THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY ASPECTS

by

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This thesis attempts to assess the security aspect of the Barcelona Process (Process), or so called Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) within the theoretical framework of new regionalism and the Copenhagen School (Security complex theory) which agrees with neo/realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism in some aspects. The end of the Cold War broadened the security agenda and new security concerns emerged. Actually, most of the so-called security threats are not new, but the perception of them by the states has changed with globalization which increased the interconnectedness and density of the interaction. Global challenges have made states more vulnerable so appreciated the cooperative interaction at regional level. Comprehensive and cooperative security approaches gained importance and led regional security partnership among states. The construction of Euro-Mediterranean security partnership is one case stemming from the high level of interdependence between the European and the Mediterranean countries. The historical ties, economic dependency, geographical proximity increased the EU's interest towards the Mediterranean. While new regionalism enables to grasp systemic factors in the Process, the Copenhagen School permits to understand security partnership at the regional level. The rise of illegal immigration flows and religious fundamentalism in the Mediterranean as well as tension in the Middle East conflict, the Iraqi War, and terrorist attacks to the US, Algeria and recently Turkey appreciated the importance of the EMP policy and security cooperation so make this study more crucial.

This study showed that the security challenges in five sectors of the security defined by the Copenhagen School are observable in the EMP’s case. Both military and non-military concerns threaten the stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean Basin. The three baskets of the EMP depict its comprehensive security approach. Having made an overview of the Barcelona Process, the thesis evaluated the security challenges in general and the thematic areas of concerns in depth. Since security cannot be defined without reference to the perceptions and security cultures of the actors, the study examined the perceptions and security cultures in the EMP.

The evaluation of the EMP showed that the EMP has shown certain developments on the way for the security cooperation. However, it could not produce tangible results due to the fundamental shortcomings categorized as inter and intra-institutional incoherence, definitional/perceptual problems and multi-actor involvement in the region. The lack of institutional structures, asymmetrical relations among partners, unbalanced distribution of powers and lack of commitment of the EU are crucial problems. On the basis of all problems lie the gap between the perceptions and security culture of Europe and the Arab world. Thus, this thesis emphasizes the enhancement of inter-subjective understanding and cultural dialogue in order to improve trust and interaction among partners. The EMP is on right track to build zone of peace in the Basin, but it requires longue durée to achieve this.

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Abstract

This thesis attempts to assess the security aspect of the Barcelona Process (Process), or so-called Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) within the theoretical framework of new regionalism and the Copenhagen School (Security complex theory) which agrees with neo/realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism in some aspects. The end of the Cold War broadened the security agenda and new security concerns emerged. Actually, most of the so-called security threats are not new, but the perception of them by the states has changed with globalization which increased the interconnectedness and density of the interaction. Global challenges have made states more vulnerable so appreciated the cooperative interaction at regional level. Comprehensive and cooperative security approaches gained importance and led regional security partnership among states. The construction of Euro-Mediterranean security partnership is one case stemming from the high level of interdependence between the European and the Mediterranean countries. The historical ties, economic dependency, geographical proximity increased the EU’s interest towards the Mediterranean. While new regionalism enables to grasp systemic factors in the Process, the Copenhagen School permits to understand security partnership at the regional level. The rise of illegal immigration flows and religious fundamentalism in the Mediterranean as well as tension in the Middle East conflict, the Iraqi War, and terrorist attacks to the US, Algeria and recently Turkey appreciated the importance of the EMP policy and security cooperation so make this study more crucial.

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Map of Euro-Mediterranean Region

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS:

ACRS: Multilateral group on Arms Control and Regional Security within Middle East Peace Process

AMU: Arab Maghreb Union

CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy

CBMs: Confidence Building Measures

CSBM: Confidence and Security Building Measures

CSCE: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (later OSCE)

CSCM: Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean

EuroFor: European Land Force

EuroMarFor: European Maritime Security Force

EuroMeSCo: Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission

EMP: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy

EU: European Union

FDI: Foreign Direct Investment

FTA: Free Trade Area

IR: International Relations

MEDA: Mediterranean Development Aid (The principal financial instrument of the EU for the implementation of the EMP)

MENA: Middle East and North Africa

MEPP: Middle East Peace Process

MPCs: Stands for the 12 Mediterranean Partner Countries in the EMP during the dissertation

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGOs: Non-Governmental Organisations

NPT: Non-Proliferation Treaty

OSCE: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PBM: Partnership Building Measures

Strademed: Strategie et Development en Mediterranee

UMA: Union of Arab Maghreb

UN: United Nations

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

WEU: Western European Union

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction
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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The post-Westphalian world is characterized by interaction of both states and non-state actors not only at national levels, but also global and regional levels. Global interconnectedness has made states more vulnerable to the flow of global uncertainties across the world. McGrew (1997:6) states that information, pollution, migrants, arms, ideas, images, news, crime, narcotics and diseases frequently flow across national territorial boundaries. Since nation-states have difficulties in protecting their borders, and security of their citizens by themselves, regional cooperations in economic, social, cultural, political and security terms have gained importance.

The change of the security understanding with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the communist bloc also transformed the security concerns of the states for the Mediterranean region. While the Mediterranean was viewed from the military threat dimension during the Cold War, non-military threats entered the security agenda in the Post-Cold War. The comprehensive and cooperative security arrangements gained more importance for states to enhance their security. As a response to global challenges, in addition to furthering its collective security capacity and developing the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the European Union has adopted two approaches and policies towards its neighbourhood: stabilization approach aiming at fostering regional cooperation and broad partnerships (‘regionality’) and integration approach targeting to bring neighbour countries into the EU through bilateral process based on conditionality (Missorili, 2002:1). One of such initiatives is the construction of a Euro-Mediterranean security system, which has initiated with the 1995 Barcelona Declaration with the annexed Work Programme named as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). It is the general framework for the relations between the European Union, its 15 Member States and 12 countries situated in the South and East of the Mediterranean area. It comprises three baskets: political and security partnership; economic and financial partnership; social, cultural and human partnership.

During the Cold War, the Mediterranean was secondary in European’s agenda. The East-West confrontation and the Middle East conflict were two issues that led the Mediterranean enter into the European policies. Changing nature of security issues in the post-Cold War structure attracted European interest into the Mediterranean region. The attacks of September 11, 2001, the

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* Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority.
intensification of the Middle East conflict and the Iraqi situation after the US operation in 2003 have enhanced the importance of the Barcelona Initiative for developing cooperation in the Mediterranean basin. Hence, the EMP encompasses the new security concept as comprehensive and cooperative and holds an example of regional arrangement in the global world.

1.1.1 Aim and Research Questions

This thesis has two-fold aims. First, it attempts to evaluate the European policy towards the Mediterranean institutionalized by the Barcelona Process and EMP; second, it aims at studying the regional security arrangements and takes the EMP as a case study. The Mediterranean case is rarely studied from this perspective because most of the literature focuses on other regions and regional arrangements than Mediterranean due to its heterogeneity. Yet, the EMP emerged as regional arrangement and holds importance for the security of the Mediterranean so it needs to be studied. Thus, this study takes the EMP into consideration in order to explain the process from the regional security perspective, which is the main focal point.

Regionalization and regional arrangements have re-emerged as dominant topic in contemporary international relations literature with the globalization trend (Calleya, 1997). Yet, the Mediterranean area has been disregarded by many studies. Studying the EMP and specifically the security partnership is interesting and valid in this sense. In addition, the rise of international terrorism, migration flows, religious fundamentalism and organized crimes in the contemporary system as well as the terrorist attacks to US on September 11, 2001, Algeria, and recently Turkey in 2003 together with the Iraqi situation after the US operation in 2003 and the intensification of the Middle Eastern conflict all brought the Mediterranean area into the priority agenda of the EU and make this study more important.

As a theoretical framework, “new regionalism” is chosen in order to provide a general scaffold that reveals the systemic environment causing regional security arrangements. Since the centre of attention in the thesis is on security, the analytical framework stems from security theories, specifically the regional security complex and Copenhagen School of security studies, which are preferred in order to evaluate the Barcelona Process. Thus, security and security partnership will be used as analytical tools and security complex as the framework of analysis.

The main research questions the thesis will focus upon are:

- What are the security threats and dynamics at stake in the Mediterranean region? What are the security priorities of the partner states that led the Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation initiative within the EMP framework?
- How well did the EMP work as a response policy to those challenges up until now? Has EMP encountered security challenges? What are the weaknesses in the process?

- What can be done to make this process more effective and sustainable?

This thesis attempts to answer these questions through new regionalism and regional security theories. The theoretical framework expands the range of interest from the creation of the EMP to its implementation and future prospects.

As the EMP since its formation could not show tangible results, it was targeted by many criticisms. Thus, this research will contribute to the current debate on the project, evaluate how the Barcelona Process is going, and thereby come up with some propositions to further the process.

More broadly, this research can contribute to the regional security theories and general debate on security in contemporary international politics. In addition, it can also contribute to the discussion on EU’s international performance as well as its role in the international security system.

1.1.2 Delimitation

This study takes a broad definition of security concept, which comprises political, economic, social, environmental as well as military sectors. However, since the five sectors are too large to be evaluated deeply in this limited thesis, the study will briefly explain the security challenges in those five sectors and give priority to the issues that are more emphasized in the agenda of the EMP participants, which are religious fundamentalism and related to this terrorism, migration, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus the thesis focuses on both military (hard security) and non-military (soft security) issues. Taking the most important and declared problems will give the basic idea on the issue.

The Middle East peace process is also part of the Barcelona Process, but it is totally another issue that needs evaluation by itself in another thesis. Yet since the elements embedded in the EMP process are not separable from the developments in the Middle East, this issue will be touched upon in order to clarify the EMP agenda and EU’s role in the conflict.

The role of the US and the other multilateral initiatives, in addition to the EMP, concerning the security of the Mediterranean mainly NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative and the OSCE that form regional security arrangement in the region are not the focus point of this study because the EMP
excludes these external actors in its structure and negotiations. In fact, as Snyder (1996) expresses, the post Cold War environment has changed the balance of power. Key security challenges of the Cold War, which was weapons of mass destruction, are not the only security challenge in the Mediterranean region. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Mediterranean shows that the EU assumes a stabilizing role in the region while the US and other initiatives redefined their stance (Synder, 1996).

1.1.3 Disposition

The thesis is organized in the following way. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the topic of the study, states the research aims and questions, and outlines the methodology and research design including a review of the literature pertinent to this topic.

Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework. The main premises of theory will underline the specific dimension of the study; give an order and classification to the thesis. In this chapter, the analytical framework and terminology will be explained.

Chapter 3 encompasses historical background of the Mediterranean security and European attempts in the area so overviews the events that led the creation of EMP. Then, the chapter will provide brief information about the Barcelona Process as a whole policy and security aspect in specific.

Chapter 4 focuses on the EMP’s security realm and how it values security partnership. The security sectors will be explained and main security challenges that the EU and the Mediterranean face will be examined.

Chapter 5 comprises the evaluation of the EMP. It will be divided into two parts: First, the developments in the Process will be set; then the problems in the partnership will be analyzed under the categorization as inter and intra-institutional incoherence, definitional and perceptual problems, and multi-actor involvement. This will allow completing the analysis of the EMP policy.

In the Concluding Chapter, the prospect of the EMP and probable resolution to the problems will be envisaged.
1.2 METHODOLOGY

1.2.1 Methods of Analysis

From the beginning, it should be noted that choosing certain methodology and theories do not preclude the relative usefulness of other methods and theories for the study. “There are no methods that are intrinsically better than others” (Chadwick et al., 1984:42).

This study is a policy analysis, more specifically a policy evaluation study. “Policy analysis is the activity of creating knowledge of and in the policy-making process” (Dunn, 1994:1). Policy analysis is based on a methodology that comprises “problem solving along with formulating problems as a part of a search for solution as well as a system of rules, procedures for creating, critically assessing and communicating policy-relevant knowledge” (Dunn, 1994:2). Thus, policy analysis is composed of basic parts as defining the problem, monitoring the policy action/performance, evaluating the policy outcomes and finally envisaging policy future. As the primary target of this study is to analyze the security aspect of the Barcelona Process (EMP), the thesis takes the methodology of the policy analysis and seeks first to define the objective of the Process, its implementation and then concentrates on the evaluation of the Process.

In policy analysis, evaluation contributes to clarification and critique of values that defines the goals and objectives of the policy and questions their appropriateness. “Evaluation of a policy means investigating whether the policy has been successful in achieving the outcomes desired in contrast to securing the desired outputs which is the focus of implementation, monitoring and control” (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984:10). Monitoring is prerequisite for evaluation because evaluation claims depend on ‘facts’ so activities involved in conveying policies needs to be indicated and outputs up to now identified (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). Moreover, criteria for policy evaluation are effectiveness, efficiency, responsiveness and appropriateness (Dunn, 1994). This study attempts to assess if the EMP is appropriate policy for the Mediterranean security and analyze the effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness of the EMP in encountering the security challenges.

The evaluation design is tri-dimensional in time perspective: evaluation of the past, present and for future (Eraut, 1982). Using this method, the researcher tries to understand the reason for the policy, its aim and goals. The second step is to see whether the policy was implemented as intended. The researcher evaluates whether or not the policy goals are achieved or changed as well as describes the strengths and weaknesses of the policy (Patton, 1978). Process evaluation is developmental, descriptive, flexible and inductive (Patton, 1978:185). Moreover, evaluation provides reliable, valid information about policy performance while contributing not only to clarification and critique of
values that underline selection of goals and objectives but also to provision information for problem structuring (Dunn, 1994). Hence, in this thesis the main design of the policy evaluation will be conducted in the assessment of the Barcelona Process and the EMP policy.

There are some concerns in using policy analysis. Policy analysis is generally utilised in policy-making process so it may not be “detached and objective, but highly charged, value-laden and political” (Chadwick et al., 1984: 288). In addition, the policy problems are generally complex and messy which creates difficulty in clearly identifying and defining the problems and objectives specifically. Related to this, how the success of the objective is to be measured is open to question (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984: 224). In addition, evaluation itself makes political statements about the problems in the policy (Weiss, 1975). Those disadvantages could be reduced through utilisation of multiple sources and methods. In addition, the policy evaluation is fundamental because it improves our understanding of the factors shaping policy and provides information for the future policy-making (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). Moreover, the policy evaluation as methodological tool fits to the target of the dissertation since it aims to determine how well the policy goals have been achieved.

The other method of analysis that will guide the thesis is the case study. The case study of the EMP as a regional security partnership contributes to understanding the regional security arrangements and European policy of regional partnerships.

Case studies are categorized as explanatory, deviant, single and embedded single case (Johnson and Joslyn, 1986:144). This thesis is explanatory that studies the implementation of EMP, its weakness and difference from other arrangements, and it is embedded that takes particularly the security aspect of the EMP. Robert Yin defines the case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context; when boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin, 1989:23). “Case study is important design to use for development and evaluation of public policies as well as for developing explanations for and testing of political phenomena”(Yin, 1989:21). Thus, in this study, the research questions set as why and how the EMP is formed and implemented are appropriate to the method.

The main criticism against case study emphasizes the impossibility to generalize from a single case. Yet, Yin (1989:23) states that “case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to population or universes”. This study does not attempt to reach a generalization from this case because the Mediterranean regional security arrangement is unique in certain aspects while having common points that allow the use of regional theories. As Yin (1989: 23) stresses, the case studies does not represent a ‘sample’ and researcher’s goal is to expand and generalize theories
(analytical generalization). This study takes this premise as basis and tries to set the research results into the theoretical frameworks. Hence, in this study, case study permits deeper understanding of causal processes, the explication of general explanatory theories.

Examination of multiple sources and the use of triangulation increase the validity and reliability of this study and reduce the shortcomings of both policy analysis and case study. **Triangulation** refers to search for consistency of findings from different observers, times, methods and research situations. Norman Denzin (1970:301-310) defines four types of triangulation as data, investigator, theoretical and methodological. In this study, it is more theoretical triangulation, which means in Denzin’s term (1970:303-306) assessment of a single data set from the standpoint of several theoretical perspectives. In the thesis, new regionalism along with the security theories but specifically the Copenhagen School, which includes some aspects of neorealist and constructivist premises, will be used. In addition, methodologically, the case study and evaluation methods will lead triangulation. Thus, the reliability and validity of the study will be strengthened.

Hence, in this thesis, regional security complex framework together with new regionalism is conducted in order to set the context and frames of the Process. Security and security partnership are the analytical tools while security complex is the framework of analysis. The framework is explanatory that it shows why and how something happens. New regionalism as part of theoretical framework enables one to see the systemic causes within the international environment that gave rise to the Barcelona Process. It also provides a definition of regional arrangement and forces behind it. The Barcelona Process with EMP and its implementation is regarded as problematic and open to evaluation so it is valid to study it in this thesis.

1.2.2 Data Collection

In evaluation design there is no particular method of data collection; different methods are appropriate according to the research questions (Chadwick et al., 1984). Similarly, the case study permits the use of various data collection methods (Johnson & Joslyn, 1986). In this thesis, qualitative methods will be the main source. The reports of the EU and governments, official speech, conference records together with academic research made in the issue will be examined. The academic studies will direct the propositions of the thesis along the line of academic debates. While books, journals and articles are the basic secondary sources utilised, the EU official documents, governmental documents and conference reports are the primary sources that provide the raw data that will be analyzed along the study.
1.3 OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH:

Although the broader discussion and examination of the literature will be handled during the study, the main literature about the topic can be summarized.

Stephen Calleya (2000) in his study, “Is Barcelona Process Working?, stresses that EMP offers a unique opportunity to strengthen political, economic and cultural ties across the Euro-Mediterranean area defining the Mediterranean as a geo-strategic area composed of sub-regions; yet throughout its twenty-six years of direct engagement in the region the EU has failed to reach a progress in achievement of stability and security in the region. He emphasizes that “Euro-Mediterranean process is the most adequate type of multilateral forum that can further cooperative security in the area and EMP is the only regional institutional arrangement that brings states of the region together. Moreover, to date, no other trans-Mediterranean security arrangement has been able to move beyond the theoretical stage of development” (Calleya, 2000:39).

