The Nation’s Brightest and Noblest

Narrative Identity and Empowering Accounts of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia in Post-1991 L’viv

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At the Faculty of Arts and Science at Linköping University, research and doctoral studies are carried out within broad problem areas. Research is organized in interdisciplinary research environments and doctoral studies mainly in graduate schools. Jointly, they publish the series Linköping Studies in Arts and Science. This thesis comes from the Department of Social and Welfare Studies.

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This study, like any other piece of scholarly work, is a product of both aspiration and perspiration and of a personal desire to prove that “I can also do it”. It is the result of my eagerness to illuminate at least a little part of an exciting urban semiosphere in which I have been fortunate to spend a great deal of time. This dynamic environment stimulates considerable reflection due to its complexity, vitality and many contrasts. This study has been enriched greatly by the numerous personal encounters I had with fascinating people who, at various points and in various ways, significantly influenced my ideas and the trajectory of my research.

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Note on Transliteration and Translation

In my study, I use the Library of Congress system of transliteration from Ukrainian when rendering quotations spoken in Ukrainian and general terms, except when another spelling has become accepted usage in English (e.g., Chernobyl rather than Chornobyl’, glasnost rather than hlasnist’, Yushchenko instead of Iushchenko, Yulia Tymoshenko instead of Iulia Tymoshenko). When the Ukrainian names or terms appear in English language quoted sources, I strictly keep to the transliteration used by the authors. Place names in Ukraine have been transliterated from Ukrainian (e.g., L’viv rather than Lvov, Kyiv rather that Kiev, Odesa rather than Odessa, Dnipro instead of Dnieper, Donetsk’k instead of Donetsk). When quotations, citations or specific designations are given from Russian, and not from Ukrainian, I have indicated this and used the Library of Congress system of transliteration. All translations of interview excerpts and other Ukrainian-language sources are my own, except where otherwise noted.
Introduction

In the most general terms, this study examines the correlation between intelligentsia’s presentations and claims to power in a concrete ‘post-Soviet’ locality. The place is L’viv, which throughout the years has been a medieval Rus’ town, a city belonging to the Polish crown, a capital of the Austro-Hungarian province of Galicia, an important urban centre in the Second Polish Republic, a part of the Ukrainian SSR, and is now an integral part of independent Ukraine.

“Of all the social strata, the intelligentsia is the most difficult to define” (Gella 1976: 10). One can still agree with this statement made more than thirty years ago. Interest in this multifaceted socio-cultural phenomenon has been particularly high after the break of the socialist block and the disintegration of the USSR. As a social actor whose quest for power is based on claims of expertise in the realm of culture, intelligentsia seemed to be predestined to play a crucial role in the so-called transformation processes in this part of the world, in formulation of new ideational trends, as well as in current political disputes. The nation-building processes in the former Soviet republics, which previously were stateless or existed briefly as independent political entities, further fuelled debates around intelligentsia. It has been suggested that social trajectories and ideological choices of intelligentsia and intellectuals may predetermine shapes and contents of national projects (Smith 1981, Greenfeld 1992, Brown 2000). Hence, it is important to learn more about East European intelligentsia’s identifications and social roles in post-1991 social and political circumstances.

It has been concluded that “In Eastern Europe, intellectuals have played a prominent role in bringing communism down” (King and Szelenyi 2004: ix) and that “The most prominent actor in the 1989 transformation of Eastern Europe has been the intelligentsia” (Kennedy 1992: 29). Indeed, criticism from intelligentsia and intellectuals contributed greatly to undermining the Communist regimes’ legitimacy. Nevertheless, intelligentsia was not among those who benefited from the dismantling of the old socio-political system in the first turn. In fact, in the opinion of many, the intelligentsia did not benefit at all. With the Soviet ideological modernity project denounced and the Soviet welfare system dissolved, a great part of intelligentsia and intellectuals found themselves in a difficult situation. Furthermore, the wide-scale post-Soviet transformations were accompanied by pervasive millenarian moods: the proclaimed ‘end of Communism’, dismantling of the USSR, drastic changes in living standards and social hierarchies resonated with the visions of the erupted societal order, declining morality and broken inter-generational transmission. In tandem with this, intelligentsia with its ‘outdated’ worldview and privileged positions in the old social order, was proclaimed disempowered and even ‘dead again’ (Gessen 1997). At the same time, the issues and rhetoric typical of intelligentsia as well as concern with morality and culture have not at all lost their impact after 1991. Also, there are many individuals who identify themselves with intelligentsia, who make themselves heard and influence popular opinion in this capacity. Hence, it is probably too early to conclude that the intelligentsia’s
tradition was extinguished by the change in political order and to discard patterns of cultural transmission between different generations of the highly educated urbanites.

Controversy and dilemmas related to intelligentsia are many; likewise, there are many ways of approaching this phenomenon. Some scholars (for example, Sokolov 2006, Shlapentokh 1990, Kasianov 1995) have tried to figure out the combination of features ‘typical’ of the intelligentsia and thereby orient their research according to a certain ideological narrative. Others have made use of richly textured narratives of the informants who defined themselves or could be intuitively categorized by the researcher as intelligentsia, while avoiding detailed theoretical discussion about this notion (see, for example, Ries 1997, Wolanik Boström 2005). Yet others prefer to skip over clear definitions of intelligentsia, and instead employ it as an instrumental notion (Balzer 1996; xiii). As Bauman shrewdly points out, intellectuals and intelligentsia never have been and never can be “definitionally self-sufficient”, and “no current definition which proposes to focus on the features of the category itself in order to explain its position and role within a larger society, can break through the level of legitimations to the social configuration they legitimate” (Bauman 1987: 18). Hence, when trying to define intelligentsia as a set of attributes and features, the scholar easily confuses power rhetoric with sociological analysis (ibid: 18-19). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the intelligentsia should be proclaimed a pseudo-object and abandoned as a topic of scholarly research altogether.

This study is not intended to reveal who or what the post-Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia ‘really’ is or what its main ‘problems’ are. Instead, it focuses on the narrated presentations which endorse a particular ‘voice’ of the Ukrainian-speaking L’viv intelligentsia that conveys claims for cultural authority and moral superiority. Intelligentsia is a notion widely employed in the public polemics concerning nation-building projects in the post-1991 Ukraine. Simultaneously, it is still an important reference point for personal social and cultural affiliations. In L’viv this notion has been elaborated under historical conditions of different political regimes, the multiethnic urban environment and nearly century-old strivings of the nationally conscious intelligentsia of the ‘Ukrainian Piedmont’ to define the ‘National Idea’ for the entire Ukraine. These particular historical and structural factors have conditioned the multilayered and contradictory understanding of the socio-cultural phenomenon behind such related notions as intelligentsia, *intelhent*, *intelhentlyi* and

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1 In Ukrainian, as in several other Slavic languages, there are particular words for individual representative(s) of intelligentsia: substantives *intelhent* (singular form) and *intelhenty* (plural form). There also exists the word *intelhentist* which is a noun addressing the totality of intelligentsia features and characteristics. Because the English word ‘intelligent’ is an adjective, which means something other than belongingness to ‘intelligentsia’, I have chosen to circumvent this terminological problem by putting the indigenous terms in the Ukrainian spelling (with one ‘l’) in italics. In addition, aiming not to complicate, but to contextualize and specify the terms, I use the adverb *intelhentno* and adjective *intelhentyi* (in its different grammatical forms: *intelhenta*, *intelhentni*) when the informants use it. This adjective has often been translated as ‘cultured’ in English texts, but *kul’turnyi* and *intelhentyi* in the Ukrainian language (as well as in Russian) are not synonyms. In order to maintain the connotation of the specific cultural, social and discursive phenomenon evident in this word, I prefer to use the adverb *intelhentno* and the adjective *intelhentyi* non-translated.
intelligentsia'. Under post-1991 conditions of L'viv, these understandings and opinions incorporated in intelligentsia's narrative identities have been further translated to empowering narratives focusing, in particular, on 'place-making' and on symbolic presentation of political cleavages in Ukraine.

In this study I have dealt with narratives on different levels, as I have addressed them both as empirical material and analytical tools. Besides, my ambition was also to present the study in the form of a story revealing some patterns of meaning. I found that Alexander’s (2004) conceptualization of social performance provided me with apt scaffolding for the ‘story’ about intelligentsia. In my view, Alexander’s model is an inspiring example of how such determinants as ‘culture’ and ‘structure’, meaningful patterns and social power may find their place in an overarching account of complicated social phenomena. Insofar as intelligentsia’s narrative identity is not only a collection of stories, but also a set of guidelines for individual and collective action, it may be considered inseparable from the intelligentsia’s ‘social performance’. Following Alexander’s model, I have chosen to concentrate on several components, which, given that intelligentsia may be viewed as a social actor, predetermine its ‘social performance’. Hence, after the theoretical chapters (1-4) which outline the conceptual constitution of the study and describe the historical and cultural conditions of the (Western) Ukrainian intelligentsia, I proceed with chapters (5 and 6) which focus on analysis of the empirical material and describe the ‘protagonist’ (intelligentsia) and its discursive ‘antagonists’ (‘folk’ and ‘elites’). Chapter 7 addresses the issue of ‘mise-en-scènes’ (arenas, spaces and structural locations) where intelligentsia’s social performance has taken place. Finally, chapters 8 and 9 provide discussion about intelligentsia’s ‘scripts’ and background representations, which find their expression in the place-making narratives.
Chapter 1. Orientation, Profile and Methodological Premises of the Study

1.1. What the research is about: aim, research questions and actuality of the study

This work is a case study focused on narrative identity of the Ukrainian (Ukrainian-speaking) intelligentsia in a particular socio-historical location. I view this study as a multidisciplinary one whose methodological procedures and theoretical inspiration mainly come from the disciplines of cultural sociology and ethnology. My research was guided by the assumption that when dealing with intellectuals and intelligentsia the scholar should not only consider “those mythical actors who are conscious and autonomous imposers of values”, but also “real historical beings who are formed by social, political, historical, and cultural forces …and then attempt to reshape those worlds sometimes by virtue of their direct political activity…, or by the intellectual products they leave behind” (Kennedy and Suny 1999: 392). The other important issue was the generational shifts, gaps and continuities explicates in the discourses and practices of the intelligentsia in L’viv. Hence, the study deals with certain concrete, pronounced and reflexive expressions existing in both discursive form and in the form of representational practices. My aim was to account for why these expressions are reproduced (or why they fail to be reproduced) with the passage of time among the named social actors.

Already in the earlier stages of the research I assumed that it was worthwhile to look closer at, on the one hand, how intelligentsia is envisaged and ‘emplotted’ (Borneman 1992, Somers 1992: 603) in L’viv and, on the other hand, what empowering narratives it articulates. It is an urgent issue in view of several factors. Firstly, representation and discourse are constitutive features of construction of political (including national) communities (Bhabha 1990, Bell 2003). In order to comprehend complexity, contradictions and occasionally the paradoxes of molding national identity in present-day Ukraine, one should look more closely at the key actors who provide narratives through which symbolically mediated communities are formed and dissolved. The intelligentsia’s voices are decisive in discussions about national identity which gained momentum in post-1991 Ukrainian society. Therefore, the empirical studies on how intelligentsia articulates the nation and how the nation in turn articulates intelligentsia are in particular demand (Kennedy and Suny: 1999). Another factor is the specificity of Eastern Galicia3 as a site at the crossroads of political, economic,

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2 Power and empowerment are correlating, although not synonymous terms. According to Wrong (1995: 2), “Power is the capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others”. Meanwhile, “The verb ‘to empower’ and the noun ‘empowerment’…refer to the acquisition rather than to the exercise of power. What is to be acquired is ‘power to’ rather than ‘power over’ others; indeed, the terms are typically used with reference to groups perceived as victims or at least passive objects of the power exercised over them by others. ‘Empowerment’ sometimes appears to refer to mobilization of previously isolated individual actors so that they achieve collective power through solidarity and organization…” (ibid: x).

3 The name of this region in Ukrainian is Halychyna. In Latin-German transliteration it became Galicia.
ethnocultural and religious divisions. This “least Sovietized, least Russified” (Ignatieff 1993: 125) region known as a stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism is presently a ‘transitional’ space on the EU’s eastern border where due to the conditions of widening international cooperation and transnational migration narratives of national identity and local allegiances proliferate as never before. Finally, until now the West Ukrainian intelligentsia has been regarded as the main producer and exporter of the, reportedly, quite assertive and ‘mobilizing’ variant of ethnic Ukrainian nationalism to the rest of Ukraine. However, while being an inspirer of Ukrainian national projects, it had far too little political influence for becoming also their main implementer. Nonetheless, the events of the Orange Revolution have demonstrated that the nationally aware West Ukrainian intelligentsia succeeded to project symbolic authority and to form the popular opinion under the slogans of democratization, morality and Ukrainian national pride. One may thus suggest that complex processes of identity work and paradigmatic shifts in local narrative identity of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia both preceded the events of the Orange Revolution and continued in the resulting environment.

When conceptualizing the stories about intelligentsia—and in this or that way actualizing the issues of intelligentsia’s socio-cultural positions, roles, practices and concerns—in terms of ‘narrative identity’4 I have made an essential strategic choice. This study places the analytical focus on the issues of discursive empowerment and cultural authority of intelligentsia, and the concept of narrative identity is precisely the notion which expounds the important link between narrativity, processes of identity formation and power. When making this assumption I followed Somers who argues that “Locating ourselves in narratives endows us with identities—however multiple, ambiguous, ephemeral or conflicting they may be (hence the term narrative identity…). People act… in part according to how they understand their place in any number of given narratives—however fragmented, contradictory and partial” (Somers 1992: 603). She continues:

Historically, this East-Central European region emerged as a province in the Habsburg Empire in 1772, as a result of annexation of the lands of the Polish crown. The Habsburgs laid claim to the territory that had once been a part of a medieval Rus’ state called Halyts’ko-Volyns’ke kniazivstvo (Galician-Volhynian principality). The principality came into existence in 1199 after disintegration of Kievian Rus’. As the dynastic line of the Galician prince Danylo expired in 1340, Danylo’s patrimony was claimed by many rulers. Between 1370 and 1387 the land was controlled by the Hungarian crown, and then annexed by the Kingdom of Poland. The new Habsburg province and the medieval principality were by no means territorially congruent. Nevertheless, the Donau monarchy managed to justify its territorial claims by evoking the memory about the old Galician-Volhynian principality whose lands once had appeared under the rule of the Kingdom of Hungary. Although throughout history many Polish and Ruthenian intellectuals lamented over ‘artificiality’ of the region which had been carved by the imperial power disregarding history and cultural traditions, it proved to be that, in the words of a Ukrainian historian, “the fall of Communism showed Austrian Galicia to be one of most enduring inventions of the Habsburg in central and eastern Europe” (Hrytsak 2005a: 186).

4 In professional literature the terms ‘narrative identity’ and ‘narrated identity’ are often used as synonyms. However, in my study I prefer to use the former term. In my opinion, ‘narrative identity’ conveys embedment of meaning and identity construction into narrative processes, while ‘narrated identity’ rather evokes the connotation of a fragmented representation, a snap shot of some ‘fixed’ identity.
Although social action is only intelligible through the construction, enactment, and appropriation of public narratives, this does not mean that individuals are free to fabricate idiosyncratic narratives at whim, they must “choose” from a repertoire of stories. Which kinds of narratives will socially predominate is contested politically and will depend in large part on the actual distribution of power (ibid: 608).

This is an essential point which, in wider perspective, resonates with broader analytical issues touched upon in the study such as the correlation between ‘voices’ and visibility, discursive production and socio-cultural location and, in the last account, between culture, structure and agency.

The concrete research questions posed in this study are: what narratives framing ‘intelligentsia’ against the background of various cultural communities (national, local, supra-national) circulate presently among different generations of the highly educated Ukrainian-speaking L’vivites? How is intelligentsia portrayed in relation to other significant ‘characters’ (e.g., ‘folk’, ‘elites’) in these narratives? What particular spaces in L’viv are viewed as ‘belonging’ to intelligentsia, making intelligentsia ‘visible’ and are claimed by intelligentsia as bases of its autonomy? Through what ‘place-making’ narratives do intelligentsia in L’viv make their voice heard and become empowered in the post-1991 public debate?

In my view, the peculiarieties of the intelligentsia’s narrative identities in L’viv are predetermined by several factors:

1) ‘objective’ structural positioning of the highly educated within fields of power, fields of cultural production, and class and status hierarchies;
2) structural features of the social location (mainly urban location, as intelligentsia is embedded in urban lifestyle, practices and social hierarchies), which provide space for intellectual autonomy and empowerment during different historical periods;
3) particular historical and cultural circumstances, openness to local, glocal and global trends of a community which intelligentsia is ‘emplotted’ into (to avoid essentialization, I view these communities as first and foremost discursive entities);
4) intellectual debates which the intelligentsia and intellectuals initiate and lead.

Narrative identities as well as narratives about ‘own’ cultural communities which are engendered by intelligentsia, have been viewed as the principal sources of the intelligentsia’s empowerment. The issue of intelligentsia’s power is in many respects connected to the issue of ‘place-making’, of defining ‘own’ communities and localities, and drawing their symbolical boundaries. Intelligentsia defines the conceptual boundaries of its ‘own’ community which becomes the principal object for its cultural rationalizing projects (Bauman 1987b). In turn, the community legitimates intelligentsia as a societally important category and admits its expertise in such principal questions as “who are we, where do we belong, where do we go, what is
to be done?” and, in certain circumstances, “who is to blame?” It may be expected that the legacy of different ideological regimes and cultural-historical epochs remembered by current generations (the Habsburg Empire, Polish Republic, Soviet and independent Ukraine) each in its own way left their traces in the narrative identity of the L’viv intelligentsia. Every epoch engaged intelligentsia in formulation—and enactment—of different answers to the identity-related questions. In such a dramatically changing context, dealing with the issues of cultural transmission and generational gaps and continuities, becomes unavoidable.

