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ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND MINORITIES IN A MULTIETHNIC SOCIETY

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ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND MINORITIES IN A MULTIETHNIC SOCIETY

Introduction

Subject of the study

The relationship between ethnic conflicts and democratisation is one of the most topical issues of the present time, but also of the future of multiethnic societies. That is why the subject of the analysis in this paper will be basic determinants of ethnic policies and models of ethnic relations management in the territories of former communist/socialist, multiethnic federations (CSSR, USSR and SFRY). Causes, factors, chief political and social actors and the impact of ethnic conflicts on development and democratisation of post-communist multiethnic societies will be also analysed. As ethnic conflicts, i.e. the relationship the Majority – Minority, are going to be an active factor of changes in Eastern Europe, this paper will deal with connections between ethnic conflicts, the status of minorities and the achieved level of democratisation.

Special attention will be paid to the analysis of processes in the territory of former Yugoslavia, which could provide an abundance of material for such an analysis. This particularly applies to the most important conflicts between Serbs and Croats; Serbs, Croats and Muslims in B&H, Serbia and Macedonia. The example of the Serbian-Albanian relations and war in Kosovo will be elaborated on because it sublimely manifests the devastating force of ethno nationalism along with Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, and Albanians and Macedonians in western Macedonia. However, the analysis will be reduced to Serbia and the FRY, more specifically to the crisis of national and state identity of the Majority (Serbs) and the status of Minorities.

Opening hypotheses

The opening hypotheses of the study are the following:

- First, preservation and development of ethnicity and the state/nation building are in the east of Europe and in the Balkans strongly interconnected and intertwined.
- Second, the aggravated minority issue results from the acceptance of nationalism as a ruling ideology and practice and in that context especially the one of the basic ideas of ethno nationalism: Ethnic and State borders must coincide.
- Third, the problem of national minorities derives from the conflict between the ideals of the homogeneity of the state/nation and the reality of ethnic heterogeneity. In fact, while making the “one state, one
nation" formula utterly inappropriate, a mixture of ethnicities brings to the fore the political and ethnic differences.

- Fourth, in an undemocratic framework, ethnic conflicts of the Majority and Minority lead to violence and disintegration or reshaping of the state.

I ETHNIC CONFLICTS MANAGEMENT AND THE STATUS OF MINORITIES IN FORMER COMMUNIST/SOCIALIST MULTIELTHNIC FEDERATIONS

In the course of the last hundred and fifty years the east, and especially the southeast of Europe has been experiencing tumultuous fundamental ethnic and political ferment and restructuring. If the number of newly created entities is taken as a criterion of success, the road of this part of Europe towards the state/nation has been a more dramatic and successful one than the one of Western Europe. As distinct from Western Europe, the state apparatus is here built only in part, there are neither autonomous organizations, nor a "uniform political culture" and even nor "practised national elites". The populus is activated to achieve the objective: "to belong to a state" = "to belong to an ethnic community". While the populus in Western Europe aspires to control government and to have an active role, as "demos", with the help of the concept of the sovereignty of the people and the demos set-up as a yardstick of democracy, in the eastern part of Europe and the Balkans the populus is always imbued with the feeling of fear of real or alleged menace. It is constantly on the verge of imbalance and often experiences collective hysteria of a mystic collectivism that is embodied in the "romantic charm of the ingenious political leader" and in dictatorship. Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic provides the recent convincing example of such a state of the society and spirit.

The communist/socialist bureaucracy regulated relatively efficiently political and economic inequalities among ethnic communities (Marshall, 1993: 182). Its approach to the national question was more or less in the spirit of the Stalin's formula: "National in the form and socialist in the content". In reality, ethnic problems were ignored or pushed back, while the "socialist transformation" (collectivisation, industrialization) and elimination of the "bourgeois past" that was viewed upon in ethnic, religious and similar categories were overstressed. Ethnonationalism was suppressed as a "remnant of the past" (Csepeli, 1991: 48). Ethnonationalism was believed to disappear with the improvement of material conditions, and ethnic communities were politically organized on an ad hoc basis. Similarly, different strategies were devised and practised for meeting the most diverse needs that originated from a multiethnic structure of the society.

Generally speaking, Eastern Europe was subjected to a universalistic logic of big empires: when different ethnic communities were joining this or that empire, loose ties were established with the central authority. That is why ethnic communities managed to preserve their autonomy and to develop continuously
their self-awareness. One of the features of this region is a concentrated heritage of history and imperial expansion. Ethnic relations and minority issues in Eastern Europe are particularly burdened by the heritage of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian empires. The Russian Empire proved to be the most dynamic one, earning along the way the title of the "dungeon of the peoples". It comprised both Christian and Moslem nations. In addition, many states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, CSSR and Yugoslavia) were created under treaties after the disintegration and division of former empires.

The universalistic vision continued also to live within the framework of the ideal of the irrefutable communist state. The minority statuses were determined by way of differing structure of the political administration that, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly, represents social or political stratification on the basis of ethnic identity. Congruence of cultural and political boundaries moderates temporarily ethnic differences (Marshall, 1993: 177, 189-190). It is, therefore, no wonder that, for instance, 20 nations of the USSR have been embroiled, since 1990, in the process of ethno nationalistic mobilization; the SFRY has also been the place of inflammable communal conflicts (Gurr. 1993: 25, 26). Reasons for potential conflicts are numerous, among them the question of the status of ethnic communities, especially of minorities, standing out (See: the crisis map in Europe). For instance, in 1990, thirty minorities or around 143 million people and around 35% of the population of the Region, were identified as at risk minorities. Out of these minorities, 16 are today in a position of the ruling majority in the newly created states while 93 million people or around 20 – 25% of the Region population is still at risk (Marshall, 1993: 178). In reality, uninterrupted ethnic reorganizations were taking place, including mass movements of the population, ethnic cleansing and genocide (Kayden, 1996). Rough reality incited contradictory processes: on the one hand, ethnic self-awareness has been developing and expanding excessively, having been burdened by bad, xenophobic and exclusionist experiences and, on the other hand, there were tendencies of hiding ethnic belonging and reducing the influence of ethnic self-awareness in economic, political and cultural life (Gasparini and Bergnach, 1995: 211). In the final analysis, both tendencies make ethnic relations and structures factors of instability in analysed federal states. Therefore, Schopflin was right in naming these states "Humpty-Dumpy States" (Schopflin, 1995: 3, 4). Throughout their existence they were experiencing serious crises endangering their existence (See the table: Crisis years of the CSSR, USSR and SFRY).

In Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the relationship between state borders and national identity represents one of the most delicate problems (Evans, 1992). Namely, the political life of these states is "overfilling with petty and inextricable territorial contradictions" and "every of the nations in the region is in a state of constant, uninterrupted disputes with almost all its neighbours" (Bibo, 1989, 64). In this region, state territory and national homeland have never been identical. None of the states in this part of Europe is devoid of potentially severe territorial conflicts with immediate neighbours and all these states are potentially the
subject of revisionist aspirations on the part of neighbours (Brzezinski, 1989/90: 3-5). All in all, minds and souls of middle East Europeans are made for a known and favourite topic of theirs: Just borders and how to acquire them! A characteristic of irredentist crises is that they are managed with more difficulty than other crises due to presence of strong affective motivation. Dissatisfaction with ethno-territorial and political borders creates fertile ground for the feeling of discontent among ethnic communities. Fear for their territories is spreading among the people (for their homeland, for their community, for their estate and home, for the existence itself). At the same time, claims in respect of other’s territories are encouraged. Situation is created where advancement of a nation is connected with territorial expansion and gathering together around the ideology and policy of chauvinism, which seems to be the only one capable of creating the necessary protective shield of "the strong state/nation" (Gleason, 1992: 160). One of the arguments in favour of this view is that, throughout history, new borders were often drawn during the war dividing thus minorities, which in the process change the state for several times. There is only a small step, which is made rapidly but corrected with difficulty, from that old — new aria and hatred against others instigated by it to a general civil war in the name of the ethnic principle and domination. Opening up of the question of territories and new frontiers or rather strengthening of irredentism has faced political leaders of this part of Europe with three inter-connected problems that cause insecurity:

- They would have, often arbitrarily, to determine borders, strengthening among the states transnational affinities;
- Lack of experience in building up inclusive civil and democratic political culture, and
- Facing with internal and external threats to security (Carment and James, 1995: 104).

Efforts that have been made so far to solve the problem mostly ended in failure. One of the reasons is that there was no perseverance in linking guarantees for unchangeability of borders with different kinds of autonomy (Glatz, 1993: 8). For that very reason, ethnic and territorial conflicts are one of the main threats to peace and security in this part of Europe, which otherwise has a long history of irredentist and secessionist movements (Bugajski, 1995: 103). For instance, Ukrainians are a classic example of irredentism from among the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and Rumania. Many testimonies of the danger of territorial conflicts can be found in war tragedy of the peoples of former Yugoslavia and a series of wars in the former USSR, especially in the Trans-Caucasus area. There are more than 70 cockpits of new ethnic conflicts in the Region, 20 of them being armed ones (New Conflicts, 1992: V).

The USSR was a federal state from 1923, Yugoslavia from 1946 and Czechoslovakia from 1969. During World War II Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia died and then were reconstructed, while the USSR was faced with disloyalty of individual whole non-Russian communities. Czechoslovakia experienced in the
period 1968 – 1969 hard traumas. All three states disintegrated in early 1990s. After disintegration of federal states in the Region, the idea of a national state becomes stronger, and the model of the state/nation becomes extremely attractive to the majority of local minorities (Kolossov V., Treivish A. 1994: 1 – 7).

Contemporary relevance of ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Balkans is emphasized by tumultuous and deep changes that have begun with events of 1989. Then, instead of the dying socialism, free market economy, combined with the Old God and sacralizing the Nation, appears as the New God (Aronowitz, 1990: 5-6; Buchanen, 1990: 212).

Events that began in 1989 are usually called "revolutions" because they include dismantling of totalitarianism and establishment of a new political and social order (Heler, 1991: 546, 548). All these revolutions began as exaltation of democracy and self-determination to be later on transformed into self-exaltation of new political elites of power and spreading of fear that democracy might die young (Miszlivetz, 1991: 786 – 787).

After the fall of communist regimes, two kinds of conflicts prevail in Eastern Europe:

- Political ones, where nearly everywhere (excluding Serbia) the forces that were connected with the former regime were removed from power, and

- Ethnic conflicts that brought about the disintegration of multiethnic federal states: USSR, CSSR and SFRY (Brubaker. 1999: 23 – 26, 43 – 48, 60 – 69). Ethnic conflicts dispelled even the last illusion of the communist brotherhood and marriage in a sort of a supraethnic nation (Brzezinski, 1989/90: 1). However, these conflicts have also begun to undermine the new hope of democracy.

The area of former USSR and Yugoslavia is the one where the concentration of politicised ethnic communities takes places in particular. The identity and status of minorities in this region was changing in early 1990s from month to month. In the period 1989 – 1992, a new geopolitical map of Europe was drawn. The collapse of these federal states has completely changed the picture of and reorganized Europe as it was when created in the period 1945 – 1949 (Foucher, 1995: 13; Harris, 1993: 301). By negotiations or wars, fourteen new independent European states have been created. Politically, disintegration of the federations was an expression of victory of strengthened political, economic and intellectual elites of the constituent states (constituent republics) that were, under the slogan of exercising their right to self-determination and to leaving the state union, taking over the power that was by that time controlled by the Centre (Marshall, 1993: 173, 174).

After these changes, states of the Region might be conditionally classified into three groups:
- North-central Eastern Europe: Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia.
- Southeastern Europe/the Balkans: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), Bulgaria, Macedonia, Moldavia, Romania and FR Yugoslavia.
- Eastern-Slav Eastern Europe: Russia, Byelorussia and Ukraine.

The newly created states were established on an ethno nationalist principle though, by their ethnic composition, they are heterogeneous (See: Table Major Ethnic Groups in New European States 1989-1991; Harris. 1993: 307-308). A fifth of the total population of these states (about 340 million) can be classified as ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities. Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Croatia, after the military ethnic cleansing of the territory in the secondary half of 1995, can be taken as relatively homogenous national states (with the share of national minorities of 10%). Other states have a large number of national minorities in terms of the percentage. Marked examples are Latvia with 46.8%, Estonia with 38.1%, Moldavia and the FRY with 33.7% of the minority population. Kazakhstan is a binational state consisting of two majority national groups. B&H is a trinational state where all three groups are conflicting for political influence so that it is an open question whether the state will survive the civil war. In seven states (Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldavia, Tadzhikistan and Ukraine) the majority group accounts for between the half and ¾ of the population. These states are faced with serious challenges of legitimacy, citizenship or sovereignty (borders) (Marshall, 1993: 179).

Accordingly, the existence of ethnic minorities is a fact (See: Table Minorities in Nation-States in Eastern Europe) creating problems even to the majority of new states though these states are more homogenous than the ones preceding them. In addition, the fate of minorities in states trying to build themselves as nationally homogenous is uncertain. However, taking into account that all newly-created states, which were established in modern circumstances of the triumph of democratic models of power, are obliged to invoke democracy, and that even when their elites are trying to rule authoritatively, they cannot fully manifest it, i.e. to transform the states completely into totalitarian police states that would nip in the bud autonomy aspiring movement of minorities. Even authoritarian authorities are compelled to bargain with minorities. All this emphasizes the necessity of having such a relationship between the majority and minority where the protection and the exercise of the rights of minorities are one of key yardsticks of democracy. It is, however, unfortunate that in the paradigm of a homogenous national state there is no room for compromises with minorities. Hence, in conditions of economic crisis, political conflicts and instability, the issue of minorities becomes topical and exacerbated particularly in border areas where numerous ethnic groups live. This leads to latent or open ethnic conflicts.

In addition, minorities are mostly dissatisfied and their elites are striving to make their own dream of statehood come true, either by creating their own state or
joining the king country. This is demanded by invoking the right to self-
determination or, at least, to political and territorial autonomy. In addition, the
existence of ethnic minorities that resist assimilation, specifically those that
aspire at their own state or autonomy, are a hindrance to the majority to build the
nation-state. This may irritate the majority, instigating on its part conflicts among
communities, generating repression (forced assimilations and expulsion of
minority groups, i.e. ethnic cleansing). Repression, however, transforms even
moderate advocates of autonomy into radical separatists. This points out the
problem of the protection and exercise of minority rights as one of key criteria of
democracy and as an integral part of the general situation in a society, especially
in ethnic relations.

Majority – Minority relationship when translated into the ethnicity sphere
becomes a relationship of conflicts because every ethnic community is, in the
same way as the god Janus, “with two faces looking in opposite directions”. One
face is turned inwards and it personifies objectivity, righteousness, ethicality, and
self-sacrifice. The other face is turned outwards, towards other peoples. That
face is a symbol of “sacro egoismo” dictated by primordial instincts of self-
preservation. Being one of an ethnic community is a mobilizing factor of people.
Ethnocentrism lies in the very ideological centre of this mobilization: elevation of
one’s own ethnic community to the level of the first and sole value excluding and
negating values of other communities (Kovacs. 1999:5). Ethnic mobilization is a
process in which members of an ethnic community, in correlation with the other
ones, develop a higher degree of group consciousness, when cultural and other
unification criteria (along with religion) are used in order to establish distinct
borders vis-a-vis others. Ideological core of ethnic mobilization is ethnic
centralism, setting one’s own ethnic community to the level where it is considered
to be the highest and the one and only value, whilst underestimating, even not
recognizing, other communities. Ethnic mobilization encourages masses
assuring them that they will have security in a “strictly delineated ethnic borders”.
As these borders do not exist in reality, and ethnic loyalty is placed in the service
of the struggle for power, as is the case with Milosevic’s and other ethno
nationalistic regimes, the force of ethnic mobilization becomes uncontrolled and
adverse.

Ethno nationalism, as a sub-type of a general process of identity forming, is
based on the idea that ethnicity represents natural essence, arguing for cultural
differentiability as a basis of inequality of people. In terms of ethnic nationalism,
membership in a nation is designated within the category "jus sanguineous". It
tries to prevent mixing of cultures and ethnic communities by segregation and
delimitation of ethno nationalities. Ethno nationalism of 1990s has two priority
political objectives: restoration of ethnic or national identity and the creation of
independent state. In the process of the nation-state building, ethnicity serves as
the fullest source of political identity. This creates problems for minorities and
augments the number of new ethnic mobilizations and demands for state
(Richmond. 1994: 289 – 290). Thus, ethno nationalism leads to the separation of
the people, ethnic communities, the majority and minority. The resulting outcome is destruction of the state.

Ethno nationalism set to its followers two objectives at the turn of the past century:

- First, restoration of ethnic or national identity, and
- Second, creation of an independent state. Ethnic-national country is supposed to be based on one ethnic group or nationality, with domination of ethnic loyalty (Tamas, 1994: 78).

However, let’s see what of these objectives was achieved:

- First, the national issue that was in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the power moving peoples to create modern nations and states of an open society, which are since the second half of the twentieth century entering broader regional integrations, has degenerated under the influence of ethno nationalism. The last decades are marked by spending huge social energy for the purpose of extolment and accumulation of wealth of nationalistic elites, and proclamation of the establishment of closed and unfinished states. Efforts to create own states/nations, as opposed to the reality of multiethnic character of states, and existence of minorities that are stubborn in defending their identity, caused extreme intolerance and violence (Deak, 1990: 54). Horrors of wars, ethnic cleansing, devastation of human homes, social, economic and moral misery are too high a price which will have to be paid in this part of Europe for long for establishment of weak states, of which some of them (Albania, Macedonia and may be soon Serbia) cannot survive and function without constant international assistance which is nearing the state of protectorate and international protectorates in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

- Second, subordinating national identity to ethno nationalistic building of the state and nation, ethnicity only serves as a source of political legitimacy of political leaderships and governments. That is a fertile ground for all kinds of intolerances, for various types of xenophobia – situations where different groups see the same things differently. Those are situations where the Others are blamed for everything (Galtung. 1993:15). This creates many problems, among them being the problem of minorities in particular, intensifying in that way their orientation towards ethnic mobilization with new demands for statehood building. This, however, makes these questions the ones of broader, regional relevance (Kupchan, 1995: 186, 187).

All in all, it turned out that ethno nationalistic movements are not able either to establish stable and efficient states or modern societies, and national identities.

Fate of minorities in the states political leaderships of which are trying to build these states, as ethnically homogenous ones is uncertain. In fact, a considerable
proportion of the population is landed into an unequal position. Taking into account that newly created post-communist states are emerging in an environment where democratic values are prevailing, their political leaderships are obliged to invoke democracy, even when they are authoritarian. In fact, the environment does not allow them to transform fully into totalitarian – police states that would nip in the bud the autonomy movement of minorities. Actually, political leaderships of these states are forced to come to an agreement with minorities. The trouble is that in a paradigm of ethnically homogenous state there is no room for a sound compromise. Ethno nationalistic national and state project is a way to conflict with Minorities, and nationalists are speaking about national self-determination of only their own nation and not about freedom of minorities within the new Majority (Konrad, 1995: 7, 32, 68). Data on this point were obtained in the very beginning of blooming of ethno nationalism in this part of Europe. Hatred for minorities was, from the very beginning, as early as in 1991, strong and especially directed towards them (41% of Poles dislikes Ukrainians; 49% of Czechoslovak population dislikes Hungarians; 4 to 10 Russians or Ukrainians have the same negative opinion about Azerbaijani). Another big “enemy” is the neighboring state. That is the view of 84% of respondents in Russia, 81% in Czechoslovakia, 56% in Hungary and 54% in Poland. Such an attitude is dangerous where linked with uncontrolled love for “own territories” that are under the control of neighbouring states. This is just the view expressed by the majority of Poles, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Russians and Ukrainians, and considerable percentage of Lithuanians, Czechs, and Slovaks and, of course, Germans are trying not to lag behind them (The Pulse, 1991).

In conditions of economic crisis, political conflicts and instability, the minority issue becomes topical and particularly exacerbated in border areas where numerous ethnic groups live. This leads to latent or open ethnic conflicts. These conflicts prove that even minorities are experiencing a period of “waking up“, which judging by everything cannot be prevented but it can be slowed down or redirected. However, there is a risk of their redirecting into conflicts between states since all post-communist countries have their compatriots in the status of minority in neighbouring countries. In addition, governments of rival states treat these and other ethnic minorities as the "Trojan horse" (Connor, 1991: 4). Accordingly, there are high risks of conflicts between these states on account of minorities growing into open armed conflicts, as it was in the past.

Changes in what existed, and the new not established yet, without the possibility of finding solutions quickly, have created conditions of uncertainty, fear, nervousness and loss of security. That is a fertile ground for all kinds of intolerances, for various types of xenophobia – the situation where different groups view identical things differently, where the "Others" are blamed for everything (Havel, 1991: 17). The question is, therefore, how ethnic conflicts are going to affect the direction of changes in Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia. That is one of open questions and this paper will deal with it. Analysis will be made of the connection between ethnic relations, and conflicts in particular, the status of
minorities and the achieved level of democratisation.

Many present ethnic conflicts can break out of control. That would endanger stability of the European continent. There is mention in some forecasts that there are 129 potential spots of ethnic conflicts in Central – Eastern Europe and the former USSR (excluding the Trans-Caucasus), 25 of them being those where government uses means of serious pressure, including threats or actual use of force (Rady, 1996: 1). However, there are also views that present ethnic conflicts and tensions in Eastern Europe stem from the framework of long-term conflicts and that they are perhaps the last stage. That is why attention will also be paid to possible effects of the existing ethnic conflicts, and possibilities for emergence of new ones of relevance for regional stability.

II TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE AND NATIONAL MINORITIES

The position of minorities in the state – social transformation of East European countries is, depending on demographic and geopolitical circumstances, of great relevance. The fact that minorities are prone to making their own state creations or joining the king state, requesting the right to self-determination or "at least" political and territorial autonomy, represents a particular problem for stability of this part of Europe.

Political pluralism and democratic institutions have created more favourable conditions for minorities to establish their own political organizations, to defend with more success their own interests and political representation. However, the initial pressures of "democratisation" have not resulted into any considerable changes in the policy in regard to minorities. But negative effects of nationalism on democratisation and reforms prevailed soon over its mobilizing value, which was a particularly marked in ethnically heterogeneous society. Anyhow, restoration of nationalism was one of the clearest expressions of a general crisis of the communist/socialist type of society (Kellas, 1993: 163; Zaslavsky, 1995: 241, 242).

However, building of "nationalized states", though being ethnically heterogeneous, are true to the model of the state where ruling elites promote the language, culture, demographic position, economic prosperity and political hegemony of the "state-forming nation". Such states intensify conflicting character of mutual relations of ethnic communities, relations of minorities with the state they live in and relations with their external "homeland" (Brubaker, 1995: 107-111; Harris, 1993: 318). However, despite this, these states include among their priorities, in the very beginning of their existence, a new system of minority protection (See the Annex: Minority Protection Since 1989). This system is based on international legal provisions of the UN, on the OSCE minority standards and other forms of regional protection (UIS, Council of Europe), or on bilateral agreements of states. Internally, minority protection is incorporated into new or altered constitutions; laws are passed (on national minorities, elections, schooling,
education, the use of language, administration, etc.) that regulate individual aspect of
the protection. The minority protection is being established at the level of individual and
group rights, objective guarantees (Estonia, Croatia, Slovenia, etc.), territorial (the FRY)
and personal autonomy (Brunner, 1994: 22 – 31). The scope and coverage of this
protection differ considerably. The reason lies in the wish of political leaderships of
newly established states to facilitate and expedite political recognition of their states.
Thus, the EU adopted in December 1991 the Declaration on Criteria for Recognition of
New States in Eastern Europe and the USSR, which expresses commitment to the Final
Newly created states are requested to observe these acts and the UN Charter,
especially where the rule of law, democracy and human rights are concerned.
Guaranteeing the rights to minorities in accordance with obligations laid down within the
framework of the OSCE is second ranking.

Judging by constitutional and legislative solutions, the status of minorities is not bad
(Czamta, 1995: 98). However, actual position of minorities is in many aspects at its
worst, including the "ethnic cleansing". A testimony to that effect is the fate of several
million refugees and internally displaced persons that are victims of forcible migrations
(Rady, 1996: 1).

