From Global Justice to National Order?

- An analysis of the newly proposed immigration and integration policies of Sweden

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Foreword
For this Master's Thesis, I would like to thank my supervisor Mikael Rundqvist for his great help during this process with good comments and ideas. I would also like to thank my classmates for their company during long days of writing in Studenthuset. A special thanks to my friend Albin Carlsson for always offering me good support and discussions.

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Abstract
In this Master Thesis, I will examine in what sense the proposed changes in the proposed migration and integration policies of the Tidö Agreement (Tidöavtalet) make current policies of the area even stricter. I will also analyse the agreement and the critique against the agreement using two ideal types. I chose to analyse this agreement because I found it interesting that there was a lot of debate about the proposals and therefore I want to analyse what the agreement is and in what sense it makes the Swedish migration and integration policies more restrictive than what they are now. I will use the dimensions constructed by Reidar Larsson as an analytical framework to write my idea analysis. My two ideal types and theories will be social conservatism and cosmopolitanism. I will go through the agreement point by point with a few exceptions and compare current and proposed legislation as well as using my theories to categorize the proposals and the critique. My conclusion shows that the policies will be noticeably much stricter in many aspects and that there is much presence of social conservatism in the agreement and that the critique is more cosmopolitan in nature.

Keywords: migration, integration, Sweden, Tidö.
1. Introduction

In today's globalized world, human movement over land borders occurs every second. Persecution, armed conflicts, environmental changes, or the sole dream of a better life may all be reasons why one decides to leave the nation they were born in to go to another. Ongoing conflicts in the world include for example Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Syrian Civil War.

In this context, Sweden has for a long time been a country where many individuals have sought themselves to live in. Over the last decades, migration has been high. It peaked in 2016 with around 163 000 immigrated individuals and it has gone down to around 102 000 in 2022 (SCB, 2023). The Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt held a speech in 2014, addressing the refugee crisis with people mainly fleeing from Syria stating: “Now I plea to the Swedish people about patience, about opening your hearts to see people in strong stress with threats for their only life that flees, flees to Europe, flee to freedom, flee to better conditions1.” (Moderaterna, 2014). The German Chancellor Angela Merkel showed a similar vision, with her slogan “Wir schaffen das”. This vision though fainted and in 2016 a temporary law that heavily restricted the Swedish migration policies was implemented. The law was temporary and expired in July 2021 (Fores, 2021). New legislation was put in place in July 2021, when the former law expired (prop. 2020/21:191, 1-2).

1.1 Problem formulation

In the election 2022, a new political majority took over in Sweden, consisting of the Moderate Party, the Liberal Party, the Christian Democrats, and the Sweden Democrats. The party leaders of the new majority held a press conference on the 14th of October, presenting their agreement, the Tidö Agreement (Tidöavtalet). The Sweden Democrat party leader Jimmie Åkesson described the agreement as a “paradigm shift” regarding the migration politics of Sweden. The direction assigned in the agreement is that the EU minimum rules of migration are the ones that will be applied and nothing beyond that in national law (Ruderstam, Westling, and Hällsten, 2022). I mean that this is interesting to investigate because Sweden has been a country in Europe that historically has taken a different path in its

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1 Original quote: Nu vädjar jag till svenska folket om tålmod, om att öppna era hjärtan för människor för att se människor i stark stress fly med hot om det egna livet som flyr. Flyr mot Europa, fler mot frihet, flyr mot bättre förhållanden.
migration policies than other European countries for the last 15-20 years, especially compared to our neighbour Denmark, and generally has chosen to be open to refugees, relatives to refugees, and labour immigrants from all over the world. The Sweden Democrats have for a long time been vocal opponents to this and had growing support, becoming the biggest party in the Tidö constellation. The party could be considered part of the overall nationalistic wave that has hit Europe over the last decades, with parties such as Dansk Folkeparti and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).

In the context of this, I will examine the migration and integration area of the Tidö agreement and the critique against it from a perspective of social conservatism and cosmopolitanism. The two theories of social conservatism and cosmopolitanism are chosen, because of their diametral differences in world view. Social conservatism put the states and their sovereignty and character first, whereas cosmopolitanism put the individual first, arguing for a universalistic point of view, where humans are all equal to a great extent. The point of this is to put the agreement in a wider context and analyse whether it makes Swedish migration and integration policies much more restrictive and conservative than what it is now. Or if the proposed changes are not especially stricter than earlier policies. In the analysis, I will use argument by different actors of relevance and compare the proposals with how it looks in other countries in order to situate the agreement. I will analyse the proposals and the critique using idea analysis. The idea analysis will be conducted via an ideal type apparatus, constituted of the ideal types of social conservatism and cosmopolitanism. The ideal type apparatus that I have constructed draws inspiration from Reidar Larsson’s and his seven political dimensions, which I will discuss more in the method chapter.

The research gap in this Thesis considers partly the Tidö Agreement itself. It is a very new agreement and is thus not that researched. When I did a search in March 2023 on Google Scholar, I found that the academic work concerning the agreements has also foremostly addressed the law and order aspects of the agreement and not the migration and integration area, which this thesis wishes to examine. The framing of the agreement, signals visions in these aspects, with the Sweden Democrat leader Jimmie Åkesson talking about a “paradigm shift”, meaning a radical change in this political area. The international relations discussion in this Thesis involves different legal sources such as European Union legislation as well as global human rights (UDHR) and international norms, in the form of conventions and how the proposed legislation in the agreement will act out in practice in Sweden in relation to
these different international legal sources. I will also show examples of how similar proposals to the Tidö Agreement works in other EU countries and Nordic countries, such as citizenship tests. It is also a Thesis about global egalitarianism contra nationalism in a sense, i.e. what is the responsibility of the wealthy world (Sweden in this case) for individuals in the poorer and more exposed part of the world, as well as migration in itself, which is a transnational issue involving all the world’s nations. It should be underlined that the Tidö agreement is far from fully implemented, but I would argue that although the agreement is mostly in the starting pit, it is interesting to analyse what the agreement signals already now, since it is a long and detailed agreement.

The thesis also critically examines this new position and what it means for refugees and non-citizens seeking themselves to and residing in Sweden. I aspire to achieve theoretical generalization, thus successfully connecting theoretical reasoning with empirical material (Bryman 2016, 64).

1.2 Research Questions

The purpose of this thesis is to examine in what sense the proposed policy changes regarding the migration and integration area in the Tidö agreement implicates that the Swedish migration and integration policies will become more restrictive than what they are now and how the proposals and the critique against them can be understood through the lens of social conservatism and cosmopolitanism.

- In what sense does the Tidö Agreement implicate that the Swedish migration and integration policies will become more restrictive than what they are now?

- How can the proposed migration and integration policies of the Tidö agreement, and the critique against them, be understood through the lens of social conservatism and cosmopolitanism?

1.3 Limitations and Disposition

The focus of this thesis will be the migration and integration policy area of the Tidö agreement, which is pp. 31-47 in the agreement. In order to answer the first research question, I will use myself of the agreement as well as legal text, web pages and news
articles, parliamentary material, reports, and scientific articles in order to understand what changes there will be if the proposals in the Tidö agreement are implemented in relation to current policies. I will also use material about how laws similar to the proposals in the Tidö agreement are applied in other Nordic countries and EU countries in order to situate the agreements and in that way elevate the discussion about how restrictive the agreement is. I will also incorporate relevant EU Law in touched-upon areas, as EU Law acts as an important framework for Swedish Migration Law.

In order to answer the second research question, I will also use myself of the agreement. Other units of analysis will be written and oral statements criticising the migration and integration policy area of the Tidö agreement, written from the 14th of October 2022 (the day when the agreement was presented) until the 5th of April 2023. The written and oral statements criticising the agreement could for example be opinion articles, press statements, and reports. These units and the agreement itself will be analysed using the two ideal type categories and in that way I will answer the second research question.

This Master Thesis does not aspire to give an analysis of Swedish migration and integration policy areas outside of what is proposed within the framework of the Tidö agreement but will be about the proposed changes in relation to current legislation in touched upon areas by the agreement.

First, there will be a background chapter where I will go through different ideological and legal aspects of international migration. This will be human rights, fundamental conventions, and the EU framework. I will also give a short background to the Tidö agreement, to give the reader the political context. After that, I will give a short literature overview where I focus extra much on the concept of civic integration. After that, there is a chapter on material & method, where I discuss how the analysis will be conducted and the analysis material. I will also go through the method and source criticism. After that, there is the analysis, where I analyse the agreement in chronological order, i.e. the proposals come up in the same order as they do in the Tidö-document, and where I also analyse the agreement and the critique against the agreement via my ideal types. Finally, there is a conclusion with answers to the research questions, as well as ideas for further research.
2. Background to the Judicial and Political Context

In this section, I will take a look at ideological and judicial issues involved in migration policy, as well as the development and background of the Tidö Agreement. Human rights is the first chapter and this is involved because human rights is the starting point of international rights since the end of the Second World War because of the atrocities during the period. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) mentions clearly the right to be a refugee and that it is a human right. As an expansion of this discussion further, also more conventions related to refugees' rights are discussed such as the ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights) and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee. The chapter on EU legislation is in because EU legislation is brought up a lot in the thesis, mostly through the different directives that constitute EU Migration Law. EU legislation is also much mentioned in the Tidö Agreement because of its function as a framework for migration legislation. In the end, it is a minor introduction to the Swedish political setting and how the agreement was created.

2.1 Human Rights

The starting point for human rights in its ideological foundation is a universalist perspective. Universalism is the idea that there are norms and rules that apply to all people and cultures, regardless of the individual's context (Kohfeldt & Grabe, 2014). Our human rights are everywhere and equal, from Mongolia to Sweden to Peru. The foundation of human rights is found in “natural law”, which was something that emerged during the 18th-century Enlightenment period. Philosophers like Rosseau, Locke, and others thereafter refined these “natural laws” into rights to life, religion, and property (Fisher 2020, 13). These laws stood above the laws of the king, which was a perspective that sparked revolutions in both France and the US. The national law was thought of for a long time as the only law of interest until the horrendous atrocities of the Second World War showed that a nation could do so horrible acts against its own population and others that there was a need for some sort of global framework (Fisher 2020, 13). The core values of human rights and the conventions embodied are human dignity and equality. With these core values, the ambition is that individuals should to a certain extent be able to live a life in dignity and that we as humans should all
have equal access to this basic dignity (Council of Europe, 2023). Several core sub-values can be extracted from these two and address issues more specifically. As put by the Council of Europe, these are freedom, respect for others, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, and responsibility.

As mentioned in the introduction, the primary source for human rights is UDHR, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948. It is a long document, that covers several aspects of social and political issues. Two aspects can be brought up firstly Article 1. states that: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”. This statement addresses that humans are born free and equal. The first paragraph of Article 2 is also interesting: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, property, birth or other status” (United Nations 1948, 2). With this article, the declaration emphasizes the idea of universalism. The other aspect to be brought up here is the paragraph concerning migration, which is Article 13-14. Most clearly, it is mentioned in 14.1 as “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution” (United Nations 1948, 4). As this thesis in part wants to address migration and what the Tidö proposals mean for asylum-seekers coming to Sweden, the perspective of human rights is important to know before.

2.1.1 Global Migration

In June 2022 there were over 100 million refugees in the world. Big conflict zones include for example the Tigray region in Eritrea as well as Myanmar. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has also spawned an enormous refugee wave from the country (UNHCR, 2022). In such a situation it is extra important to uphold human rights and the right to asylum for refugees. Refugees are refugees because they cannot return because of their situation in their home country, which makes it important to uphold the tradition of giving asylum since the alternative can mean dangerous consequences (UNHCR, 2023). Therefore it is important to address when infringement of asylum-seeker's rights is being conducted and when governments have the intention to make it more difficult to come and live in countries like Sweden. The stricter the rules become, the more there is a risk of violating the asylum-seekers rights and thus also human rights.
2.2 Fundamental Conventions

A cornerstone in the European asylum policies is the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees from 1951. All of the EU countries, including Sweden, are bound to the convention. The convention defines who is a refugee, the rights of a refugee, and what the convention states duties towards refugees are. Stated in the convention is that a refugee is a person that has fled their country because of fear of persecution of race, religion, or belonging to a certain social group, or because of political views. Important for the convention is the non-refoulment principle, which stipulates that no individual is supposed to be sent back to places where the person risks being subjected to severe violations of their human rights, such as torture (Amnesty, 2022).

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is a convention designed to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in Europe. All 47 countries forming the Council of Europe are party to the Convention, 27 of which are members of the EU. It gives anyone the right to take their case if their rights are violated (EUR-LEX, 2023). This convention is a minimum standard that has to be followed in the EU and that the member states have to respect. The convention has also been adopted in the EU via The Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union from the year 2000 which includes many of the rights stipulated in the convention, plus a few other social and economic rights (Fisher 2020, 42-43). The rights stipulated are limited by the subsidiarity principle, in the sense that the individual must first have tried his or her case in the home country and must have used all possible national legal resources before taking it up to the European Court of Justice. It is though not always clear since the European Court of Justice generally gives the states a margin of appreciation, One area where a big margin is given is security, which is considered an important national issue. There are therefore also other values other than the strict human rights values involved regarding human rights and how they are implemented in the European Union (Fisher 2020, 45-46).

2.3 EU Framework

To understand the Swedish shift in migration policy, it is necessary to bring up the framework that encircles Swedish migration policy. In the Tidö Agreement, this is referred to often, and that framework is European Union Law. In several places in the agreement, the phrase “to
what extent that is allowed by European Union Law” is used in the agreement as an inherent limitation to the proposals, for example on page 34. The foundation of European Union Law is foremost the treaties, which is the so-called primary law. The treaties act as a constitution in the EU and address how the EU function and the relation between member states and the EU are constituted. There is also secondary law, which are the legal documents created in the day-to-day operations of the legislation work in the European Union. Legal documents can come in seven different shapes which are the following - regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations, opinions, delegating acts, and implementing acts. Regulations are laws that apply automatically and with uniformity in the entire EU. They are legally binding for all member states directly. Directives are legally binding goals that the member states are required to fulfill, but they can implement them into national legislation as they wish. Directives are the most discussed legal text source discussed in this text (European Commission, 2023).