Fulvio Attina (2002, 2000) sees the new regionalism as an appropriate theory to grasp the EMP and evaluates the Mediterranean as security partnership building. He also emphasizes the role of security cultures in the evaluation of the EMP. Bicchi (2001) stresses that the end of Cold War and communism along with the rise of terrorism led Western countries to point the Mediterranean as a new hostility frontier. Security perceptions have become more accentuated so a study of Mediterranean needs to include security perceptions into analytical framework. According to Bicchi (2001), migration, Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism are the primary issues in the new configuration of European security perceptions while the economy and environmental issues are secondary. And Islamic fundamentalism was perceived as a substantial challenge to both European domestic politics and outside European borders and stayed at political level whereas migration is securitised through emergency measures. Bicchi (2001:2) also states that “definition of security is while vertically deepened which added other actors like individual and society beside states into analysis, horizontally broadened which include a wider range of potential threats”. This thesis will also follow the line of this definition and see the security from a broad definition including both soft and hard security issues. In fact, the EMP itself is founded on the premise and goals of achieving cooperative and comprehensive security.

Like Attina, Joffe (2001) also evaluates the EMP from the new regionalist perspective and he states that “although EMP is articulated in largely economic terms, Barcelona Declaration makes it clear that its signatories recognized the underlying social, political and security realities on which it will impact” (Joffe, 2001:208). According to Joffe (2001), the EU does not possess either the means or the will to involve in hard security issues in the Mediterranean so leaving hard security issues to the
US and NATO, the EU intends to resolve soft security problems by providing economic support, confidence-building measures and continuous dialogue. Thus, “European security vision in Mediterranean tended to be holistic rather than particularistic and addressed to specific problems. Moreover, Europe’s security concerns about Mediterranean region reflected the fact that it formed part of the European periphery or hinterland” (Joffe, 2001: 215)

Spencer (1998) stresses that the EU with Barcelona Initiative supports cooperative policy moving away from defensive or confrontational security approaches. However, the viability is questionable as it bases the partnership on perceived negative factors such as Islamic fundamentalism.

Pierros et al. (1999) state that many problems facing the region like immigration, unemployment, terrorism and pollution are concerns shared by peoples on both shores of the Mediterranean, thereby require common solution.
CHAPTER 2- THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The end of the Cold War led to the re-emergence of regionalism in the international politics. This new regionalism differs from the former regionalism in many aspects, which will be examined in the first part of this chapter. Mittelman and Falk (1999) stress the role of multinational and transnational actors in the international system together with effects of globalization led increase in the importance of regional arrangements. Joffe (2001) states the difficulty in defining the regionalism since neither geographical nor systemic definitions alone provide a comprehensive mechanism to conceptualize the term and then he explains new regionalism as “a process of political, cultural or social interaction between entities within its geographical bounds” (Joffe, 2001:208). Hettne (1999) sees the new regionalism more comprehensive with stronger emphasis on political realm.

The second part of this chapter will focus on security studies in International Relations (IR) theories. Different theories explain and perceive security from different angles. Stephen Walt (1991:212) defines security studies as “the study of threat, use and control of military force”. Kolodziej (1992) criticizes this realist definition of security in terms of coercive power, force and inter-state conflict to be too narrow to explain the security challenges of post-Cold War environment and he argues for a broadening of the scope of security.

Nye (1989), as neo-institutionalist, stresses the inclusion of economic and environmental aspects to the scope of security besides the political and military dimensions. Similarly, Rosenau (1990) focusing on globalization highlights that international actors along with other actors increase in this global system so it is not possible to explain security from a state-centric perspective. David Baldwin (1995) also stresses that IR theories are military biased in security, therefore security should not be studied only as military policy but also non-military issues.

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) stress that the changes with the end of Cold War led the broadening of the concept of security which is applied not only to the maintenance of state sovereignty, but also to the safeguard of societies and individuals within those states.

2.1 Old Regionalism and New Regionalism

The world system is facing fragmentation and integration at the same time due to various forces of globalization and regionalization. On the one hand, globalization has made the world economy globalized with the increase of flows of trade and FDI, liberalization of market, globalization of production, deregulation, privatization and decline of welfare state. In addition, ideas and identities are also globalized. On the other hand, regionalization created regional arrangements in the system. A
region means a group of countries with a more or less explicitly shared political project; and regionalization which is defined as homogenization of regional space is part of process of globalization (Hettne, 1999).

In this global system, besides states, different actors like trans-governmental organizations, multinational companies and non-governmental organizations appeared in the stage. Regional arrangements also increased as a response to those challenges. “Weakening of the state is producing various adverse types of societal vulnerability to the integrative tendencies in the global economy and is partly responsible for the intensity and incidence of pathological forms of anarchy that are a different character from the type of structural anarchy that Hedley Bull has depicted” (Falk, 1999:229). Regional settings became alternative to state-centrism due to the end of bipolarity and lack of capacity of a state to tackle with global problems.

In some respect, “regional institutions can be perceived as alternative to or complement of global governance that enhance demilitarization, sustainability, human rights and security” (Falk, 1999:235). The end of the Cold War and changing system also led to changes in the regionalism perspective which first emerged in 1930s and led re-emergence of regionalism called new regionalism. “New regionalism usually refers to a ‘second wave’ of regional cooperation and integration that had started by mid-1980s but took off only after 1989 when Cold War came to an end” (Hettne, 1999:8). New Regionalism differs from the old regionalism in certain aspects.

While old regionalism was formed in the bipolar Cold War context and created from ‘above’ by the superpowers, new regionalism is a product of a multipolar Post-Cold War world and emerged as a more spontaneous process from within the regions and also from ‘below’ meaning that constituent states themselves with other actors are the main proponents of regional integration. Moreover, old regionalism was specific with regard to objectives, some organizations being security-oriented and others being economically-oriented whereas new regionalism is a more comprehensive, multidimensional process including trade and economic integration, environment, social policy, security, democracy which means inclusion of whole issue of accountability and legitimacy. Furthermore, old regionalism only concerned relations between formally sovereign states while new regionalism includes non-state actors as a part of global transformation. (Hettne, 1999: 7-8)

In the old regionalism, commonality of political and economic structures of the members of the region is the prerequisite for regional integration. Economic and political interdependence put pressure on nation-states to construct groupings and institutions either regional or international in order to tackle the problems of globalization. Commonality and social homogeneity seem important conditions for the regional integration. New regionalism, in contrast, studies non-homogenous regions
and explains the possibility of regional cooperation in those areas. It underlines the perception of problem-sharing and intensification of dialogue between governments in the formation of regional cooperation. (Attina, 2002, 2003) The new global system is characterized by the flow of information, communication, cross-border problems such as migration, terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crimes and illegal trade. Countries became vulnerable because of the problems in other parts of the world. Moreover, it is not only the military but also the non-military issues that threaten the security and stability of a country. Thus, nation-states become insufficient to prevent the threats unilaterally. Therefore, states preferred to participate in collective security and cooperation framework and establish trans-national policy coordination so that costs of action will be shared. New regionalism stresses that “regional cooperation can be started by governments which assume that negotiations for building good-neighbour relationships, economic ties, knowledge transfer and policy coordination, are the most preferable tool to cope with the problems broadly caused to the countries of the region by some new global trends” (Attina, 2003: 183).

Hettne (1999:10-11) distinguishes five levels of region interaction. The first level is region as a geographical unit delimited by natural barriers. The second level is region as social system, which implies trans-local relations of a varying nature between human groups. Security complex theory fits into this category since these relations constitute a security complex in which constituent units are dependent on each other as well as on overall political stability of the regional system as far as their own security is concerned. At this level, the power balance with low level of organization shapes the security mechanism. The third level is region as organized cooperation in cultural, economic, political or military fields. Here, the membership to a regional organization is pre-requisite. The fourth level is region as civil society which occurs when the organizational framework boosts social communication and convergence of values in the region. Fifth and the last level is region as acting subject with a distinct identity, actor capability, legitimacy and structure of decision-making. The EU is a good example for this high level of regional integration.

Cultural identity, historical context, degree of economic and political homogeneity, and security order are the factors that explain the regional formations and arrangements according to the new regionalist paradigm. New regionalism also stresses the growth of a regional civil society which means development of social, economic and cultural networks that promote cooperation. Therefore, dynamics of regionalization includes cultural, security, economic and political dimensions. According to this paradigm, regional security arrangements can absorb the tensions easily, reduce the risk of bilateral conflicts and could intervene in the intra-state conflicts which threaten regional security. (Hettne, 1999)
In summary, new regionalism goes beyond the Westphalian rational evaluation and broadens the perspective by seeing the whole picture with its all dimensions. Therefore, new regionalism is a multidimensional process of regional integration. “It is a package rather than a single policy and goes beyond the free trade market idea” (Hettne, 1999:17). This multidimensionality of new regionalism, which differs it from old regionalism, offers an explanation of regional cooperation in heterogeneous regions like Mediterranean.

2.2 Security in IR Theories

Traditional international theories, primarily realism/neorealism, are still dominant in security studies. As realist theory has been viewed as the main theory of IR and other theories emerged as critiques of the realist paradigm, it is crucial to evaluate traditional theories first before going on to define the premises of Copenhagen School security study, which includes security complex approach, that will provide the framework of analysis to this thesis. More importantly, since Copenhagen School encompasses basic premises of traditional theories along with constructivism, it is necessary to analyze those theories in order to understand this school of thought.

The main theoretical concepts used in order to explain security relations are alliance, collective security, security regime and security community. Another is the security complex which differs from the others in certain points and agrees in other. These concepts will be defined along the chapter.

2.2.1 Realism/Neo-Realism

The realist approach defines international system as anarchic and sovereign nation-states as the primary actor in this system. Power and interest are the key terms. Hobbesian realist tradition views international politics as a state of war, competitive, zero-sum game in which interests of each state are realized at the expense of others. There is pure conflict between states. As there is no central authority in the international realm; it is a conflictual, anarchic and self-help system. The shadow of the future prompts a state to always have a fear of other states. Thus, this uncertainty limits interstate cooperation. Yet, as states are rational actors, they focus upon their relative gains and want to maximize their security so they make bargains with other states and create balance of power in order to hinder the emergence of hegemony.

In the 1970s, traditional realism faced criticism by neo-realists who reshaped the realist tradition and made it relevant to the conditions after the Second World War. Waltz (1979) in Theory of International Politics defines the premises of neo-realism and argues that unlike realism which is
based on reductionism by explaining international outcomes through elements at national and sub-national levels, neo-realist tries to explain political outcomes through systemic features on a scientific platform. Since classical realism takes the state as the unit of analysis and focuses on the state behaviour, it cannot explain the repetitions in the international system. In addition, as it assumes a direct link between states’ interaction and international outcome, it cannot explain similarity. On the other hand, neo-realism takes system as unit of analysis to explain why different units behave similarly. Political structure limits the state behaviour and leads to similar international outcomes. The root of power for classical realist is the human nature whereas Waltz emphasizes the anarchical system pushing states to accumulate power in order to survive. Moreover, neo-realism further distinguishes domestic and international politics. “While national politics is realm of authority, of administration and of law, international politics is realm of power, of struggle and of accommodation” (Waltz, 1979:113). According to realist/neo-realists, “international realm is characterized by conflict, suspicion and competition between nation-states” (Burchill et al., 2001:70).

Realism/neo-realism separates politics from other domains. They take politics as an autonomous sphere and disregard the interaction between the economics, culture and politics. Realism also differentiates high and low politics. While high politics is about military and security issues, low politics is about economic and social ones. Thus, realism subordinates nonmilitary issues to military ones by emphasizing military power and security of a state as the most important realm. It perceives the regional arrangements as an obsolete precaution against globalization. Geopolitics enables to grasp the problem of national power. “The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to preserve their positions in this system. Therefore balancing is the behaviour induced by the system” (Waltz, 1979:126). Security alliances, collective security and regional arrangements are the means of reaching this end.

“Regionalization is a means to extend national concerns and ambitions rather than an alternative to a state-centered international system” (Gilpin, 2001:357). According to the realist perspective, there is a zero-sum game between the regional blocs in which each member state tries to maximize her relative gains in terms of resources, wealth and security. Regionalism simplifies the conflict at the international realm by combining the states together under the leadership of one or more dominant powers. Nation-states enhance their security against external threat by involving in a regional bloc. The motives behind the formation of regional blocs are political and success of integration process depends on the willingness of one or more superpowers.
2.2.2 Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

Like realists, neo-liberal institutionalists also believe in rational analysis and see the nation-state as the primary actor and the international realm as anarchic, but they also accept the role of transnational and non-state actors in international politics. They view institutions as effective mechanisms for achieving international cooperation. International institutions reduce uncertainty and increase predictability of others’ action because they provide information and knowledge. Rules, norms and principles limit and regularize the states’ actions. Hence, they enable cooperation and coexistence among states, thereby maintenance of the international order.

International regimes are also important in the establishment of international order. Regimes are defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in given area” (Krasner, 1983:2). Security regimes are "those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate" (Jervis, 1982:357). They promote stability because states value peace and cooperation in order to avoid military threat and reduce the cost of achieving peace (Jervis, 1982). Moreover, regimes make government policies more predictable and more reliable by providing information so that shared information can lead to agreement and joint action (Keohane and Nye, 2001:289).

According to this paradigm, international politics is characterized by economic and political interdependence. States being aware of weakening of their control try to extend their control by cooperating with other actors. Today, internationalization of production, environmental and ecological problems threaten not one state but all states in general so they become more interdependent not only in economic realm but also in political and social realms for whole security. Moreover, the cost of total control is very high due to the lack of capability to deal with rapid changes. According to Keohane and Nye (2001), globalization made the unilateral measures of nation-states insufficient. States facing increased globalization will become willing to cooperate and some of this cooperation will take place on a regional level. It also implies that by acting cooperatively they can gain together, not at the expense of others. “In the politics of interdependence, domestic and transnational as well as governmental interests are involved so domestic and foreign policy becomes closely linked” (Keohane and Nye, 2001:7). Issue linkages can change the distribution of powers among states. In contrast to neo-realism, liberal institutionalism states that “firstly, national preferences are assumed to be domestically generated and not driven from a state’s security concern; secondly, in the bargaining states look for their relative intensity of preference not by military or material power capabilities” (Pollack, 2001:225).
Moreover, in the contemporary system, economic issues became as important as the military ones. Market issues can lead political outcome or political issues can affect economy. Therefore, there is interaction between different domains. Besides, “force is often not an appropriate way of achieving other goals such as economic and ecological welfare” (Keohane and Nye, 2001:24). Instead of military force, states prefer economic sanctions and political punishments. Moreover, the only problem among states is not the military threat. Today, trade disputes, migration and terrorist attacks are also among the problems that states encounter. Thus, today, security is not strictly a national matter; it requires international collaboration.

In conclusion, complex interdependence stresses that each state has relative power with different issues. There are reciprocal effects among countries so there needs not to be a zero-sum game. Since states compose the system, they can change it. Anarchy can be modified by inter-state cooperation. Institutions and international regimes are the tools for this cooperation.

2.2.3 Constructivism

Constructivism emphasizes the role of ideas, socialization and normative value formation in the regional arrangements. Regionalism is a political and social project in which different actors interact and define themselves by looking at the non-members as well as the other member states. The rules and norms of the regional arrangement reshape the identity of the member states in time.

The Constructivist approach expresses that world politics is based on ideas and conventions. Normative and ideational structures are as important as the material structures in this approach. What gives meaning to the objects or concepts is the common agreements among agents. Therefore, the system is socially constructed. Constructivism accepts power and interest as important factors in international life “since their effects are a function of culturally constituted ideas” (Wendt, 1999:41). Like neo-liberal institutionalists, constructivists also accept that institutions matter. Yet, from the constructivist approach, institutions have a wider role than just functional one. For them, institutions constitute actors and shape their interests and identities.

According to constructivism, security cannot be defined without reference to inter-subjective perceptions. Perceptions of security and insecurity are connected to values, beliefs and identities. The collective, inter-subjective understanding of member states gives meaning to regional formation. It is a social process that interaction between the member states leads to common social understanding. In this process, each member state redefines its own identity and interest; thereby they get closer to each other and become other-regarding. Wendt (1999) argues that states are at the beginning ‘pre-social actors’ with basic needs. The interaction with other states leads them to redefine ‘self’ and become
cooperative. Regionalism would be explained from this approach not as a result of structural or institutional factors, but as an instrument for states to change the existing international system and create new identities and alliances. Regional arrangements can also be constructed through interaction and building of new loyalties. Wæver (1990) stresses the reason of the difficulty in region-building to be different and competing national conceptions of the regional arrangement.

2.2.4 Copenhagen School of Security Studies

Barry Buzan, as the leading figure of the Copenhagen School, suggests a broader definition of security. The concept of security goes beyond traditional politico-military notions by putting emphasis on interconnectedness of different realms of society. Buzan (1991:19) states that “the security of human collectivities is affected by factors in five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental.” He emphasizes the interconnectedness, global trends and rising density of international interaction as crucial conditions that necessitate the broader notion of security because “these conditions made the narrow views of national security and national security strategies inappropriate and counterproductive” (Buzan, 1991:369).

The Copenhagen School agrees on the anarchic nature of the international system and states as the primary actors; but also accepts the globalization and rising interdependence in the current system. “In a multipolar world, security agenda has got fragmented and governments face increasingly divergent needs and threat perceptions” (Buzan, 1996:12). Therefore, this school underlines emerging different types of threats regardless of decline in the military concerns. According to Buzan (1991:370), a broad security concept will bridge the political gap between idealism and realism and integrate traditionally compartmentalized branches of IR.

The broader view of security encompassing all five sectors serves to raise, rather than to suppress, questions about vested interests and domestic structures. States are locked into the context of interdependence and national security supported by international and common security is necessary element to view the broad picture. Since the logic of security contains a strong international and collective dimension, it avoids the destructive zero-sum logic of power.

(Buzan, 1991:371-2)

In this perspective, the state is still the predominant actor holding legitimacy of use of force. Security problems also bring economic ones by itself and change in the security order leads a new regional cooperation structure. “The systemic pressures led the states to develop rules and forms of mutual recognition” (Burchill et al., 2001:94). Security interdependence is at the heart of this approach. Since security threats are closer in short distances, insecurity is associated with proximity. “The normal pattern of security interdependence in a geographically diverse, anarchic international
system is one of regionally based clusters, which is labelled security complexes” (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998:11).

Security complexes are related to the intensity of interstate relations that lead distinctive regional patterns. Distribution of power and historical relations of amity and enmity shape the regional patterns. “The three key components of the structure in a security complex are the arrangements of units and differentiation among them; patterns of amity and enmity; and distribution of powers among units” (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998:13). Regional complex is defined as “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan et al., 1998:12). Main characteristics of security regions are: “there should be at least two states as constituent; these states constituted a geographically coherent grouping; security interdependence shapes the interaction between these states; and lastly, the pattern of security interdependence is to be deep and durable” (Buzan et al., 1998:15). Going further from traditional security complex theory, Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) emphasize a wider range of sectors in security study. They define homogenous complexes, which hold for classical views of complexes concentrating on specific sectors, and heterogeneous complexes, which assume that regional logic can comprise different types of actors interacting across various sectors. Within this new framework, security complexes extend beyond state and interstate relations and beyond politico-military issues.

