Unravelling Energy Relations between Russia and Germany
– The impact of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine since 2000 on German discourse

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Abstract
The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022 has greatly impacted the political environment, especially, around energy and gas imports from Russia. As a country previously highly dependent on Russian gas and the Nord Stream 2 project underway, Germany’s position is particularly interesting. While there is literature on the topic, it lacks the utilization of discourse analysis. To identify discursive changes in the use of language in the German government, official government speeches or statements from the early 2000s and after the Ukraine crisis in 2014 are being analysed. The happenings of 2014 are considered to be the first significant event in the energy relation between Germany and Russia. Both stylistic devices and narratives are being considered in the analysis. The findings show a lack of application of stylistic devices throughout the selected material, wherefore no discursive differentiation can be found. However, general narrative changes can be identified throughout the material and defined time periods, starting with optimism towards economic cooperation with Russia. After the Ukraine crisis, the narrative shifted to a more apprehensive one, while still advocating for the energy imports from Russia. With Russia no longer being a reliable supplier from 2022 on, the narrative finally shifts to negative. In the later material concrete approaches to diversification are also discussed contributing to a narrative that moves away from Russia as a single energy source.

Keywords: German-Russian energy relations, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, energy dependency, Nord Stream, discourse analysis
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACG</td>
<td>American Council on Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bcm</td>
<td>Billion cubic meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Content analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical discourse analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNA</td>
<td>Critical narrative analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Discourse analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GANY</td>
<td>German Academy New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA</td>
<td>International Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNG</td>
<td>Liquefied natural gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>msc</td>
<td>Munich Security Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OA</td>
<td>Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>Political discourse analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNG</td>
<td>Verbundnetz Gas Aktiengesellschaft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction

The Member States of the European Union (EU) have been highly dependent on the import of Russian gas and oil for years. Russia was able to provide the EU with a stable energy supply at a reasonable price since the end of the Cold War (Siddi, 2022). Germany has been one of the countries with the highest dependency on Russian gas. Over the last five decades, even prior to the reunification of Germany and the end of the Soviet Union, the cooperation between Germany and Russia in the energy sector has grown steadily (Sullivan, 2022). In the early 2000s, bilateral cooperation reached its peak with the agreement on building a pipeline directly connecting the two countries through the Baltic Sea. The project was successfully completed in 2011 (Knight, 2021). Given the increasing political tensions between Ukraine and Russia, the route through the Baltic Sea was considered necessary to increase energy security within the European Union. Prior to Nord Stream 1, around 80% of Russian gas was imported through Ukraine, making it the most important transit country (Siddi, 2022).

The political tension reached its first peak in 2014 when Russia annexed the Ukraine Crimean peninsula. Only a year after EU sanctions against Russia for the annexation were introduced, the Russian company Gazprom announced the extension of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline system. The Nord Stream 2 project would allow Russia to avoid transit fees in Ukraine while Germany would continue to have a stable energy supply (Offshore Technology, 2022). While the project was set out to be a commercial one the political implications have been high with other European states claiming Germany only acted out of self-interest regardless of the issues it would create for its eastern European neighbours (Kliwerer, 2023). Nord Stream 2 has become even more controversial since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022 (CNN, 2023). This unprovoked act of violence by Russia has caused both the EU and Germany in particular to reassess their energy dependency on Russia including the Nord Stream 2 project. Only two days prior to the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war the German government had stopped the certification process of the project, resulting in the pipelines not becoming operational (Congressional Research Service, 2022). Once again, the EU imposed sanctions on Russia including banning Russian oil imports and limiting Russian gas imports (CNN, 2023). As a repercussion, Russia also limited the gas it was supplying, gradually at first before shutting the systems down completely (BBC News, 2022). In September 2022 three of the four pipelines were damaged by an explosion rendering them completely inoperable. Given the current status of both pipeline systems and the continuous war on Ukrainian territory, the likelihood of Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 to ever carrying gas again or at all is low (Vakulenko, 2022).
Considering the happenings of 2014 and 2022 between Ukraine and Russia, it is interesting to analyse the change in behaviour from a German perspective. While the actions taken by the German government are quite relevant, their reasoning and impact are easily identified, it is the use of this discourse the following thesis discusses. Discourse is considered to be a powerful tool within politics. Politicians especially rely on language while making speeches as they can use discourse to their advantage to interact with people and to achieve their political goals (Stânculete, 2019).

With the most recent escalation only occurring in 2022, researchers have opted to focus on more direct changes in the German political discourse, thereby creating the current research gap. Andreas Umland published a paper on the German-Russia policy, including the Nord Stream 1 project, and its connection to Interdependence Theory (Umland, 2021). In a similar fashion Umbach published an essay on the mistakes made by the German government when dealing with Russia as an energy importer over the years (Umbach, 2022). Both articles focus on the general developments of the relation and the impacts major events had. Few research papers actually use discourse analysis. In 2020 Siddi published a research paper in which he used discourse analysis to compare the positions of Germany and Poland on the Nord Stream 2 project by identifying positive or negative language (Siddi, 2020). A quite relevant and most recent research paper concerning German-Russian Energy Relations was published in the journal ‘Energy Research & Social Science’ by Wiertz, Kuhn, and Mattissek. They applied discourse analysis to a set of materials to identify how the invasion of Ukraine impacted the German discourse on renewable energy transition (Wiertz, et al., 2023). There is still a lack of focus on the implications that can be drawn from discourse and the use of certain stylistic devices. It gives way to new angles to comprehend the development of attitude towards cooperating with Russia in the energy sector. The topic has been the subject of many speeches by German government officials, especially in recent years when political tensions rose once again. This thesis focuses on analysing the speeches specifically made by the three most relevant positions in the German government on the topic: the Federal Chancellor, the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Economics. There is no research to be found on this particular material, creating a research gap that this thesis aims to fill while also creating a basis for further research.

### 1.1. Problem formulation

With the previously mentioned information at hand, this thesis will discuss the following research question:
How has the German government changed its discourse on Russian cooperation since the invasion of Ukraine by Russia?

This question brings forward a secondary question that will be discussed subsequently:

How has that discursive change become visible within the narrative told by high-ranking members of the German government?

A particular focus will be put on the cooperation between the two countries in the energy sector. This includes gas imports as well as German and European energy security as they have been largely dependent on Russian gas.

Several significant events occurred since the year 2000 that can be considered critical to the relation between Germany and Russia. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 by Russia marks an important turning point for Russo-German relations. The second critical event was the full-scale military invasion of Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022. The following research will take material from before and after each occasion into account to be able to identify significant changes.

1.2. Research design

The following research is a discourse analysis focusing on the effects that specific events, the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, had on the chosen actor’s, in this case, Germany, discourse. Furthermore, it will connect these discursive changes to the observed changes in the German narrative when discussing Russia. It is research of a qualitative nature as it aims to analyse written and spoken discourse on the topic through the use of critical discourse analysis and narrative analysis. Furthermore, a deductive approach will be applied as the conclusions will result from the application of existing theories and concepts. The research will focus on developments that occurred until the beginning of March 2023, roughly a year after the invasion of Russia in Ukraine and the ongoing war.
2. Background

2.1. EU-Russia energy dependence

As a substantial amount of the energy consumed in the European Union stems from imported energy sources and the EU has been faced with ensuring energy security in its member states. This issue has become more relevant over the past two decades given the high dependence on Russia as an importer of energy and the unstable political relations with Moscow. The beginning of the energy dependence of the EU on Russian energy imports can be traced back to the Cold War era when Soviet Russia began exporting fossil fuels to Europe. Further expansion in the energy trade became possible with the end of the Cold War. The EU member states needed a stable energy supply while Russia was determined to capitalize on their fossil fuel resources which combined created an interdependence in the energy sector between the parties involved. Until the mid-2000s this economic relationship was considered a ‘positive example of post-Cold War cooperation’ (Siddi, 2022). This perception became more controversial following the 2006 and 2009 oil transit crises between Ukraine and Russia. With around 80% of Russian gas being transported through Ukrainian territory to Europe, the dispute caused a temporary disruption in the gas supply. Together with arising geopolitical frictions between Russia and the West, energy interdependence became a topic of securitization. The escalation of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, lead to the sanctioning of Russia through the EU. At that time around 50% of Russian gas imports were transited through Ukraine. Through trilateral negotiations, a European gas shortage was avoided, and the EU energy security was reinforced. Nevertheless, the political tensions lead to Russia reassessing its export routes to Europe once again as the country is as much dependent on the energy trade as Europe is (Siddi, 2022). Diversification requires new infrastructure like pipelines. However, this would allow Russia to bypass Ukraine as a transit country and with that limit the possibility of potential disruptions of oil exports (Siddi, 2022).

2.2. Germany-Russia energy relations

From being allies to fighting on opposite sides of the two World Wars, the political and economic relationship between Germany and Russia is a historically diverse one (Trenin, 2018). There are several different dimensions of relations between the countries like foreign policy, education, and trade. A crucial one is the energy trade, especially the gas import from Russia to Germany. The beginning of this energy cooperation dates back almost 50 years to the 1958 bilateral trade agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and the Soviet Union. In the 1960s the Soviet Union discovered its vast reservoir of gas and oil. In order
to be able to capitalize on those findings the Soviet Union required large-diameter pipes, mainly made in Germany. After finishing the Druzhba pipeline, an embargo on the export of pipes to the Soviet Union from West Germany was imposed by the US. Nevertheless, thanks to the Ostpolitik policy by the West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, which aimed for a more open engagement with the country’s eastern neighbours, 1970 marks the year of a historic deal between West Germany and the Soviet Union commonly known as ‘pipes for gas’. While West Germany received Soviet gas through the pipeline extension Transgas that ended in Bavaria, the Soviet Union got paid in steel pipe. Germany has been supplied with Soviet/Russian gas since 1973, as both West and East Germany started receiving gas that year. Regardless of US concerns about the amount of Russian gas being important to Europe, the German import volume increased from 1.1 bcm in 1973 to 25.7 bcm in 1993 (Sullivan, 2022).

Russia has continued to be Germany’s main supplier of gas in the 21st century with increasing numbers. Table 1 shows the total quantity of gas imported to Germany from 2011 to 2020 and the respective percentage of how much was imported from Russia. It becomes clear that Russia’s market share in Germany is exceptionally high with around 50% since 2016 (Eurostat, 2023). According to the German Bundesnetzagentur (Federal Network Agency) the Russian share accumulated to 52% in 2021 before dropping by 30% in 2022 (Bundesnetzagentur, 2023). Not only has Russia been Germany’s main provider of natural gas but Germany was also the main export country for Russia. In 2020 Germany alone received 20% of all Russian gas exports making it Russia’s biggest consumer (Sullivan, 2022).

### Table 1: Imports of natural gas by partner country in million cubic metres (Eurostat, 2023)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>German gas import total</th>
<th>Russian Gas</th>
<th>Percentage share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>80,439,019</td>
<td>52,463,565</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>94,786,760</td>
<td>46,250,986</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>88,347,545</td>
<td>43,108,053</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>118,694,443</td>
<td>62,079,783</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>97,379,000</td>
<td>58,671,000</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>102,517,000</td>
<td>43,626,000</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>89,896,000</td>
<td>37,201,000</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>97,777,000</td>
<td>39,977,000</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>88,401,000</td>
<td>32,632,000</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>89,645,000</td>
<td>32,859,000</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.1. Nord Stream

In 2005 the then Federal Chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schröder met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, a good friend of his. Together the heads of government decided to put to action an idea that first emerged in the 1990s. On the 8th of September 2005, they signed a declaration on building a new natural gas pipeline directly connecting Russia and Germany through the Baltic Sea. After losing the 2005, federal elections, Gerhard Schröder became a director at the pipeline’s operating company, which is now named Nord Stream. Politically it was therefore
left in the new Chancellor’s hands to see the pipeline project through. The project consisted of a twin pipeline system with both pipes running parallel to each other connecting the town of Greifswald in Germany with the Russian port of Narva Bay. With a length of 1,224 kilometres, Nord Stream became the longest subsea pipeline worldwide (Knight, 2021). Construction on the first pipeline was finished in the summer of 2011 with an official inauguration taking place in November of that year, while construction on the second pipe only started in May 2011 and finished in April 2012. Together the two pipelines can transport a capacity of 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas per year (Nord Stream, n.d.). Both Germany and Russia gained economic benefits. Russia was no longer dependent on the transit countries like Ukraine or Belarus and paying them transit fees. Germany on the other hand got a reliable, steady supply of energy (Knight, 2021).

2.2.2. Nord Stream 2

The project to extend the Nord Stream connection by two more pipelines was first considered in 2011 starting with a feasibility study. In 2013 the Nord Stream 2 project information document was published. This was prior to the sanctions that stemmed from the annexation of Crimea. Regardless of the political tension with Russia, the shareholders signed an agreement in September 2015 making way for the Nord Stream 2 project (Offshore Technology, 2022). A major instigator for the project was Gazprom, a Russian state company, in cooperation with several Western European companies. The project encompassed the building of two new additional pipeline systems running, for the most part, parallel to the existing Nord Stream 1 pipelines connecting Russia and Germany through the Baltic Sea. With an additional 55m³ of annual capacity, the Baltic Sea pipelines together could transport a total of 110m³ of natural gas. The project company Nord Stream 2 AG was founded in September 2015 with the sole objective of successfully realizing this project. Initially, the European companies Uniper, BASF/Wintershall, OMV, Shell, and Engie were to own 10% of the company each, while the remaining 50% was owned by the Russian Gazprom. However, merger controls in Poland led to the withdrawal of the European partner companies, making Gazprom the sole owner of Nord Stream 2. As the project was developed by these investors from the private sector it can be considered strictly commercial. Germany, especially, considered Nord Stream 2 as a commercial project given the economic rationality together with the potential for national and EU energy security provided by the increased capacity (Lang & Westphal, 2017). By August 2018 the project had received approvals for construction from Russia, Finland, Sweden, and Germany. However, Denmark was more reluctant and only approved the project in 2019 after being presented with two new routes. Nevertheless, construction on the two pipelines came to
a stop in December 2019, when the US announced imposing sanctions on the Swiss-Dutch company Allseas, a deep-sea pipe-laying company (Offshore Technology, 2022). This was not the first time the US intervened in the project through sanctions. The US government passed several different sanction packages between the years 2017 and 2022 restricting investment, vessels, companies, and entities. In January 2021 the Russian ship Fortuna was sanctioned. This vessel was in use by Gazprom to complete the construction of Nord Stream 2. Regardless of the sanctions, in September 2021 Gazprom announced the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipelines. Initially, by the end of 2021, the project received a binding opinion from the German government expressing that Nord Stream 2 was no threat to the energy supply security. On the 22nd of February however, only two days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Olaf Scholz the German Chancellor revoked that opinion, bringing the certification process of Nord Stream 2 to a halt as the opinion is an essential prerequisite for the process. The pipeline can therefore not become operational (Congressional Research Service, 2022).

During this entire process, the project never received support from the European Commission. While the German government continuously considered it a private project that would strengthen European energy security, it did not see a necessity to stop the project in 2015. Meanwhile, many other EU member states, especially the eastern European ones, considered the enforcement of the project to be a ‘Germany first’ policy. They believed Germany decided based on their own energy security interests rather than considering the security issues of the eastern European countries including Ukraine, by deciding to continue the Nord Stream 2 project both lacking solidarity and anti-European in nature (Kliwer, 2023). While the project was conceptualized as a commercial project, the political implications it entails cannot be disregarded (Lang & Westphal, 2017).

2.3. Ukraine-Russia relations

The beginning of the modern Ukraine and Russia relations dates back to the Soviet Union. After a failed previous attempt to declare independency from the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian parliament declared independence again on the 24th of August 1991, which was approved by Ukrainians in a voting with 92% of votes in favour in December 1991. This occurred only days before the complete dissolution of the Soviet Union. Since then, Ukraine evolved and explored international economic opportunities as well as the possibility of joining Western alliances such as NATO or the EU. However, Ukrainian politics were still being overshadowed by Russian influence. Political tensions grew when Gazprom cut off gas flows through the Ukraine in January 2009 not only impacting the country itself but creating a gas crisis in all of Europe.
This was due to failed gas price negotiations which were highly politicized. Through bilateral negotiations between Ukrainian prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko and Putin, a new deal was agreed upon, through which the crisis was fairly quickly resolved (Sullivan, 2022).