EU migration law is important to this thesis, which is stipulated in the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The founding legal documents for this system are the Asylum Procedure Directive, the Reception Conditions Directive, the Qualifications Directive, the Dublin Regulation, and the EURODAC Regulation. Also important is the European Union Agency for Asylum. The different legal documents clarify different aspects that apply for an asylum-seeker when he or she comes to the European Union and states the individual seeker's rights (1aEuropean Commission, 2023). Also important is the Family Reunification Directive (1bEuropean Commission, 2023). It should be mentioned as well that a new EU pact on migration and asylum is on the table and discussed. This is something that might have an effect on the Tidö agreement (Asylrättscentrum 2022, 19). The pact will though not be put forward until 2024 and is thus not discussed in this thesis (Foy, 2023).

2.4 Background to the Tidö Agreement

As earlier mentioned, a new political majority took over in 2022. The government formation ended with a government consisting of the three first parties and the last one, the Sweden Democrats, as a support party. Worth noticing in this context is that the Sweden Democrats were the biggest party in the constellation and still did not become a part of the government. The parties met in September when election results were clear and started secret negotiations, which ended up with the Tidö Agreement. The Tidö Agreement as earlier mentioned has been
The agreement is 63 pages long and marks objectives in several political areas, such as school, climate, and crime. There has been a lot of debate on the chapter on migration and integration, which to a large extent has been influenced by the policies of the Sweden Democrats, who had demanded a paradigm shift in this political area since it is the most important issue for them.

The constellation that is supposed to fulfill the agreement has parties with different ideologies. First, we have the Moderate Party, usually described as a liberal-conservative party and also describing themselves as a liberal-conservative party, embracing the sole individual but also what they describe as the inherent communities in society (Moderaterna 2021, 6). Then there are the Christian Democrats, which describe their ideology as an ideology that put humans in the center. Every human is unique but also needs a sense of community to thrive. The most important community is the family. Another important issue is the subsidiarity principle, that decisions are made on the right political level (Kristdemokraterna, 2022). There is also the Liberal Party, which is a party based on liberalism that states that they are a party protecting individual freedom and giving individuals the possibility to shape their own lives (Liberalerna, 2022). The Sweden Democrats are the party that describes itself as a social conservative party with a nationalist basic view. It is a party that endorses law and order, family, and the nation (Sverigedemokraterna 2019, 2). The party has by others, for example, party opponents have been described as “xenophobic” and “populist” (TT, 2021). Given the party’s size and that the government depends on its support, it is a given assumption that the party would have a large influence on the government coalition’s policies, including the area of migration and integration.

2.4.1 The Sweden Democrats

The Sweden Democrats became the biggest of the right-wing parties with 20,54% of the votes (Valmyndigheten, 2023), thus naturally receiving a huge impact on the agreement. In opinion articles, the migration and criminal areas of the agreement have been described as cut out of the Sweden Democrats party program (Alnebratt et al, 2022). The party is a member of the ECR (European Conservative and Reformist) in the European Parliament. The ECR consists of conservative and Eurosceptic parties, such as Polish Law and Justice and the Italian Brothers of Italy (European Conservative and Reformist Group, 2022).
The Sweden Democrats were founded in the late 1980s by individuals with backgrounds in the Swedish Nazi and other racist and non-democratic movements (Mattson, 2022). The party entered the Swedish parliament in 2010, after having been visible on the local level since 1998 when they were receiving financial support from the French far-right party National Front. Until 2006, the party symbol was a burning torch, a symbol derived from fascist ideology. The symbol was switched to a blue anemone. Many scandals have followed the party over the years, where party members and representatives have expressed themselves as xenophobic and racist (Expo, 2022). With time, the profile of the party has changed and the party today describes itself as a social conservative and nationalist in its party program (Sverigedemokraterna 2019, 1).

I will not address more long-term internal aspects of migration and integration policy that are addressed in the agreement. The five proposals out of 33 that will not be addressed will be the following:

- Strengthening the work against forced marriages, polygamic marriages, and child marriages (Tidöavtalet 2022, 43).
- Foreign financing of religious communities and non-governmental organizations (Tidöavtalet 2022, 45).
- The proposal to do a census (Tidöavtalet 2022, 41).
- Long-term investments in order to raise socio-economic vulnerable areas (Tidöavtalet 2022, 45).
- Increased integration possibilities for the youngest children (Tidöavtalet 2022, 46).

Since I am interested in the more direct relation between asylum-seekers and non-citizens visavi Sweden, I have chosen not to address these points, since they do not directly address this relation, but are more related to internal issues of the country concerning the entire population. Thus, I will analyze 28 out of 33 proposals. Some proposals are also not examined in all detail, since it is this relation between asylum-seeker/newcomers/non-citizens visavi the Swedish state that is interesting for me and not the administrative aspects of the proposals, like which authority is given the mission to do what measure. Some proposals will therefore not be described fully, but be summarised into their most important principal parts.
3. Literature overview - current and historical migration and integration policies

For this chapter I will summarise a couple of articles that relate to the subject of this thesis. The articles relate to migration law, integration policy, migration incitement, and migrants' social rights and civic integration. So they all relate to the area that is discussed in this thesis.

The study *Hur gemensamma är det gemensamma EU-reglerna? Svensk asylrätt i europeiskt perspektiv* (2022) by Vladislava Stoyanova and Eleni Karageorgiou is a study that goes through the Swedish asylum law in comparison to what the European Union Law stipulates and whether Sweden is a more or less beneficial place for refugees. The study addresses the qualifications for protection, the access to residence permits on the basis of asylum and family reunification. The study also compares Sweden with Denmark, Germany, and Greece, as well as gives an overview of the EU overall. The study is limited to legislation before March 2022, thus before the Tidö agreement existed.

The study shows several results. Sweden offers in certain aspects more beneficial rules for individuals in need of protection (refugees). One aspect is the necessary prerequisite for the expiration of the refugee status. Here is a difference between the Qualifications Directive and the Swedish Alien Act. The directive states that refugee status expires if the refugee afresh of free will uses the protection of the country where they are citizens. This is not a necessary prerequisite in the Swedish legislation which makes the Swedish legislation more extensive than the directive. In the EU, the average time of staying in a country to receive permanent residence is five years, while in Sweden, it is three years. The Swedish legislation also mainly gives individuals with *subsidiary residence status* the same possibility of family reunification as individuals that are refugees. The Swedish legislation is also more rigorous than the EU average in some aspects (although in line with prescripted norms). When it comes to the decision regarding residence given the first time, Sweden follows the EU norm of three years, but many countries, like Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands have five years instead. With this article, I receive an understanding of Swedish law to other European countries' migration law, thus understanding more how generous/strict the current Swedish legislation is from this perspective.
In the article *Asylum Seekers and Undocumented Migrants’ Increased Social Rights in Sweden* (2011), Hans E. Andersson and Susanna Nilsson show that over the decades, several countries in the EU have restricted the social rights of refugees, predominantly when it comes to rights to work, but also to health care. For example, in 2003, the United Kingdom refused all welfare benefits from asylum-seekers (with the exception of children) who could not prove that they were refugees shortly after their arrival. According to the article Sweden seems to have gone in a very different direction over time, with rather increasing social rights for asylum-seekers. This article shows how Sweden historically for a long time has been a place where asylum-seekers have received benefits that have not been received elsewhere, making proposals presented in the Tidö Agreement even more exceptional from a historic viewpoint.

There is also the article *Do asylum-seekers respond to policy changes? Evidence from the Swedish – Syrian case* (2023) by Henrik Andersson and Kristoffer Jutvik. This is an article that makes a quantitative analysis of shifts in Swedish migration law. They look at the Swedish liberalization of migration laws in September 2013, offering permanent instead of temporary residence permit which Syrian asylum-seekers picked up and acted on. Their study shows that there was an increase in asylum applications from Syria. It also showed a shift in the number of single individuals that seek asylum and thus a shift in the application for family reunification. This article is interesting because it is a clear example of how immigration policies can affect the flow of migration. When Sweden allowed more people, this also lead to record numbers.

### 3.1 Civic integration

As an underlying concept to theories used, the concept of civic integration will be used. The increasing requirements for settlement and naturalization as an immigrant are something that has been addressed in research. In “Integration Requirements for Integration’s Sake? Identifying, Categorising and Comparing Civic Integration Policies” by Sara Wallace Goodman (2010), so-called “civic integration policies” are problematized and discussed. To evaluate the tendency within the EU, she uses an index called CIVIX “to measure language, country-knowledge, and value-commitment requirements”. The founding idea of civil integration is that for a successful incorporation of a newcomer, it is not enough to just work and engage, there is also a need for a cultural understanding. This includes knowledge of the
country, language proficiency, and understanding of the new country’s values. With civic integration, there is not an ambition to assimilate, but to create an individual that functions in his or her new society.

The CIVIX analysis done in 1997 and 2009 shows that among the countries that have the most barriers are Germany (scoring 6.0, the highest), Austria (4.5) and Denmark (5.0). The countries with the least barriers there are Sweden (0,0), Italy, and Ireland (0,5). The results for Germany, Austria, and Denmark is not surprising, since they have a tradition of being exclusive countries in different senses, where there are a lot of barriers in the form of language test and integration courses, and Germany in particular with its blood-based kind of nationhood. In other countries, citizenship is considered something that enables integration, rather than rewarding integration.

Even though the agreement proposes changes in the current legislation, it is still so that the new legislative proposals could be seen as a further development of the Swedish migration policy changes that occurred in the wake of the refugee crisis of 2015-2016, with the temporary law in 2016 and the new migration law in 2021. The article *A 'civic turn' in Scandinavian family migration policies? Comparing Denmark, Norway, and Sweden* by Emily Cochran Bech, Karin Borevi and Per Mouritsen from 2017 addresses changes in family migration policy, in other words, reunification policy and how it has been restricted in the three countries. The article addresses a tendency to go for more “civic integration” when it comes to refugees, focusing on how integration policy can create a good citizen. The writers argue that the reunification policy is a part of this, creating incentives stating that if you become a “better” citizen it is more likely that you get to reunite with your family. The authors address several legislative changes in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden as a consequence of the refugee crisis in 2015, but also point to the fact that the Dutch parliament already 2005 imposed a pre-entry integration regime stating to reunite with your partner or child in the Netherlands, you have to show knowledge of the Dutch society as well as pass a language test.

Another researcher discussing civic integration is Christian Joppke in his article *Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe* (2007). He discusses civic integration as an expression of liberalism. His viewpoint is that an important part of liberalism is contractualism, where there is a balance between rights and duties. This
kind of liberalism he argues is a repressive form of liberalism. He underlines that it is not about racism or nationalism, since the liberal discourse more uses terms like “integration” instead of “assimilation”, thus giving space for the immigrant to keep their own culture within the framework of their new state of residence. The “repressive” liberalism is built in part on John Rawls's emphasis on equality and equal rights as well as John Stuart Mills “disciplining” liberalism, where liberalism is something that could be acquired by individuals by illiberal means, in other words, forced upon.
4. Theoretical Framework of Social Conservatism and Cosmopolitanism

In this section, I will go through the theories used in this thesis, which are social conservatism and cosmopolitanism. These are not classic scientific theories in the sense that they in a structured way explain how the world looks based on gathered observations (Bradford and Hamer, 2022), but are instead rather considered ideologies or philosophical positions. In political science, the ambition to investigate and use normative standpoints in periods has been considered somewhat unscientific and connected more to the expression of opinions. A work that changed the conception of this was John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*. Rawls’s book showed that arguing for a normative viewpoint could be done in a systematic way and in that way, political philosophy was welcomed back. An objection could be that Rawls's theory of justice, as well as other normative theories, are built on an array of assumptions and therefore cannot be proven true. This is true, but on the other hand, there is also a lack of “absolute” proofs when it comes to more purely empirical investigations, because an empirical investigation is also built on a number of assumptions beyond the investigation itself (Beckman and Mörkenstam 2016, 8, 10). Against the backdrop of this, I would argue that the most important thing when applying a theoretical framework is that the theory is constructed coherently and therefore can be applied in a uniform way. As shown later in the method chapter, I use Reidar Larsson's dimension to create ideal types of the two ideologies in order to do a uniform analysis and thus create systematics of the two positions that I have chosen. Why I have chosen to use these positions as theories is because when constructed and demarcated, the archetypes act as different visions of the world and how things should be regarding the relationship between Sweden and immigrants, which I would argue creates a strong link between the outlook of the thesis and the used material. Using these ideological glasses, I wish to get a full span, from global justice to national order as the title tells, and be able to use my categories in order to analyse whether the agreement can be considered creating legislation more restrictive than the current in the area, and how the critique against the agreement can be understood through these two perspectives.
4.1 Social Conservatism

The Sweden Democrats define themselves as a “social conservative party with a fundamental nationalist view” (Sverigedemokraterna 2019, 2). It could be discussed if the Sweden Democrats are what they suggest they are and if they should not be described as for example a right-wing populist party or a purely nationalist party. For this Thesis, I think though that social conservatism is, as I write in the introduction, an ideology that offers a world-view focused on the nation and putting the nation first, and very different from considering the world to be a global community, making it relevant in the examination of the right-wing Tidö agreement. Social conservatism is an ideology deriving from conservatism. Modern political conservatism begins usually would most people say with Edmund Burke. With his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Burke argued against hesitant political change and for the preservation of longtime established institutions. According to Burke, by utilising the inherent stability of the institutions and considering them when conducting political reforms, life becomes better for all the citizens, since that is consistent with society’s “natural” order (Nordin, 2013). Political work is therefore also a practical matter based on earlier experience, not a theoretical matter built on conceived ideals of how society should function. Burke's central political observation is that society is to be considered an organic unit, not a group of individuals sharing a territory. The groups of individuals living together are social creatures, created in a context and with a history. The political system is nothing other than an extension of existing smaller units like families, making the nation at heart an entity made out of blood ties (Roberts and Sutch 2016, 336-339). In the book *Politiska ideologier i vår tid* (2014) by Reidar Larsson, the political ideology of social conservatism is further discussed. The first country to act as a role model for social conservatism is the German Reich, founded in 1871 by Otto von Bismarck. The ambition of the state is to provide welfare to the citizen, lessen social tensions, and create a sense of community (Larsson 2014, 45).

