial system, and a political tardiness to implement necessary transitional reforms. These political deficiencies have affected the efficiency of the state, which in turn, has
contributed to a low level of public support for political institutions. Sweden expresses concerns over the human rights situation in the country, and about the possibility that lingering deficiencies within the political dimension may cause democratic regression, radical nationalism, and intensified social and ethnic division. Many of these political deficiencies are linked to the problems that are identified within the economic sector. Statements indicate that Sweden considered Macedonia to be struggling to complete the transition from command economy to market economy. Macedonia is presented as the poorest of the former Yugoslavian republics and reference is made to the damage caused during the 1990s by the Greek trade embargo and the UN trade sanctions on Montenegro and Serbia. The financial sector are depicted as obsolete, the banking sector as underdeveloped, and privatisation methods as unsatisfactory. The inability to generate sustained economic growth, partly caused by the absence of market economic traditions, is portrayed as a source for extensive unemployment and poverty. Taken together, Sweden regarded these economic shortcomings as factors that undermined the political stability of the country and as a serious hindrance for poverty reduction. The deficiencies within the political and economic sector are also linked to the third dimension of the triple transition: the state-nation dimension. Statements indicate that Sweden regarded the ethnic balance within Macedonia as extremely fragile and that the situation were affected by the deficiencies in the political and economic sector. Sweden declared that a pro-active approach was of great importance in order to prevent an intensification of ethnic tension and possible future violence, as such a development would result in severe human suffering and most likely have extremely damaging effects on Macedonia’s development process. This contextual analysis, with its implicit three dimensions, is summarised in the first country strategy, by the following three declared objectives for Swedish development cooperation with Macedonia.

- To promote a stable peace in the region
- To promote democratisation and respect for human rights
- To promote a socially sustainable market economy that can generate enduring growth and reduce poverty.

The Swedish engagement in Macedonia is justified through reference to the main policy documents for development cooperation, where it is declared that human rights serve as a normative framework for Swedish activities and that the overarching objective is to raise the standard of living of poor people in the world. Reference is also made to the conviction that poverty is a wider concept than merely material needs. It is declared that Sweden incorporates a political dimension into the concept, where issues such as power/powerlessness, empowerment, and opportunity are included. Instead of elaborating on these motives, the strategy documents mainly present perceived development shortcomings and the different objectives for Swedish development cooperation in Macedonia. The conveyed impression is that Macedonia was regarded as a country at the crossroads. The conviction appears to have been that external efforts could underpin a continued trajectory towards democratic
consolidation and future EU-membership, which is a development that Sweden, on what appears to have been primarily altruistic and ideological motives, decided to support. This impression is reinforced when the Sida supported projects are taken into consideration. All of the projects supported by Sida during the period between 2000-2006 incorporated objectives and designs that are connected to primarily altruistic and ideological motives. Sida contributions were categorised under four headings, economic development, environment, democratic governance, and fight against HIV/AIDS, and all these contributions were connected to detected contextual development needs. The allocated contributions primarily targeted NGOs, agricultural projects, and institution building support. A few examples were: School of Tolerance, a project that attempted to develop a model of interaction between school-children-teachers-parents-peer educators with the aspiration of raising knowledge and tolerance between different ethnic groups; AMPEP, a project that worked for local empowerment in rural villages; as well as a number of different agricultural projects that supported the development of the economic sector in Macedonia. When reviewing the list and description of these projects, it is difficult to find evidence of Swedish self-interest. Swedish actors, such as the Swedish University of Agricultural Science (SLU) and the Federation of Swedish Farmers (LRF), were involved in the implementation of a number of projects. Their involvement can possibly be interpreted as serving Swedish self-interests in the form of cloaked economic contributions to these organisations, or attempts to gain economic advantages on a new market, but the extent of their involvement and the content of the supported projects indicate however that such motives are secondary at best to the primary altruistic motive of supporting the development process in Macedonia.

Despite this perceived dominance of altruistic and ideological motives, there are also indications that the Swedish engagement in Macedonia is partly motivated by different self-interests. References are made to the existence of violent conflicts in the region and Swedish engagement in different conflict management operations. One interpretation of these references is to regard them as reflecting the altruistic desire to support the development of a stable region where people can live together in peace, but they can also be interpreted as concerns that conflicts in Macedonia, and in the region as a whole, may have negative ramifications for Sweden. The cost of Swedish military engagement in the western Balkans and the large number of refugees that migrate to Sweden from this region are mentioned for instance when the Swedish engagement in the Balkans is justified.

The costs for Sweden’s military engagement in the region 1991-2004 have amounted to approximately 9 billion SEK. Taking into account the cost of admitting into Sweden over 100,000 refugees from the region the Swedish engagement is extensive.

Western Balkan is one of the primary regions of origins for asylum seekers in Sweden, with a significant element of minorities. Declining living conditions, discrimination, lack of power and influence contribute to people leaving their
countries in the pursuit of a better future elsewhere. Swedish activities should also contribute to increasing the possibility for people to stay in their home country.\textsuperscript{21}

These citations may indicate that Sweden not only engaged in development cooperation and democracy promotion in Macedonia because of altruistic and ideological motives. They can be interpreted as indications that economic and security motives also served as partial explanations for Sweden’s commitment. By promoting democracy in Macedonia, Sweden has been able to support a socio-economic development that will hopefully render future military engagement unnecessary. Socio-economic development in Macedonia is not only good for the country; it can also be beneficial for the region and Europe as a whole. The Balkans has endured significant hardship since the collapse of communism and the consolidation of a liberal democracy in Macedonia can have a stabilizing influence on neighbouring countries. Continued democratisation towards consolidation would additionally increase possibilities to address the problems of organised crime, human trafficking and drug trade, that Sweden argues is plaguing the region and spreading into Europe.\textsuperscript{22} Democracy promotion can also function as a means for increasing the possibility for people to stay in Macedonia, thereby preventing large refugee movements, which in turn may place Sweden under pressure. Large refugee migration into Sweden is not without its costs, as pointed out by the quote above, and Sweden may therefore want to assign resources to resolving the problem at its core instead of being forced to deal with the consequences of the problem. Both of these dimensions can be interpreted as altruistically motivated, but it is also possible to see economic and security motives for Sweden in these issues. There are further indications of particularly economic motives. Statements indicate that Sweden has an interest in supporting the efforts of Swedish companies to export and investment in the region.\textsuperscript{23}

Possibilities to support the presence of Swedish enterprises in the region as part of the development cooperation process should be taken. For instance should educational contributions in connection with investments of individual companies in Macedonia be possible. In exceptional cases this can even apply to sectors not directly prioritised in this strategy. It furthermore is of importance to strengthen the Swedish representation in important organisations such as the EAR.\textsuperscript{24}

As previously discussed, it is likely that the Macedonian economic sector would benefit from increased contacts with Swedish enterprises. The investments of Swedish enterprises could result in jobs, tax revenues, labour skill transfers, and other favourable outcomes for Macedonia. The Swedish willingness to support such activities can therefore serve altruistic motives. But it is also possible to interpret this willingness as an indication of Swedish economic self-interests, particularly because it is declared that sectors not directly prioritised by the country strategy can be considered for an allocation of contributions. This implies that
there may exist occasions when the willingness to support Swedish enterprises takes precedence over otherwise prioritised sectors. Such statements are therefore not necessarily compatible with the notion that Sweden is primarily motivated by altruistic and ideological motives. Instead, it provides support to the previously discussed conclusion from Schraeder et al that trade considerations influence Swedish development cooperation. However, no Swedish enterprises became involved in the projects that received contributions from Sida during 2000-2006, which either indicates a low interest from Swedish enterprises or a Sida decision to allocate resources to other projects.

Furthermore, the Swedish activities in Macedonia can serve political motives. Macedonia was the first country in the Western Balkans to sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU and has future EU-membership as a key strategic objective. Sweden recognises and supports this desire, which is reflected by statements in the country strategies that a EU-perspective should guide all Swedish development cooperation activities in Macedonia. Sweden regards the EU-integration process to be the most effective long-term approach for underpinning a positive socio-economic development in Macedonia. By supporting Macedonia’s EU-integration process, Sweden will help to encourage the implementation of reforms that will lead the country towards liberal democracy, which in turn will support efforts to raise the living standards of poor people in the country. The emphasis placed on a EU-perspective in the Swedish development cooperation with Macedonia can thus be regarded as an altruistic method. It may also reflect political motives, because contributions provided to a future EU-member could be politically beneficial for Sweden in the future.

Finally, some comments deserve to be made about the different cooperation partners’ conceivable motives. As was described earlier, Sida rarely takes responsibility for the actual implementation of programmes/projects. Sida signs agreements with cooperation partners who in turn, take the full responsibility for the implementation of the project. These cooperation partners can be government institutions and they can be NGOs. In Macedonia, Sida has mainly cooperated with NGOs. It is not unreasonable to assume that economic motives serve as a strong driving force for these organisations. As was described in chapter four, the number of NGOs in Macedonia is very high and has in part become a business that provides employment for a part of the population. Gaining a cooperation agreement with a donor organisation, such as Sida, will generate funding for the organisation, which in turn generates wages, which is of great importance because of the strained economic situation in Macedonia. Sida officials located at the field office in Skopje experienced this first hand, as they were frequently contacted by different organisations in search of contributions for diverse projects. The existence of economic motives is not necessarily in conflict with altruistic and ideological motives, as it is a practical reality that external financial resources are needed in order for many NGOs to function in Macedonia. The projects implemented by these NGOs can therefore still be able to serve the purpose of democracy promotion despite being influenced by economic motives. Sweden also wanted to support the growth of a vibrant civil society, and channelling development contributions through, or to, NGOs was
regarded as a means to support such a development. Unfortunately, as previously discussed, many of these NGOs would not have survived without external support and in many cases failed to function as people movements. Sida recognised this concern and incorporated measures to make them sustainable over time. Sida also conducted evaluations of the capabilities of the cooperation partners that applied for contributions, in an attempt to find sustainable and suitable partners. Sida’s partner organisations served an important role in this regard, because they had a longstanding relationship with Sida and consequently had proven to be reliable.

To recapitulate, the driving force behind Swedish democracy promotion activities in Macedonia appear to have been mixture of altruistic and ideological motives. The country strategies incorporate references to the general policy motives for Swedish democracy promotion and the field activities conducted had objectives and designs that correspond well with these motives. Sweden regarded Macedonia as a struggling transitional democracy. The Swedish objective was to support a continued socio-economic development, in the hope that Macedonia would progress towards democratic consolidation and EU-membership, which in turn would improve the living standard of poor people in Macedonia. However, indications of different Swedish self-interests, such as economical, political, and security motives, can be detected. The dominating impression is nonetheless that the influence of such motives was mainly as desirable side effects rather than prime movers.

Strategy

Democracy promoters are guided in their choice of activities by a strategy, or compass, as discussed in chapter five. This compass is constructed on two definable aspects: firstly the character of the desired objective, which is the actor’s understanding of democracy; and secondly the process of political change the actor believes necessary in order to reach that goal, which is the actor’s understanding of democratisation processes. The previously conducted analysis of the Swedish policy on democracy promotion reached the conclusion that Sweden principally subscribes to a liberal definition of democracy, with elements of Swedish democratic characteristics. This democracy model partly reflects a Swedish democratic self-image and it can be positioned closer to a maximalistic definition of democracy along the democratic spectrum, than to a minimalistic definition. The Swedish understanding of democratisation processes has been found to be primarily structured around two dimensions. Firstly, that a democratic culture is essential for bringing about democratisation. This conviction is based on a bottom-up perspective where political change is generated through protracted power struggles between the public and the governing elites for increased political inclusion. Additionally, formal institutions are perceived to be connected to informal institutions, which make a democratic culture a vital component for democratic consolidation. Secondly, there is the belief that the introduction of formal democratic institutions can shape social behavioural patterns and thereby lead to democratisation. This conviction is based on a top-down perspective where the focus is on the
introduction of formal democratic institutions. The belief is that these institutions, when in place, will mould political practices and thereby the community as a whole. Taken together as a combined belief system, this understanding of democracy and democratisation can be conceptualised as Sweden’s core strategy for democracy promotion.