2.3.1. Ukraine Crisis 2014

In 2010 Victor Yanukovych was elected president of Ukraine against his rival Tymoshenko. He had previously won the 2004 presidential elections which were later declared invalid due to the accusation of manipulation. These had sparked the largest protest among citizens post-Cold War, known as the Orange Revolution. Political controversy continued in 2011 as former prime minister Tymoshenko was jailed for abuse of power during the 2009 gas negotiations with Russia (Sullivan, 2022). While back then Yanukovych was largely supported by Russia, in his time as president he aimed to bring Ukraine closer to the EU (BBC News, 2014). However, when in 2013 he abandoned an EU free trade agreement days before the signing due to pressure from Russia, protests grew anew. These would turn into the largest protests since the Orange Revolution and bloodiest in the post-Soviet Ukraine (Sullivan, 2022). In February 2014 within 48 hours, uniformed snipers shot at least 88 people. This atrocity was the ultimate demise of the Yanukovych government. The president transferred power to the parliament which allowed for early elections after international pressure. He proceeded to flee from Ukraine to Russia, as the new Ukrainian leaders had put out a warrant for his arrest for the “mass murder of innocent civilians” (BBC News, 2014).

This dismantling of the pro-Russian government in Ukraine sparked new tensions between Russia and Ukraine. Following the flight of President Yanukovych, a new interim government was elected, which decided to agree to the EU trade agreement and release Tymoshenko. Russia however saw this change in power as an illegal coup (Sullivan, 2022). As a response, Russia deployed its military to secure Russian interest in Ukraine and resulted in Russian troops with the support of pro-Russian separatists taking control of the Peninsula Crimea. In March 2014 the self-appointed Crimean parliament announced a regional referendum to confirm its decision to join Russia. Said referendum took place on the 16th of March. While observers raised concerns about the legitimacy of the results, 95% of voters were in favour of seceding Ukraine. Both the Ukrainian interim government and the Western government found the result to be illegal. Nevertheless, after the approval of the Russian parliament, Putin officially annexed the peninsula on the 21st of March 2014. This act was followed by sanctions from the United States and the European Union against Russia (Ray, 2023).
Not only did Russia annex Crimea, it also deployed the military to the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, both of which were primarily pro-Russian separatists. They declared independence from Ukraine on the 7th of April 2014. The regions got support from Russia with military crossing the border (Ray, 2023). This launched the Donbas region into a civil war with Ukrainian forces trying to regain control over the highly industrialized region from the Russian-backed separatists. More than 14,000 people lost their lives during the fighting and the conflict area fell to ruin the economic value of the region. The Minsk Agreement was an attempt to stop the fighting. Several versions of it were signed by Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France by the beginning of 2015. However, there was a lack in the implementation of the agreed-upon terms. Finally, the fighting subsided with two-thirds of the region becoming Russian proxy de facto states as the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (International Crisis Group, 2022).

2.3.2. Russian invasion 2022

On the 24th of February 2022, Russia’s president Vladimir Putin announced the deployment of the Russian military in Ukraine as part of a so-called Special Military Operation. Its aim was the ‘demilitarization’ and ‘denazification’ of Ukraine, which was formerly a part of the Soviet Union. While the Western countries had been wary about such an invasion, the actual execution of it came as a shock to many (CNN, 2023).

From a Russian perspective, the reasoning behind the invasion stems from the time of the Soviet Union. It collapsed in the early 1990s creating new countries and giving way for NATO to expand eastward. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland all took measures to distance themselves from Russian influence by joining both NATO and the European Union. Especially NATO’s statement from 2008 to someday affiliate with Ukraine as well, was perceived as a direct threat to the Russian territory by its government. According to Putin, Ukraine is inherently Russian as it shares its culture and history. Therefore, the war is considered an act of self-defence by the Russian government and is communicated as such to the Russian public. Putin expected to have a quick and easy takeover of Ukraine. Considering the initial state of the country this seemed possible, as the Ukrainian military is in no way a match for a military power such as Russia. Furthermore, the Ukrainian government under the lead of Volodymyr Zelensky, comedian turned president, was considered weak. Putin did however overestimate the Russian supporters in Ukraine and underestimated the will of the Ukrainian people to defend their country’s sovereignty (Nagourney, et al., 2023). While the Russian military did make significant territorial advances initially, the Ukrainian military stood its ground and regained control over many territories. On several occasions the Russian military suffered unexpected
losses, leaving Russia, the great, proud military nation, embarrassed. This includes the sinking of the Moskva, Russia’s flagship, the Crimean Kerch bridge attack, and the liberation of Kherson from its Russian occupiers (CNN, 2023). During the recapturing of territory, the Ukrainian military came across evidence of horrendous atrocities such as the torture and execution of civilians in Bucha. The Russian military was accused of breaking international humanitarian law, Russia however claimed the pictures taken there were fake (CNN, 2023). Civilians in Irpin, Izium, and Lyman suffered a similar fate and were concealed in mass graves. Official numbers state that more than 7,000 Ukrainian civilians lost their lives. According to the UN, the true number is much larger. The damages to homes, cultural sites, and infrastructure, such as heat, electricity, and water, caused by Russian missiles left many citizens displaced (Nagourney, et al., 2023). Within the first 24 hours, more than 100,000 Ukrainians alone fled their homes. During the first week of the conflict, the neighbouring country Poland received over 750,000 refugees (CNN, 2023). By the end of February 2023, the number of Ukrainian refugees across Europe reached around 8,000,000 (UNHCR, 2023).

Russia not only attacked the Ukrainian energy infrastructure but also put pressure on the Western European States’ energy supply. Nord Stream 1 used to supply around 35% of all European gas imports. Since June of 2022 however, Russia has gradually restricted the gas flow through the pipeline. Initially, the gas volume was reduced by 75% before being completely shut down for 10 days in July. Russia argued this was due to maintenance issues. After reopening only 20m cubic meters a day were transported through the pipelines which is only a fraction of the full capacity of Nord Stream 1. August 2022 then marked the end of gas deliveries as Russia claimed equipment issues (BBC News, 2022). On the 26th of September 2022, both Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipeline systems pressure drops were registered. The two lines of Nord Stream 1 and one pipe of Nord Stream 2 were leaking, caused by an explosion according to the Swedish and Danish-based seismologists. These leakages have been considered to be sabotage as the likelihood of three failures on a single day is low, given the constant inspections. It is unclear who is responsible for the sabotage as there are indicators towards both Russia and Ukraine but also the West. It is clear however that neither of the Nord Stream pipeline systems are likely to be repaired anytime soon or transport gas again if at all (Vakulenko, 2022). The gas leaks are visually represented in Figure 1 (BBC News, 2022).
Given these circumstances, Germany’s imports of Russian gas dropped to zero in September of 2022. *Figure 2* visually shows how the energy imports from Russia decreased rapidly during the course of 2022 as described earlier and then completely dropped to zero by the end of the year (Statista, 2023).

Even though Ukraine does not form part of NATO, it has received the full support of its member states and other Western countries given the unprovoked nature of the invasion. The Western nations imposed a number of sanctions on Russia. This includes financial sanctions, hindering Russia from utilizing foreign currency and Russians from making international transfers, and economic sanctions, such as the EU’s ban on Russian oil and the cutting of gas imports (CNN, 2023). Furthermore, countries like Sweden provided humanitarian, financial and civil support for Ukraine (Government Offices of Sweden, 2023). Despite statements made by the US government prior to the invasion saying the US wouldn’t provide military support, the country has sent weapons, munitions, and crucial anti-tank and antiaircraft systems (Nagourney, et al., 2023). After weeks of discussion, on the 25th of January, the German government agreed to send the German-made Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine and also allow other countries to send theirs. Simultaneously the US president said they would provide M1 Abrams tanks. This is a significant move by the West to further strengthen Ukraine and its territorial rights (CNN, 2023).

*Figure 2: Import volume of natural gas from Russia in Germany from January 2021 to February 2023 (in million cubic meters) (Statista, 2023)*
3. Theory and concepts

3.1. Social constructivism

Constructivism or social constructivism emerged after the Cold War when traditional theories no longer could account for the actions taken by relevant actors. Constructivists, therefore, believe that both the world and the acquired knowledge are socially constructed. They find that material structure is not solely to be important in understanding actions but also consider the ideational structure as essential. In principle, constructivists consider the meaning given to material power to be more important than the material itself. A crucial belief is that this meaning can change over time through the ideas and beliefs of the involved actors (Theys, 2017).

A fundamental argument within the theoretical approach of constructivism is that actors can influence structures and vice versa. Structures can be understood as an international system that includes both material and ideational elements. Basically, the actions of one entity can impact the international system while the entities are influenced in their actions through the existence of such an international structure. Both are bound to ideology. Therefore if ideas change, international relations can change as well (Theys, 2017). However, identity plays a big role in this process as well. Contrary to realist and liberal beliefs, constructivists argue that an actor’s identity is learned and evolves through socialization and time (Mansbach & Rafferty, 2008). Within international relations, states are key actors. Each has one or even multiple identities. These are defined through the state’s interactions and relations with other states of the international community but also their size for example. These identities represent the state’s interests and what they stand for, especially in an economic, political, and military context.

According to constructivism, all actions taken by a state should be in line with these internationally known identities and interests to ensure the state’s integrity. By taking actions out of line the international community could question the validity of said identity and the state’s place in an international context (Theys, 2017). The concept of social norms is central to the identification of the appropriateness of actions within social constructivism. There are certain norms, states with a certain identity are expected to comply with. This is called ‘the logic of appropriateness’. However, before something can be accepted as a norm it has to go through a ‘lifecycle of norms’. Social norms can develop into expected behaviour for states. For this to occur the norm needs to be adopted by a large number of relevant state actors and in a further step also be internalised into their state practices. The use of language and discursive methods play a large role in creating norms and with it initiating social change (Theys, 2017).

An example of different identities and alignment of actions is Germany. While being a great
economic power, the country is no military power. Both of these current German identities developed and have largely been shaped by the country’s historical background towards pacifism (Theys, 2017).

While the mentioned characteristics are generally applied principles throughout constructivism within International Relations (IR), there are two main versions that developed over time: North American and European. Both variants aim to give more weight to the social aspects of global politics rather than the material ones as realists do. The main distinction between the two strands can be seen in the questions asked about international relations and the methods applied to resolve them. The North American one puts more focus on how social norms and identities impact the construction of international politics and foreign policies. Usually, it’s positivist researchers that concern themselves with the causal relationship between actors and identities (Behravesh, 2011). The European strand is often applied by interpretivist scholars. They concentrate more on the importance of language and the use of linguistic constructions, in particular social discourse. Their aim is to identify what role language plays in the construction of social reality (Behravesh, 2011). This theoretical standpoint of interpretivist constructivism is relevant to the following research as it aims to identify linguistic changes that can be connected to a change in social interests or identity.

3.2. Discourse: A social practice

The definition of discourse varies throughout literature and research. The following definition will establish a cohesive understanding of the term. Given the chosen method of critical discourse analysis (which will be further discussed in the succeeding section) it is also his understanding of discourse that will be applied.

Generally, social scientists refer to spoken or written language when using the term discourse, Fairclough however understands it as the use of language. Furthermore, he describes discourse and language use as a social practice rather than merely an activity evoked by situational variables. Several implications can be drawn from the assumption of discourse as a social practice. For one, discourse can be considered a mode of action and representation, used to interact, and act upon one’s surroundings. Social structure also has a significant impact on discourse, similar to the relation between social structure and social practice in general. Through social structures like class, education, relations, institutional regulations, laws, and norms, discourse is shaped but also restrained. Depending on the social setting the use of language varies significantly (Fairclough, 2006). At the same time, it is the use of language that impacts and constructs social structure. Hence, discourse is also socially constitutive. There are three
particular aspects that discourse has constructive effects on. First, discourse allows for the formation of social identities of individuals and also subjects such as institutions. Second, discourse aids in the construction of social relationships between individuals. Lastly, it is essential to the construction of knowledge and belief. These are the three functions through which discourse reproduces society. Discourse can however have transforming effects on society, reshaping it accordingly (Fairclough, 2006).

To summarize, discourse is an important social practice that not only has a representative nature but is also constituted and constitutive within social structures. The use of language has an identity, a relational, and an ideational function (Fairclough, 2006). Therefore, “discourse is in a dialectical relationship with other social dimensions” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 65).

3.3. Concept of energy security

The concept of energy security has been widely discussed throughout literature and has developed since its emergence in the 1970s. A common definition is introduced by the International Energy Agency (IEA). It defines it as ‘the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price’ (International Energy Agency, n.d.). On a short-term basis, the concept aims to counterbalance sudden shocks to the supply and demand energy chain, while long-term it also takes economic developments and environmental needs into account (International Energy Agency, n.d.). Researchers have gone further and defined up to eight different dimensions of energy security. However, there are three characterises that due to their reappearance in literature can be considered the main pillars of energy security. First, there is the aspect of energy independence that ensures the availability and accessibility of energy sources. Second is the affordability and equity of energy which can be improved through energy efficiency. Finally, stability and environmental sustainability are considered crucial to energy security (Rabbi, et al., 2022). During the following thesis when referring to the term ‘energy security’ these three fundamental characteristics are meant.
4. Methodology

4.1. Ontology and epistemology

Ontology defines how social researchers understand reality. It is the theory of ‘being’ that basically questions the existence of a ‘real’ world without the external influence of knowledge (Marsh & Furlong, 2002). This is an important consideration as the ontological standpoint can drastically change the perception of reality. According to objectivism, entities like organizations and culture are objective regardless of the sections of social actors e.g., people. The constructivist view on the other hand finds that social objects and categories as well as their meaning are the product of social actors. They are also undergoing constant change and revision through continuous social interaction. The use of spoken and written language in particular is a big contributor to how reality is perceived and understood. Discourse represents a selection of possible realities as it takes form that gives structure to the nature of reality (Bryman, et al., 2021). The ontological standpoint adopted for this research will therefore be constructionism.

Epistemology is considered to be the theory of knowledge. It reflects the researcher’s understanding of what is known and how knowledge is created. The two key questions within epistemology are “can an observer identify ‘real’ or ‘objective’ relations between social phenomena? If so, how?” (Marsh & Furlong, 2002, p. 19). There are three different epistemological positions to be considered: positivism, realism and interpretivism. Both the positivist and realist positions are based on a foundationalist ontology, meaning that a knowledge-independent world exists. On the contrary, the interpretivist position views the world as a construct of social and discursive actions (Marsh & Furlong, 2002). Interpretivism, therefore, poses a more subjective perspective of reality. Cultures, circumstances, and time for development pose important aspects to determining social realities. These insights can help to avoid imposing generalized ideologies on diverse social actors like positivism does (Alharahsheh & Pius, 2020). The research will be conducted from the epistemological position of interpretivism.

Overall, the following will consider the ever-changing social structures and their causal impact on the observed patterns. The ontological and epistemological assumptions are therefore also in line with the selected theory of social constructivism.

4.2. Critical discourse analysis

The term critical discourse analysis (CDA) refers to an overarching field of critical analysis approaches as well as a specific approach coined by Norman Fairclough. Overall, the
approaches within CDA have certain similarities but also diverge from each other. Jørgensen and Phillips identify five common features throughout the different CDA approaches. For one they share the assumption that discursive practices, which refer to the production and consumption of text, are a driver for social and cultural development. CDA, therefore, aims to analyse the linguistic-discursive dimension of societal phenomena (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). A significant differentiation between CDA approaches and e.g., poststructuralist approaches is the conceptualisation of ‘discourse’. Within CDA discourse is considered to be both constitutive and constituted. Accordingly, discourse does not only influence the social structure but it is also influenced by its social situation. Social change can be driven through the use of discourse while at the same time is shaped by non-discursive societal forces (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). When analysing the use of language within the critical discourse analysis movement it is done empirically. Once again, the social context forms an important aspect when conducting a linguistic textual analysis. Furthermore, all critical discourse analysis approaches identify discursive practice as a contributor to the uneven distribution of power and a tool for the continued oppression of certain social groups, like ethnic minorities or even women in general. The specific use of discourse can further the interest of other small social groupings that hold on to their power through it (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Lastly, critical discourse analysis is overall not considered to be politically neutral or objective. Although power relations are analysed, CDA adopts the views of the oppressed social group (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). While these are common properties within the broader critical discourse analysis field, each also employs a unique understanding of the theory, historical importance, and ideology that discourse holds (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

4.2.1. Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis

Norman Fairclough is a British professor who over the course of the past 40 years has published and co-written several articles and books on the use of language and critical discourse analysis. He developed and refined his approach to CDA over the years according to different theoretical assumptions and developments (Fairclough, n.d.).

