WILL THEY STILL BE DANCING?
INTEGRATION AND ETHNIC TRANSFORMATION
AMONG YUGOSLAV IMMIGRANTS IN SCANDINAVIA

By

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“Collective dancing or singing, particularly spectacular cases of the synchronization of the homogeneous and the orchestration of the heterogenous, are everywhere predisposed to symbolize group integration and, by symbolizing it, to strengthen it”

Pierre Bourdieu
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Indulged with sociological self-centeredness we have reduced vampires to mechanisms of social cohesion. Hence, we have questioned a culture, seeing vampires as what they are, the dead ones haunting the living. If our interpretations have shown contempt towards vampires, we apologize for our mundane limitations, and thank them for the inspiration.

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Part One

INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1

FROM "BIRDS OF PASSAGE" TO ETHNIC MINORITIES

"... apathy and disillusion often transform themselves into a renewal of autonomous, public initiatives".

John Keane

In Scandinavia of the 1980's, the era of the "guest worker", "the bird of passage" (Piore 1979), is now over. Although most immigrants still harbour a profound sense of attachment to their countries of origin, they are now developing strategies of integration in the society of immigration. There are emerging ethnic minority cultures with a variety of dilemmas and opportunities.

The migrant population which came to Scandinavia during the 1960's and 1970's has largely stabilized, a result of the immigration of dependent family members and of the reproduction of the migrant population within the immigration countries. The reproduction of immigrants within the orbit of the immigration countries we shall refer to as integration in the most general sense. Our use of the term integration covers a range of specific processes of adaptation and social change.

It is these processes which are the subject of this book. In particular we focus on two groups of Yugoslav migrants in Denmark and Sweden. The two groups are the Macedonians from southern Yugoslavia and the Romanian-speaking Wallachians of northeastern Serbia. Members of both groups settled on each side of the strait dividing Sweden and Denmark. Thus, they have come to form four separate groups: “Swedish” Wallachians, “Swedish” Macedonians, “Danish” Wallachians and “Danish” Macedonians, each with distinctive patterns of integration and ethnic transformation.

In explaining these patterns, we argue that immigrant ethnic organization and local “ethnic publics” are decisive for the character of integration in Scandinavia. However, “the ethnic minority culture”, should by no means be understood as a peacefully rotating nucleus of tradition, as is often depicted. Integration is a dynamic process whereby an “ethnic minority culture” or “immigrant culture” develops. “Immigrant culture” is both a response to tensions between immigrants and Scandinavian society and a reaction to conflicts within the immigrant community.

Since the mid 1970's the Scandinavian debate about immigrants has been increasingly inspired by the Swedish policy known as “Equality, Freedom of Choice and Cooperation”. Debate in other Scandinavian countries centers on the degree to which immigrants should have the right to their own cultural development and expression and whether society ought to develop in the
direction of "cultural pluralism". In reality, prejudice and discrimination become more intense, while ideological orientations are propagating norms of cultural/ethnic uniformity and conformism. This particular kind of "cultural pluralism" we are witnessing has become a hierarchic ethnic division of labour (Ålund 1985). While there are differences between various immigrant groups and individual immigrant social mobility, immigrants overwhelmingly dominate unskilled labour in industry and services, while positions of management and control tend to be reserved for natives. The introduction of new technologies and forms of management seems to have consolidated this ethnic stratification even further (Schierup 1985).

A marginalized position in relation to the distribution of power and the division of labour in society has increased the need for immigrants' autonomous organization, a process evident throughout Europe. Increasing polarization along ethnic lines has stimulated the self-organization of immigrants.

The emergence of immigrant organization should be seen in conjunction with the emergence of new social movements in general. Polarization between "public" and "private", the anonymity and bureaucratization of established social movements and increasing distances between grassroots and central political bodies have all led to greater needs for local attachment, to organizing around substantive issues and the problems of identity and influence. Ethnic minority-cultures have become the response to immigrants' inability to satisfy key social needs in Scandinavian society. "Ethnic organizations", which might have begun as a spontaneous reaction against the atomization and exclusiveness of society, have tended to develop into political platforms.

The formation of immigrant minority-cultures in Scandinavia and Western Europe calls into question certain assumptions about the notions of "acclertation" and "assimilation". At the same time it also questions the notion of an immigrant "ghetto" as a static ethnic isolate. We do not regard immigrant minority cultures simply as the product of isolation; they are not just an "escape from problems of adaptation" (Diedrich & Diedrich 1975). Rather they are the product of increased integration in society and of an ethnic consciousness which grows out of interaction with Scandinavian culture. Hence, interaction between different cultures in society simultaneously creates both bonds of interdependence and a consciousness of social differences and inequalities. It is in this process that socio-cultural change takes place, expressing itself both through changes in society at large and in the transformation of each particular group. The formation of ethnic minority-cultures among immigrants is typically connected with the ethnohistorical past of each group, but not as any static repetition of "tradition". Rather, redefinitions which use this past become means of defining and coping with new situations. Through the symbolic manipulation of the past, conflicts rooted in the "ethnohistorical heritage" are mediated and transformed.

In pursuing this argument, this book begins by presenting the ethnohistori-
cal backgrounds of the Wallachian and Macedonian groups, in Chapters Two and Three, respectively. Our focus is on social forces which have produced the two groups' different migration patterns and the conflicts which influence the character of integration and ethnic transformation in Scandinavia.

Chapters Four through Eight discuss the migrants' integration in Denmark and Sweden. Chapter Four provides socio-economic data on the two groups. Using value statements from Wallachians and Macedonians in Denmark and Sweden the chapter outlines four different patterns of integration in Scandinavia. Chapter Five discusses immigrants' working conditions and occupational mobility. Particularly important here is the "workers' collective", a social field which mediates the immigrant's experience of the new country.

Chapters Six through Eight discuss immigrants' experience of public life in Scandinavia. We focus here on the importance of the "ethnic publics" for both inter-cultural and intra-cultural relationships. Chapter Six discusses the development of social networks and ethnic organization among immigrants in Denmark and Sweden. Chapters Seven and Eight deal, respectively, with the significance of gender and generation in processes of integration.

The final two chapters explore the implications of ethnic transformation, partly by detailed situational analysis of a single group, and partly through general reflections over the meaning of ethnicity in the present and future of Scandinavian societies. Chapter Nine is a situational analysis, discussing the formation of ethnic consciousness and socio-political strategies in a local immigrant community. Chapter Ten summarizes conclusions of the study, discussing ethnicity and integration in relation to major developmental trends of contemporary capitalist society. Posing the question, "Will they still be dancing?", we finally reflect over ethnicity in political movements and as "identity work" among modern immigrant youth.

In the remainder of this introductory chapter we present some theoretical and analytical problems connected to the study of integration of immigrants. We use the notion of "migrancy" as a basis for analyzing integration processes and ethnic transformation.

**Perspectives on Integration**

During the 1970's, European research on migrants shifted its dominant focus from studies of migration movements to the "adaptation" or "integration" of immigrants into Western European societies. It has been amply documented that different groups respond to the immigrant situation in different ways due to their varying socio-cultural backgrounds and cognitive frames of reference. Nevertheless, in general immigrants' "adaptation" is depicted as going in the direction of their increasing cultural assimilation. One could even speak of "assimilation" as a self-fulfilling research paradigm which either precludes
serious analysis of alternative patterns or groups them under the notion of "deviance". Operating with concepts such as "assimilation", "acculturation" and "absorption", such research makes the host society's homogeneity a dominant or even the only indicator of integration. Thus, much of the current debate still contains strong assimilationist assumptions, despite lip service to "freedom of choice" and "coexistence of different value systems" (e.g., Esser et al. 1979). European research on immigrants continues to treat "integration" and "assimilation" as nearly identical. The "well integrated" migrant is the one who has assimilated functionally into ways of speaking, thinking and behaving in the host society. Both "liberal" and "Marxist" research orientations have suffered from such assimilationist biases.

Most mainstream social research on integration is marked by an atomistic approach. Migrant integration is treated alongside a number of separate dimensions of adaptation using abstract standards of culture or behaviour taken to represent the majority. Theoretically, the process of integration is analyzed via varieties of decision making models based on individual rationality (e.g., Esser et al. 1979). Empirically, integration is typically investigated in relation to specific sectors of society such as linguistic competence, norms and values, education, work, housing and use of social services. The results are often expressed as a series of statistical averages.

While mainstream research on immigration and integration excludes from its conceptual framework the power structure of the global or national society, this is the very point of departure for most researchers in the Marxist tradition. However, the atomism and subjectivist rationalism of liberal research is replaced by Marxist "hyperintentionalism" (Shanin 1978) and an "objectivist" bias. Capitalist accumulation, labour processes and relationships of production are seen to reflect global and national hierarchies of power and class. Interpretations of the immigrants' situation derive from analyzing their role in the production process and their position within the working class. Analyses of the relations between immigrant groups and the indigenous population tend to reflect marxist dogma, which assert that the position in the production process is determinant for consciousness; presumably, similar positions in the process of production should lead to a common class consciousness. Once immigrants enter the threshold of West European capitalist society they are thus stripped of their culture and ethno-historical heritage.

Theodor Shanin (1978) was one of the first to note the consequence of such a narrowly defined class concept in Marxist migration research. Shanin argued that the specific socio-cultural background of migrants should be a component part of Marxist analysis, and that structural determination could be avoided through detailed studies of migrants' experiences and practice in everyday situations:

"... it is important to advance Marxist analysis by bringing the desks of those who write closer to the human experience and struggles which matter" (Shanin 1978:286).
For Shanin, the clue to a better understanding of migrant behaviour and social consciousness lies in the peasant background of the majority of present day immigrants in Europe. Yet it is important to consider the point made by Ernesto Laclau (1977), reflecting on the role of inherited symbols and ideologies among immigrants:

"Under these circumstances, a natural reaction would be to assert the symbols and ideological values of the society from which he has come, in order to express his antagonism towards the new society which exploits him. Superficially this would seem to be the survival of old elements, but in reality, behind this survival is concealed a transformation: these 'rural elements' are simply the raw materials which the ideological practice of the new immigrants transforms in order to express new antagonisms."

It is obvious that all migrants carry their ethnohistorical heritage with them into the immigration context. But we must remember that this "heritage" is not static. It can become a force for social transformation. In West European immigration countries, structural and cultural factors provide the context for new forms of social practice and ethnic strategies of integration among each migrant group, regardless of their ethnohistorical backgrounds, social or occupational positions. Among immigrants in Europe the increasing importance of processes of integration is now indicated by the growth of ethnic consciousness and the formation of immigrant ethnic communities.

Emerging ethnic minority cultures among immigrants in Europe serve as frameworks for socialization of recent arrivals as well as for new generations born in Western Europe. Through this process of socialization, members of minority groups adapt to life in a West European urban-industrial context. However, for many this adaptation more accurately reflects the development of a "double cultural competence" than any cultural assimilation.

Nevertheless, the dominant political ideologies in most European immigration countries continue to be inherently assimilationist in character. This is certainly the case in Denmark. In contrast, the Swedish political scene has reformulated assimilationist assumptions into a notion of "cultural pluralism". Holland and other European immigration countries might also be forced to give in to immigrants' political claims for a pluralistic society and gradually give up their assimilationist assumptions.

A development of cultural pluralist ideology corresponds to the historical experience from the United States (Ålund 1985). The course of integration processes in America has caused assimilationist ideologies of "Anglo conformity" and the "melting pot" to adjust themselves to a diverging reality. According to Crispino (1980) each of these perspectives is

"...a direct product of their historical surroundings and represents themes or statements which describe how immigrant groups should behave in their host society. Anglo conformity demanded that new arrivals renounce their ethnicity and adopt preexisting, supposedly superior "American" ways. The melting pot perspective was a bit more sympathetic to the ethnic's culture and social structure but still prescribed the abandonment of foreign
habits and the adoption of a new, indigenous type of American value and behavioral matrix. The cultural pluralism ideology, which spoke of the maintenance of the communal life, identity and values of the immigrant group, gave public recognition to a reality that already obtained, namely, that American society was a mosaic of subcultures and subgroups" (Crispino 1980:153, our italics).

However, Crispino emphasizes that none of these ideologies can cope with the complex ethnic reality of American society. The actual "assimilation process" must be analyzed as a complex interaction between structural conditions in society and ethnic group characteristics, between class and ethnicity. This interplay must also be viewed in the perspective of generational succession. Each new group of immigrants will experience unique processes of ethnic and class transformation as alternate generations pass through various phases of integration.

Based on the American situation, Breton (1970) argues that the notion of integration in studies of immigrant situations should be reviewed. It is important not to see

"... the integration of the immigrant from a purely assimilationist point of view in which integration is said to have taken place when the immigrant is absorbed in the receiving society" (ibid.: 46).

According to Breton, there are actually three types of communities within which immigrants can be integrated: the community of their own ethnic group, the "native" community of the dominant cultural group, and other "ethnic" communities. Breton maintains that some of the most crucial factors determining the integration of immigrants are to be found in the social organization of ethnic communities. In judging the capacity of an ethnic community to attract and integrate immigrants, it is important to investigate the community's ability to develop a greater or lesser degree of "institutional completeness" (ibid.) which can meet the needs of its members. Such tasks of an ethnic community towards its members are circumscribed by various informal and formal structures of organization.

The idea that ethnic organization is important for the incorporation of immigrants in the receiving society is not new to migration research. However, this theme is only slowly gaining attention in contemporary European discussions about the integration of immigrants. In discussing the integration of Yugoslav immigrants in Scandinavia, we shall refer to the development of immigrant ethnic communities as "internal integration". We emphasize that there is no contradiction between a high degree of internal integration in an ethnic group and a simultaneous integration of its members into overarching institutional structures of society. On the contrary, we argue that internal integration is a prerequisite for the development of ethnic organization. It is such organization, fighting for cultural pluralism and equal opportunities, which fosters genuine immigrant integration into Scandinavian society.
Analysing processes of integration in a non-reductionistic way requires a concept of culture quite different from that which assumes a homogeneity of the culture of the "receiving society". This homogeneity "does not exist in any differentiated society". It also requires a dynamic conceptualization of social practice which "accounts for the ongoing creativity of social actors" (Cohen 1982).

One attempt to formulate an understanding of society which acknowledges such claims is that of Dahlström (1982:143), who cites the "zone of the local public" as the basis for developing "efforts from below" in contemporary capitalist society.

The zone of the local public is a "zone of transition" (ibid.: 144) between the "private" zone of the household and the highly institutionalized and centralized national systems of the market and the national political arena. Household members and the zone of the local public are integrated into the market as consumers and sellers of their labour and into the "political public" as "citizens". But both private households and the intermediate zone of the local public retain a considerable degree of "autonomous development" in relation to the national market system and to the "political public" (the state).

Different social strata and classes are the bearers of different political part-cultures. The market system and the state are increasingly centralized and associated with particular cultural part-systems defined by a narrow elite. At the local level of society, people live and act through specific local-level cultures in working collectives, residential areas and other types of local social networks. These cultural part-systems differ from the cultural part-systems defined by the ruling strata.

"These local formations can be seen as deviant cultures, counter-cultures or part-cultures ... Local work, community life and the family can be seen as niches for the daily life of human beings. The overarching structures create problems for people, and they seek support and defend themselves from the position of their local niches" (ibid.: 145, translation from Swedish).

We regard the "zone of the local public" as the privileged arena for the active and creative development of ethnically specific ethnic minority cultures. They have their own dynamics which can by no means be reduced to a one-dimensional "adaptation" to the urban-industrial culture of the "majority", nor dealt with as simple manifestations of class consciousness without considering the ethnic dimension.

This ethnic dimension is all too often reduced to "the force of tradition", carried by a presumably unchanging "ethnic group". "Ethnic group" is usually applied to a culturally unique group with common descent and origin, (most often) with the same language, religion, common organization, and customs. However, a dynamic conception of "ethnic group" presupposes the notion of "ethnicity". We define ethnicity as a situationally determined articulation of particular factors of organization and forms of habitual behaviour with cogni-
itive factors of ethnic belonging. Ethnic boundaries demarcate a cultural distinction between “us” and “them”. Ethnicity thus represents an interaction between objective group structures and subjective consciousness. It follows that the two cornerstones of ethnicity are its cultural and its structural elements. In the former case, ethnic groups and their members experience a subjective feeling of having common values and normative criteria (ethnic identity). As regards the structural element, there are objective material interests for constituting a single community.

A one-sided focus on either structure or culture can hide the complex relationship between the two. Hence, “ethnicity” expresses a complex relationship between cultural groups and the economic and political structures of society as a whole. Our point here is to give a more accurate picture of distinctions which all too often are simplistically lumped together under the terms “culture” or “class” (see Schein 1972).

"Culture" is particularly emphasized in definitions of ethnicity. Culture can come to represent a sociological dumping ground. Emptied of its dynamic content, “culture” becomes a static “tradition” rather than a vector of transition.

Ethnic groups and “society” both continuously influence each other. However, the character of this interrelationship is assymetrical. Overarching structures of society set the general “rules” for the development of ethnic differentiation. The “horizontal” dimension of class is increasingly differentiated and stratified. Working classes in Western Europe are crosscut in a hierarchical sense by ethnic stratification of the labour force. In the interaction between structural factors in society and individual immigrant groups, ethnicity may appear more or less salient, and it may manifest itself in political, religious or cultural terms, depending on how the platform of interests is defined. Among the once atomized and easily manipulated “birds of passage” of Western Europe we now find that ethnicity and emerging immigrant cultures are beginning to evolve into politically conscious “counter-cultures”. We also see different groups of immigrants developing broader common identities, and fusing into wider communities of interest. They have become social movements questioning and challenging the premises of the ethnic stratification.

Migrancy

Yugoslavs’ patterns of integration range from their almost complete assimilation into the economic, social and cultural systems of the immigration countries to the formation of relatively isolated ethnic enclaves.

Although this study focuses on processes of integration among Yugoslav labour migrants in Scandinavia, the socio-cultural “hinterland” remains an
integral part of our analysis. The migrants are continually involved with their Yugoslav communities even if they spend most of their lives in Scandinavia.

In spite of growing integration, empirical evidence shows that the vast majority of Yugoslav migrants continue to harbour profound feelings of attachment to their country of origin and a desire for eventual return. This can range from concrete plans for social and economic reintegration back home to vague ideas of returning “someday”.

The Yugoslav migration researcher Ivo Baučić characterizes this “migrant dilemma” as a state of “continuing temporariness”. Continuing temporariness dominates migrants’ life experiences:

“Although the more recent features of European migration indicate that for a growing number of migrants their stay in foreign countries loses its characteristics of temporariness, considering their socio-economic situation in the host country as well as their permanent illusion of return it is still justified to regard this form of migration as specific and temporary, although we in fact have in mind a continuing temporariness, which is a synonym for uncertainty and only temporary solution” (Baučić 1979:1).

Migrants do not simply leave their homelands once and for all. A dominant feature of European post-war migrations is that migrants have been continually involved in a process of “migrancy”, commuting between immigration country and country of origin—perhaps for years, perhaps throughout their lives. This perpetuates a continuing ambivalence: they participate in two alternate socio-cultural systems—that of the country of origin and that of the immigration country. This double involvement—migrancy—circumscribes the processes of integration of each immigrant group and gives them their specific meaning.

The term “migrancy” is taken from the British social anthropologist Philip Mayer (1961, 1962), who studied differential patterns of urbanization among two groups of Xhosa migrants in South Africa. "Migrancy" connotes the continuous processual character of migration in opposition to the conventional depicting of migration as a definite decision and act; that is, the once and for all passage of the migrant from one type of social system to another. Mayer showed that the various instances usually abstracted from the migration process as a whole—emigration, immigration, integration, remigration, etc.—cannot be studied in isolation from one another. They are inseparable parts of a wider social process, each part of the same contradictory social reality.

In discussing “migrancy”, Mayer describes migration from the rural area to the town as a long-range social process where the migrant might alternate residence between town and a “rural hinterland”. This long-term oscillation between town and country might end with the final separation of the migrant from his rural hinterland and his definite integration in town; alternatively, it might result in his definite withdrawal to his rural homeland. The end result depends on the overall character of the social situation within which migration
occurs and the overall cultural-historical background of those involved.

The content of "migrancy" is not contained solely by the notion of oscillation between village and town. Mayer's analysis shows how migrants are continuously involved in a long term process of "networking". Migrants are continually participating in the maintenance of old social networks or the construction of new ones in the homeland and in town. The long range orientation and results of the process of migrancy will depend on the quality of the total social network bridging countryside and town. It might eventually lead to differential types of social separation from the rural hinterland or to new forms of reintegration into the rural area.

Thus, the researcher is impelled to analyse the problem of integration within the wider conceptual framework of migration as a complex historical process uniting community of immigration and community of emigration into one frame of reference. As suggested by Mitchell (1959), this implies the extension of the empirical study of integration (or urbanization) to embrace the social reality of migrants in the community of origin as well as community of immigration. The two communities ought to be treated as a single social field of investigation.

The tradition founded by British anthropological research on migration and urbanization in Africa continued in the modern social anthropological studies of integration of Commonwealth immigrants in Britain. In view of the character of integration processes among a dominant part of the more recent immigrants on the European continent, we find the analytical logic of these studies justified here as well.

Migrants in present day Western Europe can be seen as being restlessly involved in a process of "network building", binding in microcosms the poles of the international migratory system into a single web of overarching social relationships—one single field of social action. Migrants participate simultaneously as actors in social processes going on in the country of immigration and their country of origin. They are continuously influenced by structural determinants, norm systems, values and agents of socialization of two different social systems. Through the medium of migration they become actors in this total social field.

These multiple influences are synthetized into various socio-psychological profiles, specific practices and specific cultural compromises. Such profiles, strategies and compromises cannot be satisfactorily conceptualized unless reference is made to the migrants' total socio-cultural and material realities. For the immigrant this double existential frame of reference is not a socio-psychological aspect alone, but is authentically rooted in social and material realities. Separation from social networks, groupings, material possessions and alternatives of labour and education in the countries of origin takes place only slowly, for some not all. From this perspective, the cultural heritage of migrants can be placed in its proper context. It is not an immutable body of norms, given once and for all, but a dynamic force linking the historical
processes and present day actions, a social force which is continually replenished, remoulded and transformed through its incorporation into practice within the complex and changing historical reality of the migration process.

Wallachians and Macedonians

Wallachians and Macedonians—the two groups of Yugoslav migrants which are the focus of the present study of integration—exhibit considerable contrasts as to their socio-cultural backgrounds and patterns of migrancy.

The historical background to Yugoslav post-war processes of migrancy is a rapid industrialization process in the country after the Second World War. Masses of a peasant nation were set on the move, indulged with visions of a brighter “European” future to be realized in their Balkan homelands (Schierup 1977, Puljiz 1977).

However, by the mid-1960’s Yugoslav society became marked by the “saturation-effect” of industrialization, labour transfer from agriculture and a rapid proliferation of bureaucratic structures and national elites. New internal political-economic changes (1962-1967) and an unequal integration of Yugoslavia into the “international division of labour” (Schierup 1977 and 1982) struck a fundamental blow to visions of prosperity and social mobility for millions of peasants and workers. Twenty years after revolution thousands of Yugoslavs would pour across the borders to seek work in the industrial cities of northern and Western Europe. In its initial stages emigration was conceived as a temporary strategy for achieving socio-economic status in the Yugoslav homeland. Emigration grew at exponential rates between 1965 and 1973, the outset of economic crisis in Western Europe. By 1973 the number of Yugoslav citizens in European and overseas countries had grown from a few thousand to almost one and a half million (Schierup 1982). They were members of several different ethnic groups: Serbs, Croatians, Macedonians, Turks, Romanians, Wallachians, Slovenians and others.

Those Yugoslavs who have emigrated for economic reasons carry the official label of “Yugoslav citizens temporarily working abroad”. This euphemism reflects Yugoslavia’s official policy in the question of international labour migration. Yugoslav labour migrants abroad are regarded as a component part of the Yugoslav working class, such that the Yugoslav state has a moral duty to provide adequate socio-economic frameworks for the return and reintegration of those citizens working temporarily abroad (Tanić 1974, 1979).

Yugoslavia’s different ethnic groups of migrants all shared a general historical-structural context of migrancy and the ultimate goal of return and reintegration. However, the concrete processes of migrancy among individual groups have varied greatly in relation to socio-professional, cultural and
historical factors (Schierup 1977, 1982). This section describes the general migration patterns of Wallachians and Macedonians.

Members of the two groups of Yugoslav immigrants are distributed over a number of urban communities in Southern Sweden and Eastern Denmark.

The Macedonians are estimated to number about 8,000 among the 40,000 immigrants with Yugoslav citizenship in Sweden. They are estimated to make up about 800 of in all 7,000 immigrants of Yugoslav citizenship in Denmark. The “Macedonians” in this study are exclusively ethnic Macedonians of South Slav origin and traditionally characterized by adherence to the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church. Thus, other immigrants from the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia living in Scandinavia, such as ethnic Turks and Albanians, are not dealt with in the study.

The Wallachians come from northeastern Serbia. They speak a Romanian dialect and are ethnically close to the Romanian people across the Danube. However, they still regard themselves as being of Serbian nationality. Hence, they do not appear as “Wallachians” or “Romanians” in Yugoslav censuses or statistics of emigration. In each of the two countries there live about 2000 Wallachians.

Two Patterns of Migrancy

In a superficial sense, the migration strategies and patterns of “migrancy” among Macedonians and Wallachians are similar. People from both groups

originally emigrated with the aim of creating better living conditions for themselves and their families in their country of origin. In both cases “the promised land” was the country that one left and not Denmark or Sweden, which represented only a means to an end. Migration developed initially as a means of creating culturally defined, socially necessary conditions of existence “back home”, conditions which could not be secured locally.

Map no 1:  
*The share of migrants in total population according to communes*

The map shows the two high-migration areas from which immigrants in the study originate. Figures are based on the Yugoslav population census of 1981, which contained a special section entitled "Yugoslav Citizens Temporarily Working Abroad". A high migration area was defined as an area from which five percent of the total population were working temporarily abroad. For critical comments on census methodology and the validity of census results we shall refer to Baučić (1985). With few exceptions, the Macedonians which we deal with in this study originate from three communes situated in the old emigration area (see Schierup 1977) of south-eastern Macedonia: Prilep, Bitola and Resen. The Wallachian immigrants emigrated from two high-emigration communes of north-eastern Serbia, bordering Romania: Kladovo and Negotin.
However, when we examine the migratory processes among the two groups more closely, we recognize that they are based on fundamentally different historical experiences, contextual situations and strategic options which put the two groups on opposite ends of a continuum of Yugoslav immigrants in Scandinavia. The vast majority of the Wallachian immigrants came from peasant or peasant-worker background with a mental horizon centered around the village as a socio-cultural microcosmos. Many Macedonians were of a working class or petty bourgeois background. However, whether of peasant, working class or petty bourgeois background most Macedonian migrants aspired modern middle class status for themselves or their children.

Before Wallachians started to migrate to West European industrial centers (about 1968), their dominant source of livelihood was small-scale peasant agriculture with a stress on subsistence farming. Wallachian patterns of migrancy still follow a course directed by a social universe and a mental horizon centered around the village. Over the past two decades, three generations of migrants have oscillated back and forth between the rural villages of origin in Yugoslavia and local immigrant settlements in eastern Denmark and southern Sweden. Wallachians were previously involved in various forms of labour migration within Yugoslavia, but they never developed patterns of urbanization or permanent emigration from their rural home communities.

The purpose of sojourn abroad remains exclusively instrumental: to earn as much as possible for raising one's material standard and status in the village of origin. The input of migrants' remittances creates tremendous inflation in ceremonial prestation (dowry, patterns of gift giving, etc.); “investments” in traditional items of prestige (e.g., houses) run high. The ultimate rationale of labour migration is to return to the village in order to reestablish oneself as a peasant-worker with a well-paid job in a nearby town. Wallachians' basic identity remains circumscribed by the “little tradition” (Redfield 1960) of a peasant society. This is closely connected with the specific character of the ethnogenesis of the group and the character of its minority situation in the republic of Serbia. People adapt to random opportunities offered from the “outside” in order to exploit these within the framework of the village. Of course, inputs of money, ideas and new forms of organization act to transform patterns of material reproduction in the villages of origin, as well as their social structure and the local conceptual universe. However, this does not take place as a “straight line” acculturation or “modernization”, adopting ready made alternative frameworks. The “little tradition” provides much of the “tool kit” by the means of which new situations are perceived and new practices elaborated.

Unlike Wallachians, the Macedonians have a centuries-old tradition of labour migration to destinations in the Balkans and in the Middle East. By the turn of the century these migration routes had been superseded by large scale migration to overseas destinations, mainly in North America. After the introduction of immigrant quotas in the United States in 1924, Australia became
the main destination for Macedonian labour migrants and emigrants. Most came from southwestern Macedonia (Bitola, Resen, Ohrid) which was an important area for Ottoman feudalism and commerce on the Balkans (cf. Schierup 1977). Within the Socialist Republic of Macedonia this area has the highest rate of migration. The majority of Macedonian immigrants in Scandinavia also came from here. Elaborate networks of social relationships are still cultivated between old overseas emigrant communities and the Macedonian homeland. Emigrants from the old emigration areas in Macedonia were among the first Yugoslavs to go abroad after the Second World War. They headed mainly for old immigration destinations in Australia. However, many soon followed the post war emigration of Yugoslavs to new destinations in Western Europe.

When Macedonians started emigrating to overseas destinations a century ago, they did so as labour migrants with the purpose of returning to buy land, or to establish themselves as merchants or money-lenders in the existing social context of an economically underdeveloped peasant country (Schierup 1977). However, the rising ambitions of a growing number of emigrants soon exceeded the objective limits of socio-economic opportunities in the homeland, and most labour migrants became permanent settlers within overseas immigrant communities.

Since the Second World War the Socialist Republic of Macedonia has undergone profound processes or urbanization and social transformation (cf. Schierup 1977). However, these processes of social change have long been preceded by a fundamental transformation of the social consciousness among the population of old emigration areas. The historical experience of labour migration has had profound impact on social and cultural development in old Macedonian emigration regions and has contributed to the formation of a social personality marked by great ambitions for social mobility, flexibility and cultural adaptability. This puts its stamp on the present day orientation of Macedonians in Western Europe. Like their predecessors, the new Macedonian labour migrants left in order to return and build a better future at home, but within a changed social framework. While Wallachian migrants sought to establish themselves in the village context, Macedonian migrancy has been directed towards return, physical establishment and status-attainment in urban-industrial contexts of the Macedonian homeland. Most Macedonians wanted to gain a position among the modern middle or professional classes for themselves or for their children.

Analyzing Ethnic Transformation
We have argued that the integration of immigrants in Europe ought to be studied in a dynamic and holistic perspective. While most immigrants conserve a profound sense of attachment to the hinterland, they nevertheless develop
strategies of integration within the intermediary “zone of the local public”. This integration comprises a variety of social strategies or practices used by different ethnic groups. Integration processes should therefore be analysed within the context of a “total social field” of “migrancy”.

Wallachians and Macedonians, having had different patterns of migrancy, also have different strategies of integration in Scandinavia. However, each group—urban-oriented Macedonians as well as village-oriented Wallachians—has quite differential patterns of integration. Neither sociocultural background nor the general differences between two immigrant countries could alone explain intra-ethnic differences in patterns of integration. Each of the four different local contexts has produced new types of ethnic transformation, creating further distinctions within each original ethnic group.

A number of cultural and structural factors intersect under the impact of specific conditions of local Scandinavian communities, resulting in the accumulation of varying experience and the development of distinct social strategies. Some immigrants started to “amalgamate” with other ethnic minority groups, while others chose to further demarcate their ethnic group integrity.

This book seeks to elucidate the “black box” of “ethnic transformation” as the expression of group-specific forms of social practice. Wallachians, for example have emigrated from the same villages and have evolved into two diverging ethnic profiles in Denmark and Sweden. The pattern of integration among Wallachians in Sweden reflects immigrant experiences different from those of Wallachians in Denmark. We seek to explain such specific experiences and their underlying causes through the analysis of various types of social practice. Here we use the notion of “the social field” as an analytical medium for organizing the strategic dimensions of everyday migrant behaviour.

We define a field as the social space for a definite type of practice in society (family life, sport, education, philosophy, politics, work, etc.). The specific practices defining a social field cannot be understood by relating them directly to general economic and social conditions in society or to the character of general social cleavages and struggles (the class structure and class struggle). Nor can an individual’s position in a certain social field be reduced to his (class) position in the overall social structure. Once established, a social field develops its own relatively autonomous history, which although influenced and shaped by important events in the general economic and social history of society, has its own dynamics, its own laws of development and its own crises. The very existence of a field thus implies that one cannot understand its attached practices and culturally defined values without knowing the specific history which has produced it.

The notion of “field” thus presupposes the existence of a common practice for its social actors. The members of a field are able to conduct themselves strategically and reach common definitions of cultural values and social practices on account of their shared backgrounds. This presupposes the “incor-
poration” (Bourdieu 1977) of culturally specific predispositions for cognition, motivation and behaviour which are brought about via primary and secondary socialization. Social practice constantly undergoes transformation. Existing forms of practice become questioned because of antagonisms and conflicts between actors in the field itself and because of outside events in society at large (i.e. economic fluctuations, new state policies, major social upheavals, etc.). This produces crises within the field which call into question existing forms of practice (i.e., existing patterns of migrancy) and force redefinitions of a number of social situations. In the same way, the shared cultural predispositions—what Bourdieu (1977) calls the habitus—are constantly restructured through a dialectic unity with social practice. Habitus is modified or transformed by new collective experiences accumulated through ongoing struggles for influence, authority, and material or symbolic values pertaining to a particular field.31

In analyzing ethnic transformation, we employ the notion of a total social field—a “field of fields”32—which provides the framework for the process of “migrancy”. We have divided this total social field into two sub-fields, one revolving around the community of origin, the other around the community of immigration. Each of these fields can be further subdivided into fields which are the loci of particular practices within domestic life, work, education, politics, etc. Our main concern is with those social forces within a field which might call into question established forms of conduct. To locate such forces, we have tried to locate the principal conflicts between categories of social actors and analysed the struggles for influence and authority.

In elucidating the complex character of ethnic transformation, we discuss a number of “sub-fields” within the immigration context: the fields of work, of informal community relationships, of local level politics, and domestic relationships within the migrant household. Each of these social fields is relatively independent. Each has its own history, antagonisms and social dynamics. However, individuals and groups of migrants will simultaneously engage themselves in social action within these fields. Through simultaneous involvement in a number of social fields, the situation in one field feeds back into the conflicts in other fields.33 Antagonisms within each field and the interdependence between fields can produce a general crisis of values so that existing practices of migrancy are transformed.

The notion of the “social field” has been a tool for the organization of our discourse and the interpretation of empirical data from ethnographic field works in Scandinavia and Yugoslavia and quantitative data from a sociological survey undertaken among Wallachians and Macedonians. A detailed analysis of a number of social situations helped us to delimit those fields which we saw as essential for the course of the integration process, and to define and interpret forms of social practice within these fields. Comparison of a range of social situations and the combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods helped us to understand how the social fields of the immigrants’
situation interacted. For a further presentation of methods of empirical enquir-
ity we refer the reader to the appendix, and for a presentation of the sample for
the survey to Chapter Four.

We will now pay a visit to an immigrant community in Scandinavia. Here we
meet an important “person”, with whom we shall be travelling through both
the past, the present and the future of immigrant communities in Scandinavia.
Part two

**ETHNO-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

"... in each of us, in varying proportions, there is part of yesterday's man; it is yesterday's man who inevitably predominates in us, since the present amounts to little compared with the long past in the course of which we were formed and from which we result. Yet we do not sense this man of the past, because he is inveterate in us; he makes up the unconscious part of ourselves. Consequently we are led to take no account of him, any more than we take account of his legitimate demands. Conversely, we are very much aware of the most recent attainments of civilization, because, being recent, they have not yet had time to settle into our unconscious".

Émile Durkheim
Chapter Two

THE VAMPIRE IS STILL ALIVE:
WALLACHIAN LABOUR MIGRANTS
FROM NORTHEASTERN SERBIA

"The future path through future ambushes is a continuation of the old path by which the
survivors from the past have come. ... It is by following a path, created and maintained by
generations of walking feet, that some of the dangers of the surrounding forests or mountains
or marshes may be avoided."

John Berger

The year is 1983. The place is an immigrant suburb in Denmark. The time is
almost midnight. Milorad is in the process of putting together the annual
report for the meeting of the Wallachian Association. Suddenly, there is a
knock at the window. As soon as he raises his weary eyes from the membership
list, he realizes that what he had feared has indeed occurred. His deceased
mother is hovering outside the window in her white burial attire, muttering
with a distant voice: "Why have you left me?" Trembling, Milorad rushes into
the bedroom, and buries himself between his wife and son, both sleeping
peacefully.

The next day Milorad pays a visit to baba (grandmother/old woman) Jana. Despite his studies in Belgrade, he realizes that even the educated cannot
escape vampires:

"The first time my mother came was while I was reading Karen Horney's book 'The
Neurotic Modern Man'. I also paid a visit to the doctor, but he said, "surely you don't
believe in that nonsense". I tried to put it out of mind, but I couldn't sleep at nights. My
wife and especially my son also became afraid. The boy refused to sleep alone. Now we're
all sleeping together. At the club, in fact, they even asked me if my mother hadn't come.
They knew before me that she might come ... I had gone against my mother and married
Zlatka, who was a simple girl and not good enough for me according to Mama. Then later,
when I moved from my mother's house to bring peace to the family, V my mother con­
demned me. Her struggle for my education became 'throwing pearls to swine', now that I
had married below my status and had left her. People knew that my mother was strong and
that her judgement was a hard burden to bear. They knew that she might return ...
"

Baba Jana is the only one that can help. She is a wise woman— a "vraj" (wall.)
who can bring vampires to rest in their graves so that they leave the living
alone. With a twig of basil, incense from harpins from the sacred mount,
garlic, a knife, eggs, flour and many other contrivances, Jana can bring the
vampire (moroj in Wallachian) to meet the hand of God at the door and
envelope the house with the "web of life". Most important is for the living to
really show great sorrow and pain after the departure of the deceased, "so that
the whole village can hear them". The memory of the deceased that is invoked
by a worthy ceremony can, together with Jana’s ritual and rhymes, bring Milorad’s mother to rest.

As a matter of fact, Milorad does not “believe” in vampires. He is a modern, educated and progressive man who has always fought them stubbornly. He is deeply ashamed of the “rubbish”, that is, the “superstition and traditionalism” plaguing his people. Nevertheless, the vampire still believes in Milorad and returns from the depths of his unconscious to haunt him in nightmares during his unguarded moments.

Milorad’s son of six is less reserved than his father in the question of vampires. He says that there are more vampires in Denmark than in the village in Yugoslavia. For Danes can also become vampires. For him, grandmother begins to become violent like Count Dracula and merges with the modern horror of a video film. If grandmother knew, she would probably be hurt.

Who Is the Vampire?

The vampire (Wallachian: moroj) is an old, and still central gestalt in Wallachian mythology which has been heavily exploited by Western commercial lore. According to Wallachian mythology, moroj is a human being who has died, but cannot find peace in the grave. As a rule, moroj haunts close relatives, with whom it has experienced some kind of conflict before death. Moroj can be one who has died towards whom the proper ceremonial homage has not been paid, or who has a reason to return in order to redress acts of injustice committed against him or her during life. Moroj never haunt those who have behaved well towards them, but only those who did not show proper respect. However, even in retrospect, it is possible to prevent a moroj’s return by undertaking proper rituals. In this case, one will consult a specialist, a vraj.

The Wallachian belief in vampires and their efforts to prevent the return of deceased relatives are forms of worship of the dead. Worship of the dead implies not only the idea of survival after death, but also the active participation of the dead in mundane affairs (Goody 1962:379). Their intervention, in the past or in the future, requires the living to propitiate the dead by the offer of goods, services, words, and other gestures to secure their favours. Such acts of propitiation include sacrifice (of food, drink or blood), gifts or other material objects, and the payment of respect through other forms of ritual.

Worship of the dead varies according to the inclusiveness of the cultus and the relationship between the living and the dead (ibid:380ff). By the notion of ancestor cult we refer to a type of worship in which the living and the dead are kin to one another. Worship of ancestors provides sanctions on relationships between members of a kin group in two ways: by giving supernatural support to the system of authority, and by the threat of mystical retribution in life and in death.
Among the Wallachians, the vampire belongs to a comprehensive mythology of death and elaborate mortuary rituals. In spite of continuing processes of social and material change in the period after World War II, this mythology and its associated rituals still survive in the present (Zecević 1974). It plays an important role in social and cultural life in towns as well as in villages.

Milorad's struggle with the vampire shows how beliefs like the ancestor cult integrate with mechanisms of social control used in Wallachian immigrant communities in Scandinavia. The question, "Why are vampires still alive?", requires us to look back into Wallachian history and to examine the nature of the village community and the family in Wallachian society. Chapter Nine presents a more detailed discussion of the meaning of "traditional" forms of belief and organization among Wallachians in Scandinavia.

"The Blood Drenched Shirt of the Krajina"

The Wallachians in Scandinavia come from the historical region of Negotinska Krajina in northeastern Serbia. The area lies on the Yugoslav side of the Danube, bordering the historical province of Wallachia in today's Romania. The Wallachians in the Krajina speak dialects of Romanian, which they do not use as a written language. Linguistically and culturally, the Wallachians are clearly distinguishable from the Serbs, the other major ethnic group in the Krajina. However, their speech contains many Serbian words and phrases, and Serbian is also the Wallachians' written language. Although they speak "vlaški" in the family and the village context, according to Wallachian folk mythology Serbian is their original mother tongue. They also regard themselves as Serbs by nationality and historical origin. Today's Wallachians of Negotinska Krajina carry Serbian names and surnames and practice the ritual of the slava, which is specific to the Serbian branch of the Orthodox Church. Here they differ from groups of Romanian speaking minorities of Yugoslavia (Vojvodina), who carry Romanian names and surnames and affiliate themselves nationally to the Romanian nationality in Yugoslavia.

Today's Wallachian ethnic group in Serbia is the result of a long and complex process of ethnocultural amalgamation (Barjaktarović 1973). Besides primeval Balkanic roots and early Roman influences, the most important component of Wallachian cultural history is later Slavic influences, predominantly Serbian. Previously settled populations in the Krajina region blended with Slav immigrants and later with Romanian-speaking refugees from the historical region of Wallachia beyond the Danube.

Due to its geographical position and specific legal-political status, the Negotinska Krajina was for centuries a favourable immigration area for Romanian peasants from beyond the Danube.
The distribution of Romanian speakers according to the Yugoslav population census of 1921.
The 1921 census was the last Yugoslav population census giving indications about the distribution of Romanian language speakers in Eastern Serbia. All subsequent censuses operate with indicators of national identification and not of language or "mother tongue". Practically all "Wallachians" are counted as "Serbian nationality in later census-results. However" the map can be regarded as giving at least a fairly reliable picture of the present situation.

Based on a folding map in Resultats préliminaires du Recensement de la Royaume des Serbs, Croats et Slovènes du 31 Janvier 1921, publié par la Direction de la Statistique d'Etat Belgrade 1924, reproduced in NID 1943-1944:248.

Also during earlier periods the region of Negotinska Krajina was on the border between major political-administrative territories. From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century it was for prolonged periods part of the Ottoman frontier to Hungary, and after that time it became part of the eastern border regions of the Kingdom of Serbia.

The border character of the area has historically placed it into relationship with shifting centers of power. Hence, its population was accorded a special administrative-political status and some degree of autonomy. Most often this special status had to do with the issue of border control. In order to keep the population settled along unstable territorial borders and in order to use them as a bastion of defence against rival states and interests, specific "border laws" were instituted.
During Turkish rule in the Negotinska Krajina, the Wallachian inhabitants were from the beginning of the fifteenth century administered under so-called “Wallachian Laws” (Vlaški Zakoni, Bojanić-Lukac 1978:36). These laws envisaged special tax privileges for the Wallachian population in exchange for obligations to defend the border of the empire. When the border was moved, the privileges ceased. Most often the Wallachians moved toward the border, searching for the privileges, trying to escape the severe taxes in the interior. Under Ottoman rule and later under the Kingdom of Serbia, Wallachians in the border regions enjoyed a great measure of autonomy and self-government under their traditional rulers (Knez, starešina). These preconditions helped perpetuate the specific cultural profile characterizing Wallachians in Yugoslavia today.
Social and political oppression in Wallachia increased the attraction of the border privileges and led to considerable immigration. The history of the peasants of Wallachia bears witness to cruel repression and heavy misery coupled to continuous migrations in order to escape persecution and exploitation. The commercialization of feudalism in Romania from the mid-eighteenth century led to deteriorating social and legal status for the peasantry in Wallachia. The life of the peasants became renowned as "... the most brutish, most conservative and least humane in the whole of Europe" (Petrović 1968:4).

"The situation of Romanian peasants on the frenzied and merciless landlords' estates was frightful. The wild orgies and luxury of the landlords stood in sharp contrast to the misery in the subterranean hovels where the peasants lived burrowed in dwellings almost under the earth. These dwellings were filthy, dark spaces with no furniture or household utensils ... Documents from the end of the 1800's suggest that the simplest of African huts met life's
requirements better than the Wallachian ... The tyranny of the Romanian lords, the
godlessness of the church, heavy state taxes, and the corruption of the authorities were the
causes of these conditions” (Dorđević 1923, from Marjanović 1981:42. Our translation).

However, it is probably much too simple to describe today's Wallachians of the
Krajina as the offspring of Romanian speaking immigrants from Wallachia. Autochthonous Romanized and South Slav populations have probably blended into what is today's Wallachian population of the Krajina and northeastern Serbia.

In the same way as the Wallachians themselves are ambiguous about their
own ethnic identity Yugoslav ethnologists are ambiguous about Wallachian ethnogenesis. Barjaktarović (1973), Marjanović (1981) and others discuss the Wallachians in terms of a possible ethnohistorical “amalgamation” of several groups including settled Romanized population elements and later immigrants to the Krajina—not only Romanian groups from Wallachia and Hungary but also immigrants from southern Serbia and Kosovo.

According to this view, the historical position of the Krajina as a buffer zone bordering shifting state formations as Byzantium, Bulgaria, Serbia, Wallachia, Hungary and Turkey paved the way for the formation of complex ethnic amalgamations. Migrations in both directions over the Danube were frequent and extensive over the centuries. The ambiguity about Wallachian origin in the Krajina is even attached to the fact that several different groups of immigrants “became Wallachians” in order to enjoy Wallachian border privileges. However, the historical process of “amalgamation” has often been connected with forced cooperation and conflicts. This can be illustrated by the following Serbian proverb:

“O Turčine, za nevolju kume, a ti Vlaši, silom pobratime”

(“Oh, you Turk, misery's godfather, oh you Vlach, enforced blood brother”).

In view of frequent political storms and pervasive social perturbations which have passed over the Krajina for centuries, one can envision that this border area has also been exposed to violent conflicts. The local population has conserved the memory of violence and unrest in a traditional designation of the Krajina area as “The Blooddrenched Shirt” (“krvava košulja”; Marjanović 1981). Continuous movement of refugees and migrations within and beyond the region is the background to memories of persecution and bloodshed.

The history of a single ethnic group is easily lost in the streams of refugees. This makes it difficult to determine with certainty the historical and cultural roots of the various groups. But this does not mean that ethnically distinct groups have disappeared. Rather, they have been transformed through mutual contacts and influence, retained some of their original traits, lost others, and added new ones. It is still plausible in today’s ethnic “amalgam” to draw ethnic boundaries between Wallachians, Serbs and a small group of Montenegrins in the area. These boundaries consist mainly of the language, variations in family

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structure and above all in social structure and the social position of the group as a whole, compared with other ethnic neighbors.

The Wallachians have historically been stigmatized by their other ethnic neighbours. This stigmatization has perhaps helped to unite the Wallachians in their hard struggle for survival under a sequence of strong rulers. In both chronicles and written documents Wallachians have been described as opportunists who turn their cape to the winds (or wherever there is something to be gained), murder for a brass button (which they mistook to be gold), or as perfidious or unsuited as friends. "Ni u tikvi suda ni u Vlahu druga", says the proverb: "There's as much a bowl in a pumpkin as there is a friend in a Wallachian". To this are added assertions that the Wallachians had formerly killed their elderly, were sexually loose, etc. (Barjaktarović 1973, 23-27). Upon closer consideration, these sayings may also be taken as evidence of the Wallachians’ extremely difficult historical conditions, and their vital capacity for adaptation.

Nevertheless, the Wallachians share a common religious identification with the Serbians. Historically, they became loyal members of the first autonomous Serbian state (1817). Since the liberation from Turkish rule in 1878 they have developed a growing Serbian national self-identification (cf. Marjanović 1981:43).

Even as late as the beginning of the nineteenth century, Wallachian national consciousness was relatively undefined and no Wallachian bourgeoisie existed, not even in a rudimentary form (Petrović 1968). Following the penetration of money-commodity relations, Wallachians remained in their villages and in the social periphery. The emergence of a merchant class towards the end of the eighteenth century conserved a definite Serbian character in the Negotinska Krajina and northeastern Serbia. During later capitalist development after the turn of the century, the idea of “progress” and prosperity was attached to the symbolism of Serbian national identification and self-confidence. Wallachians’ indifference to the Romanian national revival could possibly be explained by the still vivid memory of the ruthless historical character of exploitation and oppression among the Wallachian peasantry beyond the Danube.

In spite of their undoubtedly Serbian national self-identification, Wallachians today still differ profoundly from their Serbian neighbours. The adoption of the national political and cultural tradition appears superficial, characterized more by mechanical copying of conspicuous symbols than by internalized mastery. The prevailing ideological configurations of the Wallachian social universe seem still to be founded upon a specific “little tradition” (Redfield 1960) specifically attached to Wallachian peasant society, through which messages of the Serbian and Yugoslav “great (national) traditions” are continuously filtered. The foci of Wallachian social structure and self-identification are still their village and the household, while they in spite of their national allegiance have remained loosely integrated into the social and political structure of Serbian and Yugoslav national society. Some of
the most conspicuous features of this loose integration is that Wallachians have not taken part in the pervasive processes of urbanization in Serbia and Yugoslavia after the Second World War and have until recently resisted the school education of their children. Due to this the Wallachians of Serbia are today the definitely most “rural” and one of the most “traditional” population groups in Yugoslavia.

The appearance of magical and mystical aspects is an important element of present day Wallachian cultural tradition. Here elements of the mythology of early Balkan tribes are blended with elements brought by later Slav and Romanian settlers. These cultural “sediments” express themselves as a unique “religious-magical complex” among the Wallachians of northeastern Serbia (Marjanović 1981, Zečević 1974).

The early Balkan historical roots still occupy a prominent role and can be seen in ancestor cults and the belief in vampires as well as in fertility rites honouring the first fruits of spring. These are not just ritual relics. They have important functions in the cultural and social life of the rural communities.

The persistence of pre-Christian forms of “superstition” among the Wallachians of northeastern Serbia can be regarded as connected to the historical experience of constant political unrest coupled with an ever present threat of collapse of a feeble social organisation. In border areas, often devastated by war, villages, kin groups, and even families were scattered and torn apart by constant migrations. The smallest unit, the family, became the most important bastion of social solidarity. Its importance was constantly emphasized in rebuilt villages and settlements. Village communities built their common identity on smaller cores of individual families and not around larger corporate unilineal kin-groups as was common among the Serbs. Ceremonies, beliefs and ritual practices reinforced the cohesion of the individual family and its relationships to neighbours and bilateral kin, while the patrilineage as a corporate group was a dominant focus for social mythology and ritual practice among the Serbs.

The Village and the Family

The fundamental social units of the traditional village community of the Krajina-Wallachians are loosely connected nuclei of three- to four-generational families. In today's Krajina we find no married collaterals in these extended families. The cohabitation of collaterals is characteristic for the type of South Slav extended family, known as the “zadruga”, remnants of which are still to be found today in most parts of Serbia. The zadruga and its principle of solidarity and cohabitation of (male) collaterals is tied to a strong patriarchal tradition of kinship and marriage, and the zadruga can be seen as forming the minimal segment of a ramified patrilineal kinship system (based on the opposition of lineages, clans etc.). In Figure 1 we have drawn a sketch of the zadruga family model and the present day Wallachian family model.
As in the case of the Romanians (cf. Cvijić 1922, Mosely 1953, Chirot 1976) it is doubtful, whether zadruga’s have ever existed among the Krajina Wallachians. Nor does the present day kinship system of the Wallachians bear any witness of a patriarchal social tradition (Schierup 1973, Pantelić 1970). The system of marriage as well as the authority structure is markedly bilateral, with strong importance given to women and with equal social importance of female descent. However, the issue of the existence or non-existence of zadruga’s in Wallachian society is still an unsettled question in Yugoslav ethnology. Certain sources indicate that large families with 16 to 20 members or more existed earlier. But whether such families were Wallachian or Serbian or mixed does not appear (Pantelić 1970:249).

Turning from the still unsettled question of the exact historical character of the Wallachian family to the present-day situation, it is evident that patriarchal forms of authority or corporate kinship groups are of no importance for the conservation of social order, neither in the Wallachian family nor in the village of today. A strict social order in the Wallachian multigenerational family depends on the reproduction of the power and authority of the older generations of the household. This authority and the dependence of the younger generation is reinforced by mythical sanctions and by the social pressure from elaborate social networks of relatives, neighbours and ritual relationships. These connect every single household to other households and to the village community as a whole. The household is merged into an intricate web of mutual obligations, expectations and social control.

The vampires are the ultimate sanctions of senior authority. However, they are not blood suckers, as related by commercial lore. They simply terrify
people, and can even be seen as giving blood to the community united in the village by common symbols belonging to the past. Vampirism can be understood as a form of ancestor cult with ancient roots, having been perpetuated in the special historical situation of Wallachian society. Without strong quasi-political corporate kinship groups and without the idea of a nation-state, Wallachian migrants and refugees gathered in their villages around a variety of symbols bolstering social order and common identity. This is still part of the social meaning of vampires in the modern Scandinavian context. The contradictory social function of vampires is at once to reproduce social order and oppression in the family and during socialization. This aspect deserves special treatment. It can be viewed through the prisms of the Wallachian village and the Wallachian family.

**The Village**

As is the case among most Romanian-speaking groups, the Wallachian village has been the dominant focus for communal identity and corporate solidarity. Among the South Slavs, the village community is typically crosscut by or identical with corporate kin groups.

Comparing Romanian and South Slav villages, Chirot (1976) argues:

"The communal village provides an alternative solution to the problems of land clearing of a pastoral economy and of insecurity in a sparsely populated area ... Romanian communal villages were apparently territorial rather than family based units from a very early period ... The old Dacoroman population was quite thoroughly mixed with Slavic elements from the sixth to the twelfth centuries ... From at least the middle ages, villages were probably composed of mixed ethnic elements. Traditional Romanian villages have long had a strongly endogamous marriage tradition, while most South Slav communities were strongly exogamous" (ibid.:153).

In Romania the development of feudal exploitation and the usurpation of communal village lands by large land owners forced villagers either to break up and privatize the communal land themselves (ibid.) or to emigrate to regions characterized by milder forms of exploitation and greater autonomy for the peasantry.

"In order to protect themselves, villagers had to break the communal solidarity of the village ... The key reason for division of communal lands was protection from exploitation by rich natives or outsiders ... The general pattern elaborated here spread through Romania and produced either serfdom or breakup of communal villages." (ibid.:149-50).

As mentioned, the Negotinska Krajina was for prolonged periods a major immigration region for Romanian peasants east of the Danube. Migrants from Romanian Wallachia, carrying with them their tradition of the village community and probably composed of small families, would have assimilated with
previously settled Romanian populations and with various South Slav groups. Ethnically mixed villages would have developed as segmented units; that is, greater or smaller conglomerations of houses and households all sharing the same collective (village) territory. These villages developed on lines very much like traditional Romanian communal villages. There existed territorial endogamy aimed at conserving or bettering the living standard of individual households and at retaining family property within the limits of the village. In contrast to the prevailing situation in Romania the relatively great autonomy of the villages and the peasantry was retained. In spite of a growing penetration of money-commodity relations and a growing property differentiation among the peasantry itself, several collective functions of the village were perpetuated to the end of the Second World War. These include the seoska utrina (Serbo-Croat), or communal village pasture, and the communal granary or koš. Here grain was gathered during years of hunger and for those in need. The coherence and solidarity of villages in this respect showed a resurgence. In the 1930's—during years of hunger—the village granary regained its importance as a redistributive instrument. Every tax-paying citizen was to provide a certain amount of wheat to the communal granary, and grain was later distributed according to need (Stojančević 1957, Marjanović 1981).

Although land is now completely individualized and old collective institutions have died out, the Wallachian village still represents a very integrated social unit. Considerable property differentiation has been going on among households for at least one hundred years, accompanied by conspicuous demonstration of social status. However, many earlier ceremonies expressing the unity and solidarity of villages are still in practice. Property differentiation and status competition has to the present day been affected by the impact of ceremonies and practices of redistribution and leveling. The social network of the village is tightly woven and makes it difficult to exceed the bounds of public morality. Old corporate institutions and practices have been supplanted by new ones in the shape of modern local self-government assemblies and committees. While the Wallachian peasants are generally not politically active on higher administrative levels, they take a keen interest in the collective progress and status of their villages. This is also expressed among Wallachian labour migrants in Scandinavia. Everybody takes a vivid interest in every event in the natal village to which they expect one day to return. Migrants universally remit large sums of money to their local self-management committee, meant for the improvement of village infrastructure (roads, piped water, assembly halls, health centers etc.).