No explicit references to either the Swedish democratic system, or different democratisation models, are made regarding Swedish activities in Macedonia. The amount of theoretical reasoning within the Swedish documentation is relatively limited. The components that instead stand out are context analyses together with project progress reports. Indications of what was previously described as the Swedish core strategy can nonetheless be detected when the documentation is placed under scrutiny. Starting with the Swedish understanding of democracy and its connection to development cooperation, democracy promotion is described as serving the political dimension of poverty reduction and an explicit connection is made between human rights and democracy.

Human rights […] constitute a normative framework, a point of departure of what we want to achieve with our development efforts. […] Democracy solves the problem of how the values described in the human rights conventions can be transformed into reality.31

The declared overall goal for Swedish development cooperation in Macedonia was the well-known development mantra, “to raise the standard of living of poor people in the world”, in which human rights and democracy are regarded as essential components. Human rights serve as the normative foundation for the Swedish notion of a life in dignity, and democracy is the political system required to institutionalise the values and practices that are incorporated within the concept of human rights. Furthermore, Sida guidelines for the support of human rights and democracy projects in the Western Balkans include indications of a maximalistic understanding of democracy.

A formal democracy exists on paper and respects, in its legislation, certain principles in respect of regular elections, the division of power, the balance of power, accountability and so on. A real democracy meets these formal criteria with content – a democratic culture. This is permeated by attitudes and values such as tolerance, dialogue, inclusiveness, consultations, respect for minorities, acceptance and support, representativeness and so on. We do not consider a formal democratic system that violates minorities to be a real democracy.32

The quote above indicates that the objective of Swedish democracy promotion in Macedonia was the introduction of a societal democracy, which incorporates a broader democratic culture and extends the notion of democracy further than the introduction of formal democratic institutions. This democratic understanding is moreover reflected in the breadth of democracy promotion activities that received contributions from Sweden during the period 2000-2006.
Sweden provided contributions to projects that aimed towards strengthening formal democratic institutions as well as a democratic culture. These two approaches often interacted, but a distinction deserves to be made between projects involving ministries, the judiciary, and local governments on the one side, and youth organisations and women movements on the other. The possible influence of a Swedish democratic self-image on the content of these projects is difficult to decisively determine. Most of the projects that received contributions had characteristics that were justifiable on a general liberal democratic basis. Nevertheless, a number of the projects that received contributions from Sida incorporated characteristics that can be regarded as reflecting a Swedish democratic self-image, for example through democratic features such as gender equality and the role of women in development processes. Sida always emphasises the need to include a gender perspective in all the projects to which they provide contributions, an approach they call gender mainstreaming. According to Sida officials, gender issues and the role of women is a dimension that is rarely included in the initial project plans submitted by aspiring cooperation partners. The gender perspective is therefore added in most cases to the project following a request by Sida during the dialogue and project planning process. Sweden’s interest in gender issues is also reflected by a number of Sida financed projects that particularly aim to support the development of women’s movements and strengthen the role of women in Macedonia.

Another project that received contributions from Sweden, and can be perceived as reflecting a Swedish democratic self-image, involved the establishment of an Ombudsman Office. Sweden is often credited with having invented Ombudsman institutions, something which has since become a common feature of democracies worldwide, and therefore it suggests that Sweden has “comparative advantages” in relation to other donors, when it comes to supporting the development of Ombudsman institutions. The interest and contributions dedicated by Sida to this Ombudsman project can be understood as rooted in a Swedish democratic self-image. A final characteristic of the Swedish activities in Macedonia that can be categorised as rooted in a Swedish self-image is the emphasis on government transparency and freedom of information. Sweden incorporated these characteristics into projects aimed towards strengthening political institutions on all levels. The impression is nevertheless that these characteristics, which reflect a Swedish democratic self-image, are not predominant. The conclusions generated by this investigation are therefore ambiguous about the possible influence of a Swedish democratic self-image on the activities conducted in Macedonia. Signs of a Swedish democratic self-image can be noticed, as discussed above, but most of the projects that received contributions from Sida could possibly have received contributions from other donor organisations as well. The possible influence of a Swedish democratic self-image is also reduced by the fact that the cooperation partner controls the actual implementation process. These cooperation partners need to adjust to Swedish priorities in order to receive funding, but they are less likely to have become permeated by a Swedish democratic self-image.
Sweden’s understanding of democratisation as a process underpinned by democratic institutions and a democratic culture is noticeable in the Swedish activities in Macedonia. All of the projects funded by Sida within the thematic area of democratic governance can be connected to one of these two perspectives. Sweden argues that functioning democratic institutions are a prerequisite for democratic consolidation and, in the case of Macedonia, for EU-integration. Macedonia is described as a transitional democracy in need of a continued reform of many of the pivotal state institutions, such as the financial sector, the judiciary, and local governments, if it is to achieve a positive, stable, and sustainable development. For instance, Sweden expresses concerns about the high level of corruption in the country, something which affects all levels of the state apparatus. The corruption problem is identified as one of the main hurdles for improving the situation in the country.

Corruption if one of the main obstacles on the road to Europe and also for a positive development in general. The former Prime Minister as well as the deputy speaker of Parliament resigned for those reasons, pointing in the direction of the Albanian coalition party. The new government set-up stresses the need to fight corruption, but actions to demonstrate this remains to be seen.

On the basis of this analysis, Sweden therefore prioritised the fight against corruption in its country strategies and anticorruption measures were declared to be mandatory in all activities supported by Sida. Encouraging transparency, fair public administrations, and the rule of law are examples of measures used by Sweden to combat corruption. Such measures can be regarded as incorporating a mixture of both the democratisation perspectives: institution building and democratic culture. Another prioritised sector where an institution building perspective merged with a democratic culture perspective, were the projects aimed towards strengthening local governments. Sweden regarded such projects as important for a number of reasons. Macedonia has transformed the municipality boundaries a couple of times since becoming independent and these transformation processes depleted the local governments of resources and capabilities. Sweden therefore regarded projects aimed towards strengthening local governments as essential in order to improve the efficiency of the democratic system as well as ethnic relations. The citation below reflects the argumentation found in support of these projects.

The country has an elected government and democratic structures, but the state is fragile. Support for consolidation of democratic structures and a democratic culture is pivotal factors for stabilising the country further.

To improve the democratic system and improve relations between different ethnic groups in a country where democratic traditions are not well-rooted, local governments should be strengthened in order to be able to provide services to the citizenry.
The quotes above indicate that the emphasis was not solely placed on democratic structures, but also on the development of a democratic culture. As previously discussed, this is partly done in combination with institution building projects. The communist period hampered the development of a vibrant civil society in Macedonia and produced a political culture of negative integration, through which the citizenry become atomized. The public in Macedonia was therefore not accustomed with the practice of entering into dialogue with government agencies and other policymakers, in order to influence decision-making processes about community activities. Instead, the public remained passive and expected government agencies to identify and handle those public concerns that arouse. By supporting the decentralisation process and the strengthening of local government, Sweden attempted to change this political culture and instead encouraged the development of a democratic culture where the public and local governments established a higher degree of interaction and dialogue, the aspiration being that this would lead to local empowerment and support the democratisation process from the bottom-up. Sweden also attempted to support the development of a democratic culture by targeting the civil society more directly. Much of the contributions channelled through SHC, OPIC, and KtK ended up in local civil society organisations. The overarching objective behind this was to strengthen civil society and the democratic culture in an attempt to develop a political culture of interaction, dialogue, tolerance, and community cooperation. Sweden also expected that civil society would function as a balancing force against the state apparatus, especially through its role as society watchdogs.46

Besides these two democratisation perspectives, there are also indications of a third perspective that have influenced the Swedish strategy for democracy promotion in Macedonia, namely a EU-perspective. Future EU-membership is a declared interest for Macedonia and progressive steps have been taken towards this objective. This started with the signing of a trade agreement in 1998, the signing of a SAA in 2001, and finally acceptance as a candidate country in December 2005. Sweden supports this aspiration and has therefore incorporated this EU-perspective into the development cooperation. The EU-perspective in that respect follows the will of Macedonia, but it is also justified as a means for continued democratisation, market economy, and socio-economic development. The importance ascribed to this perspective is partly reflected in different statements about the integration process serving as an overarching framework for all Swedish development cooperation in Macedonia, as exemplified in the quote below.

The main component of EU:s regional strategy for Western Balkans is the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). This process is the primary instrument for these countries to approach the European cooperation structure and constitute the overarching framework for the Swedish development cooperation with Macedonia.47
This EU-perspective, and the declaration that it serves as an “overarching framework” for Sweden’s development cooperation in Macedonia, is striking primarily for two reasons. First, because it may reveal an inconsistency regarding what constitutes the overarching objective for Sweden’s development cooperation in Macedonia; the poverty objective, “to raise the standard of living of poor people in the world”, or the EU-integration perspective. It is possible that the EU-integration process is regarded as the most suitable channel for poverty reduction in Macedonia, and that there is no inconsistency between the two objectives. However, the EU-perspective might also cover different political and economic self-interests, as previously discussed. The country strategies essentially present the EU-perspective as being compatible with the poverty objective, but even Sida officials articulate uncertainty about this matter. One Sida official had the impression that the Swedish Foreign Ministry at times placed the EU-perspective above the poverty objective, and he suggested that political interest in Sweden took precedence. The discussion about the EU-perspective should therefore be considered in the light of the investigation of the conceivable motives for Swedish democracy promotion in Macedonia, and serve as an indication that political and economical motives might influence Swedish development cooperation in Macedonia.

The second reason why the EU-perspective is striking is that it provides an indications that Sweden regards institutional modelling, through twinning, as a potential democratisation strategy. This is to some degree a revelation because, as has been previously discussed, the principle Swedish policy documents on democracy promotion contain no mention of institutional modelling or twinning as a means of democratisation. Even so, twinning is not an unknown Swedish development strategy. Twinning was first introduced into Sida’s development cooperation activities in the mid 1980s and has since been widely used to underpin institution building processes. Sida describes twinning as a cooperation between organisations with similar functions, one organisation in the developing country and the “sister organisation” in Sweden. The basic idea behind twinning is that the cooperation strengthens public organisation and government services in developing countries through a transfer of professional skills and knowledge cultures from the more experienced twin to the less experienced. It is a favoured EU approach for supporting aspiring membership countries in their efforts to reform, adapt, and strengthen public institutions in order to comply with the acquis communautaire. As a development approach, EU-twinning can be regarded as a form of institutional modelling, where the acquis communautaire functions as a checklist and the reform process is partly composed of copying European cooperation structure. Sweden has used twinning in past development cooperation processes for example in Central and Eastern Europe, and indications suggest that Sida used twinning in a couple of projects in Macedonia. The first project involved Statistics Sweden and the Statistical Office in Macedonia, and the second project involved LRF and the Farmers Association in Macedonia. It should be noted that the documentation about these projects used in this study contains no explicit mentioning of twinning, even though the projects appear to incorporate all of the main components of a twinning relationship. Nevertheless, the possibility that Sweden recognises, and uses, twinning as a means of institution building is surprising because
of its possible incompatibility with the perspective of the poor and the belief that socio-political institutions cannot be exported from abroad. Twinning, in label and content, includes a connotation of a partnership between a senior and junior partner, which in many ways is a direct antithesis to the Swedish position on development cooperation. This issue is not discussed in any of the documents about Sweden’s activities in Macedonia, or in the overarching policy documents on democracy promotion, which provides reasons to question the declared Swedish understanding of democratisation processes, as presented in chapter six.

To recapitulate, this study has detected indications that the Swedish activity in Macedonia was partially guided by a Swedish core strategy for democratisation. The objective was to promote a liberal democracy model that partially reflects a Swedish democratic self-image. This model incorporated a broader, maximalistic, understanding of democracy than the mere introduction of formal democratic institutions. However, to what extent the attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia have been shaped by a Swedish democratic self-image has not been decisively determined. The activities conducted in the thematic area of democratic governance reflected the Swedish understanding of democratisation. All of the activities conducted incorporated institution building and/or the nurturing of a democratic culture. The declared justification for these projects regularly included a top-down or bottom-up perspective. The activities in Macedonia also appear to have been influenced by a third perspective on democratisation; a EU-perspective rooted in institutional modelling, where western democratic institutions functioned as transitional models and the democratisation process involved a twinning process.