Fairclough’s approach to critical discourse analysis is considered to be one of the more developed approaches within the field. First, he establishes three distinct definitions for the term discourse, which are discussed more in length under the ‘Theory and concepts’ section. One major element of Fairclough’s definition of discourse is that he refers to it as a social practice that is constitutive and constituted. Furthermore, discourse is the language that is used in specific social environments, such as political discourse. Finally, discourse, used as a count
noun, “gives meaning to experiences from a particular perspective” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 66-67). Overall, however, discourse aids in the construction of social identities and relations as well as the systems of knowledge and meaning (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Based on this understanding of discourse, Fairclough developed his three-dimensional model consisting of different analytical traditions that are essential to accurate discourse analysis. The model is visually represented in Figure 3 (Fairclough, 2006). Overall, this three-dimensional model provides a basic analytical framework to understand the relationship between text and social context. A main goal of Fairclough’s CDA is understanding how discursive practices can initiate social change or on the contrary, maintain social order. A simple linguistic analysis cannot provide in-depth comprehension like a multidisciplinary analysis, as presented in the three-dimensional model, can (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

4.3. Narrative analysis

Narrative is an important tool within discourse to systematically recount the human experience. Not only does this aid in the retelling of experiences but it also gives actual meaning to the experiences. It also allows for the interpretation of new experiences. A narrative is created by ‘connecting events, arranging them temporally, and depicting these events from a particular perspective’ (Souto-Manning, 2014). This is how a human being is able to make sense of the world and the experiences it creates. Narratives are also essential in creating identities. Through sharing they can also reconceptualize identities as they give new perspectives to consider (Souto-Manning, 2014).

Putting it into a social context, narratives can give meaning to the construction of cultural norms and institutional discourse. The aim of narrative analysis is therefore to put a set of smaller events into perspective of the broader social context. More specifically, it aims to interpret the meaning behind the text (Souto-Manning, 2014).

4.3.1. Critical narrative analysis

Critical narrative analysis (CNA) combines both CDA and narrative analysis together. Souto-Manning applies this mixed method in her paper from 2014. She described the combination of CDA and narrative analysis as a ‘mutually beneficial partnership’ (Souto-Manning, 2014).
CNA allows the researcher to develop a greater understanding of the construction of reality and social norms by putting everyday storytelling into the context of institutional discourse. This analytical approach also takes into consideration how personal narratives affect established social situations. CDA assumes discourse holds the power to initiate social change. CNA adds to that assumption, arguing that without the stories and overall narratives conveyed by language, discourse holds no meaning. In the analysis of political speeches, CNA can be especially relevant. By considering narratives in political speeches, researchers are able to identify the influence and potential for change a speaker is trying to communicate. Critical narrative analysis is therefore a combined method of textual analysis and social reality, ‘considering the complex ways in which language and the social world are intertwined’ (Souto-Manning, 2014).

4.4. Alternative method

4.4.1. Content analysis

As the research is of a qualitative nature, content analysis (CA) is another alternative method that could be applied. Content analysis used to be largely applied as a quantitative research method. Qualitative content analysis has become more prominent since the late nineties. Its aim is to identify the characteristics of language focusing on the contextual meaning behind the text data. The text data material can consist of a variety of verbal, print, or electronic sources such as interviews, focus groups, surveys, or printed media outputs. Through the use of coding, during which the text data is systematically classified, common patterns or themes can be identified throughout the different materials. This allows for a more detailed analysis than when only examining language intensity based on the word count (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).

This method would be a valid option to conduct the following research. While CA is closely interconnected with critical discourse analysis and has similar approaches to analysing text data, it would provide unique insights into the topic and contribute to the posed research aim. However, the focus of this analysis is on the discourse itself making the combination of CDA and narrative analysis a more suitable option.

4.5. Material

The use of critical discourse analysis allows for a broad amount of material and sources to be considered as a basis for the analysis. The materials used often consist of already existing data and materials already produced (Bryman, et al., 2021). Given the short time frame and the limited amount of resources available for this thesis, this aspect of discourse analysis works in the favour of the researcher.
Since the year 2000, the German Federal Government offers an online library covering a vast variety of official speeches and statements made by members of the government. That includes the federal chancellor, the federal president, and all federal ministers. All publications are authorized versions and can be cited without restrictions making them valuable scientific sources. Since the so-called Bulletin covers speeches from 1987 to the present day, a time frame was established and a set of keywords was applied to create a manageable set of material relevant to the topic (Die Bundesregierung, 2023). As previously mentioned, two significant events impacted the relations between Russia and Germany. Therefore, the years most relevant to this research are 2014 until March 2023. For reference, material speeches from the early 2000s will be analysed when the Russo-German relations were considered to be at their most amiable. To further limit the material, only statements from the German Federal Chancellor, the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate protection (called Federal Minster for Economic Affairs and Energy from 2013 to December 2021 and the Federal Minister of Economic Affairs and Technology from 1998 to 2002). Over the years the politician occupying each position changes and with it their political party affiliation. This will be taken into account during the analysis. These positions were chosen due to their fields connecting to the topic of analysis: international relations and energy security. Although, the German Chancellor and the Minister of Foreign Affairs play large roles when it comes to the cooperation with other nations, especially, in light of the invasion of Ukraine. Given the economic nature of the trade of energy sources and the expansion of pipelines the statements made by the Minister of Economic Affairs are also important to consider. Finally, a set of keywords were used to identify speeches covering the research topic. The following keywords were inserted in the search engine of the Bulletin either individually or combined: ‘Ukraine’, ‘Russia’, ‘Crimea’, ‘energy’, ‘gas’, ‘Nord Stream’, ‘Nord Stream 2’, ‘war’, ‘crises’. The results included government statements from the Chancellor addressing the German Bundestag but also speeches made in international political environments like the Munich Security Conference or economic forums.

The results found can be considered credible given that they were published and authenticated by the German Federal Government, however, the speeches and statements recollected are in the German language. There are a number of news reports in the English language that concern themselves with some of the chosen material and they include some translations, however, to accurately analyse the change in the language use the original discourse will be used. The relevant sections to the analysis will be translated by the researcher to the best of her abilities while preserving the meaning and ideology.
The following table shows the material retrieved from the Bulletin under the previously mentioned filters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Statement</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz am 27. Februar 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz (2022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz (2023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech by the Federal Chancellor</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech by the Federal Minister of Foreign</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Sigmar Gabriel (2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Heiko Maas (2019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rede der Bundesministerin des Auswärtigen, Annalena Baerbock (2022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech by the Federal Minister of Economic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rede des Bundesministers für Wirtschaft und Technologie, Dr. Werner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affairs and Technology (title from 1998</td>
<td></td>
<td>Müller (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to 2002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech by the Federal Minister of Economic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rede des Bundesministers für Wirtschaft und Energie, Peter Altmaier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affairs and Energy (title from 2013 to</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech by the Federal Minister of Economic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rede des Bundesministers für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz, Dr. Robert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affairs and Climate Protection (title</td>
<td></td>
<td>Habeck (2023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>since 2021)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Material (Die Bundesregierung, 2023)

It is important to mention that the speeches made prior to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 are not in their entirety relevant to the research. However, they do contain certain paragraphs that provide information linked to the research question.

4.6. Analytical framework

Based on the previously discussed critical discourse analysis by Norman Fairclough the following analytical framework is proposed to analyse the collected material. While Fairclough’s three-dimensional model provides a guideline for the analytical framework the analysis will not follow the model in detail as the following will also be combined with a narrative analysis.

The first step was to analyse the text of the individual speeches itself. This analysis focuses on the use of linguistic features including their frequency and the issue they are applied onto. This also focuses on the use of language and rhetoric devices which can be mainly classified under
cohesion and text structure according to Fairclough. The aim of the rhetorical devices is to portray a clearer image of the content and in the best case also persuade the recipient of a certain notion. They, therefore, make powerful tools for politicians when holding speeches or campaigning (Stănculete, 2019). The following table provides an overview of the rhetorical criteria this first analysis is based on. These specific rhetorical and stylistic devices were chosen given their frequent use in political speeches and the possible implications they offer. There are other stylistic devices that could be considered; however, they were excluded due to the complexity the inclusion would create. The limited time and resources require a more limited framework. Table 3 also includes a definition of each term to create a common understanding of the rhetorical devices that are identified in the speeches.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rhetorical device</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analogy</td>
<td>Refers to the comparison made between similar happenings that is self-explanatory. Complex metaphors and long similes are types of analogies. Given the short frame of this thesis, all linguistic comparisons will be grouped under the term analogy (THESAURUS.COM, 2023).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaphora</td>
<td>Refers to the repeated use of words or phrases at the beginning of consecutive sentences. This creates a specific syntactic structure and rhetorical reinforcement to give more importance to the expressed (BachelorPrint.de, 2016).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyperbole</td>
<td>Refers to the over-exaggeration of happenings to clarify its importance and impact (BachelorPrint.de, 2016).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repetition</td>
<td>Refers to the repeated use of entire phrases throughout a text. This can aid in portraying the urgency of a certain matter. Contrary to anaphors the sentences don’t have to be successive (BachelorPrint.de, 2016). Furthermore, repetition can refer to words or their meaning being used relatedly throughout a text.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pronouns</td>
<td>Refers to the usage of first-person pronouns, I and we, in political speeches. This has several different purposes. First off it positions the speaker relative to the intended audience, for example as a separate individual or a member of society. The use of ‘we’ creates a collective identity either together with the audiences or the affiliated political party. Overall, pronouns in political speeches can express different social relations, including asserting power and control. They can also create social categories that allow the speaker’s identity to either be in the foreground or stay in the background (Stănculete, 2019).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Rhetorical devices (BachelorPrint.de, 2016; Stănculete, 2019; THESAURUS.COM, 2023)

Furthermore, this part of the analysis also considers whether the words and phrases used to describe the relations with Russia as generally more positive or negative. Descriptions like ‘economic partner’, ‘good neighbour’, or ‘mutual interest’ can be considered positive, while expressions like ‘aggressor’ or ‘security issues’ can be considered negative. There is no definitive list of such expressions as they vary largely. This aspect was assessed individually for each speech. These phrasings can also be an indication of underlying implications. Implications behind the spoken word are also considered as an important indicator of discursive
change over time. To compare the different speeches and identify patterns throughout the timeline, each speech was classified according to the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use of language</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indirect language</td>
<td>There has been a constant use of language that indicates further meaning or interpretation throughout the speech. A high or medium frequency of implications can be observed throughout the speech. When determining the frequency, the length of the dedication to the topic within the speech will be taken into account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct language</td>
<td>The speech only indicates a low frequency of implications indicating that the meaning is clearly stated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Use of language: indirect or direct

Not all implications made during the text will be discussed directly in the analysis given the limited space of this thesis. A speech can have a high frequency of implications and therefore a more indirect use of language even though just the implication was discussed.

The second step is the analysis of the social context. Here the applied framework deviates from the three-dimensional model presented by Fairclough, as both the discourse practice and sociocultural practice are analysed together under the term of social context. This allows for a better understanding of the conditions under which each speech was held. This step first focuses on the author and presenter of each speech (production). Then, the analysis also takes into account the current political circumstances and the intended audience (consumption), mainly determined through the event or location (distribution) the speech was held at. This social context could provide an overview of when certain rhetorical devices were put to use more than others. Finally, the intent of the speech is discussed and whether it aimed to reproduce or restructure social practice. These are the five questions regarding the production, consumption, distribution, and social impact of each speech that this step of the analysis considers:

- Who made the speech and which office did they hold at the time?
- Where was it made referring to both location and event setting?
- Who was the audience and was a larger audience like the public intended?
- What significant events involving Russia and Ukraine, impacting bilateral cooperation between Germany and Russia occurred prior to or during the time of speech?
- What was the aim of the speech to reproduce or restructure?

To support the social context further, additional material in the form of news media outlets and related official websites are referred to. They aid in identifying the target audience as well as in describing the political setting the speech to place.
These two steps of initial analysis then aid in identifying the narrative throughout the material, creating a broader picture of what linguistic developments occurred over time. The narratives portrayed in each speech are connected to the speaker’s personal experiences. However, all still represent Germany as a country and a certain governmental office. This means that regardless of personal opinion there is an official position and in a sense narrative the politicians have to convey in their speeches. The narrative of each of the analysed speeches were summarized in a table according to the following template:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrative</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plotlines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keywords</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Table 5: Narrative table template*

The plotlines refers to the story that each speaker is telling to make the point. That includes how the current events play into the narrative. The keywords consist of words or phrases that indicate positive or negative language towards Russia and the Nord Stream projects that are relevant to the narrative.

In the discussion part of the thesis, the shifts in the narrative were identified through the previously discussed shifts in language and by comparing the individually created narrative tables. Since the person in office changed multiple times throughout the to-be-analysed time period, the focus was put on the ministry in general. This means that the narratives told by the German Federal Chancellor, the Minister of Economics (whose title and responsible area changed through the years) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs were compared against each other while at the same time identifying any common narrative changes.

In order to able to assess discursive changes the selected material will be divided into three periods of time based on the significant events mentioned previously (in the following referred to as periodic group or cluster, or just group). The first group includes speeches made between the year 2000 and the start of the Ukraine crisis in 2014. The second periodic cluster then ranges from 2014 until the end of 2021 given that the invasion of Ukraine launched in February 2022. The final and most recent speeches from 2022 and 2023 are allocated in a third periodic group. While each periodic cluster differs in its length, five relevant speeches were identified for each. These chosen speeches were made by at least two different federal ministers or chancellors. After analysing each group separately in chronological order according to the presented analytical framework, the findings on the rhetorical devices, social contexts, and overall...
narrative they created, are compared against each other in the ‘Discussion’ section of this thesis. This allows for the posed research question, of how the German government discourse changed, to be answered. The entire analytical framework is visually represented in a simplified way in Figure 4.

4.7. Limitations

Like with any research method, critical discourse analysis also comes with its limitations. The limited selections of both analytical tools and materials pose a limitation in themself. For one, not all speeches from within the timeframe, found through the chosen keywords, are being analysed if they were held by other federal ministers or members of government. Increasing the total of relevant governmental positions would significantly widen the analysis. This is a common point of criticism made by scholars when it comes to discourse analysis (Ayfin-Düzgit & Rumelili, 2018). In a similar fashion, more rhetorical devices could have been included in the analytical framework. This would allow for an even more in-depth text analysis and basis for the succeeding analysis on the social context of each speech. The selection of rhetorical devices was chosen to match the researcher’s capabilities within the field of linguistics. Commonly discourse analysis requires a high knowledge of the field, making it difficult for scientists from other disciplines to apply (Ayfin-Düzgit & Rumelili, 2018). However, these restrictions of the material and analytical framework are also necessary to arrive at some kind of conclusion by the end of this time and length-limited thesis.

Overall, critical discourse analysis is often criticized for being too abstract as it claims to identify the connection between language and social context. This abstract approach to the analysis of language makes it difficult to reach well-rounded conclusions. By introducing narrative analysis into the methodological framework, this issue is counterbalanced as it regards the influence of social issues and their telling (Souto-Manning, 2014).

4.7.1. Validity and reliability

Both validity and reliability are common criteria for the quality of both quantitative and qualitative social research. Validity concerns the conclusions that researchers arrive at through their analysis and whether they have integrity. Internal validity specifically concerns the
correlation between the research results and the applied theoretical ideas. Within qualitative research, this can be achieved through deep analytical insights into social constructs (Bryman, et al., 2021). The external validity of the following research is however not given as the results cannot be generalized across different social settings. Like with many qualitative research subjects, generalisability isn’t possible as the research consists of a discourse analysis, set in a specific ethnographic environment focusing on specific countries (Bryman, et al., 2021). Reliability considers whether the same results can be achieved under the same circumstances. This is especially important for quantitative research. The reliability of qualitative research tends to be more difficult to assess. Internal reliability is not relevant to this research as there is only one researcher. Therefore, there will be no disagreement on observations. External reliability refers to the replicability of a research study. Given the qualitative nature of this research, this is difficult to achieve. The research is situated within a specific social setting that cannot be frozen or replicated in a different context (Bryman, et al., 2021). The following research will be conducted with these issues of validity and reliability in mind in order to ensure the quality of the results.

