Usable Security Policies for Runtime Environments

by

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“Humans are incapable of securely storing high-quality cryptographic keys, and they have unacceptably slow speed and accuracy when performing cryptographic operations. (They are also large, expensive to maintain, difficult to manage, and they pollute the environment. It is astonishing that these devices continue to be manufactured and deployed. But they are sufficiently pervasive that we must design our protocols around their limitations.)”

Abstract

The runtime environments provided by application-level virtual machines such as the Java Virtual Machine or the .NET Common Language Runtime are attractive for Internet application providers because the applications can be deployed on any platform that supports the target virtual machine. With Internet applications, organizations as well as end users face the risk of viruses, trojans, and denial of service attacks. Virtual machine providers are aware of these Internet security risks and provide, for example, runtime monitoring of untrusted code and access control to sensitive resources.

Our work addresses two important security issues in runtime environments. The first issue concerns resource or release control. While many virtual machines provide runtime access control to resources, they do not provide any means of limiting the use of a resource once access is granted; they do not provide so-called resource control. We have addressed the issue of resource control in the example of the Java Virtual Machine. In contrast to others’ work, our solution builds on an enhancement to the existing security architecture. We demonstrate that resource control permissions for Java-mediated resources can be integrated into the regular Java security architecture, thus leading to a clean design and a single external security policy.

The second issue that we address is the usability and security of the setup of security policies for runtime environments. Access control decisions are based on external configuration files, the security policy, which must be set up by the end user. This setup is security-critical but also complicated and error-prone for a lay end user and supportive, usable tools are so far missing. After one of our usability studies signalled that offline editing of the configuration file is inefficient and difficult for end users, we conducted a usability study of personal firewalls to identify usable ways of setting up a security policy at runtime. An analysis of general user help techniques together with the results from the two previous studies resulted in a proposal of design guidelines for applications that need to set up a security policy. Our guidelines have been used for the design and implementation of the tool JPerM that sets the Java security policy at runtime. JPerM evaluated positively in a usability study and supports the validity of our design guidelines.
Acknowledgements

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Almut Herzog
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List of Enclosed Papers

This thesis contains revised versions of the following papers:


In addition to the publications enclosed in this thesis, the following work has been published.


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Introduction
1 Motivation

Application-level virtual machines provide a runtime environment for programs written in an intermediate code representation. The virtual machine takes the intermediate code representation as input and executes that code on a native platform. The idea of virtual machines for applications dates back to the 1960’s and the OCODE machine for the language BCPL [17]. But with the advent of the World Wide Web these high-level runtime environments and their associated programming languages—residing between compiled and interpreted languages—have received a boost.

One of the things that makes high-level virtual machines interesting is the ease of porting a program to different platforms. This is even more true today than it was when virtual machines were originally developed [100]. Web service providers create cross-platform code that can be downloaded by web site visitors and run in any number of client environments to offer advanced, interactive content. In the web scenario, programs must be able to execute on as many client machines as possible with as little development and deployment cost as possible. Even though web clients running applets were the snowball that started the avalanche of web services [113, p. 243], end user machines are not the only target platform for virtual machines. Glue software, using virtual machine technology, is used on all web server platforms to connect web interfaces with business logic. For providers of such software, platform-independence is important in order to support many different architectures, operating systems, web servers and web applications—hence the need for cross-platform languages and their virtual machine architecture. In recent years, many virtual machines have been specifically developed for use in an Internet setting. Virtual machines run Java applets or Java Web Start applications, ASP.NET web applications written in C# or glue applications written in Python or Perl to connect html-code to e.g. back-end databases.

In these Internet scenarios, security requirements play an important role [38]. With applets and Web Start applications that execute on the browser machine, security is of paramount importance to protect security-unaware end users. CGI (common gateway interface) scripts and web applications that execute solely on the web server must also be secure so as not to create a vulnerability that a hacker can exploit to get access to back-end data, to subvert client connections or to disrupt the web server. In addition, some web servers—notably web hotels but also application servers—run web applications from multiple, possibly untrusted parties, and therefore require isolation for these web applications.

All of the current virtual machines have responded to some extent to the
security needs of web applications. Python used to have a restricted execution and bastion mode [68, 71], where the untrusted code executed in an environment customized—i.e. programmed by subclassing a standard sandbox—by the code deployer. Because this execution mode was easy to circumvent with the introduction of new style classes it was deprecated.

Perl 6 and the Parrot Virtual Machine [89] support input security through ‘taint mode’, which must be switched on for regular programs and is automatically set for privileged setgid/setuid programs. Tainted data may not be used directly or indirectly in any command that invokes a sub-shell, nor in any command that modifies files, directories, or processes (with certain exceptions). Perl 5 already supports Safe Mode, where a low-level opcode mask defines which operator names are accessible to the module in safe mode. By default, all access to the system is denied in safe mode, but variables can be passed in explicitly.

The Java and .NET virtual machines share the same view on runtime security and have both achieved the same level of control, which is much more advanced than that of Python, Perl or other application-level virtual machines. Java provides a so-called sandbox [41, 75, 84], a reference monitor called the ‘Security Manager’, which provides a contained environment customized through a text-based policy file that denotes the permissions with which a piece of code is allowed to run. This sandbox was initially designed only to contain applets but, since Java 1.2, it can also be used to restrict local Java applications [40]. The runtime environment of the .NET framework, inspired by the security features of the Java Virtual Machine [8, 9, 31, 87], supports similar so-called Code Access Security which controls access to sensitive resources based on code properties and the security policy in effect.

The advanced runtime environments of Java and .NET require end users to configure the security policy that holds the allowed permissions for resource access. If this configuration is performed by a dedicated system administrator, it is the administrator’s job to do it properly and to check that the result is secure. However, if this security-critical configuration is meant to be done by security-unaware end users—as in the case with applets or Web Start applications—a prerequisite for a truly secure environment is that the security policy set-up is usable and effective. This is not a trivial task as end users are notoriously bad at making security decisions [21, 44, 45]: A security decision often requires the user to decide between performing a primary task insecurely or not at all [115]. Regardless of whether the task is work- or leisure-related, users tend to choose the primary task over security [92, 94]. When lay end users are confronted with a security warning or the need to interact with security features, they often see these security events as obstacles [101] and experi-
ence frustration, even resignation and futility [23]. These negative feelings are caused by the fact that end users want to get their primary task done, that they do not understand and have no patience for security jargon, and that the impact of an erroneous security decision can be so high [23, 66, 108]. This duality of security and usability is well-recognised and further explained in the related work section 6.2. One interesting approach to tackling usability and security requirements has been suggested by e.g. Smetters and Grinter [99] who ask “if you put usability first, how much security can you get?”

It is in this interesting area of efficient and usable runtime environments and runtime security policies that our work makes its contribution.

2 Problem Description

From the current virtual machines that provide security features, we chose to investigate one in greater detail and to use it as a platform for our implementations: the Java Virtual Machine. The Java Virtual Machine is ubiquitous, well-documented, open source and has reached a certain stability and maturity. The Java runtime environment is installed with every web browser, and the J2EE web application server has a market share of 35–40% in the web application business [79]. It is thus a much-used but also open platform that lends itself easily to extensions.

Our focus within the Java Virtual Machine runtime environment is the Java sandbox with its Security Manager. The Security Manager checks whether code is allowed to e.g. access a file or other sensitive resources. Our ontology of information security (paper 8, p. 201ff.) describes the Java sandbox as a countermeasure that provides access control and ensures policy compliance. The Java sandbox prevents the violation of the integrity and confidentiality of technical assets. Other countermeasures that provide access control are e.g. anti-virus software, firewalls or e-mail filters. Countermeasures that protect similar goals and assets are e.g. intrusion detection systems. The sandbox is configured through a policy file, a plain text file (see middle of figure 1), which contains the permissions granted to a given piece of code.

After a literature study and hands-on experience it became clear that the sandbox with the Security Manager is underspecified in two important ways:

**Resource control** The security architecture, by way of the Java Security Manager, provides access control for resources. This protects the confidentiality and integrity of resources. However, the Security Manager does not support
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Problem: Resource control: How to control the use of resources that have been granted? How much can be read, written, recorded or downloaded from the network?

Figure 1: Two problematic areas with runtime security. How can an end user create a runtime security policy? Simple syntax support tools do not help the lay user. Can the runtime security policy be set-up such that it not only allows access control but also resource control? Resource control limits the extent to which a granted resource can be used.

release control or resource control\(^1\). The availability of resources remains unprotected: Once the Security Manager has concluded that a piece of code has access to a resource, that piece of code has complete access. There is no control of the extent to which the code is allowed to use a resource. Thus, while the Security Manager can enforce that an untrusted application can only write to a specific directory (see policy file in figure 1), there is no way to restrict how many files the untrusted application can create or how many bytes it can write to a file or how long it can keep a file open for writing. This shortcoming can result in denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that can make the virtual (and physical) execution environment unresponsive to legitimate requests and eventually

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\(^1\)For the remainder of the thesis we use the term resource control to denote access control including release control or quota management. The terms resource control and release control are used interchangeably. We use the term access control if only the initial access to a resource is controlled.
force a restart or other user intervention.

**Usable policy set-up** While the security policy is configurable through a so-called policy file, there is no user-friendly tool that enables an end user to set up such a policy. The existing policy tool (see the upper left-hand side of figure 1) allows only offline set-up of a security policy. Offline setting is generally not possible, because the end user cannot know beforehand which permissions a piece of code may need. A simple runtime tool as suggested on the upper right-hand side of figure 1 is not suitable for a security lay user either: It is too technical and does not reflect that not all permissions are equally dangerous. A consequence of this lack of a usable tool is that the Security Manager is not used at all and that the runtime security features of Java are often switched off. This means that the sandbox is effectively disabled and the execution platform is open to all kinds of malware.

The same two issues also hold for the .NET Code Access Security. While our contribution in the area of resource control is specific to Java, our findings for usable policy set-up can also be applied to the Common Language Runtime.

### 3 Research questions, objectives, methodology

It is the aim of our research to investigate two specific security needs in runtime environments and to contribute with solutions for these. We address two major research questions:

1. How can resource control be achieved in a runtime environment?
2. How can lay end users be enabled to set up a runtime security policy?

The connection between these two seemingly unconnected objectives is that enhanced security features for runtime security (i.e. allowing resource control) must also be made usable to become a secure feature. If the security feature is not used it does not actually enhance runtime security.

Our goal is to answer these questions in the context of the Java Virtual Machine, but answers shall be as general as possible so that a solution for Java can also be applied to other application-level virtual machines.

One objective of our research is to achieve runtime resource control for the Java Virtual Machine. As related work in section 6.1 shows, previous research has addressed such resource control but not in the context of the existing runtime security architecture. We aim at a general solution that should fit seamlessly into the existing security architecture. Preferably the runtime monitor that manages access control should also be used for resource control. This
would lead to a clean design with one monitoring component and one policy file for access and resource control.

The method of this first part is exploratory, in order to gain technical insights into the runtime environment of the Java virtual machine. One insight concerns performance. We must ensure that the proposed solution can achieve reasonable performance. First, the current runtime monitor shall be checked for performance penalties. If the penalty is low enough, an implementation of runtime resource control within the Security Manager shall be done.

The second objective is to make the set-up of runtime security policies so usable that not only security administrators but also lay end users can achieve high security in the runtime environment of, for example, their web browsers. The method for this second objective is to propose the hypothesis that existing tools are not sufficient. If this proves true, we use the method of usability engineering [28] with user studies to arrive at a better tool and verified guidelines for tools that set up a security policy.

Consequently, we set out to identify shortcomings in the existing tool for policy setup by means of a usability study. In order to gain further experience and insights in usability issues for setting up a security policy, we evaluate the usability and security of personal firewalls. Personal firewalls usually set up their rules (security policies) at runtime, with user interaction. The evaluation of their usability should supply indications as to which user interface techniques would be most appropriate for security tasks. In a parallel and more analytical approach, we survey literature on user help techniques in order to identify those techniques that could assist end users in their security decisions. Given this background we shall recommend guidelines and present an implementation of a tool that guides lay users through the set-up of a runtime security policy. The tool shall be evaluated by user studies in several stages: during the design phase as a paper prototype, during the implementation phase with early user feedback and with a final user evaluation. The early evaluations shall provide input for enhancements in the design and implementation process. The final evaluation shall show the extent to which our recommendations hold and to which we could obtain a practical answer for our second research question.

4 Contributions

Part I of this thesis introduces and specifies security in runtime environments and addresses the problem of missing resource control. This part consists of papers 1–3 and paper 8 as a reference and general overview over the area of information security. In the first paper, we set the scene and identify require-
ments for a secure runtime system for executing untrusted code by way of
a risk analysis of runtime environments. A performance study of the Secu-
rity Manager provides evidence that the performance penalty is low enough to
build further on runtime security. Consequently, in an exploratory approach,
we implement resource control in an integrated fashion by enhancing the Java
Security Manager.

Part II, consisting of papers 4–7, deals with the problem of usable set-up
of security policies for runtime environments. The connection to the first part
is that part I proposes a solution for resource control that extends the syntax
for Java policies with constructs that allow resource control policies. But how
can users be enabled to actually set up such advanced security policies? This
question dominates the second part of the thesis.

We start from the hypothesis that offline policy editing is neither suitable
nor usable. In order to prove the hypothesis, we conducted a usability study of
the existing tool for setting up Java permissions and received strong indications
that offline editing was not enough for end users and that integrated runtime
editing would be favoured (paper 4). This evaluation—together with our work
on personal firewalls (paper 6) and general user help techniques (paper 5)—
has led to the definition of design guidelines for applications that must set a
security policy. The tool JPerM, the Java permission manager, for setting up
Java permissions at runtime has been designed and implemented according to
these guidelines. In a final user study (paper 7), JPerM proved to be superior in
terms of efficiency, effectiveness and user satisfaction and thus supported the
validity of our guidelines.

In a concise overview, the contributions of this thesis are

• an analysis of the security features of the Java runtime environment with
  regard to its effective security and with regard to its security effect as a
general countermeasure to information security threats,
  – We derive security requirements for Java container software from
    a risk analysis and evaluate to which extent the requirements are
    fulfilled in a number of Java containers (paper 1, p. 47ff.).
  – The Security Manager, the policy enforcer, is not used often, which
    is often blamed on its alleged slowness. We show that the Security
    Manager need not impair performance by more than a few percent
    and provide a checklist on how to improve performance (paper 2,
p. 63ff.).
  – Security of runtime environments, and specifically the Java sand-
    box, is only a small part of the domain of information security. We
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provide a structured overview of the domain of information security by way of an ontology that places our research area in a greater context (paper 8, p. 201ff.).

• an extension of the Java runtime environment that provides resource control,
  – Release or resource control is often solved outside of the existing security mechanisms (see related work on resource control, section 6.1). We show that resource control for Java-mediated resources can be done within the Security Manager, which results in a cleaner security design with only one security policy configuration file (paper 3, p. 97ff.).

• an extension of the Java runtime environment that provides interactive or automated set-up of permissions for the code that is currently running (paper 7, p. 181ff.),

• an analysis and one solution for how to present security decisions to end users in a usable fashion.
  – The Java development toolkit from Sun contains a small graphical user interface tool for setting permissions. We evaluate the usability of this tool (paper 4, p. 117ff.).
  – We evaluate the usefulness of different help systems in a security context (paper 5, p. 139ff.).
  – We present a template that can help designers identify those help features that are suitable for their security application (paper 5).
  – Editing of a security policy is tedious but security-critical work. We show how personal firewalls have addressed this problem of letting individual users set up a security policy and draw general conclusions for successful policy set-up (paper 6, p. 163ff.).
  – We present and evaluate JPerM, an interactive application monitor that helps the user set a least-privilege security policy (paper 7, p. 181ff.).
5 Paper Summaries

This section provides short summaries of the papers that are included in this thesis and explains their connections to the research area and to each other.

**Paper 1: An evaluation of Java application containers according to security requirements [52]** There are a number of Java application containers—web browsers, web servers, Java application servers and OSGi frameworks—that load and execute Java code. By way of a risk analysis, we identify security requirements that the containers should meet and show the extent to which these requirements are fulfilled. In the evaluation, the container for Enterprise Java Beans scores best. It addresses the requirements partially through technical solutions but also by providing a written contract that disallows certain behaviour for the components it runs.

**Paper 2: Performance of the Java Security Manager [51]** The Java Security Manager, responsible for the Java runtime protection, is often not used because of its alleged performance penalty. If this was true, building solutions on top of the Security Manager would be difficult to promote. However, our measurements show that the performance penalty is often negligible and that there are certain measures that can be taken by developers and policy writers to make that penalty even lower.

**Paper 3: Using the Java sandbox for resource control [50]** One criticism of the Java sandbox is that it only addresses access control but not release control, i.e. once granted, access to a resource is unlimited. We show an implementation where resource control can be integrated into the standard Java sandbox. Due to an implementation on the Java level (rather than using native code), the performance penalty of our solution is high, but as a proof of concept the solution is interesting and shows the potential of the Java sandbox.

**Paper 4: A usability study of security policy management [53]** The previous two papers have shown the technical potential of the Java sandbox. However, users have a hard time using the sandbox because they do not receive adequate help in their task of setting up a security policy. We have evaluated the graphical user interface tool that is meant to assist the user and found a great number of usability problems that effectively prevent the user from setting up a tight security policy.

**Paper 5: User help techniques for usable security [54]** If one wants to assist the user in setting up a policy, be it for the Java sandbox or any other security application that relies on user-defined rules such as personal firewalls or intrusion detection systems, one can choose from the tool box of user help techniques. This tool box contains techniques such as online help, context-sensitive help, wizards, and even some specific help techniques for security
applications. We compare these techniques according to which user questions they may answer and how well they can address criteria that make security applications usable. While our comparison is general, we provide a template that is meant to be instantiated by system designers for their specific applications.

**Paper 6: Security and usability of personal firewalls [55]** While the previous paper describes user help on a general level, this work evaluates 13 free and commercial personal firewalls according to their security and usability. With a personal firewall, it is the end user that has to make the security decision whether or not to allow an application to access the local host or the network. Here we show which user help features are used and which are relevant and helpful.

**Paper 7: Usable set-up of runtime security policies [56]** After having identified existing shortcomings and possible remedies, we have developed JPerM, a tool that aids the user in setting up a security policy for a Java application. JPerM prompts users for security decisions using meaningful, non-technical wording. JPerM uses colour-coding as a visual aid and assists the user with editing a security policy for the application. User tests show that it is superior to the existing policytool. It does not force users to understand Java policy syntax or security implications, and may even increase user awareness of security issues.

**Paper 8: An ontology of information security [57]** We describe the area of general information security by means of an ontology. The ontology focuses on the classic concepts of risk analysis—assets, threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures—and their relations. The ontology is implemented in OWL (Web Ontology Language) and supports querying and searching. It contains general concepts such as ‘access control’ as well as specific, technical concepts such as ‘Java sandbox’, ‘SSH’ or ‘Blowfish’. With the ontology at hand, the reader can find the area—‘Java sandbox’—that our research addresses and see how it relates to other areas of information security. However, the ontology addresses neither resource control nor usability issues. This paper serves as a reference and is an independent piece of work.

## 6 Related Work

Java security is an active area of research. Especially in the early years of Java, with the more rigid sandbox of Java 1.1 suggestions abounded on how to ensure Java code security by containing applets [15, 30, 47, 72, 73], on providing more expressive policies [16, 27, 76, 85, 105], or by providing alternative sandbox solutions [13, 25, 67, 88, 102], often by using bytecode rewriting (runtime
modification of Java system classes). In recent years, sandbox research has focused more on static analysis rather than the runtime security features [14, 70, 78, 98].

6.1 Resource control

It is well known that the Java security architecture provides access control but not release or resource control (e.g. [75, p. 43], [6, 42]). Naturally, this has led to a number of suggestions and implementations that attempt to remedy this shortcoming. This section gives the background for resource control solutions for Java.

A start was made by researchers within Sun [18] as early as 1998 by introducing the resource-accounting interface JRes. JRes resides outside of the existing security architecture and policies are written as Java code. In fact, it was this early work that led to the proposal of a multi-tasking virtual machine [20]. Eventually, this approach was the most accepted one. It evolved into the Isolate API (application programming interface) [63], a specification for isolating Java applications in the same Java environment from each other. In 2001, the approach was promoted to a Java Community Process, a process that aims at integrating a new API into the Java Development Kit. But although ‘JSR 121: Application Isolation API Specification’ 2 has been finalised and was meant to be integrated into Java 1.5 and then Java 1.6, it is still unclear if it will be part of Java 1.7.


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In contrast to our approach, all of the above cited solutions solve resource control outside of the existing Java security architecture with the Security Manager. All of them introduce new hooks for resource control into Java code and do not consider use and augmentation of the existing policy enforcer, the Security Manager. While disregarding the Security Manager is reasonable for low-level resources (CPU, memory etc.) that are not represented as Java objects, the Security Manager should be the natural place to provide resource control for Java-managed objects such as files, network connections or the screen.

In addition, it is notable that none of the publications pay attention to the usability of the actual policies at deployment time or even to thorough descriptions of policy APIs or policy syntax specifications.

6.2 Usable security

The second part of this thesis deals with usability aspects of security. Assessing usability is usually done by user studies. Methods for such studies are described by Nielsen [81] and Nielsen and Mack [82]. Comparisons of different methods are provided in [48, 61, 77, 96], with Hornbæk and Frøkjær [58] providing an insight in problems that arise when usability studies lead to redesign proposals.

General and more specific guidelines exist for the design of usable applications, as shown in table 1 and further described in the section ‘Guidelines for usable set-up of security policies’ of Paper 7: Usable Set-up of Runtime Security Policies (p. 181ff.).

Early influential work on the importance of usability in security applications is provided by Whitten and Tygar [108], Zurko and Simon [114] and Smetters and Grinter [99]. Zurko and Simon as well as Smetters and Grinter raise and argue the issue. Much like Smetters and Grinter, Sandhu [91] argues for ‘good-enough security’ that balances security and usability. Whitten and Tygar have conducted the well-known ‘Johnny’-study that shows how difficult lay users find the notion of public-key encryption in e-mail clients.

In the last few years usability evaluations of security applications or security features of general-purpose applications abound: Gerd tom Markotten [39] repeated the Johnny-study with similar results. Internet banking and the usability and security of user authentication is often evaluated (e.g. [49, 83]). Furnell and others have studied the usability of security features of Internet Explorer [32], Outlook Express [35] and Microsoft Word [33] as well as Wireless LAN set-up [34] and have found usability rather low. Our contribution is the eval-
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Table 1: Overview of influential general and security-specific usability guidelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General usability guidelines</th>
<th>Security-specific usability guidelines</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Nielsen [80]: 10 design slogans,</td>
<td>• Johnston et al. [62]: six criteria for</td>
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<td>• the ISO standard 9241 (parts 10–</td>
<td>successful human-computer interaction in</td>
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<td>17) provides high-level as well as</td>
<td>security applications,</td>
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<td>concrete suggestions and advice</td>
<td>• Leveson [69]: 60 guidelines for</td>
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<tr>
<td>on usability issues,</td>
<td>safe human machine interaction</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Shneiderman and Plaisant [97]:</td>
<td>design,</td>
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<tr>
<td>eight golden rules of interface</td>
<td>• Yee [110]: 10 principles,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>design.</td>
<td>• Garfinkel [36]: six principles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attempts have been made to create usable security applications. Balfanz et al. [3] have simplified the set-up of certificate-based Wireless LAN configuration. Two approaches show that using encrypted e-mail can be made much easier [37, 90]. The work that is closest to ours is where researchers have tried to simplify security policy set-up. That literature is reviewed in the following section.
6.2.1 User assistance for setting up a security policy

A technical solution that inspired our work is JSEF [64], a Java framework that is primarily intended to allow more expressive, hierarchical, positive and negative XML-based permissions. As a by-product, JSEF can also negotiate, i.e. prompt for Java permissions at runtime. This part of JSEF is not designed with usability in mind. It presents every permission with a technical text and cannot be used if no display is associated with the Java server. However, it is an inspiring starting point.

Polaris (Principle of Least Authority for Real Internet Security) [103], an add-on to Windows XP developed by Hewlett Packard, is an operating-system sandbox for compartmentalising applications and thus defeating virus attacks. Each application, such as Web browsers or text editors, can be polarized. The polarized application, called pet, runs from an unprivileged user account and can only access its local copy of configuration files and files opened by a trusted dialog box. If the same application, e.g. a browser, is used for both trusted and untrusted resources, for example, Intranet vs. other web sites, at least two pets should be created. Thus the pet for the Intranet can save passwords, to which the pet for the external web sites has no access. The security policy in Polaris is set up explicitly at application installation time and implicitly by user designation when opening files or accessing web sites. Polaris has been evaluated in a usability study [21] which shows that users often forget to create a pet, do not realise that they should have created yet another pet or assume that Polaris would create a pet automatically when launching an application. It demonstrates again that security-by-default is a better solution than relying on end users to remember security issues (their secondary task) when they want to run an application (their primary task).

Brostoff et al. [10] have worked on the usability of PERMIS access control in an e-science setting where access control is used for sharing equipment, data and software among geographically distributed scientists. Their first attempt at a user interface for setting the access control policy failed, mostly due to technical jargon (‘SOA’, ‘RBAC’) in the user interface. Their second attempt was more successful but was only tested with a very small number of users. While the authors do not provide constructive advice to those facing similar usability problems, we present the findings from the JPerM studies in the form of general guidelines.

Maxion and Reeder [74] compare the user interface for file permission set-up of Windows XP with a tool, Salmon, that they have developed. In their design of Salmon they use a method from cognitive science called external subgoal support (ESS). ESS ensures that users make correct goal assumptions...
for the task they want/need to complete, and that it is straightforward to define and fulfil subgoals. However, the user must still show interest and commitment in defining and solving the subgoal. Such interest or commitment cannot be taken for granted when security is not a user’s primary task.

In initial work, Cao and Iverson [12] have improved the setting of an access control policy for a web authoring system. The existing ACL (access control list) editor was too general. In one study task it gave the users a false sense of security: The users thought they had successfully solved the task and improved security, while this was not true. The proposed solution is implemented as a wizard that in a more task-oriented way guides the user to setting an ACL. Their early findings of important design principles have been incorporated into JPerM: (1) The user has access to essential information for making the decision (see also Whitten and Tygar [108]), (2) the system should be responsible for predicting and presenting such information when it can.

Our work builds on the user’s ability to make an informed decision at the time when an untrusted application requests access to a sensitive resource. How we provide input to this informed decision is influenced by the following publications.

Hardee et al. [45] have put up guidelines for designing such dialogs. They advocate explicitly to stress the negative effects of granting an action. The user should be warned of the loss of time, money and privacy. The guidelines emerge from their previous study which has shown that users tend to underestimate the risks in a computer setting. Acquisti and Grossklags [1] present a study on factors that influence the security decision making process of users. Specifically, users will easily trade privacy and security for convenience. Whalen et al. [106] report early results from a user interview study about user habits for setting access control to files that shall be shared within an organisation. They conclude that access control set-up must be integrated into people’s workflow to be used, that it must be convenient and must fit into social settings.

Our design guidelines for applications that must set a security policy—and the design of JPerM—have been influenced by these specific studies, implementations and their findings but also by more general usability publications as cited previously.
7 Limitations

This section shows ways in which our work could be improved to even better fulfill the stated objectives.

One of our contributions (paper 3) is to present a proof-of-concept implementation, using the Security Manager for resource control. However, the work is not a full-blown solution for the resource control problem. The syntax that we use for denoting resource-controlling policies such as “allow only the writing of 2MB to the file /tmp/a” is crude. A better suitable syntax for resource control should be chosen. One could, for example, evaluate, and, if possible, select one of the many policy languages of the Semantic Web. If none of the languages support resource control as such, one could possibly identify a language that can be extended with a resource control syntax. It is important that the chosen language is external—and not Java code—so that it can be set up by an end user. From our work on the comparison of policy languages [24] we suggest that Protune or XML-based Ponder might be suitable candidates.

Both our performance study of the regular Java Security Manager (paper 2) and our work on resource control (paper 3) show that the Java permission check is a certain (regular permissions) or even high (resource control permissions) performance bottleneck. Caching of Java permissions in a suitable structure could make a permission check faster than stack inspection and reduce the bottleneck. While caching may not improve performance for regular permissions much, it is important for resource control permissions because these are invoked more frequently than access control permission. Potentially, a file resource permission could be invoked for every byte written to the file.

For now, JPerM, the usable permission set-up manager, only handles regular Java permissions. It should be extended to support even resource control permissions. The additional twist with resource control permissions is two-fold: (1) The user must make the rather technical decision of limiting resource access. This means that the user must be supported in gaining an understanding for existing resources and reasonable limits. (2) An overzealous user may choose resource control limitations that degrade performance. If the user wants to control every read-operation in a file access, every byte written to disk must be approved by the Security Manager, leading to a noticeable performance overhead. A usable JPerM would recognise this problem and try to mediate it.

It could be worthwhile to verify with proof-of-concept implementations that resource control in the Common Language Runtime of the .NET architecture can be achieved with a similar approach as taken with Java. That work would have to be preceded by a performance evaluation of the runtime access control of the Common Language Runtime.
8 Future directions

Our research has led to the identification of the following additional research problems.

The thesis shows that setting up a security policy for a runtime environment or for an application is a difficult task, especially for a security lay user. Many advanced policy languages for access control, privacy or trust exist and with the advent of the Semantic Web, their importance is increasing. While we have addressed usability in security decisions, further work is needed for also making advanced policy languages more usable through usable set-up routines and thus available to lay users. In this context, interaction with the policy enforcer becomes even more important and challenging for the designer. Kapadia et al. [65] show one such challenge, namely the importance of providing useful and security-insensitive feedback as to why an access control failed and how the current state could be changed so that the access control mechanism would allow access. Such a component would need to be integrated into a tool that helps set up advanced policy languages. Further challenges are likely to be identified and need to be addressed.

JPerM is mainly intended for end-user interaction. However, it can also be configured to silently log, not warn, users of security-critical events. Thus in an organisational context, JPerM could be used as a data collection or auditing tool that can be connected to an intrusion detection system, which has centrally managed rules for detecting unwanted actions. The security-critical events that JPerM captures are on a higher level than more network-centric intrusion detection system. One should investigate whether such high-level events provide a more reliable footprint of an attack than lower-level events.

The principle of user designation is enticing. It suggests allowing security-critical actions automatically, if the user has indicated by e.g. double-clicking a file or entering a URL, what she wants to do. If the principle of user designation is used for setting up security policies, how much security does it achieve? For investigating user designation, learning mode in the Norton firewall could be an interesting starting point. Learning mode sets up a rule according to what an application (not necessarily the user) wants to do. Is user designation always obvious? Can a monitoring application reliably distinguish between user designation and the acting of a malicious application? These are general but important security usability questions to consider.
9 Concluding remarks

Our work has shown that the Java Security Manager is an underused security component of the Java Virtual Machine security architecture. Its alleged slowness could not be proven and it can be easily extended to not only support access control but also release control for sensitive resources.

However, before the Security Manager or any other policy-guided reference monitor or runtime checker can be used, users must have means of setting up the access and, if possible, resource control policy. This is addressed in the second part of the thesis. As end users do not have much patience with security applications—these rarely constitute a primary task for the user—policy set-up must be convenient and interfere as little as possible with a user’s primary task. We have shown this by implementing a more user-friendly tool for setting up Java security policies. JPerM allows e.g. the set-up of policies at runtime, much like personal firewalls, and clearly classifies user alerts by severity to help users in their security decisions.

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