Methods and Channels

The method most prominently used by Sweden to promote democracy in Macedonia appears to have been rational persuasion, with elements of stick and carrot methods. Two reasons essentially explain why rational persuasion has been the primary method used; first, because the Swedish conviction is that development cooperation needs to be build on dialogue and partnerships with recipient countries, and second, because Macedonia can be regarded as principally being committed to democratisation, making stick and carrot methods largely redundant. Macedonia’s commitment to democratisation is partly reflected through the rapid introduction of the necessary formal institutions for a constitutional democracy following the declaration of independence. Sweden has therefore been able to work with the Macedonian development agenda as a foundation and the rational persuasion method has primarily been used to argue best practices, for instance ethnic tolerance, gender equality, transparency, and the rule of law. The stick and carrot elements of the Swedish method of democracy promotion in Macedonia derive from the conditions and rewards attached to Swedish development support. In order to become a beneficiary of Swedish ODA the recipient country needs to subscribe to the normative objective that underpins these activities, for instance strengthening of gender equality, democracy, and human rights. Commitment to these norms and values increases the likelihood of receiving funding; while failure to conform to these conditions
prevents Sweden from initiating development cooperation with that country. Subsequent failure to conform to these norms after the initiation of development cooperation, may furthermore result in the development support being suspended, or discontinued. Moreover, one of the main driving forces behind Macedonia’s willingness to continue the transition process towards democratic consolidation as a liberal democracy, is rooted in the demands set for EU-membership, for instance by the acquis communautaire. Macedonia depicts future EU-membership as a “key strategic interest and priority objective of the country”, and this conviction strengthens its willingness to implement the democratic reforms stressed during membership negotiations. A possible reward of conforming to the conditions placed on Macedonia by Sweden and other western donor organisations, with regards to continued democratic transition, is a better likelihood of gaining EU-membership. Failure to conform to these conditions on the other hand diminish the possibility. In that sense, the prospect of EU-membership can function as a stick or carrot. The primary foundation of the development cooperation between Sweden and Macedonia is nonetheless a shared understanding about the direction of the continued development process.

Sweden’s choice of channels appears to have been influenced by both theoretical and practical considerations. The Swedish strategy for democracy promotion serves as the theoretical foundation, while the practical considerations involved issues such as, the capacity of the Swedish resource base, the capacity of Macedonian authorities to engage in development cooperation, other donor activities in the country, the determined needs and expressed wishes of the recipient country, and available and reliable cooperation partners. These considerations have been interwoven into all of the decision-making processes that have preceded the approval of both country strategies and the allocation of contributions to specific projects. The planning process for the first country strategy started in early spring 2000, and had as its objective to identify suitable areas for Swedish contributions. This stage involved studies, meetings, trips, and discussions between Swedish officials and different stakeholders. Sweden strived for donor harmonisation and cooperation with Macedonian authorities, but experienced difficulties on both fronts. Macedonia lacked an official development strategy and the state apparatus was not regarded as mature enough to receive and coordinate foreign development support. Sweden therefore hesitated to initiate development cooperation with Macedonian authorities. The large-scale dismissals of public officials following government changes, which effectively erased all institutional memory, were especially mentioned as a factor that complicated long-term development cooperation. Sweden determined that a large number of donors were operating in Macedonia, but that their contributions were poorly coordinated. After discussions with representatives from other donor organisations, Sweden was nonetheless able to identify gaps in the donor web and attempts were made to focus on areas where Swedish activities could complement other development activities in the country. It was also determined that Macedonia’s development needs exceeded the previously provided development contributions, which warranted Swedish contributions. The identified development needs, and the channels used to respond to those needs, can be understood in connection to different dimensions of the triple transition.
The state/nation transition

Upon entering Macedonia, Sweden acknowledged the need to support a development where the ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian communities were able to co-exist peacefully. A number of violent conflicts had previously plagued the Balkan region and Sweden acknowledged that the ethnic balance in Macedonia was “extremely fragile”. Continued ethnic tension, and the possible outbreak of armed violence, was regarded as a threat against continued political, economic, and social development. Sweden therefore aimed to support the improvement of ethnic relations in Macedonia and adopted the position that ethnicity was going to be mainstreamed through all the activities supported. This meant that the ethnic dimension was considered during the process of planning and implementation of all Sida funded projects. The channel that was most forcefully used to improve ethnic relations was civil society organisations and a bottom-up perspective. A number of projects attempted more directly to improve ethnic relations; for instance the Children’s Theatre Centre, a project that attempted to “promote interethnic communication, understanding of other cultures and children’s rights and democracy” through workshops and theatre plays. Sida attempted to reach and influence the opinions of children and youths, based on the conviction that it would be easier to influence the younger generation than the older. Other Sida supported projects, like the School of Tolerance, were based on a similar mindset. The ethnic dimension was also noticeable in the two largest projects within the thematic area of democratic governance, AMPEP and Integrated Rural Development Programme. The objective of both of these projects was to support the decentralisation process by engaging and mobilising citizens in rural areas to develop and cooperate in village councils. Attention was given to the inclusion of all ethnicities in the decision making process, in an attempt to encourage cooperation in the management of local problems. The aspiration was that these ethnic communities would become integrated through joint problem solving processes, and that inter-ethnic cooperation on a local level in turn would influence cooperation patterns on the national level.

The political transition

Sweden regarded Macedonia as a transitional democracy struggling to deal with many of the problems that typically arise during democratisation processes. Sweden therefore acknowledged the need to support the continued strengthening of both democratic institutions and the democratic culture. Continued democratic progression was primarily connected to three different dimensions. Firstly, the EU-integration process was identified as a strong driving force for continued socio-economic development in Macedonia, and this reinforced the Swedish determination to support Macedonia in their aspirations for EU-membership. The prospect of future EU-membership was used to argue the need of developing stable, transparent, and democratic institutions. Secondly, the centralisation process that followed upon Macedonia’s declaration of independence had effectively eroded the capacity of local
governments. Sweden regarded the democratic system as undermined by this concentration of power and suggested that a decentralisation process would improve both the democratic structure and ethnic relations. Thirdly, the democratic culture was deemed to be weak and therefore in need of strengthening. This would be accomplished through improvement of democratic practices in the state apparatus and through support to the development of a vibrant civil society.63

The channels primarily used by Sida to make democratic progress in these areas involved local governments, civil society, and a bottom-up perspective. AMPEP and Integrated Rural Development Programme were the largest projects within the thematic area of democratic governance. The objective of both projects was to support the decentralisation process by encouraging citizens in rural areas to cooperate in village councils, and thereby contribute to local empowerment.64 The Macedonian public entered the democratisation process as largely atomized and pacified, expecting state authorities or external actors to identify and solve community problems, and the projects attempted to change this political culture. The projects encouraged citizens to actively take part in problem solving processes, and thereby develop community awareness. The village councils were also encouraged to develop institutionalised contacts with municipalities and other regional authorities, which in turn could strengthen local democratic practices. The village councils were entrusted with the task of identifying a local problem or need, for instance the repair of village streets, the construction of irrigation channels, or the construction of a water supply system. Sweden then contributed half of the finances necessary to remedy the problem, with the requirement that the village council would convince local governments to contribute the other half. Through these projects, the villages affected gained a practical improvement in their everyday life, while at the same time, communication channels were created and democratic practices were adopted.65 Civil society was supported through contributions to a large number of different organisations. Portions of this support were handled by the three Swedish framework organisations, SHC, OPIC, and KtK.66 Areas receiving Swedish contributions included the development of independent media, women empowerment, gender awareness, contributions to the fights against trafficking, and support of the Roma community.67 Sweden also contributed to a number of institution building projects. Contributions were provided for the development of Ombudsman institutions and a project financed by Sweden attempted to enhance the capacity of the Ministry for Local Self-Government. Both of these projects were conducted in cooperation with other donors, namely the OSCE and the UNDP. Sweden also provided support through Statistics Sweden to the strengthening of the Statistical Office in Macedonia. Many other donors crowded the national level, causing Sweden to make a decision to concentrate on the local level, where the effects of the contributions were deemed to be greater.

The economic transition

Sweden identified significant development needs within the economic sector. The economic transition in Macedonia was regarded as a disappointment, causing severe unemployment,
poverty, and increased ethnic tension. Continued failure to generate economic growth was depicted as a possible threat to the future stability of the country. Swedish contributions were therefore directed to projects aimed to support the economic transition and local production. These contributions cannot be viewed as democracy aid, but they can be called democracy assistance because a partial motive for these activities was to strengthen the ongoing democratisation process. Two areas of the economic sector were especially targeted, the first being agriculture.

Through dialogue with Macedonian authorities and other donor organisations, Sweden identified the agricultural sector as an area where Swedish contributions could have positive influence. The agricultural sector constitutes a significant part of the Macedonian economy, but reforms were necessary for production to be competitive on world markets. Reform was also needed as part of the EU-integration process. One of Sweden’s contributions was to initiate cooperation between LRF and the Farmers Association in Macedonia. The objective was to develop a well-functioning and market-orientated farmers’ organisation that can support the development of the agricultural sector. Another project initiated a cooperation between the SLU and the Faculty for Agriculture at Skopje University. The cooperation provided a channel for knowledge transfer and education between the two institutions. The second area receiving Swedish contributions was the financial sector.

The banking sector in Macedonia was found to be functioning inefficiently, causing small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) to have difficulties finding bank credit. Sweden therefore took initiatives for private sector development through the initiation of two financial funds, which facilitated SME loan requests by providing guarantees for part of the necessary collateral. As previously discussed, the density of SMEs in Macedonia has been relatively low in comparison to the more successful Central European and Baltic countries, but the situation has improved since 2002. Sida financed funds may have contributed to this development.

In ODA-figures, the Swedish development contribution to Macedonia has been disbursed in the following manner, see table 7.2. As shown in table 7.2, a large portion of the Swedish contributions during the period 2000-2006 went to the thematic area of democratic
governance. Following the adoption of a new Swedish country strategy in 2006, this changed in favour of economic development and agriculture. The decision to concentrate on the agricultural sector was taken in accordance with the wishes of Macedonian authorities, following coordination with the activities of other donor organisations, and was justified as a means for improved EU-integration and socio-economic development. A few democratic governance projects have continued to receive Sida contributions after 2006, but many projects initiated during 2000-2005, like AMPEP and Integrated Rural Development Programme, were phased out during 2006.

On the basis of this investigation, the primary channels used by Sweden to promote democracy in Macedonia can be categorised as democracy assistance, targeting governing institutions and civil society, and predominantly using a bottom-up perspective. Many of the Swedish activities incorporated different objectives; democracy promotion being one. AMPEP and Integrated Rural Development Programme can for instance be regarded as democracy promotion projects, but they also incorporated elements of traditional material development assistance: such as the construction of irrigation channels. It is therefore suitable to view them as democracy assistance, rather than democracy aid. Few of the Swedish activities directly targeted formal democratic institutions, even if such institutions were affected. There were projects that did and which thus deserve to be labelled democracy aid, for instance the Ombudsman Office project, but these projects only comprised a small part of the total conducted activities. The Swedish strategy, or compass, for democracy promotion appears to have partially guided the allocation of contributions to certain channels. Many of the Swedish activities, for example, incorporated the strengthening of a democratic culture and a bottom-up perspective on democratisation. The contributions made to civil society organisations and the projects directed towards the local empowerment of rural areas serve as examples of projects that operated on this theoretical basis. Other projects reflect the conviction that democratisation can be reached through institution building and a top-down approach, for instance the Ombudsman Office project. However, practical considerations also seem to have guided the Swedish allocation of contributions, indicating that Sweden is partially influenced by a pragmatic approach to democracy promotion. Sweden appears to have analysed the contextual situation and thereafter concentrated on areas where needs had been identified, where other donors were largely absent, and where suitable and reliable cooperation partners existed. This development practice indicates that the possibility to influence was put before the notion of a rigid theoretical model on democratisation. In this way, the flexibility of the Swedish policy on democracy promotion is detectable, and it is even explicitly declared.

The contributions will be characterised by flexibility and adjustment to needs and absorption capacity in the country.