4.7.2. Trustworthiness

Another concept to assess the quality of qualitative research is trustworthiness. It consists of four criteria: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. Each of these concepts is a parallel to the already discussed concepts of reliability and validity (Bryman, et al., 2021). These concepts were developed by Lincoln and Guba in 1985. According to them, credibility in qualitative research refers to the degree in which the results of a research study are in line with reality and how they are interconnected. By investigating multiple data sources with similar outcomes or patterns the credibility of research can be increased. This method is known as triangulation (Stahl & King, 2020). Since the material of the following research is speeches provided by the German government, which can be considered a reliable source, triangulation will only be applied when necessary. This confirmation of data through different sources is especially relevant in the background section given the Russian spread of disinformation throughout the war. Russian sources are only used in the background section and critically evaluated beforehand. Transferability concerns itself with the generalisability of a study, which is difficult to achieve within qualitative research. This mainly touches upon the applicability of patterns and descriptions in a different context. The research aim and method of this thesis could be applied to another context however, it would still require an intensive background and understanding of the social context chosen. Through continuous knowledge exchange and revisions of the following research, the dependability is increased. It creates a
sense of trust in the research process and its findings as it is confirmed by peers (Stahl & King, 2020). The final concept of trustworthiness is confirmability which raises the question of objectivity. Once again it is not as easily established as in quantitative research. It can be increased by assessing whether the researcher has overly introduced personal values and ideologies into the research (Bryman, et al., 2021). To secure the quality of this research these four concepts of trustworthiness are taken into account throughout the research process.
5. Literature Review

While keeping the invasion of Ukraine in mind as a major pivotal event for this research, the following research papers and articles were determined relevant to the thesis at hand. In view of the topicality and ongoing war in Ukraine, the existing literature is still limited to a few research papers that were published in 2022 after the invasion or 2023. Nevertheless, there is previous research that covers the Russian-German energy relations and especially Nord Stream 2 even prior to the invasion of Ukraine given the developed controversy through the years.

The Finnish researcher Marco Siddi published a paper in the Journal for East European Politics in 2020 on the EU-Russia energy relations focusing on the Nord Stream 2 debate. The opinions on the project within the European community have been diverse since the beginning. In his paper, Siddi argues that this is due to the differences in the identities of EU member states and their corresponding conceptualisation of Russia. It is also discussed how the Russian Other has impacted national identities. These diverging identities have led to the ‘conflict/cooperation dichotomy in the energy sector’ (Siddi, 2020). Other refers to an external entity in this case Russia, and their impact on the building of national Self or identity. Siddi uses discourse to compare the identities and positions on energy cooperation with Russia of Germany and Poland. He specifically focuses on statements made by national leaders on Nord Stream 2, such as heads of government, foreign ministers, and ministers of the economy. The timeframe for the material was determined through the launch of Nord Stream 2 and was set between 2015 and 2018. The statements were either retrieved from official government websites or the press (Siddi, 2020). This approach was chosen, due to a lack of focus on the ideational aspects within existing research. Most scholars discuss the material and strategic factors, which Siddi does not dismiss but also includes in a later stage of his research process. In his analysis of both German and Polish discourses, Siddi focuses on articulations, expression and whether they are framed positively or negatively. For example, the former German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier used phrases like ‘EU’s largest neighbour’, ‘good neighbourly relations in the interest of both sides’, ‘need [ed] each other’, and ‘reliable energy partner for us’ when talking about the Nord Stream 2 project (Siddi, 2020). On the other hand, the Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski was quoted saying the project was ‘a blow against not only CEE (Central and Eastern Europe)’s security of gas supplies but also Ukraine’s stability’ and that it could result in the ‘geopolitical destabilisation in Central Europe’ (Siddi, 2020). These contrasting uses of discourse reflect the German tradition of Ostpolitik, which is the basis of the long-standing economic cooperation with Russia, especially in the energy sector. Since the
1960s, *Ostpolitik* has developed into an ‘important component of German foreign policy identity’ (Siddi, 2020). On the contrary, Poland’s use of more negative use of language is the result of the *Russia Other* being preserved as threatening and aggressive leading to an opposite view on energy relations with Russia (Siddi, 2020). Siddi also arrives at the conclusion that the views on Russian energy cooperations are also defined through the geological position of EU Member States. Poland and Russia share a border and a history of conflicts, making the country more cautious about economic ties and energy relations, while countries like Germany, which are located further away are more keen on energy cooperation and see Russia as a crucial economic partner for the European energy security (Siddi, 2020).

In November of 2021, only a few months prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Andreas Umland published a piece on the German Russia policy, also called *Ostpolitik*, in connection with Interdependence Theory (Umland, 2021). Over the years the aggressions and political pressures from Moskow towards Kyiv increased. The Nord Stream project that was supported by the German government has largely been considered to have had a significant impact on the Russian-Ukrainian relation. With the gas pipeline directly to Germany, Russia reduced its dependence on Ukraine as a transit country. Interdependency theory can account for there being no radical escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict prior to the completion of the first Nord Stream project in 2012. The development and escalation of the Ukraine crisis can be considered a prime example of how interdependency in the energy sector can ensure peace (Umland, 2021).

Frank Umbach published an essay in November of 2022 in German, discussing the mistakes made and misconceptions of the German energy policies since the year 2002, especially in light of the invasion of Ukraine (Umbach, 2022). The approach to cooperate in the energy sector has led to Germany becoming highly dependent on the imports of gas from Russia. While the security risks of such a dependency were made clear mainly through Russian obvious abuse of such dependencies for geopolitical influence, the German government chose to ignore these issues. Germany’s decision to exit from both nuclear and coal energy largely contributed to the dependency on Russian gas as reliable alternative energy sources were required (Umbach, 2022). With Germany being considered one of the most powerful economic states in Europe, the chosen energy policy path seemed to contradict the core principle of solidary within the European Union. Both Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 were large topics of conflict as the German government defended them while the EU and many member states found them to go against EU law. Germany has a lot to make put for and to readjust in its Russia and energy
politics in this time of *Zeitenwende* as proclaimed by the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (Umbach, 2022).

Both these essays focus on the German political and economic approach towards Russia over the years and the consequences for not only Germany but also Eastern Europe that stemmed from the decisions made by the German government especially concerning energy security. They are not research papers but give more of an overview of how the situation developed over the years including the impacts of major events.

Another research article actually also applies discourse analysis to the topic of energy and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The researcher Wiertz, Kuhn, and Mattisèk published their article titled ‘*A turn to geopolitics: Shifts in the German energy transition discourse in light of Russia’s war against Ukraine*’ (2023). As the title already leads on, their research focuses on the German *Energiewende* (renewable energy transition) and how the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 impacted the discourse on the topic. Germany’s plans to switch to renewable energy are considered to be exemplary within the international community, but the war has pushed the *Energiewende* into the foreground again with discussions on energy policies resparking. The chosen material for the analysis consists of discourse collected from a variety of different sources. Since the pivotal event of the invasion of Ukraine constitutes, only discourse published after the happenings were considered for all the following data sources. From Twitter, the research recovered 26,745 tweets containing the keyword *Energiewende*. Next to the overall qualitative approach that was applied in the paper, these tweets were analysed quantitively based on the frequency of additional Hashtags (Wiertz, et al., 2023). Secondly, nine national newspapers covering the political spectrum from left to conservative were searched. Articles containing the terms ‘Ukraine’ and ‘Energiewende’ added up to a number of 179. Next, footage of the four most prominent political talk shows in Germany was searched. Specific sections on energy politics were transcribed and included in the analysis. Finally, the researchers also recollected eight protocols of plenary discussions from the *Bundestag* which include parliamentary speeches. Speeches concerning the war on Ukraine and renewable energy or *Energiewende* were determined and included in the analysis. All these found sources create the corpus which is then used to identify discursive patterns (Wiertz, et al., 2023). The results were divided by topic starting with the energy transition and whether it was the cause or the solution for the gas dependency during which the researcher refer to multiple statements made by a variety of politicians and news articles. The second section discusses the discourse on the reduction of the German energy consumption. This is largely connected to the question of morality and the price
to pay for a war of aggression. Thirdly bridging technologies like LNG (liquefied natural gas) but also coal and nuclear power are discussed. And finally, the researchers discuss the topic of renewable energy and its meaning for security, freedom, and sovereignty. Each section includes several direct quotes taken from the corpus (Wiertz, et al., 2023). Overall, Wiertz, Kuhn, and Mattisek arrive at the conclusion that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to a shift in the discourse on Energiewende, renewable energy and energy security in Germany. Through their analysis, they identified four distinct changes caused by the geopolitical changes of 2022 which are represented by each of the previously mentioned. These conclusions of the discourse analysis however have their limitations as they are not generalisable and that discursive positions can change rapidly through new circumstances (Wiertz, et al., 2023).

Wiertz’, Kuhn’s, and Mattisek’s research article is in method and subject matter similar to the proposed research in this thesis but still takes a different approach to the sources of data and their specific analysis. Their research focuses on the energy transition towards renewable energy and the change in discourse the invasion of Ukraine by Russia caused or rather how it reinitiated the discussion on the topic (Wiertz, et al., 2023).

These previous research papers and articles show how discourse analysis has been applied with the selection of material being done in a similar fashion to this thesis which focuses on German-Russian energy relations. This narrow section of research papers on the topic also shows the relevance of the following analysis. There exists a research gap on the change in discourse on German-Russian cooperation in the energy sector caused by major geopolitical events that this thesis aims to fill.
6. Analysis

6.1. 2000 – Ukraine Crisis 2014

6.1.1. Schröder (2001)

The first relevant material in this analysis is a speech that was made by Gerhard Schröder on the 3rd of February 2001 at the 37th Munich Security Conference in Munich, Germany. In his speech, Schröder focuses on the importance of transatlantic cooperation with the United States and the Americas on questions concerning trade, politics, peace, and of course security. There are two paragraphs that focus on the relationship between Germany and Russia but also on Russia’s importance to the international community. Given the shortness of the relevant sections within the speech, the use of rhetorical devices is not as distinct.

What is striking is his use of pronouns in this section of the speech. At first, he becomes personally recounting a private trip to Moscow:

‘During my recent private visit to Moscow, I was able to ascertain that President Putin is in principle open to an intensification of his country's relations with the European Union and also with the Atlantic Alliance.’ (Schröder, 2001, p. 6)

Before following this statement up with:

‘A dialogue with the Russian leadership on this is in our common interest.’ (Schröder, 2001, p. 6)

This is a general, quite direct, call from Schröder towards the international to cooperate further with Russia and benefit from it. It does not refer to a specific area of cooperation like the energy sector leaving his statement open for interpretation. He does however use the pronoun ‘our’ to refer to a greater group, mostly likely the heads of state of other European nations. This conclusion derives from Schröder mentioning earlier that ‘Russia plays a prominent role in ensuring lasting stability and security in Europe’ (Schröder, 2001).

Overall, Schröder’s use of positive phrases to present Russia in his speech creates a favourable image of the country and its cooperation with it. Furthermore, he tells a sort of personal narrative that makes the listener feel more connected to him and understand he is personally committed to what he said.

Gerhard Schröder was the German Federal Chancellor at the time of the speech, making him an important actor in international politics, security, and cooperation. As previously mentioned, he made the speech at the Munich Security Conference (msc), which takes place annually in February in Munich, Germany. It is the world’s leading forum for debates on international
security policy during which heads of state, ministers, leaders of international organisations and non-governmental organisations come together with representatives from business media, research, and society (MSC, 2023). By making the speech during the forum Schröder already had a prominent audience and directed his speech at politicians and policy makers in attendance, knowing that representatives from media and society would further spread his sayings. His call for more cooperation with Russia was an attempt to restructure the social structure surrounding the energy relations with Russia.

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Table 6: Narrative Schröder 2001


On the 21st of May 2002, Dr Werner Müller gave a speech at the German-Russian economic forum. He starts off boldly claiming that the year 2002 marks the start of a new stage of economic relations between Russia and Germany with new opportunities for expansion being larger than ever (Müller, 2002). A main topic he refers to repeatedly in different sections is the need for investments and the protection of investors in Russia. The lack of investment opportunities and regulations is an issue to solve in order to deepen the economic ties between the two countries. After discussing several more different aspects of economic cooperation between Russia and Germany like perspectives and reforms, Müller dedicates one section in particular focuses on the opportunities of economic relations in the energy sector. This is the most relevant section of this speech to this analysis.

Müller starts by indicating the importance of Russia for the German energy sector:

‘With its oil and gas exports, Russia is our most important supplier of energy sources.’ (Müller, 2002, p. 7)

His use of the pronoun ‘our’ indicates that he is referring to Germany and its society as a whole including himself. This is a reasonable approach given his position within the Federal Government. Using the phrase ‘most important supplier’ puts even more emphasis on the importance of bilateral energy relations. Similar to Schröder in his previous speech, Müller applies general positive phrases throughout his entire speech to describe the relation with Russia. He even names a number of starting conditions where Germany and Russia go well together including cultural similarities (Müller, 2002). However, he is also critical by pointing
out issues with investment that limit the full potential of cooperation between the countries. He even calls for resolving these issues within Russia to increase the mutual economic benefits (Müller, 2002). With this Müller creates a narrative that shows a willingness for cooperation in the energy sector with some suggestions on how to improve the conditions and harness the full potential the energy market has to offer.

Dr Werner Müller was the German Federal Minister for Economics and Technology at the time. This ministry has undergone renaming several times, the only constant being the economics part. The German-Russia economic forum, where he gave that speech, took place in Cologne that year. The forum introduced a so-called new generation of Russian entrepreneurs and businesses as reliable economic partners for the German economic. The attendees therefore mainly consisted of representatives from politics and the economy including Russian businessmen (WDR, 2002). As German Federal Minister for Economic Affairs, Müller was one of the main speakers and had a fitting audience. While leading economics representatives were present it can be assumed that the speech was aimed at a large audience within the German economy. Given these circumstances, it can be concluded that the aim of his speech was to restructure the economic cooperation with Russia in a positive way towards a better relation.

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<td>Positive, recognizing the potential that Russia holds as an economic partner, yet being wary about conditions of investment in Russia having to improve for successful cooperation</td>
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| Keywords                  | ‘most important supplier’, ‘potential’ |

Table 7: Narrative Müller 2002


This speech Gerhard Schröder gave on the 4th of June 2003 at a congress from the Association of the Electricity Industry. His main focus of the speech is on how politics and the energy industry can work together better and towards a stable future. Similar to the previously discussed speeches there is only a small section that mentions Russia in connection to the German energy sector. He does however make an interesting use of hyperbole. It is not as direct as one would expect by using more descriptive adjectives, but he refers to Russia as

‘… an energy policy partner whose importance cannot be overestimated, not only for the present but of course even more so for the future.’ (Schröder, 2003, p. 2)

His use of ‘partner’, ‘importance’, and ‘future’ convey once again a positive imagine of Russia (Schröder, 2003). Schröder mentions as part of his introduction where he makes references to his next trip abroad. A significant event that was happening at the time was the expansion of
the European Union towards the East. The EU vote on the Polish membership was set to occur later in the same month (Schröder, 2003). With this in mind Schröder refers to the expansion as an opportunity for creating a ‘continent of lasting peace and prosperity for all its people’ (Schröder, 2003). There is a clear narrative that trails through his speech from the Eastern expansion making a clear transition to the importance of at the same time expanding economic relations with Russia.

In 2003 Gerhard Schröder was still the Federal Chancellor of Germany. He gave the speech at a congress organized by the Association of the Electricity Industry which took place in Berlin (Schröder, 2003). The organization has since been renamed the Federal Association of the Energy and Water Industries (bdew, 2023). The congress took place under the general topic ‘Electricity industry between competition and politics’ and drew in around 1000 participants from politics, science, and of course from the energy industry. Chancellor Schröder was considered one of the most prominent guests at the congress. The business representatives also had the opportunity to present themselves during the Accompanying trade exhibition (ITC AG, 2003). Overall, Schröder aimed to encourage the restructuring of the energy sector including the cooperation with Russia on the topic. With representatives of economy and politics present he addressed them directly with little intention of the speech to also address the public.