One might draw a conclusion that democratisation revives nationalism and that,
simultaneously, nationalism is one of major obstacles to democratisation and the
state/nation building. In fact, nationalism makes the arising of totalitarianism easier, and
the creation of market economy, consolidation of constitutional democracy and
protection of social justice more difficult (Dimitrijevic, N. 1995: 4). A nationalist state is
essentially a unitary one and obsessed by the idea of national unity. However, actually
existing differences are of the sort that the state cannot be centralized and that the need
for federalism and regionalism as well as for territorial, cultural or other form of the
minority autonomy is to be bolstered. This sets as one of the basic objectives
achievement of an "equilibrium level" of the minority autonomy that would support
maintenance of cultural and ethnic specificities but discourage separatist movements
(Kupchan, 1995: 14). However, the accomplishment of this objective is aggravated by a
pronounced fear and obvious animosity of the ruling elites of these states towards any
autonomy (Tabajdi, 1994: 16, 17).

Particularly difficult political problem is the status of "new minorities", i. e. members of
those communities that in the former USSR and Yugoslavia enjoyed the status of the
"constituent peoples". Successor-states would have, in exchange for territory and
stability, to secure equality of all citizens and of persons belonging to these minorities in
particular. The first steps along these lines are guaranteeing of citizenship and
appropriate measures of the affirmative action. However, the reality is reverse:
treatment of these "foreign nationalities" is extremely bad, and millions of people do not
have a regulated citizenship. In many respects the government policy in the newly
created states is directed against "new minorities" and, as a result, ethnic conflicts gain
in weight (Glatz, 1993: 14).
III THE TIPOLOGY OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS: THE CASE OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND SERBIA

1) Conflicts in the case of former Yugoslavia

The territory of the FRY is the crossroads, a meeting place of the western and eastern cultures, civilizations. Meetings and clashes of interests of various Balkan, European and Great Powers caused many crises and wars, altering of boundaries, migrations and changes in ethnic composition on this territory. Today, many existing differences and conflicts result from special historical – cultural, religious, political, economic, etc. development of ethnic communities and different segments of the territory.

Wars in the territory of former Yugoslavia have become a paradigm of new, post-cold war times. Those are hot wars warning that wars are possible in Europe. The example of former Yugoslavia gives arguments in favour of the conclusion that a war today is, in fact, internal decay through a series of long-lasting local (localized) ethnic wars.

War is a culmination of compression of a nation into a collectivity and, at the same time, a process of distinguishing from others. Those compressed into the Nation believe that there is a firm ethnic border, which basically does not exist. Therefore, ethnic loyalty bound by blackmail and struggle for power leads to ethnic cleansing. Indeed, ethnic cleansing is one of the most drastic consequences of war and it will for a long time be determining Serbian-Albanian relations.

The long-drawn-out global and structural social crisis in Yugoslavia turned into a profound political crisis, violent ethnic conflicts and bloodshed. Indeed, the recent history of Yugoslavia and Serbia provides a challenging and enlightening example for an understanding of the conflict. The 1987-2000 period has been one of the most turbulent ones in the Yugoslav political history, including such momentous events as the end of communism; the reintroduction of the multiparty system, the break-up of the former Yugoslavia; the civil war or wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; the creation of new states in the territory of former Yugoslavia, establishment and breakdown of the FR of Yugoslavia (FRY), a state composed of Serbia and Montenegro; UN sanctions and international isolation of the FRY; constant internal ideological conflicts, political instability and conflicts between the majority and the minority; frequent elections and governmental instability, radical changes in cultural, moral and social values and many more.

The crisis of socialist government legitimacy and efficiency of the operation of institutions that was deepened by the death of Tito necessitated the establishment of a new system for resolving political conflicts, including the ethnic ones. There was neither strength nor will for that but also any political skill and, above all, there was no necessary social and political consensus. Basically,
the old, already weakened, system was retained. Neither centralization nor federalization of the state or the communist party was brought about. The solution of the problem was expected to be achieved through an extremely complex system of rotation and national balancing of the government and party hierarchies. In fact, the system should have been functioning even without the "domineering leader". However, that was not possible with incompetent and lifeless lower-class nomenclature. Thus, while with help of this system, domination of any republican elite in inter-republic relations was relatively successfully prevented; it could not serve the purpose of governing the state, let alone to reform and modernize the society. That is how a union was created of the old communist elite, existing to the present day, which accepted the official nationalism as its new "image", and unofficial nationalism, the proponents of which are the core of the majority of present "democratic" parties. That is in essence an anti-reform union (Schierup, 1992: 122, 123).

Conflicts in former Yugoslavia, could be divided into four different types according to their degree of intensity and the parties involved:

(1) Conflicts between nation-states: Conflicts of the first type include those between federal units/republics, which, due to their attributes and status as nation-states, necessarily took on the properties of ethnic conflicts. In that context, the most prominent subclasses are:

a) Direct political conflicts between Serbia and Slovenia, and Serbia and Croatia. Encouraging ethno-nationalistic mobilization of Serbs with regard to the Kosovo issue, a group of politicians in Serbia, led by Slobodan Milosevic, tried to make use of the Kosovo problem to fortify its power in Serbia and to rearrange former Yugoslavia (Milosavljevski, 1993: 148 – 152; Sirc, 1986: 88, 89). With the beginning of wars and acquiring of independence by Croatia and Slovenia, the attempt at this "rearrangement" acquires the contours of the unification of "all Serbian countries" and the Kosovo issue is pushed into the background, waiting for its time immediately before the end of the process of disintegration of former Yugoslavia (1999).

b) Open conflicts between the residual power of the federal state and federal units (in particular Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia) over the redistribution of the economic and financial burden of economic reform and the prerogatives of state authority (especially the armed forces and foreign policy) which the federal units wanted to obtain and considered necessary for the full realization of their respective independent nation-states. This conflict was articulated in different ways depending on a number of characteristics (including, inter alia, regional-ethnic features);
(2) *Conflicts within the nation – state*: The second group comprises conflicts within federal units that emerged in response to the growing centralization trends within nation states. These were, in fact, conflicts among the republican authorities that tried to strengthen the processes of state centralization and ethnic homogenisation, directly encouraging similar tendencies among minorities as reflected in:

(a) Demands for ethnic separation (e.g. activities of the Albanian movement, especially in Kosovo, demands for autonomy and ethnic mobilization by Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; the ethnic mobilization of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the Muslim ethno-nationalist movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sandzak, Serbia and Montenegro; calls for ethnic mobilization and for a separate organization for Hungarians in Vojvodina etc.).

(b) Efforts to renew the political autonomy of certain regions (in Kosovo and Vojvodina), or to establish it for the first time (in Istria, in Croatia and Slovenia).

In order to analyse these conflicts the following hypothesis could be tested: the reorganization of the public sphere and changes in governmental forms (from centralized federation to loose confederation), as well as the principles and mechanisms for the resolution of the national question, including the so-called elimination of nationalism as an instrument for the management of conflicts of interest, proved useless to the extent that they could not ensure modern development, the establishment of democracy and the preservation of the state. These conflicts shall be analysed in greater detail in relation to the overall political conflicts among federal units.

(3) *Conflicts between ethnic communities*: As in other multiethnic communities, the main characteristic of these types of conflict is the fear of the hegemony of the most numerous and/or influential ethnic community. These conflicts often lead to divisions into irreconcilably opposing blocks. This section of the paper will pay particular attention to conflicts between Serbs and Croats and later to conflicts between Serbs and Albanians and Serbs and Muslims.

Here, the hypothesis is that we are dealing with a crisis in national identity and that any attempts to resolve it on the basis of ethno-nationalism, failed. The effects that this approach to the question of national identity has had on one specific community, the Serbs, will be discussed subsequently.

(4) *Ethnic conflict in personal relations*: These are the conflicts that develop in personal relations, in everyday life. They are characterized by the domination of a collective – and thereby also national and ethnic – awareness and identity.
The implicit hypothesis is that the domination of collective national/ethnic awareness and ideology as well as the overall politicization of the ethnic factor (the “ethnification” of politics and social life) reflects on numerous aspects of individual life and personal relations, including the most intimate ones. These issues will be analysed below, in dealing with the question of ethnicity and national identity as mechanisms for ethnic mobilization.

Two mutually related but not identical problems should be distinguished. One is the question of Serbia as a state. It is constitutionally defined as a civil state but is being developed as a national state of the Serbs.

Speaking of the Serbian nation, it is the new identity that is undergoing a crisis, i.e. the attempt to build a national identity based on ethno-nationalist standards. The decisive factor which allowed traditionalism to determine the spirit of the times in present-day Serbia and within the Serbian nation, was a combination of spontaneous popular traditionalism, oppositional “traditionalism of resistance” in which tradition serves as a symbol of political attitude, and “official traditionalism” as a reinforcement of “official nationalism”. Thus, the cultural sphere developed a kind of national mythomaniac kitsch reflecting megalomania and xenophobia in equal measure (Naumovic 1994: 1 - 4, 99, 105,109).

The crisis of national identity was manifested as permanent division and confrontation – numerous inter-ethnic conflicts in Serbia. This paper will specifically address conflicting political-psychological stereotypes and political doctrines and institutions.

2) In the conflict of psychological stereotypes new stereotypes have been created and old ones strengthened.

The widespread prejudices and stereotypes prevalent in Serbia and among the Serbs reflect a deepening of the real economic, political, inter-ethnic and even exceptionally violent conflicts of psychological stereotypes, within Serbia and the Serbian nation but also in relations with others, especially competing nations and states, as well as the European and world organizations (the UN in particular). One could even say that views about Serbia and the Serbs were formed under the growing influence of stereotypes both in Serbia itself and among the Serbs, and in the world in general. The long list of misconceptions that others have of Serbia and the Serbs is in itself evidence of the propaganda-ideological needs of the regime to bring about national homogenisation by “encircling Serbs and Serbia with enemies”. At the same time, the response to these stereotypes confirms the existence of strong nationalist stereotypes in the prevailing Serbian understanding of Others and the Serbian nation.
This situation has been created by persistent media and other promotion of the old Manichean dichotomy of the confronted “We” (us), determined in value terms as the “good ones”, and “others” who are “evil”.

Serbian nationalist, populist ideology uses variations of numerous nationalist-populist stereotypes, the most important of which are the following:

“We are hated by the whole world”! This stereotype was created in an attempt to use emotional elements to make isolation from the world seem acceptable to the Serbs and other inhabitants of Serbia. This stereotype is also bolstered by the fact that indeed a part of world public opinion has vilified Serbs and Serbia. It is without any doubt that keeping this stereotype alive was fostered by a relatively widespread anti-Serbian disposition or unread ness of the many to understand that political elite of Serbia is also trying, like other elites in former Yugoslavia, to resist, through ethno nationalism, temptations it is exposed to (Nel, 1993; 397, 404 – 411).

This stereotype is in contradiction with another one, which is also quite widespread in Serbian public opinion, namely that Serbia and the Serbs are an “important”, “historic nation that has always been “on the right side” and had allies (e.g. the French, English, Americans and Russians). However, the recent nationalist interpretation seemingly removes this contradiction. Namely, the “Serbs emerged victorious from wars with all empires in alliance with others. It seems that this is where an important reason for the present vilification of Serbia should be sought. It is a planned revenge on the part of the mighty towards a small country taken at a moment they found favourable” (Ralic. 1994: 80).

Incorporated in these stereotypes is the so-called theory of conspiracy. This conspiracy against the “heavenly people” is substantiated by the allegedly centuries long efforts of numerous parties against the Serbs. Of late, these include the Comintern, the Vatican, Germany, the CIA, etc. The concept of a general conspiracy against Serbia has been firmly implanted. “This theory of conspiracy” was deliberately encouraged by the authorities and the ruling party and primarily through the media and nationalist intelligentsia, with a view to adding to enhancing the ties and dependence of the masses on the nation, state and above all the Leader, to blaming the deficiencies of the regime on someone else and channelling the dissatisfaction of the citizens towards those who point out the flaws in the regime and were, most often, labelled “traitors to the nation”. This theory served the purpose of retaining power, but also evolved into an independent national fixation.

The insecurity felt by many people because of the crisis and the war, gave rise to concern and anxiety which grew into fear and from there into aggressiveness and various forms of hatred. This hatred was turned against Others – neighbouring peoples, minorities and “national traitors”. All of this is expressed by the stereotype, “Others are impossible to live with”, the development of which was
encouraged by the regime and the media it controls to facilitate a “divorce” from the Others. Thus, Serbia nationalism, just like other nationalisms on the territory of former Yugoslavia, confirmed itself as being separatist. But, in contrast to others – primarily due to frustrations generated during life in a multi-ethnic Yugoslav state – it was concealed behind false Yugoslav rhetoric. This misled quite a few as to the true objectives of Serbian national policy and secured the support of those who would otherwise have been disinclined to embrace separatism. That delusion was exceptionally effective in the first stage of Milosevic’s rule and in winning for him the support of the Army. Essentially, it was nationalism and needs that had not been properly articulated and therefore turned into aggression. However, since nations are forced to live together, and politics must express that requirement, it will certainly be one of the first stereotypes to be abandoned.

3) The sphere of conflicts of ideological doctrines reveals a fierce ideological struggle to win members of the Serbian nation for individual ideological concepts, i.e. national programmers.

Throughout the development of Serbian civil society various views on society and the nation, its social and national achievements have been expressed in Serbia. This came, among other things, from the fact that in the 19th and 20th centuries the Serbian nation existed in several states, some of which were initially vassal and thereafter sovereign national states, while others were foreign (the Hapsburg and Ottoman states). At the same time, national awareness and feelings were expressed in various strata of the underdeveloped or semi-developed civil society as well as in patriarchal communities. However, there is a permanent line of thought – the Serbian nation emerged from the struggle for liberation with distinct elements of social revolution and sees in the continuation of the revolution its national transformation. Reforms and gradual changes are of secondary interest.

Ever since the time the Serbian nation had through national revolution raised the question of completing its liberation and state unification, two mutually conflicting national programmes have had the greatest influence. They could, in most general terms, be defined as programmes that treat the national issue as problems of the state and of democracy respectively. These two programmes are characterized by the syntagma: “Two Serbias”. The syntagma of two Serbias was first used by the leader of Serbian social democracy Dimitrije Tucovic on the occasion of demonstrations by 12 thousand Belgrade workers, in December 1910. He was, at that time, referring to bourgeois and proletarian Serbia.

The modern syntagma of “Two Serbias” has acquired predominantly political prefixes. The central point of difference between the ‘two Serbias’ is the struggle for power. However, there is a still deeper dichotomy than one of political prefixes. This is the transition from a patriarchal into a modern society, which is always painful and controversial, time-consuming and unpredictable.
While the first option builds national identity on a single cultural pattern which
defines ethnic entities without erasing their specificity, the other pattern bases
identity on the national state as the foundation of national sovereignty with
internal homogenisation (within the nation) and opposition to the exterior (Other
ethnic groups and nations) including a characteristic revival of the mythical
heritage (Golubovic. 1994: 35,36). This other option of regarding the question as
one of state territory became topmost, demanding expansion of the king state to
the envisaged ethnic borders. Thus, it is not a question of what kind of a state it
would be, but rather how large it would grow. This option predominant in the
history of the Serbian nation prevailed once again. The majority of the intellectual
and political elite of Serbia favoured it. One of the best-known supporters of this
option is Dobrica Cosic, called by many people “the spiritual father of the Serbian
nation”. Cosic changed his explication of the role of the nation as the key political
actor from “integral Yugoslavism” to pan-Serbian unification. Seeking to define
the “substance of the Serbian question” in Yugoslavia in 1968. Cosic linked the
renewal of the “Old historical objective and national ideal – unification of the
Serbian nation into a single state” to “bureaucratic and petty-bourgeois
elements”. He particularly criticized so-called “Serbianism” which he saw as an
“essentially primitive and anachronistic political mentality”, i.e. a. vision of Serbia
stretching from Uzice to Zemun” which in addition to other consequences,
inaugurated an infamous personnel policy “according to native affinities and
criteria” (Cosic. 1988: 31, 34, 35). That is why Cosic, the most prominent
advocate of such a concept and called by many, as mentioned above, the
“spiritual father of the Serbian nation” wrote, in 1992, to the Congress of Serbian
Intellectuals: “We are keen on having a state where the whole Serbian people
will have freedom of existence and creation secured for ever; we want to create a
state which will be considered by all nationalities and all religions as their own
(Borba, Belgrade, 31 March 1992: 9).

The nationalist intelligentsia, from the already mentioned Memorandum of the
Serbian Academy, to the Congress of Serbian Intellectuals, generally accepted
Cosic’s ideas.

This idea of a “Greater Serbia” spread myth-like throughout Serbia and the
Serbian nation in the period 1992-94, particularly in the form of a belief that the
unification of all Serbs in a single state was only a matter of days. In that respect
Milosevic and the SPS enjoyed the support of the opposition until 1993.
However, during 1993 a part of the “moderate” nationalist opposition started to
gradually distance itself from this idea. In 1994 open conflict in Serbia broke out
between the SPS and radical Serbian nationalism embodied in the former SPS
ally, the Serbian Radical Party of Vojislav Seselj. By opposing the radicals, the
regime sought to detach itself from the war-mongering programme it had initiated
itself and used to reinforce its rule in Serbia, and to transfer to Seselj and his
followers the burden of the responsibility for the war and war crimes. This turning
away from the war-mongering policy meant separating from those political factors
among the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia who were not able to follow in their steps or believed that the policy of war should be continued so as to establish a union of Serbian states.

The programme of unification of the Serbian nation need not have Greater Serbian, nationalistic overtones if it results from the cohesive needs accompanying the creation and development of any nation, including the Serbian. Even the idea of Serbia as the “king country” – a home base for all Serbs – does not, in itself, lack legitimacy. But there is no doubt that Serbia, led by an elite obsessed by the idea of the union of Serbian lands, cannot provide that base. Actually, in its efforts to achieve union, the present Serbia has weakened and isolated itself so much that it seems unable to resolve even its own problems. In effect, it is clear that the basis of the concept of Greater Serbia (“Greater” state or nation) is that of a totalitarian state. Reasons against the idea of “Greater Serbia” include the following: the Serbian people do not have the demographic potential to “cover” the area of the new Serbian state as envisaged; the Serbs would be a minority and the state would find itself exposed to permanent ethnic and religious tensions. Implementation of this programmes has adverse effects in two basic fields of action: first, it advocates statehood within a national framework at a time and under circumstances when this framework has already become limited, leading to localism and parochialism; and secondly, since basically nationalism is not in the interest of groups which can carry out modernization, it obstructs social structuring and interest stratification on new bases, which is the only way to overcome the collectivist pattern of socialist society. Actually, in multi-ethnic societies (such as Serbia – FRY) “patriotic” mobilization precludes strengthening the formal equality of citizens.

Already at the time of the elections in 1991 the struggle (political parties and blocs, institutions of power, etc.) became increasingly sharp, primarily over control of centres of political, financial and military-police power, as well as the political rights of individuals and groups. A particularly grave problem in this respect is the unresolved question of the army, which retains autonomous status, both in relation to the public and parliament; and which is primarily a political factor outside the legal system, i.e. a factor with its own parallel legal system. The army is, therefore, one of the main motors of hyperinflation and unpredictability in political developments. The army also is a direct channel for Serbian participation in the war.

Underlying this is an even more serious problem. Serbia and the FRY are, in fact, states with a “divided personality”: on the one hand, the old institutions – presently under the influence of the voluntarism and subjectivism of the leader and the nationally defined Serbian interest – are crumbling, while on the other hand there is the newly emerging state – the FR of Yugoslavia which is incapable of defining itself. Just like many other terms, this one also has different meanings and synonyms. There are some who call this state “Rump Yugoslavia”, while others refer to it only by the names of its members, i.e. “Serbia and
Montenegro”. In both cases it is implied that this creation emerged out of the disintegration of the former state and is not recognized by international law. Furthermore, this term is, whenever possible, used to suggest something derived from nationalism, aggression, war, wartime devastation and atrocities and, therefore, unacceptable. However, for the purpose of this paper, this and other terms will be used as defined in the existing constitutional acts. Actually, the FRY is an incompletely formed social and state community. This state is, just like many other countries in Eastern Europe, presently undergoing the process of its political constitution and search for legitimacy. Along with that, the FRY, is, today, caught in between the incomplete disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and emerging of new states. The position towards the former Yugoslavia is contradictory: on the one hand, the political authorities of Serbia, seeking to secure for themselves and the FRY the “automatic international recognition”, although it would not acknowledge that Serbia has left the framework of Yugoslavia, still invokes continuity with the state in the FRY Constitution and at the same time notes the voluntary association of Serbia and Montenegro.

Sharper conflict at the internal territorial-political level, combined with the ethnic element, has also become evident. Kosovo and the Albanian population are almost completely outside the control and influence of Serbia. There are difficulties in containing the situation in Sandzak, and the authorities are having problems maintaining control in certain parts of Vojvodina. The question of the status of these parts as well as the actual authorities, economic powers and meeting of social and individual needs at the local level is increasingly intense. Within that framework, the question of minorities and the conflict between the majority (represented by the state authority) and minorities come to the fore. These conflicts are, most often, focused on the status and protection of minority rights.

IV MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES. RESHAPING THE STATE

1) Lack of awareness of multiethnic and undemocratic framework of the relationship Majority – Minority. The example of Serbia and the FRY.

The FRY and Serbia are multiethnic states (see the table: “Ethnic Composition of the Population”). Within the FRY and Serbia there are huge regional differences, even the culture of the Serbian population is not the same throughout the whole territory. Therefore, in some regions of the FRY and Serbia even the official majority (the Serbs) could be a minority group in a given locality. For example, the Serbs who are the biggest ethnic group in Serbia are a minority in Kosovo, and in some parts of Kosovo and Sandzak, they are a small minority (Bogosavljevic. 1994). Such a constellation of ethnic settlements provides a fertile ground for confrontation between the majority, which is represented in the state institutions, and ethnic minorities, which in some important cases (Albanians) are not. These confrontations are usually concentrated around the
status and territorial-political mode of organisation of both, the State and ethnic communities (Majority and Minorities). The issue of status is especially explosive when one has in mind the territorial concentration of minorities. That problem is acute in the cases of the so-called border minorities, such as the Albanian, Hungarian or the Muslim ones.

Basically, the FRY and Serbia continue to be pre-political communities. In such communities, nationalist collectivistic principle becomes the ruling one, while universal human rights are in the function of the politics. This results in moral dullness, suppresses the spirit of tolerance without which democratic life cannot subsist. These creations are from the political and state point of view "incomplete" – undemocratic and inefficient in controlling basic social processes, including even control of the territory. These states are not able to ensure internal integration of the nation or its joining broader integrations.

Individual rights are governed by federal and republic laws, bylaws (decrees, decisions, regulations), statutes of municipalities and individual political-legal documents (for instance, Declaration on Human Rights and the Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities of the Republic of Serbia). However, the status of ethnic minority as a collectivity is mostly unregulated. Taking into consideration that in political life and, in general, ethnic communities appear as collectivities, constitutional solutions are contrary to the reality. This reduces, on its part, the possibility of managing ethnic relations. Accordingly, the minority issue in Serbia/the FRY is distinctly complex. Problems differ depending on the fact whether a territorially concentrated ethnic community is concerned or not. Some of them, such as Serbian – Albanian relations and the question of the status of Albanians in Kosovo, are in themselves complex, additionally burdened by mass perpetration of violence, violation of human rights of Albanians, war and ethnic cleansing, first of Albanians, and then, "in revenge" and in presence of the KFOR, of Serbs, Roma, Jews and Bosniaks.

One of the features of Serbia is that a high degree of various ethnic communities live in the same areas, the same city, and the same municipality. Hence, depending on the territorial-political level of observance, it is possible that the majority becomes minority and vice versa. For instance, Serbs are the most numerous ethnic community and they are the majority in Serbia, while in Kosovo and within Serbia itself (some municipalities in the south of Serbia, in the north of Vojvodina and in Sandzak) they are a minority, and somewhere even a small minority. That makes the exacerbation of conflicts easier between the majority and minority, which are mostly concentrated on the issues of the status and territorial-political framework of organization of the ethnic minority. A special weight to this issue is given by territorial concentration of the most numerous minorities in border areas. On their part, minorities manifest marked need for self-identifying symbols or attributes (flags, emblems, national language, etc.), and the minority elites try to organize politically and control all minority needs (through minority parties and associations). This is indicative of the process of
homogenisation of minorities, and more numerous and influential minorities (the Albanian, Hungarian and Bosniak ones) put up their requests for political-territorial independence or autonomy.

