‘New Europeans’ For the ‘New European Economy’: Citizenship Discourses and the Lisbon Agenda

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Abstract
Combining insights from critical discourse analysis (CDA) and neo-Gramscian IPE theory, this paper puts forth a cultural political economy (CPE) perspective to analyse the discursive articulation of ‘European subjects’ in the context of the EU’s Lisbon Agenda modernisation strategy. It is suggested here that the transformation proposed in Lisbon to the new economic imaginary of the knowledge-based economy (KBE), depends on ‘new subjects’ and thus new discursive constructions of identities to reflect the new economic and social formations it envisions. The citizenship discourses of two of the Lisbon Agenda’s main supporters, specifically European business lobbies (represented by the ERT and LCEC) and the EU Commission, are examined in order to explore the relationship between citizenship rights and responsibilities and the two main goals of the Agenda, namely economic competitiveness/growth and social inclusion/social welfare protection modernisation. The argument is made that the discursive articulation of a ‘neoliberal communitarian’ variant of citizenship, especially evident in the discourses of the EU’s business lobbies and the EU Commission since the ‘shift’ to jobs and growth in early 2005, represents an attempt to further the commodification of the EU polity, and as a result, subordinate the more social goals of the Lisbon Agenda to the perceived imperatives of economic growth and competition. The Lisbon Agenda does not therefore mark a dramatic ‘turning point’ in favour of a more ‘social Europe’ as was speculated early on, but instead works to consolidate the dominance of ‘embedded neoliberalism’ as the socio-economic governance model for the EU. The paper ends with a discussion of the possible counter-hegemonic movements challenging the orthodoxy of embedded neoliberalism and neoliberal communitarian conceptions of citizenship.

Keywords: European Citizenship, Lisbon Agenda, EU Transnational Business, European Commission, Critical Theory, Cultural Political Economy, Neo-Gramscian IPE, Discourse Analysis, Embedded Neo-liberalism, Neo-liberal Communitarianism
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Part I - Outline of the Research Project

1) Introduction/Aims of Study

The European Union’s Lisbon Agenda is conceived in this study as representative of the most current ‘phase’ of the EU integration process. Indeed the Agenda, which was laid out in the spring of 2000 at the European Council meeting in the Portuguese capital, is no doubt significant in its calls for a “radical transformation of the European economy”, with the stated goal of making the EU the most “competitive and dynamic knowledge based economy in the world” by 2010. While broad and ambitious, the Lisbon Agenda is characterised by two main goals of economic competitiveness and growth on the one hand, and improved social cohesion and social protection through a “modernised” European Social Model (ESM) on the other. Both goals are underscored by a need for ‘more and better jobs’ within the Union.

In the words of Bob Jessop, this phase of EU integration and the vision of a European knowledge-based economy that is evoked represents a “new economic imaginary”. Thought of in such terms, the Lisbon Agenda entails a “re-thinking of social, material, and spatio-temporal relations among economic and extra-economic activities, institutions and systems and their encompassing civil society”. While the new economic imaginary of the knowledge economy has been invoked in many different nation-states, the Lisbon Agenda marks the first efforts at establishing this imaginary at the regional level. Thus as a new economic imaginary, the Lisbon Agenda is not simply an EU-based accumulation strategy, but a broader strategy with wider implications for the socio-economic governance of the EU as a whole.

Considering the potential significance of the Lisbon Agenda for the EU polity, we must investigate the broad, and as some would argue vague, nature of the new economic imaginary’s goals. After all, as has been demonstrated elsewhere, terms like ‘economic competitiveness’ and ‘social cohesion’ are highly contested with a variety of interpretations, especially amongst the EU member states. The Agenda as set up in the spring of 2000 should as such not be viewed as a

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2 It should be noted that although the Lisbon Agenda eventually added a third main goal of ‘environmental sustainability’ at the Stockholm Council meeting of 2001, it will not be considered within the realm of this study.
concrete, set-plan for the EU and its member states to implement, but as a dynamic, contingent and malleable strategy that will only find precise meaning once social actors begin to espouse their own interpretations of it.

Thus in the parlance of post-structuralist discourse theory, the Lisbon Agenda to some degree represents a floating signifier, “open to different ascriptions of meaning” and subject to a discursive struggle amongst social actors. One way in which to explore this discursive struggle is through an analysis of the discourses of citizenship surrounding the Lisbon Agenda. After all, as Norman Fairclough explains, new economic imaginaries, and the new economic and social formations they carry with them, depend on ‘new subjects’ and thus new discursive constructions of identities to reflect the new order in which they envision. If, as Chantal Mouffe suggests, “the way we define citizenship is intimately linked to the kind of society and political community we want”, and if in turn, as Bryan Turner suggests, “whatever forces push modernization forward also develop and expand citizenship”, then an examination of the citizenship discourses of the EU’s modernisation strategy should give us a clearer indication of the underlying ‘social purpose’ and precise meaning of the Lisbon Agenda.

Citizenship will be considered at a most basic level in this study as the concept that defines the relationship between civil society and the state and which expresses the obligations and duties (rights and responsibilities) of civil society and state to each other. Defining citizenship in such a way allows us to emphasise how the concept can take on an array of meanings depending on the way it is articulated within any new economic imaginary. Relating the concepts of economic competitiveness and social inclusion to the rights and responsibilities of citizenship is effective in helping us map the movements and potential contradictions of the Lisbon Agenda goals.

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Central Aims

The central aim of this study is to explore how the concept of European citizenship is articulated in the Lisbon Agenda discourses of the European Commission, as well as two of the main private business actors supportive of the Lisbon Agenda strategy, namely the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), and the Lisbon Council for European Competitiveness (LCEC). It is hoped that while citizenship cannot tell us everything about how the EU polity is governed, it can provide us with a relatively broad and multi-dimensional analytic concept for understanding socio-economic governance in the EU.

I use the term socio-economic governance as it is used by Bastiaan van Apeldoorn to denote a wider conception of governance that includes not only the public policies of EU institutions (which include a multi-tiered dimension involving national and local governments), but also the institutions and associated practices of civil society (among them, lobby groups and private forums). The notion of socio-economic governance also includes “the ideological and discursive underpinnings” that underlie polices and practices in the state-civil society complex of the EU. Thus the basic assumption made here is that these actors, which find themselves bound together in a campaign to promote the 'modernisation' of the EU through the auspices of the Lisbon Agenda, play a crucial role in this socio-economic governance, and their agency plays a key role in determining whether or not the reforms suggested under Lisbon are realized in policies of the EU.

At a broad level then, the aims of this study will aid us in understanding how the European Union and certain elements of business interact in the integration [modernisation] process, and as well, in understanding how they formulate new identities within this new economic imaginary, and attempt to draw on public support in the process. The history of previous economic imaginaries in the EU have demonstrated, from the inception of the EC with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in the 1950s to the establishment of a European Monetary Union in the late 1990s, that there has been “no lack of political conflict between the goals of social welfare and promoting capital accumulation”. At the level of the EU this conflict has resulted in what Fritz Scharpf has described as an asymmetrical favouring of negative

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11 I am grateful to Bastiaan for clarifying the concept in personal correspondence (12 April 2005)
12 Hansen, Peo with Carl-Ulrik Schierup (2005), p. 4
integration [abandoning controls over economic activity] over positive integration [market-correcting mechanisms]. This asymmetry, argues Otto Holman,\(^4\) when considered at the level of the different European states, results in a situation of ‘asymmetrical governance’ whereby the (re)regulation of economic and monetary matters at the EU level leads to the deregulation of social welfare at the national level.

In relating this notion of asymmetry to EU citizenship we find that certain citizenship rights and responsibilities have been extended to the supranational level to compliment and enhance already existing negative integration (the free movement of people to compliment the free movement of goods, services and capital), yet at the same time the extension of social citizenship rights associated with positive integration at the supranational level has occurred only to facilitate labour mobility.\(^5\) Asymmetrical governance further exacerbates these matters as EU deregulation and austerity measures put a further strain on the social rights of citizenship associated with the national welfare state, with little compensation provided at the supranational level.\(^6\) It goes without saying that the limited nature of EU citizenship has as a result ineffectively addressed the very issues of EU-legitimacy it was set up to solve.\(^7\)

Yet as some argue, the Lisbon Agenda marks some sort of turning point for EU-level social policy and the associated matter of social citizenship.\(^8\) According to Martin Rhodes,\(^9\) the Lisbon Agenda represents a substantive effort by the EU to address the asymmetry of the integration process through a pragmatic “Third Way” plan that balances economic reform with a serious dedication to creating a ‘social Europe’. In the Commission’s own words, the EU is to become the best at both the firm and the daycare.\(^10\) With this comes a policy discourse of “a


\(^5\) Hansen, Peo (2000) “European Citizenship”, or Where Neoliberalism Meets Ethno-Culturalism: Analysing the European Union’s citizenship discourse, European Societies. 2(2)


\(^8\) Wincott, Daniel (2003) ‘Beyond Social Regulation? New instruments and/or a new agenda for social policy at Lisbon’, Public Administration. 81(3). It should be stated here that one will find a lack of mention of the Lisbon Agenda’s open method of coordination (OMC) for social policy in this study. This is for two reasons: first, because of space constraints and the limited scope of this argument, and second, because there has been a large amount of research already conducted as regards the OMC, especially from the Foucauldian tradition.


\(^10\) Nilsson, Ylva (2002) ‘EU-ländernas mål med Lissabonstrategin: EU ska bli bäst på både företagende och dagis [EU member states’ goal with the Lisbon Strategy: The EU will be best at both business and daycare]’, Europa-Posten. No. 3, p. 4; my translation from Swedish
unified account of equality and responsibility”, which Rhodes argues “bridges the traditional concerns of egalitarians and conservatives by embracing both the individual and collective rights and responsibilities of citizens”.  

The central argument underpinning this study, following a cultural political economy tradition, is that the social goals of the Lisbon Agenda (social inclusion, poverty reduction, modernisation of the ESM) will be ineffective if, as in past economic imaginaries, they are subordinated to the imperatives of economic growth and competition. More specifically, following the argument of Étienne Balibar, this study suggests that one of the main obstacles (or as Balibar would have it, ‘impossibilities’) preventing the realization of a democratic and legitimate European citizenship has been the lack of an “extension of social rights and [...] possibilities for intervention in the regulation of the economy” at the European level. The discourses surrounding the Lisbon Agenda provide us with one avenue in which to explore whether or not this ‘impossibility’ noted by Balibar can be overcome. Before exploring these matters in more detail, an explanation of the theoretical framework under which the problem is undertaken will be offered.

2) Meta-Theoretical Considerations

In order to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework for this study, the theory section will be divided into three parts. First an explanation of the meta-theory guiding this study will be offered. Second, a critique of the mainstream theories of EU integration will proceed based on our established meta-theoretical premises. Third, an attempt will be made to develop what I deem to be a ‘cultural political economy’ perspective for the study of European integration, formed through a critical engagement between neo-Gramscian international political economy (IPE) and critical discourse analysis (CDA).

The meta-theoretical level of this study follows a critical international relations (IR) theoretical framework. Critical IR theory arose in the 1980s as a response to the ‘structural dogmatisms’ of neorealism and structural Marxism. A wide range of theorists, including Robert Cox, Andrew Linklater, Richard Ashley, and Mark Neufeld, began to question the knowledge claims and ontological focuses of the more dominant theories of IR. While the relationship between critical IR theory and the critical social theory associated with the Frankfurt School is

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21 Rhodes, Martin (2000), pp. 2-7
22 Balibar, Étienne (2004), pp. 162-3
less than clear, the work of Robert Cox follows the classical work of the school’s Max Horkheimer in distinguishing critical theory from problem-solving theory, or as Horkheimer called it, traditional theory. Following Cox’s now famous dictum, “theory is always for someone and for some purpose”, we can differentiate between the epistemological and ontological claims made by problem-solving and critical theorists.

Problem-solving theory, according to Cox, “takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action”. The general purpose of problem-solving theory is to work within the established status quo to correct disfunctions and problems in relationships and institutions in order that they run more effectively. Critical IR theory, on the other hand, “does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing”. Thus the social purpose of critical IR theory is to offer a historical analysis that questions the ‘common sense’ continuity of realist assumptions in the hopes of offering a guide for alternative possibilities to the dominant world order.

In terms of epistemology, problem-solving theory operates, following the natural sciences, under a Cartesian dualism that assumes that thought and being and the subject and object of inquiry can be separated in order to analyse ‘objective’ behaviour. Hence in operating under a positivist epistemology, problem-solving theories argue that theory in general must be ‘value free’; that theorists must study the world ‘out there’ obtaining an ‘objective knowledge’

31 Horkheimer, Max (1972), p. 231
whilst abandoning any bias that may distort the scientific observation.\textsuperscript{33} Social scientific enquiry is therefore modeled after the methodological frameworks developed in the natural sciences.\textsuperscript{34} Problem-solving theory is empiricist to the extent that it prioritizes measurement and observation, isolating variables to test ‘falsifiable hypotheses’ allowing the theorist to gather concrete, objective data.\textsuperscript{35}

Stemming from this positivistic epistemology is a positivistic ontology based on ahistorical, individualistic and behaviouralistic assumptions.\textsuperscript{36} Consequently problem-solving theories take the position that human nature, history and reality are relatively fixed concepts that exist \textit{a priori} to our collective experiences of them.\textsuperscript{37} When applied to the level of international relations, problem-solving theories operate within an anarchy \textit{problématique}\textsuperscript{38} that leads to \textit{ceteris paribus} assumptions about human nature\textsuperscript{39}. As an example, realist theorists argue that the anarchic, self-help environment of international politics creates a struggle for power and security among nation states.\textsuperscript{40} States are conceived as individualist actors within the anarchic structure, and the domestic character of states is unimportant in the international realm because all states, acting within the international environment, rationally seek to guarantee their own security in the absence of a dominating international authority.\textsuperscript{41} This structural nature inherent in international politics runs through history and is taken to be the natural order of things.

Critical theorists, in opposition to problem-solving theorists, reject the notion that social-scientific inquiry can imitate the natural sciences in forming value-free analyses. For critical theorists, an attempt must be made to overcome the Cartesian dualism of problem-solving theory through the employment of a hermeneutic epistemology, and the recognition that knowledge is always embedded in social and political life, and as a result political itself.\textsuperscript{42} Critical theorists argue that even a theory that claims to be value-free is latently normative and “value-bound” to the extent that it “implicitly accepts the prevailing order as its own framework”.\textsuperscript{43} With this in mind, critical theorists pose that the purpose of knowledge, following the classical insights of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33} Devetak, Richard (2001), p. 157
\item \textsuperscript{34} Linklater, Andrew (1990), p. 9
\item \textsuperscript{35} Ryner, Magnus (2002) \textit{Capitalist Restructuring, Globalisation and the Third Way}. London: Routledge, p. 195
\item \textsuperscript{36} Cafruny Alan W. & Magnus Ryner (2003), p. 2
\item \textsuperscript{37} Gill, Stephen (1993a), pp. 22, 27; Cox, Robert W. (1986), p. 209
\item \textsuperscript{39} Cox, Robert W. (1986), p. 208
\item \textsuperscript{40} Linklater, Andrew (1990), p. 8
\item \textsuperscript{41} Linklater, Andrew (1990), p. 12
\item \textsuperscript{42} Devetak, Richard (2001), pp. 157-9
\item \textsuperscript{43} Cox, Robert W. (1986), p. 209
\end{itemize}
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Karl Marx\textsuperscript{44} in the \textit{Eleven Theses on Feuerbach}, should be used not only to understand the world, but also to change it.

Although not taking the prevailing world order as 'given', critical IR theory must be careful not to ignore the 'real world' it is presented with,\textsuperscript{45} and must instead offer possibilities for change within the prevailing order.\textsuperscript{46} This is achieved through immanent critique for the purposes of identifying "social power relations that are preventing humans from reaching their aspiration of self-expression and adequately achieving their needs".\textsuperscript{47} Critical IR theorists employ an "intellectual conceptual 'mapping' to historically examine human social relations and their contradictions and movements".\textsuperscript{48}

In ontological terms, the alternative ontology of critical theory contrasts with that of problem-solving to provide a more dynamic, reflexive and historical framework designed to offer ethical, theoretical, and practical dimensions for the construction of an alternative world order.\textsuperscript{49} The critical perspective employed by Stephen Gill\textsuperscript{50} offers three assumptions that nicely frame the ontology of critical IR theory in general:

1) the recognition that social reality is transient, and because history is ever-changing, is conditional;

2) the conditionality of ontology means that no single ontology can adequately explain social reality over widely differing periods, although for explanatory purposes, comparisons of these periods can be made;

3) in any historical situation, social action is constrained by structures that are not fixed, but appear to be of necessity. These perceived structures of necessity are transcended through “consciousness and political will” or by “natural or quasi-natural forces such as ecological degradation”; but even these natural forces “entail a human response to their repercussions”.

More specifically, in taking a historicist perspective, critical theorists involve themselves


\textsuperscript{45} Devetak, Richard (2001), p. 161

\textsuperscript{46} Gill, Stephen (1997), p. 15


\textsuperscript{48} Ibid, p. 35

\textsuperscript{49} Gill, Stephen (1993a), p. 22

in examining how historical structures come into being and how they are transformed through human agency. In this way, critical IR theory is inspired by the French historian Fernand Braudel, who holds that any historicist perspective must not only involve itself in the examination of certain short term historical events [l’histoire événentielle], but must also consider how these events are conditioned by historical structures built up over a long time span [longue durée].

History is viewed as moving through a “dialectic of duration” under which structures are transformed through a dialectic interplay between the immediacy of l’histoire événentielle and the long-term (seemingly permanent) longue durée. In order to then adequately address the structure and agency debate, critical IR theory departs from the reductionism of purely structuralist (focusing on structures) and intentionalist (focusing on agency) positions in suggesting that neither structure nor agency should be considered as ontologically prior to the other. Instead, critical IR advocates “a historically grounded conception of the dialectic totality of structure and agency”.

Following Robert Cox, historical structures can therefore be defined as “persistent social practices, made by collective human activity and transformed through collective human activity”. This view of structure and agency is analytically useful in explaining the role of ideas (agency) in social practice, yet at the same time recognizing how they are shaped by embedded structures. Although structures are not considered by critical IR theorists to have physical existence, they do produce “real, concrete effects” that provide a framework for action for individuals and groups.

3) Critique of EU Integration Theories

With these meta-theoretical premises established, we are now in a position to critique the more dominant, problem solving approaches to EU integration, namely neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. The contention made here in this section rests on normative concerns that

because the debate between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism ultimately focuses on “whether EU integration is controlled by nation-states or is driven by a functionalist logic leading to supranationalism”, both theories tend to focus on the ‘form’ at the expense of the ‘content’ of EU integration, and as a result abstract the EU polity away from its social purpose and social base. This leads to a common, and rather narrow problématique whereby “power and special interests are strictly contained in the discrete realm of (inter)state affairs”, and questions of democracy and legitimacy are of secondary importance. Both thus operate within what was mentioned above as Richard Ashley’s “anarchy problématique”.

**Neofunctionalism**

In general we can say that neofunctionalist theory conceives the process of EU integration to be “gradual and cumulative”, or as some critics argue “automatic and unidirectional”. Central to neofunctionalism’s understanding of integration is the ‘logic of spillover’: in essence, this suggests that politics follows after economics, as cooperation in matters of ‘low-politics’ creates the need for supranational institutions to oversee inter-state economic arrangements. This in turn eventually leads to political cooperation in matters of ‘high politics’, and a loyalty transfer takes place away from the traditional nation state towards a supranational authority, as it is increasingly viewed as the more important focal point for social groups to apply their pluralist lobbying and input to the now more meaningful supranational arena.

**Intergovernmentalism**

Intergovernmentalism, closely related to neorealist IR theory, marked a highly critical response to neofunctionalism, seeking to recapture a state-centric paradigm for the explanation of EU integration. This meant adopting the neorealist assumptions that states, as the only significant

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59 van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan, Overbeek, Henk & Magnus Ryner (2003), p. 19
62 Ibid, p. 60
63 Ibid, pp. 55-7
actors, interact in rational self-interest within an anarchical global environment. In particular, intergovernmentalism cast a critical eye on the logic of spillover “and the implication of automaticity it conveyed” by arguing that areas of ‘vital national interest’ in the realm of high politics were essentially out of bounds for integration. Meanwhile areas of ‘low politics’, although indeed subject to integrative tendencies, were cast in terms of bargaining and convergence in state-preference formation, whereby cooperation in areas of economics (and the creation of supranational institutions that it implies) actually reinforces national state sovereignty.

Critique

While the debate between these two theories has formed the reference point for much theoretical discussion regarding EU integration, both have also been subject to critique by theorists wishing to go beyond empirical argumentation about the precise form of the integration process to analyse the ‘social purpose’ of EU integration. While the pluralism of neofunctionalism seems to suggest a pertinent role for transnational societal actors, Bastiaan van Apeldoorn et al argue that these actors are not viewed as playing an autonomous role, but rather “are instrumental to the self-expansive process of spillover, and hence to the achievement of […] a European supranational state”. Furthermore, these authors make the case that pluralism, as defined by neofunctionalism, makes no effort to conceptualise the unequal social power relations inherent in society, nor an understanding of how these groups succeed (or fail) in influencing the integration process. It is thus a “sociologically thin” conceptualisation of transnational civil society actors as rational economic agents caught up in the expansionary logic of integration.

Intergovernmentalism, for its part, calls for the ontological primacy of rational nation-states in the EU integration process, and as a result, neglects altogether the role of civil society in influencing EU integration. Stanley Hoffmann, one of the key early theorists within intergovernmentalism, makes this point clear in suggesting that the process of integration “has to wait until the separate states decide that their peoples are close enough to justify the setting up of

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64 Rosamond, Ben (2000), p. 131
65 Ibid
67 van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan, Overbeek, Henk & Magnus Ryner (2003), pp.21-22
68 Ibid

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This suggests that member states, acting as ‘gatekeepers’ guarding national sovereignty in the process of EU integration, act in a rational way to limit cooperation to a level satisfactory to their domestic populations. This view proves problematic as state interest is construed as a unitary matter, thereby neglecting the possibility of domestic social struggle over the integration process, and at the same time ignoring fundamental issues of domestic legitimacy that arise in relation to EU-level policy convergence.

New Integration Approaches: Beyond the Impasse?

In recent years there has been exciting theoretical innovativeness in EU integration studies that has attempted to move us past the impasse between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. For the most part, these attempts have manifested in two ways: the first endeavours to find a more sophisticated ‘middle-ground’ mode of analysis between the rationalisms of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, and the second, which seeks to move outside this dominant framework in offering constructivist alternative modes of explanation.

The ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’ work of Andrew Moravcsik encapsulates one important example of the former, while the latter has been formulated by social constructivist approaches to EU integration, and also the more critical ‘small c’ constructivism of neo-Gramscian IPE theory. Whatever the case, it is evident that the field of EU-studies has in recent years started to become more receptive to theoretical developments that have been at play in other fields since the

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71 Andreas Bieler has demonstrated how Swedish and Austrian neutrality were undermined by EU membership, and this formed a key issue amongst different forces at the domestic level. The eventual accession of these two nations in 1995 also goes against intergovernmentalist assertions about political integration in politically sensitive areas. See Bieler, Andreas (2000) *Globalisation and Enlargement of the European Union: Austrian and Swedish Social Forces in the Struggle Over Membership*. London: Routledge


4) Cultural Political Economy and European Integration Theory

This section will propose a ‘multidisciplinary’ approach to EU integration, combining elements of neo-Gramscian IPE\(^7\) theory with critical discourse analysis (CDA). In order to follow our meta-theoretical premises, while at the same time avoiding eclecticism, we will outline the premises of these theories, and remain sensitive to critiques that have arisen towards them. The combination of insights from both of these strains of thought produces a ‘cultural political economy’ (CPE) perspective to the study of EU integration.

Neo-Gramscian IPE was pioneered by Robert Cox in the early 1980s, and is influenced by Gramsci’s analysis of capitalism in the 1920s and 30s, but also by a range of other theorists, including Fernand Braudel, Karl Polanyi, and Karl Marx. Stating the theoretical premises and offering a critique of neo-Gramscian IPE theory is difficult considering that there is no single reading of Gramsci’s work, and therefore no single neo-Gramscian IPE perspective.\(^7\) We can however assert that any neo-Gramscian IPE perspective concerns itself with the study of historical structures, or “persistent social practices, made by collective human activity and transformed through collective human activity”,\(^8\) by giving equal weight to the analysis of three categories of forces (ideas, material capabilities, and institutions) that interact within three interrelated spheres of activity (social relations of production, forms of state, and world order).

While neo-Gramscian IPE has been applauded for offering rich historical analyses of ‘world orders’, and for broadening the study of IPE beyond the traditional separation of politics from economics,\(^8\) the theoretical framework(s) have not gone uncriticised. The works of Bob Jessop, Ngai-Ling Sum, and Marieke de Goede in particular have offered insightful, sympathetic critiques of neo-Gramscian IPE. In short, these three authors\(^8\) still see three tendencies that point

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\(^7\) Alan Cafruny & M. Ryner (2003), p. 1

\(^8\) While most problem-solving approaches will define the discipline of IPE as the study of the politics of economic decision making, the critical perspective employed here follows Robert Cox in defining IPE as the study of the “historically constituted frameworks or structures within which political and economic activity takes place” (Cox 1995, p. 32)


\(^8\) Cox, Robert W. (1987), p. 4


\(^8\) The following list is an amalgam of the three authors criticisms as found in Sum, Ngai-Ling (2004), ‘From ‘Integral State’ to ‘Integral World Economic Order’: Towards a Neo-Gramscian Cultural International Political Economy’, Cultural Political Economy Working Paper Series. Lancaster: Institute for Academic Studies at Lancaster University. Available at: [http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/ias/polecon/](http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/ias/polecon/)
toward a remnant of ‘economism’ in neo-Gramscian IPE; these tendencies include:

1) Class-reductionism: ‘over-privileging class over non-class identities and interests in the analysis of power and institutions’; viewing class identity within the realm of the objective forces of production

2) Neglecting ideas: privileging material capabilities and institutional power over ideas; treating ideas as stable and fixed in ‘ideational terms’ while neglecting their ‘practical and discursive nature’

3) Neglecting civil society: focusing on political society at the expense of civil society; in turn, neglecting the role that ‘private’ discourses play in governance

In order to address these criticisms, this study follows the above authors in suggesting that neo-Gramscian IPE can benefit from an engagement with the path-breaking advances that have been made within the field of discourse theory and analysis. Jessop and Sum have made a particularly convincing case for a ‘multidisciplinary’ perspective employing the insights of neo-Gramscian IPE with critical discourse analysis.

Critical discourse analysis (CDA), most commonly associated with the work of Norman Fairclough, goes especially far in addressing our concerns since it is first multidisciplinary in nature, and is second careful to assert that discourse is a social practice in a dialectical relationship with other (material) aspects of social life; CDA therefore denies, like neo-Gramscian IPE, that everything in social life is reducible to language.\(^{83}\) Discourse, according to Fairclough, refers to language in a general sense,\(^{84}\) and in order to explore its relation to materiality, he examines not only texts and the discursive practices associated with language production, but also with “the larger social context that bears upon the text and discursive practices”\.\(^{85}\) Critical discourse analysis therefore argues that discourse, in order to be a meaningful analytical concept within the social sciences, must be linked to the idea of power,\(^{86}\) and thus to the agency of social actors that employ discourses ideologically,\(^{87}\)

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\(^{83}\) Fairclough, Norman (2003), p. 2

\(^{84}\) Ibid (2003), p. 214

\(^{85}\) Sum, Ngai-Sum (2004), p. 5


\(^{87}\) Philips, Louise & Marianne Jørgensen (2002) Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method. London: Sage, p. 63; Ideology is used in a positive sense implying a set of beliefs, rather than in a negative way which
a historical structure. This ontological premise makes critical discourse analysis inherently multidisciplinary in its insistence that discourse analysis be combined with other elements of social theory.\(^8^8\)

Like neo-Gramscian IPE, critical discourse theory has been subject to various criticisms. According to Jacob Torfing,\(^8^9\) CDA is limited to the extent that it is unclear as to the relationship between discursive and non-discursive elements.\(^9^0\) Furthermore, as Philips and Jørgensen explain, it is left unanswered how one demonstrates empirically a dialectical relationship between different social elements, and in addition, how to demarcate between these two corresponding elements, where and how the discursive and non-discursive influence and change each other.\(^9^1\) To take the economy as an example, it is problematic to determine whether the ‘economic’ aspect of social life is non-discursive in the sense of running on its own logic, or whether the economy is in fact a discursive construction formed through the intersubjectivities of human meaning-making.\(^9^2\)

By formulating our alternative perspective on European integration, and relating it to our subject matter, an attempt will be made to address the criticisms associated with neo-Gramscian IPE theory and CDA. As advocated by Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum, a cultural political economy approach, combining the insights of neo-Gramscian IPE and CDA, will be offered to the study of European integration within the specific realm of this study’s subject matter. Our alternative problématique, as stated in the introduction, is to understand and explain how discourses on citizenship are indicative of the broader ‘social purpose’ of the new economic imaginary of the Lisbon Agenda; and second, how these discourses on citizenship, as a key aspect of legitimation, are articulated by both private and public actors supportive of the new economic imaginary to secure the support of other elements of civil and political society. We must therefore develop a theoretical framework that reflects this subject matter by justifying theoretically how

suggests manipulation.


\(^9^0\) Torfing’s critique is based on a post-structuralist understanding of discourse as inspired by Laclau and Mouffe. Because of limited space, we cannot delve into the differences between these two traditions, nor can we discuss the potentialities that post-structuralist work may have vis-à-vis IPE. We can however note that in terms of actual analysis, the difference between the two traditions is small. Therefore many of the concepts and strategies developed by Laclau and Mouffe are useful within a CDA framework.

\(^9^1\) Philips, Louis & Marianne W. Jørgensen (2002), p. 89

\(^9^2\) Ibid, p. 90
our actors (the ERT and LCEC as well as the Commission) and citizenship discourses relate to the European integration process as manifested in the Lisbon Agenda.

**The Hegemony of Production and the Production of Hegemony: The KBE as a new economic imaginary**

Neo-Gramscian IPE perspectives have in the past concentrated on what Ngai-Ling Sum calls the “hegemony of production” (or “the relative domination of a production order or accumulation regime, i.e. Fordism”) at the expense of the “production of hegemony” (or, “the processes and mechanisms in and through which ‘political, intellectual, and moral leadership’ is secured in and across the differentiated and dispersed organizations and institutions of civil society and articulated with the apparently autonomous production order”). By instead taking the production of hegemony as our point of departure, it is argued here that we are able to address many of the criticisms leveled against both neo-Gramscian IPE and CDA.

It should at this point be noted that the concept of hegemony as employed in this study, inspired by Gramsci, differs significantly from its usage by neorealists, “in which a hegemonic state controls and dominates other states and the international order thanks to its superior amount of economic and military capabilities”. Instead Gramsci considered both the consensual and coercive aspects of hegemony. As Robert Cox explains, hegemony prevails “to the extent that the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront […]. Coercion is always latent but is only applied in marginal, deviant cases”. Our purpose here must then be to explain and understand how an order becomes hegemonic at the level of the European Union.

**The EU as a ‘Novel Polity’**

Firstly, again borrowing from Gramsci, this study considers the EU as an ‘integral state’, which is more than just the political society, or the public “apparatus of government”, but also consists of the private element of civil society. While the EU should not be conceived as a state

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93 Sum, Ngai-Ling (2004), p. 2
96 Cox, Robert (1993), p.52
in the national sense, it can be defined, as James Caporaso makes clear, as an “ongoing structure of political authority and governance”. The EU can therefore be thought of as a socially constructed capitalist economic and political space under which various economic, political, and intellectual forces present rival economic imaginaries for the socio-economic governance of the EU. Economic imaginaries can be conceived of as rival projects that seek to (re)define specific subsets of economic activities as subjects, sites, and stakes of competition and/or as objects of regulation and to articulate strategies, projects and visions oriented to these imagined economies.

The economic imaginary of the knowledge-based economy evoked in the Lisbon Agenda at the level of the EU polity is supported by various forces that seek to mobilize elite and/or popular support behind this imaginary against rival, competing imaginaries. Our task is then to analyse within the ‘state-society’, or political-civil society relations of the European Union, the social and political forces supportive of the Lisbon Agenda and their strategies employed vis-à-vis this new economic imaginary.

**The Social Force of Capital and the New Economic Imaginary**

By using the “production of hegemony” as our point of departure, we attempt to address the charge of class reductionism that is often leveled against neo-Gramscian IPE theorists. The accusation often emanates from an insistence that the social relations of production, and the power that derives from them, gives historical content to any nation-state. The EU as a capitalist economic space, according to neo-Gramscian IPE theorists, thus creates the structural potential for the classic structural division of capitalism based on a ‘logic of exploitation’: the capital-labour division where private ownership of the means of production divides society into a minority group of capitalists which own and control the means of production, and a working class that is forced to sell its labour as a commodity on the open market.

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100 Jessop, Bob (2004)
Yet beyond this, as Marieke de Goede\textsuperscript{103} explains, the “processes of identification are not exhaustively determined by material circumstances, but have to be articulated through contingent and political discourses”.\textsuperscript{104} For our purposes then, we must adopt a heuristic class model, and follow E.P. Thompson in suggesting that class “happens when some men (\textit{sic}), as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs”.\textsuperscript{105}

Secondly, following Bastiaan van Apeldoorn\textsuperscript{106}, I argue that although ‘the social’ is not exhausted in an examination of the social relations of production, they are “still primary in the production and distribution of wealth and thus central to both the constitution of forms of social power and the question of socio-economic content”. We must therefore be careful not to reduce all facets of identity to class identity, and must instead locate class identity within the rubric of social forces, which include various identities (ethnic, nationalist, gender), and be sensitive to how these identities, like class, “derive from a common material basis linked to relations of exploitation”.\textsuperscript{107}

Thus in order to achieve a broader conception of the integral state, the ERT and LCEC are conceived as significant private (civil society) actors that conform to our class model as planning forums for the European capitalist class. This categorization is true to the extent that members of these forums “own and/or control substantial income-generating assets at the expense of others – through expropriation, unpaid (or surplus) labor, or unfair competition” and/or form part of a managerial cadre of the capitalist class “in imposing the discipline of capital on workers and on society at large”.\textsuperscript{108} Both have privileged access to key European elites, especially national and European-level politicians and members of transnational economic forums, and as well, both share a privileged access to some of Europe’s largest media outlets, including the European edition of the \textit{Wall Street Journal}.

With this in mind it is important not to think of the LCEC as traditional lobbies that seek to advance single or limited-issue agendas, and should instead, as Andreas Bieler\textsuperscript{109} argues, be thought of as platforms for organic intellectuals seeking to “formulate a coherent hegemonic project for transnational European capital”. The ERT and LCEC are hesitant themselves to the

\textsuperscript{103} de Goede, Marieke (2003), pp. 89-90
\textsuperscript{104} de Goede, Marieke (2003), p. 90
\textsuperscript{106} van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan (2001), p. 88
\textsuperscript{107} Morton, Adam David (2003), p. 159
\textsuperscript{108} Holman, Otto & van der Pijl, Kees (2003), p. 73
\textsuperscript{109} Bieler, Andreas (2003), p. 12
label of ‘lobby group’, and instead prefer to think of themselves as citizens groups with broad agendas. Nevertheless for the sake of practicality and simplicity, this study will refer to them cautiously as EU business lobbies. As well, since our heuristic class model recognises the limits to a simple labour-capital dichotomy, the ERT and LCEC, with their ‘global’ outlooks and interests, are best situated within what Bastiaan van Apeldoorn has called the ‘transnational fraction’ of European capital or as part of a transnational business elite. They maintain a global outlook, seeking to increase Europe’s competitiveness in the world market, particularly by comparing the European market with that of the United States. Although these business groups are not the only important actors emanating from the civil society of the EU, they are amongst the most prominent.

The EU Political Society: The Commission

The Commission for its part is central to our analysis of the EU polity as the EU institution that represents most clearly the idea of a European political society, with some going as far as to call it Europe’s government-in-waiting. The Commission, as an institution of political society serves an integral role in “stabilizing and perpetuating a particular order”. Institutions in this case “reflect power relations”, and are amalgams of ideas and material capabilities, but at the same time take on a life of their own and reflect back on and have the ability to influence material capabilities and ideas. Therefore, although the European capitalist class has been supportive of the Lisbon Agenda as the EU’s new economic imaginary, this does not mean that it holds the same vision for the attainment of the Lisbon Agenda goals as the Commission. The institutionalization of particular amalgams of material capabilities and ideas relates closely to the Gramscian notion of hegemony, yet the ways in which a hegemonic project is manifested in any historical structure requires further explanation.

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111 van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan (Forthcoming 2005)
113 Cox, Robert W. (1986), p.219
114 Ibid (1986), p.219
Citizenship Discourses and ‘Mass Politics’ and the Historical Bloc: From Accumulation Strategy to Economic Imaginary

Finally, in order to address the charge that neo-Gramscianism neglects ideas and that CDA is not clear on the relationship of discursive to non-discursive we introduce the Gramscian concept of the historical bloc. In order for a new economic imaginary to be effective, it must go beyond “narrowly economic matters” (or what Gramsci called the ‘economic-corporate level’), to the ethico-political moment of “mass politics in broader civil society”. This is the point at which our use of discourses on citizenship as our analytical focused becomes justified in the overarching theoretical framework: as Magnus Ryner and Alan Cafruny explain, the idea of citizenship represents Gramsci’s ethico-political moment “par excellence”.

In the case of the European Union, the shift from the economic-corporate to ethico-political dimension (and thus to hegemony) cannot be based merely on economic factors alone, and requires “the introduction of new, compatible identities to achieve coherence within the emerging European social body”. This coherence can only be achieved through a political discourse that presents itself as ‘mass politics’: the most effective way to do this is to evoke the idea of putting forth a political project that appeals directly to ‘the people’; where the idea of a ‘people’s Europe’ is upheld. As a result, citizenship discourses can give us a clear indication of the ethico-political strategies (involved in the ‘production of hegemony’) employed by various social forces.

Social forces that are successful in expressing a ‘coherent’ hegemonic fit between the ideological and material foundations of their new economic imaginary, and between the mass politics of civil society and the political society of the EU, have their hegemonic project materialize into an ‘historical bloc’. At a basic level, a historical bloc “is an alliance of classes or fractions of classes, which attempts to establish a particular form of state and/or world order preferable to them”. However, a historical bloc is more than just an alliance of social forces, and rather represents “the solid structure of political society and civil society […] in which precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are the form”.

Thus the concept of a historical bloc allows us to theorize the economy not as a separate,
strictly non-discursive element operating by its own logic, but rather as a distinctive element within which discursive constructions attempt to lend legitimacy to certain economic forms vis-à-vis a coherent, broad-based ideology within civil and political society.\textsuperscript{122} Thus in order to be effective (and legitimate), and to form a hegemonic historical bloc, a new economic imaginary “must, together with associated state projects and hegemonic visions, be capable of translation into a specific set of material social, and spatio-temporal fixes that jointly underpin a relative \textit{structured coherence} to support continued accumulation”.\textsuperscript{123}

To sum up our purpose then, we are seeking to understand how certain private social groups employ new economic imaginaries that go beyond a narrow economic accumulation strategy to the ethico-political level of mass politics (through an appeal to citizenship). We must probe as to how this strategy interacts with the political society of the EU (in this case the Commission). We are thus involving ourselves in the analysis of citizenship discourses in order to determine the relationship between a social force from civil society, and the political society of the EU in the strategic mobilization of a new economic imaginary based on a knowledge-based economy for the European Union. The new economic imaginary of the knowledge-based economy invoked by the ERT and LCEC need not be the same as that of the Commission, yet the examination of the discourses of both of them will help us to determine whether the new economic imaginary of Europe’s transnational business elite has structural coherence as a historical bloc in the socio-economic governance of the EU.

\textbf{5) Methods and Methodology}

With the theoretical aspects of the study now clear, we must ground our epistemology and ontology in a methodological framework, and in the process, develop a methodology that adequately addresses our theoretical aims.\textsuperscript{124} It should first be noted that this study follows the idea that no attempt should be made to establish (or to draw upon) an “all-embracing” methodological framework for the study of discourse. Instead, in keeping with our critical, reflexive, and historicist approach, the way we go about study the empirical material should be “left up to the individual researcher’s own creativity and discretion”.\textsuperscript{125}

As far as empirical materials are concerned, this study will analyse all of the documents

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{123} Jessop, Bob (2004), p. 166; my emphasis
\item \textsuperscript{124} Gill, Stephen (1993a), p.44
\item \textsuperscript{125} Hansen, Peo (2000) \textit{Europeans Only? Essays on identity politics and the European Union}. Umeå: Umeå UP, p. 31
\end{itemize}
(communications, press releases, white papers, green papers, letters, speeches, etc.) produced by the ERT, LCEC, and Commission concerning the Lisbon Agenda that include some form of citizenship discourse. The citizenship discourse need not directly refer to the ‘citizen’ as such, but might involve discourses that are “notable for being implicated in establishing and maintaining identities and relations of citizenship as well as people’s views of what these are and might be”.126

The temporal frame for the analysis of these materials begins in early 2000 with the introduction of the Lisbon Agenda at the Lisbon European Council Meeting, until mid-2005, with special emphasis on the discourses on citizenship and the Lisbon Agenda since the nomination process began for the Barroso Commission in 2004.

**Methodology and ‘Empiricism of the Surface’**

Aside from these practical matters, following William Walters,127 I argue that in “exploring the changing ways in which European integration has been ‘said’ […] can tell us much about the ‘how’ of European governance”. In particular Walters, in following Nikolas Rose,128 suggests that we involve ourselves in an ‘empiricism of the surface’, not in the sense of measurement and calculation, but which attempts to identify “what is said, how it is said, and what allows it to be said and to have an effectivity”. In order to achieve these goals, I propose two modest, yet effective discourse-analytical strategies, comparison and multivocality, that will address the subject matter.

**Multivocality**

The analytical strategy of multivocality delineates between what are seen as different voices or discursive logics in a text.129 This follows the assumption made by Norman Fairclough that a “rough idea” of these different voices and discursive logics in a text can be established before beginning a discourse analysis.130 After this has been established, Philips and Jørgensen explain,131 the researcher must ask: “What characterizes the different voices of the text? When

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130 Fairclough, Norman (2003), p. 47
does each voice speak? What meanings do the different voices contribute to producing?”. For our purposes, the different discursive logics, or the interdiscursivity\textsuperscript{132} of a text is of most importance. The determination of the interdiscursivity of a text involves plucking out the ‘main themes’ that are represented within a specific text and open “to a range of different perspectives, representations, different discourses”\textsuperscript{133}.

Within the Lisbon Agenda, we have a rough idea of the discourses that will be drawn on based upon the two main ‘themes’ of the strategy: economic competitiveness and social cohesion; these two goals thus represent an economic competitiveness and a social cohesion discourse, both of which are broad and open to differing interpretations. Therefore in relation to discourses on citizenship, these two ‘master discourses’ will frame the citizen or subject in certain (perhaps different) ways. It is thus our purpose to establish how both master discourses (in the texts of the ERT, LCEC, and Commission) articulate the concept of citizenship. Instead of making a claim to privileged knowledge of this subject, we can employ this ‘modified ideology critique’ in a way that highlights possible congruences or contradictions in the representations of citizenship within these two master discourses. All in all, the interdiscursive articulations of citizenship offer one way of exposing any “potential contradictions” at play between the Lisbon Agenda’s economic and social discourses.\textsuperscript{134}

**Comparison**

As Philips and Jørgensen make clear, the discourse analytic strategy of comparison, used to compare one text to another, offers an effective and simple way to build an impression of a text.\textsuperscript{135} In relation to this study, the method of comparative analysis also allows us to conceptualise any comparisons or differences present between the discourses of the EU’s business lobbies and the Commission. This should not be viewed as an attempt to establish any cause and effect relationship, one side influencing the other. However, once we have established the nature of the multivocalities of both the transnational business elite and the Commision, the method of comparison will give an indication as to what extent to the articulation of citizenship in this group from civil society is similar to that of the political society of the EU.

This is significant because it may indicate the degree to which the discourses on

\textsuperscript{132} Philips, Louis & Marianne Jørgensen (2002), p. 73
\textsuperscript{133} Fairclough, Norman (2003), p. 129
\textsuperscript{135} Philips, Louise & Marianne Jørgensen (2002), p. 149
citizenship (and subsequently the ‘new economic imaginary’) of Europe’s transnational business elite have been institutionalized in the socio-economic governance of the EU. This analytical method may be limited in the sense that we cannot ‘prove’ that the agency of this particular social group has had a certain effect on the Commission\textsuperscript{136}, but if there are fundamental similarities in the discourses of these actors, it provides a powerful statement in the sense that both, as significant political and social forces, share similar interests and agendas. In Gramscian terms, it may point to the creation of a historical bloc, or at least a power bloc that succeeded in institutionalising a ‘new economic imaginary’ for the socio-economic governance of the EU.

With these theoretical and methodological particulars in place, we can now delve into the heart of the empirical analysis.

\textsuperscript{136} van Apeldoorn (Forthcoming 2005)
Part II - Analysing the Citizenship Discourses of the Lisbon Agenda

1) New Economic Imaginaries and the Subject: Preconstructing Citizenship Discourses

Following the work of Fairclough et al., our analysis treats discourses on citizenship as a “communicative achievement” in an “attempt to get us away from preconceptions about what citizenship is, and force us to look at how it’s done - at the range of ways in which people position themselves and others as citizens in participatory events”. Nevertheless as these authors also recognize, basing their work on the theoretical insights of Pierre Bourdieu, our analysis of citizenship must also recognize how citizenship discourses employed by these agents draw on previous citizenship discourses, and are dialectically influenced by preconstructions of citizenship. Instead of taking the concept of citizenship as given, sketching the preconstruction(s) of citizenship allows us to identify and characterise “the process whereby the term […] has been given some determinate and/or functional meaning”.

Thus remaining consistent to our metatheoretical premises on structure and agency, our task is to explain how our agents (and their discourses) interact with and are informed by preconstructed citizenship discourses, upon which they then draw from. This is not to say that our actors will have nothing new to say or to add to our collective understanding of the concept of citizenship, but that they are inevitably forced to engage with past conceptions in order to forge their own conceptions of citizenship.

Following Colin Hay’s definition of citizenship “as specifying the relationship between the state and civil society, as expressing the obligations and duties of the individual ‘citizen’ within civil society to the state, and of the state to its ‘subjects’”, we find a long and diverse lineage of preconstruction which our actors can draw upon in the European context. Operationalising this definition, we see that the preconstruction of citizenship in the European context is informed by a rich historical tradition, and also diverse (and often conflicting)

138 Ibid
139 Ibid
traditions emanating from the Union’s member states.\footnote{Bellamy, Richard, Castilgionone, Dario & Emilio Santoro (eds.) (2004) Lineages of European Citizenship. Rights, Belonging and Participation in Eleven Nation-States. New York: Palgrave}

The development of citizenship in the European context is often traced back to the ancient Greek city-states (Aristotle’s idea of ‘civic duty’),\footnote{Hay, Colin (1996), p. 66} and later to the French Revolution (‘civil and political rights’).\footnote{Marshall, T.H. & Tim Bottomore (1992) Citizenship and Social Class. London: Pluto Press, pp. 9-10; Dell’Olio, Fiorella (2005) The Europeanization of Citizenship: Between the Ideology of Nationality, Immigration, and European Identity. Ashgate: Aldershot, p. 17} Yet for our purposes, the most important preconstructions of citizenship emanate from the ‘modern’ era of citizenship and correspond to distinct new economic imaginaries. Instead of focusing on ideal type models of citizenship as possible preconstructions, we will instead relate our discussion to concrete historical situations where citizenship has been employed within various economic imaginaries.

At the national level these include: first, T.H Marshall’s post-World War II thoughts on citizenship and their association with post-war Fordism; second, the rise of the ‘Third Way’ and its citizenship conceptions with its relation to the post-Fordist national era. Lastly, our preconstruction of citizenship cannot avoid a discussion of the development of the EU’s own distinct supranational citizenship, particularly in its association with the re-launch of the EU integration process from the mid-1980s. Though these models do not offer an exhaustive treatment of the preconstructed categories of citizenship, they do serve as three necessary examples that are particularly relevant to the topic at hand.

\textbf{The Post-WWII Era: Fordism and T.H Marshall’s National Citizenship Model}

The most influential modern thoughts on citizenship derive from T.H. Marshall’s \textit{Citizenship and Social Class}, an academic work that is still the “central point of reference for much current debate”.\footnote{Hay, Colin (1996), p. 66} In this text written in 1950, Marshall outlines a historical analysis of the development of national citizenship (focusing on the UK), and argues that national citizenship has witnessed a continual progression for 250 years. The progression, according to Marshall, occurred as people gained civil rights in the eighteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth, and social rights in the twentieth. The twentieth century realisation of social rights, which Marshall associates with “the educational system and the social services”,\footnote{Marshall, T.H. (1992), p. 8} represents an important evolution of capitalist social relations that have been developing since the Middle
Marshall’s rights-based views on citizenship are, as Colin Hay\(^ {146} \) argues, inextricably reflective of the post-war period of British reconstruction. Citizenship in the post-war period, especially in its emphasis on social rights, was part and parcel of a new economic imaginary for the post-war period characterized by nationally-based Fordist forms of production, the development of the ‘welfare state’, and was coupled with the “greatest boom in economic history”\(^ {147} \). As Bob Jessop\(^ {148} \) explains, for the developed capitalist societies of Western Europe and North America more generally, the post-war period and the Fordist accumulation strategy:

> [b]enefitted from a spatio-temporal matrix based on the congruence between the national economy, national state, national citizenship, and national society; and from institutions relatively well-adapted to combining the tasks of securing full employment and economic growth and manage national electoral cycles

The development and congruence of national citizenship to the Fordist model was ensured by what Jessop\(^ {149} \) has called the Keynesian Welfare Nation State (KWNS), which corresponds directly to Marshall’s notion of social citizenship as enshrined in the ‘social rights’ of national citizens.\(^ {150} \) Hegemony was secured under this economic imaginary through a ‘conjectural fit’ between Fordist forms of production, ‘consensus’ corporatist bargaining between labour, business, and the state,\(^ {151} \) and an ‘embedded liberal’\(^ {152} \) international finance regime in Bretton Woods which made states accountable to both their domestic populace and to an international system of fixed exchange rates and capital controls.\(^ {153} \) The social citizenship model as conceived of by Marshall was thus key to the hegemony of this economic imaginary, so much so that he believed the development of social citizenship had led to class abatement and a crucial element in the legitimation of social inequality in capitalism.

Marshall’s theory has been criticized on many fronts, especially for offering and

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\(^{146}\) Hay, Colin (1996), p. 66  
\(^{149}\) Jessop, Bob (2002)  
\(^{153}\) Cox, Robert (1987), pp. 254-255
‘evolutionary’ view of citizenship that glosses over gender and racial oppression,\textsuperscript{154} but that also offers an ambiguous explanation of the relationship of citizenship to capitalist forms of accumulation.\textsuperscript{155} This ambiguity is best exemplified by Marshall’s\textsuperscript{156} claim that “citizenship and the class system have been at war”, while at the same time asserting “that citizenship has itself become, in certain respects, the architect of legitimate social inequality”. Nevertheless this optimism and ambiguity in Marshall’s work reflects the ‘common sense’ of the post-War Fordist period.

**Post-Fordism and the Third Way Response: A Third Way National Citizenship Model**

If Marshall’s views on citizenship are taken as exemplary of the post-War Fordist milieu, then the rise of the national Third Way models and their accompanying thoughts on citizenship in the 1990s points to a response to the decline of the post-War period, and the rise of what has been deemed a new era of post-Fordism. The Third Way conceptions of national citizenship serve as an important pre-construction for our discussion because, as Martin Rhodes suggests, the Lisbon Agenda is an attempt to apply a Third Way model at the regional level of the EU.\textsuperscript{157} The term Third Way requires some explanation as it has been used over a wide historical time-span to denote a wide range of national projects in a variety of different forms.\textsuperscript{158} Yet in this case the Third Way refers specifically to the academic work associated most closely with British sociologist Anthony Giddens, and ‘officially’ in Europe by political projects of Tony Blair in the UK and Gerhard Schröder in Germany.

According to Giddens, the Third Way, in its current manifestation, is a project that seeks to ‘modernise’ social democracy in “the advent of global markets and the knowledge economy, coupled with the ending of the Cold War”.\textsuperscript{159} The basic argument of Third Way proponents is that the postwar Fordist compromise is no longer tenable in the wake of these structural changes, and that we must instead “introduce a different framework, one that avoids both the bureaucratic, top-down government favoured by the old left and the aspiration of the right to dismantle

\textsuperscript{156} Marshall, T.H. (1992), pp.7,19
\textsuperscript{157} Rhodes, Martin (2000)
government altogether". In short, technological advances have made the traditional Fordist model of production and the traditional welfare state obsolete, and in light of more ‘flexible’ post-Fordist economies government policy must be re-designed in order to remain competitive and flexible, while at the same time ensuring that ‘traditional’ social democratic values, such as solidarity, liberty and social justice are upheld.

The Third Way project also envisions a specific role for the citizen within the post-Fordist era, and unlike Marshall’s view of citizenship which seems to suggest an unconditional right to social citizenship, the Third Way argues that there “can be no rights without responsibilities”. The postwar emphasis on the rights to social citizenship have created a situation of moral hazard, which Third Way proponents argue, must be overcome by a critical view towards the ‘unconditional’ social citizenship provisions of the traditional welfare state. This critical view of the unconditional rights of the welfare state is based on an argument that “those who profit from social goods should both use them responsibly, and give something back to the wider social community in return”.

This conception of citizenship, as Nikolas Rose points out, redefines citizens not as social beings as in traditional social democracy, nor as rational creatures in purely neoliberal terms, but as ethical individuals who hold the responsibility of building a responsible society based on a “community-based ethic”. The community-based ethic will be ensured by a move from ‘risk minimization’ under the traditional welfare state to ‘risk management’, whereby citizens take charge of their own well-being as risk-taking, entrepreneurial, and active citizens. Governments still play a key role in regulating and deregulating, yet it is argued that ‘universal social safeguards’ often subordinate certain values, “such as personal achievement and success, entrepreneurial spirit, individual responsibility and community spirit”, while at the same time elevating rights above responsibilities, so that a person’s duties to “family, neighbourhood and society” are often “offloaded onto the state”.

In this sense, the Third Way is best thought of, as Hans-Jürgen Bieling has so

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164 Giddens, Anthony (2000), p. 52
165 Rose, Nikolas (2000), p. 1398
166 Ryner, Magnus (2002)
167 Giddens, Anthony (2000), p. 52
168 Blair, Tony & Gerhard Schroeder (1999), p. 3
poignantly noted, as an ideology between neoliberal rationalism and communitarianism. This neoliberal communitarianism implies support for strategies of deregulation and flexibilisation that enhance competition, yet at the same time espouses a communitarian element that will make competitiveness ‘sustainable’ by creating “cohesive civil societies in which people are willing to accept more public duties and social responsibilities”.

The Third Way offers a formidable critique and challenge to the traditional notions of social democracy and social citizenship, however the ideas associated with the Third Way have not been immune criticism themselves. Colin Hay and Matthew Watson are particularly critical of the globalisation discourse of the Third Way advocates associated with New Labour. The transition from Fordism and state welfare in the postwar period to the current period of post-Fordism is conceived of as an inevitable process, as the world economy becomes ‘globalised’, and government has to adjust to compete for the investment of more mobile capital. As Norman Fairclough argues, the Third Way discourses on globalisation thus treat the process as free of social agents, where neither governments nor elements of civil society are held accountable for instigating the process. The seeming ‘inevitability’ of globalisation and the transformation to ‘post-Fordism’ presents itself as creating the only strategic responses to it, with only one social democratic response, the Third Way response, appearing salient.

In terms of its conceptions of citizenship, the Third Way has also met many criticisms. Speaking of the British case, Hartley Dean argues that the mantra of ‘no rights without responsibilities’ has led to an over-privileging of responsibilities over rights, as the Third Way ‘ethic of responsibility’ is conceived of in individualistic terms. Approaching the Third Way from a more critical perspective, Magnus Ryner argues that in attempting to cater to the conflicting demands of neoliberal “economic imperatives, and on the other to imperatives of legitimacy, social representation and civic participation”, the Third Way “functions as an elaborate rationale for mediating and pre-empting social conflicts that may arise from real and concrete cleavages and contradictions”.

Thus, following Stuart Hall, Ryner notes that the Third Way’s attempt to radically modernise society while at the same time avoid disturbing any existing interests cannot be taken

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172 Ibid, p. 151
173 Fairclough, Norman (2003), p. 127
174 Dean, Hartley (2004), p. 75
175 Ryner, J. Magnus (2002), p. 18
seriously as a “[radical] political enterprise”. Ryner’s broader argument is thus that although the Third Way cannot be equated with the neoliberalism of Thatcherism/Reaganism, the particular variant of “a politics of commodification, and a politics of no alternatives” it espouses contributes to the hegemony of neoliberalism by attempting to neutralise antagonisms by broadening and consolidating the appeal of neoliberalism to a broader social base.

Despite the diversity of models and the degree of criticism, the Third Way has asserted itself as a powerful post-Fordist alternative to the ‘common sense’ view of national citizenship espoused by Marshall in the postwar Fordist period. As Blair and Schröder mention in their influential work *The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte*, social democracy based on Third Way models dominated the national governments of EU member states in the late-1990s, and their ability to ‘modernise’ social democracy along the principles of the Third Way has given social democracy a “new acceptance” within Europe. Thus the Third Way and its accompanying views on national citizenship form an important preconstruction for the citizenship discourses of the Lisbon Agenda, which attempts to establish its own Third Way model at the EU level.

**EU Integration and European Supranational Citizenship**

Any discussion of the preconstruction of European citizenship needs to take into account the EU’s own development of supranational citizenship. The preconstruction of EU citizenship is unique in the sense that it does not correspond directly to any ‘academic model’. Nevertheless, by attaching this *sui generis* conception of citizenship to the idea of a new economic imaginary of the re-launch of the EU integration process, we find distinctive traits and criticisms that have arisen in this context.

While the identification of European ‘subjects’ occurred already with the advent of the European Community and the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and is distinctly evident in EC policy discourses since the early 1970s, the major development surrounding EU citizenship did not occur until the re-launch of the EU integration process in the late 1980s and early 90s. The most important developments during this period include the formal introduction of EU citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty, and the ‘rights agenda’ of the Amsterdam Treaty which elaborated on the rights of EU citizens.

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177 Blair, Tony & Gerhard Schröder (1999)
179 Hansen, Peo (2000a), p. 142
How do we explain the historical development of the EU’s own unique supranational citizenship? In keeping with our premise that new economic imaginaries require new and compatible identities to go along with them, we must now identify the changes in the EU that brought along the introduction of citizenship. While the idea of Marshall’s national social citizenship accompanied the postwar Fordist period, and the Third Way ideas on national citizenship have been compatible with the post-Fordist period, the introduction of EU citizenship can be seen as accompanying a particular period in the history of EU integration.

The revitalization of the EU integration process in the mid-1980s is often pin-pointed with the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) and then with Maastricht Treaty (1992), which helped bring forth the completion of the internal market and initiated the European Monetary Union (EMU).\(^{180}\) As Alex Warleigh\(^ {181}\) has succinctly noted, the purpose behind the formal introduction of EU citizenship during this time was to help facilitate the single market and at the same time lend legitimacy to the widening and deepening EU project.

The practical necessities of harmonizing the rights regarding member state nationals may be clear enough in regards to the single market and monetary union, yet the introduction of European citizenship as a source of legitimation within the EU is much more complex. As Giles Scott-Smith\(^ {182}\) explains, the expansion of the EU’s regulatory powers during the re-launch of the integration process incorporates new areas of social life into the EU domain and creates serious questions about the extent to which the EU’s political society is sensitive to the “possibilities for the democratic participation of the European public”.

The famous words at Maastricht which pronounce that a “citizenship of the Union has hereby been established”, have come to form the reference for political and academic debate surrounding the concept of EU supranational citizenship.\(^ {183}\) In the Treaty, provisions are laid out that apply to all member state nationals, and include the right to vote and stand for local and European Parliament elections in the member state in which the citizen resides; the right to diplomatic or consular protection from any Member state government abroad; and the right to petition the European Parliament and EU Ombudsman.\(^ {184}\) As Percy B. Lehning\(^ {185}\) clarifies, the formal introduction of European citizenship in Maastricht marks an “act of symbolic

\(^{180}\) van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan (2002), p. 1
\(^{182}\) Scott-Smith, Giles (2003), p.263
\(^{183}\) Treaty on European Union (1992) (consolidated version), 2002 O.J. (C 325) 5
\(^{184}\) Ibid, arts. 8-8d
importance”, for the first time moving citizenship beyond the context of the nation state.

The Amsterdam Treaty (1997), for its part, expanded and elaborated on the provisions of EU citizenship as established in Maastricht. The Amsterdam Treaty is significant because it clarifies the purpose of the introduction of EU citizenship, its intended purpose being to “supplement and complement the rights conferred by national citizenship”. Aside from this, Amsterdam also provides provisions allowing member state nationals to receive correspondence from the EU institutions in each of the twelve official EU languages, and a provision on education that seeks to promote education through better access and “continuous updating”. While the additions made to citizenship in Amsterdam are not in themselves very significant, Alex Warleigh explains that “people issues” such as the environment, health, and anti-discrimination, were given an indirect boost with such changes as the expansion of EP powers through the extension of co-decision to all areas of social policy.

EU citizenship has been subject to controversy and also to a wide-range of academic criticism. Most of the critics of EU citizenship point to its limited capacities reflecting the priorities of the open market, the uncertain position of third country nationals in light of the legal formalization of EU citizenship, and the implications of the ‘ethno-cultural’ underpinnings of the concept. Whereas some critics have argued that although EU citizenship is a potentially positive force within EU integration that must overcome various obstacles in order to be effective, other critics, such as Hazel Smith, who take an orthodox Marxist approach to EU citizenship, argue that the very notion of citizen ‘rights’ as inscribed in the EU Treaties is fallacious in the sense that it does not lend itself to the democratization of the EU political and economic space, but rather serves merely to increase the rights of capital vis-à-vis workers.

Whatever the case the development of EU supranational citizenship, and the debates that arise in turn, form a central preconstruction for our current discussion of the citizenship discourses of the Lisbon Agenda.

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186 Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), 1997 O.J. C340/1
187 Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), 1997 O.J. C340/1, art. 1
188 Warleigh, Alex (2001), pp. 28-29
190 Dell’Olio, Fiorella (2005)
192 Balibar, Etienne (2004), p. 161
Preconstructions in Perspective: EU Citizenship as ‘Nested Citizenship’

With these preconstructions of citizenship in mind, it now becomes vital to explain how the concept of ‘EU citizenship’ as used in discourse analytical terms cannot be understood exclusively in terms of the supranational category mentioned above, and must instead be thought of, as Thomas Faist argues, as a “nested citizenship”. This implies that “European citizenship is nested in various sites: regional, state and supra-national forms of citizenship function in complementary ways – while the associated norms, rules and institutions are subject to constant revision and further development on all governance levels”.

To think of European citizenship as nested in several levels of governance (especially national and supra-national) is particularly useful for our purposes of analysing the European citizenship discourses of the Lisbon Agenda. When our social actors speak of ‘Europe’s citizens’ they are not only referring to the limited legal category of the EU’s supranational citizenship, but are invoking the concept in its broadest form, to refer to national citizens (and rights and responsibilities included at this level) in addition to ‘Europeans’ in the supranational sense.

This concept of nested membership is essential in relation to Lisbon Agenda citizenship discourses related to social inclusion and the social rights of citizenship. A strict treatment of EU citizenship as a supra-national legal category becomes especially problematic when Lisbon actors speak of ‘social inclusion’ and the social rights associated with the modernisation of the ESM. As a result of the limited competencies of the EU in regards to positive integration and social matters, and continuing relevance of member states in the provision of social rights as they relate to national welfare state, any reference of the social rights of ‘Europe’s’ or the ‘EU’s’ citizens inevitably deal (whether directly or indirectly) with the rights and responsibilities of national citizenship. It therefore becomes evident that the discourses of European citizenship need be related to national as well as the EU’s own supranational preconceptions of citizenship.

195 Ibid, p. 37
2) The Citizenship Discourses of the European Union’s Private Business Lobbies

Setting the Scene: Imagining the European Economy Through Lisbon - Business’ Response to European Crisis

Our analysis of the citizenship discourses of the EU’s business lobbies and the Commission will proceed alongside an analysis of the general social, economic and political Lisbon Agenda discourses of these social actors. This allows us to go beyond the assumption that all EU social actors envision and support the Lisbon Agenda goals in a similar and equal manner, and also avoids assuming that all social actors envision the same ‘path’ to the realisation of the Lisbon Agenda goals. The purpose of this section then is to understand more precisely the type of Lisbon Agenda envisioned by the EU’s private business lobbies, and how social, economic and political discourses interact with the citizenship discourses of the business lobbies. In relation to our theoretical premises on discourse, it is argued here that this broader discussion of citizenship in relation to general discourses on the Lisbon Agenda allows us to understand more fully the discursive construction of the Lisbon Agenda ‘subject’, and to grasp the (potential and realised) extra-discursive factors that interact dialectically with the discourse on citizenship.

European citizens, as the business lobbies themselves acknowledge, play a key role in the realisation of the ‘business view’ of the Lisbon Agenda reforms required in the new European economy. As the ERT has noted, “the education, personal qualities, attitudes and behaviour of Europe’s citizens are essential ingredients for success”. Yet this statement does not in and of itself provide us enough information regarding the role of the citizen in the Lisbon Agenda. Consequently, we must specifically ask with reference to the citizenship discourse of these lobbies “what forms of identity does it presume and construct for the governed?” This central question will accompany questions as to how and why, according to these lobbies, the need for the Lisbon Agenda has arisen. What sort of role(s) should the Lisbon Agenda play in transforming the EU’s socio-economic governance? How are the Lisbon Agenda’s two main goals, economic competitiveness and social inclusion, factored into the Lisbon Agenda strategy?

\[196\] ERT (2001a) *Actions for Competitiveness Through the Knowledge Economy in Europe*. Brussels: ERT, p. 6

\[197\] Walters, William & Jens Henrik Haahr (2005), p. 13
The Crisis

In general, the discourses of the ERT and LCEC are dominated by a discourse of crisis to which they advocate their own specific vision of the Lisbon Agenda to alleviate this crisis. Both lobbies speak of deep-seated economic and social problems stemming from the refusal of the EU and its member states to adopt structural reforms needed in an increasingly globalised economy:

At the beginning of the 21st century, as we move from the industrial age to a networked, knowledge-based economy, our current Social Model is in desperate need of modernization. At a time when flexibility and speed are engines of economic growth and wealth creation, our current system breeds inertia and gridlock […] Our economy, too, has ground to a screeching halt - leaving us puzzled about Asia’s and North America’s ability to grow out of recession while we sputter along in endless debate, seemingly unable to return to the forefront of the global economy where we belong.198

The future prosperity of Europe is coming under enormous strain. Unless urgent action is taken on long awaited and long overdue structural reforms, Europe risks paying a heavy price in terms of future economic growth, job creation and its ability to compete successfully in global markets.199

The process of globalisation, viewed as an inevitable, non-negotiable external economic constraint,200 serves as a key theme for the ERT and LCEC in explaining the EU crisis. The EU’s high unemployment rates are attributed to a lack of innovation and rigid labour markets, which the lobbies see as the most pressing symptoms of the EU’s current crisis. As in national Third Way discourses, the ERT and LCEC argue that the process of globalisation has rendered European economies and social models of the post-war period out-dated, and as a result, the EU has fallen behind its more competitive rivals in the North America and Asia. In the words of the

LCEC executive director Ann Mettler,\textsuperscript{201} the most successful EU member states are those “that have learned to meet the challenges, and reap the opportunities of globalization, rather than wage a futile and destructive fight against it”. The stubborn resistance of the EU becomes, for the EU’s business lobbies, the key factor in explaining the current crisis.

\textbf{The Crisis of Citizenship? Situating the Citizen}

The discourses on European citizenship carry with them several perceptions of what European citizens are, and also normative discourses of what European citizens ought to become to suit the new economic imaginary of the knowledge-based economy. In keeping with our original definition of citizenship mentioned in the introduction, we must seek to understand how the ERT and LCEC Lisbon Agenda discourses define the relationship between civil society and the state, and the expectations regarding rights and responsibilities that accompany both.

In relating EU citizens to the current crisis, the ERT and LCEC view citizens as at least partly culpable in the current economic and social malaise, and yet at the same time, the citizenship discourses of the ERT and LCEC conjure up images of Europeans as hard-working, enterprising, innovative and entrepreneurial peoples, “eager to learn”, and with a historical tradition that confirms these traits:

From Gutenberg’s printing press to CERN’s accelerating protons, from Pythagora’s theorems to Marconi’s radio, Europe can look back on a proud tradition of entrepreneurship and discovery. Throughout the centuries, the relentless pursuit of knowledge and innovative ways of doing things is what made our society strong, prosperous and safe.\textsuperscript{202}

We Europeans are strong, we are visionary, and we have a proud tradition of pushing the boundaries of social and economic development. There is no reason why we cannot meet the challenges - and reap the opportunities - of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. We must not fear change; we must accept and embrace it.\textsuperscript{203}

In appealing to this ‘proud tradition’, the ERT and LCEC argue that the EU and member

\textsuperscript{202} LCEC (2005a) \textit{Innovation Manifesto: Build on Diversity; Capitalise on Potential}. Brussels: LCEC, p. 1
\textsuperscript{203} LCEC (2004), p. 1
state governments are not doing enough to capitalize on the potential of its citizens, and as well, that Europeans themselves are not doing enough at present to realise their true potential, to carry on the tradition of innovation, and to accept and embrace change by adapting themselves to the knowledge-based economy. In other words, there is plenty of room for EU citizens to ‘be better’ and for the EU and its member states to ‘do better’ for their citizens. Citizens’ hesitance to accept competitive attitudes are considered to be a contributing factor to the current crisis, and a major obstacle to the realisation of a more competitive and prosperous EU. How then do the EU and its citizens, according to the EU’s business lobbies, reap the opportunities of the inexorable process of globalization and the increasing global competition that it brings with it?


In light of the crisis, the ERT and LCEC propose a radical strategic response of which the Lisbon Agenda plays a key role in the transformation of the EU’s socio-economic governance. While both lobbies are hesitant to propose ‘American-style’ reforms for the EU, they both admit that in light of the severity of the EU’s crisis, the EU’s social model and economy ‘will inevitably resemble the US model more than is the case today’, as the EU plays ‘catch up’ to an American economy with higher growth rates, labour productivity, and IT production. In fact, the business lobbies’ invocation of the American case is so prevalent that 17 of the 25 ERT and LCEC documents analyzed in this study contain direct comparisons between the economies of the EU and US.

With these recurrent comparisons to the American economy in the discourses of the EU’s business lobbies, what specific role does the Lisbon Agenda play in increasing the EU’s competitiveness vis-à-vis the US? While a wide range of measures are discussed, the central theme drawn upon for the ERT and LCEC is the transition from a Fordist economy to the new knowledge-based economy. This transition demands a number of specific reforms, or what Bob Jessop has termed a techno-economic paradigm shift, of which the transformation of the EU’s technological base, labour markets and social model form an integral part.

The business lobbies, for their part, argue that the main task for the EU in properly preparing for the transition to a knowledge-based economy will be to create an environment

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205 ERT (2001b) Actions for Competitiveness Through the Knowledge Economy in Europe. Message from the European Round Table of Industrialists to the Stockholm European Council. March. Brussels: ERT, p. 4
conducive to technological innovation. Some of the measures called for that conjure up the notion of innovation in a knowledge-based economy include: an increased emphasis on research and development (R & D), the institutionalization of an EU-community patent, more spending and resources for education, and increased development of the internet for business and government services (often referred to as e-Europe and e-Government). Coupled with an environment more conducive to entrepreneurship and risk, innovation is seen as the ‘engine’ of growth in the knowledge-based economy.

In addition to technological innovation, labour market reform also plays a crucial part in the Lisbon Agenda discourses of the ERT and LCEC. It is argued that in order to pave the way for an innovative knowledge-based economy, the emphasis cannot be only put on the creation of a ‘smart economy’ (through increased R & D, etc.). Even with these measures in place, argue the ERT and LCEC, rigid labour markets still make the EU a less desirable place to do business than the North America and Asia. It thus follows that labour markets must be reformed in order to make them more flexible and cost effective, with greater efficiency emanating from “fewer benefits, longer working hours […] more competition”.

In a speech to the LCEC’s Young Leaders Congress, Jean-Phillip Cotis, Chief Economist of the OECD, sets out a number of reforms to address the EU’s “main challenge” of labour market reform:

1) To strengthen work incentives by reducing the tax wedge on labour income and the implicit tax rate on continued activity;
2) To better protect employment prospects by increasing flexibility in wage setting and bargaining. Great care should be taken in particular not to increase further the cost of unskilled labour;
3) To alleviate the ‘insiders/outsider’ syndrome by loosening employment legislation protection.

In a similar vein, the ERT posits that current EU labour markets, still reflecting the Fordist era of full/life-long employment and corporatist wage bargaining, are preventing the realization of a healthy knowledge-based economy, which should instead create labour markets that encourage

\[\text{ERT (2003), p.2}\]
\[\text{Cotis, Jean-Phillipe (2005) Speech to the Lisbon Council Young Leaders Congress: Getting the agenda right: strategies for spurring growth and creating jobs. 14 March. LCEC: Brussels, p. 5}\]
self-employment and/or ‘flexible’ (more cost-effective) jobs.\textsuperscript{211}

Finally, intimately tied to the reformation of labour market reform is ESM reform. The business lobbies’ discourse surrounding the reform of the EU’s social model seems to suggest that the notion of what constitutes the ‘social’ in Europe requires radical re-thinking:

At a time when flexibility and speed are engines of economic growth and wealth creation, our current system breeds inertia and gridlock. Even worse, a social safety net that was once conceived as an ‘insurance of last resort’ has become the permanent life-support for an ever growing caste of outsiders.

The welfare state models of the Fordist era have not only become unaffordable in these more competitive times, but they have also in and of themselves contributed to the current economic and social crisis in the EU. The generous welfare benefits associated with European welfare states have created a situation of moral hazard, and economic redistribution to lower classes has promoted idleness and exclusion from labour markets, contributing even further to economic inefficiency.\textsuperscript{212} As a result, both lobbies argue that the idea of a ‘social Europe’ becomes contingent on the realisation first of better economic competitiveness and job creation instead of an end in itself. This suggests that “a thriving economy is the best social policy”\textsuperscript{213}:

We have to accelerate employment and productivity growth if Europe wants to uphold its social and environmental values […] It is higher levels of employment and higher productivity that can pay for a generous social security system and higher environmental standards.\textsuperscript{214}

The specific reforms needed to strengthen the welfare state itself do not enter into the discourses of the ERT and LCEC, and instead “growth and employability” are the two vague prerequisites to the realisation of social Europe.

\textsuperscript{211} ERT (2004)
\textsuperscript{212} Mettler, Ann (2004a) \textit{What is ‘Social?’ Modernizing the European Social Model Initiative}. Brussels: LCEC
\textsuperscript{214} Cromme, Gerhard (2005) \textit{How to put economic reform on the front burner - a business view}. Brussels: ERT, p. 1
Business Lobbies and the New European: Responsible and Active

As an integral part to the realisation of Lisbon reforms, the ERT and LCEC call for active citizens that accept that they “are not born with a God-given right to one of the world’s highest standards of living”, that realise that prosperity hinges on competitiveness in the global economy, and acknowledge that “everybody has a vital stake in - and must make a significant contribution to - the economy and well-being of society”. This conception of the new ‘active citizen’ in the Lisbon Agenda brings with it, as the LCEC suggests, a new understanding of the rights and responsibilities of government to citizens and citizens to government.

In terms of responsibilities of the citizen, the two business lobbies take the Third Way mantra of ‘no rights without responsibilities’ to new heights by heavily emphasizing the duties that citizens themselves have in the realisation of Lisbon reforms. Citizens are responsible for changing their own attitudes to:

- bring a spirit of enterprise to life as an employee and a citizen. Not necessarily in the sense of developing and pursuing business ideas, although Europe certainly needs more business entrepreneurs, but definitely in terms of developing a capacity for creativity, innovation, flexibility, team work and intellectual curiosity. Such an individual must be capable of taking charge of his or her employment destiny. Lifetime employment will not soon disappear, but it will be less relevant for many people. In pursuing other preferences and opportunities, they will need, among other things, to be able to identify emerging employment opportunities and to acquire necessary training for them.

Accordingly for the EU’s business lobbies, the ideal citizen is envisioned in individualistic terms as a self-reliant ‘risk-taker’, a ‘life-long learner’, an ‘entrepreneur, and an ‘innovator’. In making the EU a more competitive economy, it is the citizens of Europe (European civil society) that take an active part in this transformation by adopting competitive attitudes, instead of acting merely as passive subjects that are of secondary importance to competitive reformation of the EU’s political society. Those citizens that are unwilling to take this responsibility upon themselves to adopt more competitive attitudes are regarded as complacent, and too “[a]ccustomed to social safety nets and an assured standard of living.”

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215 LCEC (2004), p. 3
216 Ibid
217 ERT (2001), p. 4
Active, responsible citizens are those that take sight of their individual interests by increasing their own “employability”, and that are no longer ‘reliant’ on welfare state to provide them with personal security.

This emphasis on the responsibilities of citizens raises interesting questions about the role (responsibilities) of government in the realisation of Lisbon, and the rights afforded to citizens in light of the increased emphasis on responsibilities. There is a striking absence of any elements of Marshall’s rights-based conception of citizenship in the discourses of the ERT and LCEC, as the discourse of the traditional ‘welfare state’ is replaced with an emphasis on the responsibilities of government to ‘empower’ individuals:

Europe will still have a high level of social security, but not as high as it is now […] We will have to work more and longer, while maintaining a good deal of leisure time and we will have made our leap towards a knowledge-based industrialised service economy. The European model will change from a welfare state towards a guarantee state, guaranteeing the wellbeing of the individual and self-competent citizen.  

With active citizens taking charge of their own destinies in the knowledge-based economy, citizenships rights become restricted to the right to employment and to the opportunity to upgrade their skills through life-long learning. As such, the responsibilities of the EU and the member-state governments, according to the business lobbies’ discourses on citizenship rights, are limited to providing “a healthy economy and a flourishing job market”, which ensures that “if a citizen is laid off, he or she can be confident that new employment opportunities can be found within a reasonable time”. This discourse on citizenship rights fits closely with the general social discourses of the business lobbies which suggest that the traditional idea of what ‘social’ means needs to be re-thought in light of the required Lisbon Agenda reforms. The entitlements related to the social rights of the welfare state are treated as out-dated by the EU’s business lobbies and as a result “the best system of social inclusion” and prosperity can only be secured through job creation and economic growth.

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219 ERT (2001), p. 6
220 Brinkhorst, Laurens Jan (2004), p. 15
221 LCEC (2004), p. 3
223 Ibid, p.3.
The Business Lobbies’ Neoliberal Communitarian Discourse

Reflecting on these general and citizenship discourses, we can see that the EU’s business lobbies advocate a neoliberal communitarian view of the Lisbon Agenda and for the role of the citizen in the fulfillment of its reforms. The perceived need for more flexible labour markets, lower social benefits, and more risk and entrepreneurship is complimented by an active role for the EU’s citizens that make structural reforms sustainable by taking charge of their own employment destinies, and no longer rely on the state to ensure their prosperity. These individual and self-reliant citizens will then ensure themselves that social cohesion is secured and poverty tackled simply by the act of working. This in turn ensures that the goal of a socially cohesive society is achieved in a way that does not hamper global competitiveness.

As Henk Overbeek\textsuperscript{224} maintains, this discourse views unemployment “as a problem of individual employability rather than as a structural property of a capitalist economy, or a temporary (because curable) disturbance in the way Keynesianism has approached unemployment”. As a result, the Third Way mantra of ‘no rights without responsibilities’ is taken to extremes in the business lobbies’ citizenship discourses, whereby employability has become “the personal responsibility of the individual to qualify for employment”, and the state’s role becomes limited to providing “an active labour market policy that encourages and facilitates workers to upgrade their skills and qualifications”\textsuperscript{225}.

3) The Citizenship Discourses of the European Commission

Setting the Scene: Imagining the European Economy Through Lisbon - The Commission and the EU’s Embrace of Globalisation

The Lisbon Agenda discourses of the EU’s business lobbies, in terms of general and citizenship discourses, are characterised by consistency. Both lobbies consistently draw upon Europe’s proud traditions of entrepreneurship and innovation, and advocate an active neoliberal view of citizens that take charge of their own destinies and adjust their attitudes and expectations to the new competitive economy envisioned under the Lisbon Agenda. Meanwhile the Commission’s discourses are punctuated by a recent ‘shift’ since 2004 that carries with it some

significant qualitative changes relating to both general and citizenship discourses towards the Lisbon Agenda. To make sense of this shift we will divide the Commission’s discourses into two periods: first, an early Lisbon optimism period (2000 - 2003), and a mid-term Lisbon period of pessimism (2004 - mid-2005).

**Early Lisbon Optimism: Embracing Globalisation through Lisbon Reforms**

The urgency of crisis as present in the business lobbies’ general Lisbon Agenda discourses is largely absent from the Commission’s early discourses on Lisbon. In fact, as the lobbies talk of a ‘desperate need’ to modernise the European economy and social model, the Commission talks of the ‘challenges’ brought about from demographic changes and competitive pressures from globalisation. Instead of discussing the urgency of a European crisis fomenting from these developments, the Commission, echoing the statements made in the Lisbon Agenda, prefers to speak of a “quantum leap stemming from globalisation and the new knowledge-driven economy”.226 Commissioner Romano Prodi goes as far as to associate the Lisbon Agenda with a coming “renaissance of Europe”,227 under which “[o]ur current prosperity must be maintained and enhanced. At Lisbon, in March, the European Council drew up a bold but achievable agenda for further unleashing our economic potential”. While still maintaining a discourse of globalisation as an inexorable process, the discourses of the Commission, as expressed by Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs Anna Diamantopoulou,228 argue that “[t]here is very little for Europe to fear from increased globalisation, indeed there is everything to gain if we look to past and present experience”.

**The Response**

In response, and in light of the more optimistic tone, the general Lisbon Agenda discourses of the Commission reveal a significant attempt to balance the neoliberal communitarian discourses (as espoused by the EU’s business lobbies) with what at best can be described as an ‘ambiguously social’ discourse that has a less than direct association with the KNWS and ‘social Europe’ as envisioned by former Commission President Jacques Delors. This attempt to balance the goals of economic competitiveness and social cohesion comes out most

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226 CEC (2000a) *Challenges for enterprise in the knowledge-driven economy*. COM 256 final, Brussels, p.2
227 Prodi, Romano (2000a) *Europe’s renaissance*. Speech/00/441, 17 November. Frankfurt am Main.
forcefully in the speeches of the Commissioners. Fritz Bolkestein,\textsuperscript{229} former Commissioner for the Internal Market and Taxation argues that the EU must leave the comfortable surrounding of the Rhineland and move closer to the tougher conditions and colder climate of the Anglo-Saxon form of capitalism, where the rewards are greater but the risks also.

Meanwhile Commission President Romano Prodi\textsuperscript{230} speaks of a “just balance between economic reform and social cohesion”, whereby:

action to create a dynamic economy is only one side of the equation. It must be balanced by equally determined action to promote social inclusion and solidarity.\textsuperscript{231}

This balanced discourse also finds its way into the Commissions official documents. While the business lobbies are adamant in their insistence that economic growth is a pre-requisite to the realisation of social Europe, the early-Lisbon official documents of the Commission take a more pragmatic tone:

Improved economic and social cohesion results from the combination of stronger economic performance, the delivery of a knowledge-based society and long-term structural support of investment in infrastructures and people, notably in the least developed areas. It builds on the strength and ambition of the European social model and welfare state.\textsuperscript{232}

Increasingly, social protection is seen as having the potential to play an important role as a productive factor, ensuring that efficient, dynamic, modern economies are built on solid foundations and on social justice.\textsuperscript{233}

\textsuperscript{230} Prodi, Romano (2000a), p.2
\textsuperscript{231} Prodi, Romano (2000b) The road to Europe’s Future. Speech/00/416, 7 November, Brussels, p.5
\textsuperscript{233} CEC (2003a) Strengthening the social dimension of the Lisbon strategy: Streamlining open coordination in the field of social protection. COM 261 Final, Brussels, p. 3
US, the Commission recurrently invokes the American economy as well, but tempers these comparisons with a recognition of the negative aspects of the American socio-economic model. Quantitatively, the Commission is right in step with the business lobbies, with 17 of the Commission’s 29 documents examined in this study containing comparative references to the ‘American model’. Yet while the business lobbies invoke the American case as a model to which the EU should aspire, the discourses of the Commission warn against a “flexible labour market model as in the US leading to a deterioration in living standards through increasing wage inequalities”.  

All in all, the general Lisbon discourses of the Commission in this early period differ from the discourses of the business lobbies in a number of ways. For the Commission, the Lisbon Agenda should be treated as a strategic response to face up to the EU’s great potential and harness the positive aspects of globalisation. Unlike the EU business lobbies, which suggest that a strategy based on economic competitiveness and growth is the only viable route to social cohesion, the Commission’s early Lisbon discourses are adamant in suggesting the mutually reinforcing nature of Lisbon’s two main goals of social cohesion and economic competitiveness:

This two-way interconnection between inclusion and economic performance - between cohesion and competitiveness - is central to Europe’s strategic approach. Social inclusion is not only about social justice - though it certainly is about that. Social inclusion is a positive economic factor, since exclusion brings major economic costs - costs of crime, of unemployment, of poor health.  

**Balancing citizenship: Rights and responsibilities in a passive revolution**

The ‘balanced’ general discourses of the early Lisbon period also find their way into the Commission’s discourses on citizenship, as the more neoliberal communitarian versions of citizenship espoused by the business lobbies are accompanied by an unspecific discourse of social rights. Yet focusing strictly on this balanced character risks neglecting what is perhaps the most important aspect of the Commission’s early Lisbon citizenship discourses: unlike the business lobbies, which are constantly referring to the citizen’s active role in the realisation of Lisbon

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234 Diamantopoulou, Anna (2003a) ‘Tackling Europe’s unemployment – strengthening social cohesion’, *Address at the Presidency Workshop on ‘Economic Policy and the new sources of Growth in Europe. 8 February, Athens, p. 4*

reforms, references in the Commission’s early Lisbon discourses are infrequent and when present, envisage a passive role for the citizen within the Lisbon Agenda.

Although Prodi\textsuperscript{236} exclaims that he wants "the future of Europe to be firmly in the hands of its citizens" and that the EU "must explore ways of getting the citizens genuinely involved in EU policymaking", the citizen is generally not conceived as an active actor within the Lisbon Agenda reforms. Instead the Commission describes how the EU and its member states are responsible for Lisbon Agenda reforms that work towards "giving people new skills for the new economy"\textsuperscript{237} and that "bring our fellow citizens greater prosperity".\textsuperscript{238} The notion that the EU’s young citizens "must be taught how to thrive in a world becoming increasingly complex and subject to change"\textsuperscript{239} and that the EU itself "must encourage risk-taking and the spirit of enterprise" is a far cry from the EU business lobbies' citizenship discourses, which match their calls for EU action by calling on citizens to take charge of their own destinies.

Making sense of the Commission's early Lisbon Agenda citizenship discourses requires us to think in theoretical terms about the significance of this passive conception of the EU's subjects. Utilising Gramsci's thought, the early Lisbon Agenda discourses of the Commission reveal that the institution is attempting to bring about the Lisbon modernisation project through a "passive revolution".\textsuperscript{240} Gramsci used the term, as Walters and Haahr\textsuperscript{241} explain, "to theorize a particular process of socio-political transformation: one where states undertake leadership and modernization tasks whose overall function is to stabilize the socioeconomic order". The citizenship discourses of the Commission during this early Lisbon period indicate an attempt to place the task of the EU’s socio-economic transformation solely into the hands of the EU's political society, as citizens become the beneficiaries of the leadership role taken by the EU institutions and member state governments.

The passive character of the Commission's citizenship discourses makes it hard to place them in terms of the citizen's rights and responsibilities. Nevertheless, and perhaps quite obviously, the citizenship discourses in the early-Lisbon period concentrate on a rights-based conception of citizenship, with the burden of responsibilities falling on the EU and its member state governments. Throughout the early-Lisbon period there exists a consistent effort on behalf of the Commission to consolidate both the neoliberal communitarian version of citizenship rights

\textsuperscript{236} Prodi, Romano (2001a) \textit{Are we really on the road to European Integration?} Speech /01/187, 26 April, Munich, p. 4
\textsuperscript{237} Prodi, Romano (2000b), p.5
\textsuperscript{239} CEC (2000b) \textit{Innovation in a knowledge-driven economy}. COM 567 final, Brussels, p. 16
\textsuperscript{240} Gramsci, Antonio (1971), pp. 106-120
\textsuperscript{241} Walters, William & Jens Henrik Haahr (2005), p. 88
as espoused by the business lobbies with elements of a social rights discourse.

There are on the one hand indications that the Commission supports the neoliberal communitarian conceptions of citizenship rights associated with the business lobbies, as the Commission argues "that a job is often the best protection against exclusion". This argument proceeds as the Commission envisions citizen rights in terms of the rights to job training skills development and lifelong learning. In a speech to the European Banking Congress in 2000, Commission President Prodi expresses this view of citizen rights as he discusses the significance of Lisbon and the knowledge-based society, and its relation to Europe's citizens:

[The Lisbon Agenda strategy] means educating our young people for the digital age, getting our schools and universities on line. It means training and retraining our workforce, giving them new skills for the new economy, filling thousands of IT job vacancies. It means cutting red tape for entrepreneurs, and giving bright young business people ready access to venture capital.

Yet at the same time, often within the same documents and speeches reflecting the neoliberal communitarian citizenship discourses of the business lobbies, there are, even if only fleeting, references to citizen social rights. Within the Commission's early-Lisbon citizenship discourses, there is clearly an element of social rights that calls for a social dimension for the EU's Lisbon Agenda, which will "ensure adequate social protection for those who cannot [work]" and that faces up to the fact that "you can't have a fair society without fair pay".

Just as the general early-Lisbon discourses of the Commission warn of dangers in uncritically advocating a US-style socio-economic model, so too do the citizenship discourses of the Commission during this period cast suspicion on the American citizenship model. In arguing that European society is "much more demanding than its American counterpart", Prodi states that the increasing income gap between EU citizens, is a major concern that is also plaguing the US and that may lead to "irreparable divisions in our society later".

This social discourse contrasts significantly with the business lobbies’ calls for

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243 Prodi, Romano (2000a), p. 4
244 CEC (2003b) Choosing to grow: Knowledge, innovation and jobs in a cohesive society. COM 5 final, Brussels, p. 1
245 Prodi, Romano (2001b) Building the new Europe together. Speech/01/630/, 13 December, Brussels, p.2
246 Prodi, Romano (2001c) A new economic policy for a new European economy. Speech/01/194, 2 May, Brussels, p.4
Europeans to accept greater economic inequality as a prerequisite to economic growth.\textsuperscript{247} Even the Commission’s acceptance of a need for greater labour market flexibility, which is so central to the citizenship discourses of the LCEC and ERT, is tempered with a social rights discourse. President Prodi makes this clear in arguing that “[t]he labour market needs to flexible certainly: but people need to be able to plan their lives, and should not be the victims of shock redundancy announcements”.\textsuperscript{248}

**The Commission’s early-Lisbon citizenship discourses: Between Marshall and Neo-Liberal Communitarianism**

The Commission’s early-Lisbon citizenship discourses attempt to balance the neoliberal communitarian discourses of the EU’s business lobbies with a discourse of social rights, albeit within a model of citizenship that is quite far removed from the traditional social democratic welfare states of the Fordist era. Nevertheless, social cohesion and the social rights of citizenship are viewed as ends in themselves as opposed to contingent on the attainment of economic competitiveness and jobs created through labour market flexibility. In this way, Marshall’s unconditional social citizenship rights still find a small degree of relevance in the early-Lisbon discourses of the Commission, as the re-structuring associated with economic reforms are recognised as having potentially harmful effects on those already at risk for poverty and social exclusion. The citizen as a passive bearer of rights is thus regarded as a potential victim worthy of social protection, instead of an active entrepreneur or risk-taker who is responsible for taking changing matters into their own hands. Since globalisation is viewed in these discourses in optimistic terms, and if embraced properly, will serve to strengthen the EU’s economies and societies, social protection and the social rights contained therein are still regarded by the Commission as affordable and important to the realisation of a prosperous economy.

\textsuperscript{248} Prodi, Romano (2000b), p. 5
4) From Passive Revolution to Active Citizenship: The Commission’s mid-Lisbon Citizenship Discourses

Shifting Priorities: The mid-Term Review and the Future of the Lisbon Agenda

In early 2005 the newly appointed Barroso Commission, acting in unison with member states in the conclusions made at the Spring European Council in Brussels, presented a plan to “re-launch” the Lisbon Agenda in a streamlined form that focuses on raising employment and economic growth in the EU. Although the Commission insisted that this re-launch did not mean that the EU was abandoning its commitment to social cohesion and the ESM, the plan proved to be highly controversial for the EU’s social NGOs and think tanks, and seemed to confirm their suspicions of the newly-appointed Commission, especially President Barroso, as too “business friendly” and bent of shifting the EU to the right.249

In what has proven to be perhaps the most controversial statement of his brief tenure thus far, Commissioner Barroso,250 in a speech to the EU parliament, equated the three Lisbon Agenda goals to his three children in arguing for the need to help the EU’s ‘sickened’ economy:

It is as if I have three children – the economy, our social agenda, and the environment.
Like any modern father – if one of my children is sick, I am ready to drop everything and focus on him until he is back to health. That is normal and responsible. But that does not mean I love the others any less!

Even though the above statement has proven to be to the extreme end of the Lisbon Agenda discourses of the new Commission (it certainly has not been repeated), it is still apparent that the feeling of urgency and crisis so prominent in the business lobbies’ discourses has found its way into the Commission’s discourses in promoting the new focus on jobs and growth.

Acting upon recommendations made by the EU-commissioned High Level Group hired on to carry out an independent mid-term review the Lisbon Agenda, the Commission claims that in light of the EU’s recent failures to attain its Lisbon Agenda goals and to adapt to ever increasing competition, an ageing population, and slow growth, a shift in focus is needed to make the Agenda relevant under changed circumstances. Indeed as the High Level Group made clear in its Lisbon Agenda report, “time is running out”, and in light of the “new economic situation” that

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has developed in the EU since the Lisbon Agenda was created in 2000, the EU needs to take drastic measures to update the Lisbon Agenda to reflect the current pressures.\textsuperscript{251}

As a result, the Commission justifies the move to growth and jobs by adopting similar arguments to those espoused by the EU’s business lobbies concerning the role higher employment and economic growth play in securing social protection and inclusion. As the mid-Lisbon discourses of the Commission confirm, the argument moves away from the idea that social inclusion and economic growth and jobs are mutually reinforcing goals, towards an assertion that the EU needs “a dynamic economy to fuel our wider social and environmental ambitions”.\textsuperscript{252}

Growth is a necessary condition for effective solidarity. Without growth, without a dynamic economy, there will be no sustainable development, no future pensions and no response to the pressures on our quality of life.\textsuperscript{253}

**The Citizen and the Shift to Jobs and Growth**

The shift in focus to jobs and growth brings with it a change in the citizenship discourses of the Commission. What comes across in quite stark terms in the High Level Group’s mid-term review of the Lisbon Agenda is a criticism of the EU’s passive conception of the citizen’s role in the early-Lisbon period. In formulating a shift to focus on jobs and growth, the High Level Group states quite clearly, and in somewhat paternalistic terms, that the EU’s citizens’ role needs to be re-thought with Lisbon’s re-launch:

The need for reform has to be explained especially to citizens who are not always aware of the urgency and scale of the situation. ‘Competitiveness’ is not just some dry economic indicator that is often unintelligible to the man in the street; rather, it provides a diagnosis of the state of economic health of a country or a region. In the present circumstances, the clear message must be: if we want to preserve and improve our social model we have to adapt it: it is not too late to change. In any event the status quo is not an option. Engaging and involving citizens in the process has two mutually reinforcing

\textsuperscript{251} High Level Group (2004) *Facing the Challenge. The Lisbon strategy for growth and employment*. Brussels, p. 6
\textsuperscript{253} Barroso, Jose Manuel (2005a) *Choosing to grow – a new agenda for growth and job*. Speech/05/188, Warsaw, p. 4
attractions: it in effect seeks public support by giving people elements for debate and it leverages that support to put pressure on governments to pursue these goals.\textsuperscript{254}

The High Level Group suggests that the EU must encourage all its citizens to “take action” in order to “to deliver on the Lisbon goals of growth and employment”, and that a “broader and deeper engagement” of the EU’s citizens must take place to create support the new streamlined Lisbon Agenda.\textsuperscript{255}

The Commission recognises that the EU has “failed to mobilise support around the idea of what Europe can be”,\textsuperscript{256} and addresses these criticisms in its documents and speeches related to the shift to jobs and growth, and there is therefore a constant effort on behalf of the Commission to make the citizen an active actor in the Lisbon Agenda reforms. The Commission goes to great lengths to demonstrate its commitment to citizen involvement, arguing that “[t]he Lisbon reforms are […] as much about people as about economics”,\textsuperscript{257} and as a result hinge on active popular support:

We have to mobilise support for change. Establishing broad and effective ownership of the Lisbon goals is the best way to ensure words are turned into results. Everyone with a stake in Lisbon’s success and at every level must be involved in delivering these reforms.\textsuperscript{258}

The sense of urgency for reform associated with the shift to jobs and growth thus brings with it a more active conception of citizenship, as the Commission adopts the idea that success in instituting substantial change requires that citizens have a “stake in the success of these reforms”,\textsuperscript{259} and that Lisbon “gives a real sense of ownership”.\textsuperscript{260} The failure of Lisbon to this point is at least partly attributed to passive role for citizens envisioned in the early-Lisbon discourses of the Commission, and in making the case for reform to focus on jobs and growth, the Commission follows the EU business lobbies and the High Level Group in calling for a more active citizen that takes an active role in the urgently-needed reforms.

\textsuperscript{254} High Level Group (2004), p. 44
\textsuperscript{255} Ibid, p. 6
\textsuperscript{256} Barroso, Jose Manuel (2005b) The Lisbon Strategy – a key priority of the European Commission. Speech/05/125, Brussels, p.3
\textsuperscript{257} Barroso, Jose Manuel (2005a), p. 2
\textsuperscript{258} CEC (2005), p. 5
\textsuperscript{259} Barroso, Jose Manuel (2005a), p.4
\textsuperscript{260} Barroso, Jose Manuel (2005c) \textit{Growth and Jobs: a new start for the Lisbon strategy}. Speech/05/152, Strasbourg, p.2
The Rights and Responsibilities of Active Citizens in the Shift to Jobs and Growth

Anchoring the Commission’s citizenship discourses in relation to our original definition of citizenship, we find that the shift to jobs and growth entails not only a more active role for the citizen, but also reflects the EU business lobbies’ citizenship discourses in adopting an extreme version of the Third Way mantra of ‘no rights without responsibilities’ and limiting social rights to the to skills and education related to making citizens more ‘employable’. The Commission’s view on citizenship is made clear by Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities Vladimir Spidla in a speech to the Lisbon Council, in his assertion that “Europe needs people who are ready to face up to change and not close their eyes to new developments in Europe or to their global responsibilities”.261

It is thus up to the EU and its member states to re-define the rights and responsibilities of citizenship in light of the Lisbon reforms, and to ensure that this re-definition mobilizes support amongst EU citizens:

The political challenge to offer citizens a credible “new deal” allowing them to embrace more flexibility in return for social inclusion systems that effectively help them to master change and partake in prosperity, whilst offering adequate security and solidarity – including between generations – is crucial but has not yet been answered.262

Although the Commission poses the challenge between citizen flexibility and security as an unanswered question, we can deduce from the citizenship discourses surrounding the shift to jobs and growth that a belief that stronger economic growth and employment are the best routes to social cohesion and protection. In short this suggests that in the jobs element of the jobs and growth formula the EU “should generally be striving for security of employment rather than to preserve every single job”.263

As a result, the Commission advocates a ‘new deal’ between citizens and governments focusing on re-defining ‘social inclusion systems’ away from the socialization of risk associated with the welfare state, towards an individualized system whereby the individual’s pursuit of employment (through upgraded skills and life-long learning) leads to greater social cohesion and

262 CEC (2005) 160, pp. 15-16
263 Spidla, Vladimir (2005), p.9
provides the material basis for continued social expenditures. The EU is thus tasked with the responsibility of providing an adequate supply of jobs to its citizens, and “maintaining a worker’s ability to find a job.” \(^{264}\) Citizen rights become limited to the right to obtain more skills and better education, so that “workers and enterprises” alike “become more adaptable and labour markets more flexible”. \(^{265}\) The active and responsible citizen is thus indispensable in the reforms associated with more jobs and growth:

The impact of changes can be limited by sustained investment in developing workers’ skills, thereby enabling them to cope with change: a well-trained worker is better able to find a new job in the wake of unavoidable restructuring.\(^{266}\)

In a speech to the European Trade Union Confederation, President Barroso applied the notion of active and responsible (and adaptable and flexible) workers to moves in some EU countries to allow “older workers to update skills to compliment their wealth of experience, thereby making it more attractive for companies to hire and retain them”, praising this “positive partnership” as the key to making “Europe a more attractive place to invest and work”.\(^{267}\) In a speech to the Lisbon Council, Barroso goes on to invoke the image of Europe’s mobile phone industries and low cost airlines to dispel beliefs that EU-based companies are uncompetitive, and that EU citizens are risk adverse and reluctant to innovate. Considering the economic successes of these companies and the ways in which EU citizens have embraced them, Barroso\(^{268}\) expresses regret that “European citizens do not always have the freedom and choice to flex their muscles in this way”.

**Adopting Neoliberal Communitarianism? Categorising the Shift to Jobs and Growth**

The shift to focus the Lisbon Agenda towards creating more jobs and greater economic growth marks a fundamental change in the citizenship discourses of the Commission, moving away from a ‘balanced’ discourse that attempts to fuse neoliberal communitarianism with ambiguous social concerns, to a greater focus on the active neoliberal communitarian model of

\(^{264}\) Spidla, Vladimir (2005), p. 9  
\(^{265}\) Barroso, Jose Manuel (2005d) *Key challenges for the European Union: Enlargement and Governance.* Speech/05/195, 1 April, Madrid p. 4  
\(^{266}\) Spidla, Vladimir (2005), p. 9  
\(^{267}\) Barroso, Jose Manuel (2005b)  
\(^{268}\) Barroso, Jose Manuel (2005e) *Creating a Europe of Opportunities.* Speech/05/172, 14 March, p.7
citizenship espoused by the EU’s business lobbies. In particular, the business lobbies’ assertion that citizenship rights be limited to measures that increase their employability forms a major part of the Commission’s mid-term Lisbon Agenda discourses. In making the shift from a passive citizenship model to an active neoliberal communitarian one, the Commission adopts the view that citizens become more responsible in becoming risk-takers, and flexible entrepreneurs to ease the shift to a knowledge-based economy.

The lobbies, for their part, enthusiastically embraced the Commission’s streamlined Lisbon Agenda, with LCEC President Paul Hofheinz affirming that “without economic growth, our social system will collapse”. Adding to this, Hofheinz chides critics of Lisbon’s re-launch as “dangerous demogogues” for arguing that “efforts to improve the economy will lead to a less social Europe”. While it is doubtful that the shift to jobs and growth will be viewed by the business lobbies as ending the need for further Lisbon Agenda lobbying, the new streamlined version of Lisbon presented by the Commission sends a strong signal that the views of the EU’s business community have maintained favour in the socio-economic governance of the EU polity.

Part III - The Contradictions of Neoliberal Communitarian Citizenship and the Future of EU Socio-economic Governance

1) Neoliberal Communitarian Citizenship and the Production of Hegemony: ‘Embedded Neoliberalism’ and EU socio-economic governance

The transition envisioned in the Lisbon Agenda by the EU’s business lobbies and the Commission to the new economic imaginary of the KBE implies a ‘master discourse’ of neoliberal competitiveness, and at the ethico-political moment (or at the level of the production of hegemony), this master discourse is complimented by a ‘neoliberal communitarian’ citizenship discourse. As Bieling explains, these discourses are neoliberal to the extent that they do not seriously question the social consequences of neoliberal competitive restructuring, but instead attempt to offer a Third Way between “the most painful social effects of neoliberal restructuring without relapsing in an allegedly old-fashioned style of Keynesian state intervention”. This is achieved through a social discourse that emphasises community commitment and “individual commitment” to the achievement of social cohesion and a “socially sustainable market economy”, meanwhile the overall imperatives of neoliberal competitiveness are prioritised and lead to a subordination of these communitarian ambitions.

In this sense, the shift to the economic imaginary of the knowledge-based economy of the Lisbon Agenda does not mark a radical departure from past economic imaginaries in the EU, and instead works to consolidate the ‘embedded neoliberal’ character of the EU’s socio-economic governance:

Embedded neoliberalism is neoliberal inasmuch as it emphasises the primacy of global market forces and the freedom of transnational capital. Yet, as a result of such processes, markets become increasingly disconnected from their post-war national social institutions. Embedded neoliberalism is thus ‘embedded’ to the extent that it recognises the limits to laissez-faire, and thus to the disembembedding process, and accepts that certain compromises need to be made; hence at least a limited form of ‘embeddedness’ is

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270 van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan (2003)
272 Ibid, p. 61
Citizenship and Embedded Neoliberalism

The citizens’ role is thus contained within the Third Way discourse of neoliberal communitarianism, with the mantra of ‘no rights without responsibilities’ forming the basis of its citizenship conception, as opposed to ‘unconditional’ social citizenship entitlements” of social democracy which advocate “positive welfare intervention by a ‘social investment state’”. Making the argument that “the relationship between individual rights and responsibilities was thrown out of balance from the late 1960s onwards”, advocates of neoliberal communitarianism suggest that a situation of ‘moral hazard’ has arisen amongst EU citizens, and that problems of social instability can be solved by fostering a society which gives more responsibilities and duties to individual citizens.

Neoliberal communitarians thus advocate an active form of citizenship in which “flexibility’ and ‘adaptability’ on the part of the workforce have […] come to be seen as the panacea for Europe’s unemployment problem”. EU citizens are expected to take responsibility to adapt by upgrading their skills through life-long learning, changing their attitudes to become less ‘risk-adverse’ and more ‘entrepreneurial’. The overall goal of neoliberal communitarian citizenship is to ensure that citizens, for the cause of global competitiveness, become less reliant on the state for welfare protection and more ‘employable’ in order to adapt to “more flexible labour markets” and “flexible working conditions”.

This citizenship discourse is underlined by a particular view of unemployment, one that views unemployment as “a moral problem of the individual who is unemployed”, and argues that it is the “personal responsibility of individuals to make sure they qualify for employment (whatever the changes in the structure of the labour market)”. This view contrasts with a more social democratic (and Keynesian) view of unemployment as societal problem that can be managed through economic intervention.

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273 van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan (2001), p. 82
274 Ryner, Magnus (2002), p. 15
275 Bieling, Hans-Jürgen (2003), pp. 63, 65
276 van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan (2003), p. 114
277 Bieling, Hans-Jürgen (2003), pp. 67, 65
278 Ryner, Magnus (2002), p. 10
279 Overbeek, Henk (2003), p. 27
280 Ryner, Magnus (2002), p. 10
The KBE and Citizenship: The Longue Durée From Keynes (and Marshall) to Schumpeter?

Placing the new economic imaginary of the KBE into a wider perspective, we see that the Lisbon Agenda represents a broader (tendential) shift, at play since the beginning of the 1970s, from the KWNS towards a Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime (SWPR). While this shift is most prominent at the state-level, the EU plays a key role in promoting it and in practicing it at the supranational level. In addition to encompassing all of the characteristics mentioned above (a communitarian neoliberal conception of citizenship, flexible labour markets, and a limited welfare state), the SWPR contributes in general to exerting, in the name of competitiveness, the discipline of market forces across relations and at different scales of governance (hence the term ‘postnational’).

The development of a SWPR and a neoliberal communitarian conception of citizenship marks an attempt to suspend the contradictions in the shift from the Fordist economy and KNWS to the KBE. As well, instead of marking a radical departure from the ‘embedded neoliberal’ character of EU socio-economic governance, the development of the SWPR and communitarian neoliberal citizenship through the Lisbon Agenda marks an effective strategy to maintain its dominance by rearticulating the supposed imperatives of economic competition within a more social discourse, this in turn seeks to “assure public support for the necessities of neoliberal competition”. Yet in spite of the powerful rhetoric inherent in both the SWPR and its accompanying neoliberal communitarian citizenship model, this does not suggest that the Lisbon Agenda itself is free of contradictions, dilemmas, and/or conflicts.

283 Bieling, Hans-Jürgen (2003), p. 69
284 Jessop, Bob (2002), p. 103
2) On the contradictions between neoliberal communitarian citizenship and the Lisbon Agenda’s social goals

Despite the attempts to suspend contradictions of ‘embedded neoliberalism’ through the introduction of a communitarian neoliberal form of citizenship, there are still various sites of contention that arise between the Lisbon Agenda’s two main goals of promoting economic growth and competition while at the same time securing social cohesion and ‘modernising’ social protection. The abstract distinction made by Kees van der Pijl, reflecting the work of Karl Polanyi, in capitalist social formations between commodification and socialisation is crucial in allowing us to frame the contradictions at play between the articulation of a neoliberal communitarian form of citizenship and the Lisbon Agenda’s social goals.

Commodification in this sense refers to the process whereby “[g]oods produced, services rendered, but also the raw material of nature and human beings as such, are […] subjected to an economic discipline which defines and treats them as commodities”. Socialisation, on the other hand, is the dialectical opposite of commodification, and refers to the “quasi-organic interdependence” that is created in light of market relations and a concomitant relation to more complex webs of social interaction. One of the key modalities of socialisation is Polanyi’s notion of social protection, which aims to counteract the “deleterious action of the market” through measures generally associated with the national welfare state (“protective legislation, restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention as its methods”).

In any market economy, Polanyi argued, attempts to subject the three fictitious commodities of land, labour, and money in any supposedly democratic state to uncritical commodification through a ‘self-regulating economy’ inevitably threatens societal cohesion, as “a pure market system is a utopian abstraction and any attempt to construct it fully would require an immensely authoritarian application of political power through the state”. The creation of a increasingly competitive labour market entails further demands and responsibilities placed on the citizen, and if pushed too far, this further exploitation of labour forces the exhaustion of society

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286 Ibid, p. 8
287 Ibid, p. 8
288 Polanyi, Karl (1945) Origins of our time, the great transformation. London: Golanz, p. 135; it is van der Pijl (1998, p. 15) who argues that social protection is but one modality of socialisation
whereby the “organization of ‘daily life’” becomes “insecure and increasingly difficult”.\textsuperscript{291} Furthermore, feminist historical materialism has brought awareness to the gender dimension of the exhaustion of society by analysing the implications of the commodification and reprivatisation of social reproduction:

Women, although obviously in varying degrees, find themselves squeezed between growing demands for their paid labor in order to support households and growing demands on their unpaid domestic and care-giving work as government austerity programs erode various forms of collective support and provision.\textsuperscript{292}

As others have demonstrated, there can be little doubt that with the neoliberal communitarian citizenship discourses of the Lisbon Agenda, traditional social democratic ideas, such as social solidarity, social rights, and full employment are discursively re-redefined and ultimately subordinated to the imperatives of commodification brought about through neoliberal competitive restructuring.\textsuperscript{293} Wolfgang Streeck makes this point clear in arguing that Third Way conceptions of employability defines the responsibility of public policy in terms of the creation of “equal opportunities for commodification” as opposed to “de-commodification of individuals”, and which “pursues social justice through intervention in the distribution, not of market outcomes, but of capacities for successful market participation”.\textsuperscript{294}

Proponents of a neoliberal communitarian citizenship model thus give us no reasonable argument as to how the contradictions theorised by Polanyi no longer apply, and instead, as Ryner argues, “[i]t is as if the entire weight of the social contradictions of modern capitalism is to be borne by the individual, who has no social rights at all to claim ‘without responsibilities’”.\textsuperscript{295} Furthering this argument in his critique of Third Way ideology, Ryner goes on to add that such a conception of citizenship places “utterly unreasonable demands on the citizen”, as it is hard to comprehend how one could expect that a citizen should be a “heroic, competitive, flexible and mobile individual who at the same time is a nurturing parent, rooted in a community, in which

\textsuperscript{291} Bieling, Hans-Jürgen (2003), p. 59
\textsuperscript{295} Ryner, Magnus (2002), p. 19
he/she has time and energy to invest civic involvement”.296

With all this in mind, as Bieling suggests, there is no reason to believe that the neoliberal communitarian conception of citizenship as espoused in the Lisbon Agenda discourses of our actors will render “the exhaustion of society as a consequence of intensified capital accumulation […] a thing of the past”.297 In fact, there is a strong argument suggesting that neoliberal communitarian conceptions of citizenship, and the intensified commodification of social life that they imply, work against the Lisbon Agenda’s goals of ensuring strong social protection and social cohesion.298 The research of Jörg Flecker299 has demonstrated how the new emphasis on more competitive, deregulated labour markets within the EU has led to severe societal cleavages, increasing insecurity and providing a dangerous breeding-ground for radical right-wing populism and racist anti-immigrant rhetoric.

In a passionate speech attacking Third Way models in the US and the UK, the late Pierre Bourdieu300 seems to put this all into a wider perspective, arguing that these ‘Anglo-Saxon’ models have done nothing to solve mass unemployment, and have instead made most forms of employment “precarious”, therefore creating a situation of “permanent insecurity” for a majority of the population. In addition to the “gross trickery” of claims to full employment, Bourdieu301 points to a collapse of “elementary solidarities” in the US and the UK, which has led to increased crime, juvenile delinquency, drug use and alcoholism, radical right-wing movements, and a subordination of social services to economic imperatives. With the Anglo-Saxon model and neoliberal communitarian conceptions of citizenship being touted as general models for the EU’s socio-economic governance through the Lisbon Agenda (especially since the shift to jobs and growth), the future of the Lisbon Agenda’s social goals, and the ESM in general, seem dire indeed.

3) From Resistance to Counter-Hegemony: The Future of Lisbon and Social Europe

With the debilitating effects of embedded neoliberalism and neoliberal communitarian

296 Ryner, Magnus (2002), p. 20
297 Bieling, Hans-Jürgen (2003), p. 71
298 Ryner, Magnus (2002), p. 21
301 Ibid, p. 127
citizenship established, there is little reason to believe that the Lisbon Agenda reforms proposed by the EU’s business lobbies and the Commission will not proceed without substantial resistance. In fact the ‘high regulated’ nature of EU capitalism(s) and social citizenship traditions, despite their diversity, suggests that attempts to consolidate a monolithic new economic imaginary and citizenship model for the EU as a whole is especially problematic.

Much research has already focused on the resistance, not only from traditional circles such as labour and left-wing political parties, but also of non-traditional social forces to embedded neoliberalism. NGO lobbies such as Solidar and The Platform for European Social NGOs have been highly critical of the Commission’s shift to jobs and growth, and have focused efforts on advocating a broader notion of the social goals of the Lisbon Agenda. This includes a view of social rights and social protection as ends in themselves instead of subordinated to economic goals, transnational frameworks for social policy that ensure that the EU can be more receptive to its citizens’ needs, and lobbying for a minimum citizen income to protect EU citizens against social exclusion and poverty.302

In addition, groups such as ATTAC, EuroMarch, traditional as well as radical labour unions, and others brought together by the European Social Forum are being academically examined as part of a possible transnational counter-hegemonic force, seeking more inclusive, just, and democratic alternatives for the EU and the world.303 Proposals from these groups represent a ‘counter-movement’ to re-articulate the idea of citizenship away from the traditional welfare state, but also away from the socially-thin conception of citizenship of neoliberal communitarianism, towards a notion of citizenship that links the idea of democratic social struggle to a broader global movement.304 The innovative citizenship discourses these groups propose seem to nullify attacks that suggest that proponents of a ‘social Europe’ are clinging to an ‘old-fashioned’ love-affair with the Keynesian national welfare state.

With this in mind, it seems fitting to conclude by invoking Gramsci’s favourite political maxim ‘pessimism of the intelligence, optimism of the will’.305 This suggests identifying what is

305 Gramsci, Antonio (1971), p. 175
structural and seemingly permanent about ‘embedded neoliberal’ socio-economic governance in
the EU and what is contingent and open to change.\textsuperscript{306} The strikingly similar neoliberal
communitarian citizenship discourses of the EU business lobbies and the Commission point to a
relatively broad-based, materially powerful bloc of forces\textsuperscript{307} that seek to maintain an ‘embedded
neoliberal’ socio-economic governance model for the EU through a combination of intensified
neoliberal reforms and a communitarian social discourse which is ultimately subordinated to the
imperatives of economic competitiveness. Yet at the same time, broad-based social movements
are challenging the legitimacy and ‘common sense’ of this bloc, seeking to stem the intensifying
commodification of ever more areas of social life, and at the same time suggesting that the notion
of a ‘social Europe’ may still be of relevance. Whatever the case, what seems certain is that the
future of the Lisbon Agenda, European Citizenship, and the socio-economic governance of the
EU as a whole will be fought along these lines.


\textsuperscript{307} This ‘power bloc’ permeates various elements of the EU polity, notwithstanding the ‘democratic voice’
of the EU, the European Parliament. A quote from MEP Jorgo Chatzimarkakis indicates support for the
Commission in subordinating social matters to economic competitiveness: “European bureaucracies are
content with the status quo and have little interest in helping to create a good framework for entrepreneurs.
And economy (sic) does not really come first at all. Although most politicians agree on pushing economy
(sic), their hymn to competitiveness is followed by a big ‘but’ and concluded with a long list of social and
environment standards to be achieved at the same time. As long as Europe’s politicians fail to learn their
lesson, Europe will never become the most competitive region in the world”. Chatzimarkakis, Jorgo (2005)

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