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Table 8: Narrative Schröder 2003


This speech was given by Angela Merkel in 2008 at an anniversary event of the German gas company VNG. While most of the speech is centred around the achievements and developments of the company, a large section of her speech is dedicated to the relation between the VNG and Russia as a main energy provider for Germany, especially for gas (Merkel, 2008).

Throughout the entire speech, she switches between the use of the first person singular and plural. On a regular basis, she repeats the phrase ‘I believe’ or ‘I would like to make clear’ before expressing an opinion about the relation with Russia. Her use of the first-person plural generally refers to Germany and the energy sector. In some cases, she also combines the government and the economy under the term. Furthermore, she even refers to ‘we’ when talking about discussions that are had between Russia and Germany (Merkel, 2008).
She repeats the fact that there are shared interests and that it is a reciprocal relationship through different phrasing several times. By repeating this Merkel draws more attention to it and implies the importance of understanding that the relation between the countries is not one-sided but that they work together and that both benefit from. She even explicitly phrases it:

‘Russia needs customers, and we need supplies.’ (Merkel, 2008, p. 3)

Angela Merkel uses a set of very positive and optimistic words and phrases regarding cooperation with Russia in the energy sector. She referred to there being a ‘very close relationship’ with ‘many future opportunities’ for both Germany and the EU in general (Merkel, 2008). She also refers to the importance Russia has to VNG specifically saying that ‘gas supply contracts with Russia play an important, central role for your company’ (Merkel, 2008).

Furthermore, Merkel says:

‘Russia as an important producing country is of course very important as a gas supplier for Germany.’ (Merkel, 2008, p. 2)

And while this statement is true and supported by numbers, Merkel dedicates two paragraphs to the diversification of the energy sector. She repeats the term a number of times calling it ‘economic rationality’ and ‘a necessary prerequisite for securing our energy supply in the long term’ (Merkel, 2008). One could argue that this implies a kind of warning towards a growing dependency on Russian gas imports. Merkel, therefore, recognizes Russia as an important actor in the German energy sector and the future economic opportunities but is also cautioning the gas industry.

In a later section of her speech Angela Merkel shortly mentions the Nord Stream project in connection with a steady supply of gas to Germany:

‘German gas suppliers in particular, which are at home in the largest gas market in continental Europe, should have a vested interest in smooth gas flows across Germany and through Europe because these naturally open up considerable new growth opportunities. We certainly also need new pipeline systems for this.’ (Merkel, 2008, p. 6)

The choice of words in this quote demonstrates the importance of new steady gas flows to Germany and Europe. By referring to new growth opportunities Merkel indicates future opportunities to work together that can be explored. This fact is used to make an implication towards the Nord Stream pipeline project. With the ‘we’ she refers to Germany in its entirety and its energy interest groups (Merkel, 2008). It is a narrative that implies the importance of
energy relations with Russia and the necessity for further pipeline systems to meet the demand while at the same time cautioning against too much dependence on a single supplier.

Angela Merkel was the successor of German Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and took office in 2005 after winning the election against him (Knight, 2021). This speech she gave at the 50th anniversary of the VNG - Verbundnetz Gas Aktiengesellschaft in Leipzig in 2008 (Merkel, 2008). VNG is a German network of gas and gas infrastructure companies with around 20 fully consolidated companies in Germany and other EU Member States (VGN, 2022). In 2008 VNG was one of only three direct imports of Russian gas in Germany, creating a unique market position one that was addressed by Angela Merkel. The speech was given in front of 1600 prominent guests from politics and the energy industry, and the audience even included the head of the Russian energy company Gazprom Alexej Miller (Höhne, 2008).

At the time, the first Nord Stream project was in its planning and authorisation stage. Having the oil transit crisis of 2006 in mind the new pipelines were more desirable. They would improve the energy security of Germany and also Europe by bypassing Ukraine as a transit country (Siddi, 2022). This speech’s aim was more to reproduce the current social or better said economic structure. Merkel implies a certain kind of possibility for restructuring the energy sector. It can therefore be considered to be both reproducing and restructuring.

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<td>‘very close relationship’, ‘many future opportunities’, ‘economically rational’, ‘central role’, ‘new growth opportunities’</td>
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Table 9: Narrative Merkel 2008

6.1.5.  Merkel (2011)

2011 marked an important year in the energy relations between Germany, Russia, and the European Union, as the first Nord Stream pipeline was completed. Angela Merkel gave a speech at its inauguration (Nord Stream, 2011).

The speech is overall positively framed in a very favourable light, highlighting the good cooperation during the construction as well the future opportunities the project entails. She uses expressions such as ‘resilient partnership’ and refers to Russia as an ‘outstanding partner’ to secure the European energy supply (Merkel, 2011). The following positively phrased sentence also implies a much large cooperation between Russia and the European Union in different economic and political areas:
‘This project is exemplary for the cooperation between Russia and the European Union.’ (Merkel, 2011, p. 1)

Not only does she have a positive attitude towards energy cooperation with Russia but also the pipeline project itself. She calls it an ‘outstanding example’ for the future cooperation between Russia and Europe. Significant is also that she refers to Nord Stream as an ‘economic project’ that was conducted by private companies; politics only played a supporting role (Merkel, 2011). Merkel’s use of language can be considered to be rather indirect as she leaves room for interpretation and implications concerning energy cooperation with Russia in the future.

Once again, Merkel makes use of the first-person plural. Throughout the speech largely refers to the European community and the EU when using it. She refers for example to ‘our continent’ when stating the importance of diversification of the gas sector (Merkel, 2011). Through this she creates a great sense of unity, no longer distinguishing between Germany as a country and Europe in its totality.

Angela Merkel was re-elected as German Federal Chancellor in 2009 (Chmura, et al., 2022). As such she was one of the most prominent speakers at the inauguration ceremony that took place on the 8th of November 2011 in Lubmin, on the German Baltic Sea coast where the pipeline ends. Among the 500 people audience made up of political and business leaders were many influential stakeholders in the project including the at the time Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, the Prime Minister of France François Fillon, the Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte, and EU Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger (Nord Stream, 2011). Through the way Merkel phrases her speech it becomes clear that it is these political leaders that she intends to address with it, as she refers to the discussion between them. It can be determined that other than the people directly involved in the project no larger audience, like the public, was intended.

Angela Merkel actually talks similarly to her 2008 speech discussed earlier. She not only uses similar phrasing when discussing the German-Russian relation in the energy sector, but she also repeats certain aspects. She once again comments on the common economic interests and the bilateral benefits. Furthermore, she mentions the importance of diversification of the European energy market again (Merkel, 2011). This implies that there hasn’t been a large political change between Germany and Russia between 2008 and the opening of Nord Stream 1. In a sense, Merkel is reproducing the already existing social structure as she repeats herself while at the same time calling for restructuring in the future. This restructuring can refer to the call for even
closer cooperation with Russia in the future or the diversification of the energy sector to ensure European energy security.

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Table 10: Narrative Merkel 2011

6.2. Ukraine Crisis 2014 – 2021

6.2.1. Merkel (2014)

Angela Merkel made this government statement shortly after being re-elected for a third term as Federal Chancellor in 2013 (Chmura, et al., 2022). She dedicates her statement to the ongoing situation in Ukraine but referred back to Europe’s history of conflicts and wars. From this rather gruesome history, she spins the narrative to how since then the world has become interdependent through globalization:

‘We are all, and more and more, intertwined - and so is Russia.’ (Merkel, 2014, p. 2)

Merkel continues by clearly stating that Russia’s actions against Ukraine are breaking international law and that sanctions in the energy sector can be put into place on the EU level should Russia continue its aggression (Merkel, 2014). Her use of language is more negative towards Russia:

‘In a phase of great uncertainty in Ukraine, Russia has not shown itself to be a partner for stability in the neighbouring country with which it has close historical, cultural and economic ties, but is exploiting its given weakness.’ (Merkel, 2014, p. 3)

Especially the economic ties between Ukraine and Russia are of concern. Merkel declares that the EU is prepared to support Ukraine with alternative energy sources and the diversification of the energy market (Merkel, 2014). This indicates an awareness of the dependence of Ukraine on Russian gas, Germany’s own dependency is however not mentioned by Merkel.

While she no longer describes Russia as a reliable partner, Merkel does not specifically rule out future economic cooperation with Russia. However, for this to occur Russia needs to stay from its current path of aggression towards Ukraine, saying that:

‘For all of us in Europe and the world - including Russia - this path opens up so many more opportunities than risks.’ (Merkel, 2014, pp. 8-9)
Merkel uses the first-person plural to demonstrate the unity of Germany and its EU partner countries but also the international community throughout the entire statement (Merkel, 2014). It demonstrates that Germany does not stand alone with its opinions and actions against Russia.

Merkel’s statement was triggered by the events of February and beginning of March 2014 which resulted in the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the armed conflict in the Ukrainian territories of Luhansk and Donbas. This government statement in particular aimed to inform the German Bundestag in Berlin on a previous meeting of the EU heads of State and Government. That meeting took place a week prior and discussed the ongoing situation in Ukraine (Merkel, 2014). The statement also intends to present Germany’s position and proceeding during the Ukraine crisis to the international community. Merkel recounts the discussed steps the EU is willing to take against Russia to support Ukraine.

### Narrative

**Plotlines**

Negative, looking back on European history from conflict to international cooperation and globalisation, pointing out that Russia’s action broke international law, stating that the EU is prepared to support Ukraine, especially in the energy sector through diversification and sanctions against Russia, expressing that cooperation would be more beneficial for all parties than conflict.

**Keywords**

‘breach of fundamental principles of international law’, ‘not a partner for stability’, ‘right of the stronger’, ‘exploiting’

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Table 11: Narrative Merkel 2014

6.2.2. **Merkel (2015)**

Merkel focused this speech largely on the economic relation between Ukraine and the EU and Germany as the two economic regions agreed upon a free trade agreement. However, she does refer to energy relations with Russia in the middle section of her speech. She explains that through mediation by the European Commission, a stable gas delivery plan through Ukraine could be agreed upon. She refers to it as a success saying the following:

‘This is a signal that we can use very well for the initiation of economic relations.’ (Merkel, 2015, p. 3)

This is once again positive language directed at the energy relation with Russia. At the same time, she makes clear that the trilateral relations with both Russia and Ukraine from a German and European perspective continue to be difficult:

‘Our relations - both economic and political - continue to be overshadowed by the annexation of Crimea in violation of international law and the unstable situation in eastern Ukraine.’ (Merkel, 2015, p. 3)

Nevertheless, her use of language reflects a hopefulness to resolve the issues and enter good economic relations with both countries. The narrative she tells is, therefore, a positive one.
focused on the future and peaceful economic relations with both Russia and Ukraine while still being aware of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine (Merkel, 2015).

Merkel also makes an interesting use of the first-person plural pronouns which can be noted in the previously discussed quotes. There are no clear indicators of whom she refers to, leaving room for interpretation but also for all stakeholders to feel addressed by her (Merkel, 2015).

Angela Merkel continued being German Federal Chancellor until December 2021, making her the Chancellor with the longest time in office in the history of Germany next to Helmut Kohl (Der Bundeskanzler, 2023). Merkel made this speech during the German-Ukrainian Economic Conference in Berlin on the 23rd of October 2015 (Merkel, 2015). It can be assumed that the conference included representatives of both the German and Ukrainian economies. Clear is that former Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseny Yatseniuk was present (Reuters Staff, 2015). Merkel's speech was aimed next to the present audience also at the Russian leadership and industry. She aimed to reproduce the political environment while keeping the economic ties open from restructuring.

At the beginning of the year, the Minsk agreement was signed as an attempt to end the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine. Crimea (International Crisis Group, 2022). With Crimea annexed by Russia, the EU imposed sanctions on Russia and the geopolitical relation between Ukraine and Russia continued to be tense (Ray, 2023). But 2015 was still a significant year in the German Russian energy relations. A month prior to Merkel’s speech, stakeholders signed the agreement of Nord Stream 2, to increase gas flows directly to Germany and ensure its energy security (Lang & Westphal, 2017). The project is actually in line with Merkel's comments on continuing cooperation with Russia, however, she does not mention it directly (Merkel, 2015).

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Table 12: Narrative Merkel 2015

6.2.3. Gabriel (2018)

Sigmar Gabriel dedicated his speech to the economic relations between the German economy and its business partners from Eastern countries. He also points out the importance of commerce in the energy sector with Russia calling it ‘the backbone of European-Russian cooperation’ and ‘essential to the German and European security of [energy] supply’ (Gabriel, 2018). Once again
this is a positive view on the European-Russian but also German-Russian relations in the energy sector. He continues to say:

‘Russian companies are welcome in our market as long as they play by the rules.’ (Gabriel, 2018, p. 11)

This implies an openness to continues and future cooperation with Russian companies and organizations while at the same time being wary. This sense of wariness can also be found in the paragraph following that statement as he expresses concerns about Russia trying to change the rules post-introduction into the European market (Gabriel, 2018).

Gabriel dedicates a section to Nord Stream 2. He uses considerately defensive language while trying to defend the project as well as demonstrate its necessity:

‘In any case, as Germans, we should not allow anyone to try to say that our support for such gas projects increases our dependence. No, we should say that we are prepared to expand the gas infrastructure in order to increase our independence, but we do not want to get into the area of political and then incalculable interventions.’ (Gabriel, 2018, p. 11)

This is also a type of anaphora as both sentences follow a similar phrasing pattern at the beginning of each sentence. Due to the translation into English, it is not as clear as in the original. This reinforces his statement and gives it even more importance. The quote also indicates an openness to further gas infrastructure projects, to counteract any dependency issues (Gabriel, 2018). Wariness is conveyed as Gabriel mentions the importance of protecting the gas transit countries like Ukraine while continuing with the Nord Stream 2 project (Gabriel, 2018).

This use of defensive language together with the content of his speech portraits an interesting narrative. On one side Gabriel defends the Nord Stream 2 project and is in favour of cooperating further economically in the future, while at the same time exclaiming German’s awareness and protection of transit countries (Gabriel, 2018). It is a slightly contradicting narrative.

In both previously discussed quotes the use of ‘we’ and ‘our’ refers to Germany and German society (Gabriel, 2018). This use creates a more united sense of belonging while at the same time presenting a unified country.

Sigmar Gabriel hook office as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2017 and finished his term of office in 2018. On the 10th of January 2018, the German Eastern Business Association (Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft – OA) held a New Year's reception in Berlin during which Gabriel held his speech (Gabriel, 2018). The OA is a German initiative that is made up of more than 350 member companies conducting business in one or more of the 29 partner countries. The partner countries are located in Central Europe, Eastern and South-eastern Europe, the
South Caucasus and Central Asia which includes Russia. The New Year’s reception is an annual event that brings together representatives of the members (OA, n.d.). In a similar manner to Angela Merkel in her speech from 2015, he mostly reproduces the at the time geopolitical context.

Since the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the conflict in the east of Ukraine in 2014 there were no other significant new geopolitical developments until this speech was held. The annexation of Crimea continued to be discussed and frowned upon by the international community. The Minsk agreement which ultimately lacked complete implementation aided in the calming of the conflict in the east (International Crisis Group, 2022). At the time Nord Stream 2 was in the planning stage, spiking controversial discussions on the political implications (Kliewer, 2023).