In that sense, the Swedish activities in Macedonia reinforce the impression that Swedish democracy promotion operates with a flexible democratisation model. The pragmatic
approach is also visible in the choice of partner organisations, where the country strategies show a preference for established channels. Partner organisations like the SHC, OPIC, and KtK, with whom Sida have a longstanding relationship, have an advantage when submitting project proposals compared to other partner organisations. Sida and these partner organisations have cooperated in the past, something which has established trust and understanding that in turn, enables a quick and relatively secure distribution of development contributions. It is also common that donor organisations share their experiences with each other regarding the reliability and efficiency of different cooperation partners. In sum, it can therefore be argued that a mixture of theoretical and practical considerations guides Swedish democracy promotion. The Swedish core strategy on democracy promotion seems to define the wider area of operation, and a pragmatic approach is then used to identify thematic areas and suitable cooperation partners. The underlining policy is taken up again during the dialogue and planning process, when Sida officials revisit relevant policy documents dependent on the area of operation. The forest of Sida policy documents functions in a sense as a smorgasbord from which Sida officials are able to pick out the policy directive that suits the desired project. The breadth of the Swedish core strategy for democracy promotion provides this policy flexibility, and the possibility for Sida officials to influence field activities rests in their ability to justify a large array of democracy promotion approaches. Sida officials are also very much involved during the planning process that precedes the adoption of a country strategy and they control the decisions regarding contribution allocation within the frame of this strategy. This policy flexibility is not necessarily a problem, because ample motivation can be given for the usefulness of such an approach.

To conclude, this study has determined that the primary method used by Sweden to promote democracy in Macedonia has been one of rational persuasion. Elements of stick and carrot methods have been detected, but the Swedish ambition to reach development cooperation based upon dialogue and partnerships and Macedonia’s establish commitment to democracy has made them largely redundant. It has been determined that the Swedish choice of channels was guided by both theoretical and practical considerations. Most Swedish contributions in Macedonia can be categorised as democracy assistance, aimed towards governing institutions or civil society, and primary with a bottom-up perspective. The pragmatic approach used by Sida when determining thematic areas and suitable projects was partially made possible by the flexibility of the Swedish policy for democracy promotion.

Relationship

As discussed in chapter five, the relationship between a democracy promoter and a recipient country affects both the possibility of having influence and the strategy choices open for the democracy promoter. The acceptance of the recipient country of democracy promotion constitutes one dimension of the relationship. It is generally more difficult for a democracy promoter to influence a hostile authoritarian country than a country with a supportive attitude. The other dimension of the relationship involves the level of resources and the commitment
the democracy promoter has for the objective. A democracy promoter with inadequate resources and a low level of commitment is limited in both strategy choices and in the possibility to have influence, even in contacts with a recipient country with a supportive attitude, while a democracy promoter with large amounts of resources and a strong commitment is allowed increased flexibility with regards to strategy choices and is more likely to have influence, even in contacts with a hostile country. When combined, these relationship dimensions establish different relationship-scenarios, which in turn, frame the democracy promotion activities that are conducted.

The relationship dimensions discussed above will be used in an attempt to portray the relationship that has framed the interaction between Sweden, as the democracy promoter, and Macedonia, as the recipient country. Starting with the recipient country, the Macedonian acceptance for Swedish democracy promotion essentially rests on two factors: first, the ideological acceptance for democracy within the Macedonian society, and second, the general character of the diplomatic relations between Macedonia and Sweden. It is for instance possible that a recipient country, like Macedonia, can have a strong ideological commitment to democracy, but that strained diplomatic relations with the democracy promoter, in this case Sweden, would obstruct the establishment of a cooperation around the continued advancement of democracy. It is therefore beneficial if the recipient country both has an acceptance for democracy and the willingness to cooperate with the democracy promoter. This appears to be the case in the relationship shared between Macedonia and Sweden. Macedonia has shown commitment to democracy and established good diplomatic relations with Sweden. Frequent statements in support of democracy by Macedonian state officials and the rapid introduction of numerous formal democratic institutions following the declaration of independence serve as indications of this ideological commitment. The diplomatic relations between Macedonia and Sweden have been good ever since they were formally initiated in 1993. This is partly reflected through the diplomatic contacts that have been maintained and the public’s acceptance for increased cooperation with Sweden; for instance expressed in a poll where 97.4 percent of the respondents believed it to be “good”, or “very good” if Macedonia cooperated more with Sweden. Sweden was in fact, the country, among 21 others, that received the highest combined approval score for increased cooperation. The assessment is therefore that Macedonia’s acceptance for Swedish democracy promotion can be regarded as located somewhere between ambivalent/tolerating and supportive on a spectrum stretching from hostile to supportive. The more exact location along this spectrum is difficult to determine. Macedonia’s tardiness to deal with issues such as state corruption, shortcomings in the judicial sector, and the politicised state apparatus may reflect flaws in Macedonia’s commitment to democracy, but it can also simply reflect a state that is experiencing problems changing established patterns. No indications however, suggest that Sweden has been constrained in their strategy choices for democracy promotion because of a low level of Macedonian acceptance for democracy. The Swedish decision to concentrate on the local level instead of the national level was not principle caused by any unwillingness to cooperate on behalf of Macedonian authorities. As previously discussed, the decision seems
to have been primarily taken out of practical considerations. The objective of continued
democratic progression can therefore be regarded as one that is shared by both Sweden and
Macedonia, even though the perceived immaturity of Macedonia state authorities to receive
and coordinate foreign development support to some extent obstructed the development
cooperation from turning into a joint venture. Additionally, no indication suggests that the
influence of Swedish democracy promotion has been constrained by a shortage of democratic
acceptance. Macedonia appears to have hopes for continued democratic progression, partly
motivated by the desire to gain EU-membership. A more complex web of transitional
concerns, as indicated by the analysis in chapter four, deserves instead to be contemplated in
an investigation of the influence of democracy promotion activities.

Turning our attention to Sweden, the democracy promoter, it becomes clear that it is equally
difficult to determine the level of commitment and resources that underpin the Swedish
democracy promotion activities in Macedonia. Some guidance is provided by factors such as
the amount of resources devoted to the objective, the amount of resources available, the
content and extent of conducted activities, and the suggested importance of democracy
promotion in strategy documents. Investigation of factors like these do not provide definitive
answers about the position of Swedish commitment and resources on a scale ranging from
low to high, but they do provide guidance for an assessment. An investigation of the strategy
documents indicates that democracy promotion is described as a pivotal component of the
Swedish development cooperation activities in Macedonia. The objective is explicitly
declared and one of four thematic areas specifically focuses on the progression of democratic
governance. Moreover, table 7.2 showed that a significant portion of the Swedish resources
was invested in contributions categorised as democratic governance. This suggests that the
Swedish commitment and resources devoted to democracy promotion in Macedonia can be
classified as moderately high. The democracy promotion activities in Macedonia can also be
understood as forming part of a Swedish ambition to spread democracy globally, as discussed
in the previous chapter. Sweden’s foreign policy is permeated by an ideological commitment
to continued global democratisation, and the Swedish activities in Macedonia contribute
towards this objective. Historical relations or close cultural ties are not likely to underpin the
Swedish activities in Macedonia. Nonetheless, Sweden appears to take an interest in the
development of the Balkans, which most likely has been enforced through the peacekeeping
missions that have been conducted by Sweden and by the admittance of large numbers of
refugees from the region. There appear to be relatively few risks attached to democracy
promotion in Macedonia, as the country has ideological acceptance for democracy and a
willingness to cooperate. Possible rewards in pursuing democracy promotion in Macedonia
have previously been discussed, for example improved trade opportunities, together with a
decrease in organised crime, human trafficking, and the drug trade that Sweden argues
originate from the Balkans. Another possible reward is the political benefits that might
follow upon supporting the development of a possible future EU-member.

Comparisons with the contributions of other bilateral donors in Macedonia, and Swedish
contributions elsewhere, can also provide indications of the level of Swedish resources and
commitment to democracy promotion in Macedonia. In comparison with other bilateral donors in Macedonia, Sweden is positioned among the largest donor countries, as shown in table 7.1. The table shows that the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands contribute significantly more than Sweden, but what needs to be remembered is that they also have significantly larger ODA-resources. The United States spent 1.5 percent of their total ODA-budget for 2005 in Macedonia: Germany 2.5 percent, and the Netherlands 4.1 percent. Sweden in comparison spent 3.6 percent of the total ODA-budget for 2005 in Macedonia. These figures can be interpreted as a relatively large commitment by Sweden to the development of Macedonia. When comparing these amounts to the amounts devoted to other recipients of Swedish democracy promotion, a total of 22 countries rank before Macedonia in 2005. These figures can indicate that the Swedish commitment to promoting democracy in Macedonia is not so strong, but it can also reflect the extent of the socio-economic development that has already taken place in Macedonia. Needs can be considered greater in other countries. When investigating the level of democratic progression among these 22 countries that ranked above Macedonia, only two countries (South Africa and Serbia & Montenegro) were regarded as more democratic than Macedonia in 2005, which can serve as an indication that needs, and not commitment, have directed these resources elsewhere. All of the 22 countries were also larger, in population, than Macedonia. In the Balkans, Macedonia received the third largest contribution for human rights and democratic governance, while Serbia & Montenegro and Bosnia & Herzegovina received between 2-3 times the amounts of contributions. In population, however, both countries are much larger than Macedonia. This means that if the countries are compared in resources provided per capita, the three countries in fact received similar amounts. It should also be remembered that Sweden has a large ODA-budget to draw resources from, if needed. The final assessment is therefore that both Swedish commitment and Swedish resources for democracy promotion in Macedonia can be classified as moderately high.

To conclude, the relationship between Sweden, the democracy promoter, and Macedonia, the recipient country, can be described as positioned in the cube that has relationship-scenario B in one of the top corners, see figure 7.3. Neither strategy choices nor the possibility to have influence seem to have been negatively affected by a lack of resources, commitment, or acceptance for democracy. Macedonia had significant acceptance for democracy and the strategy documents and the contributions provided indicate that Sweden had a moderately high level of commitment to democracy promotion in Macedonia and the same can be said about the level of resources. Additional resources would most likely have improved Sweden’s possibilities to have influence. Nonetheless, Sweden had the possibility to pursue the strategy choices determined suitable and it is mainly practical considerations that constrained the choice of democracy promotion channels. The relationship has not been optimal, in the sense that it was located at the extreme point exemplified by relationship-scenario B, but, to a large extent, the relationship had the characteristics of a cooperation surrounding a shared objective.
Impact

Democracy promoters want to see democratic progression, and they want to contribute to this development. It is, however, very difficult to evaluate the impact of democracy promotion, and as has previously been discussed, this is mainly for two reasons. The first reason is that criteria need to be developed for what constitute as a success, and the second reason is that causality needs to be determined between activity and political changes. Democratisation processes are extremely complex transformations that involve numerous interacting factors. It is difficult to deconstruct democratisation process into small measurable indicators and clearly determine success or failure. Many state aid agencies nonetheless regard evaluations as essential for learning and control, which has prompted state aid agencies to develop evaluation methods. These evaluation methods may have ramification on the strategies, methods, and channels used to promote democracy. This study has not attempted to evaluate the impact that Swedish democracy promotion had in Macedonia. A study with that ambition would need extensive field evaluations, something which places the objective outside the frame of this study. The objective has instead been, in regards to the dimension involving impact, to investigate the possible ramifications of evaluation demands on the Swedish attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia. Can indications be detected that suggest that evaluation demands have influenced project designs?

The investigation reveals that evaluation demands from Sida have influenced project designs. The policy document, Guidelines for Sida’s support to Human Rights and Democracy Projects in the Western Balkans, explicitly declares that measurable goals need to be incorporated into projects receiving contributions from Sida.

The projects must be designed in such a way that the goals are measurable, preferably with both qualitative and quantitative indicators. Reports shall provide a picture of whether the project has contributed to the achievement of
the overall goal and not merely, in the absence of concrete results, comments on the activities.\textsuperscript{85}

These guidelines have led the dialogue and planning processes that are attached to receiving contributions from Sida. This, in turn, means that Sida’s cooperation partners in Macedonia have been asked to design their projects in such a way that measurable indicators can be detected. There are no indications that these demands have affected the choice of strategy, method, or channel for democracy promotion, but it is very likely that they have been affected the more detailed design of the projects. The request for measurable indicators has also been raised during project evaluations. PEP International for instance, received criticism by a Sida evaluation team because the project AMPEP was regarded as lacking concrete and measurable objectives, as shown in the quote below.