For conservatives, the nation and the family are the most important aspects of society. The defense and the sovereignty of the nation are central. Therefore, conservative parties (SD among them) generally have been against the European project. The unity of the family is central to the raising of children and the education system. Another central observation is that human is neither good nor bad, which entails a rather pessimist view of humans, which leads to the advocating of strong norms from a conservative viewpoint (Larsson 2014, 49-50). Historically, the resistance against universal voting rights for all members of the land has also
been something that conservatives reject, fearing revolutionary left-wing politics as a result. In later days, conservatives accept universal voting rights but continue to have a view of democracy as something fundamentally rule-based. In the US, conservatives often for example adhere to the Supreme Court and its possibility to upheave political decisions, giving certain rules and traditions precedence (Larsson 2014, 51, 53).

The Sweden Democrats have mentioned British conservative thinker Roger Scruton as an inspiration for their thinking, and Scruton has spoken at the party events (Larsson, 2016). Scruton is famous for coining the term oikophobia meaning denouncing one’s home in favor of favoring other nations and cultures (Scruton 2004, 36). The Sweden Democrat Jimmie Åkesson used the term in an opinion article he made in 2009, with a headline stating that Islam was the biggest threat to Sweden since the Second World War (Åkesson, 2009). In a lecture from 2014, Scruton argues that immigrant communities in Western countries must become a part of the nation they reside in because otherwise, the nations are risking national division (Expanding Overton, 2014). Scruton is against immigration and has written among things that he dismisses the belief “that pious Muslims from the hinterlands of Asia would produce children loyal to a secular European state” (Portes, 2020). Therefore, Scruton on the large refuses to believe in immigration as something functioning and that people born in other parts of the world than say England would be able to be loyal to England. Loyalty is something he further addresses in his book “England and the Need of Nations”, where he writes “Democracies owe their existence to national loyalties—the loyalties that are supposedly shared by government and opposition, by all political parties, and by the electorate as a whole (Scruton 2004, 1)” The Sweden Democrats to an extent echoes this position in their party program, where they write that “the Sweden Democrats does not oppose immigration, but argues that immigration must be held on a level and be of such character that that it does not threaten our national identity or the welfare and safety of our land (Sverigedemokraterna 2019, 14).

4.2 Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism implies the philosophical position that justice is equal for all human beings, where we all can be considered citizens of the world. Cosmopolitans question what they argue is the liberal position of equality being a matter for the national states and not for humans beyond the nation-state border. This is a valid philosophical position in the sense that
we do not choose where we are born and it is, therefore, reasonable to consider an oppressed individual interest, rather than a state’s interest. This is a development of Rawls's idea of justice, where traits such as gender, religion, and disability are considered morally arbitrary. Therefore as these traits do not matter, the trait that is where you were born should not matter either. Cosmopolitanism can be divided into two sub-groups: strong respectively weak cosmopolitanism. Strong cosmopolitanism argues that sharing humanity is enough for global egalitarian solutions. Weak cosmopolitanism argues that there is a need for some kind of global network first, for obligations to be made (Erman 2016, 296-297). Cosmopolitans argue further that the usage of the national states as the limit for help is arbitrary, and that borders do not have inherent value. Even though the national state is important in facilitating international justice, is considered an instrument, more than a unit in itself (Erman 2016, 303-304).

A staunch proponent of cosmopolitanism is the German philosopher Thomas Pogge. In his article Rawls and Global Justice (1988), he reasons about the justice of institutions with the starting point in the thinking of John Rawls. Justice can not only be something that the sole individual practices, but it has to be a virtue for the institutions, which act as the collective view of society. Therefore, the virtues of the institutions continuously must be discussed (Pogge 1988, 228). The Rawlsian position of justice is described as “justice as fairness” and consists of two principles, with the first one being that everybody has equal rights to a basic scheme of rights and liberties. The second is the principle of difference which means that social and economic inequality is only acceptable on the following two conditions 1) offices and positions must be open to everyone and 2) they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society (Rawls 1985). Pogge argues that Rawls's principle of the least advantaged must be addressed at the global level and address the globally least advantaged. The national perspective that Rawls applies is not legitimate in a world where societies are open (Pogge 1988). In this theory, the conflict is the global inherent injustice in that some humans of the world live lives that are much more difficult than others, and it is therefore motivated that it exists global mechanisms for the distribution of welfare and wealth.

Given the universalist nature of cosmopolitanism, one could draw the conclusion that cosmopolitans are generally positive about refugee immigration and increased immigrant rights. In the article Moral Cosmopolitanism and the Right to Immigration (2012) by Yusuf
Yuksedag, this is addressed. The cosmopolitan position defends the right to freedom of movement to escape misery in the world since individuals can be harmed by living in their country, and not accessing welfare or a good life. In his article *Migrant Cosmopolitanism* (2015), Thomas Nail addresses the development of NGOs constituted by migrants and working for migrants. The first example of this was the French *Coordination Nationale des Sans-Papiers*, advocating for the paperless to have more rights, which also won many battles. Also known as the organization No One Is Illegal - NOII. In his article *Cosmopolitan Patriots* (1997), Kwame Anthony Appiah argues that the ideal cosmopolitan community is a community that celebrates diversity and where individuals choose how they want to live.
5. Material & Method

5.1 Material

For the thesis, several different kinds of sources will be used. A fundamental basis for the thesis is the agreement itself and its migration and integration policy section. What also will be used is different written and oral sources that discuss the agreements migration policy area, such as opinion articles, reports, and press statements from NGOs, and sole individuals. Also, reports, academic articles, parliamentary material and legal texts will be used.

The sampling method that I will use is *purposive sampling*, a non-probability form of sampling. This a kind of sampling where data is not found through randomization, but where I take a role in the sampling process, being strategic in finding material that suits the purpose and research questions of the study (Bryman 2016, 408). This is to find statements, reports, and legislation to cultivate a discussion about migration and integration policies.

The process of writing this Master Thesis has been a process where I have gathered different kinds of sources along the way. One document I have chosen to use is the Swedish Refugee Law Centers (*Asylrättscenrum*) report on the Tidö agreement. The Swedish Refugee Law Center works in order to guard the right to asylum, and for human rights as well as legal certainty in Migration Law processes (*Asylrättscenrum* 2023, 2). This I have chosen to use because this is an organization that consists of individuals with different kinds of legal competencies. They have worked in courts, in bureaus, and as well in NGOs relating to law-related issues, such as Save The Children International. The head of law for the organization has worked for example for UNHCR, the Swedish Migration Agency, and the Swedish Migration Court of Appeal. The purpose of using this extensive report is to give a critical overview of the agreement from a legal point of view, in relation to international conventions, human rights and EU Law. I have also used a report on the agreement written by Civil Rights Defenders, which is an international human rights organization, working for civil and political rights since 1982. They have worked with issues for a long time and are based on four continents with 100 employees (Civil Right Defenders, 2023).
I have also chosen to use EU legal text, Swedish Government Reports (SOUs), Swedish legal text, and Swedish legal Bills, which are stamped and signed. This is to get an understanding of what the premises are in migration and integration-related policies in Sweden. I also use reports written by different state and non-state organizations, such as the Swedish Migration Agency and OECD to get more empirics and to elaborate the discussion. Peer-reviewed articles are also used to give the thesis academic depth. Web articles are used to provide the thesis with argumentation pro and against the agreement. For example, an article written in the newspaper Svenska Dagbladet by representatives of the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO) will be used. Texts by many other NGOs are also chosen, such as for example Save The Children International. I have also used reports, academic articles, and web articles (web articles when it comes to minor details) in order to find out what kind of legislation that applies in other countries in EU countries and in the Nordic countries in order to understand the level of restrictions in the Tidö Agreement in an international context.

5.2 Idea analysis and ideal type analysis

The analysis approach will be qualitative since I wish not to use numbers, but the interpretation of words to gain information. The more specific analysis method will be idea analysis as described by Ludvig Beckman in Evert Vedung’s Fyra typer av statsvetenskaplig idéanalys (2018). Idea analysis can be made in various ways - describing, argumentative, explanatory, and constructive. Idea analysis can be described as studying political ideas in a political science context. This method suits the thesis well since its ambition is to analyse political ideas manifested in the agreement itself, other countries' legislation and opinion articles, and press statements. I wish to do a describing idea analysis, to make political ideas visible. In this, there is the ambition to illuminate and get an understanding for what is the underlying message and ideology eg. what the concerned actors think, and to which political hemisphere the thinking expressed belongs (Beckman & Ljungwald, 2009). This is what I want to achieve using my theoretical framework in the second research question, by categorizing the proposals and the critique using the categories of social conservatism and cosmopolitanism.
There will also be an explanatory element to the thesis as well. In the context of policy, there is an inherent interest in explaining, since it is a crystallized material, derived from ideas. To explain policies, in short, I can do two things. The first is forward mapping, which is to try to understand the functions and the effects of the adapted policy, also called “effect searching”. The second is backward mapping, which is understanding the causes of the policy created (Vedung 2018). In his book Grundbok i ideanalys (2005), Ludvig Beckman discusses the explanatory dimension of idea analysis further. He differentiates between a casual explanation and a so-called purposive explanation (ändamålsförklaring), where he argues that a casual explanation is more interesting to use when explaining human behavior, but that purposive explanation is more interesting when it comes to motives since it addresses the reasons behind actions, not their physical causes (Beckman 2005, 83). With the explanatory dimensions, I wish to understand which are the desired effects of the policy. It could be considered too early to include this dimension, but I mean that even though almost no proposals are implemented, there is an interest in investigating which functions the policies desires to fill, and in that way addressing the first research question about the proposals how the proposals make Swedish migration and integration policies stricter.

For the idea analysis to be conducted, there is though still a need for a framework of some sort to process the material found physically into results to create the analysis. As a framework, I will therefore use an ideal type analysis apparatus as a tool to conduct my idea analysis. The ideal type analysis is created by Max Weber, referring to a theoretical construction to use as a guideline in order to analyze different phenomena. It is about attributing a theoretical construction with certain traits to use as a mirror for scientific observations. This construction does not have to fully reflect reality or be an expression of an statistical average, but the value lies in the refinement of analytical concepts in order to understand reality and research problems (Weber 1904, referred in Boreus and Svärd 2018, 147-148). When constructing ideal types, one takes an ideology or theory to the extreme to create an archetype and thus be able to analyze the phenomenon against the imagined archetype. This method can be used to analyse the characteristics of a phenomenon, hence does the agreement mean a real change in the direction that it aspires to be? Using the ideal types I will be able to mirror the traits of the Tidö agreement migration and integration policies and the critique against it, against the ideal types of social conservatism and cosmopolitanism. To create ideal types, one does the right thing by using the earlier research on the subject in question. One does not necessarily has to buy everything stated in earlier
research, but essentially one needs something to relate to in the creation of the archetypes (Essaiasson et.al 2017 140, 142).

An ideal type does not have to be something complicated. Here is one example, from Marie Demker’s dissertation with the ideal types “Conservatism” and “Liberalism” (Essaiasson et.al 2017, 142).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception of reality</th>
<th>Conservatism</th>
<th>Liberalism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Liberalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivism</td>
<td>Individualism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
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</tbody>
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Here, “authority” means the fundamental values based on experience that citizen has to subordinate to for society to work. In this, is perceived that some truths go beyond human knowledge and are “holy”, so to speak. “Collectivism” addresses the political view that the collective at the end of the day has priority over the individual need. The strategy thus has to be collective and involve entire groups. “Order” is desired because it gives a harmonic society where all humans feel that have a role to play. In liberalism, “rationality”, in contrast to authority argues that human intelligence is strong enough to critically analyze and dissect everything, even the most given of “truths”. With “individualism” as a strategy, the perception is that it is the individual who is the basis for society. The collective is only a group of individuals at heart, where the individual is more important than the group as a whole. “Freedom” means freedom from obstacles and societal construction, with the goal that everyone can be who they want to be (Demker 1993, 74-76).

The analysis scheme to construct the ideal types in this thesis is derived from Reidar Larsson's seven dimensions of political ideology. The seven dimensions are fundamental values, perceptions of humans, the most important unit in society, methods for societal change, political governance form, economic organization, and utopia. For this thesis, where the phenomenon analysed fundamentally is migration and integration policies, the goal will primarily be to analyse in accordance with the dimension fundamental values, perceptions of humans, the most important unit in society, and utopia. These aspects are chosen because as mentioned in the “Limitations” section, they touch upon subject matter such as the direct relation between domestic individuals and foreign individuals and how that relationship
should be. The other dimensions touch upon the more internal political work in a nation, which I argue makes them less relevant in a discussion about migration, which is a transnational issue present in the global arena all the time.

5.2.1 Ideal type categories

My ideal type categories, my apparatus, will be constructed on the basis of my two chosen theories, social conservatism, and cosmopolitanism.

**Summarising the social conservative ideal type**

In short, using Reidar Larsson’s dimensions, I will use the dimension *fundamental values*. Fundamental values are about which values should act as a foundation for the direction that society should take, whether there be for example economic growth or the absence of force (Larsson 2014, 23). The fundamental value of social conservatism is traditions. Traditions in society are something that should be preserved and not be controlled by outer influence. Citizens should be able to recognize their own home. When it comes to the *view of humans*, this is about how the ideologies view humans, their ability to make decisions, and how they function in groups (ibid, 25). The social conservative is generally pessimistic about human nature, arguing that humans are unfulfilled creatures that need strict norms to function. The *most important unit in society* for the social conservative is the nation. The nation shall be sovereign and be able to form its own future, without the involvement of foreign powers. With *utopia*, what is meant is the “end goal” of each ideology, how society should look in the end after the accomplishment of the ideology (ibid, 27). The social conservative outlook is that utopia is an impossible construction. Since humans are incomplete, society can not be complete either (ibid, 55-56). Given this perspective, one can draw the conclusion that “order” could act as a utopian ideal, in the sense of stability and predictability. This means an organic society with little friction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Social conservatism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fundamental values</td>
<td>Traditions</td>
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<tr>
<td>View of humans</td>
<td>Pessimistic</td>
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<tr>
<td>The most important unit in society</td>
<td>The nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utopia</td>
<td>Order</td>
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Summarising the cosmopolitan ideal type
The fundamental value of cosmopolitanism is global justice and how it can be fulfilled. The view of humans is optimistic, humans are all the same part of humankind and belong together. The most important unit is the individual, national borders are not important, but the individual and individual’s possibility to self-fulfillment. The utopia is thus a pluralist society, where everybody is free to live how they like and where we all can travel and live freely over national borders.