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<tr>
<th>Narrative</th>
<th>Positive, stating that Germany is open to future cooperations with Russia, turning defensive against calls for Germany increasing its energy dependency on Russia through Nord Stream 2, making clear the German government will still work towards ensuring the security of transit countries</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plotlines</td>
<td>’welcome on our market’, ’backbone of European-Russian cooperation’, ’essential to the security of supply’, ’expand gas infrastructure’</td>
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<td>Keywords</td>
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Table 13: Narrative Gabriel 2018

6.2.4. Altmaier (2019)

Peter Altmaier held this speech in 2019 in Berlin. He focuses largely on Nord Stream 2, its role in the German Energiewende (energy transition) and ensuring German energy security. Altmaier’s narrative leads him back 40 years exclaiming that for that time the German government has always ensured German energy security. With the ever-rising demand for gas questions of dependency on a single country have risen. Altmaier recounts this argument with the fact that even during the peak of the cold war Russia continued delivering the agreed-upon gas quantity (Altmaier, 2019). This plays right into his defending the Nord Stream 2 project. In general, he also applies direct language with positive phrasing when speaking of the project saying it is ‘a private project’ which has been issued permits by in Finland, Germany, Russia, and Sweden, and which through trialogues has received support from EU member states (Altmaier, 2019). There are no assumptions to be made about where he and the German government stands when it comes to the project. While he clearly speaks in favour of the energy cooperation with Russia and Nord Stream 2, he is also aware of the concerns about Ukrainian security that have been raised:
‘When we talk about Nord Stream 2, about terminals for liquefied natural gas (LNG) and about issues related to Ukraine, these are not opposites, they are the different sides of the same coin.’ (Altmaier, 2019, p. 2)

In this quote he uses a metaphor (different sides of the same coin) to create a mental image, making it easier to comprehend for the audience. Nevertheless, Altmaier shortly addresses the issue of energy stability and diversification. He mentions the US and the Middle East as further possible partners that could contribute to the energy supply of Europe. However, this would also require new infrastructure to be constructed (Altmaier, 2019).

Altmaier finishes his speech with a quite defensive statement, saying that the German government does not require any external counselling:

‘We have freedom of speech - everyone is allowed to say what they think - but the federal government decides what is important and necessary in the interest of our country.’ (Altmaier, 2019, p. 5)

In this quote, Altmaier uses the pronoun ‘we’ in a broad sense of society. Throughout his speech, however, he mostly applies the first-person plural to refer to the German Federal Government as he represents its position on the subject (Altmaier, 2019).

Peter Altmaier held the office of Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy from 2018 until 2021. On the 13th of February 2019, he held this speech in front of the German Bundestag as part of the ‘Aktuelle Stunde (topical hour)’ (Altmaier, 2019). The ‘Aktuelle Stunde’ is an hour-long discussion forum in the German Bundestag. A parliamentary group or at least five per cent of the deputies can call for such a discussion on topics of current interest (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d.). Altmaier made his speech on the topic ‘Compatibility of Nord Stream 2 with EU climate and energy targets’ (Altmaier, 2019). His speech was directed at his fellow parliamentarians. While it is a topic that concerns the general German, he focuses however on addressing the politicians and policymakers present, discussing policies, and directing some of his speech to in response specific politicians. He reproduces the current happenings and political ongoing.

2019 marked an overall import year for the construction of Nord Stream 2 and therefore the energy relations between Russia and Germany. Altmaier mentioned in his speech that authorisation for construction was still missing from Denmark. Later that year the project received all necessary authorisations and started construction (Offshore Technology, 2022). This intensified the international debates on the geopolitical impact the project would have and Germany’s disregard for anything other than its own energy security (Kliewer, 2023). Nevertheless, Altmaier did not aim to restructure with his speech but to reproduce the realities under which the Nord Stream 2 project was carried out.
6.2.5. Maas (2019)

Heiko Maas held the following speech in April 2019. He mainly focuses on the cooperation between the US and Germany, but he dedicates a separate section to both the economic relation between China and Russia. The latter provides relevant information to this thesis. Maas recognizes that the relation between Russia, the US, and the EU but also Germany specifically has been largely impacted since the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s involvement in the east of Ukraine. There is however still a positive reflection that can be determined from the speech towards the energy cooperation with Russia from a German perspective. Maas calls Russia ‘our greatest neighbour’ referring to the EU and adds that ‘it will not work without Russia’ (Maas, 2019). This still implies an openness to work together with Russia, so while more positive language is being used, it is not without disregard for the happenings in the Ukraine as Maas mentions the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the inherent disregard of international order from Russia (Maas, 2019).

Maas also uses quite defensive language when talking about the Nord Stream 2 project and the possible growing dependency on Russia:

‘And to say it again very clearly here: Despite all the prophecies of doom, Nord Stream 2 will not make Germany dependent on Russia! We have alternative sourcing options.’ (Maas, 2019, p. 4)

While the translation to English gives an even more exaggerated expression with the phrase ‘prophecies of doom’ in the original it is still a hyperbole (Maas, 2019). This use of this stylistic device creates a deeper sense of importance for the phrases and creates a lasting impact on the listener or reader.

Heiko Maas was the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs during the last Merkel Cabinet and succeeded Sigmar Gabriel. As such he was present at the dinner of the American Council on Germany (ACG) on the 1st of April 2019 in New York, where he gave this speech. The dinner was held under the topic ‘Germany, Europe and the United States: A strategic partnership facing new challenges?’ (Maas, 2019). The ACG is an independent, nonpartisan non-profit organization that aims to contribute to a better mutual understanding of economic, political, and
social matters between the two countries (ACG, 2023). The audience present at the speech included around 70 members of the ACG, the German Academy New York (GANY), and the German Consulate (ACG, 2019). It can be assumed that his speech was meant for a large audience, especially within the political ranks of the US.

As previously mentioned 2019 was an important year for the construction of Nord Stream 2. In the context of the event that Maas held his speech it is important to mention again that later, in December 2019, the US imposed sanctions on the companies working on the Nord Stream 2 project after reoccurring discussion on the controversy of the project (Offshore Technology, 2022). Overall, the section on Russia in the speech aimed to reproduce the given social context, repeating the political and economic position that Germany takes up.

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<tr>
<td>Positive, framing Russia as an important economic partner, yet recognizing Russias disregard for international order in Ukraine, defending the notion that Germany will not become more dependent on Russia through Nord Stream 2, mentioning that other energy suppliers are available</td>
<td>‘our greatest neighbour’, ‘not without Russia’</td>
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*Table 15: Narrative Maas 2019*

6.3. Invasion of Ukraine 2022 – March 2023

6.3.1. Baerbock (2022)

Annalena Baerbock gave this speech on the 18th of February 2022. She mainly focuses on security in the traditional sense of being free of any danger or acts of violence. She does not specifically mention energy security, but one can assume that it is applied as energy as it forms a crucial part of security overall. Baerbock clearly expresses a warning that ‘a new war looms in the middle of our Europe’ (Baerbock, 2022). She uses direct language to evince Russia as the indicator of the situation and the aggressor of the threat, calling it a ‘really difficult crisis’ with ‘unacceptable threats’ and ‘risk of escalation’ (Baerbock, 2022). These are phrases that are connected to a negative image of Russia. Furthermore, she portrays Russia as not only a threat to Ukraine but the ‘peace structure in Europe’ (Baerbock, 2022).

Baerbock is also very clear on possible sanctions that Germany and Europe have already prepared in case Russia launches a military attack against Ukraine, stating:

‘Germany is prepared to pay a high economic price for this. That is why for me, for us, all options are on the table, including Nord Stream 2.’ (Baerbock, 2022, p. 4)

This indicated doubt about the project and its completion. Furthermore, it indicates that Germany longer sees Russia as the economic partner it once was. Baerbock does not go further
into the topic of energy. There is therefore no indication that Germany will completely put a stop to gas imports from Russia.

Throughout her speech, Baerbock applies the first-person plural to portray a united front not only as Germany but as Europe. In the previously discussed quote, she refers to Germany, yet she also mentions ‘our peace architecture’ and ‘our jointly built security architecture’ referring to Europe in its entirety (Baerbock, 2022).

Under the Scholz government, Annalena Baerbock took over the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs from Heiko Maas. Looking at the date of when she held the speech it becomes clear that it was actually a few days prior to the invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, this speech was filed in this chronological chapter. This is due to the already tense political situation with Russia positioning military troops along the Ukrainian border indicating that an attack was imminent (Baerbock, 2022). Furthermore, the Munich Security Conference gave her a prominent audience, since the conference has been an established event in the international community, she had the ear of relevant actors when it comes to international security questions. The audience of the conference 2022 included among other international high ranking governmental and non-governmental representatives the Secretary General of the United Nations António Guterres, the President of the European Council Charles Michel, the Vice-President of the US Kamala D. Harris, and the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky (msc, 2022). It can be assumed that she also aimed her speech at the Russian government.

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<td>Negative, reprimanding Russia for its military deployment to the Ukrainian border, clarifying Germany’s position on sanctions including the stop of Nord Stream 2</td>
<td>'unacceptable threat', ‘risk of escalation’, ‘really difficult crisis’, ‘Russia crisis’, ‘authoritarian forces’, ‘pay the economic price’</td>
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Table 16: Narrative Baerbock 2022

6.3.2. Scholz: Zeitenwende (2022)

Chancellor Olaf Scholz made this government statement at the end of February 2022 which was triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. He immediately states that this raid on Ukrainian territory will be known in history as a turning point:

‘The world afterwards is no longer the same as the world before.’ (Scholz, 2022, p. 2)

With this, he coins the term ‘Zeitenwende’ (watershed). It is referred to several times in his speech and later on Scholz clarifies that this does not just concern Germany but all of Europe. Scholz refers back to European history to the time of great powers in the 19th century when territorial conflicts lead to wars. He mentions the importance of not going back to such a state
of international conflict (Scholz, 2022). While Scholz uses overall negative phrases when speaking about Russia, using terms such as ‘scrupulousness’, ‘disgrace’, and ‘inhuman’, he makes clear that it is not Russia’s war but Putin’s war (Scholz, 2022). He also refers to the Second World War and the reconciliation Germans and Russians went through to make clear it is not the people of Russia that are responsible for it (Scholz, 2022). These two historical associations in the speech are important factors in the narrative. The audience is able to create a better image in their mind of the situation and its extent.

Scholz’s speech mainly focuses on the political situation and steps taken by the government like agreeing on EU sanctions against Russia as well as security in general including increasing military expenses and Germany’s overall support of the Ukrainian people (Scholz, 2022). However, energy security is also a concern of his which he addresses. Scholz states that the government will do more to ensure a secure energy supply for its citizens:

‘And we will change course - change course to overcome our import dependence on individual energy suppliers.’ (Scholz, 2022, p. 8)

He uses a kind of repetition in this quote which gives more value to his statement. This quote also implies that there is a dependency on Russia as a gas supplier, one that needs to be resolved as it poses a threat to Germany’s security. To resolve the said issue, Scholz lists concrete projects and approaches to how the German government plans on overcoming this dependency. Next to two new LNG terminals that are in planning, the government plans on acquiring gas from the world market. Furthermore, to secure the supply, especially for winter, the storage volume will be increased (Scholz, 2022). While this does indicate preparedness for new suppliers and diversification, there is no direct comment on whether Russian gas imports will be stopped completely. Not only does Scholz talk about alternative gas supplies but also the expansion opportunities for renewable energy and subsequently the renewable energy transition (Scholz, 2022).

The following quote sums up Scholz’s direct use of language and narrative on energy quite well. It implies that this will be a switch to the current energy policy and also indicates that Russia will no longer sole part of said future energy policy:

‘A responsible, forward-looking energy policy is not only crucial for our economy and our climate but also for our security.’ (Scholz, 2022, p. 8)

Both first-person singular and plural are used in the statement. The use of ‘I’ makes the statement more personal and direct. With his use of the first-person plural throughout, Scholz
creates a sense of unity between Germany, Ukraine, the EU and the international community that stands for Ukraine:

‘And I thank all those who stand with us in these times for a free and open, just and peaceful Europe. We will defend it.’ (Scholz, 2022, p. 11)

Olaf Scholz took office as the German Federal Chancellor in December 2021, only a few months before the invasion of Ukraine (Chmura, et al., 2022). On the 27th of February 2022, three days after the invasion, Scholz called for an extraordinary session of the German Bundestag to make this government statement concerning the Russian war on Ukraine. This speech in particular was not just meant for the members of the German Bundestag. It was meant to address the German public to reassure them and inform them of the government's steps to maintain the country's security while aiding Ukraine. He even addresses them directly in his opening. Not only that but from the content of the speech and Scholz’s use of language it can be assumed that he made this speech as a message of solidarity and warning to the international community (Scholz, 2022). The speech coined the term ‘Zeitenwende (watershed)’, and it has become internationally recognized and the concept is being applied globally (Scholz, 2022). Scholz aimed to restructure with his speech, restructuring in the sense that one could not let Russia’s actions stand as they were. He called for counter actions in the form of sanctions together with a united stand against the aggressor Russia (Scholz, 2022). Early that same week Scholz had already revoked the necessary government opinion on Nord Stream 2 that resulted in the stop of the certification process of the project (Congressional Research Service, 2022).

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<td>Negative, condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine, recognizing the shared history between Germany and Russia, expressing the government’s and EU’s support of Ukraine as a sovereign state, admitting the energy dependence on Russia, mentioning concrete diversification projects including renewable energy</td>
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6.3.3. Scholz (2022)

This government statement was given in October of 2022. Scholz starts off by condemning the ‘brutal war in Ukraine’ and expressing Germany’s continuous political, financial, humanitarian, and weapons support of Ukraine (Scholz, 2022). Of large concern is Putin’s use of hunger and energy as weapons against not only Ukraine but also Europe. With this Scholz opens up the narrative towards Nord Stream 1 and 2. Months before the destruction of the pipelines, Russia
had already stopped deliveries through Nord Stream 1 without comprehensive reasoning (Scholz, 2022). Scholz describes this as an attempt at blackmail against Europe and especially Germany as a ‘country, which has so far been particularly dependent on Russian gas’ (Scholz, 2022). This is a significant statement, as it is the admission of an existing dependency on Russian gas even before the commissioning of Nord Stream 2. From Russia’s decision to turn off the gas taps, Scholz concludes the following:

‘Therefore: This Russia under Putin is no longer a reliable trading partner.’ (Scholz, 2022)

This is a very direct use of language as it clearly states the current standing of Germany. Yet it leaves room for interpretation. For one, prior to the Russian war on Ukraine, the country could be considered a reliable trading partner, defending the previous approach to energy relations with Russia. One can even go so far as to see cooperation with Russia again in the future. Scholz said ‘Russia under Putin’, which indicates that there might be a chance for a new Russia without Putin to become an economic partner again (Scholz, 2022).

Scholz continues by mentioning Germany’s and Europe’s efforts in restructuring the energy infrastructure and ensuring energy security. In just a few months Germany has begun construction on two new LNG terminals, which will become operational by 2023. Germany also diversified its suppliers receiving for the first time gas from France, increasing deliveries from Norway, funnelling gas through the harbours of the Netherlands and Belgium, and signing supply contracts with the US and Arabic countries (Scholz, 2022). Scholz does not mention any expansion plans for renewable energies. This could be due to the restructuring of the gas network being a more quickly execute endeavour and the persistent need for gas.

With concrete projects completed or well underway and gas storage filling up, Scholz seems confident that Germany and Europe will make it through the coming winter:

‘Together we will probably get through this winter.’ (Scholz, 2022, p. 6)

He praises the European countries for their cooperation and their preparedness to reduce their gas consumption to ensure European energy security throughout the winter (Scholz, 2022). This is a reassuring statement that addresses the concerns of the public. Throughout his government statement, Scholz mostly speaks on behave of Germany using the first-person plural. In the previously discussed quote, however, he applies a to Europe in its totality. It conveys a great sense of unity and mutual understanding.
While the government statement in its entirety addresses different subjects that arose from the war other than energy, the entire statement includes negative language towards Russia. He uses phrases like ‘brutal war’, ‘imperialist war of aggression’, ‘terror’, and ‘disgrace’ (Scholz, 2022).

Olaf Scholz made this government statement in front of the Bundestag in Berlin on the 20th of October 2022. This was almost a year after his election to become Federal Chancellor for the duration of four years (Der Bundeskanzler, 2023). He aimed to inform the present members of the German Bundestag of the ongoing war. However, he made the same speech again in front of the European Council a day later. This shows that the speech was meant for a large audience from the national and international community, to inform about the current happenings and Germany’s stand.

Obviously, at the time the war was still ongoing with gruesome crimes against humanity being discovered by the Ukrainian forces that recaptured land from the Russians (CNN, 2023). A significant event that impacted the German energy infrastructure occurred a month prior. In September of 2022, explosions damaged three of the Nord Stream pipelines leaving them completely inoperable. While Nord Stream 2 was never operational in the first place given the lack of authorisation by the German government and Nord Stream 1 no longer carried gas as Russia had stopped exports because of alleged technical faults, this sabotage eradicated any possibilities for future transports (Vakulenko, 2022). This lack of gas deliveries also opened up the discussion on whether Germany could sustain the coming winter, given the country's high dependency on Russian gas imports (Feininger, et al., 2022).