The Family Where Shame Has Disappeared

At the turn of the century certain learned circles in Serbia viewed the Wallachian family as an example of immoral living. With reference to the
Wallachian view on sexual relationships and family life as a whole, Wallachian women were customarily pointed out as the embodiment of sinfulness. Thus, Đorđević (1912:61), in one of the accounts from the turn of the century, paints the following picture of the Wallachian family:

“The classical type of the “wrecked” family type may be found in eastern Serbia, where unfortunately it evolved almost exclusively in a negative direction—among the Serbs as well as among the Romanians (Wallachians). Until recently I was willing to believe that the low moral understanding in this region was a consequence of cultural underdevelopment and backwardness, a lack of interest in things public, cultural remoteness and primitivism...

The incomplete cultural intermingling had many negative manifestations in the spread of culture. Decadence advanced so far that one can say, that as far these mountain tracks are concerned, the people there have returned to their natural savage state in relation on one another, to things public, and to the state, and that the people in the lowlands have been culturally destroyed ... As an example I will only mention that women visit taverns and drink together with men, and it is no uncommon site to see the most shameless behaviour, where marriages are loose, where witnesses may be purchased who will testify to anything at all, where murder is part of everyday life ... In the Požarevac region, peasant women from these regions go out alone, with powder and rouge on their faces, among the people, dressed in cheap imitations of city attire, and some go so far that they work as waitresses in the inns in the area and regard this work just like any other job, all the while they retain normal ties with their families in the village. When they return home, the men stand in queue to marry them since they have saved money, and here nobody asks where the money comes from, as long as it's there ...

The Wallachians have brought bad morals and habits with them and passed them on to other groups, since they are an old mixture of Serbs and Romanians. Hence, more or less the same things are also seen in purely Serbian villages. Here one can see bigamy, arising from repulsive desire, abductions of brides, violence and barbarism as normal forms of settling accounts. Morality has been driven to its furthest limits” (Đorđević 1912:11; our translation from Serbo-Croatian).

Đorđević's views in 1912 on the Wallachian family met with harsh criticism from a later generation of his Yugoslav colleagues. Nikola Pantelić (1970) dismissed Đorđević's “bourgeois moralizing”:

“It seems as if professor Đorđević was proceeding from his own patriarchal and petty bourgeois moral conceptions and avoided any objective approach to the facts and to the problems” (Pantelić 1970:248).

But even if professor Đorđević was airing his own private ethical views, the problem, accented by Pantelić, of the special qualities of the northeastern Serbian families still remains. Pantelić has tried to undertake a scientific examination and clarification of the causes and effects of, for instance, early child marriage, which at that time was still practiced, a high divorce rate, liberal sexual practices (“freedoms”), etc. (Pantelić 1970).

The Wallachian and the eastern Serbian family in general is marked by a number of unique features, which have merited this family its own place in the Serbian family typology, the “Timok family type”. Following Pantelić (1970),...
Kostić (1958), Schierup (1973, 1977) and Marjanović (1981) it possesses the following features:

1. The prevalence of extended multigenerational families; i.e., the cohabitation of several (three to five) alternate generations in one single household.
2. A low natality; i.e. one or two children per married couple.\(^\text{18}\)
3. An early age of marriage.
4. A high degree of matrilocal marriages.
5. A relatively liberal view of sexuality.
6. Frequent divorces without loss of prestige to either party.

If we shall understand the role of “vampires” in Scandinavia we must understand the dynamics of intergenerational tensions in the Wallachian peasant family and the ways in which this family is influenced by migration and by integration in Scandinavia.

A continued reproduction of the multigenerational family serves vital ends seen from the perspective of the senior generation which holds the rights of property, and until old age continues to occupy a privileged position in decision-making concerning household and family affairs. Given low natality only maximal involvement of labour—both male and female—of several generations can solve the problem of farm labour. Moreover, cohabitation with junior generations in a common household is seen as the only guarantee for being well taken care of in one’s old age. As families with more than two children (collaterals) per married couple are seldom, partitions of the family estate takes place almost exclusively through outmarriage; the outmarrying young woman or man carries her/his inheritance with her/him into the household of the spouse. However, this seldom leads to the establishment of new households, as marriages usually take place into other already established multigenerational households (See Figure 2).

Figure 2: Marital alliances between Wallachian multigenerational households

![Diagram of marital alliances between Wallachian multigenerational households](image-url)
Strategies to conserve the multigenerational, extended household as a productive and reproductive unit, entail strongly enforced control over offspring in order to secure that at least one child marries and begets children on the homestead. This, above all, makes it necessary to control reproduction; that is, the sexuality of male as well as female offspring. In Wallachian villages, agreements for marriage are still made between families—i.e. parents and grandparents while the potential spouses are still children. A variety of institutions for public mating and parental guidance and manipulation of sexuality aim at the realization of parental marriage plans among young adolescents.

A continued practice of very young marriages—a traditional feature of Wallachian peasant society—is connected to the elders' strategies of household sustenance and their strivings to extend their position of authority and control into the lives of new generations.

It is thought to be much easier to manipulate and control the choice of partners of young adolescents than that of adult offspring. The marriage and procreation of very young partners also makes it easier for the older generations of the household to extend their authority and control even to their grand- or great-grand children.

Given low natality early marriages have become an important element of strategies to solve labour shortages of peasant households. A short span of years between alternate generations means that several generations can be of full working capacity at the same time. In Wallachian peasant households, it is common that three and even sometimes four adult generations of a single household are fully active in agriculture and supplementary sources of subsistence.

In the Wallachian multigenerational households the transmission of household authority and property rights to the younger generation is limited until the physical death of the parental generation. This entails a deprived position in decision-making and is the basis for outspoken intergenerational tensions.

Even though the younger generation has so far accepted the multigenerational household as a framework for family reproduction, the specific constellation of power between the generations has always been open to contest. This is most clearly manifested in a struggle between the generations over the question of control over sexuality and the subversive counter-strategies of marriage conducted by the younger generation.

The marked contradiction between parents' efforts to control mating and the traditionally liberal view on sexuality, marriage and divorce in Wallachian peasant society makes divorce a likely outcome of many alliances. Typically, many arranged first-time marriages break up rather quickly, after which the two partners will enter new marriages (Milanović 1965).

Moreover, no embracing system of corporate kinship groups prescribes and sanctions certain types of preferential marriage alliances and bans others. Marriage alliances in Wallachian villages are typically of an ad hoc and
situational character, depending upon the opportunity structure and complementary interests of single households and the “balance of power” between the generations.  

Alliances initiated by young partners themselves might in the end appear as solid and lasting compromises between the preferences of alternating generations. However, many such alliances initiate bitter conflicts between the generations, which can last a lifetime and in the afterlife lead to vampirism. Thus, the ultimate moral sanction of the older generation lies in the fact that they might reappear and revenge themselves in the afterlife.

Migration to Scandinavia

The majority of Wallachian immigrants in Scandinavia come from villages in two communes of the Krajina region, Negotin and Kladovo. Their degree of education is still far below the Serbian average. Every fifth peasant in Negotin was illiterate in 1971 (Zikić 1973, cited in Marjanović 1981:119). In 1971, when migration to Scandinavia had reached its peak, the proportion of farmers in the area was still 85.6 per cent—one of the highest in any Yugoslav region. An orientation towards village life can be seen even among the younger generations of Wallachians in Yugoslavia. About 50 per cent of Wallachian youth chose not to continue their education after finishing primary school and to remain on the family farm (Marjanović 1981:117 and 128).

People from this area had already developed different types of intra-regional and inter-regional labour migration. They complemented work on the family farm with wage labour in agriculture, mines and on building sites (Schierup 1973, 1977).

Emigration from the region accelerated in 1969. About 8 per cent of the total population in Wallachian villages were working abroad in 1971 (ibid.) versus 2 per cent in ethnic Serbian villages. Today the Krajina region is one of the highest areas of emigration in Yugoslavia. Well above 10 per cent of its total population works abroad (Baučić 1985). The great rush abroad from 1969 meant a profound change in Wallachian migration patterns. Earlier inter-regional migration in Yugoslavia was usually a seasonal migration. Compared to Serbian villages in the area, where internal migration meant a permanent transfer from village to town, Wallachians always returned to their villages after shorter intervals of work in different areas of Yugoslavia.

Migration from the Krajina to Western Europe and Scandinavia was characterized by the fact that both men and women migrated from the outset (Schierup 1973) in order that both take up employment abroad. Migrants would usually go away in couples, man and wife together, while minor children would remain at home with the grandparents. This pattern rests on the markedly bilateral kinship and authority structure of Wallachian peasant households and on the
fact that the sexual division of labour in Wallachian peasant society is comparatively fluid. Thus, women have been engaged in all kinds of agricultural work on the farm and even in off-farm wage-labour when the need arose. The mobility of women was supported by the fact that they were not barred from occupational activity by many childbirths. The family structure among the Wallachians seems well-suited for sustaining intensive migrancy of economically active members.

In the dominant type of household, with several cohabiting successive generations, the older generation(s) would care for young children while the parental generation left for Scandinavia. At first the younger or middle-aged Wallachians went abroad in order to earn as much money as possible in a couple of years, so that the household might achieve a better material position in the home village and increase its relative social status. When the most immediate existential needs had been covered, remittances from abroad were used to buy land, houses, dowries, etc. (cf. Schierup 1973). This rapidly led to a tremendous increase in the claims for income of the average household, inducing increasing numbers to migrate abroad in order to sustain increased consumption at home. Dowry and bridemoney rose to levels which exceeded the resources of those households who were without foreign remittances. Prices of agricultural land skyrocketed and there developed grossly exaggerated norms as to what was considered a “decent” dwelling. Humble peasant cottages were supplanted by new solid brick villas. These were first built as onestorey houses, but gradually became 2 and 3 storey “mansions”. Despite their size the family still utilizes only two or three rooms; others are empty, with the entire family absent in Western Europe most of the year.

Most investments were tied to increased consumption. Even when migrants invested in improving household production this has largely taken on the character of conspicuous status demonstrations in the village context. Even peasants with very little land have invested heavily in tractors, combines and large agricultural buildings. Some villages have a ratio of one tractor per every 2 hectares of land. Simultaneously, peasants now see agriculture as inadequate for fulfilling the material norms, needs and claims of the migrant communities. Only very limited possibilities have appeared for the generally poorly-educated Wallachian labour migrants to return, and only a handful have found possibilities to reintegrate themselves into the local labour market after returning from Western Europe after 10 or 15 years. Only a viable combination of wage labour and agriculture could fulfill the goals for which most migrants went abroad; i.e., to return to a better future in the village of origin. Lacking this combination migrants constantly postpone their return; temporary migration developed into a permanent process of migrancy.
Two Decades of Migrancy

Today (1985), Wallachian immigrants in Sweden and Denmark have been involved in migrancy between their Yugoslav villages of origin and migrant
communities in Scandinavia for a period of almost two decades. Migration abroad has caused great social and material changes in the villages of origin, and differential forms of integration are developing among Wallachians in Scandinavia. However, neither changes in Yugoslavia nor Scandinavia can be understood without reference to the total social field of migrancy involving the “hinterland” as well as the immigration country. In this section we shall treat some aspects of Wallachian migrancy seen from the perspective of the “hinterland”: 1) the social organization of the migration process, 2) the material reproduction of ties to the hinterland, and 3) the ceremonial confirmation involved.

Social Organization

Wallachians form a relatively closely integrated ethnic minority group in Scandinavia, maintaining an intensive internal social and cultural life. In Sweden and Denmark, Wallachians settled down in a number of provincial towns, close to one another on each side of the Öresund, the strait dividing the two countries.

In Sweden, Wallachians mix with other Yugoslav immigrant groups in Yugoslav immigrant associations, where they most often form a minority. In Denmark, however, Wallachians form a majority in a number of associations and are as a whole more integrated as an ethnic minority group with their own institutions. “Swedish” Wallachians often go to Denmark, where together with “Danish” Wallachians they celebrate important Yugoslav holidays. Wallachians in Scandinavia have built up their own Wallachian cultural scene, embracing the two Wallachian groups across the Danish-Swedish border. They marry within these joint Scandinavian groups or “import” spouses from the country of origin.

Even the Wallachian migrant definition of “household” bears witness to the continued unity of hinterland and immigration community as a single social field. After almost 15 years of emigration—interrupted by obligatory visits to Yugoslavia—both young and old describe themselves as belonging to one (multigenerational) household, with its roots in the village of origin and with some or all members working temporarily abroad. We have met no Wallachians who definitely claim that Scandinavia has become their new home. Even for families where all members are working or living abroad for a long time, the house and the homestead in Yugoslavia remain the focus for their social identity and the central index of social status. The ultimate rationale for a prolonged exodus and continued migrancy is to return to the point of departure of the migratory cycle—i.e. to return “home” for good and reestablish oneself in the community of origin.

An embracing interpersonal network uniting community of immigration
with communities of emigration in Yugoslavia is constantly renewed through intermarriage between migrants and youth recruited from “home”. As new emigrants are recruited from Yugoslavia through marriage, bonds to the hinterland are reinforced. Marital alliances come about in a field where diverging interests between younger and older generations are strongly present, but where the elders still occupy a dominant position of authority and control.

The first to migrate to Scandinavia from Wallachian villages were younger or middle-aged married couples. They left their children back with their parents while working in Western Europe. Thus, the socialization of children was conserved in the realm of the hinterland being in the hands of grandparents and great-grandparents. Today these sons and daughters of the first migrants, socialized in Yugoslavia, have emigrated themselves and form the “second generation” of Wallachian immigrants now working in Scandinavia.24

Their parents, representing the first wave of emigrants, are in most instances still working in Scandinavia. Most of these people would be too old and have too little education to acquire a job in Yugoslavia. They constantly postpone a desired return to the community of origin. Most plan to return only at the age of pension. This does not mean that the socialization of offspring in the communities of origin is given up altogether. However, a system of complete socialization “at home” is being supplanted by a system of divided socialization, where only a part takes place in the communities of origin. Hence, a majority of children born abroad will reside for longer or shorter intervals in Yugoslavia, especially during school age between 7 and 14 years of age.25 To make such arrangements practically possible, one or both grandparents will temporarily quit their job abroad in order to reside with their grandchildren in Yugoslavia.

The reasons for continuing a system of socialization in the communities of origin are to nurture a sense of cultural and social attachment among growing generations, to make children “learn the language”, and to acquire the fundamentals of a general Yugoslav school education.26 All this is meant to facilitate a future return to Yugoslavia, which is in some way or another planned by most Wallachian immigrant families in Sweden and Denmark.

**Material Reproduction**

For the vast majority of Wallachians—young and old—the primary point of identification remains the village or local area of origin in Yugoslavia. One’s link to the local microcosm in Yugoslavia ends in the homestead and the house, for the sake of which years of hard work and abstinence in Scandinavia have been sacrificed. Wallachian migrants have used most of their savings from work abroad for investments in huge houses in their villages of origin, for
investments in agricultural machines, for various prestige goods, and for improvement of the collective infrastructure of village communities (Schierup 1973 and 1977).

Immigrant experiences abroad form constantly prolonged sequences of "continuing temporariness", which in their objective effects (housebuilding, collective building up of villages) reproduce social bonds back to the village by constructing material symbols of attachment, necessitating years of toil, abstinence and suffering.

Migrant investments in the villages of origin are definitely connected to "games for prestige" (Schierup 1973) among migrant households. However, the competition for prestige in local village contexts cannot be compared with investments for accumulation, or the quest for social status mobility in capitalist industrial society. Housebuilding is not primarily a way of showing that one is richer than one's neighbour. It represents the justification for emigration and conveys a social status from which the migrant is alienated in Scandinavia. At the same time a continued social attachment and loyalty to the community of origin is demonstrated. In this sense "investments" can be regarded as a sort of "sacrifice" to the community, and social continuity on a par with the huge expensive tombstones and mausoleums which emigrants erect in honour of their dead in their communities of origin. This continued reproduction of the attachment to the hinterland through "investments" is supplemented by ritual and ceremonial practices.

Ceremonial Confirmation

All important rites of passage among Wallachian immigrants have remained firmly tied to the Yugoslav hinterland. To our knowledge, not a single Wallachian wedding, baptism, or burial has taken place in Scandinavia during the two decades of migrancy.

During the summer holidays, several weddings are held every Sunday. Their symbolic importance, the number of guests, and the proportion of lavish conspicuous consumption and display rises year after year. Baptisms and funerals have become acts of symbolic acknowledgement of common roots; they, too, become occasions for increased conspicuous consumption in the villages. This development of the ceremonial sphere of society consumes a major proportion of the savings of migrants, demonstrating that migration serves a peasant economy which is still more governed by principles of redistribution than principles of accumulation (Schierup 1984). Through the entertainment of great numbers of guests and through the lavish distribution of gifts, one purges oneself from envy of the community, while reinforcing one's social network and increasing one's social status in the community. During pomane, ceremonies of remembrance in honour of the dead, the distribution
of food and drink to the living expresses the continuity of social relationships. The “nouveaux riches” distribute their wealth, while the proportions of the prestations in relation to individual ability are closely observed by the community. An expanding conspicuous consumption of migrant households demonstrates attachment and humility towards the community through the distribution of newly won wealth from the outside to powers of a higher order, as well as to the dead and the living.

Seen from the perspective of intergenerational relationships, collectively attended ceremonial life in the hinterland confirms and reproduces the attachment of growing generations to the communities of origin, to a common cultural tradition, and to a commitment to return. Especially important are the mortuary ceremonies (pomane) directly representing sacrifices, humility and cooperation in relation to the ancestors. Hereby the unity and continuation of the household is confirmed, witnessed by the village community, a congregation of worship.

Hence, ceremonial life in the hinterland acquires increasing importance for the reproduction of the generational balance of power in the Wallachian family and migrant communities. In the premigratory rural situation, the authority of the older generation had been firmly embedded in the control over land and inheritance, backed up by public moral and social mythology. Today, young migrants would be able to sustain their own (nuclear) families materially, on the basis of wage labour, without the support of their parents or grandparents. As the younger generation becomes better educated and more cognizant of the possibilities for economic independence, conflicts between the generations tend to become more frequent and more divisive. In this situation, the authority of the older generation increasingly comes to rest on ideological foundations of public morality, mythical and magical sanctions, and a common attachment to symbols of “the little tradition” (cf. Redfield 1960) of Wallachian peasant society.

Thus, the strategic importance of “vampires” tends to increase as integration in Scandinavian society grows. Vampires not only survive, but are even invoked more often in immigrant communities, than in the premigratory rural situation.
Vectors of tradition. (C.U. Schierup/1971)
Chapter 3

ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND MIGRATION: THE MACEDONIAN PÊČALBARI

"If you don't study, you will begin and end your life in rubber boots—stuck in the village mud like your parents"

(Macedonian peasant, urging his son to do his school homework).

A group of middle-aged Macedonian immigrants sit gathered in a crowded apartment in Copenhagen, avidly discussing some recent news. Someone has said that an ancient tomb had been discovered near Thessaloniki and that it is suspected to be the tomb of Phillip or even Alexander the Great, or "Alexander the Macedonian" as he is called among the Macedonians.

Alexander belongs to these Macedonian immigrants. They regard themselves as the bearers of his legacy, although they are not exactly sure how (or if) they are related to the ancient Macedonians. The actual descent line is uninteresting. What is essential is that he was strongly present in the gathering. United by an echo from the past, a little gathering of immigrants from various parts of Macedonia discussed a common vision they shared of themselves. One of those gathered in the room declares:

"Just as Alexander journeyed the whole way to India, the Macedonians have journeyed the world over to bring honour to their nation; just as Alexander fought against the tyrants of the East [the Hellenic war] the Macedonians have freed themselves from centuries of foreign tyranny. They are now building their fosterland ... as prosperous pečalbari [migrants] who will some time in the future return from Scandinavia ..."

This statement is enthusiastically supported by the vision of Macedonian history and their aspirations for upward social mobility, from an oppressed ethnic group to free citizens in a Macedonian nation, from impoverished peasants to educated, prosperous urban dwellers, from the village to the city, and from Scandinavia back to the cities and towns of their homeland. If one finds it impossible to establish roots in the midst of one's homeland, then one can emigrate, accumulate resources or knowledge, and then return to try again. And if one should remain permanently in emigration, Alexander the Great’s vision can serve to guide one’s progress abroad.

A younger member of the gathering tells the guests about the father who has bought a new home computer for his son, who is to become an engineer and computer expert.
"Our children get everything which we ourselves dreamed of: electric toys, clothing, money—everything that we're able to give them through muscle and hard work. They will learn to read, show their worth, and make us proud. They are also the kind of children who get good marks and are noticed by their teachers ..."

The child with the computer silently examines his toy. Does the toy cost too much in lonely hours as the parents work themselves to the bone to be able to afford it? Will their expectations result in a huge dissatisfaction if he falls short of the vision? Does the child think that Alexander's Macedonia is the center point of his own self-affirmation? The child is probably thinking about his Danish schoolmate and their wanderings together through Copenhagen's disco world, where the dreams of youth lie closer to John Travolta's success story than to Alexander's. When he comes home later in the evening, he will nonetheless be drawn into the discussion, which will still be going on, about the contents of the newly-discovered ancient Macedonian tomb, the crown of myrtle on the Macedonian queen, and Alexander's sword. He will probably dream of Alexander and Travolta conquering the world together.

The Historical Background

The name Macedonia probably derives from the name of a chieftain of one of the ancient tribes living in northern Thrace (Wilkinson 1952:25). As the Macedonians' military strength grew, the name became less closely linked to the local regions and spread until it came to refer to all of the territories under Macedonian leaders. The Romans retained the name when they conquered Greece and made Macedonia one of their provinces, and it has survived in that form down to our days.

Today, two thousand years later the name Macedonia still survives in a corner of the Balkans. This territory is divided among Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece (since the Balkan war of 1912-13). It is populated by several ethnic groups, but the Slavs make up the majority. With time this ethnic, cultural, linguistic and geographic amalgam—an "ethnic chessboard", as Jovan Cvijić described it in the early 1900's—grew into an ethnic group with a strong national consciousness. Despite the difficulties attendant in cultivating a national language and culture, and despite the territorial isolation of the Aegaean, Pirin and Yugoslav Macedonians from one another,¹ these various groups survived the vicissitudes of history and defined for themselves a national identity with a common political interest: an independent Macedonia. Perhaps this desire is so strong because of their collective historical oppression by diverse conquerors and their common religion. A Macedonian republic has existed in Yugoslavia since 1945, with total cultural independence. In Greece and Bulgaria, however, the Macedonians have been exposed to strong policies of assimilation. The national and cultural destinies of the Greek and Bulgarian
Macedonians remain a burning issue for the Macedonians in Yugoslavia.

Here we will be concerned with the fate of the Yugoslav Macedonians as immigrants in Sweden and Denmark. But to understand their current character as an ethnic group and the role it plays in the context of immigration, some historical background is necessary.

The Ethnic Chessboard

The Slavic peoples overran the Balkan peninsula and within a short time had set their cultural mark upon it. In 600 A.D., large areas of the Balkans already bore the names Sclavinia, Sclavinia, Sclavonia or Sclavinica.

We know very little about the first Slavic immigrants in Macedonia. They encountered other geographic and climatic conditions than those of the Trans-Carpathian steppes and swamplands they had left behind. Adaptation to these ecological conditions must have entailed a radical readjustment.

Macedonia is principally a mountainous region with only ten per cent cultivated land apart from pasturages. Its population has traditionally been engaged in stock-raising, trade, handicrafts and other occupations which often linked the cities and major trade routes. The major trade routes in Macedonia have attracted many would-be conquerors. War and frequent unrest forced the population in time of turbulence to take refuge in inaccessible and protected mountain areas. When peace returned, these refugees would descend again from the penurious mountain areas to the valleys, close to the cities to ensure their livelihood. This resulted in continual movement between mountains and valleys, villages and cities, as well as emigrations from the cities to other countries.

The earliest known migration was begun by the Aromanians. This group, together with the Albanians, constituted the aboriginal population in Macedonia when the Slavs arrived. The Aromanians are descendants of the ancient Thracian tribes who were "semi-Latinized" during the Roman Empire (Cvijić 1966:105). They later became the principal bearers of Byzantine civilization, which they transmitted to the newly-arrived Slavic ethnic groups.

The Albanians are descendants of the ancient Illyrian tribes. When the Slavic tribes came to Macedonia, they drove out or were mixed with the Thracian tribes in the east and the Illyrian, Celtic and Macedonian tribes in west-central Macedonia (Cvijić 1966:105). If we add various Greek tribes from the south and then later the Turks to this mixture, we get an ethnic and cultural mosaic under continual transformation and recomposition.

In his now classic description of the Balkan peninsula's ethnic, social and geographic composition, Jovan Cvijić presented the notion of an ethnic chessboard:
"With Byzantine, Slavic, Levantine and finally Turkish cultural traits, Macedonia culturally resembles a chessboard. The boundaries between the various cultures are marked by geographic boundaries, mountain ridges and valleys" (Cvijić 1966[1922]:117).

According to Cvijić, ethnic distinctions are manifest in the rich variations in appearance, occupational preferences, architecture, folk costume and folklore in general. Despite overlapping and intermingling of the various cultural elements, the specific ethnic profiles made for immediate recognition of each distinct ethnic identity during Cvijić's time.

The cultural mixtures in Macedonia gave rise to two principal "spatial" and temporal socio-cultural profiles: The first had to do with the development of distinct profiles between the countryside and the cities, while the other bore the early marks of Byzantine culture, which was gradually replaced by or mixed with the Oriental Islamic culture introduced under Turkish reign.

Both the early Byzantine and the later Turkish cultural influences left their marks on the growth and development of Macedonian towns. A rich socio-cultural life flourished in the towns, while the countryside was most often molded by the archaic Slavic culture (Cvijić 1966:118). Cvijić maintains that the Balkan peninsula never had the opportunity to develop a flourishing Byzantine civilization.

The literary tradition and material wealth which had allowed for the development of elite tastes and fine living among the higher Byzantine classes never took root in the Balkans. However, many other Byzantine features, such as "enclosure in the private dwelling and homelife", isolation of women within the walls of the house and the strong influence of religious beliefs became even more pronounced. Cvijić claims that this is because Byzantine civilization was transmitted to the Slavs indirectly, via groups like the Aromanians. In Byzantine society the Aromanians belonged to the middle and lower classes, but in Macedonia they were the foremost representatives of Byzantine civilization. That civilization later experienced further changes under Turkish Ottoman influence.

The strong religious orientation instilled by the Orthodox Church and the restricted home life with its isolation of women were reinforced under the Turks. Turkish influence was carried mainly into the cities, just as was Byzantine influence in earlier times. From the 1500's to the end of the 1800's the appearance of these cities were more Asiatic than European. The Turkish influence also meant a sharp division between lords and subjects.

But in the isolated countryside, especially in the mountainous areas, old Slavic "patriarchal" cultures retained their archaic forms. This was especially evident after the advent of the Turks, when Byzantine influence was abruptly broken off in the countryside and the various population groups were largely left to themselves, as long as they paid tribute to their Turkish lords. This brought about a renaissance of traditional Slavic social and cultural mores which continued throughout Turkish rule. The cities contained islands of Slavic culture, such as architecture and art around the time of the Serbs' period...
of greatness (1100-1300); but whereas Balkan urban culture readily adapted to the succession of different masters, the rural folk traditions and old zadruga structures proved more resistant (cf. Ålund 1978).

The Slavic ethnic groups had retained their old tribal and family structures based on a collective life-style, most typically preserved in the old household collective, the *zadruga*. The Macedonian Slavic tribes had declined after their arrival in the Balkans; some disappeared completely under Byzantine and later Serbian influence. When the Ottoman conquerors left, the peasants in most of present-day Yugoslavia reverted to the "old order", the *zadruga* thus experienced a revival especially among the Serbs. In Macedonia, especially in areas near the Aegean coast, the *zadruga* did not experience the same intense revival (Erlich 1966, Cvijić 1966).

A lingering *zadruga* tradition was more characteristic of Slavic groups living further away from trade routes and in mountainous areas of western Macedonia. But even there a strong Aromanian influence was reflected in the dominant occupations and ethnic organization. In the splintered Slavic groups, tribal organization disintegrated quite early (e.g. *Brzjac* in western Macedonia). The barren soil forced the population to concentrate on stock-raising, like the Aromanians. Pillaging (mainly by Albanian groups) made livestock-raising an uncertain means of livelihood, and quite a few Slavic men took up trading, again like the Aromanians. Goods from the coastal cities were sold to the villages in the interior. After doing harvest work on estates in more fertile areas of Macedonia, seasonal migrant workers would buy goods in the coastal cities and then sell them on the way home. A combination of trading and farming became a typical means of livelihood. As time passed, roving groups of bandits escalated their terror against travellers and trade caravans, making this form of livelihood questionable as well.

Later on, exploitation by Turkish feudal masters forced the peasants once again to migrate to the cities in search of a livelihood. They engaged mainly in trade (in livestock) and handicrafts. However, growing competition from Greek merchants drove most of these Slavic and Aromanian tradesmen and craftsmen out of business. In the end, long-distance migration—"*pečalba*" in Macedonian—became the only possibility for a growing portion of Slavs and Aromanians. During an unruly nineteenth century the "*pečalbari*" constantly grew in number and migrated still further from their communities of origin. Migration became most intense during the early 1900's, when the Ottoman Empire approached its final dissolution.

Migration became both a way to earn a living and a life-style. The tradesmen of earlier days gave way to generations of craftsmen among the immigrant peasants. The peasants migrating to the cities built up well-organized social networks on which later generations of industrial workers have relied today. The heirs to the "culture of the cities and trade routes" (Cvijić 1966) are today spread, like Alexander, beyond the Balkans.
Emigration

Jovan Cvijić (1966) first called attention to the interrelation between ethnic intermingling, historical oppression and migration in Macedonia. Cvijić concentrated on processes of change among a population whose social and cultural profiles were influenced by their migratory style of life (Cvijić 1966:458). Both those who joined the stream of migrants and those who remained home were affected. In the 1800's Cvijić points out two types of migration: the older migrations of stock-raising populations from remote mountainous areas, and a more recent migration consisting mainly of peasants and craftsmen from the valleys. The causes of migration were geographic, economic and social.

Certain larger valleys and plains excepted, most of Macedonia consists of rugged and often barren mountainous areas. The traditional means of livelihood, farming and herding, did not yield enough to provide for the large families which were the norm in Macedonia. Access to fertile soil was often limited to small garden plots, especially in the highlands. A growing population and land scarcity forced those dwelling in the mountain regions to come to the cities and work as craftsmen or servants. Initially, emigration was limited to the nearby cities in Macedonia itself and the more fertile tracts nearer the Aegean Sea. As time passed, the emigrants shifted their destinations further and further away to Turkey, Serbia and present-day Romania and Bulgaria. Initially, migration tended to be seasonal. In hard times especially, people migrated in search of farm labour and returned home with money and good. But migration later acquired a more permanent character especially when the nearby Macedonian cities were no longer able to absorb a growing number of immigrants from the rural areas.

Growing pressure from the Turkish feudal landlords finally carried things beyond the breaking point, so that the population was no longer able to live exclusively from the land, even in the most fertile valleys. Migration then became the only alternative for both the tenant farmers and small peasants owning their own plots (Cvijić 1966:458). During the second-half of the 1800's, in connection with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, social and political insecurity, and lack of civil rights put its stamp on daily life both in the countryside and in the cities.

Macedonia was under Ottoman rule for almost 530 years. Its proximity to Istanbul, its location on major trade routes, and its fertile valleys and its mountain zones gave Macedonia political, economical and military importance. Under Ottoman rule, Macedonia was dominated by Turkish soldiers, craftsmen, and administrators who settled in the villages and cities. Initially, these administrators left the Macedonian population at peace. They demanded only that taxes be paid regularly to the state. However, the pressure on the peasants grew as the Turkish fief-holding system was “commercialized” under impact of its involvement in the world economy and a growing dependence of the Ottoman Empire on West European capitalism. Due to a growing
Ottoman state debt and falling prices of basic agricultural export products tax burdens grew, as did the exploitation of the Macedonian peasantry by Turkish feudal lords. The response of the peasantry became migration on a rapidly increasing scale.\(^5\)

The Turks remained in Macedonia until after the Balkan Wars (1912-13). The new era found Macedonia in a state of underdevelopment with mainly feudal traditions. The rudiments of capitalist development existed only in certain urban regions (see Schierup 1977). The “çiftlik” system was a sharecropping system based on quasi-feudal relations between Turkish landlords (Spahis) and their serf-like Christian peasants (çifçije). Thus did a Turkish military commander comment upon the situation in Macedonia in 1839 in a letter addressed to the government in Istanbul:

“The Turkish feudal lords regarded their “Raja” [Christian subjects] as their bought slaves, who were forced to work without any remuneration, at the same time as they meddled into the private relations of the population and tormented them... The villagers were forced to convert to Islam, their women were raped, and the population in general was regularly subjected to the indignities, violence, and whims of its Turkish lords, who demanded every sort of privilege with direct violence and terror” (Poplazarev 1980:254).

From 1870 onwards, Macedonia remained without organized political structures, without law and order and ravaged by Turkish/Albanian terror whose principal targets were the trade caravans and the Christian population. The combination of terror from these guerilla groups and exploitation from the ruling class made Macedonia an “economy of pillage” (Brailsford 1971:1-58).

Many of the free peasants and bankrupt urban craftsmen and merchants sought to alleviate the hopelessness of their situation through migration. Initially, they travelled to other parts of the Balkans, but emigration later spread until it reached the U.S. Around the turn of the century emigration assumed mass forms (Müller 1913). The nearest major port city, Thessaloniki, was called the “gate to the world”. Since then about 400,000 Macedonians have emigrated abroad, mostly to Australia, the U.S. and Canada. In Sweden there are about 8,000 Macedonians, nearly all of whom have emigrated after 1960.

After the Balkan Wars present-day Macedonia became part of the Kingdom of Serbia. The first Yugoslav state was formed after World War I: this was the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Until 1931, its political system was what has somewhat sarcastically been called a “southern Slavic version of parliamentary democracy” (Tomasevich 1955). One of the new Yugoslav government’s first acts was to proclaim a land reform, which envisaged the breaking up large estates with the intention of distributing them to the peasants. But long, drawn-out parliamentary struggles, political intrigues and resistance from land owners rendered the reform ineffective. Decisive changes and improvements for Macedonian small peasants did not occur. Alliances
between former estate owners and managers whose support was necessary for
the new political and economic elite were strong enough to thwart the peas­
tsants' interests (Warriner 1959:64; Schierup 1977). In addition, the parl­
iment was subject to pervasive corruption and to ethnic conflicts. The question was
first resolved after parliamentary democracy was suspended and a royal dic­
tatorship proclaimed in 1931.

Thus the “čiftlik” system in Macedonia which bound small peasants to the
land was in practice finally abolished only in 1933. However, the former
landlords received a liberal indemnity to secure their political support. The
reform was far from adequate for meeting the peasants’ needs for land. In most
places, they remained desperately poor and unable to keep the land or earn a
livelihood from it. The plots that resulted from the redistribution were much
too small. In addition to the lack of land, there was no public credit facilities,
market conditions or larger peasant cooperatives. These conditions lasted
throughout the entire interwar period. Instead of progress, economic and
social misery merely escalated in the countryside, again forcing people into
emigration. However, due to restrictions and regulations governing emigra­
tion, overseas interwar migration was largely limited to internal migration
within Yugoslavia.

Reflecting the experience of the ancient Aromanians, the Macedonian
population also developed social contacts and trade networks, and accumul­
ated knowledge based on migration as a means of livelihood. Ties between
the emigrants and the home regions were assiduously cultivated. The new
knowledge and practical experience brought by the emigrants created an
openness to innovations. It also led to a social network based on migration,
which gradually grew into an “institutionalized” style of life (Cvijić 1966:459).

The early migrants usually spent but a short time outside their home, since
the early seasonal migration consisted of trade and harvesting work. By the
late 1800’s, and especially around the turn of the century, when emigration
overseas began, the migrants usually spent 3-5 years abroad and then returned
to buy land or to live from their savings or from the interest on money
deposited in banks (Müller 1913).

Steady contacts between emigrants and the villages of origin fostered a
familiarity with consumption patterns and a way of thinking that had its roots in
a world outside of Macedonia. An entire style of life and social organization
was slowly formed on the basis of migratory experience. Those Macedonians
who emigrated to nearby areas often took their families and friends with them.
A network of kinship-based entrepreneurial activities grew up among both
domestic and foreign migrants. This made new emigration easier by providing
jobs for emigrants.

Initially, the migrants worked at any jobs that were available, which in­
cluded casual work and low-paid jobs or small handicraft shops in the best of
cases. However, the immigrants gradually became more organized and began
to move into larger businesses and restricted job sectors. The experience
gathered in migration gave rise to permanent forms of group work among Macedonian migrants. These organized work groups of migrants were called *tajfe* (*tajbe, tajve*). The *tajfe* were a motley mixture of Slavic peasants, Macedonians, and Macedonian-Aromanian as well as other minorities. The conditions which made these forms of organization possible among the migrants had already been developed in the emigrant society. Migration had been a means of social mobility for some time. Indeed, the population earned its living in a way that combined agriculture and stock-raising with migration. But this division of labour also had a socio-geographic counterpart: Macedonia was divided into occupational niches in which different regions, settlements, ethnic groups and kinship groups tended to concentrate on specific crafts with which they then became identified. This specialized division of labour throughout an entire area was typical of most of the eastern and south Slavic regions. By “hiring out” their expert labour they compensated for the meager productivity of the land. It was these specialist work groups which became known as *tajfe*.

The sense of community (*kumpanija*) which marked the *tajfe* was most often based on patrilineal kinship, although neighbors and members of various ethnic groups might also be recruited into regional “specialist work”. The leader (*dragoman*) was usually the “head craftsman” as well, and he was responsible for his workers. His task was to find and contract for jobs for the group, and to allocate and organize the work. Most of those in a *tajfe* were master craftsmen (*ortak*), along with a dozen or so assistants (*kalfi*) and a few apprentices (*dirak, segrt*). A *tajfe* usually consisted of 15-20 persons (V. Stojančević 1974:195).

The Serbian-Turkish border settlement of 1878 created new national borders for the Macedonians and made migration more difficult. This entailed a refinement and reinforcement of the *tajfe* group. It had now to provide security for new emigrants and to improve the conditions of newly-arrived immigrants. Emigration to Serbia intensified between 1878 and 1912 as a consequence of rapid urbanization and the need for construction workers. The *tajfe* assumed a number of tasks: the labour organizations slowly grew into construction firms which furnished building materials, labour and other services to clients. Trade also expanded as merchants and bankers emerged from the ranks of the Macedonian immigrants. Macedonians established themselves as respected citizens in immigration centres, gradually building up a network of their fellow countrymen which was continuously reinforced by new waves of immigrants. Cvijić (1966) sums up the significance of migration for Macedonians.

“There is no factor in recent times that transformed the populations of the central areas [Macedonians] like the pecalba*. Lifestyle, work, and habits of mind all changed under the influence of ever newer waves of emigration and contacts with new countries and new conditions. Those who prospered abroad returned to improve conditions in their villages and even in whole areas; novelties were introduced in businesses and handicrafts. They changed their household habits, their clothes and their food. The features created by the oppression of history were eradicated. Fear and the need to be devious in order to survive
disappeared. People became more open and more accessible to contact. When fear for one's existence is replaced with greater security, people become less rigid and withdrawn” (Cvijić 1966:459, our translation).

The Greeks and the hellenized Aromanians had previously been the dominant merchant groups in the Balkans, particularly in present-day Macedonia, in the cities, and along the main trade routes. They lived throughout the Balkans and were the bearers of Byzantine culture, “the culture of the cities and the great trade routes” (Belgrad-Constantinople and Belgrad-Thessaloniki). In the 1800's, Slavic groups grew increasingly important as merchants in the cities, initially in the north and later in southern Macedonia. The Aromanians brought an interest in education and the learning of skills. Their children had always been sent on to higher education, which with time stimulated interest in schooling among other Macedonian groups as well. (Many ministers and persons in important positions in liberated Serbia were of Aromanian origin).

Two related processes of change were evident in Macedonia throughout the entire period between the two World Wars, and again from World War II until 1965 when a new wave of emigration abroad began (Schierup 1977):

1. The maintenance of close contacts between earlier migrants and the regions of origin indirectly contributed to the spread of modern ideas among Macedonian peasants and fixed their attention on the cities. Contacts with emigrant relatives brought goods and new ideas and values, along with the experiences accumulated by the emigrants in their adopted countries. The result was that an orientation toward urban culture was greatest in those regions of Macedonia from which emigration took place (Bitola, Resen); people aspired to give their children education and left the countryside for Macedonian cities.

2. Internal migration, picked up particularly after the War and resulted in a virtual “flight” from the “peasants’ rubber galoshes” toward the cities and into industrial jobs, as well as a depopulation of the countryside (the latter being a growing problem in present-day Macedonia). The urban-oriented Macedonian peasants saw their opportunities to enter the emerging administrative, political, economic, and educational elite in their own country; they quickly entered those niches formerly occupied by the Turkish and Serbian ruling elites. Macedonia’s poorly-developed infrastructure and limited rates of industrial growth, as well as limited opportunities for upward mobility in the administrative and political bureaucracy led to restlessness among the population. The growing unemployment among both educated young Yugoslavs and peasants was made a priority problem in the economic reform of 1965 (see also Schierup 1977). The pressure caused by Yugoslavia’s acute unemployment resulted in an opening of the borders; a wave of migrants again left Macedonia with their sights set on Western Europe.
The Macedonian Family

The contemporary Macedonian family has its roots in the tradition of the South Slav extended patriarchal family, the zadruga. The form of the family has changed significantly. A variant of the extended three-generation family and the nuclear family are now the dominant family forms in Macedonia. However, there remain important vestiges of the patriarchal legacy, the husband and father as master of the family, male control over the women's sexuality, and an authoritarian relationship with the children. Macedonian families are today marked by strong ambitions for the education of children of both sexes and for professional careers for both sons and daughters. Nevertheless, the traditional
sexual hierarchies break down only slowly, and reproduction of female subordina­tion is continuously going on in the private sphere and at home.

A tribal, "Dinaric" life-style, developed in the mountain areas of southeastern Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro, southwest and central Serbia, has been assumed to be representative of the "classic" South Slav Yugoslavia (Erlich 1966).

"The whole family and social life was permeated by an aristocratic principle, the belief in the inherited characteristics of the individual, in his ... manliness and heroism, and belief in ... breed was developed to the extreme. The reputation of family and ancestors was worth more than what a man did himself. Girls, from whom no heroism was expected, acquired their own importance and any opportunity for a future wholly by reason of the good name of their family and the heroism of its men. Distinction and eminence were to be acquired by heroism in battle and by some brave deeds of one's ancestors" (Erlich 1966:381).

Hence, in the context of constant struggle against Ottoman rulers, there developed a strong male collective marked by cultural elements like manliness, heroism, breed, "face" or honor. As a matter of fact, however, these elements formed a new historical whole, different from the South Slav family tradition prior to the Ottoman occupation.

"The Dinaric fighting spirit, with its explosive quality, can hardly be found either in the invading Ottomans (the 'donating culture', as it may be called) or in the Slavs before the Ottoman invasion (the 'receiving culture'). But the new quality, once in existence, decisively influenced further historical development" (Ibid.).

In contrast to this Dinaric tribal culture, other elements have influenced the development of a specific Macedonian patriarchal life-style. Presumably Macedo-Slav tribes closely resembled other South Slav tribes when they immigrated to the Balkans. However, they were exposed to other forms of social and cultural influence and developed in a different direction. Cultural and family patterns were moulded more by Byzantine and Littoral merchant and individualist values. Male networks organized through migratory chains or merchant organization evolved as the basis of a typical Macedonian "lifestyle". This life-style resembled the survival strategies of the old Aromanian population, which was largely assimilated into the Macedo-Slavs. A Macedonian family formed under such conditions developed a great measure of adaptability and individuality, coupled with a domestic sphere orientation and strict patriarchal social relationships within the family. However, Macedonian families are also inclined towards adaptation and adjustment concerning the relationships between the sexes and the generations. This stands in contrast to the vehement clashes and often very abrupt breaks in family relationships which occur in the Dinaric region.

This adaptability of the family and the patriarchal tradition, deeply rooted in Macedonian socialization patterns, is important for understanding the forms of integration among Macedonian immigrants in Scandinavia.
The majority of the Macedonians interviewed in Scandinavia had emigrated from smaller Macedonian cities or from the countryside. Many had already begun their migration in Yugoslavia from the villages to the cities. They brought with them many of the elements of popular culture, especially to the
smaller towns. Because of the intensive immigration of people from the countryside and the towns’ own deficient infrastructures, the towns had often become “ruralized” (Panov 1974).

Elements of ethnoregional culture struck root in the towns. These small towns have a provincial flavour due to the large number of rural immigrants often exceeding the original urban population. Many of Macedonia's smaller towns are therefore in the midst of the process of internal transformation. For these “peasant-urbanites”, immigration means that they often begin to live in smaller nuclear families, though they retain contacts with kin back in the villages. Despite the disintegration of the large family, these urban nuclear families still retain rural values.

Women tend to maintain their insistence on strict marriage ties and virginity, mutual fidelity in marriage as well as the established division of labour in the patriarchal family. On the other hand, women’s experience in employment in
the cities has slowly begun to erode traditional values. Emigration to Yugoslav cities and later abroad have broken up large families; the nuclear family is becoming the model among Macedonians. In many respects this entails a greater burden on women, since they must combine their traditional tasks in the household with their jobs. Lacking help from other family members and maintaining their patriarchal view of the division of labour and of power relations between the sexes, women find themselves straddling between the traditional and the new values.

Despite the fact that open conflicts between the sexes (e.g., violence and divorce) are less pronounced among Macedonians than among other Yugoslav emigrants, such conflicts hover just below the surface. In Chapter 7 we discuss different outcomes of such conflicts depending on the conditions which Macedonians face in Scandinavian communities and the organization among the immigrants themselves.
Part Three

PATTERNS OF INTEGRATION

"Each person, withdrawn into himself, behaves as though he is a stranger to the destiny of all the others. His children and his good friends constitute for him the whole of the human species. As for his transactions with his fellow citizens, he may mix among them, but he sees them not; he touches them, but does not feel them; he exists only in himself and for himself alone. An if on these terms there remains in his mind a sense of family, there no longer remains a sense of society".

de Tocqueville.
Chapter 4

TWO BECOMING FOUR

Milorad, a Wallachian immigrant in Denmark who regards himself as a man of “progress”, encounters his deceased mother in the shape of a vampire. This forces him to make commitments to the traditions of the “backward and superstitious” community which he is trying to “reform”. Macedonian immigrants discuss the historical achievements of Alexander the Great, or “Alexander the Macedonian” as they prefer to call him, while younger family members examine the newly bought home-computer and dream about John Travolta and his disco world. These are modern situations taken from the experience of Wallachian and Macedonian immigrants in Scandinavia.

Milorad’s encounter with the vampire illustrates the compulsive force of “paths of tradition” (Berger 1978) in an immigrant community which is the product of both a peasant society and minority culture. The intricate network of such narrow paths across an “indeterminate hostile environment” (ibid.:352) comprises “guerilla” strategies of defense. These strategies have enabled Wallachian peasants to survive the onsluts of shifting historical ruling classes and dominant majority cultures. These paths of tradition also form the backbone of Wallachian social organization and survival as an ethnic group in present day Scandinavian society. Wallachians still subscribe to a peasant view of the world, despite their “objective” existence as members of the Scandinavian working class. They are still a “culture of survival”(ibid.), which despite social differentiation and heterogenous experiences, “envisages the future as a sequence of repeated acts for survival”, where each act “pushes a thread through the eye of a needle and the thread is tradition”(ibid.).

As Berger states it: “Any transformation of which the peasant dreams involves his rebecoming ‘the peasant’ he once was” (ibid.). This is the logical outcome of a basically cyclical view of history and time. The peasant’s utopia is return to a mythologized egalitarian past without unjust claims from an exploiting ruling class.

“His dream is to return to a life that is not handicapped. His determination is to hand on the means of survival (if possible made more secure, compared to what he inherited) to his children. His ideals are located in the past; his obligations are to the future, which he himself will not live to see... The only, but great, future hope is survival. This is why the dead do better to return to the past where they are no longer subject to risk” (ibid.:353, 351).

The orientation towards “survival” can be illustrated by the statement of a Wallachian immigrant, who explains why so many of his people emigrated so quickly to work in Western Europe.
"It is in the springtime, when the sheep has got wool, that the fleece has to be shorn!"

Behind this statement lies a logic conceiving of "outside" opportunities as being temporary, unsafe and unpredictable. When the fleece has been shorn and there is no more wool, then one will return to "survive" in the village; one will return to "tradition".2

In contrast, Macedonian migrants see labour migration as a strategic option for a qualitative transformation of their social situation. Migration is a instrument which facilitates social *mobility* rather than *stability*. Macedonians from the old emigration regions long ago adopted a linear and expansive view of time, a world shared by liberals and socialists alike (Berger 1978). Macedonian peasants' adoption of new epistemologies was influenced by major historical upheavals in their homeland and by the impact of their migration experience. Instead of dreaming of a more just peasant past, present day Macedonian peasants and workers dream about the disappearance of all which has condemned them to a life in stagnation. They seek a qualitative social mobility. In this context mythologizing the past serves not so much to extend traditional paths into the future as to justify claims of achievement within modern social frameworks.

In the preceding chapters we have presented data about the ethnogenesis and socio-cultural background of the Wallachians and Macedonians. In the present chapter we shall present some *quantitative background* data on the sociological sample which we interviewed among Wallachian and Macedonian labour migrants in Scandinavia. Next we describe the *differential processes of integration* among these immigrants in Scandinavia. We started with a general idea of two ethnohistorical profiles crosscut by two immigrant policies in Denmark and Sweden. We expected to end up with rather straightforward explanations which would reflect combinations of these two factors of explanation—socio-cultural background and immigrant policy. We expected Wallachians to be as a whole more "ethnic" than Macedonians, encapsulating themselves from "outside" influences in both countries. We thought that the specific "peasant" orientation of Wallachian migrancy would make it much more difficult for this group to transfer its ambitions from the "hinterland" into the Scandinavian context than for the urban oriented Macedonians.

We also expected that a more benevolent and well-planned immigrant policy in Sweden might as a whole be reflected in a more open and positive attitude of immigrants towards the host society than in the Danish case. In Denmark a "guest worker" and an "assimilation" policy was expected to generate an atmosphere of suspicion about Denmark and hostility between Yugoslavs and Danes. Thus, we expected the impact of general immigrant policies to crosscut and modify the impact of socio-cultural background.

Even thought both cultural background and immigrant policies influenced patterns of integration, this did not occur in any simple or linear way. Neither our ethnographic field data nor our survey provided any firm basis for confirm-
ing our initial hypotheses. Though “tradition” was important, it did not appear in the shape of inertia. Rather “tradition” was a means of transforming and manipulating inherited cultural resources and strategies, in order to cope with present conditions. In the course of this process, new ambitions, competence and cultural orientations would appear.

Moreover, the specific character of the local Scandinavian communities became more decisive than national immigrant policies. Within four different concrete realities, each in their local context, “tradition” functioned as different strategies. Our two original groups split into four distinct immigrant profiles:

- Wallachians in Denmark
- Wallachians in Sweden
- Macedonians in Denmark
- Macedonians in Sweden

Thus, “paths of tradition” split at the crossroads of migration.

**Poles of a Continuum**

From 1965 until 1973—a period of only eight years—Yugoslavia became an emigration country of great dimensions (Schierup 1977, 1982). In 1973 it was estimated that there were almost one-and-a-half million Yugoslav immigrants in European immigration countries.

Like other emigration countries feeding labour to Western Europe, Yugoslavia is an ethnically and culturally heterogeneous country involved in a turbulent process of socio-economic transition (Schierup 1977).

The ethno-cultural heterogeneity and the rapid transition from a predominately agrarian to an industrial society is reflected in the diverse ethnic and occupational composition of Yugoslav migrants in Western Europe.
Table 1: Occupational distribution among Yugoslavs compared with migrants who were active before taking employment abroad (1971)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group of occupations</th>
<th>Proportion among economically active persons in Yugoslavia</th>
<th>Migrants who were economically active in YU before empl. abroad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farming and farm labor</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining, industry</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management, administration</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialists and professionals</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other occupations</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In total 100.0 100.0


About half of the original emigrants were farmers before emigration (1971). The next largest group (31%) consisted of industrial workers, of whom the majority were skilled or highly skilled. The rest of the emigrant group, divided among a number of other occupations, also held relatively skilled work (see Table 1).

However, a large proportion of both peasants and workers were “peasant-workers”, working in both industry and agriculture, holding varying degrees of work qualifications and education. They are situated on different points in the process of transfer from village to town, and occupy various stages in the social metamorphosis from peasant to worker and urbanite (Schierup 1977, Simić 1973).

The level of education and qualification among Yugoslav labour migrants was high compared to other labour migrants in Europe (Baučić 1973). However, there were great contrasts between migrants coming from urban-industrial areas and migrants coming from rural areas.

The Wallachians and the Macedonians represent different ethnohistorical traditions and patterns of “migrancy”. At the same time the two groups as they are represented in our survey sample come close to two opposite poles of a socio-professional continuum of Yugoslav labour migrants—a rural and an urban-industrial.

The Wallachian sample comes close to the actual composition of the aggregate of Wallachian labour migrants (Cf. Schierup 1973 and 1977). They are the most ruralized of all Yugoslav labour migrants in Europe. The Macedonian sample represents rather the urban-industrial pole of the socio-professional continuum.
The Survey: Some Background Data

Fifty-two Wallachians from northeastern Serbia and 52 Macedonians from western Macedonia were to be interviewed in both Denmark and Sweden. We aimed at interviewing an equal number of women and men in each group, between 24 and 47 years of age. We placed special emphasis on the 30-40 year age category, since this cohort is most representative for first generation Yugoslav immigrants in Scandinavia.

Alltogether 189 persons answered the questionnaire—slightly more men than women. We obtained fairly similar sub-samples (from both groups) in both countries, taking several variables into consideration.

Table 2: Respondents according to ethnicity, sex and country of immigration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wallachians:</th>
<th>Macedonians:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>189</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than half the respondents in both countries had been in Scandinavia between 10 and 14 years (62% of the Wallachians and 52% of the Macedonians). About 20% had been in Scandinavia for less than 10 years and about the same proportion (about 25% among the Macedonians) for 15 years or more.

There is a clear correspondence between age of informants in the sample and their length of residence. Older migrants have generally stayed abroad for a longer time. Among the Macedonians, there is also a clear correspondence between sex and age of the respondents and length of stay in Scandinavia. The men have generally stayed for a longer time than the women, who again are generally younger than the men. This reflects marriage and migration patterns:

1. The age of the marriage partners are usually uneven among the Macedonians. Older men marry younger wives.
2. Most Macedonian women have gone abroad some years after their husbands or have left Macedonia in order to marry migrants in Denmark or Sweden.
This provides for an uneven age structure among the Macedonian immigrant population in Scandinavia. As it was difficult to find an adequate number of female migrants in the older age categories and an adequate number of male migrants in the younger, this uneven age structure is partially reflected in the sample. The uneven age structure must be seen in light of the fact that migration from Yugoslavia has taken place over a short interval (mainly between 1965 and 1973).

We do not find the same correlations between age, sex and length of stay among the Wallachian immigrants. This is because Wallachians usually marry at an early age to spouses of approximately the same age as themselves. Married couples usually went abroad together.

All informants were married at the time of the interview. Except for five respondents among the Macedonians in Sweden, two of which were married to Swedes and three to Yugoslav immigrants with Swedish citizenship, all were married to fellow Yugoslavs.

However, when we look at the marital status of immigrants immediately before emigration from Yugoslavia, there are great differences between the two groups (but not between the countries). Almost 60% of the Macedonians were unmarried at the time they emigrated; almost all of the male emigrants had been single. This again reflects a pattern of migration where the first wave of migrants was composed mainly of younger men, who later on married much younger women from Macedonia. In accordance with the Wallachians' different marriage and migration patterns, over 80% of the Wallachian sample were married at the time they came to Scandinavia.

Almost all respondents (96%) had children at the time of the interview. The most common number of children among the Wallachian respondents was one child per respondent (about 50% of those with children). About forty percent of the Wallachian respondents had two children and less than 10% had three children. This low number of children is connected to the specific patterns of household sustenance and inheritance and the relationship between the sexes in Wallachian society. Among the Macedonian respondents the vast majority of the respondents had two children, while about 10% had three children.

The respondents in both Sweden and Denmark came from a limited number of communes in the two high-emigration regions in Yugoslavia. Among members of each group there was extensive communication across the Danish/Swedish border.

However, the emigration patterns varied considerably. Typically, the Wallachian immigrants had emigrated from a limited number of villages via close-knit networks of relatives and co-villagers; they tended to cluster around the same networks in the immigration countries. The Macedonians came from a larger and more widespread number of rural and urban communities, were more mobile in relation to local networks and tended to associate on the basis of nationality (Macedonians) in the immigration country rather than primarily according to local affiliation like the Wallachians.
Socio-Professional Background

The socio-professional background of respondents reflected fairly well the general orientation of the two groups and their patterns of "migrancy".