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<th>Cosmopolitanism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>The individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utopia</td>
<td>Pluralism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final analysis scheme thus looks like this:

Analysis scheme

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Cosmopolitanism</th>
<th>Social conservatism</th>
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</tr>
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<td>Utopia</td>
<td>Pluralism</td>
<td>Order</td>
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5.3 Method discussion

5.3.1 Epistemology and ontology

Epistemology discuss the issue of what knowledge is. The discussion can be understood as a scale, from a more positivist position to a more interpretivist position. The positivist position implies a position where social science should be observed with the same lens as natural
science. This means that social science must be value-free and that knowledge is stipulated via information that provides a basis for laws, eg the research must have very high replicability. The information gathered must be confirmed via the senses. Thus, this perspective implies a very empirical view of science. On the other end of the spectrum, there is the interpretivist position, which implies a point of view on social science as something inherently different from natural science. This perspective argues that what is important is understanding humans' social actions, rather than purely explain of the reasons behind them. In this spectrum, this thesis author takes a more interpretivist position, with a focus on the underlying essences of social actions and what they mean to the performing actor, rather than focusing on causal conjunctions.

**Ontology** is the discussion of the existence of entities. The underlying issue is whether entities should be considered objects independent from reality, which is an objectivist position, or if they should be considered creations that exist in our heads and whose meaning changes in a different setting and with different actors, which is a constructionist position. (Bryman 2016, 24, 26, 28-29). In this Master Thesis, the author will use more of a constructionist position, with the aspiration to investigate how groups, in this case, non-citizens, are shaped in contrast to the majority population via the proposals.

5.3.2 Validity and reliability of the study

**Validity** regard the question of whether a chosen indicator measures the things I wish to measure (Bryman 2016, 158). In this thesis, I wish to discuss the migration and integration policy area of the Tidö agreement and the critique of it. I argue that the validity is fulfilled through the clear connection between the aim and research questions, the theoretical framework, and the material. There are though problems with the validity of my Thesis, which has to do with the fact that I am probably not going to cover the entire discussion of the agreement since I have put an end date for gathering critical statements on the 5th of April, which could be considered too early. I have chosen this date because of the limited scope of the thesis and the limited time to write it.

**Reliability** is about consistency in the measurement of a phenomenon (Bryman 2016, 156). This is generally a sensitive discussion in qualitative social science research since that kind of research often involves the researcher and the researcher's judgment and understanding of
things. This is manifested in this thesis in the creation and usage of the analysis scheme. The scheme used is designations created by me and the demarcations of these designations are to a certain extent built on my pre-understanding and perceptions. This creates the risk of the category scheme not being used coherently. Therefore, it has to be built on a good pre-understanding in order to get the full picture.

5.3.3 Source Criticism

Discussing sources there are four common indicators usually brought up. First is authenticity, which is about whether the source is made-up or real. For this thesis, the material will mainly consist of opinions and arguments published in articles that are signed with names. From what I see, the articles used are generally published on platforms that many people have confidence in, traditional media platforms that have existed for a long time and built up credibility. I also use legal sources that are signed and stamped, as well as articles that are peer-reviewed. Reports used are also stamped with the who has produced the report. Independence is about the material that actually relates to reality. In this thesis, I use several sources that do not rely on each other that gives a similar picture of what the Tidö agreement means from their critical, cosmopolitan perspective. When it comes to the report made by the Swedish Refugee Law Center, that report continuously refers to appropriate law sections that could be checked up. Closeness in time is also a criterion. This I have handled by using many sources of material that is from the 14th of October of 2022 until the 5th of April. There is though a risk with using legal sources since these are often changed and additions are made, and so on. To make sure I write the correct things, I have multiple times checked that the legal sources I have used are the right and double-checked if my interpretation of the material has been done by other sources. Tendency I would argue is to an extent not that much of a danger to the Thesis since I actually want to see ideological arguments in the critique and use them as material for the analysis. There is though a demand on me, the author to clearly in my analysis differentiate between what is fact and what are opinions (Essaiasson et al 2017, 291-292, 294-295).

5.3.4 Alternative Methods

One alternative method that could have been used is argumentation analysis. Argumentation analysis is about systematically describing the argument that is being used in a debate regarding a topic. This is often done with the purpose to determine the sustainability of the
arguments using a deconstructive approach. It could also be used to declare similarities and differences in arguments. In the argumentation analysis, the thesis, arguments, and counter-arguments are usually separated in a spreadsheet, marked with T, A, and C. A problem with this method is though that there is a risk that the analysis becomes unwieldy and difficult to oversee (Beckman 2005, 38-41). I would also argue that the method could become somewhat mechanical. In this Master Thesis, where I have reflected on different approaches, this was also my conclusion, that using argumentation analysis could lead to much focus would be spent on shape, at the expense of fruitful thesis content. Therefore, I decided not to go forward with this method. Another method that could have been used is content analysis. Content analysis is usually used quantitatively, where a researcher counts words in a large material in order to get the frequency of certain phrases or words. With this, one can define differences and similarities, as well as changes over time. Historically, mass media material has been the main source material when using content analysis. In the content analysis, the quantitative part must though be made useful, which requires reasoning by me. The content analysis could be summarised in the way that it says a little about a lot (of many units of analysis), while idea analysis says much about little (few analysis units) (Beckman 2005, 42-45). For this thesis, I drew the conclusion that the number of units of analysis used was not really enough and too dispersible to make into a content analysis.
6. Analysis of the migration and integration policies of the Tidö Agreement and the critique against it

In this section, I will analyse what changes that will occur in migration and integration policies in relation to current policies, using sources such as reports, web pages, and legal text. I will also analyse the agreement and the critique against using the ideal types of social conservatism and cosmopolitanism. I will integrate the stated opinions of NGOs and other actors, as well as include an international perspective by showing examples of how it looks in order Nordic countries and other EU countries where these proposals are already policy. The chronology of this analysis will be the same as in the written agreement. For example “strengthening inner border controls” is the first proposal in the agreement, and “an increase in the use of biometrics in Alien Law” is the second.

6.1 Strengthening inner border controls

The Police Authority shall do more controls in areas which it is assessed to have an effect on irregular migration and crime over borders, as well as change the law in order to make it possible to make id-controls on trains and buses or other vehicles that go from and til Sweden from another state. Other proposals for more efficient border controls and monitoring as stipulated in SOU 2021:92 shall also be put forward (Tidöavtalet 2022, 31).

Critics have argued that the proposal labels terrorists and irregular migrants the same. They have also argued that the proposals in SOU 2021:92, which gives the mandate to visit some on the grounds of a general presumption, create the risk of discrimination and race profiling (Asylrättscentrum 2023, 7-8). Also, Civil Rights Defenders have criticised the proposal, arguing that the proposal equates migration with criminality and thus leads to the denigration of migrants (Civil Rights Defenders 2022, 4).

The critique of this proposal is founded on the idea that it shows a pessimism in its view of humans. With the goal to lessen the number of irregular migrants and terrorists, the proposal can be classified as having the national perspective over the individual perspective. The
nation’s security is the overall most important value and the individual need is considered something very secondarily.

6.2 An increase in the use of biometrics in Alien Law

A government investigation is supposed to be done in order to investigate how to increase the gathering of biometric data when it comes to applicants for residence permits. The prescription time for ignoring a decision of deportation or rejection is going to be prolonged or removed. The time before it is possible for an asylum seeker to yet again apply for asylum after a rejection is to be prolonged. Travel bans are also to be increased in time (Tidöavtalet 2022, 31-32). Criticism has been raised towards this proposal on the basis that it is an infringement of personal integrity to use biometrical data to this extent (Civil Rights Defender 2022, 5). This is something that has also been lifted by the Swedish Refugee Law Center in their evaluation (Asylrättscentrum 2022, 10).

In the case of removing the prescription time for rejection and deportation, this was addressed in an article written by legal scholar Caroline Taube in the journal Svensk Juristtidskrift in 2021, where Norwegian and Swedish Alien Law is compared. Taube shows that Norway, in contrast to Sweden which has a prescription period of four years, does not have a prescription period. The police in Norway, therefore, have the mandate to deport an individual with a rejection or deportation decision regardless of how much time has passed, because a decision is considered a decision although time has passed. The critique against this part of the proposal has been that it is an unreasonable infringement of the right to seek asylum and that individuals should have the right to seek asylum since the circumstances could have changed until a new application (Civil Rights Defenders 2022, 6). The proposal has been criticised for making it very difficult for individuals who cannot return to their home countries to legalize their residence in Sweden and thus increase the “shadow society” - the grey part of society where aliens with no residence permit live, with risk for increased exploitation and mental health problems. As mentioned above, today's rules stipulate that a decision to deport someone is barred four years after the decision has turned into legal force. When the decision is prescribed, it is possible to apply for a residence permit again. Many decisions today are barred because the countries that these individuals shall return to do not accept them (Asylrättscentrum 2022, 11-12). The critique could be summarised as being for that the individual's situation should be put in first hand, which is a perspective in opposition since I
would argue that there is a focus on the nation in the form of the nation’s safety. The individuals and the individual’s integrity are to be put in second place and instead, individuals are to be put under state control and sent out if discovered.

6.3 Intensified work on finding and reporting illegal aliens

A number of articles question a proposal in the agreement stating that: “Municipalities and regions are to be obliged to inform the Swedish Migration Agency and the Swedish Police Authority when they come in contact with individuals in Sweden without permission/…/ There might be situations where a report could violate tender values, for example in health care. Exemption from the reporting duty must therefore be investigated2”. This is part of an overall investment in making sure that individual that resides in the country illegally is deported. The possibility to use DNA-test in conjunction with inner border controls as well as giving the Police the right to deprive liberty of individuals that cannot prove their residence is also to be investigated, as well as enforcing possibilities to do body visitation and confiscate digital media (Tidöavtalet 2022, 33). The overarching issue that one could argue legitimize this proposal is that there are a lot of individuals residing in Sweden illegally. The Swedish Minister of Migration, Maria Malmer Stenergaard has lifted that the number could be over 100 000 individuals, a number whose credibility is affected by uncertainties (2022/23:128 Antalet papperslösa i Sverige). With illegal residents, there is a risk of various criminal actions being taken in what is called the shadow society by people that goes under the radar.

This proposal is controversial and the especially the idea of a “reporting duty” met a lot of objections from critics, arguing that it forces the individual welfare worker to decisions that they should not be forced to take, because of the ethical stress connected to it. In an opinion article, signed by 4000 health care workers, a critique is expressed: “To be forced to name patients without residence permits that are looking for health care implies ethical stress and goes against the demand for equal care on the same conditions for the entire population stipulated in the Health and Medical Care Act3” (Hillerberg et.al, 2022). In the ethical stress, one can see the stress lies in that the welfare worker has to treat the refugee in a different way than the citizen. This goes against the general value of health care providing in general in

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2 Original quote: Kommuner och myndigheter ska vara skyldiga att informera Migrationsverket och Polismyndigheten när de kommer i kontakt med personer som vistas i Sverige utan tillstånd/…/Det kan finnas situationer där en anmälan skulle strida mot ömmande värden, till exempel i sjukvården. Undantag från informationsplikten behöver därför utredas närmare.

3 Original quote: Att tvingas ange patienter utan uppehållstillstånd som söker vård innebär en etisk stress och går emot hälso- och sjukvårdslagen om jämlik vård på lika villkor för hela befolkningen.
Swedish legislation, as the first paragraph in the third chapter of the Health and Medical Care Act stipulates that the aim with health and medical care is good health and care on the same conditions for the entire population. /…/ The one with the most need of health and medical care is supposed to be given precedence to care⁴.” (SFS 2017: 30, 3 chap. 1 §). This is a very cosmopolitan ankle on health care, which clearly is going to crash with a more nationalist ambition, where healthcare is considered something exclusive for the national citizen.

The Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO), has also expressed criticism towards the proposal, arguing that trust problems will grow, that children would not go to school and that the most vulnerable would be affected (Arrius et al, 2023). Here there is an argument that also implies the need for inclusion, to avoid the problems addressed in the proposal actually will be growing instead of shrinking. A general aversion towards authorities would grow, making it even more difficult to find individuals that reside in Sweden unregistered. Save the Children International has also criticized this proposal, arguing it will make fewer children go to school because of the risk of being deported (Rädda Barnen 2022, 7). It should though be repeated that in the proposal there is a clause regarding special circumstances that are addressed, which is also something that Health Care Minister Acko Ankarberg has stated in her answers regarding this issue (Arnell-Szurkos, 2023). Even though such a clause exists, it could be argued that false rumors could spread making children not go to schools or do hospital visits (Asylrättscentrum 2023, 16). Since January 2020, the Convention of the Rights of the Child is written into Swedish Law (Skolverket, 2023) and article 28 of the convention states that all children have the right to education (UNICEF, 2023. To conclude, a reporting duty without room for clear exceptions seems to face major legislative obstacles. The critique is generally grounded on the view that individuals should be considered the most important units in society and that their possibilities for a better life should be considered something desirable.

The proposition draws more towards the nation than the individual, because it puts the overall will to deport illegal aliens over the individuals' will to stay in Sweden and their situation. Also, the proposal enshrines more order than pluralism, because the proposal states that it is more important that the state keeps track of which individuals reside in the nation, instead of welcoming a society with more individuals with backgrounds in other nations.

⁴*Original quote:* Målet med hälso- och sjukvården är en god hälsa och en vård på lika villkor för hela befolkningen./…/Den som har det största behovet av hälso- och sjukvård ska ges företräde till vården.
6.4 Collected responsibility and intensified work for returning operations

Relevant authorities (Swedish Migration Agency, the Police Authority, the Tax Authority and the Swedish Prison and Probation Service) are given the mission to work more together in order to increase returns. Increased security measures are to be taken by Swedish Migration Agency to make their custody places more secure. Individuals who have been rejected are to be subject to a residence obligation (Tidöavtalet 2022, 33). The critique against the proposal has mentioned that residence obligation might mean infringements in relation to individuals' right to privacy and right to freedom of movement and that individuals will be detained without them being deported anyway (Asylrättscentrum 2023, 17). The infringement has been considered unproportional (Civil Rights Defenders 2022, 5). A report made by the Red Cross in 2022 points to the consequences of detention with increased risks for increased feelings of hopelessness and apathy (Piquer and Rusch, 2022, 34). The critique here rests on an optimist perception of humans, that they should not be detained but instead given the confidence to move freely. The focus on increased security I would argue shows a focus on the nation and the nation’s security.