1.2. Orientation of the study, orientation of the researcher

When trying to understand national projects of post-Communist European societies, it is important not only to scrutinize ‘faceless’ macro-processes of societal transformation, but to highlight meaning-constructing micro-events and discourses of the social actors who articulate the processes of nation building. It has been argued that specificity of nation building in this part of the world needs to be approached by studies balancing the view from above (‘the state’) and below (‘society’) (Goshulak 2003, Kulyk 2006). In view of this, my research is focused on narrative accounts of an important, if not always clearly definable and visible, category of social actors in Eastern Europe, namely, the intelligentsia considered as a dynamic, class-mediating social space and historical tradition, which is mostly appropriated by cultural producers, that is, individuals engaged in the arts, media, education and science.

Although this study can hardly be classified as post-modernist when it comes to the mode of writing and conceptual guidelines, postmodernism as a theoretically oriented way of accounting for socio-cultural change has nevertheless left its touch here. Postmodernism has often been used as a derogatory term indicating an image of a culture that is concerned with surfaces, and hence exhibits certain ‘depthlessness’ (Jameson 1991). It allegedly hails relativism, denies importance of clear theoretical foundations and releases researchers from the burden to verify data and find evidence. However, such depiction of postmodernism is unfair, because postmodernist scholars often pursue the quest of alternative ways of theorizing social and cultural worlds (Brubaker 2004, Gibbins and Reimer 1999: 16-18, Kvale 1996: 231). In the social sciences and humanities, postmodernism has opened a way to some groundbreaking changes of the vantage points and methodological premises. As Bauman (1987b: 118) put it, “The post-modernist debate is about the self-consciousness of the Western society, and the grounds (or absence of grounds) for such consciousness”. Hence, the issue of the actors and structures legislating the established societal order and imposing symbolic hierarchies comes increasingly to the focus. Also, the postmodernist agenda elevates issues of discourse, linguistic constructions, and language games as the principal symbolic fields where ‘truths’ become objectified and social and cultural manifestations elaborated. Postmodernist interest in discursive worlds is basically informed by the concern to examine processes of social classification and construction of symbolic boundaries.
of various kinds. The preoccupation with discourse, narrativity and symbolic power unavoidably leads postmodernists to reconsider strictly dualistic distinctions and focus instead on the ways in which multiple affiliations compete with, amplify and transform each other in various hierarchical social spheres. Diversity, multiplicity, contradictions and eclecticism are the crucial characteristics of postmodernist theoretical and methodological stances (at least in principle).

The other approach that informs this study is ethnography. The objective of present-day ethnography may be formulated as an exploration of the interplay between human subjectivity and the nature of locality as lived experience in a globalized and deterritorialized world (Appadurai 1995). Although ethnography is an old approach that had been developed to study relatively closed communities long before the advent of the ‘postmodern epoch’, its basic assumptions fit perfectly into the conditions of the postmodernity featured by globalization, transnationalism and mass communication. Ethnography as an epistemological paradigm and as a method has some problematic points. Among them, for example, is the assumption about the possibility of drawing a clear demarcation line between the explanations given by the informants in the course of the study (‘emic’ level) and the ones developed by the researcher (‘etic’ level).

Emic/etic distinction in the studies on intellectuals has been addressed, for example, by Kennedy who suggests that the etic approach implies “the ascription of identity to social actors … based on their location in a system of relations of production and distribution identified by the analyst” (Kennedy 1992: 73). As for the emic approach, it is in operation when “the self understanding of the actors is privileged in the identification of the meanings of group action” (ibid: 73). The present study unavoidably combines both emic and etic approaches, as answers to the basic questions of the study—“where is the post-1991 L’viv intelligentsia? From whence stems its power? What discourses is it embedded into?”—may be formulated out of them both.

Another source of analytical controversy around ethnography has been the issue of whether it is possible to make generalizations about entire groups or social categories on the basis of personal meetings with and observations of just a few their representatives. Nevertheless, the foundation of ethnography on personal experience should not be viewed as a limitation. On the contrary, ethnography is a very personal and imaginative vehicle by which anthropologists are expected to make contributions to theoretical and intellectual discussions, both within their discipline and beyond. . . the ethnographer is still writing from a largely unique research experience to which only he or she has practical access in the academic community (Marcus and Fischer 1999: 21).

The basic assumption of the older and newer versions of ethnography about the necessity to meet, hear and see quite concrete persons, ‘informants’, in order not just to measure and calculate some data provided by them, but to explore and expose their experiences, is increasingly relevant.

Ethnography has always dealt with meanings, contexts and practices of everyday life (Agar 1996: 26); the important task of the ethnographic study is still to present cultural difference and persuade the
reader that “culture matters more than he might have thought” (Marcus and Fischer 1999: 43). However, in the last decades ethnography has been increasingly informed by ‘structural’ issues of social domination, hierarchical divisions and political processes saturating everyday realities. As Agar (1996: 50) puts it, the present-day ethnography

has to deal with ethnographic detail as part and parcel of political economic process. It has to move closer to the ground and represent lived worlds and collaborative relationships in construction of the product, including a clear representation of the ethnographic role… It has to deal with issues of power… [E]thnography is now understood to be a part of a political process, with the ethnographer playing an active role whether he or she likes it or not.

Involvement of the ethnographer in mechanisms of power and social hierarchies on both professional and personal levels is quite obvious. One of the direct consequences of such a state of affairs is impossibility—and among postmodernist ethnographers pronounced avoidance—of keeping the ‘objective point of view’ and giving ‘the objective picture’ of the observed relations and events (see Gutmann 2002). A great number of contemporary ethnographers expose awareness about historical and political context of their studies, and thus discourage readings of them as objective descriptions of social or cultural forms (Marcus and Fischer 1999: 21). Moreover, these studies problematize the role of the ethnographer as a human ‘device’ trained for unbiased deciphering of cultural meanings. As Borneman (1992: 12) points out, the ethnographer cannot avoid being emplotted herself, i.e., being framed as a narrator in a plot that encapsulates some version of the history of her own group or milieu, the history which she personally did not write.

One of the theoretical standpoints formulated by twentieth century hermeneutics and widely accepted in present-day scholarship is that research questions, and likewise interpretations and conceptualizations, cannot be unbiased (Ödman 2007: 106). Therefore, nowadays the ethnographer is expected to be aware of the ideational—as well as ideological5—points of departure on which her conclusions and critical suggestions are based. This assumption is far from being unproblematic—not only because the researcher often encounters the dilemma of “why our ideologies often don’t connect with a community when it’s obvious that the two should correspond” (Agar 1996: 28). The closeness of the positions of the researcher and the researched can lead to no less confusion than diametrical opposition of their world/political/ideological views. In the latter case, the ethnographer hardly has a right to claim that she comprehended and ‘gave a voice’ to her informants. In the former case, the researcher runs the risk of considering the statements of the informants without a necessary share of criticism and can fail to distinguish between her own theoretical constructions and pre-reflexive practical modes appropriated by the informants—in other words, confusion of etic and emic levels may arise. Thus, the ethnographer coming from ‘outside’ (both in terms of ethnic/national

5 “To say that the statement is ideological is then to claim that it is powered by an interior motive bound up with the legitimation of certain interests in a power struggle” (Eagleton 1991: 16).
and class/stratum/occupational affinity) may encounter the problem of ‘too long a distance’ between herself and ‘them’ (representatives of groups and communities), while direct or indirect identification with the studied milieu and its representatives may create obstacles for the ‘native’ ethnographer or ‘insider’.

In order to practically resolve (or at least suspend) the dilemma of ‘too long and too short distances’ between the ethnographer and the chosen milieu, or to put it differently, the issue of how one can be simultaneously both subject and object of the research, it is worthwhile to have in mind some recommendations suggested by Pierre Bourdieu. As an experienced anthropologist, he proposed to use a heuristic device called ‘participant objectivation’ or, as he put it, “objectivation of the subject of objectivation, of the analyzing subject—in short, of the researcher herself” (Bourdieu 2003: 282). The procedure of ‘participant objectivation’ aims to reduce the gap between the knowing subject and knowledgeable object by way of encouraging the researcher to define her subject position not by way of framing her unique life experience, but first and foremost through illuminating the social conditions which make this personal experience possible (ibid: 283-284).

When appropriating such a reflexive stance toward her own historical experience and professional position, the ethnographer, on the one hand, avoids endowing her objects with the same sort of theoretical logic and scientific rationality as she uses in her research, while, on the other hand, she gains insight that these ‘ordinary agents’ are subjected to similar cultural determinations as herself. By way of defining her subject position both in relation to her idiosyncratic experience and through self-socio-analysis, the ethnographer thus abandons “the narcissistic reflexivity of postmodern anthropology” and gains epistemic as well as existential benefits (ibid: 281). I do not intend to give a full-range analysis of my subject position in the manner suggested by Bourdieu. On the one hand, such an account deserves a separate study of the researcher’s ‘own’ field (the enterprise that Bourdieu himself conducted brilliantly in, for example, Homo Academicus and The State Nobility). On the other hand, it is more apt to save some relevant reflections for the later analysis of the research material. Nevertheless, a short introduction into this discussion can be presented now.

When writing about those whom I call Ukrainian (or, more precisely, Ukrainian-speaking) intelligentsia in L’viv I encountered a range of insider/outsider and subject/object dilemmas. Am I fully justified to write about this space (milieu, category, collective representation…) as about ‘them’—given that several years ago it used to be (even though with some reservations) a part of the milieu I identified as ‘my own’? Is it ethically correct to reveal the ‘insider information’ which probably does not depict these people—‘my’ confidants, ‘my’ informants, to whom I feel sympathy and gratitude—to their best advantage? How do my informants view me and my study? As a researcher with an ascribed hyphenated identity (at least some of my Ukrainian colleagues whom I have known for years, presently introduce me half-seriously, half-jokingly as a ‘Ukrainian-Swedish researcher’) I could easily be looked at as a (half?) stranger whose credibility and scope of power cannot be easily assessed. Was my ‘double position’ too weak, so that in many cases I was not
taken seriously—or, on the contrary, too authoritative, something that resulted in precluding me from gaining access to more personal and contingent data?

These were only few questions concerning my own affinity that I was compelled to answer almost every time I encountered the constructed space or milieu under investigation and its representatives—actual people, the majority of them confessing strong attachment to an ethnic, national and cultural community of the Ukrainians (though, unavoidably, defined and experienced in multiple ways). On the other hand, my identity as ‘a female researcher in the field’ gave rise to a range of questions concerning the ethnographer’s position of power—but also of powerlessness. Generally speaking, women in Western Ukraine are not precluded from active public activity, full-time employment, access to managerial positions and other proclaimed benefits of the modern socially-oriented society. However, invisible barriers on the way to a successful professional career are countless, and traditional attitudes concerning the ‘true place’ and the ‘real nature’ of the Ukrainian (Galician) women cannot be discarded so easily. In such circumstances it is easy to be trapped in ‘the gender myth of field research’, assuming that female researchers ‘naturally’ possess greater communicative skills and are regarded as less threatening than their male colleagues (Warren 1988: 64, quoted by Silverman 1993: 35).

Indeed, many times I benefited from the fact that my informants took for granted my ‘greater communicative skills’ as a woman and probably viewed me as ‘less threatening’. However, the field work also exposed numerous gaps in my communicative skills and compelled me to constantly negotiate the scope of my ‘(un)threatening position’ as a female researcher with both male and female informants. At the beginning of my fieldwork in 1999, an interview with a known right-wing politician gave me some clues as to my position of power as a young female researcher. It was obvious from the beginning that the power balance would not be to my benefit, that I should formulate my questions more cautiously than usual and be prepared to resist quite an assertive communicative style of the person in question. My suspicions were partly confirmed. However, when passing me an interesting hand-written document, the man suddenly blushed: “Oh, excuse me… I’ve just forgotten to strike out some ugly words…” My protests were rejected politely, but resolutely. Motivation was, shortly, as follows: the interviewee was not only embarrassed that I could get the impression that he was a rude ‘uncultured’ person, but was also concerned to demonstrate that in his view women—especially ‘educated women like you’—must be treated with highest respect and be precluded from any contact with ‘filth’. Thus, my power position was not too weak; in that special case its configuration was defined by boundary-markers of gender, education, ‘decency’ and ‘purity and danger’.

Such reflection-inspiring cases were numerous during my fieldwork. Another thing that surprised me, was, for example, that despite expectations, elderly people were mostly as much open to contact as respondents of my own age. Their way of telling their stories as well as modalities of these stories were, of course, quite specific as these people often clearly signaled that even though I was allowed to intrude into their
landscape of meanings and memories, I was nevertheless an obvious stranger there. However, inherent respect for my position as a researcher, academician and ‘cultured girl’ frequently aided me during the study. As one of the elderly respondents put it, “you, young people, you have your ideas about things, but you are educated folk, so you can understand us, old men”. Thus, even though they could not be absolutely sure about modality of my perception (“Is she skeptical? Bored? Sincerely interested? Indifferent? Does she listen to me out of mere politeness because of my age?”) and my capability to understand these narratives, I think many of them regarded me as a person who deserved to learn their stories.

But let us come back to the issue of the hyphenated research identity. Years spent in the Swedish academic milieus and inspiration derived from ‘western’ anthropologic as well as sociologic concepts left their trace in my professional stances and attitudes. The most significant of them is, probably, a gradual withering of the view that as an ethnographer I need to look for drastic contrasts, exoticisms and dramatic forms of cultural expression. Indeed, it seems to be that interesting studies within the field are most often informed by the pursuit of understanding routine practices and expressions rather than some catchy cases of anecdotal character, and “the good observer finds excitement in the most everyday, mundane kinds of activities” (Silverman 1993: 31). The earlier period of my career as a researcher at the Ethnology Institute in L’viv was devoted to cultural expressions of the so-called urban youth subcultures, some of them proclaiming distinct styles (clothes, hairstyling, music etc.) as their main tokens. In the late 1990s, when I launched my fieldwork in the milieus of urban youth, the phrase ‘youth subcultures’ was perceived by everymen as a kind of derogatory term. From the beginning, I considered ‘my’ object of investigation with mixed feelings of fascination and fright, as the appearance, speech and behavior of the youngsters who some colleagues from the academe viewed solely as deviants seemed to be so exotic. Later on, however, came understanding that spectacular youth styles and non-conventional modes of presentation are fuelled by distinctions, lines of division and solidarities saturating everyday-life worlds of greater numbers of people. The problem discourse which youth’s expressions were framed by, hindered the realization that young people, especially students and highly educated youth, are the most radical agents of change, and that the stances and discussions in youth milieus in many respects resonated with (and even predicted) dynamics of the wide-scale ideational changes in this part of the world. This study which deals with narrative identity of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in my native city L’viv is one of the results of such a ‘frame shift’ which changed the optics of my research.

The other momentous development was awareness of undesirable consequences of romanticization (the tendency to explain certain cultural and social phenomena in terms of individual will and consciousness). When one studies national/nationalistic/ethnic phenomena which by definition presuppose various grades of personal emotional engagement among those involved, one needs to be prepared to sort out this ‘romanticizing stream’ in the stories told by the informants. However, as an ethnographer, one can also experience ‘romantic drive’ when representing ‘authentic’ people and milieus in her study (Silverman 1993: 31).
Ethnography, as it has been mentioned, is “a very personal and imaginative vehicle” (Marcus and Fischer 1999: 21), and personal unique experience of the field can often be accompanied by the desire to explain some patterns in terms of a personal and unique experience of the informants. Needless to say that such a stance of the researcher can result in the underestimation of the power of existing cultural cues, social hierarchies and symbolic boundaries as conditioning personal choices and experience.

Analytical and cognitive frames used by me—the Ukrainian-Swedish ‘hyphenated insider’—quite predictably, are of an eclectic character. I examine the investigated milieu through the optics of the contemporary ‘Western’ ethnological and cultural sociological models, but my previous personal and historically determined experience of the studied location still dictates what I notice at the first glance and what I expect to see. I suppose that my historical and cultural experience of being brought up in an ethnically mixed family, being formed as a thinking person by three different ‘epochs’ (the Soviet period, perestrojka and independence) and brought by personal circumstances to Sweden, can account for my fascination with fragmented and puzzling combinations of cultural meanings. Everyday existence before 1999, in conditions of significant discord and often unbridgeable gaps between the official discourses, discourses accepted in semi-official public arenas and unwritten rules and folklore of the family sphere, may also have contributed to my double-edged research attitude that holds no illusions about possible ‘strategies of dissimulation’ (Kharkhordin 1995: 212) used by my interlocutors—and simultaneously accepts multiple ‘truths’ or ‘regimes of truth’ in their narratives.

Likewise, during the last two decades of the twentieth century residents of L’viv experienced consequences of several momentous shifts in the sphere of official politics as well as in daily life. However, as often happens in ethnocultural and ‘civilizational’ borderlands, drastic historical cleavages seldom result in total abandonment of earlier cultural forms and social hierarchies (Brown 2004). Rather, newer and older ideologies, life philosophies and practical strategies, while competing in one sphere, amplified and completed each other in plenty of others. The state of minds in the last years of the Soviet Ukraine was aptly expressed in the refrain to a song by the L’viv rock band ‘Braty Hadiukiny’: “The Party and God are with us!” (“Z namy Partiia i Boh!”). A slogan reflecting the present-day consciousness of an ordinary L’vivite could be even more eccentric—even though the golden era of slogans seems to have passed away for good.