Furthermore, the Copenhagen School agrees with the constructivist paradigm that insecurity is linked to state security, which is related to the societal security (Waever et al., 1993). Shared understanding is regarded as a way to improve the regional integration. Emphasis on ‘existential threat’ comes from constructivist view into this paradigm. According to Buzan et al. (1998), security is the move that takes the politics beyond its existing rules and makes it a special kind of politics or above politics, thereby securitization means extreme politicization. Securitization is also an inter-subjective process since there is no objective measure of security meaning that different states perceive threat different from one another. Therefore, both within and between actors, the extent of shared inter-subjective understandings of security is key to grasp the interplay among actors. Rather than the security concept, the actors and units¹ should be analyzed since they construct and reconstruct the security concept. State remains the most important referent object but it is not the only one.

Buzan,Waever and de Wilde (1998) stress that internal dynamics of security complex can be located along a spectrum according to whether the defining security interdependence is driven by

¹ The units of analysis are “the referent objects (things seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival), securitizing actors (who securitize issues) and functional actors (who affect the dynamics of a sector but neither being referent object nor securitizing actor)” (Buzan et al., 1998:36).
amity or enmity. At the negative end stays conflict formation (Vayrynen, 1984) in which interdependence arises from fear, mutual perceptions of threat and rivalry so it is purely realist perspective. In the middle lie security regimes (Jervis, 1982) in which certain rules and norms regularize the interaction and behaviour of states and reduce the security dilemma. This falls into the neo-liberal approach. At the positive end of the spectrum lies the security community (Deutsch, 1957) in which states are no longer rivals instead they are part of a society transforming from anarchic subsystem of states to a single united actor in the system.

While in military alliances, like-minded states coordinate their military forces in order to threaten the aggressor, in security partnership all regional states as well as external powers involve in the partnership rather than just the allies against the aggressor. In the partnership both international and internal measures are used to further the stability and security in the region. In the collective security system, which is also another realist tool, states make their forces ready against an aggressor and prepare collective forces. This kind of cooperation neglects the domestic conditions in states for stability and peace. In comparison to security community, in security partnership states have small flow of communication and transaction. (Attina, 2002)

Explaining security on the basis of power and peace is narrow. According to Buzan (1991), security is broader than power and peace. The Copenhagen School accepts the anarchic structure of international system and the significance of power amalgamation but it also accepts the possibility of international society and security community. Therefore, the security complex is the way to manage differences and promote interaction among units of system. Thus, “the security complex approach allows capture the security dynamics and the interdependence operating in a region with relation to their impact, both internally and externally, on states and societies” (Haddadi, 1999:3). “A security complex can be defined in terms of economic factor; the existence of a regional organization or the need for it; a perceived security threat; and geopolitical, historical and cultural links that might exist between the members involved” (Haddadi, 1999:4).

This paradigm agrees on the neo-realism in certain aspects because, according to Walt (1985), aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions are the factors that constitute threat (Bicchi, 2001:3). Thus, neo-realism and Copenhagen School emphasize power relations, proximity as well as perceptions of threat as crucial in security arrangements. Global trends and interdependence are the premises that this paradigm shares with the neo-liberal institutionalism. The constructivist premises of shared-understanding and values as a way to further the regional partnership are also put into the framework of the Copenhagen School. In conclusion, the Copenhagen School remains one of the most comprehensive and alluring security studies.
2.3 Theoretical Framework

Buzan (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998) stresses that the Mediterranean is not a regional complex. However, many researchers of the Mediterranean security, like Haddadi (1999), state that this framework is more appropriate to provide a general outlook of the process and arrangements than any other terms. As Biscop (2003: 191) highlights “although Mediterranean partners are diverse set of countries, they involve in an interrelated set of security issues: unresolved disputes, conflicts across region, militarization and proliferation and violent Islamism. Thus, Mediterranean can be regarded as a single security complex”. Thus, this study will use the security complex theory as analytical tool.

Security interaction and security interdependence, which are two characteristics of the security complex, exist in the Mediterranean region. Although it is not possible to explain and generalize different, uneven regional settings and varying degrees of regionalization in the global system, new regionalism as a theoretical perspective identifies the structures, changes in the contemporary system and provides strategies; thus “it is a promising focus for both empirical and normative inquiry” (Falk, 1999:229).

The new regionalism theory will prove systemic factors that explain the regional cooperation in the Mediterranean region. “The EMP is a regional-level process of building mechanisms and institutions to settle the local aspects of global trends and problems” (Attina, 2003:183). This paradigm stresses historical ties, economic and political interdependence, security vulnerabilities and geopolitics. These factors can be used to understand the interdependence between Europe and the Mediterranean states to further their security cooperation through EMP. New regionalism is preferred because unlike the old one, the new regionalism provides a viewpoint on the possibility of cooperation in a heterogeneous region like the Mediterranean. Thus, new regionalism will help to grasp the policy better with forces behind it and how Mediterranean regional partnership could be possible.

The security complex theory, in general Copenhagen School, leads this thesis with its broad and comprehensive security notion encompassing both military and non-military issues. The study includes both the premises of neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism. The geographic proximity idea of neo-realism accepted in the regional security complex theory knits the whole Mediterranean together. The security complex theory enables to understand increasing number of regional patterns and provides a framework for studying particular regions. It allows for explanations of security interdependence between the EU member states and the Mediterranean states that patterned into regional cluster. The interdependence among many sectors with the involvement of different actors is the premise that neo-liberal institutionalism and Copenhagen School share. The general picture includes interplay between systemic factors and security of nation-states which form the regional dynamics. This theory offers a structure to grasp these dynamics.
In this thesis, new regionalism will lighten the systemic factors that lead to the formation of Mediterranean security cooperation while the security complex theory gives a frame to study the regional patterns. Upon the definition of five security sectors by Copenhagen School, the study will examine issues in those security sectors in the EMP context. This theory perceiving from constructivism also stresses the role of security cultures and perceptions in order to understand the conflicts and cooperation so this study will assess European and Arab security cultures and examine how the Barcelona Declaration and the following ministerial meetings, which reflect the position of governments, approach the security cooperation in the Mediterranean. Since the patterns of amity-enmity, proximity and security interdependence are set as the characteristics of a regional complex in the Copenhagen School, these characteristics will be considered during the evaluation of the EMP.
CHAPTER 3- HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

After the collapse of Soviet Union, the EU gave priority to Russia and the former Soviet Republics in its regional relations. Yet, in early 1990s, the Gulf crisis and subsequent events such as immigration, radical groups along with the Islamist movements emerged in Algeria in 1989 increased the EU’s attention to the Mediterranean basin and Arab world. The Mediterranean holds importance with concerns mainly of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Middle East conflict, religious fundamentalism and migration. Economic factors, security threat perception, and the geopolitical, historical and cultural ties enhanced the security interaction and interdependence between the EU and the Mediterranean so the security complex.

The Mediterranean Basin consists of two main regions: the EU in the north-west and the Middle East in the south-eastern part of the Mediterranean. In addition, there are four sub-regions in the Basin: Southern Europe, the Balkans, the Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco) and Mashreq (Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, Arabian Peninsula). Each of these regions has diverging patterns of evolution and features. While Southern Europe pursues cooperative way in its relations with each other, the Balkans, North Africa and the Levant still maintain conflictual relations (Calleya, 2000). Haddadi (1999) calls the two main regions as two security complexes where the Middle East has the lower-level security complex while the EU has higher-level. The two regions are linked by those sub-regions, in Haddadi’s term by Western Mediterranean which he labels as ‘a liaison security complex’ (Haddadi, 1999:2).

The Barcelona Process brings those sub-regions along with the two main regions together, institutionalizes the relations and aims to achieve cooperative patterns in the region. The Mediterranean region in this study implies the region encompassing all countries that are partners of the Barcelona Process.

3.1 Evolution of Barcelona Process

Before Barcelona Program, there were previous European efforts to achieve collective security in the region besides the Mediterranean initiatives of the NATO, OSCE and ACRS. The European Community’s relation with the Mediterranean countries developed in the 1960s and 70s through bilateral agreements. In 1972, the Community set a more determined policy called the Global
Mediterranean policy. Yet, the Cold War and disunity among Community members hindered the policy. Later, the Italy and Spain called for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) during the Palma de Mallorca meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE- later OSCE) in 1990. The CSCM failed due to the difficulty to reach an agreement on which Mediterranean countries were to be included in the initiative and due to the reluctance of Northern Europeans and the US. Nonetheless, the attempt illustrates the awareness of the states for collective security action in the region. Similarly, the EC’s Revised Mediterranean Policy in 1990, the creation of Euro-Maghreb Partnership and later the 5+5 Dialogue also depict the desire of security cooperation in the Mediterranean. The 5+5 Dialogue project aimed to take attention of Europe to the Mediterranean but it failed because of the Gulf War in 1990-1, the diplomatic exclusion of Libya and tensions between Morocco and Algeria over the Western Sahara (Spencer, 1998:146). Then, the Mediterranean Forum sponsored by Egypt in 1991 comprised of eleven Mediterranean states occurred. Since this forum emerged from within the region, it provided an outlet for Mediterranean countries to express their security and development concern. This forum was considered seriously by the southern European participants and led them to push the EU to bring the Mediterranean into the EU’s priority agenda. The EU realized the necessity for further and wider action due to the complex interdependence. In June 1994 the European Council in Corfu asked the Council of Ministers and the European Commission to evaluate the global Mediterranean policy and strengthen it. The European Commission proposed a wide range framework of initiatives which were presented to discussion in the Barcelona Conference. Thus, the Barcelona Program was the culmination of all these previous attempts and institutionalized the interaction between the EU and the Mediterranean countries.

Having made a brief overview of the process that led the Barcelona Program, the following section will focus upon the basic premises and principles of the Barcelona Declaration, its baskets, key security issues as well as the implementation system of the Program. Following that, the Euro-Mediterranean Conferences will be examined in a thematic manner with the main themes related to the security aspect which were discussed in the conferences.

3.2 Underlying Principles and the Baskets of the EMP

In the Barcelona Conference on 27-28 November 1995, 15 EU member states and 12 Mediterranean countries (MPCs) gathered and created a Declaration and annexed the Work Program

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4 5+5 Dialogue was initiated by France at the beginning of the 1980s and then relaunched by Italy and Spain in the late 1980s. The first meeting took place in 1990. First it was called five plus four encompassing the five Mediterranean countries of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia and the European countries of France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. With the accession of Malta, the project became five plus five.

* France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Ireland.
named the ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ (EMP) which reflects the desire of participants to create stability, peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean region. They agreed to further bilateral and multilateral relations or regional cooperation named the Barcelona Process (in general, EMP). The Mediterranean is identified as geopolitical, strategic and economic space. “The Barcelona Process is based on three main guiding principles: equality in the partnership; complementing rather than displacing bilateral activities; and comprehensiveness, decentralisation and gradualism in the approach” (Philippart, 2003:202). Underlying goals in the Partnership are improving democratic structure in the region, enhancing liberalized trade and free market, achieving peaceful settlement of disputes, regional cooperation and cultural dialogue. The three baskets of the EMP reflect those goals and they are declared to be complimentary. These baskets are:

- **Political and Security Partnership** proposing establishing a common Euro-Mediterranean area of peace and stability based on fundamental principles including respect for human rights and democracy.

- **Economic and Financial Partnership** sought to create an area of shared prosperity through liberalization of economies in the region and formation of free trade area by 2010 supported by substantial EU financial support for economic transition and for reform process.

- **Social, Cultural and Human Partnership** aiming at creation of cross-cultural interactions and exchanges as well as support for development of civil societies which will generate political pluralism and democracy.

  *(Barcelona Declaration, 1995)*

The EMP is expressed largely in economic terms but the partner states recognized the underlying social, political and security objectives of the EMP. The European integration has been based on the logic of spill-over effects of economic development to other areas. The EMP reflects the same idea. From R. Youngs’ word, “in designing the Barcelona Process, the EU’s philosophy was that economic and political objectives were symbiotic: economic reform would bring in its wake political reform, which would boost economic performance further, the latter helping to stem any potential for unsustainable levels of migration and thereby enhancing security objectives” (Youngs, 1999:17-18). Inclusion of social and political mechanisms as ways of reaching ultimate aim, which is security and stability, depicts the comprehensive understanding of security in the Barcelona Process.

* The 12 Mediterranean Partners, situated in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia (Maghreb); Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Syria (Mashreq); Turkey, Cyprus and Malta; Libya currently has observer status at certain meetings. During the thesis, MPCs imply the 12 Mediterranean partner countries in the EMP.
The conjunction in which the EMP emerged was the end of the Cold War, collapse of Soviet Union and rise of Western notion of democracy and liberalism. The first basket comprises a concept of peace and stability, which is reflection of this post-Cold War world vision expressing safer, more prosperous and less conflictual arena. “According to the EMP approach, security is both the overall effect of the multidimensional strategy of the Partnership as defined in the three baskets and the object of specific initiatives within the first basket frame” (Attina, 2002:16). The three baskets also show that the EU has taken into consideration the soft security threats and views regional cooperation as an appropriate solution. The first basket identifies following goals for both military and non-military security issues:

- Promote regional security by acting, inter alia, in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through compliance with international and regional non-proliferation regimes, and arms control and disarmament agreements.
- Strengthen cooperation in combating terrorism.
- Fight together against the organized crime and the drugs problem.
- Pursue a mutual and effective Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological.
- Take practical steps to prevent the proliferation of weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms.
- Refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements.
- Promote conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves and support processes aimed at stability, security, prosperity and regional and subregional cooperation.
- Consider any confidence and security-building measures to create an ‘area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean’, including the long-term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.
- Make sure non-interference in the internal affairs of the other partners and respect the territorial integrity and sovereign equality of the other partners.

(Barcelona Declaration, 1995)

Similarly in the first basket, the principles underlining to uphold human rights, rule of law, democracy, tolerance and pluralism target to appreciate internal security. In the third basket, the areas for cooperation are education and training, social development, migration, drug trafficking, terrorism, international crime, racism and xenophobia, combating corruption and judicial cooperation, which show that soft security challenges are targeted.

3.3 Implementation System of the EMP

The implementation of these baskets is realized through bilateral association agreements, multilateral relations; and unilateral (intra-EU) structure to channel funds (Philippart, 2003). Until now, eleven of the twelve Association Agreements (except Syria) have been concluded. Relations with Turkey, Cyprus and Malta are managed through EU’s enlargement (accession) process and based on
first generation association agreements. Libya, for political reasons, was left out the process; however Libya has been given observer status in some meetings.⁶

EMP sets four instruments for monitoring the evolution of the policy⁷:

- Periodic meetings between the foreign affairs ministers of the twenty-seven partner states are held to monitor the Barcelona Declaration and decide on common objectives and actions.
- The Euro-Mediterranean Committee for Barcelona Process, encompassing Senior Officials from participant states together with EU troika, prepares the meetings, monitors and evaluates the outcomes.
- The European Commission with its appropriate directorate generals deals with preparatory and follow-up work from decisions of meetings and manages financial issues.
- Ad hoc meetings of ministers, Senior Officials and others are responsible for realization of actions defined in foreign ministerial meetings.

The actors in the Barcelona Process also vary from one basket to another. In the first basket, especially in security, a group of senior officials carry out the issues, which allows the governments to have primary and direct impact on issues. In the second basket, the EU and individual governments undertake goals together. Finally, the third basket is more interactive with contribution of civil societies and funding of the EU. In addition, the European Commission is influential in all baskets since the Barcelona Process is prepared by the Barcelona Committee where the EU is represented by the Commission. The EU provides funds for structural reforms and specific cultural, economic and political projects.

EMP stresses the need for continuous political dialogue, so the committees and meetings are held frequently. In the field of security, senior officials meet and try to reach a common position. After Barcelona, their first meeting in May 1996 ended with an ‘Action Plan’ which lists six areas for dialogue: “strengthening democracy, preventive diplomacy, confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), disarmament, combating terrorism and fighting organized crime and drug trafficking” (European Parliament, 1998:7).

⁶ “Status of Libya as future Mediterranean Partner: On the basis of a consensus among the 27 partners on its admission reached on the occasion of the “Barcelona III” Stuttgart conference of Foreign Ministers on 15-16 April 1999, Libya could in time become a further partner in the Barcelona Process following the lifting of UN Security Council sanctions against it and once it accepts the full terms of the Barcelona Declaration and the related actions. Since its participation in the Stuttgart conference as a special guest of the EU Presidency, Libya takes part as an observer in some of the meetings of the Barcelona Process” (European Commission External Relations), [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/index.htm]
⁷ Cited at the website of EuroMeSCo, [http://www.euromesco.net/euromesco/publi_artigo.asp?cod_artigo=67969]
3.4 Major Themes Discussed in the Euro-Mediterranean Conferences

3.4.1 Institutional/ Structural Themes

From the beginning, the signatories underlined the necessity to develop CSBMs and to prepare a ‘Charter for Peace and Stability’ considering the French and Maltese proposals for a Mediterranean security charter in 1996. The Charter was locus point in all Euro-Med conferences because it would enable description of conflicts and threats, and the way to tackle with them. It reflects the neo-liberal institutionalist view of security regimes which provide norms and rules of the action and transparency so that boost the security cooperation. The Charter would be a reflection of a common position among the partners in the security field and create a regional security system which would make the EMP more regionally integrated complex.

The Stability Pact for Europe motivated the MPCs at the beginning. However, unlike Eastern European states, the MPCs, especially the Middle East and North African (MENA) ones, have divergent security threats and challenges with a different security culture. Patterns of amity-enmity and historical experiences that Copenhagen School stresses became obstacles for the formation of the Charter. In addition, the complexity in the MEPP made the partners to be reluctant to develop the Charter. Yet, at the end of each Euro-Med Conference, they gave support to the work of senior officials on the Charter.

