Smooth and Non-Violent Democratization: The case of Slovenia

Submitted by
Emine Pandir

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Abstract
After 1989, along with the collapse of Soviet Union, Central and Eastern European countries the democracy became synonymous with ‘return to Europe’. The post-communist regime was a reaction against its predecessor and that reaction had produced a demand for democratization. Therefore, the process of democratization, which gained momentum at the end of eighties and, the beginning of the nineties, has become an important phenomenon. The most extreme case of transition, certainly, is former Yugoslavia. Due to the war and the collapse of the Federation into several successor states, the legitimacy and viability are still being questioned. The Balkan region, known as the ‘Powder Keg of Europe’ has been commonly considered to be representing a chronic political instability and a lack of socio-economic modernization as well as much poorer prospects for democratization and for acceptance into the European Union (EU) in comparison to the other countries of East and Central Europe.

Slovenia however may be seen as the exception that proved the Balkan rule. Besides, the successor states of Yugoslavia, Slovenia has recorded the smoothest, non-violent and the least problematic transition toward liberal democracy. Slovenia maintained the highest level of system stability in the powder keg of Europe. Slovenia is the only Yugoslav successor state, which has peacefully established a functioning democracy. It has established a stable democracy and moved easily to a market economy. It is also the only the EU member country from the former. More importantly, Slovenia has kept the highest level of system stability in Powder Keg of Europe’.

The main purpose of this thesis is to review and discuss the political democratization process in Slovenia. This study also reviews the reasons, which make the Slovenian transition to democracy special among the post-communist democracies. More specifically, this study particularly focuses on certain political aspects to discover its way of democratization. Slovenia, one of the most successful countries within Central and Eastern Europe is also the only component republic of ex-Yugoslavia not to confront continuing problems of ethnic challenge, deep political conflict and economic debility.

All theories attempt to impose order and find patterns in the messy and complex reality of human life. Therefore, the theories are useful in that they ask important questions about democratization in general and contribute to particular explanations. Concerning the democratization process in Slovenia, ‘Theories of Democratization’ is generally going to be reviewed. Democratization theories aim to explain how authoritarian regimes change into liberal democratic ones. More specifically, Transition Theories will be applied during the study. Transition studies have been chosen, because they offer a ‘political’ explanation of democratization and also differentiate democratic transition and democratic consolidation phases properly, and point out the necessary conditions for the success of each phase.

Keywords: Theories of Democratization, Transition Theory, Civil Society, Milan Kucan, Mladina, Slovenia.
Abstract

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Keywords

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# ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Central and European Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEMOS</td>
<td>Democratic Opposition of Slovenia</td>
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<tr>
<td>DeSUS</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Retired People</td>
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<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>The European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNA</td>
<td>Yugoslavia People’s Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCS</td>
<td>League of Communists of Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCY</td>
<td>League of Communists of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSi</td>
<td>New Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS-SDZS</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDZ</td>
<td>Slovenian Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFRY</td>
<td>Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKD</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKZ</td>
<td>The Slovenian Union of Peasants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLS</td>
<td>Slovenian Farmer’s Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td>Party of Young People of Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>Slovenian National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZLSD-SDP</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Renewal</td>
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<td>ZS</td>
<td>Green Party</td>
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INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

Sloveni! . . .
Zmozni smo premagati miselnost, ki je unicila in se unicuje najlepse primerke nase tradicije . . .
Bodimo odprti . . .

(Slovenes! . . . We are capable of overwhelming the mentality, which has destroyed, and is still destroying, the best examples of our tradition . . . Let us be open . . .)1

I.1. Introduction

Slovenia is a small size, newly independent country situated at the edge of Central and Western Europe. One of the great but under-reported success stories of post-communist democratization has taken place in the former Yugoslav republic of Slovenia. Slovenia is the one Yugoslav successor state, which has peacefully and relatively non-violently moved toward democracy. It is also the only EU member country from the former Yugoslavia. Slovenia was always the most liberal of the republics in Yugoslavia; it has established a stable democracy and moved easily to a market economy. One of Slovenia’s main distinguishing characteristics is that it has practically been considered ethnically homogenous, economically the most prosperous and culturally more distinctive among the CEECs.

After 1989, along with the collapse of Soviet Union, Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), the democracy became synonymous with ‘return to Europe’5. The post-communist regime was a reaction against its predecessor; in Central and Eastern Europe the reaction has produced a demand for democratization6. The paths of Central and East European countries have differed radically from the West European approach to democratization. No communist country was able to evolve gradually into a democracy, as occurred in almost half of the countries of Western Europe. However, more importantly, in comparison to other CEECs, Slovenian transition lies in the fact that it was a gradual process, which was endorsed and ultimately led by the self-reformed communist leadership which responded to the gradually growing pressures of the opposition organizations and civil movements7.

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1 Cited: Johannes Birringer, The Utopia of Postutopia’, Theatre Topics Volume 6, Number 2, September 1996,143-166.
2 That was used by the Slovene Liberation Front under Nazi occupation in 1943
4 EUROPA- European Commission- Enlargement- Candidate Countries- Slovenia http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/slovenia/
5 **See Table 3 Ethnic Distribution in Former Yugoslavia, p.71
6 ** See Table 4 Comparison of the standard of living of East- Central European states with the EU, 1995/1996(GDP per person as a %of EU average) and Table5 Real GDP per capita in Former Yugoslavia, P.72
Democratization in Slovenia started long before independence, in the beginning of 1960s. The transition to democracy in Slovenia, just as in all post-communist countries, must be regarded in the context of general crises of the communist regimes, but with particular features, aside from the national independence that it shares with other newly independent states. Firstly, the most significant characteristics of Slovenian democratization is that, democratic political order did not emerge in Slovenia overnight but took place as a consequence of a long and complex development. Secondly, peaceful, non-violence, less revolutionary and comprehensive democratic evolution took place between 1989 and 1992 under a home-grown regime rather than as a Soviet-imposed communist regime. Erika Harris argues, these characteristics make Slovenia more special case among post-communist transition. Briefly, it is fair to say that all these features make Slovenian democratization more different and least problematic than other ex-Yugoslav republics.

After short-lived but violent suppression to stay in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), this small republic of two million people proclaimed its independence on 25 June 1991. It has since compiled a record of political liberty and relative prosperity and has, whatever its flaws, managed rather successfully the "threelfold" transition to national independence, political democracy, and a market economy. It is important to note that in a sense, Slovenia's story is only a chapter in the larger tale of the democratic wave that rather unpredictably taken place in Central, Eastern, and South-eastern Europe during the last years of the twentieth century.

Slovenia was one of the first five Central and East European countries, along with Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, to begin negotiations with the EU in 1998. It enjoys the highest GDP of any applicant state 70 percent of the EU average, almost on par with its poorest members, and is in general hailed as a regional success story. Along with its economic prosperity, high degree of ethnic homogeneity attributed Slovenia’s smoother transition. Of all of the Yugoslav successor states, Slovenia has recorded the smoothest and least problematic transition toward liberal democracy and has kept the highest level of system stability.

I.2. Why is it interesting to study?
Slovenia and its democratization process are interesting to study, because Slovenia’s achievements over the past several years have been outstanding. I strongly believe

8 ibid., p.66.
10 Ibid.134.
13 Ibid.
that it is important to study Slovenia and its democratization process, which make it seen as an exception in many cases:

➢ First of all, compared to other Yugoslav Republics, Slovenia has peacefully and relatively non-violently shifted from authoritarian rule to democracy. While the Balkan region has been called the ‘powder keg of Europe’ and commonly considered that representing chronic political instability and a lack of socio-economic modernization and least successful and less favorable in their transition to democracy\. Slovenia, as one of the most successful countries in CEECs, is also the only component republic of ex-Yugoslavia not to confront continuing problems of ethnic challenge, deep political conflict and economic debility\. For that reason, Slovenia is the first and only ex-Yugoslav republic that was admitted for membership in the European Union, in the last enlargement, in May 2004. While Slovenia was the only ex-Yugoslav republic eligible to get EU membership during the last enlargement on May 2004, the rest of the ex-Former Yugoslav republics (except Croatia\textsuperscript{18}) stayed out of the union.

➢ Secondly, as Anton Bebler argues, Slovenia is a small, new state that has one of the most successful democratization stories in the CEECs. There have been crucial changes in Slovenia to transform from a single party communist regime to multiparty; from being a constituent part of the SFRL to being an independent country; and from having a semi-marketized socialist to free social-market economy\textsuperscript{19}. Similarly, Mojmir Mrak points out “threefold” transition to national independence, political democracy and a market economy. Mrak claims that in comparison to the former Soviet satellite states, the fact that Slovenia had never known national independence before 1991. It means that Slovenia had to construct its own bureaucracy; its own army and police, a diplomatic corps, monetary and customs systems, government institutions and administrative structures, all from the ground up\textsuperscript{20}. That is why it is important to examine Slovenia’s “threefold” transition to national independence, political democracy, and a market economy.

➢ Thirdly, although these changes occurred in Slovenia at about the same time compared to the other communist-ruled states of Eastern Europe, Slovenia had a relatively good starting position\textsuperscript{21}. Throughout the region, relatively the same general reasons existed. The communist regimes had not succeeded to take their own promises of prosperity and freedom. Their closed, authoritarian political systems created decay and degeneration, and were disintegrating from within. Extensive dissatisfaction over poor economic situation gave rise to pressures for deeper political and social change, beginning with the replacement of unpopular and discredited

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} EU leaders granted Croatia official candidate status in June 2004, and accession negotiations are scheduled to start in 2005. Croatia hopes to join the EU in 2007, along with Bulgaria and Romania. Membership talks are scheduled to open in April 2005.
communist rulers. In Slovenia these events were present in much-softened forms. In other words, transition to democracy was softer and smoother compared to other post-communist countries.

- Last but not least, Slovenia was always the most liberal republic in Yugoslav Federation. As a consequence of dissolution, it has established a stable democracy and moved easily to a market economy. Along with functioning democracy and the integration to Europe, Slovenia has kept the highest level of system stability in 'Powder Keg of Europe’. More importantly, Slovenian’s successful transition promotes open economic, tolerance, and democracy in the region.

I.3 Objective and Research Questions

- The aim of the thesis is to review and discuss the political democratization process in Slovenia. I will also discuss the reasons that make the Slovenian transition to democracy unique among the post-communist democracies.

This study attempts to answer some fundamental questions. The main aim of this study is mainly divided into five major research questions. Major research questions are:

- What are the main reasons that make Slovenian democratization and finally its integration to EU smoother and least problematic?
- What was the internal factor that encouraged Slovenes to accelerate democratization process?
- What was the impact of ‘Europeanization’ in Slovene democratization?

I.4. Delimitation

The main purpose of this study is to discuss the Slovenian democratization process concerning political dimension. Although Slovenia is generally considered to be practically ethnically homogenous, economically most prosperous and culturally more distinctive among the CEECs, economic, social, and cultural dimensions in the way of democratization will excluded in this study. The only reasons that gave rise to political democratization will be discussed. As a theoretical framework, contemporary theories of democratization will be analyzed in this study. Although nationalism seen as a “replacement’ ideology after communism in Slovenia has been one of the influential factors in political dimension, this study will focus on democratization theories.

I.5. Disposition

Chapter I Introductory Chapter gives basic information about the thesis. It describes purpose of the thesis and significance of the topic. Moreover, which methodology and literature reviews are used in this study will be discussed. Chapter II Theoretical Framework provides theoretical framework to analyze democratization process in Slovenia. This chapter comprises two parts; historical background on democratization and the theories of democratization. In the first part; how democratization has historically developed will be examined. In the second part,

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three different theories of democratization will be described to analyze the Slovenian democratization process. **Chapter III Transition Theory by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan** focuses on ‘transition theory’ in term of Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan’s viewpoint. They developed an argument as to why and how democracies need five interacting arenas to become consolidated. **Chapter IV Democratization in the case of Slovenia** discusses the Slovenian independence process from the establishment of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the present day. It demonstrates the fundamental factors and their effects on the way of democratization. The main purpose of this chapter is to show distinction of the Slovenian democratization process as opposed to CEECs and ex-Yugoslav republics. Besides, analytical findings will be given through fundamental factors. This chapter will discuss empirical finding rather than theoretical by explaining these factors. **Chapter V Analytical Findings** discusses both empirical and theoretical findings. **Chapter VI Conclusion** includes main findings of this study.

1.6. Definitions of Concepts
-- **Democratic consolidation** essentially refers to the process by way of which democracy is intensely tested and as a result becomes firmer. Consolidation has been used in the common sense of the term basically as the strengthening of the regime. Consolidation is the multifaceted process by which democratic structures, norms, and regime-civil society relationships are firmly established.
-- **Democratization** aims to promote a better understanding of democratization defined as the way democratic norms, institutions and practices evolve and are disseminated both within and across national and cultural boundaries.
-- **The modernization theory** emphasizes a number of social and economic requisites either associated with existing liberal democracies or necessary for successful democratization.
-- **The structuralism or historical sociology** emphasizes the changing structures of power favorable to democratization.
-- **The transition theory or agency approach** emphasizes the political progress and elite initiatives and choices that account for moves from authoritarian rule to liberal democracy.
-- **Transition** process refers to that fluid and uncertain period when new democratic structures are about to emerge, while some of the structures of the old regime still exist.

-- **Staness Problem** is termed by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan when there are profound differences about the territorial boundaries of the political community’s state and profound differences as to who has the right of citizenship in that state.
-- **Self-Determination** “is set of rights and powers to decide the collective future of the land and the people. The right to self-determination is that right, according to which a nation as a whole can decide on the form of its state community, of its connections or contacts with neighboring peoples, of association with other nations in whatever internationally recognized state configuration, of disassociation and therefore separation from that community, on internal order, etc”.

1.7. Methodology

1.7.1. Qualitative Research

Alan Bryman argues, qualitative research generally “emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data. It has tendency to relate to words rather than numbers. Qualitative research is epistemological in that it seeks to grasp social world by methods of interpretation. It is *ontological* and holds that social phenomena are related to interaction between human beings rather than remain ‘out there’ in isolation from those in such construction process”.

As a social science study, the thesis will be conducted primarily in qualitative research. The main purpose of this study is to find out political reasons in the way of democratization in Slovenia. For that reason in order to discover these political reasons during the democratization process, we need to find an answer for “How” and “Why”.

Qualitative research design has often been criticized due to bias and lack of objectivity. This criticism signifies that there is excessive reliance on the researcher’s perspectives about what is main and significant. However the counter-argument is that qualitative research prefers to “acknowledge it in the process of collecting empirical material and explicitly consider its effects on substantive findings”.

Another criticism raised against qualitative research concerns the lack of transparency issue. One of the other criticisms is that because of the lack of standard procedures in conducting qualitative research, a true replication is very difficult. Another difficulty concerns problems of generalization. Briefly, qualitative research strategy has its disadvantages like other research strategies. However, the advantages of qualitative research are clear. The objective of qualitative research is to examine people’s experiences, practices, attitudes, norms, values and culture in depth, and to find out their meaning for the parties concerned. Consequently, in this study I aim to discuss various political reasons in shaping democratization in Slovenia. Therefore this study will be conducted in qualitative research design.

1.7.2. Case Study

This study will also be conducted as a case study to deeply examine democratization process in Slovenia. It is a research design that entails the detailed and intensive

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33 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan Problems of Democratic Transition: Souther Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe, p.16
34 James Gow. ‘Slovenia and the Slovenes: a small state and the new Europe’, London: Hurst, cop. 2000, p.52
38 ibid.
analysis of a single case. In other words, case study includes the detailed exploration of a particular case. As Bryman argues, case study research is concerned with the complexity and particular nature of the case in question\textsuperscript{39}. Case studies provide the reader with in depth information about that specific subject. Primary purpose is to generate an intensive exploration of a single case, regarding which they get involved in theoretical analysis. The main concern is the quality of the theoretical reasoning\textsuperscript{40}. Yin defines a case study as ‘(…) an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’\textsuperscript{41}.

Case studies have been criticized regarding the reliability criteria. The objective of reliability is to minimize the errors and biases in a research. One way to approach the reliability issue is to make as many steps as operational as possible\textsuperscript{42}. Besides, the procedures that are being followed should be documented to the largest possible extent.