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Table 18: Narrative Scholz 2022

6.3.4. **Habeck (2023)**

Robert Habeck’s speech focuses on the economic situation in Germany, how the lack of Russian gas imports impacted the economy, and what this implies for the year 2023. Habeck does not concentrate on Russia’s actions directly but on the devastating suffering they have caused in Ukraine since the invasion. From there he builds a narrative of Germany and the economic price
it has paid. He makes clear that not being this economic price would be drastically worse, as it would mean the support and financing of Russia’s warfare (Habeck, 2023).

‘This price is nothing compared to what the people of Ukraine have to endure, what the horror of war and bloodshed actually amount to.’ (Habeck, 2023, p. 2)

The quote can be interpreted as a reminder to people that regardless of the national economic situation, there is no armed war on German territory causing deaths and destruction. While there is room for interpretation in his reflection of the price of the war, his direct use of language (‘war of aggression’, ‘killing’, ‘bloodshed’) guides the interpretations in a specific direction, one away from Russia and towards supporting Ukraine (Habeck, 2023). Repeatedly, Habeck mentions the German support Ukraine directly through sanctions and military goods. In this context, he also names the restructuring of Germany’s energy infrastructure (Habeck, 2023).

There is no more concrete information on what this entails, but it can be interpreted as a sign to move away from Russian gas imports and energy dependency.

Afterwards, Habeck also addresses the issues arising from not receiving Russian gas anymore. There had been dire prognoses concerning economic slums:

‘If no Russian gas comes - and we know that it is no longer coming - the German economy could slump by up to 12 per cent.’ (Habeck, 2023, p. 2)

He uses a type of repetition in this quote, which indicates the finality of his statement. There is no room for interpretation: Russian gas is no longer being imported. This quote also gives an example of Habeck’s use of the first-person plural. Throughout his speech, he applies it to represent Germany and the German government (Habeck, 2023).

The rest of his speech is more focused on national data and concerns that have risen as a result of the war, such as inflation but also general economic issues like labour shortage (Habeck, 2023).

Dr Robert Habeck is the successor of Peter Altmaier; however, they do not hold the same Minister title. Shortly after taking office, Chancellor Olaf Scholz renamed the ministry, making Habeck the Minister of Economic Affairs and Climate Protection (BMWK, 2022). On the 26th of January Habeck gave this speech in the German Bundestag to give information on the Annual Economic Report for 2023. His main aim was to inform the members of parliament present, yet the provided facts are also relevant to the general public, making his intended audience much larger. The speech is therefore also aiming to reproduce data on the current economic situation of Germany.
Habeck gave his speech in the middle of the first winter since the outbreak of the war. This is a relevant aspect to be considered as it is also the first winter in Germany without the steady supply of Russian gas. Those imports fuelled a large number of public and private heating systems and are also crucial to the industry. The resulting gas crisis in Germany had been thoroughly discussed and researched. The fear of cold households rose with experts saying that without alternatives not even full gas reserves would suffice for the entire winter (Feininger, et al., 2022).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plotlines</th>
<th>Narrative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Negative, stating the damage the war has cost Ukraine, indicating that Germany paid an economic price, supporting Ukraine through sanctions and restructuring the energy infrastructure towards a future without Russian gas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Keywords | ‘Russian war of aggression’, ‘the killing’, ‘horror of war’, bloodshed’, ‘no more Russian gas’, ‘conversion of the energy infrastructure’, stabilisation of the energy situation’ |

Table 19: Narrative Habeck 2023

6.3.5. Scholz (2023)

Scholz starts his government statement by looking back on the year of war in Ukraine. He once again uses direct phrases like ‘war of aggression’, ‘breach of international law’, ‘Puntin’s imperialism’, and ‘Russian aggression’ to describe Russia’s actions, creating a negative image of the country itself (Scholz, 2023). At the same time, he expresses Germany’s continuous support of Ukraine and its fight against Russia specifically by providing new weapons systems. Scholz also applauds the German society for its overall solidarity and its determination to support Ukrainians (Scholz, 2023). He also addresses the protest against weapon deliveries for Ukraine and calls for peace coming from certain public groups. He clearly states:

‘If Ukraine stopped defending itself, it would not be peace, but the end of Ukraine.’ (Scholz, 2023, p. 2)

The narrative he creates with this is in clear support of Ukraine and against Russia as a political and economic partner.

After further discussing weapons deliveries and military actions taken, which is the main subject of the statement, Scholz moves over to the topic of gas and energy security. He addresses the large concern that arose within the German government and society that the energy reserves would not be sufficiently stocked without the Russian gas to ensure warm households through the winter, referring back to Russia’s use of energy as leverage (Scholz, 2023). There are several aspects that contributed to this. Business adjusted their energy supply, while new LNG terminals were built and put into operation in record time. Scholz commends businesses and workers that made this fast transition possible (Scholz, 2023). This implies that Germany
through the restricting of the energy infrastructure is no longer dependent on a single energy supplier as it was before from Russia.

Lastly, on the topic of energy, Scholz mentions Germany’s plans on extending renewable energies, stating that their expansion is now more important than ever (Scholz, 2023). It not only contributes to the 2030 goals, but Scholz also implies relevance to energy security and independence.

The following quote uses a type of repetition, to sum up the most important takeaways from the statement and reaffirm their importance:

> ‘We have survived the winter well - even without gas from Russia. And we are investing in the security of our country - in our Bundeswehr, in our energy infrastructure, in the future of our economy and energy supply.’ (Scholz, 2023, p. 10)

Throughout his entire statement Scholz also repeatedly refers back to the term ‘Zeitenwende’ and what hardships it has created for Ukraine, Germany, and Europe (Scholz, 2023). Furthermore, Scholz applies the first-person plural as he represents Germany. He even says so in his speech:

> ‘And behind this "we" stands our whole country.’ (Scholz, 2023, p. 9)

This is a very clear and direct use of language, which implies the sense of unity and Germany’s cohesion in the matter.

Olaf Scholz’s government statement on the 2\textsuperscript{nd} of March 2023 was constituted as a one-year follow-up from his Zeitenwende speech from February 2022. He continued being the German Federal Chancellor (Der Bundeskanzler, 2023). The setting where he made his speech was similar to the speech a year prior. He made the speech in front of the German Bundestag with the intent to address both the German public and the international community and inform them of the developments in the Ukraine war (Scholz, 2023). He, therefore, aimed to reproduce rather than restructure.

A year after the invasion the war in Ukraine continued. Over the span of that year, multiple atrocities committed by Russian forces were uncovered and Russia left the Ukrainian infrastructure destroyed (Nagourney, et al., 2023). By the anniversary of the invasion around 8.000.000 Ukrainians sought refuge in other European countries (UNHCR, 2023). A month prior to the government statement, Germany had agreed on sending heavy machinery to Ukraine, which included the Leopard 2 tanks that could from then on also be provided by other European countries (CNN, 2023). Germany itself had largely been affected by the lack of
Russian gas, having to bridge the gap in the energy supply with alternative suppliers or sources (Statista, 2023).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plotlines</th>
<th>Narrative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative, condemning Russia’s actions once more, expressing further support of Ukraine through weaponry, addressing fears of cold winter and how they were overcome, commending the fast restructuring of the energy infrastructure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keywords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Table 20: Narrative Scholz 2023*
7. Discussion

The analytical findings have been summarised in Appendix A while the narratives are summarised in Appendix B. When reviewing Appendix A and comparing the stylistic devices used in each speech, one thing stands out. While developing the analytical framework the assumption was made that a discursive change could be determined from the use of stylistic devices. To limit the framework specific devices were chosen, defined in Table 3. These were chosen based on the assumption that they are commonly used within speeches and would provide the greatest insight into the discursive structure. During the analysis, it became clear that the use of classical stylistic devices including the chosen ones was surprisingly very limited. Occasionally the speakers have used an anaphora, metaphor, or hyperbole yet their overall application has been minimal within the chosen material (Table 2). The only constant is the use of the first-person plural. It is used in all speeches to either represent Germany, the German government, Europe or different country combinations like Germany and Russia. Given this device’s presence in the entire material collection, there is no difference to identify between the periodic times concerning this aspect. Hence, this part of the analytical framework has not yielded the desired outcome of being able to recognize a change in the discourse. One could argue that there is a visible change in the use of language regardless that came visible during the analysis itself which refers to the identified keywords in each speech. This was however not specifically defined as a rhetorical device in the analytical framework. This aspect of discursive change is considered an essential part of the narrative and aids in identifying its changes.

The discursive changes could mainly be observed through the comparison of direct or indirect language use, the positive or negative phrasing used, and the aim of the speech. This is why the additional narrative analysis is so important. Together with the social context they are what gave meaning to the spoken and through which the discursive development could be assessed. The following subsections will therefore focus mainly on the changes in narratives observed.

7.1. Chancellors

From 2001 to 2023 there have been only three different Chancellors: Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005), Dr Angela Merkel (2005-2021), Olaf Scholz (2021-2023). Angela Merkel is the only politician that was active in the government before and after the start of the Ukraine crisis in 2014. She even held the same office of Federal Chancellor (Chmura, et al., 2022). This allows for a more direct comparison of language use.
Schröder’s narrative on the energy relations with Russia in both analysed speeches is positive and with his personal relation to Russia complementing his arguments. A first-shift narrative can already be identified within the first periodic group when Angela Merkel takes over office.

In 2008 and 2010 Merkel’s speeches conveyed both a very similar narrative, one that largely recognized the economic potential that energy relations with Russia held. This is also in line with her predecessor’s position. However, in both speeches, she also mentioned the importance of diversification of the energy market. This could be related to the Ukrainian oil transit crisis of 2006 and 2009 which also impacted the European energy market. She does mention diversification once again in her government statement from 2014, yet it relates to the diversification of the European market to aid Ukraine during the crisis and ensure its energy security rather than the German one. That statement also marks a shift in her language as it no longer is as positive towards Russia. At the German-Ukrainian Economic Forum in 2015, she does not mention it but rather focuses on Ukraine as a transit country once again, regardless of the fact that the Nord Stream 2 agreement had just been signed. This indicates another change in the use of language. Merkel is considered the difficult situation between Ukraine and Russia. Compared to Schröder, through whose narrative Russia seemed like the ultimate energy partner, Merkel generally shows more interest in the diversification of the energy market.

Olaf Scholz shifts the narrative on diversification once again in 2022, as it did not occur in such a manner that the energy supply of Germany was safe. Scholz actually admits to a dependency on Russian gas that has to be overcome. Nord Stream 2 would have contributed to this dependency, but it never became operational since Scholz revoked the government’s permission to do the certification process. Nord Stream 2 is therefore no longer a topic of discussion since 2022, only when talking about the sabotage. Scholz is however the first to mention concrete projects that will contribute to the diversification of the energy supply. Significantly, previously renewable energy alternatives were not discussed either. Out of the Chancellors, Scholz is the only one that mentions it as a viable alternative. The late consideration could be accredited to a set of reasons. For one, the climate ambitions of the German government have changed through the years. Secondly, before 2022, there was no real incentive for the expansion of renewables since Russia provided a steady and cheap flow of gas. Now, it has become more important than ever as renewable energies can be sourced on national territory. This contributes to a reduced dependency on foreign countries in general inherently contributing to Germany’s energy security.
The narrative, therefore, changed from the fixation on a single large reliable energy supplier (Russia) to the loose call for diversification, to the realisation that the dependency on Russian energy imports has been turned into a weapon and finally shifted to the concrete expansion of alternative methods. In addition, the use of language went through a set of shifts from positive, to positive but wary, to negative but forward-looking after the Ukraine crisis back to positive but considerate when Nord Stream 2 was underway and finally to overall negative with Russia being the aggressor and an unreliable economic partner.

7.2. Federal Ministers of Foreign Affairs

There are speeches from 3 different Ministers of Foreign Affairs: Sigmar Gabriel, Heiko Mass, Annalena Baerbock. It is critical to mention that no relevant speech from a Minister of Foreign Affairs before the Ukraine crisis in 2014 was identified during the recollecting of material. Both Gabriel and Maas were in office afterwards when Nord Stream 2 became the subject of international controversy. Baerbock only took office shortly before the full invasion in February 2022. This lack of material from the early 2000s could be faulted to there not being no significant political occurrences concerning Russia and Ukraine and energy security that required the Minister of Foreign Affairs to react to or comment on. Regardless, the shifts in discourse and narrative between the years 2018 and 2022 can be discussed.

The speeches made in 2018 and 2019 are close together in time yet made by two different Ministers: Gabriel, and Maas. Regardless, they both told similar narratives. There is an overall understanding that Germany is still open to economic cooperation with Russia. Words like ‘essential’, ‘greatest neighbour’, or ‘expand’ are being used. Significant is how both use defensive language when discussing Nord Stream 2, which was in the planning and authorisation stage at the time. They both focus on the aspect of Germany not becoming more dependent on Russian gas through the project, Maas specifically says that Germany has other sources. Gabriel conveys an openness to invest in the expansion of the gas infrastructure to other suppliers. Yet both make it very clear that the German government makes its decisions based on what is right for the country. This is significant as it indicates international pressure on Germany concerning Nord Stream 2, one that made it necessary for the Minister of Foreign Affairs to make a statement. Both ministers do not completely disregard the situation that Ukraine. Gabriel states that Germany will work towards ensuring continuous gas flows through Ukraine after the project is complete, while Maas addresses the still tense political situation with Russia after the annexation of Crimea.
This similarity in narrative can be accredited to the German government having the same standpoint on the energy cooperation with Russia and the Nord Stream 2 project during that time. Maas and Gabriel share a parallel narrative as well as similar uses of language: positive, direct, and defensive. Annalena Baerbock’s narrative in 2022 goes in a different direction. She condemns Russia’s military deployment to the Ukrainian border using negative language by calling it an ‘unacceptable threat’. While she does mostly focus on security questions, she mentions energy cooperation. She names the stop of Nord Stream 2 as part of possible sanctions against Russia, should it continue on its path of aggression. This is a radical switch from her predecessors. However, she only mentions Nord Stream 2, there is no mention of gas imports from Russia in general.

The narrative changed from a very direct defence of the project to making it specifically part of sanctions. This shows the shift from clear defending of the energy relations with Russia to possibly sanctioning the German-Russian gas infrastructure project.

7.3. Federal Ministers of Economic Affairs

As previously mentioned, this ministry has been renamed and allocated additional responsibilities on several occasions. For the sake of convenience, the following will only refer to the Ministry of Economic Affairs or the Minister of Economic Affairs given that that is the common denominator. While there have been more Ministers of Economic Affairs since 2000 only the speeches of three of them have been included in the material: Dr Werner Müller, Peter Altmaier, Dr Robert Habeck. As Minister of Economic Affairs, the three focus more on the economic side and impact rather than the geopolitical implications.

Müller was Minister more than 10 years before both the Ukraine crisis and 20 years prior to the invasion of Ukraine. There is a large time gap between his speech and the next Minister of Economic Affairs speech. Nevertheless, it creates a baseline of what the government’s position was at a time when the overall political and economic relations between Germany and Russia were increasing. Müller portrays Russia as an important economic partner. However, he also expresses concerns, not political, but directly connected to the future economic potential. His use of language is therefore positive but also wary as he recognizes investment issues. By not concretely defining solutions, he leaves this section of his speech open to interpretation. Overall, he speaks favourably towards the cooperation with Russia.

17 years later Altmaier made his speech communicating a more radical narrative. With Nord Stream 1 in operation and Nord Stream in planning, causing international tension with the
Ukraine crisis in mind, the political and social context drastically changed. Nevertheless, Altmaier’s use of language is quite direct and defensive. He clearly states that Nord Stream 2 was a private project, indicating that political implications are not relevant. He does not disregard Ukraine completely as he asserts that the project in no way contradicts gas transits through Ukraine. The narrative shifted from a certain degree of openness towards Russia and its energy relations with it to a need to defend the decisions made on expanding energy imports even further.