At the Stuttgart Conference (1999), the ministers emphasized that the Charter would “provide for an enhanced political dialogue as well as evolutionary and progressive development of partnership-building measures (PBMs), good-neighbourly relations, regional cooperation and preventive diplomacy” (3rd Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1999: paragraph 11). As this conclusion stresses, the Barcelona Process underlines the role of PBMs in the creation of the political and security dialogue as well as of the Charter. The replacement of the term CBMs with PBMs is crucial because while CBMs imply the existence of a conflict or tension, partnership eliminates this kind of sense. The definition of PBMs stated in the Stuttgart Conference illustrates the priority of

9 The Stability Pact for Europe proposed by French Prime Minister E. Balladur in 1993 was a Pact for Central and Eastern European states illustrating that the Central and Eastern European states would work to promote good neighbourly relations and to resolve the problems of national minorities and borders.
10 In the Stuttgart Conference, the PBMs are defined to compose:
“Establishment of a Euro-Med system of disaster prevention, mitigation and management, exchange of information on signature/ratification of international instruments in the fields of disarmament and arms control, terrorism, human rights, and international humanitarian law; the successful holding of Euro-Mediterranean
soft security issues in the EMP agenda. In the Naples Conference (2003), the ministers suggested that “if necessary PBMs could be on the basis of participation by limited number of partners, open to rest to join later” (6th Euro-Med Conference, 2003: Paragraph 26). This implies that the ministers accept the flexibility in the Process.

The Guidelines annexed to the Stuttgart conclusions is a crucial step in elaboration of the Charter because it would help defining the security concepts and identifying the threats and areas of cooperation. Another important document in the Barcelona Process is the ‘Valencia Action Plan’ declared in the Valencia Conference (2002). It reflects “the principles of co-ownership visibility, efficiency and credibility of the Barcelona Process” (5th Euro-Med Conference, 2002: Paragraph 4). The Plan sets short and medium term initiatives that would reinforce the cooperation together with political and cultural dialogue. It also prepared the main lines for the future work of PBMs so that it contributed to the formation of more concrete lines for the future actions and highlighted the significance of the EMP. Thus, it manifested the renewal of the Barcelona Process.

The Euro-Med Conferences also ended up with some decisions to institutionalize the Process. In the Brussels Conference (2001), the ministers, with the impact of the September 11 attacks to the US, appreciated the creation of a system for preventing and managing disasters. Acquis of the Barcelona Process is a significant element to be improved in order to institutionalize the Process. Only after eight years, in the Naples Conference (2003), could the partners focus on enhancing the legislative and regulatory structure of the EMP. The European Commission’s EU Wider Europe/ New Neighbourhood Policy also influenced the EMP. The policy would improve the Barcelona Process acquis by supporting reforms and regulatory and legislative approximation; thereby strengthen the regional cooperation. From a structural view, the Naples Conference emphasized the open ended ad hoc informal groups’ discussion in the Process. The welcome of the creation of the Euro-Med Parliamentary Assembly in the Valencia (2002) and Naples Conferences (2003) is another institutional decision, realization of which will enhance the transparency and bring the Process closer to the people. Furthermore, the Naples’ conclusions stressed the approximation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with the EMP. It is emphasized that the dialogue of the MPCs with the Political and Security Committee of the EU could be complimentary to the Process so that this dialogue could help to familiarise the MPCs with the ESDP aims and instruments (6th Euro-Med Conference, 2003:Paragraph 32). The linkage of the ESDP with the Barcelona Process is significant for the enhancement of the mutual trust and as instruments that could be utilized in the management of conflicts.

information and training seminars for diplomats aiming at the shaping of a culture of dialogue and cooperation through informal exchange and open discussions between practitioners involved in the implementation of the Partnership; dialogue and cooperation in terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking” (3rd Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1999: paragraphs 13,15).
Finally, the appreciation of the *sub-regional cooperation* initiatives such as AMU and Agadir\(^{11}\) in the Naples Conference (2003) is crucial. Since the Mediterranean is heterogeneous composed of many sub-regions, the sub-regional integration is required. The Naples Conference realizes this setback and calls for the implementation of policies at a sub-regional integration in both the Western and Eastern Mediterranean, beginning with the three central Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia). Then it could extend to other partners. Parallel to this, “the Conference of Euro-Mediterranean regions held in Palermo on 27-28 November 2003 underlined the importance of cooperation amongst regions which will be instrumental in providing the Barcelona Process with further breadth and substance as well as in bringing the partnership closer to the civil societies of the region” (6\(^{th}\) Euro-Med Conference, 2003:Paragraph 55).

### 3.4.2 The Middle East Conflict

The Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) has been in the agenda of all Conferences and its progress was one of the determining factors of the Conferences’ conclusions. The apparent progress in the Conferences is observable at the times when the MEPP showed some positive moves. For instance, it was the collapse of the peace talks at Camp David in July 2000 that deterred the adoption of the Charter in the Marseilles Conference (2000). In order to prevent the Middle East conflict to deter the EMP process, the ministers underlined that “the MEPP is complementary to the EMP and any direct linkage between the two should be avoided” (6\(^{th}\) Euro-Med Conference, 2003: Paragraph 27).

Essentially, the Conferences repeated the agreement among the partners that the realisation of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East needs to be in the line with the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions, Madrid Peace Conference, Oslo Accords and Wye River Memorandum\(^{12}\). While the ministers asked the Palestinian Authority to apprehend the people responsible for the attack against Israel, they called for the withdrawal of Israel from areas under the Palestinian authority (Euro-Med Conference, 2001). The Valencia Conclusion stresses the “creation of an independent, democratic State of Palestine and the right of Israel to live within secure and recognized boundaries” (5\(^{th}\) Euro-Med Conference, 2002: paragraph 7). Another crucial point is that participants emphasized the necessity of the intensified action of all three of the negotiating tracks, the Syrian, Lebanese and the Palestinians with Israel, and the need to work together constructively.

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\(^{11}\) Agadir Process was started by Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia in January 2003 to reactivate the South-South free trade area.

\(^{12}\) Wye River Memorandum in October 1998 was a US-brokered compromise that Israel would withdraw 13 per cent of the West Bank in exchange for security assurances from Palestinian Authority.
Moreover, the MEPP is linked to the refugee problem for the whole Mediterranean countries, which was underlined in the Brussels Conference (2001). The conflict in the Middle East forces people to be refugee and seek asylum in Europe and in other Mediterranean states. This implies migratory flow from the Middle East to the other Mediterranean partners, which creates a societal security concern to whole Mediterranean countries.

The current Iraqi situation after the US operation in 2003 was also considered by the Euro-Med partners in Naples Conference. The Iraqi situation is important for the Mediterranean stability and security because any kind of instability in Iraq will spread to the region. In Naples, the EU and Mediterranean states committed to contribute to the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq within the framework of the UNSC while they emphasized the role of the UN in the post-conflict arrangement.

3.4.3 Terrorism

Since all partners have been victims of terrorist attacks, the Conferences attributed considerable attention to the fight against terrorism. In the Palermo Conference (1998), the partners identified terrorism as a serious threat to the objectives of the Process and agreed to hold a special ad hoc meeting of senior officials to develop a dialogue on prevention of it. The September 11 attacks and the deadly terrorist bombings in Istanbul in November 2003 stimulated the partners to form a more precise stance against terrorism and clear definitions. In the Brussels Conference held after the September 11 attacks, the signatories regarded terrorist attacks as attack against the entire international community and against all religions and cultures. Utterance of culture and religion within this issue shows their concern on not to equate terrorism with cultural or religious divergence so that prevent hostage among societies. Therefore, participants clearly emphasized their rejection of any equation of terrorism with the Arab and Muslim world (Euro-Med Conference, 2001: Paragraph 2). Similarly, in Naples (2003) ministers underlined the significance of promoting tolerance in all EMP countries and particularly the need to stand up against anti-Semitism and Islamophobia as well as xenophobia (6th Euro-Med Conference, 2003: Paragraph 21). This shows that partners are aware of the perceptional differences as defined to be the cause of the security threats in the Copenhagen School. The ministers’ emphasis on cultural and political dialogue along with the consensus to fight against terrorism is parallel with the comprehensive and cooperative approach of the EMP.

3.4.4 Migration

In general, migration is considered in the third basket realm and in the Conferences ministers stressed their concern on human movements and illegal migration which is linked to organized crime,
drug trafficking as well. In combating illegal migration, the partners confirmed “the need for a global approach balancing security concerns and the management of migratory flows on the one hand, with the facilitation of legal movement of persons and social integration of migrants on the other” (6th Euro-Med Conference, 2003: Paragraph 61). In the Brussels conclusion, for the first time migration was moved to the first basket, and the ministers emphasized the migration together with the fight against terrorism and human exchange as the areas of common interest that require dialogue. This move has securitized the migration further and it was the result of the September 11 attacks. The regional and sub-regional initiatives were supported to deal with migration. In the Valencia Conference (2002), a Framework document for the implementation of regional cooperation programme in the field of justice, combating drugs, organised crime and terrorism as well as cooperation in the treatment of issues relating to the social integration of migrants and migration is adopted.

3.5 Concluding Remarks

This chapter provided an overview of the Barcelona Process, its main principles and the main themes discussed in the Euro-Mediterranean Conferences. Until the Valencia Conference (2002), the EMP could not show apparent results. The Valencia Conference brought the renewal of the Process and the mutual commitment. The Naples Conference (2003) depicted a larger agenda of issues with a deeper evaluation. The international and regional developments such as the September 11 attacks, the Iraqi War, the challenge of EU enlargement, the stagnation of the MEPP and terrorist attacks in Istanbul, Morocco and Saudi Arabia triggered the partners to pay closer attention to the regional cooperation against the threats. Both the Valencia and the Naples Conferences’ conclusions reflect this attention. It is parallel to the logic of the security complex theory that systemic factors and global threats knit the neighbouring countries closer. The security challenges discussed during the conferences are more non-military issues. The formation of the Charter would be a momentous improvement. The PBM, which set to counter the security threats, are mostly non-military and civilian measures. While the first basket deals directly with the security, the third basket also considers security challenges such as migration and fight against racism, drug trafficking and emphasizes the necessity of regional cooperation and of the participation of civil societies in the EMP. Furthermore, economic and financial partnership will also provide prosperity and solution for some security issues. The neo-liberal institutionalist view of expecting economic growth and free trade to bring security and stability is not enough. Since ultimate zone of peace and a regional complex require a comprehensive security approach that calls for cooperation mechanisms in the political, security and cultural sectors as the Copenhagen School highlights, the three baskets of the EMP illustrate an attempt to realize this and achieve a charter for stability and peace. The Naples’ conclusion demonstrates this by stating that political and security cooperation requires “an overall strategy to the stability/security issue in the region, while paying more attention- with an even-handed and balanced approach- to new security
challenges particularly in the Mediterranean basin” (6th Euro-Med Conference, 2003:Paragraph 26). The following chapter will offer an in-depth analysis of the security challenges to discern how well the EMP could respond to them.
CHAPTER 4- SECURITY CHALLENGES in EMP

As the Copenhagen School underlines, security as concept is not a threat but it is the definition of threats and existential threats by the actors or referent objects that shows what threat is and how to resolve it. The Barcelona Initiative is oriented towards preventing new conflicts and security threats; actually “most of the so-called new security threats are not new; but it is only perception of them which developed in last decades with globalization makes spill-overs and consequences of those threats more intrusive and palpable”(Aliboni, 2002:9). Therefore, it is crucial to analyze the perceptions and security cultures before analyzing the security challenges.

4.1 Security Cultures and Perceptions:

According to constructivism, security cannot be defined without reference to inter-subjective perceptions. The Copenhagen School underlines that the consideration of a sectoral issue as a security challenge is related to the actors’ perception of the problem. If a state has conflict with another state, a non-security related issue could turn to be a security one.

Perception of security problems and management of external security relations depend on the views of political leaders and the culture of the country…Security cultures of states and regions interact and change over time under the influence of these institutions and agents and of new ideas, practices and experiences. (Attina, 2002:11)

In order to understand the EMP process and its future, it is necessary to examine the security cultures of the main partners. Both cultures are influenced by the worldwide changes. Although states in the same group may have also different security cultures, they are not focused upon, so intra-regional differences are ignored. By evaluating the security policies and decision of states, the security culture of states could be analyzed. Security perceptions of states and societies could also differ.

European security culture

The European security culture is shaped by three major experiences in history: experiences of nuclear deterrence strategy and arms control negotiations during the Cold War; the Helsinki Process which laid the basis for a comprehensive and cooperative security; and finally the national and multinational defence policies reacting against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Attina, 2002). Arms control negotiations showed the importance of meetings and conferences in the formation of common meanings and cooperative solutions which are vital to establish regional security system (Adler, 1998). This view of conference and seminar diplomacy is used in the Barcelona Process at the EU initiative. In all the three baskets of EMP, the meetings and conferences are tools to achieve dialogue and interaction among partners. Justice, rule of law, democracy, pluralism, human and
minority rights, civil society and market economy, which are declared as Maastricht criteria of the EU, are considered as conditions for a stable and secure environment so part of the European security culture.

The concept of confidence building measures (CBMs) occurred in the CSCE/OSCE aimed to eliminate misperceptions and provide military transparency and understanding of each other’s action. In the 1992 Vienna Document of the CSCE, the CBMs were declared to be the compulsory instrument of the European security system. “The co-operative multilateral approach was acknowledged as more efficacious than unilateral approaches and opposed strategic power systems to attain peace and security at the region level” (Attina, 2002:13). According to the European perspective, mechanisms of cooperative security enable the regional projects despite the difference of political culture and values. The CSCE/OSCE brought the concept of comprehensive security into the European security culture, which also constitutes the basis of EMP security aspect. “This concept focuses on the non-military aspects of security including economic, environmental, political and human factors within the group of the factors essential to build international security” (Attina, 2002:13). Thus, the EU initiated the Euro-Mediterranean security framework on the basis of this comprehensive and cooperative security framework.

Arab Security Culture
MENA states are linked to each other by cultural, historical, religious and linguistic factors. Trans-national movements and socio-economic problems as threats to domestic stability, policymakers’ perception of threat, inter-Arab state conflicts and Arab-Israeli conflict shape the Arab security culture (Attina, 2002). “To the Arabs, Israel is the most intrusive, aggressive and expansionist state, non-respectful of Arab states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Attina, 2002:14).

The worsening of economic conditions due to more investment on the military at the cost of other areas led reaction of the people against their regimes. In North Africa, the security culture shifted from one stressing strong military power as a source of security to one that emphasizes civil society security and improvement of socio-economic conditions (Attina, 2002). In addition, Islamist groups criticized their governments for failing to provide socio-economic needs of society and concerned with threats from non-Islamic world. Therefore, radical groups and movements increased and threatened the security within the state and in region.

In general, the Arab security culture is more oriented around traditional and realist view of security that considers national military power. Since the Arab countries did not experience any security cooperation, they are suspicious about comprehensive and cooperative security initiatives. They also carry suspicions about the possibility of interventions, thus perceive the economic aspect of
security as tools for it. The creation of EuroMarFor (European Maritime Security Force) and EuroFor (European Land Force) has reinforced the fears in the North Africa. The European states have divergent position in the Middle East conflict. It is more unbalanced towards Israel. This also influences the Arab’s suspicion, thus shapes their security culture. Hence, building regional security cooperation like the EMP seems unusual and suspicious for the Arab security culture.

For Islamists, the EMP is a strategy for downplaying the Islamist character of the societies on the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea... While the benefits of economic cooperation cannot be refused, the economic and political conditional requirements posed by the EU cause resistance.

(Attina, 2000: 13)

When compared the two security cultures, it is seen that there is big gap between the two and difficult to reduce it in short term. The Mediterranean basin, compared to Europe, is more conflictual and more based on balance of power system. The security policy in Europe has a multilateral character and many EU countries are also members of NATO and OSCE whereas the Mediterranean partners possess unilateral policies (Schumacher, 2002). The MPCs have a stronger perception of external threat which is defined as Western dominance, cultural and economic imperialism, extremeness against Muslims and imposition of Western standards (Buzan et al., 1998). The Gulf War, sanctions and isolation of Iraq and Libya, failure of the EU in Bosnia and support for Israel have shaped this perception.

From the constructivist perspective, the difference in the security cultures is related to the rejection of one another’s identity. The North tries to appreciate and stabilize its identity by defining it against the ‘Other’ which is the identity of the South (Orient). Europe uses its identity as a bounding factor among the whole European states. The South, on the other hand, due to the historical experiences as well as the rhetoric of the North, differentiates its identity from the North. This ends up with societal security concerns for both sides and forms the grassroots of many other security challenges. Therefore, the divergence between the two security cultures is also related to the culture, religion and the economic situation. Thus, the EMP needs to focus on this problem by improving dialogues between societies and the states and to ensure the trust by enhancing military openness and transparency. The interaction of the cultures could achieve the formation of inter-subjective understanding and change the perception of the West vis-à-vis Orient.
4.2 Sectors of Security and EMP

Different reports and organizations like WEU and NATO\textsuperscript{13} have identified security problems affecting Euro-Mediterranean relations. The Barcelona Declaration and the following Ministerial Conferences also highlight the similar security problems while some of the regional conflicts such as Cyprus or Greek-Turkish disputes are handled under the enlargement framework of the EU. This shows that there is a consensus on what the threat is in Euro-Mediterranean relations (Hollis, 2000).

In the security complex framework, security is analyzed in five sectors. There are various security dynamics at play in five sectors of security.

1) Military Sector

Military threats are the core of the security concerns. “So long as the international politics is anarchically structured, the military sector will remain of vital interest and importance”(Buzan et al., 1998:133). Military capability of states threatens the other states. Especially if the relationship is in enmity pattern, the capabilities would trigger further threat. “Geography shapes perceptions and operation of military threats and vulnerabilities in two ways: through distance and terrain” (Buzan et al. 1998:59). Distance implies that military threats are more difficult to be controlled and prevented in short distance while terrain can reduce or increase the vulnerabilities according to the landscape and climate conditions. History is another factor determining the military threat that past experience shapes the present perceptions. Political factors such as degree of recognition of each other and ideological divergences also trigger military threats.

The Mediterranean region but especially the Middle East consists of large amount of nuclear, biological and conventional arms. The geographical proximity of Europe and the Mediterranean and the terrain of the Mediterranean area increase the threat. From a realist view, the military concerns are in the high politics and presence of arms in one state is enough for the other to feel threatened and suspicious. The proximity feeds this threat. The 1986 Libyan missile attack on the Italian island of Lampedusa is shown as an example of future threats caused by the proliferation of conventional arms (Haddadi, 1999). This enhanced Europe’s sensitivity to the issue of conventional arms. In addition to arms, the internal instabilities in the region pose military threats. An example of this is the political violence in Algeria. Thus, terrorism and organised crime might enter among the issues of military

\textsuperscript{13} Both the WEU Report (1996) and Asmus et al. in NATO Review (1996) stress the economic, demographic and social pressures, threat of ballistic missile development, terrorism, organized crime, migration, political Islamism, energy dependency, military expenditure and nationalism as security threats in the Euro-Mediterranean relations besides the regional conflicts such as MEPP, crises in regional countries, Cyprus and disputes between Turkey and Greece.
challenges. The Barcelona Process stresses CBMs/PBMs so as to prevent military threats posed by military challenges.