The lesson of war tragedy of former Yugoslavia is that exacerbation of problems between the Majority and Minority is an unavoidable consequence of acceptance of ethno nationalism as a ruling ideology and practice. The problem arises from the conflict between ethno nationalistic ideal of ethnically homogeneous state and the reality of ethnically heterogeneous society. Virtually, the mixture of ethnic communities make the formula “one state, one nation” inapplicable.

2) State-minority relations: an open question of the status and uncertainties of minorities

Constitutionally, the federal state and its constituent republics are defined as states of equal citizens, but they are essentially pre-political communities wherein the national principle has the quality of universal emancipation and a form of constitutional democracy.

The status of minorities in the FRY is regulated by the following documents: Constitution of the FRY of 27 April 1992; Constitution of Serbia of 28 September 1990; Constitution of Montenegro of 12 October 1992; Statute of the Province of Vojvodina of 28 June 1991. Apart form these documents, which are general in their scope, some rights of the minorities are regulated with the acts of law and legally lower regulations: decisions and codes of practice, on the federal as well as on the level of the republics. The status of minorities is also regulated at the local/municipal level with certain political-legal documents such as “The Declaration on Human Rights and Freedoms of Persons Belonging to National Minorities of the Republic of Serbia”.

There were in the FRY, with regard to their status, a number of minority categories:

- Minorities that were designated in former Yugoslavia as “nationality”;
- Minorities that were termed as “ethnic groups” (Roma, Vlachs, Tzintzars, etc.), and some as “Others” (Germans);
- The so-called new minorities (Croats, Macedonians, Slovenians) and Bosniaks. The status of Bosniaks is especially uncertain as they do not have "the king national state" constituted;
- “Yugoslavs" have been left, due to the war, without their state and have become a minority in the FRY. They do not have the language, culture or ethnic origin to distinguish them from Others and they are most likely to disappear.

Minorities in the FRY can be classified as follows:
- Minorities having the "king state" in a neighbouring state (Albanians, Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians);
- "Newly-created" or emerging minorities the "king state" of which is in some of the republics of former Yugoslavia (Croats, Macedonians, Slovenians, Bosniaks);
- Ethnic minorities without the "king state" - Yugoslav and Bosniaks. Depending on the solution of the question of survival of the FRY and further course of stabilization and state building of B&H, one of them can perish (Yugoslavs) or be attached (Bosniaks) to this or preceding group of minorities;
- "Small minorities" of the European origin (Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Germans, etc.);
- Dispersed minorities of non-European origin (Roma, Jews).

In spite of the proclaimed Constitutional rights and the rights arising from the lower legal acts, ethnic minorities in the FRY are in retreat, they are discriminated against through the narrowing of their rights for education in their native language, marginalisation in the cultural life, dying away of their cultural institutions, expulsions form state sponsored media, psychological and political pressures, numerous acts of violence (especially acute problem is in Kosovo against Albanians), some forms of "genocide" (such as high-jacking and murder of Muslims from Sandzak). As a matter of fact, the FRY is at the very beginning of the establishment of a new institutional system that could help in the management and peaceful and democratic resolution of conflicts stemming from national interests of different groups living here.

If it is possible at all to recognize in the existing legislation in Serbia and the FRY some sort of "the will of the legislator", then it has incorporated the following:

- Authoritarianism and strict interventionism;
- Assimilation and discrimination;
- Bureaucratic arrogance and arbitrariness;
- Centralization;
- Status quo in matters that cannot be directly instrumentalized for the needs of the ruling politics;
- The status of the so-called acquired rights;
- Unprincipled adherence to principles. For example, brandishing ethnic principles when in the interest of own population (e.g. Serbs in B&H) and disclaiming the same principles to the others (Albanians, for instance), along with according priority to historic possession of a territory (Kosovo, for instance).

Mechanisms of protection of the rights of ethnic minorities guaranteed by the constitution and laws are the weakest link in the minority protection in the FRY. Since the minority protection is to a large extent a political issue, it depends on mutual relationship of political power and influence of federal and republic
governments. This relationship develops along the lines of strengthening the influence of republic government, above all the one of Serbia, i.e. Slobodan Milosevic, while he was the president of the Republic of Serbia. Such a situation has the following effects on the protection of ethnic minorities:

- Absence of a well-devised minority policy with current political adjustment of decisions on the status and protection of minorities to the needs of maintaining dictatorship of Slobodan Milosevic and his view of the domination of the Serbian interest over interests of minorities;
- Distance between and confrontation of the federal authority and republic centres of real economic and political power resulted into political dependence and insecurity of federal government. This engenders differing behaviours of different centres of political decision-making, resulting on its part in confusion, causing suspicions and reducing otherwise poor reputation and influence of the authorities, especially the federal ones;
- Stirring up hesitation of political representatives of ethnic minorities, above all of Albanians, that are anyway insufficiently ready for a dialogue;
- Strengthening of ethno nationalistic, centralistic tendencies in political life, in culture and conscience of the majority of the population of Serbia and the FRY, above all of persons belonging to the Serbian nation. This additionally aggravates regulation of the minority protection issue.

Generally speaking, notwithstanding proclaimed principles of equality and non-discrimination, ethnic minorities are increasingly faced in the FRY with being pushed in the background, and even with discrimination:

- By narrowing the rights to education and upbringing in the mother tongue, by being pushed out of cultural life;
- By dying out of the work of minority institutions in the sphere of culture, media, etc.
- By pronounced psychological and political-propaganda pressure organized by government institutions and parties, scientific and cultural institutions and media controlled by government. There was also violence, even the one belonging to the category of "genocide", not only "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo but also kidnappings and murders of Bosniaks from Sandzak.

In essence, it is the question of impossibility for both ethnic minority and majority to reconcile the conflict between the loyalty to the state and the loyalty to the ethnos.

Due to the far-reaching influence of ethnic nationalism, and to the fact that public and governing structures do not acknowledge it, the possibility to protect or integrate certain ethnic minorities is slim. Ethnic minorities in the FRY show a distinct need for self-identification with symbols or attributes (flags, emblems and most commonly by stressing the fact that they have a language of their own etc.) On top of that, the elite is trying to organise their groups in political parties and associations. A characteristic of such political organisation of minorities is that
none of them formed a political party proper at the given time; that was a tactical
move inspired by the air of non-tolerance for pluralism expressed by the ruling
oligarchy. The intellectual and cultural centres of these associations are in the
places where the concentration of the minority population is the highest (Ada,
Vrsac, Prizren, Novi Pazar, etc.) Showing the tendency of the shift from the old
centres (Novi Sad and Pristina) and homogenisation of ethnic minorities, these
associations provide a platform for the public articulation of interests of the
minorities, the major ones being to retain the rights and freedoms which they
already enjoy, or to enrich them with some further rights, considered by the group
as fundamental for the improvement of their status. That confirms that the
essence of the identity of a minority in connected with the strong aspiration of the
group to underline its specific traits but it also shows that the minority problem is
highly politicised. Bigger and more influential minorities (such as the Hungarian
and the Muslim ones) show more poignant demands for political and territorial
autonomy; they use the international support and the current state in the region
to underline their demands. The reality is, however, that the recent changes
within the FRY brought about the trend of centralisation of political decision-
making and provided a fertile political ground only for a qualitatively different
direction of the change in their status - the narrowing of the existing rights - the
expansion of rights to the new ones is inconceivable under the circumstances of
economic and social poverty in which the FRY exists today. However, in present-
day Serbia and the FRY, the painful issue of the Majority – Minority, including the
one of loyalty of minorities to the state, has been left to ad hoc political solutions
and the ratio of forces "in the field". Though there is in Serbia 34.3% of members
of other national groups, government tends to solve the question following the
logic of the centralized state nationalism, within the limits of “minimum rights” and
the reduction in the "excess of rights" that has existed so far. Many solutions (like
the one concerning the language of minorities) are below the international
standards and practise to date. In fact, in many respects, ethnic distance is
increasing, cases of discrimination multiply, and efforts of ethnic communities
(specially the minority ones) to organize their political life on their own, solving
thereby their political and social affairs, become more vigorous. More numerous
and influential ethnic minorities (like the Hungarian and Bosniaks ones) put up
increasingly open their demands for autonomy, relying on international
circumstances and support.

Ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority are not able to reconcile the conflict
between the loyalty to the given state and to their national/ethnic group. The
loyalty of the minority is in principle based on the belief of its members that they
are equal in their rights and prospects with other citizens of the given state.
Today, in the FRY, very often it is not the case, due to the widespread
chauvinism among the members of the majority and in some cases among the
members of the minority groups. This is especially manifest in the case of
Albanians and Kosovo.

Prospects for democracy in Serbia are directly related to successful solution or
directing of stubborn ethnic conflicts, and within this, to solution of the question of the minority status and guaranteeing of their rights. The largest burden shall bear government and the Majority in this respect.

For Serbia, building of a new minority policy is a necessity of survival, democratisation, security and development. However, the question of a new, democratic minority policy in the FRY has been opened up only after the fall of Milosevic’s dictatorship, late in 2000. The commitment of principle of new government is to build democratic institutions and procedures for solving the status issue, protection and promotion of minority rights, to cooperate with neighbouring countries and international community and to accept international standards. This is confirmed by accession to the Framework European Convention on National Minorities, and active cooperation with numerous experts of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations.

Taking into account that protection of minorities is also, to a large extent, a political issue; it depends on mutual relations of political forces. The ruling coalition is made up of parties covering a whole political gamut, from nationalism and conservativeness through the left centre to minority and regional parties. Hence, the minority policy is being built as a compromise between the policy of "democratic nationalism", recognizing the existence of minorities and interpreting their rights restrictively, on the one hand, and decentralization of government, including various forms of autonomy, and the minority one as well (personal, cultural, regional, etc.), on the other hand. This has as a result lack of a well-devised minority policy coupled with adaptation of decisions on the status and protection of minorities to current political needs of government. Thus, for instance, federal government promoted through statements of the President of the FRY Vojislav Kostunica and federal minister for national minorities, the official term "Bosniak". This was a step towards a new policy. At the same time, the Constitutional Court of Serbia annulled the by-laws of the municipality of Sjenica for using the same term. That is, undoubtedly, a step backs towards the old policy codified in the law on official use of the language that is still in force.

Minority policy comprises a whole set of political and legal documents – standards (internal; among them the major ones being constitutional acts that have to be passed, including the constitutional law on minorities and relevant special laws and enactments; international, especially the European ones: the FRY did not since 1992 when it was created and until the end of 2001 when it acceded to the Framework Convention on Minority Rights, ratify any international documents); institutions and procedures; political actions, especially creation of a democratic public receptive to the need to promote and protect human and minority rights.

DOS government has expressed so far readiness of principle to pursue a democratic minority policy, and initial steps have been made in that sense (openness and spirit of cooperation with international experts and organizations
in solving the crisis in the south of Serbia by peaceful and democratic means and passing, in February 2002, of the federal law on national minorities).

A democratic minority policy should be based on the consensus of political actors, minority communities and the public at large. There is no democratic minority policy unless active participation of minority community leaders is ensured. It is of special relevance that the majority of minority leaders and organisations, including minority political parties, have been a segment of the opposition and active in overthrowing Milosevic's dictatorship. Also, minority representatives, particularly the Hungarian and Bosniak ones, are in government bodies (for instance, deputy prime minister of the Government of Serbia in charge of development of local self-government, vice-president of the assembly of Vojvodina, federal and provincial ministers for national minorities), that have a direct bearing on creation and application of the minority policy. This also increases the responsibility of minority leaders for establishment of a democratic minority policy.

The national minority problem is tied up with interethnic relations within Serbia itself but also with relations with other countries. Indeed, the fate of the minorities is linked to certain wider and even regional solutions (starting from the solution to relations between the newly created states on the territories of former Yugoslavia to Central-European and Balkan integration) (Kiss. 1992: 77).

Minority problems are directly connected with relations between the states as numerous minorities have their "king states" in neighbouring countries. These relations are particularly burdened by victims and grave consequences of recent war conflicts and are directly linked with progress of the reconciliation process. This particularly applies to relations of Serbia with Croatia, B&H and Kosovo. Minority issues are also associated with national issues many of them being, especially the Serbian, Croatian and Albanian ones, regional in themselves, that is they can be solved only within the regional framework of cooperation. In addition, these questions encroach directly upon the questions of security and stability of the Region. For that reason, the minority policy has to build in instruments of risks detection and early reaction to increased risks of conflicts in the Region.

Regional standardization and harmonization of minority legislation would contribute to stabilization of the states and promotion of the status of minorities in the Region. That would contribute to lowering of interethnic tensions. The first step along those lines would be to abolish discriminatory norms in national legislations. Those are processes requiring lengthy efforts, many bilateral and multilateral agreements, and assistance of international community to boot. In that way the problem of relations of "new diasporas" and "new minorities", that have come into being as a result of disintegration of former Yugoslavia, would be placed on grounds of cooperation, while manipulation of minorities in the function of destabilization of neighbouring countries would be avoided.
It is an imperative that, for all its weaknesses, the leadership of Serbia should be involved in international cooperation, especially in international consultations and information process, above all, in connection with the reform of state organisation and prevention of potential ethnic conflicts by encouraging compromises with different ethnic communities living in Serbia. It is necessary for the purpose to enlarge autonomy regulation and protection of minorities by securing independent judiciary, international monitoring, special representation and the right of veto (van Meure, 2001, 69 – 70).

Actually, the public opinion is insensitive and even intolerant to minority demands. This is, however, in contrast with the general attitude of the public towards the minorities, which does show the signs of opening. This is apparently a conflict between two types of political socialization and political propaganda - one, of previous times which is still effective on the general level, which looks upon the minorities as equal and constructive parts of the Yugoslav community, and the other, of present times which operates on a specific level and which considers that the minorities, being “non-constructive” and “secession-oriented”, “threaten the necessary state unity” and should retain their present status.

This also exacerbates conflicts at the internal territorial and political levels. This is evidently manifested by conflicts about the federal control of Montenegro or the total loss of control by Serbia and the FRY over Kosovo, as well as more difficult control of Vojvodina, Sandzak and parts of southern Serbia or rather municipalities of Presevo and Bujanovac, populated mostly by Albanians. Namely, the question of the status of these regions has been exacerbated, along with the actual power, economic power and satisfaction of public and individual needs at the local level. Within that framework, the conflict between the Majority, represented by the state authority and minority comes into the forefront. The conflicts mostly concentrate on the status of minorities. In circumstances of economic and legal collapse, and unstable political situation, the lack of determination of the status of minorities is close to a drama, even a tragedy. The issue of minorities is related to relations within Serbia and the FRY but also to inter-state relations and some broader regional solutions: from the solution of relations among newly created states in the territory of former Yugoslavia to southeastern European integrations. In view of the gravity of the problem, and taking into account the fact that in the area of Serbia and the FRY nearly every community can find itself, at an appropriate territorial level, in a position of being the minority, the resolution of the conflict Majority – Minority has also a direct impact on Serbia’s and FRY’s leaving the shadow of the past on the way to democratisation and modernization.

V ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND THE CRISIS OF IDENTITY: THE CASE OF SERBIAN - ALBANIAN RELATIONS
Albanians and Serbs have lived for long in mutually separated, and closed within, parallel worlds. Hence, in viewing, describing and naming major events in their lives, everybody has his own explanation, definition and naming, which is always opposite to the Other one. Thus, according to many Albanians in Kosovo, Serbia introduced the system of apartheid (Die Albaner in Kosovo, 1991: 66), or "a sort of controlled colonial authority was established" (Malici, 1993: 4). In judgement of Serbs, Kosovo is the Serbian territory colonized by Albanians from Albania who try to separate Kosovo from Serbia and join Albania, without even hesitating to resort to terrorism.

The name of this entity is the best illustration of separateness of the Albanian and Serbian worlds, and of the overall ethnification of the public and political life and speech. One of the names used by Serbs is "Southern Serbia" or "Ancient Serbia". That was the name used in the beginning of the 20th century by the Serbian politics and historiography to designate this area, stressing that there was "the core of the ancient Serbian state and culture". The name "Kosovo" is of the Turkish-Albanian origin meaning the Kosovo vilayet (province) which covered, immediately before the Balkan Wars - 1912 - the territory of Sandzak, Gornje Polimje, Kosovo and Metohija, northern Macedonia to Veles and eastern Macedonia to the river basin of Bregalnica. Inter alia, this name was associated with the idea of "Greater Albania" and, today, it represents a synonym for the Albanian view of the status of this province. The name "Kosovo and Metohija" is present for long in the constitutional - legal and linguistic practice. However, since 1960s to the present time, "Kosovo and Metohija" has been a synonym for the Serbian view of the entity. Under Milosevic, it has become the term used in the constitutions of Serbia and Yugoslavia and has remained so far. The name "Kosovo" will be used in this paper since it is widespread in contemporary writings and in the public.

Both separateness but also particular disparagement is present in naming communities. Thus, both in the Serbian and Macedonian languages and in everyday communication the prevailing name for the Albanian community is "Shiptar". That word is derived from the Albanian name "Shqiptar" - "eagle's son", denoting highlanders, the union of clans of northern Albania, and out of which the name of the state was also derived. This term associates with pre-modern and, accordingly, pre-national condition, emphasizing the tribal element in organization of life. The message is clear: Those are people that are neither able to organize themselves in a modern way nor to have, as a result, their own state. Connection with Albania as a national-state creation is expressed by the name "Albanian". This name has come into established use in former Yugoslavia and Kosovo since 1968. Today, it manifests association with Albania but also political - national shaping of the community (Dogo, 1992: 332, 333). For the same reasons as in the example of the term "Kosovo", the term "Albanian" will be used in this paper.

On their part, many Albanians for the purpose of giving tit for tat call Serbs and
all Slavs by a pejorative name "Skiji" that was created in the beginning of the 20th century, and take many measures to suppress the Serbian culture and language (Petrovic, 1992: 38, 111 – 175; Blagojevic, 1993: 48, 49). The term "Serbs" is used in this paper since it is the generally accepted name for the Serbian community.

All this is indicative of the conclusion that a long-standing conflict is at issue, having the most diverse causes and a great number of influential actors.

I) The Origin, Causes and Consequences of the Kosovo Conflict

a) The origin of the conflict and the significance of Kosovo for the Serbian-Albanian relations and regional stability

The foundation of the Kosovo crisis and the Serbian-Albanian conflict is a long-standing and deep crisis of (both Serbian and Albanian) identity, along with the striving to solve the crisis by ethno nationalistic mobilization in order to establish a national (ethnic) state, as opposed to the modern process of regional integration and nation-state building.

The crisis of national identity and failure to solve it with the help of ethnic nationalism is deep and lasts for years. This applies both to the Serbian and Albanian communities. A predominant model of national self-identification of Serbs belongs to the group of pre-political and pre-determined national identity (Maliqi, 1994). Ethnic background (birth or blood) and history are decisive "elements" of the national self-identification. The prevailing model of identification for the Albanians is the one in which they observe themselves through negative characteristics of Serbs. According to this concept, the picture of contemporary situation according to Albanians looks like this: Serbs homogenize against the Albanians and the whole world in order to diminish negative consequences of their policy in Kosovo. On the other hand, Albanians homogenize spontaneously, in order to defend their national entity from the Anti-Albanian regime of Slobodan Milosevic. Essentially, the Albanian national movement found the source of its identity in the resistance to Milosevic's regime. According to this concept, Albanians are the "dominant ethnic group", not a minority, because they number two million people. Albanians are "the only nation in Europe divided by international borders". Self-determination and independence of the Albanian nation are justified because it has never been recognized as equal to others in the Slavic environment, and because continuing its life out of its own legal system leads to new conflicts.

Albanian and Serbian communities are distant from each other and they both show a great degree of reticence and xenophobia. Serbian-Albanian relations are, at present, marked by confrontations, which have numerous characteristics indicating the existence of an inter-ethnic conflict. Its actors and their behaviour have been "ethnified". The conflict itself can be designated as a "realistic social
conflict* relating to the status of Albanians and control over the territory of Kosovo. It is a conflict between the majority (which has opted for isolation) and the minority (which has chosen separatism), wherein both sides aim at the realization of pan-ideas (Greater Serbia and Greater Albania respectively) (Boileau, Strassold, Sussi. 1992: 156; Horowitz. 1981: 184–8; Janjic. 1994: 184–5; Smith. 1981:3).

The Serbian-Albanian conflict represents a crucial moment in the long sequence of events from political crisis to confrontation and war in former Yugoslavia and one of the most important examples of ongoing political strife in Europe. According to some estimates, there are at this moment approximately 70 ethnic and territorial conflicts in Central-Eastern Europe and 204 in the former Soviet Union (New Conflict. 1992: 33–5; Szjakowski. 1993). This is a conflict in the political field, which extends into deeper spheres of human life and creativity. It has a complex structure with pronounced elements of political and social drama. Due to its complexity, this conflict can also be viewed as a confrontation between two different civilizations: Orthodoxy and Islam (Yugoslavia. 1992: 3–4).

The new nationalist elites and their so-called negative policies (internal colonialism, ethnic cleansing, genocide and assimilation) play a special role in this conflict. The regime of Slobodan Milosevic tried to establish direct jurisdiction over Kosovo in the first place by restricting the rights of Albanians through a methodically conducted campaign for their marginalization, as well as discrimination and provision of social, economic and political "motives" for leaving Kosovo.

In this case we are dealing with Majority – Minority relations in an undemocratic state. In such a kind of state, the level of violence associated with secessionist/separatist conflicts tends to be high. The institutionalised protection of civil liberties and respect for human rights is not dealing with and does not permit communities to translate their demands into democratic, electoral power. The government cannot rule in a democratic way and oppress its ethnic opposition. Also, there is no widespread popular legitimacy for resolving conflicts peacefully, through democratic institutions. Serbian-Albanian relations in Kosovo are established according to the model of domination. Both communities seek to institutionalise their domination. The order in Kosovo was not based on the rule of law but on the balance of fear: be it the fear of "vendetta", which is especially widespread within the Albanian community, or the fear of the state sanctions.

Serbian-Albanian relations are marked by confrontations, which reveal numerous characteristics of an ethnic conflict. The conflict itself concerns the status of Albanians and control over the territory of Kosovo. It is a conflict between the Serbian majority opting for self-isolation and the Albanian minority opting for separation. At the same time, both sides choose irredentism.

Kosovo is situated in the south of Serbia and the FRY. It is the geostrategic
centre of the Balkans, known for its permeability, road junctions and geostrategic operational courses.
Kosovo covers the territory of 10,908 sq. km and is populated with approximately two million people, ethnic Albanians accounting for 1,600,000.

The FRY, Serbia and Kosovo are a ground where peoples and communities meet, co-operate and clash with their different ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds. (See Tables. 1, 2, 3, and 4.) Accounting for 82% of Kosovo population, ethnic Albanians are the prevailing ethnic community. However, in the context of Serbia (17%) or the FRY (16,5%) ethnic Albanians are a significant minority. This clearly indicates the relativity of the majority-minority concept in the case of Serbian—Albanian relations. The process of ethnic homogenisation is characteristic of Kosovo and it is also well evident on the territorial level as a concentration of ethnic minorities, especially in the bordering areas.

Kosovo is an area of extreme emigration: with the establishment of Milosevic’s rule over Kosovo, in 1990, coercion and political insecurity grew among the Albanians, which intensified their emigration to other countries.

The territory of Kosovo became an administrative entity in the second half of the 20th century. The 1946 Constitution of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia for the first time in history gave Kosovo and Metohija the shape of an administrative and political entity – an autonomous region. The 1963 Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia gave the status of an “autonomous province” to Kosovo and Metohija, as well as to Vojvodina in northern Serbia. Constitutional Amendments made in 1968 extended the powers of the province of Kosovo.

The Constitution of 1974-linked Kosovo with the federal state directly referring to it as a “constituent element”. After coming to power in Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic changed the constitution in 1990 and limited the autonomy of Kosovo. The essential turn in the status of Kosovo took place and was completed by passing the Constitution of Serbia (28 September 1990). Kosovo was proclaimed to have a “territorial autonomy” with a narrow scope of competences. With the change in the status of Kosovo, accompanied with changes in political leadership in Kosovo and Montenegro, Milosevic established control over four out of eight votes in the then federal ruling circle. This intensified fear of the Serbian domination in other republics and nations. However, this also stirred up association on anti-Serb basis (Largentaye, 1993: 37).

The response of Albanians were demonstrations that included two methods: first, in November 1988, there was a protest march of miners from the mine of Trepca, from the then Tito’s Mitrovica (and now Kosovo Mitrovica) to Pristina, 40 km long, accompanied with miners strike, from 20 to 28 February 1989, which expanded into a general strike of Albanians throughout Kosovo and, second, demonstrations in the days the Constitution of Serbia was being changed, the
strike of miners and taking over of the mine (winter of 1989 and January 1990), as a way of rejecting to recognize legitimacy of constitutional changes and protesting against removing from power the communist Albanian leader Azem Vllasi. Then follows the signing of a petition For Democracy – Against Violence by 400,000 Albanians, establishing thereby the authority of the new Albanian leader Dr. Ibrahim Rugova and domination of his Democratic Alliance of Kosovo. Rugova has become the Albanian Father of the nation.

In answer to Albanian protests, government of Serbia adopts a program of measures in 95 points determining numerous tasks of republican authorities in all spheres of political and social life of Kosovo. The majority of these tasks relates to the establishment of uniform legislation in Serbia; strengthening of judicial, military and police functions of Serbia; employment in Kosovo of the people outside Kosovo; application of republican legislation in science, culture, education, information and social welfare and health care, etc. (The Official Gazette of the SR of Serbia, No. 15, 1990). The result was, inter alia, that around 250,000 Albanian students were prevented from continuing their regular education. Only 28.8% of students could enrol in secondary schools in 1991. Numerous elementary and secondary schools were closed down, and segregation on the national basis was introduced (Vreme, Belgrade, 3 June 1991; Borba, Belgrade, 31 May and 26 June 1991; Republika, Belgrade, 1-31 July 1991, p. 12).

The Law (The Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 22, 1991) limited the sale and purchase of real estate between natural and civil legal persons in the area covering the territory of Serbia without Vojvodina for a period of ten years. Officially proclaimed purpose of the Law was “to prevent departure of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo by prohibiting real estate purchase and sale between Serbs and Montenegrins, on the one hand, and Albanians, on the other hand”. These discriminatory measures were aimed against the right of Albanians to purchase or sell real estate but they were in time extended to other cases where one of the parties was not of the Serbian/Montenegrin nationality (National or worker’s employment booklet. A debate in the Forum for Ethnic Relations, Borba, Belgrade, 12 December 1990).

Kosovo experienced a fast-growing modernization of economy and society. But it still remained the least developed area in former Yugoslavia. Despite a great number of changes and modernization, the Kosovar Albanian society remains mostly rural. There has been a real exodus of population from villages into towns, from agriculture into industry. The towns, with their growth, could not absorb the increase in population and were especially unable to influence the change of the ingrained habits and life styles. The colonial model bears upon the development of the economic structure of Kosovo. Kosovo is on the “outskirts” of economy development and Albanians a peripheral social group. The economy is devastated, educational and other systems of socializing people, especially of the young, are not functioning, and cultural lagging behind is dramatic. The range
of social differences in Kosovo drastically widened. Around 81% of the Kosovo population lives below the social poverty line. Differences take on some features similar to the caste system ones. Channels of vertical social mobility are extremely narrowed and jammed. The possibility of breaking them through exists only in the field of politics and "grey economy" where ethnic, tribal and family connections are very useful for constituting a "pressure group". In such circumstance, for instance, the institution of blood feud proves to be an extremely important means of coercion.

Kosovo is an area where the Albanian population is concentrated and which is, according to proponents of the pan-Albanian state unification, only a centre around which "Greater Albania" should be created. All documents of Albanian political organizations in Kosovo testify to the shaping of the idea of Kosovo independence that would be, according to the "official" interpretation, without any form of association with other "Albanian territories" (Albanian Democratic Movement in Yugoslavia, 1993). However, an insight into documents of Albanian organizations outside Kosovo shows that basically, using identical political "methodology", advanced preparations were made for unification of all these "territories" into one state – the Republic of Kosovo that would be, later on, united with Albania achieving thereby the borders requested by the Albanian movement in 1913 (Ismajli, 1993). The request "Kosovo – the Republic" is present as the generally accepted one within the Albanian movement (Poulton, 1991: 60; World Directory of Minorities, 1991: 137). Differences arise as to whether it is the final objective of the movement or only one of important stages on the way to pan-Albanian unification. Furthermore, the request for unification is common to all Albanian groups and parties. In the course of 1990, they politically connected activities of Albanians in Kosovo and in western Macedonia (Poulton, 1991: 84 – 86). Naturally, in attainment of this objective, municipalities in the south of Serbia – Bujanovac and Presevo – where Albanians are the majority population, are not forgotten (Kosumi, 1992: 14, 15).

The Albanian movement managed, relying on strong mobilization of the Albanian population, on interests of individual foreign states and assistance of Albania and Albanian diaspora, to achieve considerable results in that effort. Attempts of Serbian authorities to place Kosovo under their control by restricting rights of Albanians and by repression considerably facilitated the job to the Albanian ethno-nationalistic movement. This helped to fortify the conviction of the international community that Serbian government is, by violating human rights of Albanians, violating basic OSCE principles. However, outbreak of war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina diverts attention of the international community towards the Serbian – Croatian conflict, and the Serbian – Albanian conflict is pushed in the background. The reason is that the war threatened to destabilize Europe. The response of the EU was insufficiently thought out actions based on the "right of interference" (le droit d'ingerence). That led to challenging the right of Serbia to the territory of Kosovo, to the application of the "Baltic model" and to the recognition to Albanians from Kosovo of the right to independent state.
However, faced with unforeseeable consequences that such a precedent might have in the Balkans but also in the states of Western Europe (above all, Basques and Catalonians in Spain, Corsicans in France, Irishmen in Great Britain, etc.), the EU opts for the principle of territorial integrity that it applied both to Slovenia and Croatia, demanding guarantees of collectives rights for the Albanian minority within the borders of Serbia, Yugoslavia and Macedonia (Melchior, 1991: 275). Thus, the politics of Europe found itself in both cases at variance with reality. The first time, opening up the possibility for establishment of an independent state, it encouraged the Albanian movement to radicalise its requests and, the second time, offering autonomy it was offering too little, which stirred up resignation and motivation of Albanians to intensify their activities.

Albanians were among the last nations that built their national community after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. This may be the reason for today's so strong national and ethno-nationalistic homogenisation and centralized control of the Albanian political movement. This enables relatively quick "ideological shifts". Thus, almost overnight, numerous Marxist – Leninist groups become "democratic" organizations. However, there are no considerable changes in the nature of this movement or the basic principle of self-identification of Albanians. That what is changing is the legitimacy basis of Albanian leaders. They identify themselves now as democrats. According to many designations, that is very close to self-legitimacy that the Serbian, Croatian and many other post-communist regimes of Eastern Europe are procuring for themselves. Such self-legitimacy is termed in literature as "constitutional nationalism" (Hayden, 1992: 654 – 674). Albanians also belong to rare nations in the Balkans that succeeded in finding an intra-national balance among three religions (Islam, accounting for around 70% of Albanians, above all from Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro; Orthodoxy, accounting for around 20% of Albanians from southern Albania and Greece; Catholicism, accounting for 10% of Albanians, mostly from northern Albania and Kosovo). The triple intensity of differentiation is often a motive for conflicts of opposing interests but also for compromises. Hence, there is no wonder that there are no religious wars in the Albanian history. Conflicts are based, above all, on tribal-territorial grounds. However, three religions often provoke a reflex of radical reaction. Thus, at the time of Stalinism and Enver Hoxha, or the so-called Enverism, Albania was "the most orthodox communist country". It became in 1967 the first state in modern history that prohibited religion by law. Rapid degradation of the patriarchal codex, the system of values based on the previous tenet, created conditions for speedy deodorization and Stalinization. After the fall of Enverism, this "last atheistic museum" was closed down. The first attempts at de-Stalinization and democratisation of Albania bring about the "recovery of religiousness". Radical Stalinization of Albanians in Albania and half a century of relative de-Stalinization in former Yugoslavia created a special asymmetry in the attitude of Albanians towards the total spirituality, the attitude towards the religion having a special place in that respect. Kosovo did not experience "the phase of forced atheization". The Yugoslav communist regime did not secure precedence of the Marxist ideology and "class
consciousness" by marginalization of the religion. Though the huge majority of Albanians from Kosovo are Moslems, and only 50,000 Albanians are Catholics, Islam is not the guiding principle of political actions of Albanians. In fact, "an amalgam of religion and separatism" was not created as the one that existed in Bosniaks. In Albanians, ethno nationalistic homogenisation is in the foreground (Starova, 1992: 201 – 204).

The radicalisation of the Albanian movement and political life in Kosovo took the course of the intensification of Albanian political conflicts. In 1996, among the Albanians, especially the younger ones, there was a growing tendency to reject the peaceful policy of Ibrahim Rugova. At that time, strengthening of an anti-Serbian attitude culminating in a series of "test attacks" by LKCK and KLA, which began on April 22nd, 1996 and turned into armed resistance in 1998 and 1999.

The beginning of the year 1997 was ominous. In March, protests in Albania grew into a chaotic rebellion against the government of President Sali Berisha. The events in Albania had two consequences for Kosovo: an increasing insecurity and nervousness among Kosovo Albanian political leaders, along with the strengthening of radicalisation and reinforcement of military activities of the KLA, which used training camps in northern Albania. KLA was formed from "Marxist-Leninist" resistance groups that were active in 1980s. However, in the period of 1996-1998, these groups were "refreshed" by young Albanians, unhappy with the situation in Kosovo and with Rugova's "Gandhi-like" policy. From the end of 1997 until the end of February 1998, KLA was rapidly arming itself and openly calling for armed struggle for the independence of Kosovo. Volunteers, arms and money came from Albanian communities in Europe, especially from Germany and Switzerland.

The Serbian-Albanian relations in former Yugoslavia underwent five stages of the conflict and cooperation (see: Scheme of Serbian – Albanian Conflict and Cooperation) and landed in the war over Kosovo. Taking arms into their hands, Serbs and Albanians believed they took their destiny into their hands. For the first time, Kosovo became the personal problem for both Serbs and Albanians. It was a question of their destiny, their survival on the territory of Kosovo, which was to be resolved by force. Serbs from Kosovo who supported Milosevic for 11 years, believing that he will "finally solve the Kosovo problem", did not find the way to give up. A wide circle of local Serbs was taking part in these actions, mostly through police forces. Local Serbs, who took part in ethnic cleansing, were in total conflict with their Albanian neighbours. Also, many Albanians tried to find an answer to the dilemma: Now or never! The KLA was ordering: Freedom cannot be gained without Blood!

Admittedly, military – police structures of Serbia/ FRY were also ready. In fact, since the first serious signs in 1996 that Kosovo is becoming a hotbed of war, owing to Milosevic's politics, international failure to get involved more directly and multiplication of terrorist acts of Albanian extremists, it was announced that the
VJ (Army of Yugoslavia) was ready, i.e. that the VJ that covered Kosovo with extremely strong forces, which operationally and strategically were land forces, would act according to the model of "scorched earth". It was clearly pointed out that, due to the density of population, ethnic structure and exacerbated ethnic relations, casualties would be huge and that there was big possibility for involvement of foreign armies and military factors into a broader Balkan conflict (Jovanovic, 1996: 8). Accordingly, all were informed and ready, including the international community, especially the NATO.

The war in Kosovo, which began on February 28th, 1998, was yet another in the line of armed conflicts waged on the soil of former Yugoslavia over the past decade. These wars were part of the process of former Yugoslavia's disintegration and building of new states.

The key factors of the escalation of conflicts in Kosovo into a bloody war are:
- Inability of the political elite to undertake the modernization of the society and democratise the government. Ethno nationalism appeared to be the means of survival for this elite.
- Orientation of the new nationalist elite towards non-democratic means and policy, and violence that included ethnocide, genocide and war;
- A sense of insecurity among Kosovo citizens, which developed into a psychosis of being endangered, maintained by the government, political leaders and parties, as well as media under their control, all for the purpose of tipping the balance in favour of one of the competing elites;
- Different shapes of repression of Albanians and violation of their rights;
- Failure to resolve deep crisis of national identity with ethno nationalism. That applies to both Serb and Albanian communities. Predominant model of national self-identification of Serbs belongs to the group of pre-political and pre-determined national identity.

b) The end of war: New Reality and Challenges

June 1999 marked the end of the war and Milosevic's control over Kosovo came to an end with the arrival of UNMIK, headed by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General. A new reality was established in Kosovo. Such a situation has been created on the basis of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

The situation in Kosovo in the first post-war days was really difficult. The war aggravated unresolved problems from the past, and added the status of Kosovo as a new problem, including:
- Killings, dislodging and war devastation;
- The military and civilian presence of the international community, including the NATO, the UN and the OSCE, insufficiently prepared or willing to preserve the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo as the fundamental value of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244;
Administrative and security vacuum or rather Kosovo as an example of bad management of conflicts. The existence of a security vacuum is also illustrated by the fact that for full 90 days since the arrival of KFOR neither the control of borders with Albania was established nor the Kosovo police forces were formed. That directly affected the strengthening of the decision of the non-Albanian population that had fled not to return to Kosovo.

- Economy is not functioning and UNMIK is incapable of establishing social security. The public sector in Kosovo is worse off a year after the war than it was before. The Albanians now think that freedom has come and that the West will provide jobs for Kosovo people and will pay them. However, the international community has neither intention nor funds to do that in Kosovo (Malliqi. 2000: 26). The price of the Kosovo conflict was high for all the parties concerned. Only the war cost the FRY around 60 billion US dollars. The war in Kosovo additionally contributed to the population of the FRY becoming the most destitute in Europe, even more than the Albanians were. The gross domestic product per capita amounted to $ 75 per month and $ 900 per year respectively in 1999, as stated by the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) (Danas. April 23, 1999). The percentage of the Serbs living below the poverty line increased from 14 to 44 percent in only a year (1999/2000). The domestic gross product per inhabitant fell by 46 percent in 1999 over 1998, while industrial production fell by 44 percent. The foreign trade has been halved. It will take 15 years to bring the industrial production back to the level of 1998, provided the production increases at the rate of 4 percent per year and foreign investments begin flowing into the country (Vijesti. July 11, 2000).

- The economy of Kosovo was in a bad condition even before the NATO bombing for which the responsibility lays with the government of Serbia which managed it poorly and which controlled major economic capacities. Economy before the conflict was mostly agriculture-oriented and, as such, it continues to provide for the majority of the population. The major industry was the iron and steel one and manufacturing enterprises associated with it. Agricultural production and food processing are also of importance. The leading exports were energy, ores and agricultural products. Aid from relatives from abroad and foreign aid was significant sources of national income. Grey economy was substantial. The population had low standards of living. Armed conflicts caused mass destruction of property, including economic enterprises. Unemployment among the Albanians is estimated to be between 40 and 75 percent. It is considerably higher than among the Serbs and Roma. Unstable environment does not provide an incentive to investors. For example, there are about 300,000 people in Pristina who fled their villages. They come from a traditional society where everybody knows everybody and where a moral code prohibits a person to do anything that might disgrace the family in the eyes of neighbours. Since the society in Pristina makes them feel anonymous, they become completely unrestrained, as there is
no authority to respect. The "Father of the Family" used to have everything in his hands but now he is a refugee or lives in wretched conditions and is not able to provide for the existence of his dependants. This causes traumas for hundreds of the young people. Teenagers are without any family control, and the school has broken down.

- The Albanian society at present is suffering from a trauma: Half of the population is displaced; lack of legality, increased insecurity and instability of Kosovo; crime and politically motivated murders, kidnappings and thefts; unauthorised possessions of arms, etc. are numerous. Kosovo Serbs and members of other non-Albanian communities live in an atmosphere of fear in isolated and insecure enclaves. Repression and mass intolerance are today characteristic of the Albanian side. In fact, in late 1999, anarchy and lawlessness ruled Kosovo. Such a situation caused a balance of impotence of all the actors in the Kosovo crisis. The position of Serbs was particularly weakened, demonstrated by the fact that with the arrival of KFOR and establishment of the interim civil administration they began to seek refuge. In July 1999, the report by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan states that the first wave of Serbian refugees set out for fear of future behaviour of Albanians, while the second wave of refugees was caused by a large number of incidents – kidnappings, murders, setting Serbian property on fire and plunders perpetrated by Kosovo Albanians.

- Opening up of the Albanian issue both as a regional issue and the one of possible unification of all Albanian territories. The transfer of ethnic, and political and territorial tensions outside Kosovo is a matter of particular concern. In southern Serbia (Presevo Valley) provocative activities of Albanian extremists and their so-called avenging actions continue. Negative effects of such actions are also evident in neighbouring Macedonia.

c) Kosovo- Trauma of Serbian Nationalism

In May 2001, the question of Kosovo status became again interesting to the Serbian public. Until May there were some sporadic discussions on certain "incidents" taking place (amnesty to the majority of the Albanians who were arrested during the war in Kosovo; terrorist activities, such as planting a mine under a civilian bus in northern Kosovo in February 2001; leaving of the SRSG, Bernard Kouchner, who was in Serbia considered as a man who was pursuing a pro-Albanian policy and building independent Kosovo with Albanian leaders; the appointment of Hans Haekkerup to the same position was greeted with a hope that he would correct effects Kouchner's one-sided policy, but in May he met with the Serb criticism; there were criticism on account of the KFOR, both from the Serbian and Albanian sides.

Some new significant steps taken by the new Belgrade Government remained on the margins of the public. These are the following steps: founding a relationship
with the UNMIK; establishment of the Federal Committee for cooperation with the UNMIK; attempts to bring Kosovo Serb leaders’ attitudes into accord, including meetings with the FRY President, Vojislav Kostunica. However, the end of July and beginning of August 2001, announced a more intensive engagement of Belgrade, in cooperation with the OSCE and UNMIK, in registration of displaced persons from Kosovo and organization of the November elections. That was worked out through the newly established Coordinating Centre for Kosovo and Metohija appointed by the Government of Serbia and FRY. It is led by Nebojša Covic and composed of the DOS and SPS – and the local Serb population including people coming from the old structures, particularly those from northern Kosovo.

It cannot be denied that the position of Serbs and other minorities in Kosovo since KFOR’s arrival has been extremely difficult. From June till the end of 1999, a great number of cases of violence were noted towards the non-Albanian population committed by the armed Kosovo Albanians, KLA members and criminals from Albania. The Serbs, Montenegrins, Roma, Muslims-Bosniacs, Gorans and Turks were victims of physical attacks, maltreatment, kidnapping and sexual harassment. Access to health institutions was also prohibited to them. They are forbidden to use their mother tongue in public. Numerous settlements and municipalities, which used to have mixed population before the war, do not exist as such any longer. The number of these people is nowadays negligible in comparison with the previous period. Serbs in Kosovo live under two de facto different regimes: in the north, which is inhabited by them in a more compact way and supported from Serbia, they live under the legal regime of Serbia and the FRY, but still with the habits inherited from Milosevic’s period, while in the rest of Kosovo territory they exist as an extremely small and weakly protected minority. They live within the isolated enclaves under very bad economic and social conditions. Therefore, there is a strong need for resolving the problem of the Serbs by complete reconstruction and democratisation of Kosovo. That implies their more active involvement in economic, political and public life of local communities, as well as more active cooperation with UNMIK and KFOR. Though there is no internal consensus of the Serbian community as to the kind of self-organization they need, they nevertheless began to self-organize in a way. Since such harmonization does not exist even in Belgrade, the Serb community is paralysed and incapable of making a decision. There are some ideas on this issue: ethnic cantonization, the Serb national councils both at the local and Kosovo levels, but there are also some ideas on territorial delimitation along ethnic lines.

As far as the Serb national community self-organization is concerned, the final agreement on this issue does not even exist within the community itself. The idea “all Serbs in one country” is being discussed to be realized in a “shortened” territorial frame, while the administrative-territorial division should be carried out among other communities, particularly those that are nationally “disloyal”. The proposal of Nebojša Covic on creation of two entities (the Serbian and Albanian
ones) attracted special attention. According to Covic, it should satisfy both the historical right of Serbs to Kosovo and the Albanian ethnical right. In that case the Serbian entity would be under "protection" of the police and the military of Serbia. In essence, that is an attempt to realize, within a "reduced" territorial framework, the idea "All Serbs in a single state" and to carry out administrative-territorial delimitation with others, especially "disloyal" national communities. This is not a new idea in the Serbian politics towards Kosovo. The idea was elaborated on in numerous political documents, speeches, texts and books and, of recently, the staunchest advocate of it has been Dobrica Cosic, former President of the FRY and Father of the Serbian Nation, and an ideological support of the Milosevic’s regime. Some persons, from among those that are close to the President of the FRY Kostunica, present the identical idea.

Since the public in Serbia is not basically informed about the situation in Kosovo and possibilities of its improvement, and having in mind that the idea on ethnic self-organization and boundaries has its proponents among the top people of the new Government, then it could be expected that this issue is going to be discussed. It is most likely that some measures will be taken for finishing up the already existing nucleus of ethnic self-organization among the Serbs. It is a fact that the life in Kosovo is strictly divided according to the ethnicity, while Serbs are isolated within their enclaves or inhabit the compact territory of northern Kosovo. Therefore, it will be difficult to preserve the remaining "Serb communities" without military presence – KFOR. So, the need for security improvement, law and order, for the protection of both individual and collective rights in Kosovo does exist. There is also a need for special protection and positive discrimination of the Serbs. The Interim Constitutional Framework i.e. Haekkerrup’s Constitution offers certain bases for reaching a compromise, and promotion in the matter. For example, the establishment of common constitutional-legal framework presents a step forward from the situation of legal insecurity and a step closer to the implementation of law and order, and security improvement. Haekkerrup’s Constitution instead of the traditional concept of minorities uses the concept of a "community" and, accordingly, we have Albanian, Serb and other communities. It also guarantees appropriate political representation in the Assembly of Kosovo and a strong local self-government. The Constitution sets forth also a list of human rights and introduces the Ombudsman. However, despite all these developments, the majority of Kosovo Serb leaders and the official Belgrade do not have a fixed and agreed political strategy on Kosovo. Actually, the policy of Belgrade authorities towards Kosovo includes a feeling of frustration due to the "Kosovo loss".

Kosovo really is a trauma of Serb nationalism. The nationalistic elite of Serbia and the regime of Slobodan Milosevic attempted to take direct control over Kosovo by performing the systematic campaign of marginalisation and discrimination, which during 1999 brought the war and ethnocide against the Albanians. That made Kosovo a trauma of Serb nationalism and a dark spot in the history of the Serb society. During 1998 and the beginning of 1999, a political
propaganda of ethno-nationalistic “play on numbers” performed by Milosevic’s war machinery was translated into “ethnic cleansing” of Kosovo. During March and April 1999, the Kosovo Albanians were being expelled to Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro, while the police and paramilitary forces took away their personal documents (identification cards, passports, driving licenses, license plates, money, etc.). After withdrawal of the police and army and the Serb administration ended, the exile of Kosovo Serbs took place.

The Balkan experience shows that inter-ethnic conflicts cease when both of two conditions are fulfilled: when reconciliation of both parties is secured only by power (army and police) or when one of the confronted communities is reduced to a “bearable minority” by violence, political and other means.

The duration of the Serb-Albanian conflict contributed to a huge ethnic distance due to killing, raping, torturing, ruining and burning houses, administrative maltreatment, etc. The “bearable minority” becomes very small and most likely isolated within its “parallel world” – within the territorial enclaves with stronger concentration of Serbs. From this perspective, the Serbs are facing a hard period of self-organizing and building of their own “parallel” civil society, which would enable their future integration within the Kosovo society and cooperation with the Albanians. According to the ten-year old “parallel Albanian state”, numerous non-governmental organizations offer their support to the Albanians, including the international public opinion as well – the Albanians are more easily accommodating themselves to the new, extremely difficult and complex economic, social and security conditions. For the Serbs it will be a more difficult and slower process. Actually, the abolishment of Kosovo autonomy and centralistic governance of Kosovo imposed by Milosevic in the last decade of the twentieth century completely destroyed the basis for the local Serb elite existence. The Serbs became a pure transmission of Belgrade, while their close connection with the authorities made them dependent on the state economy and budget, which was in the meantime completely destroyed. The role of Milosevic’s regime transmission influenced a very weak democratic oppositional potential among Kosovo Serbs, as it influenced an undeveloped civil society initiative. That is why the development of individual civilian and minority institutions of Serbs and other non-Albanians is the most effective way for their emancipation from Milosevic’s inheritance and dependence on the state and its “help”. This process will be additionally impeded because it has to be developed under conditions created by the war and weakening of Serbia, i.e. FRY. The fact that Kosovo is de facto out of political and legal system of Serbia affected the change in the Serb status: They are a minority in Kosovo! All these things are being carried out in the atmosphere of fear, an unexacting control with no instruments for adaptation to the new status. It seems the former authorities of Serbia did not realize the problem, while only a small number of people among the new authorities realize the problem, they do not consider Kosovo as a priority or are capable of resolving the problem.
There is a “hot spot” in Kosovo – Kosovska Mitrovica. Upon KFOR’s arrival it has been a town divided by the river into the northern part inhabited by Serbs and the southern one inhabited by Albanians. About 90,000 Albanians live in the southern part and there are no Serbs there, although 6,000 of them used to live there before the war. 2,000 Albanians and 14,000 Serbs inhabited the northern part. At the moment, there are only a few Albanians living in the north and about 30,000 Serbs. The Albanians, actually, left the northern part of Mitrovica, while new Serb refugees arrived. These communities are in a permanent state of confrontation. In such a situation the Albanians attempt to enter the northern part of the town, which is interpreted by the Serbs as an Albanian intention to expel the Serbs. The Serb community is, however, under strong influence of the people linked to the regime of Milosevic and military and police intelligence. This looks like rejection of living together with Albanians and an attempt to divide Kosovo. The Serbs from northern Kosovo feel about themselves as an integral part of Serbia rather than of Kosovo. From their point of view, Albanians are afraid that Serbs intend to divide Kosovo and annex Mitrovica to Serbia. Thus, the majority of Albanians consider “reintegration” of the northern part into Mitrovica as a basis for “reintegration” of northern Kosovo into an independent Republic of Kosovo.