6.5 The overall aim is to lessen asylum-related migration in accordance with the EU minimum legislation

That migration has to lessen has been a fundamental entrance value in the work with this agreement. As mentioned in the background, the overarching proposal is that asylum legislation should be adapted after the judicial minimum level in accordance with EU Law. The asylum seeker is supposed to take more responsibility for the asylum application process, and the legal help given by Sweden shall be taken down to the minimum allowed. Relative immigration and family unification should only be allowed for the most narrow family circle. Permanent residence permits are to be taken out of use and an investigation shall look over the possibility of turning current permanent residence permits into temporary such. (Tidöavtalet 2022, 34). Jimmie Åkesson, the leader of the Sweden Democrats has talked about a paradigm shift in the migration policy area, which he for a long time has argued for the necessity of this. The Sweden Democrats also released a report before the election called Lägst invandring i Europa EU (Sverigedemokraterna, 2022), where they compared Swedish law with the EU migration law to find areas where Sweden's legislation is more extensive.
than what EU directives demand. In the report, there are for example proposals to statute the asylum-seekers obligation to prove that they are in need of protection, which according to the SD interpretation has not been the case earlier in Swedish migration law. This was not implemented because when the Asylum Qualification Directive was put forward in 2011, the then-ruling government considered the demands already fulfilled (Sverigedemokraterna 2022, 4). Another proposal in the report concerns the eighth article in Receptions Conditions Directive, which gives the possibility to keep individuals in detention for a time, for example, because the asylum-seekers identity has to be verified. This is not used to the maximum in the Swedish legislation, which gives asylum-seekers much more freedom of movement and must therefore be sharpened, according to SD (Sverigedemokraterna 2022, 13).

The Sweden Democrats have as earlier stated argued for a long time that migration to Sweden has to lessen, and earlier stated that it should lessen by 95% (Eriksson, 2015). The party has specifically attacked Islam as a problem in Swedish society and in 2009 the Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet published an opinion article by Jimmie Åkesson with the headline “The Muslims are our biggest foreign threat” where Åkesson states that the individuals in power are completely blind for the problems with Islamization (Åkesson, 2009). As mentioned, the party was founded in the late 1980s by Nazi and racist individuals that wanted a Sweden without immigrants. This can be connected to the idea of Roger Scruton. In the article by Åkesson, he mentions the concept of “oikophobia” which is a concept created by Scruton, meaning a phobia for your home (Åkesson, 2009). Scruton has as earlier mentioned shown a huge skepticism against migration and the integration of newcomers into a nation, which is a skepticism that can be mirrored in the Sweden Democrats. The party with time has polished and written about immigration in the following way in their party manifesto from 2019: “The Sweden Democrats does not oppose immigration, but argues that immigration must be held on such a level and be of such character that it does not consist a threat to our national identity or our country’s welfare and safety” (Sverigedemokraterna 2019, 14).

In the constellation constructing the agreement, there has been an ideological disagreement on this point between the Sweden Democrats and the other more refugee-friendly Liberal Party. The Liberal Party has written in their party program that: “As a liberal party, we strive

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5 Original quote: Sverigedemokraterna motsätter sig inte invandring, men menar att invandringen måste hållas på en sådan nivå och vara av en sådan karaktär att den inte utgör ett hot mot vår nationella identitet eller mot vårt lands välstånd och trygghet.
to stepwise implement the long-term of a world where humans can move freely without political obstacles and where everyone can decide for themselves where he or she can seek protection, and live and work⁶ (Liberalerna 2021, 21). This writing clearly signals a cosmopolitan worldview, where borders should not matter to the individual. There is, in other words, so that it is a conflict in the ruling majority when it comes to values regarding migration and the distribution of refugees. In the speech presenting the direction of the elected government policies, Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson stated this about immigration:

“The immigration to Sweden has been unsustainable. The result has been a dangerous alienation among many foreign-born, but also among children and adolescents born in Sweden. The integration problems nowadays affect the entire society in the form of housing segregation, health-related problem, and poor school results; Criminality and the vulnerability for criminality, honor oppression, and violations of adolescent rights. There has never been a clear vision of how many individuals should be allowed to enter and under which conditions. Not either which rules that are demanded to integrate individuals into the community when they come from communities with totally different norms, laws, and cultures”⁷ (Regeringen 2022, 7).

If one summarizes the statement, it is a statement arguing that immigration has been too big to handle and that it has given an effect on all aspects of society. The difference between the majority population and the arrivals is also emphasized, which means that for the government, the need for immigration restrictions is not only based on financial grounds but also on social and cultural. Sweden has in other words all the dimensions reach its limit.

Critics against this announced direction argue that it is a bad direction because it makes life more difficult through the limiting of rights for an already vulnerable group. Also removing the possibility of a permanent residence permit will mean that more resources have to be spent on testing the right to residence. Given the fact that the Swedish Migration Agency approves 94% of the pro-longing applications, this has been considered an overly bureaucratic solution. It has also been considered leading to legal uncertainty given the fact that if permanent residence permits are converted to temporary, it will be unsure if earlier beneficial juridical decisions regarding permanent residence permits will apply, with could mean conflict with current legislation and tradition in Administration Law. Together with increased demands on citizenship, the road to living in Sweden temporarily becomes longer. The ambition to restrict giving out residence permit on a humanitarian protection ground may also strike against children (Asylrättscentrum 2022, 19-22). Civil Rights Defenders have argued that the proposal to remove permanent residence permits will increase mental

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⁶ Original quote: Som liberaler strävar vi efter att stegvis förverkliga det långsiktiga målet om en värld där människor kan röra sig fritt utan politiska hinder och där var och en själv kan bestämma var han eller hon ska söka skydd, bo och arbeta.

⁷ Original quote: Invandringen till Sverige har varit ohärlig. Resultatet har blivit ett farligt utanförsäkra bland många utrikes födda, men också bland barn och ungdomar födda här i Sverige. Integrationsproblemen påverkar numera hela samhället i form av bostadssegregation och trångboddelighet, arbetslöshet och bidragsberöende, hälsoproblem och dåliga skolresultat; brottslighet och utsättet för brottslighet; hedersförtryck, otrygghet och kränkningar av ungdomars rättigheter. Det har aldrig funnits en genomtänkt syn på hur många som kan komma, och på vilka villkor. Inte heller på vilka spelregler som krävs för att integrera människor in i gemenskapen, när de kommer från länder med helt andra lagar, regler och kulturer.
unhealth, especially among children (Civil Rights Defenders 2022, 6).

The individuals against the proposal argue that it strikes against individuals and their welfare and in the prolong against global justice overall, since Sweden will take in as few refugees as possible. The overall ambition is clearly putting order and nation, in the form of national norms and laws over ideas of global justice and individual need. A disassociation between the majority population and its minorities is underlined, in the veins of Scruton and his anti-immigration stance.

6.6 Reinforce registering of EES-citizens

EES-citizens are to be registered after three months of duration (Tidöavtalet 2022, 35). According to Article 8.1 in the directive, 2004/38/EC, a citizen of the European Union shall have the right to reside in a member state for up to three months without any conditionalities and demands other than holding an ID card and a passport. After three months passed, a Member State may enforce registration in accordance with Article 8.1. This registration requirement was taken away by the ruling 2010-2014 government because it was considered unnecessary given that a residence would be granted legal residence anyway if certain requirements were met, for example, that the citizen is studying or working in accordance with 5. Chapter § 3. a in the Swedish Alien Act (prop. 2013/14:81, 16). Now the plan though is to reinforce it. In an earlier draft of a parliamentary decision, a Sweden Democrat MP argued that the removal of registration has made it more difficult to control if individuals have the right to reside in Sweden and that the amount of individuals that are not self-sufficient has increased (motion. 2021/22:302, 1-2).

Looking at this proposal using the categories of social conservatism and cosmopolitanism, this proposal seems to be a proposal that draws to the nation over the individual, since the act is done in order to make the nation feel safer. The individual is instead to be subject to more control.

6.7 Resettlement (Quota refugees)

In the agreement, there is a proposal on limiting the number of quota refugees to 900 individuals a year (Tidöavtalet 2022, 35). As mentioned before, this is a substantial reduction, given the fact that Sweden took in 6401 quota refugees in 2021. It should be said that the
yearly goal was 5000, but 1400 could not make it to Sweden in 2020, thus they had to be sent the year after (Migrationsverket, 2022). A part of the proposal is that Sweden should put forward demands to the UNCHR to receive more influence over the selection process: “The selection shall be done based on the criterias that it gives a wellfounded prognosis for good integration in Swedish society and in relation to Swedish values. Within this framework, women and girls, as well as vulnerable groups such as LGBT individuals, shall be prioritized”\(^1\). The resettlement refugees are to be distributed with respect to the municipality's individual “integration capacity” (Tidöavtalet 2022, 35). This is also an area of conflict for the Tidö parties. The Liberal Party still argues on its website that the number of quota refugees should increase (1aLiberalerna, 2022). The Christian Democrats have also expressed disagreement with SD and the Moderate Party on this issue. This is because they consider that shrinking the number of quota refugees would strike against those who have it the most difficult (Larsson/TT, 2021). The proposal has also met criticism, one example being representatives from the organization Religious Social Democrats of Sweden (Socialdemokrater för Tro och Solidaritet), arguing that the quota refugees are very vulnerable and the government’s decisions to take in fewer quota refugees is horrible and that taking in the refugees for resettlement is a small cost (Kukka-Salam and Eneroth, 2023). The idea to include the integration criteria has also been criticised, for putting the focus on the possibility of integration rather than vulnerability (Asylrättscentrum 2023, 23). Compared to other countries in the Nordic, Finland will take in 1050 quota refugees in 2023 (Maahanmuutovirasto, 2023). In 2021, Denmark took 200 refugees for resettlement, Iceland 100, and Norway 3000 (Valtioneuvostio, 2021). In a Nordic context, Sweden, therefore, put itself lower with this goal, albeit not the lowest. Historically, Sweden has also been involved in the resettlement of refugees, starting to participate in the UNHCR program in 1950, whereas Denmark started in 1979, Norway in the 1980s, Finland in 1985, and Iceland in 1995 (1aUNHCR, 2023).

The criticism can be categorized as putting global justice aside. 4100 fewer individuals will be able to come through the system for resettlement, which will have an effect on the collected global justice in the world, as well as for the sole individuals who will not get the chance. The proposal is putting the nation ahead of the individual as a unit, in the sense that it is primarily in Sweden's interest, manifested in the formulation about the importance that the

\(^1\) Original quote: Utvalet ska utgå från kriterier som ger en välgrundad prognos för god integration i det svenska samhället och i förhållande till svenska värderingar. Inom den ramen ska kvinnor och flickor samt utsatta grupper som HBTQ-personer prioriteras.
chosen migrant has a good possibility to integrate into Swedish society. At the same time, the proposal show a slight turn towards pluralism within the framework, in the sense that vulnerable groups such as LGBT individuals should be prioritized. It is also that it is not mandatory to do resettlement, but that is something that certain countries with an agreement with the UN do. Sweden has historically also taken a large responsibility when it comes to the resettlement of refugees. In practice, the proposal could have been to take in zero refugees for resettlement, which is something that the Sweden Democrats have advocated for (Larsson/TT). One could therefore argue that since it is voluntary and Sweden will accept 900 individuals a year, global justice is conducted, although not to the same extent as before. The overall conclusion is though that this proposal shows a nation-centered view with a focus on restrictions and a will to lessen migration to Sweden and put the nation over the individual in the sense that the nation will have to spend less of its resources in this aspect.

6.8 Sharpen conditions for labour immigration

The rules for immigration via labour are to be tightened. Labour immigration shall only be motivated when the immigrant is expected to make enough money in accordance with the Swedish median wage. Workers within certain occupational groups, such as personal assistants, shall not be allowed to labour immigrate. Researchers and Ph.D. students are to be sorted under special regulations. More work is to be done in order to discover exploitation and rule misconduct, via for example increased cooperation between authorities (Tidöavtalet 2022, 35-36).

In 2008, Sweden changed in labour immigration law from being one of the most restrictive in the EU to be one of the most liberal. Employers were given pretty much the full possibility to recruit anyone they wanted (OECD 2011, 32). Labour immigrants are as of today demanded to make 13 000 SEK before tax (Migrationsverket, 2023). Several representatives for employers' organizations as expressed criticism against the proposal, arguing that it will make it more difficult for Swedish companies to find the right competencies (Bengtsson, 2023). The Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) has criticized the proposal for being too complicated and argues instead that the rules should be that labour immigration should be based on a model that takes the needs of the labour market into consideration (LO, 2023). LOs proposed model means that if they are individuals in Sweden already capable of doing the work that a company needs, the labour immigrant should be denied. This model has been
criticised for being time-consuming and that it would make fewer labour immigrants want to come to Sweden (Hernandez, 2022). Also, a Swedish government report, SOU, pointed out that an income floor will not be effective in counteracting exploitation. The proposal is also built on an assumption that low-waged personnel should be rejected and somewhat high-waged personnel welcomed, given that the wage floor is supposed to be raised (Asylrättscentrum 2023, 25). This is signaling a more optimistic view of some people and a more pessimistic of others. The proposal also draws more to a more pessimistic than optimistic view of humans since its inherent meaning is that labour immigrant must be put under more control in order so that they do not commit crimes when they wish to come to Sweden and work.

6.9 An overview of asylum application testing from safe countries

An overview of the current framework with the aim to enable those countries that are considered partly safe to be categorized as safe is to be done. The list of countries considered safe shall maybe be transferred from the Swedish Migration Agency to the Government Office (Regeringskansliet) (Tidöavtalet, 36-37). This would mean that more individuals would be deported from Sweden since the definition of what is a safe country will be extended. The proposal has been criticised partly for it might be the Asylum Procedure Directive, as well as the risk of “politicisation” of the list when the Government Office is to be made responsible for the list of safe countries. It has also been criticized for increasing the risk of breaking the non-refoulement rule and sending people back to dangerous situations. (Asylrättscentrum 2023, 27-28).