2) Political Sector:

Political security is about the organization stability of social orders, especially threats to state sovereignty. It is the widest sector and in certain aspects, all security is political (Buzan et al., 1998). Political threats stem from the great diversity of ideas and traditions. Legitimacy crisis, problems in democratic system and human rights, secessionist movements, pressure on government for change, ideological and identity problems are among political threats.

In the Mediterranean region, most of the states are weak states meaning that they have legitimacy crisis, that democracy could not be achieved and political violence is extensive. There are external and internal pressures for reform in their domestic system. In addition, structural political threats stemming from the ideological and identity problems are present in EMP. For instance, the ideological difference between the Islamic and Western ones and between Israel and Arabs, threats to weak states due to nation-state split which is the case in relation to Palestinians, Kurds, and Arabs as well as in North Africa. Similarly, on political-ideological ground, Western values and attempt of Europe to define those values as universal principles are perceived as threats to Islamic values. Moreover, some groups and political parties at domestic level of MPCs perceive the EU as interventionist so they hold abhorrence towards it which trigger the radical groups for violence.

On the other hand, the EU holds the fear that any radical change in the domestic regimes and in the intra-regional relations among the MPCs could create instability in Europe. Therefore, Europe puts more emphasis on human rights and democracy in those states through political conditionality. Yet, the conditionality clauses are interpreted as Western intervention by those countries. As a solution, the EMP stresses the necessity to develop political dialogue and achieve an understanding of two sides’ concerns.

3) Social/Societal Sector

“Societal threats are often part of a larger package of military and political threats” (Buzan, 1991:122). Suppression of sub-identities, ethnic differences, rise of societal violence, migration and population growth are among those threats. While social security is about individuals and is largely economic, societal security is about collectives and their identity (Buzan et al., 1998: 120).

Europe has strong regionalizing dynamics in the societal sector by embracing different minorities and regions. “The issue of minorities, nation and Europe has produced a complex constellation of multilayered identities. And the fate of European security is determined largely by the
fate of the constellations” (Buzan et al., 1998: 132). Among the minorities in Europe, people from MENA are of considerable concern for the EU. Moreover, reaction of Islamic fundamentalists to the penetration of Western values and their suspicions lead terrorist attacks to both the regional states and to European states. High population growth in the MENA creates problems of migration. In the Middle East, “there are stateless minorities like Kurds and Palestinians and there are overarching identities as Arabic and Islamic that play contradictory roles: They can be seen as threatening to and as threatening by attempts to construct specific national identities and as useful in mobilizing on the international level” (Buzan et al., 1998: 132). The EMP aims to prevent societal threats through regional programs and by improving cultural dialogue and economic conditions in the MPCs.

4) Economic Sector

Economic security means self-reliance of a state to feed its population and industry and its ability to have access to outside supplies, markets and credits. At the regional level, it is related to the new regionalist logic of interaction between the states and the impact of global economic transitions on the relations of the regional states. The economic threat is highly linked to the political and military threat. The economic welfare of a country poses military threat to others since the financial sources could be used to strengthen the military capabilities. In addition, the Copenhagen School stresses the strong link between economy and the overall power of the state within the international system. The recession and economic worse-of threatens the domestic stability. “Economic threats resemble to an attack on the state that… result in material loss, strain on various institutions of the state and even substantial damage to the health and longevity of the population” (Buzan, 1991: 130).

In the EMP case, economic security is related to the South-South economic relations as well as North-South interaction. As the EU is the main trade partner of the MPCs, there is competition among them. In addition, as the Southern EU members also specialized in agriculture and have similar production scale with the MPCs, the EU follows a protectionist policy and restrains the labour-intensive products from MENA. These factors constrain the economic development and increase the asymmetric relations between the EU and the MPCs. Since people from the MENA mostly work in agriculture, protectionist policy implies increase of insecurity, deterioration of economic situation and rise of immigration and illegal trade. The instability in MPCs can easily spread and threaten the European security. Besides, the economic situation is not strong in the Mediterranean region14. The productivity level is declining in the Arab region while it is increasing in the rest of the world (Nienhaus, 2003). Unemployment is very high. The South-South trade remains marginal. As solution, the EMP promotes economic development, structural changes in the regional states through funds and

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14 For more details and analyses of economic problems in the MENA and the Mediterranean partner countries could be found in the reports of the FEMISE at www.femise.org; in the documentations of the Mediterranean Development Forum organized by the World Bank at www.worldbank.org/wbi/mdf/mdf4/index.html.
aids directed by the MEDA programs. The EMP envisages free trade area (FTA) by 2010. However, the aids are insufficient and the free trade is biased to the EU side as the European producers are more competitive. From the new regionalist premise, it is the global dynamics that reinforce the regionalization, thus the creation of the FTA. From the realist perspective the Mediterranean area with its cheap labour and potential for investment would encourage the EU’s interest to further the EMP project so that gain more power in the system. Yet, this is not fully acceptable because even though the labour in the MPCs is not cheap and the Mediterranean is not attractive for FDI compared to the Eastern Europe, Russia and South Asia, the EU continues its support to the EMP.

On the other hand, Europe is dependent on MENA’s oil and gas. The Mediterranean is a transit door for the oil and gas from Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East towards Europe and America in addition to its existing infrastructure. The gas and oil imports are delivered mostly via pipeline systems, which are open to any kind of attack. Europeans have made considerable investment in the energy sector. Therefore, “Europe’s security concerns over the region will increase both in nature and in intensity as its energy dependence on the MENA region increases” (Joffe, 2001:211).

The prospective pipelines under construction or in project carrying oil and gas from Central Asia and the Caucasus are likely to run through Turkey. Once the Iraqi oil starts to be operated, it will also run via Turkish pipelines. Thus, the geopolitics of energy supply increases the interdependence of MPCs with the EU member states. “The countries of Southern Europe are already well aware of this - 70 per cent of Spain's gas supply comes from Algeria. Energy security gives Europe, especially Southern Europe, a tangible economic stake in stability across the Mediterranean” (Asmus et al.,1996:27).

5) Environmental Sector

“The nature of environmental problems as a long term danger makes the environmental security node very weak in comparison with other security sectors”(Haddadi, 1999:10). Nonetheless, it started to count in international relations and to raise conflicts between states. The environmental sector includes several issues like disruption of ecosystems, energy problems, economic problems, food problems and civil strife. But not all the environmental issues create security threats.

The main environmental issues in the EMP are the environmental degradation and threats to supply, especially water supply. Degradation and scarcity in resources can lead to migration and frictions between states. Use and ownership of water supplies is major conflict. The rapid population growth makes the water resources in the region scarce and expensive. While in the north, the problem is much of quality, in the south the shortage of water is the main concern (Pierros et al., 1999). The human and industrial pollution poses serious risks to the lives of the inhabitants and to the nature.
What do facts in these five sectors speak for?

The evaluation of the five sectors of security shows that the relationship between Europe and MPCs is marked by the security interdependence since the solution of these challenges requires collective rather than unilateral action. In the security complex theory, the existence of the security interdependence and the pattern of interdependence are determining for a regional cooperation. Globalization with rapid flow of transaction, information and new technologies makes the states more vulnerable to the conflicts. In addition, the linkage between cause and effect of conflicts is getting more complex. The challenges have both local and global causes and effects, though the degree whether global or local differs from sector to sector. Thus, the pattern of interdependence gets deeper for the EMP partners. This picture confirms the necessity for cooperative action.

In addition, the nature of affairs among sectors differs from one another in some aspects, but gets consistent in others. For instance, the FTA is not only the result of the economic security but also the political competition of the states in the international system. The societal factors like migration could become a political concern. Therefore, the security in the Euro-Mediterranean area is the aggregation of all five sectors. Moreover, the sectors differ in their degree of priority as some security threats spread fast and become more intense than others. The most declared and concerned problems in the EMP are migration, terrorism, religious fundamentalism, weapons of mass destruction and the Middle East conflict. Therefore, the following part will examine those thematic areas.

4.3 Thematic Areas of Concern

4.3.1 Illegal Immigration

Migration is an important issue at both national and EU level policies and started to be framed as threat to the security of European citizens in late 1980s and early 1990s. The First and the Second World Wars increased the demand for labour so Mediterranean people migrated to different European countries. By 1970s, those temporary migrants became settled and brought their families from countries of origin. This created an integration problem. At the same time, the stagnation in world economy with oil crises and the rise of unemployment forced governments to operate restrictive immigration policies which intended for the reduction of the migration flows to zero. However, during 80s and 90s, both European governments and the European Commission realized that these policies did not work. First established migrant communities could not be easily dissolved and second driving factors encouraging migration flows have constantly increased (Collinson, 1996). Hence, migration started to be perceived as a threat to security in the 1990s and became a stimulus for the EMP.
As Southern European countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece) entered the European Community (EC) and improved their economy, they changed from being emigration countries to being immigration countries in 1980s. Being closer to the Mediterranean shores, they felt immigration pressure and the security risk in a stronger way, thus persuading the EC to take measures.

According to Lennox (1997), just as the people of Mexico and Latin America look north to the US for a better life, so the peoples to the south and east of the Mediterranean look to Europe. That is why the Mediterranean is called ‘Europe’s Rio Grande’ (Pierros et al., 1999). Even though migration holds risks and dangers, the migration pressures on Europe are increasing. According to the European Commission (1994), the reason is that south Mediterranean economies failed to grow sufficiently to create employment and the discrepancy between growth rates and labour demand accelerated.

Demographic growth, unemployment, income gaps prompt the young Mediterranean population to seek illegal employment in Europe. As the table below shows, the population of Mediterranean partners has been rising rapidly by 2 to 3 per cent or more each year\textsuperscript{15}.

**Table 1: Population’s increase rates in selected countries, in percentage**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bicchi, 2001:10

**Table 2: Demographic Trends in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population (in million)</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force (in million)</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population annual growth (in %)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour force annual growth (in %)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The second table demonstrates that although the population growth is somehow controlled, the labour force is kept increasing (Nadat, 2002). This implies high rates of unemployment and lower per capita income. In the Mediterranean, besides unemployed people, there are ‘underemployed ones’ who

\textsuperscript{15} “In 1950, two-thirds of the population of the Mediterranean basin lived on its northern shores; by 2025 it is estimated that the situation will have reversed itself. In the Maghreb alone, between 2000 and 2025, the population will grow from 70 million to 97.5 million, an increase of 40 per cent. In the near future, the population of Morocco will be larger than that of Spain, and the combined populations of Algeria and Tunisia larger than that of France.” (Pierros et al., 1999:11)
work in rural areas, whose work is not productive enough to be considered as full time (Pierros et al., 1999). The unemployment figures neglect those underemployed groups so the real unemployment indicators are much higher. In addition, those unemployed people are not protected by the social system of the state. (Pierros et al., 1999)

The stagnation in the economies of MPCs triggered the migration to Western Europe as a way to escape from grinding poverty, social restrictions, and political oppression. In addition, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism led many people seek for illegal immigration and asylum within the EU. For instance, in Algeria, estimated 50.000 people died in four-year conflict between radical Muslims and security forces (Jones, 1995).

Table 3: Foreign Residents from MED-12 by nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>European Union*</th>
<th>% of MED immigrants</th>
<th>% of non EU immigrants</th>
<th>% of total EU immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>657,840</td>
<td>13,2%</td>
<td>5,2%</td>
<td>3,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,141,136</td>
<td>22,8%</td>
<td>9,0%</td>
<td>6,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>286,084</td>
<td>5,7%</td>
<td>2,3%</td>
<td>1,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>64,762</td>
<td>1,3%</td>
<td>0,5%</td>
<td>0,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>18,637</td>
<td>0,4%</td>
<td>0,1%</td>
<td>0,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>98,664</td>
<td>2,0%</td>
<td>0,8%</td>
<td>0,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>37,748</td>
<td>0,8%</td>
<td>0,3%</td>
<td>0,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>30,251</td>
<td>0,6%</td>
<td>0,2%</td>
<td>0,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>192**</td>
<td>0,0%</td>
<td>0,0%</td>
<td>0,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>11,084</td>
<td>0,2%</td>
<td>0,1%</td>
<td>0,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>11,652</td>
<td>0,2%</td>
<td>0,1%</td>
<td>0,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2,695,251</td>
<td>53,3%</td>
<td>21,3%</td>
<td>14,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,053,109</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>39,9%</td>
<td>27,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non EU immigrants in the EU</td>
<td>12,668,100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total immigrants in European Union</td>
<td>18,488,800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures from 1997  ** Figures only from Portugal, Greece and Spain


The immigrants in the EU countries as the Table 3 above depicts are a considerable amount making the receiving countries multi-cultural and multi-ethnic ones (Olivan and Aragall). Rise in the number of immigrants created concerns including lack of employment, political threat, reduction of social benefits like in health, education areas and rise of xenophobia. In addition, further sensitive security concerns linked to drug smuggling, organized international crime and political terrorism increased with immigration. Therefore, Migration across the Mediterranean is one important manifestation of the way in which social and economic problems on Europe's southern periphery could have a direct effect on the stability of European societies and the evolution of European politics… Europe
could be increasingly exposed to the spill-over of political violence from inter and intra-
state conflicts across the Middle East.

(Asmus et al., 1996: 26-27)

If the instabilities in the Mediterranean states deteriorate and spread to EU member states, the
can get more hostile against immigrants descents which radicalizes groups within the EU states
against the states. On the other side, raise of the xenophobia can lead to social unrest, cleavages
among EU citizens and to the rise of new groups in European countries. This increases the mistrust
and perception in the MPCs against the West. Hence, the immigration threatens internal order in
receiver countries. On the one hand receivers try to ensure the internal order through launching
integration projects and refining categories of acceptable migrants which means reset of distinction
between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’; on the other hand they increase border controls (Bicchi, 2001). Europe
needs to be careful on its rhetoric about immigrants because exclusion of them enhances frustration
not only among immigrants but also in the sending countries (Chater, 1996).

However, the EU’s 15 states have had difficulty to adopt a common migration policy and a
coordinated approach to illegal movement until now. Some countries, such as France, traditionally
take a lenient approach to asylum seekers, whereas Greece welcomes supranational involvement in
fighting immigration problem (Fray, 2002). Moreover, the migration issue shifted along the political,
low security and high security continuum across Europe. For instance, while Italy concerns about
Albanian or Kurdish immigrants as a matter of high security, the neighbouring countries perceived
them differently (Bicchi, 2001). This highlights that realism is on the stage. It is the interest of the
states that define whether an issue is in the realm of politics or security and this definition can be
changed in time according to the context. “The threshold which distinguishes matters of political
interest or importance from matters of security (is) almost entirely context-specific” (Collinson,

According to Olivan and Aragall (2002), tightening of immigration policies at the national
and EU level is no solution, it could even trigger further crisis in the future. The European
Commission Horizon 2000 paper suggests a development cooperation strategy focused on increasing
aid and improving family planning programmes across the region (Lister, 1997:100). Instead of a tight
policy, co-development policy needs to be strengthened. At this point, the EMP provides a platform to
cooperate with the MPCs with a long-term commitment to solve the problem. The root of the problem
is the economic and social instability in the region so the EMP pushes for economic, political and
social development in the region. The EMP has produced a regional cooperation program that workers
of the Mediterranean region are provided education, training while immigrants are given programs to
integrate to society.
4.3.2 Religious Fundamentalism and Terrorism

Bicchi (2001) stresses that politicisation of Islamic fundamentalism has also affected the migration to be seen as security issue. Today, the Islamic fundamentalism is playing a key role in the Mediterranean security. “In Western Europe, the Gulf War entrenched anti-Arab and anti-Islamic attitudes which contributed in Europe to establish a false equation ‘Arab=Islam=Islamic fundamentalism’” (Bicchi, 2001:12).

The security conception of the EU vis-a-vis religious fundamentalism is two-fold. On the one hand, Islamic fundamentalists in Arab countries are thought to challenge not only regimes in their countries, but also the West. On the other hand, there is a fear that the Islamic resurgence could spread into Muslim communities within Europe, thus creating problems in integrating immigrants and creating a dangerous threat at Europe’s core (Bicchi, 2001).

The ‘Clash of Civilisation’ idea of Huntington stresses the clash of values as the source of the conflict between civilisations. However, the cause of the conflict is not the clash of values but the regime changes, political and economic instability and radical reforms in the MENA states. Socio-economic grassroots have been deprived due to the economic and political deterioration in their countries. Algeria is the example for those extreme groups and their terrorist attacks posing threat to stability. The Algerian economy had been suffering since mid 80s a decrease in oil price and population explosion. The emergence of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in 1989 was an example of a populist movement appealing to the deprived population against the national government. When it won the majority in the parliament in 1991, the military coup prevented it to come to power. Yet, it led violent attacks of the Front against civilians. The FIS declared its will to spread their view to other Muslim states and the West. This alerted the Europe to consider the security in the Mediterranean. Civil war in Algeria spilled over into France through terrorist attacks in 1995 and 1996. Yet, Algeria is not the only country that is subject to violent movements in the region. The recent terrorist attacks in Turkey illustrate that violent fundamentalist movements increasingly continue to threaten security. Moreover, Islamic extremists threatening the stability of Algeria and Egypt would likewise affect the fate of the MEPP (Moss 2000).

The post-independence era led rise of a middle class and gave hope for the new class and young generation for better life with the new policies but these policies could not be realized. They could not satisfy the demands of the new generation; thus, the creation of the resistant radical groups. Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995:17) explains that “a growing number of aggrieved, alienated, but articulate youngsters of the small middle class have been recruited into radical movements seeking to transform the socio-political order in the name of Islam. In turn, they have
recruited many more alienated but less educated youngsters of the urban lumpen-proletariat”. These two groups became resistant against the government which follows the Western notions of human rights and democracy. This explanation applies to the most MPCs.

Moreover, the political systems of the most of the Mediterranean states are authoritarian or autocratic. The elites-political, economic and military- have more voice in the government. The state-owned enterprises are rent for the governments. The elites in business and politics are interacting for furthering their vested interests. In this rentier state structure, the political priorities are above the productivity parameters which worsen the economy as well as raise the reaction of the mass against the regimes. Moreover, the mass cannot gain from the economic reforms in the short-run so rejects western culture (Joffe, 1996).