This does not necessarily mean that the task of the researcher is to reveal some ‘genuine’ core of beliefs and cultural patterns behind the peels of political sloganeering and ideological constructions. Indeed, the latter ones cannot always be treated as some ‘external’ inculcated patterns which people have never cherished some illusions about and whose ‘falseness’ they easily discerned. The presentation of the Soviet and, to some extent, even post-Soviet rank-and-file toilers (be it peasants, workers or broader circles of intelligentsia) as a kind of ‘dissimulating animals’ (Kharkhordin 1995) who only imitated obedience in the face of the hated regime while clandestinely cherishing their genuine traditions and world outlooks is quite problematic. It
implies that one tacitly accepts the existence of a sharp polarity of the internal, inherently ‘true’ discursive worlds of the dominated and the external, mighty and false ones of the dominant. Obviously, having in mind Foucault’s idea about different regimes of ‘truth’, the analyst has every reason to question such a presentation. As Yurchak argues, the story about the divided languages of the ‘elites’ and the ‘people’, of authorities and intelligentsia during the Soviet period was, to a large extent, “a retrospective late- and post-perestroika construction” (Yurchak 2006: 7). In my fieldwork I have witnessed numerous examples of the interpenetration of the ideological rhetoric and semi-private understandings in the informants’ stories, and realized that efforts to reconstruct ‘undistorted’ narratives would be meaningless. The informants’ narrative identities should be analyzed in all their complexity, as the constellations of mosaic-like discursive elements in their stories themselves deserve deeper analysis. All in all, when dealing with ambivalences and binaries of the present-day discourses relating to the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the scholar should be aware of the pitfalls of the binary analytical readings and non-contradictory explanations of these discourses and identity constructions.

L’vivites and Galicianers are, of course, not unique in this respect, as the phenomenon of cultural hybridity is widely known. However, the similar state of ambiguity and a feeling of existence ‘betwixt and between’ reigns nowadays also in political and economical spheres of Ukraine, where it has been known for a while under the name of the ‘transitional period’. Prolonged unfinished transitions (earlier to the ‘society of developed socialism’, later on to democracy, the law governed state and market economy) and a profusion of vital cultural ‘beddings’ within the same society lead, over and over again, to the insight that one should look closer at the forms of generational transmission in the area called ‘post-Soviet’ space. Here this space is analytically demarcated to an urban location and to particular local actors with their specific cultural repertoires. Examination of the fabrics of cultural meanings and social hierarchies which are reflected in the

6 The question of terminology of political eras deserves at least a brief remark here. Indeed, why are these ‘transitional’ societies still described in such ‘hyphenated’ terms as post-Soviet, post-Communist or post-state socialist? In many cases, the figurative impossibility of definition in terms of posterior (‘pre-liberal-democratic’, ‘pre-Something Else’…) conditions is not the issue, as at least some of these societies have a quite clear vision of the prospective societal order they strive after. Rather, the point is that the past of these societies is still a factor to be reckoned with, to assess and to admit. In the words of Irwin-Zarecka (1994: 10), “Central and Eastern Europe are defined precisely as ‘post-Communist’ societies, societies that cannot make any effective transition to functioning (capitalist) democracies unless the legacy of Communist rule is studied and understood. Often explicitly against the idea of return to the (glorious) past, this is a vision calling for scrupulous inquiry into the recent times. It appeals to people’s sense of fairness, but also to their direct experience of the difficulties of transition. …The Communist past becomes an obstacle to overcome, but not to bypass”. On the other hand, there is also much controversy over what name should be applied to the socioeconomic and political systems that existed in the USSR for over seventy years and in East-Central Europe for nearly 40 years. King and Szelenyi (2004: 45), for example, pointed out the problem of defining these countries as ‘socialist’, because “these countries did not live up of some of the doctrine’s key ideals—in particular, to the principles of democracy so central to the nineteenth-century theorists of socialism. Nonetheless, these countries made a serious effort to implement some of the key proposals of socialism …”
specific texture of local narratives and concepts makes it possible to define possible mechanisms of such transmission.

1.3. Sources and methods of material collection

I intend to discuss in more detail first the methods used for collecting of the material and then the choice of methodological inventory for its textual analysis. Because of the explorative ethnographic type of the research I have chosen the data collecting methods viewed as ethnographic ones. In this study I make use of a range of qualitative data sources. I present the account of some practical arrangements in connection to participant observation (problematicized, according to the strategy of ‘participant objectivation’ advocated by Bourdieu), in chapter 7. Throughout the study I also use visual sources such as posters, caricatures and documenting photos, which I approach as encapsulations of cultural narratives. The main bulk of textual material comes, however, from numerous oral interviews which I will discuss later. As the interviews alone did not contain material for a comprehensive reading of such an issue as the L’viv intelligentsia’s empowering narratives, I have searched for needed information in articles of the L’viv-based periodicals (especially ‘Ti’ and ‘Postup’ which enjoy the reputation as a quality press oriented to the more intellectually sophisticated publics) as well as in works of fiction writers. Also, the Internet forum www.zaxid.net and some other websites were extremely valuable sources documenting present-day debates about the historical and cultural significance of L’viv. My hope was that by triangulating these sources it would be possible to address the issue of the L’viv intelligentsia and intellectuals empowering projects more comprehensively.

When addressing the media sources, the researcher unavoidably gets into the domain of the ‘elite’ discourses that should not be mixed with the ‘trivial’, daily discourses of the interviews. Nevertheless, the discourses shared by the cultural producers are the discourses of those with privileged access to the cultural production assets both in their professional fields and in everyday life. Participation of the cultural producers is indispensable for the formulation and legitimation of the meaning and practices of a national community (Duara 1996). Both before 1991 and after it, the discourses and practices of these actors related to the ‘place-making’ and identity debates have not been irrelevant for the political and business establishment, i.e., those ruling few who, unlike the intelligentsia and intellectuals, exercise direct political power in Ukraine. All in all, intelligentsia and intellectuals may be generally regarded as a kind of elite, that is to say, privileged actors. Hence, in chapters 8 and 9, I focus predominantly on elite discourses and strategies actualized by the post-1991 L’viv intelligentsia and intellectuals, which in various ways penetrate daily worlds of the rank-and-file (Western) Ukrainians and also influence the official policies of the authorities.

In what follows, I would like to go into detail about the principle source of material for the present study, i.e., forty qualitative semi-structured interviews which I conducted in L’viv between 1999 and
2006. People of different age, genders, social origins, religious confessions, ideological persuasions and institutional affiliations were invited to participate in the project. For the majority of them Ukrainian is a native language which they use both in public and in private communication. In principle, my informants had only two features in common: they were either L’viv residents or worked and studied in L’viv and all of them had post-secondary education. Many of them were students and academicians affiliated with various research and educational institutions in the city.

Reliability and validity of the data obtained via interviews is a frequently discussed issue (see Kvale 1996: 284-291). Skeptics have often pointed out that the researcher hoping to gather ‘sincere’ and ‘authentic’ everyday views, instead usually finds standard statements and ‘right answers’ triggered by the ‘forced on’, ‘unnatural’ situation of an interview. Also, reliability of the information has been questioned because, as it has been argued, the interviewees are liable to ‘construct’ their identity or opinions so as to resemble, or differ from, the perceived identity or opinions of the interviewer (Mishler 1986). Nevertheless, despite these and other reservations, interviews are still regarded as a source of valuable data not least because “the degree of conscious intention and finality … decreases in individual contributions to discussions in focus groups and even more in the individual interviews” (Wodak et al.1999: 32).

In the present ‘postmodern’ situation ‘truth’ is worked out locally in small narrative units, and collective stories expose their relevance only in certain contexts (Kvale 1996:42-43). Besides, asking questions actively is often a more effective way to obtain an abundance of reflexive, verbalized information than time-consuming efforts to come across it in spontaneous situations of participant observation. As I focused on collecting a wide spectrum of narratives or ‘stories’ addressing the multiple meaning and contexts in which the concept of intelligentsia is embedded in a historically significant urban location which is renowned, in particular, for its role in the development of Ukrainian (as well as Polish) nationalism, I decided that open-ended semi-structured interviews should be the dominant methodological technique in this study.

An interview situation is not a simple communication of information from the narrator to the listener, but a sort of narrative situation which implies more complicated mediation between these two agents. Both interviewer and interviewee assume certain roles which are explicated on the discursive level. The interviewee as a real person beyond the interview situation is not the same figure as the narrator whose statements and opinions have been recorded and analyzed. Namely, narrator is a role, or voice, which has been adopted by the interviewee, and which is embedded into a frame of narrative conventions. In the same manner, the interviewer as a real person beyond the established discursive frames and beyond the interview situation differs from the ‘narratee’ which exists on the same discursive level as the narrator. Narratee is the preconstructed “entity to whom the narration is directed, overtly or covertly” (Keen 2003: 34). Thus, the researcher in the situation of the interview should also be conceptualized as a role or as a discursive figure of narratee whose presented features, as ‘scanned’ and interpreted by the narrator, may sufficiently influence the
modality and contents of the narration. In order to diminish the distorting effects of narratee as a figure pre-
constructed by the narrator in the interview situation, some ‘neutralizing’ techniques may be applied by the
researcher7. In my experience, some of these recommendations are not easy to implement in practice, as the
informants may take the initiative and put questions to the interviewer about what they want to know. Besides,
efforts of the interviewer to send confusing signals about her identity may jeopardize the entire interview.

In more precise terms, the majority of the conducted interviews can be classified as semi-
structured life world interviews (Kvale 1996: 13) intended “to obtain descriptions of the life world of the
interviewee with respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomena” (ibid: 5-6). The design of
the interviews was ‘soft’ and flexible, allowing greater room for improvisation and adjustments to the situation
both for me as a researcher and for my informants. I may agree with Agar and Hobbs (1982: 2) who warn that
“the more the informal interview is controlled by the informant, the less the ethnographer knows how to deal
with it”. Intending to provide informants with a space for free expression—more comprehensible for them and
more controllable for me—I kept a careful check on the five-part structure of the interviews (see Appendix 1).
After a short representation of my project, I asked about the interviewee’s background and how s/he ‘became’
a Ukrainian. The second part was devoted to more general questions relating to ethnic/national awareness as a
Ukrainian. Both the formulation of conceptual understandings of the issue and the mentioning of concrete
examples from the interviewee’s daily experience were encouraged. The third part concerned the issues of
intelligentsia, intellehenty and intellectuals. I was especially interested to learn more about ‘Galician
intelligentsia’, ‘old intelligentsia’, ‘Soviet intelligentsia’ and present ‘national intelligentsia’ (the definitions
used both in daily contexts and in media). The following sections addressed the circles and networks of the
intelligentsia and intellectuals and their roles in present-day Ukrainian society. The interview sessions usually
were ended with questions concerning those statements I wanted to be clarified, explained or developed by the
informant—and with a suggestion to complete the interview with reflections on relevant issues that, in the
informant’s view, were omitted or elucidated insufficiently.

Specificity of the narratives which make up a core of my material is that they were obtained in
the process of semi-formal interviewing, which strove to elicit as ‘relaxed’, ‘sincere’ and ‘routine’ responses as
possible. In a way, it was an endeavor to switch the modality of speech—and, respectively, mode of
thinking—on the topics which for the majority of respondents are a part of the official discourses they produce
for the public or expert use. The aim of such a switch was to encourage my interlocutors to speak about their
individual, purposed for everyday life8 understandings of their social and ‘communal’ (national, regional,

7 For example, Lamont used the research technique of presenting herself to the interviewees as a person
with blurred professional and cultural identity. Presumably, as long as the interviewee is confused about
the researcher’s identity and cannot immediately ‘classify’ her in terms of class, ethnicity and cultural
affinity, the interviewee’s narration will be less affected by the attempts to give the ‘right answer’ to the
posed questions (Lamont 1992: 19-21).
8 Though its boundaries are not easily marked or maintained in the study of nationalism, everyday life is
local) affinity about which they were otherwise expected to talk about as professionals or experts. They could reflect on the suggested topics as ‘ordinary’ people and re-frame their narratives according to their individual experiences. Still, questions of presentation rather than questions of consciousness were of primary interest. Namely, I was interested to find out in which ways the intellihent, intelligentsia and relating categories are presented and contested, and what are the social spaces from which these images have been generated.

It does not necessarily entail that cultural meanings and hierarchies of the domain of everyday life should be viewed as more ‘real’ or ‘basic’ than those explicated by the same actors in the spheres of public activity. Rather, it is worthy to take into account—and account for—these vernacular statements, categorizations and anecdotes parallel to publicist and propagandist discursive production. This hopefully results in a nuanced picture of the post-state socialism intelligentsia as a collective representation, social category, historical tradition and cultural myth which is constantly reproduced, embedded into both the new and old social hierarchies, and clustered around certain discernable cultural concepts. Also, as the study focuses on the representation of nationhood and national identity, the everyday unarticulated aspects of ‘the national’ among the L’viv intelligentsia should be attended to as they may be conflated with the discursive production which articulates the nation (Kennedy and Suny 1999: 395). Besides, the insight into the daily ways of reasoning and ways of employment of some core concepts may lead to a deeper understanding of the creative processes of ‘fabrication of meanings’ (Peterson 2000) and to an insight into relations of social and discursive power articulated by cultural producers.

In order to follow the structure of the interviews I needed to conduct longer sessions. An almost ideal location for such prolonged conversations was found in numerous smaller cafés (kaviarnia, knaipa). These cafés are presently an inalienable part of a ‘typically L’vivian’ cityscape and in many respects are an important public institution of post-1991 life in the city. The cozy atmosphere accessible to practically everyone and strong associations with the ‘cultivated’ way to mingle and chat made these cafés in the city centre a suitable place for many interviews with both men and women, with younger as well as older informants. As I had in mind a certain delicacy of the research theme and wanted to obtain richly detailed information from my interlocutors, I found it most appropriate to conduct individual interviews. That is why the choice of cafés as more ‘intimate’, accessible and, at the same time, anonymous locations was quite natural. Power-holders and people belonging to certain organizations, however, often preferred other locations, such as their offices, and occasionally the interview took place in the presence of co-workers or other witnesses who could even break into the conversation. The majority of the oldest respondents were interviewed in office locations because almost all of them belonged to a certain organization and besides, they were individuals who to be understood in the first place as a realm for the routine activities of ordinary people. In this sense, everyday life is to be distinguished from that field of activities coordinated and pursued by (national) elites (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2007: 2-3).
originated from smaller towns and villages where people used to have more restricted views on hanging around in cafés.

The recruitment of the prospective informants took place initially in the circle of my personal acquaintances; via these initial contacts, I later managed to get access to some other networks, which I purposefully sought contact with (more about this see in chapters below). Being a kind of insider in some of these milieus, and having the opportunity to refer to the ‘right’ persons, as well as to some relevant points and issues of mutual interest, helped my work to go more smoothly. However, I was not spared from confronting situations where interviewees exposed views and values diametrically opposed to my own. When one conducts an interview-based research dealing with patterns of national and ethnic identification, one unavoidably encounters obviously xenophobic or racist statements. Such moments belong to the less pleasant sides of interaction during fieldwork, and probably the only sensible solution the researcher can come up with in such a situation is to continue listening while distancing herself emotionally from the shocking statements and comforting herself with the thought that the ethnographer must take into account a wide spectrum of views concerning the studied theme. In such interview situations charged with value conflict, it was useful to have in mind Kvale’s argument about the aims and purposes of the qualitative interview: “The qualitative interview attempts to gather descriptions of the relevant themes of the interviewee’s life world that are as rich and presuppositionless as possible. …The interviewer leads the subject toward certain themes, but not to certain opinions about these themes” (Kvale 1996: 33-34). I agree that the aim of the ethnographer is, by assuming a curious, open and engaged attitude, to gather information concerning the chosen theme without (consciously) encroaching on the interviewee’s values and personal integrity. It is more appropriate to leave the evaluation, examination and criticism of the interview data to the later—analytical—stage of the study.

1.4. Narrative analysis, frame analysis, and ethnographic analysis

Putting questions to the collected material in a systematic and purposeful way is a difficult enterprise. Therefore Kvale (1996: 176-185) maintains that a ‘correctly’ conducted interview should already include a pronounced analytical component, i.e., it should contain answers to the most important research questions. However, it is not obvious that if one asks ‘correct’ questions in a ‘right’ way one can be sure that the answers will be also ‘right’, straightforward and unproblematic: “Method as a guarantee of truth dissolves; with a social construction of reality the emphasis is on the discourse of the community” (Kvale 1996: 240), which implies that the extra-textual reality of the material, its idiosyncratic contexts and time-specific conditions of discourse production may determine a possible spectrum of ‘right’ answers.

Methods of textual analysis also have their inherent limitations. One of them is that “textual analysis depends upon very detailed data analysis. To make such analysis effective, it is imperative to have a
limited body of data with which to work. …Having chosen your dataset, you should limit your material further by only taking a few texts or parts of texts…” (Silverman 2001: 152). Unlike analyses grounded in statistical data, qualitative textual analyses seem to be extremely ‘wasteful’. Even if the researcher makes a well-argued interpretation of several chosen texts of good quality, she unavoidably sorts out plenty of other texts which could open the way to new and, possibly, absolutely different interpretations. Nevertheless, even very limited textual material may be analyzed in plenty of ways, and thereby reaching alternative readings is not an indication of deficient scholarship, but a manifestation of the wealth of the material and the interpretive sensitivity of the scholar (Lieblich et al. 1998: 171). Of course, the relevance and validity of the material chosen for the textual analysis as well as the scientific reliability of the obtained results may sometimes be openly questioned. One may argue, however, that the understanding of what may be considered as ‘scientific’ has changed. Today, the legitimating question of whether a study is scientific or not tends to be replaced by the pragmatic question of whether it provides ‘useful’ knowledge (Kvale 1996: 42, Gibbins and Reimer 1999). Such a position is justified in the case of the qualitative approach to narrated texts which implies interpretation as a grounding procedure.

The scholarly tradition addressing the issues of interpretation and understanding, hermeneutics, is conventionally presented as a set of guidelines and principles which facilitate elaboration of veritable and ‘useful’ scholarly knowledge. Although hermeneutics is not a system of methods in a proper sense, it nevertheless increases awareness about the choice of methods and methodological assumptions which are needed for the generation of justifiable scholarly interpretations (Ödman 2007: 34-46). Several basic principles formulated within twentieth century hermeneutics have been of special relevance for my study. One of the most general of them is the postulate about the impossibility of drawing a clear demarcation line between the subjective and objective aspects of the scholarly interpretation. It means that, on the one hand, the scholar should be aware of subjective factors which saturate the historical and cultural processes and, on the other hand, about the limitations of her own horizon of understanding. Hence, “Understanding is not to be thought of so much as an action of one’s subjectivity, but as the placing of oneself within a process of tradition, in which past and present are constantly fused” (Gadamer 1975: 258). The other important principle is the actualization of the model of hermeneutic ‘circle’ (or, rather, ‘spiral’ (Ödman 2007: 104)) oscillating between totality and partialness, contextualizations and recontextualizations as well as between historical, contemporary and prospective aspects of the interpretation process. Finally, the assumption that the interpretation and understanding of cultural phenomena is inseparable from the ability to have insight into narrated stories (Ricoeur 1988) has strengthened my determination to deal with narration and the contents of collectively-produced stories in my study.

Accordingly, this research makes use first and foremost of narrative analysis. Narrative may be defined as a “discourse, or an example of it, designed to represent a connected succession of happenings”
As a strand of discourse analysis, narrative analysis approaches a wide spectrum of societal reality, and ideally it ought to be an interdisciplinary undertaking (Fairclough 1992: 225). I maintain that this method may also promote in-depth analysis of cultural meanings and practices as well as to provide the researcher with good opportunities to apply interpretive procedures.

Narrative analysis (or, rather, analyses emphasizing different dimensions of narration) is a highly relevant methodological vantage point in social sciences and history, among others, which is determined to dismantle the master narrative of modernity (Somers 1992, Sewell Jr. 1992, Steinmetz 1992). As selectivity and significance are the principles behind the formation of collective and individual narratives (Borneman 1992: 38), narrative analysis may provide useful cues to value and meaning attribution within hierarchical systems of culture. Another advantage of narrative analysis in the eyes of scholars who are “to a certain degree, comfortable with ambiguity” (Lieblich et al. 1998: 10) is that it allows testing of how multiple ‘plot hypotheses’ (Somers 1992: 601) correlate with actual (embedded in local contexts of relationships) events, and what “choices, voices, and noises” (Gutman 2002: 24) participate in the sense-making of these events.

Narratives are not only modes of representation through which social subjects learn and make sense of the social world. They are also forms of social action as they are “ways in which we try to organize our experiences in terms of certain conventional norms or rules” (Anthias 2002: 499). People adjust stories, which they most often do not create personally, and choose among the existing ‘pools’ of narratives in order to form consistent meaningful stories about personal standing, choices, orientations and beliefs. Conversely, people often adjust their physical surroundings and personal memories to these stories (Somers 1994: 606, 618). As narratives exist interpersonally in the course of social interactions over time, they ensure a certain degree of cultural continuity, even in periods of massive societal restructurings (Ries 1997: 4). Narratives actualized within a group contribute to constituting the group’s sense of selfhood and to holding the group together (Kvale 1996: 200, Somers 1992, 1994, Steinmetz 1992). In a sense, narratives are cultural ‘fictions’ because they relate to the realm of the imaginary in a search for meaning and selfhood (Anthias 2002: 499). They endow flows of events with cultural meanings and construct their tellers and audiences as meaningful subjects (groups, categories, communities, etc.) (Borneman 1992: 42). Elements of ‘fiction’ in the narratives usually go hand-in-hand with their factuality and in no way diminish the value or credibility of the narrated events. On the contrary, these ‘poetic’, ‘fictional’ elements are devices that “give narrative form to stories, whether state or individual versions, without which they would be meaningless” (ibid: 44).

When appraising narrative material and narrative analysis as an apt means of accessing cultural meanings, I am aware of the former’s limitations as a reflection of social relations. In the words of Anthias (2002: 500), “narrational elements are embedded in structured social relations, although not mechanically derived from them. …narratives are never innocent of social structure and social place, simultaneously reflecting and making sense of our social position in the order of things while never being merely
representational of this order’. What narratives mediate is not an objective truth, but a ‘narrative truth’, not verifiable picture of social relations, but rather modes, used by a narrator, of making sense of his/her placement in the social order (Lieblich et al. 1998: 8, Anthias 2002: 500). Out of the collected narratives centered on issues of intelligentsia and nationality, it is possible to reconstruct elements of ‘maps of meaning’ (Jackson 1989) which the respondents utilize when they estimate events, categories and individuals as well as to reveal what boundaries and oppositions they actualize when defining their own and others’ socio-cultural positions.

The narratives presented here do not expound consistent fully-developed stories and authentic representations of the ordinary day-to-day life of the chosen group of respondents. They are rather fragmentary and tend to focus on ups and downs of the informants’ experience. However, such exhibiting of significant moments and associations of significant categories, plots and fragments within the contexts marked by certain modalities and narrative strategies is of importance. Having at my disposition such ‘concentrated’ texts which map respondents’ opinions about certain categories and notions, I have got an opportunity not only to learn more about the nature of these categories, but also about the symbolic space in which they have been ‘emplotted’. However, the narrative material alone has been insufficient for comprehending the reasons for the development of these configurations of senses, meanings and placements. Therefore, excursions into the realm of history of L’viv, Galicia and Ukraine have been necessary in order to complement my ethnological-cultural sociological expedition.

Narrative analysis may be defined as a type of structuralist textual analysis aiming to uncover intrinsic logical patterns which organize narrative fragments into coherent meaningful stories (Silverman 2001: 122). When applying a narrative approach, the researcher works in a ‘grey zone’ between purely linguistic, rhetorical and socio-cultural levels of the texts. These texts are usually regarded as meaningful accounts about certain events or even as histories with their own plots and inward logic. Awareness about contextuality and plurality of the obtained meanings is one of the central methodological premises of narrative analysis (Mishler 1986). However, plurality and contextuality of the meanings does not necessarily preclude the analyst from searching for deeper logical patterns in their constellations. For instance, Victor Turner (1974: 122-123) argued that the mythological logic of some narrative models impacts the course of action in major public dramatic processes such as revolutions and other cases of wide-scale collective mobilization.

In my research I have utilized the modes of reading narrative which may be called holistic-content and holistic-form ones (Lieblich et al. 1998). The content-oriented mode aims at approaching the implicit content by asking about the meaning that the story, or a certain section of it, conveys, what justifications and motives are displayed, or how a certain trope or image used by the narrator may be interpreted. Sometimes, however, it was preferable to look more closely at the form of a story or presentation as it seemed to manifest deeper layers of meaning, as the formal aspects of a story are presumably harder to manipulate than its contents.
One of the preconditions to successful narrative analysis is to organize the interviewing into a form of storytelling (Kvale 1996: 274). By so doing, the researcher’s task is made easier by looking for narrative models as they unfold in the interviews. An equally challenging task for the scholar is to take the role of a ‘narrative creator’ and to melt many different narratives into a coherent ‘plot’ of her own study (ibid: 201). Russian Talk by Nancy Ries (1997) may be mentioned as one of such narrativized studies that became a source of inspiration for my research. Ries chose to look closer at everyday stories, idle chat and gossip among middle-class Muscovites in order to uncover some ‘specifically Russian’ discursive mechanisms of meaning creation. The author uncovers coherent logic chains and discursive patterns of dramatization of everyday events. Behind common ‘unstructured’ grumbling and chat, she distinguishes contours of a unique genre system of Russian talk. One may agree or disagree with Ries’s conclusions about the Russian intelligentsia’s value system and its way of performing on the political arena. Nevertheless, the methodological approach and the design of her research cleared the way for cohesive analysis of intricate issues of meaning making. When it comes to my study, I assume that narrative analysis may help to realize that behind plurality of opinions about intelligentsia and its ethnic/national and class affinity one can distinguish elements of cultural logic which have been formed in certain local circumstances. Nevertheless, the material of more explicit dynamic nature that has been systematized and thematically structured with a help of narrative analysis may, in its turn, be complemented by, for example, frame analysis.

Unlike narrative analysis whose main objects are mainly plots and explicit narrative models categorizing structure and functions of the story, frame analysis is focused on textual meta-message, that is, devices that indicate the communicative process producing certain kinds of utterances (Jaworski and Coupland 1999: 28). Frame, according to Goffman (1974: 21), is a schema of interpretation enabling individuals to locate, perceive and categorize both discursive forms and events within their life worlds. By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function as ideational devices that organize experience and guide action (Snow et al. 1986: 464). According to Irwin-Zarecka (1994: 4), “Questions about framing are essentially about limits to the scope of possible interpretations. Their aim is not to freeze one particular ‘reading’ as the correct one, rather, it is to establish the likely range of meanings”. Hence, may be said that framing is a process of meaning selection within a certain range. Coupling narrative analysis with frame analysis, I expect to widen the room for analysis of the discursive material, while at the same time making this room more structured. When using these two methodological devices for analysis of the interviews, texts from media, observations and events relevant to the research theme, I tried to use them as a kind of double mirror. On the one hand, more ‘tangible’ narrative models explicited in the material might be tested in the light of wider ideational frames used in the social worlds of the informants. On the other hand, meta-message conveyed by frames might be

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9 Actually, Ries acknowledges that the majority of her interlocutors were representatives of the Moscow intelligentsia, although she prefers not to go into detail on this issue.
expressed in more peculiar discursive narrative structures. One may say that back and forth oscillation between ethnography (process of gathering and selecting ‘relevant’ narratives), narrative analysis (distinguishing meaningful patterns, models and plots in them) and frame analysis (explicating a possible meta-message behind patterns, plots and models) has been a concrete realization of the hermeneutic spiral principle in the course of the study.

Keeping in mind that this study is based not solely on discursive data, ethnographic analysis which is not entirely focused on plots, statements and utterances becomes of relevance. Ethnography is a complex methodological stream which provides not only techniques of gathering material (‘gaining access’, ‘looking as well as listening’, ‘recording observations’) but also procedures for analysis of field data (Silverman 2001: 57). In the latter case ethnography envisages “analysis of data that involves explicit interpretations of the meanings and functions of human actions [my emphasis—E.N.], the product of which mainly takes the form of verbal descriptions and explanations, with quantification and statistical analysis playing a subordinate role at most” (ibid: 56-57). Thus, not only verbal statements, but also observed practices and events should be considered as meaning-producing entities yielding comprehension and verbal interpretation.

However, the problem is that although actions and practices can and should be interpreted, they have ontological status that differs them from verbal accounts. Namely, “the essential part of the modus operandi which defines practical mastery is transmitted in practice, in its practical state, without attaining the level of discourse” (Bourdieu 1991: 87). Oftentimes, in order to explain cultural meaning of an action or practice the scholar must address not only discursive material, but also data which may be obtained with help of statistical modeling and quantitative methods (ibid: 21).

Without denying importance and relevance of discursive data for ethnographic analysis, one should not repudiate non-discursive sources that may provide the researcher with a deeper understanding of structural mechanisms that, though being reflected in discursive material, operate beyond the level of conscious linguistic expression. In both cases, however, the researcher should not expect that meaning of textual material, observed events and actions is encapsulated in them and can be easily revealed or ‘excavated’. Instead, the ethnographic analysis encourages theoretical modeling of the material, reformulation of it and the quest for plural sources that can inspire multifaceted interpretations of the investigated phenomena. Such an understanding of vantage points of the (post)modern ethnography as a methodological kit that informs interpretations, critical reflection and representational problematics (Alvesson och Sköldberg 1994: 110) is of principal importance for this study.
Chapter 2. The Research Field: Multietnic, Multicultural, Nationalist Daily

L’viv

2.1. L’viv: an (un)usual borderline city

When conducting a study about intelligentsia in L’viv it would be impossible to overlook one of the crucial factors contributing to specificity of the symbolic sphere and narratives relating to this category of actors—namely, the historical and cultural cityscape of L’viv. This city is an exciting urban space combining trends and features which have made it look exotic and even unique in contexts of different historical epochs, under various political regimes. Due to these features L’viv, while not being a remarkable industrial, administrative or political centre, has acquired a reputation as a place with a distinct *spiritus loci*, as a mythogenic urban space (Grabowicz 2000, Zayarniuk 2008), a site of unique cultural production (Czaplicka 2000) endowed with a special role in the cultural sphere (Szpompuk 2000) and, last but not least, has provided an important case for studies of modernization processes, multiculturality and nationalism in the East-Central European context (see, for example, Albrecht et al. 2003, Czaplicka 2000, Fässler et al. 1998, Henke et al. 2007, Hrytsak 2004, Hrytsak and Susak 2003, Zaliński and Karolczak 1996, 1998). A brief historical review facilitates understanding of the ethnic- and national-related issues making up a background of the analyzed interview material, as well as the issues directly addressed by the informants.

The numerous lines of historical-cultural continuity and discontinuity saturate L’viv’s cityscape and are periodically actualized in daily life and communicative memories of its inhabitants (Czaplicka 2000: 34). Viewed from the present perspective, these lines of continuity/discontinuity oftentimes point to the problematics of being Europe and being with Europe. In the twentieth century L’viv changed its geo-cultural and geopolitical orientation as the city “moved” from the vaguely defined cultural region called Central Europe into the politically defined region called Eastern Europe, the borders of which were demarcated by the politics of the Cold War (ibid: 14). However, the course of events of the last two decades indicates that the city experienced a kind of ‘Central European Renaissance’ (Kenney 2000) in a range of spheres: from creative (re-)appropriation of the latest art and literary trends to practices of the ‘western-styled’ civil society. Hence, the continuity/discontinuity and its actualization in the fabrics of generational transmissions and gaps can be supposedly regarded as organized around the important ‘European’ identity vector.

Specificity of L’viv as a Central European urban microcosm is not in the last turn conditioned by its borderline location. For centuries L’viv has been a crossroad of geopolitical, religious, ‘civilizational’ and ethnocultural borders and frontiers of expansion. In different epochs this middle-sized city was a home for several cultural communities, with Poles, Jews, Germans, Ukrainians, Armenians and Russians as the most significant of them. In this respect L’viv up to the middle of the last century has followed a pattern of
urbanization typical of Central Europe where cities had smaller populations than their counterparts further west (Hrytsak 2002b: 50) and urban populace’s ethnocultural composition was different from the one of the surrounding rural area.

What distinguished L’viv from other European cities was the distinctly multiethnic character of its population whose main ethnocultural and religious groups (Polish Catholics, Jews and Greek-Catholic Ruthenians, later becoming Ukrainians) resisted assimilation (Ther 2000: 262, Hrytsak 2002b: 50). In times preceding the emergence of modern national states and nationalist movements, i.e., from the 16th to the end of the 18th century, “No other city in the Rzeczpospolita (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth…), or perhaps in all Europe, could claim five ethnic groups each comprising over 5 per cent of the population. In its religious composition the city exhibited a similar diversity” (ibid: 50). However, ethnic and religious diversity of the pre-modern urban culture in L’viv has seldom resulted in situations of multicultural mixture or ‘hybridity’, as the city communities mostly lived side by side, but not together with each other, when cultivating their own, rather closed, cultural and economic worlds and distinct religious identities. One may agree that in at least some important respects the story of L’viv is a story of ‘failed multicultural experience’ as “Civic solidarity and cooperation among citizens failed to cross the religious, social, ethnic or, later on, national boundaries” (Hrytsak 2002b: 60). Hence, the city’s turbulent history is full of episodes of the religious and ethnic conflicts, coupled by uprisings provoked by social injustices. Nevertheless, although the city’s ethnic communities lived in a state of ‘distant proximity’, due to daily contacts and the resulting knowledge about each other, “mutual perceptions of different ethnic/national group members were not one-sidedly pejorative, but rather ambivalent, combining both positive and negative elements” (Morawska 2000: 1054).

Under the periods of peace and relative political stability one could find numerous examples of ethnic intermarriages, creative competition and co-operation of different city communities for whom, as it seems to be, their place-based identities (Czaplicka 2000: 38, Ther 2000: 255)—their ‘L’viv-ness’—was often more important than ethnic, religious, and later on also national allegiances. In the daily life of L’vivites free choice of cultural and national orientation was rather a norm than a divergence from it—a situation that can be confirmed by examples of some famous families. Hence, although symbolical boundaries of the city’s ethnocultural and religious communities seem to be quite strict and impenetrable on the level of official representations and policies, the daily grass-root agency of L’viv dwellers exhibits another picture—a situation that may puzzle the researchers who are inclined to write the story of the city and its dwellers along some clear national lines (Czaplicka 2000: 27).

In the modern history of L’viv the period of the Habsburg rule (1772-1918) is regarded as one of the brightest and most prosperous, a period not burdened with escalating ethno-national conflicts. It is a well-

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10 The Szeptyckis brothers provide probably most known example: while Andrei Shepyts’kyi chose Ukrainian identity and became the famous Greek Catholic metropolitan, his brother Stanisław Szeptycki made a carrier as a Polish general.
known fact that the pragmatic Habsburgs were interested in maintaining a balanced and peaceful co-existence among the different ethnic subjects of the Empire. Thus, in L’viv each religious-ethnic group was allowed to establish its own schools and other academic and cultural institutions; tensions between the major antagonistic communities of the city were usually resolved by legal means. Historians also point out that “due to the broad freedom of the press, both Poles and Ukrainians soon learned to carry out their conflicts publicly and in print rather than by force of arms. This heritage of legal and public mediation had an effect long after the demise of the Habsburg Empire” (Ther 2000: 257, see also Hrytsak 1996). Besides, the Habsburg reforms, aimed at fostering modern and loyal subjects of the Empire, resulted in emergence of politically conscious urban intelligentsia and bourgeoisie who catalyzed processes of formation of the modern nations on the scale of the city (Czaplicka 2000: 37). Hence, the Habsburg rule resulted both in formation of a civil society able to restrain ethno-religious conflicts and in foundation of the basis of the modern nationalist movements among Poles, Ukrainians and Jews in L’viv. No wonder that at the end of the twentieth century, after cataclysms of the two world wars, escalation of ethnic tensions in the interwar period when L’viv became a part of the Second Republic of Poland, expulsions and ‘cleansings’ of the postwar time and everything but consistent and tolerant national politics of the Soviets, the Habsburg period, being not at all free from controversies, looked like an almost idyllic epoch in the history of the city. As Czaplicka (2000: 32) points out, “Beside the Greek Catholic Church, another contemporary factor nurturing the culturally distinct character of L’viv in an independent Ukraine is the current nostalgia for the Dual Monarchy. Since independence this period of L’viv’s history has been cultivated to emphasize the city’s ‘European’ connection.”

During World War I and in the interwar period L’viv became an arena of struggle for cultural and political dominance between Polish and Ukrainian nationalist movements that both claimed Galicia to be the Piedmont in their pursuits to unite ‘their’ respective lands in the national states (Ther 2000: 253). As a result of the Ukrainian-Polish war, in 1919 L’viv became a part of the Second Republic of Poland, and due to assimilationist policies of the Polish state the city’s multicultural milieu became more homogenized. However, the paradox of the interwar period in L’viv history was that despite “the sorry record of successive Polish administrations’ policies vis-à-vis the national minorities…, the material, spiritual and political life of the national minorities in interwar Poland was richer and more complex than ever before and after” (Gross 1988: 6). The national minorities, and the Ukrainian one was obviously not an exception, elaborated comprehensive networks of political, cultural, religious and community-oriented institutions which continued traditions of the civil society originated in the Habsburg period. On the other hand, L’viv’s distinctive popular culture, already immortalized before the war in countless street songs, ballads and satirical verses in the local Polish dialect, provided an alternative to identification defined by rigid national lines of division. Although patriotism was constantly present in interwar ‘light-hearted L’viv’, so was “the illusion of a healing environment beyond national boundaries” (Wendland 2005: 147). In the 1920s and 1930s, one can come across numerous
examples of Polish-Ukrainian co-operation and mutual adaptation in the daily life as well as evidence of continuing integration of Galician Ukrainians into the institutions of the Polish state (Fedevych 2009). Nevertheless, the population of L’viv was divided, and in the interwar period L’viv witnessed radicalization of social and national forces, violence and splashes of anti-Semitism that could hardly happen in the Austrian-Hungarian epoch (Ther 2000: 255).

2.2. The ‘most Ukrainian, least Sovietized’ city in Ukraine

The nationality policies of the Soviet who marched into the city in 1939 aggravated the already existing ethnic-national tensions between the city communities. A symbolic Ukrainization of the city was launched, and the Poles began to be portrayed as belonging to a class and a nation of exploiters. At the same time the mass deportations of the ‘exploiter elements’ (among them representatives of intelligentsia) took place. The majority of those deported from L’viv were Poles and Jews, but several thousands of Ukrainians were also sent to the labor camps as their offense lay in opposing nationalization and collectivization as well as alleged support of the Ukrainian nationalists. Despite the escalating terror of the Soviets, Ukrainians, Poles and Jews of the city did not exhibit much solidarity in the face of the common enemy as each national community regarded themselves as the main victim of the conspiracy and intrigues launched against them by their rivals (Ther 2000: 266).

The Nazi’s nationality policies toward the Poles and the Ukrainians were surprisingly similar to the Soviet ones. The same ‘divide and rule’ principle was applied. Hatred toward the Poles and Jews was once again stirred up, the Ukrainians were promised their own state, the formation of the Ukrainian SS division ‘Halychyna’ was allowed. However, Nazi’s flirting with the Ukrainian nationalist movement was very short-lived, and leaders of the nationalist movement as well as numerous common Ukrainians in L’viv fell victim to the repressions. Undoubtedly, the principal victim of the Nazi terror were Jews whose large prewar community was exterminated by 1943 with particular brutality and thoroughness. At the same time, mutual hatred of Poles and Ukrainians culminated in 1943-44 as the detachments of the Polish and Ukrainian radical insurgent movements began to solve their territorial claims in Galicia and Volhynia by the force of their own weapons.

As a result, L’viv, whose material structure and buildings survived the war with only minor damages, suffered enormous human losses. The Soviet Army returning in 1944 found a city whose population was decimated to half of its prewar number (Tscherkes 2000: 210). The Soviet authorities, however, had far-reaching plans to develop the region and to make L’viv an industrial centre of Western Ukraine (which it had never been before, for its significance resulted from its position first and foremost as a cultural, trade and administrative centre in the agrarian and poor Galicia). Thus, the city had to be quickly and massively re-
populated. The ‘problem’ was, however, that many Poles still resided in the city and the region that were ‘reunited’ with the Ukrainian SSR. The presence of a significant Polish minority in Western Ukraine could allegedly endanger the stability of this region so strategically important for the Soviets. Such a view in fact reigned not only among the implementers of the Stalin nationality policies: the Western Allies were also unanimous that a lasting peace in the postwar Europe could be only maintained on the basis of homogeneous national states, the state boundaries of which would correspond with ethnic borders (Ther 2000: 269). Therefore the massive ‘repatriation’ of the Poles behind the redrawn eastern border of Poland and, correspondingly, ‘resettlement’ of the Ukrainians living in the borderline Polish zone to Ukraine was launched. Hence, immediately after the war the native urban population of L’viv shrank further. According to different estimates, it became decimated in the range from 20 to nearly 10 percent of its prewar number (Hrytsak 2002b: 58-59, Tscherkes 2000: 210).

Those who came to the city devastated by the war were for the most part migrants from the nearby countryside, Ukrainian expellees from borderline Polish territories, and the Soviet citizens (mostly Ukrainians from Eastern and Central Ukraine, Russians and Jews) sent there to lead the postwar ‘reconstruction’. The loss of the population was thence quickly compensated. However, even though the postwar city did not become completely homogenized in ethnic terms, the old prewar multicultural and multiethnic L’viv was irrevocably gone. The ethnic composition of L’viv in the middle of the twentieth century was drastically changed. For many centuries Ukrainians made up an ‘indigenous minority’ (the third largest after the Poles and the Jews) in the city surrounded by the Ukrainian countryside. The first census taken after World War II showed, however, that the L’viv population was made up by 60 percent Ukrainians, 27 percent Russians, 4 percent Jews and 4 percent Poles (Ther 2000: 271). Even more important was the drastic change of the old social order and the social composition of the postwar L’viv populace. The city became resided predominantly by people who allegedly had difficulties with identifying themselves with its local color, its ‘exotic’ Central-European architecture and remnants of its high-class and burgher culture. Communicative memory11 of the prewar L’viv, even though not completely lost, got interrupted, and with a new population, the majority of which was already accustomed to the Soviet economic order and mores, L’viv quickly became a Soviet city forced to rapid industrialization (Tscherkes 2000: 210).

This does not, however, mean that L’viv became completely assimilated into the new political and social order. During the entire Soviet period the city was perceived not only by the visitors, but also by its inhabitants as the least Sovietized and most ‘nationalist’ city in Ukraine. Up to the mid-1950s the Ukrainian nationalist underground was active in L’viv and L’viv Province (oblast’), and even several decades after the ‘reunion’ with the USSR the authorities spared no efforts in order to neutralize national sentiments and

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11 Assman and Czaplicka (1995: 126) argue that “the concept of ‘communicative memory’ includes those varieties of collective memory that are based exclusively on everyday communications. These varieties …constitute the field of oral history.”
religiousness of the West Ukrainian populace. It is however notable that while the Soviet ideologists were
determined to put an end to the ‘Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and clericalism’, this rhetoric was not
complemented with equally harsh policies against the accepted forms of Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian
language in the region. Ethnic and linguistic homogenization in the case of L’viv took rather the direction of
Ukrainization than Russification, as the share of Ukrainians and Ukrainian-speakers grew steadily from the
late 1950s and up to the dissolution of the USSR (Szporluk 2000: 305-306, Åberg 2000: 285). The share of
Ukrainian schools in L’viv was highest compared with other Ukrainian cities, a number of academic
institutions were engaged in collection and preservation of the local Ukrainian culture, the city boasted its own
theatre of Ukrainian drama, readers had an opportunity to learn news from several local newspapers in
Ukrainian, local TV and radio stations broadcasted a big share of its production in Ukrainian, and even as the
language of administration Ukrainian has never been completely forced out by the Russian language. All in
all, the reason for persistence of the Ukrainian culture in Western Ukraine was hardly the survival of “pockets
of premodernity”, but rather the pervasive modernization of ethnicity (Bauböck 1996: 92) in the framework
(however limited) provided by the Soviet state.

The plans of the Soviet authorities to turn L’viv into an industrial centre have been, for many
reasons, implemented only partially. L’viv has never become industrial and ‘proletarian’ in a manner that was
typical of the cities in Eastern Ukraine. One of the factors—and also results—of this became national
awareness and Ukrainian cultural affinity of a sufficient part of the new first-generation L’viv urbanites. These
people who filled newly built L’viv factories and plants were still more relying on the familiar ‘individualistic’
rural patterns of everyday life (implying, for example, regular food supplies from the family lots in the native
villages, weekly visits to the relatives in the countryside, regular celebrations of the religious holidays etc.) than
on standardized urban patterns of everyday collective life imposed by the ‘Soviet modernity’ with its
dependency on distribution of goods and services controlled by the state bodies. Consequently, quite
determined wide-scale efforts of the Soviet ideological apparatus to forge a new supra-national identity of the
‘Soviet man’ in the 1970 and 1980s which in fact presupposed a course to Russification, did not reach its aim
in L’viv. Behind the thin Sovietized-Russified surface of urban life a vital body of local Ukrainian dialects,
folklore, humor, mores and material culture continued its unofficial everyday existence (Matyukhina 2000:
16). As Åberg (2000: 292) summarizes the situation in L’viv in the Soviet period,

incomplete Soviet modernization did not lead to the assimilation of Galician Ukrainians; because
changes remained superficial from a cultural and linguistic point of view, they retained aspects of
their pre-Soviet identity and may have continued in certain aspects to distinguish themselves
socially from the Russian population. . . the foundation of West Ukrainian ethno-nationalism in
L’viv—that being an ethnically and linguistically homogeneous community—was being
reconstructed, but along partly new lines.
Hence, while being superficially ‘Sovietized’, many rank-and-file as well as high-positioned L’vivites stubbornly resisted assimilation of their cultural and ethnic distinctive features as Ukrainians into the imposed identity of the ‘Soviet man’\textsuperscript{12}. It may be suggested that it was not only sporadic cases of political resistance or cherished historical memories about national fame and grievances, but the continued awareness of these quotidian cultural distinctions that made mass anti-regime mobilization of L’vivites possible in 1989-1991. In L’viv, where nationalist dissent had never been eliminated, the first cases of mass activism with anti-regime connotations took the form of quite ‘innocent’ cultural movement for preservation of cultural heritage in L’viv. The initiative met with enthusiastic response among the younger generation of L’vivites. Notably, in 1987 one of the initiators of the idea to clear and restore some historical landmarks in L’viv by volunteers was a senior Komsomol leader who published his appeal in a local newspaper (Kenney 2000: 304-305). The cultural Lion\textsuperscript{13} Society (Tovarystvo Leva) that resulted from this successful action soon “became the place for those who hesitated to follow more radical confrontational politics, but who nevertheless wanted to see immediate, concrete change” (ibid: 304). Following the inspiring example of the Lion Society, Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society was organized by a young engineer who allegedly had never been politically active before. Soon the grass-root cultural activity that took the form of discussion forums, public celebrations of folk feasts, organization of voluntary work days for cleaning historical monuments etc. whirled in the city. As one of the activists put it, in \textit{perestroika} times “it was necessary… to create a new Ukrainian culture” since the official one could not inspire and engage the younger generation (ibid: 306).

2.3. Post-Soviet L’viv and the vicissitudes of the local, the national and the glocal

The cultural activism of L’vivites soon resulted in more radical actions and concerns. Only two years passed between the first public ‘mini-nationalist’ (Kenney 2000) action of cleaning graves at the Lychakiv cemetery performed by a handful of devoted L’vivites and the first resounding deeds of the ‘awaked’ nationalism, namely public parading in L’viv streets with the national Ukrainian yellow-and-blue flag, which had been forbidden for several decades, and dismantling of the Lenin monument that was the first political action of this kind in the USSR. Though it would still take two years before the Soviet Union disintegrated, the emphasis shifted from ‘purely’ cultural concerns to raise prestige and increase visibility of both officially accepted and more ‘peripheral’ forms of Ukrainian culture to the formation of popular fronts and political parties (ibid: 310).

\textsuperscript{12} A study of patterns of national identification among residents in L’viv and in East Ukrainian industrial centre Donets’k showed that in 1994 the Soviet identification was still prevailing among Donets’kites (40 to 45 percent), while in L’viv only 4 to 7 percent of the respondents chose ‘the Soviet’ as the identity that described them best (Hrytsak 2000: 266).

\textsuperscript{13} See footnote to p.209.
Thus, the local patriotic or ‘mini-national’ cultural concerns of L’vivites proved to be an important factor contributing to the beginning of large-scale national revival in Ukraine that resulted in declaration of state independence in 1991. Nevertheless, the growth of interest in and concern with Ukrainian culture in L’viv during perestroika did not occur exclusively due to some vestiges of ‘authentic’ Ukrainian-ness that the Soviet regime did not manage to eradicate. On the one hand, West Ukrainian dissent, even though its voices were effectively silenced by the authorities, did a lot for wakening awareness about the Russification policies and the regime’s discrimination against Ukrainian language and culture. However, on the other hand, had it not been for the Soviet state’s generous funding of officially accepted forms of Ukrainian culture and cultivation of local patriotism by intelligentsia, who were at least moderately loyal to the regime, it could be hardly possible to ‘wake up’ the locally-based pride of L’vivites in Ukrainian national culture and history. Hence, one may agree with Alexandra Hrycak (1997) that by the end of the 1980s there already existed elaborated collective action frames that transformed and incorporated cultural and national meanings of L’vivites. When the moment was ripe, these frames became subverted and reinterpreted by the activists in a way that challenged the Soviet state’s monopoly on mass production of discourses of nationhood and nationality. As a result, Western Ukrainians adopted an alternative approach to the Soviet-styled nationalism that was itself nationalist (ibid: 79).

In 1991 Galicianers and especially L’vivites had every reason to be proud as their mass political mobilization as well as enthusiastic daily support of the ideas concerning revival of the Ukrainian nation and culture made the declaration of Ukraine’s state independence possible. The nationalistic myth of L’viv as the capital of the ‘Ukrainian Piedmont’ was revived. Statistics confirms that by that time, and even more in the early 2000s, L’viv was one of the most Ukrainian cities in terms of ethnic—and first of all linguistic—identification of its residents. In 2001 Ukrainians made up 85 percent of the L’viv populace; Russians, whose number constantly declined since the 1950s, were still the largest minority community in the city (12 percent). Although since 1989 there were tensions between these two communities, it is difficult to talk about some large-scale ethnic or political mobilization among the local Russians, on the one hand, or about consistent organized efforts of the Ukrainian majority to present them as foes or scapegoats, on the other hand. Moreover, the recent sociological studies and periodic public opinion polls in L’viv could not point out any significant and durable differences between Ukrainians and Russians in either political preferences or everyday concerns (Davymuka and Kolodii 2001). Statistically much more significant differences have been found in this regard between L’viv and the cities of the industrial Russified east than between the Russian and Ukrainian communities within the city (Hrytsak 2000). Thus, despite sensational media accounts and popular stereotypes, present-day L’viv can hardly be described as a site of intense ethnic-national confrontation. Moreover, indicators of current processes of acculturation of Russians into the Ukrainian community can be observed (Druil’ 2002). A factor that still significantly influences the character of the city’s daily culture and its
further Ukrainization is the prevalence of first-generation urbanites in its social structure (nearly two thirds). Because of this, according to the recent poll, the local identity as a L’vivite and Galicianer is of importance for only approximately 20 percent of L’viv residents (Postup 26.05.2006). The vast majority of the L’viv populace chooses identification with more ‘abstract’ and inclusive communities, first and foremost in terms of citizenship and nationality.

Often represented as the ‘least Sovietized’ and ‘most Ukrainian’ city, post-1991 L’viv did not, however, gain much in the first decade of Ukrainian independence in terms of economic and social development. In the witty words of an American journalist, “no Ukrainian city is more European and democratic. And few are poorer” (quoted in Hrytsak 2002b: 60). The Soviet modernization policies led to even higher homogenization of the Ukrainian population in L’viv and thus created a social base for mass national mobilization when the reform movement started from below at the turn of the 1990s (Åberg 2000: 295). However, the consequences of these (in many ways unsuccessful) policies in other spheres proved to be disastrous. The late and relatively weak industrialization and correspondingly modest urbanization in Galicia (ibid: 287) put the region in a backward economic position already in Soviet times, and the situation was further aggravated in the 1990s, when the transition to the free market economy hit even more economically competitive parts of Ukraine hard (ibid: 3). Although in conditions of the economic crisis of the 1990s L’viv’s numerous institutes and universities continued to graduate highly qualified specialists, a plenty of them were doomed to join a huge army of the unemployed.