According to such radically opposed political aims, a significant influence of the extreme currents on both sides and a high level of the armed population, Mitrovica presents a serious security challenge. The priorities of that domain are: violence prevention and confidence building. Since an ethnically divided and confronted town does not present a good recommendation for building “multi-ethnic Kosovo”, which was actually a task of the UN SC Resolution 1244 imposed on the international military and civil mission in Kosovo, then there is no wonder why UNMIK and KFOR as one of the most important aims find the functioning of the “united city” administration, economic development and safe environment. Therefore, careful consideration should be given to a possibility of applying the experience (security, political and economic measures) from “Sector B” (Presevo Valley) to “Sector M” (Kosovska Mitrovica and northern Kosovo).

d) The Peace and Democracy Building Process in Kosovo

The territorial issue is also of extreme relevance in the state building of Serbia and there is also, within this context, the question of territorial implications of the solution of the Kosovo status. The existing circumstances place government in Belgrade in a situation that is similar to the one that Konrad Adenauer was landed in immediately after World War II. That means that it is better for them, as it was for the authorities of West Germany at the time, not to define the territorial framework in the Constitution of Serbia. The formula: Territory for development might help them in that difficult task. Indeed, the question of the status of Kosovo can be solved in a negotiating process, as Kosovo is de facto under the international protectorate exercised by the UNMIK. A detailed regulation of the question now would aggravate negotiations because it would prejudice the
solution. In addition, the question of Kosovo is already covered by the agreement on new relations of Serbia and Montenegro of 14 March 2002. The Security Council of the United Nations has also the right of participation and decision-making on the matter.

The question of the status of Kosovo is present in the public of Serbia sporadically and incidentally. A quarter of citizens of Serbia hold that the situation in Kosovo is worse than it was at the time of Milosevic, and only 1% is of the opinion that it has improved (UNDP, 2001: 10).

That is why even some important steps taken by new government in Belgrade are on the margins of the public interest (establishment of connections with the OSCE and UNIMIK, above all through the Coordinating Centre of the Governments of the FRY and Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija, headed by Nebojša Ćović). This cooperation was basically good on the occasion of the registration of temporarily displaced persons from Kosovo that are in Serbia and of organization of the elections in November 2001. However, this cooperation suffers from serious oscillations and it is at the moment in the phase of tensions relations. One of risk factors is political effort to create two entities in Kosovo as early as possible.

In regard to this idea, the public of Serbia is divided: the Albanian majority in Kosovo is against it, while representatives of the UNIMIK and other international organisations mainly reject it in public pointing out that it is a platform for territorial division of Kosovo. That would lead to the establishment of new state boundaries and further destabilization of Kosovo. However, the idea of ethnic self-organization and delimitation has influential advocates at the very top of new government in Belgrade, and one should count on it that this question is to be discussed yet. In addition, Serbs in Kosovo are most likely to continue developing the existing nuclei of ethnic self-organization (such as the Serbian National Council, etc.).

The fact stands that people live in Kosovo strictly divided along ethnic lines and that the position of Serbs and other minority communities in Kosovo is extremely difficult. Within Kosovo, Serbs live in two different regimes: in the north, which is more densely and compactly populated by the Serbs who rely on Serbia, they live under the legal system of Serbia/FRY, with old political habits. In the remaining territory of Kosovo, they live either as an extremely small minority, poorly protected from legal and security standpoint or within enclaves that are isolated from the surroundings and that are in terribly bad economic and social conditions.

As far as regulation of the status of the Serbian community is concerned, the following options are at play:

- Ethnic cantonization;
- Territorial delimitation and division of Kosovo along ethnic lines; and
- Minority self-government based on the right to self-organization and self-administration, including regional autonomy.

The third option seems to be the most appropriate to the present situation and the Interim Constitutional Framework. That option presupposes adoption of the concept of strong local self-government and protection of minority rights, including: the right to self-organization and self-administration, the right to the official and public use of the language, the right to use the flag and other symbols of the community, the right to dual citizenship (the right of domicile); the system of education, culture and sports respecting all values of specific relevance for ethnic communities, the right to proportionate representation in public services, the police and other security bodies, the right to collect self-contribution for self-financing needs, along with the right to use resources from the Kosovo budget, the right to international cooperation within the self-government competences.

The November elections of 2001 represented for institutions of Kosovo the first important but initial step for incorporation of Serbs in the processes of problem solution. However, the majority of Serbian politicians from Kosovo and Belgrade pursue a policy without a clear-cut strategy, using the tactics "tighten and then loosen". However, the weakest point of the policy of Belgrade towards Kosovo is that, basically, the public is neither informed nor its active involvement is wanted. This only indicates that there is neither a consensus nor a well-devised strategy in Serbia as regards Kosovo.

It is evident that the DOS is not able to devise the strategy. Therefore, there are real reasons to expect that the policy of Belgrade towards Kosovo will continue to develop without a clear plan, as a reaction to pressures of events in Kosovo or of the international community. The prevailing feeling in this policy will be for long the feeling of frustration owing to "the loss of Kosovo". Such a policy cannot be an active factor of democratisation of the Serbian society but it can make it possible for the international community to perform "many tasks". The problem is that in that way the obligation to find and apply a solution to Kosovo and stability in the Region is transferred to the international community, especially to the UNMIK, EU and U.S.A. This is not and cannot be one of the primary interests of the international community. As Kosovo continues to be part of the responsibility of Belgrade, it is in the interest of Belgrade to support the policy of the international community in Kosovo. The first steps along those lines might be the termination of financing parallel security forces, such as "bridges watchmen" in northern Mitrovica and support to the UNMIK efforts to establish administrative structures in the north of Kosovo as well (ICG. 7 March 2002). Similarly, Belgrade should formulate a clear strategy and intensify the dialogue with international community, above all on the Interim Constitutional Framework and on improvement of position of Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanian communities in Kosovo.
There are also in Belgrade, though being the minority but having a certain influence on the public, advocates of a democratic national and government policy. In case of Kosovo, this is manifested in the form of pleading for "active involvement in the negotiating process and building of democratic institutions", cooperation with the international community, and particularly with neighbouring states (Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro) and, of course, with Albanian leaders. For instance, Minister for Foreign Affairs Goran Svilanovic explained on many occasions the need to hold a Regional conference on cooperation and security in the Balkans that would also place on the agenda the questions of the protection of minority rights, non-changing of borders and the Kosovo issue. Since May 2000, there has been present both in the domestic and foreign public a proposal of the nongovernmental organisation Forum for Ethnic Relations from Belgrade to hold a Regional Peace Conference on Kosovo where a regional framework for a peace process and the principles for involvement of Serbia, Kosovo and neighbouring countries in the regulation of the status of Kosovo and mutual relations would be agreed upon. The conference would have to be preceded by lengthy and serious preparations as well as launching of an open and frank dialogue among national communities in Kosovo, Pristina and Belgrade, with mediation and participation of the international community.

Recommendations on Regional Peace Conference on Kosovo result from the conviction that the background of Kosovo drama includes a real social conflict on the Albanians' status issue and control over the territory of Kosovo. Furthermore, the fact stands that Kosovo nowadays does not come under the immediate control of Belgrade and as such will remain for a long period of time. However, that does not mean the end of the responsibility of Serbia's authorities that are supposed to find out a motive for changes in the Kosovo crisis. From the Serbian point of view, the formula for Kosovo crisis resolving should be the Territory for Development!

The Albanian side is also faced with the new reality primarily caused by changes in the circumstances in Kosovo but also in Serbia in October 2000. The fall of Milosevic's dictatorship faced Albanians with determining a new strategy, since in the last decade one of the most important origins of the Albanian identity movement resulted from the resistance to Milosevic's regime. Such an identity origin does not exist any more, but the new challenges request new answers.

One of the challenges stems from the fact that the majority of Albanians wants democracy, but they still want the establishment of their own state much more than they want democracy, while the international community, as well as the majority in Belgrade, do not accept resolving the Kosovo status issue in such a way. The Albanian leaders are certainly exposed to temptation concerning the resolving of this problem, and they do not even exclude a possibility for delay. The Albanians and the international community should determine more efficient instruments as a priority to prevent mass violation of human rights of Serbs and other non-Albanians. They should also determine who would bear the
responsibility for murders, expulsion and kidnapping of other community
members. The formula the Final Status for Peace and Democracy might be very
interesting to the Albanian side.

Although the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 states that the tasks of the
UN Civil Administration will be mainly formulated "in accordance with
Rambouillet", in the previous practice an insufficiently strong political accord
between the relevant factors of both the international civil and military presence
emerged on the surface. Furthermore, such practice shows an improvisation, the
lack of clear strategic concept and of efficient tactical reaction. The international
community itself seems to be totally unprepared to accept the reality that
changed its role. It has been treated as a mediator by a great number of people,
although it keeps the position of protector and arbiter. Using its right to
intervention in Kosovo, which was the case in Bosnia and will be the case in
Macedonia, the international community took over the obligation for the
intervention, which up to the moment has been fulfilled as an "unproclaimed and
undefined protectorate" but nothing else.

There is an old saying reminding us that it is better to have negotiations lasting
for one hundred years than having a single day of fight. After horrible expulsion
of Albanians from Kosovo, killings and war destruction followed by expulsion of
Serbs, Roma and others from Kosovo, such message sounds so simple, even
banal to these people. Even if the agreement on validity of such a principle
existed, the real problems would start with the question when and how to initiate
a discussion. Furthermore, in accordance with an old rooted habit of the Albanian
and Serb leaders in setting the various preconditions for the discussion, one
could hope they would accept the experience of the others: Any discussion is a
good discussion, but "Any discussion" does not lead to negotiations, although it
maintains communication. The negotiations come after the negotiators and the
public in particular are carefully prepared for that. Therefore, discussions are the
only way for preparation of negotiations, since the future should be discussed on
and negotiated as soon as possible.

In a situation where the overwhelming majority of the Kosovo population wants to
establish own independent state, and the majority public opinion in the Region is
of the opinion, excluding Albania and Albanian parts of Macedonia, that this
would be dangerous and destabilizing, it is necessary to have a regional
negotiating process that would involve all actors concerned and that would deal
with major controversial issues of the Region. That would, in fact, be
intensification of the process of regional cooperation on the basis of the
principles that the existing borders in the Balkans cannot be changed forcibly, of
good neighbourly relations, protection of the rights of national minorities in all the
neighbouring states, total freedom of movement, free movement of goods and
capital, harmonization of customs and administrative regulations in the field of
regional cooperation, cooperation in the fight against organized crime and
terrorism. This is also the way for the Balkan states to join the Euro-Atlantic,
European and Regional security, political and economic organizations (Partnership for Peace, NATO, EU). Within this context, the following options for the status of Kosovo should be considered:

- Extension of the present "temporary status" of Kosovo for 10 – 15 years,
- Kosovo joining, in the status of the republic, the union of Serbia and Montenegro, and
- Recognition of independence of Kosovo.

In Kosovo, upon the restoration of peace, and with the arrival of KFOR and establishment of UNMIK, two priority objectives have been set:

- First, stabilization of peace. In that context, it is extremely important to complete the process of disarmament of citizens and suppress organized crime, specifically the trafficking in women, arms, drugs, cars, etc. Among the measures to be taken with a view to achieving the mentioned objective are the following: to increase the strength and improve the training of the police forces which should also incorporate members of local communities; establishment of independent judiciary and prosecution; education in non-violence, etc;
- Second, peace building, which is in fact a process of democratic institutions and procedures building in Kosovo.

The attainment of these two objectives is not possible overnight. In addition, they would have to be accomplished in a situation where Kosovo Albanians and Serbs are, more than ever in their history, far from one another and imbued with mutual hatred and conviction that they cannot live “under the same roof” (Milosevic, 1999:8). In this war, as in other cases, it has been confirmed that intolerance and rejection of diversity is a major cause of war. In its extreme form it leads to ethnic cleansing and genocide (Annan. 2001). To the contrary, the dialogue seeks to promote the understanding that the diversity of cultures can be a source of betterment and growth (Annan. 2001). For that reason, the work to promote tolerance is fundamental to both conflict prevention and peace building.

In order to achieve the desired objectives, one should take into account, among numerous ones, the following recommendations resulting from the preceding analysis and experiences in other cases of fractured societies:

- First, talks that might lead to negotiations have been conducted so far. To reach negotiations, it is necessary to achieve both in Serbia and in the Albanian community a consensus and on that basis a strategy for the solution of the Kosovo problem. The mediation role of the international community is necessary. UNMIK should be developed more in a sense of communication than, as it used to be during the time of Kouchner’s leadership, as an arbiter. However, more than that, it is necessary that conflicting parties make some unilateral moves for the sake of regaining
confidence. Among these measures, on the part of the authorities of Serbia / FRY, it is the amnesty and return of several hundred Albanians to their homes. Here comes also the cooperation with the Hague Tribunal and individualization of guilt and responsibility for civilians having been the target of attacks. Protection of civilians and giving force to the international law has to be at the very top of the internal and international agendas. It is an aggravating factor that Milosevic and organizers of his war machinery were not tried for war crimes at that. That might be, however, one of the strong measures in favour of the return of confidence;

- Second, the peace-building process necessitates fundamental constitutional and legislative reforms, building of democratic institutions and procedures. This process is linked with the one of establishing new relations between Montenegro and Serbia, and with the solution of the Kosovo issue. In Kosovo, a singular legal, administrative and political milieu has begun to be established which will differ from the one in the Republic of Serbia. That is why, late in 2000, Kosovo looked to many people like the Balkan Taiwan – an independent state recognized by no one (Judah. 2000);

- Third, the work of UNMIK to date should be reappraised with a view to finding possibilities for using the work on constitutional and legislative reforms for harmonization of the legislation of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia with the European legislation;

- Fourth, restoration and expansion of the civil society can play a significant role in the recovery and development of Kosovo and, consequently, the international community should support those activities. In that respect, UNHCR has a particularly important role in the development of cooperation with the Kosovo civil society, including national NGOs.

- Fifth, needs of the Region, especially needs of Albania and Macedonia, must not be disregarded in haste to restore Kosovo. The Stability Pact is one of the key elements of the building of regional cooperation in political, economic and security spheres. No less important is the involvement of all the countries of Southeast Europe in the NATO. This includes Partnership for Peace, the alliance of the Euro-Atlantic partnership and, for the countries that fulfill conditions, membership in the Alliance. This becomes possible with the introduction of the Action plan for membership, at the Washington summit in April 1999. At that moment, the NATO manifested clearly its intention to expand additionally the zone of stability and security in Europe through the admission of other European democracies, which are able to contribute to common security (Judah. 2000).

In search for pragmatic solutions, it is an imperative to find answers to the following questions:

- First, on the future status of Kosovo. The status of Kosovo issue should be solved with the least possible delay as the continuation of the present
state of affairs has extraordinary negative effects: criminalization of the Region and constituting of a strong “parallel” Albanian state;
- Second, on the status of Kosovo surroundings, Serbia and Montenegro where three different political and economic systems will exist (Surroi. 1998:5).

VI THE CIRCLE OF INSTABILITY: KOSOVO – SERBIA – MACEDONIA

The unstable situation in Kosovo disables the reconstruction of civil society, deters regional democratisation and peace building efforts. It also influences the destabilization of neighbouring countries. Actually, a circle was created: Albania (the state, the institutions of which are falling apart) – Kosovo (a destructive substance society without its state identity) – South of Serbia (a crucial point in the constitutionally unformed Serbia) – Macedonia (a country faced with the threat of “Lebanonization”) – Albania (as a weak state) – Kosovo (with unsettled status). Also, it emphasizes the need to approach the Kosovo issue as a regional question.

- One needs to bear in mind that the Kosovo conflict and resolving the Kosovo status affects a wider regional conflict of interests, including the South of Serbia and Macedonia. Also, there will not be a lasting peace if people of Kosovo, Serbia and the UNMIK do not achieve a political agreement on regional unity. The seriousness of the situation makes the fact that the majority of the Kosovo population wants to establish their own independent state. The major public opinion that is presented in the region, with the exception of Albania and Albanian parts of Macedonia, considers the situation as dangerous and destabilizing. Furthermore, one could say that the possibility of new conflicts between the ethnic groups would be a contribution to further fragmentation, ethnic separation and nation building without a mandate.

1) Ethnic clashes in the south of Serbia

It is quite clear that there is a strong connection between the situation in the south of Serbia and the situation in Kosovo. For example, when we thought that the KLA in Kosovo had no more reasons for its existence, the OVPMB and KPC were created. The Albanian political parties from Kosovo, of course, supported that. During 2000, these parties were organizing numerous public panels and discussions on the topic “the future of eastern Kosovo”. That topic was an integral part of the pre-election campaign for the local self-government in Kosovo, and we should expect it to be reactivated for the November election campaign. The OVPMB framework is composed of Albanians who were KLA fighters from these municipalities. The public assessments on the number of those people vary: the Albanian political leaders say that there was 400-500 people, while VJ sources say there was more than 1,500 of them. But, there is also a mass arrival of the Albanian highlanders coming from Kosovo and
northern Albania across the border with Kosovo. The aim of the OVPMB is 
"liberation" of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac. Their basic idea is to provoke 
by their activities the repressive answer of the authorities, bloodshed and mass 
exile, believing that such things would influence the NATO expansion in this 
area.

The Presevo Valley zone, composed of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja 
municipalities, is also important to Serbia for its major railroad and other road 
networks that connect Middle Europe with the Mediterranean. About 70,000 
Albanians live in this zone. For the Albanians, that is “Eastern Kosovo”. In the 
1992 referendum, the Albanians from these municipalities voted for “peaceful 
attachment” to their Kosovo compatriots. On the other hand, “Bujku” for 
example, has been publishing weather forecast for Kosovo, Albania and these 
three municipalities since 1998. At the beginning of 2000, all those who were 
interested in border changes considered that the “right time” for such changes 
had come.

According to its dimensions, we could say the Presevo valley problem is small, 
but it is at the same time dangerous for its link with Kosovo and Macedonia and, 
therefore, must be resolved. The Presevo valley turned out as one of the 
“pockets” which was left in the ethnic re-composition of former Yugoslavia. 
Observed from this point, the Presevo valley serves as an opposite thesis for 
Mitrovica and northern part of Kosovo, which are under control of Serbs.

Neither the international community, nor the KFOR are innocent concerning this 
matter. Namely, the Kumanovo agreement established the Ground Security Zone 
(GSZ) on the side of the Serbian border towards Kosovo. It is a five kilometre 
wide zone, which forbids the presence of the VJ, while the MUP members are 
only allowed to carry “less than 12 mm calibre” weapons. In March 2000, it was 
publicly stated that KFOR does not have control over the land security zone. 
Such a statement enabled the establishment of the OVPMB base numbering 100 
to 200 people in Dobrosin village and its continual mobilization of more people. 
At the beginning of the year 2000, the NATO had no intention to intervene or 
involve itself if riots that ensued. A few months after the low intensity war was 
finished it was clear that Mitrovica which is marked by the KFOR as “zone M” and 
Presevo valley, marked as “zone B” are the areas targeted by armed extremists, 
which present a direct challenge to the KFOR responsibility and security. 
Attempting to give an answer to the question, opposite views arise: the Serbs 
believe the main cause of instability are activities of the Albanian extremists and 
an insufficient capability and readiness of the KFOR, while for Albanians the 
main problem lies in the repression of the Serbian police.

In February 2001, by the gradual downsizing of the GSZ, the NATO was 
attempting to exert pressure on the armed Albanians in Presevo Valley and stop 
their attacks, while Belgrade was required to cooperate with KFOR. That was 
also confirmed at the meeting of NATO ministers when decided that the GSZ
would not be used as a ground for further violence. At the same time, the American Minister, Colin Powell, confirmed that the American forces within KFOR would participate in all NATO and KFOR activities in order to stop the violence, to the extent of conflict with Albanian extremists if required. In the meantime, the confronted sides defined their “platforms”.

The Coordinating Body of the federal and republic governments for Bujanovac, Presevo and Medvedja adopted on 6th of February 2001 the information on security situation in Bujanovac, Presevo and Medvedja municipalities with a draft on crises resolving (the so-called “Covic’s plan”). This plan presents the following:

- A peaceful approach to resolving the regional crisis, including a proposed Albanian contribution to the effect;
- A need for security forces for the protection of citizens, prevention of the expansion of terrorism; anti-terrorist activities;
- Establishing a multi-ethnic society. These tasks are divided into several phases:

  a) The first phase includes planning the integration of Albanians within the state and social system, with respect of their human rights (coordination of national composition of employees in the civil service, economy and social activities with national structure of the population; establishing of an appropriate representation of Albanians in the municipal executive boards of the Government of Serbia and afterwards in the municipal assemblies and the National Assembly of Serbia. Prevention of any human rights violation through intensified police supervision, supported by a legal framework and other governmental institutions. Direct, clear, international pressure on the Albanian terrorists; protection of citizens, settlements and communications with efficient police policy and equipment to carry out their duties. Finding a way to overcome the limitation on police and military intervention in the GSZ; establishing security and peace building in the villages of Lucani and Veliki Trnovac by the international community (including the KFOR) verification; preparation and planning of the economic and social revitalization and development in the region, including care of resettled persons from Kosovo.

  b) The second phase is a phase of providing security in the region;

  c) The third phase is planned as a phase of political, economic and social development.

The “Albanian platform” presented by Riza Halimi, a manager for the Party of Democratic Activities (PDD), which takes part in political life of Serbia, requests the following:

- Disputes can and must be resolved in a political way through negotiations;
- The PMBLA representatives should take part in the Albanian negotiating team;
- The negotiations should take place in another country with a direct international intervention factor (the USA, UN);
- All military activities to be stopped on both sides;
- The implementation of the agreement to be guaranteed by an international institution with credibility – NATO, UN;
- The legal status of Albanians in Presevo Valley should not be under the existing constitutional-legal and institutional framework of Serbia;
- The aims of the negotiations should be the protection of the individual and collective rights of citizens, preservation of their ethnic territories and finding a way out by political solution, etc.
- The Albanian negotiating team, should not only include PDD but also Albanian extremist factions;
- Demilitarisation of the area by withdrawing the Serbian forces and imposing an international control over PMBLA;
- Legal order, governmental institutions, police, administration and judiciary, including further presence of such “international administration” in the area until a definite solution is found, etc.

Beside these common requests, Albanians are also requesting their “legitimate rights” of Albanian Muslims in the field of education, culture, language, administration and judiciary to include preserving the right to their relations with the homeland – Kosovo, etc.

The beginning of March was followed by “jeep diplomacy”, while the negotiations lasted for two weeks. Those were indirect negotiations – the negotiations through international mediators. The agreement on the cease-fire was signed on 13th of March 2001 and on 14th of March it enabled the joint Serbian-Yugoslav security forces to enter the part of the GSZ, 25 km along the Yugoslav-Macedonian border within the “sector B”. This zone includes three Albanian villages: Norca, Trnova and Miratovac.

Such events were followed by some changes on the ground: Albanians started activating the civilian sector; numerous non-governmental organizations that started working with civilians were established, while the political parties, after organizing a peaceful protest against the arrival of the Serbian and FR Yugoslavia forces, adopted a common declaration in which they stated that they would return to their usual “peaceful activities”.

The international community led by the American administration financially supported the repair of infrastructure (the first amount was 600,000 US$). Realization of other projects is ongoing and primarily relates to the support of small and medium enterprises, training of local administration, and various NGO projects but there is no serious political negotiation improvement. Political measures foreseen by Covic’s plan and particularly those foreseen by the Albanian plan are being slowly and partially applied. Some of the Covic’s promises cannot be applied because of the existing legislation on local self-
government and elections. The Albanian demands in the field of national minority rights would be satisfied by termination of discriminative laws at the republic level and also by passing a law on national minority rights. However, nothing has been done on that issue. Since the fields of politics and legislation were not promptly addressed, this domain could expect reactivation of crises, which would “support” and “justify” the Albanian “return to weapons”.

All things considered, the only successfully achieved interest is on the side of the NATO:

- Strategically, a direct cooperation between the VJ and NATO started, which is to end in the Partnership for Peace. That is particularly confirmed by the agreement on total control over the GSZ.
- To cut a long story short, the Serbian police and VJ undertook control over the Kosovo border, including a significant part of risk that goes along with the KFOR tasks, i.e. the risk of the NATO’s confrontation with the Albanians and possible human victims and material losses. However, there is a “hidden political risk” of de facto changing the administrative into state border between Kosovo and Serbia.

2) “Lebanonization” of Macedonia and challenges of managing the Region

The entire population of Macedonia numbers 2.2 million people, including various national and ethnic groups, where Macedonians represent the majority, followed by the Albanians, Turks, Roma, Serbs and Vlachs. If it is to be judged according to the legislation, then all citizens of Macedonia are equal before the law. The constitution provides to the minorities the protection of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity, including the support from the Government to the education in minority languages in secondary schools and the official use of minority languages in those areas where minorities present the majority of the population.

In the period the clashes escalated, the leading coalition included the two biggest Albanian parties and one Roma party. There are 25 Albanian members of the Parliament, 1 Macedonian Muslim, 1 Roma and a small number of Vlachs. However, ethnic tensions and prejudice do exist. According to its public attitude, the Government of Macedonia declared itself for the policy of peaceful integration of all ethnic groups but, at the same time, faces political resistance and maintenance of a widespread prejudice in terms of achieving the goal (students’ quotas, affirmative actions of school administrations, education in the mother tongue, etc.). The international community, particularly the USA, has been politically and military present in Macedonia since early nineties and the level of Macedonian authorities’ cooperation with them is very high. Until the last year, the international community representatives, especially the USA, reacted by an arrogant refusal of any warning that the armed clashes in Macedonia might be
expected. Factors, which lead to the escalation of political and armed clashes, were growing in reality.

By the end of 2000 and beginning of 2001, the Albanian representatives became louder in their accusations of discrimination. They were underlining some arguments, such as:

- Insufficient presentation of the Albanian community within the army and police. Though there were some announcements on the enforcement authority attempts to recruit as much Albanians as possible, the police forces were predominantly Macedonian, even in those areas which are mainly inhabited by Albanians. Macedonian police forces include 8.7% of minority members, 17% in Tetovo and 12% in Gostivar. In the past years the Government managed to achieve by its recruiting policy 22% of minorities out of total number of high police school students. It makes its greatest efforts to recruit more minority members in the military, as well. There are 25% of Albanians serving in the military, but the total number of deficit cadre amounts only to 12% of minorities and 15% of cadets in the Military Academy. Thus, 11% of civilians from the minority communities are employed in the Ministry of Defence, having an Albanian Deputy Defence Minister and ten Albanian Generals.

- In 1999 there was 15% of minority member students; in 1998 there was 14% of them, while only a half of those minority students attends the university. In July 2001, the Government of Macedonia passed some laws relating to the long-term requests of Albanians on university lecturing in the Albanian language. The Law on high education enables establishment of a private institution under the OSCE sponsorship plan, with instruction in the Albanian, English and Macedonian languages. The institution was supposed to start working in the beginning of 2001. Such a decision was supported by Xhaferi’s party, but not by a great number of Albanians who supported the idea of the Albanian University in Tetovo.

- During the last ten years, the Government of Macedonia has been continually rejecting legalization of the use of the Albanian language for their communication with the Government, Parliament as well as the use of the Albanian flag, etc.

The main factor of inner instability was the coalition Government of Georgievski and Xhaferi and particularly the political insincerity between these coalition partners. Before the war escalated, the situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was repeated in the same way: Two extremely strong nationalistically coloured partners attempted to achieve their interests by using the joint institutions. After Kiro Gligorov and his Social-Democratic party came down from power, Macedonia remained, in the political sense, without influential factors, which would really work in favour of a unified democratic Macedonia. It became a
trading ground. That could have been realized from the very beginning when the new government took over.

The beginning of Macedonian armed clashes has all characteristics of political confusion, just as that was the case with all previous beginnings of the armed clashes. One thing is sure: In February 2001, Albanians initiated their organized armed activities on the border with Tanusevci village. Such activities were coordinated with the activities of the Albanian extremists from the south of Serbia and Kosovo. The Albanian guerrillas in Macedonia used the same tactic that proved successful in the Presevo Valley, while Kosovo was once again used as a logistic base.

The existence of the connection between Kosovo and Presevo Valley is confirmed by the Albanian extremists' statements from that area, which claim they will spread the clashes all over Macedonia and that their aim is "Great Kosovo". Some new political parties were established, which were directly supporting and proclaiming the armed clashes (the National Democratic Party led by Kastrriot Haxhirexha, for example), while those "moderate Albanians" from PDP supported the same activities through their leader Mahi Nesimi. Political messages of the extremists were taken over from the list of unfulfilled wishes of Macedonian Albanian parties. They have to do with the state of two nations, two languages and two flags. Just like in Presevo, armed guerrillas demand constitutional reforms, while the "rebellion" program is identical with the program of the Albanian political parties. And, just like in Kosovo and in Presevo Valley, they differ from their politicians only in terms of used methods. The Albanian political elite in Macedonia had a vision of gradual Albanian status improvement for a long-term period. The reason is the fact that Albanians in Macedonia were not directly jeopardized, as that was the case with Kosovo before the NATO intervened. And, in contrast to Milosevic's Serbia, Macedonia had a support of the international community.

The extreme Albanian groups became impatient. They were afraid of corruption of the political leadership and the possibility of Macedonia becoming in military and economic terms stronger, which would completely set in concrete the inferior position of Albanians. Radicals did not want to wait that long. They believed Macedonia should be military provoked over the period it was already weak, in order to force it to give up. Their aim is federalization of Macedonia in this phase, while the next phase, i. e. to open up the question of the state revision of the Albanian status remains for the coming generations.

From the extremists' point of view, such aim cannot be reached without creation of an ethnic Albanian military in Macedonia. Without the military and an autonomous territory, the Albanians will not reach their guaranteed rights and security. The Republic of Srpska within the Bosnian Union has both the military and territory, although there is also the Kosovo Protection Corps in Kosovo and a "multi-ethnic police" in the Presevo Valley. Such requests had to be made ten
years ago, but the Albanian politicians missed their chance. However, guerrillas put those requests into effect and brought politicians into an inconvenient position. Nowadays, they are forced to "run after guerrillas" and give the explanations for such demands. According to the "Welt am Zontag", 18th March 2001, the Albanian leader Arben Xhaferi stated that Macedonia was a society "divided into two classes. One is composed of Macedonian Slavs, while the other one consists of the" oppressed Albanian minority", which accounts for almost one third of the Macedonian population". Xhaferi also emphasized that, upon the Macedonian separation from the SFRY and its independency gaining, suffering of Macedonian Albanians started, which were deprived of their rights to the Albanian language, culture and education. According to the Albanian officials, the police and soldiers practised discrimination, and almost nobody from among the Albanians managed to make any significant career.

The thesis that Albanians want to separate themselves from Macedonia and join Kosovo, Xhaferi comments in the following way: "Such presumption is a great mistake of western politics. We are the Albanian Macedonians and we have not that much in common with Kosovo. Macedonian security forces are currently directing the most brutal power against their compatriots – the Albanian Macedonians and not against former KLA fighters, as western media present in a simplified way. The NATO has to intervene rapidly before Macedonian police and army create a bloodshed".

Due to the wrong steps made after the escalation of the armed clashes and some periods of panic, the Government decided to use its military-police forces against guerrillas until the moment it manages to regain the control over the whole territory. On the other hand, it didn't have strong enough army, nor it had a real agreement with the international community. It could be even said that the Government, led by its own nationalism, easily granted amnesty to the international community, to the US in particular and its "coalition partners" from the Albanian community. It pardoned them for their part of responsibility for the war and new destabilization of the region. Namely, the clashes were in the view of both communities the clashes in which both nationalities had to protect their ethnicity. Such reaction was possible because these two communities used to live one near another, but not together. That's completely identical to the attitudes of Serbs and Albanians in 1998. In case of Kosovo and Macedonia, such belief influenced the stirring up of the conflict, as it also unmistakably shows that such situation leads to the point where the only solution appears to be the territorial separation between Macedonians and Albanians. There are no good prospects that something else might happen in Macedonia.

The first reaction on Ohrid agreement, August 2001, confirms the same thing, starting from the unwillingness of the NATO forces to send their soldiers to setting the conditions before Macedonian politicians. Such conditions imply realization of constitutional reforms only after the Albanians have been disarmed and massively "transformed" from the ONA into a newly established Albanian
National Army (ANA). Numerous indicators, even the political propaganda of the ANA itself, which demands “continuation of the fight to the final victory”-creation of “Great Albania”, point out that a new phase of political and armed clashes is not also excluded. The contribution to such an opinion is given by the fact that the ethnic Macedonian side is faced with creation of radical political groups, which de facto have control over some parts of the territory. There are also some possibilities for re-transmission of tensions to the south of Serbia. Kosovo itself will not probably be the battlefield of these clashes till the beginning of the November elections. Stability will afterwards depend on the election outcome of the extreme parties and groups. In case they become defeated, then it is quite certain, just as it was after the local elections, that they would try to intensify conflicts and, at the same time, strengthen their chances for the survival in political life. A possibility for the clashes renewal in Macedonia and the region is very likely to happen, since the causes, which enable such a situation, still do exist. They are the following:

- A strong pan-Albanian nationalistic movement;
- A lack of stronger pro-Macedonian movement, which would guarantee building of the democratic, multi-ethnic society within the existing Macedonian boundaries;
- Centralization of power in Macedonia and non-resolving, furthermore identifying numerous economic and social problems, including the education problem, etc.
- A conflict of political and economic interests of numerous international and regional actors on various questions. One of these questions is the status of the NATO presence in this part of the Balkans;
- Non-resolving of the inner stability problem and an intensified development of Albania, including the status of Kosovo.

According to the Ohrid agreement between the conflicting sides and NATO, the possibility was created for the extension of the NATO role. It is, therefore, necessary to establish a new international arrangement. It is of great importance now to reach a consensus within NATO on the future policy in Macedonia and the Balkans in general. In accordance with that, it has to be admitted that those who in the Great Britain, in the beginning of 2001, expressed their fear and warnings about the armed clashes expansion from Kosovo to the south of Serbia and Macedonia, were right. They were also warning that the armed Albanian groups and their activities had to be stopped. There is a great number of indicators showing that the Albanians interpreted the presence of NATO “in a wrong way” as a support to reaching the “aim of the Albanians”. By their activities, the Albanians actually jeopardized the previous NATO achievements in the region for a long period of time. That was a result of a slow, sluggish and inappropriate response by NATO and KFOR.

The Albanian extremists were, for example, using the GSZ for months as their shelter and for smuggling weapons to the south of Serbia and Macedonia
through the American and German sectors of responsibility. At the same time, there was a constant conflict within KFOR between the British and Germans in terms of defining the way they should respond to such activities. The British contingent is for a stronger confrontation and implementation of northern Ireland methods, which means broader police activities enforced by the military for arresting and disarming the extremists – The Times, 17th March 2001.

Although NATO and the USA from the very beginning, 27th February 2001, have been supporting the right of Macedonian authorities to protect their border and their people, the West was hesitating. The West knew there wasn’t any possibility of direct-armed intervention, particularly because they were afraid of warring against the Albanians in Kosovo – the territory that was supposed to be under their control. The concern of NATO that the Albanian terrorists might attack their soldiers is certainly justified. In that case, they would have to aim their weapons at those Albanians that they were supporting for the last two years. That is something that the majority of politicians does not want. It is obviously hard to accept a part of that responsibility.

After the explosion of a mine under a bus full of civilians that took place in the north of Kosovo, in February 2001, the Albanian extremists faced again the international community with the question, which was topical in 1998: Is the terrorism being discussed here? But, from the moment such activities started spreading out from Kosovo to the south of Serbia and Macedonia and became a direct challenge to the international community, the view on “rebelled Albanians” started to change. Such an attitude brings in question the previous NATO politics, especially the efficiency of KFOR activities and its existence. That imposes an obligation on NATO and on the USA in particular, to stop the extreme armed activities of the Albanians against legal authorities in the surrounding countries. From that direction came an interesting appeal of Willy Wimmer, the former vice-president of the OSCE parliamentary assembly, addressed to the Federal German Government to persuade Washington to conduct its policy in the Balkans in agreement with Europe. He emphasized: “this what is happening now is not unexpected, but was created in front of the USA and supported by their army...Nobody must turn a blind eye to the KLA leaders. Terrorism must stop, although it was supported at the beginning”, said Wimmer and indicated that the Albanians had been trying to create their own national state for a long time. He also added: “The matter admits no delay, on the contrary, we will open Pandora’s box.... that will destroy peace order in Europe”.

VII THE END OF YUGOSLAVIA: SOLANA’S SHOCK THERAPY FOR THE NEW BEGINNING

The FRY lasted for ten years. Throughout its entire existence the FRY was a seriously ill patient, its last years, from 1997 to 2002, having been the years of crisis and the death rattle. Thus, the only institutional product of Milosevic’s rule
was based, as everything else in that authoritarian government, on political voluntarism of the political leadership rather than on the consensus of the leading social and political factors. Under the constitutional definition, that was the state based on equality of all citizens. But, in essence, that is a pre-political community in which the ethnic principle has universal validity. That is a social and state community that lived its whole life in the process of political and state search for and failure to find the legitimacy basis. In its life, disintegration of the old and onset of the new institutional structures intermingle. That results into discord and incompleteness of the normative and institutional system, which such as it was, is totally contrary to democratic institutions and standards.

State organization of the FRY vacillated between demands for the centralization of power and ethno national homogenisation, on the one hand, and numerous signs of confederalization, on the other hand. From its very inception in 1992, the following options of the structure of the state seemed to be equally possible:

- Federation with a strong centre of federal government and appropriate degree of administrative-political decentralization, i. e. regionalization (like in Germany),
- Confederation, and
- Separation of individual parts (Kosovo and Montenegro).

However, in reality, the federal authority was exercised only in the territory of central Serbia and Vojvodina. Kosovo was all the time only de jure within the FRY but de facto until the war, i. e. 1998, influence of the federal government was restricted to the Serbian and other non-Albanian communities, police and financial functions and even that in a relatively reduced extent, and since the second half of 1999, the territory of Kosovo has been under international protectorate. Montenegro has been developing since 1997 as an independent society and state.

The relations between Serbia and Montenegro had been deadlocked ever since Milo Djukanovic and his Democratic Party of Socialist (DPS) beat Milosevic's confederates in Montenegro on a pro – independence ticket in the 1997 presidential and the 1998 parliamentary elections. His victory revealed the fundamental flaw of the two – state federation created in 1992 from the remainder of Tito's Yugoslav Federation: Serbia is 15 times bigger than Montenegro in terms of both territory and population. Consequently, the equality of the unequal partners in the new mini – federation deviated absurdly from the democratic principle of "one person – one vote". As long as Milosevic's SPS de facto ruled in both republics and on the federal level, this structural problem could be ignored. With Montenegro's pro – Western reform policies and Serbia's nationalist paralysis diverging more and more, Montenegro became independent in all but name and the Yugoslav Federation became a dead letter. On the eve of the epochal elections in the fall of 2000, Milosevic eliminated the principle of equality of the two constituent republics in law to restore the Serb hegemony.
Spotlighting the question of future relations of Serbia and Montenegro that had begun in 1997 was only intensified in the five coming years. In fact, Montenegro and Serbia have become since 1997 two different worlds and two different political consciences. Topicality of the issue is underlined by the following facts:

- Instability of the FRY caused by the lack of reforms, weaknesses of democratic forces, especially in Serbia, ethnic conflicts in Kosovo, centralization of power in Serbia and converting the federal authority into an extension of Milosevic’s power, and since October 2000, into another government of Serbia;
- Efforts of Milosevic but also of post-Milosevic political leadership of Serbia, all the time until the beginning of 2002, to impede and retard democratic transformation of Montenegro and its breaking away from the control of Belgrade by actions from the federal centre;
- A permanent crisis of the federal centre caused by its inability to govern the society. The centre appears to be as the sole but increasingly weaker protector of interests of the monopoly in legal and illegal trade in military industrial and similar monopoly products;
- Difficult economic and social situation and many years of exhaustion of Serbia and Montenegro due to wars, economic crises, including the hyperinflation, international sanctions and isolation;
- Inadequacy and incompleteness of the legislation, political institutions of government, political parties, trade unions, and even political confrontation of all these;
- Underdevelopment of the civil society and organizations of the civil society, inactivity of citizens, especially of the intellectual and artistic elites in public life of Serbia and Montenegro, etc.

From the viewpoint of reforms and democratisation of Montenegro during Milosevic’s ruling, the conflict was both inevitable and useful. Through the conflict, "anti-reform forces" in the Montenegrin government and political elite, embodied above all in the SNP, were marginalized. This political structure turned back in October 2000 to its Creator and coalition partner Slobodan Milosevic, and promised cooperation to the new winner. However, change in political side has not been accompanied with change in policy. The SNP continues defending Milosevic’s institutions. This is also manifested in connection with provision of cooperation with the Hague tribunal, and above all in blocking the reforms.

Throughout this conflict, Milosevic’s regime demonstrated clear signs of readiness to use the VJ for the purpose of alleged protection of the market and territorial unity of the country.

On the Serbian side, political parties and media dealt with the topic of future relations of Serbia and Montenegro incidentally and their major preoccupation
has been struggle for division of power, including since October 2000, Milosevic's heritage. The question of relations with Montenegro, as the ones with Kosovo, was made "functional" for political clashes within the DOS. Anyhow, general characteristics of the attitude of the Serbian public opinion and political leadership towards Montenegro are the following:

- There is insufficient knowledge and understanding of what is going on in Montenegro;
- The centralistic positions prevail, without foreseeing any possibility at all of Montenegro being separated from Serbia;
- Unreadiness to come face to face with the fundamental issue and that is the issue of the crisis of Serbian national and state identity.

Basically, there were the following options for solving the problem of relations of Montenegro and Serbia:

- First, that Montenegro should remain in the FRY and to arrive gradually at a "better joint state". This idea was faced with two basic obstacles: the first one is that its application would require from Montenegro to make a step backwards in the field of reforms, and that would harm interests of the majority in Montenegro; second, considerable resistance would be met in Serbia to a consistent implementation of the system of equal rights, i.e., distribution of federal functions;
- Second, that Montenegro should become independent. Independence of Montenegro. Undoubtedly, that is an option that cannot be agreed upon but it is possible only as a result of failure to reach an agreement, i.e. as a result of a referendum;
- Third, to establish a union of independent states of Serbia and Montenegro, i.e., Community (Association or Union) of Serbia and Montenegro. This option has become in time, especially during negotiations, increasingly acceptable solution to many, so that it was finally accepted on 14 March 2002 in the Agreement on principles of future relations of Serbia and Montenegro. The main limiting factor of this option is that Serbia has not made yet all its calculations as regards its interests, especially as regards pragmatic requests that might be made in the creation of this community. Another limiting factor is the influence of advocates of a loose federation who are, unable to materialize their option, against the Union, which is to their mind a provisional solution, "unnecessary loss of time". The option of the Union was granted support by the EU, and especially the U.S.A., evidenced by the active role of the EU during the signing on 14 March 2002.

The Union of Serbia and Montenegro can represent only a transitory solution until the final separation but also the beginning of the process of economic, communication and similar integrations of the Western Balkans. However, there is one thing that is not controversial: the new union has been created as a result of trilateral agreement of Serbia, Montenegro and the EU. It is, anyhow, basically
tri-entity one: Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo.

During negotiations, representatives of the EU gave up their belief that the solution lies in democratic Montenegro within democratic FRY, which was arrived at in the first half of 2001 under the presidency of Sweden, under a strong impression that October events of 2000 made on the EU. This also resulted into an uncurbed adoration of new government in Belgrade. The outcome was weakening of the position of the ruling coalition in Montenegro and strengthening of pro-Milosevic forces in Montenegro and even in Serbia.

The total paralysis of federal bodies and exacerbation of the conflict within the DOS that grew into an open political war between the DS and DSS had to happen and every question, including the one of future relations of Serbia and Montenegro, had to serve the purposes of mutual clashes of the warring factions, that the EU found itself in a position that it often was in since the beginning of disintegration of former Yugoslavia: faced with unreadiness and inability of local politicians to conduct negotiations and to solve their problems in agreement and peacefully. Thus, the EU had to take the initiative. In addition, due to difficulties in reaching an internal compromise, the EU had to gain time or rather to maintain the status quo. In reality, this led to deepening of the political crisis and blocking of the reforms.

Direct involvement of Solana into the negotiating process in late 2001 resulted in a mild change expressed by a formula of functional federation. However, even this change did not eliminate the basic weakness of the previous position of the EU: disregard of the reality in which the federal state did not de facto function. In addition, the negotiating process that lasted for a few months, especially the so-called expert discussions, fortified the position of equality of Montenegro with Serbia. Some governments also took a more active part (particularly the government of Germany and individual centres of power in the U.S.A., above all outside the State Department) insisting on the fact that the right of Montenegro to self-determination cannot be challenged and that agreement on future relations of Serbia and Montenegro have to respect it. After that, a statement replaced the position on functional federation to the effect that the existing federation was not functional.

Direct involvement of the EU in the solution of the question of future relations of Serbia and Montenegro demonstrates that the international community is of the opinion that future relations of Serbia and Montenegro represent an important security and legal question:

a) As a security issue, it is of relevance to regional security. Anxiety of the international community is, however, associated above all with the possibility that management crisis in Kosovo might be made difficult or even impossible if the FRY were to disappear. In that case, the Kosovo issue might be reverted again to the question of Albanian – Serbian
relations and the question of the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo. There was also fear in the international community that the break-up of the FRY would encourage further disintegration of the B&H, i. e. gaining of independence by Republika Srpska and its linking with Serbia. From this point of view, the question of the status of Kosovo can be postponed, after the November elections and participation of Serbs in them, for some time, at least for three years. As for Republika Srpska, the time limit is shorter. Hence hasty efforts to reintegrate Republika Srpska as soon as and as deeper as possible into Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of major steps in that direction is the total interruption of financial and other support of Belgrade to the army of Republika Srpska.

b) As an international law issue, that is the question of the international legal status or succession to former Yugoslavia. It should be also taken into consideration that the EU has a problem due to the existence of the opinion of the Badinter’s commission relating both to Montenegro and Serbia. If this view were accepted with regard to Montenegro, which cannot be however rejected explicitly, that would mean that Montenegro may, in so far as the majority of citizens of Montenegro in a referendum is in favour of it, declare its independence and that it will be recognized by the EU and the international community. Additional problem lies in the fact that during the creation of the FRY both Montenegro and Serbia declared that they were in favour of direct succession to the SFRY, undertaking thereby many obligations (for instance, repayment of shares of debts of former Yugoslavia, which is anyhow in the interest of the many in the international community). The option of full independence of Montenegro or union of two independent and internationally recognized states intensifies in many doubts about the factor with which one would have to negotiate as regards international arrangements but which would also be responsible for payment of war damages to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to Croatia should the FRY lose the case before the European Court of Justice.

Faced with all these problems, the EU tried to gain appropriate time until conditions were created and mechanisms for restraining risks of possible instability within Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo, and the Republika Srpska, i. e. Bosnia and Herzegovina, were provided for.

Involvement of the EU has an additional dimension: The lesson of the experience is that the EU is not ready and willing to admit its failure! Taking into consideration that a consensus has not been reached within the EU as to how protect interests of European states in the Western Balkans, and taking also into account the complexity of the problem, representatives of the EU opt for a strong pressure on both parties with a view to reaching an agreement. Therefore, a combined carrot-and-stick measure will be applied. Conditionality of financial and other assistance can be used as a stick, and conclusion of an agreement on stabilization and association with the EU as a carrot.
VIII SERBIA 2002: A CHALLENGE TO REGIONAL STABILITY

Milosevic’s dictatorship was completely stripped bare in the course of summer 2000. The response of citizens of Serbia came on 24 September. On that day, the ruling parties (Socialist Party led by Milosevic, JUL – the party of Milosevic’s wife and the Serbian Radical Party of Milosevic’s satellite Seselj) were defeated in local elections and Milosevic himself lost in presidential elections. The coalition DOS (Democratic Opposition of Serbia) and its presidential candidate Vojislav Kostunica were the very top of an iceberg of discontent of citizens and work of many opponents of the regime, specially independent media, non-governmental organizations and civil movements strongly supported from the EU and U.S.

With collapse of the authoritarian regime, Serbia set off on the road of reforms and democratisation and stopped playing the role of major disturbing factor of stability in the West Balkans. This, however, has not made it stable. On the contrary, major conflicts have come back home, to Serbia. If Serbia is to become an active factor of stabilization and development in the Region, it should achieve its own stabilization on a democratic basis. This entails a long and painstaking work to overcome effects of Milosevic’s heritage.

Thus, the following underlie Milosevic’s defeat:

- First, wide dissatisfaction of citizens of Serbia with Milosevic’s rule;
- Second, growing awareness both among those in Serbia and the international community, above all in Russia and France, whose interests were represented by Milosevic that he was an unreliable warrantor of their interests;
- Third, a putsch of its kind, which demonstrates that the closest collaborators of Milosevic turned their back on him and went over to the winners. The most notable examples are commanders of special police units, commanders of the VJ as well as numerous members of Para police units. It was the victory of citizens who, at the attempt of Milosevic to steal votes in 2000, as he did in 1977, responded by protests, strikes and, on the 5th of October, by an open rebellion, joined also by the "putchists". The culmination of all this was dashing of demonstrators into buildings – symbols of Milosevic’s power (Federal Parliament, state television, etc.). This medley of facts and events many, like Madeleine Albright, call “the Serbian democratic revolution”. The more sceptic ones use the term "the Serbian October revolution".

Without regard to how the period from 24 September to 5 October 2000 will be termed, it is indisputable that at that time:

- First, every serious support of Milosevic’s power was knocked down;
- Second, that his repressive apparatus has disintegrated;
- Third, and the most important, that citizens of Serbia have won their freedom and regained self-confidence and belief in the possibility of a better future.

However, though Milosevic is not on the public political scene since then, one could not say that Serbia has become "post-Milosevic". Should one take as a mark of post-Milosevic's era the establishment of the rule of law and democratic institutions, it is more correct to say that the process of a slow transfer of power has begun. Participants in the process are both representatives of democratic forces and groups, institutions of Milosevic's regime, the so-called putchists. After the relationship between the putchists and democratic forces has been resolved, Serbia will be faced with an onerous and long process of building up new institutions and rules of political, economic and over-all social life. Thus, two possibilities are open before Serbia:

- The first, and hardly likely, to "democratise" and "modernize" itself, i.e. to make more acceptable to the world basically Milosevic's policy of nationalism.
- Second, that after republican elections, in December 2000, provided DOS has a convincing victory; a process of economic, political and legal reforms begins. These changes should end with a new constitution for Serbia and, after that, the first not only truly fair but democratic elections.

1) Trials of the process of the nation – state building

Despite two centuries of its state history, Serbia is again in 2002 in the very beginning of the process of building a modern state/nation faced with an exacerbated identity crisis.

When the identity crisis is talked about, then there are two different but interrelated problems: one is the question of Serbia as a state and another the question of the Serbian nation.

Admittedly, the Serbian nation is experiencing today a deep crisis of national and state identity. Endeavours to build the national identity to the measure of ethnonationalism has not yielded expected results, either in terms of the integration within the nation or defining differences in relation to the Others that would match present-day circumstances and values of national awareness. On the contrary, advantage was given to the values of being self-sufficient (autarchy), homogenisation on ethnic principles and orientation to the primary group, i.e. collectivism.

The crisis of national identity is manifested in numerous acute and dormant ethnic conflicts. One of the basic culprits for it is the policy of ethno nationalism, which, in the territory of former Yugoslavia since the end of 1980s, has been the
most influential factor of the building of Serbian and other national identities. In fact, the prevailing pattern of national self-identification in the FRY belongs to the group of pre-political and primordial features of national identity because the ethnic origin (birth or blood) and history are decisive “elements” of national self-identification of people. A positive national self-evaluation of own national community is also very marked, while the relation towards the Others, especially “competitive communities” (such as the Albanian, Croatian, Hungarians and Muslim ones) is rife with xenophobia and antipathy. All this points to the fact that the crisis of national identity and xenophobia (fear and mistrust) are more prominent than the inter-ethnic hatred.

This is also confirmed by findings of a survey “Pulse of Yugoslavia” according to which citizens in Serbia use the following “elements” to determine their national identity:

1. Birth in a given nation (37.7%);
2. Common history and tradition (23.1%);
3. Common territory (13.7%);
4. Common religion (8.9%);
5. Common language (5.7%);
6. Common state and politics (2.4%);
7. Common culture (1.8%), and
8. Economy and trade (0.5%)

The insecurity felt by many people because of the crisis and the war gave rise to concern and anxiety which grew into fear and from there into aggressiveness and various forms of hatred. This hatred was turned against Others - neighbouring peoples, minorities and “national traitors”. All of this is expressed by the stereotype “Others are impossible to live with”.

The regime and the media it controls to facilitate a “divorce” from the Others encouraged the development of stereotypes. Thus, Serbian nationalism, just like other nationalisms on the territory of former Yugoslavia, confirmed itself as being separatist. But, lacking an appropriate articulation, unlike other nationalisms, it turned into aggression. Particularly important is the stereotype “The whole world hates us!” This stereotype was created in an attempt to use emotional elements to make isolation from the world more acceptable to the Serbs and other inhabitants of Serbia. This stereotype also relies on the fact that indeed a part of the world public opinion has vilified Serbs and Serbia. Incorporated in these stereotypes is the so-called theory of conspiracy against Serbia and the Serbs, which served the purpose of retaining power, but also evolved into a national fixation of its own.

Constitutionally, Serbia is defined as a state of citizens while, in reality, it is being built as a national state of Serbs. As far as the Serbian nation is concerned, its new identity that has been built to fit ethno nationalism is in crisis.
Modernization is both the necessity and condition for survival and development of Serbia and the Serbian nation. However, the idea of a modern, democratic, European Serbia is only at the level of a list of wishes. There is neither a program nor strategy of building such a state.

The majority political and intellectual active segment of Serbia still refuses to face with the fateful choice between development, freedom and democracy on the one hand, and lagging behind, return to the past and nationalistic totalitarianism, on the other hand.

Torn apart by the dichotomy of the traditional and modernizing patterns of development, Serbia played one of the key roles in the break-up of former Yugoslavia. So far, both the capitalist and socialist modernization failed. But, the possibility of democratic development in Serbia has not been definitely eliminated. There are changes in ownership relations and the ways of business operation; elements of the market economy are being introduced. Certain important assumptions for modernization have been created in public and cultural life. This process has given rise to numerous civil organizations, movements, groups and initiatives, including those linked with the concepts of liberal democracy, federalization and integration of Europe whose actions represent the beginning of a new political culture and an important step towards democratisation. Although the establishment of nationalist parties encourages conflicts, it also initiates the political institutionalisation of national differences and existing conflicts. That creates a chance for them to transform, in time, their destructive energy into that of competition and cooperation. The road to modernization imposes the priority of learning to live with conflicts; i.e. of necessary mechanisms for the establishment of coexistence among groups with different cultural, religious and ethnic traditions (Bien. 1993: 243 – 5). In this context, self-limitation is one of the assumptions of democracy. Ethnic community, solidarity and nationalism are all factors, which must be taken into account. A policy, which identifies itself with a specific national community, is not in itself incompatible with democracy. It only does become incompatible in a situation where national or ethnic identity forms the basis for the distribution of social wealth, where a political community is reduced to an ethnicity, and political subjects are limited to national and ethnically defined collectivities.

It is an open question: What is Serbia? Kostunica’s circle tries to solve the problem by a formula under which Serbia would include – integrate, if not all, then as many as possible Serbs and Serbian territories. Djindjic promises: The time has come for Serbia as a normal and democratic state! In fact, in reply to this question, Serbia is now as it was in early 1890s faced with a choice between two options: "the civil" and "the national" ones. The first one emphasizes the need to develop the state/nation, civil society and Serbia’s joining global developments, disregarding to a certain extent national problems. The second one puts into the forefront "interests of the endangered Serbian people". These
options are the platforms for both mobilization and confrontation within the DOS, but also at the total political stage (Milic. 2002: 6). Confrontations are present in debates on Kosovo, on the south of Serbia, relations between Serbia and Montenegro but also on the direction and pace of reforms, social policy, etc. It is without doubt that those confrontations will be exacerbated on the occasion of the passing of a new constitution.

Modern Serbia means a democratically constituted democratic state. One of the first steps on that road is shaping of an optimum state structure. Modern state building is a lengthy process and it cannot be done overnight. It is to be done through parliamentarism and enlightenment of the population, i.e. through creation of a new, democratic political culture. The same applies to the redefinition of Serbia as a state/nation. Serbia should be defined constitutionally as a democratic, multiethnic state that can be, but need not be, in union with Montenegro.

Constitutional and legislative reforms of Serbia and restoration of its statehood cannot be postponed infinitely. In principle, there are two possibilities to do it:

- The first one is that the Assembly of Serbia should pass the constitution with the consensus of all the DOS members, which has in the Assembly a two-thirds majority required for the passing of a new constitution;
- The second one is that republic bodies should take over all functions from the federal ones. This is also provided for in the present, Milosevic's, constitution. However, such a way represents a high risk and might lead finally to disintegration of the state.

The process of building of Serbia takes place parallel to finding answers to the question of future relations between Montenegro and Serbia. The formula of a union of Serbia and Montenegro has been accepted with mediation of the European Union. Namely, the EU found itself in a position that it often was since the beginning of disintegration of former Yugoslavia. Faced with the lack of readiness and inability of local politicians to solve problems in agreement and peacefully, the EU had to take the initiative. Since a compromise could not been reached, the EU opted for gaining time, i.e. for a compromise that would satisfy interests of the most influential parties without prejudicing the solution.

In order to secure the desired solution, it is necessary to exert pressure on key political leaders. It is particularly risky whether and how the EU will talk politicians from Serbia into implementing the Union. This is made harder by a careless attitude of politicians from Serbia towards their own public, the majority of which is otherwise in favour of independence of Serbia.

2) Institutional problems

Today, Serbia is a relatively weak political entity. In fact, Serbia is an incomplete,
pre-political community. That community is in search for its constitutional-legal set-up and legitimacy. It is torn between completion of the process of former Yugoslavia disintegration and emergence of a new state. Hence the attitude of the overwhelming majority of the population of Serbia is conservative. Thus, many people see the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Army of Yugoslavia and President of the FRY Vojislav Kostunica as pillars of social legitimacy and stability (UNDP. 2001: 9).

In Serbia, the legitimacy crisis of constitutional identity, caused by the lack of basic social consensus on fundamental principles on which the community is based, has been going on for years. Absence of elementary stability of institutions, erosion of their credibility accompanied with permanent drastic violation of the constitution and laws, loss of confidence in the state, the law, institutions and procedures are only some of indicators of the depth of the constitutional and institutional crisis (Principles. 2000: 6).

Conflicts of political parties and blocs, institutions of government, etc. have been exacerbated in Serbia with respect to the control of the centres of political, financial and military – police power. A deeper problem lies in the background: Serbia is a state with "split personality". There are in the institutional system institutions that date back to the time of Tito's Yugoslavia (above all, the military, the police, federal and republican state security, military counterintelligence service and the information and documentation service attached to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs). Then, there are institutions that were established by Milosevic and adapted to his authoritarian ruling (governments outside the efficient control of the public, bureaucratised and corrupt administration; constitutionally established presidential system of authority in Serbia and de facto established presidential authority at the federal level by Milosevic, which is organized under the Constitution as the cabinet office authority; lack of institutions and guaranteed procedures for citizens' influence on government or rather non-existence of the democratic public). Finally, institutions that have been de facto established by new government on the basis of the balance of political power: for instance, at the federal level, Kostunica's governing continued the inherited presidential authority from Milosevic, derogation of the influence of the Parliament and Government; in the Republic of Serbia, Djindjic has established, contrary to the Constitution, the prime minister's authority. Chaos in the institutional system prevents efficient society governance and represents a factor of instability of Serbia.

Serbia is a strongly centralized state with narrowed local self-government. On the other hand, there are in reality regional (territorial, economic, ethnic, cultural and historical) differences. Serbia is de facto a multiethnic and multicultural community. That is why the institutional system should be based on the principle of decentralization. It is necessary to establish an optimum balance between democratic legitimacy and the need to take efficiently crucial, often painful and unpopular decisions without which there are no reforms. That implies
development of different forms of autonomy and regionalism, the ethnic pluralism being in this process an independent and democracy dependent variable. Therefore, one of the first questions is the one of the internal reorganization of centralized states.

Decentralization of government would facilitate resolution of tensions in Vojvodina, Sandžak and in the south of Serbia. This also implies solution of the status of Kosovo, while citizens and the leadership should base relations with Kosovo and Montenegro on taking over of responsibility for governance in the territory in which citizens live and work.

The new government has demonstrated general political will to embark on the solution of problems that originated from strict centralization. Thus, in March 2002, the Assembly of Serbia passed the Law on Local Self-government and the law giving back to Vojvodina functions that it is entitled to under the Constitution in force, and an agreement in principle has been reached on fundamentals for constitutional amendments, including the principles of the strengthening of autonomy of Vojvodina.

It is also necessary to repeal the new republican law on local self-government and to decide on a new type of local self-government and decentralization that would define community as the basic level of self-government rather than municipality as it is the case now. Local self-government bodies should have at their free disposal the funds they collect. In that way local population, including national minorities, would become active agents of local self-government.

In Serbia, there are reasons of principle for regionalization: demand for a higher degree of citizens' participation in the exercise of authority in matters that are of direct concern to them; demands for a more efficient and more responsible exercise of authority; historical, cultural, traditional and economic reasons (Principles, 2000, 35).

Autonomy of Vojvodina is an important topic in Serbia in respect of which there are conflicting views. The relative majority of Serbs from Vojvodina (53%) considers that the present degree of autonomy is a satisfactory one, while the relative majority (52%) of the most numerous ethnic minority in Vojvodina — Hungarians is of the opinion that the autonomy of Vojvodina should be strengthened, and 27% of Hungarians are for Vojvodina as a new republic (UNDP, 2001, 11). In March 2002, the Assembly of Serbia passed the law on definition of certain competences (the so-called omnibus law). Under the law, 25 competences, provided for by the Constitution of Serbia, that were despite the Constitution either taken away from Vojvodina or it did not make use of them, were transferred to it. The areas of culture, education, the official use of language and alphabet, public information, health care and insurance, etc. is at issue.

This law was also an occasion for misunderstandings between the DSS and the
rest of DOS. The majority of Vojvodina parties are satisfied with the passing of the Law but they stress that this is "an initial step" in the process of giving them the autonomy back.

The Presevo Valley, consisting of municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, is important for Serbia because main railway and road lines run through it connecting Middle Europe with the Mediterranean, and it also has a big potential for agricultural development. In this zone, in addition to Serbs and Roma, around 70,000 Albanians live and many of them refer to this area as "Eastern Kosovo". In fact, Albanians from these municipalities came out in the 1992 referendum for "peaceful joining" Kosovo.

The Presevo Valley proved to be one of remaining "pockets" of ethnic recomposition of former Yugoslavia. The appearance of Serbian enclaves in Kosovo intensified the conviction of not only Albanians that the Presevo Valley is the Albanian enclave in Serbia. In early 2001, all those concerned in changes of borders, in Kosovo and the south of Serbia, concluded that the "right time" had come and the armed rebellion of Albanian extremists occurred. Within that perspective, the Presevo Valley serves as a counterweight to Mitrovica and northern part of Kosovo controlled by Serbs. Weaknesses of the idea to exchange the Presevo Valley for northern part of Kosovo are that Serbia would get in that way an important (northern) part of Kosovo but would be, along the way, practically cut off from Macedonia. In addition, application of this principle could have a domino effect in western Macedonia and in border areas of Montenegro, Albania and Kosovo.

Positive effects have been achieved in resolution of the Presevo problem:

- Increase in the degree of security and, as a result, increased chances for preventive checking of extremist actions, narrowing the room for terrorism, reducing the smuggling, organized crime and various "economic" abuses;
- In strategic relations with NATO, direct cooperation of the VJ and NATO has begun with prospects of development towards the full integration into the Partnership for Peace; on a short-term, the police of Serbia and the VJ have taken over control of borders around Kosovo but also a considerable portion of the KFOR or NATO risk of conflicts with Albanians, including possible human casualties and material losses.

The Presevo Valley is a subdued "hot spot" but there continues to exist a considerable political risk.

3) Weaknesses of political leadership

The situation within the political leadership and, above all, its incapacity to govern the state and to continue the reforms that have started are the subject of increasing concern of the domestic public. Basically, the political elite in
Milosevic's and post-Milosevic's Serbia has been established by renaming a section of the "old" ruling elite, and the most significant source for its filling in is the so-called middle echelon of the "ancien régime" – local managers and executives.

The experience of many reformist governments in transition societies, and especially of those that were supported by a broad coalition of parties and movements, tells us that their life is not long. Their position is paradoxical: they would have to invest a lot in the future with small chances of reaping the fruits of changes. This exposes all politicians, especially those that are power-hungry and frustrated by many years of marginalization in conditions of dictatorship, to difficult temptations. Temptations are additionally increased by ever-present corruption, grey economy and organized crime. As a segment of political leadership in Serbia opts for acquiring their gains overnight, it becomes a risk factor. This also applies to politicians in the Government of Serbia who settle on political voluntarism, decision-making in a narrow circle, governing by decrees, using the funds from privatisation for adding to the budget, improvement in the standards of living and promotion of economic power of businessmen and politicians that are loyal to them, rather than for investments, for invigoration of privatisation and deepening of reforms. Day after day, this increasingly moves the Government away from the rules of democratic communication and narrows the initial broad support of citizens and other partners. Thus, instead of widening the circle of support, through political and social dialogue, the vicious circle of conflicts is created. These conflicts take place within the governing political and economic leaderships, while the politics become a sum of affairs and incidents. That is why the politics of Serbia becomes increasingly recognizable as a sum of affairs and as a critical incapacity to build a modern state.

Synergistic effect of the DOS was lost in October 2001 but this coalition continues to have majority support. Changes in the support of the public to individual political parties and politicians are small in comparison with the situation before the elections of 2000. The reason lies in the fact that former ruling parties or rather present opposition have been marginalized. Accordingly, should the DSS quit DOS, the balance of power would not be changed (UNDP. 2001: 9). However, should some of the DOS parties quit Djindjic's DS, he would have extremely poor chances to remain in power. Furthermore, further disintegration of the DOS is not excluded because it is, within, in political conflicts. In that respect the most influential political parties and people set the example (Kostunica and the DSS, and Djindjic and the DS). There are deep misunderstandings between them almost on every question of policy, above all on priorities, pace, the cost and instruments of reforms. These conflicts go so far that each of the conflicting parties tries to establish control over "its own" repressive-security structure: Djindjic has established a monopoly on the police, state security service and special anti-terrorist units (SAJ), and the SAJ represents a mini army consisting of people many of which were involved in wars, and even crimes, and have strong connections with organized crime,
above all in Serbia, Republika Srpska and Montenegro. All these structures are outside efficient public control. Kostunica tries to strengthen his influence on the military, using military intelligence and counterintelligence services as a powerful means to "discipline" the army but also his political opponents. As for intelligence service attached to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs – SID, it is in all likelihood disorganized and marginalized and, therefore, of lesser interest for the conflicting parties.

Thus, the control of intelligence – security services has become an issue causing anxiety in Serbia and in the international community (International Crisis Group, 2001: 35). The reason is that the conflict over control and abuse of these services by political leaders (even Nebojsa Covic abused data from the files of the State Security Service in settling political accounts) is nearing a dangerous point. It is positive that monopolizing the military, the police and their intelligence and security services by Kostunica and Djindjic represents a risk for the future reform of Serbia, especially for adaptation of the military to new relations between Serbia and Montenegro. A situation in which the majority of officers of the Army harbour a high degree of mistrust towards the Government of Serbia and the Prime Minister Djindjic, and the Prime Minister and his associates, on their part, additionally exacerbate these relations, for instance, by threatening to stop financing the Army, grows into a serious security risk. For instance, if the Army would be denied finances that could bring about an open conflict in which chances of the Prime Minister to win would be small. That would certainly result into the total separation of Montenegro and long-standing destabilization of Serbia and, necessarily, suspension of the reforms. The monopoly of the Prime Minister on the police, and especially the SAJ, represents also a risk because it makes it impossible for the Government of Serbia, inters alia, to fight against organized crime.

All this confirms the necessity of establishing without further delay the civil control over the armed forces. This will necessitate new laws on the military and police, establishment of the rights of parliaments of Serbia and Montenegro to control activities of the military and police, including their funding. A reform of the military doctrine, structure and composition as well as disbanding of the present SAJ should be also made. Demilitarisation of the police of Montenegro and Serbia is also necessary (ICG, 7 March 2002).

4) Negative socio-political effects of the reform

Economically and socially, Serbia is today below the zero point. A permanent recession in the economy of Serbia has been lasting for already thirteen years. In addition, financing of the war took almost ten years, and the international sanctions almost seven years. Serbia has come to rank among underdeveloped countries and with regard to many indicators it belongs more to Asia and Africa than to Europe. According to the national income, per capita income, purchasing power of the population, general condition of poverty of the society as a whole,
particularly enormous unemployment rate, increased mortality rate due to hunger and the rise in the rate of diseases that accompany poverty, such as tuberculosis, Serbia is the poorest state as compared with former Yugoslav republics (Golubovic. 2000: 44).

Socio-economic structure of Serbia is marked by the total loss of the middle stratum, which is otherwise a basic cell of the civil society. This is conducive to maintenance of ethnic solidarity, which represents a hindrance to social and market relations based on private interest. In addition, a newly grown layer of "new upstarts", war profiteers and "thieves' barons" that elevated themselves on a non-economic basis in a closed, war economy, will be for long against market economy. Social misery produces spiritual misery, brain drain, keeping a high rate of semi-illiteracy and illiteracy. All this fosters anti-modern orientations where an amalgam of socialism and nationalism nurtures maintenance of collectivist authority and culture.

New government has established relations with the most important international financial institutions, and economic relations with many states; the tax system and public finances have been consolidated, many prices have been liberalized along with foreign trade; the currency (dinar) has been stabilized, etc. However, conditions for safe investments have not been created. The foreign trade deficit is rising. While the exports rise at the rate of 4%, the imports are increasing at the rate of 20%. Exports mainly consist of consumer goods; the principal import items are connected with energy. In June 2001, the Law on Privatisation was passed and around 20 big companies have been privatised so far, a half having been sold to foreign buyers (UNDP. 2001: 12). However, the first negative socio-political effects of reforms are already visible: fall in the standards of living, price rise, mass layoffs of workers, etc. The stable currency resulted into increase in almost all prices, and the highest rise in prices has been for energy, postal services, tobacco and even food. Real earnings rise at the rate of around 10% per month but they do not keep pace with the increase in prices. It is no wonder then that more than 80% of citizens are not satisfied with the standards of living. The number of protests and strikes has already reached the level of the ones before 5 October 2000 (UNDP, 2001, 12 – 14).

Public opinion polls confirm a widespread economic frustration of the public, conducive to destabilization of the democratic process. These frustrations spread rapidly to politics, culture, morality and other spheres of life. This contributed considerably to the change in political disposition of citizens of Serbia. While a huge majority of the population of Serbia confirmed its dissatisfaction with the previous administration in October 2000 and in subsequent elections, the attitude towards new government developed from satisfaction in 2000 and 2001 to frustration in 2002. On the basis of this, one can also say with certainty: Serbia is entering a phase of political instability of new government and most probably frequent reshuffles of the governments, falls of the governments and elections.
One of the facts that should be taken into account is that there is something that could be called the habit of people in Serbia to spend more than they have and than they can earn. At the same time, there is also a habit of viewing social problems as exclusively political ones, i.e. to go out in the streets (strikes, demonstrations, road blocks, etc.). With such habits and extremely difficult economic and social situation, where the majority is below the poverty line, the risk of a vast social revolt is constantly present.

Experience teaches us that a political consensus of the most influential political factors of the society is necessary for a successful implementation of reforms. However, there is not a sufficient degree of political agreement in the ruling structure that would enable efficiency of the reforms and security of government necessary for negotiations with owners and workers. The Government of the Prime Minister Djindjic makes significant reform moves in the field of privatisation, the monetary and fiscal authority, and banking. However, reform measures that have been taken so far do not take into consideration at all social costs and risks of social rebellion.

On its part, the bloc around President Kostunica requests constitutional and legislative reforms for the sake of reduction in political and social risks, providing good arguments therefore, but it does it in a way that obstructs the reforms. In fact, this bloc has isolated itself from participation in the government of Serbia, in the Parliament of Serbia it advances proposals that are contradictory to the ones of the government, and behaves in the public as the opposition critic of the government. Since 17 August 2001 when DSS left the government of Serbia, tensions have been exacerbated between Kostunica's and Djindjic's parties so that one may say that the DOS does not exist since then. Such behaviour actually blocks the government, which even now does not have a clear strategy of reforms.

Prospects for establishment of a social dialogue are small because the trade union movement is weak and divided and the government does not show any intention to do it or understanding of the substance of the institute of social agreement.

Prospects of having large-scale social and political upheavals in 2002 are big and, therefore, the following options should be considered:

- The first one, more likely, is that Serbia will enter the phase of political crises that would lead in the second half of 2002 to new elections in which no individual political party, and even possible coalitions, will have the majority that DOS had. That means that Serbia will continue to be governed by unstable and short-term coalitions. Accordingly, Serbia will have to undergo a series of unstable and weak governments;
- Another possibility is not very likely but deserves to be considered. It is an attempt at having a mini repetition of the Moscow August putsch. Open
entrance of the Army into the political arena does represent a deadly danger for democratic transition of Serbia and for reforms (International Crisis Group. 28 March 2002). Effects of such an act would neither result into recomposition of the existing political stage nor creation of a new coalition, which would be more successful than the present government. It is, however, positive that this would only additionally deepen the gap between the military and politicians, and would intensify mistrust of citizens in both of them.

- The third one is a revolt of citizens that might take place as early as in May. There is little probability, however, that this is the way of solving the crisis because weak trade unions and individual parties that have opposing interests will join the revolt and will scatter the people’s energy to different parts.

There is a pronounced need in Serbia for a moderate party or a broad reformist coalition of parties that will respond to nationalist requests in a democratic way, encouraging decentralization and particularly strengthening of local self-government, autonomy and regionalism, accompanied with opening up of socio-economic questions in a politically persuasive manner. This could be achieved in the existing circumstances if, along with the DOS parties which would in the next elections, most probably in autumn, win elections, a new coalition composed of influential civil movements (Otpor, Г 17 plus, numerous NGOs) that are now excluded from direct exercise or control of authority, would get involved in government. This would enable calming down of political ground temporarily and the onset of more favourable conditions and time for long-term solutions. Undoubtedly, this option implies an active role of the EU and U.S.A. supporting such a pro-reformist association. One of the reasons in favour of this option is that some of the leading DOS members, faced with considerable resistance to economic and social reforms on the part of citizens frustrated by many years of sufferings, turn back to nationalism. That is why, as recommended by the ICG, the international community would have to direct policies and support through forces that are striving towards integration and discourage thereby nationalism (International Crisis Group, 2001, 35).

IX IS DEMOCRACY A WAY OUT?

The territories of former Yugoslavia and the USSR have been divided under the pressure of many ethno nationalistic and territorial requests and conflicts accompanied with mass forced movements of populations. We learn from the war tragedy in the territories of former Yugoslavia and the USSR the following:

- First, exacerbation of ethnic relations problems, and especially the status of minorities, are consequences of accepting ethnonationalism as a ruling ideology and practice; and
- Second, the problem of minorities stems from a conflict between ethno nationalistic ideal of ethnic homogeneousness of the national state and the
reality of ethnic heterogeneity. In fact, a mixture of ethnic communities makes the “one state, one nation” formula inapplicable and brings to the fore the political and ethnic differences.

Newly created states, excluding Slovenia and the Baltic states, are at the very beginning of establishment of a new, democratic institutional system. The system that is about is the one that would suit the present situation and needs and that could help in peaceful and democratic management of conflicting interests. Those are "incomplete" states and, accordingly, inefficient in the control of fundamental social processes in their territories. These states will not be able, for a longer term, to ensure internal integration of the nation or its joining broader integration connections. This confirms impotence of ethno nationalism to accomplish basic interests of the nation.

One of the extremely important principles which has not been mastered yet in newly created national states in the territories, albeit verified in other multiethnic societies, runs as follows: The world of small states is the world of decentralization and democracy! That principle implies development of different forms of autonomy and regionalism, the ethnic pluralism being in this process an independent and democracy dependent variable. Therefore, one of the first questions is the one of the internal organization of these states. A new, democratic minority policy is also necessary. Additional guarantee for the process of building a new minority policy is control of the public. This process also implies acceptance of the following principles:

- First, collective rights of ethnic minorities have to be recognized to them, above all in the fields of education, culture, information and the official use of language;
- Second, political identity expressed by the will of the minority electorate in elections for assemblies at all levels of authority should be recognized to minorities;
- Third, forming of various degrees and kinds of autonomy. It is possible to have within the framework of the one and the same territorial autonomy other forms of parallel autonomy, especially cultural, regional or so-called special statuses. Of course, the most diverse forms of personal and functional autonomies only add to measures of democratisation and prevention of ethnic conflicts and territorial secession. Namely, autonomy is a limited sovereignty and a fair compromise between two legitimate and in the international law recognized postulates: the right to self-determination and respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The autonomy demonstrates also the confidence of a state in ethnic minorities that are allowed, in individual spheres of importance for national identity, to govern by them and to undertake before the state political, legal and material responsibility for their activity.
These are the principles on which a democratic import of newly established state and national identities might be built up and which might be applied in the resolution of ethnic conflicts:

- Respect for identity and finding out a balance between human liberties and rights of an individual and rights of ethnic minorities as well as elimination of the existing ethnically conditioned rights and freedoms (e.g. citizenship);
- Division of power between the majority and minority, starting from the application of the principle of decentralization to the establishment of various forms of coalitions that would enable ethnic communities to manage their own affairs in different forms of the autonomy and regionalism;
- Modernization of the ethnicity, i.e. building of ethnic loyalty according to criteria of a democratic society and subject to moral and social standards conformed to the new millennium.

Already since the beginning of 2001, basic trends that the life of the Balkans will follow in the years to come can be discerned.

The collapse of Milosevic’s war machinery and establishment of democratic rules of authorities in Belgrade and Zagreb facilitated the process of stabilisation and democratisation of former Yugoslavia, excluding Slovenia. On its way to Europe, Slovenia made such a progress so that it can only say to its former co-citizens: See you in Europe!

The area for new-armed conflicts has been narrowed but not so for political and social conflicts and instability in the Western Balkans. Within that context, there are still outstanding questions of the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, of Kosovo and relations between Serbia and Montenegro, which still represent focal points of potential conflicting situations. The fact that in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is an increasing trend of strengthening joint government and economic functions, and that the November elections are an important step towards constitution of democratic institutions of self-government in Kosovo testify that the room has been really narrowed for all those movements and groups that would like to keep others submissive by violence. Kosovo is irreversibly on its way of democratic development and inter-ethnic cooperation. The question of the final state status will have here, as in the case of Republika Srpska, at least temporarily, to give way to the questions of security and development. As Serbia and Montenegro are obliged to search for peaceful solution to their future relations, and even divorce is not excluded, the same applies to the future status of Kosovo. It turned out here, as in numerous cases all over the world, that the process of acquiring independence and democratisation is a long one, often painstaking, but inevitable in modern society. Pains of learning and beginner’s mistakes can be certainly reduced if the road of cooperation is chosen with fellow townsman (for instance in Kosovo, cooperation
of Albanians, Serbs and other communities), with neighbours (the example of Kosovo, cooperation with Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia, and the example of another former war battlefield – Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro) and, surely, with the international community, above all with its representatives in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If this cooperation is viewed as a road to European and Euro-Atlantic integrations, then it seems that a mid-step might precede it.

Despite conflicts between the Majority and minorities in the field of government policy and the prevailing idea about Others, increasing phobia and negative stereotypes, in these countries and the whole region do exist numerous ties (Suny, 1991: 125). This makes mutual linking and cooperation possible, and such an outlook might reduce ethnic conflicts and direct the people from this area towards "post-national identity". In that way, a boost is given to orientation towards integration within ethnic communities, strengthening of the concept of citizenship but also "softening" of relations between individuals and ethnic communities (Gasparini and Bergnach, 1995: 211 – 212). Pragmatic reasons also favour regional cooperation. In fact, small states are forced to have good relations with their neighbours. It is in their interest to establish political unions, economic blocs and cultural exchange arrangements, and to solve within the security system the question of their own safety.

The international community, above all the EU and the U.S.A., test in the Balkans fundamental values of democracy, human rights, market economy, integration and globalisation and, of course, security within the framework of cooperation with NATO.

There is the rule: United, they are stronger! The time by 2005 is sufficient to make significant steps along the lines of strengthening cooperation in the above-described areas of former battlefields. Customs union, free passport zone and even, for example, uniform car registration look like easily attainable goals because they are in the interest of every individual actor. Accordingly, the Western Balkan BeNeLux (Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro) is something that steps up their development and takes them, on a shortened trip, in the period between 20215 and 2020, into the European Union. Neither neither political nor state unions are at issue. That is neither possible any more nor anybody wants! We are speaking about a single area with undisturbed communication, movement of people, goods and ideas.

The Albanian – Serbian reconciliation is a backbone, a historical changeover in the Balkans. It can produce broader framework for an inter-Balkan cooperation incorporating directly Albania and Macedonia. Agreeing with the view of Pascal Milo that all Albanians will be together in Great Europe, I would only add: We will have before that to establish connections in the Balkans!

Whether Kosovo will be an independent state or a part of a regional set-up is a
matter to be decided on only when peace, stability and basic development trends have been established. The proper way is a peaceful agreement. However, as we learn from history, this is not the way taken by those whose basic arguments are violence and arms. It turns out, therefore, that two basic priorities are the following: at the national level, to procure democratic political elites by strengthening democratic procedures and institutions and, second, at the regional level, to use the existing ad hoc associations of intellectuals, politicians and, of course, business people to go further and establish cores such as the Rome Circle was for the European Union. Simply, to have organized cooperation of people who are aware of their individual and national identities and are, simultaneously, open for cooperation.

A high risk of the international presence and especially involvement of the EU in the Western Balkans issues requires consideration of the role of the EU in Serbia.

Post-Milosevic Serbia still represents an obstacle to regional stability in key areas, and in many cases it openly confronts the policy of the international community, especially of the EU, UN, OSCE and NATO. Regional instability is affected by the following at the most:

- Weakness of government, i.e. of institutions and political leadership;
- Non-existence of the civil control over the military and police that are not reformed and are under the control of Milosevic's followers;
- Lack of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia in The Hague (ICTY);
- Undermining of the international community policy and the Dayton Peace Accord in the neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Violation of some important aspects of the UNSCR 1244, above all by blocking an active part of local Serbian leaders, financing and running illegal parallel security forces and administrative structures in Kosovo (ICG. 7 March 2002).

Opening up of Serbia towards the world, especially towards the most influential countries, European integration structures and neighbouring countries is at the very beginning. In actual fact, a sort of new realism has been demonstrated by the public opinion to the effect that the international community will help to overcome delay in the process of democratisation. Thus, 80% citizens of Serbia support efforts to join the EU, 47% citizens are against joining NATO, while 31% supports the idea of close cooperation (UNDP, 2001, 9, 28).

In an effort to integrate into the European and international economic and political processes, post-Milosevic Serbia should set a number of political targets for 2002. The most important among them are the following:

- Membership of the NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP);
- Membership of the Council of Europe;
- Signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU.

In exchange for membership of the Council of Europe, the PFP and SAA, the international community can expect from Serbia to harmonize its policies with objectives of the policy of the international community in the Balkans. It can also make the PFP, membership of the Council of Europe and the SAA conditional upon removal of obstacles to regional stability (ICG. 7 March 2002).

In fact, the "West" faces the dilemma of balancing the stick and carrot in the case of Belgrade. In order to have pressure without undermining the democratic legitimacy of the friendly regime and risking a more nationalistic turn, it is necessary to choose carefully issues in respect of which it will be applied. The best framework for this pressure is the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. There are at least three arguments in favour of such a choice:

- First, already undertaken obligations on the part of governments of Serbia and Montenegro, and also the EU, to cooperate in building new relations between Serbia and Montenegro;
- Second, need to prevent further aggravation of the situation in Kosovo that would be caused by further destabilisation of Serbia;
- Third, interest in helping reforms in Serbia and prevention, by using preventive methods, of present risks from escalating into political, social and even ethnic conflicts (for instance, in the south of Serbia and Sandzak) and further on into a disintegration process that would land the central Serbia and Vojvodina into a situation where they would be a factor of instability and of checking integrations in the Region.

In case of the worst scenario of deepening of conflicts, the EU and U.S.A. could be faced with the necessity of establishing a sort of protectorate over Central Serbia and Vojvodina. This is a more risky and more costly option for the EU than a preventive reaction. This applies directly to the feasibility studies and the task force for the SAA with Serbia.

The following areas deserve special attention:

- First, in the field of regional economic cooperation, the priority is to eliminate barriers, obstacles to economic changes that are on the increase. In this case, inadequate regional structure (roads, railroads, the Danube) is at issue. International community should support building of this infrastructure. Likewise, investment priorities should encourage Serbia and the Region through promotion of conditions for small business, encouragement of bilateral and regional trade contracts, relaxation of the visa system and expansion of opportunities for establishment of economic ties. Special attention should be paid to economic environment in small communities. In the field of agriculture and rural development, Serbia has
potentials for being a "bread basket" for South-eastern Europe; this particularly applies to Vojvodina and Presevo Valley (Reconnecting. 2002: 5);
- Second, establishment of a social dialogue between the government and trade unions, employers and workers;
- Third, assistance in the reform and modernization of the military, police, administration; assistance in active involvement of the authorities of Serbia in the negotiating processes and implementation of the agreement on new relations with Montenegro, in building up temporary democratic self-government institutions of Kosovo, especially in accomplishing an active and efficient cooperation with the UNMIK;
- Fourth, promotion of Serbia as an active factor of regional cooperation.

Indeed, both in Serbia and the Region there is agreement on the necessity of integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, primarily in the EU. This implies that regional stability is a condition for Euro-Atlantic integrations as well as acceptance of regionalism both by the EU and the countries of the Region.

Long-term cooperation should be established between the international community, governments, the private sector and NGOs. Domestic institutions that should see to the transition and regional cooperation have to be developed and qualified for the job. In fact, the international community should encourage Serbia and the Region to take a regional approach to problems solving. To that end, the EU could work out together with Serbia a list of priorities where objectives of Serbia and the international community or rather the EU would converge (Reconnecting. 2002: 4).

It is also necessary to establish cooperation with other international institutions, funds, governments, and financial institutions in order to encourage regional projects and cross-border cooperation. The regional approach should be developed through sub regional cooperation. For that reason, the existing Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative should accord priority to sub regional investments, promoting cooperation among, for instance, Serbia – Montenegro – Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. The second sub region would be Serbia – Montenegro – Kosovo – Macedonia – Albania. This could lead to a passport-free zone, the customs union, and the free trade zone and, for a medium term, to a uniform economic and market union (Reconnecting. 2002: 13)
Appendices

**Table: MINORITIES IN NATIONS-STATES OF EASTERN EUROPE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proportion of minorities in %</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 10%</td>
<td>Albania, Armenia, Poland, Slovenia, the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Czech Republic, Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 – 20%</td>
<td>Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania, Russia, Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 – 30%</td>
<td>Georgia, Macedonia, Turkestan, Ukraine,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uzbekistan, Byelorussia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 – 40%</td>
<td>Estonia, Moldavia, Tajikistan, FR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 – 50%</td>
<td>Kyrgyz Stan, Latvia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kazakhstan were not included in the table as none of the nations living there reaches the half of the population.

**Table: MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS IN NEW EUROPEAN STATES 1989-1991.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/ethnic group</th>
<th>Number (in '000)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia/ Russians</td>
<td>147,022</td>
<td>81.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>119,866</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine/ Ukrainians</td>
<td>51,452</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37,419</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11,356</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussia/ Russians</td>
<td>10,152</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,905</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia/ Russians</td>
<td>1,566</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>963</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>475</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia/ Latvians</td>
<td>2,677</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,388</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>906</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Number (1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania/Lithuanians</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td></td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavia/Moldavians</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td></td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td></td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic/Czechs</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td></td>
<td>567</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia/Slovenes</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovene</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia/Croatia</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td></td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina/Muslims</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croat</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td></td>
<td>756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia/Macedonian</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td></td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRY/Serbia (Serbia/Montenegro)</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrin</td>
<td></td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRY/Serbia (without Vojvodina and Kosovo)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>Hungarians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>341</td>
<td>1,955</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table: CRISIS YEARS IN THE CSSR, USSR and SFYR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>The year of establishment</th>
<th>The year of serious crisis</th>
<th>The year of recovery</th>
<th>The year of disintegration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSR</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1939; 1968</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1941; 1971 and 1991</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Schopflin, 1995:4)

**Annex: MINORITY PROTECTION SINCE 1989**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constitutions and constitutional laws</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>The Law on major constitutional liberties, 29 April 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 22 September 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constitutional law on human rights and freedoms and the rights of ethnic and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>national communities or minorities in the Republic of Croatia, 4 December 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Czechoslovak constitutional law on approval of the constitutional act of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>law on fundamental rights and freedoms, 9 January 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Provisional constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, 11 March 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Document Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Constitution of Romania, 8 December 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia:</td>
<td>Constitution of the FRY, 27 April 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 28 September 1990; Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, 29 June 1991 (As the assembly of the AP of Kosovo and Metohija was not constituted (the previous one was dissolved under the Law on the termination of the assembly of the SAP of Kosovo, passed by the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia on 5 July 1990) it could not have passed the statute. Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro, 12 October 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro, 12 October 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, 23 December 1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Parliamentary enactments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Decree of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia on the establishment of the Consultative Council of Nationalities, 8 January 1991; Declaration on condemnation and non-permissibility of genocide and anti-Semitism in Latvia, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia, 19 September 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Decree on the use of the state language of the SSR of Lithuania, 25 January 1989</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Charter on Serbs and other nationalities living in the Republic of Croatia, 25 June 1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Declaration on human and civil rights and freedoms, 22 November 1991</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Declaration on the rights of Ukrainian nationalities, 1 November 1991</td>
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<td><strong>Laws on minorities</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Law on development of national and ethnic groups of Latvia and their right to cultural autonomy, 19 March 1991</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Law on national minorities, 26 November 1989</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Law on self-government of ethnic communities, 5 October 1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Law on free development of citizens of the USSR living outside their national borders or having no their territory within the USSR, 25 April 1990</td>
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<td>FRY</td>
<td>Law on national minorities, February 2002</td>
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<td>Byelorussia</td>
<td>Law on legal equality of languages spoken in the territory of the SSR Byelorussia, 26 January 1991</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
<td>The language law, 18 January 1989</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Law on languages used in the territory of the SSR Kazakhstan, 29 September 1989</td>
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<td>Kyrgyzia</td>
<td>Law on state language in the SSR Kyrgyzia, 23 September 1989</td>
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<td>Latvia</td>
<td>The language law, 7 May 1989</td>
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<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>Law on conditions to use a language in the territory of the SSR Moldavia, 1 September 1989</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
<td>Law on languages of the peoples in the SSR Russia, 25 October 1989</td>
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<td>Law on the official language of the Slovak Republic, 25 October 1990</td>
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<td>Serbia</td>
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<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>Law on the official use of the language and alphabet, 24 July 1991</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Law on national symbols, 2001</td>
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<td>Tadzhikstan</td>
<td>The language law, 24 May 1990</td>
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<td>Turk Stan</td>
<td>The language law, 24 May 1990</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Law on languages used in the territory of the SSR of Ukraine, 29 October 1989; Declaration on the right of nationality of Ukraine, adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, 1 November 1991</td>
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<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Law on the state language of the SSR of Uzbekistan, 21 October 1989</td>
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Table: ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF THE FRY AND SERBIA

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<th></th>
<th>Serbia</th>
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<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>6,428,420</td>
<td>57,176</td>
<td>6,485,596</td>
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<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>40,024</td>
<td>380,484</td>
<td>520,508</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>1,686,661</td>
<td>40,880</td>
<td>1,727,541</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>345,376</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>345,376</td>
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<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>317,739</td>
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<td>237,358</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>137,265</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>327,290</td>
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<td>Croats</td>
<td>109,214</td>
<td>6,249</td>
<td>115,463</td>
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<td>Slovaks</td>
<td>67,234</td>
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<td>67,234</td>
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<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>47,577</td>
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<td>Romanians</td>
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<td>42,386</td>
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<td>Bulgarians</td>
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<td>25,214</td>
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<td>Russians</td>
<td>18,339</td>
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<td>Vlachs</td>
<td>17,557</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
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<td>/</td>
<td>11,501</td>
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<td>Slovenes</td>
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<td>407</td>
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<td>Regional belonging</td>
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<td>Others</td>
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<tr>
<th>Phases and Levels</th>
<th>Time Periods</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 1</td>
<td>1918-1941/45</td>
<td>Mutual violence and domination</td>
</tr>
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<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>1945-1966</td>
<td>Armed violence and administrative limitation of Albanian's Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 3</td>
<td>1968-1981</td>
<td>Strengthening of Kosovo autonomy and national affirmation of Albanian community</td>
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<td>Phase 4</td>
<td>1981-1999</td>
<td>Conflicts with regard to Kosovo status</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Level</td>
<td>1981-1985</td>
<td>Strengthening of Albanian national movement</td>
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<td>2nd Level</td>
<td>1986-1989</td>
<td>Political disputes on the status of Kosovo and Albanian community</td>
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<td>3rd Level</td>
<td>1989-1997</td>
<td>Suspension of autonomy and establishing of parallel Serbian and ethnic Albanian communities</td>
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<td>4th Level</td>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>Armed conflict (war)</td>
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<td>Phase 5</td>
<td>1999-</td>
<td>Deployment of the International civilian (UNIMIK) and military (KFOR) missions</td>
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### Table 3: ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF KOSOVO, 1948-1991

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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>727,820</td>
<td>808,141</td>
<td>963,988</td>
<td>1,243,693</td>
<td>1,584,446</td>
<td>1,956,196</td>
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<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>28,050</td>
<td>31,343</td>
<td>37,558</td>
<td>31,555</td>
<td>27,028</td>
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<td>Serbs</td>
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<td>189,869</td>
<td>227,016</td>
<td>228,264</td>
<td>209,497</td>
<td>194,190</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>498,242</td>
<td>524,559</td>
<td>646,605</td>
<td>916,168</td>
<td>1,226,736</td>
<td>1,596,072</td>
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<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>11,230</td>
<td>11,904</td>
<td>3,202</td>
<td>14,593</td>
<td>34,126</td>
<td>45,745</td>
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<td>Turks</td>
<td>1,315</td>
<td>34,583</td>
<td>25,764</td>
<td>12,244</td>
<td>12,513</td>
<td>10,446</td>
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<td>Yugoslavs</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>5,206</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>2,676</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7,393</td>
<td>9,434</td>
<td>10,098</td>
<td>11,997</td>
<td>11,929</td>
<td>17,332</td>
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### Table 4: ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION IN KOSOVO IN %, 1948-1991

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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
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<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<td>Muslims</td>
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<td>3.4</td>
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<td>Serbs</td>
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<td>23.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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Source: Final results of the 1991 census – official estimate.  
NOTE: Data are given for nationalities accounting for more than 0.5 percent of the total population at least (except Yugoslavs).
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