1.7.3. Data Collection
Democratization and post-communist transition are widely studied topics in International Relation discipline, especially after the collapse of communism. Although Slovenia is a small republic of two million people, it is easy to get data about democratization process in Slovenia. Sources of this thesis primarily consist of books, electronic journals, academic articles, official documents, meeting reports and internet sites. When I gathered my data, I tried to be selective in order to demonstrate different viewpoints about democratization process in Slovenia. To have a sufficient and contented ground for my thesis, I have collected data from libraries of Istanbul Bilgi University, Koc University, Bogazici University, Linköping University and Umeå University.

The official web page of Republic of Slovenia has been extremely helpful to provide information as well. Especially Public Relations and Media Office has been useful to find articles about Slovenia as a whole. I have benefited from fundamental electronic journals; mostly *Journal of Democracy*, *World Politics*, *International Affairs*, *East European Quarterly*, and *East European Studies* web sites. I have found numbers of articles that provide different approaches and viewpoints, which gave rise to shape my thesis.

1.8. Literature Review
1.8.1. Empirical Literature
This study consists of great amount of empirical literature written about Slovenia, Slovene history, Yugoslav and the Balkan history and the process of democratization. James Gow’s ‘Slovenia and the Slovenes: a small state and the new Europe’\textsuperscript{43} is a fundamental study examining Slovenia historically, politically, economically, culturally and ethnically. To review Slovenian history within Yugoslav Federation,
Glenny Misha’s book ‘The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War’ is useful. And also, to signify how independence and war taken place in Slovenia and how civil society was employed as a driving force to democratize Slovenia, ‘Independent Slovenia: origins, movements, prospects’ by Evan Kraft and Jill Benderly eds. is prominent. ‘Making a new nation: the formation of Slovenia’ edited by Danica Fink-Hafner and John R. Robbins also gives understanding about a creation of a new nation. ‘Slovenia: from Yugoslavia to the European Union’ by Mrak Mojmir and Matja Rojec, Carlos Silva-Jauregui eds explains how Slovenia separated from Yugoslav Federation and became member of the EU. Pridham Geoffrey and Tom Gallagher eds. in ‘Experimenting with democracy: regime change in the Balkans’ point out how Balkan countries have transformed from communism to democracy.

The main purpose of this study is to examine Slovenian democratization process and its fundamental reasons. Therefore, Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda’s book ‘Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe’, is one of the fundamental book about post-communist countries and their democratization process to comprehend democratization process in Slovenia. Similarly, Richard Rose and William Mishler, Christian Haerpfer’s book ‘Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies’ tries to find out democracy in post-communist countries. Other remarkable book by John D. Nagle and Alison Mahr ‘Democracy and democratization: Post-communist Europe in comparative perspective’ aims to explain democracy and democratization in Central and Eastern Europe comprehensively. By comparing post-communist countries, the book exhibits the characteristics of Slovene democracy and Slovenes’ attitude towards democratization. One of the fundamental books, undoubtedly, in this study is, ‘Nationalism and Democratization: Politics of Slovakia and Slovenia’ by Erika Haris, which comparatively examines two post-communist countries and tries to expose the political, economic, cultural and ethnical differences among them.

During the construction of my work I have made use of a number of articles about Slovenia case, such as ‘Post-communist Transition and Social Sciences: The case of Slovenia’ by Frane Adam and Matej Makarovic, ‘Slovenia’s Smooth Transition’ by Antonio Bebler, and ‘Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe’ by Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda.
and Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Slovenia’ in Civil-Military Relations and Defence Planning: Challenges for Central and Eastern Europe in the New Era55, and ‘Civil-Military Relations in Slovenia’56 by Anton Bebler, Professor in University of Ljubljana, Oplatka, Andreas’s article ‘Ten Years of Independence in Slovenia: A Successful Case of Transformation’57.

I.8.2. Theoretical Literature

For theoretical review, ‘Democratization’ edited by David Potter and David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh and Paul Lewis gives theoretical ground for this study. The book explains democratization theories in three categories; the modernization approach, structural approach and transition approach, and discusses each group in detail as well as how they relate to each other58. Jean Grugel, in his book ‘Democratization: a critical introduction’59, explains theories of democratization and more importantly he presents how these theories relate to each other and what their weaknesses are. Another explanatory book about democratization by Tatu Vanhanen ‘Democratization: a comparative analysis of 170 countries’ gives rise to understand democratization in number of countries60. In order to explore democratization process in Slovenia, I have chosen transition approach among theories of democratization. In their ‘Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe’61 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan discuss the main arenas which give rise to consolidated democracy. Another theoretical approach that is applied in this study by Samuel Huntington and his prominent book ‘The Third Wave’62 will be discussed in this study regarding ‘Waves of democratization’. As a counter-argument Michael McFaul’ ‘The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Normative Transitions in the Post-Communist World’63 gives another perspective to consider how democratization process has taken place in Slovenia.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter aims at providing theoretical framework for democratization process in Slovenia. I have chosen theories of democratization, because “democratization provides an in-depth investigation into the cause of democracy”64. This chapter

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consists of two parts. In the first part, historical background of democratization will be examined to give some information about how Slovenian democratization is considered by political science thinkers. Secondly, three different theories on democratization; modernization theory, historical sociology (structuralism), and transition theory (agency theory), will be examined to find out both strengths and weaknesses of all approaches. Finally I have chosen transition approach conducted in this study.

II.1.1. Historical Background on Democratization

*Democratization* simply refers political changes towards a democratic direction. It has been the most significant global event during the twentieth century. Since the 1970s democratization has extended with particular vigor. “In 1975 at least 68 per cent of countries throughout the world were authoritarian; by the end of 1995 only about 26 per cent were authoritarian, all the rest having held some sort of competitive elections and adopted at least formal guarantees of political and civil rights.” In the mid-1970s, rapid political transformation began in Southern Europe, extended to Latin America and parts of Asia in the 1980s, and then moved on to parts of sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The collapse of communism has unexpectedly obliged politicians to supply new political regime in place of the old. Free elections throughout Central and Eastern Europe in 1990 heralded the introduction of new democracies across half a continent. Election result showed widespread popular support for democratic parties. The states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and Former Yugoslavia were the least to phrase of democratization, although the situation of post-communism has by no means provided a solid base for stable democratic development or the peaceful transition to a new political order.

The process of democratization has not been linear or uncontested. Besides, the causes of democratization have differed over time and space. So while the class was the motor of democratization in the nineteenth century, by the 1980s and 1990s process of democratization was driven by a complex combination of social conflict, state-building and external influence. One way to explain the expansion of democratization over time is to group experiences together in distinct ‘waves’. This suggests that democratization in the countries linked together in the ‘wave’ at least have common causes. In 1991, Samuel Huntington suggested that waves of democratization have been followed by reverse waves of authoritarianism, as some countries failed to consolidate democracy and others experienced democratic collapse. This wave theory had become a conventional part of the story of democratization. It is important to move beyond the idea of the wave in order to understand more completely democratization both in historical perspective and in the present day.

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66. Ibid. p.1
67. Ibid. p.1
70. Ibid.2.
II.1.2. Waves of Democratization
Samuel Huntington describes a wave of democratization as:

“A wave of democratization is a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time. A wave also involves liberalization or partial democratization in political systems that do not become fully democratic. Each of the first two waves of democratization was followed by a reverse wave in which some but not all of the countries that had previously made the transition to democracy reverted to non-democratic rule.”

For Samuel Huntington, the long first wave of democratization began in the early nineteenth century gave rise to triumph of democracy in the amount of countries around 1930. Liberal democracy was in a process of expansion during this time, although it was challenged by the alternative notion of socialist democracy, which linked the concept of popular rule to a socialist organization of society and economy. Communism, in other words, was a persuasive anti-capitalist ideology. But the most substantive challenge to liberal democracy, and indeed Communism, came from Fascism. The rise of the Fascist movement across Europe and the Fascist seizures of power in Italy and Germany brought the first wave to a close. A reverse wave followed, according to Huntington, lasted from 1926 until 1942. During this period, democratic political systems collapsed in Italy, Germany, Spain, Argentina and some of the fledgling democracies in Eastern Europe. Fascism formed the ideological core of the dictatorships that spread across Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. Although it was eventually defeated in Italy and Germany, the dictatorships that emerged in Portugal and Spain in the 1930s survived into the 1970s.

The second wave described by Samuel Huntington was noticeably shorter. The second, short wave of democratization after the Second World War increased the number of democracies in the world. The physical defeat of the Axis power in 1945 was initiation for second wave of democratization. The American, British and French allies were the main architects of democratization in the occupied territories of Germany, Japan and Austria. In this time, democratization spread in parts of Latin America. Decolonization after the Second World War further increased the number of democracies, although democracy in much of Africa was both unstable and formalistic. Democratic consolidation was incomplete through the 1960s and by the 1970s the developing world in particular was the grip of harsher dictatorships as had never been before.

Huntington describes a third wave beginning with democratization in Portugal in 1974, followed quickly by Greece and Spain. In the 1980s, a number of Latin American countries began to democratize. Democratization began in 1989 in East and Central Europe, the former Soviet Union and parts of Africa. Democratic movements

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73 ibid,p.77
74 ibid, pp.78-80.
also emerged at this time in Asia\textsuperscript{76}. The fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, from 1989 to 1990, along with change of the political landscape in other regions of the world in the 1970s and 1980s, were part of a global democratic trend. That democratic trend has become widely known as a “third wave of democracy”\textsuperscript{77}. Similarly, Jacques Rupnik argues, the democratic revolutions of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe have been described as the culmination of the "third wave" of global democratization that began in Spain and Portugal in the mid-1970s\textsuperscript{78}. Briefly, Samuel Huntington explains in his book when and how democracy took place in these countries\textsuperscript{**}. 

II.1.3. Michael McFaul’s Fourth Wave democratization

Michael McFaul analyzes third wave democratization and argues transitions in post-communist countries are completely different from third wave democratization. Transitions from communist rule to new regime types are so different from the third wave democratic transitions in the 1970s and 1980s that they should not even be grouped under the same headline\textsuperscript{79}. McFaul argues, in third wave both old and new elite makes a pact to have consolidated democracy. Masses do not have to involve in democratization process. On the contrary, McFaul claims that in post-communist transitions are fourth wave that masses are strongly important along with the elite. In post-communist transition, masses were involved and masses committed to democracy. There are elite and their interests, and people who believed in democracy are important\textsuperscript{80}. In other words, revolution comes from below in the name of democracy.

McFaul asserts that main argument of the third wave was that the mode of transition affected the resulting regime type. It was asserted that democracy emerged as a result of transitional moments, in which the balance of power between supporters and opponents of the authoritarian regime was relatively equal and also uncertain\textsuperscript{81}. Because neither side had the capacity to accomplish its first preferences through the use of force, the sides opted to negotiate power-sharing arrangements with their opponents, which represented second-best outcomes for both. Often called "pacts," these power-sharing arrangements negotiated during transition were then institutionalized as a set of checks and balances in the new democracy. Considerably, ideas, norms, and beliefs played little or no role in these transition theories, and hence the famous notion that a country could become a "democracy without democrats"\textsuperscript{82}.

McFaul highlights the need to limit the role of radicals and the masses in the negotiation process. Pacted transitions are elite affairs; mobilized masses spoil the

\textsuperscript{77} Gabriel Bădescu, ‘Civil Society and Democratization in the Post-Communist Balkan’s, Central European University, Center for Policy Studies, Blue Bird Agenda for Civil Society in South-East Europe, p.1. http://www.ceu.hu/cps/bluebird/par_par_badescu_prog2.pdf
\textsuperscript{**}See Table 1 Waves of democratization according to Samuel Huntington, p.70
\textsuperscript{80} ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} ibid.
\textsuperscript{82} ibid.
party. In successful transitions from dictatorship to democracy in capitalist countries, trade unions, the left, and radicals more generally must not play a major role in the transition process and then only a limited role in the new political system that eventually emerges.83

II.1.4. Samuel Huntington’s vs. Michael McFaul’s Wave
Samuel Huntington called post-communist transition as ‘third wave’. Erika Harris points out various reasons why considering post-communist transitions in the “third wave” may not deepen our understanding of the 1989 developments in the CEECs. First of all, Harris argues, there were no signs of democratization in those countries during the 1970s. Secondly, one is well advised to consider the significant differences in the international environment. After the end of the Cold War, the integration of new post-communist democracies into the existing Western political, economic and security structures is, at the end of bipolar competition, perceived to be less vital. And integration of post-communist countries is thus much slower than the integration of the Southern European states such as Spain and Portugal in 1980s. In contrast, the development in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s can not be separated; indeed they were of decisive significance, from the following developments in the rest of the Communist Europe. For this reason, the ‘wave’ of transitions from communism is better considered as a distinct phenomenon; if not a “fourth wave” then definitely a particular pattern of transitions within a chronological ‘third wave’.84

II.1.5. Summary
That is true to say that Slovenian situation was more different than CEECs in general. When Socialist Yugoslavia expelled from the world communist family, Cominform1, in 1948, in return developed alternative system that is known ‘self-management’. Consequently Socialist Yugoslavia was the most liberal among all socialist states. This was reflected in Slovenes feeling that they had almost received the “third way” between capitalism and communism. Even in the early 1960s, Slovenia enjoyed relative economic liberalization and improving the relations with the West not only in terms of goods but also travel.85 The Slovenes, just as other Socialist Former republics, adopted more liberal position than the rest of the socialist world. Besides, Former Yugoslavia provided more autonomy to its constituent republics in 1974 Constitution that will be discussed in following chapter. Most importantly, it is significant to note that in Slovenian transition process, as McFaul claims, masses committed to democracy, along with the elite played an important role in transition. It has to be considered that Slovenes produced a state at the best possible time in history, when Vaclav Havel’s vision of a “peaceful transition to the participation of

83 ibid.
1 Cominform, acronym for Communist Information Bureau, information agency organized in 1947 and dissolved in 1956. Its members were the Communist parties of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. The Cominform attempted to reestablish information exchanges among the European Communist parties that had lapsed since the dissolution (1943) of Comintern. Its decisions were not binding, nor was membership obligatory for Communist parties
As it will be discussed below in detail, mass population demanded democratization in Slovenia like in any other post-communist countries. The role of civil society and masses are in fact important in this respect. Revolution came from below instead of imposition by the elite. In addition, one of the distinguishing features not to discuss Slovenian democratization, as ‘third wave’ is its structure within the Yugoslav Federation. The reason is that Slovenes called for an abandoning of the communist system and the introduction of a politically pluralist, democratic system, a free market economy with public welfare and an independent Slovene state over two and a half years before the fall of the Berlin Wall. That was the time Yugoslavia was still ruled by a communist system. It was not precisely the same time when CEECs countries gained their independence. All in all, Slovenian transition seems to be considered “fourth wave” instead of “third wave” due to these evident reasons.

II.2.1. THEORIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION

Democratization studies examine and explain processes whereby governments, states and societies attempt to move away from some form of authoritarianism towards some form of democracy. This chapter puts in plain words different approaches and examines how they have been used in the literature on contemporary democratization. Theories of democratization have been concerned mainly with causation and the identification of the main factors that lead to the emergence of democracies. Most explanations of democratization draw upon elements of the three distinct approaches: modernization theory, historical sociology (structuralism), and transition theory (agency theory).

It is important to note that all theories attempt to impose order and find patterns in the messy and complex reality of human life; to some extent, therefore, theories are bound to be parsimonious and partial explanations. No single theory will explain completely a particular case in its own. But the theories are useful in that they ask important questions about democratization in general and contribute to particular explanations. On the other hand, all three approaches have something different to contribute to the debate about consolidation of democracy. Nevertheless, they all also have very important limitations in this respect.

II.2.1. Modernization Theory

The ‘modernization theory’ emphasizes a number of social and economic conditions either associated with existing liberal democracies or necessary for successful

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87 ibid.p.55
88 Janko Prunk ‘Path to Independence’, Government of the Republic of Slovenia Public Relations and Media Office
Retrieved on 7 January 2005 http://www.uvi.si/10years/path/
90 ibid. p46
democratization91. Many other variables are also considered, but the level of development is central. Seymour Martin Lipset, in his essay ‘Economic development and democracy’ argued democracy is related to a country’s socioeconomic development or level of modernization92. Democracy is therefore related to a country’s socioeconomic development or level of modernization.