The critique argues that this proposal is putting global justice and the individual on the side since it makes more countries considered safe, thus restricting the number of countries that one can come from and get a residence permit. One could conclude, that although there could be parts of a country that is for example protected from conflict, it does not make a country a generally safe country to live in.
6.10 The usage of transit centers

The possibility to introduce transit centers that shall be used during the entire asylum-seeking process shall be examined, in accordance with Article 43(1) in the Asylum Procedure Directive, which gives the member states the right to construct such. The thought is that the entire asylum-seeking process shall take place in transit centers. The idea of the proposal is to make sure that asylum-seekers do not vanish during the process. It shall be investigated how to shrink the number of asylum-seekers that go underground (Tidöavtalet 2022, 37). Before asylum-seekers had the possibility to reside wherever they want during the process, for example with relatives. Since 2020 no financial aid is given to individuals who choose to reside in socially vulnerable areas (Pelling 2023, 9). The Swedish Refugee Law Center has criticized the proposal, arguing vulnerable groups must have access to separate living and that asylum-seekers need health care and schools (Asylrättscentrum 2023, 29). It has also been argued that it will mean an infringement of the freedom of movement and create worse conditions for reception (Civil Rights Defenders 2022, 6-7). The vision to restrict asylum-seekers movement could also be in conflict with Article 7.1 in the Reception Directive (2013/33/EU), which is stipulating that the asylum-seekers should move freely within a designated area in their host nation, where they must be able to obtain all benefits constituted in the directive and that there should be no effect on “the unalienable sphere of private life”. The individuals applying for protection cannot be detected, that would violate Article 8 (1) which explicitly states that detention cannot be used only because an individual seeks protection. An example of a country that uses transit zones is Germany. When there is an entrance by air (no legislation exists for entry by land), the applicant remains in the transit area during the procedure and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) conducts a personal interview in accordance with the applicant's right, which is outlined in Article 14 in Asylum Procedure Directive (2013/32/EU). It shall be decided within two days whether the applicant can enter Germany and follow regular procedures. If rejected, the applicant might appeal. If no decision is made after that within 14 days, the applicant may enter German territory (European Asylum and Support Office 2020, 28-29).

Looking at the scheme, this proposal touches on two dimensions in the scheme, which are the “view of humans” and “the most important unit in society”. The view of humans signaled in this proposal I would argue in line with the critique is pessimistic, because humans are not given the trust to move more freely in society, but must be kept somewhat in closed areas,
otherwise the assumption is that they will run away. When it comes to the dimension “the most important unit in society”, an argument could be made that the nation is given superiority over the individual, in the sense that it is the safety of the nation that is addressed, in that these individuals must be under control even though one does not know if the individuals are dangerous or not.

6.11 Expelling a foreign citizen because of a deficient way of living ("bristande vandel")

An government investigation will be put in place in order to find out how to reinforce the possibility to expel foreigners because of a deficient way of living. It can be of several different characteristics, such as drug abuse, association with criminals, participating in an extremist organisation, prostitution, or participating in organisations with values threatening Swedish values (Tidöavtalet 2022, 37). This proposal has received a lot of critique, among others the NGO Civil Rights Defender, who argues that through this measure it will be possible to deport foreigners that have not committed a crime and that is a violation of human rights norms about the right to freedom of expression. They also argue that what constitutes Swedish values is arbitrary and in that sense, the proposal lacks legal certainty (Civil Rights Defenders 2022, 7). Also Swedish Refugee Law Center argues that the “vandel” definition is very wide and also points out that disabled individuals, as well as individuals with mental illness, must be addressed in the preparatory work on the legislation. They also point out that Sweden has signed the European Council convention on fighting human trafficking, making the deportation of prostitutes difficult. Also here, Article 8 in the ECHR on the right to family life is referred to, stipulating that to deport an individual, the action must be proportional to the individual’s deed (Asylrättscentrum 2023, 30-31). The SD leader Jimmie Åkesson has stated that the goal of the proposal is to create possibilities to deport individuals without doing a crime, to “simply get rid of people that should not be here” (Davidsson/TT, 2022). In an earlier version of the Alien Act from 1989 (Utlänningslagen 1989:526) there was a paragraph (Chapter 2. § 11.2) stating that an individual could lose their residence permit because of bad living. Alcohol and drug abuse was though not considered such reasons (Wikren & Sandsjö 1995, see Pelling 2023, 38). As of today, such a clause exists in order to receive a permanent residence permit. It is stated in the Alien Act Chapter 5. § 7.2 that a permanent residence permit is only to be given if there are no doubts regarding the foreigner’s

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9 Original quote: att helt enkelt kunna göra sig av med människor som inte ska vara här.
way of living. A permanent residence permit shall be refused if the foreigner has done a crime in Sweden with a temporary residence permit and can be expected to do so in the future. How severe the crimes have to be is not exactly stipulated, but The Swedish Migration Court of Appeal has found for example that an issued assault conviction five and a half years before is a reason for not giving a permanent residence permit (Migrationsverket 2021, 19-20). For asylum-seekers, there must be a very severe crime as grounds for refusal of temporary residence permits as stipulated in Chapter 5. § 1.1-2. The grounds for deportation out of Sweden will therefore, if implemented as in the agreement, be very much expanded.

In this proposal, we see a tendency towards partly the nation as a concept, in the sense that it is “Swedish values” that are supposed to be protected from foreign individuals. Some values are therefore considered to be extensions of the nation and frames that have to be followed. There is also clearly a focus on order overall, where not only criminal deeds but also a problematic lifestyle such as drug abuse should lead to deportation, thus creating a marginal towards what is acceptable behavior in Swedish society. The critique is arguing that this is to put order above the individual's right, not as a citizen, but as a human. The emphasis on Swedish values could also be a way of lessening pluralism in society and creating more streamlining.

6.12 The asylum-seekers responsibility for the expenses of asylum reception

An government investigation is supposed to find out the advantages and disadvantages of letting the asylum-seeker pay for more of the cost in the form of a given fee for the reception and what EU stipulates in the area (Tidöavtale 2022, 38). This is a point that is not very developed, but it is interesting in the sense that it in accordance with Goodman's article, shows an approach where the newcomer is not necessarily seen as someone that will automatically contribute to society, but will instead have to pay for the privilege of coming to Sweden. This could make fewer people seek themselves in Sweden as a result of the higher cost of coming to the country as a refugee. The EU Reception Directive (2013/33/EU) gives the Member States the right to condition welfare in order with Article 17.3 which stipulates that the asylum-seeker must show that they do not have any assets before they acquire material support. 17.4 gives the Member States the right to demand that the asylum-seeker pay expenses connected to the reception. Opponents of the proposal argue that it might lead
to individuals living in Sweden for many years without the right to fundamental welfare benefits. The Swedish Refugee Law Center has also argued that the proposal could violate the directives since it is already implemented and refers to the Swedish Migration Agency, which state on their website that asylum-seeker should only receive financial aid if they do not have a job or other assets. They also here point to the vulnerability of refugees (Asylrättscenrum 2023, 31-32). The European Union Agency for Asylum has reported that no country in the EU uses fees for first-time asylum applications. Greece though uses fees for subsequent applications (European Asylum and Support Office, 2021).

Using the analysis scheme, critics can argue that this proposal manifests a will to maintain order in the sense that it signals that the taxpayers should not pay for the asylum-seekers, but instead, it should be done by themselves. It could be argued for being excluding to refugees, which in general are a financially vulnerable group, thus neglecting individuals and their needs.

6.13 Stricter requirements for citizenship

A clear goal in the agreement is to increase the demands for becoming a citizen in Sweden. Investigation areas are the following: The individual shall have Sweden as a residence place for a longer time than today, at least eight years. Stricter knowledge and language test are also to be applied, as well as controls of all criminal deeds in the EU. Increased demands on self-sufficiency and the implementation of a loyalty oath, or other ceremonies of a mandatory character. It is also supposed to be investigated how to make individuals with double citizenship lose their Swedish if they do criminal acts of system-threatening character (Tidöavtalet 2022, 38-39). Today the following criterion applies if you applying for citizenship as an adult are the following (1aMigrationsverket, 2023):

- The individual shall have turned 18 years old
- Be able to verify their identity
- Lived in Sweden for five coherent years
- Have a permanent residence permit (other rules applies for EU or British citizens).
- Different records from different authorities are collected to show whether the individual has debts, has been convicted, or if there is a suspicion of a crime. Records from the security police are also collected. If the individual is convicted of a crime,
the individual can still become a citizen but have to wait a certain extra period of time. The amount of time depends on the severity of the crime.

Connecting to the idea of civic integration, one can see a tendency in these proposals to make citizenship something that is deserved and not something that enables integration. In Goodman’s article, she also compares Sweden to other nations in the EU, taking into account different methods for making the citizen more integrated, such as different tests regarding integration and language for settlement. Comparing the years 1997 and 2009, Sweden stood out quite much, not having any demands in 1997 or 2009 for settlement and further no demands for citizenship such as a ceremony or oral oath, differentiating themselves from example Germany and Denmark. In the Netherlands, the bar is also high with already before entering the country, and Human Rights Watch in 2008 condemned the Netherlands for using integration tests as a means of discrimination. Of the fifteen countries mentioned, Sweden is the only country receiving a 0.0 CIVIX score in 2009 (Goodman, 2010). A language and society orientation test is since before on the agenda since 2019 and was initiated by the Social Democrat and Green government in the government official report Krav på kunskaper i svenska och samhällskunskap för svenskt medborgarskap (SOU 2021:2). Also in this report, the Swedish differences compared to the other Nordic countries is underlined, which have increased over the years. 2018, only Sweden, Ireland, and San Marino were among the states in Europe not to use language tests as a part of the integration process. In Sweden, applying for citizenship cost 1500 SEK (1aMigrationsverket, 2022). In Denmark, the individual applying must have lived in Denmark for seven years (Öresund Direkt, 2023), show an “honest” way of living, and be self-sufficient. Denmark has a language test, requiring skills on GERS level B1 at least, which could be regarded as rather high. Over 80 % of the individuals taking the test passed it. More difficult it is with the Danish orientation test, where 64 % passed and where only 27% of refugee background passed, while 80 % of EU background passed. To apply for citizenship costs 3800 DKK (around 5600 SEK) (SOU 2021:2, 112-115). In Finland, the individual must have lived in Finland for five years and show language ability on the B1 level, be unpunished, and don’t have tax debts or other debts to the state. The language test does not have to be done if the applicant came to Finland after the age of 65 or has health problems hindering the completion of a test. Citizenship costs at least 420 € (around 4600 SEK) (SOU 2021:2, 118-119). In Norway, one should have resided for seven years and taken part in language education (300 hours) or shown enough knowledge in Norwegian or Sami as well as speech on the A2 level. Knowledge in
Norwegian society is also a criterion (SOU 2021:2, 127-128). The Swedish Refugee Law Center has argued that it makes it more difficult to become a citizen and to discriminate of primarily elders and women and that it should be exceptions, for example for disabled individuals to fulfill commitments towards the UN Convention on individuals with a disability (Asylrättscentrum 2023, 32-33). They argue therefore that the future Swedish legislation should remind of the Finnish legislation, thus being more inclusive.

Looking at the analysis scheme, it is several dimensions that are touched upon in this part of the agreement. In the utopian dimension, this proposal leans towards “order”, in the sense that it creates a stricter frame for being a part of society, even though it could mean less “pluralism”. The “view on humans” critics could consider to be pessimistic, given the fact that the proposal rest on the idea that only a certain type of individual can be a citizen in the nation of Sweden, and exclusion will be more common. On the other hand, a language and society knowledge test does not make Sweden controversial from a European and Nordic viewpoint, which can make it seem less problematic. The overall direction with for example longer residence time, of at least eight years, which is longer than in Finland, Norway, and Denmark, and the demand for loyalty manifested in an oath shows something more exceptional. There is a focus on order over pluralism and adaption to the nation over the individual's right to become a Swedish citizen.

6.14 Suspend residence permits in more cases

The Swedish Migration Agency is supposed to be given the mission to make the suspension of residence permits a priority issue. A government investigation shall address extended possibilities to make more controls to make sure that individual who no longer has a reason for their residence permits are supposed to lose them. The causes for residence permits are also to be more restrictive. For example, individuals who have received asylum for a conflict that later ends, should not keep their residence permit (Tidöavtalet, 39). This proposal has been constructed in order to make sure that individuals with resident permit really have the right to be here. In the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1. C (5) it is stipulated that individuals recognized as refugees shall not be considered refugees if “the circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist” (UNHCR, 1951). This is also stipulated in the Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU), where also individuals with alternative/subsidiary protection needs are processed, in Article
19. An argument that speaks against the proposition is that the Swedish Migration Agency passed 94% of the prolonging application in asylum-seeking errands. Putting in even more resources to deal with the follow-up of these errands could be considered unnecessary and a waste of time and energy. Important is also mentioned before to respect the *non-refoulment* principle (Asylrättscentrum 2023, 34-35). As earlier mentioned, the proposed policies are directed towards making the residence permit more temporary and difficult to receive and upheld, which could create a more uncertain and stressful living situation.

Critics would argue that this proposal is putting a more pessimistic view of humans over a more optimistic one since the criteria for being considered a desirable individual in the country becomes more restricted. Also, the individual has put over the nation in the sense that it is the overall migration goal that matters and not the individual’s wish to reside in the country. It could be argued that this proposal, if not advocates, at least is not in conflict with an ideal of global justice, in the sense that it follows the global mechanism of the Geneva Convention. On the other hand, the Geneva Convention could also be thought of as the bare minimum, and rather a starting point for more things to do.

6.15 Enforced controls of “way of living” (“vandel”) in foreigners' errands

There is a proposal to put forward an investigation with the aim to find out how demands on a sufficient way of living can be increased and more controls are to be done (Tidöavtalet, 35). The Swedish Refugee Law Center argues in their evaluation that integrity-sensitive information might be risked in this. This is a proposal that aims to strengthen tradition and nation via increased control over the individual and the individual’s character, thus making sure that only somewhat “desirable” individuals residing in the country.