As the current Minister for Economic Affairs, Robert Habeck has had to address war and energy-related issues. He first uses direct language to condemn Russia and its aggression against Ukraine. He puts more focus on Ukraine, the damages done on its territory and condemning Russia as the aggressor, than Altmaier did. The full-scale invasion can therefore be considered a more significant event. There was also no more denying that the lack of Russian gas deliveries caused significant issues in the industry. Habeck states that in order to get through the winter the restructuring of the infrastructure was necessary and that it will continue. This is a clear move away from cooperating with Russia towards diversification and energy security.

The narrative between 2002 and 2023 changed from positive and optimistic towards future economic cooperation to defensive, while supporting the expansion of Nord Stream and inherently the cooperation with Russia to negative, recognizing the issues the dependency on Russian gas created and understanding the importance of diversifying the energy infrastructure.

7.4. Response to the research questions

Having analysed the speeches individually and then discussed the findings for each relevant government position, some final observations can be concluded to answer the research questions:

How has the German government changed its discourse on Russian cooperation since the invasion of Ukraine by Russia?

How has that discursive change become visible within the narrative told by high-ranking members of the German government?

In the timespan from 2001 until 2011, the frame from the earliest to latest speech in this section, the speeches include discourse that is generally positively associated. The Ministers and Chancellors used words like ‘economic partner’, ‘common interest’, or ‘reliable gas importer’ expressing the importance of working together. They also mostly aimed to restructure the social context between the two countries, mentioning Russia as a favourable country for energy
imports. The narratives conveyed by the speakers were in favour of even further cooperation in the energy sector. Given the seemingly good political relationship with Russia, the material is very limited. While there was the gas conflict in 2006 and 2009 between Russia and Ukraine, this topic wasn’t largely addressed by the German government as it had little impact on the relation between Germany and Russia.

The topic of the political relation with Russia in the energy sector and the dependency on its energy imports that derived from it only seems to be questioned or discussed by politicians when a significant event occurred. While the gas kept being imported steadily there were barely any comments on the rising dependency. Not even the annexation of Crimea had a longer-lasting impact on the political discourse. Between the Ukraine crisis and the invasion of Ukraine, the use of language overall became more considerate of the happenings in Ukraine. Nevertheless, the overall discourse was still positive and in favour of economic relations with Russia especially in the energy sector. The Nord Stream 2 project was defended vigorously, not thoroughly considering the effects the national energy security of Germany would have on Ukraine as a gas transit country. The project also brought up concerns of energy dependency in the international community, which were shut down with defensive language.

Seemingly the invasion of Ukraine was the pivotal event that led to a visible and more lasting impact on the German government’s discourse. The most recent speeches and government statements demonstrate a cohesive use of negative language towards Russia while expressing their full support of Ukraine. Russia is associated with phrases like ‘war of aggression’, ‘violence’, and ‘energy as a weapon’ by all Ministers and the Chancellor. Furthermore, there is also a larger regard for energy security. The change in discourse is also visible in the way the Chancellors and Ministers start referring to concrete projects and plans that would eradicate the dependence on Russia as a single energy supplier after the invasion of Ukraine. This concreteness is a further development from earlier years, where simple calls for diversification were made without implementation plans.

To conclude, the German government shifted its discourse from a positive narrative that showed optimism towards cooperating with Russia in the energy sector to a negative narrative that recognizes mistakes made in the energy policy given Russia’s use of energy as a weapon and working towards rectifying those mistakes through diversification of the energy infrastructure.

This kind of slow change towards negative is in line with an identity change, one that slowly moved away from the German Ostpolitik. As mentioned in the literature review Marco Siddi
referred to Ostpolitik as being an important component of Germany’s foreign policy identity. According to social constructivism, a state has to act within its identity for it to pertain integrity. Germany initially during the early 2000s acted within the lines of its Ostpolitik. Social constructivism does take into account that identities change. However, diverging from an established identity as Ostpolitik was for Germany is not a rapid process. Furthermore, after the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Germany’s identities conflicted with each other. For one, there was Ostpolitik but there was also Germany’s identity as part of the European Union. One can argue that between 2014 and 2022 Germany intended to act in line with both at the same time leading to the discourse still being positive. After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, economic relations with Russia could no longer be considered appropriate actions within the entire German identity, causing change. With the aspect of identity in mind, the slow shift to negative discourse can be explained.
8. Conclusions and further research

In conclusion, there is a general change in discourse that could be identified through this thesis. While the initial assumption of a textual analysis providing insight into such a change, was proven wrong during the analysis due to a lack of use of stylistic devices, the narrative analysis revealed discursive shifts. Within each periodic group, the different Chancellors and Ministers demonstrate a certain degree of cohesion that represents the government’s general view on the matter. The limited material from the early 2000s introduced a very positive narrative that optimistically advocated for cooperation in the energy sector with Russia. The Ukraine crisis in 2014 led to a slight change in discourse with more consideration of Ukraine’s situation and energy dependency. Yet the German government demonstrated an eagerness to continue Nord Stream 2 and inherently energy cooperation with Russia. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022 resulted in a radical narrative change in the German government’s discourse that clearly states full support of Ukraine. The narrative shifts from Russia as a reliable economic partner and single large gas supplier towards concrete diversification projects to bridge the gap in the energy supply. This is also where renewable energies come into view as alternative sources. Germany’s open Ostpolitik can be considered a crucial factor in this change and more importantly, the manner in which the discourse shifted, impacted only by major violations of international law in Ukraine. These findings contribute to understanding how the German identity changed in the period between 2000 to 2023.

This thesis was conducted under a limited timeframe which inherently also limited the scope. Further research could be conducted including a larger portfolio of material. Speeches from other members of parliament could be analysed, resulting in more representative findings. Furthermore, the research could be extended to a mixed methodology, incorporating a vaster number of stylistic devices, and considering their use numerically. Through this expansion of the research, the initial assumption of a discursive change being visible through the use of linguistic devices could be confirmed. It could also further confirm that the developed analytical framework is not suited for research of this nature. Another interesting research approach derived from the finding of this thesis could be to analyse how the discourse on renewable energy transition specifically changed over the years and impacted the German identity, while still considering the Ukraine crisis and the war in Ukraine as pivotal events.
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## Appendix A

### Results of Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech</th>
<th>Stylistic devices</th>
<th>Phrasing and narrative</th>
<th>Language use</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Geopolitical context</th>
<th>Reproduce or restructure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schröder, 2001</td>
<td>Pronouns: very personal</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>Munich Security Conference, Munich GER</td>
<td>No significant geopolitical happenings, cooperation in the energy sector continued</td>
<td>Restructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Müller, 2002</td>
<td>Pronouns: use of ‘we’ as Germany relating to Germany and Europe</td>
<td>Positive, but wary</td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>German-Russia economic forum, Cologne GER</td>
<td>No significant geopolitical happenings, cooperation in the energy sector continued</td>
<td>Restructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schröder, 2003</td>
<td>Hyperbole</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>Congress by the Association of the Electricity Industry, Berlin GER</td>
<td>No significant geopolitical happenings, cooperation in the energy sector continued</td>
<td>Restructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merkel, 2008</td>
<td>Repetition</td>
<td>Positive, but wary</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>50th anniversary of the VNS, Leipzig GER</td>
<td>Two years prior the first oil transit crisis occurred. No significant geopolitical or political event took place at the time itself.</td>
<td>Reproduce and restructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merkel, 2011</td>
<td>Repetition Pronouns: the use of ‘we’ and ‘our’ mainly relating to Europe</td>
<td>Positive, but wary</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>Inauguration of Nord Stream, Lubmin GER</td>
<td>The first Nord Stream pipeline was inaugurated with Russian and European political leaders present.</td>
<td>Reproduce and restructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merkel, 2014</td>
<td>Pronouns: the use of ‘we’ and ‘our’ mainly relating to Europe</td>
<td>Negative, but forward-looking</td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Bundestag, Berlin GER</td>
<td>The annexation of Crimea by Russia and the conflict in eastern Ukraine caused the statement to be made.</td>
<td>Reproduce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merkel, 2015</td>
<td>Pronouns: No clear definition of ‘we’ to make all feel addressed</td>
<td>Positive, but considerate</td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>German-Ukrainian Economic Conference, Berlin GER</td>
<td>The Minsk agreement was signed at the beginning of the year. A month prior the Nord Stream 2 project was agreed upon.</td>
<td>Reproduce and restructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriel, 2018</td>
<td>Anaphora: ‘we should’ Pronouns: use of ‘we’ as Germany</td>
<td>Positive, but considerate</td>
<td>Direct (defensive)</td>
<td>New Year's reception of the German Eastern Business Association, Berlin GER</td>
<td>Nord Stream 2 plans proceeded. Controversy sparked the discussion on Nord Stream 2 and the possible dependency of Germany on Russian gas.</td>
<td>Reproduce and restructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altmayer, 2019</td>
<td>Metaphor: ‘two sides of the same coin’ Pronouns: use of ‘we’ as Germany</td>
<td>Positive, but considerate</td>
<td>Direct (defensive)</td>
<td>Bundestag - Aktuelle Stunde, Berlin GER</td>
<td>Controversy fuelled the international discussion on Nord Stream 2 and the possible dependency of Germany on Russian gas.</td>
<td>Reproduce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maas, 2019</td>
<td>Hyperbole Pronouns: the use of ‘we’ and ‘our’ mainly relating to Europe</td>
<td>Positive, but considerate</td>
<td>Direct (defensive)</td>
<td>Dinner of the American Council on Germany, New York USA</td>
<td>Controversy fuelled the international discussion on Nord Stream 2 and the possible dependency of Germany on Russian gas.</td>
<td>Reproduce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baerbock, 2022</td>
<td>Pronouns: the use of ‘we’ and ‘our’ relating to Germany and Europe</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Munich Security Conference, Munich GER</td>
<td>Two days before the invasion when the Russian military was already stationed at the Ukrainian border.</td>
<td>Restructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholz, 2022</td>
<td>Repetition: ‘Zeitenwende’ Pronouns: the use of ‘we’ and ‘our’ relating to Germany and Europe</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Bundestag, Berlin GER</td>
<td>The invasion of Ukraine occurred only days before triggering the speech in response</td>
<td>Reproduce and restructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholz, 2022</td>
<td>Pronouns: the use of ‘we’ and ‘our’ relating to Germany</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Bundestag, Berlin GER</td>
<td>Ongoing war between Ukraine with Russia using energy as a weapon, however a month prior the Nord Stream pipelines were sabotaged by unknowns</td>
<td>Reproduce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habeck, 2023</td>
<td>Repetition: ‘no more’ Pronouns: the use of ‘we’ and ‘our’ relating to Germany</td>
<td>Negative (Neutral)</td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Bundestag, Berlin GER</td>
<td>In the middle of the first winter without Russian gas. The German economy was largely affected by the war</td>
<td>Reproduce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholz, 2023</td>
<td>Repetition: ‘our’, ‘Zeitenwende’ Pronouns: the use of ‘we’ and ‘our’ relating to Germany</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Bundestag, Berlin GER</td>
<td>One year of war, a recap of one year ‘Zeitenwende’, a month after the agreement on Leopard 2 tanks</td>
<td>Reproduce</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21: Results of analysis
### Appendix B

#### Summary of narratives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech</th>
<th>Plotlines</th>
<th>Keywords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schröder, 2001</td>
<td>Positive, portraying Russia as a future economic partner of great relevance to the European energy security</td>
<td>'our common interest', 'prominent role'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Müller, 2002</td>
<td>Positive, recognizing the potential that Russia holds as an economic partner, yet being wary about conditions of investment in Russia having to improve for successful cooperation</td>
<td>'most important supplier', 'potential'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schröder, 2003</td>
<td>Positive, embedding the importance of Russia within the energy sector into the greater picture of expansion and international cooperation</td>
<td>'energy policy partner', 'important', 'future'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merkel, 2008</td>
<td>Positive, speaking about the mutually beneficial relationship between Russia and Germany in the energy sector, arguing for the need for Nord Stream 1, but also calling for diversification of the market to improve energy security</td>
<td>'very close relationship', 'many future opportunities', 'economic rationality', 'central role', 'new growth opportunities'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merkel, 2011</td>
<td>Positive, describing the outstanding cooperation between the countries on Nord Stream 1 and how it shows promise for further future cooperation, mentioning that diversification is still in the interest of ensuring Europe’s energy security</td>
<td>'exemplary', 'outstanding example', 'cooperation'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merkel, 2014</td>
<td>Negative, looking back on European history from conflict to international cooperation and globalisation, pointing out that Russia’s action broke international law, stating that the EU is prepared to support Ukraine, especially in the energy sector through diversification and sanctions against Russia, expressing that cooperation would be more beneficial for all parties than conflict</td>
<td>'breach of fundamental principles of international law', 'not a partner for stability', 'right of the stronger', 'exploiting'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merkel, 2015</td>
<td>Positive, being hopeful for future cooperation in the energy sector due to the Minsk Agreement and gas delivery plans, but being aware of the continuous political tension with Russia</td>
<td>'initiation of economic relations', 'overshadowed', 'viable concept', 'good economic relations'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriel, 2018</td>
<td>Positive, stating that Germany is open to future cooperations with Russia, turning defensive against calls for Germany increasing its energy dependency on Russia through Nord Stream 2, making clear the German government will still work towards ensuring the security of transit countries</td>
<td>'welcome on our market', 'backbone of European-Russian cooperation', 'essential to the security of supply', 'expand gas infrastructure'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altmair, 2019</td>
<td>Positive, explaining that the government has historically always ensured the energy supply with Russia as a reliable partner, defending the German position on Nord Stream 2 and that it does not contradict gas transports through Ukraine, mentioning new possible partners to diversify the market</td>
<td>'private project', 'supply security', 'supplier', 'substantial gas transport', 'interest of our country'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maas, 2019</td>
<td>Positive, framing Russia as an important economic partner, yet recognizing Russia’s disregard for international order in Ukraine, defending the notion that Germany will not become more dependent on Russia through Nord Stream 2, mentioning that other energy suppliers are available</td>
<td>'our greatest neighbour', 'not without Russia'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baerbock, 2022</td>
<td>Negative, reprimanding Russia for its military deployment to the Ukrainian border, clarifying Germany’s position on sanctions including the stop of Nord Stream 2</td>
<td>'unsustainable threat', 'risk of escalation', 'really difficult crisis', 'Russia crisis', 'authoritarian forces', 'pay the economic price'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholz, 2022</td>
<td>Negative, condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine, expressing the government’s and EU’s support of Ukraine as a sovereign state, admitting the energy dependence on Russia, mentioning concrete diversification projects including renewable energy</td>
<td>'attack', 'war of aggression', 'own repressive regime', 'inhuman', in violation of international law', 'disgrace', 'scrupulousness', 'Russian aggression', 'armed violence', 'package of sanctions', 'Putin’s war', 'military force', 'import dependency', 'our safety', 'forward-looking energy policy', 'world market', 'drive expansion of renewable energies'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholz, 2022</td>
<td>Negative, condemning the brutal war, expressing support for Ukraine on all levels, condemning the use of energy as a weapon, stating that Russia is no longer a reliable economic partner, admitting the dependency on Russian gas, discussing the projects to restructure the energy infrastructure of Germany through diversification which will increase the energy security</td>
<td>'energy as a weapon', 'extort', 'imperialist war of aggression', 'terror', 'disgrace', 'destruction of Nord Stream pipelines', 'no reliable trading partner', 'turning off the gas tap', 'strengthen own energy security', 'particularly dependent on Russian gas', 'act of sabotage', 'high energy price'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habeck, 2023</td>
<td>Negative, stating the damage the war has cost Ukraine, indicating that Germany paid an economic price, supporting Ukraine through sanctions and restructuring the energy infrastructure towards a future without Russian gas</td>
<td>'Russian war of aggression', 'the killing', 'horror of war', 'bloodshed', 'no more Russian gas', 'conversion of the energy infrastructure', 'stabilisation of the energy situation'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholz, 2023</td>
<td>Negative, condemning Russia’s actions once more, expressing further support of Ukraine through weaponry, addressing fears of cold winter and how they were overcome, commending the fast restructuring of the energy infrastructure</td>
<td>'Russia's war of aggression', 'breach of international law', 'Putin’s imperialism', 'Zeitenwende', 'our energy supply', 'stop of energy deliveries', 'pressure', 'energy infrastructure', 'converted and invested', 'expansion of renewable energies'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22: Summary of narrative