“European Security and Foreign Policy in a post-Cold War era. 
A study of France, Germany and Great Britain”

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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agriculture Policy</td>
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<td>CESDP</td>
<td>Common European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Commission on Security Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>European Airlift Command</td>
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<td>EC</td>
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<td>European Capability Action Plan</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>ERRF</td>
<td>European Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Identity</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GMO</td>
<td>Genetically Modified Organism</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Member States</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NMD</td>
<td>National Missile Defence</td>
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<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
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<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapon of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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“I would like to start with a paradox; of all the prerogatives of states, security and defence policy is probably the one which least lends itself to a collective European approach; however, after the single currency, it’s in the dimension that the Union has made the most rapid and spectacular progress over the last five years...beyond that vision of the world and of the Union’s role in the world, The European security strategy has another virtue, of a more institutional kind: as it is a long-term project, it also acts as a general framework for the CFSP, within which the specific priorities of each EU Presidency must now been handled. It therefore enhances the continuity of the Union’s security and defence policy, long before the provisions laid down in this area by the draft European Constitution are implemented.”

Javier Solana

1 Introduction

After the Second World War, the world’s configuration turned to a bipolar system. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin wall, the world was living in fear of a third world war but the bipolar configuration showed that it could lead the whole continent in peace-keeping. “Biplolarity is the power configuration that produces the least amount of fear among the great powers...Fear tends to be less acute in bipolarity, because there is usually a rough balance of power between the two major states in the system”². The presence of two superpowers during that period was the race to nuclear armament where international confrontation was not the aim but they both had mutual interests in not reaching escalation to nuclear exchange. The nuclear missile crisis in Cuba was the most important alarm of this artificial confrontation. But which kind of world configuration will follow the post-Cold War era?

The end of the Cold War changed the international atmosphere and European security could not exist anymore under United States (US) leadership. European security still remains an important concern of the US through the transatlantic link via the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). But US at the same time states that Europe should take responsibility to ensure its own security within its continent. Also the isolationist approach of the American foreign policy in terms of security creates fear in the establishment of European common

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security. This drawing of a new map of Europe due to the integrating political process offers the possibility to achieve a political influence on the international arena to the European Union (EU).

The lack of political will from Member States (MS) to create unity within foreign policy and security issues struggles with the image of Europe outside of its scene. European countries are currently facing a difficult climate in which they re-evaluate their security needs due to the changes that occurred after the Cold War period. The concern about national security and national priorities does not create confidence in the implementation of a believable common foreign and security policy. But the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia has created awareness in the mind of EU countries. Nowadays they know that they have to deal with security issues on their own continent.

It is impossible to fully discuss security issues without mentioning the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. The destruction of the twin towers, symbols of the American economy, and the partial attack of the pentagon, symbol of American intelligence operations, reflected seriously on the way countries will manage their foreign policy for a long time. Also the terrorist attack in Madrid in March 11th, 2004, brought the threat of terrorism closer to the European continent. National security needs to focus not only on fighting against another territory but against a well-structured, internationally developed ideology, which is well developed through international networks, ready to act.

The EU, nowadays, faces new challenges to become a global actor in the international scene. It has proved its economic strength from the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957 to the launch of their single currency in 2001. However, in terms of foreign policy and security, MS have never been able to agree efficiently. This implies that EU is strong economically but it is not so politically. Nevertheless, during the Helsinki Summit in 1999, MS had the ambition to develop a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) of 60,000 troops “capable of rapid deployment within 60 days and sustainable for at least one year”\(^3\).

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) emerged from the “convergence of attitudes between Britain and France, historically antagonists on how to approach foreign policy and defence”\(^4\). After the post-Cold war era, MS agree on the fact that they should develop a European pillar to give a political dimension to the EU. However, recent events have shown that the EU does not have the will to speak as one voice in the international arena. US

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stratagem has been efficient in dividing different European foreign policies, especially between France and England. The case of the Iraqi conflict is the proof that EU members are still looking for a unilateral approach on the CFSP. It is the real weakness of this pillar. The US will keep on trying to weaken its robustness.

The construction of the EU remains the most important co-operation between states in world history. This region includes many great powers such as France, England and Germany which all have a great influential capability. That is why this region became the focus of many scholars.

1.1 Aim of this paper

The purpose of this paper is to answer the following questions:
- What processes have led Europe to have a unilateral position in its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)?
- Facing the enlargement, which strategy do the European leaders (France, Great Britain and Germany) have to apply in order to promote a unified European position in the international arena?
- How does the cementation of the second pillar affect transatlantic security relations?

The first question deals with the development and the will of European Countries, especially Great Britain and France, to provide themselves with a unilateral foreign policy avoiding US engagement. It also puts into orbit the EU’s need to realize that it must equip itself with stronger military infrastructures. The answer to this first question will be the basis for answering the next questions in an efficient manner. I will also construct this paper using the neorealism and neoliberalism theories to explain the cooperation between these countries and the complexity of their relations.

The second question highlights the challenges that European great powers will face. It was already a big issue to speak as one voice when the EU had only 15 members, so what will it be with 25 members?

In the framework of NATO and US foreign policy, the cementation of this pillar would eventually start to destabilise the EU-US relationship. Twenty years ago, the US was laughing at the creation of a common currency within Europe. Today, it became a reality. Even if the European security strategy remains unclear, what can happen in the next 15 years?

As I explained above, I will conduct my research with the help of neorealism and criticism towards neorealism using neoliberalism theory. My analysis will also include an
analysis explaining the different configuration of the world order post-World War II. Even if the new world configuration does not remain the main point of this discussion, it is heavily linked with these questions.

1.2 Construction of the CFSP

After World War II, Foreign Policy and Defence of Western European countries was under the influence of the transatlantic relationship and American leadership. It was seen as vital for Western Europe to be defended through the American commitment\(^5\). In 1948, the Treaty of the Western Union came up with the creation of the Western European Union (WEU), whose military task forces were integrated into NATO. In February 1969, De Gaulle organised a meeting to launch the Fouchet Plan to organise closer political cooperation. However, strong disagreements occurred between members. This failure was the result of the withdrawal of the French military forces within the NATO structure\(^6\).

1.2.1 From the European Political Cooperation (EPC) to the CFSP, a history of major developments

The Hague Summit in December 1969 was the launch of the political cooperation. The EPC was developed, outside of the European framework, as an intergovernmental process. The French vision of the EPC was “a more autonomous European Defence”\(^7\). In February 1986, the Single European Act (SEA) developed relations as a whole into the EU\(^8\). The aim of the SEA was to further reduce the differences between the instruments of the EPC and the European Community (EC) and in 1989 the EPC “represented a working model of intergovernmental cooperation without formal integration”\(^9\). After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the revolution in Central and Eastern Europe, security and defence policy was not a priority on the agenda, only the monetary union took prominence. However, this major change in the political sphere forced MS to advance the priority of its own security and defence policy\(^10\). In February 1992, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) established the CFSP as a union and not as a community. The instruments of EC and CSFP were fully

\(^6\) Ibid, p. 464
\(^7\) Ibid, p.465
\(^8\) Ibid, p.469
\(^9\) Ibid, p.466
\(^10\) Ibid, p.467
combined but the institutional distinction was maintained through the ‘pillared’ structure. They sub-contracted the defence to the WEU. In October 1997, EU members examined all aspects of foreign and security policy and brought closer links with the EU and hold the possibility of a EU-WEU merger. In December 1999, The Helsinki European Council developed a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) with the creation of a General Affairs Council including defence ministers, a Political and Security committee, a Military Committee, and a Military staff attached to the EU council. They also created a joint military force of 60,000 persons prepared for rapid response within 60 days.11

1.2.2 Construction of the CFSP through the Treaties analysis

The basis of the political co-operation was initially created in the single Act of 1986 which formalized the intergovernmental co-operation. The Treaty of Maastricht came into effect in November 1993 including for the first time the goal of a common foreign policy. The Treaty of Amsterdam came into force in 1999 and is dedicated to the CFSP in articles 11 to 28. Its main objectives are stipulated in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union:

“The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be: to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.” 12

The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the mechanism known as a constructive abstention which makes it possible for a State to protect its vital national

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interest without preventing the other members from adopting a joint position. The Treaty of Amsterdam also introduced a new aspect, a High-Representative for the CFSP. Mr Javier Solana took his functions after this summit in October 18th, 1999 for a five years period. The last treaty, Nice, came into effect on February 1st, 2003 and contains new provisions about the CFSP. It increases the number of fields in the framework of the majority qualified vote and reinforces the role of the political and security committees in crises management. The Treaty also provides a new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to the EU which covers all matters referring to its security. The principal instruments of the CFSP are the joint positions, the common actions, and the decisions and conclusions about international agreements. Declarations and contacts with third-world countries also constitute a common diplomatic tool for the EU.13

“The Convention Working Group on External Action made the following recommendations in December 2002: current competencies in external action need not be revised; large majority in favour of one European External Representative (combining functions of High Representative and Relex Commissioner); establishment of External Action Council, distinct from General Affairs formation; focal point to be established within the Commission, possibly Vice-President; establishment of joint service (European External Action Service), composed of DG RELEX officials, Council secretariat officials and staff from national diplomatic services; creation of EU diplomatic academy and EU diplomatic service; majority in favour of maximum use of qualified majority voting on common foreign and security policy; high support for qualified majority voting in all areas of commercial policy; common foreign and security policy to have more financial resources.”14

1.3 Theoretical approach

In this thesis, I will focus my research by dealing with two competing theories: neorealism and neoliberalism. Neorealism is still regarded as one of the most important theories of international relations needed to analyse current events in terms of foreign policy and security. However, these theories strongly criticise each other for understanding international relations on many points such as international co-operation and the objectives of foreign policy. I will briefly explain the difference between these theories as the engine of the analytical part of my paper. Finally, I will also point out and compare the choices of the

13 http://www.euractiv.com/Article?_lang=EN&tcmluri=tcml:29-117265-16&type=LinksDossier
14 Ibid
leading countries of the EU, that is to say France, Germany and Great Britain in their view of the European security co-operation outside of a theoretical framework.

Nevertheless, I would like to say that these theories have a real potential to explain the way countries co-operate in the framework of international relations. Both have their own view about the way States co-operate with each other, but neoliberalism, on one hand, has a more optimistic approach in terms of cooperation and sees this cooperation as a potential factor of success. Neorealism, on the other hand, sees co-operation pessimistically and explains why states’ cooperation is more often a failure and leads to conflict due to their goal to reach their national interests.

1.3.1 Realism

Many specialists support that the philosopher Thucydides is the first precursor of the realist tradition and of the analysis of international relations. Its famous work on the history of the Peloponnesian war is an analysis of the principles of military and political power of Athens and Sparta and the causes of their aggressive behaviours, based on the meticulous observations of these events and the realisation of many protagonists’ interviews. The conclusion he found out is that war is the result of fear and a change in the balance of power. Two fundamental lessons have not been forgotten by the realists from Thucydides’ work: firstly, every state seek to defend or maximize its military and political power, which creates favourable conditions to begin a war; secondly, war is more probable between authoritarian states than between democratic states because the former is less imperialistic than the latter.15

The two philosophers considered as the first founders of realism remain nevertheless Machiavelli and Hobbes. They believe, based on their personal observation on the reality of their time, that men are animated by their innate instinct of power and domination which brings them to compete between each others for the acquisition of wealth, power and prestige. The nature and behaviour of states are not different from the men’s ones that lead them. States are animated by the spirit of conquest which incites them to compete constantly between them. In the case where states are unequal, they are more or less suited to use efficiently their force

(military), or their trick (diplomatic), this rivalry leads to the domination of the weakest by the strongest.\textsuperscript{16}

Morgenthau is regarded as the contemporaneous successor of Machiavelli and Hobbes due to its major contribution to the conceptualisation and systematisation of the classic realist thought. His theory, in his book \textit{Politics among nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace}, can be defined as the following\textsuperscript{17}:

\begin{quote}
Realism believes that the world, as imperfect from a rational point of view, is the result of inherent forces of the human nature...to live in a better world, we must act with these forces and not against them.
\end{quote}\textsuperscript{18}

For the large majority of realists, international relations are strictly states’ diplomatic and strategic relations that maintain sovereign states between them outside of international organisations. These relations are necessarily characterized by rivalry, on one hand, because every state naturally and constantly tries to defend and enhance its military and political power; on the other hand, because the power is unequally distributed within international society; finally, because it is improbable that states accept to be subjected to a supranational authority which would force them to cooperate. It is only for that last reason that the international society is anarchic, and not because it is entirely deprived of order and delivered totally to violence. Sovereign states adhere freely and voluntarily to agreements and rules that maintain the dynamic of interstate conflicts in a pacific structure. However, the setting-up of a perpetual peace is inconceivable due to sovereignty, ambitions, inequalities, and mutual mistrust of states which places them into a security dilemma. The use of force is not avoidable, but it is not desirable and can be limited. The war is not advantageous because, even if it permits to create a new balance of power and institute a rotation of supremacy between states, its cost is higher than its benefits. Armed confrontations can be avoided during a more or less period of time thanks to the adoption of two behaviours: the adoption of defensive, isolationist or neutralist politics or the setting-up of a balance of power through strategic alliances.\textsuperscript{19}

\begin{quote}
the first solution (war) that comes to our spirit (realists) consists in searching between the involved forces an equilibrium that creates an obstacle to the domination of great powers and that diminishes the risk of armed confrontations. To reach this equilibrium, states are
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, p.26
\textsuperscript{18} Braillard, théorie des relations internationales, p.85
incited not only to moderate their ambitions but also to conclude necessary alliances between them.”

According to Thucydides and its successors, it is when a state believes that its military and political power is threatened by another state that it declares war. The principal finality of alliances that states conclude between them is to avoid a powerful non-member state to impose its domination. Therefore, the quadruple alliance concluded in 1815 between Austria, Great Britain, Russia and Prussia had the aim to counter expansionist and republican Napoleonic empire. This kind of alliances favours peace insofar as it creates a new balance of power. However, this peace is relative, because the effects of a such alliance are circumscribed to a restrain number of states on a temporary basis. This quadruple alliance permitted to overcome the Napoleonic empire and maintain the peace between Australia, Great Britain, Russia and Prussia but just for a while.21

1.3.2 Neorealism

The reformulation of the realist thought by neorealists articulates itself around the following themes: definition of states’ power, the balance of power between great powers, relations between states’ interdependence, hegemony and peace; and the changing place of international relations. 22

First of all, the definition of neorealists concerning states’ power is far from that of realists and closer to the one of neoliberals. It associates with the former that not only the political and military capabilities are essential but also economic and technological resources of a state. Even political and military power rise from technological and economic capabilities.23

Second, Kenneth Waltz’s work in Theory of international Politics, is considered the first reformulation of the traditional realist thought, according to Keohane in his book Neorealism and its critics. He believes that the balance of power between great powers is an inherent attribute of the states’ system. Waltz reaches this conclusion by applying the precepts of the neoclassic liberal economy to international relations. A contrario to the liberal thought, Waltz affirms that every state, and not only the ones that are democratic or capitalist, are

20 Merle, Sociologie des relations internationales, p.68
22 Ibid, p.46
23 Ibid, p.46
rationales. The balance of power can succeed between states whose economic and political systems are altered. Furthermore, neorealists wonder about the respective advantages and disadvantages of the diverse systems: unipolar, bipolar and multipolar. According to their analysis, the more a system comports many states, the bigger a risk of uncertainty and instability there is, because it is more difficult for statesmen to make any rational decisions due to the difficult task to manage the profusion of information. This reasoning brings to the conclusion that the bipolar system during the cold war created more stability than during the multipolar system of the nineteenth century or between World War I and World War II.24

Third, according to realists, military and political dependence of states is negative because it is synonymous with the limitation of sovereignty of weak states by the great powers. To some extent, neorealists add that interdependence of states is also economic and determined by government resources and private companies. The domination of rich countries is concretised largely by the influence exerted by multinational firms on the economy of less developed countries. This neorealist conception of economic interdependence, on one hand, is closer to the one of neomarxists than the one of liberals, on the other hand, which states that economic interdependence attenuates inequalities of development and reinforces common interests and cooperation between states.25

That is to say, even if for neorealists interdependence is fundamentally a source of inequalities between states, it is not necessarily a synonym for conflict. Military confrontations can be avoided if states eliminate contacts with their opponents or adversaries. On one hand, according to neorealists, the conduct of the international system by a powerful hegemon does not attenuate inequalities, but it profits every state by causing stability, prosperity and cooperation. On the other hand, the decline of hegemony engenders a diversification or a fragmentation of the balance of power and a reinforcement of instability and conflicts. Thus interests of the weak states are better protected in the framework of a centralised international system than in a decentralised international system.26

Fourth, according to realists, change is possible but only in the framework of the immutable objective laws that govern reality: states naturally or rationally seek to maintain and maximise their power; the international society is anarchic because no state can rationally accept to cede its sovereignty to a supranational authority. Neorealists have cemented more

25 Ibid, p.48
26 Ibid, p.48
than contested this conception tending to deepen this empirical knowledge of laws in the framework of a possible change.27

1.3.3 Neoliberalism

According to classic liberals, it is the triumph of individual interests on states’ interests that warranty the founding of a universal peace. However, on one hand, for Anglo-Saxon liberals that are usually more pragmatist and utilitarian, the primacy of individual interests is principally ensured by the development of economic exchange. On the other hand, for idealist liberals, like the French and the Germans, it depends mainly on the extension of the law and political democracy. Contemporary neoliberalism thought, from American origin, is closer to the former conception than the latter for the reason that it founds the future of international cooperation and peace on economic interdependence of states. Moreover, its vision of the democratic state differs from that of the liberals. The democratic state is perceived as a place of arbitration between diverse national groups and transnational interests. Neoliberalism defines the state and the international system according to the American system in the framework of a political game dominated by the competition and negotiation of interest groups. Taking into account their vision of the state, neoliberalists grant more importance to non-governmental actors in international relations than liberals do. According to them, states are not the major actors of the international system. Transnational forces and multinational corporations and organisations devoted to humanitarian and environmental causes are also considered major actors of international relations. In a context where politics of states are determined by the conflicts and trade-offs of interests groups or coalition, there is no difference between domestic policy and foreign policy of states, between national societies and international society. The national environment is constantly in interaction with the international environment. Changes that occur inside every society have an effect on the international system and the transformation of the international system has an impact on the internal dynamic of every society. These postulates explain how the neoliberal school is deeply interested in the determinants and modalities of the decision-making process, in the framework of foreign policy in particular, and also in the relations between the economic modernisation of societies, and in the rise of transnational

relations, in the development of the process of international integrations and the deepening of states’ interdependence since 1945.28

The modernisation of societies generates a myriad of problems of a non political nature whose solutions require the collaboration of experts in diverse countries. Benefits arising from this collaboration incite states to reinforce their cooperation by the conclusion of regional agreements of economic integration which contribute to the development of political integration. Integration results from the obligation of states to cooperate in different domains in order to resolve inherent issues of modernisation, but also from the conviction that national political leaders have an interest in transferring their loyalties, their expectations and their capabilities to intervene in new institutions that own a supranational jurisdictional power. However, integration is not idealised. It is seen as an extremely complex dynamic and carries uncertainty.29

Many liberal experts are also interested in the phenomena of states’ interdependence which is a larger concept than that of integration because it makes reference to multiple relations that link states’ governmental and non governmental actors, in various spheres of activities, in the framework of integration agreements.30

Thus interdependence is more favourable to cooperation than conflicts. This cooperation does not only result from the leadership of a hegemon, as neorealists pretend, but from the convergence of states’ interests which incites them to create international regimes. According to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, the insitutionalist neoliberal theory of international regimes supports that international regimes permit the states to defend their egoistic and rational interests while cooperating.31 A contrario to liberal thought, the neoliberal school of thought does not believe that the advent of a global government and the disappearance of states’ sovereignty is inescapable. However, they do not draw aside the possibility that a reinforcement of the convergence of states’ interests brings them eventually to accept voluntarily the transfer of their decision-making power to a supranational authority. According to their perspective, the states’ capacity to transform the international environment is quasi-unlimited because it is not subjected to constraints or immutable objective laws, as it is pretended in the realist tradition. A change of scenario is obviously not utopian.32

29 Ibid, p 51
30 Ibid, p.52
31 Ibid, p.52
32 Ibid, p.52
1.3.4 Neorealism and neoliberalism

Neorealist and neoliberal theories include elements of similitude and divergence. So these theories are more difficult to differentiate than realist and liberalist theories, which are radically opposed. Many debates between neorealists and neoliberals permit us to dissociate the two group of scholars around four themes:
- Nature and consequences of the anarchy
- International co-operation
- International Regimes
- Objectives of the Foreign Policy

Nature and consequences of the anarchy

Both group of scholars agree that the international system is anarchic, without any central authority and world government, but they define consequences in a different way. For neorealists, states act or decide independently to reach their national interests. From their point of view, there are no collective decisions. However, neoliberals believe that, due to the interdependence, states can take decisions that reflect their common interests.

International co-operation

Neorealists and neoliberals believe that international co-operation is possible and desirable. For neorealists, this co-operation is hard to realise due to the fact that countries are not looking for the same interests. For neoliberals, this co-operation strengthen the co-operation itself thanks to the interdependence of states. Moreover, both theories do not seem to have the same vision about co-operation.

International regimes

Both groups of scholars have agreed on the proliferation of international regimes since 1945 but they disagree about its meaning. For neoliberals, international regimes constitute the

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34 Ibid, p.54
35 Ibid, p.54
principal source of co-operation and peace in the international system and mitigate as an instrument of the anarchy. Neorealists do not share this optimism. From their point of view, international regimes remain only as places of conflicts and interests rather than forums of cooperation because they do not share the idea that interdependence brings a convergence of states’ interests.36

**Objectives of the Foreign Policy**

Neorealists and neoliberals agree on the fact that the main objectives of foreign policy are security and economic prosperity. However, Neorealists consider that security remains the first priority vis-à-vis economic prosperity and neoliberals defend the opposite thesis. In terms of foreign policy, both theories present common aspects. First, they focus on statesman’s intentions. Second, they highlight the importance of military and economic capabilities of states but they do not attach the same importance on these variables. Neorealists favour the first one and neoliberals the second one.

To sum up, I conclude that the essential source of these divergences between neorealists and neoliberals is the unequal importance that each theory grants to economical and political aspects of international relations. It is desirable and foreseeable that a balance of these variables eventually merge these theories into one paradigm.37

2 Methodology

“Qualitative research is a research strategy that usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data. As a research strategy, it is inductivist, constructionist, and interpretivist”.38

2.1 Qualitative Research : Literature Study

Finding a subject to analyse within a research paper has to be realised out of definition, and mine can be found mainly within international relations. This points to the reason that I decided to study this field in particular, international relations, and more

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37 Ibid, p.56
precisely the choice of security and foreign policy in the framework of the EU was motivated by the interest to find out an interesting subject and a current issue within Europe as a global actor of international relations. Deciding on this topic should also have its significance in a wider social science perspective, contributing with relevant elements of information to a larger set of people in the field of security cooperation and foreign policy.

I have decided to use the qualitative research method, the stimulus of this choice is that I have found out that it is the most efficient way to handle this task. I am currently focusing on the analysis and creating a wider understanding about a topic that is honestly related to broader social science issues, that is to say very difficult to reach in many ways with a quantitative method. The eventual use that I can distinguish for a quantitative approach would be to locate empirical substantiation for my statements. However, the substantial limitation of this thesis builds incapability in this approach. Thus this thesis will be based on the literature study, with the prominence on understanding rather than explaining; where any empirical evidence will be incorporated in the source material I have selected previously to work with.

I will highlight my analysis by experimenting with the two theories in opposition to the topic chosen. The aim of utilizing both theories, neorealism and neoliberalism, will be to find out a correlation between these theories and the subject. This correlation, to some extent, will have the purpose to explain how the different nation states have behaved, and the theory should be employed to explain their actions.

Due to the breadth of this topic, there are several sources to work with and they are almost never-ending. But by searching and going through relevant international political journals such as International security, Foreign Affairs and Survival, I have established an efficient assortment of leading experts that are currently conducting the discussion about international security and European security and foreign policy in the construction of a CFSP. These experts are constantly working together and establishing a circle of intelligent researchers in this domain. I will try to combine these circle of intellectuals in the political debate about the European security and defence policy by bringing them together with official sources that EU has generated through the construction of the CFSP.

I began with a limited set of statements, started from prior understanding of the topic, instituting the basis from which I have then founded my questions. First of all, the first question, concerning the process of a unilateral CFSP leads up MS to develop a behaviour out of their national interests. Then, the second question is developed through the assumption that EU great powers need to develop a strategy to push every MS to develop a common interest necessary for the image of Europe outside of its continent. Finally, the third question is built...
up through the assumption that the cementation of the CFSP will affect the transatlantic link. I strongly believe that this development is hard to deal with, in the short run, without the interest of the US particularly and especially within NATO.

This work is of course developed as an external witness of the international political scene. In my methodological approach, I might have omitted some information that could have been fundamental to bring a correct investigation. Thinking about this aspect, I have tried to accomplish my research in the most efficient way, with the help of official sources, descriptive and normative literature, omitting speeches and summit declarations. I have been mainly dealing with information about the establishment of the CFSP and how it has been appreciated in France, Germany and Great Britain in particular during the Iraqi conflict. This has been the starting point for my thesis where I understood the stakes of cooperation in the EU for the future of a unilateral CFSP on the international arena, and the move on to the questions of the problems with the transatlantic intentions. Finally, in the last part, I stress an analysing approach to theoretically compare the different alliances (Franco-German and Great Britain) in the framework of the CFSP and the importance of a new strategy to develop a new world order.

2.1.1 Official documents deriving from the state or institutions

To be able to understand the construction of the CFSP, using documents of the state or institutions represents “a great deal of information of potential significance for social researchers...the state is the source of a great deal of textual material of potential interest”\textsuperscript{39}. I have also used EU official publications. The EU homepage and in particular the one devoted to the CFSP have been very helpful. Also other publications emanating from the national governments of the country studied and from other institutions such as NATO have been very useful.

2.2 Limitations of the paper

First, to conduct this research efficiently, I have used sources in different languages to get a better understanding of the different approach of these countries. Material produced in English, French and Spanish has been used. However, one limitation that has to be remarked

is that I do not understand the German language. Nevertheless, mainly because English is the international research language, many German scholars and experts contribute to this debate in this language or it is transposed into English for the goodwill of world research.

Concerning the theoretical framework, I have utilized the foremost figures of neorealism and neoliberalism including scholars such as Waltz, Mearsheimer or Keohane and Nye. I do not pretend to entirely cover their work but the description provided is adequate enough to get a fine analysis of international relations.

It was hard to find books concerning European Security and Foreign Policy and the impact of the CFSP, but some new publications are relevant in French and English. I think the major reason for this lack of documentation is the rapid evolution of the concept of security in Europe in the last 5 years. Nonetheless, several articles on this topic are available. Thanks to impressive international relations journals such as International Security, Survival and Foreign affairs, I was able to find many interesting articles produced by leading experts concerning this topic.

In general, I feel confident in the sources used, even if I cannot ensure their validity because they come from second hand information. However, these authors are all well-known and recognised in the sphere of international relations which procures me some comfort in my choices.

3 Theory

3.1 Neorealism and neoliberalism: The Debate

These theories have been controversial in the study of international relations but we noticed that some of their aspects are similar. It is complex to cover the whole debate between these theories. Nevertheless, this debate brought the assumption that there is the possibility and the capability to merge neorealism and neoliberalism into one paradigm. In the highlight of this debate, we will try to emphasize our analysis on six different points seen as the main core-centre of this discussion. It is also important to notice that these points are presented in the book of David A Baldwin as a credible position in that debate. In this context, it is important to clarify zones of dissimilarity to explain the debate, which will solidify the groundwork for a better understanding of our analysis where these zones of dissimilarity are located in our areas of investigation.
3.1.1 The nature and consequence of anarchy

“in a world of anarchy, incentives exist for states to balance. Security, indeed survival, is the fundamental goal of state, and because states cannot ultimately rely on the commitments or guarantees of other states to ensure their security, states will be very sensitive to their relative power position. When powerful states emerge, secondary states will seek protection in countervailing coalitions of weaker states. The alternative is to risk domination. As waltz argues: “secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side they are both more appreciated and safer, provided, of course, that the coalition they join achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from attacking.” Alliances emerge as temporary coalitions of states formed to counter the concentration of power. As the distribution of power shifts, coalition will shift as well. Order is based on the balancing actions of states, the necessary and inevitable outcome of states seeking to ensure their security in an anarchic system.”

Both theories consent that the international system is anarchic but they do not have the same perception about that fact. Every scholar has his or her own way to interpret the concept of anarchy. However, they agree on the definition that anarchy as a lack of presence of “common authority to enforce any rules or laws constraining the behaviour of states or other actors”. It means that there is no supranational authority which is able to be impartial and judge the actions taken by any states vis-à-vis another one in the interactions of international relations.

“The difference between national and international politics lies not in the use of force but in the different modes of organisation for doing something about it. A government, ruling by some sort of standard of legitimacy, arrogates to itself the right to use force... A government has no monopoly on the use of force, as is all too evident. An effective government, however, has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and legitimate means here that the public agents are organised to prevent and to counter the private use of force”. Neorealism stresses out that the international structure is anarchic, so cooperation between states is difficult to reach, even quasi-impossible. Neorealists use the model of the Prisoner’s

42 Waltz, Kenneth N, ‘Theory of International Relations’, p.103-104
Dilemma to demonstrate the fact that rational actors are unable to cooperate: “Political theorists use the Prisoner’s Dilemma to explain the contractarian-coercion conjunction at the root of the modern state, arguing that the state of nature is a Prisoner’s Dilemma in which individuals have a dominant strategy of defecting from common action, but in which the result of this mutual defection is deficient for all”\textsuperscript{43}.

A contrario, neoliberalists argue that neorealism neglects the possibility for cooperation because it focuses too much on the concept of anarchy: “In prisoner’s dilemma, concern about the future helps to promote cooperation. The more future payoffs are valued to relative to current payoffs, the less the incentive to defect today...The cases discussed support this argument and identify specific factors that help to make the shadow of the future an effective promoter of cooperation. These factors include: long term horizons, regularity of stakes, reliability of information about the others’ actions, quick feedback about changes in the others’ actions”\textsuperscript{44}. In conclusion, neoliberalists perceive anarchy as a less constraining aspect of states’ actions in international relations than do neorealists.

### 3.1.2 International cooperation

Both theories state that cooperation is achievable between states. Differences come to the surface when discussing the facility and probability of its appearance. “The major challenger to realism has been what I shall call liberal institutionalism....Most significantly, they argued that international institutions can help states to cooperate. Thus, compared to realism, liberal institutionalism offered a more hopeful prognosis for international cooperation and a more optimistic assessment of the capacity of institutions to help states to achieve it”\textsuperscript{45}. Neorealism points out that cooperation is “harder to achieve, more difficult to maintain, and more dependent on state power”\textsuperscript{46}.

But we should not forget to stress that neoliberalism is aware of the conflict inherent in the states’ priority to pursue national interests: \textit{la raison d’état}, in the framework of international cooperation. “Above a certain level of conflict the international organisation

\textsuperscript{43} Stein, Arthur, Coordination and collaboration : Regimes in an anarchic world, in Baldwin, David A, (editor), Neorealism and Neoliberalism : the Contemporary Debate, p.35
\textsuperscript{44} Axelrod, Robert & Keohane, Robert O, Achieving co-operation under anarchy: Strategies and institutions, in Baldwin, David A, (editor), Neorealism and Neoliberalism : the Contemporary Debate, p.91-92
\textsuperscript{45} Grieco, M Joseph, Anarchy and the limits of cooperation : A Realist critique of the newest Liberal Institutionalism, in Baldwin, David A, (editor), Neorealism and Neoliberalism : the Contemporary Debate, p. 111
\textsuperscript{46} Baldwin, David A, (editor), Neorealism and Neoliberalism : the Contemporary Debate, p.5
model and sensitivity interdependence become largely irrelevant.”

The main divergences on both theories about this point are their view about conflict in international cooperation. The way the EU manages itself is for that aspect, of great importance.

3.1.3 Relative versus absolute Gains

“In a competition for the position of leader, bandwagoning is sensible behaviour where gains are possible even for the losers and where loosing does not place their security in jeopardy.”

States seek to skyrocket their power and their influence (absolute gains) in the framework of cooperation with other actors in the system in order to increase their capability. However, these actors are also apprehensive with how much power and influence other states might reach (relative gains) within this cooperation. This approach can be defined as the key-difference between neorealists and neoliberals. The neoliberals argue that cooperation cannot be applied when states cheat or that it does not follow the rules in order to secure their national interests. As a result of this, for neorealists, states are facing two barriers in international cooperation: cheating and relative gains of actors.

“When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not “will both of us gain?” but “who will gain more?” if an expected gain is too be divided, say, in the ration of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gain for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities.”

Neorealists believe that relative gain can hinder cooperation between states and neoliberals deem that relative gain does not always hinder cooperation. Only this connotation divides these schools of thought.

47 Keohane, Robert O & Nye, Joseph S, Power and interdependence, p.58
48 Waltz, Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, p.126
50 Ibid, p.186
51 Waltz, Kenneth N, ‘Theory of International Relations’, p.105
“The divergence between the two theories will become apparent only when opportunities for joint gains through cooperation are substantial. Under these conditions, according to neoliberal theory, states’ obsessions with relative gains will diminish”\textsuperscript{52}.

De facto, “who is gaining more?”, this empirical question is not easy to answer due to the fact that states are rational actors and the appreciation of gain and the level of gain are not valuable.

### 3.1.4 Priority of State Goals

According to Keohane, this debate about the priority of state goals is not at all efficient at predicting interests in both theories. Neorealists and neoliberals both consent that national security and economic welfare remain important goals but they currently differ in this relative emphasis. While neorealists preach security issues, neoliberals tend to focus on political economy\textsuperscript{53}. The neorealists emphasize security because the international structure of the system gives prominence to secure national interests. The anarchic structure of the system implies that states’ top priority, in a state of war, is hierarchically organised due to the fact that every unit has its own agenda preferences.

“In a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest”\textsuperscript{54}.

Neoliberals argue that survival is the first goal of all states and that military is always the core-centre of national power. To synthesize, we can conclude that both “treat state goals by assumption”\textsuperscript{55}.

### 3.1.5 Intentions vs capabilities

“Without some set of given undertakings (strategies, policies), actual or postulated, with some reference to some frame of operational contingencies, actual or postulated, there can not be no estimation of political capabilities...Failure to keep discussions of capabilities...within some such policy-contingency frame of reference is all too common. Such failure tends to reduce statements about the elements or foundation of a given states’ power

\textsuperscript{52} Keohane, Robert O., Institutional theory and the realist challenge after the Cold War in Baldwin, David A, (editor), Neorealism and Neoliberalism : the Contemporary Debate, p.278
\textsuperscript{53} Baldwin, David A, (editor), Neorealism and Neoliberalism : the Contemportary Debate, p. 7
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, p.107
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid, p. 7
and influence to various irrelevancies. The data of physical geography, or of demography, or of economic production, or of any other field have no intrinsic political relevance whatever. Such data acquire political relevance and significance only when related to some frame of assumptions as to what is to be undertaken or attempted in what operational contingencies.”

According to Keohane, the sensitivity of states to the relative gains of other states is drastically influenced by perceptions of the intentions of such states. A contrario, neorealists emphasize capability more than intentions. Greco stresses that due to uncertainties in the future intentions of enemies or allies lead statesmen to focus on capabilities: “the ultimate basis for their security and independence”

3.1.6 Institutions and regimes

Neoliberalism points out the significance of institutions for many reasons, but especially because institutions put a structure in the anarchic system, other than the one formed by the balance of power. This enhances cooperation, develops the concept of difficult interdependence, manipulates state behaviour and in the long run institutes trust and assurance between the states that will diminish conflict drastically.

However, neorealism is aware of the existence of international institutions and, to some extent, admits the involvement of these actors. Nevertheless, while neoliberals see international institutions as something that is able to, more or less, take its landing, neorealists see them as an instrument of statecraft, which is integrated when it corresponds with the national interest. The power and influence of any international institution depends dramatically on the determination of units composed by it.

3.1.7 Objective of the foreign policy: cooperation for peace-keeping

According to realists and neorealists, the main condition for peace-keeping between states is the balance of military force within the international system thanks to the creation of security alliances which enables the smaller powers to dissuade the great powers to attack. In addition, many authors from this school of thought, believe that these hegemonic alliances are

57 Baldwin, David A, (editor), Neorealism and Neoliberalism : the Comtemporary Debate, p. 7
susceptible to prevent and resolve international conflicts because the hegemon obliges
member states to cooperate between them. All tenants from this school agree on the fact that
the capability of action of a security alliance is based upon cooperation or the common will of
the MS\textsuperscript{58}.

According to liberals and neoliberals, from the pendulum of the foreign policy
strategies (persuasion, oppression, coercion, sanctions and force) the worst is the use of force,
because it is the less predictable one and it is the most expensive one, for the state and the citizens, in every circumstances. The war between states, on one hand, has to be avoided and on the other hand, it can be eliminated definitively thanks to the globalisation of capitalism which attenuates the economic inequalities between nations and reinforce the common interests of the states to cooperate and obligates governments to take into account the fundamental interests of the citizens which are prosperity and security.\textsuperscript{59}

Therefore, we can say that the conditions to maintain peace identified by the neorealist school of thought provides an avenue of solution to wars meanwhile the conditions to maintain peace as an objective of the foreign policy is defined by neoliberals as a mean to prevent wars.\textsuperscript{60}

In conclusion, the foreign policy is developed through two different behaviours, diplomacy and strategy, which are expressed by two contradictory attitudes: confidence and mistrust. The former encourages states to resolve their misunderstandings via the dialogue and negotiation, the latter incites them to arm and unit themselves in order to prevent or overcome the attacks from other states.\textsuperscript{61}

4 European Security Approach from a cooperation perspective

“The Alliance is committed to reinforcing its European pillar through the development of an effective European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) which could respond to European requirements and at the same time contribute to Alliance security. By assuming greater responsibility for their own security, the European member countries will help to create a

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid, p. 172
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid, p. 172
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid, p.173
A stronger and more balanced transatlantic relationship which will strengthen the Alliance as a whole.”

The choice of these countries, as mentioned formerly, is stimulated by the influence of France, Great Britain and Germany in terms of security and foreign policy. Moreover, each of these countries has its own particular policy and, in security matters, their position remains the focus of many international political actors. This choice is also influenced by the proximity and the multiplicity of cooperation which makes it complex in understanding these countries.

First of all, the bilateral cooperation between France and Germany has been rigorous and has been seen as the motor of European integration. Cooperation, combining it within the three states, represents the influential sphere of Western European politics. Lack of solidity in their relations is usually criticized because of their inability to reach a common Western European policy.

The contribution of the three has always strengthened the different steps of the institutional integration process. France, Germany and Great Britain were, in the 1970’s, involved in the growing position of the EPC, the birth of the Commission on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the decrease of the power of the WEU.

4.1 Franco-German cooperation

The Franco-German cooperation has been established through the Elysée Treaty in 1963. It has always been intensified, first, due to its economic relations. France and Germany are both primary trading partners. They also have a strong link through their history due to World Wars I and II.

“The Franco-German relationship was and remains the foundation stone of European integration. The founding fathers of the post World War II movement for European unity were driven by a motivation that France and Germany be so bound together in projects of mutual interest that they could never go again to war.” Meetings between these countries have been

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64 Ibid, p.7
65 Ibid, P.7
more frequent than the rest of European countries. France and German cooperation has remained the same for the past twenty five years. Their cooperation is so far very important for the European integration process because they are considered as the engine of the EU relations\textsuperscript{67}.

“Germany has been valuable for France for several reasons. As the only country devoted to a European Agenda, it was the ideal partner for France with which it could pursue a number of projects. Proposals supported by the two have had a strong chance to be accepted by the EU…. The Franco-German cooperation is, as the French have expressed it, a constructed relation, not a natural one, and therefore effort has to be put into it. It rests on the needs of both countries and they therefore have to do their utmost to find common ground”\textsuperscript{68}.

The bilateral cooperation between these countries is definitely the richest one of the EU. They have a common interest in projecting their cooperation as the core-centre of the EU integration process and this is clearly apparent in the opulence of their communiqués\textsuperscript{69}.

German Grand strategy is “to keep intact a continental option centered on the special relationship with France...with each of the two regarding (and manipulating) the other as an indispensable partner in the leadership of Europe”\textsuperscript{70}.

4.2 Great Britain-German cooperation

The German and Great Britain relations are developed through the annual Königswinter conferences. These relations are not the same as those established by the Elysée Treaty between France and Germany. They are more informal discussions between the elite representatives of their respective countries than meetings between officials of the two countries. They have been holding these meetings since 1950 and some disagreements occurred at the beginning; however, later on, in the 1960’s, with the shift towards Europe of Great Britain, the conferences strengthened their relations and clarified their common views for the Great Britain’s second application for membership of the European Communities in 1967. These countries cooperated in the framework of bi- or multilateral settings due to the closeness of both Defence ministers, Helmut Schmidt and Denis Healey. With the withdrawal

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid, p.293-294
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid, p.294
\textsuperscript{70} Tiersky, R. (1999), ‘Europe Today, National politics, European Integration and European security’, Rowman & littlefield Publishers Inc, NY, USA, p.34
of France from NATO in 1966, the cooperation between these countries became closer within the Nuclear Planning Group and the armament issues in the Eurogroup in the late 1970’s. However, their views differ on the European integration process and there is a strong lack of perceptibility in their relations, which is quite conspicuous. They still have difficulty reaching common causes, intense communications, meetings or joint proposals.\(^{71}\)

“The two countries still differed over what Germany saw as the accompanying changes in creating the Europe of the future….bilateral cooperation pursued between Great Britain and Germany was of a pragmatic nature, dealing with issues where their interests met, such as paving the way for a proposal endorsed by both with the aim of anchoring it in a multilateral context.”\(^{72}\)

4.3 Franco-Great Britain relations

The Franco-Great Britain relations have always been through periods of turbulence. The French have always noticed the pre-eminence of Anglo-American relations over Anglo-European relations. The Nassau Agreement signed in 1962 contributed to the French veto of Great Britain membership of the European Communities in 1963. De Gaulle averted Great Britain entry one more time in 1967; and, finally, President Georges Pompidou allowed British membership in 1973. The pro-European Great Britain foreign policy in 1970 brought French and British relations closer. But these relations hardened due to the criticisms emanating from Great Britain vis-à-vis the share of the European Communities budget.\(^{73}\)

Nevertheless, France and Great Britain cooperation have been closed, first of all, on nuclear matters. In 1995, they agreed that each one would use nuclear weapons to defend the vital interests of the other. They declared that they would deepen their nuclear cooperation through the Franco-British Joint Nuclear Commission. Second, their relations have been at their finest dealing with security matters.\(^{74}\)

“For France’s aspirations for an increased European role in the world, resting on increased military capabilities, the British contribution was necessary. The British changes of


\(^{72}\) Ibid, p.293

\(^{73}\) Ibid, p.8

\(^{74}\) Ibid, p.9
policy in February 1980 and at Saint-Malo were triggers for cooperation in spite of the fact that the main element of British policy remained the same.”

These countries are the most significant military powers of the EU and, during the Bosnia crisis, their divergences with the US on how to handle the crisis, fortified the Franco-Great Britain rapprochement. The meeting at Saint-Malo in December 1998 was highly successful. They highlighted the importance to create an ERRF capable of rapid deployment and sustainable during one year.

4.4 USA

After the Cold War Period, the first actor to define the new security order for Europe was the US. The Bush administration, at that time, developed a strategic conception of what it wanted to achieve in Europe. It saw this historical change as the opportunity to put an end to the old political-military balance between the two continents. Furthermore, it worked hard on the reunification of Germany to incorporate its eastern region into NATO structure. Concerning the new European security architecture, Americans supported the European integration process and pushed further development of the CSCE process. The US was more worried about keeping Germany on the side of the US and avoiding this great power from eventually turning against its ally. The US state department planner, George Kennan, classified five industrial powers that could threaten the US: Britain, Germany, France, Japan and the Soviet Union. The plan was to try to maintain these countries, except the Soviet Union, strongly on the US side. The US perceived NATO as the central security organisation for Europe. According to President Clinton, “Some say we no longer need NATO, because there is no powerful threat to our security now. I say there is no powerful threat in part because NATO is there.”

NATO played a leading role in American eyes as a means to maintain its military presence in Europe for security reasons. “If the Americans removed their security blanket from Europe...The Western European states could well return to the destructive power

76 Ibid, p.9
77 Robert J. Art, Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1, Spring, 1996
78 Huldt Bo & Herolf, Gunilla (ed), Year book 1990-91, Towards a New European Security Order, p.21
politics that they had just spent the last forty-five years trying to banish from their part of the continent”.

The US position concerning the development of an independent European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) is ambivalent. “In the light of the experience of the 1990’s, it should be clear that the relationship between NATO and the EU requires careful thought and management.” According to the US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Marc Grossman, “Our goal is simple: we want to get ESDI right. That’s because we want ESDI to succeed…More European military capacity will make the alliance stronger, lift some of the burden we now have to act in every crisis, and make the US-European relationship more of a partnership”.

4.4.1 US current unilateral approach

Since 1945, the international society has been organised through the United Nations (UN). Its Charter admits that the use of force remains necessary, and sometimes indispensable. But it implements rules which confer a character of international legitimacy. A simple principle builds its edifice: facing an aggression or a threat against international peace, the Security Council is the only organisation able to decide if there is a need to use force. The application of these rules has always been valid since the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, these mechanisms tend to disappear. However, American neo-conservatives have re-established la raison du plus fort, transformed into raison d’état, to take over the international law. The US opted one more time for unilateralist options. It is the only great power which is able to exercise its domination on a global scale. The US has unquestionable superiority in terms of its military and technological approach. The US, strong in its unipolar movement, gives the impression that it wants to realise the prediction announced by Theodore Roosevelt in 1898, “The Americanization of the world is our destiny”. Later on, in 1991, after the end of the Gulf war, George Bush promised, “the advent of a new world order where the law, and not the jungle reigns, governs the control of nations”.

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82 Ibid p.32
84 Ibid, p.57
The main change in the priorities of the US foreign policy could be explained by the growing influence of the neo-conservatives. In January 2001, after the election of George W. Bush for the American presidency, neo-conservatives expressed their concern with Iraq. They started to complain about the fact that Iraq is still under a dictatorial regime and the inefficiency of inspections concerning Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their application. Due to the fact that this role is managed by the United Nations (UN), they deducted that UN multilateralism is a failure. The question they ask themselves is, “how can we be confident in the international organisations to ensure American security if they are in the hands of American enemies?”. All these factors lead neo-conservatives to modify their strategic and diplomatic doctrine and focus their work on Saddam Hussein’s regime.\(^{85}\)

5 EU issues in terms of its CFSP

5.1 The military capability gap

First of all, the US military and defence budget is almost as much as the sum of every military budget in the world,\(^{86}\) that is to say that the current military world order is unipolar. Never has a country been able to compete with American Hyperpower in terms of military expenditures. Even the Ex-USSR tried to compete and this desire to equal American military power is one of the main reasons it fell to its knees. If we compare these expenditures, EU countries nowadays spend half of the US budget. The US military budget reached 370.7 billion USD in 2004\(^ {87}\). The EU, with its 25 members, is spending 180 billion EUR. Even if EU expenditures represent half of the one of the US, EU military\(^ {88}\) capabilities do not represent half of US military capabilities. This means that the EU spends 20 per cent of the world’s military expenditures which can specify that it should not spend less on its military.\(^ {89}\) The main point is that the US spends its money on one national military structure while the EU divides up its expenditures on 25 MS with bulk duplication.

There are many identified gaps in the US-EU military capabilities. First, the US has the ability to plan, conduct and sustain theatre-wide expeditionary operations. It is the only one able to deploy hundreds of military aircrafts far beyond its homeland and to own the

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\(^{86}\) http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade/Spending.asp
\(^{87}\) http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geo/us.html
\(^{88}\) http://www.tgarden.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/writings/articles/2004/041011nl.html
\(^{89}\) Heisbourg, François, Europe’s Strategic Ambition: The Limits of Ambiguity, Survival, Volume 42, Number 2, Summer 2000, p.5-16
logistics for the transportation of its airfields with limited facilities. Its synergy brings a pre-eminent influence in this area and implies an overall superiority. Furthermore, this supremacy “includes strategic mobility assets (such as aerial re-fuelling and air transport), surface ships and submarine, precision-strike munitions, electronic warfare, power projections (long range air and missile strikes), and what the US military calls C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance)”.

William Cohen, the former US secretary of defence, states that: “NATO (European) countries spend roughly 60 percent of what the US does and get 10 percent of the capability”. In contrast with most of its European counterparts, the US has been training its forces for transoceanic power projection for decades.

5.1.1 Differences in military strategies and defence industry

The EU MS organized themselves to defend their countries against an attack from the Warsaw Pact and construct its defence and capabilities around that scenario. The experience of World War I and II and the Cold War shows that the US is able to concentrate its efforts on developing and deploying its forces rapidly outside of its continent and have the logistical skills to do it. A contrario, the EU remains still far behind the US when it comes to have the capability to reach the same kind of deployment of military forces. Some EU countries have started to apply these requirements and adapt to this kind of circumstances.

“Contrary to appearances, it is not a question to have several levels of autonomous forces, but rather to decline of the troops, according to various formats, according to circumstances and of different needs. In France, the "Guépard device" (used for Ivory Coast) makes it possible to have a range of highly involved units, on several levels of alarm, but which will be able to compose, at the proper time, a tactical grouping.”

The US spends more of its military and defence budget on development and research than the EU does, Europe’s defence budget represents one third of the US one. The main

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91 Ibid, p.83
94 ‘L’UE se dote d'une nouvelle force militaire rapide’ http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3214,36-388079,0.html
reason is that the European Defence industry is confronted to some political issues, that is why it does not consolidate a cross-cooperation among the European industries, and is exceedingly nationally focused. European Politics have not been involved enough in the European Defence industry to make it more efficient to a larger extent.

“Moreover, the European Defence ministries have generally spent this smaller budget share less efficiently, partly because they have bought less and partly because they have paid more for comparable weapons...the Europeans have invested much less than the Americans in military R&D, and the Europeans efforts have for the most part been scattered and dispersed in national programs.”

5.1.2 The importance of the military gap

How can the EU narrow the military capabilities gap vis-à-vis the US? One recommendation could be to realize economy of scales for each country by specializing in different military roles and capabilities where they surpass. That is to say Great Britain focusing on special forces, nuclear-powered submarines and fighter squadrons; the Germans on tanks, engineers and diesel submarines; the French on space warfare, attack helicopters and aircraft carriers. This synergy could be the start-up of a more effective European Defence. It could also permit the restructuring of the European Defence industry. Thus the cross-border defence mergers could lead to avoid the wasting of money, on one hand, if each country is ready to make any efforts in focusing in their comparative advantages and, on the other hand, if each country puts aside some of their manufacturing capabilities where it has no strengths.

“In Europe, we have 21 industrialists for 23 shipyards, against, the United States, four industrialists for six shipyards. It is necessary to cease groaning on the American power by not doing anything in Europe.”

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96 Grant, Charles, European Defence Post-Kosovo, Centre for European Reform, June 1999
98 Grant, Charles, European Defence Post-Kosovo, Centre for European Reform, June 1999
99 Le secteur européen de la défense prépare sa réorganisation’, http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3234,36-387720,0.html
The second recommendation could be the rise of the European military spending. It does not seem to be applied by the European countries whose defence budget has reduced, for many of them, for the recent years due to several reasons. “The reversal of current trends toward reducing defence spending in most EU countries depends on at least three factors: economic growth, threat perceptions, and the prominence of social priorities other than national defence. Whether economic growth will lead to increased defence spending in large part in other two factors...the increased demand for pensions and health care is likely to constrain defence spending in all NATO countries.” However, even if some of the EU countries have increased their military expenditures for 2001, this rise is to bring closer, to some extent, the military gap and balance the military capabilities: “During 2001, the defence budgets of Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom are set to rise. More importantly, governments are spending a greater part of their defence budgets on the sorts of equipment that are needed for crisis-management missions. France, for example, has increased spending on weapons procurement for 2001. Many sceptics in the US and in Europe do not see the point of all this effort and expenditure.”

Military expenditures have skyrocketed within the US since 2001 due to the terrorist attacks of September, 11th meanwhile they have kept on decreasing within the EU. The US military budget projection for 2007 is to reach 450 billion USD.

Thus, does it remain a valid argument to narrow the gap and challenge the US military capabilities? When we see what the Americans plan to spend, do we have to be satisfied with the headline goals implemented by the European Council in Helsinki? The response to this question is yes. The European Council of December 2003 marked the end of the process implemented in Helsinki, although further effort have to be fulfilled to meet the European force Goals. At the same time, the European Council approved the European Security Agency for a ‘secure Europe in a better world’, which highlights the future of the CFSP and ESDP.

However, from another perspective, the fulfilment of the Petersberg tasks for EU’s force goal appear astonishingly not ambitious due to the main reason that they are similar to the one of France announced in February 1996 by President Jacques Chirac: “it is imperative

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101 Grant, Charles, The case for defence, World Link, July/August 2001
that France be able of projecting abroad a significant number of men, 50,000 to 60,000 and not 10,000 as is the case today, in rapid and organized conditions.”

The EU has agreed on the need to improve and has now expressed the wish to fill the necessary gaps by using NATO assets when requested. France has now demonstrated its will to widen those capabilities within the EU structure but allowed using NATO assets as a transitory solution because of the high development cost meanwhile Great-Britain has been pointing out the unnecessary to duplicate those capabilities. France is also interested in managing EU strategic intelligence capabilities and owns the most advanced space technology in Europe. Good examples of European cooperation to work on common capabilities is the development of Helios 1A and 2 and Horus, but it also showed that the constraints can be developed by the MS in the framework of high expenditures and high profile projects.

There is also a significant test whether the EU is working hard on it, in the framework of the CESDP, is the project to develop the A-400M transport plane project, where eight EU MS are engaged, which would deeply improve the EU’s heavy lift capabilities.

5.1.3 The European Capability Action Plan

At the first capability improvement conference in November 2001, EU defence ministers created the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) to address the shortfalls of the Helsinki Headline Goal catalogue and the Force Catalogue. In terms of the force catalogue, additional efforts must be realised with regard to protecting forces deployed, capabilities and logistics. The level of availability of ground elements, operational mobility and the flexibility of the force deployed must also be enhanced. Improvements in the fields of naval aviation resources and maritime medical evacuation must continue to be required. There are still issues to be solved with regard to air elements, also in the fields of combat search and rescue and precision guided weapons. In terms of capabilities, a qualitative analysis of certain resources has yet to be realised. If this analysis reveals certain insufficiencies, they must be considered as critical. Moreover, shortfalls exist in deployable communications units. Additional efforts must be realised about assistance for strategic decision-making as the possibilities for

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104 Jacques Chirac, television interview on February 22, 1996
106 Grant, Charles, European Defence Post-Kosovo, Centre for European Reform, June 1999
107 Grant, Charles, A European View of ESDP, Centre for European Reform, September 10, 2001
intelligence, achievement of goals, surveillance and reconnaissance remain inadequate. Concerning strategic mobility, the main shortfalls relate to wide-body aircraft and roll-on/roll-off ships. However, the impact of those shortfalls could be diminished by making more effective use of existing resources (coordinated or joint use of resources, planning of movements, etc.) and using commercial resources on a methodical foundation.\textsuperscript{109}

The ECAP process has for objectives the following: “the improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of European defence efforts, enhancing cooperation between member states or groups of member states; a bottom-up approach to European defence cooperation, relying on voluntary national commitments; coordination between EU member states as well as coordination with NATO; public support through ECAP’s transparency and visibility.”\textsuperscript{110}

There is a very wide range of options available to remedy the remaining shortfalls: “if national forces and capabilities other than those already declared were made available and included in future projects and initiatives, this would enable some deficiencies to be made good, particularly those in relation to forces; other alternatives would consist, first, of making existing capabilities more effective and efficient and, second, of seeking creative responses, going beyond the traditional framework of military procurement programmes; multinational solutions might include the co-production, financing and acquisition of capabilities, particularly for large-scale projects but also for very specific capabilities. These solutions might also extend to the management and use of the equipment when it is use.”\textsuperscript{111}

5.1.4 The Post-Helsinki Headline Goal by 2010

The adoption of the EU Security Strategy in December 2003, EU member states decided to implement a new Headline Goal which reveals the progression of the strategic environment and technology. In May 2004, the EU defence ministers adopted a new plan identified as the ‘Headline Goal 2010’. It envisages that MS will “be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of

\textsuperscript{109} Press release on the ECAP


\textsuperscript{111} Press release on the ECAP
crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the European Union.”112. The Headline Goal 2010 plan was approved by the June 2004 European Council summit meeting in Brussels113.

By 2010, they envision:

“The establishment of a civil-military cell within the European Union Military Staff. The cell should have the capacity to rapidly set-up an operation centre for a particular operation. (2004) - The establishment of a European Defence Agency (2004) - The implementation, by 2005, of EU strategic lift joint coordination
- Development a fully efficient European Airlift Command (EAC) for those member states who want to be part of the EAC.
- Completed development of the rapidly deployable battlegroups by 2007
- The availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and escort by 2008.
- The improvement of performance of all levels of EU operations through appropriate compatibility and network linkage of all communications equipment and assets (terrestrial and space based) by 2010.
- The development of quantitative benchmarks and criteria that national forces declared to the Headline Goal has to meet in the field of deployability and training.”114

Therefore, the challenge for the years to come is the adaptation of European military capabilities to the strategic environment outlined in the European Security Strategy. The first headline goal was at the beginning motivated by the conflict in Kosovo, so the second one has to take into account the unconventional threats.115

5.2 Structural issues within the EU

The decision-making process for a EU operation within the CFSP framework requires the unanimity vote of the council. It means that the 25 MS have to agree for such an operation to take place, with the domestic requirements of the 25: “Nevertheless, certain Articles will remain subject to unanimity in whole or in part, as they are particularly important for the

113 Ibid
Union and its MS. The Constitutional Treaty also creates certain new legal bases which, because of their importance, are subject to unanimity. The following fields, amongst others, will remain subject to unanimity: the common foreign and security policy, with the exception of certain clearly defined cases; the common security and defence policy, with the exception of the establishment of permanent structured cooperation.\textsuperscript{116} Even if every MS definitely reaches an agreement, it is still difficult to get such an agreement and the time spent and wasted to convince in taking such a decision.

Shifting from unanimity to the use of qualified majority vote could significantly improve the aptitude for the EU to efficiently respond to an international management crisis. But defence and security issues have highlighted the importance for EU countries to surrender to a qualified majority vote\textsuperscript{117}. This approach is too complicated due to the main reason that EU holds four neutral countries: Sweden, Austria, Finland and Ireland. Therefore, for those countries, the unanimity approach is essential for the aptitude to keep the principle of neutrality. A good example could be the negative response of Austria, which is not a NATO member, to let NATO warplanes to fly through its airspace during the Kosovo war.\textsuperscript{118}

The EU has tried to reach a compromise in the possible break down in the requirement of unanimity by developing and integrating constructive abstention. \textit{“The Amsterdam Treaty modified the decision-making process, so that decisions relating to joint actions or positions can be made by qualified majority voting. However, in those cases where unanimity is a requirement, a new procedure of constructive abstention may be applied. This means that a member state not wishing to approve a certain proposal can abstain from voting, thereby making it possible for other countries to proceed and adopt the proposal. If, for reasons of national policy, a member state opposes the approval of a decision, which may be made by qualified majority voting, no vote should be held. Instead the Council of Ministers can refer to the European Council, which may then decide the matter with a unanimous decision... Under the CFSP, qualified majority voting has been reinforced, which means that a minimum of 62 of a total of 87 votes from at least ten member states are required before a decision can be made.”}\textsuperscript{119}

Furthermore, the EU has to take into account the power of persuasion and group pressure. If we consider a situation where a MS holds crucial capabilities for a CFSP operation and it decides to use constructive abstention and by doing so withdraws those

\textsuperscript{116} http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/constitution/majority_en.htm
\textsuperscript{117} Duke, Simon, the elusive quest for European Security, P.137-139
\textsuperscript{118} Grant, Charles, European Defence Post-Kosovo, Centre for European Reform, June 1999
\textsuperscript{119} http://www.riksdagen.se/english/eu/eufacts/security.asp
capabilities from common use, what could be the reaction of the MS for such behaviour? For instance, a neutral country such as Sweden, Finland, Austria or Ireland, could be put under strong political pressure and the fear of colossal political retribution in a near future if one of those countries considers using its constructive abstention and withdraws much needed military capabilities. In this context, the policy of neutrality could be analysed to a great extent. Moreover, it also points out the importance of committed cooperation and integration into the ESDP. The major role that the great European powers, Great-Britain, France and Germany, play cannot be avoided. It seems like that the decision from any of these countries to use constructive abstention, a contrario, could stop any CFSP operation.

A last issue has also to be stressed out, the EU members need to agree if EU military operation requires or not a UN mandate. Therefore, only the official EU documents stipulate that the principles of the UN Charter shall be followed. “The EU shall, as it strengthens its capacity in the areas of crisis management and conflict prevention, improve its close cooperation with the UN and relevant regional and subregional organisations.” However, some EU MS asserts that a EU military operation need a UN mandate meanwhile others say no or eventually. According to the fact that unanimity is still ruling the decision-making process of the CFSP, it will keep on creating problems and it will grow with enlargement of the EU to at least 30 countries which will not simplify this decision-making process.

5.2.1 The enlargement process issue

The point that we highlight above reveals the fact that EU countries, which are really involved in the development of the CFSP/ESDP can generate an inner core meanwhile other MS that are not engaged, for example the neutral countries, can create an outer circle. This approach is not very well accepted by the countries which fear to be located in the outer circle. It will split up the EU countries in 2 groups and threaten their influence as full members with a change in the power of balance within the EU. Moreover, Great-Britain has acknowledged on the fact that defence cannot be a field where a limited number of EU members build a defence policy at the expense of the other MS. “The United Kingdom, fearing that division of the Union into an inner circle and an outer circle in the field of
defence would undermine NATO coherence, insisted on leaving ESDP out of the range of policy fields for enhanced cooperation.”

This is a common debate within the European integration process, the question of widening instead of deepening, specifically in terms of the future enlargement with a debate around models such as “Multi Speed Europe”, “Europe à la carte”, and “Europe of concentric circles”. The enlargement process is itself something that the EU needs to take into account seriously because it has changed drastically its institutional forms. The representation in the European Parliament and the Commission, the use of majority versus unanimity, the change in the weight of votes and the future handling of the EU’s policy, and in particular the CFSP and the Common and Agricultural Policy (CAP) are just a few areas that remain a major concern in the interests of nation states. Some efforts to respond those fears were made at the Nice Summit but the essential issues were not settled. The enlargement has requested a total restructuring of the European cooperation form and has hampered the EU’s capacity to emphasize on developing a convincing CFSP.

5.3 The question of Turkey

In 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk proclaimed the Republic of Turkey preaching a mix of secularism and nationalism. Atatürk converted the Ottoman alphabet into Turkish, based on the European one because he “wanted Turks to turn their backs on the Ottoman past and become modern by imitating Europe”. This was called the “westernization project”. Turkish objections to the use of NATO assets by EU countries is seen as a tactic to promote the case of Turkish accession into the EU. Turkey, a member of NATO but not the EU, has hold an agreement between NATO and the EU that would give full access of NATO planning facilities and capabilities to the EU. However, these negotiations failed in 2001 due to the rejection of Greece to allow great concession to Turkey, preventing this agreement going into force. In this context, Turkey plays an important role, firstly, in the EU foreign and security

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124 Preston, Christopher, Enlargement and Integration in the European Union, p.227-235
126 Grabbe, Heater, Nice is not enough, World Link, January/February 2001
127 Ibid
129 Ibid, p.141
policy that is why “The EU is willing to give Turkey consultative rights over its military operations, but is unwilling to allow any states outside of the Union a decision-making role in EU councils.” Secondly, Turkey’s significant location strategy has risen since the terrorist attack of September 11. Turkey’s location remains at the centre of the most conflict part of the world, its neighbours are so far Iraq, Iran and Syria. The terrorist attack that happened in Istanbul in 2004 was due to the fact that it supported, in terms of military logistics, the coalition military operations in Afghanistan. The fact that Al-Qaïda chose a synagogue as a target is merely due to the support that Turkey acknowledges to Israel in order to follow Washington’s political line.

However, new arrangements were made under the ‘Berlin-Plus’ negotiations: “a (missing) link that mattered for both political and operational reasons, and that was then complicated by tortuous negotiations with Turkey over the so-called ‘Berlin-plus’ arrangement for the access to, use and release of NATO assets for EU-led operations... The ‘Berlin-plus’ arrangement was eventually finalised in December 2002, in the wake of the radical political change that had occurred in Turkey the month before. Accordingly, the Union is now assured to have access to NATO planning capabilities and can assume to have access to NATO capabilities if necessary, although that will be decided on a case-by-case bases.”

Finally, Turkish main concern is the fear to be excluded from bilateral relationship between the US and the EU. Therefore, that is why Turkey considers vital its integration into the EU’s security structure, not to be isolated from both parts.

5.4 NATO and the US

The Bush Administration has welcomed more positively, than its predecessors, the approach to EU’s efforts to develop its own military capability. And the EU has reassured the US that CFSP/ESDP will not undermine NATO. However, Donald Rumsfeld, the secretary of US defence, has expressed its serious concern about the potentially damaging impact of

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CFSP/ESDP on NATO. 133 “I favour efforts that strengthen NATO. What happens within our alliance and what happens to it must comport with its continued strength, resilience and effectiveness. Actions that could reduce NATO’s effectiveness by confusing duplication or by perturbing the transatlantic link would not be positive. Indeed they run the risk of injecting instability into an enormously important alliance. And if I may add one more point: whatever shapes the effort may finally take, I personally believe it should be inclusive/open to all NATO members who wish to take part.” 134

According to Kori Schake, nevertheless, a constructive duplication could be the engine of the amelioration of the problems of both divergence and of European reliance on US assets. This could give the opportunity to EU to conduct military operations without relying on US assistance. And, obviously, it would raise European influence over the US decisions about the use of force. Therefore, the way EU would handle military campaign will carry more weight on US decision-making. 135

On the other hand, in a second period, this reluctant approach about the reinforcement of EU military capabilities, expressed by Rumsfeld above, from the Bush Administration turned to a more encouraging one. At the first meeting between Bush and Great Britain Prime Minister, Tony Blair, both of them agreed on their view about the CFSP/ESDP, affirming that NATO remains the essential foundation of transatlantic security. 136 After this meeting, Blair explicitly reassured these terms stating that: “It is not a standing army, it is the capacity that Europe should have, but the sovereign decision of each nation is necessary for each operation. And speaking together as the founders of NATO, we will never do anything to undermine NATO. But where NATO as a whole chooses not to be engaged, it is important that we have the capability where it is right and within these limited tasks that I have set out, to be able to act, should we choose to do so ourselves.” 137

President Bush, during the NATO summit strongly reformulated this statement: “It is in NATO’s interest for the EU to develop a rapid reaction capability. A strong, capable European force integrated with NATO would give us more options for handling crisis when NATO, as a whole, chooses not to engage. NATO must be generous in the help it gives the

136 Ibid, p.109
137 Joint Press Conference at Camp David, February 23, 2001
EU. And similarly, the EU must welcome participation by NATO allies who are not members of the EU. And we must not waste scarce resources, duplicating effort or working at cross purposes.” \(^{138}\)

The attitude of the US vis-à-vis the emergence of a European Defence Policy refers finally to a problematic of divergences between an America whose strategy wants to be more global and a EU more preoccupied by itself and by its periphery. So, as a final analysis, it is in terms of the burden sharing that the US will be able to evaluate the merits of European defence: this former has interest in their eyes at the sole condition that ESDP relieves their burden in Europe reinforcing the legitimacy and efficiency of their actions outside of the EU borders. It is, therefore, in function of the compatibility between an effective contribution of the ESDP and the perspective of the US global role and also in terms of burden sharing that the US will approach the question of the relation between EU and NATO; A contrario, the definition of these relations will be for sure instrumentalised by the US. \(^{139}\)

5.5 Conclusion

I view all the mentioned areas of interest to be a suitable reason as to why the EU will face many difficulties to reach the post-Helsinki headline goal set by the European council in December 2003. They are areas that will be long term issues for the EU, also with the strong position of Turkey. Thus it will take a long time before the EU will be able to become an autonomous actor of international security. The areas of interest can be best appreciated with the use of neorealism and neoliberalism in the explanation of the analytical chapter which is coming next.

The EU has already implemented the development of the missing capabilities to run autonomous operations, especially in regards to strategic lift capabilities. “\textit{Several EU states have looked at ways of improving European lift. Germany and France have proposed the creation of a joint air transport command, while France and the Netherlands have mooted an EU maritime lift force and coordination cell.}” \(^{140}\) Such a change has made Turkey keener on reaching a trade-off in the Berlin-Plus arrangement, to get a chance not to risk damaging their relations in the cooperation framework in diverse areas such as European security.

\(^{139}\)http://www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/das/dossiers/les_etrangers_face_a_lEmergence_de_lEurope_de_la_defense/portal_repository/1351638555_0001/fichier/getData
Another reason to start developing for the EU their own military capabilities is that the NATO assets that they are able to use are in fact American ones and they are really expensive. “If EU allocates scarce Defence euros to duplicating capabilities that both enhance its autonomy and reduce the burden on heavily taxed US military assets, duplication can be constructive rather than wasteful.” Thus the US might come to reach the conclusion that military expenditure is a comfort that scratches the country’s ability to compete in the economic sector with the result that the US might decide to use more self-control in its foreign policy with a disengagement of its military forces from the rest of the world. And this will be the turning point of the “transition from a US-dominated Alliance to a collaboration among more equal partners.”

6 Analysis and Final conclusions

In this chapter, I will analyse the different national interests of Germany, France and Great Britain that lead to the development of the CFSP/ESDP. With the help of the theories, I will study the policy choices made in an attempt to find out if the development can be understood and explained by them, building a bridge with the theory chapter. I will examine the national role of the three states in a broader approach because the national interests behind the policy towards the CFSP/ESDP are interfered into the wider question of European Integration, but with a focus on security issues. I will also compare their policy choices vis-à-vis each other and the investigation will be conducted in the light of the end of the cold war.

After the analysis of these countries, I will pursue my analytical part by writing the final conclusion about the two first questions dealing with what led to the development of the CFSP/ESDP and the different areas of interests, mentioned previously, for the implementation of a viable CFSP/ESDP. In this particular part, I will draw my final conclusions and how they can be interpreted using neorealism and neoliberalism theories. And, finally, to close this paper, I will deal with the question of the possible impact created by the CFSP/ESDP on the transatlantic link between the US and the EU together with a general discussion of the future world order. This part, as mentioned in the introduction, is founded on analytical ground but should be appreciated as a discussion.

142 Ibid, p.131
6.1 Germany

The policy adopted after the post-cold war by Germany poses a challenge to both neorealism and neoliberalism. None of these theories is relevant to explain the path of German policy regarding the European Integration. After the Cold War, the relations in the international arena changed. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, neorealists’ prediction was that the theatrical shift in the international environment would change German foreign policy into a more national one. Germany had a wide range of opportunities to become a regional hegemon with the support of its neighbours following its policies to maximise and influence its power. Germany would have gained more in terms of its relation with other European states, alone as the European economic source of power. This prediction was pointed out by Mearsheimer that would have leading Europe in an increasingly conflict situation. “German domestic political and social developments also played a significant role, contributing to the aggressive character of German policy. Specifically, the German society was infected by a virulent nationalism…that laid the basis for expansionist foreign policies.”143

However, Germany did not change its foreign policy after the structural change of the Cold War. Between 1991 and 1994, the German parliamentary debate has, in fact, really demonstrated astonishing agreement around a foreign policy based in a supranational European Identity. This policy result comes from an ancestral approach and was implemented at the end of the 1950’s. Its objective was a lucid one in the choice of a policy rejecting the past and the eventual raise of nationalism. European cooperation and integration has become Germany’s main raison d’état and any tentative to diverge from that position has received high criticisms. Germany has been aware that integration is the best remedy against the repulsion of nationalism that infected Europe before 1945. Its reason for involving to integration is an attempt to ensure that Europe will not come back to the nightmare of the World Wars and to reassure its neighbours about German intentions, reducing fear among European states.

Waltz’ argument has been that the collapse of the Soviet Union was not the rupture of a bipolar world, but the beginning of the end of this configuration. According to Waltz, Germany is still under the influence of the superpowers and reliant on US nuclear deterrent to balance Russia. It can explain why Germany has not made any changes in its foreign policy,

143 Mearsheimer, John J. , Back to the Future. Instability in Europe after the Cold War, International Security (Summer 1990), vol.15, n°1
but will probably do, towards more political autonomy and military power.\textsuperscript{144} This argument does not remain well-founded nowadays because Germany has made some changes in policy for the last 14 years. A contrario, Germany appears to be committed to the EU integration process, including the CFSP, and is currently restructuring the Bundeswehr to follow the “security engagements of Germany as a partner of NATO and the EU...The total reform of Bundeswehr will continue.”\textsuperscript{145} Furthermore, Germany has never desired to build up nuclear warheads.

Germany’s policy is also an enigma for neoliberalism, competing hardly with neorealism in this field. Neoliberalism focuses on institutions and their function in the international structure. Due to the end of the bipolar configuration, neoliberals would expect Germany, as the regional hegemon, to put pressure on other countries for expanding the existing institutions and constructing new ones. Specifically when we know that Germany is the most powerful country in Western Europe and whose location in Central and Eastern Europe is a strategic stake in terms of European security. But instead of making the expansion a first priority goal, Germany is in favour of deepening the European Integration process.\textsuperscript{146} Germany’s devotion to the EU process can be better analysed through its history than anything else. Germany has involved in the European integration as a national interest due to its fear of nationalism. Neorealism faced many difficulties explaining this approach, except by arguing that it is Germany’s national interest. The enlargement taking place within the EU goes against almost everything neorealism stands for. On the other hand, Neoliberalism can largely explicate why European integration is so far a big success, even if it might not catch precisely the turns predicted. German involvement in the CFSP/ESDP is central but regrettably questionable. Due to its fear of nationalism, strong feelings have grown about the use of German military capabilities on the international scene. I am aware that a change has occurred in the 1990s according to the participation of Germany in operations into the framework of NATO, involving the German bundeswehr in international operations but only on the basis of case by case. The involvement of Germany in the CFSP/ESDP is a part of its desire to take some international responsibilities. But German commitments still remains a sensitive issue because of its concern about peace-making operations: “We are in a real conflict between basic values. On one hand, there is the renunciation of force as a vision of a world in which conflicts are resolved rationally, through recourse to laws and majority

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid
\textsuperscript{145} http://fr.bmvg.de/misc/pdf/sicherheit/040107_vpr_fr.pdf
\textsuperscript{146} Banchoff, Thomas, German Identity and European Integration, European Journal of International Relations, Volume 5(3), 1999
decisions, through the constitutional process and no longer through brute force; a world in which military means are rejected, and in which the aim is to create structures to replace them and make them redundant. One the other hand, there is the bloody dilemma that human beings may be able to survive only with the use of military force. Between solidarity for survival and our commitment to non-violence. That is our dilemma.”

Germany’s view about Europe is federal, a plan that incorporates a constitutional framework, directions where competences have to be allocated at the different levels of the Union, region and state. This view can be interpreted as the starting point for cooperation because it benefits less to Germany than the other states. Germany supplies roughly 60 percent of the EU’s net expenses, where 80 percent is going to the CAP and the development fund that benefits specifically to the Mediterranean countries. The issue of fair contribution has remained taboo in Germany because of this reason: the fear of spreading European scepticism and nationalistic reactions. Neorealism would explicate this change with Germany’s awareness of its national interest and its role within the integration process. Germany has been so far the good pupil of the European class, and is now soliciting fair share. Neorealism would argue that this could develop into an anomaly of Germany from the cooperation if those feelings are not verified. I do not follow with this argument, I do not trust that it will go that far, but I do trust that Germany will ask with more conviction where its allocations are going to. This can create tensions between France and Germany because France is the largest benefactor of the CAP subventions, but only a small contributor of the EU.148

6.2 France

The Yalta Conference after World War II was a frustration for France. This frustration laid in the fact that France was not invited and it indicated that France was not a major power of international relations anymore. As I mentioned before, France was not comfortable within the bipolar structure of the Cold War. However, France found a good stratagem to influence international politics by a strong involvement to European cooperation and integration. This stratagem was also a good tactic to control its historical enemy Germany.

147 Maull, Hans W, German and the Use of Force: Still a ‘civilian power’, Survival, Volume 42, Number 2, Summer 2000
148 Pond, Elisabeth, Schroder and the EU’s Future, Europe, October 2001, Issue 410
However, the end of the cold war and the new international structure took France by surprise. France feared a unified Germany that could become a security threat and was consequently doubtful to unification. Neorealism is using the argument that the structure change had affected the balance of power between France and Germany and the fear in France that it would disadvantage even more this balance. Germany had already exceeded France economically and had now the capacity to do the same politically and militarily. At the same time, French’s status as a permanent member of the Security Council in the UN was contested, and the position of being a nuclear power had diminished149.

When France was aware of the fact that the German unification was inevitable, it modified its policy towards Germany binding it closer to France within the European integration process. The stratagem of this policy would proscribe Germany to become a regional hegemon that could menace France position and raison d’état, and in parallel it would protect France position to influence international politics through strong regional institutions. The EU had become a mean for France, not a major power to play the role of a great power, because France is leading the debate in Europe and speaks for Europe. “Everywhere Chirac goes, he claims to speak not just for France but for Europe.”150

France is gaining influence through selective cooperation. France has for decades been reluctant to admit new members into the EU going back to De Gaulle’s way of managing French foreign policy. France fears losing its influence due to the increase in members states. France also fears the EU will dwindle to no more than a free-market area instead of political cooperation.151

The significance of Germany in French foreign policy cannot be stressed enough. France is preaching its leadership role around the world and together, with Germany, has developed into a core where the rest of the EU gravitates around, a fact that France focuses on. This partnership, however, has recently shown signs of divergences in a number of areas. First, the enlargement process, Germany is resolute to expand as fast as possible while France is dragging its feet.152 Second, France fears a shift in influence within the EU towards Germany with Central and Eastern Europe. France’s reluctance is mainly because it is afraid to cede its sovereignty over foreign and security policy, like its British counterpart. Meanwhile Germany is more in favour of a qualified majority vote in all areas. France does

150 The Economist, Chirac astride the world, Volume 339, Issue 7965, 1996
152 Economist, a French lesson, Volume 356 ? Number 8177, 2000
not have federal vision, it is a centralised state; in favour of intergovernmentalism, states cooperating within areas where they have common interests.

First of all, we noticed that France responded to the structure change, and adapted its foreign policy vis-à-vis this new structure. The importance of having its hand on Germany became an imperative goal of French foreign policy and both neorealism and neoliberalism give explanations as to why France has applied its policy in this way. Both theories agree that national interest promotes cooperation and this would be applicable in this case. First Neoliberalism would explain the development of cooperation into new areas of interest in order to find new ways for cooperation that would be beneficial and how France domestic political programme has been influenced by the institution. But to understand why France is reluctant in ceding its sovereignty of its defence to majority decision should be explained by Neorealism. The answer would be its unwillingness to develop dependence within this area because the stakes and the fear of defection are too important. But it is important to notice that cooperation does not contradict neorealism theory. Even if Neorealism focuses on cooperation, it argues that it is harder to implement in areas where stakes are high, but also that states often pool their resources in a multipolar world in order to serve their interests. The choice of France to cooperate within the EU reveals that France is not favouring relative gain within every policy area.

The concept of balance of power is, as I understand it, subjected to a spectrum, not only because of the fear of future military conflict but also for the gain of economic and political power. France also views European integration as a way to seriously influence international politics. Germany has the capacity to exceed France and the best way for France to handle international politics is to make an alliance with Germany.

Neorealism deals with how states are searching to reach maximal power in their pursuit of raison d’état. I perceive France according to this view. It is difficult to make a distinction of the state’s main priority in France’s policy towards the EU where security remains more important than the economy. But I would argue that economy remains a much higher concern currently because of the secure relationship between France and Germany. According to neoliberalism, International institutions should have an influence on national interests. For neorealism, States cooperate as long as it serves their national interests. It will be interesting to follow the case of France in the reform of the CAP, for example, in the enlargement process. The CAP is viewed in the eyes of France as their biggest national interest and it would definitely cause a tornado if it were dismantled. French opposition to a larger Europe can also be interpreted with the balance of power theory and the concept of
relative versus absolute gain. I would argue that France draws more attention on relative gain and therefore pulls further the agenda when it deals with enlargement. This is a strategy where France would have better opportunities of securing its national interest and its position within the EU.

France wants to influence international security matters, to be able to play a leading role on the international scene. France has found NATO and more precisely the US throws wrenches in its wheels. Even if France has to cooperate with NATO, it would prefer to cooperate within a EU military and defence structure where it would have a better chance to impose its view. Therefore, France has been for a long time involved in the development of the CFSP as a useful tool.

But we cannot say that France does not respect US leadership but in parallel they want it to leave the field of European security. France agrees that the US is the only Hyperpower and their leadership is incontestable but they want the EU to be able to defend their own territory and to play an international role in terms of security even if the US is not involved. “To be a credible player in international affairs, we need to be able to back the European diplomacy through military means.”

6.3 Great Britain

Great Britain did not perceive positively the German unification at the beginning, because it identified Germany’s future ambition as a threat for British national interests, explainable according to the balance of power theory. But the unification process became reality and Germany demonstrated its commitment to the European integration process. Thus Great Britain could breath without fear. Great Britain can consequently be perceived as a status quo power until the meeting at Saint-Malo. Great Britain takes a realistic approach vis-à-vis European security and defence policy:

“The practical conclusion drawn by the British policy makers from this is that NATO remains the key to Europe and Britain’s and Europe’s defence; and that the continued commitment of our North American allies is crucial to NATO’s effectiveness. This point is

153 Richard, Alain, Minister of Defence, European Defence and the emergence of a multipolar world, Speech in New Dehli, 19 May, 2000
pretty much accepted. What is less generally agreed is the extent to which Europe acting alone could carry out...the Petersberg tasks.154

The fear that Europe develops its own autonomous capabilities within a European structure would make the US remove its commitment in European Security and threaten NATO as a whole in terms of security cooperation in the future. Out of this viewpoint, we can argue that NATO remains nowadays the vital organisation even after the post-Cold War era and the end of bipolarity.

Great Britain does not encourage an extension of the European integration process towards a federal structure. According to their view, the EU should focus on trade aspects and maintain an intergovernmental structure. Great Britain’s unwillingness, in the French eyes, has awarded them the name of the gauche partner. Therefore, the position adopted by Great Britain within security and defence policy binds together with its vision of its foreign policy vis-à-vis Europe, and even if Great Britain has demonstrated its willingness to cooperate, sovereignty still remains very important in many areas. The British are therefore reluctant to cede these areas to qualified majority vote.

The change that occurred at Saint-Malo was seen as a major step because it appeared to be out of a new interpretation of the structure that was built at the end of the Cold War. Until this Change at Saint-Malo, Great Britain was still certain that there was no need for a convenient security cooperation outside of NATO. But the long term conflict in Ex-Yugoslavia made the British government conscious of Europe’s reliance on the US. This fact, added to the low interest of the US in the Yugoslavian conflict, created doubt in the British government’s intelligence on the US commitment vis-à-vis European Security and highlighted the necessity for Europe to handle this kind of crisis itself.155

About the British rhetoric in the establishment of the CFSP, four models frequently re-emerge. First of all, the fact that NATO will remain the keystone of European security. Secondly, the fact that the CFSP does not involve the creation of a European army. Thirdly, the fact that the CFSP development will only fortify the European pillar of NATO. Last, the fact that Britain’s own security and economical interests are linked to the rest of Europe. Great Britain demonstrates that it still values its connection with the US and that it does not want to make vulnerable the NATO cooperation. France focuses on the need to develop an autonomous capability. Meanwhile Great Britain defines such a development as a duplication

154 Galsworthy, Anthony, The roots of British Defence Policy in Europe, in Herolf, Gunilla (ed), The Security and Defence Policy of the EU, the intergovernmental conference and beyond, 1997, p.27
155 Grant, Charles, European Defence Post-Kosovo, Centre for European Reform, June 1999
of NATO military assets. Therefore, Great Britain argues that the CFSP skills would only be utilised when NATO as a whole would not be involved, depending on the use of crucial NATO assets\textsuperscript{156}.

Great Britain’s change in foreign and security policy vis-à-vis the CFSP and the development of the ESDP can be brought to light both by neorealism and neoliberalism. The change was stimulated by the new understanding of the structure and how Great Britain best could serve its national interests within the new structure. These national interests are not only the security matters but also economical ones. Great Britain has reached the following analysis that its position within the new structure is in the EU and instead of being an indulgent actor, Great Britain would prefer to become a leader. This is also the area that remains a major argument for the CFSP and British cooperation. Great Britain favours largely the enlargement process, mainly for the following reasons; first, it interprets the enlargement as stabilising Central and Eastern Europe and second, it gives the opportunity to the EU to focus on widening instead of deepening. One of the central concerns of the British foreign policy is to keep a special relation with the US and in parallel remain a good European actor\textsuperscript{157}. Nevertheless, we wonder what Great Britain’s first priority would be if their commitment vis-à-vis the EU and the US coincides, a question that is highly present in the minds of French policy makers.

6.4 Conclusion on the development of CFSP

Both neorealism and neoliberalism begin with a similar approach. They both agree on the anarchic structure of the system, cemented around states as units and that national interest encourages cooperation. So after having demonstrated that France and Great Britain cooperate out of their national interests, we cannot reject either theory. Germany also cooperates out of its national interest, however Germany is a special case and their policy choices, as I mentioned previously, are a big ambiguity for both theoretical approaches. Neoliberalism would state that the process of integration into security matters is a natural progression of the previous integration process. I consent so far that this integration process has been built upon the past cooperation, but I disagree with the fact that it is a natural progression. I trust that the move towards security matters was stimulated by the structural change, which would explain

\textsuperscript{156} Howorth, Joylon, Britain, France, and the European Defence Initiative, Survival, Volume 42, Number 2, Summer 2000

\textsuperscript{157} Grant, Charles, Intimate relations, Can Britain play a leading role in European defence-and keep its special links to US intelligence ?, Centre of European Reform, April 2000.
why it was complex to reach unity within common security matters during the cold war. France was fastest to respond to the new structural change because it affected its policy more, but when Great Britain changed its analysis of the structure, stimulated by the Yugoslavian issue, it also redefined its policy. Neither France nor Great Britain are ready to lose their sovereignty in terms of security and defence matters to a qualified majority vote, having the will to maintain intergovernmental cooperation and reducing dependence, according to a neorealist approach. These arguments highlight the fact that neorealism is nowadays the most valuable theory to explain and understand French and British cooperation vis-à-vis the CFSP. Neoliberalism might give the legitimate proof only if cooperation intensifies and confirms success in the face of challenges.

Current decisional approach

The meeting of the defence Ministers of the Twenty-five, ratified on Monday the 22\textsuperscript{nd} of November 2004, the creation of thirteen groups of combat, composed of 1 500 men each. The EU thus hopes to be able to react more quickly in the event of an emerging crisis, anywhere in the world. In parallel, the budget of the new European Defence Agency, which must help the EU to fill its gap in the field of the armament, was adopted. The EU decided the creation of thirteen tactical groups enabling itself to obtain a fast capacity of reaction in the event of an emerging crisis, anywhere in the world, announced by the Dutch Defence Minister, Henk Kamp, whose country currently occupies the European presidency. These groups of combat will be made up of 1 500 men each, being able to be deployed in fifteen days maximum. France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom will each form a tactical group. Every MS of the EU decided to take part in at least one of these tactical groups, the applicant countries which can join to it, according to Mr. Kamp, who specifies that the concept of tactical groups is complementary to the ERRF. The EU will lay out, in 2005, a tactical group permanently available, then two in 2006, according to the minister, who specifies that these groups will be completely operational in 2007\textsuperscript{158}.

Groups complementary to those of NATO

\textsuperscript{158}"L’Europe des 25 connaît de nouvelles avancées en matière de défense’ http://www.lemonde.fr/web/imprimer_article/0,1-0@2-3214,36-387919,0.html
Two of the thirteen groups whose formation was announced by Brussels will be on alert, so that the EU has them at its disposal if one or even two crises occur in the world, which would make any intervention necessary. The aim of these tactical groups is, first of all, the reinforcement of the capacities, giving to the EU a credible force, quickly deployable and coherent, able to carry out operations only or in the initial phase of more significant operations, according to the official statement of the Dutch presidency of the EU, published in the exit of a meeting of the European Ministers for Defence. During this same meeting, the Defence Ministers of the Twenty-five approved the budget and the 2005 program of the new European Defence Agency, created last July, indicated its general manager Nick Witney. The MS avoided "haggling" on the precise tasks assigned by the Agency for the months to come and thus allowed a fast adoption of this one. The second management committee of the Agency, composed of the Defence Ministers of the EU, approved a budget of 20 million euros for 2005, which should enable him to reach the workforce of 77 people in the current year. The European Defence Agency must help the EU to fill its gaps in the Arms field.

6.5 Final conclusions about the problem of the CFSP

The military capabilities gap, as I mentioned previously, does not require any additional explanation. But the motives behind the development of common assets, the creation of economy of scales in the framework of defence industry production, the reluctance of states in ceding their sovereignty trough the CFSP via a qualified majority vote and the priority of national defence expenses over supranational ones are real concerns where an analysis can be helpful in explaining states’ rational choices.

Germany is heavily linked and definitely committed to the development of the EU. The question of the CFSP is naturally suitable for Germany in the framework of the European integration process. It is strongly in favour of the qualified majority vote mainly due to its vision of the EU in a more federal approach and because of its fear of the rise of nationalism that could repeat the historical mistakes of the past. The development of common assets is a natural aspect of this process for Germany, even if some apprehension can be observed when it comes to how the development of these assets are going to be handled. Germany has

159 L’Europe des 25 connaît de nouvelles avancées en matière de défense’
http://www.lemonde.fr/web/imprimer_article/0,1-0@2-3214,36-387919,0.html
received support from the US military forces during the Cold War period and needs to restructure its defence. This a structural change that has now begun, but not in the way neorealists suppose. Germany has no aspiration to become a regional hegemon power and its defence and military expenditures are compared to the other EU great powers to some extent lower. The restructuring Germany is going through, is more in parallel with deploying its troops towards participation in operations leaded by NATO. The low amount of expenditures can be explained by economic priorities taking over security ones, according to neoliberal school of thought.

France and Great Britain both are unenthusiastic in ceding sovereignty in security and defence matters to a qualified majority vote. This lack of enthusiasm can be explained by neorealism; their fears are fuelled by the protection of their national interests. Their cooperation in defence and military production is serving their national interests by developing the European defence industry in a more competitive one in order to be able to become a potential rival of the American defence industry. The tension about where the production should be located, and what production it should address, can also be explained by the same argument. France is more concerned about developing intelligence capabilities, focused on the development of space technology, which some English policymakers define, on one hand, as an attempt by France to see the EU financing a part of its industry. On the other hand, France strongly criticizes the European reliance on American intelligence assets, for many reasons, and that Great Britain is reluctant to improve these capabilities because they have a privileged access to American intelligence assets.

Both France and Great Britain also hold back due to domestic pressure in the framework of a number of policy areas that have not pushed the agenda to spend more in military expenditures. But none of these countries are in the same situation as Germany and the inconsistency between military and defence and expenditures and social policy is not obvious in France and especially not in Great Britain.

The enlargement process in parallel with national apprehension has already been explained formerly in this chapter and the position of Turkey is effortlessly explained by its desire to gain influence to become a member of the EU. These issues can also be defined in the same way when it directly deals with the other MS of the EU. The fear to loose its sovereignty in terms of security and defence matters, pushing many states to oppose a

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160 Ashbourne, Alex, Opening the US defence market, Centre for European Reform, October 2000
161 Grant, Charles, Intimate relations, Can Britain play a leading role in European defence-and keep its special links to US intelligence ?, Centre of European Reform, April 2000.
qualified majority vote, according to the neorealist school of thought. Moreover, for many states also, defence and military expenditures are not in the top priorities of the agenda mainly due to domestic pressure for social policy, according to the neoliberal school of thought. The presence of a real threat is not as apparent now with the end of the Cold War and that has put into orbit other areas in the priorities of the political agenda.

6.6 The aim of the CFSP: developing a new world order

The configuration of the world during the Cold war was a bipolar one. This ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. There was only one superpower left, the US, defined today as the hyperpower, which brought the world into a unipolar structure. President Bush spoke about the role of the US through the Pax Americana after the end of the Cold War. “More broadly, the 31-page document asserts American dominance as the lone superpower – a status no rival power will be allowed to challenge. It provides a reason the world should accept this state of affairs: the expansion of peace and more freedom. A Pax Americana will be in the service of a balance of power that favours freedom. Critics are already describing the new strategy as arrogant and dangerous, a far cry from the tone of humility in foreign affairs promised in President Bush's inaugural address. To supporters, it represents an overdue codification of America's mission of global leadership. It's a very far-reaching and comprehensive statement, and it's likely to endure as a bedrock element in American thinking in this post cold war world.”162 But the question is will the US stay the world hegemon power for a long time in a unipolar structure or will the configuration of the system go back to tripolarity or multipolarity? The development of the CFSP is an important factor of the development of a new world order and its impact on transatlantic relations between the EU and the US.

Neorealism sees bipolarity as a more stable structure than multipolarity. The main reason for this argument is that bipolarity raises the stakes for clashes, especially in a structure where the two poles own nuclear weapons. Defection by smaller states does not affect the structure which is not the case in a multipolar one. Rivalry within a multipolar system is more confused, which enhances uncertainty about the competing poles capability and lowering the

162 http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0923/p01s03-uspo.html
stability of the system. Neorealists see unipolarity as the less stable structure for two main reasons. On one hand, the concentration of power is defined as a threat for other states in the system and creates rivalry in order to re-establish the balance. On the other hand, the leading powers acquire too many international responsibilities that weaken the country in a long term period.

The fear indicated by some neorealists was that Europe, with the end of the bipolar structure, would see an increase in national goals and the balance of power would lead the world in a sphere of tensions and conflicts. This prediction did not occur. Europe has instead persisted in its quest for a European integration around the pre-eminent Franco-German partnership that has developed into a union, which can be portrayed as a regional constructed unipolarity. The fear highlighted by Mearsheimer in his article is not a valuable statement. In my point of view, Mearsheimer’s mistake is that he does not identify the power of the integration process that Europe has launched.

Neorealism would also interpret the development of the CFSP as a mark of power balancing by the EU with US over military capabilities. This argument could be suitable, but I do not see the development of the CFSP as a rivalry with the US. Even if French policymakers to some extent are in favour of a more autonomous European defence that could be interpreted as rivalry, I would say that most of EU MS do not view the CFSP as a rival to NATO, more as a complementary structure. We should not forget to speak about the US military considerable advantage in terms of its capabilities, the need for NATO assets, the EU decision-making process which causes difficulties for the domestic concerns of the 25 MS, the implication of the neutral states, the enlargement…etc., all the reasons I explained in Chapter 5. My opinion remains the same even if the CFSP has a long way before reaching the Post-Helsinki headline goals by 2010. And even if it reaches these goals by 2010, the US would still have a considerable military advantage and the EU would have no interest to supplant the US in this field because it would only irritate them and worsen transatlantic

164 Waltz, Kenneth, Structural Realism after the Cold War, International Security, Summer 2000, Volume 25, Issue 1
relations, so the development of the CFSP will not affect the transatlantic relations but it will help them.

Nevertheless, some tensions have been noticed over the transatlantic link since the development of the CFSP. The US approach has been hesitant about its process, to some extent they have been supporting its development due to the burden sharing and the improvement of the European capabilities into NATO structure and to a certain degree they have been questioning the impact on this common organisation and the European commitment to it. These apprehensions articulated by the US are explainable by the neorealistic school of thought, but recently, the US has supported strongly the European development of a CFSP because of the guarantee from the European head of states that NATO will remain the core-centre of the European security. “Europe is sharing with America, with which it faced the challenges of security since more than one half-century, values and ideals which are the fruit of its history. The transatlantic partnership remains a fundamental strategic priority for Europe. This partnership is a necessary condition of security and world peace. In the prolongation of the Declaration of the Washington Summit, we wish to continue the adaptation of the Atlantic Alliance, which remains the base of the collective security of its members, to the challenges of the 21st century. We are determined to implement the decisions of the Prague Summit, because we include/understand our engagements in the Atlantic Alliance and the EU as complementary. The strategic partnership between the European Union and NATO, which is based on the declarations of the Berlin and Washington Summits, right now made it possible for the EU to resort to the means of NATO to lead its first operation in the Old Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We wish that tomorrow the arrangements set up between the two organizations make it possible for the EU to ensure the changing of NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”167

Other tensions have been stressed out in the transatlantic link that can be addressed back to the shift in the structure. The US has met many obstacles due to the EU’s reluctance to comply with the WTO approval about bananas and the Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO), especially beef, and their protection of the European agriculture via the CAP. But the file of complaints of the EU against the US is even broader. Some of them are the American campaign to develop National Missile Defence (NMD), their renunciation from the Kyoto Protocol and their unilateralist approach not to sign many international agreements like the

167 http://www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/defense/base/autorites/declaration_commune_europeenne_a_bruxelles/
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the global land-mine ban and the International Criminal Court (ICC).  

All these different approaches have affected foreign policy between the EU and the US. While the EU emphasises challenges and deals with world governance, praising stability and managing globalisation, the US focuses on threats and speaks about burden sharing, American interests and US leadership. In a 1992 Pentagon drafted strategy, The US has highlighted the fact that its objective is to maintain a unipolar structure by stopping the emergence of a potential rival. According to this statement, American policy appears to be clear, and neorealism is useful to explain the US policy towards the rest of the world. The US decides not to involve itself in these international treaties and agreements in order to enhance American mobility in its pursuit of national interests. As the hyperpower and the world hegemon, the US does not need to rely on other states and can adopt a unilateral attitude. The US has no interests in making itself dependent on the international community by signing international agreements because it will not loose of its influence on the other hand. However, the EU would like to see the emergence of a developing multipolar system in order to weaken US unilateral approach. International Organisations are used as a mean to counterbalance the US and get a larger influence on the world order. Generally they would disagree to that statement. The rhetoric for integration, cooperation and treaties is gain and the will to live in a better world, not only for themselves but for all, meanwhile the rhetoric for not cooperating is concentrated only on inadequate agreements and cooperation. The question of the pursuit of national interest is also valid for the EU when it chooses not to cooperate, to illustrate this fact the CAP is a good example. It means that even if the US seems to conduct its policy according to the neorealism school of thought, on one hand, and EU according to neoliberalism on the other hand, the picture is not so easy to catch.

Due to its unilateral approach, the US is always doing what is in its interest and it is not paying too much attention to anything which does not affect American interests. This aspect is not really precise, but the US has behaved like this on more than one occasion. That is why it is interesting to analyse the change in US foreign policy after the attack of September 11th. The US went quickly in defining a strategy for Afghanistan and worked

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169 Everts, Steven, Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe?, managing divergence in transatlantic foreign policy, Centre for European Reform, February 2001
efficiently to find unity in this operation, but not only in the EU, China, Russia and Japan but also in the Middle East. This fact can be interpreted as an example where American interests and the necessity for international cooperation combined together. This operation also connected the divergences that the EU and the US had, so it is time to wonder if this current world order will have a long-term impact on transatlantic relations? I consider that it will, of course, but only in the intelligence cooperation framework. This cooperation will be the outcome of the implementation of a new security danger originally from international terrorism and the necessity for international cooperation to “fix” the problem, in inhibiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and prepare for the next attack. The only thing that I am scared about is that the US will concentrate too much on developing hard intelligence, such as the NMD, instead of soft intelligence. 170 This program is perceived as very wasteful and ineffective but not as a real mean of security. 171

Concerning the future relationship between the US and the EU, I do not think that the transatlantic relations could reach a military conflict. In this point, I would give more credibility to the thesis developed by John Mueller. 172 In his work, he states that the western world has reached a point where military conflict as a mean to resolve disputes among themselves is no longer a choice.

The world order, for the 21st century, will remain unipolar and “stable”. The main argument is that no state or region is able to become a potential rival of the US in all the areas needed to create a shift in the structure, especially in terms of defence and security. The EU will stay so far the main competitor of the US in terms of economy, but will have a hard work to do to be able to compete with the US in terms of military capabilities. I believe that only the creation of a European Defence and Military Union will probably have the capability to compete the US Army.

The European dream

Europe is a dream and a new ambition. But it has doubts about itself. Instead of speaking as one voice, it is divided. In this case, can we speak of a Europe with a common

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171 Economist, Missile defences, A shield in space, Volume 355, Number 8173, p.19-21, 2000
172 Mueller, John, Retreat from doomsday, the obsolescence of major wars
ambition? During the Iraqi conflict, it gave up delivering the message that the world was expecting facing a diplomatic crisis\textsuperscript{173}.

MS are afraid to loose their sovereignty and are more concerned about their national interests\textsuperscript{174}. What credibility should we allow to construct a CFSP?\textsuperscript{175} Europe understands that it has to take its destiny into its hands to ensure its own security and to reach the hope expected. Indeed it has to measure the obstacles standing in its way to become a great power.

The first obstacle is the insufficiency of its military budget and its lack of efficiency: the sum of every military budget in the world does not reach the one of the US. The investment is spread on too many forces, meanwhile the one of the US is concentrated on armies acting in a perfectly coordinated manner. MS have to gather, in priority, their forces and evaluate together the threats, define their needs and work on a joint program.

The second obstacle comes from the complexity of the decision-making process in the EU. As long as EU procedures will remain too complex, Europe will not be able to play a major role in the international scene.

The last obstacle, and the most important one, remains the inability to affirm its strategic ambition in the framework of its ESDP. With its military infrastructure, its economic power, its values, its outstanding culture, why MS does not influence more the political affairs at a global scale? The process of enlargement is bringing Europe closer to the most sensible areas of crisis in our planet. If Turkey is integrated into the EU, European borders will be common with Syria, Iraq and Iran. Too many blockages exist in Europe to create confidence and give Europe the strength to take its own responsibilities\textsuperscript{176}.

Europe has, however, to respond to the needs of the European citizens, who ask the Union tangible results in terms of security. Major progress accomplished in the domain of defence has strongly been approved by the public opinion since the 1998 Franco-British Summit of Saint-Malo and the different European Councils defining the European missions, the relations with NATO and the objectives in terms of EU’s capability in military interventions on the external scene. Today, threats are becoming more and more difficult to predict such as the terrorist attacks of Madrid the 11\textsuperscript{th} of March 2004, MS need to implement a common agenda vis-à-vis EU co-ordination policies. Europe has to take into account that it is facing the same threats, so Europe belongs to only one space of security.\textsuperscript{177}

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid, p.222
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid, p.228
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid, p.234
Europe has not the ambition to join again with the dream of empire and hegemony that has caused its loss of importance since the World Wars. Europe has to exert its responsibilities due to its important geographic, economic and cultural weight. Europe has to find its vocation to bring the world in a more peaceful and stable environment on earth. Who would believe that the CFSP/ESDP would go against a state or an organisation? The major projections in this domain have been accomplished smartly with NATO. These projections are complementary to the ambitions of the alliance’s reforms. More than ever, the world needs several poles of stability. The EU has the vocation and the duty to be one of them. This brings the question of the relations between the EU and the US. Europe knows that it won’t be able to face contemporary threats without an efficient and confident partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic. Europeans know that the future of this relationship depends largely on the international stability. It is impossible that a disagreement appears to be unreachable because Both of them know that their values and their convictions are too close.178

7. Summary

During the Cold War era, the edifice of the world configuration was built on a bipolar structure. The security of west European countries was not only important in the eyes of the Europeans but also in the American ones. But the end of this era in 1989-91 also put an end to this world structure and brought it into a unipolar one. The US became the world hegemon and Europe started to fear that US security priority would not remain Europe in the awakening of this structure. Therefore, some improvements occurred in terms of EU cooperation security in the framework of the conflict in Kuwait, but the main change happened because of the conflict in Ex-Yugoslavia. Especially Great Britain and France became aware of the need to develop an EU military capability in order to handle autonomous peace-keeping operations, outside of the NATO framework. The EU understood that any action developed by NATO was reliant on the US and without the support of the US the possibility to operate was restrained.

The move towards a more autonomous European security from the cooperation within NATO created a fear of loss of American influence over European politics. However, when the EU stated that NATO would remain the primary organisation to handle European security

178 Ibid, p.235-236
matters and that the CFSP would only reinforce the European pillar of NATO, the US appeared to support the cementation of this pillar.

France, Germany and Great Britain are contributing actively to the development of this pillar and they have all their reasons to support it. Germany is self-committed to the European integration process and cooperation in order, on one hand, to inhibit the raise of nationalism into Germany and on the other hand, to use it as a mean to play a major role in the international arena. France is a medium size power trying to keep its voice in the world arena. Its presence in the EU is marked by its strong link with Germany to enhance its role internationally. France uses the EU in order to promote its national interests. Great Britain maintains special relations vis-à-vis of the US and has not the desire to commit to any European cooperation that could hurt or threaten this link. But Great Britain changed its attitude towards its foreign and security policy due to its new interpretation of the structure during the Ex-Yugoslavian conflict. Therefore, its policy shifted in the need to develop a closer EU cooperation within the security, even if they stated that NATO still remains the primary organisation to handle European Security. This change is also strategic because Great Britain is motivated to become a EU leader instead of a spoiler.

The EU has to face a number of issues in different areas before it will be able to implement an efficient CFSP. First of all, the military capability gap that has widened the dependence on NATO military assets. Secondly, the difficult decision making process that has to deal with the domestic demands of all MS generated by a reluctance in ceding sovereignty of security matters to a qualified majority vote.

The development of the CFSP has electrified the transatlantic relations creating tensions but nothing that will damage the transatlantic link between the EU and the US. The CFSP will become complementary of NATO and not a competitor at all. The military capabilities and the domestic demands of all EU MS will guarantee this statement. The US will remain an unenthusiastic global actor in a unipolar world, pushing the international agenda in favour of a unilateral approach.
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