It is not difficult to see the main orientation of the Programme by looking at the principles on which AMPEP activities are based. However, it is somewhat more difficult to establish more specifically what AMPEP attempts to achieve. […] For instance, in the programme document for 2003-04 (dated February 2003, version 6) the long-term goal is stated to be “create the spirit of development among …” and the short-term objective for the next two years is “strengthen and stimulate the democratic and decentralisation process through …” […] The problem seems to be that the Programme has formulated objectives, which are so broad and/or vague, that is it is not entirely clear what they mean. For instance, what is to be understood with “spirit of development”, “mobilisation of people”, “create open-mindedness”, “strengthen the democratic process”\textsuperscript{86}

The evaluation team went on to declare that concrete and measurable objectives are not only needed in order to evaluate the project, but also because the project staff need to have a clear understanding of the desired objective of the programme. This statement was provoked by a discovery that AMPEP staff members in fact, lacked a shared understanding of the concrete objective. Following the evaluation, PEP International was requested to redraft the project plans for AMPEP and define measurable goals for the project, which they attempted to do.\textsuperscript{87} AMPEP therefore serves as an example of a project where evaluation demands directly influenced the project design. The statements above also indicate that the demands for concrete and measurable indicators not only involve evaluation demands, but that it is an indication that Sida regards these demands as a means to secure effective project management. Fuzzy indicators are basically regarded as a sign of a vague project design. This line of thinking serves as one of the foundations for the Logical Framework Approach (LFA) that Sida uses for objective-oriented project planning. The conviction underpinning the LFA is that requests to define measurable indicators encourage project managers to consider the relationship between inputs, outputs, outcome/impact and objectives. Sida regards this approach to be essential in order to avoid the vagueness and inefficiency that occasionally plagued past projects. The LFA approach can subsequently be classified as an indicator
system, which provides reason to consider if the evaluation tail has begun to wag the programme dog. The LFA, the Sida guidelines, and the evaluation of AMPEP, are all indications that this may be the case. However, it is difficult to determine the extent of this influence. It is for instance uncertain if these demands for measurable goals have had influence beyond the project documentation. AMPEP for instance, appears to have remained essentially the same before and after the revision of the project objectives. The change can therefore have mainly been on paper. Cooperation partners have strong incitements to adjust according to the demands of the donor, but if these changes are carried out in the field is another question. Projects often have their own dynamics and the influence that demands for measurable objectives have on the different projects probably varies. Some project might be completely revised following demands for measurable objectives, while others change very little or not at all. Multiple field studies, where the project circle of numerous projects is studied, is probably the only reliable way to reach further insight into the influence of evaluation demands.

In sum, the study has determined that Swedish evaluation demands influenced project designs in Macedonia. The LFA approach, used by Sida to manage projects, incorporated an indicator system where project managers were requested to define measurable project objectives. The projects were also evaluated according to these criteria. However, the extent of this influence is more uncertain. It has been determined that the design of projects was affected, but there is no indication that the choice of strategy, methods, or channels for democracy promotion were directly determined by these evaluation demands.

Concluding observations

The concluding observations at the end of chapter six discussed three features of the Swedish policy for democracy promotion: the influence of a democratic self-image on the Swedish understanding of democracy, the eclectic theoretical reflection that permeated the policy, and the flexibility of the policy. These three features will be revisited in the light of the conclusions generated by the investigation of Sweden’s attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia. As part of this discussion, attention will be drawn to the influence of practical considerations on the Swedish attempts to promote democracy and the indication that a third democratisation approach influenced the Swedish activities. This third democratisation approach was not detected previously as part of the overarching policy for democracy promotion.

The influence of a Swedish democratic self-image was not very noticeable when the democracy promotion activities in Macedonia was scrutinised. Sida’s contributions were not primarily directed towards projects that clearly reflected a model of democracy that can be connected to a Swedish democratic self-image. Some democratic features that can be connected to the Swedish democratic system were detected within the supported projects, for instance transparency in state administration, the establishment of Ombudsman institutions, and equal gender representation. Many of these features can, however, also be found in other
western democratic systems and it is therefore possible that these projects could have received contributions from other donor organisations. So it cannot be decisively declared that Sweden attempted to create a duplication of the Swedish democratic system through its activities in Macedonia. The Swedish strategy for democracy promotion appears to have functioned as a normative and theoretical foundation for the conducted activities, but the allocation of contributions to different projects was primarily influenced by practical considerations. The desire for donor harmonisation, the existence of suitable cooperation partners, and detected contextual development needs, are examples of practical considerations that moved Sweden to focus on certain thematic areas and to allocate contributions to specific projects. The Swedish strategy for democracy promotion provided the wider frame for the activities and these practical considerations served as a pragmatic approach that sharpened the focus to certain areas within this frame.

The flexibility and eclectic theoretical reflection that permeates the Swedish policy for democracy promotion allowed for such an approach to democracy promotion. By not being tied down to a very rigid democratisation model, the Sida officials were able to find policy support for the projects that they wanted to support. In that respect, the forest of Sida policies for development cooperation and democracy promotion functioned as a smorgasbord. The projects submitted needed to fit into the country strategy, but if they did, and if they gained the initial approval of Sida field personnel, the continued dialogue process was supported by consultation with Sida policies developed for the effected area. These policies partially guided the activities, but the directives incorporated in these documents are also flexible, allowing Sida officials a possibility to find support for many different forms of activities within the frame of civil society support, institution building and so forth. The country strategies were developed in cooperation with the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Sida and purposely adopted a flexible frame for Swedish activities. The declared objective of these strategies was to allow Sida to adjust to changes in the contextual environment, but it is also likely that the flexibility of the Swedish policy for democracy promotion influenced the decision. The investigation of the Swedish attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia therefore supports the previous conclusion that the practical usage of the Swedish policy for democracy promotion is determined in the outer link of the policy chain. This is probably needed because of the complexity of democratisation processes. Tying field personnel to a rigid and universal democratisation model could have detrimental effects on the possibility of gaining influence. This flexible usage of the democracy promotion policy also fits well with the conviction that field representatives are very important for the management of development cooperation, and the belief that all development processes are unique to their contextual environment.

What is more unexpected, are the indications that Sweden to some extent used institutional modelling and twinning in its attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia. As previously discussed, Carothers determined that US democracy promotion utilises this democratisation approach, but the investigation of the Sweden policy for democracy promotion detected no indications of institutional modelling or references to twinning as a democratisation
approach. The Swedish development cooperation ideology is, instead, that the affected people are the crafters of social and political transformations, and that foreign democracy promoters can only provide help for self-help. Political institutions are also believed to need local roots, and can therefore not be externally created or imposed on people. Nevertheless, some of the activities in Macedonia were designed in such manner that they reflected a twinning approach, in which western democratic institutions were used as transitional models. The same can be said about the emphasis on EU-integration and adjustment to EU-practices as a path towards continued democratisation and socio-economic development. In that sense, the overarching policy for democracy promotion and the activities conducted in Macedonia are not necessarily compatible. Sida has used twinning and an institutional modelling approach in other settings since the 1980s, which indicates that this development approach has acceptance within Sida. It should also be recognised that this approach can have positive effects and that it is compatible with the belief that social behavioural patterns can be influenced by the introduction of formal democratic institutions. However, the use deserves to be discussed because it can be argued that the approach mainly treats the symptoms and not the underlying structures. Again, this is not necessarily compatible with the notion that development can never be externally created or imposed on people.

Summary

This chapter has analysed Sweden’s attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia during 2000-2006. It has been demonstrated that Sida served as the primary actor empowered to administer the Swedish activities, but that the implementation of field activities were to a large extent controlled by cooperation partners. Sida describes itself as a development partner and provider of contributions, while the cooperation partner are entrusted with the full responsibility for implementing the development projects. A clear policy chain linked Sida to the Swedish Parliament and the Government, but the links with the respective cooperation partners was more loosely managed by a cooperation agreement.

Moreover, it has been demonstrated that Swedish attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia were primarily driven by a mixture of altruistic and ideological motives. Sweden perceived Macedonia as a struggling transitional democracy and development contributions were provided to support a continued transition towards democratic consolidation. Sweden was convinced that continued democratisation would improve the living standard of poor people in Macedonia. Sweden also believed that continued democratisation would provide other benefits for the people of Macedonia, for instance through improved possibilities for future EU-membership, which in turn would generate socio-economic development. Some indications have been detected that suggest that Swedish motives of self-interest served as partial driving forces behind the contributions provided. Nonetheless, these motives appear mainly to have functioned as desirable side effects rather than as prime movers.

Sweden’s activities in Macedonia were in part guided by a core strategy for democracy promotion. The identified objective was the establishment of a liberal democratic model, with
emphasis on societal democracy, that incorporated features that could be connected to a Swedish democratic self-image. These features were exemplified through the promotion of democratic features, such as administrative transparency and gender equality. It has been demonstrated that Sida extended the notion of democracy beyond the introduction of the minimal definition of democracy. To what extent these activities were influenced by a democratic self-image has not been determined, but the influence as such, has been detected. The investigation revealed that the Swedish understanding of democratisation processes influenced the activities conducted. All of the attempts to promote democracy incorporated institution building and/or the nurturing of a democratic culture. A third perspective, categorised as a EU-perspective, was also detected. This democratisation perspective incorporated institutional modelling, through which western democratic institutions functioned as transitional models, and the transition process involved a twinning process of western democratic practices. The inclusion of this democratisation perspective is unexpected, because it is not necessarily compatible with essential components of the Swedish ideology for development cooperation.

It has been demonstrated that rational persuasion served as Sweden’s principle method of choice when attempting to promote democracy in Macedonia. The Swedish conviction that development cooperation rests on mutual respect and acceptance, together with the broad acceptance of democracy in Macedonia, made stick and carrot methods largely redundant. Theoretical and practical considerations influenced the Swedish choice of channels. The core strategy provided the theoretical foundation and practical considerations, for instance, suitable cooperation partners and harmonisation with other donor activities, influenced the allocation of development contributions to specific thematic areas and projects. This pragmatic approach was partially made possible by the flexibility of the Swedish policy.

Findings suggest that the relationship between Macedonia and Sweden was beneficial to democracy promotion. Neither strategy choices nor the possibility to have influence appear to have been negatively affected by a lack of resources, commitment, or democratic acceptance. Sweden was able to pursue the strategies it had determined suitable and it was mainly practical considerations that constrained the choice of thematic areas and suitable projects. Project designs were also influenced by Sida evaluation demands. The extent of the influence has not been explored, but it has been determined that cooperation partners were directed by Sida to incorporate measurable indicators in project plans.

With this knowledge, the following chapter will conclude the study with a discussion of the roles that Swedish democracy promotion has had in the democratisation process in Macedonia. The basis for the discussion will be arguments and conclusions previously presented, and the ambition is to provide a role typology.

Notes:

1 For more information concerning these operations, see Ackermann (1999), Williams (2000)
There are additional regional policy documents that also aim to guide Swedish development cooperation activities in Macedonia, but the different country strategies are the essential documents in use at the field office.

IDA is an acronym for International Development Association, which is a part of the World Bank that provides support to developing countries worldwide.
This argumentation concerns the establishment of long-term development cooperation with state agents. Sweden can still provide humanitarian assistance to authoritarian countries and engage in development cooperation with non-state actors in authoritarian countries. This latter form of cooperation is however more sensitive and it is a discussion that does not need to be taken up within this study.