Another feature of the most MPCs (specifically MENA) is that they follow a realist view concerning their national power so diverting the resources to military sector instead of other sectors. This deteriorated the economy. People criticized their governments in failing to meet the socio-economic needs of society, thereby allowing external intervention into their countries. “Strong emphasis on religion and cultural identity makes the Islamists concerned with the external threat of the non-Islamist world and the internal enemies of un-Islamic groups” (Attina, 2002:15). Actually, Islamic movements are not against the West or modernity. As Bichara Khader (quoted in Pierros et al., 1999) highlights, “radical Islam is less a reaction against the modernisation of Muslim societies than it is a product of modernisation. But the Western world, by supporting governments in power, adds to the frustrations felt by Islamic fundamentalists” (Pierros et al., 1999:15). Since the reformation is costly and mass Hence, the frustration of people against their corrupt governments supported by the West was to be repressed by local governments. This paved the way of fundamentalist groups that use violence as their tools.

Terrorist attacks have been observed in many countries. “Terrorism is non-specific in its targets. It can target any person who does not have any link to the aims” (Joffe, 1996:140). Thousands of people died in Algeria’s civil war. The Groupe Islamique Armes (GIA) replaced the FIS and continued violence. The massacre on 28 August 1997 is one of the GIA’s violence ended up with death of 300 women, children and elderly people. Israel is facing the attacks of the Palestinian Intifada and Islamic Resistance Movement called Hamas since 1987. Hamas and the Islamic Jihad made several terrorist attacks. In Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood (the Ikhwan Muslimin) targets to create an Islamic state. The Jihad Islamiyya is another movement that assassinated President Sadat in 1981. The September 11 attacks in 2001 that bombed the Twin Towers in New York and Washington and the recent suicide bombings targeted synagogues and British consulate-general, with a bank of British origin in Istanbul in 2003 all indicate that terrorism is crossing national borders (Pierros et al., 1999).
As the Islamic Radicalism flourishes in places where no opposition is allowed and economic injustice is high, the opening up the political systems and economic prosperity could eradicate the militant opponents in the Muslim world (Pierro et al., 1999:16). The EMP with comprehensive approach aims this. It considers religious fundamentalism as a soft security challenge. Yet the September 11 attacks have shifted the terrorism stemming from religious fundamentalism to the hard security realm. From new regionalist perspective, the global and regional developments showed that each state is vulnerable to the attacks. Senior Officials and governments make ad hoc meetings on terrorism and agree on taking cooperative measures within the EMP framework.

4.3.3 Middle East Conflict and Peace Process

The most serious threat to stability in the Mediterranean is the Arab-Israeli dispute\(^{16}\) which started with the reaction of the Arab League to the creation of the Israeli state. The international community involved in creating a peaceful solution. The US is the primary actor in these talks. Up to now, the peaceful settlement has not been achieved.

The Middle East conflict encompassing both Israel-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian problems has endangered peace and prosperity in both the regional and the global context. The Middle East is important (energy supplies), reckless (terrorism), dangerous (four major conflicts), unstable (fin de régimes), expensive (for keeping the peace or waging war), and intrusive (because of the domestic dimensions of policy decisions for the area) (Serfaty, 2000:59). Thus, the EU’s main concern has been undoubtedly security in developing the Mediterranean policy to stabilize the Middle Eastern economies and politics in order to avoid spill-over of conflicts into Europe (Nonneman 2001:158).

Europe’s geographic proximity, historical ties, commercial relations, fears of Islamic extremism, Middle Eastern oil, proliferation of weapons in the region push the EU and member states to involve in the process as a credible political actor. This shows that the EU has to engross in the MEPP for its own security. Therefore, the EU followed a pure realist politics concerning its own vested interests by engaging in the MEPP. Hence, eventually the EU has increased its role in the peace negotiations process along with the US who also welcomed the multilateral involvement. Yet, the US

\(^{16}\) The Arab-Israeli dispute goes back to the Balfour Declaration of 1917 stated British support for establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. The UN voted for the division of Palestine into two parts in 1947 and faced the reaction of the Arab League that opposed the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Once the Israeli state was declared in 1948, the Arab world announced war. After a couple of wars, only in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War peace talks, the Camp David Agreement and the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty of 1979 were possible. After the Israeli-Egyptian agreement, the conflicts became more internal. The Palestinian Authority has been recognized by the international community since they shifted to favour a moderate movement, distancing themselves from terrorist groups. (Pierros et al., 1999)
is reluctant to give up its dominant position in the process and is uncomfortable with any framework that would challenge its role in the MEPP (Koechler, 1998). The EU accepted and preferred to engage in economic and financial areas not involving in political aspects. In fact, this is also because of the EU’s problem in reaching consensus among its members to have common position on the conflict so it has no alternative than to leave hard security aspects to the US. This implies lack of the EU commitment in the real solution and unbalanced power relations in the MEPP. While the EU gave support to the creation of a democratic Palestinian state in the Euro-Mediterranean Conferences, in practice it does not work on the realization of it by leaving the political aspect to the US. This also makes the US to have an unbalanced power in the MEPP.

The EMP is crucial in the MEPP regarding its success to bring all parties to the Middle East conflict into the same forum to discuss. However, “while success of EMP is dependent upon advancement of MEPP, EMP has had very little influence on the MEPP” (Calleya, 2000:11). For instance, as Benjamin Netanyahu had a hard line approach in the process which freezed the peace negotiations, throughout his term as Israeli prime minister the Euro-Med process could not produce a considerable positive impact on the MEPP (Calleya, 2001). On the other hand, Wye River Memorandum encouraged progress in the EMP. The week after the Memorandum, the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum held a session in Brussels that aimed to give a parliamentary dimension to the EMP process.

In conclusion, the elements embedded in the EMP process are influenced by the developments in the MEPP which slowed EMP down. Therefore, the partners stressed that “the MEPP is separate from, but complementary to the Barcelona Process” (Calleya, 2001:11). According to the security complex theory, the regional arrangements are influenced from the sub-regional, inter-regional and internal transformation. The Middle East conflict is indispensable factor for the enhancement of the partnership. Yet, as the conflict seems hard to be solved in the short-term and it is also in the sphere of the US, the EU and MPCs need to make sure that the MEPP is not overemphasized in the EMP context and thus prevent progress. In the Barcelona Process, conflictual parts are together so it is hard to create cooperative security arrangements since the participants think that acceptance of an arrangement implies recognition of current status quo which stops further development; therefore, Arab states hesitate to normalize relations with Israel before setting an extensive peace agreement that would satisfy Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority (Hollis, 2000: 117). In this regard, if Europe wants to play a credible role in the region, it should formulate a more objective position considering the Arab stance.

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17 The Parliamentary Forum was composed of six parliamentarians from each Mediterranean country (total 72 parliamentary), 43 MEPs and 30 parliamentarians from EU Member states.
4.3.4 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Arms build-up in the Mediterranean is another concern since the Cold War. During the Cold War an arms arsenal was accumulated on the territories of the regional states. The regional wars like Arab-Israeli, Gulf War and Iraqi war increased the weapons in the region. Military expenditures are high. “One-third of all military expenses in the developing world are born by countries in the MENA” (Pierros et al., 1999:28).

Many countries in the region are capable of developing short-range missiles that can bomb Southern European states. Chemical and biological weapons are preferred by the terrorist groups since they are easily produced at low costs. Although there are agreements for arms control and non-proliferation, adherence to the agreements is weak. Many regional states signed the Non-proliferation Treaty but most of them pursue either covert ballistic missile programs or WMD initiatives in the region (Snyder 1996:174). According to Snyder (1996:173) there are two types of proliferation threats: “the development of indigenous military programs designed to develop warheads or launchers; and the acquisition from outside suppliers of ballistic missiles and technology”.

With regard to nuclear proliferation, France and Israel besides India and Pakistan are the two countries that have nuclear capabilities; Italy, Greece and Turkey possess nuclear warheads (Pierros et al., 1999:29). Neither Israel nor Egypt signed the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Both sides want to be sure that the other will stick to the agreement. Actually, since the European states are also selling weapons to those countries, they do not put much pressure on them to sign these treaties. Thus, neither bilateralism nor multilateralism can be applied in the Mediterranean. Bilateralism cannot be practiced because there are not two single or collective actors… Arms control negotiations in the Mediterranean cannot resemble multilateral negotiations run by UN because distinct states have different stocks of arms.

(Attina, 2000:19)

Stavridis (2002) stresses the conventional weapons besides the others. “In 1992-5, Turkey, Greece, Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia absorbed just under 65.6 % of all arms deliveries to the Middle East. More than half of top ten countries acquiring conventional weapons on the world market are in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf” (Stavridis, 2002). The military expenditure in the Mediterranean countries is high compared to the European ones19.

However, “the general opinion in military circles was that the nature of the challenges originating from the Mediterranean was not military. The main military risks in the region remained

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19 “In 1990, the ratio of military expenditures to the GDP of the Arab countries was 9.9%, in contrast to 4.3% in other developing countries and 5% for the entire world” (Pierros et al., 1999:28).
South-South, rather than North-South but the regional rivalries could indirectly affect Europe” (Bicchi, 2001:8). However, this possibility of military threat can emerge in any time and these weapons are used by terrorist groups to attack the European states too.

Asymmetry in military organisations on the two shores of the Mediterranean region is another obstacle to the CBMs and cooperation. On the Northern part, the NATO gathers all the national armies under its umbrella and supports the development of ESDP whereas on the southern side, national military power and in few cases bilateral defence agreements are the only way for a regional state to tackle the security dilemma (Attina, 2000:17).

The WMD is in the realm of high politics and threatens both the South-South relations and the EU. The military threats are not strictly regional going beyond including other actors and their policies. Nonetheless, the region is one of the main foci for proliferation of WMD (Aliboni et al., 1996). It is unrealistic to expect the EMP to bring the EMP partners to work in this realm because even the EU as a more integrated regional constellation could not realize the ESDP. The EMP first needs to create the trust among the partners. The PBMs can enhance this. The EMP, in this realm, needs to be in harmony with trans-Atlantic security structures, mainly NATO.

4.4 Concluding Remarks

The evaluation of the security challenges along this chapter depicts that the EMP needs to promote both domestic and regional security in order to realize full stability in the Mediterranean Basin. The security complex theory argues that as the security is broad concept with five sectors, it needs not only economic cooperation but also political and social dialogue. The root-causes of these challenges lie on the one hand in socio-economic deprivation, on the other hand in the difference of perceptions of the Europeans and the Arabs. The EU with MEDA funds and specific aid try to enhance structural reforms and economic development. Yet, it is too limited compared to what they need in order to achieve the transition cost. The economic interests of the European states are more in the forefront of the EMP which reduces the success of a full security in the Mediterranean. The lack of commitment of the European states in the MEPP, protectionism in agriculture, political conditionality and tight immigration policies feed the gap between the perceptions and push the pattern of amity-enmity more to the negative end of the spectrum. The domestic socio-economic conditions in MPCs pose threat of terrorism, religious fundamentalism and immigration. The high proliferation of WMD in the Middle East is another crucial security concern.

From the realist and the Copenhagen Schools’ view, the geographic proximity of the EU to the Mediterranean Basin makes Europe vulnerable to those security challenges as well as any spread of
instability from the Basin to the EU. This makes the EMP initiative inevitably compulsory for the EU while for the MPCs the EMP is also unavoidable to promote stability and prosperity in the Basin. Thus, this proximity makes the regionalizing logic strong.

The security challenges depicted that they are interrelated and make both the European and the MPCs interdependent. Rising density of relations and security interdependence premises of the Copenhagen School frame the EMP. Especially the assessment of the thematic areas illustrates the urgency of the threats and their root-causes while underlying the necessity of partnership.

Both the European states and the MPCs involve in the EMP in order to make themselves stronger in the international system. The realistic approach applies both for the EU and the MPCs. They give support to the EMP because it ensures stability and prosperity in their territories while promoting their economic and political development and interests. Being part of a regional system and tackling with the problems from this system rather than unilaterally enhance their stance in the global arena.
CHAPTER 5- EVALUATION OF EMP

The security challenges presented in Chapter 4 demonstrated that the problems in the Euro-Mediterranean region require collaborative interaction. At one point, the EMP depicts a fundamental step on the way to solutions. But then, until now the Barcelona Process could not produce tangible and considerable results. Therefore, it is crucial to assess the Process and see the reasons that slowed it down. In the first part of this discussion, the positive developments will be highlighted. In the second section, the shortcomings of EMP will be discussed.

5.1 The Achievements and Strengths of the EMP

The Barcelona Process is a product of globalization and interdependence within the new regionalist premises. Its three baskets clarify the problems posed by the global international environment and put suggestions onto the table. “In terms of identifying problems, defining objectives, selecting intervention logics, programming, delivering projects and anchoring the policy reforms, the EMP fares much better than any previous and actual schemes in the region, including South-South ones” (Philippart, 2003:213).

In the Barcelona Conference, Syria, Israel and the Palestinian Authority came together and sat at the table along with other participants. This demonstrates the significance attached to the Process by the signatories. Moreover, the EMP provides an arena where Israel accepts the EU’s role in the Middle East security and political issues. “The Barcelona Process provided a diplomatic safety net in MEPP. It is the only regional forum preventing the peace process from ‘spilling back’” (Behrendt, 2000:23). The Valencia Ministerial Conference (2002) happened at the height of Israeli occupation of Territories. Despite this, the conference reached a consensus on the Action Plan which aims at relaunching the Barcelona Process through new measures, enhancing visibility and institutionalizing the Process with the creation of a Parliamentary Assembly.

In addition, the Barcelona Process is crucial because it forces the South-South cooperation going beyond the North-South patterns of relation. The interaction of the MPCs with each other can speed the self economic growth and better understanding of each other. Social and cultural interaction is important in order to reduce the misperception of each other, which is the major stimulus of security problems. Yet, it will take long time to reduce it. Political development and dialogue would promote the cooperation and reduce conflict in the region. Thus, the Barcelona Process aims at strengthening not only North-South cooperation but also South-South cooperation.
The EMP is the only political institution in the region where competence, legitimacy and resources are present (Brauch, 2001). This strengthens its potential to be a security partnership. The EU, as a partner of the EMP, is the dominant regional power in the political and economic senses. It strives to establish a “culture of peaceful conflict resolution and negotiations; it has considerable military strength based on the collective potential of the EU member states; and it maintains cultural ties with societies of MENA region” (Behrendt, 2000: 15). Hence, it can become an example for regional cooperation in the Mediterranean, provide resources and enhance the legitimacy of the partnership. Moreover, unlike previous attempts, all EU member states are supportive of the EMP. From the realist and the Copenhagen School’s points of view, the existence of a powerful partner in the security constellation strengthens the complex and the integration process. Yet, it is also important how the powerful actor uses its power and defines its position within the complex. The unbalanced relations would also nourish the tension and perceptions.

In other collective security attempts in the region, some of the regional countries were excluded from regional institutions whereas the EMP brought many Mediterranean countries under one roof. The invitation of Libya to attend the Stuttgart Conference and the presence of Libya in the Valencia Conference along with the Arab League, UMA and Mauritania as guests enhanced the results. The integration of those parties into the EMP framework would further the inter- and intra-regional cooperation. The regular meetings of ministers and related actors according to the issues promote coordination of activities, exchange of information, “provide for deeper socialisation, a steeper learning curve and regular adjustment of the framework for action” (Philippart, 2003:214).

The Guidelines set in the Stuttgart Conference (1999) reflected improvement in the creation of a common security concept. The principle of co-chairmanship declared in the Valencia Conference as a way to strengthen the sense of ownership of the Process is important on the way to re-balance the distribution of powers in the decision-making. Moreover, “in Valencia, partners agreed to include the next meeting’s agenda as a permanent item in the agenda of each Senior Official and Euro-Med Committee in order to prevent the session from becoming hostage to non-related issues” (Schumacher, 2002:235). Furthermore, the ministerial conferences also appreciate sub-regional and bilateral cooperation that would enhance flexibility in the EMP that those who are willing and capable to move forward will do. This aims for a multi-speed integration structure. Yet, it holds the risk of further fragmentation, thereby preventing cohesion and unity. While Attina (2003:197) supports sub-regional cooperation as a way to further EMP like a safety valve against tensions among countries with different interests, Schumacher (2002) underlines that although flexibility could advance decision-

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20 See the Annex for the Chart showing comparison of the cooperation initiatives in the Mediterranean prepared by European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation with the Support of the European Commission, 2003.
making and reduce veto-option, “co-centric circles with different acquis, varying members and diverging cooperation speeds would end the Barcelona Process’s underlying globality and inclusive design” (Schumacher, 2002:235). The analysis in this thesis shows that fragmentation among the partners is one of the crucial obstacles for the cooperation. The flexibility could nourish the suspicions; thereby deteriorate the main target of the EMP. It is the embrace ment of many Mediterranean states under one roof that differentiates this Process from the other initiatives.

The Barcelona Process with the regional programme enabled the experts and practitioners from the partner countries to work together in the fight against terrorism, drugs and organised crime, judicial cooperation and in a joint approach to migration. While the police forces and judges are trained together, common tools are used in the analysis of migratory flows. The first project in the field of migration management and border control has started for the term between 2002 and 2004. The Naples Conference welcomed the sub-regional cooperation through Agadir Process. Hence, the initial steps for creation of an inter-subjective understanding have been taken.

The assessment of the Conferences showed that the global events specifically the terrorist attacks in the US stimulated the partners to clarify their common position towards the terrorism. They focused on terrorism from a global and multidisciplinary approach. Yet, more concrete definitions of the actions and the terrorist groups are necessary.

The committee of Senior Officials has been producing new mechanisms like early warning, conflict management, sharing military data, CBMs/ PBMs and arms control to achieve mutual understanding and management of issues among partners. This demonstrates that the committee works on both soft and hard security issues. Expert networks called EuroMeSCo and Strademed support the committee in developing the Euro-Mediterranean Security Charter. These networks have linked communication networks with civil society. They actually took the same role carried by East-West security dialogue or OSCE security diplomacy (Attina, 2000:14). Both EuroMeSCo and Strademed enhance confidence building among partners through their ties between experts working in different sites such as the Middle East, the Maghreb and the EU. The role of civil society is vital in presenting the Process to the public and gaining their support to the partnership. This would enhance the legitimacy of the EMP while it would reduce the patterns of enmity among societies and states. Hence, the redefinition of the ‘Other’ could be achieved. Even up to now, the interaction among experts contributed to the creation of a common language in certain areas of security.

Replacement of the CBMs with the PBMs depicts a positive development since the CBMs in rhetoric reinforces the existence of a conflict. Also, involvement of PBMs underlines that the EMP tackles with hard security issues as well (Holli s, 2000). In fact, PBMs encompasses more civilian and
comprehensive security whereas CBMs is more focused on arms control and conflict (Aliboni, 2002). Yet, as Guazzone and Bicchi (2002:243) stress, “the PBM are an overarching instrument including CBMs, instead of focusing only on the later”. The categorization of an issue to be a soft or hard security issue changes according to the context and time.

Another important step to reduce distrust among partners occurred in the Naples Conference which supported the cooperation of the EU with the MPCs on ESDP, so through dialogue of security committees the mutual understanding would be achieved. The Naples Conference calls first some countries which will be examples for the others in the future. Opening up ESDP to MPCs will constitute South-South PBMs in addition to the existing North-South ones by allowing exchange of information, participation of partners in planning process and decision-making (Biscop, 2003). However, the EU’s own problems on the ESDP should be kept in the mind, thus it is doubtful how far the nation-states could go in building up a common military structure.

As Calleya (2000) suggests, the Barcelona process can be set to a spectrum of short, medium and long term goals and priorities since some of the activities can produce tangible results in a short time, the others need long term.

In the short term, the PBMs, the goals in the first basket, could promote information flow, exchange of views, transparency and elimination of misperception. Institutional frameworks like a Euro-Med Development Centre (Calleya, 2000) could assist cooperative arrangement in different security sectors and become a clearing house of EMP information while strengthening the cooperative regimes (Calleya, 2000:14-15). The Early Warning mechanism, part of conflict prevention, can inform the states before the threat occurs and assess the impact of security issues on Euro-Med relations. Starting with soft security issues like environmental concerns, maritime safety and organized crime, after a while, having strengthened the security mechanism, it can tackle more sensitive security challenges such as religious fundamentalism, terrorism, WMD (Calleya, 2000).

On the other hand, the goals in the second basket like creation of a FTA, increase in investment and providing funds to the MPCs target to reduce the socio-economic gap within and between the EMP partners. The result of those initiatives could only be attained after certain time and the transition period is too painful for the MPCs.

Lastly, the aims of the third basket, to achieve social and cultural cooperation, are the most time-consuming and difficult goals to be realized. Social and cultural perceptions shaped by history and interaction are deeply rooted in the nations and societies. The analysis of the security cultures and perceptions in the previous chapter showed the presence of many misperceptions between the societies.
and states. Shifting the views require reconstruction from constructivist view. Thus, it needs a long time to achieve a coherent understanding of each other and create a peaceful interaction among cultures.

In conclusion, the EMP is based on a long phase. The achievement of the short-term goals will produce apparent outcomes. This will stimulate the partners to contribute to the Process further, thereby fleshing out the long-term goals (Calleya, 2000).

5.2 Shortcomings of the EMP Process

Despite the positive developments, there are crucial difficulties that prevent progress in the process. These problems can be classified in three main categories, inter and intra-institutional incoherence, definitional and perceptional problems and multi-actor involvement in the region.

1) Inter and Intra-institutional Incoherence

The main issue is the EU’s own internal incoherence and structural problems. The EU is not a cohesive unit. It has difficulty in creating a common external position and achieving supra-nationalism in the CFSP. While the development, trade and aid issues are handled under the Community pillar, illegal immigration and asylum issues are the third pillar’s preoccupations. Finally, the political and security issues are mainly considered at intergovernmental level. Such a division among the EU institutions makes it difficult for the EU to have a comprehensive and common policy towards the region.

Up to now, the EU priority agenda was occupied with the Eastern enlargement and European Convention which encompassed formation of EU constitution and institutional changes. Therefore, the Mediterranean policy was secondary. This decreased their support and interest to the EMP. The EU needs to resolve its internal problems about integration, institutions, representation and particularly the CFSP. “Until the EU resolves its internal debates, the Barcelona Process will be limited by the extent to which multilateral commitments and undertakings can be made to meet the expectations of the EU’s southern partners” (Spencer, 1998:150).

Among the EU’s institutions, responsibilities and priorities differ. Whereas the European Commission focuses on the operational and technical issues along with the emphasis on promotion of human rights and democracy across the region, the European Parliament is much more sensitive to the conditionalities of human rights and democracy in EU relations with the third countries. Since the CFSP issues are handled in the Council which is composed of the member states’ governments, who
prefer to keep their bilateral relations and their own conceptions of security, it is difficult to have
common positions among them towards the Mediterranean.

There is consensus problem inside the EU. Due to the different foreign policy priorities of 15
EU member states, which will become 25 by May 2004, the EU has difficulty to act in international
events, crisis in that the EU lacks a common external position. For instance, in 1996 when Israel
launched a military strike against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon as a response to terrorist attacks in
Israel, France directly entered the arena to negotiate for cease-fire without consulting with the EU.
Similarly, when the US invaded Iraq, the EU states could not create common position. This underlines
the presence of reel-politic. The EU Council meeting in Santa Maria De Feira in June 2000 adopted a
Common Strategy on the Mediterranean region to arrange EU relations with the MPCs. Yet, in reality
and practice the member states are divided in major issues pursuing their interests. While France, Italy,
Spain support the Process, Great Britain has concern of weakening trans-Atlantic Alliance (Biad,
2002). The EU members have varying concerns and aspirations about the Mediterranean. While UK,
Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Ireland do not perceive socio-economic and political problems as
security threats, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands emphasize soft
security challenges as direct threat (Schumacher, 2002). Therefore, special bilateral relationships
flourish between France and Algeria, Britain and Saudi Arabia, Italy and Libya, and Spain and
Morocco (Serfāty, 2000). Different priorities of the countries and the bilateral relations, linked to
historical ties, underline that states still preserve realist view in their policy which hinders the creation
of a common position.

Incoherence is not only about the EU’s internal problem but there are institutional and
structural problems within the framework of the EMP. Lack of necessary institutions is one. The EMP
is carried by intergovernmental interaction. The issues are discussed in the regular ministerial
meetings. The Permanent Euro-Mediterranean Committee of Senior Officials consists of EU Troika,
12 MPCs and the European Commission which has been carrying out the Political and Security
Partnership through the periodical meetings and providing proposals to the ministerial meetings. The
Committee primarily works to develop CBMs/PBMs, prepare the Euro-Med Charter for Peace and
Stability and establish crisis management procedures. This shows that the political dialogues are non-
institutionalized and more in the hand of governments.

Lack of a Parliament within the EMP has been creating representation problems. The Naples
Conference stressed the establishment of a Parliamentary Assembly under the EMP structure. This
would ensure the voices of citizens to be heard. Yet, the Euro-Med Parliamentary structure has been
tried to be launched since 1998 and it is processing slowly. In addition, the EMP lacks its own
secretariat and other institutions to put its rhetoric into practice. Moreover, the role of the Commission
in the operations creates an asymmetrical relation between the EU vis-à-vis the MPCs. Furthermore, “while the Commission enhances the coherence and efficiency in implementation of the EMP, it makes the EMP subject to weaknesses in the EU foreign policy-making” (Hollis, 2000:119).

According to the security complex theory, in a regional security complex, the important element is the distribution of powers among principle units (Buzan et al., 1998). Analysis of the EMP from this element shows that the distribution of power reflects a realist view of dominance of the powerful. The EU and the European states have more voice in the decision-making. As the EU is the supplier of the funds, aids and resources, this economic power appreciates its role within the EMP. This unbalanced, asymmetrical relationship weakens the logic of partnership and the equality principle of the EMP. Moreover, it feeds the suspicions of the MPCs towards Europe. Therefore, establishment of a Euro-Med Secretariat and other institutions would speed up the transaction of information and activities as well as reduce the institutional imbalance. Besides, the inclusion of the Arab League into the EMP that organizes Arab position can balance the European Commission and promote inter-Arab coordination, thus enhancing the stance of MPCs at the negotiation table.

The decision-making mechanism in the security realm is based on the unanimity principle which gives the veto right to any state. The unanimity system slows down the Barcelona Process and reduces coherence. However, it is difficult for now to change this system especially in an environment of mistrust. In addition, security is the most crucial policy within the foreign policy of states that prefer to preserve their control. Hence, security issues are only discussed at the ministerial level at Euro-Mediterranean Conferences. This organizational lack could be balanced with the formation of additional institutions such as a permanent council at the ambassadorial level (Biscop,2003) or the conflict prevention centre (Calleya, 2000). These kinds of institutions could follow the security issues permanently and closely so as to provide rapid reactions even before a crisis occurs. They can enhance the political and security dialogue by monitoring the events, consulting with the ministers and managing the implementation of the CBMs/PBMs. Such kinds of institutions will make EMP a more organized system that functions more effectively.

In a security regime identified in neo-liberal institutionalism, the institutions are the tools to arrange and regulate the actions of the units. The rules, procedures of the institutions provide transparency and information about the states’ stance towards an issue. This reduces the fear produced by uncertainty and lack of information. Within the EMP, the construction of the institutions would not only enhance the transparency and trust but also it would augment the efficiency and speed of the Process. By including all 27 partners, it would “equalize the roles of the participants, reduce the EU domination and enhance the Mediterranean partners’ influence in agenda-setting” (Biscop, 2003:192). Yet, the root-cause behind the institutional weakness lies in difference among security cultures.
Nonetheless, by making participation in an operation on voluntary basis, the process can evolve gradually (Biscop, 2003). The voluntary basis is not unfamiliar to the EU since in the European integration constructive abstention principle\textsuperscript{21} has been used.

Moreover, the lack of a treaty or a legal agreement within the EMP as well as the non-inclusion of the heads of states reduces the compliance among the partners. The legal basis and political basis would reinforce the visibility and sense of co-ownership (Nadat, 2002). Hence, because of these problems and especially because the key units in the decision-making are states, the Process is based on a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach. This implies that unless there is a common political will or interest on the security issue, the decision will be closer to the position of a state that prefers the preservation of the status quo- the current situation. Therefore, the Conferences’ conclusions are inadequate.

Closely interlinked with the institutional problems mentioned above, there is another institutional lack threatening the confidence built upon EMP process. The CBMs like regular communication, flow of information and transparency do not exist in the relationship between the EU and MPCs mainly because the MENA countries are suspicious towards the EU activity. The EMP considered this and stressed the PBM rather than CBMs. And the process has created some kind of transaction and communication. However, as Aliboni (1998) highlights, if the EMP mechanism of preventive diplomacy concentrates on North-South aspects of EMP, neglecting the South-South inter-state and intra-state conflicts, the EMP conflict prevention capacity will be very weak.

Although equality among all members may be difficult to realize, some kind of balance is to be achieved. In fact, from a realist point of view, it is the participation of the EU that makes the EMP more viable and durable. The EU as the powerful actor could push the other actors to negotiate and also provide resources for the Process. However, this should not be misused against the MPCs. It is the superiority and lack of commitment of the EU on the crucial issues that feed the suspicions of the MPCs and their hesitation to contribute to the Process. Thus, the EU should consider the legitimate security concerns of its Arab partners in the whole EMP region if it wants to be credible in the project of EMP. Strengthening of non-governmental actors through giving more credibility and resources to the trans-national networks could also boost process and gain grassroots support.

In addition, PBM are limited to soft-security like training the diplomats, creation of networks, exchange of information on human rights, disarmament and cooperation among civil services. However, further precise and innovative PBM are needed. Actually, the EU’s resources and crisis

\textsuperscript{21} Constructive abstention principle implies those who do not want to participate in an operation will not prevent the others to do so from taking part (Biscop, 2003).
management system are still limited for providing sufficient support for the EMP and its PBMs. Therefore, hard security issues or operations are under the control of NATO (Schumacher, 2002).

Another problem stems from the heterogeneous structure of the Mediterranean region which is divided into sub-regional constellations that have distinct evolutionary patterns and security concerns. This should be taken into consideration in the Mediterranean Security Charter. In fact, the recent ministerial conference in Naples has considered this point and welcomed sub-regional cooperations.

The economic sector is part of the comprehensive security. The EU tries to improve the economic well-being in the MPCs through structural reforms and development funds. The envisagement of the FTA is part of this. However, the elimination of the tariffs with the FTA will influence the MPCs negatively at least in the short run since they highly rely on the trade taxes as budget revenue. It will reduce the competitiveness of the local producers in the short term. Besides, the exclusion of the agriculture and continuation of the protectionism in certain sectors like textile against the MPCs by the European states underline the asymmetric relations and depict a realist view of the EU in the EMP project. The European financial assistance to the MPCs is still too limited to achieve the transition costs. When the aid is distributed to per person, it turns to be too marginal (Nienhaus, 2003). Moreover, the rise of the FDI with the economic transition may not be in the expected rate especially if the insecurity at domestic and regional levels cannot be resolved. The investors consider the risks and hesitate to invest in a volatile region. The FEMISE Reports in 2002 and 2003 underline the low labour productivity and the worsening of the positions of the MPCs in the international competition.

The EMP trade policy seems to increase unemployment and eliminate the local producers (Nienhaus, 2003). The structural adjustment and development programs aim at mitigating those problems but they are inadequate. The worsening of the domestic economy leads destabilization in the MPCs and popular uprisings as well as immigration pressure all of which poses threats to Europe. Hence, the EU needs to consider those factors and support more in economic terms so as to show its full commitment to the Process. The EMP should consider improving the access of the Mediterranean countries to the EU markets. The economic concern is also linked to the domestic systems in the Mediterranean states based on heavy rent-seeking that the governments along with the business sector try to preserve their economic interests so they are unwilling to introduce liberal market economy. Therefore, the European governments need to be cautious not to support rent seeking. Yet, as the European firms and governments consider their vested interest, this structure has been exploited; thus avoidance of this and stimulation of the dialogue among the Euro-Mediterranean businessmen and the politicians would be constructive (Nienhaus, 2003).
In conclusion, the Copenhagen School suggests that if the security complexes are seen as structures, the structural effects or changes determine the outcomes (Buzan et al., 1998). The structural/institutional problems in the EMP confirm why the EMP has not produced tangible results. Structural inconsistency is linked to the problem in distribution of power. These asymmetrical relations need to be set on a more balanced and symmetric basis. The institutions are crucial tools needed to constitute the actors and shape their identities. The EMP project with a more balanced and even structure can only realize an interactive contribution and build of common interest and conceptions.

2) Definitional and Perceptional Problems

The basis of lacking confidence among the countries of the EMP relies on definitional and perceptual differences underlying security policies and perspectives. Indeed, the definition of the Mediterranean itself is ambiguous, since the Mediterranean in geographical terms does not match the political definitions of the region. Panebianco (2000) emphasizes that the EMP brings together 27 partners with different levels of socio-economic development and socio-political systems differently ranged in democratic development scale. Differences among the countries of the region require particular policy for the region. While the EU tends to categorize the North African countries as Maghreb and the Eastern Mediterranean as Mashreq and treat them accordingly, these countries do not see themselves in such categorisations.

The security complex theory agreeing with the constructivism underlines that the ideas, perceptions of members determine the regional formation. The fear and ‘otherness’ are still present in the Mediterranean basin and they are obstacles to improve partnership. The legacy of European colonialism and imperialism, the Arab’s perception that the West aims to penetrate and control the weaker states and the lack of experience of relation based on confidence hinder the development of CBMs/ PBM. While one party sees the other as a threat, it is not conceivable to create a dialogue which assumes creating a minimum confidence between the participants (Spencer, 1998:146). The Barcelona Process does not make clear dialogue or definition on key issues like fight against terrorism, arms control and disarmament due to the perceptual gap. Moreover, declaring migration as security threat may also deepen the gap between communities since it means perceiving immigrants as direct threat with this rhetoric. In fact, the conclusions of the Naples Ministerial conference show that migration is dealt in the third basket rather than the first one in general.

The European Commission (2001) defines conflict prevention as ‘structural stability’ which will be provided through structural reforms strengthening democracy, human rights, viable political structure, sustainable economic development and healthy environmental and social conditions. In contrast, these terms are subjective and tools for intervention in the eyes of Mediterranean states.
Since reforms produce solid results in the long-run while producing short-term instability and conflicts, the EMP needs to manage and monitor these short-term instabilities, thereby use ad-hoc measures to prevent them (Aliboni, 2002). Instead of forcing the MPCs to recognize the conditions fully in the short run and becoming a Europe imposing solutions, the EU needs to be more flexible and show the societies of the MPCs the benefits of change through education so that the reforms can come from below within the MPCs. This will enhance the collective response and reduce the asymmetrical relations.

The Arab states question absence of other North African and Arab nations such as Libya, Mauritania and Saudi Arabia in the membership of the EMP so view double standard in the partnership. This prompts them to be suspicious about the EMP and interpret it as reflection of priorities of the EU and EU member states instead of collective will of all Mediterranean. Moreover, after the failure of the EU in the Bosnian crisis, it is difficult for the Arab Muslims to trust Europe.

In relation to the Middle East conflict, the security conceptions and perceptions of the Arab world do not match with the EU’s. Arabs perceive the role of Europe in the Middle East conflict as unbalanced policy in favour of Israel, whereas Israel thinks of Europeans as unsupportive to Israel’s basis. The difference between the Arab and European security cultures reduces the possibility of regional cooperation so becoming a big obstacle to the EMP. Attina (2002) stresses that the double nature of partnership based on cooperative and comprehensive dimensions is difficult to be accepted by Arab policy makers. Even if they welcome benefits of economic relations with Europe, they show strong resistance against the political conditionalities imposing socio-economic and political adaptation as well as military transparency because their security culture is based on self-help and national power as the previous chapter explained. Thus, Attina suggests that “partnership building, conflict prevention, early warning and preventive diplomacy seem feasible only at a later stage of the Mediterranean security partnership and the priority should be given to reduce gap between cultures” (Attina, 2002:17). However, while the priority is to be given to the reduction of the gaps between cultures by promoting mutual trust and consensus, it should be kept in mind that the PBM as a whole would also work to bring closer the cultures and prepare ground for mutual trust.

The MEPP was the focus in most of the conferences that hindered the other issues to be handled. The solution of the Middle East conflict will speed up the process. Failure of Oslo Peace Process and increasing violence in Occupied Territories contribute to suspicions and hostility in Arab world (Biad, 2002). However, since it seems that solution will take time, the Process should be decoupled from the situation in the Middle East as much as possible and emphasize that the EMP is not a forum to find solution for the Middle East conflict; rather “the EMP is more than MEPP and can create indirect solutions” (Nadal, 2002: 24). Moreover, focus of the participants during the
conferences was whether the Barcelona Process can be separated from the MEPP. But according to Hollis (2000), the real question is not this or implementation, but a “conceptual flaw that Barcelona ignores the unresolved conflicts and proposes conflict resolution with creation of new mechanism in a setting which has yet to be created” (Hollis, 2000:117).

Another important point is that priorities among three baskets are not evenly set and it is assumed that economic progress would bring political and social development. This reinforces the perception held by Arabs that the EU intervenes in the region to gain market. Democracy, human rights and globalization are perceived as a method for European interference by the Arabs. The policy responses of North and South differ against the challenges that “while the North prefers proactive long-term policies aimed at political and economic reforms in Southern countries, the South pursues defensive policies intended to secure good political relations and socio-economic cooperation while avoiding interference” (Aliboni, 2002:7). Hamdani point outs “it is for societies concerned to move towards democracy and the rule of law so the Western countries can help to create good conditions and appropriate environment for development in this target” (Hamdani, 2002:176). Therefore, the EMP needs to balance three baskets, reflect linkages between the economic, security, political and social realms.

Related to this, the EMP needs to go beyond the state level and reach the hearts and minds of societies. This could be possible with more dialogue and interaction. The EU can act as a mediator to activate the local actors and let them make decisions so as to reduce the mistrust. Calleya (2000) underlines that it should be the main local actors involved in a crisis because the preventive measures could be successful if the majority of the local actors comprehend that compliance would provide more benefit. At this point, EU could use its political, economic and social mechanism to influence decision-makers at local level (Calleya, 2000).

Changes in Iraq with the US involvement in 2003 together with the strong ties of Iraq with Mashreq raise the question on its impact in the EMP and whether the Gulf States should be included into the Process. However, the inclusion of Iraq into EMP would disqualify the Mediterranean as a geographical reference for the partnership which has a positive connotation for Europeans and the MPCs (Philippart, 2003). In addition, the inclusion of Iraq would underline the double standard as the EMP still excludes other non-Mediterranean countries. Moreover, the Gulf States have distinct political structure with lower governance and human rights level which will reduce the EMP’s prospective goals and success. (Phillipart, 2003) Hence, it is more viable for the EU to continue its relations with the Gulf States at the bilateral level and within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation
Council. In fact, the European Commission underlines that the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Iran, Iraq and Yemen are not part of the EMP.

The pattern of amity-enmity is one of the main elements in a security complex. In the EMP, the divergence in definitions and perceptions show that in the spectrum of the patterns of amity-enmity defined by the Copenhagen School, the pattern is closer to the negative end of the spectrum for the MENA states towards the Europeans. For the Europeans, the pattern is shaped by the factors like immigration and terrorism. Increase in immigration, religious fundamentalism, terrorism and refugees from the Middle East have shifted the Europeans’ perception more to the negative side of the spectrum. It led rise of xenophobia and Islamophobia in the society. Furthermore, these factors have been politicized and even securitized by the far right political parties which cultivated the nationalist attitude of the European societies. The recent rise of extreme right political parties in France and Austria exemplifies this. The EMP project can be classified to stay in the middle end of the spectrum where states still treat each other as potential threats but have agreed on certain points and created, in this case, the Barcelona Declaration. However, the lack of commitment and progress in the Process shows that within state level and societal level, the negative pattern preserves. Furthermore, within the EU, states stand closer to the positive end where the relationships are mutually constructive while in the South-South case, states are closer to the negative end that intra-regional relations are shaped by fear and conflict. Therefore, the foremost obstacle against the Barcelona Process is this negative pattern. Although the 27 Mediterranean states by signing the EMP depicted their will to reduce security dilemma through security partnership, the partners need to revise the policy, their rhetoric and the commitment so as to move the pattern to the positive side of the spectrum.

3) Multi-Actor Involvement in the Region

The EMP is not the only actor in the region for security cooperation. NATO, OSCE and ACRS are also working to promote security and stability in the region. However, EMP differs from these initiatives. In the EMP, actors and context are indirectly related and not consistent (Hollis, 2000). “The EMP is not a transatlantic but an EU regional initiative” (Tayfur, 2000:5). Yet, any regional security cooperation in the Mediterranean should consider the US position and interest as well as the other multinational actors in the region in order to prevent duplication and competition. In addition, different initiatives comprise different countries. “When organizations tasked with the collective defence of their members enter a dialogue with non-members, who are perceived as a

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22 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman
24 See the Annex for the Chart showing comparison of the cooperation initiatives in the Mediterranean prepared by European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation with the Support of the European Commission, 2003.
potential source of threat, they risk reinforcing rather than ameliorating suspicions between them” (Hollis, 2000:120). The involvement of the major powers in the Mediterranean and these collective defence organizations are signs of existence of realism in the region. Any act of one power would create suspicion and feel of potential threat in this anarchic and realist world. Therefore, the EU needs to consider the US role in MEPP and try not to conflict or overlap with its role in the issue.

Initially, the US asked for participation to the Barcelona Process but this was rejected and instead it was granted observer status. The US accepted this on the understanding that the Process would not extend beyond the US considerations in regions of conflict. The EMP alone could not engender a conflict resolution mechanism that could reduce tension in the Middle East dispute. Aliboni (1998) argues that the EU is not a fully-fledged security actor in the EMP’s sphere, so it cannot act as a guarantor and mediator. It cannot get directly in touch with factors which affect the security perceptions in the area. Yet, this study shows that it can act as mediator though it is not a fully security actor because of the lack of a European security architecture that deals with the hard security issues. The ESDP is formed to be a structure dealing with the humanitarian issues, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and crisis management. Its scope of action is limited and it lacks capability. During the discussion on “Constitutional Treaty”, the 15 EU members show their willingness for joint action and extend its scope of action beyond the Europe. Yet, the priority of the EU is in and around Europe. The capability gap between EU vis-à-vis US and the inconvenience led by a strong ESDP to NATO are two crucial factors that create a division of labour between the actors that while the US holds hard security, the EU deals with soft security issues. “Both sets of issues are separable but cannot be separated so neglect of one would hinder development” (Serfaty, 2000:61). The issues as soft or hard security also change over time and context. NATO is central for any military event in the region and the EMP sets itself not to conflict with the issues NATO’s dealing with.

Indeed, the partners and especially the EU member states are unwilling to bear the costs of hard security issues. The diverging interests among the EU members restrict to have common position. Therefore, they prefer the US and NATO to hold the hard security issues. This tendency is reflected in the rhetoric of Barcelona Declaration (1995) with the statement that “…this Euro-Mediterranean Initiative is not intended to replace other activities or initiatives but contribute to their success” (Aliboni, 1998). The transatlantic relations, the devastating influence of the US in the formulation of the European security structure and the US emphasis on Israel’s strategic interests jeopardize Europe’s efforts towards a just and balanced solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hence, the EU role is limited in this region. However, if the EU wants to be a fully-fledged security actor in the global system, it has to develop its stance in the hard security realm of the EMP and not allow the US to be the only actor in the Middle East. The EU could act as a balancer in the MEPP and prevent the US to be super power.
and break the international law. This requires the EU member states to go beyond their national interests and positions, though it seems unrealistic for now.

5.3 Concluding Remarks

The first part of this chapter evaluated the developments achieved so far in the Barcelona Process. Even though the progress is slow, it shows that the EMP has identified the challenges and proposes an appropriate policy with the three baskets. Yet, so far only some of the objectives could be achieved while the most is still on the paper but not in practice. The problems set in this thesis highlighted that there are problems arising not only from the implementation process but also from the conceptualization as well as perceptions.

From the comprehensive framework of the security analysis defined in the security complex theory, at the bottom end lies the domestic politics. The economic, socio-political conditions in the 27 partners shape the road the EMP will follow. The improvement of the domestic conditions within the MPCs would enhance the security as the challenges showed. The networks of civil society at the domestic level interact with the EMP organizations so contribute to the Process and link the domestic level to the regional level. At the regional level, the EMP with its baskets tries to build links, political and social dialogue. Within the regional initiatives, the EMP is the largest initiative comprising many states under one framework and the most comprehensive with its focus on political, economic and social fields as well as with its target of both North-South and South-South cooperation. Yet, the South-South relations are underrepresented and sub-regional initiatives need to be supported. At the top end, the participation of NATO, the UN, the US and the EU in Mediterranean issues depicts the global actors’ involvement which influences the regional and domestic developments as well as the EMP. This creates the probability of duplication and clash of priorities.

As mentioned previously, the Copenhagen School sets three components for the structure in a security complex: arrangement of units and differentiation among them, patterns of amity-enmity and the distribution of power among the units. From that standpoint, the EMP carries shortcomings in each of these components as this chapter has highlighted. Lack of institutions, the structural inconsistencies both in the EU and in the EMP and the decision-making mechanism giving more voice to the EU all underline the deficiency in the arrangement of the units and absence of an equal, balanced distribution of power. The definitional/perceptional inconsistency depicts the diverging patterns of amity-enmity. In order to create a security partnership, the shortcomings and inconsistencies stemming from those realms need to be solved.
CHAPTER 6- CONCLUSION

This thesis attempted to assess the security aspect of the Barcelona Process and the EMP within the theoretical framework of new regionalism and Copenhagen School. Existing cooperation projects and positive developments in the Mediterranean basin require attention. New regionalism with its broader perspective of studying non-homogenous regions provides an explanation of regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. Historical ties, economic and political interdependence of Europe and MPCs, security vulnerabilities, geopolitics are the main factors that led the EMP. The EMP accepts a comprehensive security by tackling the five sectors of security. The three baskets of EMP depict its will to achieve cooperation in five sectors. The Barcelona Process is initiated by the EU to tackle the challenges posed by globalisation and the interdependent international system. However, it gained the support of the MPCs who are also under the risks of similar challenges. Civil society contribution to the Process is an important part in evolution of the EMP that will enhance grassroots support for cooperation and produce constructive dialogue thereby reducing the misperceptions, prejudices in the societies and states.

The Mediterranean regional initiative falls more to the second level (region as social system) in Hettne’s level of regional integration but also carries characteristics of the third level (region as organized cooperation). There is a regional organization in the Euro-Mediterranean region institutionalized by Barcelona Process and membership of the MPCs together with EU member states is the main point that allows defining the boundaries of the regional cooperation. The EMP aims at cooperation in economic, military, political and cultural fields. Yet, since the Mediterranean is heterogeneous the organization level is low and interdependence of the constituent units triggered the cooperation in order to enhance their own security in the anarchical system.

From the realist point of view, the EMP can be viewed as the EU’s attempt to extend its interest in and power over its neighbours by establishing cooperation relations. This study showed that there are asymmetrical relations between the EU and MPCs in economic and security realms. The EU is the powerful actor within the EMP with more voice in the decision making and more resources to promote development. The EMP also enhances the EU’s stance in the international system. The Mediterranean elites and governments accept European dominance bewaring the asymmetrical relationship since they see the benefits of European economic aid and trade relations. Yet, the evaluation of the Process illustrated in the thesis reveals that realism gives only a partial explanation. Since the creation of EMP, even if there is no considerable development, the EU continues its support for the initiative and accepts the costs of the project. Despite the problems in the Process, the participant governments stress their willingness to solve them and further the cooperation. The neo-liberal premise of security interdependence pushes the EMP partners to cooperate. The EMP promotes
institutionalization of the relations and enhances transparency and exchange of information. Nonetheless, the asymmetrical relations make the EMP a reactionary policy. This needs to be changed because it aggravates dissension between Europe and the MPCs further instead of restoring the differences. Moreover, since both the EU and MPCs share similar concerns of security problems, it will be more viable to construct a common policy which has laid the basis of the Barcelona Process. The EMP cannot be seen as a security community because it lacks collective identity and due to the low flow of interaction. But the partnership in time may lead towards a security community.

The EMP is related to the systemic factors mainly because the security is relational and systemic factors are structuring the regional relations. They intensify the security interdependence among the units of the partnership. As the EU and the MPCs are interdependent, they need a partnership in order to achieve comprehensive security both in domestic and the regional levels. The regional patterns are shaped by distribution of powers and the historical relations of amity and enmity. The EMP holds the main characteristics of a security region that the Copenhagen School identifies. It is constructed by 27 states which constitute a geographically coherent grouping and whose relations are marked by deep security interdependence. The EMP falls into the heterogeneous complex category since it integrates different types of actors like states, NGOs, firms and the international organizations (the EU) which interact across different security sectors.

Having defined the five security sectors targeted with the EMP, the study focused on the major, mostly declared security issues- illegal immigration, religious fundamentalism and terrorism, the Middle East conflict and WMD- which are interlinked with each other. These challenges depicted the significance of the problems and the necessity to cooperate to prevent them. In addition, the roots of the challenges require a comprehensive approach encompassing the development in economic, political, social and security realms. The Barcelona Initiative with its baskets reflects a consensus among European states and the MPCs to target the origin of the problems. The Barcelona Process is sounding policy with its identification of problems and its vision of solution with an emphasis on partnership.

The evaluation of EMP showed several shortcomings classified as inter and intra-institutional incoherence, definitional/perceptional problems and multi-actor involvement in the region. Upon the basis of these weaknesses, the basic conclusions are first, the EMP should target at creating South-South cooperation in political, economic and security terms in order to create a consistent region and to have a healthy symmetrical interdependence between the EU and the MPCs. The Process should not further fragment the sub-regions; instead they should be pushed to integrate the international system gradually. Second, the continuation of capability gaps and institutional insufficiencies in the EU’s policies will allow the US to be the dominant actor in the Mediterranean preventing a
comprehensive role for the EU. Third, the gap between security cultures of the partners needs to be reduced through mutual dialogue and transaction. The political and economic stability in the Mediterranean region is vital for European security. This requires a pro-active development policy of Europe vis-à-vis its neighbours in the Southern Mediterranean, rather than a reactive approach. The main condition for partnership is that European countries give up the colonial habits of interfering in the affairs of the MPCs and preserve balance in relations. Political conditionality in terms of subjective and relative issues creates suspicions in the MPCs towards the EU and produces further counter-attacks and gaps. Therefore, Europe’s co-operation with the MPCs should be based on mutual respect for each other’s civilization. The EMP should be equally central to the both sides of the Mediterranean. All people in the region need to perceive the EMP as workable and effective program that brings peace and progress. The role of NGOs is crucial in realizing this. If the EMP becomes incapable of restoring the social break and stability within the Mediterranean basin, the Mediterranean can become a zone of instability. In order to make the Mediterranean a zone of peace and prosperity, the EMP process should be developed.

The EMP should enhance the necessary instruments and institutions to speed interaction among actors and crisis prevention. It is also necessary that both sides should show their political commitment to the Process through their rhetoric. Presenting the clash between Islam and Christianity would deteriorate the issue. The common ground on security could be achieved through political dialogue and will. The MEPP is also crucial as solution would make the EMP more feasible and stimulate partners to contribute to solutions of challenges more vigorously. The EU also needs to set a more active stance towards the Middle East conflict while not overlapping the position of the US.

The patterns of relations are shaped by the gap between perceptions and security culture of Europe and the Arabs. The MENA states still preserve enmity due to history, colonial heritage and interventions while the EU with its rhetoric reinforces this enmity. Rise of xenophobia, terrorist attacks and density of security challenges could push the European states more to pattern of enmity with tight policies. The EU needs to prevent the relationship from going in a negative direction, and push for friendlier, constructive dialogues. The constructivist premise of inter-subjective understanding should be realized within the EMP.

After September 11 and the Iraqi War in 2003 Barcelona Process became more vital. September 11 events have not only strengthened the relations among partners to act jointly, but also appreciated the importance of cultural and political dialogue. The post-Iraqi situation will influence the region as a whole. In the long run the consequences of the Post-Iraqi system will influence the perceptions of Arab world according to the kind of settlement in the country. Beginning with
September 11, the successive events have revealed the importance of the Barcelona Process and revised the agenda in the Process.

This analysis of the EMP showed that the EMP is an ambitious and long-term program. It is crucial because it is the only forum in the region that provides an arena for dialogue between governments and peoples of the two shores of the Mediterranean and it has a multifaceted method. It is not viable to expect concrete solutions after eight years. In the *longue durée* the problems and shortcomings in the EMP can be solved. It is a difficult road that both sides should give up some interests and contribute equally and willingly to build bridges between cultures, societies and states that would construct a prosperous, secure and stable Mediterranean region.
### ANNEX: Cooperation initiatives in the Mediterranean

Several cooperation initiatives exist between the two shores of the Mediterranean. Some are sponsored by States, others by multilateral institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Prospect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU-Mediterranean Partnership Process</strong>&lt;br&gt;See also Euro-Mediterranean Forum</td>
<td>Stability and prosperity through economic integration. Political and cultural dialogue. Security without military dimension</td>
<td>EU member countries + <strong>Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Malta</strong></td>
<td>good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATO Mediterranean Initiative</strong></td>
<td>Dialogue on security issues</td>
<td>NATO countries + Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania</td>
<td>fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEU Mediterranean Dialogue</strong></td>
<td>Dialogue on security issues</td>
<td>WEU countries + Egypt, Israel, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OSCE Mediterranean Contact Group</strong></td>
<td>Providing of confidence-building measures to the region</td>
<td>OSCE countries + Egypt, Israel, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM)</strong></td>
<td>Dialogue on social, economic, cultural and security issues</td>
<td>countries from Southern Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East and the Gulf</td>
<td>very poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inter-Parliamentary CSCM</strong></td>
<td>Dialogue on social, economic, cultural and security issues</td>
<td>Albania, Algeria, Bosnia, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Macedonia, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Yugoslavia</td>
<td>fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mediterranean Forum (also Forum for Dialogue and Co-operation in the Mediterranean)</strong></td>
<td>Dialogue on social, economic, cultural and security issues</td>
<td>Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and Malta</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“5+5 Dialogue” (also Western Mediterranean Project)</strong></td>
<td>Dialogue on social, economic and cultural issues. Informal</td>
<td>Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, Malta, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania</td>
<td>fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group (ACRS)</strong></td>
<td>Dialogue on security issues (arms control)</td>
<td>Israel and 12 Arab countries (with the exception of Syria, Libya, Iraq and Iran)</td>
<td>fair/poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Summits</strong></td>
<td>Regional economic integration</td>
<td>open to all countries from the Middle East and North Africa. Deterioration of the Arab-Israeli peace process ruined the last meeting.</td>
<td>poor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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