All these factors, corroborated by the slow pace of economic and political reforms in the 1990s, led to a rapid decline of living standards in L’viv, especially among the employees at state enterprises and intelligentsia. Under these conditions the borderline location of the city and the suspended restrictions for travelling abroad have provided many L’vivites with a way of survival. Even though the economic collapse of the 1990s was halted, still, at the beginning of the 2000s wages from sufficiently well-paid regular jobs were named as the source of subsistence only by 10 percent of Galicianers. A significant share of the work force from L’viv and the region (according to approximate appreciations, from nearly 6 (Davymuka and Kolodii 2001: 317) to almost 20 percent (Kupol 02.04.2003)) still earn their living as Gastarbeiter in the West, and the number of those who already have the experience of economic migration or would like to emigrate is much higher (Davymuka and Kolodii 2001: 318-319). Economic migration is in no way a new phenomenon in Galicia, which experienced the massive exodus of the pauperized peasants to Europe and America in the nineteenth century. The character of present-day economic migration is, however, quite different. The modern
economic (often illegal) migrants from Galicia are generally younger, better educated and qualified, and the 'money-earning' (zarobitchanstvo) suddenly became a mass phenomenon which increasingly defines realities of the city’s demographical, economic and cultural life for better and worse. The situation may look quite strange if one takes into account that Galicia is the most ‘nationally oriented’ part of Ukraine: “Earlier Ukrainians left not their land, but the alien state, as at that time economic problems were coupled with national and religious discrimination exercised by the government of prewar Poland. Nowadays people are ready to leave their own state which they longed for and which they have become disappointed in” (ibid: 319). Dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs in L’viv finds its expression not only in quests for income and better life somewhere else, but is also reflected in sympathy for the ideas of regional autonomy among the educated L’vivites (see chapter 8).

Hence, everyday life in L’viv as a city in the independent Ukraine continues to be colored by the collisions and constellations of the local, the national and the global. For a while it looked like the city, while being able to cope with most urgent economic problems, became more peripheral in cultural terms and simultaneously began to loose its leading positions as a centre of national revival (and nationally conscious intelligentsia) to Kyiv. However, the events of the Orange Revolution were a turning point. They demonstrated that the level of political and cultural mobilization among L’vivites and Galicianers who travelled in mass to demonstrate against the election fraud in autumn 2004 could be rapidly increased from nearly latent to unusually active. The new identifications and narratives—not least those developed and propagated by urban intelligentsia during the years of Ukraine’s existence as an independent state with open-to-the-world and (hesitating, but preponderant) European orientation—made possible this wide-scale political action which has been viewed as a national revolution and as the symbolical end of the post-Soviet era in Ukraine.
Chapter 3. Subject under Scrutiny: Intelligentsia, Intellectuals and Articulation of the Nation

3.1. Conceptualizations of the nexus intelligentsia/intellectuals

Building academic knowledge is largely a process of defining boundaries between conceptual cases, and of labeling these cases and the relationships between them (Jaworski and Coupland 1999: 4). How one defines and operationalizes the studied object, is not only a matter of principal theoretical importance but also a procedure that facilitates selection of the relevant empirical material. Hence, this chapter outlines those conceptualizations of ‘intelligentsia’ which I regard as especially relevant to my study. It also outlines conceptual parameters and possible theoretical approaches that may advance the understanding of mutual articulation of intelligentsia and ‘the national’ in Western Ukraine.

“Unlike the race, nation is incomplete without its ‘conscience arousing’ spokesmen; unlike the race, nation includes consciousness among its defining attributes” (Bauman 1992b: 686). When and where national identity becomes increasingly accepted as one of the basic organizing principles of the everyday relations (Greenfeld 1992: 13-14), this consciousness and its intellectual elaboration is no longer a prerogative of a particular actor. It has been assumed that, although intellectual constructions are still important in reproduction of ‘the national’, one cannot with certainty point out some ‘typical’ recognizable actors producing intellectual discourses about nation and nationalism (Kennedy and Suny 1999: 402-403). Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that some actors, categories and/or groups, are involved in discussion and legitimation of national identities, ideologies and mythologies on a more ‘professional’, influential and interested basis than others. Hence, instead of focusing on the abstract notion of ‘national consciousness’ one should examine availability of a concrete politically influential cultured elite and the ideological products of its identity-constructing activities as a crucial criterion for existence of the nation (Krejci and Velínsky 1996: 209).

It is difficult to distinguish cultural elites, intellectuals, intelligentsia, ‘literati ruling elites’ (Duara 1996) or ‘knowledge class’ (Kennedy and Suny 1999) as bounded and solidary groups. It has been pointed out that elites, including cultural elites may be “notoriously difficult to track. Like secret societies, they are among the most inaccessible elements of society, and imprecise boundaries keep them so” (Keller 1999: 357, see also Hroch 1985: 15, Gella 1976: 10). Besides, clearly distinguishable bounded groups are not the only possible modality of social organization: ‘groupness’ both intersects and exists parallel with categories, networks, identifications and other types of social co-ordinates (Brubaker 2004: 3-4). I define the studied subjects as ‘intelligentsia’—a more or less ‘native’ term applied in Ukraine and L’viv. However, both in its emic and etic applications the term is anything but clear and one-dimensional. It is hardly necessary to give an all-embracing definition of what or who are intelligentsia. Instead, it is more important to explore where intelligentsia is
located in the system of socio-cultural co-ordinates and how *intelihenty* and intelligentsia are presented by themselves and by the others in particular contexts and historical situations (Bauman 1987: 8, Kurtzman and Owens 2002: 80).

The word ‘intelligentsia’ is often used parallel or as a substitute of the closely related term ‘intellectuals’. According to the established view, intelligentsia is a historical Eastern European variant of intellectuals. As a product of specific conditions prevailing in Eastern Europe—among them political autocracy, national suppression and a weakly developed market economy—the ‘classical’ intelligentsia of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century was a definite “social group with its own distinctive values, cultural styles, networks of marriage and friendship, and sense of collective identity” (Karabel 1996: 215). In the West capitalism and secularism produced professionals, while Eastern Europe, oscillating between feudalism and capitalism, gave birth to intelligentsia (Szelenyi 1982: 308). According to adherents of the strictly historical approach, one should make a clear distinction between the concepts of intellectuals and intelligentsia, because the latter one is a denomination of a *unique* historical actor located in the nineteenth-century Eastern European (mostly Russian and Polish) context (Gella 1976: 10-12, Zarycki 2003: 92-93). Other scholars argue, however, that intelligentsia should be considered in terms of historical tradition which, under favorable conditions, was transmitted to later periods (Bauman1987a). For example, Tromly concludes that in the Soviet epoch

Intelligentsia was neither a group that can be defined in social terms nor even a firm and predictable collectivity of people united by common ideas. Instead, intelligentsia was a historically constructed template or model of how the intellectual was to fit into Soviet society. . . .Intelligentsia was an idea about how educated citizens could understand their relationships to higher knowledge, the Party state, and the Soviet people (Tromly 2007: 18).

I maintain that intelligentsia should not be seen as a ‘typical’ attribute of a certain historical period and place. For example, one may speak about intelligentsia when discerning subdivisions within middle-classes that cannot be defined as professionals (Szelenyi 1982: 308) or when education systems of any society produce more highly educated people than can be absorbed into the professions and state administrations and whose cultural distinction is supported, not in the last turn, by the powers that be (Roberts et al. 2004: 116). It is possible to talk about intelligentsia in the West, as well as in twentieth-century Eastern Europe, as about “a collective actor, without specific historical reference, which also has the status of a tradition in that it provides contemporary intellectuals with a model of collective behavior” (Eyerman 1994: 16, 21-23). Such a model implies responsibility for the community, aspiration towards public recognition and advocacy of the ‘cultural’.

What kind of social phenomenon is intelligentsia compared with (or contrasted to) intellectuals? Are they endowed with some distinct features in the so-called post-Communist and post-Soviet contexts? Some authors distinguish between and even contrast intelligentsia and intellectuals as terms which are applied
to social actors with not only historically, but substantially differing properties. For example, the doyen of
sociology Max Weber described the latter ones as “aristocracy of education… a definite stratum of the
population without personal interest in economics” (Weber 1991: 371). In his writings intelligentsia and
intellectuals appear as different ideal types of actors. For Weber intellectuals manifested themselves first and
foremost as creative avant-garde of the society, as producers of those intellectual goods that are later
disseminated and consumed by wider circles. Intelligentsia is portrayed as a ‘transmission belt’ that constantly
remolds and simplifies the ideas produced by the leading intellectuals. However, the more important
distinction between intelligentsia and intellectuals is an ideological one. Intelligentsia is described as better
disposed to use ideologies for its own immediate advantage. By contrast, the intellectuals’ attitude is reputedly
less determined by considerations of practical benefit as their material interests are counterbalanced, preceded

Weber’s normative-oriented conceptualization of intellectuals and intelligentsia is still credited,
among others, in the field of nationalism studies (see Hroch 1985, Smith 1991). One may still come across
trenchant formulations in which the term ‘intellectual’ is reserved “for the person in search of truth, driven by
the quest to explore, to unveil, to connect, to understand, and the term ‘intelligentsia’ for the person who puts
the quest for power of any kind above the quest for truth” (Galtung 2002: 65). Even though such description
of intelligentsia as ‘mercantilizing’ intellectuals is discussible, nevertheless, attempts to separate analytically these
two concepts are justified. The opinion that ‘intellectuals’ is a more comprehensive and general term than
‘intelligentsia’ is widely accepted in sociology. For example, Gouldner (1979) argued that under both market
capitalism and state socialism intellectuals are communities addressing a secular and theoretically oriented
‘culture of critical discourse’. However, in the socio-historical context of capitalist modernity the culture of
critical discourse leads to professionalization, while “in prerevolutionary Eastern Europe and more so in the
area after the socialist transformation—the teleological component of intellectual knowledge is not
subordinated to technical know-how: intellectuals are not defined as professionals but, rather, as intelligentsia”
(Szelenyi 1982: 307). Although both intellectuals and intelligentsia “demonstrate in some generally accessible
fashion the superiority of their knowledge, rather than just their special competence” (Kennedy 1992: 70), the
latter ones may be viewed as an ideologically oriented faction of intellectuals who not only accumulate cultural
authority, but also assume leadership in defining strategic aims of societal development (Bauman 1987b: 25).

Vaguely defined ‘creative powers’ of intellectuals and ‘distinctive’ cultural identity of
intelligentsia have also been discussed as criteria for distinction between these categories (Kennedy 1990: 70).

14 Differences between these two categories, especially in the context of East-Central Europe, may be
formulated on the basis of different principles, but, generally, “When intellectual is considered the subset
of the intelligentsia, (1) the former is distinguished from the larger category by creative powers and a
capacity for self definition. When the intelligentsia is distinguished from the larger category of
intellectuals, (2) they are generally identified by their inclination for teleological reasoning or their
distinctive cultural identity” (Kennedy 1992: 70).
It is also possible to translate these differences into the ‘etic’-level language. Then one may argue that intelligentsia and intellectuals relate to different types of exercising power (respectively, authority and persuasion). Further, I will argue that, as analysis of the L’viv material suggests, the conceptual demarcation line between these two categories is evident as their discourses and practices are pre-defined by the conceptual spaces which intelligentsia and intellectuals appropriate or claim for appropriation as “the territory for legislative practices” (Bauman 1987b: 5).

3.2. Class belongingness of intellectuals

Bringing the concept of power into the discussion about intelligentsia and intellectuals means bringing in the issue of interests, resources, means and conditions of exercising power, as well as lines of solidarity and conflict—in other words, the spectrum of questions embedded in the debate on class belongingness. Since the time of its foundation in the first decades of the twentieth century, the sociology of intellectuals adopted several approaches to ‘class location’ of intellectuals. Some of these approaches are normative, attempting to define intellectuals in terms of the desired or expected capacities and characteristics, while others take a more functional stance in their efforts to bound intellectuals as actually existing actors and milieus distinguished due to their societal roles.

According to Kurzman and Owens (2002), intellectuals mainly have been viewed in three class-related perspectives: as class-less, class-bound or as a class-in-themselves. The first perspective in the debate on political commitments and class affinity of intellectuals was partially advocated by one of the co-founders of the modern sociology of intellectuals, Karl Mannheim. He argued that ‘free floating’ (*frei schwebende*) intelligentsia strive to attain independence from social determinants and not to be bound to any socially determined category, even though objectively they cannot escape being embedded in structural positions. Adherents of classlessness of the intellectuals have generally advocated the normative view that intellectuals are “necessary *not* among the primary holders of political power or controllers of economic resources” (Parsons 1969: 11, quoted in Kurzman and Owens 2002: 68). Hence, their social activities are presented as inspired by non-material concerns, their social roles emphasize universalistic values and norms. The intellectuals advocating interests of certain political powers and ‘selling themselves’ are oftentimes pointed out as violators of intellectual autonomy. Authors representing this approach (among others, Benda 1969, Aron 1955, Shils 1958) tend to construct their subjects much in the Swiftean style, as an island drifting above the ground, populated with a special kind of people endowed with a strong sense of responsibility and other ‘universal’ moral virtues. This argument has been an attractive mode of *self-presentation* adopted by some factions of intellectuals. In East-Central Europe such self-presentation used to be typical of the regime-critical (dissident) intellectuals and especially of the ‘old’ intelligentsia, who “struggled to be as independent (i.e., as
‘over-class’ minded) as their ideal type prescribed” (Gella 1989: 133). This mode of viewing intellectuals and their roles has also been advocated in some recent works. For example, Eyerman (1994: 6) maintains that

Intellectuals are not a class in … [an] (economic) sense but a social category outside class relations, strictly defined, because their collective identity forms around other kinds of interests than those related to social position or for that matter social status. Intellectuals, or, as I will most often call them when referring to a collective, the intelligentsia, form a social category which takes form in varying social and cultural contexts in relation to norms and traditions reaching back to pre-industrial society. …Intellectuals are first of all that social category which performs the task of making conscious and visible the fundamental notions of a society.

An alternative approach takes a more sociologically justified stance and conceptualizes intellectuals as class-bound actors whose interests and ethos are anything but universal or impartial. According to one of the most prominent advocates of this view, Antonio Gramsci, every class produces its own ‘organic’ intellectuals who serve interests of this class (Gramsci 1971: 5). Later on Foucault developed this line of argument, when assuming that nowadays “Intellectuals have got used to working, not in the modality of the ‘universal’, the ‘exemplary’, the ‘just-and-true-for-all’, but within their specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life and work situate them” (Foucault 1980: 126). ‘Universal’ intellectuals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the more typical of present day ‘specific’ intellectuals derive from different societal sectors and speak for different cases. Unlike their ‘universal’ counterparts, ‘specific’ intellectuals are not bearers of universal values, but rather discourse producers operating and struggling for regimes of truth relevant in particular locations. Being masters of these regimes of truth, intellectuals may concentrate in their hands significant political power and cultural influence (ibid: 128-133). In a similar vein, Bauman (1987b: 17) concluded that, generally, intellectuals may hardly be associated with some certain group or strata as they articulate various structures of domination.

The ‘class-bound’ strand in the sociology of intellectuals presents quite a nuanced and sociologically relevant account of the embedment of these actors in diverse struggles for power and dominance. However, this approach has its disadvantages. One of them is, figuratively speaking, the failure of not seeing the forest for the trees. Despite different interests, lifestyles, political orientations, as well as lack of definitely pronounced class solidarity and joint political action, intellectuals still may be conceptualized as a particular social category whose specificity is determined, among other things, by the particular discursive ‘arsenal’ they use in social struggles for reproduction and domination. Besides, using arguments applied in the New Class theory, intellectuals may be generally viewed as agents occupying a certain economically determined position in the societal structure. Namely, they participate in the institutions of expropriation of surplus and have a particular interest in maintaining a monopoly on specific knowledge (Szelenyi 1982: 300-305).

Therefore, the third approach that reckons intellectuals as a particular class or at least class-like
entity provides quite powerful arguments about their sociological character. Both Marxian and Weberian theoretical frames are seminal in the present-day debate; some of the most promising conceptualizations in contemporary sociology of intellectuals are informed by a synthesis of these two streams (McNall, Levine and Fantasia 1991: 17-38). However, there are important differences between the two approaches. Marxism-inspired writers claim that in the two-poled model of distribution of economic and social power intellectuals rather belong to the dominant pole. As a subdivision of the middle classes they might become (especially in the period of state socialism in East Europe and Soviet Union) the embryo of a new dominant class in statu nascendi15 (Szelényi 1982, Konrád and Szelényi 1979). The Weberian approach is rather non-dualistic as it assumes that not only economic criteria, but also education, professional credentials and status precondition social closure and class and status group formation in industrial societies. Despite their privileged position in the cultural sphere, location of the intellectuals in the social structure does not give them a similarly privileged basis for making claims to power in the economic and political spheres (Karabel 1996: 208). Hence, in the class structure generic to modern societies the stratum of intellectuals can be definitely placed neither among the dominant nor the dominated ones (Giddens 1973: 107, Wacquant 1991: 51).

3.3. Bourdieu’s conceptualization of intellectuals as cultural producers

The recent critique of Marxian and Weberian class analyses emphasizes that both approaches initially suffer from several similar shortcomings. One of them is tendency to treat classes and strata as essential, static and ahistorical (Wacquant 1991: 51). Acknowledgement of the idea that classes are constituted out of a complex relationship of structures and agency and that both political, economic and symbolic factors necessarily play a crucial role in the formation and reproduction of classes (ibid: 51) is one of the foundations which Bourdieu’s influential theoretical contribution to the sociology of intellectuals is based on. I regard Bourdieu’s theoretical suggestions as the vantage point of my own study and therefore present here an extended review of his approach to the intellectuals.

For Bourdieu, intellectuals are in the first turn symbolic or cultural producers strategically situated for shaping the character of class relations. In his works on intellectuals in France (for example, Bourdieu 1988, 1996), he was mostly preoccupied with intellectuals in arts and humanities. Bourdieu consequently

15 Important arguments against the New Class theory have been raised by Kennedy (1992: 42), Frentzel-Zagórska and Zagórski (1989) and Daskalov (1996). The latter has pointed out that “the central thesis of Konrad and Szelényi—that under state socialism the intelligentsia was well on the way to becoming a ruling class—is strongly exaggerated. …calling the ruling elites intelligentsia is …strongly problematic; besides, technocrates are not intelligentsia in the historical tradition of eastern Europe. Furthermore, the broad strata of intelligentsia can hardly be called a dominant class, as they did not take part in the political decision-making and could not influence the economic management and the distribution of resources. A more cautious formulation… would be that the intelligentsia was a beneficiary of the ‘rational distribution’ system, but then the question arises to what extent this was so” (Daskalov 1996: 75).
refused to give a definition of the boundaries of the sociological category ‘intellectuals’ in line with his argument that the definition of boundaries of social groups and classes occurs in the process of social struggle which is first and foremost competition over power and privilege to make legitimate classifications and representations of the social world (Swartz 1997: 186). Since definitions of the social groups are in themselves objects of struggle and conflict, they cannot be definitely mapped by social scientists. Instead, they take shape only through actual mobilization of individuals into groups (ibid: 148).

Following Bourdieu, one may hardly assume that intellectuals are a cohesive, clearly bounded and self-conscious aggregate of individuals with shared characteristics. Despite the fact that they play an important role in struggles for social and political domination, have strategic interests in widening the scope and enhancing convertibility of the specific power recourse called by Bourdieu ‘cultural capital’, and occupy a certain location in the hierarchy of social positions, for him they do not constitute a proper social class. Intellectuals are rather a “dominated fraction of the dominant class” (Bourdieu 1990: 145). Being a kind of ‘cultural bourgeoisie’, the intellectuals expose posture and conduct correlating with those ones of the dominant classes. Intellectuals are regarded as privileged actors whose capability to exercise considerable power is based on their possession of highly valued cultural capital. However, though cultural capital is a resource granting intellectuals sufficient conceptual autonomy from political and economic poles of dominance, it is, in final account, convertible into economic capital. Therefore intellectuals are ‘the dominated ones’ in regard to those groups and fractions disposing larger economic resources. This vision of intellectuals’ position within the structure of social hierarchy generally correlates with Marxist tradition which mostly views intellectuals as unable to generate particular common interests and to demonstrate joint political action different from the one of capitalist class or labor class (Swartz 1997: 224).

Nevertheless, unlike adherents of ‘conventional’ Marxism, Bourdieu regards culture not as a reflection or empirical concretization of social class structure, but as an important constituent feature of social class (ibid: 151). That is why Bourdieu’s conceptualization of intellectuals as cultural producers is more sophisticated than a simple definition of their location on the map of class positions. Bourdieu (1990: 138) assumes that

The struggle over classifications is a fundamental dimension of class struggle. The power to impose and to inculcate a vision of divisions, that is, the power to make visible and explicit social divisions that are implicit, is political power by excellence. It is the power to make groups, to manipulate the objective structure of society.

Even though the intellectuals are not a ‘class-for-themselves’, they are indispensable for mediation of class relations as the operation of power requires legitimation and misrecognition (Swartz 1997: 220). Moreover, being entitled to speak publicly and officially on behalf of the ‘people’, the nation or any other imagined social collectivity, and being recognized as legitimate spokespersons of these collectivities, the intellectuals make the
people’ and the nation a social reality (Bourdieu 1990: 139).

As acknowledged symbolic producers, intellectuals also have a monopoly to ‘distillate’ symbolic capital from the cultural capital in their possession. Symbolic capital is tightly connected to economic, social and cultural capital. It transforms them so that they become misrecognised, i.e., it disguises the underlying interested relations as disinterested pursuits (for example, as ‘purely spiritual’, or ‘universal’ concerns). Symbolic capital is, in other words, a significant access that is not perceived as access or credit but as legitimate demand for recognition, deference, obedience, or the services of others (Swartz 1997: 90). Symbolic capital, in its turn, can be transformed into symbolic power. According to Bourdieu,

Symbolic power, whose form par excellence is the power to make groups [my emphasis—E.N.]… rests on two conditions. Firstly, as any form of performative discourse, symbolic power has to be based on the possession of symbolic capital. The power to impose upon other minds a vision, old or new, of social divisions depends on the social authority acquired in previous struggles. Symbolic capital is a credit; it is the power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition. …Secondly …[symbolic power is the power to make things with words [my emphasis—E.N.]. It is only if it is true, that is, adequate to things, that description makes things. In this sense, symbolic power is a power of consecration and revelation, the power to consecrate or to reveal things that are already there (Bourdieu 1990: 137-138).

Symbolic power as a privilege and monopoly to classify the social world is preponderantly wielded by intellectuals in two domains: morality and ethics (as one of their cornerstones is the ‘good’/‘evil’ dichotomy) and politics (because “politics is organized around the basic contrast between friend and foe” (Margalit 1997: 78)). Intellectuals’ privilege to legitimate the principles of “vision and division” (Bourdieu 1994: 132) in these and other spheres (much like their own practices and predilections), however, does not stem directly from their position in class hierarchies. Bourdieu does hold a class perspective on modern societies, but for him the effects of class location, milieu and context of intellectuals as well as other groups and communities are always mediated through the conceptual structures he calls ‘fields’.

3.4. The concept of intellectual field

Field is a key spatial metaphor in Bourdieu’s sociology. A field has been conceptualized as a structured space organized around specific types of capital or combinations of capital. Fields are important sites where struggles that shape cultural production take place (Swartz 1997: 117). Bourdieu introduces the concept of intellectual fields in order to designate combinations of various arenas of production, institutions, organizations and markets in which symbolic producers compete. Intellectual fields as theoretical construction mediating class locations and social practices represent Bourdieu’s endeavor to transcend interpretations of
intellectuals which emphasize either the power of ideas or the decisive role of political and economic interests to the exclusion of the others (ibid: 233).

A structural factor which discerns the intellectual field among other fields is its relative autonomy. Economic and social events can only affect parts of the intellectual field according to a specific logic which makes them undergo conversion of meaning and value and become objects of reflection and imagination (Bourdieu 1969: 119). The roles allotted to the artist or the intellectual vary depending on the degree of autonomy they expose:

At one extreme, the function of expert, or technician, offering his or her symbolic services to the dominant... and, on the other hand, at the other extreme, the role, won and defended against the dominant, of the free, critical thinker, the intellectual who uses his or her specific capital, won by virtue of autonomy and guaranteed by the very autonomy of the field, to intervene in the field of politics... (Bourdieu 1990: 145).

Competition waged in an intellectual field is, in principle, a competition between actors who consecrate their cultural legitimacy in line with fundamentally opposed principles of personal authority and institutional authority. In an intellectual field actors implement two basic types of creative project in opposition and complementarity to each other: ‘curators of culture’ are ‘responsible for cultural propaganda and for organizing the apprenticeship which produces cultural devotion’, while ‘creators of culture’ bring in “irregular lightning flashes of a creation which has no legitimation principle but itself’ (Bourdieu 1969: 110). In translation to the terms of this study, intelligentsia (‘curators of culture’) and intellectuals (‘creators of culture’) are actors in an intellectual field who wage their competition on the basis of both complementing and opposed principles of institutional authority and personal authority.

The principal aim of the parties competing within the fields (for instance, representatives of younger or older generations, men and women, ‘orthodox’ and ‘heterodox’ intellectuals etc.) is to increase their share of cultural capital and to secure the right to exercise symbolic power. Given that the struggles within the fields of cultural production are competitions grounded in ‘doxa’ (i.e., presuppositions which are taken for granted) that is commonly shared by the incumbents, and for the unchangeable stakes (monopoly of scientific authority, ‘taste’ etc.), these fields may be regarded primarily as the sites of reproduction rather than transformation of the existing social order. When competing within various intellectual fields, intellectuals (re-)produce cultural distinctions and obtain rewards over other actors seeking similar outcomes. Hence, intellectuals competing in the intellectual fields help to legitimate the dominant cultural order and reproduce the class structure (Swartz 1997: 134).

Bourdieu’s conceptualization of the intellectual fields predominately as sites of social class reproduction is not uncontroversial. It may be realistic as depiction of a certain tendency, but it is difficult to imagine that intellectual fields viewed as sites of permanent struggles cannot produce—at least presumably—
other outcomes than perpetual reproduction of the same power structures. Under certain political and economic conditions intellectuals indeed can mobilize others and be mobilized themselves in struggle for change of the existing power balance (Karabel 1996). In any case, the concept of intellectual field is an advantageous alternative to ‘groups’, ‘milieus’, ‘contexts’ and other metaphors which presuppose the existence of the more or less bounded community of cultural producers.

Bourdieu’s theoretical suggestion to investigate the fields of cultural production has been successfully realized in the empirical scholarship, including studies of the intellectuals under state socialist regimes and in post-Communist Eastern Europe. In her studies on identity and cultural politics in state socialist Romania, Katherine Verdery (1991a, 1991b) approaches intellectuals in accordance with claims and resources they employ in social struggles and with their role in societal legitimation. For her, intellectuals are rather a social space than a category of people (Verdery 1991b: 428-9). In a similar vein, Eyerman suggests that the intellectual should be understood “as a situated social practice, not a fixed quality, and intellectuals by the specific social relations which constitute that practice” (Eyerman 1994: 6). Also, Bauman (1987b: 19) suggested locating the category of the intellectual “within the structure of the larger society as a ‘spot’, a ‘territory’ within such a structure; a territory inhabited by a shifting population, and open to invasions, conquests and legal claims as all ordinary territories are.”

I assume that, indeed, it may be analytically more promising to discuss intellectuals not as a group or milieu, but as a ‘space’. Moreover, it makes sense to explore ‘intellectual’ not as a substantive, but rather as an adjectival social form (be it intellectual fields, spaces or ‘habitats of meanings’ (Hannerz 1996)). Nevertheless, provided the ethnographic profile of my study which presupposes that the researcher focuses on a concrete sample of relevant informants, it was necessary to operationalize the working concept. In her masterly study on culture of the middle-class in the USA and France, Michèle Lamont pointed out that when trying to delineate her sample, she chose to focus on “individuals who have at their disposal common categorization systems to differentiate between insiders and outsiders, and common vocabularies and symbols through which they create a shared identity. Interviewees who share such categories can be considered to be members of the same symbolic community…” (Lamont 1992: 15). In my pursuit to get in contact with such a symbolic community I delineated a combination of several observable and ‘tangible’ characteristics which could signal that persons in question are likely to share common categorization systems and vocabularies: 1) higher education and professional activity; 2) self-identification; 3) aspiration to public recognition of one’s own views, in particular, the views having to do with Ukrainian-ness, nationality and national identity (as reflected in one’s printed production or/and in one’s public activity). Thus, the practical choice of the informants was mainly guided by structural criteria and discursive production.
3.5. Intellectuals and the terrain of the national: mutual articulation and contradictions

Given that intellectuals are a fluctuating composition both betwixt and between and inside various institutionalized locations, as well as a social constellation located in various intellectual and cultural fields, they can be used by different political forces for various aims. While some intellectuals are engaged in unmasking of exploitation and oppression, others generate mystifications which help existing relations of power to flourish (Kennedy and Suny 1999: 15). However, given that nationalism is an extremely effective generator of popular mobilization, both intellectual elites and counter-elites use national(ist) rhetoric as a means for promotion of their ‘civilizing’ and populist projects (Bauman 1992b: 689). As Max Weber observed, “just as those who wield power in the polity invoke the idea of the state, the intellectuals are especially predestined to propagate the ‘national’ idea” (Weber 1978: 925-926, quoted in Karabel 1996: 230). This predisposition to become the catalysts of the national (discourses, ‘idea’, ideologies, rhetoric, movements, emotions etc.) is habitually pointed out as one of the distinguishable features of the classical East-Central European intelligentsia (Bauman 1987a, Gella 1976). Being subjects of multinational empires, classical intelligentsia turned its keen awareness of cultural, ethnic and national distinctions into one of the basic components of its narrative identity. East-Central European intelligentsia consequently fostered a sense of patriotism and responsibility for one’s nation, up to the belief that progress of a nation might with all certainty depend on level of cultural sophistication of its intelligentsia.

Issues of intersection and correlation of class and national identity are among the most discussed and contested in sociological literature. The recent debate concerning the class-bound approach to intellectuals actualized the issue of whether they can construct the community in which they claim to be ‘organic’, or whose spokespersons they may appoint themselves to be (Kurzman and Owens 2002: 74). Cultural elites indeed often take upon themselves the most visible, though not exceptional or unique part in definition of national communities by way of engaging themselves enthusiastically in their discursive creation from the existent cultural, ethnic and historical material (Kennedy and Suny 1999). Gellner (1997: 65-66) and Anderson (1997: 50) present cultural and academic elites as core figures in the processes of formation of the modern nations. Hobsbawm (1983: 302) and Smith (1982) assume that identification with nation has been an important component in the middle-classes’ and intelligentsia’s sense of collectivity. Thus, middle classes and especially professionals in the spheres of cultural and academic production are not only ‘legislators and interpreters’ of the national idea for the rest of society, but, one may argue, ‘nation’, ‘nationality’ and ‘nationhood’ are a central organizing subject in their own class/strata narrative identity (Steinmetz 1992: 501).

It would be wrong to deny the role of comprehensive social frames and the macro-social dynamics underpinning processes of formation of the modern nations. It would also be pointless to question that the popular movements and modern states exploiting national(istic) ideology cause wider social effects. Neither can the active role of particularly enthusiastic factions of intellectuals in discursive
scaffolding and (re-)defining of the nations be ignored. Kennedy and Suny (1999: 402-403) call them national intellectuals and assume that ‘a national intellectual is a social actor whose claim to distinction rests primarily on his/her claim to cultural competence and whose social consequence is indirect, through the use of their symbolic products as resources in other activities constructing the nation, whether through histories, poetry or organizing pamphlets’. This social actor is reputedly most discernable in the earlier stages of nation-making. However, once the nation becomes the naturalized form of political community, other actors compete with the nationalist intellectuals for the right to legitimate and articulate the nation (ibid: 402). Hence, “By considering nonnationalist intellectuals, and those conventionally not included in a narrower understanding of the intellectuals, we can see more clearly the nation’s lability” (ibid: 388). Nevertheless, even though analysis of ‘the national’ cannot be reduced to the nationalist intellectuals, still, focusing on intellectuals is crucial provided their significant role in forming of ‘the quiet politics of nationalism’ that predetermines the whole spectrum of the state’s and society’s reactions to the political and social issues: “In their contestation of the meanings of the nation intellectuals are disproportionately involved in such quiet politics. … Intellectuals … are the creators, not only of nationalisms, but of the …language and universe of meaning in which nations become possible” [my emphasis—E.N.] (ibid: 2).

But how is it possible that ‘national’ and other kinds of intellectuals manage to create meaningful universes where nations can exist as quasi-primordial entities? One of the possible answers is that intellectuals’ position as “legislators and interpreters” (Bauman 1987b), which is consecrated by political and social powers, creates preconditions for developing discursive strategies which endow nation with its irrefutable legitimacy and almost sacral status. Duara (1996) suggests that one may analytically distinguish symbolic and discursive levels in the formation of meaning of a nation. The symbolic level includes the whole spectrum of community’s cultural practices, i.e., rituals, festivities, forms of kinship etc. From this point of view nation is perceived as a result of the ‘objective’ historical and contemporary boundary processes separating members of national community from non-members. The discursive level comprises linguistic and rhetoric phenomena, narratives and ideological figures created by historians, pamphleteers and other representatives of the ‘knowledge class’. On this level nation is constructed mainly through symbolic linguistic mechanisms charging agency in public spheres with both rational and emotional significance (Duara 1996: 165). Thus, discursive constructions refracted through certain established and approbated symbolic means may create illusion of the objective existence of the nation as an essential community.

Effectiveness of intellectuals in elaboration of nation-legitimizing discourses can also lead to the argument that national discourses and intellectuals as a category articulate each other (Kennedy and Suny

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16 Articulation is the process where cultural forms and practices are appropriated for use by particular classes. The term originates from the works of Gramsci. In his theory, cultural forms and practices have relative autonomy; they are not defined by socio-economic structures of power but rather related to them. “The theory of articulation recognizes the complexity of cultural fields. It preserves a relative autonomy for
Nevertheless, there also exists antagonism between them, as the intellectuals who may help to legitimize nation states and ‘conjure up’ national identities are also in a position to question the essentialist constructions of national imagined communities. Reflexivity of intellectuals is therefore a serious threat to national mythologies (Said 1994: 9). Like nobody else intellectuals may be aware of the constructed nature of national discourses and the possibilities of manipulation these discourses imply. Some researchers were quick to point out the latter factor and conclude that intellectuals are predisposed to misappropriate collectively produced cultural capital and to “draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent in order to protect their well-being or existence or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups as well as for themselves” (Brass 1991: 8).

A more general question may be asked in this connection: are the intellectuals (nationalist ones or whatever sort) guided solely by their instrumental group and personal interests when they elaborate, legitimate and at the same time question the sanctity of the national communities and their narratives? Greenfeld (1992), for example, mentions sense of status-inconsistency and interest in improving their own situation among the factors which spur the actors who become the prime movers of nationalism. Bauman puts it explicitly, that endeavors of the intellectuals to extrapolate their own collective experience or mode of life on the rest of the society are, “deliberately or not, …also a bid for power” (Bauman 1987b: 98). Bourdieu’s opinion is less categorical, as he points out that the very logic of functioning of the intellectual fields prescribes “transcending of personal interest in the ordinary sense” (Bourdieu 1990: 146, see also Bourdieu 1993b: 90). Gellner makes quite a serious point when assuming in his half-ironic description of Megalomania and Ruritania that nationalist intellectuals were not driven solely by “calculations of material advantage or of social mobility” (Gellner 1983: 61). Hence, pragmatic calculations of the (nationalist) intellectuals can go hand-in-hand with efforts to elaborate their own distinctive identity as ‘consciousness of the nation’ and defenders of its culture. Nevertheless, intellectuals are ubiquitously involved in “actions objectively oriented towards goals that may not be the goals subjectively pursued” (Bourdieu 1993b: 90). Their selflessness is inseparable from wielding of the pastoral and proselytizing power17 (Bauman 1987a, 1987b).