The Wallachians before emigrating were firmly rooted in the village and agriculture. More than 95% had been living in the village at the time of emigration, and more than 70% were farmers. Thirteen percent were "workers" and an additional 11% still in school (public or secondary). Almost all who gave "worker" as their first occupation before emigration were actually "peasant-workers", simultaneously working their land in the village together with their families. Conversely, most male respondents (except for the youngest) who gave "private farmer" as their main occupation had had irregular employment outside agriculture. At the time of the interview 94% of the Wallachian respondents still had permanent home addresses in a rural village.

The Macedonians' data reflect a more heterogeneous group involved in a rapid process of urbanization. Most respondents (65%) had been born in villages. By the time of emigration, however, only 40% were still living in villages and at the time of the interview only 30% had their permanent address in Yugoslavia in a village.

The fathers of 46% of the respondents had been farmers or engaged in traditional handicrafts. Only 19% of the Macedonian respondents were engaged in corresponding occupations at the time of emigration. Twenty-eight percent were workers, 16% were young unemployed who had never been employed before emigration; 23% were still going to school or studying.

The 19% proportion of "farmers" in our Macedonian sample is considerably below the average for Macedonian emigrants, which is 50% according to the 1971 Yugoslav census. The comparatively more "urban" character of our sample is especially pronounced for those living in Denmark.
Table 3: Respondents classified according to ethnicity, country of immigration and type of occupation before emigration (in %).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of occupation</th>
<th>Wallachians</th>
<th></th>
<th>Macedonians</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Denmark</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Total Denmark</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming, private handicrafts and petty trading</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupils/Students</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Occupations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total N=189

The sample of Macedonians from Denmark also contains a comparatively low number of respondents who were unemployed and a comparatively high number who were still going to school (or studying) at the time of emigration. The sample of Macedonians from Sweden is distinguished by a comparatively high number of "workers" and a high number of "unemployed".

The largest proportion of those who were pupils or students before emigration were the Macedonian women. This reflects a migration pattern whereby young men who were largely unemployed or working under unsatisfactory conditions left first. The following wave of migration consisted largely of considerably younger Macedonian women who left school in Macedonia in order to go to Sweden and Denmark to marry immigrants.

The "rural" character of the Wallachian sample is reflected in landownership. Eighty-seven percent of the respondents had lived in households with more than 2 ha. of land before emigration compared to only 21% of the Macedonian respondents. Only 9% of the Wallachians had no agricultural land at all at the time of emigration, compared to about 50% of the Macedonians. Half of the Wallachian respondents came from households with landholdings of "middle size" (2-5 ha) according to Yugoslav standards, and 38% from households with more than 5 ha of land. Only 3% of the Macedonians came from households with more than 5 ha of land.
Education and Skills

Respondents in the Macedonian sample possessed a considerably better level of formal (Yugoslav) education than respondents in the Wallachian sample. Thirty percent of the Macedonians had finished various secondary schools by the time of emigration, and 77% of them had eight years of public school or more. Nobody was completely without formal schooling.

Among the Wallachians only 30% had eight years of public school or more. 28% had less than 4 years of school.

The Macedonians did not change their educational status by the time of the interview, while the level of education among the Wallachians had improved considerably. In 1983 more than 45% of the Wallachians had eight years of (Yugoslav) school or more. The increase in educational level was especially pronounced among young Wallachian men. They had gone to Scandinavia at a very young age, but took evening courses arranged by Yugoslav educational institutions abroad.

Table 4: Education by the time of emigration according to ethnicity and country of immigration (in %).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of education by the time of emigration</th>
<th>Wallachians</th>
<th></th>
<th>Macedonians</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without School</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than Four years of School</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to Seven Years of School</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight Years of Public School</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finished Secondary School</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=189

In Yugoslavia eight years of school represents the obligatory “full public school”. Eight years of school is an important dividing line in Yugoslavia, as it is usually a precondition for applying for employment.
Table 5: *Education at the time of interview according to ethnicity, country of immigration and age (in %)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education at the time of the interview and age of respondent</th>
<th>Wallachians</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Macedonians</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Without School:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>24-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24-29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-47</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Less than Four Years of School:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>24-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24-29</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-47</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Four to Seven Years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>24-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24-29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-47</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eight Years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>24-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24-29</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-47</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secondary School:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>24-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24-29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-47</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Higher Education:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>24-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24-29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Total:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>24-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24-29</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-47</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total N=189
An interesting picture emerges when the level of education is related to the age of the respondents among the two groups. Among Wallachians the younger age categories had the highest level of education before emigration, a situation which still existed at the time of our interviews in Scandinavia.

Among the Macedonians, the best educated were found among the older age categories.

This reflects the development of migration patterns among the two groups after 1965, when mass migration started from Yugoslavia to Western Europe (Cf. Schierup 1973, 1974a, 1974b, 1977). Among the Wallachians the first to emigrate were a few marginal people in the villages. These were followed by a mass of poorly-educated peasants and peasant workers in their twenties and thirties. Later, a second generation of better educated villagers emigrated. These were actually sons and daughters of the older “first generation” migrants, who were largely raised by their grandparents in Yugoslavia, and now left to join their parents abroad. Thus, a full fledged “second generation” of working age and with their own children—a “third generation” —has been raised among the Wallachians in a shorter span of time than among any other group of immigrants in Scandinavia. This is also reflected in our sample, which contains both first and second generation immigrants with often contrasting social characteristics.

Table 6: Education at time of emigration according to ethnicity, country of immigration and sex of respondents (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education of the time of emigration</th>
<th>Wallachians</th>
<th>Macedonians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without School</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than Four Years</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to Seven Years</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight Years of Public School</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finished Secondary School</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total N=189
Among the Macedonians we observe a pattern which is fairly general for Yugoslav labour migration (Cf. Schierup 1977). The first migrants to go to Western Europe were employed, skilled and well educated male workers from urban-industrial areas. These were later followed by the urban unemployed, young school leavers and people from rural areas who were generally less educated. The negative correlation between age of migration and education is reinforced by the fact that female migrants are generally younger than their male counterparts. They are also generally less educated and have emigrated later than the men. All those in the Macedonian sample—also in the younger age categories—are "first generation" immigrants.

Let us present some data on occupational skills among the two groups in our sample.

Many of the Macedonian respondents had had considerable work qualifications before emigration. Twenty-five percent were skilled or highly skilled workers before emigration, while 13% had had some kind of higher work qualification, mainly at secondary school level. Of the skilled or highly skilled workers 85% were men. Of those with higher work qualifications 82% were men. Among all Macedonian men more than 60% were qualified as skilled or highly skilled workers or had some higher qualification before emigration. The corresponding proportion of the Macedonian women was only about 10%. These sex-differentiated patterns were the same among Macedonians in both Denmark and Sweden.

In comparison the Wallachians' level of occupational skills was considerably lower. Only about 6% held qualifications of skilled and highly skilled workers before emigration, and the same proportion had some other work qualification. These were almost exclusively men. Eighty-seven percent of the Wallachians did not have any formal work qualification at all. Among the women 95% were without skills or work experience outside agriculture.

Four Profiles

When they left Yugoslavia, Wallachians and Macedonians had considerable differences in their socio-cultural baggage regarding both ethnic, professional background, and family and gender relationships. However, early on into our fieldwork we discovered a continuing differentiation also inside each ethnic group. The rest of the book discusses the complex process of differentiation between and within the groups during the integration process, and its underlying causes. Here, we shall start by introducing the reader to some coarse expressions of the general patterns we observed.
The confrontations between the majority and immigrants are usually marked by difficulties of communication, for which both factors of "culture" and "structure" enter as important explanations. Cultural differences combine with structurally determined antagonisms and simple feelings of insecurity and lack of knowledge to create a variety of stereotyped statements about "us" and the "other". "Us" are upgraded in order to control feelings of degradation and stigma.

Let us continue with responses to several typical statements describing the relationship of Yugoslavs to Scandinavian society from the immigrant's point of view.

We chose statements which are commonly heard among Yugoslav immigrants in Scandinavia. They represent reiterated assertions serving to neutralize threats of being "degraded", culturally or socially. The informants were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the content of these statements.

The statements were helpful in eliciting spontaneous attitudes rather than precise evaluations of closely demarcated issues. Through these spontaneous reactions to some quite provocative statements we sought to extract *symptomatic indicators* of the way the respondents experienced their position in Scandinavian society.

Is Scandinavian society closed to foreigners? Are foreigners looked down upon? Are foreigners treated equally with Danes/Swedes? (see Figure 3). These questions, measuring basic feelings of safety and confidence, were matched against the question of "what should be done"? Should (foreigners) Yugoslavs "mix into socio-political life" in the immigration country (and influence conditions)? (Question 4, see Figure 3a).
Figure 3: Relative weight of positive and negative responses to several stereotyped statements

(a) According to ethnicity.

(b) According to imm. country.

(c) According to ethnicity and imm. country (Scale: -100 - +100).

W = Wallachians; M = Macedonians; D = Denmark; S = Sweden.

Statements:
1. People look down upon foreigners in Denmark/Sweden.
2. Danish/Swedish society is closed towards foreigners.
3. Foreigners are treated on equal terms with Danes/Swedes.
4. Yugoslavs should not mix into political life in Denmark/Sweden.
5. In a Dane/Swede you can find a real friend.
6. Danes/Swedes don’t know how to have a good time.

Values:
Questions 1+2+4+6; Agree = -1/Partly agree = +1/Do not know = 0/Do not agree = +1
Questions 3+5; Agree = +1/Partly agree = +1/Do not agree = -1.

We next asked our informants whether they thought it was possible to find "a real friend" among Danes or Swedes (Question 5).

Finally, the informants were presented with a statement often heard among
Yugoslavs when they emphasized the merits of Yugoslav patterns of association, thus “aristocratizing” themselves in contrast to Scandinavians: “Danes/Swedes do not know how to enjoy themselves” or “to have a good time”. This phrase was also often used when people explained why they did not associate with Swedes or Danes (Question 6).

The answers to most of the attitude questions give no bright picture of the Yugoslav perception of Scandinavian society. A majority of those interviewed found themselves “looked down upon” in Scandinavia and also thought foreigners to be shut out from society.

The Wallachians seemed much more negative than Macedonians. Being of rural origin, the Wallachian immigrants had a much greater socio-cultural distance from Scandinavian society and culture than did the largely urbanized Macedonians. This assumption is confirmed by the disparate attitudes of the two groups when asked whether foreigners are treated equally with native Scandinavians (Question 3). Although Wallachians see the surrounding Scandinavian society as much more threatening, inhospitable and unjust than do Macedonians, only 15% definitely think that Yugoslavs should mix into socio-political life in Denmark and Sweden. Here the discrepancy between the two groups is the greatest. The Macedonians much more often than Wallachians believe that Yugoslavs should involve themselves in the socio-political life of the immigration country. Less than one in 10 believe that they should not be active.

The least variation between the two groups exists with respect to whether “one can find a real friend” among Swedes or Danes. The overall distribution of answers is negative: only about a fourth (27%) of the informants were convinced that this is possible—a little more among the Macedonians than among the Wallachians.

When asked whether they find that Scandinavians “know how to have a good time”, there is a somewhat more positive attitude. Almost half of all Macedonian informants find that this is definitely possible, against a third of the Wallachians. A great proportion of the Wallachians, however, are definitely negative to the question (41%), while a third of the Macedonians don’t know. This could be taken to signify either a greater cultural distance between Wallachians and Scandinavians or more negative experiences in personal contacts with Scandinavians. Simultaneously there seems to exist a comparatively greater degree of indifference among the Macedonians, although a fair proportion are in principle positively disposed.

If we analyze responses according to countries instead of ethnic groups, the picture becomes more complicated (Figure 3b). The overall statistical picture now falls into two markedly different profiles in the two countries, Denmark and Sweden.

On all points, the Danish profile is significantly above the Swedish one. The most marked discrepancy between the two profiles lies in the domains “equal treatment” (Question 3), active “involvement” (Question 4) and evaluation of Scandinavian informal behaviour (Question 6).
If we now reintroduce the factor of ethnicity (Figure 3c), the relationship between the profiles of the two countries will be considerably modified. Thus, the material is broken into four profiles, each distinguished by a unique combination of ethnicity and immigration country. Looking at the answers from each sub-group, it becomes clear that the statistical average in the Swedish case is mainly due to an extremely negative profile among the Wallachians in Sweden. On all points these are markedly below the other three sub-groups in the investigation. They exhibit an almost 100% negative and undifferentiated attitude to the questions concerning confidence in Scandinavian society, their social estimation of the host population, the closeness/openness of society, equal treatment and active involvement. As little as 2% find that Swedes are able to “enjoy themselves”. It appears that even the negative profile of the Wallachian ethnic group as a whole is due largely to the Swedish Wallachians.

Although there is some covariation according to ethnicity (the two Wallachian and the two Macedonian groups partly following each other in spite of variations according to immigration country) each sub-group exhibits its own specific combination of features. As it became clear in the course of field work and through analysis of survey results, each of the immigrant groups developed different forms of integration in relation to the total social field of their migrancy. Thus, we see the statements as subjective reflections of four patterns of integration, each requiring careful explanation in terms of the characteristics of each group and its migrant situation.

In the following we will go beyond the statements seeking to elucidate “.. the relation between the underlying process of society and the forms in which the process appears—people’s perception of it” (Rose 1978:102).7

We treat the context of work as the most important aspect of the relationships between immigrants and Scandinavian formal institutions in Chapter Five. We will discuss the structural position of immigrants in the production system and the nature of status differentiation in the local context. We will also discuss migrants’ social position in relation to their actual conditions, abilities and aspirations.

Chapter Six discusses informal patterns of communication in local public arenas. We focus on three social forums: the “own” ethnic group, other immigrant groups, and the majority community. We analyze the character of the “zone of the local public” (see Introduction) in the four contexts, the way this “zone” is perceived by the immigrant minority groups, and the nature of the networks linking these groups internally and externally. Types of integration among the four immigrant groups are also discussed, addressing the dilemma “to stay or to return?” We draw up holistic sketches of the four groups and factors (within the total field of migrancy) which help explain their differential patterns of integration into Scandinavian society.

In Chapters Seven and Eight we discuss aspects of integration in relation to dimensions of gender and generation, respectively.
Chapter 5

IMMIGRANTS AND THE WORKING COLLECTIVE

"Machines exhaust themselves—so do the bone and the flesh"
("Mašine se žuljaju—kako ne bi kosti i meso")

Yugoslav immigrant woman

"Having to act in concert with others means a person has to respond to them, and these relations may so entangle men with one another that a judge could not tell whom to reward for the work, nor could the entangled individual really feel he had a chance to show what he alone could do".

Sennett and Cobb

Immigrants' experience of discrimination or antipathy from a dominant majority population, which we discussed in the preceding, should be seen in relation to the character of different social fields within which they participate in the immigration countries. We treat working life as a field of basic importance.

Working life represents the labour migrant’s first and most substantial contact with the new society. In contrast to public arenas outside the context of work, the immigrant cannot remain completely anonymous at work, but is forced to integrate into the process of labour and is confronted with the rules and demands of fellow workers.

Integration in the context of working life is of fundamental importance for immigrants’ social identity and decisive for their position in relation to the total structure of social opportunities in society. The workplace therefore represents the first and most important pathway to integration in other public arenas in society. Work is the primary point of departure for contacts, communication and friendship with the indigenous population, ramifying from working life out into other social contexts.

We have argued (Introduction) that immigrant experience and behaviour must be analysed in terms of an interaction between immigrants' social and cultural background in the country of origin and their social position. In the present chapter we shall introduce conditions in the country of immigration through the general idea of the working collective. We present data on work, qualification, conditions of work and levels of unemployment among the four groups of Yugoslav workers, and discuss problems which immigrants experience in Scandinavian working collectives. Finally, we sketch four specific patterns of integration in working relationships pertaining to the four groups. We discuss how their social and cultural background becomes relevant for understanding their integration into working relationships of the specific enterprises within which they have become employed in Scandinavia.
The Working Collective and its Cleavages

The working collective is a specific form of informal organization among industrial workers in capitalist enterprises. A working collective could be defined in functional terms as a collective defense against the unlimited demands of management and demands of technical production systems for efficiency and increased labour effort. The larger collective of workers in an enterprise, like its minor subdivision the gang, shares a range of unwritten codes defining solidarity and loyal behaviour. These are part of a common Western working class culture (cf. Lysgard 1981, Sennett and Cobb 1973). Limiting expressions of individual ambition, prestation and achievement is an important means of maintaining this collective class-determined "shield of defence".2

A fellow worker who openly displays individual excellence and ambition aspires to *alternative loyalties* beyond the circle of the working collective. He thus violates the standards of good companionship and makes his fellow workers increasingly vulnerable to management's efforts to increase productivity.

Individual overstepping of group norms not only helps his chances of promotion and conveys his goodwill in the eyes of management, it also functions as a trigger so that management can increase the speed or quality of work for the group as a whole. It might also lead to reduction in piecework payments or dismissal of the work group's weakest or most difficult members.

Whenever we have discussed immigrants with Scandinavian workers, their central objection has always been immigrants' violation of the tacit codes of the working collective.

With the introduction of immigrants in an enterprise, the tempo of work might progressively be speeded up. This can lead to the remaining indigenous workers fleeing the enterprise, especially those enterprises regarded as marginal, unattractive or temporary alternatives. An increased number of immigrants are left to the mercy of employers in an "occupational ghetto" stripped of the protective shield of the secret mutual understanding and the organized behaviour of a well-functioning (from the perspective of the workers) working collective. The immigrants are atomized. The results are often an increase in the intensity of work through which immigrants are swiftly worn out and disabled physically and /or mentally. In our own research we found this problem to be particularly acute among Wallachians and other Yugoslav immigrants with peasant backgrounds.

Immigrant workers such as the Yugoslav peasants find it difficult to grasp, accept and follow the logic of traditional working class behaviour. This logic contrasts with the logic of petty commodity production in a peasant economy with its emphasis on maximum of individual effort and identification of the personal interests of the producer with the unit of production (E.g., Højrup 1983). Moreover, the relationship between superior and inferior in peasant
societies tends to be defined in terms of individual and personal submission, respect and loyalty from the subordinate and of mutual trust between the two parties. This is a far cry from “working-class consciousness” as understood in the industrial states of Western Europe.

Codes of behaviour and subjective experience do not shift automatically when the context of work is changed. The definition of work is intimately tied to class-specific definitions of “morality” and “ethics” of work; these morals and ethics are the product of deeply rooted processes of socialization. Hence, experiences in working life are codified into culturally specific “codes of work” and “self-evident” standards of conduct in relation to peers as well as to superiors in the hierarchy of the industrial enterprise.

But cleavages in the “working collective” cannot be reduced to different “codes of work”. Immigrants’ condition of “continuous temporariness”, their borderline politico-legal status and their experience of various forms of ideological repression in society (xenophobia, racism, etc.) together with their (often well-motivated) doubts as to the solidarity of West European workers with their claims all give immigrants a feeling of insecurity, powerlessness and ambivalence at the work place and in relation to the working collective. Characterizing immigrants as “passive” or “deviant” conceals their structurally determined oppression in society, which acts to reinforce “passivity” or “deviant” behaviour. Due both to their position in society and discrimination from fellow workers, immigrants can be forced to develop their own political paths (Ålund 1985; Horst 1980; i-Azaam 1979). However in the absence of organized strategies, individual immigrants might demonstrate “deviant” patterns of solving their problems in working life; for example, by trying to create direct and personal bonds of dependence with representatives of management, a kind of behaviour clearly at variance with Scandinavian workers’ notions of workers’ solidarity.

One form of discrimination which was of utmost importance for the way Yugoslavs perceived working life in Scandinavia was dequalification. Despite considerable variations in education and skill according to sex and ethnic group, almost all the respondents in the sample ended up as unskilled workers in industry immediately upon immigration. Only a handful of men in the four groups were employed as semi-skilled or skilled workers in their first job in Scandinavia. These people had been skilled workers in metal-industries in Yugoslavia and ended up in ship-building or metal-industries in Scandinavia. Most such people came early, were recruited directly by Scandinavian firms in Yugoslavia and had their status at work regulated from the beginning. Most other people came through private channels to Scandinavia and ended up in jobs, where they had little use for their Yugoslav skills, or where they were not able to get any formal recognition of them. For the women as a whole, employment in Scandinavia meant no de-skilling, as the vast majority did not have formal skills or any experience with employment to begin with. However, their situation varied considerably according to group.
In this initial phase migrants served as an undifferentiated, unskilled labour force, seen from the perspective of the immigration country. They occupied the lowest eschelons of the job-hierarchy, those jobs left over by indigenous workers, who made their way into better skilled jobs in industry and services.

In the following sections we discuss the further development of work experiences, stressing the connection between questions of socio-cultural background, qualification and the development of four different patterns of integration in working life.

Qualification and Job

It is common for Yugoslav migrant workers to improve their education and work qualifications while working abroad. People usually study in Serbo-Croatian or Macedonian in Yugoslav educational institutions abroad or periodically (or via correspondence) in Yugoslavia. It is difficult to study in Swedish or Danish, and many hope to return to Yugoslavia with improved qualifications. Moreover, it can be very difficult to receive certification for a Scandinavian work qualification in Yugoslavia, just as the opposite is also the case.3

It is the Wallachian men in Denmark and the Macedonian men in Sweden who have improved their qualifications in this way. No women in the sample have improved their Yugoslav skills during the time of residence in Scandinavia. Looking at the present job of respondents in Scandinavia there are great differences between the sexes. Very few women have improved their status at work. Most still work as unskilled workers. Only among the Macedonian women in Denmark has there occurred some improvement in occupational status. The men in all groups have improved their qualification position to a considerably greater degree. Still, very few have present jobs which correspond to their level of qualification.
Table 7: Education, occupation, conditions of work and influence upon working conditions and human relations at the place of work among four groups of Yugoslav immigrants in Scandinavia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wallachians</td>
<td>Macedonians</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
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</table>

**Professional background by the time of emigration:**
- Farmers: 91 54 9 9 74 78 13 25
- Workers: 4 38 0 28 5 4 35 50
- Traditional handicrafts/petty trading: 0 0 4 15 0 0 4 4
- Middle class occupation (white collar): 0 0 9 12 5 0 0 4
- Unemployed without work experience or school leavers: 5 8 61 36 16 18 44 17
- Housewives: 0 – 17 – 0 – 4 –

**Education at time of interview:**
- < 8 years: 74 54 26 23 58 30 30 12
- 8 years: 22 25 57 31 37 41 57 42
- > 8 years: 4 21 17 46 5 29 13 46

**Yugoslav skills acquired before emigration**
- Unskilled/semiskilled: 94 77 100 27 94 81 73 50
- Skilled or highly skilled workers: 0 23 0 50 0 4 18 40
- Higher work qualification: 6 0 23 6 15 9 10

**Yugoslav skills at time of interview:**
- Unskilled/semiskilled: 94 61 100 27 94 71 73 29
- Skilled or highly skilled workers: 0 26 0 50 0 6 18 50
- Higher work qualification: 6 13 0 23 6 23 9 21

**Danish/Swedish skills at time of interview**
- Semi-skilled qualification: 0 33 8 19 0 11 4 46
- Skilled qualification: 8 0 0 8 0 7 0 0
- Higher qualifications: 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0

**Qualification demands of first job in Scandinavia:**
- Unskilled: 100 83 95 90 100 87 100 87
- Semi-skilled: 0 13 5 10 0 9 0 13
- Skilled: 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 0

95
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Wallachians</td>
<td>Macedonians</td>
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<td>Sex</td>
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**Qualification demands of present job in Scandinavia:**

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unskilled</th>
<th>Semi-skilled</th>
<th>Skilled/highly skilled</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>78</td>
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<td>95</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>91</td>
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<td>91</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>43</td>
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**Work/Sector (present occupation):**

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Service (a.o)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>96</td>
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**Type of work:**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Physical-manual</th>
<th>Tempo-work (ass. line workers/mach. operators)</th>
<th>Other types of work</th>
<th>Working shifts</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>41</td>
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**Together with or separated from indigenous workers:**

|                        | Together with | Separated from | Assembly line workers: | Together with | Separated from | Operators: | Together with | Separated from | Physical manual work: | Together with | Separated from | Conceptions of working situation |
|------------------------|---------------|----------------|------------------------|---------------|----------------|-------------|---------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------|
|                        | 100           | 0              | 100                    | 0              |                | 100         | 0             | 0                 | 100               | 0                 | 0                      |
|                        | 100           | 0              | 100                    | 0              |                | 100         | 0             | 0                 | 100               | 0                 | 0                      |
|                        | 100           | 0              | 100                    | 0              |                | 100         | 0             | 0                 | 100               | 0                 | 0                      |
|                        | 100           | 0              | 100                    | 0              |                | 100         | 0             | 0                 | 100               | 0                 | 0                      |
|                        | 100           | 0              | 100                    | 0              |                | 100         | 0             | 0                 | 100               | 0                 | 0                      |
|                        | 100           | 0              | 100                    | 0              |                | 100         | 0             | 0                 | 100               | 0                 | 0                      |
|                        | 95            | 5              | 83                     | 5              |                | 93          | 5             | 88                | 100               | 0                 | 0                      |
|                        | 95            | 5              | 83                     | 5              |                | 93          | 5             | 88                | 100               | 0                 | 0                      |
|                        | 95            | 5              | 83                     | 5              |                | 93          | 5             | 88                | 100               | 0                 | 0                      |
|                        | 95            | 5              | 83                     | 5              |                | 93          | 5             | 88                | 100               | 0                 | 0                      |
|                        | 91            | 48             | 91                     | 48             |                | 91          | 48            | 91                | 48                | 91                | 48                      |
|                        | 91            | 48             | 91                     | 48             |                | 91          | 48            | 91                | 48                | 91                | 48                      |
|                        | 91            | 48             | 91                     | 48             |                | 91          | 48            | 91                | 48                | 91                | 48                      |
|                        | 91            | 48             | 91                     | 48             |                | 91          | 48            | 91                | 48                | 91                | 48                      |

**Work exhausting physically:**

- 48
- 25
- 17
- 23
- 26
- 11
- 22
- 8

**Work interesting and giving opportunities for personal development:**

- 43
- 58
- 8
- 31
- 21
- 22
- 17
- 21

**Work furthers personal contacts and cooperation with fellow workers:**

- 56
- 83
- 56
- 19
- 10
- 4
- 13
- 25
Dequalification (de-skilling) is most marked among the highly-skilled Macedonian men. Only about ten percent were working as skilled workers at the time of the survey, although 50-70% — in Sweden and Denmark respectively — had a Yugoslav qualification as skilled worker or higher.

In both Wallachian groups the relationship between formal (present) skill and present position at work is more favourable than among the Macedonians. But while Wallachian men in Sweden have the highest proportion of unskilled workers, the proportion of unskilled workers among the Wallachians in Denmark is about the same as in the two Macedonian groups. Among Wallachian men in Denmark we find the highest proportion working as skilled workers of all groups.

The fact that so few men have a job in the kind of occupation they had in their homeland several years after immigration can be attributed to market factors and to competition from indigenous workers. However, professional
degradation may also take place when a person utilizes his formal skills in his present job, but is not paid or recognized according to these skills. This is rather a question of discrimination.

The following experience is a case in point.

“For two years I have worked in a factory producing plastic moulds. It is a continuous process and production must go on day and night.

During the day mostly Danes work here, but during the night it is only Yugoslavs.

I used to have the job of keeping the machinery going during the night. Sometimes there are minor break-downs, and I have to change spare parts. When some more serious disturbance takes place, I must carry out more complicated repairs on the spot.

I get a bonus because the job demands great responsibility. But I do not get the same pay as the Danish guy who is running the machinery during the day. “He is highly skilled and has a diploma,” the management says.

I have a diploma from technical school in Yugoslavia. “Everybody can come with a scrap of paper like that”, they tell me. “Show us a Danish one if you want to have more privileges”.

As I have a good relationship with the Danish chap who takes over in the morning, I made him go with me to the Metal Workers' Union. The union found that we were probably right and told me that they should consider the case as soon as possible.

One week after, however, I got a notice from the management that I ought to change my union membership to the Semi-Skilled Workers' Union. I was to take over a job in another section of the enterprise, and the job would more appropriately belong under that union.

Here I also do repair work on a smaller machine. When I got my first wage on this job, it was lower than on the old job and much lower than for the Danish guy who did this job before.

I went to the management to complain. They said that I could not get the same pay, as the Dane had been a member of the Metal Workers' Union, and I am a member of the Union of Semi-Skilled Workers. I said, that I would go and complain to the union.

Then they told me this: “Either you stop making trouble, or we shall be forced to fire you”.

I went to the Union anyway. They told me that is was not so easy to fight for such claims the way things are today. But they would see what could be done.

This morning I got sacked. I know that another Yugoslav is doing my former job. I don't know who is going to take over the one I am leaving now”.

If we take a closer look at the present qualification structure of Macedonian men in the sample, it is evident that the process of dequalification works unevenly.

Most of those who have a Yugoslav background as unskilled or semiskilled are working as unskilled workers, and a few of them as semi-skilled or skilled workers. Those with formal qualification as skilled or highly-skilled are least likely to be working as unskilled workers. Most work at semi-skilled and a few at skilled jobs. Finally if we look finally at those who hold some form of higher technical or other form of higher work qualification (above skilled worker) it appears that these highly qualified are largely working as unskilled workers—to a much greater degree than even the skilled workers. The relationship between educational background and present job is reflected in the the attitudes of Yugoslavs with different skills towards the country of immigration.
Thus, those who were un- or semi-skilled workers in Yugoslavia and those who have had the highest formal work qualification generally tended to be more negative towards Scandinavia and Scandinavians than are the skilled workers.

Table 8: Relationship between Yugoslav level of skill at the time of the interviews and of skill level of present occupation among Yugoslav men (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yugoslav skill level at time of interview</th>
<th>Qualification demands of present work:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unskilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled/semi-skilled</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled/highly skilled</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher work qualification</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=101

However, attitudes tend to correspond to ethnic groups and their particular patterns of integration in local communities, rather than following the general level of qualification or educational background. That is, the responses of Wallachian skilled workers in Sweden bear greater resemblance to those of other fellow “Swedish” Wallachians than they do to those of Macedonian skilled workers in Sweden or skilled workers generally.

In the following we shall describe working conditions of the four groups.

Working Conditions and Experience of Work

The Wallachians in Sweden seem by far the least content with their situation at work. This corresponds closely to their general negative attitude towards the country of immigration. Most have ended up as operators or assembly-line workers in monotonous tempo-work in modern industries. The group has the largest proportion who work at unskilled jobs. It is characteristic that it is among this group that the largest proportion are working in “occupational ghettos” (Feuchtwang 1982); that is, in enterprises or sections of enterprises where immigrants work separately from indigenous workers in special low status, monotonous and straining tempo-work.

Those who to the greatest degree (78%) work separately from indigenous workers are Wallachian women in Sweden employed in assembly line work. “Swedish” Wallachian men more often work separately from other workers than do men in any other group. Most of the men not working in industry were
employed in the transport sector as drivers. "Swedish" Wallachians also do more shift work, which tends to have more isolated working conditions. Less than 10% find their work situation offers opportunities for contact with fellow workers. Respondents in the group find that they are able to influence working conditions, the relationships to the employer and the planning of their work only to a low degree. There are also few "Swedish" Wallachians who have actually attempted to influence their working conditions during their stay in Sweden.

We see here a typical correlation between an isolated work situation, ability to influence and the experience of such ability and actually expressed protest. This is especially clear in the case of the Wallachian women.

If we pass to the Macedonians in the same town in Sweden, we find that both men and women have to a large extent kept aloof from monotonous tempo­work. Instead, they are concentrated in more varied physical-manual work. Here the women work in unskilled tasks and the men as semi-skilled workers. A large proportion of the men have entered other professions, where they work in transport (drivers) and a few are highly skilled repair workers. One fifth of the men were enrolled as part- or full-time students in Swedish educational institutions.

Both women and men in the "Swedish" Macedonian group work alongside Swedish workers. They feel that they are able to influence working conditions, and almost all feel that they can influence their relationship with their employer, especially the men. The women are also much more positive than the Wallachian women, although more negative than their men. The Macedonians find it necessary to take personal initiative to change working conditions. Most have actually taken such initiatives (especially the men) and contacted the union or the employer in connection with this. Macedonians also tend to change job more often than the Wallachians, especially the men. The change of job tends to be connected with mobility into occupations with better working conditions and recognition of better status of qualification.

In Denmark, female Wallachians have much the same situation of work as do female Wallachians in Sweden. They are the group who to the largest extent work in industry and, who to the greatest degree admit that they find their work physically and psychologically exhausting. Nevertheless, they still find their work "interesting" and feel that they have good contacts with fellow workers. Like Wallachian women in Sweden, they find it difficult to influence working conditions, but in contrast many declare that they have nevertheless attempted to do this through the representatives of the employer. Although they are to a large measure engaged in the same tasks as Wallachian women in Sweden, none of the "Danish" Wallachian women are working in closed "occupational ghettos", separate from indigenous workers.

Wallachian men in Denmark are the only group of immigrant men in the sample who have not experienced strong dequalification in relation to their formal Yugoslav work level. While a few who had prior skills in metal working
or engineering have received recognition for their Yugoslav work qualification, most younger Wallachian immigrants have acquired qualifications as semi-skilled or skilled workers at the workplace.

The vast majority of Wallachian men in Denmark work in shipyards, steel-mills and iron-working industries. This group does considerably heavy physical labour, most often under conditions, which are hazardous to their health. However, this kind of work resembles the kind of employment which many of these workers had in Yugoslavia (mining, iron working, steel mills and heavy construction work). Moreover, the traditional division of labour in these kinds of industries tends to favor closeness and cooperation among workers with different trades and levels of skill.

Of all groups in the sample, the Wallachian men in Denmark give the most favourable picture of their work situation. Most find their work “interesting” and of the type which can further contact with others. They also experience a high degree of influence over working conditions. Almost all have attempted to influence working conditions through representatives of the firm or the union. All Wallachian men in Denmark work together with Danish workers. More than any other group they feel an actual ability to influence working conditions, relationships with the employer, etc. To a very large degree they also feel able to influence the planning of their work in the enterprise.

From the smaller industrial town where we have surveyed the Wallachians in Denmark, we now come to the Macedonians in the Danish capital of Copenhagen.

Here a more unfavourable and impersonal context of work seems to produce a more negative experience of the working situation than we have found among either the Macedonians in the small Swedish industrial town or among the Wallachians in a comparable industrial town in Denmark. As a whole, the experience of the working situation among the “Danish” Macedonians come closest to the negative picture which we have painted for Wallachian immigrants in Sweden.

Macedonians in Denmark are to a large extent employed in tempo-work in industry, although only half as much as Wallachians in Sweden. Many carry out manual labour (unskilled among the women and semi-skilled or skilled for the men) in sectors other than industry (mostly cleaning). A comparatively large proportion of the men are drivers and some work in skilled maintenance jobs. Like Wallachian men in Denmark, many Macedonian men are in metal working and ship-building jobs.

Like Macedonians in Sweden, “Danish” Macedonians only to some degree work separately from indigenous workers; most are working in mixed contexts. However, contrary to their fellow countrymen in Sweden, they see themselves as having a very low degree of control over their working conditions. And although they insist that immigrants ought to engage in socio-political life (cf. Chapter 4), “Danish” Macedonians are at the same time those who to the greatest degree find that there is “no need” for themselves to try to influence
their working conditions. In the total sample, they feel least able to influence working conditions, relationships to the employer, etc. They feel themselves largely unable to influence the planning of their own labour process. The men in the group feel that they have the lowest possibilities for contact and cooperation at work, and both men and women feel unable to exert influence on the relationships to work mates. The Macedonians in Denmark are the most passive of all with respect to actual attempts to influence their situation of work. Only 5 percent of the Macedonian women in Denmark and 30% of the men state that they have ever taken any initiative to influence their situation at work during their time of residence in Denmark. (A more comprehensive explanation of this will involve the question of local public life in the residential communities, to be discussed in the next chapter).

In the following we shall discuss in more detail women’s conditions of work, seen in the dual perspective of the job and the household.

**Women and Double Work**

For most women, emigration resulted in their very first industrial job. For Wallachian women this meant a transition from agricultural work in the rural household. The Macedonian women came directly from school or had been housewives, unemployed or workers. Only a few Macedonian women were of peasant background.

Even though salaried employment might be viewed as a precondition for social and political emancipation, for Yugoslav migrant women it rather came to mean hard and fatigueing *double work*, in the factory and in the home. In most cases the traditional Yugoslav division of labour has continued in Scandinavia.

Mira, a younger Wallachian woman, tells the story of her difficult life...

"Our women work hard. This we have always done. But nowadays you feel the pressure to shell out money more and more. All expenses are skyrocketing. But we also feel worn out too fast.

We just don’t know how to put on the brakes. Every new dance demands that you should show new dresses, and every wedding demands that you be better than anybody else. We work hard for this tiny bonus, so that the Danes get angry. In the end no Danish women will work with us any longer. “You kill us, you Yugoslav bastards!” , they say.

For example, my friend Vida says, “if this machine is not running by ten, I shall go home to sleep.” The Danes want it at four or five. But when Vida works so hard, I don’t want to be inferior or to earn less.

But the worst thing is that the air makes you so sick. Only after several of us had fainted did they start talking about installing ventilation.

I work on the assembly line. These fucking plastic “guts” don’t give me a second of rest. Sometimes I pack them the wrong way. I can’t reach to find the right boxes. Once a month we have a meeting with an interpreter, and they tell us to pack better.
But I find the tempo way too high. After five years, I don't really want to change my job. One can get used to everything, and you know what you have, but not really what you can get. But I see the young women suffer.

Often the personnel manager complains that Yugoslav women are always ill. How do you explain to them about our own foolishness, their foul air, and that they pressure us like hell, so that we pack the wrong way. And when all the Danes have left, nobody will try to keep the pace down any longer...

Always I carry this nervous feeling in my stomach. It bubbles and it sucks and it presses
like a stone. I walk stooped over like an old woman in the morning, when I come back to the factory.

The mornings are the worst. First there is this evil clock. When it rings a knife goes through my stomach and a cold electric current shakes my body. I rise at five. Before the bus I try to drink a little tea. I set the table for the others, prepare their breakfast and hurry for the bus.

In the evening when I come home, I wash our part of the public staircase. I hate the Danes saying that foreigners are dirty. That is not right.

I bake bread, make cakes, cook the food, do the dishes, clean up after the children and so on. I usually cook the old Yugoslav way, for long hours, you know. And every day. We don't like frozen food.

My husband helps me, his kind of work, you know. Takes care of the car repairs and so on.

Mother-in-law and father-in-law live with us. We bought a house here and rent part of it out. Mother-in-law also works at the factory and helps me in the house afterwards. But she is old, sick and tired.

All of us live here in Denmark. Both my husband's parents and his brother, with his family. And my parents and my sister with her family. We meet very often, and other people from the village and the home area visit. So there are many cakes and much bread to be baked.

So you can understand that my stomach can't find peace. Neither on the job nor at home.

Also my husband has a pain in his stomach. "Chattarr" the doctor says. Father-in-law also has pains. The back. He has worked all these years in the shipyard, you know. My husband's grandfather in Yugoslavia takes care of the homestead and the farm all alone. He is never ill. Everyday he eats our cabbage, bread and drinks wine and brandy. We eat light food and drink only a little. But we are always ill. Why? It can't be the food, can it?

By the way, my husband has started jogging like the Danes. Our people laugh at him. But he thinks it is easier to get close to the Danes if they jog together".

Mira's words reflect the data brought out in the survey; namely, that immigrant women have the worst working conditions in Scandinavia, the most monotonous, stressful and isolated working conditions and the least influence upon these conditions. But although Mira finds double work a heavy burden, she does not want to change the division of labour in the house. "My kitchen and my house are my pride," she says. "I don't want him to mix into my business".

Not everybody feels this way. Many of the women we met thought that their husbands ought to do more housework. Certainly there is a difference in female and male ideas about sharing the housework. We shall return to this in Chapter Seven.

Women might also try to influence their conditions of double work in ways other than by arguing with their husbands.

While many women in the beginning of their stay in Scandinavia worked more than 50 hours per week, most are now working the "normal" 40 hours a week. Both at the beginning of their stay and at present, Wallachian women work longer hours than the Macedonian women and were working full-time to a greater extent than the average Scandinavian woman.

Yugoslav women are also more often than any other group of women
employed in industrial work, while the majority of Scandinavian women are employed in administration, education or service.

The heavy degree of full-time employment among Wallachian women reflects a greater motivation to earn a “fast buck” for immediate investment in prestige goods. But this employment is only possible because Wallachian women are less tied to small children than are Macedonian women. Many Wallachians have left their children back in Yugoslavia, while others have their children cared for by older female relatives in Scandinavia.

Macedonian women in Sweden have cut down their working time most. A considerable proportion (26%) are now working half-time. This has brought them closer to the normal working pattern of Swedish economically active women, who are mostly part-time workers. The average Yugoslav immigrant women in Sweden work “full-time” in industrial work as among the Wallachian women in Sweden (see Ålund 1985). It is also the Wallachian women who have the most typical “immigrant” working conditions of all groups of women in the sample: shift work, tempo-work, isolated from indigenous workers, etc.

Unemployment

The level of unemployment among the Yugoslav immigrants surveyed corresponds to the general level of unemployment of Yugoslavs in Denmark and Sweden, which is approximately double the unemployment among indigenous workers (Schierup 1983). The official level of open unemployment among Yugoslavs is approximately five times higher in Denmark than Sweden. This is also clearly reflected in the data from the sample.

As a whole Wallachians in Denmark are the group which is at present most affected by unemployment. This is especially so for the women, of whom a third were unemployed at the time of the interview, and for the youngest respondents. The Macedonians in Denmark have a lower proportion of unemployed than the Wallachians, but they have had the longest total periods of unemployment during their residence in Scandinavia. In this group a third of all informants have been unemployed for a total of more than one year during their stay in Denmark, a fourth for more than two years, and 15% for more than three years. The difference between the two groups reflects the differences between labour markets. The Macedonians are exposed to a fluctuating but differentiated labour market in Copenhagen. They often become unemployed, but apparently find jobs in other enterprises or alternative occupations. The Wallachians are situated in small industrial towns where the labour market is more narrow, and where it is difficult to find new employment once the old enterprise closes down. Shortly before the survey there was a sharp increase in unemployment among migrant women in the area, and shortly after the survey had been completed there was a steep rise in unemployment among the men.
Table 9: General employment situation over time during stay in Scandinavia in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment status</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General employment situation:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never unemployed</td>
<td>48 56 36</td>
<td>65 71 57</td>
<td>54 39</td>
<td>60 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlier unemployed/now employed</td>
<td>30 25 39</td>
<td>29 22 38</td>
<td>20 41</td>
<td>34 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlier unemployed/now on l.m. training course for unempl.</td>
<td>4 2 6</td>
<td>2 2 2</td>
<td>2 6</td>
<td>3 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presently unemployed</td>
<td>18 17 19</td>
<td>4 5 3</td>
<td>24 14</td>
<td>3 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment/time in total during stay in Scandinavia:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than one year</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than two years</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wallachians</td>
<td>Macedonians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never unemployed</td>
<td>66 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlier unemployed/now employed</td>
<td>17 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earlier unemployed/now on l.m. training course for unempl</td>
<td>0 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presently unemployed</td>
<td>17 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment/time in total during stay in Scandinavia:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than one year</td>
<td>8 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than two years</td>
<td>4 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of respondents: 189

The differences between the two groups are also due to factors "internal" to the groups. The Macedonians have a higher propensity to risk, quitting unsatisfactory jobs to search for better ones. Owing to their higher level of education and more cosmopolitan orientation, they are also more flexible vis à vis the job market.

This is also illustrated in the case of Sweden. The Macedonian men, who are
the best educated and most mobile, are also the ones who most often change jobs. They simultaneously exhibit a high rate of present unemployment and the longest total time of unemployment. Perhaps this could be regarded as the cost of trying to escape from "occupational ghettos".

Macedonian women in Denmark have been unemployed for the longest total amount of time, but at the same time have the lowest proportion of unemployed. Their unemployment rate is only a third of that of the Wallachian women, and it is even lower than that of their men at present. This seems to reflect a general situation, whereby structural changes have created severe unemployment in traditionally "female" industries and working processes, but where the more well-educated Macedonian women have been flexible and adaptive in finding new niches. Conversely, it might mean—irrespective of the type of labour market—that once the generally poorly educated Wallachian women become unemployed, it will be very hard for them to ever find work again.

Patterns of Integration at Work

In the preceding we have dealt with problems of qualification and attitudes towards working conditions. On the background of this we can now go further, discussing four general patterns concerning the integration of Wallachians and Macedonians within Scandinavian "work collectives".

Dequalification and Marginalization

Among the Wallachians in Sweden we found the most negative consequences from the confrontation of peasant immigrants with the industrial system and the Scandinavian workers.

The "Swedish" Wallachians—both male and female—tend to be concentrated in strictly controlled and disciplined tempo-work, in contexts which offer little opportunity for face to face cooperation and communication among workers. Even when they work together with Swedish workers, they feel frozen out by their Swedish comrades and have given up trying to establish contact. The production areas in which these migrants work tend to be left exclusively to migrant labour. The Swedish workers that Yugoslav workers meet belong to the most marginal sections of the Swedish working class; they tend to perceive such jobs as only temporary solutions.

It has often been emphasized (e.g. Runciman 1959) that the most marginal and socially disintegrated sections of the working class tend to be the ones who try to distance themselves the most from socially stigmatized groups in society. Being themselves uprooted, socially stigmatized and characterized by disi-
tegrating forms of family-and community life, these workers might react by "aristocratizing" themselves in relation to immigrants. Immigrants become a negative reference group by which they prove that they are not completely on the bottom of the social hierarchy.

Being identified with the immigrant social stratum in society is felt as a constant danger. This is a very real danger, as oneself is defined as a "social problem" and associated with deviant behaviour (alcoholism, hooliganism, crime, etc.). One is, moreover, forced into the same occupational and residential ghettos as immigrants. It becomes a matter of maintaining one's own self-respect by means of avoiding contact with immigrants. Thus, in informal, non-structured situations, personal contact with immigrants is avoided as it is regarded as socially "costly" and stigmatizing.

Wallachian immigrants with whom we spoke did not complain so much about open antagonism from indigenous workers in Sweden; rather they complained about a wall of non-involvement in situations of personal communication. Immigrants typically describe how Swedes do everything to buy off any involvement or reciprocity in social interaction once they feel forced to communicate.

"Yesterday Carl asked me if he could buy one of my cigarettes. He forgot his own at the tramstation. I told him that he was crazy. 'We are working mates and you can take as many of my cigarettes as you wish, of course. And don't try to pay!' Anyway he wanted only one cigarette and forced a crown into my pocket!"

No interpersonal relations tend to arise in such a context; it is purely an anonymous "market" relation.

In such a context immigrants tend to aristocratize themselves. As it is impossible to penetrate beyond the smooth facade of privacy and non-involvement, the situation is rationalized through a number of immigrant prejudices about Swedish social life and the "immoral" behaviour of Swedish co-workers. The impossibility of socializing is rationalized into one's own lack of desire to socialize.

The lack of communication, the feeling of being unwanted or "non-existent" as persons, and the feeling of being caught in an occupational ghetto all crystallize into a general suspicion towards everything Swedish: the union, its representatives and the work done by the union in the enterprise.

Even where the work unit is weak and disorganized, the Swedish union often interferes as an external force in order to regulate working conditions according to abstract standards. The Swedish trade union movement has taken a great interest in immigrant questions and has endeavoured to recruit immigrant activists.

Such efforts develop on a grassroots level depending on the local context. During fieldwork we encountered several Wallachians who had become actively involved in grassroots work in their trade union. This would seem to contradict the immigrants' general suspicion of Swedish social organizations.
mentioned above. Indeed, one characteristic of these people was their difficult position of shared loyalties towards both the general trade union standards and their ethnic community.

One example of this was the question of dismissals in an enterprise with many Wallachian workers. Here the local Wallachian member of the union board felt obliged to follow the general Swedish trade union parole of “First hired—last fired”.

In actual practice this meant that most of those laid-off would be Yugoslavs, as they happened to have been hired most recently. Having internalized Swedish standards, the Wallachian union activist understood this as a well-motivated protection of older Swedish workers, who might have spent a major part of their lives in the enterprise and would have few opportunities to get an alternative job. The Wallachians saw the union representative as a hostage of “the Swedes”, helping the union to legitimize the rising unemployment among foreigners instead of fighting for preferential treatment for his own ethnic group. Their view was that firing immigrants in “mixed” enterprises meant a further step towards locking them into occupational ghettos. The Wallachian activist realized that it would be seen as nepotism and ethnic favouritism in the local union if he were to stand up and defend such claims.

No communication, however, occurred between the Wallachians and the union. The Wallachian community considered “their” union representative an “outsider”, a potentially dangerous one at that. He was a person with whom one should not discuss things openly, a potential spy for the union and the state.

A look back at the political culture of Wallachian peasant society can help us understand the depth and the consequences of such reactions. The state and its representatives (the bureaucrat, the police, the tax official, and the intellectual) were always looked upon with profound suspicion. This is normal in peasant societies. But instead of trying to forge bonds with the town and thus aspire to control parts of the greater scene of political decision-making (as was common among the majority of Serbian peasants), the response of the Wallachian minority was to disengage itself from political life beyond the local village arena; the community saw no possibility to control it anyway. The community would encapsulate itself behind protective shields of silence and non-involvement with outsiders. Here the closed character of village life was matched by a minute social control and the exclusion of those who became too involved with the outside. Although such people were needed in certain instances, they were treated with suspicion and defined as “outsiders” with whom it was dangerous to associate.

This traditional attitude of defensive disinvolve
dment is typical for the Wallachians in Sweden. This attitude is mirrored in the data from the survey: almost 100% agree that Yugoslavs should not involve themselves in sociopolitical life in Sweden and that it is useless for migrants to try to influence their own conditions of work.
The logic of this "passivity" in the immigrant context is that "one knows what one has got, but not what one can get," since one has no means of controlling the world outside the closed ethnic community anyway. This is a logic of powerlessness produced by isolation from the arenas of power. Following this logic, anything which you do and say could be "taken away" by outsiders or by your own "deviants", ethnic brethren who are "hostages" of the outside, to systems and centres of power beyond your control and be used against you. As you yourself are not fully cognizant of the reasoning in these (socially) distant power centers, you never really know exactly what it is that can be used against you. Therefore, it becomes most prudent to disinvolve and keep your mouth shut. This also implies that it becomes of vital interest to the community to insure that everybody conforms to group standards of morality and behaviour and to closed patterns of communication and interaction within the local ethnic community.

Still, we cannot discard with Wallachians' reaction as a mere question of "peasant tradition". Dequalification and marginalization can passify people, as in this case, and turn disappointment into unorganized protest or defensive encapsulation.

The most angry among the generally very dissatisfied "Swedish" Wallachians are the younger migrants. Most younger Wallachian men in Sweden actually had Yugoslav working qualifications, mostly of a technical character. The achievement of these qualifications represents a historical settlement with the closed nature and the anti-literary tradition of Wallachian peasant communities. In Sweden these highly skilled young people have ended up as unskilled workers in the same occupational ghettos as their parents and with older poorly educated migrants. Hence they vigorously express their anger over their "dequalification".

Table 10: Young Wallachians in Sweden (24-29 years of age) according to sex, education and skill acknowledged in present job (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational background</th>
<th>Skill acknowledged in present job:</th>
<th>Cases:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>Semiskilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight years of school or less:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finished secondary school:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of respondents: 13
We find a similar pattern among Wallachian youth who have gone to school in Sweden, several of them having finished secondary school. According to the survey data, even these young “Yugoswedes” have ended up in unskilled jobs, in occupational ghettos and express their anger at working conditions and at Swedish society. This supports observations from field work, where we often met young Wallachians expressing their anger at working conditions and at Swedish society.

We shall now compare the situation of the “Swedish” Wallachians with the situation at work of the Wallachians in Denmark. These exhibit much more positive general attitudes. This is especially true for the men.

Requalification and Integration ...

In the preceding we have emphasized that the Wallachian men in Denmark are the only group men which have not been dequalified in terms of formal skill. On the contrary a number of younger people who came to Denmark without any previous working qualifications or skills have obtained jobs as semiskilled or skilled workers. This they see as a tremendous upgrading of their social status (from peasant to skilled worker).

There are several factors which help account for the relatively positive experience of working life among these men, despite the fact that they do back-breaking and dangerous work.

First we should note that most have ended up in traditional “core-industries” (steel-mills, metalworking, ship-building) which tend to be dominated by strongly established and well-organized male work-collectives. In most enterprises these working collectives are dominated by highly skilled workers. In the contexts studied, these workers had a high degree of autonomy of work in relationship to management. They were backed by strong unions and by their monopolization of skill and knowledge of the production processes.

In these industries, foreigners never became a numerically dominant group, even though they were concentrated in certain production processes and labour tasks. Although they have taken on the most dangerous, the most arduous and the least paid labour tasks in the enterprises, they have worked as integrated parts of larger mixed work gangs characterized by a relatively high degree of division of labour, cooperation and internal communication.

Channels of advancement have not been blocked for immigrants once they became established in these enterprises. As Danes slowly fell away due to age or because they found better employment elsewhere, immigrants moved into skilled tasks. As Danes were forced to share their knowledge and skills with the immigrants, two options appeared:
- to tie immigrants still closer to the work collective and its claims.
- to support the claims of immigrants that their acquired real skills ought to receive formal recognition at enterprise and union level.

If these aims were not attained, the meaning and function of skill in general would be devalued and demonopolized and with this, workers' power at enterprise level.
In the context of these enterprises and powerful, self-conscious working collectives, the schedule of work has been much less pressed and disciplined and less closely supervised from above than among the Wallachians in Sweden. There has always been a relatively wide margin for informal joking and other forms of off-duty communication.

Danish workers in these enterprises have not simply turned their backs to people showing deviant behaviour, violating the routines or rhythm of the work collective. According to our experience, discussions and arguments have often run high between indigenous and immigrant workers. This has involved harsh verbal abuse of immigrants by native workers in the most obscene and derogative terms. However, for the immigrants, this has been conceived as a more familiar (i.e., more Yugoslav) and less offensive pattern of behaviour than the freezing out and disengaged attitudes the Wallachians in Sweden experienced. Discrimination and blunt prejudice are well-known phenomena towards which one can relate oneself through protest or through the definition of a ritualized subordinate/superordinate relationship. To see one’s offer of friendship bought off for the price of “a dirty Swedish crown” represents an unfamiliar and extremely offending pattern of behaviour. Although not necessarily a sign of “discrimination” against foreigners; it could be a standard behavioral pattern. According to Yugoslav cultural codes, however, it calls into question one’s very definition as a social being.

Discussions with Danish workers clearly show that they distinguish between different categories of foreign and Yugoslav workers. The small number of younger and middle-aged Yugoslavs who came first were rapidly integrated into the working collectives and hold the most accepted status among indigenous workers.

Around 1970, when there arrived a large number of Yugoslavs from the same villages during a very short span of time, the processes of communication and socialization into the working collective were clearly enhanced. The Danes tended to feel threatened by this sudden invasion of foreigners (“they come to take our jobs and our girls”), while the immigrants tended to associate informally among themselves.

However, it was an accepted view among natives that most younger immigrants have adapted fairly well to the norms of the work collectives, although there still occur everyday conflicts related to work routines and other aspects.

An important factor in the integration of Wallachian men is that several of the early migrants were skilled workers who had worked in similar labour processes and work collectives in Yugoslavia. Although these people had the kind of experience which was relatively marginal in the context of their communities of origin, they helped to socialize younger skilled Yugoslavs without previous working experience. From these people newcomers and those with more peasant experiences could learn the culture of the Danish work collective.
From a wider perspective, organized activities of the ethnic community as a whole have proved important. Helped by their Yugoslav immigrant association, several skilled Wallachian workers received Danish certifications for their Yugoslav qualifications. Cooperation between immigrants and the unions in most cases secured Yugoslav workers formal recognition and renumeration for the kind of skilled work they were actually doing. The importance of relatively open communication in the work collectives must be emphasized as a prerequisite for the emergence of such forms of cooperation.

... But Not for Women

Wallachian women in Denmark work under conditions very different from their men, in labour processes which are probably closer to those of the Wallachians in Sweden. Nevertheless, the women in Denmark felt that they had more opportunities for contact and informal communication on the job and more opportunities to influence working conditions.

“Danish” Wallachian women do not work in isolation from indigenous workers to the same extent as their counterparts in Sweden. Conflicts arise between Wallachian immigrant women and Danish women, as in the case of “Mira’s difficult life”. Nevertheless such conflicts and confrontations might be more positive than ignorance, leading to reflection over one’s own situation and over possible ways to influence it. Moreover, our fieldwork indicates that at least the younger women are profoundly influenced by discussions with their men, who have become more integrated into Danish working class life.