6.16 Restrictions of relative immigration

In the agreement it is stipulated that the right to family reunification and relative immigration to individuals with residence permits shall not be allowed to a more extensive circle than what is permitted by EU Law (Tidöavtalet, 35-36). The demand on sufficiency for someone taking in someone via relative immigration is also supposed to be strict with as few exceptions from the rule as possible. Family as a legal concept is to be made as narrow as
possible, even though it shall continue to include non-normative families, such as same-sex couples. No relative migrant shall be risking poverty at their entrance and it shall be possible to use DNA-test to declare family relations if necessary. It shall be investigated how the relative immigrant can be made responsible for their own health insurance during their residence in Sweden (Tidöavtalet 2022, 40). From a social conservative perspective, one can argue that there is a conflict between two units that are family and nation. Family as society's smallest unit should be held together, but at the same time, it is the interest of the nation to keep immigration on a low level and thus make family reunification difficult. This ambivalence is visualized by the Christian Democrats, who before was a staunch supporter of relative immigration, voting for softening of the rules in 2019, but then changing their opinion on the matter (Åkesson, 2019). A noticeable aspect is also the demand for sufficiency, stated as “Investigate and propose law changes to stricken the demand on sufficiency, with the goal to make sure that no relative immigrant shall be counted as poor or risk poverty upon their arrival”\(^{10}\) (Tidöavtalet, 40). With this, family reunification will be conditioned in the sense that only relative immigrants that have wealthy enough relatives are going to be reunited, arguably in conflict with a more cosmopolitan view of global justice. Contrasting to these proposed rules is Denmark where there are no demands on sufficiency for the refugees. The same applies in Germany. This though only applies to refugees and not to individuals with a more subsidiary protection status. In some countries, refugees and individuals with subsidiary protection needs are given the same right. Examples of such countries are the Netherlands and France. Other countries such as Greece and Malta, exclude individuals with subsidiary protection needs (Stoyanova & Karageorgiou 2022, 107-109). Swedish Refugee Law Center (Asylrättscentrum) in the review of the agreement mentions Article 8 in the ECHR which stipulates the right to family life and that the ECJ has several rulings on the area and that there is a possibility for conflicts with these rulings with these proposals (Asylrättscentrum 2023, 37). Looking at the Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC), the limitations of the family are outlined in Article 4.1 (a-d). The third national lawful resident (the “sponsor”) has the right to reunite with their spouse, with their minor children, and with children that the sponsor has custody over and who the minor children depend on. When it comes to sharing custody, the member state must authorize such reunification, if the other custody-sharing party agrees. According to Article 3.2 (b-c), this does not apply to individuals of temporary or subsidiary protection status, which was

\(^{10}\) Original quote: Utreda och föreställ författningsändringar genom vilka försörjningskravet vid anhöriginvandring skärps med målet att ingen anhöriginvandrare ska räknas som i vart fall fattig eller i risk för fattigdom vid ankomsten.
included in Swedish legislation from 2018. The Swedish government considered the infringement to violate the ECHR and decided to include individuals with temporary or subsidiary protection status when prolonging the temporary migration law from 2015 (prop. 2018/19:128, 41-42). When a new Alien Act was adopted in 2021, replacing the temporary law, this was also included (2020/21:191, 84).

Overall, this is though a step in the direction of making sure that individuals with residence permit work and supply for themselves and in that sense contribute to the order in Sweden, which prescribes that everyone can supply for themselves in order to create welfare services. The critique is that it puts the “nation” over the “individual” also in the case of families, although the emphasis on including non-heteronormative families in the family concept could be seen as an expression of minor support of pluralism. Since there are a lot of individuals that immigrate via their relatives, this could also have an effect on overall global justice, making a lot fewer people come to Sweden.

6.17 Overview of the incitement structure for voluntarily returning immigration

The Swedish Migration Agency is receiving the mission to conduct information work to raise awareness about the possibility to return immigration. A government investigation is initiated to find out how to return immigration could be encouraged for individuals residing in Sweden with a connection to other countries. This proposal is especially aimed at individuals that “have not integrated into Swedish society regarding the term of self-sufficiency, language or other cultural factors11”. The government especially points out Denmark as an example of a country that stimulates return immigration (Tidöavtalet 2022, 41). As of today in Sweden, a grown individual can receive 10 000 SEK in grants, and children under 18 years 5000 SEK. A family can receive 40 000 SEK (excluding travel grants) at the most as travel grants for return immigration (1bMigrationsverket, 2023). In Denmark, an individual can receive up to 140 000 DKK with them if they return to the country where they migrated from. This does not only applies to those who have immigrated but also to those who are born in Denmark but have citizenship in another country. It is also a law that municipalities must inform entitled citizens about the offer, leading to some municipalities sending out letters to all concerned

11 Original quote: Det gäller särskilt personer som inte integrerats i det svenska samhället i termen av egenförsörjning, språk eller andra kulturella faktorer
citizens. The law has been criticized for making citizens with foreign backgrounds feel alienated. A Danish government representative motivates the substantial sum of money with the argument that Denmark has an integration problem and that it is better if people that are not integrated leave the country (Lopez, 2019). The chairman for FARR, a Swedish refugee organization argues that in line with the criticism in Denmark, individuals are going to feel like they should leave the country regardless (Chamy and Hallgren, 2023).

The wish to follow in the Danish direction shows an anti-pluralistic vision of society, where new citizens are informed that they can leave the country, although they have not shown an interest to do it, in order to lessen the plurality of society. The specific wish to make individuals return immigrate who are not self-sufficient or have learned the language, pointing out them as a “burden” gives the proposal a “pessimist” dimension in line with the critique of the proposal, where integration is not seen as something possible option for some individuals, but instead, it is best if they leave the national community.

6.18 Reduce welfare benefits for non-citizens in order to lessen pull factors to Sweden

One proposal discusses welfare benefits for individuals coming to Sweden. The idea is that welfare benefits its suppose to be connected to work, meaning that one should qualify for welfare benefits such as for example child benefit or parent allowance. It is underlined in the agreement that receiving welfare benefits shall be based on effort, not on just residing. The right to complementary financial aid for newcomers with the right to introduction benefits is to be removed (Tidöavtalet 2022, 42). As discussed in Asylum Seekers and Undocumented Migrants’ Increased Social Rights in Sweden (2011), Sweden has traditionally been very inclusive in this sense, where asylum-seekers has been increasingly received benefits without being charged, a different approach than for example the United Kingdom, where it was decided in 2003 that welfare benefits (excluding children) would be removed from all asylum-seekers that not showed their asylum reason in a very short time after coming to the country. In the Qualifications Directive (2011/95/EU) Article 29 (1) it is stipulated that the receiving member state is supposed to provide “the necessary social assistance as provided to nationals of that member state”. In an evaluation of the old directive from 2004 (with the same formulation) from 2007, it was shown that member states applied this differently, with Ireland and Sweden being especially generous in relation to the directive, in parallel with the
CIVIX index (Battjes et.al 2007, 111-112). An evaluation of EU countries' legislation made by PICUM (Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants) in 2015 showed that in general, undocumented children usually have the right to schools, but that health care generally is more restricted (PICUM 2015, 6). Advocates of a solution with more qualifications for welfare services argue that directly giving welfare services to individuals residing in a country makes the entrance to the labor market more difficult, especially for foreign-born, since the incitement to work is too small. Sweden especially, as one of the countries with the most welfare benefits together with other countries, has the biggest gap in occupation between foreign-born and domestic-born (Örtengren, 2020). The Swedish right-wing liberal think tank Timbro has presented such a model in a report (Fölster and Gidehag, 2020). In the report, the authors among other points out a Danish study, that uses Danish numbers which show that such a model could mean a more efficient distribution of welfare (Bovenberg, Hansen och Sørensen, 2012). Critics argue the idea about welfare as an expense is wrongfull and that it should rather be seen as an investment in individuals, in order to make sure they receive the help they need to start contributing to society, and pressure on individuals just leads to stress (Pelling 2023, 21). Individuals with health issues or individuals that are old may also have problems entering the labor market, making them and their eventual children vulnerable (Asylrättscentrum 2023, 40). A number of studies analyzing municipalities that have used terms for receiving financial aid also indicate a weak result with not much work and more activity as a result (Engdahl, Forslund & Vikman 2022, 7). In Denmark, a somewhat such restriction was enforced in 2021, when migrants that had lived on benefits for three to four years and had not learned a sufficient level of Danish are now forced to work 37 hours a week (BBC, 2021). In Germany, receiving full minimum tax-based benefits is limited for EU and non-EU citizens, and a minimum job time duration is demanded (Schnabel 2020, 182).

When using the analysis scheme, we see that the “nation” is put over the individual in the sense that the nation's finances are to be used for the members of the nation and not for foreigners, even though it would lead to increased stress and exclusion as critics argue. In the veins of the civic integration concept, there is a rewarding aspect of this thinking, that to be a part of the Swedish welfare system you have to show that you are worthy of it. In that perspective, there is a fundamental “pessimistic” view of human nature, that an individual shall be trusted when he or she proves that they can and will contribute to the wealth of the nation.
6.19 More suspension of residence permits because of crime

In the agreement, it is proposed that it should be easier to expel individuals because of criminal acts than it is today. Both that limit for when deportation is supposed to be conducted shall be lowered, but also for example recurrence of a crime of a lower degree shall lead to deportation (Tidöavtalet 2022, 43-44). This captures an overall trend in the agreement, both tougher on crime, but also stricter regarding the right to reside in Sweden.

Swedish Refugee Law Center argues that it is important that Sweden follows international convention and do not violate the non-refoulment principle (Asylrättscentrum 2023, 45). Also, Civil Rights Defenders argue that deportation is a very punishment with a severe impact on an individual's life. The fact that it will not be possible to deport Swedes with only Swedish citizenship, creates a general discrepancy in a criminal that could violate the fundamental principle of equal treatment (Civil Rights Defenders 2022, 10). In the Qualifications Directive Article 14 (4), it is stated that the member state is allowed to revoke a granted protection status if the individual could be considered a threat to national security or being “convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime”. There is therefore a clause available for the member states to use, even though it is not spelled out what a “particularly serious crime” is. In Sweden, this was interpreted more extensively. The protection-seeker must be a threat to the national security of Sweden, not just a general threat to the community as stipulated in the directive, and another prerequisite was added in the form that it must be reasonable to believe that the individual will continue damaging business in the nation (prop. 2009/10:31, 114). In Sweden, the penalty value for considering deportation was lowered in 2022 from six months prison sentence until twelve months (2021/22:SfU28, 1., Tanaka, 2022). In Denmark, a law was passed in 2011 stipulating that all foreigners with no permanent residence that was convicted of a prison sentence would be deported (Sjöholm, 2011). In 2022, the government announced a will to take away exceptions for individuals who have stayed for a longer time in the country (with temporary residence), which is mostly not deported under current law (YLE, 2022). In the Netherlands, a so-called “sliding scale” is applied, where a decision on deporting a legally residing immigrant is based on how long the individual stayed in the Netherlands and the severity of the crime. Deportation may be a possible punishment for the first fifteen years of residence for any imprisonable crime (Woude., Leun, and Nijland, 2014). In Finland, a foreigner can be
deported if she or he has committed a crime where the prescribed maximum punishment is a one-year prison sentence (1aMaahanmuuttorasto, 2023).

This is a proposal in a clear “order” direction, with a focus to lessen the number of individuals that could be considered dangerous to the country. There is also an inherent pessimism, in that the criminals are not considered to be able to change themselves. Also here, the nation and the nation’s safety is prioritized over the individual's rights, as outlined by the critique.

6.20 Conditioned aid and diplomatic measures to increase returning

The agreement touches on international aid and proposes that international aid is to be partly conditioned on whether the receiving country takes back its citizens when that is needed. Another proposal is to work to make the EU freeze aid and limit visa possibilities for countries that do not cooperate when it comes to return immigration and taking back citizens. (Tidöavtalet 2022, 44). In practice, this means that international aid is to be used as a means to exert pressure on states to comply with Swedish political goals. The Minister of Aid and Foreign Trade, Johan Forssell argues that it is reasonable that the Swedish taxpayers, who do a lot for citizens in other countries, require that these states take back their citizens as a part of the contract. A representative for a state committee on the field has argued that it probably will not have much effect, since it is only between six and eight percent of the aid goes directly to states and the rest to UN organizations and civil society organizations. He argues as well that when international aid has been used as a carrot (not as a stick) on the EU level and that did not affect the migration streams to Europe or back from Europe (Haglund/TT, 2023). Swedish Refugee Law Center also argues that Sweden does not have a functioning readmission agreement with most countries that is in need of aid, so the effects might affect many of the most vulnerable groups and force more individuals to refugeehood (Asylrättscentrum 2023, 45-46). Another argument is that it is against the second principle of the OECD/DAC - framework regarding Official Development Assistance (ODA), where it is stated: “There should be no diversion of ODA towards providers’ immediate interests on migration at the expense of long-term sustainable development” (OECD 2022, 3). This addresses that European countries should not “extort” poorer countries with regard to the migration of their citizen. A point outside of the agreement, but that should be mentioned in
conjunction with this proposal, is that the majority constellation also decided that international aid should be reduced from the old “one percentage” of Gross National Income (GNI) goal that Sweden has had for a long time, to 0.88 of that goal over 2023 and not go under 0.84 under the period of 2023, 2024 and 2025. The Sweden Democrats and the Moderate Party wanted it to be lower, but the other parties in a constellation that was defending the goal won (Stenquist, 2022).

Looking at the analysis scheme, there is a clear focus in this to act in the interest of the nation at the expense of global justice and the individual, as the critique is formulated. It is the nation's right to deport foreign citizens over their right to reside in Sweden and create a life here. Also, there is order over pluralism, in the sense that society is moved into a direction of the multicultural character, towards more order in the sense that the proposal works for making undesirable individuals leave the country.

6.21 A law shall be proposed that limits municipalities from giving municipal financial aid to individuals residing in Sweden illegally

An individual residing in the country illegally shall not uphold financial aid. A ban shall therefore be implemented for municipalities to give out financial aid to these individuals (Tidöavtalet 2022, 44-45). The Swedish Refugee Law Center argues that it is today voluntary to give aid to municipalities and that a ban would just increase asylum-seekers exclusion and vulnerability (Asylrättscentrum 2023, 46). Save the Children International has also argued that limiting welfare benefits could damage children and their right to a tolerable life (Rädda Barnen 2022, 7).

This could be considered another way to exclude certain individuals with the goal put the “nation” over the “individual ” because it is the national finances that should go before the individual’s well-being, as described by the critics.
6.22 Secure assessments of residence permits because of studies

Work is to be done in order to get to terms with the abuse of residence permits because of studies (Tidöavtalet 2022, 45).