Lipset argues that a modern society is fundamentally a product of capitalism. Lipset presumes that modernity was a single universal experience, leading to essentially similar societies and states. As a theory of change, modernization is ‘functionalist’ and ‘economistic’, in that it considers democracy as an outcome of capitalism. It associates economic growth in a causal relationship with progress. Modernization is also predictive: democracy appears in those societies that are able to ‘replicate the original transition’ to capitalism and become enmeshed in global economic structures93. According to Lipset, capitalism is the central of democracy because it produces wealth, led to an educated middle class and produced a number of cultural changes favorable to democracy, such as increased secularism and a diminution in ascriptive and primordial identities94.

The strength of modernization theory is that modernization is an attempt to theorize the fact that democracies have taken place in the modern world under capitalism. It has tried to indicate the particular components of capitalism that make for democracy.

II.2.1.1. Weaknesses of Modernization Theory
The modernization theory attempts to explain democratization considering capitalism. The noticeable weakness of modernization theory is to narrow democratization into capitalism. It has also been suggested that modernization theory is ahistorical, ethnocentric overly structural95. Modernization is ahistorical in that it assumes that all societies can replicate a transition that in truth took place at a particular moment in space and time. It does not recognize the difficulties- indeed the impossibility- of one society copying what occurred in a different society at a different time. It also ignores the changes that have occurred globally, which mean that capitalism is now a global order rather than an economic system confined within the territorial boundaries of particular nation states96.

From a rather different perspective, Beetham has also suggested that the idea that the market is inevitably supportive of democracy, as modernization presumes is unsustainable 97. Markets can both support and weaken democracy. At length because modernization pays no attention to the particular development processes of the third world and has extrapolated out of the experiences of the Western world a ‘rule’ for the entire planet, modernization is also inherently ethnocentric98.

91 David Potter and David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh Paul Lewis eds. ‘Democratization’, Cambridge: Polity Press in association with the Open University, 1997, p.10
92 ibid. p11
94 ibid.47
95 ibid, pp.48-49
96 ibid.
98 ibid.49
The idea that modernization is an overly structural explanation of political change is a critique of a different order. Rather than attacking the fundamental assumption of modernization, it is proposed that the role of structure that is capitalism is exaggerated without regard for human action. In other words, modernization leaves politics out and should be criticized ‘for being overly concerned with structures and therefore presume that the behavior of people- whether classes, groups or individuals- is epiphenomenal and ultimately reducible to material or other conditions’.

Finally modernization theory has also been subject to a methodological critique. Lipset’s method was to categorize all countries in terms of being ‘more or less democratic’. He tested this by using two variables, wealth and education, and found that the average wealth and level of education was much higher for the democratic countries. Lipset asserts to have proved that more telephones, more cars, more consumption, in sum more capitalism leads to democracy. Even scholars largely sympathetic to modernization’s underlying thesis have found themselves obliged to decrease these far-reaching claims.

Today’s modernizationists generally do not claim direct causality between capitalism and democracy. Larry Diamond had been predominantly influential in updating modernization theory. He has picked up the 1960s concern with mass participation and political culture in newly ‘modernized’ states and emphasizes, in particular, the role of political culture and a dynamic civil society for democratization. In the process, he has shifted modernization away from a discussion on the causes of democracy towards a focus on consolidation.

II.2.2. Structuralism or Historical Sociology

Historical sociology and structuralism are often used interchangeably in democratization theories. The structuralism or historical sociology emphasizes changing structures of power favorable to democratization. In other words, historical sociology is a kind of ‘macrohistory’ in which history is ‘the instrument by which structures are discovered invisible to the unaided eye’. A central strand of historical sociology has been the search to identify different courses of state development or paths to modernity, through, for example, war or revolution.

Structuralists are concerned in how the shifting relationship between the state, understood in the Weberian sense of ‘a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ and classes shapes the political system. The point is they admit an important role for collective actors. They agree that democracies do not come into being overnight; nor does democracy happen simply because some people (individuals, groups, or classes) will it into existence. Structuralists discuss that the transformation of the state through class conflicts over time, in order to explain how democracy has sometimes appeared. Structuralism besides includes elements of political economy of democratization in that it gives emphasis to how changes in the economy bring about social or class

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99 ibid.49
100 ibid. p.50
103 ibid p52
104 ibid 52
conflict, even though economic change is not, on its own, regarded to determining political outcomes. Unlike the wave of approach of modernization theory, historical sociology explains factors that are distinctive to particular cases. The other strength of historical sociology is that it is abundantly grounded and explanatory; and that it gives the possibility of comparison across time as well as across countries or regions.

II.2.2.1. Weaknesses of Structuralism

Structural approach has been the subject of a number of criticisms. Historical sociology has been largely unfashionable, like all structuralist explanations of social change. Structuralism has, generally, fallen foul of the rediscovery of individual agency and volition in politics, of the questioning of Marxian class analysis and of the post-modern suggestion that power is too diffuse a concept to be understood in any static way; it is, instead, located in shifting and fluid relationships. The main critiques of structuralism have been that its view of the world is too simple or simply wrong. As Przeworski puts it ‘in this formulation the outcome is uniquely determined by conditions, and history goes on without anyone ever doing nothing’. In truth, still, historical sociology does identify a significant role for agency in processes of political transformation. The main agents of change are classes, or even the state. However this idea of collective action is not adequate to satisfy critics who only recognize individuals as agents.

The other weakness is that structuralism, that has emphasis on its stress on long-term historical change, seemed unable to explain the beginning of sudden democratization in societies such as East and Central Europe and the countries of the ex-Soviet Union. Jean Grugel argues, these post-communist countries where there was apparently little evidence of class struggle for democracy, except shortly before the collapse of authoritarianism. It was logical, therefore, especially in the light of the rise of agency-based theories of political behaviors through the 1980s that dissatisfaction with structuralism would cause a new agency-centered paradigm of democratization.

II.2.3. Transition Theory (Agency Theory)

The transition theory or agency approach emphasizing political progress and elite initiatives and choices that give an explanation for shift from authoritarian rule to liberal democracy. Transition theory supposes that democracy as produced by conscious, committed actors, providing that they hold a degree of luck and show, willingness to compromise, not by economic conditions. Therefore, democracy is not a question of waiting for economic circumstances to mature or the political struggles unleashed by economic change to be succeeded. The division between agency-centered scholars, on the other hand, and structuralists and modernization theorists, on the other, turns on the roles of actors, structure, culture and class relations in democratization and regime change. The transition school argues, both modernizationists and structuralists perceive the economy, history and development as over determining political outcomes.

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105 ibid.52
106 ibid. p.55.
107 Ibid. p.55
108 ibid. p.55
109 ibid. pp 56-57
110 ibid.56
111 ibid.
In term of structuralists and the modernization school, democracy is an excellent outcome that has taken place only a few areas of the world. It cannot be reproduced in countries where either the required levels of development are lacking or where the class or social structure is critical to it. By contrast, the attractions of the transition approach lies exactly in the fact that it questions these rather pessimistic assumptions. Agency-centred perspectives put forward that democracy can be created independent of the structural context. The optimism of transition accounts in great measure for its achievement, politically and academically, for this seems to be exactly what occurred at the end of the 1980s. By implication, therefore, the transition approach supposes that the chances for expanding democracy in the current world order are good. It presumes successful outcomes for democracy if elites can learn the ‘right’ way to proceed.

Agency-centred scholar, Dankwart Rustow in his article ‘Transitions to Democracy’ underlines that there are four main phases in transition approach. First, there is a phase when national unity within a given territory is being established. Rustow means the enormous majority begins to share political identity. Second, this national community goes through a preparatory phase indicated by a long-lasting and inconclusive political struggle. In brief, democracy results in conflict, even violence, never as a result of simply peaceful evolution. That facilitates to give explanation why democracy can be so fragile in the early stages, and why so many countries do not make it through the preparatory phase to the first transition. Third, there is the first transition or decision phase in which the choices and negotiations of ‘a small circle of leaders’ play a mainly important role. In Rustow’s theory there is always a conscious decision by political elites to adopt democratic rules, for a country never becomes a democracy ‘in a fit of absentmindedness’. Fourth, there is the second transition or habituation phase in which citizens and leaders fully adapt to the new system. Owing to compromises that had to be made, gradually, however, such rules, once made, become a habit. Some of the political elites who were party to the compromise decision to set up democracy may only unwillingly have put up with it in early years. However, they are ultimately accomplished by a new generation of elites who have become habituated to democratic rules and who sincerely believe in them. With that, a democratic regime may be stated to be firmly founded. These stages were later transformed into liberalization, transition and consolidation.

Transition approach differs from the modernization approach. The heart of transition theory lies on historical political processes marked by social conflict. Rustow states that historically ‘a people who are not in conflict about some rather fundamental matters who would have little need to devise democracy’s elaborate rules for conflict resolution’. Action, struggle, ‘hot family feuds’, and ultimate conciliation historically in particular countries is what democratization is about, not inexorable

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112 ibid.57
115 ibid.
116 ibid p.55
movement on the relatively bland area of timeless social conditions. What drives these historical processes is the agency of political elites in conflict. Democracy is produced by the initiatives of human beings.\(^{117}\)

In 1986, Schmitter, O’Donnell and Whitehead edited *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* that became the key reference for transition studies. They give emphasis to the fundamental importance of political actors and choices in the transition process. It marked the beginning of a massive literature that concentrated on the processes of democratization by examining the interactions, pacts and bargains struck between authoritarian leaders and democratic opposition. These pacts gave rise a ‘transition’, a kind of halfway house between authoritarianism and consolidated democracy, in which the institutional rules are laid down for the practice of democracy. It is stressed that successful transition depends upon agreements between elites, including in general the outgoing authoritarian leaders. In none of their cases did democracy emerge predetermined by the structural situation in which the struggles happen and pacts are made. They concluded that skilful leadership, aided by luck, was important means to outcomes, which cause the establishment of democratic procedures for government.\(^{118}\)

Like Rustow, Schmitter and Whitehead make a clear distinction, between the initial transition from authoritarian rule or preliminary political liberalization and the consolidation of liberal democracy. The reason for this is that initial transitions sometimes succeed, but they also occasionally failed, or get delayed.\(^{119}\) In particular, transition studies call attention to the agency and interactions of elites. They have therefore made an important contribution by detailing how elite pacts, formal or informal, or compromises shape new democracies in the first place and contribute to their institutionalization. Elite-led democratization is observed as positive for post-transition stability. But there are also some problems that come from pact-making. The foundational pacts can be a means through which economic elites guarantee themselves of the ‘right’ to continue to exploit a majority of the population and are therefore essentially ‘anti-democratic mechanisms’.\(^{120}\) While pact-making produces stability, it can also give rise to the institutionalization of forms of political omission. In other words, pacts give a shape the terms of transition and those terms may not be contributing to democratization in long-run.

### II.2.3.1. Pact-Making and Democratization

The significance of pact-making has been a central theme of transition studies. “Pact-making is a way of describing the ‘establishment of substantial consensus among elites concerning the rules of the democratic game and the worth of democratic institutions’”\(^{121}\). According to O’Donnell and Schmitter, “elite pacts are ‘an open, but not all the time publicly spelled out or justified, agreement between a select set of actors that asks for to describe rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those entering into it’\(^{122}\). They assert that elite pacts make easy ‘an institutional breakthrough’ and make negotiations over

\(^{117}\) ibid. p. 55
\(^{118}\) ibid. pp. 56–57
\(^{119}\) ibid. 58
\(^{120}\) ibid. p. 59
\(^{121}\) ibid.
\(^{122}\) ibid.
the institutional format of the new democracy possible. The major advantage identified with pact-making is establishing a stable and steady situation and limiting uncertainty during the transition. The literature on pact-making has generally stressed the role of ‘the political class’; politicians, important party officials, bureaucrats, and office-holders. But, on the other hand, Di Palma argues, accommodating business and labor, as well as the state, is important123.

Transition studies have generated an important literature on the state and transition. According to Przeworski the emergence of democracy does not necessarily suggest that all key political actors have become democrats; rather it means that the opposition and the soft-liners in government have persuaded hard-liners that there is more to gain from cooperating with change than from opposing it124. Therefore a democratic transition is only a ‘contingent institutional compromise’125. As a result, the new institutions take on an central role in their own right. The design of the new institutions is dominant for the success of the transition:

“If a peaceful transition to democracy is to be possible, the first problem to be solved is how to institutionalize uncertainty without threatening the interests of those who can still reverse the process. The solutions to the democratic compromise consist of institutions”126

Transition approach is thus accountable for the stress in contemporary studies on the creation of institutions, the writing of constitutions and the choice of electoral systems. Moreover, transition studies have shaped academic perceptions that the micro-politics of democratization are considerable. Studies of transition have stressed agency, negotiation, compromise, and the politics of change. They have also stressed the significance of distinctive different stages of democratization- liberalization, transition and consolidation127.

II.2.3.2. Weaknesses of Transition Theory
Because of the emphasis on elites, agency-centred perspectives have applied relatively little time to the analysis of civil society, associational life, social and political struggles and citizenship in the construction of democracy. Consequently, the transition perspective takes a rather ambiguous position to the role of civil society in democratization. Some agency scholars have seen an active civil society or social activism as insignificant for democratic consolidation. Przeworksi proposes that in some case popular mobilization has been harmful to democratization because it endangered the interests of powerful elites who then went to considerable length to end uncertain experiments in political liberalization. This position was altered afterwards, by recognition of the difficulties that weak civil societies pose in new democracies128.

124 ibid.62
125 ibid.62
126 ibid. p63
127 ibid.63
128 ibid. p59
Transition approaches have highlighted the micro-processes of regime collapse, the opening of transitions and the mechanisms of democratic construction. But they have also been criticized for being overly elitist, excessively empirical and voluntaristic. Furthermore, they have been inclined to apply theories constructed out of Southern Europe and Latin America to regions which culturally, politically and economically different, such as East and Central Europe, the territories of the ex-Soviet Union, Africa and China.\(^{129}\)

Transition approach distinguishes democracy from its crucial meaning as rule by the people and conceptualizes it predominantly as the establishment of a set of governing institutions. As the same time, the perspective’s elitism consigns the mass of the people to a bystander role in the creation of new regimes. This takes no notice of empirical evidence, which points to the role of popular struggles in some transitions as the determining element in unleashing democratization in the first place. It also pays no attention to the importance of civil society in democratization or at best limits it to a merely instrumental role.\(^{130}\)

Transition approach fails to study deep-rooted problems to democratization over the long term by focusing largely on short-term changes. When democratizations go wrong it is, by implication, because individuals ‘get it wrong’. The transition approach does not explain sufficiently why outcomes are different, except by assuming insufficient leadership styles or the adoption of wrong policies.\(^{131}\) It does not differentiate between outcomes- they are all ‘democratic’ in some way once elections are held and authoritarian office holders are forced out- or explain why apparently democratic institutions can run in non-democratic ways. And after all, it leaves out to analyze in any depth the roles of culture, development, history or the internationalization of politics in democratization. All in all, it does not pay sufficient attention to structural context and constrains. Yet as more authoritarian regimes broke down in different parts of the world, the understanding of democracy had to be stretched, confused and weakened in order to fit regimes that sometimes scarcely came out to qualify for the label. At the same time, a number of ‘transitions to democracy’ for which hope was initially expressed, have ended very far indeed from the democratic ideal, representing that the ‘catch-all’ definition of democracy was rather too loose.\(^{132}\)

II.3. Summary

The traditional theories of democratization, especially modernization, have usually dealt with understanding why democratization starts. Along with historical sociology, modernization also attempts to take a long-standing perspective on political change, looking for fundamental transformations in society and the economy. Transition studies, in contrast, have given attention on the politics of construction a democracy, focusing on the period immediately following the authoritarian collapse and on elite behaviour. While the influence of the mode of transition on later politics has been noted, transition studies have not in general produced a holistic approach to democratization, understood as consolidation as well as transition.

\(^{129}\) ibid. p.60
\(^{130}\) ibid. pp.60-61
\(^{131}\) ibid.p.61
\(^{132}\) ibid. p.61-62
By divest democracy of its structural context, the transition perspective proposes democracy can take root outside Western Europe and the US and that the global upheavals of the 1980s and 1990s were, in actual fact, struggles for democracy. Therefore transitology account for the global scope of democratization studies. Because of all these reasons, this study will be conducted on transition theory. Democratization is seen as a process and transition studies offer a ‘political’ explanation of democratization. To conclude, I have chosen transition theory in this study since transition studies offer a ‘political’ explanation of democratization.

TRANSITION THEORY
BY JUAN J. LINZ AND ALFRED STEPAN

Democracy constitutionally becomes ‘the only game in town’ when all of the actors in the polity become habituated to the fact that political conflict within the state will be resolved in terms of established norms, and that violations of these norms are probable to be both ineffective and costly. In brief, with consolidation, democracy becomes routine and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and even psychological life, as well as in political calculations for achieving success.

Linz and Stepan’s book Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation is one of the more recent works on the transition approach. Linz and Stepan argue, consolidated democracies need to contain in place five interacting arenas to strengthen one another in order for such consolidation to exist. These interacting areas are a lively civil society, a relatively autonomous political society, rule of law, a usable state and economic society. If a functioning state emerges, five other interacting and mutually reinforcing conditions must also exist or be crafted for a democracy to be consolidated. First, the situation must exist for the development of a free and lively civil society. Second, there must be a relatively autonomous and valued political society. Third, there must be a rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens’ freedoms and independent associational life. Fourth, there must be a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic government. Fifth, there must be an institutionalized economic society. It is important to identify these arenas since they have been quite influential during democratization process in Slovenia. Besides, Linz and Stepan conceptualize ‘stateness problem’ and argue without existence of a state, there cannot be a consolidated modern democratic regime. They also points out that Slovenia, along with Lithuania, are only countries that never had the importance of stateness problems for democratization.

III.1.1. Civil Society

By civil society, Linz and Stepan refer to that arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, try to articulate values, construct associations and solidarity, and advance their
interests\textsuperscript{137}. Civil society can consist of various social movements; intellectual organizations, neighborhood associations, women’s groups, religious groupings and civic associations from all social strata such as entrepreneurial groups, trade unions, lawyers or journalists. The idea of civil society has huge ability to mobilize the opposition to the military-led bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes.

Linz and Stepan highlight that besides the whole range of organizations, such as illegal or legal trade unions, bar associations, associations of students and professors, religious communities that compose the complex web of civil society. And also another part of the society; ordinary citizens who are not a part of any organization must be considered. Such citizens are usually of critical significance in changing the regime/opposition balance since they turn up in the streets in protest marches, heckle the police and the authorities, articulate their opposition first to specific measures, support broad demands, and eventually challenge the regime. Nevertheless significant, various and heroic such relatively unorganized groups may be, they would not be able to bring down the regime and set up a democratic regime if they were not the process. Civil society in many countries was rightly considered the celebrity of democratic resistance and transition.

A robust civil society, with the ability to create political alternatives and to monitor government and state can help out transitions begin, help resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, help consolidate, and help deepen democracy. At all stages all the democratization process, therefore, a lively and independent civil society is invaluable\textsuperscript{138}. Anton Bebler claims that one of the most striking political phenomena in Slovenia during the 1980s was the unprecedented blossoming of non-governmental associations, societies, clubs, study circles, and the like. The political role of civil society reached its acme during the final years of the communist-dominated regime\textsuperscript{139}. Briefly, the role of the civil society in Slovenia had influence during democratization.

\textbf{III.1.2. Political Society}

Linz and Stepan describe political society, in a democratizing setting as arena in which the polity particularly organizes itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus. At best, civil society can destroy a non-democratic regime. Linz and Stepan argue, a full democratic transition, and especially democratic consolidation, must include political society. The composition and consolidation of democratic polity must involve serious thought and action related to the development of a normatively positive appreciation of those core institutions of a democratic political society; political parties, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, inter-party alliances, and legislatures, by which society comprises itself politically to select and supervise democratic government\textsuperscript{140}.

It is important to stress not only the difference between civil society and political society, but also their complementarity, which is not always recognized\textsuperscript{141}. One of

\textsuperscript{137} ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{141} ibid.
these two arenas is often ignored in fervor of the other. Within the democratic community, champions of either civil society or political society all too often adopt a discourse and a set of practices that are completely inimical to the normal development of the other.

But Stepan and Linz consider overcoming the false disagreement some set up between civil society and political society. The risk that democratic groups mainly located in civil society might irregularly present for the development of political society is that normative preferences and styles of organization, perfectly appropriate to civil society, might be taken to be desirable or, indeed, the only legitimate style of organization for political society. Parties are required for democratic consolidation, one of main tasks is exactly to aggregate and signify differences between democracies. A high degree of institutional routinization is a key element of such a process. Intermediation between the state and civil society and the structuring compromise are similarly legitimate and essential tasks of political society. In brief, political society, informed, pressured, and periodically renewed by civil society, must somehow accomplish a workable agreement on the myriad ways in which democratic power will be exercised.

III.1.3. Rule of Law
The required degree of autonomy and independence of civil society must further be embedded in and supported by the rule of law, is third arena. All major actors, particularly the democratic government and the state, must respect and sustain the rule of law. A rule of law embodied in a spirit of constitutionalism is a crucial condition. A spirit of constitutionalism needs more than rule of majoritarianism. It requires a relatively strong consensus over the constitution and particularly a commitment to “self-binding” procedures of governance that necessitate exceptional majorities to change. It also entails a clear hierarchy of laws, interpreted by an independent judicial system and supported by a strong legal culture in civil society. As Richard Rose states the great obstacle to the completion of democracy in post-communist Europe is the absence of the rule of law.

III.1.4. State Bureaucracy
Democracy is a form of governance in which the rights of citizens are guaranteed and protected. To protect the rights of its citizens and to deliver other basic services that citizens demand, a democratic government needs to be able to exercise effectively its claim to a monopoly of the legitimate use of force in its territory. A modern democracy, therefore, needs the effective capacity to command, to regulate, and to extract tax revenues. For this, it needs a functioning state with a bureaucracy considered usable by the new democratic government. State would have to tax compulsorily in order to pay for police, judges, and basic services. Modern
democracy, therefore, needs the effective capacity to command, regulate, and extract. For this it needs a functioning state and a state bureaucracy considered usable by the new democratic government.\textsuperscript{147}

III.1.5. Economic Society
Linz and Stepan prefer to use the phrase “economic society” to call attention to two claims that they believe are theoretically and empirically sound. First, there has never been and there cannot be a non-wartime consolidated democracy in command economy. Second, there has been never and almost certainly there will never be a modern consolidated democracy in a pure market economy.\textsuperscript{148} If both of these claims are demonstrated to be sound, modern consolidated democracies require a set of socio-politically crafted and socio-politically accepted norms, institutions, regulations, which Linz and Stepan call economic society that mediates between state and market.\textsuperscript{149}

III.2. Stateness Problem
Democracy is a form of governance of state. Therefore, the first requirement in the way of democracy is existence of a state. Stepan and Linz claim that “the inexistence of a state or such an intense lack of identification with the state that large groups of individuals in the territory want to join a different state or create an independent state raise fundamental and often unsolvable problems”\textsuperscript{150}, since such “stateness” problems are so crucial. They claim, without existence of a state, there cannot be a consolidated modern democratic regime.

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have dedicated the most continuous and useful attention to placing ethno-national conflict within democratization theory. They speak of a "stateness" problem, identified as existing "when a significant proportion of the population does not admit the boundaries of the state as a legitimate political unit to which they owe obedience"\textsuperscript{151}. Carol Leff argues to frame the concept of "stateness". She argues, a stateness problem may exist not only in the presence of dis-allegiance to the established territorial unit but also when significant sectors of the population are agnostic about that allegiance, pending consensus on the proper institutional expression for a multinational state.\textsuperscript{152} In the light of this, Linz and Stepan claim that when of the twenty-two independent countries that emerged out of the dissolution of SU and the Former Yugoslavia, only two Lithuania and Slovenia, did not have any stateness problem for democratization.\textsuperscript{153}

IV. DEMOCRATIZATION: IN THE CASE OF SLOVENIA

\textsuperscript{147} Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan ‘Problems of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe’ Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996p.11
\textsuperscript{148} Leff, Carol Skalnik. ‘Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational States: The Breakup of the Communist Federations’, World Politics 51.2 (1999) 205-235
\textsuperscript{152} ibid.
This chapter aims to provide general outlook towards Slovenia to understand the process of democratization. This chapter will discuss certain reasons that gave rise to democratization in Slovenia. It particularly deals with the fundamental reasons that gave rise to democratization in Slovenia. These reasons respectively are; the legacy of the past, demand on independence, civil society and NGOs, political parties and elections, civil-military relations, elite pact and the role of strong leadership, ethnic policy and finally Europeanization in Slovenia.

Post-communist societies started democratization backwards; the first step was to introduce free competitive elections in 1990 with everyone eligible to vote. Free elections were needed to blow away the old regime. Free election is now a regular and recurrent feature of politics in Central and Eastern Europe. The point is that the paths of Central and East European countries have differed radically from the West European approach to democratization. No communist country was able to evolve gradually into a democracy, as occurred in almost half the countries of Western Europe. Slovenian transition was a gradual process stretching over a longer period of time, in which a degree of political reconciliation was achieved prior to independence; independent statehood and the polarization of elites were sufficiently contained, thus less aggravating to the transition.

IV. LEGACY OF THE PAST

The character of the predecessor non-democratic regime is one of the most important factors influencing the prospects for successful democratization. Historical legacies have significant effect in shaping democratization process. It is important to discuss legacy of the past, because both Slovenian economic and political inheritances were determined by communism.

A post-communist regime is a reaction against its predecessor; in Central and Eastern Europe the reaction has produced a demand for democratization. As it was the same in CEECs, in Slovenia, legacy of past was one of the influential factors in shaping democratization process. In Slovenian case, it is important to mention the legacy of communist understanding of liberalization and democratization. Specifically, Slovenia was in the vanguard of pressures for the liberalization and democratization of Yugoslav public life in the 1960s, as well as later, in the 1980s.

The Slovene lands were part of the Holy Roman Empire and Austria until 1918 when the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs would join with the Kingdom of Serbia to for a unified Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The new multinational state renamed Yugoslavia in 1929. During this period, the Slovenes experienced their first brief period of self-rule. James Gow points out that “initial period of self-government
demonstrated a balanced and cooperative approach to political affairs which was also to mark Slovene politics later in the transitional phrases from the advent of the Second World War to the formation of communist Yugoslavia and from the end of communist Yugoslavia to Slovenian independence in the late 1980s and early 1990s.\footnote{Ibid.p.32}

It is fair to say that Yugoslavia was the only European state to establish a communist regime at the initiative of a national communist leader, Josip Broz Tito, who led partisan forces in a guerrilla war against German and Italian occupying forces in the Second World War.\footnote{Andreas Oplatka. ‘Ten Years of Independence in Slovenia: A Successful Case of Transformation’, 29 June 2001. Retrieved on 07 January 2005 http://www.nzz.ch/english/background/2001/06/29_slovenia.html} After World War II, Tito established the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia on 31 January 1946, renamed Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in April 1963. Socialist Yugoslavia consisted of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. By joining SFRY, the Slovenes had got what they sought for; sovereignty, self-determination and statehood, even though in the context of communist rule.\footnote{James Gow. ‘Slovenia and Slovenes: A Small State and the New Europe’, London: Hurst , cop. 2000, p50} In the new Constitution of SFRY, Article 1 stated that “the new state was a ‘community of equal nations, which, on the basis of right to self-determination, including the right to separation, have expressed their will to live together in a common federal state’.”\footnote{ibid.53.} These republics were constitutionally equal in status with one another, because the intention was that this would suppress any resentment or discontent through domination by one ethnic group, which existed in the first Yugoslavia. However James Gow discusses that despite of some scope for autonomy in cultural field, the Communist Yugoslav Federation was ‘politically, socially, economically’ more centralized than the centralist royal Yugoslavia; Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes established in 1918 until 1929, had been.\footnote{Prunk, Kratka Zgodovina Slovenije, Ljubljana: Zalozba Grad, 1998, p.148 in James Gow. ‘Slovenia and Slovenes: A Small State and the New Europe’, London: Hurst , cop. 2000, p53.} However, in 1991, tiny Slovenia put up the strongest resistance within Communist Yugoslavia to Belgrade’s efforts to establish Greater Serbian hegemony over the constituent republics of the weakened Yugoslav Federation. The Slovenian parliament declared that country’s independence, ending its membership in the Yugoslav Federation on 25\textsuperscript{th} June 1991.\footnote{Andreas Oplatka. ‘Ten Years of Independence in Slovenia: A Successful Case of Transformation’, James Gow. ‘Slovenia and Slovenes: A Small State and the New Europe’, London: Hurst , cop. 2000, pp.53-54}

IV.I.1. Workers’ Self Management System

One of the main characteristics of Former Yugoslavia was the most liberal among all socialist states, because it was expelled from ‘Cominform’ in 1948, so it was not a member of the Soviet camp. In response, as a result of the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948 forced the Yugoslavia to seek different ways of legitimizing its position and developed an alternative model to.\footnote{James Gow. ‘Slovenia and Slovenes: A Small State and the New Europe’, London: Hurst , cop. 2000, p54} In the wake of sharp clash with Stalin and the Soviet Bloc in 1948, Yugoslavia had developed extensive subsystems of grassroots-level self-government and self-management. “The ‘doctrine of workers self-management intended to have more form than substance,
was the transfer of decision-making in the workplace to the workers themselves—a form of decentralization”\textsuperscript{166}. Legitimacy was based on the idea of “double autonomy”, that is of working people and nations, thus a self-managing society. In theory it involved ‘de-etatisation’ in the economic sphere by worker self-management and decentralization in territorial terms through republic and communal self-management; in practice it amounted to the eventual breakdown of the state authority. The irony is that the ideology designed to strengthen the federation was in the end the undoing of it\textsuperscript{167}. The distinctive feature of self-management system is that it was imposed from the above, thus its ideological function of legitimizing the rule of the Communist Party became dominant.

IV.1.2. Self-Management in Slovene Experience

In Slovenia as that was the case in the rest of the federation, self-management system did give ordinary people a limited but real decision-making role at work and in their neighborhoods. Within that already different type of communism espoused by the Yugoslav leadership, Slovenia was further the most liberal among the republics. This was reflected in Slovenes feeling that they had almost received the “third way” between capitalism and communism\textsuperscript{168}. While higher-level politics remained under party control, the practice of self-government and self-management was teaching many Slovenians about parliamentary procedure and other democratic practices\textsuperscript{169}. The system of self-management was modified during the four decade of its existence. Erika Harris points out:

“The economic reforms began in 1950 with the law that turned over the management of state firms and social services to worker’s councils, initially more consultative than decision making bodies. Later, the enterprises planned their production, investment and wage administration; salaries were dependent on each worker’s contribution and on the success of the enterprise as the whole. After 1961 workers decided how profits were to be divided within the salary fund and the accumulation fund, which after 1954 was owned by the enterprise. This resulted in the maximization of wages of profits, very high borrowing in order to finance accumulation and in the considerable decrease in the influence of the central state”\textsuperscript{170}.

As a matter of the fact self-management system had an influence on the perception of the democracy in Slovenia\textsuperscript{171}. This system created more autonomy in Slovenia from the federation. The system of worker self-management, the lower degree of coercion of the population, the significant degree of liberalization, in particular travel, some private ownership, the possibility of study abroad, the availability of Western goods and media broadcasts, was seen. If not as democratic, but nevertheless as form of democracy, which always held the premise that it could evolve into more democracy. If the West saw it as an attempt to conform to Western liberal democratic values, the domestic population believed it to be their unique ‘third way’, with Slovenia leading

\textsuperscript{166} ibid.54  
\textsuperscript{168} ibid. pp132-133.  
\textsuperscript{169} ibid. p.138  
\textsuperscript{170} ibid.138-139  
\textsuperscript{171} ibid.138
the push towards more pluralism\textsuperscript{172}. Slovenia enjoyed open borders to the West and a guaranteed access to the Yugoslav market in which they assumed a leading position.