The situation is still one of relative openness, communication and active involvement, while the situation among Wallachian women in Sweden is characterized by closure and defensive non-involvement. The “Danish” Wallachian women’s relative faith in their ability to influence their own conditions of work was supported by a general view that involvement in socio-political life in Denmark could be worthwhile. Table Eleven compares the responses of Wallachian men and women to the statement: “Yugoslavs should not involve themselves in socio-political life in Denmark/Sweden”. Have poor working conditions produced two different types of consciousness and response in the two contexts: self asserting “Danish” Wallachian women and a group of “Swedish” Wallachian women withdrawing totally into defensive encapsulation?
Table 11: Agreement/disagreement to the statement: "Yugoslavs should not mix into socio-political life in Denmark/Sweden!". Answers among Wallachian immigrants in Denmark and Sweden according to sex (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group, country, sex</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Do not agree</th>
<th>Partly agree</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
<th>N=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wallachians in Denmark:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallachians in Sweden:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of respondents: 93

Differing experiences among Wallachian women demand additional factors of explanation located outside the frame of industrial work. The totality of the female work experience is to a greater extent than the male one connected to the domestic field and informal community relationships among relatives and friends. To this we return in following chapters.

**Dequalification ... but Adaptation**

Among Macedonian immigrants in Sweden we see, as already pointed out, a clear dequalification according to formal terms of skill—especially among the men. Only very few men have received any acknowledgement for their Yugoslav skill or education. The large proportion of men who are working as semiskilled workers have obtained their present jobs through training programs run by the enterprise where they work.

Nevertheless, unlike the Wallachians, the group as a whole has succeeded in escaping occupational ghettos and the bottom of the occupational immigrant hierarchy.

The reasons for this are several. A few of the male Macedonian immigrants came very early to Sweden, where they lived for more than twenty years. At that time Sweden was (culturally and structurally on the labour market) more open toward foreigners. These first immigrants were able to establish themselves in fairly open work groups and under better conditions of work. They were also able to forge functional links of informal association with Swedes, both on the job and outside it.

When subsequent waves of migrants arrived, preexisting contacts and an
effective social network within the ethnic group and beyond it helped them escape the worst occupational ghettos and to gradually improve their job situations.

However, this cannot be reduced to a question of coming sooner or later, or to the effectiveness of the social network per se. It is also important to note that most of these Macedonian immigrants had working class backgrounds and had been integrated into work collectives in Yugoslav towns before their emigration to Sweden. In Yugoslav work collectives there are a number of codes of association and conduct which resemble those of Scandinavia (cf. Schierup 1977). From the outset this stimulated a more positive communication and sense of communal understanding between indigenous and immigrant workers.

The Macedonians in Sweden find Swedish behaviour in informal situations to be quite different from Yugoslav patterns or to their own standards of proper or desirable behaviour. Such evaluations of the culture of everyday life among the “natives” were much more negative among both groups in Sweden than among the two groups of Yugoslav immigrants in Denmark. However, in contrast to the Wallachians, Macedonian migrants have a historical tradition for dealing with threatening and complicated situations of ethnic pluralism in ways which are at once goal-conscious, constructive and flexible. People from the old emigration regions have developed the ability to acquire a double cultural competence in new contexts.

In Sweden they have typically developed an effective “functional adaptation”. By this we mean a smooth adaptation to Swedish cultural behaviour in situations of interaction with Swedes on the job and outside it. Thus, “friend­ships” with the natives largely become synonymous with a smooth and well-functioning “peaceful coexistence” in shared social situations. This furthers acceptance among the “safer”, stable and well-established strata of the Swedish working class, with which the Macedonians aspire to associate themselves at work. In turn, it opens up avenues toward better integration into Swedish work collectives, toward influencing one’s working conditions, and creates an increased ability to influence one’s social condition beyond the strict field of the enterprise and work collective.

Dequalification and Disintegration

Let us discuss, finally, the Macedonians in Denmark. In contrast to their broad-minded and flexible attitudes towards the immigration country, the Danish Macedonians had a largely negative perception of their position on the job; i.e., lack of positive communication, feelings of powerlessness, etc.

The men were especially negative. Like the Macedonian men in Sweden, most Macedonian men in Denmark felt that they received little recognition for their acquired skills in their present job. What makes their situation worse is
that they did not feel compensated by a positive integration in the working collective.

We should emphasize the radically different conditions of Macedonians in Denmark, who live in Copenhagen, compared to the smaller industrial towns in which the three other groups live. Compared to the more stable and provincial situation of the Wallachians in Denmark, the Macedonians in Copenhagen tended to be employed in larger, more modern enterprises, characterized by more advanced and pervasive forms of control over the labour process and workers by management and by a greater degree of job segregation. This means less space for autonomous workers' organization and informal communication, and a more anonymous status for the individual worker in relation to the collective, the union and the management.

Confronted with dequalification, anonymity and a feeling of powerlessness, changing jobs becomes the only way to protest against unsatisfactory working conditions, or unfulfilling human relations. Instead of integration into a relatively intimate and familiar work collective, constructive social energy is channelled into efforts towards individual achievement.

Concluding Remarks

We have argued that those migrants with peasant backgrounds are more likely to fall short of standards of conduct of the work collective than those who share the tacit codes of Western European industrial workers and a similar previous working experience. The most disruptive situation is likely to occur when “peasant” migrants are introduced into enterprises or production processes with unfavourable working conditions and staffed by marginal and poorly organized sections of the indigenous working class.

This is the situation of Wallachian women. The type of enterprises in which the Wallachian women work in Scandinavia draw their labour from the reserves of female unskilled labour in society. Our discussions with both immigrants and Scandinavians indicate that the introduction of migrant labour into such enterprises has often led to a deterioration in already poor working conditions.

Without positive communication between the two sections of the work collective in such realms of production, a permanent rupture of the work collective can occur. Indigenous workers will increase their efforts to advance into other, more tolerable jobs within the same enterprise, move to a more attractive industrial enterprise or into service and administration, or retreat back into the home. Indigenous workers may also try to force immigrants out of the enterprise through different forms of pressure.

In contrast to the weak, unstable collective of female workers in marginal and fluctuating industrial realms, there are the well-organized, well-
established collectives of male industrial workers in traditional core areas of Western European industry like metal-working, ship-building and engineering. The work collectives of such enterprises are usually organized around a hard core of skilled workers who stubbornly insist on the socialization of newcomers to collective standards of behaviour.

The composite analysis of four patterns of integration among Yugoslav immigrants yields two “negative” and “passive” groups—Wallachians in Sweden and Macedonians in Denmark—and two “positive” and “active” groups—Macedonians in Sweden and Wallachians in Denmark. The development of these concrete situations should be seen in light of the following three factors:

1. Communication between indigenous and immigrant workers within the work collectives is likely to be easier if at least part of the immigrants share a working class experience and if well-integrated, established migrants help to socialize new migrants into the work collective.

2. The internal relationships and contradictions between indigenous and immigrant workers in the work collective are profoundly influenced by the impact of new technology and management strategies. This naturally changes the way individuals experience their work situation.

3. Finally we have indicated that the development of distinctive patterns of integration in working life cannot be sufficiently explained within the field of work alone. We have pointed to the importance of both informal social networks and ethnic organization.

In order to come closer to explanations of ethnic transformation we shall now leave the field of work and carry the discussion of these matters into a more inclusive perspective.
Chapter 6

A THREAT TO PUBLIC ORDER

"Envisaging public life—of which we know very well there is all to little—requires an almost childlike feeling of omnipotence".

Alexander Kluge

In the preceding chapter we sketched the integration of Yugoslav immigrants in the field of working life. This chapter treats the residential community as a field of analysis. Following the suggestions of Breton (1970) which we put forth in the introduction, we shall analyse local public life as the interrelationships of people belonging to three main categories.

- the immigrant's own ethnic minority group.
- other ethnic minority groups in the community.
- the Danish/Swedish majority;

In order to place the development of immigrant culture and organization in a more general perspective, we begin by discussing Richard Sennett's (1977) observations dealing with the decay of public life in towns of the capitalist world.

A characteristic development in capitalist societies during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is the gradual decline of open public fora, providing meeting and communication grounds for people of unequal rank and different ethnic affiliation (Sennett 1977). Public places (the pub, the coffee house, the market place etc.), as essential fora for the expressive enactment of public communication have been supplanted by ritualized public anonymity and avoidance.

The corollary to this public anonymity is the hypertrophy of an ideology of "intimacy" and "closeness" embodied in ever more segmentary and privatized social units. This finds its culmination in middle class private housing areas with their privatized patterns of association and intimacy among individual family units. A growing ideology of psychological "intimacy" in our times goes hand in hand with an atomized character of modern society, without precedent in the history of civilization.

The acting out of important social conflicts and issues in free public zones which communicates essential public messages under the cover of a ritualized social distance has been gradually replaced by the dichotomization of social relationships into a sphere of anonymity, contract and money-commodity transactions and a sphere of personal intimacy, and similarity.

Instead of psychologically distanced, but normatively binding reciprocity in social interaction there emerges the "narcissist" self-centered definition of interpersonal communication as individual therapy on one side and imperso-
nal “business” transactions on the other.

Sennett’s “fall of public man”, also entails a decline in the experience of objective collective interest and common destiny in the working class and a narrowing in the scope of “collective personality”. The result is an ever increasing xenophobic exclusion of “outsiders” or “unlikes”:

“...Fraternity has become empathy for a select group of people allied with rejection of those not within the local circle. This rejection creates demands for autonomy from the outside world, for being left alone by it rather than demanding that the outside world itself change. The more intimate, however, the less sociable. For this process of fraternity by exclusion of “outsiders” never ends, since a collective image of “us” never solidifies. Fragmentation and internal division is the very logic of this fraternity, as the units of people who really belong get smaller and smaller. It is a version of fraternity which leads to fratricide (Sennett 1977:266).

The death of open public fora is followed by the expulsion of local public life to the closed reserves of special purpose institutions and interest groups in society (work, educational institutions, political parties, unions, sports and other “leisure time” associations). Most of these fora are characterized by restrictive
membership, initiation rites and elaborate rituals of behaviour, reflecting a closed subculture.

Another corollary of the “fall of public man” (ibid.) is the increased realm of state-intervention in modern capitalist society (Poulantzas 1978). A proliferating state-bureaucracy manifests itself through growing efforts to control and organize local public life as well as relationships within the family. This is the underside of elaborate social policies and a Janus-faced “welfare-state”, which makes the confrontation between state bureaucracies and new autonomous social movements the dominant political issue of late capitalism (ibid., Cohen 1982, Keane 1984).

Hence, a centralistic state apparatus of control on one side and the exclusivity of public life on the other is the context of new alternative sub-cultures and social movements oriented “toward the control of a field of autonomy or of independence vis-à-vis the system” (Melucci 1980:220).

This development of new autonomous movements and sub-cultures should also be seen as related to an increasing disintegration of classbased collective social identities in society (Sennett and Cobb 1973; Sennett 1977). This generates a return to criteria of group identities based on membership criteria like sex, ethnicity, age and locality (ibid., Melucci 1980, Peterson 1984). These forms of collective identity can be related to immigrant organizations based on alternative forms of solidarity. Confronting personal and collective marginality and discrimination, migrants develop solidarity organized around ties of territorial origin, culture and “blood”.

For a majority of the Yugoslavs we studied in Scandinavia, their “own people” represented a privileged sphere of informal socializing, although the concrete meaning of this “core group” varied from case to case.

Patterns of Association

We shall now examine the patterns of association between the four groups of Yugoslav immigrants and Danes or Swedes. We found that Wallachians in Denmark and Macedonians in Sweden were the most successfully integrated into life at the workplace and felt the greatest degree of control over their work situation. They were also the groups with the most contact with Danes or Swedes in other local public arenas. Correspondingly, those who found themselves most isolated and powerless at the workplace had the least contact with the indigenous population outside work.

Wallachians in Denmark were the group who most frequently said that they had tried to make contacts with Scandinavians during their free time (see Figure 4 and Table 12). “Danish” Wallachians were also the group, who to the greatest degree found Scandinavians communicative and active in associating with immigrants.
Conversely, Wallachians in Sweden showed a very closed attitude towards contacts with Swedes during free time. They confirmed their “defensive ignorance” or “defensive encapsulation”. Only 29% of the men and 11% of the women had ever tried to take up contact with Swedes in their free time (Figure 4).

Table 12: Motivation/initiative of immigrants to associate with Danes/Swedes during free time. Initiative of Danes/Swedes (as perceived by immigrants) to associate with immigrants during free time, according to group, immigration country and sex (in %).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wallachians</td>
<td>Macedonians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N= 24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Have you wanted or have you tried to take an initiative to associate with Danes/Swedes during free time?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. I have neither wanted nor tried to</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. I have wanted to, but I have not tried</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. I have taken an initiative sometimes</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. I have often taken an initiative</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Have the Danes/Swedes ever taken the initiative to associate with you during free time?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Never</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Sometimes</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Often</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of respondents: 189</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Macedonians in Sweden showed a fairly balanced relationship between their own moderate efforts and their perception of Swedes’ equally moderate interest in interacting with them.
Figure 4: Motivation/initiative of immigrants to associate with Danes/Swedes during free time. Initiative of Danes/Swedes (as perceived by immigrants) to associate with immigrants during free time, according to group, immigration country and sex.

Questions:
1. "Have you wanted or have you tried to take an initiative to associate with Danes/Swedes during your free time?"

Values of answers:
   a. "I have neither wanted nor tried" = 0
   b. "I have wanted, but I have not tried" = 0.25
   c. "I have taken an initiative sometimes" = 0.50
   d. "I have often taken the initiative" = 1.00

2. "Have the Danes/Swedes ever taken the initiative to associate with you during free time?"

Values of answers:
   a. Never = 0
   b. Sometimes = 0.50
   c. Often = 1.00

Macedonians in Denmark generally perceived themselves as being communicative and motivated for contact with Danes. Thus, 69% of the men and 66% of the women had made contact. At the same time they seem to have experienced little reciprocity from the Danes (Table 12 and Figure 4).
Ethnic Circles

We also asked migrants which categories of people they associated with most regularly, and to exclude at least two of five possibilities: 1) Close kin 2) people from their home area in Yugoslavia 3) other Yugoslavs (i.e., Yugoslavs of alternative ethnic affiliation 4) other immigrants and 5) Danes/Swedes.

It was characteristic that an inner ethnic circle of social relationships was of central importance for all four groups. But the importance and the meaning of this inner field of ethnic relationships and its relationship to other social fields varied from group to group. Each group had its own combination of priorities, which gives us clues to the kind of integration in Scandinavian society (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Inner and outer circles of association (in %). Association in free time according to group, immigration country and sex (in %).

We discuss patterns of association for each group separately. We then describe how each group experiences immigration, what this means to its pattern of migrancy, its common identity and the way its members organize their lives collectively or individually. Our intention is to isolate those factors which have caused a gradual transformation of two groups of Yugoslav labour migrants into four different ethnic communities in Scandinavia.
Defensive Encapsulation': Wallachians in Sweden

The Wallachians in Sweden express the most negative experience of the private as well as the public sphere in Swedish society. The following story illustrates what typically happens when a Wallachian immigrant tries to venture beyond the facade of sterile public arenas into the realm of Swedish private life. Our research with other groups of Yugoslav immigrants of peasant extraction in Sweden indicates that this case is typical for immigrants with rural backgrounds.

I Will Not Cut Sven's Hair Anymore

Nikola lives in Sweden with his mother and father, while his children live in Yugoslavia. During his first years in Sweden, when Nikola was not yet married, he lived in a two-room apartment together with his parents. Later, when he married Ana, a girl from his home village, Nikola and Ana moved into their own three-room apartment. Close contacts were retained with the parents, especially during the first years, when Ana had children. Nikola's mother "almost lived with us" to help Ana with the children. Ana's mother and father, who also lived in Sweden, were frequent visitors. The frequent family gatherings were natural for Nikola and Ana. Other relatives and friends came to visit on festive occasions.

Nikola was also much in demand since he knew how to cut hair. Relatives, friends and even neighbours gradually began to come to Nikola to have their hair cut. One of the latter was Sven, his closest neighbour and a frequent guest in Nikola's home. They had met at a course for automobile mechanics and since they were neighbours they often accompanied one another home after classes. They would speak about their work, life in general, women, etc. and Nikola realized that he was slowly acquiring a Swedish friend. Home from classes, Nikola would usually invite Sven home for a chat over a beer. After his haircut, Sven would often stay for dinner. Nikola would never accept money for his little service since he was "only a self-taught haircutter" and not a barber.

Nikola learned from Sven that many neighbours were irritated about all Nikola's visitors, but no one wished to make a formal complaint about it since "they seemed to be older and orderly folk who come and go without rowdy parties and noise". Initially, Sven was also irritated about all the company in Nikola's home, but when he learned who they were, he began to think that it was nice to see a family hold together.

Nikola was never invited to Sven's home. Initially he suspected that Sven's wife perhaps didn't like their company. She was very cool whenever they would greet each other on the stairs, and Sven stayed for dinner at Nikola's only when his wife wasn't home. Still, Nikola thought that Sven ought to invite him home at least once. He was also hurt that Sven always insisted on paying for his haircuts because he "didn't want to feel indebted". In Nikola's world, friendship calls for a friendship in return, and contacts and company can easily be destroyed by money. For Nikola, Sven's insistence on paying was evidence that Sven thought that he could buy his way out of his obligation to offer something in return; namely, the feelings and favours which true friends exchange with one another. With time Sven would drop in only when he needed a haircut; this hurt Nikola all the more. One day he just said; "I don't want to cut your hair any longer, you can go to a barber with your money". Sven was a worker just like Nikola. He was not "fine folk" even though he was Swedish. But Nikola was unable to understand his closed, private world and his holidays at his summer house.

Nikola's Yugoslav neighbours are "fine folk", a doctor and his wife. These people didn't keep company with Nikola either, despite the fact that they bought their meat from the same Swedish farmer. After having divided up the meat they would have a drink and go...
home separately. Nikola thinks that Doktor Ivan is a fine person and that they simply don’t have so much to speak about together. But he feels sorry for Dr Ivan and especially his wife Vera. She sits forever home alone and rarely has any contact with others. Dr Ivan and his wife live more like Swedes than like Yugoslavs, Nikola thinks, even though most of Dr Ivan’s patients in his private practice are Yugoslavs. The doctor has purchased a summer house in Sweden and a house in Yugoslavia, but the couple goes mostly to their Swedish summer house. The Yugoslavs gossip about this peculiar Dr Ivan and his Swedish summer house and how they would withdraw into their home. They usually just look at TV and think that Yugoslavs are merely gossipers and meddlers.

Nikola doesn’t have this problem. Although he has many conflicts with his father on other issues, he himself could never consider marrying a Swedish girl. “They’re too complacent, they can’t cook meals, and they don’t find it any fun going to weddings and holidays every year in the village in Yugoslavia”. But, he, too is gradually becoming tired of travelling to the village and his house in Yugoslavia every year. The house is finished now, and even though his father wants to add on, Nikola no longer wants to work just for the sake of the house. Dr Ivan is from the coastal area, and he’s always saying how warm and beautiful it is along the Adriatic Sea. “Next year Ana and I are also going to the seashore on our vacation, and my father can be as angry as he wants to. ... I hope that Sven and his wife come to the Yugoslav seashore too. Then maybe she’ll understand that we have fine cities and a culture too, and will perhaps be be more interested in our company ...”.

For Nikola and other Yugoslavs, Swedish private life remains to a large measure a “black box”. It is governed by rules which they neither understand nor accept. Their assimilation to Swedish patterns of behaviour tends to remain on a superficial level. Their informal relationships remain tied to their own ethnic group, interrupted by sporadic contacts with Swedes.

Wallachian’s fear of being accused of or reported for disturbing the privacy of the apartments belonging to the common staircase is magnified once they venture out of the cramped privacy of the flat to capture some corner of public space.

A Threat to Public Order

“The third year after people from my home region had started working in Sweden we began to meet here on the lawn outside our block.

We were 20 or 30 of us, and we had great fun making a picnic. Pera used to play the accordion and sing old Wallachian ballads. We even planned to arrange a chain-dance on the lawn, because we had nowhere else to meet. The only thing that we missed was to be able to drink a beer or two, or maybe a glass of plum brandy in the open air.

But you know, the absolutely first commandment we learned on arriving in Sweden, was that is is strictly forbidden to consume beer or any other alcohol in public places. However, we could not help feeling that bypassers stared at us like on wild animals having escaped from a zoo whenever we had our lawn-parties. We also recognized that the neighbours stopped greeting us when we passed one another in the staircase.

The third time we met on the lawn a police-car passed two times, and the third time they even stopped for half an hour close to our site. Somehow we started to feel uneasy, although we did not really know why.

I was some kind of an unofficial representative for the people from my home area because I had been involved in administrative work back in Yugoslavia and because I came to Sweden as one of the first.
The next time I went to the interpreter of the commune to have some letters from the Swedish authorities translated, he mentioned the matter of our Sunday picnics. He said that people in the neighbourhood had complained to the police several times. They found our behaviour noisy and abusive and felt uneasy seeing so many people gathered near their home.

The police did not want to intervene but found the matter delicate. The interpreter asked us to consider whether it was worthwhile to continue drawing attention to ourselves in this way. Maybe we ought to adapt more to Swedish ways.

After that time we stopped gathering on the lawn.

Their negative experiences at work, in public places and in private contacts with Swedes has made the Wallachians in Sweden withdraw from informal contact with Swedes. The "Swedish" Wallachians are the only group where nobody includes native Scandinavians as a preferential group with whom one associates regularly (Figure 5). The Wallachian women in Sweden are the sub-group with the most restricted circles of association. One fifth (21%) are completely restricted to association with close kin, while the remainder associate with people from their home area in Yugoslavia. However, there is a marked difference between the sexes, for a considerable proportion of the men include other Yugoslavs within the sphere with which they associate most regularly (44%). At the same time they are the sub-group in the sample who to the largest degree (92%) include people from their home area.

Having a social base of kin and people from the home area generates a large measure of trust in or dependence upon mutual help in situations of unemployment, borrowing money, caring for sick family members, bringing up children and resolving housing problems. While intimate problems of the children, upbringing of children and marriage remain almost exclusively within the circle of close kin, the broader circle of people from the region of origin plays an important role in other matters (Figure 6).

Close kin and the own ethnic group are of central importance as fields of interaction, communication, mutual help and protection. However, to understand the function and meaning of this tightly knit group of kinsmen from the same group of villages in Yugoslavia, we must examine the "ethnic ecology" in its local context.

We are presented here with a number of ethnic groups and nationalities, the most numerous being the Yugoslavs, followed by the Finns and Greeks. The two latter groups have more long-standing roots in Sweden than the Yugoslavs. Among the various immigrant groups there is little cooperation but a good deal of jealousy and struggle for funds for organized ethnic activities. In the local ethnic division of labour the Wallachians, together with other marginal groups, occupy the lowest positions in the occupational hierarchy. Moreover, they also occupy the lowest position on the local scale of ethnic prestige. Their traditional stigma of ridicule, "primitiveness" and marginality followed them from Yugoslavia to Scandinavia. The Yugoslavs are divided among the well-established and dominant groups, the Serbians, Croatians, Macedonians and
Figure 6: Help in cases of personal crisis (as expected by respondents). Proportion of sample in %.

Situation of crisis: 1) Unemployment 2) Prolonged illness 3) Need to borrow money quickly 4) Problems with upbringing of children 5) Problems in marriage 6) Housing problems

Expecting help from...

Slovenians, each of whom receive funds and have organized themselves into separate associations.

Being “Serbs” according to “national affiliation” (but not ethnically or linguistically) the Wallachians, without their own association, are supposed to join the Serbian association. Wallachians are regarded as “harmless” and as such, they are “left in peace”. But they are kept mostly at a distance and accredited little influence on the activities of the association. They also feel that they are offered little by the rituals and dances of other groups.

(Breaking) The Bondage of Social Control

The closed pattern of defensive encapsulation towards the outside which has developed among the Wallachians in Sweden and the patterns of rigid and intimate social control within the group has placed marginal persons of both sexes in an ambivalent position. Group social control tends to become meaningless and even intolerable for deviant and out-going individuals. This is because in-group integration offers no benefits for careers, creativity or inventiveness.

Therefore, the Wallachian group in Sweden tends to produce two extremes, a majority of conformists and a growing number of cases of “abrupt assimilation”, i.e., people who drop out of the group and involve themselves abruptly.
in Swedish contexts—either privately through marriage or in the context of socio-political work. Such people tend to become “lost” to the group.

The following story tells what kind of dreams can develop and what kind of sanctions can be invoked by an individual who oversteps the norms of the group.

**Miladin, Monica and the Sea**

When deviance occurs among Wallachian immigrants the whole group will involve itself in order “drive the lost sheep back into the flock”.

With these words Miladin summed up his problematic personal situation. Miladin married Stana very young. He was 17 years old and she was 15. Now Miladin is 45 years old having lived in Sweden for 15 years. Both his children have married.

Miladin and Stana used to live in a harmonious relationship, characterized by mutual helpfulness. But during later years, their conflicts have multiplied, especially after the marriages of their children.

Miladin had always been different, taking interest in other towns and different kinds of people, while Stana feels that one should stick to the circles of relatives and neighbours from the village.

When the children came to Sweden, Miladin insisted that they get an education and qualify for a trade.

The older daughter did well at school. In spite of the fact that she wanted to continue after public school and become a nurse, her mother succeeded in persuading her to give up her plans and marry a young man from the village in Yugoslavia.

Miladin got angry but did not insist. In the case of the son it was different.

“The boy should have another life than I have had. He should study for a vocation that will qualify him for a good profession on the sea, so that he can get an adventurous life, visiting other countries and seeing other people”.

However, Stana succeeded in checking the diffuse and long-winded plans of her husband. When the boy was 18 she managed to marry him to a “Dane”—a young Wallachian woman from Denmark. The daughter-in-law moved to Sweden and the couple started to live with Miladin and Stana in their three room apartment in Sweden.

But now the atmosphere started to become tense.

The son and his young wife became inspired by his father’s speculations about the sea, other sorts of people and far-away countries.

The daughter-in-law turned out to be more of a “Dane” than Stana had imagined. When it was time for the summer holidays the young couple went on a charter flight on holiday to Dubrovnik instead of going straight back to build the third story of the house in the home village.

The son went to do his military service in the Yugoslav navy. The daughter-in-law would save every crown she could get aside from her work in the factory in order to go and visit him during holidays.

The year after his son went into the navy, Miladin himself stayed in Sweden during holidays, for the first time since he came to Sweden, and Stana had to go to Yugoslavia alone, looking after the old people and the house.

In his loneliness, Miladin started to make advances to Monica, a Swedish woman, who worked in the same factory. Miladin and Monica had often talked when they met in the canteen or in the local supermarket. But now the contact became more intimate and they fell in love. They even made a short trip together to a seaside resort in the north of Germany.

“When Stana came home and found out that I had had an affair with another woman, she succeeded in getting everybody to regard me as crazy. 129
Everybody from our village got on me trying to “bring me to my senses” and leave the “Swedish whore” alone. My mother even came from Yugoslavia and moved into my bedroom to control me and keep me at home during nights. She would cry and yell curses at me”.

Miladin was in love with Monica and wanted to “live his own life”, as he said. But it was not easy for him to make the decision to move away from home. Collective pressure was also hard for Monica. The women would call at the door and make trouble when Miladin was with her. She got a nervous breakdown and asked Miladin if they could move to some other place together.

But Miladin could not make the decision to move. “I am an old man. Would I be able to manage alone among Swedes?”

In the ongoing crisis in the family, Miladin’s son and his wife are on the side of Miladin. They think that Miladin ought to leave Stana and “live his own life”. They plan to buy a small weekend house by the Yugoslav sea and not return to the home village.

They themselves want to move to another flat in the town. The son wants to continue studying after his military service in order to become a radio technician in some Yugoslav town.

Thus, even if the father is bound by his ambivalence, the son has strayed outside the group. Yet he still sees Yugoslavia as a future alternative, although he does not want to return to the village.

The Hinterland: a Shield of Defense …

“Predrag planned his house as if he were plotting revenge. His house was going to compensate for every indignity that he had suffered.”


In a chapter on foreign workers Jane Kramer(1976) describes the fantasies of Predrag, symbolizing the self-centered, home-sick and house-building immigrant in Sweden. Predrag often sits alone in the window of his appartement calculating new investments in the house which shall make him the first man back in the village. In Kramer’s interpretation, Predrag’s daydreams are a reflection of a long accumulated sense of deprivation in relation to privileged strata in the home country and an ever-grinding wheel of envy, mockery and petty-minded internal competition among the villagers.

In the next breath Kramer carries Predrag’s monologue onto the stage of the Swedish housing estate, which has for years been the site for his enforced exile.

“... the fact that most of his neighbours in the enormous housing project that the Swedes, pleasantly, refer to as a forort—a suburb—are also foreign and homesick, does not console him at all” (Kramer 1976:47).

But Kramer does not really draw the consequences of this observation: that Predrag’s “revenge” could be seen as directed towards injustices suffered in Sweden as well as “at home”. Predrag could have been Nikola. The fact is that
the way other immigrants or Swedes feel definitely influences him. Nikola expresses a deep sense of deprivation which he experiences in relation both to other (Yugoslav) foreigners and to Swedes, who are often themselves "strangers"/migrants in their own country.

In these mixed housing estates a number of different psychological mechanisms appear which cause status-displacements among different groups, each of whom feels violated or gets the opportunity to raise themselves at the expense of others. What the Swedes experience is what Swedner (1971) calls a "slum of despair". Those Swedes who associate with immigrants as neighbours have usually ended up with low status in the social hierarchy and do not have any hope left. Immigrants are the only ones, against whom one can raise oneself and experience a certain dignity as "native". What immigrants experience, however, in these new slum areas, is "a slum of hope" (ibid.), which can be compared to Predrag's house. What develops, in the name of hope, is intense internal status-competition among groups of immigrants, who now, on account of their "enforced intimacy" (Ehn 1975), have greater insight into one another's lives (in the country of origin) than before and more narrow social preserves within which to realize a more massive (material) "social mobility".

In Sweden, Nikola belongs to an isolated and humiliated immigrant minority. But in his dreams, when he pulls the brakes of his brand-new Volvo in front of his new big house in the home village, he has gone through a metamorphosis to rise again, as a "Yugoswede" who succeeded. He has built his house in the style of the individual villas in Swedish middle class suburbs. He nurses a Swedish identity by importing Swedish furniture and household utensils, dressing Swedish, etc. Thus, he suffers social isolation and professional degradation in Sweden in order to redress injustices and sufferings within the closed and more readily controlled universe of his native community. In Sweden he becomes more Yugoslav than the Yugoslavs. In Yugoslavia he becomes more Swedish than the Swedes—at least in some ways.

... and a Pull for Return

Wallachians in Sweden have in spite of almost 20 years of migrancy between Scandinavia and Yugoslavia remained very closely tied to their country and communities of origin. Most of their ten or more years of drudgery and toiling abroad has been invested into building large private houses; collectively, they have united to raise the infrastructural standard of their communities to a "European" level. Almost all (98%) of the Wallachian sample in Sweden have plans to return to Yugoslavia (see Table 15).

Most are very determined to return—not least the younger people, who most intensely experience the professional degradation, social isolation and the "forced intimacy" of the narrow group. These become "push-factors" in
Table 13: **Factors which induce respondents to return to Yugoslavia (in %)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Push (Scandinavia) and pull (Yugoslavia) factors</th>
<th>Denmark Wallachians</th>
<th>Denmark Macedonians</th>
<th>Sweden Wallachians</th>
<th>Sweden Macedonians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factors in Scandinavia (push):</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Unemployment</td>
<td>4 12 13 0</td>
<td>0 4 2 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Unsatisfactory conditions of employment,</td>
<td>0 6 0 0</td>
<td>0 8 0 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wages etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Unsatisfactory housing conditions</td>
<td>13 6 13 0</td>
<td>0 8 0 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Unsatisfactory conditions for professional</td>
<td>11 14 15 2</td>
<td>0 4 2 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advancement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Health problems</td>
<td>13 6 13 0</td>
<td>0 8 0 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Problems with the children</td>
<td>13 35 28 11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Cultural alienation of children</td>
<td>0 4 2 2</td>
<td>0 4 2 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Problems in marriage</td>
<td>0 4 2 2</td>
<td>0 4 2 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Loneliness</td>
<td>19 0 39 29 19 39 80</td>
<td>0 4 2 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. A feeling of being a stranger in an alien</td>
<td>55 50 61 76 81 69 83</td>
<td>0 4 2 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>country (alienation)</td>
<td>2 12 4 0</td>
<td>2 12 4 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. More negative attitudes towards foreigners</td>
<td>23 29 17 47 42 52 72</td>
<td>2 12 4 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(xenophobia)</td>
<td>74 68 23 36 9</td>
<td>2 12 4 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>N=189</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Factors in Yugoslavia (pull):                    |                     |                     |                   |                   |
| 1. Missing home area/home country                | 53 84 87 30         |                     |                   |                   |
| 2. Pressure from family, kin, friends            | 17 43 43 6          |                     |                   |                   |
| 3. Good opportunities for employment and work   | 2 8 4 0            | 2 12 4 0            |                   |                   |
| 4. Mor humane conditions of work                 | 2 12 4 0            | 2 12 4 0            |                   |                   |
| 5. Better possibilities to influence on working  | 6 16 17 2          | 0 4 2 2            |                   |                   |
| conditions                                       |                     |                     |                   |                   |
| 6. Better future for the children, culturally    | 17 33 13 9          |                     |                   |                   |
| and socially                                    |                     |                     |                   |                   |
| 7. Education of children                         | 26 39 33 13         |                     |                   |                   |
| 8. Style of life, ways of associating, the food  | 81 63 80 28         |                     |                   |                   |
| etc.                                             |                     |                     |                   |                   |

Total N=189
the immigration country. Such sentiments invoke the "hinterland" as a permanently present post of retreat and as a day-dream. The hinterland becomes a permanent source of social identity and a socio-psychological "shield of protection" in confrontation with the daily routines of life in Scandinavia.

Examining those factors which induce people to return reveals that push-factors like unemployment, poor working conditions, and bad housing are of only marginal importance (Table 13). This seems quite logical, as they are not matched by any positive "pull" factors of the same material character in Yugoslavia. Thus, of those who have plans to seek employment or in other ways to reintegrate themselves in economic activity in Yugoslavia (78%), only one in twenty believes that it will *not* be difficult to realize these plans (Table 14). Migration has served mainly to solve the housing problem for these people, while the basic problem of work has remained largely unsolved.

Table 14: *How do you evaluate the possibilities of realizing your plans for employment(other work) in Yugoslavia? (in %)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work in Yugoslavia</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wallachians</td>
<td>Macedonians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tot.</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Respondents who do not plan to seek employment/engage in other work in Yugoslavia (% of total)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Respondents who plan to seek employment/engage in other work in Yugoslavia according to evaluation of possibilities of their plans</td>
<td>(45)</td>
<td>(82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. My plans will be very difficult to realize</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. My plans will be difficult to realize, but I shall manage</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. There will not be any important difficulties</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a,b,c in total (in % of total)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of respondents: 189. N of sub-categories as in Table 2.
The three single most important factors mentioned as inducing return migration are feelings of loneliness, alienation and a growing xenophobia among the Swedes (Table 13). These factors, all connected to problems of integration in local public arenas of social life in the immigration country, reflect Wallachians’ deep-rooted experience of psychological and social insecurity within Swedish society.

Lacking integration in the immigration context, lacking opportunities of professional reintegration back in Yugoslavia and confronting ongoing status competition within the group itself, immigrants continue to be rooted in a social and cultural universe springing from the village-hinterland in Yugoslavia, and to be anchored in the country of immigration only “temporarily” and pragmatically.

It should be noted that the women are a little more hesitant in relation to the question of return than the men. This reflects their view that it will be very hard for women to find paid employment upon return to the local area of origin. This would for most mean a return to work in own farms and agriculture, which only very few would accept with enthusiasm. More than half of the women mention a lack of alternative job opportunities in their region of origin as a factor which makes them think twice about returning, against less than a sixth of the men, who reckon to find employment outside agriculture upon return.5

The Wallachians in Denmark:
The Development of an “Ethnic Public”

As a whole, Wallachians in Denmark tend like the “Swedish” Wallachians to confine their patterns of association to those people from the local area of origin in Yugoslavia. Compared to Wallachians in Sweden, Danish Wallachians tend to place comparatively less emphasis on the support of a narrow circle of close relatives and relatively more emphasis on the broader circle of people from the local area of origin (Figure 5).

We have seen that the group is the one which shows itself most open towards the local Scandinavian context and most convinced that their openness is met by positive responses from the indigenous population. Wallachian men in Denmark, alone of all in the sample, include even Danish friends into the category of people from whom they expect help in cases of personal crises, especially concerning less intimate matters like unemployment and housing problems. This reflects a conception of close social relationships which is characteristic of their rural past: friendship and other intimate relationships are characterized by reciprocity, connected to “survival” and the protective interpersonal network which the individual and the household weave around themselves.

In this case the positive relationships which particularly the men have been
able to establish at work are extended beyond the factory. In this particular local milieu there exist many public meeting spots which are less rigidly controlled—by public morality or “Big Brother”—than in the Wallachians’ local contexts in Sweden.

In housing areas the Wallachians in Denmark tend to cluster more than any other of the groups. But these are typically old working class areas, where positive relationships have often been established with those Danish workers who have remained. Especially for the men, such neighbourhood relationships are often direct extensions of relationships with fellow workers.

The positive integration in the informal sphere and a more tolerant and open character of public arenas make Danish Wallachians feel more secure and more self-confident than Wallachians in Sweden. This feeling of relative security and self-confidence in turn provides fertile soil for a more open expression of Wallachian ethnicity. New anchor points in this context slowly emerge side by side with backward looking and compensatory identities tied to the “hinterland” and expressed through the emphasis on “temporariness” and return. However, this “pull of the hinterland” is not expressed in the same dramatic way as among the Wallachians in Sweden (Tables 13-15).

A moderate motivation for return is most markedly expressed among the Wallachian men in Denmark, among whom more than half have no plans of return at all. This should be compared to the Swedish case, where 100% of the men carry plans of return (Table 15). This low motivation for return correlates with low values on the variables which we have earlier identified as the three most marked manifest push-factors for return migration: the feelings of “loneliness”, “alienation”, and as victims of “xenophobia” (Table 13). Thus, none of the Wallachian men in Denmark find that “loneliness” is a factor which would motivate return, versus 85% of the Wallachian men in Sweden. 55% of the Wallachians in Denmark (50% of the men) find “alienation” a motivating factor (83% in Sweden) and only 23% “xenophobia” (72% in Sweden). This might also mean that positive attractions in the country of origin tend to become more important in influencing decisions for return. One indicator of this is that much fewer of the Wallachians in Denmark plan to seek employment in Yugoslavia (45%) than among the Wallachians in Sweden (Table 14). Of those who do, 72% find that their plans have fair chances of coming true, as against 53% among the Wallachians in Sweden.

In Chapter Two it was pointed out that the Wallachians have traditionally been at the periphery of the political mainstream in their Balkan lands of origin, couched in the protective shell of the “Little Tradition”. Ignorance of the “Great Tradition” in Yugoslav society is still a dominant feature for the group, although an educated and dynamic generation is now emerging which is gravitating toward Yugoslav mainstream identities while it acts to transform its own roots.

In Denmark the Wallachians are a numerically dominant group in its local setting. Here it has been able to exert influence upon, and in some contexts
even to monopolize the definition of "Yugoslavness" within the local multi-
ethic Yugoslav communities. Yugoslav organizations in local Danish com-
unities are to a large degree actually Wallachian organizations.

This has produced two consequences. First, new Wallachian ethnic forums
have developed which have brought together all categories of the local ethnic
community: young, old, male, female, educated and non-educated. Second, a
local elite of younger Wallachians is emerging, an elite with a multicultural
competence. They bridge the worlds of the "Little (Wallachian) Tradition",
Yugoslav mainstream political culture and Danish political-cultural and
behavioral norms.

In this section we discuss the contradictions involved in these processes.

The Changing Image of the "Host" Society

How could the Wallachians have such a comparatively positive image of a
society which has until recently had a basically "guest-worker policy" accom-
panied by a legalized discrimination against immigrants? How could a group of
"backward" peasants embark upon a course of effective internal organization
and simultaneously increase their integration into the existing socio-political
system of the immigration country?

In fact, the original Wallachian image of migration and the Danish guest-
worker policy showed a considerable measure of mutual functional con-
gruence. In accord with the guest worker policy, the Wallachians indeed saw
themselves as temporary "birds of passage". Having lived under conditions of
scarcity for hundreds of years and with few career opportunities within their
region of origin, the relatively well-paid jobs abroad gave Wallachians the
chance to realize the peasant millenium in a short period of time. They could
throw off the bonds of the state (taxes), the trading middlemen organizations
(cf. Schierup 1977) and the ecological setup obtaining apparently exorbitant
wealth from external sources, free from the control of traditional authorities
and profiteers. Their dominant motivation was to earn as much as possible, as
fast as possible and to materialize earnings in traditional symbols of prosperity
at home (houses, ducats, large celebrations etc.).

Danish guest-worker policy was evaluated more in terms of its effects than in
its long term intentions. A typical characteristic of the guest-worker orienta-
tion, in opposition to the policy of integration at that time, was that guest-
workers in Denmark were until recently allowed to send back to their countries
of origin almost unlimited sums of money free of taxes, while immigrants in
Sweden were permitted to send only very small amounts. The Danish policy
was a natural consequence of the assumption that immigrants were and ought
to be only temporary "guests", who would return home when they had fulfilled
the goals which had driven them away.

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The Wallachians in Denmark have always feared being “thrown out”. But employment and residence abroad were typically phrased in terms of dependence upon the paternal will of an almighty benevolent state and not in terms of the type of hard money calculations implied by the European notion of guest worker policy.

This can be exemplified by a conversation during our first fieldwork in a Wallachian village in 1971 (Schierup 1973). With suspicion in his eyes, an old man told us:

“Oh, we know what you are really doing here! Everything you write you will afterwards bring to the almighty government up in Denmark. You see this here glass (he points at a glass of plum brandy) isn’t empty any more—it is full now. Well, you write that down, and afterwards you go and tell the high government that you have seen that our glass is full. When they hear that, they won’t let us go up there to work any longer. They can go home now, they’ll say. Oh, believe me, I know how it is”.

As the years passed it became evident that one could not establish the millenium at home once and for all by making the home village “a little Belgrade”, as it was phrased. It was also necessary to continue working and not so easy to acquire satisfactory employment at home. Hence, the gap between real job opportunities and possibilities for living well in the home village widened. The image of the millenium became inflated due to the ever expanding spiral of conspicuous consumption, demonstration, and redistribution of wealth. For a growing number of Wallachians, the original temporary period abroad of “two to three years, maybe five” developed into “five to ten years, maybe twenty—or when they finally kick us out”. Short term temporariness developed into an open-ended temporariness. Simultaneously, a process of spontaneous integration started to develop. The fear of being “kicked out” followed everywhere, but Danish society was judged more from daily experience than in relation to the state’s “guest worker policy”. Integration into Danish work collectives progressed as well as the spontaneous organization of the group.

Today the group has developed an increased consciousness of its actual position in society and its possibilities to influence its own situation. Simultaneously, the initial attitude of gratitude and servility towards Denmark, the employer and the foreman is giving way to a consciousness that employment abroad was no heaven sent “gift”, but a “deal” whose physical, emotional and social costs were high enough to demand legitimate compensation.

With many problems emerging, the group needs all the support it can get from its own organizations. However, these organizations are still weak and diffuse and are only slowly taking on political functions locally. Among the most prominent problems are a rapid growth of illnesses due to working and living conditions, increasing unemployment (especially among women), and problems of education among the “third” generation.
To Stay or to Return?

The central dilemma posed by a continuing process of migrancy is whether to remain in the immigration country or to return permanently to the communities of origin.

While Wallachians are now consolidating their social position as an ethnic group in Danish society, rising unemployment and structural transformations in the economy have jeopardized their situation. A deepening structural crisis in Danish society might well sharpen this "migrant dilemma" in the near future.

Although there are marked differences between age groups and the sexes, the situation for all groups is one of ambivalence and continuing temporariness. Any integration is but a provisory step. Everybody contemplates the issue of eventual return—even those who appear most integrated into Danish life. This colours any migrant political initiatives which tend to focus instead on strategic goals connected with the village or region of origin.

The issue which has had the most mobilizing effect is that of the education of children. Wallachians have managed to maintain secondary (i.e., school) socialization in the "hinterland" (Chapter 8). But for those with children in Danish schools, the central issue is education in Serbian. In some cases, Wallachian groups have collectively protested to communal authorities over the employment of "unsuitable" Yugoslav teachers. They have stressed that such teachers should not only be teaching Serbian language, but also in a "Yugoslav style", which means stricter discipline than in Danish schools. They should also teach the children a patriotic attitude towards their Yugoslav homeland.

Education is the most central issue for the future integration of Wallachians in Denmark. The Wallachians' minority situation in Yugoslavia has given them an enormous handicap in this area, a handicap reproduced through the internal dynamics of Wallachian peasant society (Cf. Schierup 1973). Wallachians in Scandinavia still retain vestiges of their traditionally negative attitude towards education—especially concerning female children. Wallachian parents, speculating about housebuilding and prestige back in Yugoslavia, induce their children to marry early and find a job as soon as possible. With the deteriorating opportunities for employment, this attitude is giving way to an appreciation of the advantages of education. Still, however, parents choose educations for their children which they believe will lead to good employment possibilities in the region of origin, not in Denmark.

So far the "migrant dilemma" remains basically unsolved. If the present crisis continues the Wallachian immigrants might disappear as swiftly as they once came to Scandinavia. The ethnic universe of fellow Wallachians is still the central reference-group. Even the most "satisfied" are integrated into the native Danish community only superficially. The Wallachians might fulfill their own "myth of return", and the response usually made to the question
“When do you return?”, is,

“I shall go, when the others start going!”

“Yugoswedes”:
The Macedonians in Sweden

Where Wallachians in Sweden are poorly integrated into Scandinavian society and oriented towards return to Yugoslavia, Macedonians in Sweden exhibit a completely different pattern of integration. About half of our informants had no plans to return to Yugoslavia, versus only 2% of the Wallachians in Sweden. However, where in Denmark it was the Wallachian men who seemed least motivated to return, in Sweden it was the Macedonian women. In fact only a third of the Macedonian women in Sweden seriously speculated about return to Yugoslavia (compared to two thirds of their husbands and to almost 100% of the “Swedish” Wallachians). The motivation to remain in Sweden was also reflected in the fact that many Macedonians contemplated taking Swedish citizenship.9

However, the great motivation—especially among Macedonian women—to remain in Scandinavia was not matched by any great measure of participation in Swedish social life. The attitude of Macedonian women towards informal association with Swedes is in principle positive, but actual interaction is sporadic and superficial (Figure 5). This is also reflected in their knowledge of the language. Thus, more than half of these women (against a fifth of their men) had only a peripheral acquaintance with the Swedish language.

The End of a Dream:
Little Macedonia and Beyond

When they first went away, they had all planned it to be a short visit, to earn money and to return. Today, only a minority have realized that aim. The Macedonians imagined that it would be enough to build a house in a city in the home country and fill it with all kinds of furniture and fixtures. However, the fact that they had a house back home was not enough. Most have been unable to find suitable work for themselves upon return. Even in cases where returnees managed to arrange for work, new problems appeared. The children and even they themselves found it hard to readjust back home.

Several of those who have had problems in connection with return to Yugoslavia have come back to Sweden. Upon reimmigration they encountered
Table 15: Plans for return to Yugoslavia/time for return. Answers according to group, immigration country sex and age (in %).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Return to Yugoslavia</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wallachians</td>
<td>Macedonians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have definite plans how to arrange return</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have only vague plans how to arrange return</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have no plans at all for return</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Time of return:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I shall return...</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Within a year</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Within three years</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Within five years</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>d. Within ten years</td>
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<td>e. When I get my pension</td>
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**Denmark**

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I have definite plans how to arrange return | 90 | 53 | 56 | 54 | 88 | 70 | 77 | 63 | 69 | 33 | 52 | 42 |
| I have only vague plans how to arrange return | 0 | 0 | 44 | 23 | 8 | 20 | 23 | 32 | 31 | 11 | 4 | 0 |
| I have no plans at all for return | 10 | 47 | 23 | 4 | 10 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 56 | 44 | 58 |

**Sweden**

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I have definite plans how to arrange return | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| I have only vague plans how to arrange return | 0 | 0 | 16 | 8 | 21 | 17 | 0 | 5 | 14 | 0 | 8 | 9 |
| I have no plans at all for return | 0 | 0 | 16 | 0 | 13 | 17 | 15 | 26 | 29 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| e. When I get my pension | 0 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 21 | 0 | 4 | 18 |
| f. I don't know, when I shall return | 60 | 67 | 62 | 69 | 62 | 50 | 46 | 48 | 36 | 100 | 76 | 64 |
| f. I shall stay here for good | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 |

**Total number of respondents: 189**

140
new problems, for they were now without jobs and suitable housing. Such people lost much of their material security at the same time as they had to renounce their dreams. They have become disillusioned and have imparted their disillusionment to those who still maintain the vision of return.

Faced with broken illusions, these Macedonians are induced to change their orientation towards Sweden. The compulsion to reorient oneself is felt as an imposition from outside. The old dreams begin to wane, but the new ones are not yet clearly formed. In this situation Sweden becomes not an alternative but a safetynet, which, however, is simultaneously threatening and not at all obvious. As an educated Macedonian woman explained:

"Now that we must live here, we feel much stronger than before that we are not accepted. Before we felt a sense of temporariness and choices. Then we could ignore what people thought about us. Now times are harder, and the distrust and dislike with which we are confronted is greater. Simultaneously we ourselves are "feeling our way" into Swedish life. These two things coincide to create a heightened sense of disappointment: We are forced to remain among people who do not want us. This experience leads both to feelings of aggression directed towards ourselves, to conflicts in the home and resentment towards Swedes. We lock ourselves into "little Yugoslavia".

The Macedonian group, however, seems to have advanced far in adapting themselves to this changed situation.

With the gradual reorientation towards integration, the emphasis on earning a lot of money as fast as possible in order to return has given way to an emphasis on finding higher quality work. Younger Macedonian men have increasingly begun to requalify themselves with reference to Swedish rather than Yugoslav demands. Macedonian women in Sweden have started to cut down their work time and give more time to the home.

Though Macedonians exhibit a high degree of involvement in their job situation and, especially among men, a good integration in Swedish work groups, interaction with Swedes in the informal sphere seems to be quite limited. Most of the respondents in the sample (75% of the men and 82% of the women) regularly associate with people from their region of origin in Yugoslavia. But while three-fourths of the women are completely restricted to association within this inner circle of social relationships of "Little Macedonia", 59% of the men include "other Yugoslavs" into those with whom they associate most regularly; and 28% include even Swedes.

Looking at the quality of social relationships, we find the Macedonians' expectations of mutual help relatively high, although varying from that described among the two Wallachian groups (Figure 6). While Wallachians valued the aid given by those from the area of origin in case of unemployment, Macedonians regarded the problem of employment as more of an individual matter. This reflects the Wallachians' tendency to enter distinct occupational ghettos via chains of kin and links of common origin and a general "collectivistic" ideology and social orientation. Macedonians advance and disperse into
jobs of better quality in more tolerant work collectives, with better possibilities of influencing the job situation and relationships to work-mates. They tend to cultivate an ideology of individualism in spite of a strong ethnic cohesion and a tight social network among immigrants from the same regions of origin.

Informants emphasized the importance of dispersing:

"If you are alone on the job it becomes easier to get good relationships to Swedes than if there are many Yugoslavs. Then the Swedes will be less frightened and less formal and closed towards us. Then we do not have a chance to close ourselves off into our own circles. But after work everybody will go each his own direction. We do not associate privately with Swedes; neither we nor they attempt to associate".

The general orientation of Macedonian migration patterns is social mobility towards the middle class. In Macedonia, personal networks of kinship, friendship and regional affiliation help bridge the gaps between town and countryside, and between different status segments or classes in the social pyramid. The management of primary multistranded bonds across class and status distinctions becomes an essential condition for the realization of social mobility which often ranks higher than professional work qualifications. With the Macedonians' quest for integration into Swedish society, the quest for status mobility also changes its locus. The old networks are of no use. The necessary attributes become command of indigenous (Swedish) cultural codes, aquisition of specialized skills and the ability to utilize and manipulate the institutions of society on a par with the Swedes, competing for the same resources.

Such skills tend to be acquired first by fairly narrow segments of immigrant groups, who through interaction within local ethnic forums dissipate information and competence to fellow ethnics. These functions of resocialization and reorientation, mediated by "brokers" (Hicks 1977) to a well-integrated ethnic community, are typical for the Macedonians in Sweden. However, this resocialization and reorientation does not simply represent acculturation and assimilation in relation to Swedish working-class culture and society. Rather it conveys and produces tools for an effective "functional integration" (cf. Swedner 1971) in formal institutional frameworks: work, education, the housing market, the welfare system. Simultaneously, it strengthens and develops internal cohesion of an ethnic community.

Among Macedonians in Sweden we see a marked tendency toward residential mobility. While Wallachians in Sweden continued to live together in the same low-cost housing-areas, Macedonians were moving into working-class and middle class suburbs of the periphery. More than a third of all respondents had bought individual family houses by the time of the interview. Families often cluster in small groups near one another, the groups dispersed about the town. In spite of greater dispersion, members of the group still cultivate a close ethnically-based network. Hence, they manage to discreetly "disappear" in Swedish housing areas and to superficially adopt Swedish life-styles while
retaining the inner circle of an alternative ethnic public. That this ethnic public is strong and means much to the life and careers of individual Macedonians we know from field work. However, people do not readily admit the importance of mutual help in a formal interview situation. This does not fit the ideology of "disappearing" in Swedish society or the idea of making individual careers.

**Dilemmas of "Public" and "Private"**

Whereas Macedonian respondents to the questionnaire tended to deemphasize the importance of mutual help concerning jobs, more informants than in any other group (70%) readily declared that they expected help from "people from the home area" if they needed to borrow money. This we take as an indication of the continued importance of the ethnic network. It illustrates the high degree of mutual help which has marked Macedonian immigrant communities historically.

Even with respect to more intimate concerns a comparatively strong sense of cohesion and mutual help exists within the group. The Macedonians are the only one of the four groups which to any significant degree expects responsibility for the upbringing of children to extend beyond the circle of the family and close kin to the broader circle of "people from the home area" that is, fellow Macedonians (Figure 6). This reflects both the strong ambitions which Macedonians have for their children and their growing awareness of the problems which confront immigrant youth in Swedish society.

In contrast to the Wallachians, however, the Macedonians in Sweden do not tend to stretch the definitions of mutual obligation beyond the network of one's own ethnic group. Thus, even if (male) members of the group tended to associate more intensively with both "other Yugoslavs" and Scandinavians than any of the Wallachian groups, one did not expect any "help in crisis" from this circle of acquaintances.

During fieldwork we realized that there exist two kinds of "circles" among the Macedonians. The dominant circle consists of people from the same original commune; it contains close knit, integrated, social networks and strong ties of solidarity. In addition there are minor circles consisting of people from other regions in western Macedonia. However, the prime social reference point remains the local Swedish Macedonian community. Several attempts have been made to unite the Macedonian community into more far-reaching programs of action with a cultural or socio-political scope—especially those concerning the children and youth. But there are sources of differentiation within the group which tend to crosscut this largely regionally-based "factionalism". Better educated people especially feel that the intimacy of closed circles of association has become choking. Therefore, they increasingly draw themselves into privacy. They are the group who to the largest extent com-
mands the cultural codes of Swedish society and can modify their life-style in a Swedish direction. However, they lack intensive informal relations with the native Swedish community. Hence, in the informal sphere, their own ethnic group or the Yugoslav community in general remain their prime social references. Here they manifest themselves as cultural brokers, though at the same time endeavouring to escape from the forced intimacy and tight social control of closed regionalist circles of association.

Such people tend to become important social references for other Macedonians and other Yugoslavs. They introduce through their personal example new “Swedish” life-styles. This leads to “acculturation” without corresponding integration into alternative networks of informal (Swedish) relations. Konstantin’s experience as an immigrant in Sweden illustrates these processes of becoming a “Yugoswede”.

“I had just finished my degree as a geologist before I left Macedonia as a young man, fifteen years ago. Now I work as a skilled worker here in this town. For me this represents a considerable step up the occupational ladder in Sweden, although I feel dequalified in relation to my real education and my intellectual capacity. But in Sweden the lowest point of that ladder was the job of dish-washer, which I held in the beginning. Now I am really settled here, with my wife and my two teenage boys.

We are changing our orientation here now, you know. Many of us are trying to come to grips with Sweden. Our dreams and speculations about return are less and less those of concrete plans to return and more and more just vague hopes. It is difficult to believe in these hopes, but still more difficult to completely abstain from it.

I myself came to Sweden in 1969. Four times I have travelled back to Yugoslavia in order to prepare return. I was quite convinced that we would do it every time.

When my plans for return went astray, I became still more tense also here in Sweden. Plans for a future life were made half-heartedly both here and in Yugoslavia. When there was a job in Yugoslavia, then the house wasn’t finished. When the house had been finished, then my wife couldn’t get a job. And eventually the children refused to move back.

All in all, it seemed better to realize that somebody would have to bear the price of return. Then we remained, and now everything has started to clear up.

We have come to grips with our life in this town. I became active in the club and carved out a “Little Macedonia” for myself here.

In a corner of the town my family has rooted itself among neighbours and friends. Contacts with fellow countrymen and the active club-life has stimulated me, both at work and in family life.

From the beginning I was under the influence of fellow countrymen who came from villages in Yugoslavia. Their more concrete plans for return split me up and gave me a bad conscience for a while. I felt like a “traitor” with my new metamorphosis and my awakening in relation to this town and Swedish reality. But then I realized that they themselves were just as perplexed and more directed by the group than I. You know, people just wait for somebody to move his foot over the line, opting for return or staying—then the rest will start to follow him.

I have myself withdrawn from this group-pressure and control from my fellow-countrymen. I started to become more private and to carve out for myself an individual platform in the group so to speak. Then I noticed that other people from larger towns at home had also started to manage their own lives—they have become more “here and now” oriented and less directed by the group. Those people have started to buy houses here and inspire each other to take advantage of education and other opportunities in Sweden. We still have
problems with decisions about the future. Some are willing to confront the truth of our situation, while others are still lost in backward-looking dreams.

Well, well ... this Sweden, it's really funny. Even though I have started to orient myself more towards Sweden I have not moved closer to the Swedes “physically”, you know. I have started to investigate how our town and this community actually functions, and to interest myself for all those benefits and opportunities which this society is said to offer immigrants. But my central interest and my central social reference is still the club and the Yugoslav community in this town. I see ourselves, that is, my Macedonians and other Yugoslavs in Sweden, as a new sort of people, with our own specific problems, our own organization, and a social and political reality which is not like that at home, nor shared by the Swedes. We in this town, the “invandrare”, are becoming “Yugoswedes” and the “Yugoswedes” are my life.

You see, for a while I have actually tried to live “Swedish”. I mean to go jogging in the forest with them and such stuff. But that isn't my style. It might be a good idea to be more with the Swedes, but it is a futile task. They are so formal that you lose the motivation.

Instead we are exiled to “Little Macedonia” or “Little Yugoslavia” and our own company, even though there are many with whom you have no more in common than nationality. As we are forced into intimacy with one another, and all of us are frustrated and oversensitive on account of the metamorphosis we are going through, we often come into conflict with one another.

Almost nobody dares to confess that he has given up all ideas of return. The atmosphere becomes tense as all conversation usually ends at this point.

We feel ourselves like second-class citizens, but we have to live with this feeling. Then we compete with one another internally to show that we are competent, clever and successful. This leads to jealousy and intrigues. Simultaneously, the present crisis on the labour market does not make us feel any safer, although our decisions are becoming displaced to deal with a future in this society. Nobody dares mention unemployment. The people get scared. Instead we have started to draw into ourselves, into our homes and our families. In this way we become more “Swedish”.

One is learning to hide one's progress, not to create jealousy and intrigues around one's person. An in relation to Swedes the situation is sharpened, as we feel less welcome than before. Then only the home and a few friends remain.

Here you see the emerging similarity between us and the Swedes, even though this does not bring us closer to the Swedish neighbour. We stay more at home and are more isolated from our own than before. When we are going out it becomes increasingly through special activities around which we gather in our associations—just like Swedes—but not with Swedes. Our old traditions and the large circles of kinsmen and friends we are slowly giving up. We are loaded with old ideas about what a friend ought to be and what he ought to do for you. But here the old type of friendship has been infected by the pressure of our situation and our forced intimacy. But the old idea remains together with a few “real friends”. This makes it impossible for us to find a real friend among Swedes—they are different with their ideas about bonds among people. Their “friendship” is rather coupled to non-obliging amusement than to confidence and help in need. And it is also time-bound. People move and forget one another here”.

Hence, it becomes very important to care about the friends one has left. This is felt to be even more important in Denmark, where social conditions and physical distance have made it more difficult to develop or maintain an integrated ethnic network.
Macedonians in Denmark exhibit the most loosely connected ethnic group and ethnic network. The “Danish” Macedonians are geographically dispersed and scattered among numerous other migrants in the city of Copenhagen. Clustered in small groups they have faced great difficulties in developing an organized ethno-cultural life, and communication with other clusters is generally of a sporadic character.

The Macedonian community in Copenhagen consists of approximately 250 families. These isolated families or groups of families have to confront the anonymity of the capital and a diffuse but growing hostility towards immigrants among the Danish population. They experience this growing hostility against immigrants more than Yugoslav immigrants in any of the smaller immigrant communities studied in Sweden or Denmark. This has resulted in a growing feeling of uneasiness among Macedonian immigrants, calling into question their manifestly open attitudes towards Danish society. Individual insecurity and ambivalence among the immigrants expresses itself both as feelings of rootlessness and loneliness in spite of the apparent openness in the orientation of this group. The Macedonians in Denmark, more than any other group, orient themselves towards both other Yugoslavs and Danes. These relationships, however, seem to lack intimacy or protective functions.

Orientation towards Return

The Macedonians in Denmark are the group which most believes that they have stayed abroad “longer than planned” (73% of the men, 67% of the women). While a majority of the Macedonians in Sweden have acquired houses and stabilized their position as immigrants, the “Danish” Macedonians, like Wallachians in Sweden, remain largely oriented towards the Yugoslav “hinterland” and are strongly resolute in their desire to return home. Loneliness, alienation and Danish xenophobia are major push factors for return in the Macedonian group in Denmark as they are among the Wallachians in Sweden (Table 13).

However, the picture varies according to gender. While the women had a clear “return” profile, they did not appear so anxious to return to the highly patriarchal society of Macedonia as did their men. They more often than their men see return as “some time in the future”. Women’s orientation towards return might be regarded as a product of “push” factors in Denmark rather than “pull” factors in the Yugoslav hinterland.

The dreams of return among Macedonians in Denmark reflects the most vivid expression of the ambivalence shown by all groups of Yugoslavs. The migrant dilemma—to remain or to return—tends towards a condition of
permanency, a way of life, where elaborate plans for return at an unsettled date helps the immigrant to survive from day to day.

*Hiding Out* ...

Without permanent locales for their association, the Macedonians in Copenhagen gathered mostly in private appartments. By meeting from time to time in their association, mostly in order to organize celebrations in connection with great national holidays, they attain an awareness of a multitude of practical and existential problems, but do not attain a sense of continuity and cooperation within the group. Although positively disposed towards associating with other Yugoslavs and with Danes, actual association in most cases remains rare. The immediate family and a few scattered relatives and Macedonian friends have to compensate for the socio-cultural frame of reference which members of the other groups find in a larger and more integrated group from their region of origin and own ethnic community. Individual families hold comparatively greater importance as cells of social life, comfort and self-help.

This affects the integration process as well. Tendencies towards individualization, growing distrust and competition around prestation and socio-material mobility divide families and individuals from one another. Behind the closed walls of the home lack of success is hidden, while any advance is readily demonstrated. One is careful not to lag behind in the purchase of the most modern household utensils and to invest in video sets, and the latest technical toys for the children.

"Advance is much too often measured in terms of things costing work and costly time, ... and the children have to sit at home alone watching the video, while the parents work to buy all the latest tapes","n

This is how it was expressed by a teacher of the Macedonian language. He continued:

"Not only individuals and families, but the whole group as such has started to "hide away". They try to hide their stigmatized immigrant traits, like the snake hides its feet. One does not speak Macedonian while Danes are listening. The men are gradually giving up the habit of meeting in public on squares and on restaurants. They look down upon us, and its getting much worse now. But like the bird Phoenix we shall resuscitate with pride through the advance of our children. They shall not be "guest-workers"."

Macedonians thus deal with their Danish present by becoming culturally "invisible", by passing as anonymously as possible into surrounding anonymity. The following interview with activists of a Macedonian immigrant association reveals strategies of adaptation branded with the stamp of collectively felt insecurity:
Grouping together means emotional security. In the last instance every single family will only help itself. People are also unwilling to speak about their problems with one another. Then we will meet in the group in order to celebrate happy occasions and feel happiness together. Most often, private problems are actually public and collective. This clearly appears when we discuss other people or other groups of people. We recognize ourselves, but step back from taking up our own case as a case for common consideration. We have a strong sense of fear of being regarded as unsuccessful. Daily life is sufficiently rough in itself. Were we to give in to failure, we would remove the basis for our emigration and our sojourn in this country. In order to survive in a world which is becoming rapidly more hostile, we hide any failure, also from ourselves.

We readily speak about the successes of individuals. Maybe positive individual examples represent a threat to one's own personal prestige. But at the same time they bolster up collective self-consciousness, strength and inspiration. Then it can appear as if we compete with one another. But we feel more secure in competing for advance than in discussing failure. We constantly flee the threat of failure, which is so to speak “built into” the immigrant's situation. This makes it easier to speak about the home country and thus forget about the menacing present. To dream about returning, building a house and establishing oneself and one's children at home is like building some solid platform for the future. To discuss the migrant’s situation, on the other hand, one is constantly confronted with a second rank position vis-a-vis the indigenous, however far you might climb the social ladder. And then there is the insecurity about the future. “Could they throw us out”? Will we become unemployed? Will the children become criminals, semilingual, culturally misshaped “monsters”? Such things one would rather not discuss with one's own family. But when such things happen to others, we will explain it with bad family relationships, “primitiveness”, and individual private failure. Actually, we do understand the collective character of and reasons for our situation. And many of us realize that we ought to organize ourself. Yes, and put our situation into the public eye. But we fear that this would be perceived by the Danes as an unwanted “politicization”. We have learned that the “good” immigrant is one who shuts up about his real problems, does what he is expected to do and interacts with them on their terms. Fearing threats to their immediate well-being, of unemployment, expatriation and repression, every family looks out for itself and endeavours to appear happy or problem-free”.

As prospects for return decline, some first- generation Macedonian immigrants have tried to develop careers in Denmark. Some have opened small shops, but complain about strong competition with other immigrant groups like the Turks. Family solidarity and support from one's own ethnic community are strong assets in this sector, but these resources remain underutilized by the dispersed Macedonian group.

... But Cultivating “the Dream”

A few Macedonians have attained a higher education abroad. Ilija, who left Macedonia as a high school student almost twenty years ago, has become living proof among the Macedonians that one can make it if one tries hard enough. Ilija himself uses to say that, “when things get difficult I use to think of the old Macedonian migrants, shepherds and merchants who once upon a time migra-
Let us acquaint ourselves with Ilija's "success story" in more detail.

*Ilija's Odyssey for the Diploma*

Ilija comes from a small Macedonian town. His parents had come from a nearby village, where his father used to be a shopkeeper in order to make it easier for the children to go to school. In town the family opened a kiosk which earned enough to enable the four sons to continue their educations beyond public school.

On finishing secondary school the oldest of the four brothers went to Skopje in order to study at the Faculty of Law. The next brother remained unemployed in the home town for some time after secondary school, doing casual work in his father's shop. Before long, however, he went away on petalba to Frankfurt. In due time the two younger brothers also left to join him, so that they could save money for studying at the University in Skopje. They lived in Germany for one year, working in a small restaurant, but did not save as much as they had expected. From Germany one of the brothers went to Australia to live with his uncle. Ilija went to Sweden to join his relatives, who had emigrated there two years earlier.

All brothers married girls from Macedonia. Ilija took his wife, trained as a teacher, to Sweden. For two years they both did factory work in Sweden. Ilija's wife, Marija, had relatives in Denmark. On their frequent visits to Marija's relatives they realized that Denmark would be a better country for Ilija. Marija's relatives were able to arrange better jobs for both Ilija and Marija, and Ilija would be able to study at Copenhagen's Business School. After working for one year in Denmark they got twins. Marija stayed at home with the children, and Ilija continued working. At the same time he started studying in his spare time.

The following years were filled with hard work managing the family economy and Ilija's studies. Ilija had severe problems doing his studies in Danish, and he quit his regular job to study full-time. Marija took various types of casual work, mostly correspondence and interpreting in South Slav languages. Eleven years after his entry into Denmark Ilija completed his degree.

His first hope was to look for work in Yugoslavia. During his years in Scandinavia, Ilija had kept up contact with his relatives and friends in Macedonia. He often went back to Yugoslavia during holidays. They all promised to help him obtain a job after his degree. But for Ilija his long period of studies and years abroad meant that

"... while my old friends in Yugoslavia made a career, I would have to start in some subordinate position, although I feel professionally much more qualified than most of them".

Actually, Ilija was much advised to forget most of his Danish "expert knowledge", as too clever an attitude would represent a threat to the director and the administrative staff in any enterprise in the home region. Ilija's brother advised him:

"You should be able to get some very good job. But don't believe that your knowledge will be enough for promotion. Those who are in positions now have helped promote each other, and you will have to keep quiet, take it easy and forget as much of your Danish cleverness as possible while you wait your turn".

Ilija felt disappointed when he realized that the "uncle-system", corruption and nepotism would still be the rule of the game in Yugoslavia. He decided to look for work in Denmark.

"I am not the man who will satisfy himself by keeping quiet, drinking coffee, smoking cigars and gossiping for days on end. I want to use my knowledge and my creativity".
However, in Denmark all avenues of getting a job suitable for his qualifications seemed blocked. Several times he was called to interviews in Danish enterprises. But when the personnel manager realized that he did not only have a funny name, but was actually an immigrant, the interview would usually be very short.

Ilija started to feel like a discriminated foreigner in Denmark and a passed-by Yugoslav in Yugoslavia. He became bitter, but he did not give up. His next plan was to start a firm selling Macedonian products to Denmark together with some of his relatives. In order to prepare himself for this task he started flying back and forth between Copenhagen, Skopje and Frankfurt. In time Marija’s job became still more necessary for the economy of the family. She is unhappy that she has had to sacrifice herself for Ilija’s career. But she is still convinced that a “man ought to be more than his wife”.

Ilija’s attempt to establish himself as a businessman turned abortive. Danish banks had no faith in his venture, and friends and relatives were not as willing to lend him money as he had hoped. He started writing applications again. After 79 applications and almost as many, often embarrassing interviews, Ilija actually succeeded in getting himself a leadership position in an expanding Danish commercial firm in the computer branch. Few will probably “succeed” like Ilija, but his example will help keep alive the myth of the successful emigrant in Macedonian villages and towns and in Macedonian immigrant communities in Scandinavia.

Concluding Discussion

This chapter has discussed how two groups of Yugoslav emigrants have developed four specific cultural and social immigrant profiles in Scandinavia. This process must not be interpreted as inert “traditions” carried over into the immigrant context. Differences between the groups were highly dependent on the structure of local contexts, being much more than simple reflections of differences in national immigrant policies. Each group has developed its own specific strategy of defense or social mobility by transforming and adapting to immediate conditions.

How does one explain, then, the differences between the two groups of Yugoslav migrants? In simple terms, it can be understood as an expression of different cultural backgrounds. Wallachians tend to be more “traditionalist”, i.e., more tied to collective standards of behaviour. Macedonians are more urbanized, closer to Scandinavian industrial culture, and tend toward individual strategies.

Nevertheless, there also exist intra-ethnic distinctions. For “Danish” Wallachians a strongly marked reproduction of Wallachian minority culture, collective standards of behaviour and strict intra-group control developed into a functional platform for communication with Danish society. This has made for active strategies of integration in local public arenas. The important causes for this development in the local setting are the well-organized and relatively open working collectives, plus a relatively open local public arena. For “Danish” Wallachian men, the immigrant experience has meant occupational mobility. For men as well as women an organized association has been a key
factor for developing Wallachian culture and for integrating Wallachians into Danish society.

In contrast, Wallachians in Sweden are characterized by defensive encapsulation, powerlessness and strict demarcation of limits towards the outside. In relation to other Yugoslavs in Sweden, Wallachians were a stigmatized group. They suffered internal disorganization and escalating conflicts between generations and between the sexes. The group had the most unskilled and most isolated work situations. Lacking collective strategies directed towards integration into local Swedish communities, (as expressed via organized associations or informally) Swedish Wallachians have sought compensation through persistent dreams of return to Yugoslavia.

Macedonians—with greater general experience of urban life and orientation towards careers in urban industrial contexts—also developed two divergent profiles in Scandinavia.

Among Macedonians in Copenhagen, there has emerged an individualized life, tied predominantly to the orbit of the individual family. This is the result of physical dispersion and of poor preconditions for the development of functioning social networks and an organized ethnic public. These Macedonians feel powerless, exhibiting much the same lonelines, alienation and xenophobia as the Wallachian group in Sweden. They, too, cultivate a strong motivation for return to Yugoslavia.

Macedonians in Sweden found a closed, informal sphere of social relationships among the majority population. Nevertheless, they have actively tried to influence local public arenas, to establish social networks and to increase individual mobility. They live side by side with Swedes, but in separate private spheres. However, they have rooted themselves in a local ethnic public which functions as both a “shield of protection” (Ålund 1985) and as a communicative special purpose platform towards the “outside”.

Hence, we can discern distinctions between “returners” and “remainers” which crosscut immigration country as well as ethnohistorical background. A key factor behind this distinction was an integrated “ethnic public” among the “remainers”.

We have defined the “zone of the local public” (see Introduction) as containing formal and informal frameworks for the active development of immigrant culture and organization. We have discussed the role of informal networks as well as immigrant associations in relation to different social fields. Different social and cultural conditions for the development of immigrant subcultures in Scandinavia are expressed in different strategies of integration. These strategies are particularly articulated via ethnicity. Ethnicity can be expressed in various ways:

1. The formation of culturally based groups is a reaction to the anonymity of mass society and the atomization and exclusivity of local public arenas. This mirrors the inability of immigrants to satisfy key social and cultural needs outside the ethnic context.
- “Ethnic publics” constitute important sources of identity; they are platforms for communication, for fostering individual and group social mobility, and for articulating collective demands.

- An integrated and organized ethnic community can foster effective collective knowledge about the immigration society, and convey this knowledge to its members and growing generations.

- Through transformation and adaptation of their own group-specific cultural competence, informal social networks, social control, and ideologies, immigrant groups come to perceive strategies of integration. With the group as a resource, the individual has at hand a repertoire of opportunities for making his own career.

- Ethnicity as a framework for group formation can pave the way for the development of an integrated political platform. For immigrant minorities, at the periphery of the socio-political arena of society, the ethnic community can under certain conditions become the basis for such a platform.

At present, however, the “ethnic publics” among Yugoslavs were still primarily the loci of spontaneous social identification, integration and reorientation. This was particularly the case for immigrant women. Immigrant women’s informal networks of close friends and relatives provide essential personal support, while they have only a peripheral relationship to the organized field of ethnic publics. Women’s hard work in those marginal areas of work reserved for immigrants is combined with their domestic burdens. To this come new developing conflicts rooted in the gender structure in society and the relationship between generations, which especially involve women. The resolution of such conflicts are seldom taken up by organized ethnic forums. Rather, it depends on the mobilization of socio-cultural competence and support from informal ethnic networks. Here women try to find support for a difficult reorientation involving their working life as well as gender and generation. These aspects are discussed in the following chapter.
Chapter 7

WOMEN AND MEN ON THE CROSSROADS OF MIGRATION

"I feel like a bird without wings"
Yugoslav immigrant woman.

Ethnic Transformation and Gender Relationships

We have argued that the emergence of "local ethnic publics" is of central importance for immigrants' integration into Scandinavian society. Different patterns of integration are reflected in both formal ethnic organization and local community networks. However, the quality of ethnic communities is different depending on the gender-character of social networks. In this chapter we elaborate on the concrete meaning of "integration" and ethnic transformation for Wallachians and Macedonians, exploring the meaning of gender in the junction between domestic (household) relationships and the zone of the local public. Changes in gender structure further clarify underlying dynamics of ethnic transformation.

The interrelationship of socio-cultural background, immigration country and everyday experiences in local communities give form to new ideologies while altering gender relationships. This is manifested in displacement of male and female spheres of power and influence and in conflicts connected to these changes.¹

¹. The historical elaboration of the sexual division of labour and the distribution of power and control between the sexes are reflected in culturally specific structures of emigrant families, particularly in the relationships between domestic and local public life. In Macedonia the dominant interrelationships of family and public life were defined by male networks, while female networks and influence remained limited predominantly to the sphere of family and household, even in the modern urban situation. In Wallachian peasant society women hold a conspicuously strong position among the village public, reflecting their position in family and household, while a strong male collective is absent.

2. In Scandinavia, gender relationships are changing in relation to both socio-cultural background and to present day conditions. In both groups the dichotomy between the household and the public sphere has been accentuated. The domestic field no longer represents a social force which can be extended into the field of public life. In Scandinavia, gender relationships have become the focus for new definitions and struggle, and Wallachian women and Macedonian men have borne the costs of a reduced public sphere.
3. However, the above mentioned changes take place in the juncture between the immigrant communities and society as a whole, depending on the specific conditions in local Scandinavian communities. Within the four local contexts of this study the relationships between Wallachians and Macedonians and other ethnic minority groups are crucial for redefining the interrelationship of domestic and public life.

In the following we discuss ethnic transformation and gender relationships for Wallachians and Macedonians separately.

Among the Wallachians, the position of women is an obvious point of departure for the discussion. Probably connected to their traditionally strong position in the household and village public, Wallachian women are among those immigrant women who see themselves as having the least to gain in terms of personal liberties and respect by entry into Scandinavian society. Instead they are anxious to defend forms of belief and organization connected with their own cultural tradition. With this in mind, we briefly describe the position of women in Wallachian peasant society. This sets the stage for our subsequent discussion of differential development of gender relationships among Wallachians and Macedonians in Denmark and Sweden.

“Crossing the Bridge to Paradise”;
On the Position of Women in Wallachian Society

Slobodan Zečević (1978:387), a famous Yugoslav ethnologist and expert on the Balkans, recounts the following Wallachian myth, where the sin of the innocent Wallachian woman appears to be chastity itself:

“After death the soul wanders to the kingdom of the dead, escorted by his spiritual leader. At the entry to the world of spirits, the soul is met by its judge. The final passage into the kingdom of the dead consists of a small bridge, a board, or a wisp of hair, and under this odd passage there is a deep abyss, Hell. The just soul could pass the bridge without difficulty, but the guilty falls into the abyss. The soul of a drunk passes easily over the bridge, for the bridge widens for a just soul and narrows to a wisp of hair for the guilty, who thus falls into hell. Drunks get to paradise, like easy girls” (ibid., our translation).

How should we understand this “freedom” of the Wallachian woman? Have the Wallachians developed a female culture which is an oasis in a Balkan cultural world marked by male, patriarchal control over female sexuality?

The easy access to divorce without stigma is definitely one fundamental base of female control over both her body and personal interests. Another basis is the traditionally legitimate practice of abortion. The personal and sexual liberties of the Wallachian woman is supplemented, reinforced and conditioned by her strong position in production and decision-making within the household and by a strong position in the local village public.

The frequency of domazestvo (i.e. matrilocal marriage) increases the
Wallachian woman's possibility to influence decisions within the household. Even in cases where the woman moves into the household of her husband's parents, the Wallachian system of wedding prestations provides her with a great measure of social security and freedom of movement. The independence of the Wallachian women in the premigratory situation was further bolstered by her central position in the productive activities of the household. Men often carried out wage labor far from the village. Hence, Wallachian women have increasingly taken on more of the traditionally male functions in the division of labour in the household and on the farm (plowing, etc.). This was quite possible, as demands of child care were moderate in the "one child" multigenerational family. Household agricultural production remained the main source of household income in the pre-migratory situation. Male wage labour was always low paid and unskilled, a necessary, but definitely supplementary source of income (Schierup 1973). As noted in Chapter Two,
Wallachian women have a long standing experience of (internal) migration and wage labour. However, until the beginning of migration abroad, such opportunities were limited and mostly seasonal in character. Yet it is important to stress the fact that no cultural barriers existed against female labour migration and wage labour. Hence, in contrast to most other Yugoslav groups of emigrants Wallachian married couples usually went to Scandinavia together. This contrasts with the typical migration pattern in which the males go first.

The Wallachian family and household contrasts with the predominant system in the Balkans in which households as basic social units are based on the men and male inheritance and control through principles of patrilineal descent. The woman’s position in the Wallachian household is matched by a conspicuously free and respected position of women in the local village public. We cannot find the strong, exclusive and well-integrated “male collective”, characteristic of most Balkan peasant societies (Denich 1974).

Women as well as men participate in almost all types of communal gatherings in Wallachian villages, and women play important roles and enjoy great respect on such occasions. Women are also the most important bearers of ideology in Wallachian peasant society: it is women who pass on magical practices, cults and mythology, knowledge of traditional herbal medicine and other types of curative techniques for the body and the mind. Women can be an evil “vraj” (witch), who destroys marriages or call down misery on a family; they can also be the “good” or “white” “vraj”, who can help a fellow sister to bring back her infidel husband, restore harmony in a household, or bring a vampire to a proper rest in the grave.

The “freedom” of the Wallachian peasant woman should not be overstated. She is not free in any individualistic sense, and her “freedom” is riven with contradictions.

This is especially true for the young Wallachian woman who experiences strong social control from her family, especially her mother or mother-in-law. The young woman confronts conflicts between the idea of chastity (before marriage) and a premarital “sexual training”, which is nearly public and arranged in detail by her mother. Subsequent activity is subject to social control embodied in the household and tightly woven informal networks of the village. Yet the same mechanisms of social control are the very basis of the authority that she herself will gain in later years.

Speaking of social control, we have mentioned the influential position of Wallachian women in local public life. The authority of women is even connected to their traditional importance as main bearers of magical practices and popular mythology in Wallachian peasant society. Also in Scandinavia, women have become the main proponents and the main practitioners of the specific Wallachian “religious magical complex”. The vraj is a specialist in magical practices, a “doctor” and a “psychiatrist”. She helps both to prevent divorces and to get back an unfaithful partner. Through herbal knowledge and other wisdom of traditional medicine she heals sicknesses. With her great
insight into the local Wallachian community and the mentality of its individual members she becomes a “family therapist”, actively mediating in conflicts between sexes and generations. Hence, she is an often preferred alternative to official medical and social institutions. Through the effects of her position and practice she becomes an important vector of group integrity and autonomy. The vraj is also a nodal point in the female-centered networks of local immigrant communities.

Today Wallachian women’s situation in both Yugoslavia and Scandinavia is increasingly jeopardized.

In Yugoslavia, young men are to a greater degree than women integrating into the modern economic, political and educational system; women lag behind, and the cleavage between the male and female worlds is deepening in the younger generation. The very few women who have achieved a higher education are “neutralized” by being placed outside the normative framework of the village. They are treated as “outsiders”. Thus, the 28-year-old woman studying medicine is not too old to marry with a man from the outside, from the town. But a girl in the village who has reached 20 and has no education is too old to marry.

Emigration has maintained the low level of education among Wallachian women, at least so far.

In Scandinavia, Wallachian immigrants are confronted with new conflicts and stresses from the environment which fuel tensions between sexes and generations. Migration and its socio-economic effects have produced profound changes in conventional social practices which threaten the authority of the older generations and women in the community. Previously, the elders’ control had been based on ownership of land and inheritance rules. Today wage labour provides objective possibilities for young couples to establish themselves independently of their parents. However, the benefits of new opportunities tend predominantly to be reaped by men. Wage labour has placed the under-educated Wallachian woman in a heavy industrial job with lower income than her husband. She still has the main responsibility for the kitchen and the household, but risks losing her influence in public life.

However, new strategies crystalize around traditional forms of female networks, which hereby acquire new meanings. In Wallachian peasant society, groups of intimate female friends are composed along generational lines. In Scandinavia, groups of younger women become a basis for the development of new cultural competence. They deal with generational conflicts in the family in alternative ways, challenging old solutions. These young women look “beyond the vampires” for new symbols and forms of social integration and practice. There have been determined attempts to form independent female sections of local Yugoslav associations. These become forums for involvement of women in relation to the wider immigrant context. The first type of formal involvement of women has been in matters of education of children.

Nevertheless, formal organization of Wallachian immigrants in Scandinavia
is dominated by men, while women remain predominantly entrenched in informal networks. Thus, along with ethnic transformation, the former balance of gender relationships is now changing in favour of men. This reflects the impact of patriarchal structures of political influence in Scandinavian society.

Young men are better educated and have better opportunities of work and socio-political activities than young Wallachian women. Socially, they tend to affiliate themselves to other more patriarchal Yugoslav immigrant groups in Scandinavian local communities and to more patriarchal lifestyles, while they revolt against the traditional “freedoms” and strong social position of women in Wallachian society.

This is particularly manifested among Wallachian men in Sweden.

The Fall of Public Woman: Wallachians in Sweden

The Yugoslav immigrants' associations represent a local public reserved for men. Only on special occasions such as films or festivals are women supposed to attend, and often only to prepare food and clean up. The woman who comes to the “club” on an “ordinary day” is most likely to acquire a bad reputation.

Wallachian men in Sweden, being without their own “clubs”, join existing Yugoslav immigrants’ clubs. Here they seek acceptance in the male Yugoslav world. They try to compensate for alienation and their low status in the local immigrant hierarchy by reinforcing their Yugoslav identities. Men’s life in the club and a common Yugoslav male culture become their main reference points through which they try to deal with their own ethnic past and the humiliation of Swedish society. However, here, too, they are confronted with prejudice. As a whole, Wallachian men who frequent the Serbian and Macedonian clubs are regarded as junior, Yugoslav partners towards whom one has a role of tutorship. The response to this frustrating situation is to reinforce Yugoslav and especially Serbian identity, and patriarchal lifestyles believed to belong to such identities, but which contrast markedly with gender relationships in Wallachian peasant society.

In contrast to their men who seek acceptance in the local Yugoslav (male) ethnic public, women of the Wallachian group in Sweden are isolated or restricted to closed circles of association. This forces the sexes further apart. The women cannot follow their men in their “Yugoslavness”. Even during celebrations, where women belonging to other Yugoslav ethnic groups come to the clubs, Wallachian women do not go. Their men are ashamed of their appearance.

“Our woman always appear in groups, have always the same dresses as their friends, hold each other in hand, gossip in Wallachian and do not mix with other people”.

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In this way a man explained why his wife did not fit into local Yugoslav public gatherings.

However, his wife’s answer shows that women themselves feel awkward:

“Mostly I have no time, and they never play Wallachian music ... Then I feel ashamed because of my bad Serbian ... And it is also that Milorad does not like to be seen together with me. So I do not feel welcome”.

Table 16: Attitudes according to ethnic group, immigration country and sex. “The kitchen is no place for a man!” Distribution of answers in %.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group and Country</th>
<th>Agree 1</th>
<th>Don’t agree 2</th>
<th>Partly agree 3</th>
<th>Don’t know 4</th>
<th>N=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wallachians in Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Total</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallachians in Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Total</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallachians in Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Total</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians in Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Total</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians in Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Total</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians in Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Total</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total respondents N = 186
Hence, they withdraw into their separate world of female groups of friends and relatives.

"You can see Wallachian women gather every Sunday in the central park forming circles of equally dressed friends. Or they walk around in groups with their children. Other Yugoslavs tend to be ashamed because of these women's awkward appearance and behaviour. They behave as if they were in a Yugoslav village on a market day and not in a Swedish town".

In these words a local social worker commented on the public appearance of the Wallachian women. She also mentioned that most of the “Yugoslav” family quarrels reported or gossiped about occurred among Wallachians.

Male overcompensation stressing Serbianness and patriarchalism reverberates into domestic life. In family life one can witness increased efforts to make Serbian rather than Romanian the prime linguistic referent for minor children among the third generation of immigrants. It also means increased conflicts between the sexes concerning division of labour in the household.

Wallachian families in Sweden had the highest degree of disagreement about matters concerning the division of labour between the sexes. Wallachian men in Sweden were more “patriarchal” in their attitudes than Wallachians in Denmark, and the opposition of male and female opinions much sharper. Wallachians in Denmark demonstrated a softer attitude towards questions of sex roles and division of labour characteristic of Wallachian peasant culture in contrast to more “patriarchal” values among other Yugoslav peoples. One example of this difference is given in Table 16. The point is that these contrasts between the two groups can only be understood with reference to the general framework for their integration in Scandinavian local communities, and in connection with wider interethnic relationships and ethnic hierarchies.

Parallel Development?
Wallachians in Denmark

Among the Wallachians in Sweden the separate development of male and female spheres has led to increasing conflicts within the family. Also in Denmark we have found separate developments for men and women, but in another sense than among the “Swedish” Wallachians. We have argued that the men, especially the middle-aged ones, are more involved in interaction with the native community (the Danes), and less inclined towards return than their spouses. The women also have a more insecure position on the labour market than the men, who were the only men in the sample who had not been
“deskilled” by immigration.

Nevertheless, even the female world seems more open for “Danish” than for “Swedish” Wallachians. “Danish” female Wallachians seek contact with the indigenous population, and a large number also include “other Yugoslavs” in their most important circles of association (Figure 5). More elaborate social networks is probably the reason for a lower number of potential returnees. While only 39% of the “Danish” Wallachian women complain that “loneliness” compels them to return to Yugoslavia, 73% of the Wallachian women in Sweden and 85% of the men feel this way. In Denmark not a single Wallachian man stated “loneliness” as a motive for return. The same pattern was found when regarding actual plans for return (see Tables 13–15).

In Sweden Wallachian men seek acceptance in the male Yugoslav world of immigrant clubs and sports groups. The women remain confined to narrow, privatized circles of close kin and people from the home area. This dichotomy is new. We shall recall that traditionally local public arenas have in Yugoslavia largely been shared by men and women: i.e., equal participation in family feasts and visiting, large celebrations, village dances, markets, etc.

This tradition of a shared local public continues for “Danish” Wallachians even though the male world tends to become more open than the female. The dominant patterns of association are still common family visits within the local community and to families in other local ethnic communities. This pattern is extended to Yugoslav friends and even to Danish acquaintances. The “club” has become a popular new gathering spot for the men, but here the Wallachians are an ethnic majority among Yugoslavs in their local communities and in local Yugoslav clubs. Hence, in Denmark, communal gatherings and large celebrations arranged by the clubs are centered around Wallachian music and chain dances. These occasions are arenas for the exercise of female social control. Thus, in contrast to Sweden, even Wallachian women can identify themselves with the club. The ritualized patterns of “traditional” Wallachian public life thus serve as an effective counter-point to the development of new “Yugoslav” male networks and identities. The genuine Wallachian character of “Danish” Yugoslav clubs is given as the main reason, why Swedish Wallachian men and women see the “Danish” clubs as their clubs. They regularly travel across the border to participate in collective celebrations.

The structure of the local ethnic public has affected gender relationships in the two countries in three ways:

1. “Danish” Wallachians retain a relatively parallel development of male and female worlds while in Sweden women are relegated to a domestic sphere.

2. Moreover, we see in Denmark rather similar attitudes among the two sexes to questions regarding household work. This contrasts with Sweden, where the female and male views tend to become polarized. This could be due to male insistence on “Yugoslav”, “patriarchal” definitions of the division of household work, despite the fact that both spouses now work in full-time industrial occupations.
3. Prejudices flower about the nature of sex-roles in Danish families, which is illustrated by table 17: i.e.: "The woman is the cock of the walk!". One's own integrity, however, seems not to be threatened: i.e., "Yugoslav women are beginning to act like Swedes!". In Sweden this seems to present a threat to one's identity.

Table 17: Some stereotyped statements according to sex. Wallachians in Denmark and Sweden (in %).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you agree to the following?</th>
<th>Wallachians in Denmark</th>
<th>Wallachians in Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M F M F M M F M F M F</td>
<td>M F M F M F M F M F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The husband ought to have the last word in the Yugoslav family.</td>
<td>50 39 29 61</td>
<td>21 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A woman ought not to mix into male company.</td>
<td>25 26 71 52</td>
<td>4 13 0 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. In marriage it is best that the husband is older than the woman.</td>
<td>42 78 33 13</td>
<td>17 4 8 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The kitchen is no place for a man.</td>
<td>38 22 50 78</td>
<td>12 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The husband ought to help his wife with household work.</td>
<td>75 96 8 4</td>
<td>17 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The husband ought to help with the laundry and to wash up.</td>
<td>42 48 38 22</td>
<td>21 30 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The woman is the cock of the walk in the Danish/Swedish family.</td>
<td>71 78 8 0</td>
<td>0 4 13 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The Danish/Swedish woman is much too free.</td>
<td>75 70 8 9</td>
<td>4 17 13 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Yugoslav women in Denmark/Sweden begin to appear like Danes/Swedes.</td>
<td>17 5 33 74</td>
<td>42 22 8 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Elderly people are respected less here than in Yugoslavia.</td>
<td>67 68 17 27</td>
<td>8 5 8 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 92 distributed among sub-categories as in Table 16

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Over the long term, Swedish women and and Swedish definitions of sex roles could become increasingly attractive models for Wallachian women, in opposition to a "Yugoslavness", which, at least in the mind of Wallachian men, is synonymous with male dominance and separation of male and female spheres. Wallachian women in Denmark, however, have much to gain by defending the *peasant* definition of "Yugoslavness", which in their perspective is tied to Wallachian public "village" culture.

**Male and Female Networks: Macedonians in Sweden**

Among Wallachians in Sweden, we saw how the immigrant situation led to relatively separate courses of development for men and women and to increased tensions within many families. Among the Macedonians in Sweden, we also see a relatively separate development of male and female worlds, although from a different point of departure. Where Wallachians' dichotomization into male/female spheres is a result of their differential experiences in *Sweden*, that of the Macedonians stems from their social organization in *Yugoslavia*.

In Macedonian villages and towns, female and male spheres are still strongly delimited. Women gather around the private sphere, the home, the children and the household. The men are strongly associated with the local public sphere dominated by all-male patterns of association. The wider female sphere of social interaction is tied to networks of kinship, neighbourhood and friendship. Such networks are reproduced through ritual and through informal patterns of visiting among friends and families. Visiting is associated with gossip, mutual help, etc. Although visiting patterns develop among couples or families, the women tend to extend personal networks to other women relatively independent of their husbands' networks and the communal social networks of the family.

However, important factors limit the scope of female networks and the relative control younger women have over them. In a patriarchal setting like Macedonia, behaviour and physical freedom of movement tend to be strictly controlled by parents and fellow kinsmen. Marriage often means an abrupt rupture with previously established personal networks due to the practiced virilocality, whereby the woman marries into the man's locality, family and kin. In this new setting, as a "stranger" in her husband's household, her ability to build new networks is greatly hampered by the social control and authority to which she is exposed. Although such restrictions tend to become more flexible with migration and resettlement in towns, male dominance over the household and the social network tends to be reproduced even there.
In Sweden this male dominance over public space is reproduced in the Yugoslav "clubs". The clubs are the dominant foci of the alternative immigrant ethnic public. Here the men meet every day to play cards, arrange football matches, talk over local politics and exchange experience in relation to work, conditions "at home" (in Yugoslavia), etc. The clubs are directed by boards staffed by men and working according to male preferences and definitions. Only slowly are "sections for women" beginning to appear. But such sections most often lack any autonomy of finance and action in relation to the Male directorship of the club. Active Yugoslav women complain that the tasks of such "female sections" are usually defined as an extension of the traditional division of labour in the patriarchal family. On the occasion of larger celebrations for example, the "female section" will do the cleaning, the cooking, and arrange to care for small children. Women are banned, however, from the daily activities of the club.

The patriarchal division of social space was most vigilantly maintained by the Macedonian men in Sweden. This is also reflected in the survey data. Seventy-one percent of the men compared to 4% of the women said that they frequented their club regularly. Women and children are supposed to show up only for celebrations and other special occasions. Both men and women seem to approve a continued separation of spheres of influence and association. Thus, the vast majority of both sexes (71% of the men and 78% of the women) agreed that "male company is no place for a woman" (Table 17).

This, however, does not mean that Macedonian women in Sweden feel isolated. Few Macedonian women in Sweden complained about feeling "lonely" (16% against 73% of the Wallachian women in Sweden (Table 13). Those who did would complain about apathetic Swedish women, in comparison to the elaborate female network of neighbours, kin and friends left behind in Macedonia. Most Macedonian women in Sweden were well-integrated into groups of kin, friends and acquaintances from the regions of origin in Macedonia. Often they all originate from the same villages or friendship groups, or were school-mates in Yugoslavia. Eighty-two percent of the women regularly associated with people from their area of origin in Yugoslavia. We found no significant differences between those coming from villages or towns in Macedonia.

Despite the gap between diverse cliques and larger circles of friends, Macedonians' physical and social proximity in a small town has allowed for a large measure of insight and participation into each other's lives. In Sweden the traditional female sphere of influence has been reconstructed, with a female collective and shared culture centered around the home and the family. Women help one another with child care, illnesses, and sewing tasks. New ideas about gender relationships are also spreading, and women give one another support for these redefinitions of female roles. The development of organized "female sections" in the wider Yugoslav immigrant community provides institutional support for these redefinitions. Although a very small
number of Macedonian women participate actively in these sections, they are nevertheless important for the spread of new ideas. “Our own Rajna Simonovska has for many years been chairing the Swedish central organization of Yugoslav immigrant women, and this has helped to make us change old ideas”, as one Macedonian woman expressed it.

Our fieldwork and interviews revealed that many Macedonian women find themselves freer and more independent in their “new” social networks than in the ones they left behind in Yugoslavia. Most women were very young at the time of emigration, coming to Scandinavia directly from school or from their parents in order to marry their already emigrated husbands. Those who were married before emigrating have left behind the authority and social control of their husbands’ families and in-laws.

Freed from the direct control of their husband’s families, these women feel that their personal control, power of decision-making and freedom of association have increased both within the family and in their social networks. Many of the women have lived in larger extended families (father-in-law, mother-in-law and husband’s married brothers). Such extended families have continued to exist as legal and social units even when one or several married couples were “working temporarily abroad”. Several extended families have split up only recently.

These factors are important in explaining the great reluctance of Macedonian women in Sweden to return to Macedonia: they are liberated from powerful bonds of social control “at home” and have reconstructed freely chosen social networks in Sweden. To this should be added the previously discussed positive integration in the context of work experienced by a considerable proportion of Macedonian women in Sweden. In Macedonia and in Yugoslavia in general, it is much harder for women than for men to find employment (Schierup 1982). Women are usually forced to take any job they can get, without the possibility of choice.

Macedonian women thus see their present employment as a source of personal freedom and as a source of authority within the context of the family. To end up as a housewife after returning would mean a loss of this independence and authority, and a loss of the support from a primary network built up during the years spent abroad. For many, return would mean their being re-subjected to social control by in-laws and kin groups over whom they had had no choice.

The Macedonian men have an opposite experience. They see a narrowing of their social space in the immigration context. The cramped intimacy of the “club” and restricted circles of association irritate all those who before emigration had been accustomed to associating in larger, more open public forums, where there was a larger selection of people of “one’s own kind”, with similar social and intellectual horizons and common interests.

Moreover, the structure of kinship tends to follow male definitions in the patriarchal Macedonian context—even among townsfolk. Men express their
grief over the loss of the solidarity of brothers and other relatives within Yugoslavia. These elaborate networks of fraternal and extended kinship and friendship helped to connect them with the larger institutional framework of society. Most Macedonian men have expended great efforts to maintain these networks in Yugoslavia, even while residing in Sweden. This has often been done in the hope that it would provide avenues to better jobs and social mobility once they finally returned to Macedonia.

In Sweden both the extent and the scope of such networks are greatly reduced. To this comes—in spite of a certain modest “career” in the immigration context—the factor of professional degradation in relation to actual or felt competence. This degradation is felt more profoundly, taking on a permanent character now that the hope of return is fading. This explains why over two-thirds of Macedonian men in Sweden remain to varying degrees preoccupied with the dreams of return. It is also among Macedonians in Sweden that we found the most informants who openly confessed that their spouses do not agree to their plans concerning return or staying (about 40% of all cases).

While three-fourths of the women surveyed were confined to associating with fellow Macedonians (while the rest include “other Yugoslavs”) almost a third of the Macedonian men included Swedes into their circles of preferential association (Figure 5). Those who were “workers” before emigration tended to associate more with Swedes during their free time than either farmers or middle-class Macedonians, who are more isolated. This is probably because the patterns of association with Swedes represent extensions of patterns of interaction in the context of work. Macedonian workers (especially those from urban areas) share a more common experiential frame of reference with Swedish fellow-workers.

While Yugoslav men of different ethnic groups tend to meet and associate in several Yugoslav “clubs”, contact between Yugoslav men and Swedes usually occurs in the context of sports and occasional visits in pubs. However, acquaintances between Yugoslav and Swedish men rarely manage to extend themselves to contact between their families. Very few Macedonians (or other Yugoslavs) have succeeded in penetrating the Swedish private sphere. Prior negative experience leads to a general feeling of insecurity, and a reluctance (especially among women) to make overtures.

Hence, the great motivation of Macedonian women to remain in Sweden cannot be attributed to any great measure of integration into Swedish primary spheres. Rather, it is due to a strong measure of social cohesion among Macedonian women combined with their relatively greater measure of basic economic and social security for themselves and their families.

Although many Macedonian women are now trying to cut down their working hours, most are still employed in exhausting full-time industrial work. This situation is made all the more tiring by the predominantly “traditional” division of labour in the household, which puts a great burden of housework on the women.
The traditional definition of the sexual division of labour tends to be supported by the men, but is strongly contested by the women. Data from the survey (Table 18) support observations from fieldwork that the men feel threatened in the context of family life generally. In particular, they are threatened by the image of the “free” and “immoral” woman—lounging at home or strolling around town—while her poor husband does the housework. Ninety-one percent of the Macedonian men (fully or partly) find that “the Swedish women is too free”, while at the same time 100% (fully or partly) find

Table 18: Some stereotyped statements according to sex (in%). Macedonians in Denmark and Sweden (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you agree to the following?</th>
<th>Macedonians in Denmark</th>
<th>Macedonians in Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Do not agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M F</td>
<td>M F</td>
<td>M F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The husband ought to have the last word in the Yugoslav family!</td>
<td>58 38 27 61</td>
<td>21 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A woman ought not to mix into male company!</td>
<td>58 26 71 52</td>
<td>4 13 0 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. In marriage it is best that the husband is older than the woman!</td>
<td>42 78 33 13</td>
<td>17 4 8 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The kitchen is no place for a man!</td>
<td>38 22 50 78</td>
<td>12 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The husband ought to help his wife with household work!</td>
<td>75 96 8 4</td>
<td>17 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The husband ought to help with the laundry and to wash up!</td>
<td>42 48 38 22</td>
<td>21 30 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The woman is the cock of the walk in the Danish/Swedish family!</td>
<td>71 78 8 0</td>
<td>0 4 13 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The Danish/Swedish woman is much too free!</td>
<td>75 70 8 9</td>
<td>4 17 13 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Yugoslav women in Denmark/Sweden begin to appear like Danes/Swedes!</td>
<td>17 53 34 74</td>
<td>42 22 8 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Elderly people are respected less here than in Yugoslavia!</td>
<td>67 68 17 27</td>
<td>8 5 8 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 92 distributed among sub-categories as in Table 16
that “Yugoslav women in Sweden begin to appear like Swedes” (against only 39% of female Macedonian informants).

However, the situation in the family is by no means static. New adaptations and compromises constantly develop, with the Macedonian community as a shared reference group. The Macedonian family seems to be quite flexible in this respect. For example, Macedonian men are renowned among Yugoslavs in the town for having adopted the Swedish custom of being present in the hospital while their wives give birth. This bears witness to the great closeness between man and wife in spite of relatively divided circles of association. It testifies to the strong cohesion and adaptability of the Macedonian family, for the men take on one of the functions previously carried out by female members of the extended family.

Birds of Ambivalence: Macedonians in Denmark

“I felt as if I flew out of a nest and a prison at the same time”

Macedonian woman.

In opposition to the situation in Sweden, the dispersed and loosely related character of the Macedonian group in Copenhagen is shown in the lack of a tightly woven male network. The male/female opposition is a less dominant feature of public life; the social networks of men and women tend to become more alike than was the case among “Swedish” Macedonians. The “Danish” Macedonian family situation has developed differently. The patriarchal division of household work and male authority in decision-making in the family have loosened considerably. The change in established patterns is experienced with split feelings. Women hail the values of equality in the family but also express a growing fear of discrimination, a loneliness and a longing for an intimate female group of friends, relatives and neighbours. A Macedonian woman says:

“Deprived of the protection of our families we arrived to enter an exhausting industrial treadmill. Dreams of career after finishing school in Yugoslavia were stopped just like when a bird has her wings cut off”.

When compared to Macedonian women in Sweden, who expressed the greatest desire to remain in Scandinavia, Macedonian women in Denmark illustrate the importance of the informal private sphere for immigrant integration, especially for immigrant women. Return, however, seems to be of more acute concern for the men than for the women, and it is much easier for the men to get jobs in Macedonia than for women. Despite the fact that both sexes
plan to return, the men recognize conflicts around this matter less often than the women. The women experience stronger ambivalence towards reintegration in Yugoslavia, and they fear that return might mean that they jump from the ashes into the fire: “Even though I might get a job in Yugoslavia, I would get the tyranny of a mother-in-law as well”, as one woman expressed it. The answer to this ambivalence is to postpone the final decision.

Concluding Discussion

Changes in gender relationships must be understood as an aspect of household and family structure under various socio-cultural conditions. The interrelationship between the family-structure and the surrounding social context is decisive for forming the specific gender structure of an immigrant minority group. We have seen how “old” antagonisms reflect themselves in the structure of emigrant families. In immigrant families there develop “new” antagonisms connected with changing material and ideological conditions, interethnic conflicts and gender relationships in varying local communities.

Due to their historical experience of continuous migration, Macedonians have developed a widely ramified system of male cooperation based on kinship, neighbourhood and friendship. Networks have served to facilitate trade, wage labour, social and spatial mobility. They embrace local as well as international concerns, private as well as public. The female world is less ramified. It is tied to household and to kinship relationships in the local and private spheres. Women have traditionally been strongly subordinated to the men and circumscribed by rigid social controls. Despite the entry of women into the Yugoslav labour market, political and public life in Macedonia remains dominated by male relationships to a greater degree than in other parts of Yugoslavia.

In Scandinavia changes in the social organization of local publics have generated new forms of gender polarization. The sphere of influence of the Macedonian men is fragmented, while the women’s sphere has “expanded” relative to men.

In the Swedish case we found a gradual relaxation of old forms of patriarchal social control, though a new male collective tended to reestablish itself in the local public of the immigration context. Pre-migration male networks fragmented and are declining in importance. New networks are still narrow in scope and relatively separated from the field of household and kinship relationships. They give no clear access to influence in wider public spheres nor to authority in the home. Male authority in the household is increasingly individualized and tends to be balanced by the establishment of new types of informal female networks and forms of female cooperation tied to household and neighbourhood. This has led to new individual compromises concerning gender relationships in the family sphere. Women’s attitude towards the
question of returning to Yugoslavia clearly reflects their perception of migration as an advance in relation to earlier conditions. In opposition, Macedonian men were much more ambiguous regarding the question of return. However, the men, seeing the prospects in Sweden for individual social mobility and developed community life, have become more open to compromise.

For Macedonians in Denmark, lack of an integrated “ethnic public” has affected both men and women, who, without elaborated local networks, retreat into the privacy of family life or individual careers. Here we observed a much more dramatic process of acculturation concerning gender relationships; however, this was combined with conflicts in the family. Clashes between sexes and generations and feelings of loneliness, alienation and insecurity have all served to maintain a strong motivation for return to Yugoslavia.

Among Wallachians the pre-migratory framework was significantly different, being marked by a tightly-knit (but heavily localized) social network, bilateral kinship relationships and strong tendencies towards gender equality. In Scandinavia we see a growing dichotomization between the household and the field of the local public. The influence of women in the household is no longer, as a matter of course, extended into the local public as it was in Wallachian villages.

In Sweden, without their own organized ethnic forum in the local public, the men gravitate to the male world of other Yugoslavs. The women cling to their own female group, but are without much influence beyond the family. This group’s ambivalence as regards their present situation is expressed in sharpening conflicts between the sexes. In Denmark we found a more parallel development of the situation of the sexes. Family conflicts were less common and values more identical. Men and women associated within the framework of a collectively developed and collectively organized Wallachian ethnic forum. Control over social reproduction remains tied to ideological sanctions by women. The fields of influence of Wallachian women are still mainly the household and the village.10

In new “ethnic villages” in Scandinavia, Wallachians have tended to reconstruct both the extended household and their villages in the immigration context, but the conditions under which forms of organization and rationality must operate have changed significantly. Women continue to have strong authority in the household. Even though Wallachian women in Denmark are still influential in the local ethnic public, their power recedes to a secondary or informal level. Female generational networks remain strong sources of authority and social control but also acquire new meanings in younger generations. Young Wallachian women occupy the bottom of the hierarchy of labour and are squeezed between “traditional” social control and a new process of “patriarchalization” in Scandinavia. These women live in another reality than that which defined the authority and “freedom” of their mothers.

Yet the “mothers” do not give up so easily. As we describe below, they, too, articulate the emergence of new conflicts between generations.
Chapter 8

YUGOSLAV YOUTH:
YOUNG BIRDS OF PASSAGE?

Immigrant Youth and Perspectives for Assimilation

Just as with gender relationships, many of the generational conflicts within immigrant families have their origin in conditions outside the household, such as unemployment, discrimination, xenophobia and stigmatization. It has been predicted that the present situation will have serious political consequences. Young immigrants have been compared to a "social time bomb" (Castles 1980).

Deprived of their parents' "roots" and cultural confidence, while experiencing degradation, discrimination and uncertainty, immigrant youth are likely to protest and to revolt (Piore 1979). Among young immigrants we are witnessing different types of protest against discrimination, ranging from the violent riots of Britain to more peaceful social movements like the French "SOS-Racism". Mass unemployment among immigrant youth all over Europe has taken its toll in the shape of rising crime, despair and self-destruction. It is in this light that we must see the perspectives for "assimilation" of immigrant youth into institutional systems, informal networks and cultural value systems of Scandinavian majority cultures.

In our discussion of assimilation, we shall use the notion in its double meaning as defined by Gordon (1970).

By cultural assimilation we refer to immigrants adoption of values and behaviour patterns belonging to the culture or to various "part-cultures" (see "Introduction") of a dominant majority population. This can also be understood as a form of acculturation. Structural assimilation means that immigrants and their offspring participate in institutional activities and in everyday life of society on a par with the majority population. It connotes similar conditions of work, income, political participation and influence for the whole population irrespective of origin. Similar conditions of living are supposed to lead to merging in the private sphere: i.e., to friendship, common activities and responsibilities. As a result of intermingling in both public and private spheres, intermarriage would become widespread and unify groups through "primary links"; that is, through relationships of marriage, kinship and friendship (ibid.).

Judging from the American experience, it seems that cultural assimilation tends to progress faster than structural assimilation: immigrant youth adopt
norms of the receiving society faster than they obtain equal access to work, education, etc. (Gordon 1970, Crispino 1980, Ålund 1985). Although acculturation has risen considerably among “ethnics” in the United States during later generations, structural assimilation has failed in several ways. This in turn has tended to enforce cultural segmentation; that is, unintended crystallization of “cultural islands”.

In Scandinavia there has developed an “ethnic division of labour” which is comparable to the American situation (Ålund 1985).

In the Swedish debate about immigrants the leading slogan since the early 1970’s has been “Equality, Freedom of Choice and Cooperation”. It is agreed that immigrants should have the right of their own cultural development and expression, and that society ought to be developed in the direction of “cultural pluralism”. Hence, assimilation has been rejected as a goal for immigration policy.

In reality, however, we have witnessed “cultural pluralism” becoming an ethnic division of labour (Ålund 1985). In spite of differences between various immigrant groups and in spite of individual immigrant careers and social mobility, menial occupations in industry and the services are still to an overwhelming degree staffed by immigrants, while positions of management and control are occupied by Swedes. The division of the labour market and the emergence of status hierarchies following cultural affiliation can be presumed to deepen with the introduction of new technologies and forms of management. Unemployment is much higher among immigrants than among natives. In spite of government measures, employment conditions are increasingly fluctuating and insecure (Schierup 1985, 1986).

Hence, ethnic affiliation has tended to coincide with one’s position on the labour market and in the social status hierarchy. Private contacts are largely limited to one’s own ethnic group. One consequence of this development can be the continued segregation of immigrants and Swedes over coming generations. If this holds true, “cultural pluralism” will become the result of structural constraints rather than an expression of “free choice” (Ålund 1985).

Although Denmark has a shorter history of immigration than Sweden, a distinct ethnic division of labour has also emerged there. Moreover, Denmark’s higher degree of unemployment is contributing to the marginalization of large proportions of the immigrant population, a situation likely to be reproduced among immigrant youth (Rahbek and Skutnabb-Kangas 1983, Hansen 1984).

Another aspect of structural assimilation concerns informal groupings among members of immigrant minorities and the majority population: family, kinship and social networks (Gordon 1970). Even in this respect, assimilation seems to progress slowly in Scandinavia. Yugoslav immigrant youth which we followed tended mainly to associate with youth from their own ethno-regional group of origin or with other Yugoslav or immigrant youth.

Davidović’s study (1983) of Yugoslav youth living in different Western
European countries, shows that they are closely tied to their own ethnic subsystems in the immigration countries. Moreover, their response to the limitations and constraints in different European immigration countries resembles the adult immigrants in our investigation in Scandinavia.

They experience immigrant life as discrimination, xenophobia and active persecution of foreigners. Immigrant youth fear unemployment and believe that as foreigners they will be the first to lose their jobs. A majority of the young respondents experience loneliness, cultural alienation, an alien mentality, and lack of friendship and companionship among the indigenous population. More than half declare that they have these problems themselves. Eighty-five percent of the respondents plan not to apply for citizenship in the immigration country where they live. A majority plan to return to Yugoslavia for good.¹

These general conclusions about the situation of immigrant youth in Europe do not negate the intrinsic importance of different immigration policies in shaping the future of immigrant minority groups. The Yugoslavs studied by both Davidović and ourselves were all in the initial phases of their integration. We do not have the kind of American studies which document the integration of ethnic groups over several generations.

But it is through the fate of growing generations that we will be able to judge the effects of immigrant policies. Will young immigrants—irrespective of ambitions and cultural preconditions—inherit the structural position of first generation immigrants or become marginalized and more strongly discriminated groups in society? Or will immigrant policies and the organized efforts of immigrants themselves be capable of counteracting the discriminatory dynamics of present day Scandinavian societies?

Markedly different general strategies of crisis-management in Sweden and Denmark seem to produce more general differences in conditions for immigrants in the the two Scandinavian countries than we have been able to document in this study. Especially in Denmark the perspectives of immigrant youth appear alarming in light of current social development.

Parents and Children

In this study we have mainly documented the experience of first generation Yugoslav immigrants. Immigrant youth have been dealt with less systematically, mostly through conversations and interviews with their parents, and their viewpoints and aspirations on behalf of their children. We have had most direct contact with Wallachian youth, who were in many instances both second generation and parents at the same time. Here we shall discuss differences in the parent generation's view of present conditions and future perspectives. Our general impression is that there are great differences
between Wallachians and Macedonians concerning viewpoints on education, generational conflicts and future perspectives.

All the children of Macedonian parents in the survey sample went to school. A few of the older children went to high school and some few at the university. We have no evidence of either working youth or unemployed. Few conflicts were mentioned or allowed to come out in public.

Among Wallachians, conditions were quite different. It is only exceptionally that Wallachian immigrant youth have continued education after primary school in the age categories after 16. It is here that we find the “second generation” becoming themselves parents. Their children are yet so small that no conclusions could be drawn with respect to their educational situation, even though the parents tend to have ambitious plans for their future. However, these plans are usually directed towards vocational training, believed to give access to occupational opportunities in the local region of origin in Yugoslavia.

In contrast, Macedonian parents want their children to become highly qualified state officials, engineers, doctors etc. We shall discuss these differences in orientation further in the following. We will analyze them in relation to both the character of child-parent relationships in Macedonian and Wallachian families and to the general situation of each group of migrants in the two Scandinavian countries.

“It’s Control that Matters”:
Macedonian Youth in Sweden

We start by citing a comment on parent-child relationships among Yugoslav immigrants made by a Yugoslav social worker in Sweden. He argued that Yugoslav immigrants can be divided into two main groups according to their value orientations and attitudes towards their offspring:

“- those who tend to accept Swedish life-styles without criticism, rejecting everything which is part of Yugoslav culture and tradition.
- those with firm roots in Sweden’s Yugoslav ghetto, who dream about return or emphasize the merits and obligations of “Yugoslavness” in the immigration context.

The first group is less subject to traditional social controls. A “let go” mentality prevails, and children are left to themselves; in practice this means the influence of the gang and the street. Here the ambivalence of parents is so great that insecurity turns into passivity. These are often people with weak social identities and exaggerated ambitions. This group consists mainly of “workers”, tending to exclude both those with peasant backgrounds and intellectuals. People in the second group tend to lock themselves up behind a wall of tradition and to overcontrol their children. Most of these people are without education and job qualifications. They often come from the
countryside and usually have only a public school background. People from larger towns in Yugoslavia with intellectual backgrounds are best able to achieve a viable compromise between these two extremes.

In all families, conflicts evolve between the generations and between the sexes. These conflicts center around the issue of return as well as practices of socialization and division of labour within the home. Children tend to take Swedish society and culture as a reference point, and conflicts evolve around the question of both language and behaviour. Many young people are forbidden by their parents to speak Swedish at home.

As a whole, however, people agree that children with “authoritarian” and “traditionalist” parents manage better than those with parents who exhibit an ambivalent “laissez faire” attitude. These children have two alternative frameworks to compare. In the laissez faire group the process may proceed so far that no domestic framework is left, and conflicts become a question of crude violence. During the last few years, the number of cases where the communal authorities have taken away young Yugoslavs from their homes because of escalating family conflicts has risen steeply.

We experienced these distinctions ourselves, recognizing groups with about the same conflicts. According to our fieldwork experience, however, all ethnic and regional groups in the local community seem to have developed their own specific patterns of socialization which crosscut the general picture painted above. Macedonian families in Sweden, relatively independently of social background, seem to favour a “traditionalist” profile in the upbringing of children. Remarkably few “social problems” appear to have surfaced in the Macedonian group in Sweden. This impression from field work was confirmed through interviews with community social workers. Social control among fairly stable families and the larger ethnic reference group combine with strong ambitions for the children’s education and social mobility, even among parents with worker or peasant backgrounds. Moreover, these ambitions are now increasingly directed towards the Swedish context. About 70% of the parents desire higher educations for their children, mostly of a technical nature. The rest aim at achieving job qualifications on secondary school level.

However, group pressure also tends to suppress problems rather than acknowledge their existence. A quest for normality and an effort to define problems away seems to be quite common for the present situation of the Macedonian group. A Macedonian woman comments:

“We do not readily speak about our problems with one another. We hide our private problems like the snake hides its feet. Anyway we do not have any private life, because secrecy as such is intriguing. It reveals the most. And everybody knows everything about everybody. By slandering others you raise yourself up. Defamation of your neighbour is the best defence for your own failure. We are all afraid that others will laugh at our failures. Therefore, we talk in groups about how one bakes cakes. We share good advice and recipes and live like in a bad film. We women make embroideries and pursue the fame of good house-wives”
“Good” Yugoslav children are idealized, while the problematic ones are apt to be excluded from the group, especially if they become linked with alcohol, drugs or criminal behaviour. People are reluctant to associate with Yugoslav families who have problems; their children are not permitted to associate with “problem” children—Swedish or Yugoslav. The immigrant situation is sufficiently problematic in itself, and no one wants to have their family-problems aired as well. Such attitudes are institutionalized through the clubs. These cultivate an image of health, sport, folklore, and other positive aspects. Families thus tend to hide their problems from both their Macedonian reference group and from the communal authorities.

The future of young people is very much dependent on the capacity of families to find their own solutions to internal conflicts. But with growing individualization of family life, both the pressure and the support from the larger group is receding. The individual family becomes freer, but also more vulnerable. There is a necessity for immigrant associations to take a more serious interest in the individual and family problems of their members, particularly the youth.

Youth as the “Wings” of Their Parents: Macedonians in Denmark

In Denmark the Macedonian club was just a postbox number on ordinary days. It was without practical possibilities for realizing the wishful ambitions to entertain and engage youth. Social control was weaker than in Sweden and privatism, anonymity and isolation markedly affected the situation of young people. Without collective defense or security it appears that individual parents to an even greater degree than in Sweden felt needs for social rehabilitation realized through their children. One’s own sense of insecurity was compensated by putting high expectations on the future of one’s children. These expectations and hopes could at times appear unrealistic, both with respect to parents’ actual capacity to support their children and in relation to the parents’ own social background. But hopes and plans are represented even to a large degree, via a conception of success with reference to the Macedonian hinterland. Here the country of origin was much more prominent than among the Macedonians in Sweden. For example, the children in Denmark should often become high pitched bureaucrats, pointing to the traditional and present image of the state bureaucracy as a means of social mobility in Yugoslavia’s less developed regions and republics. Parents in Denmark also intended that their children studied other types of subjects like economics and medicine at university level to a much higher degree than Macedonian parents in Sweden, who often expected their children to finish technical subjects at high school level, with the aim of obtaining jobs in Sweden. Thus, the homeland’s evaluations of
success tended to survive longer in the relatively isolated families of the unorganized and internally disintegrated group in Denmark. Adjustments to the harsh everyday realities in the immigration country is here less marked.

"Failure is absolutely not tolerated", as an informant put it. One's children must succeed at any price. Their success will be compensation for their parents' invisibility. Visions of social mobility are most often seen in Yugoslav terms. Parents' ambitions for their children's future profession greatly resemble patterns of social ambitions in Macedonia and other economically less developed parts of Yugoslavia. The parents' aspirations concentrated mainly around university or other higher education. More than any other group, these parents expected their children to specialize within economics, jurisprudence, and medicine, all of which are seen as avenues to high social mobility. Only few expected their children to specialize in technical subjects either at secondary school or university level. It is also typical that most parents tended to see their children's future in Yugoslavia, and that a burning issue for them was whether their children's Danish diplomas would be accepted in Yugoslavia.

It is still difficult to say what the children themselves will choose, as only a few have reached university age. The children find themselves squeezed between hardening Danish realities of the 1980's and their parents' high ambitions for their social mobility in Yugoslavia. A Macedonian parent described the situation thusly:

"Our children live with their families dispersed all over the capital, where they are more exposed to Danish than Macedonian influence. They also often start to feel more like Danes than Macedonians, and they spend most of the time with Danish children.

We do not mind that they like Denmark. But it feels hard that we cannot speak to one another, both in respect to language and culture. As a people we have developed a tradition of emigration. In our villages nobody wanted to see their child left behind the plow. While we are in Denmark, parents also want their children to get a better life and a better social position than they have themselves. But too many believe that the children will reach this if they just get all material benefits. They buy their children anything, video, expensive consumer goods and clothes, expecting that the children will advance because they have everything they want. But parents themselves sit exhausted in front of the video and do not have the strength or the capacity to offer their kids the most important thing: a reasonable discussion and understanding of their world and experience.

The children only hear about the sufferings and sacrifices of their parents, at the same time as they lack confidence in them. When the children fail, it is time for reprisals and for a stop to material rewards. Then they keep problems to themselves that could be understood as failure. When the problems are finally recognized, it is often too late to help. Macedonians do not have the custom of discussing solutions within the family. Children seek support from friends or from the authorities. But the understanding of authorities for "immigrant problems" is often too superficial and misses the most essential problem of how and why children and their parents slowly lose contact with one another. With their superficial understanding of "traditional authoritarian parents", the interference of authorities most often produces further conflict and in many cases leads to the break-up of the family.

If we could ourselves decide whether to settle down here or return to Yugoslavia it might be possible for us to correct our dreams and exaggerated ambitions on behalf of our
children. As it is now, we flee from all situations into dreams, as we do not belong anywhere. Being conscious of our powerlessness both here and at home we try through our children to reach an influential position somewhere in the future, and we try to give our children everything that we did not obtain. And from our home country we carry the memories of our wishes that brought us here. If we do not get our feet down on the ground and come to terms with our limitations here, then I am afraid that only the children will remain a hope. There is a possibility that at least some kids will realize our own dreams and become examples for others”.

Wallachian Youth:
The Hinterland in Presence

Generational Conflicts

When we made the investigation it was reported that at home a number of Macedonian informants had lived in “zadrugas”, patriarchal extended families which had only recently split up. This must have been connected with severe tensions between generations. However, we heard very little about such conflicts. In Scandinavia all Macedonian informants lived in younger nuclear families. With respect to their lives in Scandinavia, people were rather unwilling to discuss either conflicts between sexes or generations. On the other hand, we registered few actual cases of divorces or children under public guardianship.

In comparison Wallachians’ family life, frequent divorces and conflicts between generations were a greater object for public discussion, especially in Sweden. The Wallachians themselves were open about and conscious of tensions in the immigrant families. The most common issue of dispute was control over sexuality and reproduction.

As we have noted in Chapter Two, marital alliances come about in a field where partially diverging interests between younger and older generations are represented, but where the elders still occupy a dominant position of authority and control.

The struggle around marital strategies illustrates a conflict between criteria of personal attraction and considerations tied to wider strategies of household reproduction. While the first type of factors tends to hold great importance for the young, the latter considerations are the concern of the elders. The actual alliance will often represent some form of compromise between the options.

Criteria of “a good marriage partner” have shifted considerably since the start of migration from the Negotinska Krajina to Western Europe by the end of the 1960’s (cf. Schierup 1973). More importance is attached to the socio-professional status of the partners. However, some considerations continue to hold a fairly constant character among the elders. The ideal marriage partner for their children should be:
1) from a family in the village or home area with whom the household has a long-standing relationship, possibly of more substantial cooperation.
2) “Serious”, one who shows proper respect for older people.
3) Dedicated to his village and rural life and without too many modern ideas.

These features would tend to minimize conflicts with in-laws in a three-generational household, where the generations have to cooperate intimately under the authority of the older generation to help raise their socio-material status in the home village.

The authority of the older generation had been firmly embedded in control over land and inheritance, and backed up by public moral and social mythology. Today, education, wage labour and migration have helped to dissipate traditional authority. The authority of the older generations now increasingly rests on ideological foundations of public morality, mythical and magic sanctions and a common attachment to symbols of the “Little Tradition”.

As the younger generation become better educated and more cognizant of possibilities for economic independence, conflicts between the generations tend to become more frequent and more divisive.

The following case illustrates a conflict between the generations revolving around the issue of marriage:

**Aksentije and the Discoteque**

You don’t know how it is to be young in our society. It is not like here, where the young ones deal with their parents at will. Our old ones think they have the right to decide everything.

Just take a look at my own life. I am a modern young guy, and yet I join this “peasant jumping” (e.g. Wallachian chain dance on The 29th of November, see next chapter) as if we were still living in the nineteenth century, even though I would rather be at the discoteque tonight. But you know, both my wife and my parents would get mad, and everybody would gossip about my “irresponsible way of living”.

As a matter of fact, I used to visit the discoteques here in town fairly often, and I have many Danish friends here—both boys and girls.

You know, I have been here for quite a long time now, and feel half-Danish. I came to join my parents here in Appleholm when I was seven years old. It was when my grandmother died. Grandfather said that he wouldn’t be able to “keep control” of me alone. You understand, I have always been known as a “difficult” boy—lacking respect and too stubborn.

When I was 14, I started to work every day after school—black [illegally] you know, and for a small amount of money. My father said that we needed the money badly for the house. It was at that time we completed the roof of our newly built house back in the village and started to build a second floor.

Since my parents work shifts, they were often away during the night. Then I used to sneak out to the discoteque, I and my best mate from Yugoslavia and some of our Danish friends from school and work.

Here I met many Danish girls. They are not like our own; much more educated and interested in other things than clothes and getting married.

When I was 17 I fell very much in love with Lise, one of my Danish friends. We often met at the discoteque and she even brought me home to her parents, who were very kind. Her father and I would play chess and discuss about Denmark and Yugoslavia for hours. They had been to the Yugoslav coast during their holidays and thought that our country is very beautiful.
Then it happened that Lise got pregnant with me—seventeen years old. Her parents were sad, but talked calmly with her. Lise did not want to have an abortion, and her mother promised to help her with the child until she finished her education as a secretary.

In our culture it is normal that young people have babies when they are seventeen or eighteen years old, and I wanted very much to be the father of Lise’s child. We agreed to marry and to apply to the commune for a small flat.

However, I did not dare tell my parents about Lise. Finally, I could not hide my plans, as they had somehow become known all over our Wallachian community here.

It was a shock for my parents. My mother cried for hours, and told me that she had always felt that she had carried a snake under her bosom, who would some day turn around to bite the hand which had caressed and fed it. My father beat me up and yelled that I had destroyed everything that he had worked for all these years in a foreign country. I should have married a decent girl from home several years ago instead of playing games with Danish whores.

The next day he bought a one way airplane ticket for me from Copenhagen to Belgrade. One week later, his brother-in-law waited for me at the airport in Belgrade to escort me back to grandfather in the village.

In the village everybody kept speaking about Marija, a girl from a neighbouring village. She is the daughter of one of my father's old friends, with whom he used to work in the coal mines in Bor, before he went abroad. She is rather beautiful but has never been married, although she is already rather old now, seventeen years.

She has two sisters, of whom the oldest married three years ago, and the youngest is going to stay in the household with her parents. As her parents could not give Marija a good dowry, it was difficult for her to marry somebody she liked.

When my parents came home from Denmark for the summer holidays, they joined the discussion about Marija. When we went to the dance in her village, I sort of felt that everybody expected me to go and dance beside Marija. As she is quite nice, we met several times after village dances that summer, and shortly before going to Denmark, we had our wedding.

My father demanded only a very little dowry. It was not too bad for him: a small strip of land quite close to our village and to one of his own fields, which had been awarded as dowry from a family in our village with Marija's grandmother many years ago.

I've got a regular job now at the same place as my father and my uncle, and I hardly ever go to the discoteque any more. I have lost contact with most of my earlier Danish friends.

Marija is OK, you know, but not like Lise. You cannot go to the discoteque or anywhere else with our women. People would start talking if Marija went to a discoteque with me. And then there is little Dragan, our baby. A man who has become a father is expected not to play games with life.

As for Lise, I never see her any more. But I know that she had an abortion anyway.

My parents are getting old now—over forty. My father uses every occasion to talk about his bad health. It's his lungs and the smoke from his welding machine at the iron-works. He misses grandfather, the animals and the fresh air and thinks he deserves to enjoy his later years back in the village. But he doesn't dare go home although the house is almost finished now: 'I dare not think what would happen if I was to leave you alone here without control. You were always too irresponsible. You cannot manage your own life in a decent way'.

That is the way he talks, you know'.

Not everybody is so resolute as Aksentije's father. Nor is the support to the older generation always so unanimous as when, as in this case, a member of the "flock" strays.

The following story, told by "an old man" of forty-five (according to
Wallachian culture, people over forty are defined as “old”), demonstrates how tragic one can feel when “deserted” by one’s children.

*Jova and his ungrateful daughter*

Yes, all that is left is really only to cry. Look, I have worked for that girl, far away in a foreign country, for more than fifteen years. And what is the reward? I am old now, and alone too; without children, without a future. My daughter betrayed me!

I went to Sweden in 1967. Here I have worked together with my wife to create a better future for all of us. My younger daughter would demand everything and she would get everything she wanted. She was also the one who decided what the new house ought to look like. She is, after all, my heiress.

In 1979 her older sister Zlatka was married away with a large dowry to a very nice young man from the village. For her, my younger daughter, Mitra, we had found a good lad, the son of my neighbour, an honest and hard-working chap from a good family. But shortly before we were going to have the wedding, she was to cause me the greatest grief of my life, which I shall never overcome. She “ran away” [Serbian: *ona je pobegla*] with a fellow from the neighbouring village. Later she married him. They both work in Elsinore in Denmark. I refuse to see them or the fellow’s parents. The pain is too strong. A man without an heir is no human being. Besides, I am old now, and I have nothing left to look forward to.

When Mitra and her husband got their son, I expected that he would get my name (i.e., surname), and I proposed to adopt him. She would not even let me do this.

My old parents, at home in Selovats (the village) feel all this as a great misfortune which they did not deserve. We all expected that she should have stayed on the farm and brought her husband to us, you understand. . . . Here, at the celebration [dancing party of The 29th of November, see next chapter] I have nothing to do. As a matter of fact, I don’t really know why I came at all. Everybody is happy and all the young ones are dancing. And I? I feel disgraced, I feel just like crying”.

Such tensions in the multi-generational household are distinctive for Wallachian immigrants. Both migration and the new opportunities in Scandinavia for the younger generation threaten existing family relationships. Nevertheless, the “outside” is often felt more like a threat than an opportunity, making the village of origin, the extended family or the homeland appear as a “haven in a heartless world”.

*Orientation towards the Hinterland*

Feelings of insecurity similar to those of Macedonians in Denmark were also found among *Wallachians in Sweden*. But this group also feels as “black sheep” in relation to other Yugoslav groups in the local community. They are at once too “visible” in the crowd of foreigners and lack an effective protective ethnic community.

Stigma and powerlessness in the internal Yugoslav field of socio-cultural relationships are thus combined with cultural alienation and *structural marginalization* in relation to Swedish society. Frustration is most marked among Wallachian youth. Young men who have arrived from Yugoslavia with good educations and fresh expectations to conquer the modern world are frustrated by dequalification in working life and dissatisfied in the realm of
interpersonal relations. Jova, a young Wallachian in Sweden who has recently married a migrant daughter, is a case in point.

A "Black Sheep" between the Flock and the Wolves

In Jova's home it is lunch-time. We are together with Jova's father, his father-in-law's mother and several other newly arrived guests from Yugoslavia.

Jova himself came to Sweden six years ago. He married a girl from his home village, the parents of whom had become wealthy peasants after having worked fifteen years in Sweden.

"When I married Miladinka my parents got angry. In spite of their present wealth her family used to be reckoned as inferior to mine. And usually you are supposed to marry someone from a family with equal reputation.

Through my father-in-law I got this job in the plastic factory. Here I press these stupid plastic spoons day after day and throw away the fine technical education which my father paid for. As a matter of fact I throw away my life for these crowns. If I want to live as I do at home there is hardly anything for savings".

In Sweden, Jova lives in a small town with few Yugoslavs, but he wants to move to a larger town with several Yugoslav clubs.4

"Every Saturday I have to travel 100 km in order to play football with the Yugoslav team. They think I am a very good football player and promised me a job if I would move.

With Swedes I have no contact. We have no club of our own, and both Swedish neighbours and other Yugoslavs look down upon us as "black sheep". In Denmark, our old school friends have their own clubs, live close to one another and can play football and do social and cultural work in their associations. Nobody looks down upon them. They have their Wallachian streets, where Danish neighbours who have stayed on have become their friends. They even go with them back to Yugoslavia to visit their villages".

The first emigrants from Wallachian villages had also worked in the towns of Yugoslavia. When the first emigrants started building big houses in the villages and showing off their many golden ducats, a stream of poorer and wealthier peasants went away. The latest wave of migration drew away sons of the most well-off peasant families who, despite their educations, did not find satisfactory employment in their home area or were attracted by high wages abroad.

"We were drowned by the large weddings of the upstarts, as Jova expressed it, "and they made us feel like paupers with their ducats and wedding gifts and huge dowries".

Thus, Jova went away and married an immigrant girl. In this way he hoped to make himself independent from his parents' authority and to be able to return his father's sacrifices for his education by building a big house for the family in the home village. It was his ambition to return to the village after some years, to the two houses in the courtyard, one for himself and his family and one for his parents. After this he would work in the nearest town, commuting back and forth every day. "After all, my world and the world of my friends belong to the village, and a man owes his parents care and love in their old age".

In Sweden everything has started to go wrong. "In Denmark they can send back large sums of money to Yugoslavia for the maintenance of their old people. This is not possible here. Taxes eat up everything, and here at the factory I shall end up like a plastic-spoon". Now Jova wants to go back to Yugoslavia for any price.

Miladinka keeps quiet. She does not let us share her thoughts. Her family is in Sweden, but now she has to share her loyalties with her husband.

Jova understands that it will be difficult to get a job in Yugoslavia. He does no want to return to his father's farm. He opens another beer and takes a piece of homemade sauerkraut: "tomorrow is always more clever than today", he says.

Thus, Jova and his family illustrate the conflicts, dissatisfaction, and am-

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bivalence among young Wallachians in Sweden. Jova, however, being edu-
cated and recently arrived from Yugoslavia, feels extra dissapointed. He is also
very open and clear in formulating this ambivalent situation.

Jova is not the only son-in-law “imported” from Yugoslavia. However, the
majority of young parents have lived in Scandinavia for several years. We have
argued in Chapter Two that the young generation of Wallachian parents with
small children are themselves the sons and daughters of first- generation
immigrants. They are the second generation of immigrants, having grown up
with one foot in Yugoslavia and one in Scandinavia.

These young migrants seem to orient themselves more towards the “Great
Tradition” of Yugoslav society, although they appear able to assimilate at least
culturally in Scandinavian society. This seems true even for those who have
finished school in Scandinavia. Especially in Sweden, they find the surround-
ing society just as closed, xenophobic and inhospitable as their age-mates who
have lived most of their lives in Yugoslavia and finished school there. This
dissatisfied second generation seems firmly inclined to reproduce a third
generation with “one foot” in Yugoslavia. In this way they might reproduce
the cycle of migrancy within which they are themselves caught up.

In Denmark the situation concerning “to stay or to return” was more
complex than in Sweden. We have seen (Chapter Six), that there were much
fewer convinced “returners” among the Danish than among the Swedish
Wallachians. However, it is in the 30-39 age group—especially the men—where
we find the least proportion who have elaborated plans for return to
Yugoslavia. These men generally have the most qualified and satisfying jobs,
are the least unemployed and the most well-integrated into indigenous working
collectives, and those who in general look most positively upon Danish society.
Also in Denmark, the youngest 24-30 age group, both men and women, has the
highest motivation for return. These young people have come later than those
in the middle age group and perceive a less favourable situation on the labour
market and in the sphere of informal interaction. While the middle-aged
group—especially men—cultivate their Danish contacts in the local context,
the younger age groups feel the impact of a growing intolerance in Danish
society, which tends to confine contacts to Wallachian/Yugoslav circles of
association. As many as 90% of these young people declare that they have
definite plans to return to Yugoslavia.

In order to explain this pattern, the factor of latent generational conflict
should also be mentioned. For the middle-aged category, who were the first
immigrants to Scandinavia, emigration often meant a legitimate escape from
parental authority. Few of these people have lived with their parents or
parents-in-law abroad. They still pay tribute to the village and the older
generation by sending money home for housebuilding and by visiting the home
villages each year during the holidays. But their gradual integration into
Danish working class habits and life leads them to betray the collective myth of
return. A growing number in this first generation are buying houses or flats in
“better” Danish working-class areas and constructing a comfortable Danish life-style. They still pay lip-service to the idea of return, but beneath it they are ambivalent.

The youngest age-group (24-29) has mainly been raised in Yugoslavia by grandparents while their middle-aged parents worked in Scandinavia. In Scandinavia they have been subjected to parental tutorship and suffered from growing xenophobia, without positive job opportunities ahead. Although these young people are not nearly as isolated from the native Danish community as their Swedish counterparts in the same age group, although they have better conditions for building up their own identity, they, too, react with an overemphasis of Yugoslavness and a strong motivation for return.

As most of these young “second generation” Wallachian immigrants are themselves parents, let us now address the question of the third generation.

The Third Generation: Parents’ Ambitions and Patterns of Socialization

The multigenerational household and a close-knit field of domestic relationships (within and among households) work to extend Wallachians’ ethnically specific social relationships and culture into the lives of growing generations.

In Chapter Two we have mentioned how the socialization of children was conserved in the realm of the “hinterland”, channeled through the prevailing pattern of migrancy among the Wallachians (Schierup 1973, 1977, 1984).

The first to go abroad were younger or middle-aged married couples; they left their children home with their parents while working in Western Europe. Today these sons and daughters of the first migrants, socialized in Yugoslavia, form the “second generation” of Wallachian immigrants now working in Scandinavia.

For several reasons the patterns of migrancy and socialization have been importantly modified today. One of the most obvious is that given early ages of marriage and natality, the grandparents of the small children now growing up in Scandinavia are in most instances working in Scandinavia themselves (representing the first wave of migrants). Most of these people would be too old and have too little formal education and work qualification to get a job in Yugoslavia. They constantly postpone their return. Several plan to return only at the age of pension. In Table 19 we have visualized a typical developmental cycle of a migrant household from the beginning of migration to Scandinavia until today.

We will now further explore dimensions of socialization patterns connected with Wallachian migrancy. The vast majority of Wallachian migrant households (in 1983) were still three-generation households (83-84 %; see Table 19). Of the younger respondents from three generation households, almost 70 % had their parents or parents-in-law living with them in Scandinavia.
Figure 7: Typical developmental cycle of Wallachian migrant household

Phase one:
Four-generational household before migration.

Phase two:
"Old grandmother" dies, parents go abroad and leave children with their grandparents.

Phase three:
Daughter reaches puberty, marries and goes with husband to Scandinavia. Son marries and joins parents in Denmark together with his wife.

Phase four:
Grandparents die. First child of young generation born in Scandinavia.

In the village
In Scandinavia

Phase two of the diagram illustrates a typical Wallachian household situation in the beginning stage of migrancy (early 1970's). A young couple go abroad and leave their small children at home to be brought up by the grandparents. As the children reach working age and marry, they join their parents abroad in order to increase the total income of the household (phase three). The oldest generation die and a new generation is born abroad (phase four). The residence of the household as a whole has been transferred to Scandinavia, except for shorter periods during the year. However, close ties are maintained with the village of origin. Most of the labour contributions and investments of the family are directed towards "the hinterland", and nearly all celebrations connected with rites of passage take place in the village of origin.
Table 19: *Multigenerational households among the Wallachians*

1) Wallachian respondents who (in Yugoslavia or Scandinavia) had parents, parents-in-law or other older relatives in the household, according to age of respondents (as % of all respondents in the age category).

2) Wallachian respondents, who had parents, parents-in-law or other older relatives living with them (in the household) in Scandinavia, according to age of informant (as % of all respondents in the age category).

3) 2) as a percentage of 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of informant</th>
<th>1. Older relatives in household</th>
<th>2. Older relatives in Scandinavia</th>
<th>3. 2 as a percentage of 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24-29</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total N = 58

Socialization of part of the growing generations still takes place in Yugoslavia. About a third of all Wallachian children under 20 years of age were residing in Yugoslavia (1983). However, Wallachian socialization in the “hinterland” is almost exclusively confined to children from the beginning of school age up till the age of marriage. Most children residing in Yugoslavia belonged to the age category between seven and fourteen (Table 20).

Table 20: *Residential patterns of Wallachian children (Denmark and Sweden together), by age and present country of residence (in %).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of children</th>
<th>Country of children’s residence: Yugoslavia</th>
<th>Denmark/Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of children between 0 and 20 years of age</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children between 7 and 14 years of age</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 131 Children between 0 and 20 years of age

Number of children between 7 and 14 years of age in relation to N = 48%

Number of children in Yugoslavia between 7 and 14 years of age in percent of the number of children between 0 and 20 years of age, who were residing in Yugoslavia = 73%.

Young people over fifteen can hardly be defined as “children” in Wallachian society. This is about the age when young people who have lived in Yugoslavia come abroad to join their parents and seek employment abroad themselves. It is also the time when they start to think seriously about marrying and getting
children of their own. Hence, very few children over 14 were still residing in Yugoslavia. Also among the 0-6 age group we found comparatively few children residing in Yugoslavia; most lived abroad with their parents and grandparents.

Hence, the present (1983) desired pattern among Wallachian immigrants is to send their children home to Yugoslavia at the beginning of school age (7 years) and to take them back to Scandinavia at puberty (13 to 15 years of age). Fifty-five per cent of Wallachian respondents (in Denmark and Sweden together) found that “it was best for children to live” with the parents, while they were working abroad. 30 % found that it is best for the children “to live with the parents abroad while they are small, and to go back to Yugoslavia, when they start school” (Table 21).

Table 21: What is best for the children while parents are abroad? (in %).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residence of children/social situation</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wallachians</td>
<td>Macedonians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. To live with their parents abroad all the time</td>
<td>60 65 54</td>
<td>83 100 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To live in Yugoslavia with relatives all the time</td>
<td>10 29 0</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To live with the parents abroad, while they are small, and to go back to Yugoslavia, when they are starting school</td>
<td>30 6 31</td>
<td>17 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. To live with relatives in Yugoslavia while they are small, and to join parents abroad when starting school</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. To stay in Yugoslavia, and to join their parents abroad only when they have finished school</td>
<td>0 0 15</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total N = 184
However, when the responses are examined in relation to the age of respondents (and assuming that the responses represent a rationalization of one’s own objective situation), we can conclude that it represents a highly valued norm in the community to send children home to start school in Yugoslavia. Thus, 52% of the informants between 24 and 29 years of age (e.g., those with children who have reached or will soon reach school) stated that it is the best for the children to attend school in Yugoslavia. 44% answered that it was better to stay with the parents abroad all the time (Table 22). This should be seen together with the fact (Table 19) that 57% of the informants in this age category are cohabiting with their parents or parents-in-law abroad, and that 17% have no older relatives in the household who could take care of the children if they were sent back to Yugoslavia.

If we look at the more specific question “where is it best for children to go to school, when both parents are working abroad?” the responses become even more significant for the younger age category. Sixty one per cent find that it is best for children to go to school in Yugoslavia (Table 22).

Table 22: “Where is it the best for children to go to school? In Denmark/Sweden or in Yugoslavia?” Wallachian informants according to age (in %).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Age of respondent:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best in Denmark/Sweden</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best in Yugoslavia</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answers in total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 93

When asked for the reasons why they found it better for children to go to school in Yugoslavia, respondents gave one of three answers.

- “Because of return”.
- “To learn the language” (Serbian).
- “Because discipline at school is better in Yugoslavia”.

The actual reasons are various combinations of these three types of answers. The pattern has to be analyzed in relation to the attachment of the younger parental generation to Yugoslavia and their ambitions for return and reintegration. It is characteristic that the younger generation tends to have very concrete plan for return. Almost 85% of the young Wallachian respondents in the survey had some concrete plan for return and reintegration in Yugoslavia.

Wallachians tend to prefer Yugoslav schools for a number of reasons besides
the learning of the language. "Discipline" in the Yugoslav school is emphasized as a positive factor in contrast to what in Scandinavian schools is interpreted as a laissez faire attitude damaging to moral integrity. Other motives are attached to a wide range of aspects of socialization, ranging from the inculcation of national (Yugoslav) pride in the formal learning process to more subtle aspects of public morality.

Of parents between 40 and 47 years of age, only 19% find that children ought to go to Yugoslavia at the beginning of school age. This we see as a reflection of the fact that most of these people have grown children who are working abroad, and that they have their grandchildren with them in Scandinavia as well. Thus, when they answer that it is better for children to live with their parents abroad, this is also to say that it is better for grandchildren to be with their grandparents. Second, the wish for children to live with their parents is also a rationalization of an objective state: that there are probably no older people in Yugoslavia who would be able to care for the children.

The continuation of secondary socialization in Yugoslavia which we find among the Wallachians depends partly on the process of acculturation and integration in Scandinavia and partly on the eventual return and integration in Yugoslavia of the parents and grandparents now in Scandinavia.

Table 19 also reveals the relation between the migration process and generational succession.

As could be expected, we find that the youngest migrants (24-29 years of age) are those which in most cases (70%) have their old relatives in Scandinavia. These young migrants are the sons and daughters of people in their forties and early fifties; that is, of first generation migrants who came to Scandinavia in the late nineteen-sixties and were later joined by their sons and daughters from Yugoslavia. The younger generation has not started to return yet; but return has started among their parents, who are now young grandparents of their children. Will this increase the possibilities to conserve and maybe to extend the pattern of Yugoslav secondary socialization to "the third generation"?

The "middle-aged" category, between 30 and 39 years of age, has to a large extent come to Scandinavia as young first-generation migrants. Their older generation household members remained in Yugoslavia to care for their small children while they themselves worked under harsh conditions in Scandinavia hoping to return in a not to distant future. In many cases, their sons and daughters have been raised partly in Yugoslavia and partly in Scandinavia. Members of this 30-39 yrs. age group, most of whom have relatively young parents in Yugoslavia and relatively few older household members in Scandinavia, have not yet begun to return to Yugoslavia.

Very few of the younger informants found it "best for children to live in Yugoslavia" (away from their parents), when the children are small. There is definitely an increased motivation among the younger generation to have their small children with them. However, this does not mean that the role of
grandparents in primary socialization is declining. Primary socialization has simply been transferred from the "hinterland" to the immigrant community, where a majority of the younger generation of parents are still cohabiting with their own parents. Here it is still common for the grandparents to play the main role in the care and socialization of small children of the often very young parents.

Only 3% of Wallachian informants who had small children in Scandinavia utilized a Scandinavian kindergarten or daycare mother. 93% declared that the children were looked after by some grown up person in the household while one or both of the parents were working. In comparison, the Macedonian pattern was much closer to the Scandinavian. Almost 60% of the Macedonians declared that their small children were looked after by a Scandinavian institution or day-care mother. The rest stated that their children were looked after by some adult household member or by adult relatives from outside the household.

Younger Wallachians in Sweden complain that their children tend to speak Swedish among themselves. This seems not to be the case among "Danish" Wallachians. "Swedish" Wallachians live dispersed over larger housing areas mixed with Swedes, while the "Danish" Wallachians tend to concentrate in delimited areas, exhibiting a marked degree of "ghettoization". Young Wallachians in Sweden are the most vocal in insisting that the children ought to go back to Yugoslavia when they commence school. This can be seen partly as a reflection of their own relation to Scandinavia vis-à-vis the "hinterland". However, the question of return can come to mean other things to parents and children. Parents fear that their return will be complicated through a growing acculturation of their children in Scandinavia (which will make future integration of the children in Yugoslavia difficult or impossible). We shall illustrate this with the broodings of a worried Wallachian mother:

"Old grandmother in Yugoslavia is still strong, but not so strong as the old man. I sent my daughter home to her. She was to go to school in Yugoslavia, you know. But the kid complained that the food was inedible and threatened to throw herself into the Danube. Then we took her back to Sweden again. The girl complained that grandmother is dirty, never takes a bath and wears funny clothes. I never thought about that before.

When we are together in Yugoslavia for holidays, the girl wants me to cook. If not, the children won’t eat. Imagine, they are really playing gentlemen. Old grandmother complains that nobody respects old people any longer. But both I and mother-in-law find that our youngsters are quite decent compared to other Yugoslav youth or to the Swedes. But ours have also started to become too independent.

And all this about narcotics. Now, for example, I have sent the boy to buy milk. He went away four hours ago and has not returned yet. When he arrives he shall get a beating. He has started to hang around with Swedish kids and take on bad habits to impress them. He has started smoking now. Imagine somebody beating him up—a foreign youngster you know—or putting drugs into his cigarette.

But he is after all a boy. We cannot keep him at home all the time. Boys can go out, but girls should stay at home. But now she has also started to find Swedish friends. One never knows what they are talking about. I just wait to hear her say that she is moving away from

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home to live with a Swedish guy. I shall kill myself if that happens.
I tell her, "If you have the brains for it, then study and get yourself a good job. Then you
Yugoslav Youth and Their Present Dilemmas

For many Yugoslav immigrants in Scandinavia, the migrant experience has ended with their permanent return to the country of origin and reintegration within its socio-economic context (cf. Schierup 1982). Of those first-generation migrants who have remained abroad, social and material opportunities in the countries of origin remain a continuous frame of reference for the majority. These opportunities are weighed against the socio-economic realities, aspirations and future perspectives in the countries of immigration—a mental disposition which is passed on to the second generation of immigrants.

The prevalent condition of simultaneous duality and socio-cultural synthesis characterizing the state of “migrancy” reflects itself in the shape of central life dilemmas for individuals involved. Socio-cultural ambivalence of the first generation is reproduced, reworked and transformed among second generation immigrants.

Discontent with poor conditions in the immigration countries can result in
an orientation towards return even among the second generation. Experience of discrimination, degradation and stigmatization have led to extensive plans for return especially among young people.

We have observed patterns of migrancy and the development of the "stay or return" dilemma within specific immigrant contexts. Thus we have been able to analyze the concrete relationship between ethnic transformation, integration and motivation to return among certain immigrant groups. A high motivation for return and the persistence of serious plans in that direction tend to correlate with collective experience of degradation and/or powerlessness and with a poorly developed local ethnic public. Although the Wallachians in Sweden and the Macedonians in Denmark have developed very different patterns of integration, they share these features. In their respective immigrant contexts this makes them both vulnerable and insecure. Among both groups "push factors" like loneliness, cultural alienation and xenophobia are given as motives for return. This can be seen as the expression of their poor integration into Scandinavian society.

In spite of very different patterns of family life and socialization, members of both these groups continue to educate their offspring with the aim of ultimate return and reintegration in Yugoslavia. The "Swedish" Wallachians try to channel their children into skilled worker occupations, which they believe can be used in local industries or for establishing private handicrafts in the villages of origin. The Macedonians—with a strong sense of social and legal insecurity in Denmark—tend to compensate for first generation disappointments by transferring their dreams of social mobility to the next generation. Nevertheless, the ambitions expressed correspond closely to the aspirations for entering the circle of Yugoslav national elites. These are clearly mirrored in the patterns of aspiration and education in economically underdeveloped Yugoslav republics and provinces. However, the second generation is culturally ambivalent, caught between exaggerated ambitions of their parents and a lack of social support from a poorly integrated ethnic public.

In contrast to the above groups, the Macedonians in Sweden and Wallachians in Denmark exhibit a much more weakly expressed motivation for return, although this picture varies considerably according to sex (see Chapter Seven).

An active orientation towards integration in Sweden among the Macedonians is indicated by their movement into new residential areas, by the men's pursuit of individual careers and in the youth's patterns of education. In contrast to their compatriots in Denmark, Macedonians in Sweden have largely abandoned petit-bourgeois dreams of mobility via their children's return to Yugoslavia. They are instead adopting (higher) Swedish working class models for upward mobility within Swedish society. These aspirations are backed by social control from a strongly cohesive Macedonian family and a well integrated ethnic public. Thus, Macedonians in Sweden appear as the group which has advanced farthest with respect to integration in Scandinavian
They have achieved this through selective combinations of integration in formal and informal spheres of society.

Although first generation immigrants—especially middle-aged males—among the Wallachians in Denmark have gone far towards integration in Danish society, the group as a whole tends to perpetuate typical Wallachian patterns of socialization.

In contrast to the situation among Macedonians, where children are exclusively and universally brought up in the immigration county, most Wallachian children are socialized—at least for some years—in the Yugoslav hinterland. This is thought to ensure adherence to the socio-cultural heritage and to prepare for the eventual retreat to the village of origin. Children’s formal schooling is pursued with an eye toward reintegration into Yugoslav society.

Parents in all four groups tend to stimulate their children’s adherence to the socio-cultural heritage. Patterns of socialization and education among Wallachians in Sweden, Macedonians in Denmark and Wallachians in Denmark tend to reproduce the critical dilemma of migrancy—to stay or to return—among the coming generation. However, the young immigrants do not acquire adequate linguistic and socio-cultural competence for accomplishing a successful retreat to the hinterland.

Meanwhile, the objective conditions for return and reintegration in Yugoslavia have deteriorated sharply since the late 1970’s. This means that a successful return has become a realistic opportunity for only a few and a myth for the majority. Our study has largely focussed on the situation and experience of adult immigrants. However, from discussions with parents, youth, with Yugoslav club activists and social workers, we found many indications that local ethnic publics will become more than just symbolic anchors for present day Yugoslav youth.

Yugoslav children and youth have learned Swedish and Danish and adopted Scandinavian life styles to a much larger extent than their parents. Yet most of the young people remain tied more closely to their own local ethnic subsystems than to Scandinavian informal spheres.

The children we observed associate mainly with Yugoslav friends. Their involvement in Yugoslav associations seems to increase with age. After the first teenage confrontations with their parents and the social control of their own ethnic community, young people tend to “return” to the group with the motivation that the “outer” society is closed and hostile towards immigrants. This also reflects the American experience concerning structural assimilation.

Unemployment as well as the experience of degradation hit immigrant youth to a greater extent than their parents (Ålund 1985). This leads them back to their own group. With their anchoring points in two societies, they are often regarded as a valuable resource.

Attachment to the ethnic community is especially strong among Wallachian youth. This should be seen in connection with the patterns of socialization
characterizing Wallachian migrancy, the "collectivistic" character of Wallachian society and the strong authority of the older generation. In the case of the Wallachians we have had the opportunity to closely follow a second generation of immigrants. Socialized partly in Yugoslavia, these young immigrants conserve a strong attachment to their homeland and a continued motivation to return. Some are even more motivated than their immigrant parents, who tend to be resigned to their place as part of an ethnic immigrant community. As parents, these "second generation" immigrants are strongly inclined to continue the socialization of their children in the Yugoslav hinterland, even if such socialization processes gradually change their qualities.

We found this pattern among Wallachian immigrant groups in both Denmark and Sweden. In Denmark an "upgrading" of first generation immigrants, ethnic cohesion and integration into majority social fields are presently being jeopardized by unemployment, xenophobia and the migrants' own sense of insecurity. They have become increasingly aware of their low status as immigrants, while their dreams of "return" are simultaneously reinforced.

However, Wallachians in Denmark have developed new forms of organization based on local community networks and the "ethnic public". This is the basis for a newly emerging young political elite. In order to examine the formation of Wallachian ethnic organization in Scandinavia, we shall now move to the celebration of "The 29th of November" in a Danish provincial town.
Part Four

ETHNIC TRANSFORMATION

"Many have been the attempts to confound independence and liberty: two things so essentially different, that they reciprocally exclude each other".

Rousseau

"What insight do we gain into their actions by calling the search for freedom and dignity a myth, what do we learn about the culture, and why it is so structured that the more it gives them the more it makes them feel vulnerable?"

Sennett and Cobb

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Chapter 9

DO THEY DANCE TO KEEP UP TRADITION?
ANALYSIS OF A SOCIAL SITUATION

"The peasant is continually improvising. His faithfulness to tradition is never more than approximate. The traditional routine determines the ritual of the job: its content, like everything else he knows, is subject to change and flux."

John Berger

As emigrants establish themselves in the immigration countries and become immigrants, their "cultural baggage", social organization and earlier experience begin to acquire new meanings. In the early stages identity is emphasized. In relation to oneself, to the "ingroup" and the "outgroup" it becomes important to identify membership in and loyalty to a particular social group. The initial sense of cultural confidence established helps the individual to become more self-reliant. The physical presence of a basic reference group helps facilitate this process. Here a number of social-psychological mechanisms are activated in the process of recruiting friends and relatives from the country of origin.

New forms of ethnic consciousness and organization develop. Immigrants' specific conditions of living unite people in distinct interest groups in relation to the country of origin and the local community they left as well as in relation to the country of immigration. The emerging immigrant ethnic group becomes an embryo of political potential.

The preceding chapters used a comparative framework to analyze the integration of Wallachians and Macedonians in Scandinavia. This chapter uses situational analyses in order to identify specific processes of the formation of an immigrant ethnic group.

We have taken our methodological inspiration from the "analysis of social situations" employed by Max Gluckman (1968 [1940]) in his Africa research. Gluckman writes:

"Where an event is studied as part of the field of sociology, it is convenient to speak of it as a social situation. A social situation is thus the behaviour on some occasion of members of a community as such, analysed and compared with their behaviour on other occasions, so that the analysis reveals the underlying system of relationships between the social structure of the community, the parts of the social structure, the physical environment, and the physiological life of the community's members." (Gluckman 1968).

Gluckman analyzed the ceremonial opening of a new bridge in Zululand, South Africa. Clyde Mitchell elaborated on Gluckman's approach in his analysis of "The Kalela Dance" (1968 [1956]), relating the features of a new dance which developed among migrants from different ethnic backgrounds to
the "system of relationships among Africans on the Copperbelt" (Mitchell 1968:1).

Our point of departure is the social situation of "The 29th of November", the Yugoslav national day, as it is celebrated by Wallachian immigrants in a Danish provincial town. The features of the celebration are related to the wider field of social relationships within which immigrant experience is embedded, and they reflect the contradictions and tensions within this field. We argue that under changed circumstances "traditional customs" become the bearers of new social content. On first sight people appear to dance their round-dance (ora) just in order "to keep up tradition". However, this communal locus of tradition helps develop ethnic consciousness, thus generating new forms of collective behaviour.

The 29th of November

"Our thoughts go back to this important day for our country when, in Jajce, almost forty years ago, the first foundations were laid for our fatherland: The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

During The War, Tito, the Commander in Chief of the People's Liberation Movement, and all other anti-fascist forces of Yugoslavia, demonstrated the eternal value of brotherhood, solidarity and unity of nations and nationalities in the battle for a brighter future, for equality and socialism. Tito was a personal example to workers and peasants during the war of national liberation as he remains for all citizens of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Tito laid the foundations for the movement of the nonaligned countries and has throughout his life untiringly fought for international solidarity and equality among the peoples of the world.

On this solemn occasion we recall the dear face of our great departed leader, promising to follow his path wherever we might find ourselves in the world, and to do our duty towards our country and the ideals of internationalism and peace".

We are witnessing the celebration of "The 29th of November", the National Day of The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, among a group of Wallachian immigrants in the small Danish industrial town of Appleholm. Goran Strategijević, the president of the local Yugoslav immigrants' association, is holding the opening speech.

The president is recalling the history of the The League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the hardships and sacrifices of partisan war and national reconstruction and the personal example of the departed leader of The National Liberation War in Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito. He comments on the many problems confronting Yugoslav migrants abroad and reminds his fellow countrymen to always follow the personal example of the leading figures of Yugoslavia's socialist movement as well as the principles of democracy, liberty and self-determination embodied in Yugoslavia's post-war struggle for socialist self-management and international solidarity.
Behind him, decorating the bandstand, is a portrait of Josip Broz Tito in his Marshall uniform. It is draped by a black mourning crepe and flanked by large Yugoslav and Danish national banners. Above the picture, in large white letters, is written the slogan of the ceremony: "Long live The 29th of November. Long Live Tito's Yugoslavia ...".8

In front of him, in the large assembly hall of the “Forward” Sports Association, there are gathered 200 men and women, all members of “Danube”, the Yugoslav immigrants' association. All are ethnic Wallachians.

People are sitting at long tables, each couple sitting together. Younger and middle-aged persons predominate. Many of the older people have remained at home to take care of the young children. Today is a special “29th of November”, where dignity and cultivated “European” behaviour, responsibility and progressiveness ought to be underlined. There seems to be unanimous understanding on this point. The vital interests of the Wallachian community are at stake.

All are dressed in their best. Most of the men are wearing first class modern suits; the younger women look like cut outs from the latest Parisian fashion magazine. The dress of those somewhat older gives hints of the local rural tradition from which they originated. For the majority, however, one would never guess that they did not belong to the established Danish middle class.

Right in front of the bandstand the guests of honour are seated with some leading figures in the “Danube” association. The Yugoslav ambassador to Denmark and his family sit next to the president of the association. Across from the president sits the mayor of Appleholm and his wife. A representative from the recreational section of the local administration is also among the prominent guests. Also present are additional members of the Yugoslav embassy staff in Copenhagen, and representatives from a major Yugoslav bank, from the central association of Yugoslav clubs and associations in Denmark and a Yugoslav representative from the Danish Ministry for Social Welfare.

The president’s speech in Serbo-Croatian is translated (by an interpreter) into Danish in honour of the Danish guests.

Thereafter the ambassador speaks about the importance of preserving close ties between “Yugoslav citizens temporarily working abroad” and Yugoslav culture and society, and of bringing up the new generation in the spirit of the revolution and self-management. He himself and the embassy will do what they can to maintain these ties and to increase cooperation with socio-political movements and economic institutions in the home country. He promises to use his influence in helping his fellow countrymen to solve problems which arise during their stay abroad. He feels content with the many grassroots activities of Yugoslav workers’ associations and clubs and with the confidence people show in the embassy. He understands his position as being above all in the service of fellow countrymen who are living temporarily abroad. He supports his country’s efforts to provide appropriate conditions for return and reintegration in
the home country for every man and woman. But while they reside abroad, he
is convinced that every Yugoslav citizen will act as a worthy ambassador for his
country and its ideals of democracy, solidarity and cooperation.

Thanking the Danube Association for the invitation to join the celebration
of the Yugoslav National Day, the mayor of Appleholm then speaks. The
mayor expresses his confidence in international understanding, especially as
embodied in growing interpersonal contact and cooperation with immigrants
in Danish society.

The Yugoslav national anthem is played by an orchestra. Lunch is then
served to both the guests of honour and the others present. Young activists of
the association wait on tables with style and perfection. After the official
luncheon the folklore group of the “Danube” association performs Yugoslav
folk-dances dressed in lavishly gold-embroidered and many-coloured nylon
“folk-costumes” bought in Romania. The scene is very impressive and exotic.
The folklore episode is followed by communal dancing to the tunes of well
known Yugoslav “kolo”-music. Representatives of the embassy dance the
“kolo” with dignity, together with members of the local association in Ap­
pleholm.

“Yugoslavs are a competent people”, the mayor comments cheerfully,
while nursing his brandy. “They are hardworking and know how to present
themselves!”

After several hours spent in dancing and informal conversation, the guests
take their leave in small groups. But in the empty assembly hall and in the
Wallachian community of Appleholm preparations for the evening are already
starting.

In the Evening: the Round Dance and
the Lottery for Montenegro

“Oh, God! Don’t say that my toes hurt!”, a corpulent Wallachian lady in her
early thirties exclaims, as she sits down by our table taking a rest from the
dance.

She drops her stiletto-heeled shoes on the floor, airing her poor jammed and
aching toes in a minute of back-stage preparation for the next dance.

Her moment of rest does not last long. Her three similarly dressed “best­
friends”—all in pink—come strolling over the floor heading towards our
corner: “Hey, Živka, are you coming now?”, they ask the resting woman .
“Join us”, Živka calls to Aleksandra” again forcing her feet into her shoes.

Aleksandra joins the four “best-friends” in the large, comfortable ladies’
room of the assembly hall. For the third time during the evening, the group of
women collectively change their dresses. The time has now come for the main
attraction of the evening—the exclusive “indigo look”, a model they have
skillfully copied from the latest issue of the German “Burda-Moden”.

The women walk back arm in arm, passing small groups of men drinking beer and joking in the corridor and groups of older women placed in strategic spots on the outskirts of the dance floor.

The four “best-friends” join the long row of dancers, meandering through the assembly hall like an enormous serpent, closing itself into a double circle. They dance together, arm in arm for a while. Soon their husbands enter into the circle side by side with their respective wives.

The round dance has been going on for four hours now, the orchestra pounding out the ore (Wallachian for “round dance”. Romanian: Hora) rhythms in three variations. However, this is far from the end. The dance will continue for several more hours, broken only by minor pauses. The atmosphere is cheerful and loaded with an excitement which increases with every hour. At the beginning of the long chain of dancers is a young man, waving a bundle of bank notes and a white handkerchief high in the air. For the moment, he is paying the orchestra and thus has the privilege of leading the dance. Next comes a row of beautifully dressed teenage boys and girls, and next to them younger and middle-aged men and women dancing together with friends of their own sex or with their husbands and wives. At the end a long row of children are dancing.

For some Danish spectators—friends of some of the younger Wallachian men—the scene has long ago exhausted its exoticism: "This isn’t really the kind of folklore we expected", they complain, as they prepare to leave.

A couple of visiting non-Wallachian Yugoslav “outsiders” also comment on the scene:

“This is rather boring. The Wallachian way of dancing is not known to us. Believe us, as a matter of fact these are a very primitive people. Their customs and behaviour are very odd, not only to Scandinavians, but also to us”.

In the middle of the evening the cheerful atmosphere and dancing are interrupted while a lottery is held to aid the reconstruction of The Socialist Republic of Montenegro, whose coastal region experienced destructive earthquakes. Everybody realized the importance of such solidarity, and a small speech by the president was observed with great seriousness. The prizes of the lottery are a free trip to Yugoslavia, a video recorder, half a pig and some shirts and handkerchiefs.

Do They Dance to Keep up Tradition?

For an outside spectator, the dancing during the evening celebration of The 29th of November might indeed have seemed somewhat meaningless entertainment. Such reactions are common among a few Danish and “outside” Yugoslav spectators attending for at least part of the evening.

Contrary to the afternoon’s official celebration of “The 29th of November” and its folklore exhibition, the evening ore and its associated patterns of interaction seemed not to give any solid base for intercultural definitions of the situation—except maybe for the lottery for Montenegro, the meaning of which was evident to everybody.

The electric guitars, synthesizer and drums beat out the same archaic rhythmic and melodic patterns without interruption for hours on end. The vocal lead cries out verse after verse of a monotonous ballad phrased in an alien language. A long meandering row of people dressed in their best clothes repeat the same steps over and over. Nobody, however, no matter how much an outsider he may be, can remain untouched by the cheerfulness and atmosphere of enjoyment which flows through the assembly hall. It is evident that this evening means something special to the people gathered, and one cannot help being influenced by this collective outburst of good feeling. What appears as monotonous repetition for outsiders is for insiders full of refined semantic and cultural shades of meaning and symbolic content. The “endless” ballads in the Wallachian language are exciting improvisations over all important themes of life: from the legend of Hajduk Veljko’s stubborn fight against the Turks during Ottoman times, over the popular epic about the life and death
of a man who recently passed away in a traffic accident in Austria, but was buried in his home village, to the details of some modern love story.

Seen in this perspective the dance belongs to the unique tradition of a community which is hardly enjoyable without sharing the cultural codes belonging to that tradition. However, it is quite clear that people do not come to the dance just "to keep up tradition". When people dance in order to keep up tradition, the dance will become folklorism, a mythologization of their past for the practitioners, and an "exotic" display for spectators.

For the social scientist the ore is indeed very intriguing, but not because of its exoticism. The ore is not just folklore. It is an important part of ongoing social life; a scene for the unfolding of multiplex social life in a migrant community. It is a scene which reflects interests, conflicts and dilemmas embodied in the total social field of migrant existence.

Seen on an elementary level, the ore dance is simply a meeting occasion. People gather from all over "Little Wallachia"; that is from a number of provincial towns on both sides of the Öresund, the narrow strait dividing Denmark from Sweden.

On such occasions the network of social relationships among "Danish" and "Swedish" Wallachians is reinforced through collective manifestations and interpersonal communication. About 600 people participated in the evening celebration of this "29th of November", the largest of several dancing parties held during the year. Those coming from further away were housed with relatives or friends in Appleholm. Old acquaintances, school friends and fellow villagers from the region of origin, divided from one another by emigration, were united again.

By meeting on the occasion of the dance, people demonstrate their adherence to a common identity and membership in a reference group. Simultaneously, as expressed in the phrases of Bourdieu (1977) the "collectively orchestrated" ritual of dancing is ...

"predisposed to symbolize group integration and, by symbolizing it, to strengthen it".

The ritual of the ore bridges historical and social time. It unites the consciousness of common historical origin with the wisdom of shared present experience and destiny. It unites generations and people living their individual lives into an atmosphere of common cultural understanding. At the same time, cleavages which are widening between the younger and older generations, between educated and less educated, between traditionalists and modernists are temporarily repaired.

Through its rhythm, its bodily movements, its structuring of the social universe and its various layers of verbal and non-verbal communication, the dance functions as a forum of socialization. It is a privileged ground for the unfurling of "structural exercises" (Bourdieu 1977), affecting the production and reproduction of the bodily and mental disposition of a minority culture;
from the grandmothers firmly rooted in “tradition” to the small children, when they swing along at the end of the dancing chain like the tail of an excited dragon.

We shall now take a closer look at the way in which the social scenario of the ore reflects and structures the social universe of Wallachian migrant society.

A Locus of Social Reproduction

The people meeting at the ore are clearly set apart and communicating according to principles of age and sex. Outside in the corridor and on the outskirts of the dancing hall, men group themselves according to age into small beer-drinking and discussion groups of close friends, neighbours (in Yugoslavia or in Scandinavia) and work mates. The younger men are clearly very sensitive to happenings on the dance floor, watching and commenting on dancing friends, their wives or young unmarried girls in whom they are interested. The older men are more often quite absorbed in drinking and discussion and often turn their back to the dancing ground.

Older men and women do not participate in the dancing. This would be regarded as out of place or “indecent”. The older women, who usually take care of the youngest grandchildren, stand in small groups just outside the ring of dancers. They watch the dancers closely, noting the interaction between the younger and middle-aged women, gathered inside the ring, and the (open or subtle) communication between the young men and women.

The unmarried teenage girls and younger married women standing inside the ring of dancers form sets of uniformly dressed “best friends” each numbering from two to five persons. Several sets of “best friends” combine to form gossip circles. Minor children play about the dancing hall or join the dancing at the end of the chain. From their positions among their friends in the dancing hall, the young people enter the dancing chain, communicating fidelity to their friends—or maybe the opposite. Married people are supposed to dance only with friends of the same sex or with their spouses. When a couple dances hand in hand for a long time it signifies fidelity, and a stable relationship. Young unmarried adolescents find one another during the dance. The boys may break in between a group of girls in the dancing chain, but they are jealously watched by their peers, mothers and grandmothers. It is not “proper” to dance with a girl, who you do not know well or who “belongs” to another boy. One also has to match personal taste against the matrimonial plans of parents and grandparents. Hence every “strategic move” during the evening is commented on intensively, both during the evening and later on.

Among men, friendship tends to become associated with relationships of cooperation in the sphere of material household sustenance, or with common experience at work or school.
Among women, friendship tends to be more narrowly related to interests within the field of domestic relationships. The groups of “best-friends” among the women are tightly knit nodal points for information and social control, the privileged nuclei for the production and spread of gossip in the community. Gossip is in turn the privileged instrument for the creation of public opinion and social control with regard to the relationships between sexes and generations.

In the circles of intimate friends, mothers obtain information from others about their children and their children’s aspirations towards the opposite sex. They will discuss and plan strategies for influencing their offspring’s marital choices. Wallachian society is characterized by fluidity of sexual and marital relationships. Circles of friends are important sources of information concerning the behaviour of husbands and the ambitions of other women in relation to them. Older women hold an influential position in the field of domestic relationships and in the formation of marital strategies. They are no longer concerned about controlling their own husbands or female rivals. From their position on the edge of the dance floor, they instead strive to control their children and grandchildren. Social control in the community is exercised by gossip and public opinion and backed up by supernatural sanctions.

Hence the old women of today are the vampires of tomorrow. They may return after death to haunt the living. A wife with an unfaithful husband might go to the local vraj the next day, asking her to practice black magic against him and her rival.\textsuperscript{13}

We have described how the situation of the dance structures interaction into patterns defined by sex and age: i.e., the fundamental building blocks of family and household. In this sense, the dance is a strategic field for family and household reproduction (embodied in marital strategies), for the regulation of relationships between the sexes, and for the unfurling of the interests and the authority of the elders connected to social continuity.

But what is the wider frame of reference of the dance?

\section*{Continuity and Discontinuity of a Social Field}

In a sense, people are not dancing in Appleholm but in their village of origin. For the vast majority of Wallachians, the center of the universe is still the village or local area in Yugoslavia. One’s link to the local microcosm ends in the homestead and the house, for which one has sacrificed with years of hard
work and abstinence in Scandinavia. The meaning of the dance must be interpreted with reference to “the social hinterland” (Mayer 1962), the homeland. Immigrant experience abroad forms a constantly prolonged chain of sequences of “continuing temporariness”, whose objective effects (housebuilding, collective building up of villages) construct material symbols of attachment and years of hard work, cementing social bonds back to the village.

Viewed from the “hinterland”, the dance on the 29th of November represents a symbolic reconstruction of the village perpetuating social integration along the lines of the “Little Tradition” (Redfield 1960). The material strategies which form one of the strong underlying currents of the dance are part of the reproduction of family, household and village into coming generations.

The interaction, during the dance unites the community of immigration with communities of emigration in Yugoslavia, a network constantly renewed through intermarriage between migrants and youth recruited from the villages of the region of origin. As new migrants are recruited from Yugoslavia, bonds to the hinterland are reinforced. If one went to visit a public meeting place in a Wallachian village of the Negotinska Krajina (North Eastern Serbia) on a Saturday or a Sunday afternoon during the summer holidays, one would see the same kind of dance as that which occurred in Appleholm. Young people living abroad would meet young people who remained in the village. The new relationships formed would strengthen the bonds between community of emigration and community of immigration. The ring of non-dancing spectators would be larger, however, as older women and men remaining in the village would be present, eagerly commenting and watching the ore.

**Rituals and Their Integrating Functions**

Aside from the 29th of November, dances are held many times during the year in Appleholm and in other Scandinavian towns (especially in Denmark).

In Scandinavia, the vivid and intimate interaction on the dance floor has its corollary in close-knit social networks linking immigrants to one another in the housing areas, where they form ethnically delimited immigrant communities. The single immigrant communities are likewise interlinked by overarching social networks. The quality of these ethnically specific networks resemble the social relationships which link together the Wallachian peasant village. The ethnic network extends from the sphere of domestic relations to the workplace, where Wallachians tend to cluster around particular enterprises or work processes.

Social control in these immigrant communities tends to be just as intense as in the village. Social control receives its ideological rationale and legitimiza-
tion through the development of ritual and magical practices. These practices represent both elaborations on the ethnohistorical heritage and coping mechanisms to problems located in the specific immigrant context.

Practices, which are presently dying out in Yugoslavia, but growing in importance in Scandinavia are those of magic, sorcery and witchcraft practiced by the vraj (Chapters 2 and 7). One feature of the vraj and a precondition for her great capacity to intervene into the lives of her fellow countrymen is that she knows virtually everything about everybody. She is a nodal point for social control in the community. What makes possible this kind of social control is a high degree of cultural binding to shared values, an indication of the low degree of social differentiation in Wallachian communities.

Whenever the vraj is frequented by a client in need, she asks her “beans” for help. If her “oracle opens up gates” and makes clear that this is a case for her, she will agree to help.

The following verse is connected to the “asking of the beans”, which are arranged into special symbolic patterns. Through this verse the vraj will carefully approach the mind of her client.

Forty-four seeds, forty-four loaves of bread
Like you can grow
and become the food of men
and make men satisfied
and make the earth green
Thus I wish you to tell me
which are the thoughts of Marija
Come out from the forehead
in the number of nine
and from the heart
in the number of two
and from the left and from the right
Come out as joy
If pieces of news are coming from somewhere
let them into the house
and bring them to me
Help me to get insight into these thoughts

The verse is a mirror of Wallachian peasant society. It brings out the humility towards scarce resources (seed, bread), and the importance of communal insight (social control) into the thoughts and feelings of the individual as a precondition for (individual and communal) happiness. The verse expresses the underlying ideology of Wallachian peasant society as expressed through various rituals: redistribution (“parciture”), cooperation (“zavetine”), continuity (“pomana”). While parciture and zavetine are rituals connected with household and village solidarity, pomana is a form of ancestor worship invoking solidarity between the generations.
The equalizing and integrating functions of ritual among Wallachian migrants are closely connected to traditional mythology and to the ritual and magical practices in Wallachian peasant society. Common denominators for this tradition are respect for communal resources, humility towards the powers which made one wealthy and a constant fear that human beings will offend God and mythical beings through egoism and arrogance.

The adherence to such formulae of life are typical of a fairly egalitarian peasant society, where prosperity depends on a precarious and often unstable balance in the relation between members and resources of a household: this balance might be swiftly overrun by natural or social misfortunes. There is a general consciousness that everybody is in the last instance dependent upon the solidarity of the local community and one’s local personal network. Many traditional ceremonies and rituals symbolize solidarity, reciprocity and redistribution. Several of these are still practiced today. One rite carries directly the name of parciture ("sharing") in the Wallachian language. This ritual is practiced on a number of "saints’ days". It consists of an elaborate process of symbolic redistribution of the agricultural products of the season (sausages, grain, wool, milk, berries, etc) among households in the village. Candlelights are burned and the products are blessed before redistribution.

Preparing for parciture. (C.U. Schierup/1971)
It is in this sense that one could also see the expensive marble tombstones and mausoleums, which emigrants are building in honour of their dead. Memorial ceremonies in honour of the dead and the distribution of food and drink to the living express the continuity of social relationships. This is expressed through the ritual of the *pomana*, according to Serbian Orthodox ritual, a celebration of remembrance held in connection with the mourning of the deceased kinsmen. This public manifestation of homage and respect to the dead family member is a warrant that he or she shall find proper rest in the grave. For the living it is a guarantee that the old man or woman will not make trouble from the realm of the supernatural. In the same ceremony, symbolic homage is paid to an acknowledgement of the continuity of the authority of elders in Wallachian society.

Death is thought of as

"... a change of settlement, a passage from this world to the world beyond, where the soul will dwell forever. Accordingly, this world is imagined as being temporary and that beyond as eternal" (Zecević 1978:383. Our translation).

However, the passage of the soul of the departed to the world beyond is dependent upon the behaviour of the bereaved, as well *pre mortem*, in the moment of death, and *post mortem*. Improper behaviour towards the deceased in his or her lifetime or disregard of proper rituals and precautions at death and after might impede the soul in its passage, and cause it to wander about in "no man's land" between the two worlds, to seek its old house and to haunt close relatives.

With the departure of the dead, the village community and the family of the bereaved have not broken their connection with him or her, but continue to cultivate the relationship in a variety of ways. This is due both to veneration and to fear of the deceased’s vengeance. The purpose of this relationship with the deceased is one of mutual duties and mutual help (ibid.:392).

It is believed that the deceased have the same needs in the world beyond as in this world. It is the duty of the living to provide the soul with these needs until it establishes itself in the next world. Further help of the living will then become unnecessary and cease to be regular in character. In case these duties are not satisfactorily carried out, this could provoke vengeance from the deceased. She or he could take vengeance by drawing some of the living with herself to the world beyond, or she could neglect her duties towards the living. Thus, it is believed that the dead influence fertility, upon which the living depend (ibid.).

Slobodan Zecević writes about the sacrifices to the deceased:

The needs of the deceased in the world beyond are food and drink, firewood, lightning, cloth and other material items, but also songs, dances, music and other needs of a nonmaterial nature "(ibid:392)."18

These provisions for the dead are carried out by Serbs as well as Wallachians in the Negotinska Krajina through the practice of *pomana*, a ceremony of

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remembrance. All food and drink consumed at a *pomana* as well as the songs and music are regarded as sacrifices to the deceased in honour of which the ceremony is conducted. Accordingly, the more guests invited to a *pomana*, the more food and drink is consumed, the more joy and music, the more the needs of the soul are catered for in the world beyond.

As is the case with other sacred rites, *pomane* must be conducted according to a specific ritual and at a certain time in order to serve their purpose. Several *pomane* form a cycle performed at certain intervals after death. Among the Serbs this cycle is completed in one year. However, among the Wallachians the *pomane* are of much greater social importance, and the last *pomana* is held seven years after the day of death. One indicator of the importance of this ritual among the Wallachians is that *pomane* might in certain cases be conducted by old people *themselves*, while they are still alive. This happens when there is a reason to fear that younger relatives might not respect the rituals or not make the *pomana* lavish enough. This fear that young people will change or not obey rituals of remembrance has been reinforced in connection with migration abroad, when many old people were left back in the villages. In the migratory situation it became especially important to reinforce the importance of the home village and to tie the *pomana* firmly to the village hinterland.

Also marriages and other important rites of passage tied to the domestic cycle are too close to the vital interests of Wallachian society to be left to an
alien field of social relationships. It is of intrinsic symbolic importance that such “sacred” ceremonies remain firmly tied to “the hinterland”, i.e. to the home village. The village of origin is the pivotal point for the evolution of the “Little Tradition”.

The dance is one of the scenes or situations of social life in the immigrant community through which the historical continuity of a wider social field is reproduced. All people coming to the dance originate from the same local area in Yugoslavia. They come from villages united by the same language and culture, by cross-cutting relations of inheritance, kinship, marriage and friendship, and by relationships of mutual help among households. The network of social relationships is couched into long standing ritual obligations between individual families and households as well as between whole villages.

In this perspective, the dance, as the expression of a field of social relationships and obligations, can be regarded as isomorphic with occasions in the hinterland during which people have met regularly in ceremonies symbolizing cooperation between villages and households.

One such occasion is the zavetine, a religious festival of ritual “oath” or “alliance” between villages and between households in different villages. Every village in the region has its patron saint who is celebrated on a certain day of the year. On this day the village will host people from neighbouring villages. A communal gathering will take place around a village fair and dance. In the evening, people from other villages will celebrate the zavetine individually, in households of the host village to which they are related by blood, marriage or ritual kinship.

Celebrations in the region of origin are especially lively during summer and winter holidays when the villages are revived by the presence of vacationing migrants. Dances are then held not only on traditional ceremonial festivals but also on a number of other occasions. Many weddings take place during these periods, as migrants return to marry partners from the hinterland.

Since the War, new occasions for great village meetings and dances have come into existence, corresponding to the celebration of important events during the National Liberation War. From a sociological point of view, state holidays like “the 29th of November” have essentially many of the same social functions in the community as the old church holidays. These state holidays are celebrated both in the villages of the region of origin and abroad: Nevertheless, is a dancing party in the Wallachian immigrant community of Appleholm really the same as that in a village of the Negotinska Krajina region in Serbia?

Tradition in Redefinition

If we go deeper into the infinite number of interactions and the “production of meaning”, forming subcurrents and countercurrents beneath and intertwined with the mainstream of the collectively orchestrated “traditional” ritual of the
ore, we find ourselves confronted with a whole range of contradictory styles of behaviour, which seem difficult to explain as (linear) extensions of “tradition”.

For example, both the ore as a whole and the tightly knit, identically dressed female group of “bestfriends” from our situational description belong to “tradition” in Wallachian society. But “tradition” alone cannot explain the specific symbolic content (in the situational context) of the styles of dress (European “haute couture”) or changing dresses three or four times during the same evening. People use a well-known or “traditionally” defined medium (the ore) to communicate messages which get their special meaning from the present day experience of a socio-cultural group. The reflection upon and a working out of this experience and the social situation of the involved, might actually call into question “tradition”; in the last instance it might even lead to its negation. The dancing ceremony and other instances of social practice in the immigrant community carry in themselves the paradox of simultaneous reproduction (continuity) and questioning (discontinuity) of tradition (understood as historically transmitted social meaning and patterns of behaviour).

The primary reference group of the four women who go to change dresses in the ladies room are other Wallachian women of the community. In each age group of women the ascription of status and prestige is tied to specific norms of conduct and styles of dress. Traditionally, Wallachian women would compete at the dance as to who could demonstrate the most beautiful home-embroidered peasant folk-dresses in the village and who would have the most golden ducats around her neck. Groups of “best friends” would meet in the winter evenings to gossip, to sew and stitch nearly the same dresses. Today, prestige and the internal competition among groups of women are still very much tied to dressing. However, dressing alike is simultaneously a levelling mechanism and a vector of solidarity seen from within each group of “best friends”.

Nevertheless, although dressing alike is a “traditional element of culture” for groups of “bestfriends” which has remained, its practice in a new social situation points beyond the immediate context, towards new (comparative) reference groups in society. Ways of dressing and the quantity of dresses will not only signify the economic standing, but also the social self-ascription of the bearers—as being modern, cosmopolitan and “European”. When the four “best friends” gather in circles on the middle of the floor or join the chain dance together with other groups of three or four fashionably dressed “best friends”, they become a collectively orchestrated and shared symbol of the historical ascent of a group of poor rural labour migrants into the mainstream of modern European urban-industrial culture. The competition between younger women at the ore is thus something more than the extention of a “traditional custom”. It embodies “structural exercises” (of dressing, movement, etc.), which recall confrontations with social fields outside the immediate intraethnic field of interaction. Through such exercises, on the background of the safe and grateful forum of a primary reference group bound by the same
social situation, life dilemmas and problems of defining their social being, a **new cultural competence** is developed.

New forms of behaviour and appearance are integrated with established collective rituals. Traditional rituals of equality form the basis for new strategies directed towards social integrity. *Parciture, pomane, zavetine* become in this context a cultural resource, a competence to express and organize solidarity around new problems or interests. Here we can look for the political potential of ethnicity.

The rituals of redistribution of wealth (as symbolically expressed through *parciture*) can be understood as a way of controlling one’s powerlessness in the greater society, outside one’s own group. The meaning of this becomes particularly obvious in the immigrant situation even if the symbols and the rituals are changing.

Immigrant status is synonymous with social and cultural degradation in the immigration countries. In the country of origin, symbols of prestige like money and material possessions compensate for the downgraded status of migrant worker. The very act of emigration has to be legitimized through savings which are higher than they could have possibly been in the country of origin; otherwise there would have been no point in leaving.

> "Therefore one will drag everything which one has felt and thought abroad back to one's roots to demonstrate it for the living and the dead" (Wallachian *vraj* in Scandinavia).

Historical poverty has received its ritualized tribute in the shape of material symbols of welfare. Through the medium of traditional mythology and ritual practices, the internal cohesion of the reference group has so far been reproduced. Without the group as the agent of social confirmation, prestige becomes devalued. Ceremonial practices are therefore important instruments for asserting individual and collective social integrity.

While an ideology of "reciprocity" is typical for precapitalist peasant societies in general, the character of the Wallachian minority situation has acted to conserve "reciprocity" as a formula of morality and conduct right up to the present. The particular form of Wallachian "migrancy" contributes to a reproduction of ideologies and rituals of redistribution in new forms.

Ceremonies of rites of passage, especially weddings, are occasions for lavish conspicuous consumption. There is definitely a "competition" in this behaviour. The social status and prestige of a person or a household in the village depends upon the style and lavishness of its ceremonial display. However, we should warn against unilaterally judging this competition for the "specific capital" (cf. Bourdieu 1980) of prestige in the local context of the village solely as a competition attached to investment for accumulation or to the quest for social status mobility in capitalist society.

The logic of competition in Wallachian peasant and migrant society is truly contradictory. It reflects the contradictory position of this people. However, this contradictory position is nothing new. It has only acquired new elements
through the development of migration.

The growing predominance of capitalist money-commodity relationships in Serbia has, since the beginning of the last century led to the spread of ideological measures of status differentiation among the peasantry according to the accumulation of private property in land, money, etc. On the other hand, the logic of accumulation has always been counteracted (and this is also the case today) by an ethic of redistribution and “destruction” or “neutralization” of individual wealth. This ethic has a more distant origin, in the communal, relatively homogeneous and selfsufficient village.

Rising expenses for ceremonies of redistribution and inflation in consumption and gift-giving should not be interpreted as a lack of “rational thinking” but, rather, as a reinforcement of the group’s sociocultural frame of reference. It is not only a struggle for internal acknowledgement of mobility and status, but also of humility towards the powers which let one become so rich. Even the building of large houses, far exceeding the practical needs of their owners, could be interpreted in this way. The houses are not only the symbols of individual ability, but are conceived by the villagers as ritualized contributions to the collective advancement of the community. Being mainly of a non-productive character, the building of large houses contributes to neutralization of wealth from the outside.

Ritualized social control guarantees that members of the group shall not be the victims of types of behaviour from the “outside”. Should they begin to accumulate capital on the basis of their savings or to convert them into “destruction” of a more privatized and modern character—e.g., holidays on the seaside—this might mean that nobody would acknowledge one’s advances and that they were beyond the social control of the group. This idea of social control includes both living and dead. Strengthening the bonds of obligation in households and between generations, the pomana is the center for intergenerational mutuality. However, today, when so many things have begun to change, most old people find it safer to arrange their pomana themselves. They increasingly fear that the young folk will not respect their memory, that they will forget the pomana, make it too small, or be too lax about the rituals.

The persistence of “vampires” and the stress on mortuary ceremonies demonstrate the elders’ fear of the “rebellion” of the younger generation. New material problems appear, threatening the Wallachian immigrant community collectively. Illnesses and family conflicts are some of the expressions of these problems, which demand new forms of solidarity. Cultural barriers towards the “outside” give new meaning to old knowledge and competence which reappear as new resources. Among the Wallachians in Denmark we see resurgence of witchcraft and magic, practices which are in fact dying out in Yugoslavia. Such tendencies are not simply the extension of “tradition”, as they primarily reflect and cope with the growing tensions caused by the migratory situation.

The state of “continuing temporariness” tends to increase tensions between young married partners. This is combined with various forms of somatic and
psychological stress involved in the immigrant situation and reinforced by new ideas about relations between the sexes and generations intruding from the host society. However, the existence of commonly owned property (large newly built houses in the village of origin) and socio-psychological and status insecurity in the immigrant context reduces the traditional propensity to solve conflicts by means of rapid divorce. Growing but unresolvable tensions within the family and the cumulative consequences of poor working conditions have begun to lead to wide-spread psychosomatic “immigrant illness” (Table 23). Treatment of such illnesses demands profound knowledge of the psychosocial totality of the immigrant situation. This knowledge is more likely to be possessed by the vraj of the local immigrant community than by the Scandinavian public-health institutions. A growing number of people try thus to cure their illnesses and soothe their pains and anxieties by going to a vraj rather than to the hospital. Rather than going to the communes “family adviser”, who is a potentially dangerous outsider, and with whom it is hardly possible to communicate, one asks the vraj to put a spell on one’s partner in case of a threatening divorce. The immigrant community thus develops its own institutions through which it “integrates” in the new country.

It is in this light that we should understand the Wallachian ore. Against their limited primary reference group, within the context of a well known social situation, people test out new definitions and get blueprints for managing new layers of symbolism in those social interactions belonging to a wider social frame of reference. Thus, the individual finds psychological support and a testing ground for understanding new social situations and self-definition, at the same time as individual redefinitions become single instances of collective redefinitions. The individual can confront a tricky and demanding environment as a part of an integrated local public sphere. Moreover, the ore as a social gathering plays an important role in creating a new collective consciousness in relation to other spheres of interaction, via its functioning as a forum of communication about common facts of life in the immigrant situation.

The old people discuss other things than housebuilding in the home-village and the quality of the dowry they received from the family of a recent in-marrying daughter-in-law. They will reflect over their spoiled health after 15 years of strenuous work under the worst working conditions in Scandinavia. They will discuss how they just got fired from a job where they had never taken a day off, and where they had always done what they could to show good will and diligence, “working harder than two Danes put together”. They come to realize that they are not the only ones who are chronically ill—that they have a common problem. They also realize that they are not the only ones to be dismissed as “hypochondrics” by doctors and nurses who do not have the ability, patience or will to understand the (culturally specific) way they try to explain their symptoms, in awkward Danish or maybe in equally awkward Serbian through an unqualified interpreter.
Table 23: *Wallachians in Denmark. Illness according to sex and age of respondents (in %)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (24-47)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24-29 30-39 40-47</td>
<td>24-29 30-39 40-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health has deteriorated due to living and working conditions in Denmark</td>
<td>58 50 44 73</td>
<td>44 33 33 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffering from chronic illness</td>
<td>46 25 33 64</td>
<td>48 17 44 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of problem:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stomach</td>
<td>29 0 22 55</td>
<td>22 0 44 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back, neck, shoulders</td>
<td>42 25 22 64</td>
<td>22 0 0 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head (head-aches etc.)</td>
<td>13 0 0 27</td>
<td>35 0 22 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological problems (depressions, nervousness etc.)</td>
<td>21 0 11 36</td>
<td>26 17 33 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cause of health problems:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working conditions in % of those with chronic health problems</td>
<td>73 100 0 100</td>
<td>45 100 50 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working conditions in % of total number of respondents</td>
<td>33 25 0 64</td>
<td>22 17 22 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of observations:</strong></td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comments:</strong> The figures are based on personal evaluations of respondents. Many respondents maintained that their health problems were caused by working conditions, especially among the men in the oldest age category.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

For their part, young people will get a chance to exchange experience with a wider circle of peers about their confrontations with Scandinavian society. These confrontations are to an increasing degree becoming negatively coloured, as the young are not as willing as are their fathers to receive with servility what they are offered or to suffer daily humiliations. They feel that they should be treated as equals. A consciousness is growing that they have not only the obligation to be grateful, but should also have the right to demand.

The scenario of the *ør* is experienced with ambivalent feelings by these young people. A young man of 17, who (according to his parents’ taste), recently married a girl from the village of origin, complains loudly to the
anthropologist that discoteques are much more interesting than this “out-dated peasant performance”, and how much “better” the Scandinavian “system” is, where the young people decide all by themselves where and how to meet, with whom to make love or whom to marry. But the next moment he is again dancing enthusiastically with his friends, exclaiming:

“This is our custom, and we are proud of it! You don’t have such things in Denmark”.

The ore holds different layers of meaning for him. He may question its traditional function as a public “mating-institution”. However, he adds new meaning to the dance by making it a focus for ethnic self-identification in a situation where his self-esteem is increasingly put into question in daily interaction with Danish mates at work, on the street and in the discoteque at night.

**Between Tito and the Vampires:**
**Social Differentiation and the Formation of a New Elite**

“After all, Scandinavia does not function so differently from Yugoslavia. If you don’t know how to contact the right people in the right situation and in the right fashion, you can go on begging for attention and applying for support year after year, Your turn will never come!”

(Wallachian club activist in Denmark)

We shall now leave the situation of the ore (the chain dance) and ask the reader to recall the first part of the celebration of The 29th of November in the Wallachian immigrant community of Appleholm in Denmark. We come to the official ceremony in honour of the National Day of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

**Strategic Meaning of the Ceremony**

What vital interests of the Wallachian community of Appleholm were at stake during the ceremonial celebration of the 29th of November? What issue was vibrating in the air during the afternoon, but about which nobody uttered a word, as if following a common code of honour?

For years the Wallachian community had been fighting for some elementary claim: some place of their own, where they could be themselves, withdraw collectively into relative isolation from the daily nervewracking presentation of self on the stages of public places, where the rules of the play were always defined by the alien society. They sought a place to frequent when one got fed up with TV in an alien language and jokes elaborated on codes they did not share; a place to go when one got depressed by the cramped privacy of the flat.
They had always wanted “a real club”, that is a house, locale or public space where they could meet to reestablish a collective forum, within which one was not eternally questioned by the very fact of ones existence, being a “stranger”, a “foreign worker”, a “guest worker” or an “immigrant”. They wanted to establish some island, where they themselves could define the rules of the game, be the hosts and somebody else the “guests”.

During the 15 years since the first Wallachians came to Appleholm, a community had grown up with elaborate internal social networks and channels of communication and with a common organization centered around the club or the association. The association was named “Danube”, referring to the most conspicuous topographical phenomenon in the region of their common origin.

The activities of the club were conducted mainly by a group of younger activists with better education and some experience with organized sociopolitical work in Yugoslavia.

However, since the association had no permanent meeting place, it could never take on more than ad hoc functions. Its activities were limited to the periodic showing of Yugoslav films, arrangement of collective celebrations like “The 29th of November”, etc. A real club, however, should be a place always open to everybody, where one could meet and talk things over, outside the orbit of the cliques which met in private flats. It should be a place where one could relax in the company of fellow countrymen, looking at video-films from the homeland in an aura of common understanding, or play chess, cards, billiards or other games. It should be somewhere, where one could continuously develop activities such as cultivating folklore,26 gatherings for the children, etc. It should also become a place where one could discuss current questions of vital interest to the group, such as the position and the perspectives of Yugoslav children in Danish schools, problems of recognition of skills at work, questions of interpreter services and of adult education, and perspectives for increased cooperation with organizations and interest groups in Danish society. It should be, in short, a focal point for the development of common interests and identity.

For years the Wallachians had shown great patience with the communal authorities. It had always been possible to reserve a room for celebrations and meetings, but all applications for a permanent meeting place were rejected by the lower echelons of the administration on the grounds “that there were so many other interests which had to be satisfied in the commune”. In relation to the established pressure groups, socio-political and educational organizations in the commune, the Wallachians felt odd, on the outside and powerless. They felt that their problem was of “secondary importance”, and that they had not mastered “the rules of the game”.

The very special 29th of November which we witnessed was thus staged as a sophisticated strategic manoeuvre of the whole community. It bypassed the lower administration, aiming instead at the very top of the politico-administra-
tive hierarchy. Of course the question of a locale was never mentioned during the ceremony itself. Nevertheless, due to its impressiveness and the presence of several high-ranking guests, the celebration got much publicity in the town. Personal contact and an atmosphere of mutual respect were established between leading figures of the “Danube” association and the leaders of the commune.

In the following months, both the public image and the established personal relationships were carefully nursed and developed by the strategic activities of leading club activists. Finally, the issue was raised several times on the agenda of the highest political level in the commune. After some months the “Danube” association was granted a “Yugoslav Workers House” by the communal authorities.

The epoch of “exile” and “begging” had passed. The community had established a physical bridge-head in the unsteady waters of Scandinavian society.

### Symbolic Content and Meaning

The symbols expressed through artifacts, speech, organized behaviour and style of dressing during the “official” (afternoon) part of the 29th of November all had a certain strategic content matched with the common strategic goal of the Walachian community that day. It was the need for a club locale which motivated the setting of the stage for an official and formal celebration of the 29th of November that year and the associated rendezvous between the local Walachian association and community, the leaders of Denmark’s Yugoslav community, and the Danish elites of Appleholm.

Normally, the association in Appleholm, like most other Yugoslav local associations, would have celebrated the 29th of November more informally: the celebration would center around the evening gathering and ore dancing. This is in fact, what they did the next year after they had received their clubhouse. Setting up a big show like the one in the afternoon is neither simple nor cheap. Participants must be especially motivated.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to see the procedure and the meaning of the staging of the afternoon celebration only in terms of its strategic content. A ceremony like an official celebration of the Yugoslav National Day is structured according to quite specific historical-cultural codes. These codes determine the individual elements of the ceremony, the order of succession during the ceremony, the arrangement of the physical setting, and the main content of speeches. The codes cannot be altered at will, but only improvised upon according to the nature of the social situation and variations of personal style. It is in these possibilities of variation that the ceremony might be adapted to suit special strategic goals.
Moreover, the meaning of the ceremony and its symbols cannot be reduced to the symbols or the course of events in themselves, but will naturally vary according to the perceptual frameworks of participating individuals or collectivities. For the participants these various "meanings" have a historical background, social content and significance which reaches far beyond the immediate strategic content of the situation. How, then, do we interpret the major symbolic content of the afternoon celebration, and how do we connect it to the socio-cultural reality of the participants? How is the message produced and perceived?

The occasion as a whole represents an event of historical importance for the local Wallachian community, a major experiment in socio-political mobilization. However, the real importance of the ceremony as a collective experience of this nature should be interpreted with references to the ethnohistorical past of the group.

The community of Wallachians in Appleholm has historically been part of an ethnic minority which has always been organized by outsiders in the face of new social situations. On the occasion of the celebration of the National Day the Wallachians proved for themselves that they were capable of producing a team of competent young leaders under whose guidance, they might be able to take control of a complicated and threatening local environment.

Through the management of several layers of symbolism in the context of a common shared course of strategically conceived practice, they proved to themselves that they could rise from the obscure caves of a "Little Tradition" to the surface of a "Great Tradition"—national Yugoslav culture—and to use its cultural codes as an element of political practice in the immigrant context.

The main symbols of the ceremony were taken from Yugoslav national lore—the heroism and solidarity of The National War of Liberation, the creativeness and self-reliance embodied in the concept of ‘self-management’ and the Titoist tradition of nonalignment and internationalism. These bonds of brotherhood, equality and cooperation bind together the complicated ethnic mosaic of Yugoslavia into one nation with one common fate.

By managing the rituals and the formulae of the ceremony with adequate grace and style, the Wallachian community proved itself worthy of equal access to a greater collectivity—the Yugoslav community of nations and ethnic groups and their shared cultural-historic framework. The fact that the ceremony was managed by one of their own proved the genuine character of the group’s ascent to the level of national tradition. The authentic character of the collective experience was officially canonized by the presence of the ambassador and other representatives of the national Yugoslav tradition.

"The Wallachians have become very skillful", the ambassador stated with a paternal expression on his face to one of the other embassy staff upon leaving from the celebration.

The effort to affiliate to the national tradition was completed by the credit given to the official representative image of the Socialist Federative Republic
of Yugoslavia, including the commitment of the migrant community to socio-
political membership in Yugoslav society.

Moreover, at the occasion of the 29th of November, the Yugoslav national
tradition was legitimized in the Scandinavian context. The way of dressing, the
controlled, disciplined and responsible behaviour of the audience underlines
the genuine "European" quality of the Yugoslav national tradition and the
affiliation to this tradition by the local Wallachian community. This image is
further reinforced by the presence of the high Yugoslav guests, whose good
manners and cosmopolitan air no Danish mayor could doubt. The stress on
internationalism and common understanding in symbols and speech further
indicates the belonging to a common European tradition and the reality of a
common future.

Thus, the Wallachian community symbolically managed to raise itself from
the level of an odd and ridiculed ethnic minority in the Yugoslav context to the
level of national Yugoslav tradition, worthy of the respect of other Yugoslav
groups. Moreover, it managed to overcome fifteen years of humiliation as odd
(but docile) "strangers", who ought to be grateful for their residence permits
as long as they last. Here they stood forth as representatives of a proud and
equal European nation. No longer the representatives of a lower caste, practic­
ing "savage" or mystic "immigrant" customs, Wallachians' claims for decent
conditions for the preservation of a valuable cultural tradition became
legitimized. The aura of controlled organization and "responsible" middle
class behaviour characterizing the assembly guaranteed that the trust and
responsibility given the Yugoslav community would not be used for deviant or
subversive purposes.

The "folklore" included in the latter part of the afternoon ceremony had
similar mythologizing and legitimizing functions. First, it represented the
glorification and rehabilitation of the group's historical past through the
mythological transformation of that past. "Genuine" folklore, belonging to a
not too distant past of the group is embodied in home spun linen and local
styles of peasant embroidery, locked away deep in heavy chests in the villages
of origin. 27 "Folklore" was in the current collective consciousness transformed
to a glittering artifact, a delicately presented and carefully contemplated object
bearing witness of a more glorious past. As this past is distant and dim, it has to
be reconstructed and "studied". Here lies the justification for the folklore
groups.

At the same time, the image of picturesque folklore is a beloved theme in an
increasingly standardized Scandinavian society. Folklore serves the function of
an unthreatening exoticism and escapism from everyday life. It is therefore the
favourite and most legitimate expression of "immigrant culture" in the eyes of
the natives. It becomes the favorite medium of "cross-cultural communica­
tion" and the most secure publicity booster.

Scandinavians prefer the many-coloured exotic artifact or the standardized
gold-glittering representation of "industrial folklore" to the current social
reality of immigrant existence.

The presentations of the "folklore section" were thus more praised by Scandinavians than the real, living "folklore", the *ore*, to which the Wallachians have never succeeded in attracting many outside spectators or participants. It is too "real" and yet too "strange" to be engaging. It has too little glitter and not enough of the exotic to qualify as escapism.

**A New Elite**

When we first visited the villages of Wallachian migrant workers (see Schierup 1973) in the beginning of the 1970's, one of the most important struggles in these rural communities revolved around the issue of education.

In opposition to the local authorities and often the children themselves, many parents were keeping their sons and especially their daughters out of school so that they could marry and do useful work in agriculture, in the house or as wage labourers or migrants. The result is that many of today's young migrant workers in Scandinavia have not completed even the minimum eight years of public school required in Yugoslavia. The young women are especially undereducated (Table 24).

Simultaneously, a number of young men (now in their thirties) were attending technical schools or other educational institutions at secondary school level in local urban centers. In migrant villages, a large proportion of these young educated men chose to emigrate. Compared to the lavish conspicuous display of migrant workers in the villages of origin (building houses, celebrating large weddings etc.), they were unable to convert their education into local social prestige.

Table 24: Wallachians' educational level by sex and age of respondent (in %).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Education</th>
<th>Male Age</th>
<th></th>
<th>Female Age</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24-29</td>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>40-47</td>
<td>24-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without school</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than four years</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up til seven years</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eight years of public school</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finished secondary school</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_N = 93_
Through their experience in towns and educational institutions, these young men have acquired a double cultural competence. They have internalized some key cultural codes and styles of behaviour belonging to general Serbian and Yugoslav urban culture, while remaining deeply involved in patterns of thinking and acting, characteristic of Wallachian society. They stand midway between Tito and the vampires. In the immigrant communities such people, like the leaders of the association of Yugoslavs in Appleholm, represent a local educated elite, deeply embedded in the immigrant communities and their social networks, at the same time as they command a wider cultural frame of reference and a political culture which can be activated through the mobilization of the whole community in relation to a common problem.

While they might often challenge tradition by showing new ways, they simultaneously acknowledge the integrity, rituals and specific culturally defined interests of the group, which form the basis of their own authority. They might be able to lead the group to a wider political consciousness through new forms of organized struggle for its specific interests in the immigrant context. At the same time the group may continue to develop informal defense mechanisms based on traditional forms of social relationships with their roots in Wallachian peasant society. In this way, new forms of authority become established in the field of Wallachian immigrant culture, while old forms of authority are only gradually challenged and replaced.

Tradition and Beyond: Concluding Discussion

Starting from the celebration of The Yugoslav National day in a Wallachian immigrant community in Denmark, we have touched upon a number of features of present day Wallachian migrant life. The celebration is an expression of ethnicity; i.e., the collective socio-cultural identity and culturally specific social practices of a group of people. “The 29th of November” is a composite ritual; it includes ritual elements belonging to Wallachian peasant tradition as well as elements belonging to Yugoslav national culture.

Structural conditions faced by immigrants in Scandinavia will in great measure come to define the meaning of tradition. But this does not mean that new structural conditions will turn the Wallachian peasant into just another Scandinavian worker. This kind of metamorphosis seems to be implied by Mitchell, whose argument is typical for British social anthropological “network” theorists’ studies of migration and urbanization.28

Mitchell (1960 and 1966) warns us against comparing apparently “traditional” customs, as they are practiced by migrants in urban-industrial areas with corresponding “customs” in the rural areas of origin of the migrants:

“I went on to argue that a custom practised in a rural situation, when transferred to an urban one, may take on a new meaning for participants and observers alike, and ...it is
dangerous ... to assume that because an ostensibly tribal custom persists in an urban environment, the tribal social system as a whole continues to operate there. ... urban social systems should be studied *sui generis* and ... the origin of the elements in them from this point of view is irrelevant" (1960:169).

*Tito visiting Wallachians village in the 1950s.* (Photographer unknown).
Mitchell objects to the depicting of "cultures" as entities which exist separate from contexts of social interaction. He warns against the comparison and juxtaposition of abstract states of culture like "traditionalism" and "modernism" which are common in theories of social change and urbanization.

"... there are two kinds of changes going on, those that are common to people everywhere when they come to live in towns together with those peculiar to a people whose traditional way of life contains no appropriate 'definitions' of the new situations in which they are likely to find themselves. ... A custom practiced in a rural situation, when transferred to an urban one, may take on a new meaning for participants and observers alike ..." (1969:169).

For Mitchell the central problem becomes one of how people in urban situations bring meaning and definition to new contexts and situations of interaction. Existing patterns of behaviour, beliefs, values and symbols become the immediately available tools for the production of new meanings in new contexts of interaction; not static constructs conserved as museum artifacts or given up bit by bit (acculturation) for new "items" of culture.

"We must try to understand how people solve the problem of giving meaning to actions within the framework of the social situation in which they find themselves.

We take a tribal dance in a location and see it not as an expression of the arcadian values upon which tribal life is based but an expression of some of the significant evaluations in the social system in which the dancers and the spectators live. We see the operation of a diviner in an industrial town not so much as an expression of a number of beliefs about the magical properties of substances but as a means whereby industrial workers are able to formulate the oppositions and tensions in which they are involved" (ibid.: 172).

Returning to our social situation of the Wallachian ore dance, it is quite clear that we ought to pay credit to the warnings of Mitchell.

Mitchell is right in pointing out the conditioned character of any "traditional custom" in urban industrial contexts. The character of social processes in the Wallachian immigrant community supports Clyde Michell's point (1959,1966) that a "custom" or social practice must be studied as an integrated part of the field of interaction in which it appears. This holds true for symbols and messages of "modernism" expressed through "traditional" media, which come to symbolize the transition from peasant to industrial worker, from a localized peasant culture to an urban-industrial culture. It is also relevant for the interpretation of what might appear to be an opposite trend in the "adaptation" of rural labour migrants to urban life; i.e., the reinforcement of traditionalism, which has been taken to represent a typical pattern of development among immigrant minority groups (Ålund 1978).

However, Mitchell is too categorical and tends to suffer from mechanistic assumptions of functionalism when he argues 1), that "... the origin of the elements" in urban social systems are "irrelevant", and 2) that the practices of rural labour migrants in towns must be studied as a function of the urban social system "sui generis" and not as the development of "traditional" social institutions in new situations.
As a consequence of this functionalist bias, Mitchell tends to depict rural as well as urban "social systems" as prestructured totalities, within which the individual can manipulate his relative position or to which the (rural) newcomer might "adapt" and find "meaning" through special practices and forms of symbolic representation.

"The institutions are parts of different social systems, and the individual moves from one into the other. It is fallacious, therefore, to think of rural institutions as changing into urban types of the same institutions. The fact, is rather, that urban dwellers develop institutions to meet their needs in towns, and these, because of their different contexts, differ from rural institutions meeting the same need in the tribal social system. An urban social institution is not a changed rural institution: it is a separate social phenomenon existing as part of a separate social system so that the behaviour in town of a migrant when it differs from that in his rural home is more than likely to be a manifestation of 'situational' rather than 'processive' change" (1966:47-48).

We have followed Mitchell in stressing the importance of external pressures in the immigration context for the development of migrant social practices and symbolic representations. However, we need a more intrinsic definition of "customs" and less objectivist understanding of society if we are to account for the dynamic and creative character of immigrant practice.

"Customs" are not loose and instrumental tools for "adaptation". They can be seen as reflections of a structured and collective social consciousness (Bourdieu 1977) which is transformed and developed according to its structural capacity in the confrontation of historical experience and social practice with new social facts of life. This process of transformation is no simple product of or adaptation to "objective circumstances" or "systems". It represents the confrontation of active dispositions and potentials of immigrant minority groups with specific historical conditions for their development. It is a process whereby these "objective" conditions are themselves modified. Forms of behaviour and ways of thinking are culturally specific "tools" which help the migrant community cope with day to day conditions. In this context, ethnicity becomes the expression of a variety of cultural predispositions, resources and strategies of integration.

Departing from the question, "Do they dance to keep up tradition?", we have discussed the composite ceremony of "The 29th of November" in relation to a number of dimensions of Wallachian migrancy. Through situational analysis of this communal ritual we went beyond immediate behaviour to "unveil" the dialectical unity of continuity and discontinuity. On one hand we saw how the collective character of the ore and its situational content created preconditions for public social control, continuity in the socialization process and for reproduction of the system of generation, gender and household relationships. On the other hand we saw the germs of a collective process of transformation in which established authority and power relationships were displaced and new forms of organization and leadership arose.

The domestic field is the core area for ethnic identification and for
Wallachian social organization. The Wallachian round dance, the *ore*, is a social scene by means of which strategies and conflicts in the realm of household and family reproduction are articulated. The *ore* is a forum for socialization of growing generations. Patterns of socialization and social reproduction in Wallachian immigrant society are best understood within the wider context of the total social field of migrancy, within which the social "hinterland" in the country of emigration plays an important part. At present, the Wallachian communities in Scandinavia function as "extensions of the hinterland"; for the ultimate end of the prolonged process of migrancy is still return and reintegration in the country of origin.

Nevertheless, the collectively enacted ritual of the dance has increased internal integration within the local public of Wallachian immigrant communities, acting to bridge and assuage tensions based on generation, sex and educational differentiation. "Traditional" media of social control and integration—vraj's (magical specialists), vampires, patterns of social group formation and interaction—have reestablished themselves in the immigration context. As transformed symbols and practices adapted to a new content, they represent a psychological and social protection, anchored in the common cultural identity and the social network of the group. This is a precondition for collective definitions of cultural confrontations. Hence, "traditional" social networks have become the basis for new social strategies and forms of organization.

The "traditional" part of the celebration of "The 29th of November" is part of Wallachian cultural heritage inculcated into new generations through the regular and intensive practice of "structural exercises". However, by dancing, people do much more than "keep up tradition". The routine of the ritual is the same, but its content and meanings are "subject to change and flux" (Berger 1978). We have argued that traditional forms of behaviour and interaction in "traditional" social settings carry *new messages* which reflect over and seek to resolve social situations which lie beyond the field of specifically ethnic relationships—in the local public of Scandinavian society. These practices acquire important socialization functions in relation to the Wallachians' conditions of life in Scandinavia. New forms of collective consciousness have developed in relation to shared problems. Strategies of integration are developed within the intermediary zone of "the local public" in capitalist industrial society. Through the confrontation with the urban-industrial system and its various part-cultures, a double cultural competence has emerged among growing segments of the migrant population. For the Wallachians, this double competence is anchored in an ethnically specific sub-culture which extends from the field of domestic social relations to wider social arenas.

We have emphasized the ambiguity which results from the process of social differentiation among Wallachian migrants. On one hand social differentiation produces increasing tensions and disputes over the definition of authority. On the other hand, a diversification takes place which is circumscribed by a
continued overarching integrity and internal integration of the group. Sources of conflict within the group are transformed into a creative coping mechanism which deals with pressures from "the outside".

An ideology of reciprocity and mutual help among the Wallachian migrants now serves to neutralize social differentiation connected with "wealth" from the outside. Different forms of social control connected with the development of immigrant social networks and new forms of social organization use traditional symbols and rituals as a resource and expressive media. The communal spirit shown at The 29'th of November celebration had its roots in the cooperation between villages and households in the hinterland. However, today's communal celebrations feed new forms of mutual help and social integration on the basis of which new forms of leadership are developing.

Social differentiation takes place primarily due to the growing educational level of the younger generation and their confrontation with urban culture and society in both Yugoslavia and Scandinavia. The "modern" part of the celebration in Appleholm on the 29th of November, represented by Tito and other symbols of Yugoslav national tradition, demonstrates how Wallachian youth develop their own strategies and new bridgeheads to authority. In the immigrant community, there is emerging a new Wallachian leadership which derives its symbolic legitimation from both the new political culture and the old symbols of "The Little Tradition". In Appleholm, this leadership manoeuvres within a triangle circumscribed not only by Tito and the Vampires, but by the socio-political forces of Danish society.
Chapter Ten:

CONCLUSION
WILL THEY STILL BE DANCING
WHEN THE VAMPIRE HAS DIED?

"Are vampires 'killed' or do they die out? Why is it so difficult to actually 'kill' the vampire, to kill off tradition? Because you need tradition to do that too!"

Steven Sampson.

Why are Vampires Still Alive?
This book has described the dynamic meaning of the ethnohistorical heritage among Wallachians and Macedonians and its transformation within different social contexts in Scandinavia.

Why do Wallachians associate with vampires and Macedonians talk of Alexander the Great? What is it that keeps these echoes from the past alive and worth discussing?

In trying to answer these questions, we have in Chapter Nine discussed socio-cultural forces which have shaped ethnicity among Wallachian immigrants.

The continued existence and reproduction of a social practice imply fundamental common interests among participants in a certain social field, uniting them above their tensions and conflicts. Hence, vampires do not reign by terror alone or by mechanisms of rigid social control. They symbolize unity and mutual benefits; they sanction relationships of cooperation and mutual help in the community; ancestors have duties and the right to be respected.

Seen from the perspective of the hinterland, we have explained investments for conspicuous consumption and rituals of redistributing wealth as ways of controlling one's powerlessness in the greater society. Ritualized tribute, in the shape of material symbols of welfare, compensate for historical poverty and the downgraded status of the migrant worker. Successful strategies for social affirmation rest on the combined efforts of a multigenerational household. In the ritualized competition for prestige nuclear families remain “poor” households.

Among Wallachian immigrants in Denmark, the growth of an integrated ethnic community makes generational continuity and mutual cooperation important to the younger generation, even in relation to opportunities in Danish society. These interests could be seen from two perspectives: 1) the relationship between household and community network and 2) the relationship between the ethnic community and the larger society.
Through its members—living or dead—belonging to different generations, a large household gives its members access to a ramified social network in the ethnic community. Hence, relationships of mutual help are established. One obtains services and advances one’s personal career with the help of brokers who have access to the power structures in different institutions.

Moreover, an integrated and diversified ethnic community has favoured the development of a new leadership among younger Wallachians, and new forms of collective organization deal with the group’s problems in local residential areas, in education and in the world of work. We have argued that this leadership stands “midway between Tito and the vampires”. In striving to rally a following among their fellow ethnics and to create a sense of identity and solidarity, young leaders respect established forms of social and ritual practice. They prefer unity over conflict while they develop new political symbols and forms of social authority.

There may have been more than just private reasons behind Milorad’s commitments to the vampire and “tradition” (Chapter 2). Milorad does not “believe in vampires”. He is a progressive and educated man who struggles to “enlighten” his fellow ethnics and to improve their situation in Danish society. He is a political broker in the ethnic community, who for the good of his people uses his “double cultural competence” to mobilize contacts in Danish trade unions, in the county administration and in the hospital. However, he feels stigmatized. Danish society is not prepared to meet him on equal terms, to reward his talents, or to offer him a career which matches his education and abilities. He therefore remains dependent on his fellow ethnics, both as support for a career and as a reference group. To be a leader and to utilize his abilities and ideas Milorad needs a following. He thus ends up (at least provisionally) subscribing to the code of his congregation. To be accepted and trusted, he must neutralize unsettled conflicts with his mother by utilizing proper channels of mediation and performing appropriate rituals.

But Since They Do not Dance the Tango …

“Danish” Wallachians were characterized by close “internal integration”. While they dance in their “ethnic public” in Scandinavia, they have developed a “shield of protection” and new social and political competence. Here we can draw a parallel to the formation of ethnic “urban villages” in the United States by the turn of the last century. Employers used poor, unorganized, unskilled immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe and new machines to replace skilled labour, to decompose working class skills and to force through a reorganization of the labour process. This influx came to pose a serious threat to the jobs of established skilled workers, and created deep hostility toward the newcomers among “older” Americans. It was this hostility which forced immigrants to seek protection in “urban villages”.

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Together with the schisms the immigrant brought from his own past and the economic hostility he encountered at the factory from established labor, national stereotypes forced the ethnic worker to turn to people like himself for comfort and warmth, in little Italys and little Polands hostile to outsiders, “urban villages” stretching over time from the end of the nineteenth century to the middle of our own” (Sennett & Cobb 1973:13-14).

“It takes two to tango,” as Gordon (1970:41) commented on the relationships between “ethnic” Americans and the Anglo-American majority in The United States:

“To apply the analogy, there is no good reason to believe that white Protestant America has ever extended a firm and cordial invitation to its minorities to dance” (ibid.).

Nor in Scandinavia has the native population opened the doors to newcomers. Immigrants are more often degraded than accepted: they are seen as outsiders in both public and private social arenas, and thus forced back into their own ethnic communities. Straddling between two countries and confronting contradictory interests, immigrants realize that their own immediate (ethnic) group is a necessary sphere for common understanding and an essential platform for developing cultural redefinitions and strategies of integration.

The society which immigrants meet offers uncertain benefits in exchange for individual isolation and social anonymity. Far-flung isolation in “occupational ghettos”, formalization of social networks, centralization of organization and the substitution of xenophobic ideologies for social solidarity all generate an integration process carried on by alternative “ethnic publics”. Hence, immigrant ethnicity is an expression of a general societal conflict: immigrant minorities are forced to develop ethnic strategies with a social and cultural content because of their marginalized social position.

The first generation of Yugoslav immigrants in Scandinavia experienced the confrontation of different socio-cultural worlds—a confrontation in which they were exposed to discriminatory and unequal structural conditions in society at large. Coming from Yugoslavia, and from a Balkan peasant culture both Macedonians and Wallachians have carried with them dreams of struggle towards a better future via their labour in European industrial society. These expectations have turned into disappointment.

The Wallachians' vampire and other echoes from the past symbolize the persisting need for ethnic cohesion, a precondition for the development of cultural, social and political platforms for immigrants in the larger society. Hence, ethnicity expresses more than merely “strategies of defence”. Immigrant “ethnic publics” emerge as the basis for “counter-cultures” or alternative social movements in an increasingly centralized Scandinavian society.

“Traditional” cultural idioms and adapted forms of organization serve as a reaffirmation of group identity. Transformed symbols and practices from the countries of origin articulate ethnicity in terms of both continuity and discontinuity. Continuity with the ethno-historical past is expressed via the strategies which the immigrants develop in order to demarcate and defend their interests.
Simultaneously, ethnic strategies undergo *transformation* as a response to social conflicts in “internal” relationships and “outside” events in society at large. This dynamic relation between ethnic groups and society produces crises. Each crisis calls into question existing forms of practice and forces redefinitions.

Diverse ethnic strategies of integration in immigrant countries reflect the particular structural and cultural situations of different groups of immigrants. Our analysis of the experience of Wallachians and Macedonians in the fields of work, public life and the family has confirmed four different ethnic profiles. The patterns of integration of the Wallachians in Denmark, Wallachians in Sweden, Macedonians in Denmark and Macedonians in Sweden demonstrate a range of dimensions of ethnicity, from the “traditionalism” of “urban villages” to “identity work” in modern situations of fragmentation and change. In describing the delicate interplay between ethnicity and integration, we have argued that a developed ethnic organization, i.e., a high degree of *internal* (group) integration, can serve as a precondition for increased integration into the larger society. On the basis of this conclusion, we will use the remainder of this chapter to discuss some general dimensions of ethnicity in Scandinavian society. We discuss dimensions of social fragmentation and personal ambivalence among first generation immigrants and the integrating functions of “ethnic publics”. We then reflect briefly over the future of ethnicity and “tradition” among immigrant youth.

*Beyond Vampires ...?*

What forces act to fragment “ethnic publics” in contemporary capitalist society?

Let us rephrase the question and ask, “Why do vampires behave differently among Wallachians in Denmark and Sweden?” These immigrants have the same social and cultural background, come from the same village communities in their rural Yugoslav hinterland and interact within a shared social network in Scandinavia.

Among “Danish” Wallachians, vampires appear without announcement, while among the “Swedish” Wallachians they respond more and more seldom, not even appearing when people call upon them.

In Sweden, the Wallachians remain backward-looking: the hinterland is the only collective point of reference for community life and future strategies. Only opportunities in the villages of origin are promised; they involve continued migrancy and uncertain expectations for return “someday”. Social control is rigid, but is not supported by an organized ethnic community with institutionalized social control, forms of arbitration, and collective arenas for socialization. The community can offer neither “compensation” in the form of
access to social and economic opportunities in Sweden, nor positions of social
estee or respect within the ethnic group itself.

This generates several cleavages among the Swedish Wallachian community
and leads to personal conflicts in migrant households. Instead of respecting the
collective morality and the rules of the game of their traditionalist group,
young Wallachians in Sweden develop more individualistic and diffuse
strategies of integration. They turn a deaf ear to their old people’s fantasies
about vampires and witchcraft. These strategies are oriented towards alterna­
tive reference groups.

Young men try to compensate for humiliation and powerlessness in Swedish
society by orienting themselves towards the male associations of other less
“traditional”, but more patriarchal Yugoslav ethnic groups in the local com­
munities. On the margin of these groups, they cultivate images of “pan-
Yugoslav” patriarchal lifestyles which contrast with traditional Wallachian
cultural values and egalitarian gender relationships. This produces tensions
both with their parents and with their own wives. Both in relation to Swedes
and other groups of Yugoslav immigrants, young Wallachian men in Sweden
were ashamed of their traditional looking wives, who often gathered in the
parks on weekends. In fact, these gatherings were a means by which women
attempted to control their men and the domestic sphere, to reconquer a bit of
public space. Wallachian women are trying to come to grips with the effects of
immigration, which in many ways has placed them in a situation of powerless­
ness. They suffer form both growing patriarchalization in the domestic field,
subordination at work and seclusion from the public sphere.

In relation to Swedish society, Wallachian youth tend to develop ambivalent
attitudes. On one side they are attracted to a society which offers an escape
from a stigmatized ethnic group, a group which does not offer any support or
mediate promising alternatives in the new country. On the other hand, une­
qual treatment by Swedish society leads to humiliation, disappointments and
resentment. In the meantime, the youth have no organized ethnic community
to act as a “broker”, transmission link, or “shield of protection”.

This situation can lead to extreme responses and extreme strategies. Young
women, like the men, break out of their families and their ethnic network and
marry Swedes or attempt on their own behalf to make individual careers in
Swedish society. Fleecing gossip, social control and distrust of the ethnic
community, such people become “lost” to their group and to their fellow
ethnics. Another response is hostility and apathy in relation to Swedish society
and a retreat into dreams or plans for a return to Yugoslavia. Often these two
types of response are confined within the same person in the shape of a true
“migrant dilemma”.

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Forces of Fragmentation

Wallachians in both Sweden and Denmark have tended to form "urban villages" in Scandinavia. However, while "Danish" Wallachians succeeded in building an integrated "ethnic public" which acted as a buffer towards the outside and mediated internal tensions, "Swedish" Wallachians were subjected to cramped intimacy and fragmentatation. A comparison of the two groups helps us understand how the forces of fragmentation in contemporary capitalist society can have such differential effects.

Hence, it is only on the very surface that modern Europe can be compared to America during the time of the formation of "little Italy's" and "little Poles". In the Europe of the 1950's to early 1970's, large sectors of labour intensive industrial production were filled up with immigrant labour, and many old vacant housing areas became the hearths of emerging "urban villages". However, the structural conditions in today's Europe do not favour the formation or reproduction of traditionalist ethnic ghettos. Labour market conditions and growing unemployment have led to increased mobility among Europe's immigrants, while existing ghettos, like in today's America, are now exposed to "urban renewal". Moreover, the political-administrative structure's conception of immigrants has changed. For a long time, it was assumed that migrants in Europe would eventually return to their countries of origin. Once labour migrants started to become immigrants and to evolve into more or less autonomous sub-cultures, they became the object for bureaucratic ambitions to control public and family life and to manage socialization processes.

Indeed, seen in today's perspective, several aspects of the "urban villages" would on the surface appear to converge with both neo-liberal ideologies of "free initiative" and neo-corporatist "beggar thy neighbour" conceptions of social networks and community self-help. "Cultural pluralism" has become a convenient ideological catch-phrase for attempts to reduce welfare services by creating self-sustaining ethnic ghettos and labour reserves. However, in its classical form, "the ghetto" still represents an irritant to planners' visions of the metropolitan economic order, and to the welfare state's efforts to control the family's social and ideological reproduction ("socialization") and the community's public life. "The ghetto" is not just a labour reserve or a sponge for the absorption of "social problems". It can be seen as "a threat to public order" and a counter-culture, a dangerous locus of deviance and autonomous public life. It breeds more "social problems" than it absorbs. Hence, the ghetto is "attacked" via various schemes for urban redevelopment.

Alongside the assaults on the immigrant ghetto via town planning, social work and family therapy, ethnic communities are also threatened by internal tensions. In this book we have represented vampires and other symbols of the ethnohistorical heritage as "blood donors" to a threatened ethnic pride rather than as cruel "blood suckers". However, they are both at once. The vampire, "tradition" and the ethnic community can be a shield of defense and a social
platform for struggles against xenophobia, discrimination, alienation and
deskilling. Simultaneously the vampires reinforce strong generational tensions
and strict group control upon the individual. Thus, it is no wonder that young
Yugoslavs increasingly rebel against the vampires, “Alexander” or other
symbols of “tradition”.

Thus, in Scandinavia, urban villages have been attacked before they have
had time to consolidate. This is the case of Wallachians in Sweden. Milorad in
Denmark and Jova in Sweden were, in fact, very much alike: young educated
Wallachians, intent on exploring the world, and on “modernizing” their
backward fellow ethnics. Their different experiences in Scandinavia are the
products of two local situations, where the opportunities and tensions of social
fields have interacted in particular ways. These local situations and different
immigrant experiences also mirror the differentiated and uneven character of
contemporary capitalist development.

“Yugoswedes”
An “Ethnic Public” Going Underground

Jova, a young, “angry” Wallachian in Sweden, is in quite another situation
than Milorad. Jova stands “between the flock and the wolves”. Unlike
Milorad, neither Jova’s own ethnic group nor Swedish society give him any
solid basis for identification, dignity or the kind of social position and respect
to which he feels entitled. In this situation he tries to affiliate himself to other
Yugoslavs in his local community.

Here Jova is confronted with the model of the “Yugoswedes”. Like Kon­
stantin (Chapter Six) and his fellow Macedonians, he might try to become more
“Swedish” in overt culture and behaviour, while retaining central Yugoslav
values and developing an “ethnic public” under different conditions. The
Macedonians in Sweden have developed an ethnic public quite different from
that of the Wallachians’ “villages” in Denmark. Fragmented into smaller
groups throughout the town, they “disappear” both as a conspicuous symbol of
“otherness” in the community and as a “social problem” from the watchful eye
of “Big Brother”. They stop appearing as a “threat to public order”, while
conserving their ethnic network and an autonomous community life. However,
Jova feels squeezed within the cramped intimacy of his own ethnic group,
unwelcome in the Yugoslav ethnic associations, and due to the cultural stigma
of his group among the Yugoslav community, he does not really know,
whether he would like to become a “Yugoswede” himself. Confronted with
humiliations and social barriers in Swedish society, without strategies to
redress his deprivation of dignity in Swedish society, Jova continues to justify
his emigration with investments in his house “back home” and his plans to
return to Yugoslavia.
From “Migrancy” to “Ethnic Public”

Sources of Ambivalence

It is not only their particular cultural backgrounds which distinguished Wallachians and Macedonians. Patterns of “migrancy” were also quite different.

The first Wallachian immigrants were peasants or first-generation peasant-workers. Their migrancy was oriented towards establishing a peasant millennium in their native villages of origin in Yugoslavia. The Macedonian immigrants were mainly first or second generation workers or unemployed school leavers. Both men and women had a higher degree of formal education than Wallachians. Macedonians’ “migrancy” aimed at rural-urban spatial mobility as well as social mobility in urban-professional hierarchies of their Macedonian homeland.

However, both groups shared a general characteristic of most Yugoslav “guest-workers” on the European continent during the 1960’s and early 1970’s: an orientation towards return and reintegration in the Yugoslav “hinterland”. This tended to make them immune to humiliation in working collectives and local public arenas in Scandinavia. Both Wallachians and Macedonians tended to cluster with immigrants from their own regions of origin within older housing areas in Denmark and Sweden. These first immigrant communities in Scandinavia were centered on cultivating dreams and strategies of return. The Wallachians socialized their children with reference to return.

However, during repeated confrontations with the new society and with growing integration into its institutional structures and the development of new fields of social interaction and patterns of socialization, a basic dilemma developed among most immigrants: whether “to remain or to return”. Not only were individual immigrants confronted by this life dilemma, but so were immigrant communities as such. As a result, there began to develop dual or ambivalent collective strategies aimed at (conditional) integration in the receiving society while the escape hatch back to the “hinterland” was kept open.

With a growing, albeit ambivalent, orientation towards integration, a new social differentiation started to develop within each group of immigrants. Young men especially began to pursue individual careers directed more towards status achievement in Scandinavian society than in the Yugoslav hinterland. Following this differentiation another type of ambivalence started to emerge, parallel with the basic ambivalence which immigrants experienced between Scandinavia and the “hinterland”. Hence Wallachians like Milorad who attempted to escape the framework of the “urban village” or the “occupational ghetto” became potential “traitors” to collectively nurtured dreams of return. They contradicted aspirations for peasant mobility, materialized in predominant household strategies. The successful Wallachian became dangerous, a potential hostage of forces beyond the urban village and the
ethnic community in Scandinavia. Hence, he constantly had to pay tribute and prove his loyalty to the ethnic community. On the "outside" he remained a humiliated ethnic, filled with status anxiety in relation to the larger society, suffering indignities at work and in public social arenas.

Even Macedonians like Konstantin or Ilija, who against all odds have advanced into Scandinavian urban-professional hierarchies remain "blackheads" (Swedish: "svartskallar") and can never go far enough to affirm their human "dignity" in the larger society. Caught in a modern machinery of individualism, they are in constant danger of betraying prior moral obligations and bonds of loyalty to their fellow ethnics. Simultaneously, they need those ties. They can hardly afford to lose the warmth and comfort of the ethnic community for an insecure future in a society in which they can never feel authentic. They need their fellow ethnics as a reference group by which they can measure their advances in the larger society.

Milorad, Ilija and Konstantin are marginal persons within their ethnic communities. Nevertheless, their dilemmas are but more prominent examples of Yugoslavs' general ambivalence between ties to their ethnic community and a chronic need to affirm their dignity by individual achievement in the larger society. Among the Wallachians in Denmark and partly among the Macedonians in Sweden, integration in working collectives encouraged informal networks of friendship with Danes and Swedes. However, it hardly seems possible that such loyalties can supplant the functions of the ethnic communities in the future. Immigrants live in a Scandinavian society, where old forms of working class solidarity and the integration and levelling mechanisms of working collectives are breaking down. Divisive individualist achievement ideologies have gained in impact while the individual is subjected to social isolation, vulnerable to political-economic and ideological structures of domination in society.

The Immigrant Family: "Haven in a Heartless World?"

Confronted with lack of solidarity and "community" and with feelings of indignity brought on by their confrontations with Scandinavian society at work or in other public arenas, immigrant men seek refuge among their fellow ethnics and in their families. However, ethnic loyalties are subject to both "internal" and "external" sources of erosion, and their families are becoming increasingly besieged. Bureaucratic institutions are now contesting patriarchal or generational authority and control over socialization and family relationships. Immigrants "family problems" are increasingly defined as the object for the Danish/Swedish social worker or psychologist. This fuels tension between the sexes and the generations and becomes an additional threat to male self-respect.
It is the immigrant man who is most directly exposed to the injuries on public arenas of Scandinavian society. Thus, Mira's (Chapter Five) personal dignity and respect is still upheld by her qualities as a spouse, a housewife and a mother. Her physical working conditions are worse than those of her husband, her position in the enterprise hierarchy lower, and without prospects for improvement. However, she views her heavy work on the assembly line mainly as a means to an end. While her husband complains about his wounded dignity, Mira bears with pride her double burden in the factory and at home; it is a self-evident sacrifice for the benefit of her family. However, also Mira is vulnerable to "national problems that are too powerful to be excluded". Thus, she fears that her daughter will be more influenced by the "immorality" of Scandinavian society than by her own upbringing. She also fears that her son will end up in "bad company" and be exposed to drugs. At the same time, she also fears the interference of the social worker, the family therapist or the police, lest her ways of bringing up her children should be found too "authoritarian" or abusive to public morality.

Among the men it is the younger immigrant men who are most vulnerable to feelings of "indignity" in Scandinavian society. One way for these men to compensate for their humiliation in public arenas is to exert patriarchal authority within the family. However, young immigrant women now see their lives in ways other than their mothers. Even young immigrant women are becoming more vulnerable to injuries on outside arenas. Their identities as mothers and spouses are losing their self-evident values as their world views are "detraditionalized". They are losing the sense of "stability", protection and respect which were part of their mothers' lives. Hence, Mira's daughter will hardly accept the same conditions, as her mother did.

This situation is mirrored in the emergence of younger women's protest against generational authority and their husbands' patriarchalism as well as against sources of control and dominance in society at large. So far, such protest has taken on sporadic and individual forms, but it is acquiring an ever more organized character. Yet organized movements among immigrant women are not likely to replicate the forms and strategies of Scandinavian feminist movements. Rather, a new consciousness and new female movements will emerge from ethnic female networks in the immigrant communities.

"Ethnic Publics":
Four Becoming Two?

We have described how Wallachians and Macedonians were confronted with Danish and Swedish working collectives and public arenas. Analyzing these confrontations, we discussed how "two became four"; i.e. how four distinct patterns of integration developed within the "zone of the local public" in
Scandinavian society. We further analyzed how these four patterns were connected with different forms of domestic, gender and generational relationships.

Synthesizing the results of this analysis, we may conclude that in one important sense “four” has again merged into “two”.

Two of the groups—Wallachians in Denmark and Macedonians in Sweden—were marked by the emergence of what we have called an integrated “ethnic public”. We could define the emergence of an “ethnic public” as the carving out of a relatively stable field for autonomous public life by an ethnic group. The experience of the “Swedish” Macedonians—the “Yugoswedes”—demonstrates that “ethnic publics” can organize under other conditions than conspicuous “urban villages”. The experience of the “Danish” Wallachians shows that “urban villages” can develop beyond traditionalist limitations.

These “ethnic publics” became essential forums by which immigrants could cope with the life dilemmas and ambivalence deriving from their communities of origin and from confrontations with Scandinavian society. Moreover, they became arenas where new definitions of gender and generation relationships could develop, mediated by institutions and social networks of the ethnic community itself. Finally, “ethnic publics” became vectors of social mobility as well as embryonic political fora. They served to channel the energies of immigrant communities bound by “continuing temporariness”, “migrancy” and wounded pride into new, active integration strategies: they became arenas for pursuing societal integration through internal (group) integration. Internal integration included mechanisms for particular forms of vertical group integration. Many of the young immigrants and marginal persons who rebelled against group control and pursued individual careers realized that new “freedoms” were accompanied by new forms of humiliation and feelings of powerlessness. Hence, people like Konstantin and Milorad would “come back” to “reform” their ethnic communities, while themselves gaining positions of authority and respect.

A second merging took place with respect to the two other groups—Wallachians in Sweden and Macedonians in Denmark. Members of these groups were characterized by feelings of ambivalence, isolation and powerlessness. They confronted a conflict between an ever more unrealistic retreat to the Yugoslav “hinterland” versus individual achievement in Scandinavian society. As was the case with Swedish Wallachians, Macedonians in Denmark continued to emphasize “the hinterland” and “return” as the main justification for emigration and as a mythical compensation for failures in Scandinavia. Nevertheless, the story of Ilija’s successful Odyssey is cited as a worthy example of individual achievement for growing generations, although it has not (yet) led him back to “Ithaca”.

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Immigrant Youth: Will They Still Be Dancing?

Most of the immigrants discussed in this book were firmly rooted in the social networks and cultural worlds of their "Yugoslav" hinterland. It remains necessary, however, to discuss future meanings of ethnicity for second-generation Macedonians, third-generation Wallachians and other young emigrants whose bonds to "the hinterland" are more ideological or mythological than rooted in personal experiences and material commitments.

The young immigrants' acculturation without structural assimilation clearly demands a discussion which is both mundane (economic and political) and a problem of cultural identity. For the young Wallachian to whom grandmother's ghost merges with the monsters in a modern video film, for the young Macedonian struggling to reconcile the images of Alexander the Great and John Travolta, "identity work" assumes an importance equal to that of whether they will become unemployed after finishing school.

The economic crisis in the European welfare states is characterized by pervasive restructuring of national economies and labour markets. Like America at the turn of the century, discrimination and negative national stereotypes of immigrants are appearing in a situation marked by the introduction of new technologies, degradation and decomposition of established working class skills, fluctuating occupational hierarchies and a general fragmentation and weakening of the working class. Among immigrants this development has led to disproportionately high unemployment rates (Schierup 1985), deskilling and increased discrimination and stigma. Young immigrants are hit hardest, which makes for the kind of negative experiences which we saw among young Yugoslavs in Scandinavia. These young immigrants live in a class society which is becoming ethnically stratified (Ålund 1985). In this society, perspectives for individual social mobility have become increasingly jeopardized. Reliance on the institutional structure of the welfare state also becomes dubious, as social policies become more restrictive and the welfare safety net less secure. Individual entrepreneurship and "second economy" activities have thus become popular alternatives for immigrants. Yet prospects for success in the second economy are fading as competition becomes stiffer, economic niches are monopolized and an internal ethnic hierarchy develops (Schierup 1986).

The current conjuncture thus places young immigrants in a situation where autonomous political organization appears as a necessary alternative to loyalties of class. This should be seen on the background of the growing fragmentation of old class identities and broad working class loyalties in European society, and in connection with the formalization and centralization of existing political fora. New types of immigrant movements have developed. Such movements are organizing regionally, nationally and even internationally, and increasingly crosscut ethnic boundaries. They are preoccupied
with a variety of political issues, rooted in the sphere of reproduction and local community life, as well as with questions of discrimination and immigrants' status in the occupational and political hierarchies of society.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{The "Identity Crisis"}

The young immigrants' "identity crisis" is more comprehensive than the types of ambivalence felt by their parents. Current debates on Western civilization emphasize the disintegration of public life, "detraditionalization" and a general identity crisis. A classical discussion (Durkheim, Weber, Tönnies) about disintegration of society and the need for new frames of reference was taken up and accentuated by later critics of culture and civilization.\textsuperscript{13} In a contribution to this debate, Cohen & Taylor (1978) point to important changes in everyday existential conditions. People are becoming preoccupied with "identity work" so as to avoid being passively swallowed by an endless stream of pre-manufactured images, meanings and life-styles. The necessity for "identity work" is a modern phenomenon.

We orient ourselves in everyday life by means of a variety of constructions of meaning and behaviour. These constructions form a sort of "paramount reality", the totality of strategies, which we are forced to live with in order to manage the realities of everyday life. Cohen and Taylor call this "reality work". We live in what we conceive as several realities, or "life-worlds". While these life-worlds and contexts are constantly shifting, there seems to be something which we always bear with us—our identity. However, this identity is not immediately given. There is a risk that we just float around in a growing variety of different life-worlds; that we unconsciously adapt behaviour to the rules of the life-world within which we find ourself at the moment. Hence, there is a need not just for "reality work" but for "identity work". In "identity work" we attempt to escape from paramount reality. Such attempts might take the form of extreme preoccupation with one's own body or health, or other escape valves like travelling, hobbies, gambling, risk taking, overwork, drugs, sexual experimentation, "alternative life-styles", social movements, etc. However, within Cohen & Taylor's framework, "identity work" remains no more than just attempts to escape. This is because "identity work" occurs in a historical situation marked by pervasive "detraditionalisation" and by the predominance of pre-packaged life-styles which are bought and sold on the marketplace. For Cohen and Taylor the "escape" becomes the expression of a particular dialectic between real needs and the culture industry's simultaneous articulation and distortion of these needs.

New broader immigrant movements can help integrate the individual's "identity work" with struggles for concrete material benefits, needs and
political influence. In this sense “identity work” among immigrant youth constitutes a long-term survival strategy rather than a fortuitous “escape attempt”. The “identity work” of immigrant youth reflects their access to alternative cultural frames of reference. This understanding of “identity work” is similar to the argument of Ziehe and Stubenrauch (1983). In contrast to Cohen and Taylor, Ziehe and Stubenrauch argue that modern youth has a “border transgressing potential”, which emerges out of spiritual visits into historical, past cultures or contemporary, alternative cultures. This reservoir of alternative knowledge can be activated in new experimental ways and it finds expression in several contemporary social movements. Young immigrants’ access to alternative cultural frames of reference can become resources for developing social and political strategies which give new meaning to integration. As young immigrants “link” alternative cultures, they simultaneously change them and society as a whole.

Experiments and journeys across “the border” are likely to be successful only if one has something fairly stable to return to (Dahl 1984). Rootless men and women cannot interest themselves in the future more than they take interest in the past. New social movements need local ties and obligations which, while constraining the development of a cosmopolitan “world consciousness”, enable people to think about the future in constructive ways instead of giving themselves over to narcissistic despair or cosmic panic. Ideologies of “intimacy” and “localism” can break down homo politicus. Nevertheless, autonomous local organization and attachment to a face-to-face community are preconditions for constructing a public personality and a meaningful political organization.

This is particularly important in evaluating the potential double cultural competence among immigrant youth. Here the “ethnic public” has become the basis for socio-cultural and psychological self-confidence. Ethnic attachment does not contradict the need to regenerate broader political loyalties in society and to control the fragmenting effects of localism. Local attachment and personal links must exist in order to be transcended. The development of localized “counter-cultures” is a necessary basis for the reconstruction of broad alternative cultural and political movements in society. “Internal integration” and the development of immigrant “ethnic publics” are necessary preconditions for an integration in society where immigrants themselves become a political force.

Let us return to the much maligned concept of “tradition”. Without any commitment to one’s “roots”, the ambivalence which characterizes young immigrants’ “acculturation without structural assimilation” can become “a freedom from culture”, where the “liberated” person is expropriated by the structures of domination.

Hence, we can answer the question, “Will they still be dancing?”, by paraphrasing the words of Sergej Djasilev, the founder of Russian ballet, from a conversation with Igor Stravinskij:
"Avantgarde must build on tradition, not to get lost".

Modern youth need old spirits. Vampires can rise again to “dance” with young people and to help them struggle for a better world.
METHODS OF EMPIRICAL ENQUIRY

This book is part of a longitudinal study of a number of aspects of Yugoslav labour migration. We have followed Wallachian and Macedonian migrants for a period of twelve years (1971-1983) studying processes of emigration, immigration, integration and return migration (see References). Anthropological fieldwork has been our main research strategy, but was in 1982-1983 supplemented by a survey in Sweden and Denmark of a sample of Wallachian and Macedonian immigrants. General features of the sample for the survey were presented in Chapter Four.

In previous research we have dealt with the causes and effects of labour migration in local communities in Yugoslavia (Schierup 1973, 1974a, 1974b), the impact of historical-structural factors on processes of emigration and return migration (Schierup 1977, 1982, 1984), the meaning of "the cultural baggage" of groups of immigrants (Ålund 1978, 1979) and theoretical aspects of processes of integration in immigration countries (Ålund 1985).

From 1980 till 1983 we focused our investigation on integration among Yugoslav immigrants in Scandinavia, which makes the central concern of our study the processes of ethnic transformation in the immigration context, with its associated contradictions and dilemmas.

While this is a comparative study of two groups of migrants, we have done the most comprehensive research among the Wallachians. In the present study Wallachians are the main comparative reference group. We did our first field work on Yugoslav migrants in a rural community of northeastern Serbia in 1971 (Schierup 1973). The study was a social-anthropological investigation among Wallachian migrants, analyzing the causes and effects of migration to Denmark and other Western European countries. The study was based mainly on participant-observation. This initial field work was supplemented with field work in Denmark (1973) among Wallachian immigrants. Since then we have lived with the hospitable Wallachian people for a number of shorter intervals during 1973-1983. From 1980 to 1983 research among Wallachian immigrant communities in Denmark was supplemented by parallel research in Sweden.

In Macedonia we made pilot field studies in 1973 (Schierup 1974a, 1974b, 1977) and have supplemented our knowledge with data from Macedonian social research and continuous personal communication with Yugoslav ethnologists, social scientists and migration researchers. Since 1980 we have complemented our data with pilot studies in Denmark and Sweden.

Participant observation was the main field research strategy in all of these investigations. We lived for prolonged periods of time within the social contexts which we have studied, combining first-hand observations of what people do in a variety of social situations with discussions with the same people and
with informed or involved outsiders about the origin, context and meaning of such situations. Finding him-/herself in the position of participant observer the researcher tries to construct analytical models from the raw-materials of his own observations compared with the people's own explanations of their behaviour.¹ What people say they do and why (i.e., their interpretation of ongoing events), could again be compared to the “normative framework” i.e., what people think that they ought to do, which will very often not be what they actually do. By thus confronting our own observations of social situations in a field with the cognitive models of different categories of actors, and the cognitive interpretations of ongoing events with people's possibly diverging ideas of “normative behaviour”, we have a fruitful method for diagnosing important social conflicts and issues of moral interpretation and legitimization of social practice. By systematic analysis and comparison of a series of social situations in the social life in migrant communities, we aim at producing more elaborate hypotheses about the nature of Yugoslav “migrancy” and Yugoslavs' integration into Scandinavian society.

Participant observation was conducted in a wide variety of social contexts and situations in Yugoslavia as well as in Scandinavia: in homes, on street corners, in shops, in pubs, in markets places, at work, in public offices, in immigrant clubs, at major ceremonial gatherings, at the hospital, in schools, in buses bringing people “home” to Yugoslavia for holidays, etc., etc. In combination with participant observation we carried out a large number of interviews with individual informants of different sex, age and socio-economic groups. We recorded their life histories and their social situation in the family and in other fields of social life (personal network, work, education, etc.). We discussed their migration experience with them at great length. Thus, we were able to investigate the reflections of communal history in the lives of different individuals, at the same time as the recording of individual life stories cast a more differentiated light on a common history and the important issues around which this history evolved. It also helped us to see details of a complex and often contradictory present and alternative courses of possible development in the future.

We also employed group interviews. We formulated a number of questions which we “threw out” for discussion in smaller or larger spontaneous gatherings of people, or among groups which we had specially gathered with this purpose. One type of group interview would be with “those who know everything about the place”.² In Yugoslavia we interviewed village leaders, those in local administration, teachers and others who were supposed to have an overview over the social and cultural situation of the community. At the same time, they could give detailed accounts of the social situations of local inhabitants. Such meetings were very productive. People would help one another to recall important information and incidents in the life of the community. They would also check or question the validity of one another's information on the spot. More importantly, they would question one another's
viewpoints, and vivid discussion would evolve around certain important issues. In Scandinavia we arranged similar meetings with people active in the public life of the immigrant communities and discussed migrant experience in general, specific problems of immigrants in various fields of Scandinavian society and questions of organization in immigrant communities. Material from the group interviews was a part of participant observation. We also met people who had participated in interviews while they were in daily settings of family life, work, sport, etc. We were thus able to compare interviews and the discussion during interviews with people's behaviour in everyday situations. This helped us to understand issues of concern and conflict in various social fields.

We complemented our empirical research with a study of the ethno-historical background of the two groups of immigrants using historical and ethnological sources.

We supplemented participant observation and its analysis in depth of a limited number of cases and situations with the collection of survey data. In Yugoslav communities we conducted surveys of household structure, migration patterns and social change and compared the results of these surveys with data from other sociological studies and with data of Yugoslav statistics for national, county and village levels (Schierup 1973, 1974a, 1974b). Of more immediate importance to the present study, however, is a sociological survey which we carried out in Denmark and Sweden during 1983 among Wallachian and Macedonian immigrants in four local communities.

We have tried to present the views and the experience of the immigrants themselves in this study, interpreting these using our participant observation of social situations. We have made only a limited number of interviews with local Swedish and Danish officials in public institutions, trade unions and firms which employ immigrants. Other Swedes and Danes in the communities in question were interviewed randomly on informal occasions. The structural conditions to which our respondents were subjected in their specific local contexts of life and work in Scandinavia are therefore presented mainly in the shape of survey-data. In addition, the survey provided raw material for the construction of statistical models covering several other aspects of the migrant experience in local communities which could fruitfully be related to data from participant observation. The survey data covered questions of family life and family structure, patterns of communication at work and in local residential areas, and questions dealing with the relation of immigrants to "the hinterland". Statistical models constructed from the survey helped give a more nuanced perspective to our situational analysis, revealing certain connections to which we had not been sufficiently sensitive during fieldwork. This led us to modify some of our original hypotheses and formulate new interpretations.
NOTES
CHAPTER 1

(Including front page)

2. From Public Life and Late Capitalism (1984).
3. This development seems to be occurring throughout Europe. A West German study (Mehrlaender 1974) indicates that 87% of Turkish immigrant workers and 64% of all "guest workers" see the need for social, juridical and political issues to be channelled through autonomous immigrant organizations. Political claims of this character have probably advanced farther in several other European countries, especially Britain, Holland and France.
5. See the critical review in Elwert (1982).
6. This is a long established approach in migration research. Cf. Eisenstadt (1954).
7. Research in the Scandinavian context following these lines has been conducted by Henriksen (1983). For a critical view of conclusions drawn on the basis of labour market statistics in Britain see Feuchtwang (1982).
10. A concept developed by Hannerz (1982).
12. Cf. the Chicago sociologists Park and Miller (1925), Wirth (1966) and in Thomas and Znaniecki (1979[1919]). Similar ideas appeared earlier in the writings of Bodelschwingh (1861) who worked among German guestworkers in Paris. See also the discussion in Elwert (1982). For a review and appreciation of the Chicago School's focus on "community" see Stein (1960).
13. See, however, the discussion in Elwert (1982) with special reference to the situation in The Federal Republic of Germany.
14. Elwert, writing in German, uses the term binnenintegration.
15. See further the discussion in Elwert (1982).
16. The anthropology of Africa contains several cases of situation-bound ethnicity linked with internal migration. Referring to Max Gluckman's Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand (1968 (1940)), Mitchell (1968 (1956)) relates the symbolism in ethnic rituals of "recent" origin to the changes that had taken place among ethnic groups in the Copper Belt. Drawing on the symbolism in a dance (the Kalela Dance), Mitchell discusses the relationship between the traditional and the new systems of relations between the ethnic groups concerned. The different symbols in the dance indicate a change in ethnic relations between tribes as they respond to colonialism and urbanization. In this case, ethnicity is a result of the merger of traditional characteristics of different ethnic groups caught in a politically and structurally weak situation. The consequence was that new "broader" tribes were formed in which the former ethnic groups merged into new ethnic units because of the changed social context. New ethnic "boundaries" were then drawn because of the changed socio-economic relations between the tribes and the society at large. The new ethnic units consisted of "broad ethnic groups within the same general socio-economic stratum" (Mitchell 1968:17).
In this example, ethnicity became a situation-bound force and a consequence of urban and industrial development and class conflict.
Gordon (1964) presents a similar example from the American immigration experience in which ethnic membership and class position combined to produce new social groups ("ethelass").
17. Different groups come together out of collective interests which often have a material and/or social basis. These interests are regulated by ethnic strategies which are used as a social
resource to establish contact with the environment, or to achieve objectives which are essential to the group (see Hannerz 1974). We therefore receive cultural "signals" in social strategies which together mark the "boundary line" to the world around (Barth 1969). We usually think of precisely bounded ethnic groups, but in fact these boundaries vary, depending on who is observing, and the historical and social context of the observation (Schein 1972:83).

18. Gordon (1964) focuses primarily on structural background as the unifying factor. "With regard to cultural behaviour, differences of social class are more important and decisive than differences of ethnic groups. This means that people of the same social class tend to act alike and to have the same values even if they have different ethnic backgrounds. People of different social classes tend to act differently and have different values even if they have the same ethnic background" (Gordon:1964:52).

In other contexts, cultural background is stressed as the integrative factor for social groups in different structural situations. Thus, Glazer and Moynihan (1958) argue that there is group volition embodied in ethnic isolation. Ethnicity is a way of preserving some special identity in the midst of an American mass, a way of maintaining distinctive traditions and rituals even after a person has the practical opportunity to "melt" into "average" Americanness.


20. It should be noted that Mayer did his empirical studies before apartheid became instituted as the basis of race relations and labour market in South Africa.


23. Serbo-Croatian: "Jugoslovenski gradani na privremenom radu u inostranstvu".


25. According to estimates from The Yugoslav Embassy and Macedonian immigrant associations in Denmark.

26. Like the ethnic Turks, most Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia are moslems.

27. There are two larger groups of people named "Wallachians" (Serbo-Croatian: "vlasi") in South Slav languages. One is an ethnic minority in the republic of Macedonia. These "Wallachians", however, are more often named "aromuni" in Serbo-Croatian and Macedonian. The other is an ethnic minority in northeastern Serbia. These two groups of "vlasi" exhibit considerable differences, both concerning cultural traits, history and their present position in Yugoslav society. In this study we deal exclusively with members of the group in Serbia. This is the only Wallachian group of immigrants in Scandinavia.

28. According to estimates of the Yugoslav Embassies and immigrant organizations in Denmark and Sweden. The exact number of Wallachians in Scandinavia is not known. This uncertainty is also valid concerning the number of Wallachians in the republic of Serbia. A tentative guess would be about 150,000. In Yugoslav censuses, data on ethnic affiliation are based on personal identification and declaration. Even though the Romanian-speaking Wallachians of Serbia differ culturally from their Serbian neighbours in the same localities, most declare themselves "Serbians". According to the 1981 census only 25,596 persons in Serbia gave "vlah" as their national identity (Petrović 1983). On the other hand the Yugoslav annual statistic from 1984 tells us that as many as 129,613 persons in Serbia declared "Wallachian" as their mother tongue.

29. By using the notion of "practice" we want to stress a dialectical relationship between action and structure in sociological explanation. In other words, in order to explain processes of ethnic transformation we stress the active production of culture, reflecting at the same time the impact of structural conditions in society.

30. Our use of the notion of the "field" is inspired by Pierre Bourdieu (1980).

31. It is in this perspective that Bourdieu (1980) speaks about the "structure" of a field as "a state in a struggle".


33. We have taken the idea of interlocking "subfields" of a wider social field from British social anthropologists studying processes of social change in Africa.

The notion of "social field" was introduced in anthropology by Max Gluckman (1968...
A social field can be defined as a series of interconnected relationships, all of which in some way influence one another (Mitchell 1966). Mitchell speaks about mutually interlinked and interdependent "fields" or "sub-fields" of a total social field. The individual will engage in social interaction within several sub-fields. The totality of types of interaction and social relationships in which he engages within various fields makes up his total social network.

Epstein (1958) sees the social relationships on the African Copperbelt as constituting a "single field" made up of sub-sets of relationships which are internally closely interconnected, but which are relatively autonomous. The domestic set of relationships, for example, is partly independent from the industrial or political set of relationships. Nevertheless, all these "sets" constitute one field in which action in one set may feed back into the others and influence them. Hence, action in the political "set" may influence those in the domestic, etc.

The "complexity" of the social system, i.e., the fact that the same individuals act within several social fields, tends to create uncertainty in defining roles and situations. This produces the observed "inconsistency of behaviour" and forms the basis of a certain "freedom of choice" for the individual (Mitchell 1966). The element of choice varies in importance from one type of social situation to another. Some types of social situation e.g. interaction in a work situation tend to be highly structured:

"... the roles the actors are expected to assume and the norms which define these roles are fairly rigidly pre-determined... But there are other situations with varying degrees of uncertainty of definition open to individuals. In these relatively unstructured situations the actor is able to draw on several definitions of what his role ought to be" (ibid.:59).

However, in the tradition of "interactionalism" and "transactionalism" (Barth 1966) the analysis of social behaviour never passed beyond the borderline between "interaction" among individuals and social practice understood as collective action transforming the conditions of existence of a group or a class of people. In the theoretical and analytical universe of this interactionist extension of structural-functionalism, the "uncertainty of definition" became a residue left behind by structured systems of statuses, roles and norms. Through manipulating these blank spaces, the individual could influence his own position in the system but never change the system as such, except perhaps (in later cybernetically inspired theory) by statistical accident; i.e., as the result of an aggregate feed back of a multitude of individual and uncoordinated choices (Barth 1966).

The theoretical content of the notion of the "field" which we here propose differs fundamentally from the notion of "social field" in British social anthropology. It rejects both the framework of reified norms and roles, and methodological individualism. It is of a fundamentally open ended and dynamic nature. Inspired by Bourdieu, we would rather speak about a field of struggle in a constant process of transformation and redefinition (Bourdieu 1980).
By "magic" is meant a technique that is supposed to achieve its purpose by the use of medicines. "Medicines" are any object in which mystical power is supposed to reside and which is used in magic rites. The operation of these medicines is a magic rite and is usually accompanied by a spell. By "spell" is meant an address accompanying rites and forming an integral part of them. "Leechcraft" (healing) is the treatment of pathological conditions, whether by empirical or by magical means, through physic or surgery. "Divination" is a method of discovering what is unknown, and often cannot be known, by experiment and logic. The instrument is here a human being who is inspired by medicines or by ghosts, or by both. Finally a "witch doctor" is a diviner who is believed to diagnose and combat witchcraft. "Witchcraft" is a supposed psychic emanation from witchcraft substance which is believed to cause injury to health and property, and a "witch" is a person whose body contains, or is declared by oracles or diviners to contain, witchcraft-substance and who is supposed to practice witchcraft.

However, a vraj can also be evil i.e. "the fiancé of the devil", who can produce conflict and quarrels among people, divorces and even death. In this sense the vraj is then a "sorcerer" (ibid.:10), which according to Evans-Pritchard's terminology is any person who possesses bad medicines and uses them in rites of sorcery. But she would usually merit the notion of "witch" as well, as she is inherently evil. The Wallachians believe that the vraj practicing "white" (good) magic is usually quite powerless if confronted with another vraj practicing evil magic. She is very powerful, as she is allied with the "black", i.e. "the devil" (al dracul). The Wallachian vraj, whether good or evil, will usually be a woman, but can also be a man.

6. "Moraj can take up domicile in the bodies of weaker persons—small children or old people. It will creep into their heart and "eat it up". People giving shelter to moraj will start bleeding from their nose. These "weaker" people are relatives of the "wicked" persons, whom the moraj persecutes in order to redress injustices. Moraj can also eat up hearts of domestic animals belonging to its enemies. In extreme cases the vampire might directly attack a former relative and attempt to strangle him or her, but it seldom happens that moraj kills directly. God will not allow the deceased to take the lives of the living" (A local vraj).

7. For further description and for an analysis of the meaning of "vampires" among Wallachian immigrants in Scandinavia see Schierup (1985).

8. The main Ottoman administrative unit in Serbia was the Vilajet. A Vilajet was divided into Pašaluk and each Pašaluk subdivided into smaller units called Nahijas. Krajina was one of five Nahijas in the Pasaluk of Vidin, which was to form part of the first autonomous modern Serbian state in 1917. This region, with Negotin as its central town is still known as the Krajina or Negotinska Krajina.

9. "Vlaški" is used for Wallachian speech by Serbs. The Wallachians themselves also use the term vlaški when they speak Serbian, but in their mother tongue they use the designation "Rumuniesche" (Romanian).

10. "We are Serbians who fled to Romania once upon a time. When we returned, we had forgotten to speak Serbian and had adopted Romanian. Nevertheless, we are still Serbians and Serbian is our real mother-tongue".

When asked who their national legends and heroes are, Wallachians will mention Marko Kraljević and Hajduk Veljko, both legendary heroes of Serbian history connected with the fight for independence against the Turks.

11. Although Wallachians present themselves to outsiders using Serbian family and surnames, they also have specific Wallachian (or Romanian) names for use in the village context, containing a name and a suffix connoting a specific characteristic of some family or household. These labels have been integrated with the Serbian suffix -ic to construct Serbian surnames for use in communication outside the Wallachian village context (e.g. Drakul-ić, Jepur-ović, Čululej-ev-ić). However, in contrast to the Wallachian labels which tend to follow the household or the land the Serbian surnames are inherited in the male line.

12. The Slava is a festival honouring the patron saint of a family. The slava ceremony is specific to the Serbs, and has its origins in a pagan cult. When a Serbian pagan family had been baptized by a Christian missionary in the seventh century this act converted the family's pagan protector god, lar into a Christian saint (NID 1944:288. For a closer description of the important social functions of the slava see Hammel (1968)).

13. See also note 27 from Chapter One.
Before the coming of the Slavs the area of today's Yugoslavia was inhabited by Thracians and later Illyrians. The Illyrians drove the Thracians eastward into the central Balkan regions (east of the Dinaric regions) including the territory that in later history was to become Serbia. The territory of the later medieval state of Wallachia belonged to the Roman empire as a part of Dacia. The old sedentary population, mostly Thracians had been Romanized, becoming a part of Latin civilization (Cirković 1981:142).

About 650 AD the Slavonic tribes were in full occupation of the Balkans. With the exception of some few mountainous areas in the interior and regions and cities of the coastal regions, the Slav newcomers assimilated most of the old inland inhabitants to their own language and culture. In the early period of Slavonic expansion into the Balkans remainders of the old Romanized population were split from each other. When Byzantine armies later came into contact with these remnants of the Romanized autochthonous population, they found them culturally "degenerated", being thus "the same strange barbarians as the Slavonic newcomers" (ibid: 142).

The destiny of the old Thracians, later on largely known as the "Vlach" population is obscure and surely differs depending on their place of residence and the distance to Roman centers. The name vlah (Serbo-Croatian spelling) contains a number of different connotations designating both Romanized populations generally, seminomadic sheepherding peoples, and an ethnically distinct group. Vlah has even other connotations (see Cvijić 1966 and Skok 1971).

The Vlach population of south-eastern mountainous areas of the Balkans (Macedonia, Bulgaria and Greece), who were locally known as Aromuni (serbo-croatian/macedonian) showed themselves to be more persistent as a distinct culture than the more split inhabitants in the area around the Danube (Cvijić 1966. The next chapter discusses the historical background of Macedonian migrants). By the time of Medieval Serbia, some groups of Vlachs had left regions in southern Serbia and moved northeast, crossing the Danube (Cirković 1981:142). There they merged into the process of formation of the Romanians. During the 12th century this Vlach population again migrated east of the Danube, thus giving that region the name of Wallachia.

During the time of Medieval Serbia, Vlasi (plural of vlah) were known as a distinct ethnic group, marked by their subsistence on sheepherding (with primitive herding technology, keeping small sheep with bad wool), differing in early medieval Serbia from the Slavonic population, which was mainly agriculturalists. Practicing transhumance, they moved with their large herds between different pastures depending on the time of the year, thus learning to know wild and distant parts of the country. They were also horse-keepers which made their geographical knowledge wanted and appreciated as they would take care of transport and set up trading caravans. On account of their ethnic specialization special tax regulations were put on the Vlah population in Medieval Serbia. These were levied upon their basic cooperative unit, the katun.

The katun was a cooperative group, around non-permanent (fluent) settlements of vlah shepherders consisting of up to some dozens of families. The katun was organized directly around principles of cooperation rather than according to blood relationships, as was the social organization among the South Slavs. In medieval Serbia the monasteries levied taxes upon the katuns. Taxes were passed on by Vlach leaders, the knez, the primičur and the katunar, and consisted of goods (animals, blankets, etc.) and services like military support and transport (Blagojević 1981:381-83). Numerous slav groups eventually joined the organization of the katun which hereby lost its ethnic purity. The transformation of the old ethnically distinct Vlach organization of the katun went into its final phase by the end of the thirteenth century (Blagojević 1981:382). Skok (1971) emphasizes the distinction between settled and nomadic vlasi, and even the distinction between vlas in medieval Croatia and in Serbia. We shall refer to Skok (ibid.) and Cvijić (1966 [1922]) for closer discussions of these distinctions and even etymological problems connected to the historical meanings of the name "vlah". Here we have focused on the "Serbian" vlasi.

In English language both the name "Wallachian" and the name "Vlach" are used. In the book we have chosen to use the more familiar term "Wallachian" even if the term "Vlach" is more original. Today's Wallachians of the Negotinska Krajina refer to themselves as "vlahe", or "vlaž", the latter even when they speak Romanian (see note 9).

One symbolic ceremony widely practiced in the villages is the parciture, meaning "to share" in Wallachian.
16. I.e., "general", "common".
17. After the river Timok. See the typology of Kostić (1958).
18. In order to avoid fragmentation of land through inheritance, strict birth control (abortions) has been adopted during the last fifty years.
19. Girls are strongly expected to be virgins by the time of their first marriage and get a bad reputation and decreased marital chances if this is known not to be the case. On the other hand they are very early socialized in sexual behaviour through the old practice of stringeane.

Stringeane means to "press" or to "pinch" in Romanian. A mother escorts her young daughter to public dances and celebrations. Here the young lady, carefully dressed up, is shown by the mother to all young potential grooms. The mother chooses the most suitable candidate for her daughter, contacts the young man and tells him that she will acquaint him more closely with her daughter after the dance. If the boy shows interest, all three will meet "somewhere in the dark", and the mother will help to place the hands of the boy on the breasts and other intimate places on the body of the girl. More than this is not allowed to happen. The young ones should only be presented to one another.

20. Milanovic (1965) refers to an 1837 document concerning the struggle of the Serbian authorities against the practice of child marriages. How exactly the situation was at this time is hard to say, but the first Serbian regent, Knez Miloš, stipulated that no man should be allowed to marry before his seventeenth year and no girl before her fourteenth. We ourselves have during the 1980's witnessed several marriages between girls of thirteen years of age and boys of fifteen, so it appears likely seen in retrospect that the ban of Knez Miloš was not very effective.

Milanovic (ibid:??2) notes that in many Wallachian villages, adolescents still comprise almost half of all new marriages. However, a majority of adolescent marriages end up in divorce.

21. See note 18.
22. According to old established customs all siblings inherit land and immovable property in equal proportion. The marriage of younger family members means either the division of the estate through the provision of dowry (land, furniture etc.) or the establishment of a new neolocal household unit and the division of the estate. Dowry is given to outmarrying sons as well as to daughters. The youngest child (son) will remain with the parents in the old household. A low natality has today made the postponement of inheritance post mortem, the statistical rule of the Wallachian village.

For a theoretical discussion of systems of inheritance and especially aspects of the pre or post-mortem transmission of property, see Goody (1962).

23. Young lovers might try to go behind the back of their parents and elope to one of the parties' homes, against the will of their parents. In that case two things can happen. The alliance might soon be thwarted by the elders of one or both families, or it might eventually be accepted as a fait accompli and marriage prettations regulated in retrospect.

24. According to the survey (see Chapter Four and Appendix) undertaken in 1983, the vast majority of households were still three-generation households (almost 85%). Of the younger immigrants from three multi-generational households almost 70% had their parents or parents-in-law living with them in Scandinavia. See further in Schierup (1973) Schierup & Álund (1983) and Chapter Eight.

25. Among children between seven and fourteen years of age born by Wallachian parents in Sweden and Denmark, more than 50% are continuously residing abroad.

27. I.e., rituals marking passage from one stage of life to another (cf. van Gennep 1909).
28. See further in Chapter Nine.

29. A symptom of growing intergenerational tensions and distrust in migrant communities is that a growing number of old people insist that their pomana be held while they are still alive. See further in Schierup (1985).
CHAPTER 3

1. See also note 14 in Chapter 2.
2. The traditional word for “labour migrants” in Macedonian.
4. Growing indebtedness of Turkish landlords resulted in increased exploitation through the share-cropping system called “çiftlik”. See Schierup (1977a, 1977b) for discussion of the çiftlik system and emigration from Macedonia and for references.
5. By Macedonians in Yugoslavia, Macedonians in Bulgaria are usually referred to as the “Pirin” Macedonians and the Macedonians in Greece as the “Aegean” Macedonians.
6. Plural form of tajfa.
7. The habitual Macedonian name for “labour migration”.

CHAPTER 4
(Including front page of Part Three)

2. See also Schierup (1973).
3. According to the 1971 Yugoslav population census.
4. Making up a total sample of 208 persons equally distributed between the two groups and the two countries.
5. This was 91% of the total sample.

CHAPTER 5

1. See Introduction.
4. As implied by for example Kosack (1976) and Morokvašić (1977, 1983).
5. In connection with this we might note, that Macedonian women in Denmark are the group with the best command of the Scandinavian language of the country in which they live of the 8 sex-specific sub-groups.
CHAPTER 6

4. Roads, piped water, sewers, etc.
5. A characteristic of Wallachian labour migration abroad is that married couples have almost universally migrated together. A favorite destination for this migration has been the Scandinavian countries. A major reason given for this is that it was easier to find jobs for women in Scandinavia than in other European countries. See further in Schierup (1973).
6. See Chapter One.
7. Nominally to support their relatives at home.
8. The so called “instruction in the mother tongue”.
9. In contrast to the other three groups, many Macedonians in Sweden had already taken Swedish citizenship. We have no exact statistical data on this point. The sample, however, is based solely on immigrants with Yugoslav citizenship. As many Yugoslavs in Scandinavia hold a *double* citizenship, however, the situation is complicated.
11. See Chapter Three.
12. About half of the surveyed.
13. See also the discussion of attitudes in Chapter Four.
14. The traditional word for labour migration in Macedonian. See also Chapter Three.

CHAPTER 7

1. Hence, the concrete development of gender relationships depends on concrete historical conflicts and antagonisms which characterize the development and structuring of social relationships. See the discussion in Barrett (1980) and even in Ålund (1984).
2. See Chapter Two.
3. We are thinking mainly of dowry (see Schierup 1973). A further security for the bride are the golden ducats, usually paid by the groom to his bride during the wedding. Until recently, these golden ducats, which are worn round the neck on the event of communal celebrations in the village, were the main symbol of status in Wallachian peasant society. The use and ownership of ducats depend on the two households entering the marriage alliance. Sometimes the bride will receive the ducats only as “finery”. In this case the ducats revert to the groom or his family in case of divorce. If her family holds a stronger bargaining position (e.g. when there is a large dowry in land) she might receive the ducats as her personal property. Then she is in a strong position vis-à-vis her husband and his parents, as she will retain both dowry and bride-money from the household in the case of divorce.
4. The vraj was and still is a specialist in carrying out abortions in the villages. However, abortions are now legally done in hospitals, and the vraj’s techniques of abortion have been prosecuted by the authorities. Many privately done abortions in the villages produced serious illnesses or even the death of the women. In spite of this, many women in the villages still prefer to go to the local vraj for an abortion instead of to the hospital.
5. The Wallachian woman was highly respected in her village. The result was often that magical practices, cults and superstitions, but also traditional medical knowledge were maintained by the women. These women had a great responsibility for health care, managed knowledge and the stores of “popular medicine, and the local herbal apothecaries. Serious endemic diseases have usually placed women in an impossible position, objectively seen, as healers. With little possibilities for changing the severe material hardship that was the basis for diseases, care
often lapsed into a belief in help from the higher powers and superstition. But here as well, the magical element has always meant security, and even psychotherapeutic help in the form of the concern of the old wise women.

For connotations of the Wallachian (i.e. Romanian) "vraj" see note 5 from Chapter Two.

6. Young women are strongly expected to be virgins by the time of their first marriage. If this is known not to be the case they get a bad reputation and decreased marriage chances. On the other hand they are socialized very early into sexual behaviour through the old practice of "stringeane", through which mothers compete as quickly as possible to present their young girls as ripe women and coming brides on a strongly competitive "market" (See note 19, Chapter 2).

7. Using the expression of Marjanović (1981). See also Chapter Two.

8. In Denmark 17% of the men in the sample agree to this and 5% of the women; in Sweden 48% of the men and 53% of the women.

9. At least to consume and to decide on the family budget. See also the discussion about emancipation and "pseudoemancipation" of immigrant women in Ålund (1978).

10. For discussion of household and village among the Wallachians see Chapter Two.

CHAPTER 8

1. 47% soon, 22% under certain conditions, and 22% are undecided. Only 5% think they shall not return.

2. See the analysis of family and household relationships in Chapter Two.


4. The place where we made the survey.

5. By "language", we mean Serbian rather than Romanian.


7. See the critical analysis of conditions for reintegration of returning migrants in Yugoslavia by Schierup (1982).


CHAPTER 9

(Including front page of Part Four)


3. From "Towards Understanding Peasant Experience" (1978).

4. Referring to the various national and ethnic groups (Serbo-Croatian: "narodi i narodnosti") united into the Yugoslav community of nations.

5. The 29th of November is the National Day of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

On that day, forty years ago (1943), The Supreme Council of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army (Serbo-Croatian: Antifašističko Veće Narodnog Oslobodjenja (AVNOJ) =
"The Antifascist Council for Popular Liberation") held a meeting of historical importance in the small mountain town of Jajce (Bosnia) in the midst of the partisan war against fascist occupation. The meeting laid down the first constitutional foundations for the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

(For a detailed account of the history of the foundation of Socialist Yugoslavia see Branko Petranović and Čedomir Štirac, Belgrade 1977).

Today, almost forty years after the end of The Second World War and the National Liberation War in Yugoslavia, the anniversary of the constitutional meeting in Jajce is still the most celebrated occasion throughout Yugoslavia and in thousands of Yugoslav emigrant associations and clubs throughout Western Europe. It is the major symbol of the “unity of diversity” in this multinational conglomeration of Europe’s “unresty corner” (the term coined for the Balkans during the years preceeding The First World War). It is a symbol of “unity, brotherhood and solidarity” of “the nations an nationalities” of Yugoslavia and of the continued sense of belonging to the country of origin among hundreds of thousands of migrant workers and their families abroad.

6. The name of the town is fictive, but the situation is very typical, although we have changed details.

7. Fictive name.

8. Serbo-Croatian: “Ziveo dvadesetdeveti novembar! Živela Titova Jugoslavija!

9. Fictive name.

10. “Kolo” (litterarily “circle” or “wheel”) is the name for chain dance in Serbo-Croatian. The chain dance is called ore in Wallachian (Romanian: hora).

11. One of the researchers.

12. Serbian folk hero.

13. The man who threatens to leave his woman can be hit by impotency. Preconditions are that he believes in the supernatural powers of the vraj (see note 14) and that he knows that sorcery is being practiced against him.

The wife must capture her husband’s sperm (which presupposes that they still have sexual intercourse with one another). With a little sperm in a container the woman goes to the vraj, who locks a padlock around the container and in this way “locks up” the sperm. Upon this the vraj will practice her spells and make magic signs. If this does not help and the man continues his threat to divorce, the woman is ordered to fix a thread under the elastic of her husbands undershorts and to leave it there for a week. She is to collect the hair left after her husband has shaved himself. With the hair, the thread and a new portion of sperm, she again visits the sorcerer, who will again lock up everything. If the man leaves or deceives his wife, the spell will be enforced and he will turn impotent outside the house (she has locked him to herself). If the woman keeps the sperm, another vraj might be able to help the husband regain his potency. If the deceived wife wants revenge, she will throw the container into the sea or into a lake. Then no power can save him, and his scrotum and belly will become “blown up with plagues”. He cannot go to any woman, and he might even die.

14. The vraj is usually an older woman with special knowledge of traditional ritual and magical practices, medicines and divining. There are both “black” (evil) and “white” (good) vraj’s. For connotations of vraj in more detail, see note 5 from Chapter Two. The evil “vraj” is the “fiancé of the devil”, and is known to be able to produce, “divorces, revenge, aboritions and the death of people”. The good one is foremost a “family therapist”, a “psychoterapist” and a “doctor” in traditional disguise. She works to reunite people and to cure problems of the mind or body. The same person can sometimes be both an evil and a good vraj, depending on the situation (Source: interviews with local vraj in Scandinavia and Yugoslavia).

15. The name of the client.

16. It is believed that the world beyond is cold and dark (Zecević 1978:393).

17. See the detailed description in Zecević (1978).

18. Our translation from Serbo-Croatian.

19. The main part of the pomana among the Wallachians is the sacred meal. Among the Serbs it is usually the only ceremony. By means of this collective meal, to which as much family, as many neighbours and friends as possible are invited, all food and drink on the table is sent to the deceased. Hence, one should eat and drink as much as possible, and nothing ought to be left over. See the detailed descriptions and the analysis in Zecević (1978).
20. *Pomane* are celebrated on the day of death, the first Saturday after death, after 40 days, 6 months and one year after death. Especially interesting is the fortieth day *pomalla*. Until that date, the soul of the deceased has been obliged to visit all places on which it wandered about during life.

21. This is the maximum of time which a sinful soul could remain in misery, having fallen down in the abyss over which leads a narrow bridge between this world and the world beyond. See Žečević (1978).

22. Different stages in the composition of households connected to the life cycles (birth, growing up, marriage, aging, death) of individual household members. See Goody (1958).

23. Direct translation of the Serbo-Croatian word *zavet*.


25. The witch-doctor or diviner. See also notes 5 and 14 in Chapter Two.


27. By the time of emigration in the late 1960’s many older and middle-aged men and women still wore clothing made of homespun and home-woven material from the household’s own sheep or cotton crop.


## CHAPTER 10

1. See the argument of Bourdieu (1980).

2. Workers’ collectives, trade unions, firms, wholesalers, housing.

3. The notion of “urban villagers” in studies of the integration of immigrants was introduced by Gans (1962), describing the traditionalistic character of immigrant ghettos in American cities.

4. In Sweden, the so called “Alby model”, is a much debated methodology of social work, operating with conceptions of “social networks” and “community self-help”. This model, which has for some years been practiced among immigrants and Swedish working-class families in some new suburban parts of the Stockholm region, is heavily inspired by modern American conceptions of social work. For an account of the ideological foundations and conceptions of social work of the “Alby model” see Forsberg and Klefbech (1980). For an exemplary sketch of neo-liberalism and corporatism in the context of the crisis of the welfare state see Keane (1984).

5. See for example the critical analyses by Lasch (1977) and Keane (1984).

6. For an excellent analysis of modern techno-bureaucratic representations of immigrants in France see Grillo (1985).


10. For a general discussion of the situation of immigrants on the labour market during the present crisis see Schierup (1985, 1986).


12. The development of new ethnic and immigrant movements could be discussed in the wider perspective of the so called “crisis of legitimacy” (Habermas 1973) in “late capitalist” society and the opposition between “autonomous social movements” and welfare state bureaucracies. To speak of “late capitalism” is “...not to anticipate an apocalyptic breakdown of contemporary capitalist societies in the not-too-distant future” (Keane 1984:110). It is, rather to indicate the difference between these later societies and their earlier liberal counterparts. It is also to indicate that amid the irrationalities and failures of bureaucratic planning, “mass loyalty resources are in danger of being exhausted and cannot be readily renewed within the confines of the system” (ibid.).
For a comparative discussion of social movements in Sweden and Denmark, see Eyerman & Jamison (1985).

13. E.g., Riesman, Fromm, Coser, Marcuse, Sennett, Lasch.
16. Sennett (1977) sees the hypertrophy of an ideology of “intimacy” and “localism” in modern capitalist society as a corollary to “the fall of public man”. Politics has become a question of personal style and personal identification (i.e. “intimacy”) between subjects and rulers. The capacity to enter into broader impersonal (class and ethnic) loyalties and to pursue common, collective interests in society is replaced by an ideology of “community”; homo politicus is transformed into a navel contemplating narcissist personality. Sennett argues that in the name of removing barriers between people, this narcissism and the “community” ideology can be mobilized as a weapon against a society whose greatest vice is seen to be its impersonality. The results of this will be to increase fragmentation and to transpose society’s structures of domination into psychological terms (ibid:336).

APPENDIX

2. Serbo-Croatian: “poznavaoci prilika”.

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