In a report made by the Swedish Migration Agency in 2022, it was shown that there is an abuse in the sense that there are individuals that state that they are coming to Sweden to study and are actually coming here to work. This is possible because the Swedish law, unlike many countries in the Schengen area, does not have a ceiling for how much money you can make when you study at the same time (1bMigrationsverket 2022, 7, 13). Swedish Refugee Law Center mentions in their evaluation that residence permits because of studies can be a way for individuals to avoid a dangerous situation.

The critique against the proposal could be considered as putting the individual over the nation. This proposal could arguably be said to have a more pessimistic view of humans than an optimistic one since it addresses the over-exploitation by some individuals. On the other hand, given the fact that a spot could be given to someone who would actually want it, it could be considered to increase global justice, seen from an equality perspective in the sense that an individual that is applying for studies should be considered a student and not a refugee. In that case, he or she should apply as a refugee or labour immigrant instead.

6.23 Legal certainty in the migration area

An overview of the asylum-seeking procedure is to be done to enforce quality and legal certainty (Tidöavtalet 2022, 45). Critics have in part embraced the proposal's focus, but also stated that it has to expand its grasp and focus on children's rights and increase safety valves in sensitive cases (Asylrättscsentrum 2023, 47).

This proposal could mostly be seen as a technical proposal, but to some extent it emphasizes the traditionality aspect since legal certainty could be considered a traditional value. Also, global justice could in the sense of equal chances be considered to increase with this proposal, because it could be done in a way to make refugees and other groups go through a better judicial hearing.
6.24 The goal structure of integration policies

“The goal structure for integration policies are reformed to more clearly include social, cultural, financial and linguistic and democratic integration and adaptation” (Tidöavtalet 2022, 45).

I have not found any criticism or discussion about this proposal specifically, but I would argue that this proposal could also be considered kind of a technical proposal, but I would argue that clearly takes the side of tradition over pluralism and echoes some extent civic integration in the form of financial adaption, but also a conservative view that migrants coming to Sweden must adapt themselves to “fit in” to Sweden in a cultural sense.

6.25 Changes in the social introduction and social orientation courses

Connecting to the point before, there is a proposal on making the social introduction and social orientation courses mandatory and making welfare benefits connected to participation. A national curriculum is also to be constructed to dictate the social orientation, with a special focus on women's rights, freedom of speech, and other fundamental values in Sweden (Tidöavtalet 2022, 46).

As discussed in Goodman’s article and in the earlier section about stricter requirements for citizenship, it is common in the EU and the Nordic since earlier to use these kinds of knowledge tests to make sure that the immigrating individual in this sense connects to the nation they immigrate into, as kind of a political “streamlining”. An earlier adapter of this thinking was the Netherlands, which in 1998 adopted legislation demanding newcomers to take civic integration courses, covering Dutch culture and society. This was a step away from the country's former multicultural policies, against the development during the 1990s signaling that migrants and guest workers had it difficult on the labor market. The cultural and social discrepancy was seen as a part of this, thus leading to civic integration courses as a part of the solution (Ersanilli 2014, 1). As earlier mentioned, the Netherlands also have a pre-entry course since 2005. Another country using this kind of system is Denmark, which established an Integration Act in 1999 that stipulates that all newcomers and family-reunified

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12 Original quote: Målstrukturen för integrationspolitiken reformeras för att tydligare inkludera social, kulturell, ekonomisk, språklig samt demokratisk integration och anpassning.
are obliged to do an integration program in order to receive social security benefits. It is a necessary prerequisite for receiving a permanent residence permit (Mouritsen and Jensen 2014, 11).

In Sweden today, there is of today a mandatory social orientation course about Swedish society since 2021. However, there is no test for knowledge control and no sanctions take place if an asylum-seeker does not participate (Svahn/TT, 2021). This is therefore addressed in the proposal to make it more forcing. In this sense, Sweden also goes towards using more civic integration, in line with other EU states. There are benefits in that newcomers know more about the country in which they arrive to. This could hopefully create a reduction in friction between the immigrants and the nationals, as well as make it simpler to enter the Swedish job market. The Swedish Refugee Law Center adds that mandatory social orientation where benefits are conditional could hit the elderly and disabled who cannot participate. Also how that would affect children should be addressed. This is to take an individualistic viewpoint where the individual right should put in first hand (Asylrättscentrum, 48).

Using the analysis scheme, one could point on the dimension “traditions”, where it can be argued that is a proposition to encourage traditions in line with what the Sweden Democrats write in their party program, that immigration can be acceptable, but that it should not threaten the national character. There is also vision of order over pluralism in this proposal. With a mandatory social introduction, integration and employment could hopefully take place more smoothly.

6.26 Settlement for newcomers

The law 2016:38 regarding receiving certain newly arrived immigrants for settlement, is a law that gives the state the possibility to assign migrants to municipalities. The law is to be changed in order to give municipalities increased power and to be removed with time (Tidöavtalet 2022, 46). According to the law right now, a municipality can be forced to in a refugee in their municipality in accordance with § 5 in the law. To give increased powers to municipalities and in that sense infringe on the internal migration in Sweden, would probably make it easier for municipalities to reject newcomers. Because of this, it could be defined as a
proposal that emphasises that communities should not change and that there should be less pluralism in some areas, connecting to a discussion of responsibility on the local level.

6.27 Lowering of introduction benefits

The introduction benefit is going to be lowered. To receive introduction benefits, active participation in SFI (Swedish For Immigrants), and participation in other activities on full-time will be demanded (Tidöavtalet 2022, 45). Critics have raised also here that the proposal might strike against individuals that because of different reasons cannot participate in education, such as age and handicap, thus emphasizing an individual perspective (Asylrättscentrum 2023, 49).

There are several proposals that likewise to this address a need of lowering welfare benefits in order to make sure that individuals fulfill their integration contract, showing a wish to “disciple” individuals and put the nation's finances first in the form of lower expenses.

6.28 The restricted right to a publicly financed interpreter

A very direct limitation is one of the interpreters. A consideration is to be made regarding the enforcement of a fee that is to be paid by newcomers after a certain passed (Tidöavtalet 2022, 47). The intention is that citizens and individuals that have stayed for a longer time with residence permits are supposed to pay more interpreters fees. The idea was proposed already in 2019 by current prime minister Ulf Kristersson, with the underlying idea that permanent residents should be able to speak Swedish well enough to not need interpreters in contact with for example public agencies, health care, or school. As stated by Sweden Democrat Britt-Mari Canhasi “There is a smorgasbord of opportunities to learn Swedish for free under several years. Then you also have a responsibility to do so if you have a residence permit or are a Swedish citizen.” In this sense, the responsibility is shifted over to the individuals as their problem and not society's role to handle (Mellgren, 2023). This is not used in Norway or Iceland but in Finland and Denmark. In Finland, one has to pay an interpreter’s fee after becoming a citizen. In Denmark, one has to pay the whole interpreter’s fee if the individual has resided in Denmark for more than three years. The fee can be between corresponding 280 to 2500 SEK, depending on whether the interpreter for example is participating physically or

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13 *Original quote:* Det finns ett smörgåsbord av möjligheter att lära sig svenska gratis under flera år. Då har man också ett ansvar att göra det om man har uppehållstillstånd eller är svensk medborgare.
digitally. The use of interpreters has been reduced by over 30 %, but the chairman of the Danish Physician’s Union is critical, arguing that it leads to sicker patients who wait with seeking health care. The outspoken goal with the fees has been to encourage immigrants to learn Danish (Mellgren, 2023). Thus, it can be connected to the civic integration ideal of “repressive liberalism” and the goal to disciple individuals, ie. newcomers, and non-citizens.

Opposition to the proposal is present, as presented in an opinion article where 10 chairman for unions argues that it is fundamental for the safety of patients in health care that they have access to interpreters (Erkers et.al, 2022). This is a practical argument, that also connects to more of a universalistic worldview, that the individuals who are concerned, although they do not understand the language well enough, should be able to have equal access to information as those who do, in accordance with their rights as humans. It is also argued on a principal basis that the proposal is not in line with guidelines from core conventions stipulated in the UDHR, in this sense going against conventions. This gives the critique also a direct human rights dimension (Erkers et.al, 2022). In the argument, one can see that the principles of universalism and the practical arguments of professionals are intertwined. Also, Save the Children International are against it, because the proposal risk forcing the children to act as interpreters to a higher degree, which they should not be, because of the risk of missing school, but also because some information children should not be the one to tell (Rädda Barnen 2022,7). One could imagine this being for example telling the parent about a disease they have.

In a general sense, a barrier to receiving a welfare service is created, in order to stimulate learning of the language. This relates to the earlier discussed concept of civic integration and it has also been motivated as a way to make refugees learn Swedish. Sweden has historically had very low scores when it comes to civic integration, but this is a proposal with the aim to add requirements for citizens and long-term residents to integrate. Connected to the ideal types, this proposal as earlier mentioned proposals draw towards a more pessimistic rather than optimistic view of humans, since it considers that individuals have to be given sticks in order to learn Swedish. Critics argue that individuals, among them the children and their freedom, should be put in first hand. Also here could argue that the proposal is to put the nation’s finances over individual needs.
7. Ending conclusions

For this Master Thesis, there have been two questions, which have been the following:

- *In what sense does the Tidö Agreement implicate that the Swedish migration and integration policies will become more restrictive than what they are now?*

- *How can the proposed migration and integration policies of the Tidö agreement, and the critique, be understood through the lens of cosmopolitanism and social conservatism?*

Addressing the first question, one can clearly see that the migration policies of the Tidö agreement will mean more restrictive migration policies in Swedish legislation than as of now in multiple aspects, in that more prerequisites must be fulfilled in order to be eligible to be considered someone in the need of protection. Also, more prerequisites have to be fulfilled to reside in Sweden and become a citizen. Even though legislation has been strict in some sense, notably when it comes to the time of the residence permits, being three years at the first decision, which is among the shorter in Europe, there are definitely more dimensions added to this with this agreement. Family reunification is to be more narrow, including a more narrow understanding of what a family is and a higher demand for self-sufficiency. The wages floor for labour immigrants is to be raised, making it possible only for people with certain competencies to migrate to Sweden, and migrants working in low-paid jobs will not be able to migrate. There will be an increased focus on inner security and outer security, with increased residence permit controls made also by people working in welfare, although that seems to be further discussed. To reside in Sweden will demand a lifestyle free of friction with Swedish society and crimes will be even less tolerated. Transit centers will be enforced, making the asylum-seeker limited to move in a certain area. Refugees for settlements are to be fewer. Less benefits are to be given to newcomers and the benefits are going to be conditioned with work. More requirements are also to be fulfilled for a non-citizen to receive citizenship. One can see, in all these proposals, but also in the statements from the Sweden Democrats as well as the government in their government policy statement *(regeringsförklaring)* that there is a strong will to create very different migration policies in Sweden behind the agreement. So when it comes to freedom of movement to Sweden and in Sweden, there will be restrictions. The rules have undoubtedly been taken forward in order to
fulfill the goal of having, even more, shrinking immigration to Sweden. The will also be restrictions in the sense that benefits will be limited. It is supposed to be more difficult to become a Swede overall, showing that the intention of this agreement in the migration and integration area is to create overall a bigger difference and a long way to citizenship.

Addressing the second research question, using the ideal types of social conservatism and cosmopolitanism, one can see that this proposal lays down an outline of a more social conservative world, where the focus is nation and order in the form of borders and citizenship and an increased focus on security. The ambition is that individuals that are seeking themselves to Sweden are to be incorporated into an already existing community so that the domestic members of Sweden can recognize their country and have a sense of community, in order with what Sweden Democrats write in their party program. The social conservative ideals are also encircled by the idea of civic integration and liberal contractualism, which is much seen in some proposals, such as the stricter requirements for citizenship, as well as the increased focus on that one has to fulfill their duties in order to receive the benefits when you are a non-citizen. This idea of liberal contractualism has been referred to as repressive liberalism by some article writers, which matches the increased repressive ideas of the agreement. The critique on the other hand is founded on cosmopolitan ideals of individualism and global justice, pointing to the infringements, on the fact that fewer refugees are going to come to Sweden and that citizenship will be more excluded. The critique also points to the problem of vulnerability and mental unhealth that comes with the proposals for refugees.

Looking at the agreement from another perspective, one could argue that it is not much more tougher than current policies. The EU Law is to be respected in all legislation, which is an extensive law with many criterias, as shown by the used directives. Sweden will continue to take in refugees from other countries via the settlement system, albeit much fewer than before. Sweden also compared to other countries, especially when it comes to citizenship demands and welfare benefits, has been less demanding, in comparison with for example the Danish Integration Act or the Dutch law from 1998 stipulating that one shall take part in a civic integration course. In this sense, one could argue that although Sweden becomes less cosmopolitan, it also becomes more similar to other countries, albeit still being very strict in some senses, such as giving only three years residence permit when the first decision is made, as well as also aiming for at least eight years of residence for citizenship.
I also want to address my methodological approach in this conclusion. For this Master Thesis, the analysis became a bit “little about much”. This I decided to do because it is an agreement that is fairly new and therefore the process to take forward and implement legislation is in the starting pits for almost all the proposals. Therefore, I came to the conclusion that it was difficult to make so much out of a minor number of proposals, but instead, I decided to take almost the entire agreement and what the agreement as a whole signal. It remains still to be seen if all proposals actually will become implemented or to which degree they will be implemented, but I would argue that even if not all proposals will be implemented, the agreement would still be a huge shift in Swedish migration and integration policies.

Overall, my final conclusion is that even if could be argued that the legislation in a way becomes more similar to other countries, it is still very clear that the migration and integration policies (if implemented in accordance with what is being proposed), will be even more restrictive than they are now and that Sweden with this agreement moves overall towards a migration and integration policy very suitable from a social conservative perspective.

7.1 For further research
Since many of the proposals are yet to be implemented, a follow-up to this Master Thesis is much welcomed. The implementation of the agreement should be followed closely, given the significant implications that they have. Especially, the question of how lawmakers will expand the usage of deportations could be interesting, since this is a wish with the agreement to deport more individuals. It will also be interesting to see how the issue of “reporting duty” (discussed under “6.3 Intensified work on finding and reporting illegal aliens”) since that point has been subject to a lot of discussions if, for example, teachers would give out their student, or if doctors would give out their patients or where the line will be drawn. One way to do this is via policy evaluation, with a focus on the causes of the proposals, their implementation, and their outcome.
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EU legislation


Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as
beneficiaries of international protection or a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast).