THE RISE OF THE
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY,
OR BACK TO POLITICAL REALISM?

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**Title**
European Security and Defence Policy, or Back to Political Realism?

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**Abstract**
In the course of this master thesis I will argue the following:

a) ESDP project is an interesting initiative and concern issues that stand at the core of the EU integration processes. It relates to the most significant and updated development of the EU institutional, conceptual and strategic design, but is yet relatively unexplored and underdeveloped.

b) The aim of this study is to evaluate the efforts to enhance cooperation among European countries in the provision and use of military force. To set the scene and illustrate constrains and complications that bear upon activities in this field. Indeed, the author intends to recommend a theoretical framework, as a fundamental prerequisite for the proper study of EU Defense and Security Policy.

c) Constructivism and neo-Realism and their theoretical tenets offer an unexplored avenue to investigate and account for the development of the European Security and Defense Policy.

d) The efficiency of such an account depends on a meticulous evaluation of proposed theoretical approaches versus the emerging security complex. This theoretical choice allows for a construction beyond that of the unit or system levels of analysis and may therefore grant a causal role to perceived interests in terms of non-traditional approach to research in social science. Also it may thereby provoke an interest in terms of security and threat.

e) The originality and validity of a combination between Realism and Constructivism as a starting point for inquiries in IR may not only be relevant to an understanding of how such a development can unfold, but mostly how a real social phenomena can be unfolded by such a non-traditional theoretical approach.
Keyword
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Per JANSSON
To

my mother

who had the privilege to stand next to when
my back was against the wall
# THESIS PLAN

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Summary

In the course of this master thesis I will argue the following:

a) ESDP project is an interesting initiative and concern issues that stand at the core of the EU integration processes. It relates to the most significant and updated development of the EU institutional, conceptual and strategic design, but is yet relatively unexplored and underdeveloped.

b) Constructivism and neo-Realism and their theoretical tenets offer an unexplored avenue to investigate and account for the development of the European security and defense policy.

c) The efficiency of such an account depends on a meticulous evaluation of proposed theoretical approaches versus the emerging security complex. This theoretical choice allows for a construction beyond that of the unit or system levels of analysis and may therefore grant a causal role to perceived interests in terms of non-traditional approach to research in social science. Also it may thereby provoke an interest in terms of security and threat.

d) The originality and validity of a combination between Realism and Constructivism as a starting point for inquiries in IR may not only be relevant to an understanding of how such a development can unfold, but mostly how a real social phenomena can be unfolded by such a non-traditional theoretical approach.
Chapter I

Introduction

Contemporary European Union (EU) political highlights have produced a new wave of discussions concerning the future European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). So far, this problem remains to be one of the major sources of debate among the EU member states and between the scholars of International Relations per se. *What kind of defense policy does European Union need, in what form and for what purpose* provides the major questions for the ongoing security debate. It is well known that from its incipient stage EU, as a ‘soft power’, has been promoting stability, security and peace in Europe and in the world through its tight economic relationships. In addition, humanitarian aid, human rights, and the rule of law are among the prevalent policy measures through which EU exercises its power in world affairs.

Nowadays EU confronts with another aspect of its emerging power – military power. It is beyond doubt that tackling the vast majority of today’s global problems requires a careful combination of hard and soft security instruments. We can probably agree that the international security environment has moved on decisively from the bad old days of the Cold War, with its familiar lexicon of détente and deterrence. In the post-post Cold War era we have moved from risks to threats: from the single risk of the thermo-nuclear exchange to the multiple threats of globalized insecurity. As a result, we have a much more defused security environment to contend with, and between black and white there are now a thousands shades of grey. And while the majority claims that one of the consequences of this transition reduces the importance of military power, because it is often ill suited to solve the complex political and security problems we face with, some of the EU member states really pledge for an EU Common Security and Defense Policy – to be or not to be a military power.

Although some formal elements of the ESDP can be found among the major EU Treaties, the US ‘humanitarian intervention’ in the heart of the European territory influenced substantially the EU member states and decision makers to project an autonomous EU
defense mechanism, intending to revert defense to its ‘normal role’ as a technical instrument at the service of the Common EU Foreign Policy. The EU’s defining aim is to be able to play the role of a global crises management mechanism with all the necessary instruments. It shows that crisis management has become a priority of the external action of the EU, and that there are some sticking initiatives able to set own European priorities in that field. Preservation of peace, promotion of stability and security reinforcement in the world constitute a fundamental objective of the Union, prevention of violent conflict represents one of the most important challenge of its external policy (Secretary General Report of the European Council, Nice). This will oblige the EU to develop a coherent European crisis management and conflict prevention strategies, which will allow efficient use of all synergies inside the organization. Up to the moment, this initiative generates many declarations with scarce practical achievements, and the ESDP project remains to be one of the most difficult equations inside the EU common policy.

There are many other ways to define the ESDP initiative. One of these emphasis the idea that more common security and defense policy will rearm the strategic ideas of the power politics, or known as the “French contemplation theory: more ESDP less United States”. Indeed, the ESDP might be regarded as a counterbalance to the United States military might. To consider this assertion is to cut off the long way shorter. From a “non-zero sum game” to a “zero sum game” is just one step, as it is from a united trans-Atlantic Community to a divided and fragmented one. Thus, what could be the meaning of EU as a post-modern society if implicitly it seems attracted to play such kind of games? Could the ESDP be considered as a new approach reinforcing the theoretical and practical legacies of political realism?

1.1 Purpose

There are few theoretical orientations concerning the ESDP project. The difficulty to elaborate and implement such a policy aspect is mostly brought about by different interpretations and perceptions of nowadays security threats among the EU member states, and by extremely difficult to manage EU institutional design that totally lacks of “consensual theoretical tools”. To have a broader and more comprehensive way in dealing with the EU defense and security the aim of this study is to evaluate the efforts to enhance cooperation among European countries in the provision and use of military force. To set the scene and illustrate constrains and complications that bear upon activities in this field. Moreover, I intend to recommend a theoretical framework, as a fundamental prerequisite for the proper
study of EU defense and security policy, and the primary goal should not be supranationalism, “nation-state” or regionalism. This all should be regarded as subordinated to the more fundamental aim of ‘constructing’ a Europe in which democracy and social justice exist at all levels.

One thing is certain; as long as we have a threat out there, there must be the necessary means to deal with that threat. From a EU perspective such kind of areas are neither limited in form nor in substance (see for example Rogers, J, Philip 1993; Clesse, Armand and Rotfeld, Adam Daniel 1995; Dean, Jonathan 1994: 55-185; Gustav Lindstrom editor, 2003). Therefore, the multifaceted and geographically unlimited nature of future challenges requires a EU defense capability that is flexible, responsive and deployable. However, what interests me is not the need of all this military capabilities but, mostly, the consequences it can imply over EU and global security as a whole. To make this position more comprehensible some of the basic questions concerning this security project follow to be answered: What role should EU have with regard to the emerging European security and defense policy once it is the leading economic and demographic power? Why does EU need deeper defense cooperation? How can EU increase defense cooperation and, therefore, military effectiveness and efficiency, while maintaining its original “post-modern political characteristics? It is now a matter of real debate as to whether the EU, using the so supposed ‘new tools of democratization’ (like military force) can play an important role in upholding the policy regimes that reinforce liberal democratic principles as it did before. How can the ESDP be incorporated in such a way not to affect the European social-liberal democratic principles and/as the basic core of its social construction?

It occurs to me that the above epistemological questions will be of outmost importance if we develop a common ontological purview of the existing debate – The Rise of the ESDP. Thus, before I come down to the epistemological area of this research I will make off the basic ontological purview of this study, especially at the level of definitions, needs and perceptions. This theoretical study of the basic EU political engagements – security and defense engagements – can make an important contribution to the security field in general and to the EU project in particular.

In general terms, the specific purpose of this research is to build up a theoretical approach that may lead to a better understanding of the European security, to make off its necessity and to realize the advantages and disadvantages of the new EU ‘hard power’ initiative. More or less, using this analytical purview I would like to find out the theoretical answer to one simple question, the James Rosenau’s guiding question – “of what is this for
instance?” How can we understand ESDP: as a revival of power politics game in Europe, or as a deeper social challenge that will lead the EU actorness to the highest political construction an international actor can achieve? In reality this short and simple question remains to be as difficult to answer as the “deep European integration” with its “multi-speed processes” to understand. This is just a part of reality we are trying to understand and shape. This approach will lead my research to the particular understanding of the ESDP as a ‘process’, ‘structure’ and ‘interaction capacity’ through which events and actions take place. As Marriam states “the interest [in a qualitative study] is in process rather than in outcomes” and the major strength of qualitative research is in getting at the processes that led to these outcomes, processes that experimental and survey research are pure to identify (Britan, 1978; Patton, 1990, p. 94ff.). From this perspective, I consider the European Union as a goal and the integration process, like ESDP, as a means to justify the goal.

I will have a superficial interest in small number of individuals or situations, rather than collecting data from large samples and aggregating the data across individuals or situations. I will focus more on the structural meanings and effects: how X plays the role in causing Y, what the process is that connects X and Y. I believe this approach is one of the best to accomplish the above-mentioned purpose.

It should be clear that the classical phase of the EU theoretical aspect, of what is normally understood as “integration theory” was connected with politico-economic integration and not security or defense. Indeed, the motivation in defining and defending my purpose is whether different “speeds” of integration require different theoretical perspectives? Here Roseanau’s guiding question – “of what is this in instance” – becomes a vital prerequisite for any work with theoretical aspiration.

1.2 The use of theory

We can be better in doing some analyses, especially like this one, when we are theoretically reflexive. Theories are of value precisely because they structure all observations – it is impossible to make any statement about social phenomena in a theoretical vacuum.

What theoretical approach will serve to describe and assess the new theoretical background for this policy field? From this point of view, as a basic theoretical orientation I
will use the neo-Realist and Constructivist “school of thought”. My motivation for this theoretical choice is backed up by more than one reason. But the most important one is determined by the very definition of this topic problem and by the amalgamation of the phenomena and situations I have to accomplish. For better or worse, constructivist theory seems to be half-sibling of neo-Realism. And while constructivism is more concerned with efficiency, realism focuses more on issues of distribution, which are closely linked to power as both an instrument and a stake. Constructivist “school of thought” might be said to falsify realism, because it not only explains outcomes that realism successfully explains, but also has excess empirical powers over realism, and is able to plug a significant gap left by realism in a logical, axiomatically based manner. Still, it is not clear that this represents different views about the world rather than a difference in the choice of subject matters. Generally, constructivist arguments, usually implicit, that distributional conflicts are usually less important than the potential common gains stems at least in part from its substantive concern with issues in which large mutual benefits are believed to be possible rather than with disputes over territories, status, influence, and dominance.

Stressing that my intended departure is theoretical does, however, raise a more substantial issue: what is the relationship of the “security and defense arguments” of this paper to those of (neo) realism and constructivism? The short answer is that there is no prior relationship to be assumed, found, or designed. Sometimes the essay arguments supplement extant arguments; sometimes they compete with them; in some instances my intent will be to subsume (neo) realist or constructivist arguments within a broader perspective. Although this listing is not exhaustive the point is simple: various relations are possible they have to be established rather than assumed.

Often meta-theoretical assumptions afford too limited picture of completion anyway. We are rarely in a position where differing arguments take the form of two (non-nested) regression models. Neither realism nor constructivism thus can reasonably be depicted as representing a baseline model against which all comers must be measured. In a world full of anomalies, neither realism nor constructivism is sufficiently established and sufficiently precise to be treated, as a sacrosanct “paradigm” to which other lines of arguments must defer. Such imagery is unwarranted. The new phenomena we confront with in explaining the nowadays-international security relations remind us, once more, how naked the emperor of

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1 I use “school of thought” because I do not think Realism and Constructivism can be sharply defined: they are better labelled school of thought or approaches than theories.
international relations theory is. However, there must be one theoretical beginning and in our case we obviously have one.

1.3 Method and methodology

The theoretical aspect of this paper has a specific methodological design. The arguments it advances are descriptive or explanatory, or both. As a framework for collecting and analyzing data I will follow the qualitative research strategy: we can use both constructionist and interpretive features of the qualitative research strategy. There is no strict defined orientation. This selection allows penetrating into and using both the epistemological and ontological orientation of the research topic, thus the epistemological orientation focuses more on an interpretive manner and ontological orientation focuses more on a constructivist one. More than that, during the research process there will be a slight reference to the discourse analysis approach. To my view the discourse enhances an important insight in understanding the way the European Security, the society, the events concerning the ESDP, and the inner psychological worlds are shaped, constructed and motivated by the discourse.

Using this research strategy does not mean that we will follow a strictly inductive method during the whole research process. Although the inductive method will be largely used – in fact the basic thesis aim is to generate a new theory or to elaborate a more adequate theoretical design in order to understand and to explain in a better way ESDP – I do not exclude the possibility of using the deductive approach too, because I believe the two approaches do not exclude each other, they are not exclusivist, rather they could back each other.

As a fundamental prerequisite for material interpretation I have taken the qualitative content analysis. The aim of my research design is to be as systematic as possible but not rigid. Some categories and variables initially guide the study, but other are to be elaborated and interpreted during the research process, including a orientation of constant discovery and constant comparison of relevant situations, settings, styles, images, meanings, and nuances.

1.4 Source Criticism

The material used to accomplish with this paper’s task basically could be divided into three parts. The first source can be defined as the theoretical source (books and academic journals),
it composes the most important Neorealist and Constructivist theoretical thoughts about the nowadays security and defense realities. Due to the specific and non-conventional theoretical approach with regard to the subject matter the theoretical literature can be seen as the cornerstone of the whole sources used by this research project. I grasp through the whole Neorealist and Constructivist theoretical spectrum unless I do not discover the most adequate, basic, accurate and central theoretical tenets of the security and defense studies in nowadays IR, which are to be forged with the applied subject matter - ESDP. Few theoretical sources entirely dedicated to EU security and defense priorities have been undertaken so far. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) of the EU has been trying to develop an entirely new theoretical path concerning the EU security and defense policy. However, this ‘intelligence agency’ has developed a more practical and applied overview with regard to ESDP, and the theoretical approaches to European defense and security remain to be largely unexplored.

The second important source that brings a substantial weight to this research paper is the largely accessible EU official documents, speeches, statements, intelligence and defense reports. Generally, all the official documents are to be evaluated in a chronological way, supported by a relative importance for the subject matter. The importance of the above mentioned sources are to be defined by the accuracy of their formal and submissive character, and by the decision-making framework, which releases them – mostly. I focus mainly on the official documents released by the EU decision making institutions because of the major ‘system level’ interest promoted during the whole research process.

Of outmost importance for this research paper will be to follow some of the foreign policy speeches that more or less define the debate over the emerging European defense and security policy. Speeches are important for understanding the role of culture, threat perceptions, but mostly they make off the most updated information about the political environment, about the practical contradictions and theoretical failures. Indeed, they often express "we-feelings" and include expressions of a kind of defense identity, and reveal how the speakers view past history, present, and future political choices. These accounts of defense identity may become part of the strategic political culture and " [strategic] style" of a political unity’s foreign policy (Aggestam, L 1998: 7-8). The task will then be to analyze speeches and statements in search for expressions of European defense and security, and strategic conceptions.

The most common, or at least well known, criticism against the use of speeches in analysis is that leaders use moral language in statements, but that it does not have anything to do with actual behavior. This is partially right but incomplete. If we want to find the reasons
behind a certain decision or policy, looking at statements by political leaders, we can understand that these statements are made to convince people and to express a clear message about the intentions that regard some political decisions, and they are made for a certain reason. The reason speeches are used for the analysis is that the spoken word is where social structures can best be illustrated. A critical assumption is that the individuals behind speeches or statements reveal what identities there are, how they relate to each other, which understandings are possible, and how reality can be viewed. They do this either explicitly or implicitly, without necessarily being aware of it (Hopf, Ted 2002: 26). The last source is the Internet source. Here we have the internet accessed academic databases, the official web pages of the major European and American ‘think tanks’ and decision making institutions (strategic and analytical centers, security studies institutes).

The intellectual pluralism I intend to develop within this paper is mostly determined by the capacity for reasoning. The paper’s epistemological assumptions lie deep, and they affect for more that how the European security has been studied. The literature I have consulted so far ends up in determining what we can study, how we assess our studies, and how they should be related together. At the same time the promoted theoretical assertions are hardly compatible with the ESDP as a one social world that exhibits regularities and is knowable form the outside, and I doubt if it is truly known from the inside. That why first of all, I hope that my theoretical work, of whatever persuasion, should be informed by, and in term inform empirical material. There is nothing as practical as a good theory, and I found the most valuable work to be that that is empirically grounded. Second, as I mentioned previously, the intellectual pluralism has the reason to open rather than to close down analytical space. Despite all this, my difficulty is that there is more than one way that leads to reasoning and each way has its ‘barbarians’ to cope with. As between different civilized values, active pretensions to universality are ultimately reducible to power. Moreover, the context in which absolute values are advanced is always complex. Absolutist claims obscure other motives of an economic, geopolitical, or institutional kind. There are no absolutely pure motives as there are no just wars.

### 1.5 Outline of the study

This essay starts by problematizing a political outcome followed by my own line of arguments in contrast with other arguments. Sometimes, comparison is employed across time
and space in a way non-standard in social science. My concern, however, is with the centerpiece of current efforts: the ESDP project endorsed by the EU Heads of Governments since the Cologne European Council, June 1999.

The research is composed of four chapters plus the concluding part. As you already sow it

Chapter I, defined by the introduction, includes the purpose and the general description of the selected topic and questions. This part also includes the general description of the method and methodology that is to be used doing this research. One of the most important points to be addressed in this part is the use of theory and theoretical approaches available to accomplish the research purpose. More than that, the introduction part includes a rough definition of the problem and of the problematizing aspect of the selected research topic.

Chapter II

The second chapter includes a hypothetical explanation and description of the problem, mentioning all the necessary updated information. This chapter presents the general and specific puzzles, which are to be addressed. Here, I seek to summarize what has happened so far inside the project, I introduce the general and specific descriptions of the research subject presenting an overview about the ESDP. The evidence employed runs the gamut of statistical, interview and documentary sources. Moreover, I seek for a substantial inductive variation, subjecting it to intensive and varied empirical probes.

Chapter III

Chapter three, which has three points establishes systemic and sub-systemic effects of the nowadays security environment. It reclaims the specific security engagements of EU and shapes the new defense equation for the ESDP. This chapter promotes the necessary epistemological information leading up to this case study. I discuss existing attempts to explain EU defense policy from a “top down” perspective, focusing in particular on the structural propositions. In short, a “top down” perspective contends that system specific characteristics can exert a generalizable influence on the patterns of interactions in the sub-system and unit level. This kind of attempt, that causally explains ESDP, is the most common and will form the basis for my first stab at the subject matter as well.

Chapter IV
The last chapter establishes the theoretical considerations leading up the whole case study. I discuss the existing attempts to explain the security in general and the ESDP in particular. Here, I present the theoretical assumption concerning the IR in general and the ESDP in particular. The empirical work presented here does suggest that security scholars have occasionally been too narrow in their topic considerations. This project rests to contribute to widening the scientific area. In some cases the arguments of this chapter is to supplement or complete conventional arguments with regard to the security studies field in general and European security in particular, or to displace, modify and subsume them. In a way, this chapter is suppose to make an attempt to answer this question degree: How it is possible to speak about the EU state system in broader terms of a positivistic understanding of science, while mentioning a commitment to international state system structure as a whole?

In conclusion I, finally, assess the strengths and weaknesses of the related theories in light of the ESDP project. Here, I make an attempt to be consistent with the prior evidence about the research questions and about the theoretical assumptions promoted in this research paper. This part includes a general evaluation of the given answers and, to a bigger extend, I establish a common theoretical line that leads up through the whole paper. I close with a discussion of potential avenues to go further with the European security and defense in both neo-Realist and Constructivist perspectives.
Charter II

European Security and Defense Policy: From Idea to Concept

2.1 Understanding Security

“At least one thing about security seems to be agreed on by most authors – it is something good. In other words, the very term ‘security’ is positively value-loaded. And precisely for this reason much less agreement exists on what clear meaning to attach to that word.” (Hakan, W. 1987: 340)

As any other social constructed meaning ‘security’ has its interpretations. At the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century we become witnesses to one of the biggest conceptual difference in international relations (IR) concerning the meaning of security. The difference is less in form as it is in substance. As we all know the reproduction of the meaning of security is neither closed nor mechanical. However, despite the unexhausted number of interpretations during the history security has been defined by many common features. In IR the pick defender of security is Political Realism, which remains to be the most tremendous opponent to any other changes of the traditional meaning of security; and Constructivism, which is known less as a theory and more as an approach to research. Despite these paradigmatically divisions with regard to security as a definition, there are some practical differences too.

Scholars of IR have been explaining security using different theoretical approaches. During the 60s’ Karl Deutsch and his collaborators (Deutsch, K. 1957) made an attempt to change the traditional way of security studies and to explain security using a pluralistic approach to the field matter. To Deutsch a Security Community is an area, or rather “a group of people”, within which there is no expectation of either violence or the threat of violence as a means for solving conflicts. It represents a form of international peace of a certain quality,
in that it designates not merely the absence of war, but the absence of any fear of military violence stemming from any of the states in the Security Community. Because theory of collective security deals directly with the issue of how to cause peace it is useless in explaining the nowadays EU military security engagements and requirements, but it recognizes that military power is a central fact of life in IR, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. As Claude notes, “the problem of power is here to stay, it is, realistically, not a problem to be eliminated but a problem to be managed.” He wrote in 1992, “I reached the conclusion some thirty years ago that the implementation of collective security theory is not a possibility to be taken seriously” (Mearsheimer, John 1994/95: 27). After Deutsch, more models for security by collaboration, or security strategies were developed (see for example Twitchett, Kenneth J. 1979: 18-47).

Later on, a group of scholars, known as the Copenhagen School, chaired by Barry Buzan, have continued the research process in the security field studies. At best, as Buzan emphasizes, security is “a kind of stabilization of conflict or threatening relations,” with or without emergency mobilization of the state (1998: 3). Security is about survival, it is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics (Buzan; Waever; and Wilde 1998: 27). Indeed, security means survival in the face of an existential threat, but what constitutes an existential threat is not the same across different sectors and actors. Thus, security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the object nor with the subject but among the subjects per se (Waever 1990: 19; Huysmans 1996: 49). Although security in IR may generally be better than insecurity (threats against which no adequate countermeasures are available), a secure relationship still contains serious conflicts – albeit ones against which some effective countermeasures have been taken. Security should not be thought of too easily as always a good thing. It is better as Waever argues, to aim for desecuritization: the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere.

This inter-subjective theatre of the security studies field has generated one of the basic factors of the theoretical bargaining. To quote David Campbell: “nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analysis the danger, considers the event. As Kant said “the category of risk is the category of understanding; it cannot be given in sensibility or intuition.” In this term, Campbell claims, danger is an effect of interpretation (Campbell, David 1998: 2). The conventional understanding of the IR security is a goal to be achieved by a number of instruments diploid by the state (defense and foreign policy for example). But after all, “securing something
requires its differentiation, classification and definition, it has, in short, to be defined” (Campbell 1998: 198).

According to neo-Realism states are concerned first and foremost with security, since the pursuit of other goal only makes sense once survival is assured (Waltz, N. Kenneth 1979: 126). This oppose to the view of many Classical Realism that states maximize power as an end in itself. The assumption of security seeking says nothing about the states’ relationships towards each other as they think about their security, however, and as such is logically compatible with a collective rather than a competitive security system. Waltz does not make the point himself, but he makes a second motivational assumption, which rules that possibility out: that the states are egoistic and “self-regarding” (Waltz 1979: 91). Combine this assumption with anarchy, and “states [will] not enjoy even an imperfect guarantee of their own security unless they set out to provide it for themselves” (Waltz 1979: 201), which means that by definition the international system is a “self-help” system.

More than that, Waltz’s discussion of the process through which state agents and system structures relate is even more marginal in the text than his treatment of the state motivations. In fact, the term “process” plays a largely pejorative role in neo-Realist discourse because it seems to oppose “structural” theorizing. Waltz argues that structure relates to agents by affecting their behavior “indirectly,” through two processes, competition and socialization (Waltz 1979: 74-77). However, as Wendt argues, “the centrality of these processes to his theory raises doubts that international structure can be thought of in strict material terms, and Waltz must render considerably narrow conceptualizations of both, making them as mechanistic and as social as possible” (Wendt, Alexander 1999: 100). This theoretical misperception leads me to a very interesting supposition. To claim that structure affects the actors’ behavior through competition and socialization from one hand, and to sustain that structure is distinct form process, which identifies and affects the actors’ behavior, is to make a facile gesture difficult. The Realist self-fulfilling prophecy seems to have its own weaknesses. It seems to be obvious that structure cannot exist out of the process, and once we have the communication and socialization ‘feedback’, which by definition have the capability to generate a degree of “Parson’s effect” – every kind of communication and socialization generate a full operation system (including input, output and feedback effects), the structural objectivity is highly debatable. In this regard, the mechanical interpretation leads to a more constructivist one, and the objective definition leads to a more inter-subjective bargaining. As Emanuel Adler has argued, constructivism:
Sizes the middle ground because it is interested in understanding how the material, subjective and inter-subjective worlds interact in the social construction of reality, and because, rather than focusing exclusively on how structures constitute agents’ identities and interests, it also seeks to explain how individual agents socially construct these structures in the first place.

Constructivism stresses that security cannot objectively be defined without any reference to inter-subjective understanding. Understanding of security and insecurity cannot be divorced from the values, beliefs, and identity of the person or thing concerned. At the same time, however, security is not simply “all in the mind.” As Thomas Risse-Kappen has argued, ideas “do not float freely.” The task for security studies is thus to combine analysis of material structures with investigation of the perceptions and assumptions of the relevant actors.

To give a better insight into understanding structural security logic I decided to analyze it in relation to difference – ‘peace’, both because they are closely related and highly debated. Indeed, this correlation is done in order to point out some epistemological delimitation, which can be of great help during our research.

Clearly, as Ole Waavel sustains, ‘security’ and ‘peace’ are closely related concepts (2003: 1). I must reiterate that there is a difference between security and peace, and the difference is twofold: both meaning and degree (by degree I mean systemic variations). Having said this and to give a better explanation of this theoretical supposition I have drown a theoretical difference between security and peace. In this regard, I have identified security both at the structural and process level, and peace at the system level, which is to be, achieved though the security process. As the American National Policy Committee puts it, “Peace will not be secured if we organize the world by what divides it” (Brent F. Nelson 2003: 117). Peace is defined as the absence of threat, while security as a capability to deter the existing or the emerging threats. Peace is more likely to be found and backed up by the symbolic and social constructed environment of the system it hosts, while security more or less is being droved by the material factors, ideological context and conceptual understanding, which resides in the existing structural process. Peace can never be identified with a process but it reflects the process result, while security is identified with a process, which leads to a state of peace or war.

This might be the answer of why we have two words that are mostly preferred by two different schools of thought of International Relations: idealist and realist. And, if idealism
largely uses ‘peace’ because this school focus on a more absolutistic approach – to remove the existing threat, Realism is using mostly the term ‘security’ because realism has a more relative conceptual approach in explaining the international relations – the existing threat in an anarchic system can never be removed but successfully managed or deterred. Moreover, the Neorealist School does not recognize peace as a state, as Waltz sustains “in anarchy security is the highest end. … The goal the system encourages them [states] to seek is security” (Waltz 1979: 126) and in order to achieve ‘peace’ we have to prepare for war. This idea hides the meaning of “security dilemma” that for a long period of time scholars have been trying to overcome but without any results. Classical Realism describes it better than I do:

“There is a sense in which peace and co-operation between nations … is a common and universal end irrespective of conflicting interests and politics. … But as soon as the attempt is made to apply these supposedly abstract principles to a correct political situation, they are revealed as the transparent disguises of selfish and vested interests. The bankruptcy of utopianism resides not in its failure to live up to its principles, but in the exposure of its inability to provide any absolute and disinterested standard for the conduct of international affairs” (Carr, 1981: 87-88).

But this is not the point that concerns me most of all. Generally speaking political realism is not so happy to speak about the process functions because it affects its ‘objective’ but irrational theoretical suppositions, which basically are taken for granted.

Now, when we know that security, basically, is defined as the art of survival let me turn this research process to a more applied area. To follow a traditionalistic approach to security, which states that territorial and institutional integrity are the core of military security and defense an interesting equation arises concerning EU security. The EU, as it is well known, is not a nation state. It is hence no bearer of the ‘national security’ flag. It is equally unclear whether the ultimate aim of the Union is a federal European state or whether its present existence as a political system *sui generis* will be prolonged indefinitely as the integration process progresses step by step. By this saying one has to think carefully when applying the concept of military security and defense to this strange political animal. It is probably uncontroversial to propose that in any case ‘European security’ covers the territorial integrity of the Union as a whole, which means the inviolability of the borders of each and every single member state. The mutual relationship of the Union and the integration process is so intense, deep and long-term in nature that it would affect the security of Finland or Sweden if Greece or Portugal were attacked. The EU as such would cease to exist if its Western
members choose not to respond after a member in the East had become a victim of aggression. Fortunately, this most traditional security risk appears very remote. Europe’s territorial security is better than it has ever been, even though there is a residual risk of a Greece-Turkish clash, and the quarrels between Spain and Morocco remain. Neither, however, appears likely to flare up into real war in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the relationships (notably in economic terms) among member states, and the ensuing interconnections between their degrees of national welfare, are so interdependent that the brake-down of the institution of one member state would inevitably affect the stability of all others. In that sense, European security is coextensive with the sum of the national security of all the member states.

The definition of security given here includes the integrity of the institutional setting and the identity of the political unit being considered. In European terms this means both the institutions of the Union and its identity, which is the essence and the direction of the European project. External events that threaten to undermine the very cohesion that keeps the Union together and stands in the way of its further progress must be seen – from the viewpoint of the Union rather than any member state – as the major threat to European security. Thus, even if the security of the individual member state is preserved that of Europe can still be violated; this is an important feature of Europe that has to be kept in mind when discussing its security corollaries.

2.2 Conceptualizing ESDP

Developing a common European security and defense policy and creating a European defense capability to underpin it has been the major issues in the current European debate since 1990’s, which has gain additional significance in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States. It is now frequently seen to be more critical for Europe to have a strong defense capability of its own. Underling different centripetal basis or forces back up this need for Europe to develop a strong military dimension.

Legal Bases

The European Community is not a sovereign state. According to the classical understanding, the competencies of the Community are governed by the principle of attributed powers. The Member States voluntarily transferred strictly determined objects to the supranational
jurisdiction of the Community (Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community [1957-58] ECR 39). In the words of the European Court of Justice: ‘the [Member] States have limited their sovereign rights, *albeit in limited fields* [emphasis added]. This means that the Community has competencies but they are limited to those stipulated in the Treaty. The principle of attributed powers requires a legal base for Community action in the EC Treaty. A legal base is a provision in the Treaty that expressly allocates the competence for action on a particular subject matter to the Community. It prescribes the legal instrument to be used, the Community institutions involved in the legislative process, and the required majorities for the legislation to pass. This suggests a concept of rather limited competencies for the Community. If it is not expressly written down in the EC Treaty, there is no Community competence and the matter remains within the exclusive competence of the Member States. Moreover, this suggests a rather straightforward, easy to handle and clear allocation of competencies. There are areas of activity where the Community has no competence, there are areas where the Member States have no competence, and there are areas where Community and Member States competence can overlap (Weiler 2002: 44).

However, the strict principle of attributed powers is not the last word on the matter of Community competencies. During the 1970s and 1980s the principle eroded to a point where it left no core of sovereign Member State competencies out of the reach of the Community (Weiler 2002: 43; Lenaerts 1990: 220). Theoretically Community action is possible within any field of activity. A full evaluation of this process would go beyond the aim of this article. Moreover, the Treaty provides to separate the competencies in the area of defense. Suffice it to say that the principle of attributed powers does not provide a comprehensive mechanism to divide Community and Member State competencies.

There is no legal base for defense in the Treaty. The Community is mainly a commercial enterprise, with a substantial social agenda, and other policies, such as the protection of the environment. It does not seem to be concerned with defense at all. Defense, however, has commercial, social, and other Community-related implications. Defense procurement (Trybus 199: 71), competition (anti-trust), merger control and state aids (subsidies) in the defense industrial sector (Trybus 1998:117-126), trade of strategic goods (Koutrakos 2001: 93-130; Koutrakos 1998: 235; Eikenberg 2000: 117; Emiliou 1996: 55; Emiliou 1997: 22; Govaere and Eeckhout, 1992: 956), and sex equality in the armed forces (Koutrakos 2000: 433) are examples. There are legal bases for public procurement,

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Since 1992, defense is the subject matter of the second pillar of the Treaty on European Union with the CFSP and since 1998–2000 also the EDSP.
competition law, merger control, state aids, the free movement of goods etc., \(^3\) but nothing for the defense sector per se.

So far, the “legal” framework of the ESDP could be drown within some of the treaty-based commitments of the European Community. According to these commitments EU engages in crisis management activities within the framework of the Petersberg Tasks. The Treaty of Maastricht (1991) followed by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) sought to develop a common EU defense policy and a European defense identity by including the Petersberg Tasks. The basic legal EU achievement regarding the ESDP – Article 17 of the Treaty of the EU – makes the ESDP an integral part of the CFSP. Paragraph 1 of the above mentioned Article very broadly defines the scope of the ESDP, which includes “all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy (…), which might lead to a common defense, should the European Council so decide.”

Paragraph 2 of the same Article specifies that security questions include the Petersberg Tasks, in particular are: “Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”.

Furthermore, at the Franco-British Summit in St-Malo, from December 3-4 1998, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) promoted a common commitment to develop ‘the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and the readiness to do so …\(^4\)’. In the Joint Declaration, some elements illustrated particularly well the new attitude of the British, which was a key element of realistic chances of success to the project:

The EU needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. ... To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis (Franco-British Summit: Joint Declaration on European Defense, December 1998).

United States, while never enthusiastic about the ESDI, recognizes its value if it improved European contribution to common Western efforts. And despite the US reservations about the

\(^3\) See Article 95(1) EC Treaty for public procurement and the free movement of goods as matters relating to the internal market, Article 141(3) EC Treaty, Article 83 EC Treaty for competition law, Article 89 EC Treaty for state aids.

\(^4\) The meaning autonomous is sometimes controversial: while some would argue that an EU operation is autonomous only when NATO is not involved at all, others would maintain that as long as EU has political and operational control at all levels of an operation, the latter can be considered autonomous, even if NATO assets and capabilities are used.
St. Malo event, ESDI was mentioned with approval in the communiqué and in the strategic concepts (Quinlan, Michael 2001: 35).

Many view the shift in the British position as the decisive momentum of the start of the new impetus for the ESDP. Bilateral meetings that were held also with other EU countries further demonstrate that Britain would play a key role in that field. A good example is the British-Italian Summit held in London just after the end of the Kosovo War and the Cologne EU Summit, where the importance of European autonomous military capabilities was underlined again:

Among the clear lessons of Kosovo are … the pressing need for improved European military capabilities … and to ensure the EU has the capacity for autonomous action in the field of the Petersberg tasks …backed by credible military forces (British-Italian Summit, London .19-20 July 1999).

However, the new British position would surely not have been enough to expand the common European strong will and rapidly to materialize these ideas. If the Kosovo crisis and the impossibility to find a negotiated solution had pushed the British to reconsider their position, the Kosovo War was a decisive event in making all European countries to realize how weak the possibility at their disposal was in case a stronger action was needed. As such, the Kosovo War can in many cases be seen as the decisive watershed between political declarations and practical implementation. It surely contributed to enlighten the need of concrete measures within the framework of the CFSP and ESDP, and helped to “remove” internal opposition to any defense structure within the EU.

Two events that took place during the Kosovo War are worth discussing in this context. First, NATO had its 50th Anniversary Summit in April in Washington. The Alliance declared to support the process launched by the EU in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management that could only be favorable to a renewed Alliance. The second event was the entry into forces of the Amsterdam Treaty on the 1st of May 1999, with a new strategic concept based on crisis management. It is in this context that European leaders went to the European Council in Cologne at the beginning of June 1999. The situation was therefore very favorable to go ahead with the ESDP and to take advantage of the new British position. Due to the European frustrations accumulated during the Kosovo War, the somewhat strong formulation of the Presidency Conclusions should not be a surprise. It is interesting to note

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5 The Petersberg Task is fully integrated in the Treaty as possible tasks of the EU in the field of CFSP
that the text specifies that this should occur “without prejudice to actions by NATO” (Presidency Conclusion, Cologne European Summit 3-4 June 1999). The lessons learned during the Kosovo War have brought the European countries to a very realistic view of the situation and of the efforts that have to be made before any efficient European military intervention capability could be formed up:

We therefore commit ourselves to further develop more effective European military capabilities from the basis of existing national, bi-national and multinational capabilities and to strengthen our own capabilities for that purpose (President Conclusion, Cologne European Summit 3-4 Jun 1999, Annex III).

The deficiencies that appeared during the Kosovo War clearly reflected the area where European countries are generally seen so weak that they could not launch any military operation without support from NATO or US. This requires the maintenance of a sustained defense effort, the implementation of the necessary adaptations and notably the reinforcement of EU capabilities in the field of intelligence, strategic transport, command and control. The European countries, hereby, also admitted that required efforts needed to reach the capacity of an autonomous military action are important and have to be undertaken in a long-term perspective. It also can be seen as a call for increased financial resources allocated to defense procurements, or at least for a stop of the ongoing reductions of military budgets. The importance of the procurement dimension is also underlined:

We also recognize the need to undertake sustained efforts to strengthen the industrial and technological defense base, which we want to be competitive and dynamic. We are determined to foster the restructuring of the European defense industries among those states involved. … We will seek further progress in the harmonization of military requirements and the planning and procurement of arms, as member states consider appropriate (Presidency Conclusion, Annex III. June 1999).

In addition, the EU clarified its intention concerning the future of the WEU, announcing it would include “those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfill its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks” (President Conclusion, June 1999). Latter on, in 2001, this plan was applied into practice by including the WEU into the EU forming a new institution with a military-civilian character, and for the first time EU decided to open its own centre for security studies known as the EU Institute for Strategic Studies with its Paris based headquarter.
In Helsinki, December 1999, the European Council underlined its ‘determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions, and where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crisis’ (European Council, Presidency Conclusions. Helsinki, 1999), followed by the Nice Summit (December 2000) where, for the first time, the EU member states discussed the idea of Rapid Reaction Force (RRF).

Despite all this, the communitarian aspects to the Treaty on EU, or as it says previously the ‘treaty-based’ commitments often are sat in a very bizarre contrast to the intergovernmental foreign and security policy, which is little more than a good old-fashioned alliance. It seems that the very confusion that undermines a European Strategic concept has been institutionalized in the heart of the EU itself.

**Security Environment**

A second important base driving the need for a strong European military capability is the emerging security environment where the European nations become more and more involved in progressively demanding military operations beyond Europe’s immediate borders. In 1991, after the EU failed the ability to provide an effective response to the outbreak of the violent conflict in the Yugoslav Federal Republic, EU was criticized for its inability to act ‘in manner of a conventional supper power’ (Buchan 1993: 4). This sentiment is frequently echoed in media reporting, where absence of military instruments directly at the disposal of the EU generally is seen as an impediment to achieve the foreign policy aims. Thus the EU as an external actor is contrasted with a (military strong) state – and found wanting. This appraisal undoubtedly contributed, as we have seen, to pressure for the development of an EU defense dimension, provision for which was included as an aspiration for the future Article J.4 [14] of the Treaty on European Union. Ultimately, it was sustained defense is the key to the development of the community’s place in the world (Hill 1993:318). At the same time, the ongoing events recovered a historical contradiction between some EU member states, primarily France, and US, concerning the European security. Indeed, the prime energizer of this movement was France (Quinlan, Michael 2001: 17).

It is worth mentioning that as a complementary driver for this second base following September 11 the United States is likely to focus less on European security problems (in areas such as Balkans) and move on other priorities such as Meddle East or South East Asia (Gnesotto, N. 2002). More than that, the apparent centrifugal skids in the military strategic
thinking among the members of the Atlantic Alliance seem to provide a new kind of increasing strategic “diversity” that could further back up the common European defense project. This is particularly so for the EU and its member states: for strategic “diversity” is a luxury that might be tolerated among actors distant from each other within a relatively benign security environment, but is dangerously self-indulgent in Europe at the best of times and becomes progressively more dangerously if tangible threats emerge.

The nature of the new security environment militates against consensus on a transatlantic strategic concept. As Lawrence Freedman states, “the challenge is undoubtedly difficult for its most striking feature it is lack of a fix form. The new circumstances and capabilities do not prescribe one strategy, but extend the range of strategies that might be followed.” Somewhere Mearsheimer makes a valid point when he writes: “States still fear each other and seek to gain power to each other’s expense, even within the strategically safer confines of the EU, because international anarchy – the driving force behind Great Powers behavior – did not change with end of the Cold War, and there are few signs that such a change is likely soon” (Mearsheimer, J. 2001: 361). The new security environment is being shaped not only by a new structural architecture but also by the new geopolitical initiatives. For example, the new military doctrines that rearm the US military strategic thinking definitely provide a ‘motto’ for this kind of changes. The new military doctrine announced by the US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, before the ‘Iraq war’, which states that ‘the mission must determine the coalition’ and not other way around is one of the examples that backs up the above-mentioned thought. However, the most important and well-defined meaning of the new security environment has been keenly emphasized and given by German Minister of Defense Dr. Peter Struck. Dr. Struck reiterated that the EU would have an expanding role in crises where civil and security issues were at stake. "Nobody can afford the luxury of relying [security] on one organization," said Struck (Peter Struck 2004). A clearer picture of the EU security environment will follow in the next chapters.

2.3 ESDP: Concept or Reality

The European defense remains to be trapped between engaged and disengaged concepts of security, reflecting profound strategic confusion within Europe over the objectives and methods of its security and defense. On the one hand, there is a minimalist, defensive commitment to the protection of the European citizens; on the other there is a more aggressive
pursuit of security through pre-emption (Lindley-French, J. 2002: 789). The obsessive preoccupation of west Europeans with the nature of the mechanism they are creating rather than the environment in which it resides could, like its forebear, render Europe incapable of dealing with those threats when they become truly menacing. Consequently, European security and defense is somehow less than the sum of its parts. What Europe is defending, again whom, where, why and how seem to be intangibles.

Some authors argue that the EU defense is failing because, in the absence of a transnational strategic concept shared and agreed upon by the European great powers, there are no guidelines for the application of European coercive power – be it within the EU or beyond it. The hideously complex relationship between states and institutions in Europe is further preventing the construction of effective security policy. If we have a glance at the EU member states strategic thinking we can easily depict an unprepared ‘common line’ of such kind of policy. German policy, for example, is founded upon two basic principles: first, all German engagements on the international stage must be looked firmly within a multilateral framework; second, little or no Germans military power must be used. Italy, at the same time, continues to be an enigma. Too after Italy is a big country that behaves like a small one; lacking sufficient strategic self-confidence to develop a strategic concept for itself, it tends to wait to be informed of its strategic direction by the directoire of Britain, France, and Germany.

The competing and contradictory strategic concepts of both minor and major European and extra-European States are reflected in the institutions that they created and in which their security is founded. Unsure whether they are guardians of values, vehicles for pursuit of interests or shields for Europe’s protections, the OSCE, EU and NATO compete and contend. In the absence of a defining systemic threat, they are ambiguous and ambivalent in respect of the demarcation of their respective responsibilities, roles and purposes; the boundaries between regime, alliance and community become progressively blurred and their strategic concepts even more confused.

At the political level the EU member states need to reconsider the relationships between institutions, and to equip them with the means to undertake policies appropriated for the evolution of the European defense policy. While the EU members have pledged to develop a rapid reaction force, how that institution would undertake a military operation is not clear yet. Nor is there much clarity on sensitive issues such as how non-EU members of the NATO will interact with the EU. The relationship between the newly security-conscious – EU
and NATO – is also another potential source of controversy (Guay, T, and Callum, R. 2002: 775).

The Cologne Summit was very important in the sense that European countries repeatedly underlined that the project of the European intervention capabilities has to be an open one. First, they decided to be open for all NATO member states, with which a close cooperation has to exist in order to avoid duplicating unnecessary competition for security issues, and also in order to make sure that the European Union can use NATO assets when NATO itself is not involved. Second, the EU wants to keep a door open for participation of non-EU members to EU-led operations. This would not only allow European NATO non-EU members to contribute to future operations, but also allow all other (mostly European states) to participate in operations where their security interests might be engaged.

If the Cologne Summit can be seen as a formal declaration of intention of the member states of the EU, the next Summit held in December 1999 in Helsinki was a real launching of the concrete measures that should lead to the realization of the intervention capabilities. The ESDP as part of the CFSP was started as such. For the first time, concrete numbers and a timetable were articulated. Institutional bodies that are needed in order to realize the objectives were identified and the decision was taken to establish them rapidly at least as an intermediary solution, in order to allow the process to go on. The principles of the EU-led operation were clarified. At the same time, the importance of non-military tools for the complete range of crisis-management capabilities was underlined and relevant decision also taken.

In Helsinki, member states agreed on a Headline Goal: They intended by year 2003 to be able to deploy up to 15 brigades or 50’000-60’000 persons in operations up to army corps level, within 60 days, for at least one year. Some smaller rapid response elements should be available and deployable “at very high readiness”. The replacement units should also be organized in advance. Even if the members’ states did not at that time fix a precise quantity of aircrafts and ships for these forces, it appeared that some hundreds of aircrafts and up to 100 ships would be needed. The decision taken in Helsinki show clearly that at least for the moment, the EU is not developing an European army but a military crisis management capability, which should back up and create the deterrent element of a global crisis management capability where civilian instruments should play the main role. Because of its specific design, this deployable intervention capability cab hardly is considered as the first step towards a European army. The challenge constituted by the establishing process of the military intervention forces, capable of fulfilling the most demanding Petersberg tasks, is
demanding enough and will constitute an interesting test of the common will to act militarily when needed before any other more ambitious project.

Lessons learned during the Kosovo War had however pushed some European countries to start immediately some measures aiming at improving the effectiveness of their reaction forces. These measures are mentioned in the Helsinki Presidency Conclusions and fit exactly in the need efforts to establish the European intervention capabilities.

Planning for the realization of the intervention capabilities started immediately within the new established interim bodies (the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee, and the Military Staff). The Presidency of Portugal was characterized by the large amount of issues that suddenly had to be tackled, all of them being essential for the realization of the concept. In this regard the first task was to identify the national capabilities needed to meet the Headline Goal concerning the amount of military forces needed. In this framework, it was also necessary to study how it could be possible to include third countries in EU crisis management, this means not only to include their military forces in EU-led operations, but also to integrate them in the planning and command process. In addition, a new concept for the further development of the EU-NATO relationship, especially concerning the principle of consultations and the modalities of use of NATO assets by EU for military crisis management operations has to be elaborated.

Due to the progress made during the first half of 2000, the General Affairs Council and the Ministers of Defense of the EU member states could agree on the Capabilities Commitment Conference (CCC) that was finally held on the 20th of November (Ryter M.A. 2001: 20). All member states were able to finalize their initial offers for this date. The CCC held in Brussels showed that the quantitative objectives could be reached and that the contributions of the different member countries would cover the needs to fulfill all the different types of crisis management operations (Petersberg tasks). In addition, other European non-EU members announced their readiness to make substantial contributions to EU-led operations.

A look at Europe today would suggest that in certain quarters this is a persistent failure: for some the appearance of power is more important than the fact, bringing with it the danger of strategic overstretch; for while it has more potential power at its disposal than it have had for a very long time and is possessed of a sufficiently stable political platform from which to project it, European leaders lack either the ingenuity or the clarity to know to use it to long-term advantage and/or effect: partly because such power can be effective in the wider world only though the kind of power aggregation that is implicit in the structure of the EU but
which its leading member states deny it, to read a thought by John Locke, ‘we are far stronger when we stand with other nations than when we stand alone’.

The EU efforts to drive a Common security and defense policy have been worth in high-profile organizational and declaratory terms, rather those in terms of generating additional military capabilities and taking action. It should be recalled that, despite its name, the ESDP does not show to provide for ‘collective defense’ (for the EU’s NATO members this remains under the ‘defense alliance’ responsibility), but mostly for an ability to perform the “Petersberg tasks” – that is ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’.

It goes further by a profound disagreement among the member’s states over extend and the utility of the power that is to be transferred. It not only prevents the development of a working European strategic concept but also threatens the future development of the Union itself. In effect, political and economic interdependence and the spread of liberal democratic values across the continent have produced the basis for a new concert. That will require that all EU member states recognize three fundamental principles: they will all have to give up more of what has traditionally belonged to state prerogatives if security is to be effective; accept the leadership of the tri-rectories; and invest in the armed forces that can give the EU sufficient clout and credibility worldwide to ensure that the times when Europe has to resort to armed forces are limited.

2.4 Overcoming the Concept-Reality Dichotomy

Pier Hassner pointing out long ago in the interests of peace and stability said: “Some multilateral framework, some collective arrangement committing stronger states to the protection and restraint of smaller ones must be an essential part of any European System”. So far, the ESDP remains to be perforated by an incrementalistic policy stile. There is no ground view or plan how it will look like in the two or ten years, and solutions come when the problem is faced. It is more than a traditional reflex, reflecting precisely the failure to develop a coherent European strategic concept reinforced by the inherent weaknesses of both the states and the institutions they create and their inability to deliver the security “good”. Put it simply, west European states are failing to face up to their security responsibilities, with possible disastrous consequences for European citizens in the years to come.
According to the postmodern theoretical principles EU, as a political entity, has the following security characteristics: based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability. Within the post-modern world, there are no security threats in the traditional sense; that is to say, its members do not consider invading each other. The “interests” that are debated with the EU are essential matters of policy preference and burden sharing. If the EU could maintain cohesion, it might be on a derectiore rather than a communautaire basis. More cohesive EU outcomes are nonetheless theoretically possible. In circumstances like the Cremieux scenario (that is the US disengagement, for whatever reason); if the EU faced a grave external threat or large-scale disorders within Europe, the Union political bodies might show Churchillian determination in dealing with the challenges. Josef Joffe once expressed a related view in blunter terms: “Costly as it is, American European investment has yielded enormous profits – notably decades of tranquility on a continent whose strategic importance in this century has been dwarfed only by its inability to manage its own security affairs when left alone” (1984: 82).

According to the Report presented by the Nice European Council, EU will, as a priority, pass “from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention”. Any action or policy in the field of crisis management has to be able to rely on good and rapid early warning and situation analysis. These elements associated with efficient costs/results analysis of all options as well as precise military planning and command are absolutely essential for success. Moreover, it claims that areas where European interests could be at stake are not limited geographically. Therefore, multifaceted and geographically unlimited nature of future challenges requires an EU defense capability that is flexible, responsive and deployable. Generally speaking deploy-ability encompasses two elements: readiness and strategic mobility. Readiness refers to the time when, following a decision on the forces required, a unit can be made ready to perform its assigned tasks – but does not include transit time to the area of operations. Strategic mobility refers to transit time or the ability to relocate one’s forces and equipment to a design area of operations. Both elements are critical in terms of their impact on deploy-ability targets – it is no use having forces at very high readiness if one cannot move them into theatre (Lutz, R. A. 2001: 35).

The way the EU member’s states will organize their interests the policy outcomes will depend on. The first factor shaping the policy outcomes should be the organization of existing interests, institutional arrangements, and capabilities. The second factor should be the political leadership, and strategic thinking. But still, the EU members cannot agree on security issues: whether the EU will seek denuclearization, with or without Russia, or become a nuclear
The Iraq conflict ignited transatlantic tensions smoldering since the end of the Cold War. Politicians in both Europe and America profess to regret the obvious split within the once-sturdy Atlantic Alliance at the level of perception the United States and its people clearly perceive their security needs very differently than do most of Europe’s governments and its peoples (see “International Survey”, The German Marshal Fund. March, 2003). The continuing existence of the “Cold War” relic stands in the way of the necessary evolution of European integration to include full responsibility for continental security. In the 21st century, Europe can neither become a responsible power centre nor a competent partner for the United States so long as Europeans remain dependent on a non-European power for their security, or even for the appearance of their security. The core dynamic of the European Union is integration and the sharing of former national prerogatives. This dynamic has progressed quite far in many areas but remains inert in defense policy because NATO has remained the primary security instrument for most EU members. It remains the most effective military organization capable of responding to system breakdown, as events in Kosovo were to show (Tiersky, Ronald 2004: 89). The Alliance, however, is not a mechanism of European defense integration, nor has it ever been. NATO is a mechanism to integrate American power into Europe. Yet its very success has inhibited significant military integration within Europe. Despite a number of showcase combined units, like the Danish-German-Polish Corps or the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion, there is no aspect of public policy in Europe today as rigidly organized within national parameters as defense.

The consequence is grotesque: a European defense establishment in which the whole is significantly less than the sum of its parts. Many of the parts are excellent, with Europe fielding high quality units and capabilities that, in some cases (such as paramilitary units), are superior to those of the United States. Yet, except for Britain and France (and increasingly even for them), the lack of scale, the fragmentation and duplication, and the sheer waste of resources within European defense establishments vitiate what could be the world’s second-strongest concentration of military power. That Europe fields two million personnel in uniform is not an achievement but the heart of the problem. Half the number “even one-quarter” properly led, equipped and trained in modern operational skills, would produce a whole much greater than the disparate national parts deployed today.
The problem is not really one of money, and the United States has done ill service by so often measuring “burden-sharing” in financial rather than operational terms. True, most European countries spend far less of their national income on defense than does the United States, but this is a doubly false comparison (Wayne, E. Merry, 2004). First, the aggregate of European defense spending is vast and dwarfs the resources available to any power centre on earth other than the United States. Without spending another euro, Europe has a combined military budget beyond the dreams of Russian, Chinese, Indian or other military planners. Second, America spends defense money in ways Europe need not, as Europe has no pretensions to be a global military power with the attendant “and costly” instruments of global force projection.

Some of the international relations scholars argue that EU is an economic giant but political dwarf (Paul T.V. and Hall, John A. 2001: 155-177). The problem in Europe, however, is that the bulk of defense spending has little to do with defense, but is allocated to create direct and indirect employment and to retain a pattern of redundant, if ineffective, “balanced” national force structures. To spend more money in this context would produce little in the way of additional usable capability. The obvious answer is greater integration of European defense efforts and forces. The leading edge of this process today is integration of Europe’s defense industries, where there has already been considerable progress under the force of necessity from reduced acquisition budgets, as in the creation of the European Aeronautic Defense and Space multinational conglomerate.

There is nothing novel about multilingual and cross-border defense cooperation in Europe. If European units can cooperate within NATO, they have the talent to do so within a European rubric. The challenge lies in outgrowing the heavy hand of American tutelage and learning to do things without always asking for American guidance. That this can be done was shown in the Balkans where Italian-Belgian led operations in Albania and Eastern Slovenia performed as well as, if not better than, US-led missions, while the non-US peacekeeping districts in Bosnia and Kosovo are well-run without Americans. The necessary next step is to expand this experience to a broader European strategic concept.

To any citizen of Europe the basic stake is huge. European integration cannot attain maturity without full responsibility for Europe’s defense. Much of the public skepticism within Europe about the developing pace of integration stems precisely from a widely-held understanding that a United Europe is a sham so long as it remains subordinate to the United States in the most fundamental area of public policy. It is therefore wrong to wait until other major integration issues are resolved. The building of a union does not proceed in neat and
distinct stages, but in a synergism of parallel developments in many fields. Security policy
cannot be placed into a desk drawer while a European constitution is on the table. Indeed, the
creation of a common European security system to replace NATO “and incorporating much
that NATO has built over the years” will go a long way toward persuading its citizens that
“Europe” is a genuine concept worthy of their support and participation.

European capabilities already far exceed European self-confidence. Europe will
remain inferior to the United States in power projection and logistics, but that would only be
important if Europe were to emulate America’s global role. Europe played that game once and
lacks the will to repeat it; nor would the continent’s weak demographics support it.
Nonetheless, a “Europuissance” able to maintain continental stability, participate successfully
in peacekeeping operations and project power into regions proximate to Europe is well within
Europe’s grasp. None of these duties requires the global air and sealift, the bombardment
capabilities or the scale of America’s military establishment. What they do require is
European self-confidence and a willingness to proceed without looking always for
instructions from Washington. Many Europeans admit they want to maintain NATO so that
the Americans will pay a large share of Europe’s security costs. This is a classic problem of
welfare dependency. Few refuse a subsidy, even when they recognize they would be more
independent and productive without it. Free money has a narcotic effect on governments,
especially finance ministers, but narcotic dependency is widely recognized to be unhealthy,
producing lethargy and leading to gradual deterioration of the organism. The reality stands in
sharp contrast. Europe has a larger population than America, a total economy of comparable
size, a modern industrial and technological base often very competitive with America’s (and
certainly beyond those of any other part of the world), and a vast wealth of relevant military
and political experience. The notion that, somehow, Europe is “not ready” for security
independence seems to be a nonsense.

There is no need to bemoan the passing of NATO. Alliances are not pyramids but
pragmatic undertakings like business partnerships. It is almost a truism of history that
alliances die after achieving victory. The Atlantic Alliance was a remarkable success among
military pacts. Not only did it maintain cohesion longer than most alliances, but also it
fulfilled its most optimistic agenda in full, with minimal violence or destruction. But all
human activities have their term, and the supreme wisdom in political thought knows when
not to press a policy too far.
Chapter III

Power and Disillusion

3.1 Security and Defense Policy in Contemporary-International Relations

“For certainly, as long as men are men, ... and as long as reason is reason, a just fear will be a just cause of a preventive war” (Bacon, Francis 1847: 477).

It's an interesting reflection on our democratic age how nations are now expected to define and promote the security and defense policy. Generally it remains to be an easy deduction of their “grand strategies”, which, so far, remain easily accessible to the public at large. This practice would have surprised Metternich, Bismarck, and Lord Salisbury, though not Pericles. Concerned about not revealing too much, most great strategists in the past have preferred to concentrate on implementation, leaving explanation to historians. The first modern departure from this tradition came in 1947 when George F. Kennan revealed the rationale for containment in Foreign Affairs under the inadequately opaque pseudonym "Mr. X," but Kennan regretted the consequences and did not repeat the experiment. Not until the Nixon administration did, the official statements of national security strategy became routine. Despite his reputation for secrecy, Henry Kissinger's "State of the World" reports were remarkably candid and comprehensive so much that they were widely regarded at the time as a clever form of disinformation. They did, however, revive the Periclean precedent that in a democracy even grand strategy is a matter for public discussion (John Lewis Gaddis 2002)⁶.

Although Lewis Gaddis contradicts the realistic theoretical tenet, nowadays, realism remains to be the most influential theory to explain security and defense policy, and the strategy or doctrine of war – “pre-emptive strike” – is so influential today as it was during the nineteen and twenty century. The only deference, I can say, is not in the theoretical aspects or

⁶ John Lewis Gaddis is the Robert A. Lovett professor of military and naval history at Yale University.
practical implementation using tactical or strategic tools etc., but it is in the very meaning emphasized by John Lewis: “[it] is a matter for public discussion”.

“To explain war is easier than to understand the conditions of peace”, said Waltz. If one asks what may cause war, the simple answer is “anything.” That’s the Kant answer: “The natural state is the state of war” (2000: 7). Under the conditions of international politics war recurs, and the sure way to abolish war is to abolish international politics. As the majority Doctrines of War the top idea of pre-emptive strike seems to date even from the ancient Rome and used as a truly explanation of Imperial Expansionism. During the history the pre-emptive strike ideas was treaded and defended by different philosophers in different ways. Nevertheless, there is a common line of thoughts, which claim that \textit{in order to protect your self you have to strike first}. This is clear a morally fraught matter, as by definition the aggressor has not actually been harmed, and his judgment about the necessity of his action might well be called into action both by the victim and by a neutral observer (Tuck, Richard 2001: 18). Cicero, one of the greatest orators and philosophers of the ancient times, said: “A war is never undertaken by the ideal State, except in defense of its honor or its safety” and “those wars are unjust which are undertaken without provocation. For only a war waged for revenge or defense can actually be just” (see De Republica) and that the “apparent injustice of an imperial hegemony could be defended as being in the necessary interests of Rome” (see De Officiis) (in Garusey P.D.A 1978: 177).

In some areas a more placed relationship between natural men is possible. And one such area is of particularly great importance, namely the mutual recognition by natural men of the meanings they attach to the description of self-protective conduct. For example, in the eloquent and striking passage of \textit{De Cive} where Hobbes set out his case against the natural sociability of man, he accepted that one could have ordinary interactions motivated by a desire for mutual assistance. By nature, we are not looking for friends but for honors or advantage from them. This is what we are primarily; friends are secondary. Men’s purpose in seeking each other’s company may be inferred from what they do once they meet. … Every voluntarily encounter is a product either of mutual need or of the pursuit of glory; hence when people meet, what they are anxious to get is either an advantage for himself, which reputation and honors among their companions (Hobbes, T. 1998: 22-23).

Gentili and Molina very well argued the legitimacy of pre-emptive strike: “For Gentili,” the survival of a state was of such overriding importance that many conventional moral constraints (notably, the requirements not to strike pre-emptive on the basis of fear) did not apply to it. According to Gentile the State was already the autonomous agent of the great
seventeenth-century writers, governed by an extreme thin set of moral requirements – and in particular his state was already Hobbes’s man, acting on the basis of fear and striking at whatever seemed to be a threat, whether it had manifested itself as such or not (Tuck 2001: 228). Against this argument Samuel Pufendorf said: “only if there was clear evidence that the aggressive state possess a “real Design” to attack us, were we entitled to strike first.” This argument of S. Pufendorf implied a highly restricted attitude to the European colonial expansion, and the internecine wars of the continent itself (Tuck, 2001: 161), which largely is used by nowadays-strategic doctrines, though the idea that war could legitimately be made for imperial power and glory never vanished from European minds.

Just after the terrorist attacks on US the political speech has begun to be intensively perforated by the double standards: freedom, democracy, liberty from the one side; and war, pre-emptive strikes, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, rogue states, axis of evil from the other. The main idea of the political speech in support for pre-emptive strike begins with the prevailing norms of “the system culture.” According to Wendt’s “culture of anarchy” to observe and to follow some cultural norms are in the very interest of the actors, because they are forced to do, it is their self-interests, and they receive the norms as legitimate (Wendt, A. 1999: 253) – following cultural norms, sometimes, we may obtain a good reason to legitimate our activities within the system structure. The subset of social structure, known as “culture,” is made up by sheared ideas. At the same time - shared ideas is one of the “rules” of social structure and to say that a structure is “social” is to say, following Weber, that actors take each other “into account” in choosing their actions (Wendt, A. 1999: 250). The point here is not to analyze the political speech but to emphasize that the “renewed” pre-emptive strike ideas, built on the basis of cultural meaning, has a kind of “international” dimension too which, as Wendt says, is very important when we speak about an phenomena, event, etc. This is a part of classical political speech with cultural effects:

The greatest struggle of the twenty-century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom… Freedom are true and right for every person, in every society – and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages. … Freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person – in every civilization. Throughout history, freedom has been threatened by war and terror; it has been challenged by widespread poverty and disease. Today, humanity holds in his hands the opportunity to further freedom’s triumph over all

The NSS is careful to specify a legal basis for pre-emption: international law recognizes "that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack." There's also a preference for pre-empting multilaterally: "The United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community." But "we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country." Pre-emption in turn requires hegemony. Although Bush speaks in his letter of transmittal of creating "a balance of power that favours human freedom" while forsaking "unilateral advantage," the NSS makes it clear that "our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States."

September 11\textsuperscript{th} events is another real fact of human history that the existing measures of security and protection are far from being sufficient to maintain a good security environment of people, states and the system if international relations as a whole. Students of International Security Studies together with decision makers have proclaimed that this new pattern of threat to international security can be classified as a new type of war in IR. German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fisher, has called the combination of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists driven by anti-Western ideologies as “the new totalitarian threat” (Ronald D. Asmus and Kenneth M. Pollack 2002). President of the United States in a ‘West Point’ speech argue “the gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology - when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends - and we will oppose them with all our power” (Bush, West Point, 2002).

In general, the threat in international system is nearly always real enough to make their exaggeration credible. At an extreme, the need for national security can ever be evoked as a reason for not discussing it (Buzan 1991: 11). September 11 has shown us that our last policies have led us into a strategic dead end. Such changes have to be understood not only in themselves, but also in terms of their impact on prevailing strategic theories and politics.
These disputes revolve around how the US and Europe view the outside world, assess threats, and seek to meet them. They are rooted not only in their respective interests but are shaped by their size, historical experiences, strategic cultures, and the asymmetry in power and responsibility that both sides of the Atlantic bring to the table (Kargan, Robert 2002). As a result, in order to overcome the so-called “strategic gap or vacuum” of International Security, the main and useful method to prevent it is to use the pre-emptive strike measures and the United States welcomes their “responsibility” to lead in this great mission. This is hardly the first time in recent history that the idea of pre-emptive strike has been pushed into the public eye.

The United States and its NATO allies used the argument of ‘pre-emptive self-defense’ against terrorism for the first time as justification for their military intervention in Afghanistan, followed by the US Defense Secretary’s claims that ‘pre-emptive self-defense’ is the legal basis for all the United States military interventions throughout the world. Most significantly, the United States has asserted its right to pre-emptive self-defense against the development and proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as justification for a full-scale military attack on Iraq (see David Sanger). In this way, the plea of self-defense where no clear aggression by another state has occurred can become the justification for hegemonic military intervention by powerful states – the same plea that was made by the Soviet Union as justification for its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 - and creates the legal basis for a dangerous anarchy in international relations in the new multipolar world of powerful states.

In effect, this re-interpretation of the legal basis for waging war in self-defense radically alters the “laws of war” and threatens a disturbing escalation of the threat or use of force. First, any powerful state can now wage war against another country on the pretext of fighting terrorism. Second, every vulnerable country will now feel under pressure to build up its military capability, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, in order to deter an attack by a powerful state on the allegation that it has harboured or sponsored terrorists. Third, terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda find themselves in the powerful position of being able to provoke a high-tech war through a low-tech attack, possibly using nuclear, chemical or biological materials.

The UN Security Council has set out its own response to the threat from terrorism. It affirmed “the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts...”. It called on all states "to bring to justice" those responsible for the attack and stressed that those responsible
for helping the perpetrators and sponsors of these acts "will be held accountable". It set out a whole series of practical measures that should be taken by member states "to prevent and suppress terrorist acts ... in their territories through all lawful means". It also expressed "its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks”, in conformity with the UN Charter\(^7\). Nowhere in these Resolutions does the Security Council propose or imply any modification of Article 51 to cover a terrorist attack. The plea of self-defense as a legal basis for war has already been used in a number of cases to justify an armed attack against a non-aggressor country, which the UN Security Council was not prepared to authorize. In the new circumstances of a multipolar world of strong states, an agreed interpretation of the legal basis for waging war has become an important condition for maintaining international peace and security (Christopher Greenwood and Adam Roberts 2001; Michael Byers 2001).

A priority for the United Nations, when all other measures fail, is to enforce peace through military action on the decision of the Security Council (Ch.VII, Arts.42-50). While the Security Council authorizes military action to repel Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, it did not authorize military action by the United States and Britain against Iraq, after it had been defeated in the Iraq-Kuwait war. Nor did it authorize military action by the US-led coalition in Afghanistan, which was undertaken on the plea of collective self-defense (Art.51). All these facts once again demonstrate the subordination of the international organizations to national purposes. Thus Susan Strange, in pondering the state’s retreat, observes, “international organizations is above all a tool of national government, an instrument for the pursuit of national interest by other means” (1998: 192-193). States, therefore, construct institutions to improve both their information about others and their own credibility, to ameliorate the dilemmas and defensive stances otherwise dictated by realism’s hard-core assumption (Elman, Colin and Elman, Miriam Fendius, editors 2003: 81).

Machiavelli said: “Trust no one, prepare for war if you want to survive, the ends justify the means”. International Laws, institutionalized by International Organizations, and Institutions exist, but the ability to these superstructure to counter the material base of power and interests seems limited because “when the arms speak, the laws are silent” (Cicero 1979: 16-17). The US National Security Strategy proclaims that: “While we recognize that our best defense is a good offence, we are also strengthening America’s homeland security to protect against and deter attack.” Is it an effect of the anarchic culture emphasized by Wendt or it is mostly directed to power politics process so common in the International Relations? I am

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\(^7\) UN Resolutions 1368 (12 September 2001) and 1373 (28 September 2001).
more and more attempted to agree both with Wendt as well as with Morgenthau, who in 1967 claims that “statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power”. According to a new survey by the German Marshall Fund of the United States the European and American views of security threats differ. One of the sharpest trans-Atlantic splits in perception revealed by the polls concerns the future balance of power between Europe and the United States. "There is a sharp divergence between Europeans and Americans here," Pierangelo Everts, political science professor at the University of Siena, Italy, and one of the new report's authors, said that: "Washington doesn't like the idea of an eventual European superpower" (Brooks Tigner 2002).

Although “dates show nothing” but explain a lot, we can get good conclusion if we get through. In is a vulnerable point of the nowadays pre-emptive attack. The vulnerability is dictated both by the survey results and also by the actions and interactions, dependence and interdependence of the international actors and geopolitical poles. President Bush has moved beyond Washington's half-century-old strategy of deterrence and said the country will launch pre-emptive military strikes when necessary rather than waiting to be attacked by terror groups or rogue states. But most European allies oppose the idea of pre-emption, especially without a United Nations mandate to use force. Under the logic of deterrence, an adversary is kept from taking hostile action by fear of massive military retaliation. "The deterrent power of the United States did not seem to deter al Qaeda in attacking us," the official said. "Pre-emptive action, in certain circumstances, when you have good intelligence, may be the way forward.” But we are not asserting as a country, as a government, that that is the answer to every security problem around the world" (Reuters, 31 October 2002).

Since the state is a structure of political authority with a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, when it comes to the regulation of violence internationally it is the state one ultimately in power to control it (Wendt 1999: 8). There are two kinds of states: a “status quo sates” and a “revisionist states” (Wendt 1999: 124). In the case of the US, even in the case of pre-emption, we deal with a “status quo state”; according to the US security strategy the US has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to their national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction — and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. There is no intention to conquer other countries, and to change the roles of the game but to preserve, maintain and delivery security “by organizing coalitions-as broad as practicable-of states able and willing to promote a balance of power that favours freedom.” Secretary General, Lord Robertson
claims that "delivering security in a dangerous world. It’s easy to say. It’s harder to do. You cannot deliver security in isolation. A Maginot Line mentality and a Maginot Line strategy are no more effective against today’s threats than they were in past wars. Effective cooperation in security and defense must be the sum of political will plus the right capabilities” (Lord Robertson 2002). The desire plus believes plus reason equals action but not the change of the status quo.

It is well known, Political Realism proclaims that material forces constitute the essence of power, form the other side Social Constructivism proclaims that power is constituted primarily by ideas and cultural contexts. The character of the international life is determined by the beliefs and expectations that states have about each other and these are constituted largely by social rather than material structures. This does not mean that material power and interest are unimportant, but rather that their meaning and effects depend on the social structure of the system, and specifically on which the three “cultures” of anarchy is dominant – Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian (Wendt 1999: 20). However in anarchy actors must also worry that others will gain more from cooperation than they do, since those relative gains might be turned later into military advantage. The fear to relative loss my make no cooperation preferable to some (Waltz 1979). In this situation the international system might be easily influenced by the US game, not because of the so-called “sustained US legitimacy” to do it or because of the big US “atomistic” lobbies and the policy reaction, but because of the distribution of the capability which is very important in the International System. The distribution of capabilities refers to the extern to which material power resources (especially economic and military) are concentrated in the system. We do not have to think too much to say that the US is net superior in comparison with other “systemic geopolitical poles.” Although the distribution of capabilities is an aggregate of the unit level attributes, it is a property of the system as a whole with effects that cannot be reduced to the unit-level. The assumptions about motivations made by Waltz seem to be important in this context that sates are egoistic or self-regarding and that states are security-seeking phenomenon. As Mearsheimer points out, the international system generates three patterns of behavior: fear, self-help, and power maximization (2001: 32).

The preferred approach against the existing threats is to contain it. This strategy could expand the numbers, presences, and areas of terrorist support. Perceived unwarranted attacks on sovereign countries will anger a sufficient number of the attacked country's citizens to join in terrorist actions. Terrorist numbers will expand, the scope of terrorist actions will increase and the area of terrorist support will grow. The war on terrorism will become endless and the
International Security System remains to be doomed to an eternity of provocations. Anthony Blinken, an international security expert at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. says: “Many in Washington now recognize that America is moving into uncharted territory by adopting a pre-emptive strike policy. There is widespread feeling that new approaches need to be explored following 11 September. It certainly has not been American foreign policy to act pre-emptively. For the last 50 years, that has not been our first recourse," Blinken says: "… people do have to think hard about the new world that we are in and ask themselves the question whether talking about pre-emptive strikes isn't at least something worth debating, because things move so much faster and so much more lethally in a world where borders matter much less than they ever did before” (Charles Recknagel 2002).

It is unsurprising, however, that having fulfilled their hegemonic ambitions following the Soviet Union’s collapse, preponderance’s advocates want to keep the world the way it is. US grand strategists view the prospect of change in international relations in much the same way that British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury did toward the end of the nineteenth century (Art, Robert J. and Waltz, Kenneth N. 2004: 298).

The problem of pre-emptive strike resumes not only in what we can see previously, the most obvious and logic problem is that if national security is taken as an end, as US now tries to do, one runes immediately into the problem that it can never be achieved. Complete security, according to realist point of view, cannot be obtained in an anarchic system, and therefore to hold that goal as an aspiration is to condemn oneself to pursue an operationally impossible objective. If national security is a relative end, then complicated and objectively unanswerable question arise about how much security is enough? because relative security is a permanent unsatisfactory condition (Buzan 1991: 330-331). The difficulty is that while national security in general represents a state level objective, this objective cannot be achieved without taking action not only on the state level, but also on the regional and system level. When we are in power to eliminate the threat and to install absolute security at the system level only in that situation we can overcome the security difficulties at the national level. Because the international system is anarchic the surest way to abolish the international conflicts is to abolish the international politics (Waltz, K. 2000: 8). The greatest theorist of strategy, Carl von Clausewitz, repeatedly emphasized the role of chance, which can at times defeat the best of designs and at other times hand victory to the worst of them. For this reason, he insisted, theory can never really predict what's going to happen.

EU is far from being able to deal effectively with these threats. There are some EU official declarations but they are helpless. Indeed, the existing declarations seem to have a
lack of management of the ongoing construction of the emerging security environment. Broadly, three big contradictions are to be reconciled in order to deal more effectively with the existing security threats: the EU member states positions; the academic circles positions or lack of common knowledge, of the “shared mental model”; and the emerging euro-Atlantic strategic culture differentiations. Unless EU does not reconcile all the structural contradictions the EU security and defense policy process will be very confused and the threat out there could become more eminent and dangerous.

3.2 EU Defense Illusions

EU remains to be preoccupied with building up the ESDP - separate military planning capability, security strategy and military forces. If it is not a direct claim then the general indirect aim is to exclude non-EU member states from the European security and defense framework. It takes a shape of a “Monroe Doctrine” of the 21st century, this time under a different gravitational and synergetic point: “Europe for Europeans”. It reflects a determination embodied in the draft of the EU constitution to transfer decision-making in such matter to the EU level, undermining the sovereign independence of America's closest allies in Europe. It may seem perverse for the EU to follow such a unilateralist path, after accusing the US so recently of unilateralism (Jenkin, Bernard 2003). Moreover, it may seem wasteful, unnecessary and disruptive competitor (Haass, Richard N. editor, 1999: 1-7). When it was first mooted by the UK and France in 1998, Madeleine Albright, then US Secretary of State, reiterated against "the three Ds" - duplication of NATO structures, discrimination against non-EU members of NATO, and decoupling of US and European defense policies.

Without any consultation in NATO or with the US, the EU Summit from December 2002, in Copenhagen unilaterally announced the EU intention to take over NATO's peacekeeping role in Bosnia. So far, the US has strongly rejected this. Also, every concession the US makes to the EU defense agenda strengthens France's ambition to decouple US and European security policy and to undermine NATO's pre-eminence. Under these circumstances, seemingly, the ESDP helps create exactly the multipolar, not multilateral, world that is so clearly against the US military might. France, ‘as the prime energizer of ESDP movement’, is now driving the crucial defense and foreign policy proposals in the EU draft constitution, including increased majority voting in foreign affairs, scope for "enhanced co-operation", so the EU can act even if some member states do not wish to participate, and
an enabling clause for a mutual defense commitment for the whole EU, which is a direct challenge to the primacy of NATO's Article 5.

This is all backed by a general provision, compelling member states "actively and unreservedly" to "support the Union's common foreign and security policy" and to "refrain from action contrary to the Union's interests". Unlike NATO, its own supreme court – European Court of Justice, will enforce the EU constitution. The effects could become a progressive limitation of the ability of the UK, and other EU members, to pursue an independent foreign and defense policy. If the ESDP looks like succeeding then it will rather support and become difficult, maybe impossible, to derail. British Prime Minister Tony Blair became a leading backer of ESDP for short-term tactical reasons. He justified ESDP as clearly subordinate to NATO. He even persuaded a skeptical George Bush that it was no big deal at their first Camp David meeting (February, 2001). Now it looks like a colossal misjudgement because Britain opposes any separate NATO headquarters and believes that only NATO can provide Europe with a "territorial defense." The ESDP would be confined to roles that NATO had turned down. Not that the United States emerges without blame from this dangerous fiasco. Successive American leaders have accurately diagnosed the problem. ESDP would either duplicate or divert NATO resources and was objectionable on both grounds and decided to overlook it rather than have a row with the Europeans.

3.3 A New Objectivity for EU Defense Policy

It increasingly seems that now it is not even necessary to explain the conviction that an independent European security policy is useful and necessary, useful for whom and necessary for what? And why is Washington so jittery? To be correct, Europe's defense cooperation, such as it is, remains embryonic both from a practical and theoretical perspective. There is no European Union consensus on how autonomous any separate European defense capability should be. There is not even agreement among all EU countries about whether there should be a permanent European planning headquarters. Part of the answer is Washington's long-standing ambivalence towards Europe and the European Union in particular. And nowhere is US ambivalence more infuriatingly illogical than in defense and military matters.

During the Cold War, Europe's interests were equally served by that US effort, because the unlikely frontline was at its borders. This is no longer so. As a result NATO is
increasingly an American enterprise for American benefit. It has outlived its usefulness in Europe and, were it not for Britain's much-prized nuclear and intelligence co-operation with the US, Britain might find it less wrenching to join France, Germany and the others in planning for a European future. In the meantime, Washington's fresh panic attack about the fate of the transatlantic alliance tells us two things. First, the relationship is not nearly as unequal as the Americans like us to believe. The EU is in a stronger bargaining position than we seem to realize. Second, geography, politics and - increasingly - culture all dictate that the US and Europe will eventually go their separate ways; the military alliance may be the last link to disappear.

The recent infighting among the twenty five member states over America’s strategy of pre-emptive action, the legality of the use of force and military intervention in Iraq has been transformed, in the space of a few months and a few pages of text, into a truly common European vision of the world and the Union’s role in it. If one has to find something positive that has emerged from the Iraq crisis, it is that, at least, it permitted the Union to lay aside one of its old taboos and work out its own concept of international security in a collective, consensual and autonomous way, in short, European manner. The new European Security Strategy has gotten a large echo not only because, so far, this is the first Common EU Security Strategy but also because it has a real new perception and approach to the nowadays security threats (Gnesotto, Nicole 2004: 1).

The idea of Europe as a purely civil power is behind us. The great debate of the 1980’s over Europe as a civil power or a military power definitely seems to be a thing of the past: nobody any longer challenges the Union’s need to be able to act externally in all fields as a global player that can call upon a complete range of resources, including military. Joschka Fischer, German Foreign Minister, in one of his recent speeches claims that: “our concerted efforts to foster peace and security are doomed to failure if we believe that only security issues matter. They certainly do, but security is a much broader concept in this fight against terrorism: social and cultural modernization issues, as well as democracy, the rule of law, women's rights and good governance, are of almost even greater importance. The European Security Strategy adopted by the EU member states in December 2003 is based on this realization[s]” (Fischer, Joschka 2004).

What the Union intends to become is a sui generis power. There is a clear European consensus that military power is to be seen as one means among others to be used on the international scene, neither the only one nor the first: ‘none of the new threats is purely military; nor can [they] be tackled by purely military means’. That is why this European
strategy cannot be seen as a doctrine of military intervention. The Union is neither a civil power nor a militaristic one, and, to oppose Kargan, it is somewhere between the extremes of Venus and Mars that it is developing its own strategy for dealing with international threats and crises. The document represents the culmination of many years effort by European nations to formulate a defense policy separate from NATO, which is dominated by the United States.

Preventive engagement and effective multilateralism are thus the two pillars on which the European security strategy rests. Acting before crises erupt, acknowledging the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council in the maintenance of peace and security, and defending and developing international law – principles that have from the outset underpinned the Union’s external actions – now formally benefit from the greatest possible degree of consensus. Does this mean that European and American strategies are poles apart? Things are not quite so simple: it is evident that the Europeans do not share America’s ideology of ‘rogue states’ and the ‘axis of evil’, nor its obsession with military technology as a response to the new threats, or, quite obviously, its mistrust of multilateral institutions, beginning with the UN. On the other hand, when it comes to identifying the strategic agenda for the coming decades the two have broadly similar priorities: international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are at the forefront of Europe’s concerns. Similarly, the Europeans are aware that multilateral professions of faith are not sufficient when dealing with states that threaten world peace: to be effective, the multilateral system’s means for applying sanctions and coercion need to be strengthened.

At this crossroad, I discover that European architectures have a new level of objectivity, let me call it the new “inter-subjective objectivity”, with regard to ESDP. I call it ”inter-subjective objectivity” because here lies my biggest terminological disaccord with realist and constructivist ‘schools of thought’. I slightly oppose the idea that security threat is defined by some objective factors outside of our own perception, but, at the same time, I doubt if security threat is totally defined by our own subjectivity, or if it is “a problem of our own making”. My approach to security threat is twofold: it has both a subjective and objective face. It is exactly like a two-sided coin: form one side we have the subjective approach to security matter; form the other we have the objective evidence that the threat is still out there. The new US and EU security strategy confirms my terminological improvement, because from the one side we have the objective manifestation of the threats out there: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, etc., followed by the inter-subjective imperative of our own making, that estimates these threat: ground security strategies, security research papers.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation versus ESDP

If the war against Iraq was in the end launched on a false assumption or for reasons other than those advanced by the United States, how in future is one to judge just how real a threat is, or to distinguish between true proliferation and an ideological interpretation? And how can a sufficient degree of international vigilance be maintained against the background of such a glaring ‘error’ as that committed over Iraq’s proliferation?

On 6 June 2003, the European Union unveiled its basic principles for a ‘EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD’. Among its first principles, the EU underscores that ‘the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction (i.e. biological, chemical and nuclear weapons) and means of delivery such as ballistic missiles constitutes a threat to international peace and security’ (Mark Smith, Bruno Tertrais and Jean Pascal Zander, Edited by Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt 2003: 9). The basic principles were quickly followed up by an action plan identifying practical measures to boost EU non-proliferation policies. The plan outlines specific measures for immediate and medium-term action, primarily through the use of diplomatic tools. On 11 November 2003, a Council Common Position was adopted on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of non-proliferation of WMD and means of delivery. One of the key measures posited is the introduction of a non-proliferation clause in agreements with third countries. A month later, on 9 December 2003, the European Council adopted an EU strategy against the proliferation of WMD. It represents both the culmination and start of a cohesive strategy in the fight against WMD. Besides synthesizing previous EU thinking on proliferation, the strategy represents a ‘living action plan’ whose implementation will be constantly monitored. As noted in the strategy, ‘it will be subjected to regular revision and updating every six months’. There is no doubt that much of the policy work has been fuelled by recent developments on the ground, especially in Iraq. Prior to the war, distress over Iraq’s suspected WMD program brought proliferation to the forefront of the political agenda. Growing American apprehension fed European and worldwide concern. After the war, the inability to find WMD (to date) has reduced the perceived threat posed by WMD proliferation.

Nevertheless, the downgraded status of WMD proliferation post-Iraq is tempered by current events in Iran and North Korea that remind policy-makers of the importance of remaining prudent. In addition, the potential risk of WMD acquisition by non-state actors lurks in the background. As the EU Security Strategy acknowledges, ‘the most frightening
scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction’ (See the EU Security Strategy 2003). But what is a threatening missile? A missile is only a machine; it is the political and military uses to which it is put, rather than the technology itself, that are the principal source of threat.1. The possibility of accidental launch is sometimes cited as a reason for regarding missiles as generically threatening, but this seems rather unlikely, particularly in the case of developing world missiles, which are mostly liquid fuelled. Such missiles take a considerable amount of time (2-3 hours at least) to prepare and launch, and the chances of them being launched accidentally seem remote. At the time of writing, the only missiles capable of reaching Europe are in the hands of the de jure nuclear weapon states. That is to say, the states recognized as such under the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty): China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States. To put it another way, no state outside the permanent members of the UN Security Council has a missile capability that could be used against the EU. Domestic motivations such as this are not threat-driven, however. Threat-based motivations, or those missiles that are intended by the deploying state to be threatening, fall into two categories: bilateral hostility and regional insecurity. The obvious case of bilateral hostility is India and Pakistan, but Iran/Iraq, North/South Korea, and China/Taiwan have all shown how this kind of hostility can be a generator of missile programs. With the possible exception of India/Pakistan, these bilateral hostilities are also strongly linked to wider regional insecurities that involve other states from outside the region. Iran’s strategic calculus needs to incorporate the forces of the United States and its allies, as does that of the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – North Korea), since South Korea, Japan and Taiwan all have security guarantees from the United States. This means that South Asia is the only ‘missile-active’ region with no potential enemies outside the region. In turn, this suggests that the missiles programs elsewhere in the world are driven by regionally based security concerns, but not entirely by regional actors. The involvement of extra-regional states such as the United States is a significant driver of proliferation within the region. This means that talk of ‘global’ missile drivers is misleading and, very largely, a misnomer. The term had relevance during the Cold War, when it was plausible to talk of a missile dynamic between two states that could conceivably enter into conflict anywhere in the world. It is much less plausible now, when missile dynamics are rooted in regionally based relations rather than global ones. That is to say, the United States and Iraq would not have found themselves in conflict with each other outside the Middle Eastern region; where the United States influences missile proliferation, that influence applies entirely within the

Missile defense is almost as undeveloped in technical terms as norm building is in political ones. Its feasibility is yet to be conclusively demonstrated but the Bush administration has pressed ahead, with deployment scheduled for 2004. Missile defense is philosophically closer to the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) than the HCoC (Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation), since it is a means for responding to missile proliferation to be imposed rather than agreed upon.

For Europe, renewed nuclear proliferation does not necessarily imply an immediate threat. When it comes to capabilities, no regional actor having a nuclear program (except Israel) is yet capable, at least as far as known capabilities are concerned, of posing a ballistic missile threat to European Union member states. When it comes to intentions, no country in the region is known to want to attack Europe as such. Moreover, states acquiring a nuclear capability also employ a more or less explicit language of deterrence: there is seemingly general agreement today that nuclear weapons are for defense (Mark Smith, Bruno Tertrais and Jean Pascal Zander, Edited by Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt 2003: 52).

The ministerial meeting in Luxembourg and the Thessalonica European Council (both in June 2003) formed an important stage in Europe’s formal recognition of the dangers of nuclear proliferation. The Union must now implement the strategy and plan of action adopted then and go even further. The EU Security Strategy has identified the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction as ‘potentially the greatest threat to our security’. However, the fight against it is not at all a lost cause. This is the main conclusion that can be drawn from this. In fact, an assessment of the different areas of proliferation allows us to highlight a number of encouraging facts.

1. The number of active ‘proliferators’ and their technological capabilities remain limited. Existing regimes have thus far been fairly successful in reducing both the scope and the pace of proliferation.
2. Non-proliferation is possible: both Iran’s decision to sign the additional IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) protocols and Libya’s renunciation of its WMD programs illustrate that political and economic pressure can work. (Even) states of concern base their decisions on a rational cost-benefit calculation. An effective ‘stick-and-carrot’ policy can, and must ensure that the benefits of non-proliferation outweigh the costs of proliferation.
3. Lacking sufficient indigenous capabilities, most proliferating states depend on imports from technologically more advanced states to develop their WMD programs. This is particularly true of missile proliferation, which is mainly based on old Soviet Scud technology. With the exception of the DPRK and India, all proliferators need substantial foreign assistance to overcome the so-called ‘Scud-barrier’ and solve the technical hurdles for the development of missiles with a range greater than 1,000 km.

4. The development and use of WMD and their delivery systems necessitate a level of know-how, technical infrastructure and logistics that only state actors have been able to achieve so far. In consequence, there are strong doubts as to whether terrorist groups can at present produce WMD for large-scale attacks on their own. This is the case for nuclear weapons in particular, but also for biological and chemical weapons. Chemical and Biological terrorism, which is generally perceived as the most probable scenario, can cause major economic and social disruption, but the probability of large-scale attacks causing massive human casualties remains relatively low.

5. The only possibility for terrorist groups would thus be to obtain WMD from proliferating states. However, there has been no proof of such transfers up until now. Moreover, the logic of power and self-interest makes it fairly unlikely that state-actors would provide terrorists with WMD. (Mark Smith, Bruno Tertrais and Jean Pascal Zander, Edited by Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt 2003: 94).

All this does not mean that the dangers of proliferation should be underestimated. For the time being, the geographical distance vis-à-vis proliferators’ limits the direct threat to Europe, but proliferation is closely interrelated to regional conflicts that can easily lead to major international crisis and impact on Europe’s security. More than that, it would be irresponsible to build policies on the assumption that state and non-state proliferators could never acquire the ability to threaten Europe directly.
Chapter IV

ESDP: Social Construction or Power Politics

4.1 Rethinking Political Realism

In 1992, Manfred Worner, a former German Minister of Defense than serving as NATO’s Secretary General, said: “If the US disengages [to ensure the European security], I foresee a certain temptation for western European nations to revert to past patterns of power politics.” For over fifty years the Europeans’ had relied on the Americans to ensure peace on this side of the Atlantic. It was convenient, cheap and effective. However, someday something has to happen so that the situation would return to “normal”. That is, a situation in which five hundred million Europeans no longer relied for their defense on free hundred million Americans, who no longer had to defend them against two hundred million Russians who had no wish to attack them. To quote Charlie de Gaulle, ‘some day or another fantastic event with incredible reversals could happen. So many have happened in history! America could explode because of terrorism or racism … and became a threat to peace. This is why, while remaining the allies of the Americans, we want to stop leaving it [our defense] up to them.’

Despite the invocation of Article 5, many Europeans have formed the impression that American interest in NATO has declined since September 11 attacks because Washington didn’t made the alliance its primary vehicle for pursuing the campaign against terrorism. As Richard Lugar sustain: “the war on terrorism is a crucial part of this broad and ambitious agenda. And … America will never be afraid to act alone if it must …” (Lugar, Richard G. 2004). However, in short run, US will remain commitment to NATO. Both because it remains the main institution though which America can exert influence in European security affairs, and simply on geo-strategic grounds, without considering shared values and other factors America’s military presence in Europe is essential to defend the US and the Western economic and security interests in the Middle East and beyond.
Examining an extreme scenario – US disengagement over NATO – can nonetheless remind us of the enduring foundations of political order in Europe. The USA, as a superpower, counterbalance for Germany from across the Atlantic, reassures Europeans in a way that no local power or coalition could; and NATO is the vehicle for US engagement in European security affairs. This view is widely shared among German experts in international security affairs. To read Christopher Bertram, a former director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, who now serves as director of German’s Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: “for Germany the alliance has had, and continues to have, a special function, namely that of making German power controllable and hence acceptable to allies and political adversaries alike.” Former British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher has argued that NATO is essential to ensure US engagement and balanced relations with Germany within the alliance: “Only the military and political engagement of the US in Europe and close relations between the other two strongest sovereign states in Europe – Britain and France – are sufficient to balance German power; and nothing of the sort would be possible within a European super state” (Yost, D. S 2002: 294).

After six decades of social well-fare and thriving economic development the rise of the ESDP is viewed by many scholars of IR as a re-emerging power politics game in Europe, and respectively in international relations. One of the paradoxical consequences that lead up also backs up this supposition from the end of the Cold War: the renaissance military strategy in Europe. Despite the greatly improved military security environment in Europe (with some exception), the classic concern of strategy – the use of military force for political purposes – is now the major concern for the foreign and security policy elites in much of Europe (Gartner, Heinz; Hyde-Price, Adrian; Reiter, Erich 2001: 45). This is not only a matter of theoretical debate but a matter of high political contradictions too.

It is well known that during the history the politics of the European nation states have been permanently obsessed by domination and superiority. Now, the EU, considered to be the only post-modern social construction where democracy and liberal principles seem to found the ‘promised land’, develops the ESDP as a new ‘realist political project’ able to achieve European security using mostly military means. If it becomes reality then ESDP questions the very meaning of political system of EU as a ‘post modern social construction’. To clear up this puzzle I must answer to one question: is military power still the key to international security?

Military power as military threats still retain a central theoretical role in much security thinking, and so long as international politics remains an ‘anarchical society’ it will remain of
vital interest and importance for many states or group of states. The question of the importance of military power in achieving international security goals in today’s world is crucial, and the answer remains to be yes, the military power is the next most relevant key to international security. One might surmise that international anarchy is the key structural factor that causes states to fight wars. After all, the best way for states to survive in an anarchic system in which some states have some offensive capability and intentions that might be hostile is to have more rather than less power. There is no question that anarchy is a deeper cause of war. Anarchy alone, however, cannot account for why security competition sometimes leads to war but sometimes does not. The problem is that anarchy is a constant – the system is always anarchic – whereas war is not. To account for this important variation in state behavior it is necessary to consider another structural variable: the distribution of power among the leading states in the system (Mearsheimer, J. 2001: 335).

The key as it always has been is the character of the regimes that make up the international order. By far, the greatest advancement in international security theory has been the discovery that international peace and prosperity is directly proportional to the spread of liberal democratic governments throughout the globe. So far, the system of IR remains to be marginally perforated by a truly liberal political structure. Moreover, this very liberal structure has a fictional construction among governments of some great power states – like Russia and China. Despite all this, I am firmly sure that international system of states is not totally guided by a “Hobbesian worldview”, which has as its centre piece the doctrines of “pre-emptive strikes.” But if it were truly so Hobbesian, some of the nowadays security strategies (US National Security Strategy, EU Security Strategy) would not put such a heavy emphasis on the need to expand liberal political and economic principles around the globe. Clearly, using military force is sometime necessary. Diplomacy not backed up by the threat of force can be ineffective, as we saw, for example, in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s. But military force without diplomatic and political strategy is often worse and can create more problems than it solves. By this saying, the best approach to international security threats is to have an eminent combination between hard and soft powers tools. But having the upper hand military can keep a host of other problems at bay.

It is clear that tackling the vast majority of today’s global problems requires a careful mix of hard and soft security instruments. We can probably agree that the international security environment has moved on decisively from the bad old days of the Cold War, with its traditional lexicon of détente and deterrence. In this post era, we have moved from risks to
threats: from the single risk of a thermo-nuclear exchange to the multiple threats of globalized insecurity. As a result, we have a much more diffused security environment to contend with.

One of the consequences of this transition is that military power has become neither less important nor imperative to solve the complex political and security problems we face: whether the issue is messianic terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states, managing regional conflicts or whatever other international or domestic problem one may care to name. EU without boosting its own military capabilities might not fulfill the large scale of threats of globalized insecurity. The necessity for a Common European Security and Defense Policy is not to please Americans or to please some particular EU member states – like France or Germany – but so Europe can fulfill the tasks that it has set for itself. The opening premise of the EU Security Strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, is a basic recognition that ‘… the EU is, like it or not, a global actor; it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security’. In short, the Union cannot postpone its strategic dimension any longer.

Effective multilateralism and pre-emptive engagement are by nature elusive concepts, but several realities are to be recognized by the Union. First, the large scale of global threats we confront with cannot be limited to the military force alone: while not excluding it the Union must take a broader approach combining both politics and the economics. Those with fondness for simplistic comparisons will stress the new balance between Mars and Venus, the mix of Hobbes and Kant, and the marriage of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power. Yet, that comparison will be misleading because the Union is not a nation-state. That is what gives this strategic concept its special characteristic and its great merit – it is a social construction that combines French ambition, British pragmatism and German restrain.

It is evident that the analytical concern of this thesis is mostly dictated by the EU as a global actor, as a unique political system and not by some bargaining effects promoted by EU member states. But nothing can be done without taking into account the political imperatives promoted by the EU member states. Obviously, there is no plausible alternative on the horizon to replace the state, as Mearsheimer argues: “If the state disappears, presumably some new political entity would have to take its place, but it seems that nobody has identified that replacement. Even if the state disappeared, however, that would not necessarily mean the end of security competition and war. Realism merely requires anarchy; it does not matter what kind of political unites make up the system. They could be states, city-states, cults, empires, tribes, gangs, or whatever. Rhetoric aside, we are not moving toward a hierarchic international system, which would effectively mean some kind of world government” (Mearsheimer, J. 2001: 365).
The usual rejoinder to this perspective is to argue that the recent history of the EU contradicts it. When it comes to a security problem the EU member states have “largely abandoned” nationalism and are well on their way toward achieving political unity, providing powerful evidence that the state system’s days are numbered. It is obvious that the EU has achieved substantial economic integration; there is little evidence that this path will lead to the creation of a super state. In fact, both nationalism and the existing EU member states appear to be alive and well. Consider French thinking on the matter, as reflected in the comments of French president Jacques Chirac to the German Bundestag in June 2000: he said that he envisioned a “united Europe of states rather than a United States of Europe.” He went on to say, “neither you nor we envisage the creation of the European super state that would take the place of our nation state and end their role as actors on the international stage. … In the future our nations will stay the first referent point for our people.” Even if French President proves wrong and the EU becomes a super state it would still be a state, albeit a powerful one, operating in a system of states. What really matters here is, if to borrow a phrase from Wendt, the “common fate” of the EU member states. For this reason I personally tend to believe that neither nationalism nor the nation state will erode or destroy the emerging EU security project.

Actors face a common fate when ‘their individual survival, fitness, or welfare depends on what happens to the group as a whole’ (Wendt, A. 1999: 349). It seems more than a truism that the EU member states are highly interwoven between each other and that nothing could explain it better than the meaning given by Wendt as a “common fate.” But the political imperative of the ESDP is far beyond this – it is a matter of how to maintain the member states positions in global affairs and the best way to achieve it is to unify their forces. The realist statement regarding how states act to gain and maintain power merits attention. Kenneth Waltz has made famous the argument that security competition drives powers to imitate the successful practices of their opponents. States are socialized, he argues, to “conform to common international practices.” Indeed, they have no choice but to do so if they have to survive in the rough-and-tumble of the world politics: the theory of “status quo bias” – the first concern of the states [is] to maintain their position in the system.

Evidently, the rise of the ESDP will have system wide consequences. Both structure and process of the international system will be affected by this giant defense mechanism. To follow a structural thought, the ESDP will fulfill the strategic vide left aside since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it will adopt a new arrangement of the international actors including their imperative political factors.
According to the realism structure requires ignoring how units relate with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how-they stand in relation to one another (how they are arranged or positioned) (Waltz, K. 1979: 80). It is pretty much the same thought expressed by constructive school that what matters is the social structures that varies across anarchies (Wendt, A. 1995: 78). It means that IR (politics) efficiency has little system wide meaning. The producers, not the products, are of paramount concern (Waltz, K. 1979: 137). Indeed, the same Waltz promotes some criteria, which defines the stability of the system: using stability to include also peacefulness and the effective management of international relations.

4.2 Two Theoretical Approaches versus one Reality

The ESDP, as any other EU political imperative, is more a social construction and less a material phenomenon generated by the system wide consequences. Despite the constructivist agenda the ESDP engagements will go much beyond this purview. It is still a matter of high theoretical debates if ESDP is entirely defined by the social constructed principles when the reality out there seems to be subordinated to a ‘jungle law’. Thus the ESDP will remain a mixture between realism and constructivism, between national and European policies, between international security system consequences and EU security policy interests and actions.

ESDP must be seen in terms of reflexive interaction between subjective perceptions and material structures, between what is observed and what is imagined. Security is not a given any more. EU security, like its interests and identities must be constructed. The evaluation and analysis in the previous chapters generate important facts that ESDP is socially constructed. The operationalizable concept of EU security acknowledges the constructed nature of social reality. However, this does not mean that ESDP reject a materialist ontology. Rather, it involves recognizing that the material is mediated through human subjectivity. Interests, including security interest are not exogenously given by the nature of the international system or the mode of production, but are inter-subjectively constituted through a process of reciprocal interaction and interpretation, and influenced by both cultural and material structures of the International Security System. An approach, which recognizes that structure is constituted not only by material conditions but by shared ideas should do better: “It is the social processing group life that creates and upholds the rules, not the rules that create and uphold group life” (Wendt, A. 1999: 184-185). It leads my thought to the previous
statement that ESDP is basically constructed in an “inter-subjective objective” way, and to understand European security we must take into account both the material structures and cultural determination.

Once EU generates some system wide effects it must be ready to control these effects or to defend them. It is like an exogenous factor of every social being: ones you are born you use all the existing tools in order to defend yourself or to stimulate your living conditions. Moreover, once the social system is growing, the whole system of values, needs, and requirements is growing too. This self-fulfilling prophecy generated by process interactions and structural effects has its own advantages and disadvantages. Some countries may strive to become great powers; others may wish to avoid doing so. The choice, however, is a constrained one. It is constrained by the interests the unit has at the system wide level. Because of the extent of their interests larger units existing in a contentious arena tend to take on system wide tasks and responsibilities.

Now, without a considerable economic capability no state can hope to sustain a world role. States in today’s IR are not merely trying to maximize value in the present but also to secure their future position, interests, and values. The case of the EU remains. Economically and military the possibilities are easily drown. The achievement of unity will produce one instant great power, complete with second-strike nuclear forces. But politically the EU case is still complicated. Many believe that the EU has moved so far toward unity that it cannot pull back, at least not very far back. But as Waltz argues: “the easier steps toward unity come early the harder ones later, and the hardest of all at the end” (Waltz, K. 1993: 44-79). Here, I can sum up and say that security lies at the interaction of threat, capacities, and willingness.

To assume its obligations and priorities EU must generate some system wide capabilities with its own process of identity formation. Wendt sustains that the “process of identity formation under anarchy are concerned first and foremost with preservation or ‘security’ of the self” (Wendt, A. 1992: 399). Depending on how well developed the ESDP is, it will produce security practices that are in varying degrees altruistic or pro-social. This tells us how institutions of sovereign states are reproduced through social interaction. But it does not tell us why such a structure of identity and interests would arise in the first place. Two conditions would seem necessary for this to happen. First, the density and regularity of interactions must be sufficient high. Second, actors must be dissatisfied with pre-existing forms of identity and interactions. Given these conditions a norm of mutual recognition is relatively undemanding in terms of social trust, having the form of an assurance game in which a player will acknowledge the sovereignty of the others as long as they in turn will
acknowledge the sovereignty. But whether such a consensus holds depends on what states do. If they treat each other as if they were sovereign, then over time they will institutionalize that made of subjectivity; if they do not, then that mode will not become the norm (Wendt, A. 1992: 414).

The change of this identity does not lead to a more optimistic view of the world. However this intellectual constructivist management cannot be applied to understand the whole principle of nowadays IR. Still, it has only some geographical limitations. The EU member states have a slight loss in their identity and sovereignty by providing it to a bigger institution and state mechanism. In this kind of system states identifies with one another (Mercer, Jonathan 1995: 234). The more we identify with our group, the more we will differentiate our group from other groups. This leads to between group competition, perceived conflict of interests, and a preference for relative over the absolute gains. This is known as the double-edged sward of social identity – in-group identity promotes inter-groups discrimination. If we were not social we would not form groups, we could not be ethnocentric. As Marc Ross mentioned: “sociality promotes ethnocentric conflict, furnishing a critical building block for in-group amity and out-group hostility” (Mercer, Jonathan 1995: 245).

John Ruggie argues that, in this regard, a very interesting attribute comes into view: EU may constitute the first “multi-perspectival polity” to emerge since the advent of the modern era. To put it different, the constitutive process whereby each of the fifteen, or twenty-five, defines its own identity – and identities are logically prior to preferences – increasingly indigenize the existence of the other fourteen. Within this framework, EU leader may be thought of as entrepreneurs of alternative political identities, which would merely replicate on a large scale the typical modern political form (Ruggie, John Gerard 1993: 172-174). It is easy to conclude that the building European security reality is ideational as well as material. At the same time, ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions expressed not only individual but also collective intentionality. Last but not the least important fact is that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and space. This is what reduces my theoretical assumption to a concrete time and space: the rise of the European security and defense policy.

4.3 ESDP: A Realistic Social Constructed Project
European security is being founded upon a balance of power and the search for strategic consensus among a decisive but often shifting constellation of actors enjoying varying levels of power. It is the ineluctable reality for states bound so closely together that none can be permitted the “freedom” either to dominate or to withdraw. It is right that, more or less, the ESDP appears as an echo to the Kosovo war from 90s and US humanitarian intervention in Yugoslavia from 1999. Latter on, ESDP’s developments has been defined as a response to the EU global leadership: to back up the EU positions within the system of IR and to have a deterrent arm when promoting the principles of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

It is beyond doubt that constructivism as well as political neo-realism recognizes the use of force in IR, and the possibility that there are no guarantees in life, domestic or international, that in anarchy war might occur. But the fact that in anarchy war is possible does not mean “it may at any moment occur” (Waltz, K 1959: 22). Thus ESDP is a basic pillar to assure the EU security: domestic and external. After its highest approved function of maintaining an ‘island of peace’ within its own borders the EU most important role is perceived as protecting and promoting European interests in the wider world (Bretherton, Charlotte and Vogler, John 1998: 230). The rise of the ESDP is a response to the larger social constructed project of the EU as well as to the power politics principles than still hold the system of IR.

In nowadays IR EU is considered to be a non-aggressive political actor, not because the EU by its nature is oriented towards creating links rather than construction divisions, but because, at the system level, still it does not have the necessary political and military means to manifest such kind of initiatives. It must be sad that to be aggressive there is no need to have political or military leverages – it is enough to promote some aggressive intentions. Even so, EU maintains its oratorical skills inside a limited framework of peaceful political discourses that shapes the “originality” of its principles. Most of all, its originality is explained by the fact that the most successful European construction develops in ways their inventors failed to foresee.

If we claim that EU is a social constructed project it will be right to say that constructivism is not a theory of international relations but it can be characterized as a positivistic approach to interpret the world out there. Constructivism is a positive reflection about the world that has a fully materialized social consciousness. In this regard, it might be the same to say that there is no idea without being supported by the material structure, or there is no democracy without social welfare/wealth, because poverty and democracy are two
principles that reject each other. This framework could be maintained only if the circle is complete. “What we are” is the very substance of “what we make of it”. And “what we make of it” is the reason of “what we are”. Although “We” Europeans and “We” Americans have the same interests – to build up a peaceful world – there are different interpretations of the existing threats. And by this there are different means to deal with these threats because what we make of it is what we are, and what we are is a social prophecy dictated by the synergy of the social system and not by the fully materialized social consciousness. This is a point that materialism failed to explain.

To quote Wendt: “anarchy is what states make of it”, it is a behavior that leads to a “self-fulfilling prophesy” (Wendt, A. 1995: 77). Suppose it is right, what we make of it is synonym with what we are, in this situation we can achieve peace only if we achieve a ‘common self-fulfilling prophecy’, and, to take it for grant and to say that EU system of states achieved a ‘common self-fulfilling prophesy’, for a period of time among the EU member states there will be no security dilemma and peace will be assured. International system is far from having a ‘common prophesy’, moreover, it is far form having a common structural brain: a social construction imperative. Constructivism recognizes that “when it comes to the regulation of violence internationally it is the state that ultimately has to control [it]”, thus the state still remains the basic no-social actor in international politics. No anarchy can have this feature because it is not social. Moreover, it cannot be social because anarchy is a plight, an empty plight nothing more, and a plight that seduces the politics of world powers. Unless we do not find out a common prophesy dictated by systemic reasons we won’t have a common value-loaded international action.
Conclusion – ESDP, or back to Political Realism?

Now, when this paper is coming to an end the first concluding task is to give a general answer regarding the “basic question” posed in the introduction and, which explicitly derives from the title’s subject of this research paper: *How can we better understand ESDP: as a revival of power politics game in Europe, or as a deeper social challenge that will lead the EU actorness to the highest political construction an international actor can achieve?* The motivation behind this word order is simple. The designation of various periods of time in IR, in terms of categories of space, involve in itself a description of power politics: the formation of the balance of power, the dynamic of deterrence and preventive war, anarchy, and an overriding concern for security that, in itself, become the major characteristics of the political realism. Such a research exercise must, therefore, form the fundament for any attempt on explanation, which in turn was carried out during the last chapter. It is this explanation I shall first summarize.

Counter-intuitively perhaps, the answer to this question “how” will precede a discussion of “why”. And if the first answer is more or less argued through this paper, it might seem to be incomplete unless I do not discuss the second one.

The “why” question of every theoretical answer by definition is forged by a deterministic approach. To my surprise the answer is perforated more by practical achievements and historical events. To be more comprehensible the EU defense challenge lies in outgrowing the heavy hand of the US tutelage and learning to do things without always asking American guidance. Indeed, the EU, as a priority, is passing from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention and engagements. As an end in itself this is absolutely right to say that EU integration process cannot achieve maturity without full responsibility for Europe’s defense.

External events that threaten to undermine the very cohesion that keeps the Union together and stands in the way of its further progress must be seen as the major threat to European security. Thus, even if the security of the individual member state is preserved that of Europe can still be violated. System wide effects require system wide actions, fact that
none of the EU members can achieve alone. If in the short run it might be seen as impossible then in the long run the consolidation of the ESDP will become an imperative to the political process and EU’s international power identity. On April 10th, 2002 Joschka Fischer, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, clearly stated that: “… EU will never have as strong military orientation as that of the USA. Our experiences of history – centuries of bloody wars and civil wars in very small areas – are very different to those of the US and they will continue to be characterized by a greater reticence towards military actions. We will always look first for a political solution, but without excluding the use of force as a last resort. … Clearly, Europe will never be able or want to rival the United States military, but alongside a civilian crisis management capability it must also posses its own self-sufficient, independent military capabilities, if it wants to be in a position to practice effective conflict prevention and to secure or even to enforce peace, alone if necessary.”

After this short and concise definition of the “why” question I ought to mention that the ESDP has a multilateral theoretical standard of analysis. Throughout this paper I have emphasized more than once the importance of the multilateral theoretical paradigms. I did not try to prove truth or to demonstrate falsity as the Popper’s idea of “critical” test rests on (to make the distinction between trying to prove truth and being able to demonstrate falsity). Popper believed that the latter is possible; the former not (Garry King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba 1994: 19). Indeed, my “critical” test was not entirely concentrated to prove truth or to demonstrate falsity of a proper theory, the ‘critical’ intention was to find a common research line between the above mentioned theoretical “schools of thought” that could better explain the new emerging security complex of the EU.

It is evident that the existing theoretical approaches are powerless from many points of view, and Popper’s truth is largely acceptable, the theoretical anomalies are largely presented. Despite the fact that I had no intention to demonstrate falsity of these theoretical approaches in explaining European security, I did, however, emphasized the major theoretical stonewalls and agreements.

The difference between neo-Realists and Constructivists is one that concerns causal connections between levels: top-down or bottom-up. In many other ways, however, the two paradigms exhibit remarkable similarities. Both of them have universalistic pretensions; both of them fundamentally depend on a separation of levels, either as types of explanations (epistemological), or as separate existence, in the sense that empirical phenomena can be understood as existing on a particular level (ontology).
In the course of the thesis I have argued at some length that both “schools of thought” make a special theoretical contribution to understand the rise and development of the ESDP. Yet, by itself it is historically insufficiently developed to fully explain it. It could be wrong, however, to treat these two paradigms as equally insufficient in this regard. Broadly speaking, the depicted common epistemological level of explanation is of great importance for the ESDP project. Moreover, it can provoke a non-traditional theoretical revival among the scholars of IR.

It is evident that every theory has its own anomalies. How Steven Weinberg, Nobel laureate in physics, adds that there “is no theory that is not contradicted by some experiment” (1992: 93), and in the end we may be left with his thought that the “most important thing … is not the decision that a theory is true, but the decision that it is worth taking seriously” (Weinberg, Steven 1992: 103). Both neo-Realism and Constructivism is worth taking seriously at least from one single fact: that of advancing far beyond the others. The two paradigms fit in the IR events and many other social phenomena in a way that no other paradigm can do, and have the most largely accepted assumptions about the way IR are constructed, understood, and developed.

From historical to sociological explanations, from practical to theoretical achievements the emerging features of the ESDP size the middle ground of the decision making process. It is an understanding of the material, subjective, objective and inter-subjective worlds intact in the social construction of reality. Rather than focusing exclusively on how structures constitute agents’ identities and interests, or to explain how individual agents socially constructed these structures, it also seeks to take into account the existing systemic and unit levels and the emerging IR security environment. Up to the moment, as a declaratory or documentary achievement the ESDP project has a very positivistic aspect, but in terms of theoretical explanations it is absolutely stultifying. One explanation could be the political environment that builds up this project. It is totally a new political framework, which has never been recognized during the history of international relations.

Allow me to have a glance at the methodological improvements I think I have achieved during this paper. It is evident that the inter-subjective objectivity approach can be used in dealing with more than one theory, the theoretical spectrum is much broader: from Political Realism to Social Constructivism, and form Democratic Theory to Institutional Liberalism. In the same way, arguments about the democratic theory fall outside the ken of neo-Realism but may be central to cooperation. Like analysis of operational codes, most research done on the democratic theory argues or implies that believes matter. But this
approach homogenizes believes within states; leaders of democracies are presumed to think and act differently than authoritarian leaders and a strong socialization effect is postulated at least within democracies. I have doubts on this score and I am skeptical that the effect is universal and overwhelmingly. Just as some realist err in failing to differentiate between aggressive and status quo states, so the proponents of the democratic peace thesis downplay the possibility of severe conflicts of interests between democracies that could cause them to fight.

Generally, there is one theoretical point that this research paper cannot overcome. This is about the theoretical answer to some of the leading questions: ‘why’ and ‘how’. More or less, the former question does have an large echo within this manuscript and the answer is well defined. With regard to the last question the answer is well defined but not sufficiently developed: even a combined theoretical approach could not give enough insights concerning the development of the ESDP project in the long run.

Both physical and psychical features of the ESDP are far from being matured. The arguments often sound both technical and obscure, but they mostly boil down to something dimple and complicated: POWER. There is a futile “social” recognition when we have to face the European defense and security policy. Defense or security symbolism is out of the daily agenda of the EU political process, and the famous “three-headed security triangle” promoted by the Copenhagen School still finds no place inside the ESDP (Buzan. Barry 1991: 65). The gravity of this situation intensifies if we take into account the fact that there are few defined signs of improvement and the inter-subjective objectivity is still the only methodological approach able to bargain the three existing levels of analysis that defines the European security.

For strategic, financial, and political reasons, the competence for defense is always allocated to the highest possible level. The military efficiency of large federal armed forces is higher than that of many small regional armies, which would require coordination. National security is safeguarded more effectively behind the shield of a formidable force. The weight of a country in international politics grows with the size of the military. A single federal army is also less expensive, for example through economies of scale in procurement. Moreover, it can be a unifying factor and a source of identity in a diverse federation. Federations consider federal armed forces a constituting element of their statehood.

The European Community is not a federation and the EC Treaty is not a constitution. However, recent academic discourse has sought to promote understanding of Community law as a constitutional order (Weiler and Wind 2000; Craig, 2001: 125). Community law
represents a new legal order of international law. It has unique features through the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect, which represent considerable limitations of the sovereignty of the Member States. The doctrine of supremacy entails that Community law prevails over any conflicting national law of the Member States (Weiler 2000: 39). But the Member States are the only actors to have exclusive competences for defense, which they consider to be at the heart of their sovereignty. The EC Treaty, then EEC Treaty, as the founding document of the Community, was created after a failed attempt to create a European Defense Community. Also for this reasons it was widely understood as a commercial enterprise, excluding any notion of a common defense.

It is submitted that the Treaty, and now the new “Constitution” of the EU contain a mechanism to balance the interests of the Community in the defense-related areas where it has competence with the interests of the Member States. It represents a sophisticated tool to separate Community and Member State competence for defense. The security exemptions in Articles 30, 39(3), 46(1), 58(1)(b), 296 and 297 EC Treaty provide the said mechanism. The exemptions allow Member States to derogate from the Treaty and secondary law for reasons of security. This means that although a particular activity is covered by Community law obligations, the Member States can derogate from these obligations for security reasons by invoking one of the security exemptions. A Member State measure actually violating Community law can be justified by security considerations. With regards to the defense regulation the Community and Member State competencies overlap. The area is dominated by Member State competencies and the crucial question is how to separate competencies. Both the EC Treaty and relevant secondary Community law contain similar mechanisms to balance the Community and the Member States interests in security. These mechanisms are enshrined in security exemptions that allow the Member States to derogate from their respective regimes in situations that affect their security.

To conclude this paper I would like to say that the new international system look very much like the old one. Indeed, in the most basic of ways, the cold war continues “to live in the

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8 France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg had signed the European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty by 1954. All but France and Italy had also ratified the Treaty when a coalition of communists and Gaulists prevented ratification in the French parliament in August 1954. Article 1 EDC would have established the supranational character of the Community comprising common institutions, common armed forces and a common budget. The supranational character of the EDC was the most controversial aspect of the project and ultimately the reason for the rejection in the Assemblée Nationale. Another controversial point was the executive organ of the EDC, the Board of Commissioners. On a more detailed account of the reasons for the rejection by the Assembly, see Aaron and Lerner, France Defeats EDC (Frederick A. Praeger Inc., New York, 1957). See also Fursdon, The European Defense Community: A History (The Macmillan Press, London, 1980).
west” in the shape of high military spending, in the operation of intelligence services, and in the unequal distribution of power among the various states. In the new united continent there are now great opportunities for the reminiscent structures of the cold war. The new openings are unlikely to free the workers from the grip of capitalism. Nonetheless, in a “post-modern world” the possibility of building a new progressive Europe is one that should animate intelligent radicals more than pointless calls to man barricades that nobody wants to build and few wants to stand behind.
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