57 Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2000) p. 6
59 Sida (2000) p. 19
60 Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2000) p. 2
61 Project description provided by Sida
66 Sida (2005g)
67 Sida (2003b), Sida (2003d), Sida (2004c), Sida (2005g), Sida (2006e), Sida (2006f)
68 Sida (2003b), Sida (2003d), Sida (2004c), Sida (2005g), Sida (2006e), Sida (2006f)
69 Agriculture is a subsection of the economic development contributions, and the table only attempts to show how large the agricultural sector is in comparison to the entire development cooperation.
70 Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2006)
71 Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2000) p. 4 (author’s translation)
73 Interview Sida official D.
74 The support of democracy is often expressed in speeches and statements given by Macedonian state officials, for instance in the UN.
75 Sweden and Macedonia formally exchanged notes constituting an agreement concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations in December 1993.
76 South East Europe Democracy Support (2002)
77 Gov. Comm. 2004/05:109 pp. 65
78 My own calculations from figures provided by OECD-statistics. It is worth noticing that Norway spend 4.3 percent of their ODA-budget in Macedonia, making them in relative terms the largest bilateral donor in Macedonia
79 According to Sida’s statement of accounts for 2005.
81 This has been determined by comparing the number of inhabitants in the three countries with the contributions provided by Sida for each respective country for 2005.
82 For a more extensive discussion, see chapter five.
83 This discussion has previously been explored in chapters five and six. See also Carothers (2000)
84 Sida (2000)
85 Sida (2000) p. 5
88 See chapters five and six for further discussion. See also Carothers (1999), Carothers (2000)
89 This issue is further discussed in chapter six.
CHAPTER Eight

The role of Swedish democracy promotion

It is generally recognised that the promotion of democracy by international actors has increased since the fall of communism. The amount of scholarly attention dedicated to this phenomenon has, however, to date been relatively limited. This study therefore departed with the ambition to contribute to a growing body of work by investigating democracy promotion as both a concept and an activity. The main research question guiding the study was: how can we understand the role of democracy promotion in democratisation processes. In this final chapter, the theoretical and empirical arguments will be concluded with a discussion about the character and significance of Sweden’s democracy promotion activities in Macedonia’s democratisation process. The primary objective of this chapter is not to summarise the findings of this study, but rather to build on arguments and conclusions from previous chapters, and through the introduction of a new perspective produce additional theoretical and empirical conclusions. This will be accomplished with the help of role theory and a discussion of Sweden’s role conception and role performance. It will be argued that the role as democracy promoter is embedded in a wider foreign policy role, and that the role as democracy promoter can be deconstructed into subordinated roles, which more accurately reflect the function that Sweden, and the activities it has conducted, have had in Macedonia’s democratisation process. Three subordinated ideal role types will be illustrated on the basis of Sweden’s role performance, these being: educator, initiator, and supporter. As ideal types, these roles are analytically constructed from a collection of abstract elements that have been detected in the analysis of Sweden’s attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia, but they do not precisely reflect these activities. The ideal type can be considered as a theoretical model of reality, which is developed through generalisation, and simplification, and thereby focuses on certain features of the observed empirical reality at the expense of others. A discrepancy will be shown between Sida’s own role conception and these ideal role types. Moreover, the aspiration of the study is that these ideal role types can serve as a typology for future research studies in shifting empirical contexts. These findings in that sense will not only provide further insight into the particulars of this case study, but also provide possible points of departure for further studies.

Role as a concept and theory

Before launching into the discussion of the roles Sweden’s democracy promotion has had in Macedonia’s democratisation process, it is useful to have a general understanding of role as a concept and theory. A large number of studies have used the concept, but little consensus can be found regarding the definition. Le Prestre argues that the concept of role, as applied to foreign policy, has been attributed at least six meanings. Henceforth, when referring to the
role of Swedish democracy promotion activities in Macedonia’s democratisation process, this study refer to the *function* of these activities. In academia, role as a concept was originally developed in sociology and social psychology to illustrate an “actor’s characteristic patterns of behaviour given a certain position”. It served as the link between individual human agents and social structures. The concept was later adopted into international relations theory as a means to analyse foreign policy and relations between states. One of the first scholars to apply the term in studies of international relations was Kalevi Holsti. In his seminal study, *Role conceptions in the study of foreign policy* from 1970, Holsti inductively constructed a typology of the national roles that policy-makers worldwide perceived and identified regarding their own state. The empirical material consisted of speeches and statements from policymakers from the highest level of each state. A number of other scholars have since followed Holsti’s example and used the idea of role in different ways to explain or understand foreign policy. This study will use a slightly modified version of the conceptualisation developed by Holsti, as it is believed to be a fruitful approach for reaching increased insight of the role played by Swedish democracy promotion in Macedonia’s democratisation process. For the purpose of clarity, the discussion below will include all of the dimensions described by Holsti, but the focal point of this study is on *role conception* and *role performance*. It should be noted that this study refers to the role of *states* and not *nations*, which is the concept used by Holsti. Despite being closely interlinked, the two concepts are distinguishable from each other, something which was discussed in chapter three. Furthermore, it seems appropriate to refer to states and not nations, as this study focuses on the policy and activities of a state (Sweden) and a state actor (Sida). Also, instead of *role prescription*, which is the term used by Holsti, this study will use the term *role expectation*.

**Role conception**

This dimension of the role concept refers to the normative expectations that the state ascribes to itself. It is the state’s subjective understanding of appropriate behaviour. Role conceptions outline the responsibilities and obligations that the state envisages for itself in its relations with other actors in the international system, and thereby serves as an important foundation for a state’s foreign policy. Holsti, who first used the term, described it in the following manner.

*A national role conception* includes the policy-makers own definitions of the general kind of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their “image” of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment.

A state’s role conception is shaped by both domestic and external factors. Domestically, the role conception is connected with the nation’s identity and self-image. Role conception is in
part the product of a nation’s socialisation process, in which history, culture, and other societal characteristics shape the conception that the nation has of itself, and which in turn is projected through the activities of the state. In addition, the role conception of the state, as manifested through statements and speeches by state officials or official policy documents, shapes the nations self-image in intertwining interaction. It can therefore be argued that there exists a relationship between what states do, and what they are. Other domestic factors, such as the states capacity, resources, ideology, and its socio-economic and political needs, also influence the establishment of a state’s role conception. Externally, a state’s role conception is influenced by role expectations. Factors such as system structures, treaty commitments, and general legal principles all influence the development of a state’s self-image. Role expectations create a social pressure that influences the self-perception of the effected state.

National role conceptions are also related to, or buttressed by, the role prescriptions coming from the external environment. The source of these role prescriptions would include the structure of the international system; system-wide values; general legal principles which ostensibly command universal support (such as the doctrine of the sovereign equality of states); and the rules, traditions, and expectations of states as expressed in the charters of international and regional organizations, “world opinion”, multilateral and bilateral treaties; and less formal or implicit commitments and “understandings”. The extent to which these external role prescriptions become significant in developing national role conceptions varies considerably from state to state and in different situations.7

It should be noted that states most often have multiple roles.8 A state that takes an active and leading role in one area of international relations might adopt an isolated and passive role in another. A state can be a regional leader, but a minor actor globally. Role conceptions can change over time, and different state roles can conflict with each other. The role that is adopted by states varies depending upon its perceived overall importance and according to the situation and institutional context.9

Role expectation

This dimension of the role concept pertains to the expectations that are placed upon a state by other actors (alters) in the international system. States are able to assume roles, which they then enact within international structures, but international structures can also generate expectations that influence the role conception and role behaviour of individual states. The expectations that are placed on individual states have multiple sources. The international system structure, system-wide values, treaty commitments, and world opinions are examples of such sources. Role expectations affect a state’s role conception and partly determine the status of the state, and as a consequence the behaviour of the state. The EU, as an example,
has increasingly been looked to for international leadership, but continues to struggle with the capability-expectations gap. Nonetheless, these role expectations have provided status and influenced the role conception, and in turn the decisions and activities, of the EU.

**Role performance**

A state’s role performance is to be understood as the actual foreign policy behaviour that a state acts out in relations with other states in a specific time-spatial context. It includes patterns of attitudes, decisions, responses, functions and commitments. Holsti argues that role performance primarily derives “from policymakers’ role conceptions, domestic needs and demands, and critical events or trends in the external environment”. He regarded the influence of role expectations as limited, because these generally can be seen as “ill-defined, flexible, or weak” in comparison to the definitions of interest and standards of actions that derive from domestic factors.

Figure 8.1 reflects the interaction of these different role dimensions.

![Figure 8.1 Role theory and foreign policy](Source: Holsti (1970) p. 245)

Holsti’s argumentation regarding what serves as the primary source for a state’s role performance is not generally accepted. Some scholars agree with Holsti about the influence of external factors compared to domestic factors, while others disagree. This study acknowledges that both status and external role expectations influence role performance, as shown in figure 8.1, but these factors will not be explored further. The focal point of this
study is instead an attempt to discuss Sweden’s role conception regarding democracy promotion, in relation to the Swedish role performance in Macedonia during 2000-2006. In doing this, the general role of democracy promoter will be deconstructed into subordinated ideal role types, thus providing increased insight into the ideology that underpins the Swedish policy and the character of the activities conducted.

Sweden’s role conception

Sweden’s claim to be a global democracy promoter can be viewed as a role conception. It is a role that is embedded in a wider role conception that incorporates development cooperation at large, and where democracy promotion is only one dimension. The role as democracy promoter can also be deconstructed into subordinate role conceptions, which reflect the desired mode of conduct. Before the role of democracy promoter is deconstructed, the wider role conception will be briefly discussed. One approach for investigating role conceptions in foreign policy is by the use of typologies. Marijke Breuning has developed a typology for foreign assistance role conceptions that is based on four role profiles: Good Neighbour, Activist, Merchant, and Power Broker. Using this typology, Sweden’s overarching role conception can essentially be categorised as a mixture of “good neighbour” and “activist”. The Swedish policy on democracy promotion is embedded in a notion that Sweden has an ethical and moral obligation to help the less fortunate in the world, which is the rhetoric that is symbolic for the role of “good neighbour”. This rhetoric is frequently used to justify Swedish development cooperation, something which has previously been explored in the discussions about motives. The Swedish role conception as an “activist” is reflected in the ideological long-term commitment to the transformation of the international system. Sweden wants to support the improvement of living standards in developing countries and by doing so support the conversion of developing countries into developed countries. Development and empowerment is believed to lead to stability, both in these countries and the international system as a whole. The activist role conception is also reflected through the low level of tying of bilateral development contributions and the relatively high level of ODA as a percentage of GNP. This role conception as a good neighbour and activist has foundations in ethical, normative, and ideological convictions, which partly originates from a national self-image, as exemplified by the citations below.

The primary justification and rationale for Sweden’s policy for global development is solidarity with people in other countries. This rationale reflects the basic values in accordance with which Swedish society has evolved and that are also expressed in the UN charter and the Universal declaration of Human Rights. The firm conviction that everybody has a right to a life in dignity is the basis of the solidarity with poor, oppressed and vulnerable people that has been an important element of Sweden’s domestic and foreign policies for many years.
The ending of the cold war created new and favourable opportunities to promote democracy and human rights. Sweden must take these opportunities. Our country has a long and rich democratic tradition, but we recall how those who wanted democracy had to fight for it, and for the implementation of social justice.¹⁹

Hence, it can be argued that the Swedish foreign policy regarding development cooperation reflects a national social consciousness that has been extended beyond national borders. Sweden perceives itself to be an international actor with a duty to provide help for self-help to less fortunate countries in the world. The altruistic and ideological motives for democracy promotion essentially originate from this role conception and national self-image. Elements of the “merchant” and “power broker” role can also be detected in the Swedish rhetoric, for instance through statements in support of free trade with developing countries, benefits created for Swedish enterprises through development cooperation, and the argumentation that Sweden has gained influence internationally through its commitment to global development, an influence that Sweden desires to maintain.²⁰ Nevertheless, the predominant role conception that is depicted in Swedish policy and rhetoric about development cooperation is as a “good neighbour” and “activist”.

Sweden’s role conception as an international democracy promoter has been extensively discussed in previous chapters, so the focus here will instead be shifted to subordinated role conceptions. Sida, the subordinated state aid agency, uses the concept role when describing the “three major roles that characterise Sida’s way of working”.²¹ These roles will be presented below as subordinated role conceptions to the overarching Swedish role conception as good neighbour/activist and democracy promoter. These subordinated role conceptions reveal information about Sida’s operating practices and self-perceived functions in development processes, which in turn provide insights into the ideology that underpins the Swedish attempts to promote democracy globally.

The role of analyst

The Swedish conviction is that development processes are complex, involving numerous factors that interact dynamically. Development cooperation can therefore not be approached as a remedy to an isolated phenomenon. Instead, development contributions need to be considered in their contextual environment. It is therefore stated that one of the prime roles of Sida is to function as an analyst.²²

With the view of poverty as multidimensional, context specific and dynamic, each situation becomes unique and its particular characteristics must be understood. High-quality poverty analyses are thus of crucial importance for
As the citation above indicates, in order to support a development process, it has become necessary for Sida to take the role as analyst to assess the influence and consequences of development contributions. It is declared that a good poverty analysis distinguishes between the symptoms and the causes of poverty, and remedies must address the causes in order to be effective. During project management, Sida officials are therefore requested to go beyond the narrow aspects of specific projects and consider the project in its wider context. It is not sufficient to identify a path that would lead a development project from its starting point to a defined target. The dynamic and unpredictable manner of development processes also influence project management. Sida officials are asked to design programmes/projects in such manner that they can be reoriented whilst underway, in reaction to changing conditions. It is even advocated that project objectives may need to be flexible.24

This role conception aligns with the previously determined flexible character of the Swedish policy for democracy promotion. The role as analyst reinforces the perception that Sida officials are provided with significant discretion when shaping policy into field programmes/projects. Sida identifies field personnel and poverty analysis at the country level as having significant importance for providing “[…] adequate knowledge basis for deciding in what manner development cooperation best can contribute to poverty reduction in a specific situation and for determining the types and combinations of activities that offer the most effective and efficient means to this end.”25 However, it is emphasised that the primary responsibility for conducting poverty analyses rests with the partner country. According to Sida, developing countries need to develop their own national Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS), which guide external contributions towards areas that have been determined of importance for the country concerned. This argumentation is based on the conviction that external donors only can provide help for self-help, and that development processes need local ownership. Sida’s role as analyst is therefore to be carried out, as far as possible, in cooperation with partners in the country concerned. Sida, nonetheless, need internal analytical capacity in order to function as a constructive dialogue partner and in order to make informed decisions regarding suitable contributions.

The role of dialogue partner

The basis for development cooperation is a relationship between the donor organisation and cooperation partners. This relationship is mainly manifested through a dialogue between the actors concerned. An important source of this role conception is the conviction that external donors can only provide support, that development processes need local ownership, and that developing countries should be approached with respect. Sweden therefore uses a terminology that refers to development cooperation instead of development assistance or development aid. Cooperation is initiated with cooperation partners, not recipients. This terminology reflects
the Swedish position that the actors involved in the development cooperation should be regarded as having corresponding status. The dialogue process should be open to all central stakeholders, conducted in a transparent manner, and permeated by mutual trust and respect.

The parties involved need to acknowledge that the dialogue is an opportunity for mutual learning and that it could be used as a basis for re-examine positions. For the dialogue to be constructive, the parties need to accept that sensitive issues could be included and discussed in a frank and open manner.\textsuperscript{26}

The quotation above signals Sida’s belief that dialogue processes should be entered into with an open mind, which is an additional indication of the flexible character of the Swedish approach. However, it is also declared that part of the purpose of the dialogue process is to advance important Swedish positions. The dialogue process is regarded as an essential tool for putting forward these positions, identifying differences in opinions and opportunities for cooperation, and arriving at mutually acceptable agreements. Sida declares that part of being a constructive dialogue partner involves the contribution of knowledge and expertise. Sida officials are therefore requested to prepare themselves before dialogue processes, in order to become familiarised with the subject area and with Swedish principles and approaches. However, it is emphasised that the learning process incorporated into the dialogue process is “[…] based on the realisation that no party can claim superior knowledge that should be superimposed on other parties.”\textsuperscript{27} Sida may also facilitate dialogue between key stakeholders, for instance between the civil society and governmental agencies, and promote the use of strategic communication within programmes and projects. Communication is regarded as desirable, and development partners are therefore encouraged to view dialogue processes as a useful operating procedure.

\textit{The role of financier/intermediator of resources}

The third and final role that Sida embraces characterises the agency’s way of working as a financier/intermediator of resources. Development cooperation involves the transfer of resources to development partners and Sida is the primary Swedish actor responsible for conducting this task. Sida refers to this role as its “raison d’être”.\textsuperscript{28} The role involves the allocation of resources to specified development purposes and the continued monitoring of the usage of these resources. Sida declares that the agency function as a flexible and listening partner in dialogue and contribution management, but that Sida requires development partners to strictly adhere to agreed-upon rules and procedures during resource management. Good governance and anticorruption measures are mentioned particularly as being important factors for effective resource utilisation, and therefore serve as part of Sida’s prerequisites for resource allocation. The importance of these practices should be routinely emphasised during dialogue processes with development partners, and Sida are willing to support the strengthening of these practices, as indicated by the quote below.

\textsuperscript{253}
Good governance and anti-corruption measures should be raised consistently in Sida’s dialogue with cooperation partners. […] Sida provides special support for this purpose, for example support to strengthening financial management systems, supervisory institutions, watch-dog groups, free and independent media, and the legal framework. Support can also be provided to promote public awareness and win broad public support for good governance and anti-corruption measures.29

Moreover, it is argued that aspiring development partners need the capacity to assume ownership and responsibility for the development process. Sida supports capacity development when needed. Capacity development can incorporate good governance and anticorruption measures, for instance through the strengthening of organisational structures, promotion of cooperation between organisations, improvement of professional knowledge, and improvements to the state’s institutional framework.30

It is not immediately clear how compatible the role of financier/intermediator of resources is with that of dialogue partner. Promotion of good governance and anticorruption measures as part of resource management, where strict adherence is expected, can place Sweden in a superior position and thereby undermine the principle of corresponding status. Sida does not discuss the possible combination of these different approaches further, but it is declared that the differences of approaches can be difficult to detect.

In dialogue and contribution management, Sida is a flexible and listening partner, but in resource management Sida requires strict adherence to agreed-upon rules and procedures. The difference of approach in these areas may not be self-evident to the cooperation partner, and it is of great importance for Sida to make its approach to resource management clear to the cooperation partner from the very start.31

As discussed, these roles align to a large extent with the Swedish policy for development cooperation. However, it is worth noticing that these three roles partly present Sweden as a relatively passive norm entrepreneur. The promotion of “important Swedish positions” is not particularly emphasised, even if it is made clear that there exist limits to Sida’s willingness to listen and adjust to local demands. The Swedish policy documents for development cooperation and democracy promotion are more forceful in indicating that certain values, norms, and practices were to be included. It is primarily with regards to the role as financier/intermediator of resources that the description indicates that there exists a normative foundation for Swedish contributions, and expresses limitations for these contributions if “agreed-upon rules and procedures” are not followed. The roles that Sida attributes to itself are also relatively silent about the function that Swedish development contributions have in development processes. The role as analyst, dialogue partner, and financier/intermediator of
resources appears mainly to describe how Sida functions internally, and not what functions the agency and the activities conducted have in, for instance, democratisation processes. The following discussion of Sweden’s role performance in Macedonia will attempt to investigate this matter further.

Swedish role performance

A strong correspondence can be detected between Sweden’s role conception as a good neighbour/activist and the Swedish role performance in Macedonia during the period 2000-2006. The Swedish role performance has been determined to be altruistic and ideologically motivated, which is typical for the role as good neighbour/activist. As discussed in chapter seven, Sweden perceived Macedonia to be a struggling transitional democracy and the activities conducted by Sida aimed to support continued democratic progression, generate socio-economic development, and improve the standard of living for poor people in the country. The three primary objectives were to promote stable peace in the region, democratisation and respect for human rights, and socially sustainable market economy that would generate enduring growth and reduce poverty. Strategic and practical considerations determined the allocation of development contributions, which generally targeted NGOs, agricultural projects, and institution building support. Sweden was one of the largest bilateral donors in Macedonia and the contributions provided were not tied to Swedish enterprises or resources. One of the overarching objectives was to support Macedonia’s EU-integration process, which was argued to be the best path towards long-term stability and economic growth. All of these characteristics of the Swedish activities in Macedonia support the conclusion that a correspondence existed between Sweden’s role conception and the actual role performance.

As part of the good neighbour/activist role performance, Sweden also acted out the role of democracy promoter. Sweden actively promoted democratic norms, values, and practices in contacts with different actors in Macedonia. Development contributions were allocated to projects that served to support a continued transition towards democratic consolidation. Sida’s development contributions made to projects and organisations such as AMPEP, Integrated Rural Development Program, SHC, OPIC, and KtK, were all justified as means to support the development and/or strengthening of democratic institutions and a democratic culture. As previously shown by table 7.2, a significant portion of Sida’s contributions in Macedonia during 2000-2006 was categorised under the heading “democratic governance”. However, the classification as democracy promoter is not very informative about the manner in which an actor promotes democracy and of the more specific functions the actor, and the activities conducted, have in the particular democratisation process. The approach used to promote democracy can differ between actors and time-spatial contexts, which in turn influences the role that the actor, and the activities conducted, have in a specific democratisation process.

The investigation of Sweden’s role performance can be taken further by deconstructing the role as democracy promoter into subordinated ideal role types. This deconstruction is believed
to bring further insights into the role that Sweden, as a democracy promoter, has had in Macedonia’s democratisation process. These subordinated ideal roles types are not necessarily in conflict with Sida’s own role conception, but they provide a new perspective on the activities conducted.

The role of educator

The perspective of development cooperation as a relationship between actors with corresponding status does not acknowledge that donor organisations, in this case Sweden, operate with normative agendas and are in control of vital resources, which in most cases tilt the status scale. Sweden was not willing to enter into development cooperation and allocate development contributions unconditionally. In the role of a democracy promoter, the allocation of resources is dependent upon the inclusion of democratic values, norms, and practices. It therefore appears more appropriate to categorise one of Sweden’s subordinated ideal role types in the democratisation process in Macedonia as educator, rather than analyst or dialogue partner. An educator needs the ability to conduct poverty analyses and interact with cooperation partners in an open and mutually respectful dialogue process. But the normative agenda that is the basis for democracy promotion embodies a degree of responsibility. A democracy promoter, by definition, actively promotes democratic values, norms, and practices. The role of the democracy promoter therefore extends beyond being an analyst and dialogue partner, who leaves the primary responsibility for the development process to cooperation partners. A democracy promoter actively takes measures to support a specific form of development. In doing so, the democracy promoter can function as an educator, a catalyst for learning processes, and with regards to democracy promotion the objective of the learning process is to support the strengthening of democratic institutions and structures. In Macedonia, this is manifested by Sweden’s active attempts to support a continued democratic progression and the adoption of a democratic culture. The activities supported were conducted with the recognition that these democratic values, norms, and practices could not be forced upon the population. They needed to be willingly adopted and permanently merged into everyday social behaviour patterns, and this development could only be accomplished through local acceptance and ownership.

Furthermore, in order for a learning environment, which allows the democracy promoter to function as an educator, to emerge, the relationship needs to be characterised by trust, respect, and acceptance. As previously discussed, the Swedish relationship with Macedonia had those features. Macedonia and Sweden have enjoyed good diplomatic relations ever since these were formally initiated in 1993 and there are indications that the general public in Macedonia would welcome a more extensive cooperation between the two countries. The acceptance for democracy within Macedonia is manifested through frequent statements to that effect and through the rapid introduction of numerous formal democratic institutions, that followed the declaration of independence. Macedonia has also declared future EU- and NATO-membership to be key strategic objectives and continued democratisation is requirement for
membership. Together with the need for local ownership and respect for local traditions, the EU-integration approach is emphasised in the Swedish development strategy for Macedonia. The continuation of the democratisation process is therefore a shared objective, which provides Sweden, through Sida, with ample opportunity to function as an educator.

Scrutiny of the projects that received Swedish development contributions provides further indications of the educator role. AMPEP and the Integrated Rural Development Programme were designed to support the decentralisation process by encouraging citizens in rural villages to mobilise in village councils. In doing so, the projects took, in part, the character of civic education. Under previous regimes, the general public in Macedonia had adopted a political culture of individual seclusion and negative interaction, where state authorities or external actors were expected to identify and solve community problems. By encouraging the citizens in the targeted villages to actively seek solutions to their own local problems, the projects in a sense educated the participants on the merits of active engagement in local and national problem solving processes. A well-functioning democracy depends on a civic-minded citizenry, and these projects sought to encourage the development of such a political culture. The projects also affected municipalities and local authorities, because village councils were requested to involve them. The involvement established the basis for a relationship between local authorities and the village councils, whereby the public officials became increasingly aware of, and hopefully willing to take note of, the needs and wishes of rural villages. Policy had previously been dictated from above, but these projects attempted to educate public officials to appreciate the merits of involving the citizenry in decision-making processes. Other examples where the educator role can be detected are the projects involving the Swedish University of Agricultural Science (SLU), the Federation of Swedish Farmers (LRF), and Statistics Sweden. All of these organisations were involved in knowledge transfers and institution building projects, in which the Swedish organisations attempted to support the development and strengthening of twin organisations in Macedonia. The basis for these projects was the area expertise that the Swedish organisations had, and in the relationship with their counterparts in Macedonia they can be regarded as having adopted the role of educator. Another project where Swedish democracy promotion performed the role of educator was the Media Development Project (IWPR). In this project, ethnic Albanian and Macedonian journalists received on-the-job training to strengthen the number of investigating journalists. The media in Macedonia have at times contributed to the ethnic tension through biased and incorrect reporting. The project attempted to educate members of the media by enhancing their understanding of the role of the media in an open democratic society.

The role of initiator

Domestic actors do not always initiate development processes; foreign democracy promoters can also instigate changes. State authorities in developing countries may lack the institutional capacity to take responsibility for development processes and they may not wish to function as a factor for change. The civil society can also be too weak to serve as a real factor for
change. Foreign democracy promoters can, on such occasions pressure or persuade domestic actors to initiate political change and they can make resources available that facilitate change, for instance in the form of development contributions. Sweden, through Sida, to some extent functioned as an initiator of political change in Macedonia. Upon entering Macedonia, Sweden encountered a state apparatus poorly equipped to function as an effective cooperation partner and caretaker of external development contributions. The Macedonian authorities had not put together and adopted a national PRS and coordination within the donor community was almost non-existent. Sweden was therefore, to a degree, unable to rely on Macedonian authorities for poverty analyses and development strategies, and instead had to find suitable areas for development contributions on its own initiative. Decentralisation measures that targeted the local and rural sector belonged to the areas that were identified as suitable for allocation of democracy promotion contributions, generally because this was a sector that had attracted limited contributions from other donor organisations and because democracy promotion activities in this sector were perceived as being measures to deepen and strengthen the national democratic culture. The state apparatus in Macedonia had become heavily centralised following the declaration of independence, and this had depleted the capacity of local authorities and reinforced authoritative structures and the political culture of individual seclusion and negative interaction. The contributions made by Sida to AMPEP and Integrated Rural Development Programme in part initiated processes of political change through the encouragement of rural citizens to become active in village councils. As a result of educating these village citizens about the merits of active engagement in local and national problem solving processes, the projects also aimed to influence the national democratic culture. The projects can also be credited as institution building. The village councils as such can be regarded as externally initiated institutions, but the projects also encouraged the development of formalised interaction between village councils and local authorities. Under previous regimes, the citizenry and state institutions had become largely isolated from each other, and these projects promoted increased interaction. The initiation of this formalised relationship was hoped to spawn a more vibrant democratic structure and culture at local level. Many of the other projects that received development contributions from Sida also incorporated some degree of initiation of development processes. The Children’s Theatre Centre initiated a process of reconciliation between members of different ethnic groups, the Ombudsman office project initiated a process that strengthened Ombudsman institutions, and the Support to Farmer’s Associations project initiated a process that strengthened, and changed, the interaction and cooperation between farmers in Macedonia. Sweden was not the sole initiator of many of these projects, but the Swedish contribution to the initiation of all of these development processes was of a magnitude to warrant recognition.

The role of supporter

The increased recognition of the influence of external factors on democritisation processes, which this study is an example of, should not be interpreted as a negligence of the influence
of internal factors. As previously discussed, a country’s character and future political trajectory is profoundly influenced by internal factors such as the level of socio-economic development, possible existence of a vibrant civil society, unity among political elites, institutional and social traditions, the possible existence of segmented cleavages, institutional design, and the extent of state control. These factors directly influence the possibilities for democratisation while foreign democracy promotion essentially only has a secondary influence on democratisation processes. In many cases, the primary role of foreign democracy promotion is therefore to provide support to domestic pro-democratic actors and processes. In Macedonia, the democratisation process had commenced before Sweden entered the arena and actively engaged in democracy promotion. Most of the formal democratic institutions had been introduced following the declaration of independence and continued democratic progression towards democratic consolidation was repeatedly depicted as a national strategic objective. One of the roles that Sweden, as a resulted, adopted upon entering Macedonia was as a supporter of domestic pro-democratic actors and processes. Such support can be moral, material, and/or financial, such as in the form of development contributions for the implementation of specific programs/projects. Consequently, the role of supporter incorporates features of the previously described role as financier/intermediator of resources. Acting in the role of supporter, Sida provided for example annual financial development contributions to the Swedish Helsinki Committee (SHC), Olof Palme International Center (OPIC), and Women to Women (KtK). These contributions were used to support and strengthen different local civil society organisations, which were engaged, for instance, in the empowerment of women, gender awareness, the promotion of human rights, the strengthening and training of independent media, and counter-trafficking measures. The financial support provided added force to the activities and objectives of these NGOs, and as a result these contributions supported the development of a democratic culture and vibrant civil society. Sweden also acted in support of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and their counter-trafficking activities. The trafficking of women was a human rights problem that plagued the region and cooperation had been initiated with IOM to attempt to deal with this concern. IOM had initiated, and took responsibility, for the project, and the Swedish role was primarily to provide moral and financial support to the project. The projects that involved SLU, LRF, and Statistics Sweden can also be used as indicators of the supporter role. In these projects, Sweden, through Sida, supported the strengthening of the Macedonian institutions affected, by financial contributions to the project and with intermediation. It can also be argued that Sweden adopted the role of supporter in relation to AMPEP and Integrated Rural Development Programme. The financial contributions that were made facilitated the implementation of these projects, and provided the resources, and opportunities, to pro-democratic actors and processes that had already existed in these rural villages before the initiation of the projects. Sweden also acted as a supporter through contribution to private sector development, foremost capacity building of small and medium sized enterprises. In Macedonia, the poor economic development is a serious concern and continued inability to produce economic growth may therefore have ramifications on the political development. The
Swedish contributions to the programs, *South East Europe Enterprise Development (SEED)* and *Collateral Guarantee Fund (SMEDSC)*, attempted to support the privatisation process, and thereby strengthen private entrepreneurs, the economic development, and the democratisation process.

**Concluding observations**

This study has in its entirety produced a range of results, as presented throughout the study. In short, an analytical framework has been advanced, that served to bring clarity to democracy promotion as a concept. It has been argued that democracy promotion embodies six structural components, and should be understood as activities adopted and/or supported by foreign *actors*, as part of a *relationship* between the democracy promoter and the recipient country, based on a set of *motives* and shaped through the use of different *strategies*, *methods* and *channels*. The issue of *impact* has also been investigated, primarily because of its possible influence on democracy promoters’ strategy choices.

The analytical framework was used to investigate the character of Swedish democracy promotion, both with regards to the official Swedish policy for democracy promotion, and with regards to the actual Swedish attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia in the period 2000-2006. It has been determined that Sweden is primarily driven by altruistic and ideological motives, and that the ambition is to promote a democratic model that partially reflects a Swedish democratic self-image. The Swedish objective appears to be the introduction of a legal and societal democracy, which implies that Sweden’s understanding of democracy extends beyond the introduction of the minimal definition of democracy. Rational persuasion serves as Sweden’s principle method of choice, and the choice of channel appears to be decided by a combination of practical and theoretical considerations. Additionally, the Swedish policy on democracy promotion has been described as permeated by eclectic theoretical reflections and characterised by flexibility. The theoretical reasoning, which serves as the foundation for the Swedish policy on democracy promotion, appears to have been assembled from parts of a large number of different theories. Sweden believes that sustainable development processes require local ownership and acceptance, and the flexibility of the Swedish policy on democracy promotion allows for adjustments to local conditions.

Moreover, the study has analysed the multi-faced democratisation process in Macedonia and attempted to connect these developments to the activities conducted by Sweden, and to shed further light on the Swedish policy on democracy promotion and the role of democracy promotion in democratisation processes. Macedonia has been described as a grey-zone democracy with a future political trajectory largely dependent on the ability to improve upon the conditions in three different transitional dimensions. Macedonia has gained recognition as an electoral democracy, but tension between the ethnic Macedonian and Albanian communities has resulted in a stateness problem, a democratic culture is yet to become firmly rooted in the society, and the economic development has been disappointing, which has caused Macedonia to remain stuck in the “valley of tears”. It has been shown that Sweden
recognised that Macedonia struggled with all of these transitional concerns, and that the Swedish activities attempted to support processes that would improve on the situation in these transitional dimensions. The analysis of these activities not only provided insight into the character of Swedish democracy promotion, but also served as the primarily empirical source for the discussion about the roles of democracy promotion in democratisation processes.

With the help of role theory, the aspiration of this final chapter has been to take the discussion about democracy promotion one step further, and present a typology of ideal roles of democracy promotion in democratisation processes. This study has shown that we can understand the role of democracy promotion in democratisation processes to be complex and multidimensional. Democratisation processes provide unique sets of challenges, and democracy promotion can be approached differently. This has been previously discussed with regards to the different factors and causes for democratisation, and with regards to the different structural components of democracy promotion. As a whole, these variations make it possible for democracy promotion to play multiple roles, depending on the approach of the actor concerned and the time-spatial context. Moreover, it has been determined that these roles blend together in both policy and actual activity, which makes the use of ideal types, created through abstraction, analytically useful. In the case study on Sweden and Macedonia, three ideal role types were detected, namely: educator, initiator, and supporter. These roles are based in the theoretical and ideological convictions that guide Swedish democracy promotion, in the actual Swedish attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia, and in Macedonia’s multi-faced democratisation process. Taken together, it can be argued that the Swedish attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia reflect a mixture of the “sensitive approach”, which is the approach used by Sweden in relations with recipient countries that have already undergone considerable democratic progress and where there is a high level of acceptance for democracy promotion, and the more active approach, used in relations with grey-zone democracies that have insufficient capabilities or a weak civil society.34 In this combination of approaches, Sweden is prepared to take initiative when needed, but prefers to primarily provide support to positive democratic processes by contributing resources and experiences. On the basis of these conclusions, it can be envisaged that certain ideal role types are more prominent than others depending on relationship-scenario. This issue is not further explored in this study, but it provides a starting point for a continued investigation of the character of democracy promotion, on the basis of the advanced ideal role types and relationship-scenarios. It is further acknowledged that the ideal role types of educator, initiator, and supporter, may not be the only possible roles that democracy promotion can have in democratisation processes. Nevertheless, the advanced typology and relationship-scenarios provide a starting point for such investigations, and it is possible that these advanced ideal role types can help to explain the role of democracy promotion in other shifting empirical contexts, and thereby serve as a partial basis for a generalisation about the roles of democracy promotion in democratisation processes.
Notes:

1 Le Prestre (1997) pp. 3-4
3 Holsti (1970)
5 These two terms can be regarded as largely interchangeable, see for instance Aggestam (2004)
6 Holsti (1970) pp. 245-246
7 Holsti (1970) o. 246
13 Holsti (1970) p. 243
14 Holsti (1970) p. 243
15 Holsti’s model has been slightly modified to fit the terminology of the study. Instead of “Alters’ role prescriptions”, as used by Holsti in the original model, this study uses “Alter’s role expectations”. The two concepts are essentially the same thing and can therefore be used interchangeably. I have also chosen to use “state” instead of “nation”. These two concepts have close ties, but they are not the same thing. The policies of a state might for instance not be shared by the nation, so it is advisable to use caution before declaring that a states priorities are the nations priorities. If the United States was to be studied today (2008), it would probably be possible to find differences between the nation’s role conception and the state role conception, foremost regarding engagement in the Middle East.
17 Breuning (1995) uses this typology in her study of foreign assistance from Belgium, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom.
18 Gov. Bill. 2002/03:122 p. 19
20 These elements were given and discussed in chapter six, in conjunction with the analysis of conceivable motives for Swedish democracy promotion.
21 Sida (2005a) p. 36
22 Sida (2005a) pp. 42-47
23 Sida (2005a) p. 43
24 Sida (2005a) p. 42
25 Sida (2005a) p. 44
26 Sida (2005a) p. 48
27 Sida (2005a) p. 49
28 Sida (2005a) p. 50
29 Sida (2005a) pp. 51-52
30 Sida (2005a) pp. 52-53
31 Sida (2005a) p. 52
32 See chapters two and three for a further discussion about the influence of different internal factors on democratisation.
33 For similar arguments, see Carothers (1999) p. 341
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