The system of self-management gave rise to dissent that took place in a variety of forms throughout the 1950s in Slovenia through strikes by the workers, literary output or direct political criticism. Although this was only intended to apply to the economic sphere, increasingly there were pressures not only to give the measure effect economically but also extend it to other areas. As a result, although party rule was maintained, power was more diffuse than in other communist countries\textsuperscript{173}.

Discontent about self-management increased in early 1980s. Although Slovenes took self-management seriously, but at the same time became critical of the situation in Yugoslavia. It was believed that the power of the state should be strengthened. Therefore, in 1986 61.1\% of respondents in Slovenia agreed that: ‘a strong arm that knows what it wants would be of more use to our society than all the slogans about self-management. That was surprising considering that Slovenes were the champions of the decentralization and the freedom of individual\textsuperscript{174}. It may therefore be legitimately concluded that Slovenes considered the system of self-management a failure as implemented by the LCY. That not as an idea, and that the introduction of a multiparty system at the beginning of the 1990s (and ensuing independence) a was the realization of certain ideas, such as individual freedom, the participation of the majority of the population in decision-making and pluralism that Slovenes believed self-management contained.

On the other hand, the importance of participation and the freedom of choice remain the defining characteristics of Slovene political thinking and were at the heart of the transition to democracy. Considering that a high level of public participation in decision-making process and a great degree of pluralism were achieved under the system of self-management, however limited, this meant that a certain level of democratization, higher than in other post-communist countries, was achieved prior to transition to pluralist democracy. More importantly, the Slovene public was also more aware of what participation and pluralism entailed, and equally aware of the limits that the Yugoslav federation imposed on the continuation of the democratization process\textsuperscript{175}.

To sum up, in Slovenian communism did not leave behind a devastated country, but one which was economically relatively advanced, with a strong national consciousness and self-confidence of the politically and economically the most developed republic within the Yugoslav federation\textsuperscript{176}. Besides, this period marks the first real push towards a market economy and freedom of speech inside the otherwise strict one-party system of the Yugoslav federation. As a consequence of the movement, followed by similar processes in Serbia and Croatia, the new Federal

\textsuperscript{173} James Gow. ‘\textit{Slovenia and Slovenes: A Small State and the New Europe’}, London: Hurst , cop. 2000, p.54.
\textsuperscript{174} ‘\textit{Nationalism and Democratization: Politics of Slovakia and Slovenia’}, Aldershot, Hampshire, England; Burlington, VT : Ashgate, c2002, p.141
\textsuperscript{175} ibid.
\textsuperscript{176} ibid. p.67
Constitution was adopted in 1974, granting much more power to the republics of the federal state\textsuperscript{177}. 

\textbf{IV.1.3. 1974 Constitution}

The pressure and discontent in SFRY brought about number of constitutional changes, whether as amendment in 1958, 1968, 1969, 1971 and 1976 or through the adoption of new constitutions in 1953, 1963 and 1974\textsuperscript{178}. At every period, arguments were about decentralization and greater autonomy concerning powers of the republics in relation to each other and to the federation. James Gow draw an attention that Slovenia was always in the forefront of arguments for greater freedom for the republics\textsuperscript{179}.

The new constitution that was adopted in 1974 noticeably consolidated existing republican responsibilities and even extended them. The 1974 Constitution, which remained in effect through the end of the 1980s, only partially reversed the extreme decentralization of the early 1970s. Relations between the republics had formally became quasi-confederal. Only the presence of party control served as a controlling mechanism. 1974 Constitution, that gave more rights to the individual republics. According to this constitution, individual republics had a right for self-determination, up to secession, which made later break-up easier\textsuperscript{180}. Because of the nature of communist power in the state, this meant in effect that the 1974 Constitution created the ‘embryonic structure of independent states’\textsuperscript{181}. Part of the preamble of the 1974 constitution stated "the nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to secession, on the basis of their will freely expressed in the common struggle of all nations. This recognition of ‘national self-determination’ is crucial because it signified that the only way to potentially appease the various national groups within Yugoslavia was to demonstrate that they enjoyed self-determination. 

\begin{footnotes}
\item[178] James Gow. ‘Slovenia and Slovenes: A Small State and the New Europe’, London: Hurst , cop. 2000, p.54
\item[179] ibid. pp54-55
\end{footnotes}
IV.2. DEMAND ON INDEPENDENCE

‘The Slovenes never said they could not coexist with others. We said only that we
could not live under an undemocratic,
totalitarian and hegemonial regime such as
was created in Yugoslavia, because it
threatened to throttle our national identity and
rob us of our future." (Milan Kucan)\textsuperscript{182}.

Independence in Slovenia was a result of the transition to democracy. It appears that
the federal state, as a whole, was unable to complete the transition in a tempo
acceptable and suitable to all its constituent units, whether for political, cultural,
historical, or social reasons, but mostly due to the combination of all these factors.
Slovenia was far ahead of the other republics within the former Yugoslavia\textsuperscript{183}. There
has been consensus about that the demands for a redefinition of the position of
Slovenia within the Yugoslav state strongly influenced the course of Slovenian
democratization\textsuperscript{184}. Therefore, in Slovenia, democratization was associated with the
achievement of national independence\textsuperscript{185}. Similarly Erika Harris claim, separation
from the federation as the only way to guarantee the continuation of the
democratization process that was ongoing from the early 1980s\textsuperscript{186}. For that reason, it
is important to examine how the demand on independence affected the process of
democratization in Slovenia.

The social, economic and political problems led to national antagonism that the Party
was incapable of resolving. Meanwhile the huge foreign debt crippled the country and
the Party called for each republic to help to pay regardless of how much of the debt
each republic had incurred. This measure constituted a great burden for the successful
export-oriented Slovenia, and became a source of loudly voiced discontent in those
republics\textsuperscript{187}. The federal state failed to continue the democratization process in the
tempo, which would be satisfactory to all its constituent units, whether for economic,
cultural, historical, or political reasons, and usually due to the combination of all
those factors. Erika Harris expresses clearly that Slovenia was politically ahead of its
federal partners. Secession is often last option by which to emphasize political
differences in a common state and Slovenia decided that its future was best secured
by independence\textsuperscript{188}.

\textsuperscript{182} Andreas Oplatka. ‘Ten Years of Independence in Slovenia: A Successful Case of Transformation’,
http://www.nzz.ch/english/background/2001/06/29_slovenia.html
\textsuperscript{183} Erika Harris. ‘Nationalism and Democratization: Politics of Slovakia and Slovenia’, Aldershot,
Hampshire, England; Burlington, VT : Ashgate, c2002, p.132
\textsuperscript{184} Making a New Nation: ‘The Formation of Slovenia. Slovenian Political Culture: Paradoxes of
Democratization’, Ivan Bernik, Brina Malnar, Niko Tos, pp.56-82
\textsuperscript{185} Peter McDonough. ‘Identities, Ideologies, and Interests: Democratization and the Culture of Mass
\textsuperscript{186} Erika Harris. ‘Nationalism and Democratization: Politics of Slovakia and Slovenia’, Aldershot,
Hampshire, England; Burlington, VT : Ashgate, c2002, p.131
\textsuperscript{187}ibid, p.146
\textsuperscript{188}ibid. p.68
Belgrade and Ljubljana had less and less in common, each claiming defensive nationalism, the former preaching a strong Yugoslavia or rather strong Serbia in a strong Yugoslavia, the latter rejecting its eternal role of an autonomous minority. The split between the centralist Serbian camp and the more autonomist Slovenia-led one, already manifested in the Kosovo riots in 1981, became deeper.

Slovenia was increasingly disappointed and uncomfortable partner in the Yugoslav federation, seeking its own way, parallel to the increasing economic and political malaise of the federation. From Slovenia’s perspective, to continue the status quo was tantamount to ‘national suicide’ for various reasons. This federation was destroying the Slovenian economy and showing less and less regard for Slovenian culture and constitutional amendments; moreover, the Slovene leaders were repeatedly unsuccessful in influencing the federal government to bring about meaningful changes. The federal government became a ‘squabbling shop’, where deals for each republic were brokered and where decentralization had gone so far that the implementation of any reforms, or what by the late 1980s were mostly the recovery packages, became immobilized by the arithmetic of the alliances formed and enforced.\textsuperscript{189}

Miha Kovac, the editor of the Socialist Youth Alliance oppositional journal \textit{Mladina} explains that to understand the evolution of the political and cultural life in Slovenia, referred to as the ‘Slovenian spring’, one must go back to the 1970s. Kovac argues, that the Slovene leadership embraced reforms and became very antagonistic to the Serbian leadership, but he was absolutely right claiming that ‘without democratization, there is no future for Yugoslavia’. The consequence was that the regimes’ transformation could only proceed as a part of the national struggle for independence.

Independence or secession from a multinational federation is often the only way to make a clear political statement about the intended direction of political developments and how to differentiate one’s republic from others. Slovenia declared its independence distanced itself from Serbian politics forever. Kucan after he became the President in the first multi-party election in 1990 and talked of ‘Slovenia’s right to self-determination in a non-disruptive manner, stated also that ‘in a way the election results are a demonstration of the criticism of Serbia’.\textsuperscript{190}

In Slovenia, free election held in 8 April 1990, after more than 50 years, to confirm the end of the old regime and then new constitution was adopted in 23 December 1991. The median between electing a new government and adopting new constitution was twenty months in Slovenia.\textsuperscript{191} In January 1990 the federal government promised to abolish Communist Party’s monopoly power and hold free elections; these started in Slovenia in April. Separately elected governments soon became opponents of central authority in Belgrade, also the capital of Serbia, the most populous of the six

\textsuperscript{189}ibid. p.154
republics, albeit with the only one-third of its population. Newly elected governments in the republics, led by Slovenia and Croatia, sought to negotiate independence. By agreement of all the parties in Slovenia's tricameral parliament, a referendum was set for 23 December 1990. The referendum Slovenes voted for a sovereign and independent state (88.5% of registered voters voted YES, 4% voted NO, with 6.5% who did not vote and with 1% of returned or invalid ballots). Six months later, on 25 June 1991, Slovenia solemnly declared its independence and proclaimed its legal, peaceful separation from the Yugoslav federation. Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia would all shortly follow suit.

In 1990 the League of Communists of Slovenia (LCS) seceded from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), immediately followed by the Croats, renamed itself the Party of Democratic Renewal and abrogated all obligations, including the financial ones to the LCY. By then the LCY was in an advanced state of decay, accelerated by the fusion of the Serbian Communists with the local ‘Socialist Alliances’ and the subsequent election of Slobodan Milosevic as their leader. This would correspond with the general disenchantment with LCY. According to M. Hafner-Fink in 1988 apparently only 4% of the respondents in the survey believed that the Communist Party has society at interest, whilst in 1990 this figure increased to 37% - the difference is significant. The reason was whilst in 1988 the question referred to LCY, in 1990 it referred to LCS.

Contrary to Slovenia's wishes, the process of leaving Yugoslavia was not free of violence. As soon as the Slovenian National Army declared its independence on 25 June 1991 and proclaimed independent Slovenia, that meant the end of the validity of the Yugoslav Constitution in Slovenia. The JNA began its aggression in Slovenia, which is known “Ten-Day War”. About three thousand federal soldiers and police forces were sent to close the Austrian and Italian borders and to occupy the Ljubljana airport. Ten days of hostilities ensued, leaving about 70 dead, before Slovenian Territorial Defense and police units constrained the JNA to beat a humiliating retreat to its barracks. The federal army was allowed to stage an orderly pullout on 25 October 1991, and the SFRY was finally legally dissolved in Belgrade on 27 April 1992.

IV.3. SLOVENE SPRING

IV.3.1. JBTZ Trial (Trial 1988)
One of the most influential events in Slovene history in the way of democratization is the trial in 1988 of four Slovenes by Yugoslav military court in Ljubljana. As James Gow put in words that ‘1988 Trial’ and its circumstances forged Slovenian solidarity.
and it also acted as the catalyst for Slovenian democracy and turned the country in the direction of eventual independence. The military trial of three journalists and an army officer leads to calls for an independent Slovenia. The events, which followed, are known as the *Slovenian Spring*, the formation of strong civil society movements, and ending with first parliamentary multiparty democratic elections in former Yugoslavia.

On May and June 1988, the Mladina defence correspondent, Janez Jansa who would be the first Defense Minister independent Slovenia was arrested, because his articles has been increasingly critical towards JNA. Later, three others; two journalists David Tasic, and the editor Franci Zavr; and the other person indicted was the army officer Ivan Borstner; the charge being the betrayal of military secrets with the intention of publishing them were arrested. Their “crime” was to have appropriated a top-secret military document with the intention of publishing it in Mladina. Earlier, in May, Mladina had published in the pages of Mladina well-documented evidence of JNA preparations to arrest large numbers of Slovenian liberals and thereby put the top on Slovenian democratization, thus trying to end the democratization process. The prosecution in the ensuing trial of the four would cite this article. The document leaked by the army officer Ivan Borstner, concerned a plan to destabilize Slovenia, declare a state of emergency and replace the liberal Slovene political leadership and press with more conservative figures, which would have been noticeably preferable to the JNA command.

The public was irritated by the JBTZ trial. James Gow gives the reason why the Slovenes were irritated by the trial. First of all, the civilians were tried by a military court in peacetime, kept isolated for a month and a half and denied civilian defenders. Secondly, the trial was conducted in the Serbo-Croat language in a court located in Slovenia, which was in contradiction with the Slovene Constitution (although it was a routine practice in the army). Thirdly, the court was held the behind doors, the Slovene public became convinced that it was nothing more than an army frame-up to take revenge on Jansa in particular and Mladina in general and the Slovene political leadership felt obliged to became involved. Kucan in a strong speech accused the military and reassured the Party and the Slovene public that he stood for national as well as class interests.

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203 ibid. p.153
The matter of the fact is for the Slovene leadership and Slovene people the trial had been an attack on them and on their land. Some 40,000 people took part in democratization on Ljubljana’s Liberation Square, to protest the trial. Although the four accused, among them journalist Janez Jansa, were found guilty, the military failed to dampen the pressure of democratization. The four men were found guilty and arrested. The support for the further democratization was not reduced by the trial; on the contrary, the commitment to democracy deepened and broadened. In response to the trial, the Communist Party under Milan Kucan’s leadership had first embraced the notion of ‘socialism on a human scale’. Then the Committee for the Protection of Janez Jansa formed, but within days renamed itself the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights and proceeded with issuing bulletins and collected a protest petition signed by 100,000 people and thousands of small organizations. Slovene civil society, already considerably robust throughout the 1980s, was transforming itself to take the form of independent political parties.

In the few months following the trial understanding of pluralism has extended and numbers of parties were formed: Social Democratic Alliance, a Slovenian Democratic Union, a Christian Socialist Movement, a Green Party and the Slovenian Farmers Union. Existing organizations such as the League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia (later renamed Liberal Party) and the Socialist Alliance of Working People, previously affiliated to the LCS, became new independent parties. It is true to say that civil society and political society got accelerated in Slovenia as a consequence of JBTZ trial.

Ten years after the ‘Slovenian Spring’ only a modest number of non-governmental organizations remain. These include, among others, the Slovenian World Congress (dominated by the right), the Civic Forum (strongly influenced by the Catholic Church), the Democratic Forum (affiliated with the small, extra parliamentary Democratic Party), the intellectuals around Nova Revija and the Committee for the Defense of Constitutional Order (both linked to the rightist Social Democratic Party), and the Citizens’ Forum (affiliated with the leftist Social Democrats). There also appeared several non-governmental organizations with supporters or sponsors abroad. These included Slovenian chapters of Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch, and so on.

To sum up, criticism from Mladina and subsequently JBTZ Trial act unified Slovenes in a longer run led to Slovenia’s secession from Yugoslavia. Mladina became a symbol of democratic changes for all Slovenes: from left-wing members of social movements, liberal activists, to right-wing nationalists. On the contrary, the trial only deepened and broadened Slovenian commitment to democratization, while

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convincing most Slovenes that the federal structure constituted an impediment to this process.

**IV.4. CIVIL SOCIETY & NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS**

The concept of civil society provides strong theoretical basis for critique of the deformations within the ex-communist system. After the collapse of the communist regime, civil society and the pluralism it implied remained important concepts in the analysis of the level of democratic development. Civil society is the space between the individual and state. More important is the nature of the organizations and institutions, both independent and parastatal, which occupy that space and issues of utilization and control of these mechanisms in the policy process. Moshe Lewin’s definition of civil society provides us a useful basis: "the aggregate of networks and institutions that either exist or act independently of the state or are official organizations capable of developing their own spontaneous views on national or local issues and then impressing these views on their members, on small groups and, finally on the authorities." The development of a pluralistic civil society requires legal prescriptions for a balance between group and individual rights. The recognition of minority language rights (a group right) has been contentious issue. All in all, civil society is a necessary condition for democratic government.

In an article published in the spring of 1997, Clive Tempest points out, civil society never existed in Central and East Europe, neither before nor after the velvet revolutions of 1989-91. However, May Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda, in contrast, claim that the reappearance of ‘civil society’ in Central and European Europe during the 1980s paved the way for the 1989 revolutions. More importantly, Slovenia became known as ‘NGO country’. One of the most active civil society groups is to be found in Slovenia. In Slovenia the new groups have for the most part developed in response to the wars in the region and are primarily concerned with humanitarian activities, especially the welfare of refugees. In the same way, Anton Bebler claims that one of the most striking political phenomena in Slovenia during the 1980s was the unprecedented blossoming of non-governmental associations, societies, clubs, study circles, and the like. The political role of civil society reached its acme during the final years of the communist-dominated regime.

The development of social movements in Slovenia in the first half of the eighties, which actually initiated the democratization process, divorced from the Party, but to which the Party eventually responded. Social movements in Slovenia started with punk, a youth subculture, which managed to inspire the young intellectuals who lined

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212 ibid. p.68
** See Table 2 Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe, p.70
217 ibid. p.17.
up behind the movement and opposed the police violence proposed as the means of dealing with this social problem. Implicitly political NGOs, especially new social movements, such as feminists, peace activists, environmentalists and gay rights campaigners, initiated the Slovene opposition movement during the 1980s. Prior to the first democratic elections, Slovenia was, in a way, NGO country. With the emergence of parliamentary democracy, the NGO sector waned as the most NGO activists joined this or that component of the machinery of parliamentary democracy almost overnight. Public interest in politics ran high, while there were few hindrances to discussing even the most sensitive issues. Thus the stage was set up for a very high public mobilization for the cause of national emancipation and democratic reform. Civil society activists came from the ranks of political dissidents, critical intellectuals, writers, journalists, trade unionists, students, ecologists, and pacifists.

Only about 10 per cent of activists remained in their previous social and political roles, either in NGOs or, more likely, in science and journalism. One dimension of change was cultural, with the capital city Ljubljana producing an impressive output in the visual arts, literature, drama, and music especially popular music, in the course of the 1980s. Ales Erjavec and Marina Grzinic credit this cultural efflorescence with contributing to ideological and political change. As they put it in a 1001 publication “the authentic” art of the eighties in Ljubljana was alternative art and culture, or subculture which demolished the established social schemes and patterns. Any account of the players on the cultural scene in Ljubljana in the 1980s would have to include; Radio Student the independent radio station, set up in 1969 locally transmitted in Ljubljana introduced a way of informing its audience during the political trials in Ljubljana. It was using techniques such as news briefs, live broadcasting from in front of the court, public mobilization and support for democratization. Mladina the youth magazine which became increasingly independent in the course of the 1980s, the Students’ Cultural and Artistic Center which sponsored many cultural and artistic productions of the alternative movement), the punk scene, rock groups such as Laibach, Borghesia, and the Bastards, the Anna Monro Theater which was launched in 1981, combining a concept of “people’s theatre” with traditional stage action interspersed with critical commentary, the Fiction Producer Company (another theatre, featuring an all-women troupe), the Helios Theater, the Glej Theater, the Ljubljana Dance Theater, and the Slovene Youth Theater that marched straight into politics, offering, at one juncture, a program titled “Utopia instead ideology.” In all of these ways, the cultural sector proved to be a powerful force for social change in Slovenia.

The outbreak of war at the beginning of the 1990s further obstructed the extension of existing NGO activities, but helped to build new ones, especially those providing

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219 Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda. ‘Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe’, London: Pinter, 1999p.128
humanitarian aid, working with refugees or helping raped women, elderly people and children. In this period Slovene NGOs started to receive financial assistance from abroad; private foundations, the EU, etc., and so called ‘fat rats’, former activists who control most of the financial resources coming into Slovenia, began to appear.\(^{223}\)

Nonetheless, the NGOs’ main achievement of the past couple of decades has been the creation of some important alternative institutions such as Radio Student in the early 1970s; the Council for Human Rights (in the late 1990s), and later the Ombudsman; the Peace Institute (in the late 1980s); the Metelkova Alternative Culture Centre (in the early 1990s); and a strong feminist movement fighting for abortion and women’s rights at the beginning of the 1980s.\(^{224}\) Popular demands for more democracy are expected to encourage elites to supply reformed institutions that lead to a complete democracy.\(^{225}\)

Perhaps the most visible and influential embodiments of civil society at the end of the old regime were groups of intellectuals, journalists, and political activists around publications such as the monthly *Nova Revija* and the weekly *Mladina*. Other dissident intellectuals clustered around the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights.

### IV.4.1. The Role of Nova Revija (New Review) and Mladina

Sandra Basic Hrvatin clearly asserts that “democratization and independence of the Slovene media was the first step to the democratization and independence of the political sphere.”\(^{226}\) Slovenes have produced, for the seize of the country, a formidable quantity of cultural institutions and literary publications, which throughout the 1980’s became a forum for political opposition. The push towards freedom of speech, democratisation of society and market oriented reforms was primarily driven by student and youth media. Especially Radio student in the early eighties, and later by the youth weekly newsmagazine Mladina, by youth organization (ZSMS) and by the circle of Slovenian writers, founders of the monthly magazine *Nova Revija*\(^{227}\).

In the spring of 1987 a group of intellectuals with anti-Communist leanings appeared, centering themselves on the Nova Revija magazine and contributing to it articles for a new Slovene national programme. In these articles they called for an abandoning of the communist system and the introduction of a politically pluralist, democratic system, a free market economy with public welfare and an independent Slovene state. This was over two and a half years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, and Yugoslavia\(^{228}\).

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\(^{224}\) ibid. p.129  
Retrieved on 7 January 2005  
http://www.uvi.si/eng/slovenia/publications/facts/international-relations/#05
was still governed by a communist system that rejected these demands. A very important role in this way played by the journal **Nova Revija**, whose progress charted the political developments within Yugoslavia. Nova Revija Issue 57 “Contributions to the Slovenian National Program”, as this special issue was entitled, tackled the crucial question of how Slovenian civil society and its political state should be organized within the framework of a democratic republic. It provided a clear-headed and unambiguous response, which covered all aspects; geographical, economic, financial, historical, social, cultural, and political.

After the publication of the ‘Contributions for the Slovene National Programme in February 1987’, the leadership of the LCS, in defiance of Belgrade, refused to prosecute the authors. The Slovene prosecutor, after consultation with Kucan, rejected the federal prosecutor’s request to start the legal proceedings against Nova Revija, and instead opened an ‘all-Slovene’ critical discussion of the journal and fired the two responsible editors.

The weekly magazine **Miladina** magazine was established in 1943 as a paper of the Communist Youth Organization (Zveza Socialistov Mladine Slovenije). The youth magazine Mladina became the most powerful political opinion marker in 1980s. Mladina started to destroy all the sacred symbols and taboos of the Socialist society. Mladina's journalists began to dig and question the position of the federal army, the Socialist regime, the role of the League of Communists. Milan Kucan who had become party leader in 1985 let the editors of Mladina know that there would be no serious problem with their challenging the taboos of communist monism. However, the federal government accused Slovene republic authorities of using Mladina as a channel for the public exposure of their own political strategies.

Among the Slovenes, however, these demands quickly won the sympathies of the broad mass of people, including many Slovene communists. In the spring of 1989 Slovenia's communist leadership recognized this new trend in the mood of the people, and began siding with it, particularly during the heightened inter-ethnic tensions in Kosovo. In May 1989 the leadership permitted a large popular gathering in Ljubljana in support of the demands from the Nova Revija circle for an independent Slovene state.

Many articles as well as anti-military cartoons published in Mladina, reflecting the huge gap in opinion between Slovene society and the Yugoslav military and it was in this situation that relations between Mladina and JNA broke down with the trail.

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228 Janko Prunk ‘*Path to Independence*’, Government of the Republic of Slovenia Public Relations and Media Office
Retrieved on 7 January 2005 http://www.uvi.si/10years/path/


231 Sandra Basic Hrvatin ‘*The Role of the Media in the Transition*’, p.272 in Danica Fink-Hafner and John R. Robbins eds. ‘Making a new nation: the formation of Slovenia’, Aldershot, England ; Brookfield, Vt., USA ; Dartmouth, c1997

232 Janko Prunk ‘*Path to Independence*’, Government of the Republic of Slovenia Public Relations and Media Office
Retrieved on 7 January 2005 http://www.uvi.si/10years/path/
IV.5. POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS

Democratization is said to begin when multiparty system exists and the first set of free and fair elections for national level office takes place. This first set of elections must be accompanied in short order by the granting of civil liberties and political rights and the establishment of both state institutions and that operate according to the rule of law and intermediate organizations that mediate between the citizen and the state. If these events do not take place, then it is likely that the process of democratization will not be fully consolidated.

IV.5.1. Political Parties

Sabrina Ramet asserts that the first stage in Slovenian democratization may be said to have begun in 1986, when the liberal wing of the League of Communists of Slovenia asserted its predominance over party conservatives, expelling the latter from the party leadership. Slovenian conservative France Popit was compelled to step aside, and the new and younger leadership headed by Milan Kucan began to refashion the Slovenian political landscape.

Nearly a decade after Tito's death, by the late 1980s, the political order in Yugoslavia could be described as a federation of eight authoritarian single-party systems (one for each of the six republics and two autonomous provinces). The country's ruling party, called the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), paralleled the federal scheme in its own internal organization. The League of Communists of Slovenia (LCS) belonged to the more tolerant end of this spectrum. Evidence of the liberal-mindedness of the Slovenian elites can be found in an empirical cross-country study of local officials in several Central and East European states. Anton Bebler argues, it showed that in some relevant respects local officials in Slovenia were more democratic in their values than most of their counterparts in Eastern Europe and Serbia. No law explicitly banned alternative parties.

In Slovenia where communist party has begun to change during the 1980s, Slovenia ruled in coalition with liberal parties, and a form a consensual politics started to develop. The Communist Party wisely embraced the changes. In March 1989, LCS published a ‘Programme for Renewal’; this document called for the abandonment of one-party rule, the introduction of political pluralism, the recognition that legitimate differences of interests may be reflected in legitimate political conflicts, and the

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234 ibid.
237 ibid
scuttling of the communist doctrine of a “single, eternal truth”\textsuperscript{239}. As Harris states, “by endorsing repluralization ostensibly “voluntarily”, Slovenia’s communists, gave the political transition the character of taking place within “the prescribed legal form, . . .rather than involving . . . the naked clash of powers”\textsuperscript{240}.

The Socialist Alliance of Working People of Slovenia, which had been established as a transmission belt of the communist party and which in some ways mimicked the activities of a political party, was by summer 1989 showing increasing independence of action and drew up a resolution on June 27. Among other things, this resolution called for “a democratic state of sovereign Slovene people and all the citizens of Slovenia, founded on human rights and civil freedoms . . . the rule of labor, and of the law, and independence of civil society”\textsuperscript{241}.

In January 1990, the Slovene delegation led by Milan Kucan, whose role in transition of Slovenia can not be overestimated, walked out of the Yugoslav Party Congress, renamed itself the Party of Democratic Renewal and agreeing to introduce a multi-party system within Slovenia\textsuperscript{242}. From there on the evolution of Slovenia into a democratic and independent state was as calm and committed to the rule of law as was its evolution from a communist state to a democratizing one\textsuperscript{243}. The roots of LDS lay in the most reform-oriented sections of the old League of Communists of Slovenia before the introduction of competitive, pluralist elections in 1990. In party the LDS was able to preserve its position because it represented continuity with a relatively positive period in the near past, and because of the undoubted advantage in organization and experience it inherited from the communist period. Most of the other parties were relative amateurs by comparison\textsuperscript{244}.

The Slovenian Union of Peasants (SKZ), the first lawful political organization in Slovenia to exist outside the regime, was established in May 1988. Beginning in late 1989, various opposition groups publicly declared themselves parties. In November 1989 the communist regime in Slovenia, against the will of Belgrade, allowed a free, multiparty life to take root. The first multi-party elections in April 1990 won by a coalition of six non-communist parties under the umbrella- name “DEMOS” (Democratizna Opozicija/ Democratic Opposition of Slovenia). DEMOS consisted of the Slovene Farmers’ Union, the Slovene Democratic Union, the Social Democratic Union of Slovenia, the Greens of Slovenia, Slovene Christian Democrats and Liberal Party. Its platform was a proper parliamentary system and an independent national

\textsuperscript{240} Erika Harris. ‘Nationalism and Democratization: Politics of Slovakia and Slovenia’, Aldershot, Hampshire, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, c2002p.195
\textsuperscript{242} ibid
\textsuperscript{244} James Gow. ‘Slovenia and Slovenes: A Small State and the New Europe’, London: Hurst , cop. 2000, p.47
state. In January 1990, the LCY in Belgrade publicly acknowledged that the single-party system was dead in Yugoslavia.

The Slovenian elections of April 1990 featured Yugoslavia's first multiparty competition in more than fifty years. The reformed Communists garnered 17 percent, enough to make them the single largest party in parliament, but found themselves in the opposition, together with their youth wing (now called the Liberal Democrats) and the Socialists. The main house of the tricameral Republican Assembly was dominated by the DEMOS coalition, which had won a 55 percent vote share. On the other hand, a reformed communist leader, Milan Kucan, soundly defeated the DEMOS candidate Joze Pucnik to become the first freely elected president of the five-member collective presidency. Slovenia's voters in their prudence had thus created a rough overall balance between the parties rooted in the old communist regime and their DEMOS opponents, whose strongest common bond was a desire to drive the Communists from office.

The six non-communist party DEMOS coalition led Slovenia on its path to independence. The DEMOS government held a referendum on independence in late December 1990, a referendum in which a landslide of more than 88 per cent of Slovenes voted for independence. But what has not been sufficiently emphasized is the fact that since ten weeks before this referendum was held, the Slovenian Assembly had adopted a constitutional law annulling, in full or in part, some thirty federal laws in the spheres of the economy, politics and, defense. In fact, some of the key figures in DEMOS had been thinking in terms of an independent Slovenia since at least summer 1989.

Comprehending that the Yugoslav federation was rapidly spinning out of control, the Slovenian government set a deadline of June 26, 1991 for the other republics to agree to a confederation. Where Slovenia and Croatia insisted on a loosening of federal bonds, Serbia and Montenegro suggested that the federation needed to be tightened. Bosnia and Macedonia tried, in vain, to produce a compromise. On June 25, 1991, the day before the deadline set by the DEMOS government, Slovenia declared its independence.

The Slovene political scene is not devoid of nationalist and extreme parties, mostly SNS, running on a strictly nationalist and xenophobic ticket. The SDS determines its position on the Left side of the political spectrum. However it focusing on the most severe criticism of the former regime and consistently pointing to 'scandals of transition' and calling for the active role of the Church in the state education it approaches the voters from the Right. The political scene is polarized practically in

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247 ibid.
250 ibid.
half between the ‘Left’ and the ‘Right’ with the largest party of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDS) Left of the Centre, still less individualistically oriented than its Western counterparts. As the list of the parties and their changing names and allegiances indicates, the Slovenian transition to democracy has not been particularly smooth. However, it has proceeded with less turbulence and less alienation from the West than other post-communist countries; the populist leaders and overt nationalist mobilization have so far not become characteristics of Slovene politics.

The transition to democracy in Slovenia, just as in all post-communist countries, must be considered in the context of general crises of the communist regimes, but with special characteristics, apart from the national independence, which it shares with other newly independent states. First, there was hardly any continuation of political parties from the inter-war period with possible exception of the SDS, claiming its origins in the Social Democratic Party from the beginning of the century. Second, one can point to the ruling Communist Party elite’s transformation, whilst still in the position of power and its continued support for reforms. Third, since the collapse of DEMOS, the coalition of all new democratic parties, which won the first elections within Yugoslavia and could be compared to the Czech Civic Forum and Solidarnost, we can observe ‘Grand Coalition’ governments, parties of very different political ideas, in Slovene politics.

The parties of the right and center-right tend to represent the more tradition-minded, religious, and rural groups in the population. On the contrary, the parties of the left and center-left tend to be more secular in outlook and to claim as their strongest bases the capital city of Ljubljana, other larger towns, and the western part of the country. Extremist parties have withered, and the tone and substance of politics are firmly centrist. "Skinheads" and far leftists alike draw scant support, and in the last election the only party campaigning on an anti-NATO and anti-EU platform obtained barely half a percent of the vote. Likewise, communist, ecologist, feminist, and extreme rightist parties have done very poorly.

All in all, Slovene politics from the mid-1980s was characterized by a strong degree of consensus, in spite of multiplicity of parties in the 1990s. The consensus and stability, which emerged around the ideas of democracy and independence during the latter period of communist rule, carried Slovenia into independence.

### IV.5.2. Elections

The negotiated transition came to an end abruptly after the so-called founding elections, as the first free elections, and the establishment of the first democratic parliament and governments, that is, with the transfer of power between old and new elites. Coalitions among the various parliamentary have become a way of life. Despite their occasional awkwardness and instability, these coalitions have more or

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252 ibid. p.163
255 ibid. p.150
less reflected voter opinion. For all its faults, coalition government has become a major tool for crafting consensus. As such, it must be counted as a mainstay of democratic stability.

As noted earlier, the first coalition to govern Slovenia was the disparate center-right grouping that called itself DEMOS. It did not last long once the country had secured its independence. Prime Minister Lojze Peterle of the Christian Democratic Party (SKD) came under heavy criticism and was forced to resign after losing a no-confidence vote in April 1992. Peterle's successor was Janez Drnovsek, the leader of the Liberal Democrats of Slovenia (LDS). A former member of the Yugoslav federation's collective presidency, Drnovsek has served as Slovenia's Prime Minister for most of the time since.

The second free and competitive election, first post-independence balloting held in Slovenia in December 1992. The Liberal Democrats and Christian Democrats finished first and second, respectively, and joined to form an LDS-led coalition with Drnovsek as premier and Peterle serving as deputy premier and foreign minister. Although Peterle quit the government in 1994, SKD members continued to serve in other cabinet posts. President of the Presidency Kucan, running as a non-partisan candidate, handily bested the other seven contenders and won a new term as president with almost 64 percent of the vote.

The third parliamentary election, in November 1996, produced a near-deadlock. By the time of 1996 elections, the political scene in Slovenia had lost its ‘Centre’. The Christian Democrats and two other conservative parties won exactly half the seats. But since the Liberal Democrats remained the single largest party, President Kucan asked them to form a government. Their first attempt failed by a single vote. At that point, the center-right bloc split and the rural-based Slovenian People's Party (SLS) crossed the floor to serve under Drnovsek in what amounted to the fifth coalition government in Slovenia's brief democratic history. Despite considerable internal tensions and difficulties, this fragile alliance managed to survive for more than three years.

After much complicated political maneuvering, a rightist coalition came to the fore in mid-2000 with Andrej Bajuk, an Argentenian and Slovenian citizen, as Prime Minister, however under the de facto leadership of the "right-wing" Social Democrats of Slovenia. During its mandate, this alliance was plagued by policy disputes and low squabbles over office, power, and privilege. In the eyes of voters, both the SKD and the SLS, which formed a united party, were badly tarnished by their involvement in this government.

The fourth parliamentary election was held on 15 October 2000. This balloting saw the Liberal Democrats riding back into power on a wave of voter disgust with the incumbent cabinet. By late November, Prime Minister Drnovsek was able to form a coalition that once again spanned a range of the spectrum from the left to the right of center, but with the Liberal Democrats more firmly in the driver's seat than ever before and the coalition's fulcrum on the center-left257.

The last election was recently held in October 2004. That was the first elections since the country joined the European Union in May 2004. Although Public opinion polls had suggested that the ruling coalition, led by Prime Minister Anton Rop’s Liberal Democrat Party (LDS), the elections resulted in a surprise victory by the conservative Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) over the ruling Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) by a narrow margin. The LDS, which had been in power for most of the past 12 years, had suffered a setback on 13 June 2004, during the first elections to the European Parliament (EP) held in the country. On this occasion, the ruling party had been beaten by the two main centre right opposition parties, the centre-right opposition Democrat Party (SDS) of Mr. Janez Jansa and the New Slovenia (Nsi). Both of them together won 41.5 per cent of the vote and four of the seven seats that Slovenia holds in European Parliament258.

It is important to note that the ideological range over which these swings have taken place has actually been fairly modest, ranging as it has from the center-left to the center-right. Extremist parties of both the left and right did exist in the early years of Slovenian independence, but were punished by the voters. At the last election, none of these parties was able to overcome the 4 percent threshold necessary for parliamentary representation259. In conclusion, the construction of a moderate party system, based on consensus politics, has also helped Slovenia avoid the sharp polarization characteristics of transitions elsewhere in the region260.

IV.6. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
A central issue of democratization has been the reform of the armed forces and democratization of civil-military relations. A democratic civil-military pattern of relations was an important test for the political development of the aspirant countries, and Slovenia succeeded in changing civil-military patterns, which played role in the transition261. Marian Zulean considers democratic civil-military relations to be a complex mechanism for the oversight of the armed forces, civilian control by democratically elected politicians, and the existence of a professional military that functions as an expert organization for defending the state262.

The separation from SFRY brought an important transformation in civil-military relations. Since late 1968, the SFRY had had a two-part military organization consisting of a fully centralized federal standing army, Yugoslav National Army-JNA, and six militia-type Territorial Defense organizations (TD), one in each republic. Within the federation, Slovenian civilian elite controlled only its police and partly, the Territorial Defense in Slovenia263.

258 Inter-parliamentary Union- Slovenia Last Elections
Retrieved on 7January 2005  http://www.ipu.org/parline%2De/reports/2287%5Fe.htm
262 Ibid. 58-82
The legislation on civilian control of the armed forces in Slovenia was put in place immediately after independence and the departure of the last Yugoslav military units in September 1991. The basic principles and roles of Slovenia’s armed forces are defined by the constitution. The Slovenian constitution, adopted in December 1991, stipulates general defense undertakings for citizens and establishes parliamentary control for the execution of defense. Article 124 specifies that Slovenia’s defense "stem[s] from peace policy and the culture of non-violence" that was included at the insistence of the environmental movement. Besides, as a consequence of 1991 Constitution, “the Slovenian army was constitutionally confirmed as an all-national institution, its preferential ties with any political party were prescribed, membership of active, uniformed military personnel in political parties and the parties’ access to the ranks were all prohibited.”

Unlike Romania and Bulgaria, Slovenia had to start building its military and political institutions from scratch. The parliament or national assembly defines security policy and exercises democratic control over the military through its defense committee, the committee on budget and finance, the committee for the control of intelligence, and the committee for control of the realization of the national security resolution.

In practice, civil military relations in Slovenia have become relations between a civilian sector and a new military sector, whose personnel were themselves civilian until only recently. This radical change was due to circumstances that both preceded and accompanied Slovenian independence. These included the widespread rejection of the previous Yugoslav model of civil-military relations, which both militarist and praetorian proclivities. The president is the commander-in-chief of the Slovenian armed forces, while the prime minister chairs the National Security Council but has no specific powers in that area. The government has the executive role and is accountable for keeping the unity and coordination of defense forces according to national security and defense policy. The minister of defense is a political civilian appointee and plays the key role in defense policy.

NATO membership offers a threshold standard in democratic control of the armed forces. For Slovenia becoming part of the ‘New Europe’ through integration in such international organizations, like NATO means harmonizing the forces of internationalization and openness.

All in all, the military is placed under strict civilian control. As in other Central-East European states, the Slovenian system of civil-military relations has since moved closer to the West European patterns. Civilian rule has been reaffirmed as the norm and this time it is democratic rule, contrary to the 1948-1989 period.

IV.7. ELITE PACT AND THE ROLE OF STRONG LEADERSHIP

IV.7.1. Elite Pact
Elites were instrumental in the initial stages of democratization. When ex-communist elites formed new political parties, they counted on their already existing membership, which they could successfully put into use in a new political system. This could account for their success particularly in Slovenia where there was practically no change in elite structure\textsuperscript{270}.

Slovenia's communist leadership decided to implement an orderly systemic change, as well as to assume the risk of allowing free political competition. The democratic opposition--a heterogeneous congeries of small political parties and groups--was exerting pressure in this direction, but its efforts were feeble at best. The regime's concessions and its reformist posture contributed to keeping political strife within bounds and to maintaining a broad consensus on crucial national issues\textsuperscript{271}.

Elite bargaining decided which offices were to be filled by free elections, for example, whether the people voted solely for members of parliament, or of a president as well. While elites could no longer tell people how to vote, they decided electoral system that converted votes into deputies, a decision that immediately affected their chances of winning office. The bargaining process starts when defenders of the old regime realize that they cannot retain their authority as before. A new regime is often put together by negotiations between outsiders leading movements calling for change, and insiders from the old regime, who try to save what they can of their rapidly declining influence\textsuperscript{272}.

IV.7.2. The Role of Strong Leadership: Milan Kucan
The comparative study of democratization strongly suggests that leadership can serve as an important factor facilitating successful transitions and consolidations. Leaders’ importance lies in their capacity to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the structural parameters of the unfolding democratization process. ‘Capacity’ in this context, effectively translates into a sense of vision, judgement and tactical acumen, which can help determine the proper timing for action that can significantly, if not decisively, affect the course of events\textsuperscript{273}.

\textsuperscript{270}Erika Harris. ‘Nationalism and Democratization: Politics of Slovakia and Slovenia’, Aldershot, Hampshire, England; Burlington, VT : Ashgate, c2002 pp.29-30
Strong leadership has played a significant role in all the East-Central European transitions. The republic’s former Communist chief, Milan Kucan, who played a prominent role in Slovenian democratization and its disintegration from the Yugoslav Federation. Milan Kucan was a reformer and had been in the forefront of Slovenia’s struggle for independence in the period preceding the dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia. Milan, therefore, enjoyed great respect and prestige among segments of the Slovene population. Milan Kucan, by large segment of Slovene population, was seen as a factor of stability during a period of rapid change and uncertainty. When Kucan came to power in mid-1980s, he took positive steps toward reform, openness and democracy. As noted earlier, subsequently the JBTZ Trial, Milan Kucan adopted the notion of ‘socialism on human scale. Besides under his leadership through the late 1980s, Slovenia would transcend itself. Against the background of Federation dissolution, Communist Slovenia under partly leader Kucan in 1986 swiftly developed a system of political pluralism to become independent Slovenia under the democratically elected President Kucan a decade later.

IV.8. ETHNIC POLICY IN SLOVENIA

IV.8.1. Ethnic Composition

The fact that the least successful transitions are in ethnically less homogenous countries suggests that there is an obvious correlation between the succession of the transition and ethnic/national homogeneity. Ethnic community became an inner condition for a political and legal community of a modern state. It entered the world of global integration where there is little room for particularism, which in itself poses a number of dilemmas about democracy and its ability to reconcile political and cultural pluralism with the homogenizing tendencies of a new state. As will become apparent Slovenia seems to struggle with these dilemmas more successfully.

The ethnic composition in Slovenia (1991) was Slovene 92%, Croat 1%, Serb 0.5%, Hungarian 0.4%, Bosniak 0.3%, other 5.8%. However, Erika Harris claims, Slovenia is often said to be practically ethnically homogenous, which is far from the truth. As all states of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire it comprises of many minorities, however small. Ethnic minorities officially recognized are two, Hungarian and Italian in total 0.59% of the population. However, during the Yugoslav period many immigrants from other republics settled in Slovenia, mostly for economic reasons. At least further 10% of the population is of that origin. Then they are some other very small communities; Romani, Germans, Austrians, Albanians etc.

276 See Table3, p.70.
people of ‘undetermined’ ethnic origins. According to 1991 data 87.84% of the population is ethnically Slovene.  

IV.8.2. Ethnic Minorities 

The protection of ethnic minorities is one of the central arguments in the process of transition of Central and East European countries. Slovenia had traditionally a good record on the protection of minorities, already within Yugoslavia and was often cited as the best example of the Yugoslav system, in which the protection of minorities did not count among its many problems. In terms of democratization, the autonomy of the citizen is essential prerequisite in order to dismantle state’s monopoly, and to encourage the plurality of political subjects and an emergent of civil society.

In terms of ethnic structure, the Republic of Slovenia is a relatively homogenous country compared to other European countries. The Second World War was merely one of the milestones, which has affected the numbers and ethnic structure of the population living in the national territory of the Republic of Slovenia. Census data from after the Second World War shows reductions in the proportion of Slovenes and in the proportion of members of autochthonous ethnic communities, Italians and Hungarians in Slovenia. At the same time it indicates an increase in the proportion of members of the "new-era ethnic minorities", namely people who moved to Slovenia chiefly after the Second World War from various parts of the former Yugoslav federation, mostly for economic reasons.

In the 1960s, official Slovene policy and its constitution and legislation recognized the existence of ethnic plurality and Slovenia began to formulate a "positive concept of protection" for the autochthonous ethnic communities living in its territory. Following Slovenia's independence, the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia incorporated this positive concept of protection, which deals with autochthonous ethnic communities as with autonomous entities and highlights the active role of the state in recognizing the special rights of ethnic communities and in ensuring conditions for this recognition.

According to the Additional Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning National Minorities and their Members, a ‘minority’ is “a group of persons in a state who a) reside on the territory of that state and are citizens thereof, b) maintain long standing, firm and lasting ties with that state, c) display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic characteristics, d) are sufficiently representatives, although smaller in number than the rest of the

Available at: http://www.uvi.si/eng/slovenia/background-information/minorities/ 
Available at: http://www.uvi.si/eng/slovenia/background-information/minorities-in-slovenia/
population of that state or of a region of that state, e) are motivated by a concern to preserve their culture, their traditions, their religion and their language". Minority rights should therefore assure the existence and development of ethnic minorities, their distinct language, culture and identity, establishment and functioning of their own organizations, and their participation in the process of decision-making within the political system.

The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia adopted in 1991, in Article 64 separately defines the areas to which the special rights of the Italian and Hungarian autochthonous communities shall apply. Article 64 also states the use of their mother tongue, schooling and education in their mother tongue, cultural issues, the use of national symbols, contacts with their countries of origin, and public information means and publication in their mother tongue. The Constitution uses strictly term ‘ethnic community’, not ‘ethnic minority’ in order to avoid the possible negative connotations of the term minority.

Concerning the role of the state in the protection of ethnic communities, the Constitution rather uniquely in the region adopted the ‘positive concept of protection of ethnic minorities and their members’. In practice, it means an active role of the state, an obligation to act and to assure the realization of individual and collective rights. The words ‘collective rights’ are significant. It is the recognition of the duality of the rights of ethnic minorities, whereby collective rights belong to ethnic minorities of a certain distinct communities and as individual rights to ever member of a certain ethnic community. Concerning their nature, some of the rights are realized, mostly as collective rights, while others are realized mostly individual. The state’s role in the protection of minorities is covered by Article 5 in the Constitution, which also defines Slovenia’s active role in attending to the welfare of Slovene minorities in neighboring countries and promoting their contacts with the homeland.

In addition: ‘Slovenians not holding Slovenian citizenship shall enjoy special rights and privileges in Slovenia’, the extent of which shall be determined by statute.

Article 11 states that ‘the official language of Slovenia is Slovenian’. In those areas where Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities reside, the official language is also Italian and Hungarian. The main provisions regarding protection and rights of ethnic communities are located in Part II of the Constitution under ‘Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’. Besides the general provision of ‘equality before the law’ in Article 14, there is the guarantee of equal human rights, irrespective of national origin, race, language, religion, political or other beliefs, financial status. Article 61 states that ‘Each person shall be entitled to freely identify with his national grouping, to foster and give expression to his culture and to use his own language’. Article 62 states ‘Each person has the right to use his own language and script in official

284 Mitja Zagar ‘Nationality, protection of ethnic minorities and transition to democracy: the case of Slovenia’ in Teorija in Praksa 32:3-4 March-April 1995 pp.243-254, p.244
286 ibid.
proceedings and the Constitution prohibits in Article 63 ‘all incitement to ethnic, racial, religious or other discrimination’ and the inflaming of intolerance”.

IV.8.2.1. Italian and Hungarian Minorities
In addition to the basic human rights, belonging to each citizen, the Constitution guarantees special rights to the Hungarian and Italian minorities. The most important of those are: “a) the right to the use of their native language - in the mixed areas Slovene, Hungarian, Italian are equal and all public services are bilingual; b) the free use of national symbols; c) the right to establish autonomous institutions; d) the right to foster the development of their own culture and the right to be informed in their own language; e) the right to education and schooling in their own language and to become familiar with the history and culture of their mother country; f) the right to cooperate with the nation of their homeland and very importantly, and finally g) the right to direct representation in the National Assembly (Article 80 - two seats permanently reserved for the Hungarian and Italian deputies, elected by their local authorities in the Slovene Parliament)”.

IV.8.2.2. A People with No Home: Gypsies
The uniqueness of the Gypsies lies in the fact that they are a transnational, non-territorially based people who do not have a "home state" that can provide a haven or extend protection to them. One feature common to all East European states, however, is the desperate situation of the Gypsies. Slovenia is one of few countries which has incorporated the treatment of the Romany into its Constitution; a separate article (Article 65) of the Constitution specifies that "the status and special rights of the Romany community living in Slovenia shall be such as are determined by statute”. Their situation poses a threat to the democratic society that political and civic elites aspire to consolidate. Slovenia has also been quite responsive to the Gypsies' problems.

In Slovene Constitution of Article 65 recognizes Romani/Gypsies as an autochthonous ethnic community in approximately 2300 people, although they have no 'mother' state to exercise the special connection with, or to be protected by. Despite being given the status and special rights by the Constitution, these rights 'shall be such as are determined by statute' – they are still not in operation. The representation of the Romani community is made more difficult by the specific situation in which they live; their communities are usually very small and dispersed, there is little sense of a common identity, made worse by the traditional lack of education. The problem of education is exacerbated by the lack of teachers who speak their language and by the fact that the children are usually socialized in a different way, which is not always compatible with the one in schools.

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289 ibid. pp.174-175
290 ibid. p.175
Available at: http://www.uvi.si/eng/slovenia/background-information/minorities-in-slovenia
IV.9. EUROPEANIZATION OF SLOVENIA

In the early 1990s, all East and Central European and Balkan countries desired to become integrated with Europe, with in general and with the EU in particular only in the form of a rather nebulous slogan: ‘Return to Europe’. There is no doubt that, Huntington considers the wave of democratization a function of the world system as such not only the result of internal developments. This is why and how the countries of the second and third waves have been ‘forced to be free’.

The subsequent role of the EU was as an external democratizing force. The Europeanization has both a general historical meaning and a particular one as a set of special requirement for full membership into the EU. Joining the European Union has generally been viewed as the ultimate goal of the East-Central European transition. The post-1989 hopes for reuniting the continent became identified with the enlargement of the EU. Central Europeans, driven by a moral-superiority complex mixed with resentment, emphasized the shared European culture, civilization, and democratic values that had survived crumbling ideologies.

Direct international involvement in the transition to played important role in the unfolding of the democratization dynamic. In East-Central as well as South-Eastern Europe, by contrast, the international factor has played a critical role in triggering the transition process. The following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Former Yugoslavia and the end of the Cold War, the EU and NATO emerged as international actors, membership in which would bestow not only respectability but also legitimacy and security to the two regions’ fledging democratic regimes. The net outcome of this has been that international factors have played a particularly prominent role in promoting that democratic transition process in East-Central Europe.

The process of democratization is closely connected and synchronized with the process of integration into the existing international structures. Its ultimate achievement is not merely the recognition of its state’s sovereignty, but the ability to relinquish almost immediately, some of that sovereignty to transnational organizations. The evolution of South-East European democracies, to date, suggests a fairly clear conceptual range defined by Slovenia at one end Albania at the other. The former has made the greatest progress in its democratization and stands the best chance of consolidating its democracy in the foreseeable future. Socio-

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295 ibid p.33
296 ibid p.44
economically, Slovenia is the most developed country in South-Eastern Europe, with good prospects to join both EU and NATO\textsuperscript{300}.

The European Commission concludes that Slovenia presents the characteristics of democracy, with the stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights and respect for the protection of minorities. Slovenia can be regarded as a functioning market economy and should be able to cope with competitive pressure and market within the Union. In the light of these considerations, the Commission recommends that negotiations for accession should be opened with Slovenia\textsuperscript{301}.

‘Europe’ in the context of post-communist integration carries a heavy political weight and is of enormous significance as a test of the stability and the success of the transition, and as a symbol of the state’s acceptance among the world’s developed nations. To put it simply, the question is not whether ‘Europe’ matters, but how it matters, to what degree, in what direction, and at what pace. The normative and political element of the integration is of course matched by the practical considerations, the economic benefits, and in the case of NATO membership, military security\textsuperscript{302}.

However, Diamandouro and Stefano Bianchini argue, national pride was emphasized in order to oppose the country’s ‘sell-out’ to the West, as through privatization. This was the case with Slovenia where rightist and nationalist parties claimed independence and later opposed the association with the EU\textsuperscript{303}.

**ANALYTICAL FINDINGS**

During democratization process in Slovenia, everything has not been a bed of roses. Although Slovenia has experienced one of the smoothest and least problematic democratization compared to other CEECs, it had to cope with some issues. Slovenia's transition has been accompanied by fewer instances of corruption or other abuse of political power for personal financial gain than one sees elsewhere in the region. Both the Economist Intelligence Unit and Transparency International consistently rate Slovenia as among the least corrupt of all post-communist states. In Transparency International's "Year 2000 Corruption Perceptions Index" of 90 countries worldwide, Slovenia comes in twenty-eighth, averaging 5.5 points across the six surveys used. This puts Slovenia just behind Estonia (5.7), and ahead of Hungary (5.2); Greece, Italy, and the Czech Republic (4.3), etc. The 2001 index placed Slovenia into 34\textsuperscript{th} place among 91 countries surveyed\textsuperscript{304}. During the transition period, of course abuses of political abuse took place. Janez Jansa had been using his position as a defense minister to instrumentalize the military complex for the promotion of his authoritarian political ambitious. The Slovenes, who had been taken

\textsuperscript{300} Diamandouros, Nikiforos P. and F. Stephen Larrabee. ‘Democratization in South-Eastern Europe: Theoretical considerations and evolving trends’ p.54 in ‘Experimenting with democracy: regime change in the Balkans’ by Pridham Geoffrey and Tom Gallagher eds


\textsuperscript{302} ibid.


the side of Kosovo’s Albanians their quarrel with the Serbs and who had briefly fought against the Serb-controlled army in June-July 1991, were sympathetic to the Bosnian Muslims in their war with Bosnian Serbs. Thus, the war itself did not rise to the level of constituting a major issue in Slovenian internal politics, but the illegal arms transfers, on the other hand, proved highly controversial, because they cast doubt on Slovenia’s willingness to play by Western rules and on Slovenia’s “good faith” in general. Some 120 metric tons of weapons were ‘discovered’ at the airport, at Jansa’s prompting, resulting in serious embarrassment to the Slovenian government in its relations with Western countries because of abuse of his political power.\textsuperscript{305}

Although coping with corruption issues, Slovenia has still recorded smoothest, non-violent and least problematic transition among CEECs and especially within the Balkan region that is representing chronic political instability in the region.

\textbf{V.1. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS}

There is sufficient evidence on which to base a positive assessment of Slovenia’s record of democratic transition and consolidation since 1989. Thanks to its former membership in Yugoslavia, which had never known Soviet occupation and whose borders were open to the West; Slovenia found itself in a much easier starting position than the countries of the former Soviet sphere.\textsuperscript{306} For that reason, Slovenian legacy of the past has positively influenced its democratization process. That ‘third way’ between communism and capitalism gave rise to the Slovenes politically and economically more liberal then any other communist countries. Besides, by means of 1974 Constitution granting much more power to the republics of the federal state, individual republics had a right for self-determination, up to secession which gave way to independence on 25 June 1991.

For the Slovenes separation from the Yugoslav Federation as the only way to guarantee the continuation of the democratization process that was ongoing from the early 1980s.\textsuperscript{307} Therefore, the declaration of independence is the one of the biggest steps toward the Slovene’s demands on democratization. However, JNA’s aggression that was embodied with ‘Ten-Day War’ was the price to become independent. Slovenia has paid one of the lowest prices for independence of any of the newly recognized states in Europe. Especially considering the other secessionist republics, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had to pay highest prices after their declaration of independence.

One of the fundamental characteristics during democratization in Slovenia is that civil society emerged after 1980s. One of the most active civil society groups is to be found in Slovenia. For that reason, Slovenia became known as ‘NGO country’.\textsuperscript{308} From all segments of the society, the Slovenes tried to pluralize political and social life. That public mobilization caused of national emancipation and democratic reform. Along with emergence of civil society, the Media, more specifically \textit{Mladina ‘Youth}

\textsuperscript{305}Ibid pp.212-213
\textsuperscript{308} Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda. ‘Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe’, London: Pinter, 1999, p17.
Magazine started to destroy all the sacred symbols and taboos of the Socialist society and began to dig and question the position of the federal army, the Socialist regime, the role of the League of Communists. All these accelerated demands on the way of independence and democratization.

Political Parties and free and competitive elections are main tools for democracy. Party structure in Slovenia started to change in the beginning of 1980s and they started to rule by relatively liberal parties at that time. Before the declaration of independence, Slovenia had first multi-party elections after fifty year in 1990. However the point has to be pointed out that before their declaration, they desired to have liberal and democratic life and they experienced multi-party life before their independence. In addition, they established coalition government DEMOS which is sign of people’s desire on democracy before independence. After their independence, they have still held free and competitive elections to apply democratic values in their society.

It is fair to point out that civil liberties and political rights are evolved and widespread in Slovenia. Considering the Slovene adherence to democracy and democratization it is important to review minority right, because the protection of ethnic minorities one of the main argument in post-communist transition. Considerably, Slovenia has enormously provided minority rights to Hungarian, Italian and Romany minorities. Most importantly, the Slovene Constitution uses strictly term ‘ethnic community’, not ‘ethnic minority’ in order to avoid the possible negative connotations of the term minority. That is great way to address that ethnic groups are not minority but part of the community. That statement matters in the Balkans where ethnic minority has been delicate issue for years. Besides, civil-military relation that is much more transparent than SFRY gives another promising signs to democracy. Slovenia succeeded in changing civil-military patterns, which played role in the transition. The civilian control over military has adopted in Slovenia like any other democratic countries.

Last but not least, international factors caused Slovenian democratization accelerated. Slovenia has also received international recognition and support. After the independence, its priority of foreign policy focused on greater Euro-Atlantic integration mainly on entering the European Union and the NATO. Like other Central and Eastern European countries, they desired integration with Europe and particularly with the EU. This took the form of the rather nebulous slogan: ‘Return to Europe’. It has been a member of the United Nations since 1992 and is currently membership in NATO since April 2004 and within the EU since May 2005 that can only help increase the prospect of a successful democratic consolidation in Slovenia.

All in all, Slovenia gives the impression of an upwardly mobile and gradually more prosperous society that has committed to democracy.

V.2. THEORETICAL FINDINGS
Transition theory provides framework for analysis of democratization process in Slovenia. Social and political actors committed to democratization have to struggle in their attempts to secure the viability and institutionalization of democracy in South-
Eastern Europe. Slovenia is certainly ahead of the pack and is well on its way to achieving consolidation\textsuperscript{309}.

Stepan and Linz discuss about five interacting areas, civil society, political society, rule of law, state bureaucracy and economic society, have existed during democratization process in Slovenia. Especially political society and civil society have seen complementary to exist consolidated democracy. Stepan and Linz in their work show why the existence of a sovereign state is a prerequisite for democracy, and indeed for citizenship. Stateness problems and not just economic problems critically affect democratic outcomes. This becomes clear when of the twenty-two independent countries that emerged out of the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, only two, Lithuania and Slovenia, are above the democratic threshold rating. Both of these countries are exceptions that prove the rule concerning the importance of stateness problems for democratization\textsuperscript{310}.

Of the five countries in the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia is the only country not has a significant stateness problem. Slovenia does nor have a significant ethnic minority population, so it has not been embroiled in actual or potential conflicts over a Serbian or Albanian irredenta of the sort that have occurred in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and rump Yugoslavia, where armed conflicts have contributed to widespread curtailment of political rights and civil liberties. Macedonia, more than Slovenia, has potentially severe stateness problem with Albania and Serbia and even Bulgaria and Greece, and this has contributed to its less than inclusive citizenship and language policies\textsuperscript{311}.

**CONCLUSION**

Since the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia has instituted a stable, multi-party, democratic political system, characterized by regular elections, a free press, and an excellent human rights record. Slovenia is a parliamentary democracy and constitutional republic. Ten years after independence, Slovenia has made tremendous progress establishing democratic institutions, enshrining respect for human rights, establishing a market economy and adapting its military to Western norms and standards. In contrast to its neighbors, civil tranquility and strong economic growth have marked this period.

Slovenia’s experience showed that it was possible first to reform and then peacefully and legally to transform an authoritarian communist-dominated system into a competitive democratic order. First, the country has peacefully managed the stresses, tensions, and crises that have come with its rapid triple transition to sovereign statehood, a democratic polity, and a market-based economy. First, the country has peacefully managed the stresses, tensions, and crises that have come with its rapid triple transition to sovereign statehood, a democratic polity, and a market-based economy.


\textsuperscript{311} ibid.
Political life will continue to be under girded by a stable democratic consensus on the basic "rules of the game." Slovenia enjoys satisfactory to very good relations with its neighbors, and will benefit like the rest of the region from the improved geopolitical situation in the Balkan region experienced armed strife for years. Slovenian democratization carries importance on Balkan’s stability and prosperity. After its integration to Europe, especially by the EU, ‘the Powder keg of Europe’ partly might enjoy stability and prosperity in the region.
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### Table 1

**Waves of democratization according to Samuel Huntington (1991)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First, long wave 1828-1926</td>
<td>USA, Britain, France, Italy, Argentina, and the overseas British dominions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First, reverse wave 1922-42</td>
<td>Italy, Germany, and Argentina.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second, short wave 1943-62</td>
<td>West Germany, Italy, Japan, India, and Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second, reverse wave 1958-75</td>
<td>Brazil, Argentina, and Chile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third wave 1974-</td>
<td>Portugal, Spain, numerous in Latin America, Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 2

**Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>4.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>4.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>6.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


‘1’ stands for a highly developed civil society and ‘5’ for total lack of civil society.

### Table 3

**Ethnic Distribution in Former Yugoslavia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croat</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovene</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Data from the 1991 Yugoslav census.
Available at: http://homepage2.nifty.com/PAF00305/lang_e/ethno.html
**ECONOMY**
Slovenia has economically been one of the most developed countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Table 4.
Comparison of the standard of living of East- Central European states with the European Union, 1995/6 (GDP per person as a % of EU average)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE 5. Real GDP per capita in Former Yugoslavia
Slovenia has the highest GDP per capita of the former communist countries.

<table>
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<tbody>
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<td>Developed Regions</td>
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<td>97</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Less Developed Regions | | | | | |
| Montenegro          | 88  | 76  | 68  | 79  | 73  |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina  | 96  | 72  | 66  | 66  | 68  |
| Macedonia           | 71  | 67  | 68  | 67  | 66  |
| Kosovo              | 47  | 35  | 32  | 28  | 25  |