3.6. West Ukrainian intelligentsia and Ukrainian national project(s) throughout history

In Western Ukraine development of the intelligentsia as a socio-cultural category, ‘space’ of discursive production, historical tradition and collective representation was an outcome of the general political...
and economic tendencies unfolding in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries in Central or East-Central Europe. However, under socio-cultural conditions of everyday life in the borderland region subjected to frequent and drastic historical and political changes, Ukrainian intelligentsia has its specificity. In different times, Ukrainian intelligentsia in L’viv has been a diverse milieu absorbing (and in many ways re-making and accommodating) both various people and various ideational streams. Nonetheless, throughout the twentieth century this milieu became best known for its elaboration of the ‘National Idea’ and (radical) political activity in the domain of Ukrainian nationalism.

Identity construction processes and ethos (Zubek 1992: 579) of Ukrainian intelligentsia in L’viv unfolded on the intersection of the ‘European’ (most distinctively, Polish) and ‘Eurasian’ (both in its tsarist imperial and Soviet variants) traditions for nearly two centuries. From the nineteenth to the first decades of the twentieth century Polish and Polonized educated strata held hegemonic positions in the urban settings of Eastern Galicia as Poles were the politically and culturally dominating folk in this part of Austro-Hungarian empire and then, until 1939, of the Second Polish Republic. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century Ukrainians of the region (or, more precisely, an ethno-religious community called ‘Ruthenians’) were a predominantly rural population culturally distinctive primarily because of their religious affiliation (Greek Catholicism). Subjected to social and cultural oppression, up to the last decade of the nineteenth century they had vague ideas about where they ‘indeed’ belonged as several national projects (all-Polish, common-Russian, Ukrainian and distinct Ruthenian) were considered by the Galician Ruthenians (see Himka 1999, Hrytsak 2005a: 191). However, recently it has been argued that not only Ukrainians, but also Poles and Jews residing in ‘their own’ L’viv were not clear-cut national groups until the twentieth century, when the processes of distinguishing nations among the populace became more or less completed and when national divisions gained as much importance as the social ones (Ther 2000: 254).

For quite a long time Ukrainian (Ruthenian) intelligentsia in the region was almost exclusively represented by the offspring of Greek-Catholic clergy, coming from the ethnically Ruthenian countryside. Because of effective mechanisms of Polonization, secular urban intelligentsia which could be called Ukrainian according to its language and identifications with the Ukrainian people was practically non-existent in the city until the last decades of the nineteenth century (Himka 1999: 113-114). However, even though since then the leadership positions in the developing national movement were taken by secular urban circles, Greek-Catholic clergy nevertheless maintained its position as an important milieu for recruitment of nationally aware Ukrainian intelligentsia (Hrytsak 1996: 46-57, 73-83).

Initially Ukrainian intelligentsia in urban settings of Western Ukraine developed its political views and cultural lifestyle both as a counterpart and opposition to the Polish ‘spiritual aristocracy’. For the Polish intelligentsia patriotic fervor awakened by the violated national sovereignty became one of the cornerstones of their social identity. However, being spokesmen of modernity and the correlating national(ist)
ideas, Polish intelligentsia, “paradoxically, … also remained extensively tied to Poland’s anachronistic class of landed gentry” (Zubek 1992: 580) with its aristocratic haughtiness18 and tendencies to social closing. Because of this, it has been argued, Ukrainian intellectuals succeeded better in linking national emancipation with peasant emancipation, as “objective process of national awakening depended in part on mobilization by Ukrainian organic intellectuals in Galicia, a kind of mobilization that Polish intellectuals could not realize because of the organization of Polish class relations” (Kennedy and Suny 1999: 399). The newborn urban Ukrainian intelligentsia in Galicia ardently embraced national ideas as a framework of struggle against social and political oppression. However, unlike their Polish counterparts, these circles tended to be much less hermetical in terms of their social composition and, consequently, more susceptible to socialist ideas. This exemplifies the theoretical suggestion that “The fit between class and ethnic relations is absolutely central to defining the ‘social’ resources of intellectuals articulating the nation” (ibid: 399).

Advance of the Ukrainian orientation in Galicia became possible due to extensive cultural and political activity of the intellectual circles in the Little-Russian19 part of Russian empire. Both the Ukrainian and common-Russian idea were imported into Austrian Galicia from the Russian Empire (Himka 1999: 126). The project called ‘Ukrainian nation’ became a result of negotiations between the Galician and east Ukrainian intellectual elites (Hrytsak 1996: 81) who, among the plenty of available solutions chose to make a stake on the United (Soborna) Ukraine, that is, a political entity with a common political agenda, a common set of historical myths and a single standardized language. However, even though some of the most known theories of Ukrainian nationalism (like the radical ‘integral’ nationalism of Dmytro Dontsov) were formulated by the eastern Ukrainians, Ukrainians from the west proved to be more consequent and radical in development and implementation of the ‘National Idea’ as a political doctrine. The first Ukrainian political party and the concept of Ukrainian state sovereignty as the ultimate aim of the national movement were formed in Galicia at the end of the nineteenth century due to political activity of socialist intellectuals (ibid: 77). In Western Ukraine, especially in Galicia, national revival was inseparable from struggle against social and political oppression of

18 Gella (1976: 13) explains that “The appearance of the intelligentsia was determined by the deterioration of the feudal system in the Russian empire… and by legal discrimination and pauperization of the nobility in partitioned Poland. In both countries members of the ‘declassé’ fraction of the landed nobility, seeking to maintain in an urban environment their traditional style of life, had to separate themselves from the ‘bourgeois’ middle class. This entailed selecting only certain occupations and at the same time acquiring an education which would allow them to sustain their societal contacts with those whom history had not yet deprived of their idle forms of existence: the landed nobility and aristocracy”. Also, it has been argued that “Dissemination of aristocratic and noble self-consciousness within the wider circles of the Polish people had both its positive and its negative consequences, as it maintained hallucinatory capacities of the ‘noble superiority’ especially for lower levels of the middle class” (Popovych 1998: 48; see Walicki 1999 for a similar argument).

19 Little Russia (Russian: Malorossiia; Ukrainian: Mala Rus’) is the historical name, at the time of the Russian Empire and earlier, for the territory approximately corresponding to modern Central and Eastern Ukraine.
the Ukrainians. As a result, in the twentieth century West Ukrainian society—both intelligentsia and peasants—demonstrated a much higher level of mass political mobilization under the slogans of Ukrainian sovereignty.

During the last decades of the nineteenth century the national ideology in Galicia advanced mainly due to its symbiosis with socialist ideas. However, in the early part of the next century, especially in the interwar period, other ideological streams contributed to the advancing national consciousness of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia. Conservative orientation has been presented by theoretical works of Viacheslav Lypyns’kyi. This Ukrainian political activist originating from a Polish landlord family, saw intelligentsia’s role in nation building as mediation between social classes by means of developing culture and by fostering commitment of the people to the basic social values and the respect for law. Lypyns’kyi advocated civic nationalism, as he argued that Ukraine should be for everyone who lives in the land and is loyal to it (Baluk 2002: 64).

A different approach has been presented in works by Dontsov, which were extremely popular among the younger generation of Ukrainian activists coming to the political arena in Galicia in the 1920s and 1930s. In L’viv Dontsov wrote his main works where he agitated for voluntarism instead of political common sense, for interests of the nation above everything (not “Ukraine for Ukrainians”, but “Ukrainians for Ukraine”), and for principles of ‘creative violence’ instead of democracy. Consequently, his theories advocated strong authoritarian elites pursuing their political aims by all means. This ‘integral’ (or ‘organized’, ‘revolutionary’) variant of nationalism had a lot in common with other ultraconservative political doctrines, first and foremost fascism (Bondarenko 2000, Zaitsev 2000). Due to the social and cultural disenfranchisement experienced by Ukrainians in the Polish state, the weakening of democratic institutions and escalation of ethnic hatred under harsh conditions of the two world wars, this ultra-right theory gained popularity among the Galician Ukrainian intelligentsia (Hrytsak 1996: 197-8, Hrytsak 2000: 58). Ukrainian nationalist resurgence in the times of World War II and the nationalist underground in the first decades of the Soviet occupation of the West Ukrainian lands, were inspired by the ideological postulates of integral nationalism.

Soviet troops who in 1939 marched into the eastern borderlands of the Second Polish Republic in accordance with the secret Ribbentrop-Molotov protocol (and then came back in 1944) were met with mixed feelings. In many places in Galicia the Red Army was initially warmly welcomed (Gross 1988). But the liberators’ were cheered enthusiastically by a minority of the urban population, mostly by its alienated and radicalized segments (Hrytsak 2000: 58). Numerous representatives of the Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish political, cultural and economic elite left for the West, cherishing no illusions about Soviet authorities’ attitudes to the “class enemies of the working people” (according to some estimations, by the end of 1939, 40 000 Ukrainians, among them numerous representatives of intelligentsia, had fled to the Nazi-occupied territories (Gross 1988: 31)). Representatives of the intelligentsia who, even being aware of their uncertain fate under the
new regime, chose to stay in L’viv, demonstrated a quite reserved and wait-and-see attitude toward the new rulers (Luts’kyi 1999: 576). Primitiveness and rudeness of the representatives of the Soviet establishment shocked the local intelligentsia brought up in the traditions of Central European civility (Hrytsak 1996: 213). In their turn, the new authorities—aware of nationalist mobilization and anti-Communist moods among the Galician populace —began to realize a policy of threats and repressions in the region. Among those arrested and deported were representatives of urban intelligentsia of different nationalities. Repressions continued after the Soviet comeback in 1944.

The attitude of the Soviet authorities toward intelligentsia—especially non-Russian intelligentsia—has always been ambiguous. As Bauman (1987a: 177-178) notes,

In East-Central Europe there was a continuity of pastoral power and patronage of sorts linking the moral and economic leadership of the gentry through the spiritual leadership of the intelligentsia to the political domination of the Communist party. The elements of continuity were in no way minor or secondary; they related to quite central aspects of social structure and the deployment of power. It is these elements of continuity which account for the remarkably close mutual engagement between the ruling party and the intelligentsia. …The party has neither eliminated nor “devoured” the intelligentsia. The two exist side by side, as structurally separate social categories, whatever their personal or functional connections.

The highly educated were as a rule treated by the authorities with suspicion and reservation. Even the so-called working intelligentsia, in the words of Stalin, “has never been and cannot be a class; it is just [my emphasis—E.N.] a social group (sotsial’naia prosloka)” (quoted in Yurchak 2006: 43) which under new historical conditions was summoned to implement messages of the Party to the masses. However, necessity to render industries, state and ideological apparatus—and last but not least to hold prestige on the international arena—needed professional expertise and political support of the reliable ‘socialist intelligentsia’. This new tamed stratum of professionals and intellectuals was in mass bred up in the institutions of Soviet education, but the ‘old’ intelligentsia and professionals whose expertise was in great demand, were also encouraged to collaborate. In order to win support of this latter part of intelligentsia the policy of carrots and sticks was widely applied. In L’viv, for example, in the period of 1939-1941 the Soviet authorities, while sending “suspicious elements” among the Ukrainian intelligentsia to the labor camps and prisons, granted a number of its renowned representatives, whose career suffered under the previous regime, higher posts and solid material support (Luts’kyi 1999: 583, see also Sonevys’t’kyi 2001). In exchange, of course, political loyalty and ideological submission were demanded.

Nevertheless, the important political, administrative and especially ideological offices were, in accordance with the Soviet cadre policy, granted by the new regime to the non-locals, as the Galician Ukrainians because of their social origin, political past and ‘nationalist’ sentiments generally were not considered as sufficiently reliable to hold the highest offices within and outside the region (Hrytsak 2000: 59,
Luts’kyi 1999: 580). Many of them, especially representatives of the so-called creative intelligentsia (artists, academicians, writers, teachers, journalists) were subjected to constant surveillance and periodical repressions. The Soviet regime, nevertheless, was interested in fostering loyalty in the ‘local cadres’ in Western Ukraine, first and foremost among the younger generation. As a result, Galicianers, although often treated by the new rulers as unreliable, were not subjected to a systematic discrimination according to ethnic or territorial principle20. Those who managed to conceal their ‘wrong’ social origins and political sympathies—as well as those who wholeheartedly adopted the Soviet ideology—were not refused admission into the institutions of higher learning. Moreover, a rapid symbolic ‘Ukrainization’ of the city’s academic, administrative and daily life began, as Ukrainian became promoted as the language of the Soviet republic Eastern Galicia was ‘reunited’ with (Luts’kyi 1999: 583). Such a policy was in all respects typical of the Soviet authorities. Leaving sufficient, if restricted, space for representation of distinguishable ethnic elements of the Ukrainian culture (language, cuisine, song, dance, folk handicrafts etc.), they nevertheless effectively blocked development of modern forms of Ukrainian culture, and were especially ruthless when it came to demonstrations of politically-colored Ukrainian national, religious and historical consciousness (Czaplicka 2000: 34).

For the vast majority of the postwar generation of Galician Ukrainians (urbanites as well as rural population) thinking about their Ukrainian-ness in terms of national and religious belongingness was, however, an already established part of their social identification that could not be easily discarded. Existence of the organized Ukrainian nationalist underground, not least in the milieu of the students of institutions of higher education in L’viv in the first postwar decade (Heneha 2000), can be mentioned as evidence of this process. Short periods of formalized state-promoted Ukrainization and, moreover, introduction of elements of vital ethnic culture of the Galician countryside into the texture of L’viv daily life by the numerous ‘new urbanites’ helped to convey the message about distinctiveness of Ukrainian-ness to the younger generations. This combination of the developed historical and political, and also cultural and demographic components of the Ukrainian identification in L’viv and Western Ukraine (Szporluk 2000) made ‘national consciousness’ (natsional’nau svidomist’) quite a resistant element of local Ukrainian intelligentsia’s meaningful sphere which could be mobilized under favorable conditions.

Such conditions appeared first under the short period of Khrushchov’s ‘thaw’. The younger generation of Ukrainian intelligentsia, active mainly in Kyiv and L’viv, initiated a cultural movement where issues of human rights and creative freedom implied the demand of unrestricted development of national cultures. At the beginning of the 1960s young activists organized the Club for the creative youth ‘Prolisok’, which was analogous to the one formed in Kyiv a bit earlier. Ideas of this young intelligentsia, known as

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20 Nevertheless, in the first postwar years admission of Galician Ukrainians to the institutions of higher education in L’viv was limited, as the authorities made efforts to hinder ‘anti-Soviet elements’ from penetrating higher education. Due to ideological restrictions, in 1946-1947 among 10953 students in L’viv only 3056 were those who originated from Western Ukraine (Heneha 2007: 69-70).
‘generation of the 1960s’ (shistdesiatnyky) in many ways resonated with the radical swing among the West European youth that resulted in the famous student revolutions of 1968. Ukrainian shistdesiatnyky were a part of the all-Union dissident movement criticizing Soviet authoritarianism. However, unlike their counterparts from the Russian metropole (see Shlapentokh 1990), Ukrainian dissenting intelligentsia was not only concerned with struggle for human rights and for a milder variant of state socialism (‘socialism with a human face’). They also pleaded for free development of the national cultures and for self-determination (and even sovereignty) of the Soviet republic’s titular nations. The radical political demands of Ukrainian sovereignty were in particular typical of the nationally conscious shistdesiatnyky coming from Western Ukraine. Nevertheless, political protest was often disguised as ‘innocent’ culture-related activities:

According to the evidence of the movement’s participants, cultural activity was the only possible form of resistance against the regime. For the majority of shistdesiatnyky cultural activity was also a conscious choice… To be immediately engaged in the political struggle would only mean utter defeat. Cultural movement embraced both loyalty of above-Dnipro intelligentsia—and determinate absence of loyalty of the Galicianers to the idea of evolutionary development of United Ukraine (Batenko 2003: 40).

However, these sprouts of resistance were trampled down in 1972, during an all-Union campaign against dissemination of “anti-Soviet and other politically harmful material” that primarily targeted dissident intelligentsia.

The legacy of shistdesiatnyky became one of the distinguishable ideational streams in the Ukrainian national movement of the late twentieth century, even though the rows of active dissidents among them counted less than a thousand persons (Kasianov 1995: 190–192). Ukrainian shistdesiatnyky advocated the idea of a special cultural, political, and last but not least moral mission of the intelligentsia as the main architects of the new—democratic, moral (dukhovne) and patriotic—Ukrainian society. In the late 1980s and early 1990s many ex-dissidents persecuted by the Soviet regime made a comeback to the Ukrainian public arena as politicians, founders of NGOs and influential opinion-makers. Quite predictably, the first mass protest and commemoration actions in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic at that time (Zluka in 1988, student ‘Granite revolution’ in 1990) became an arena for pleading both cultural and political rights of the Ukrainian nation. The first big victory of the democratic wing of the patriotic Ukrainian intelligentsia became adoption of the Law on languages in 1989 which proclaimed Ukrainian the state language (derzhavna mova) of the Ukrainian SSR and stated that in the nearest future Ukrainian was to become the primary language of administration and education, replacing in this respect Russian (the latter, however, maintained its status as a ‘language of interethnic communication’).
3.7. West Ukrainian intelligentsia and the national mobilization in independent Ukraine

Ukraine announced its independence in 1991. Consequently, this regionally divided ‘postcolonial’ land (Kuzio 2002, Smith et al. 1998) with a very short and violently interrupted tradition of statehood and with just a minority of the nationally conscious population (mainly in its western part) suddenly found itself in the position of a sovereign body within a European—and global—system of nation states. The disintegration of the USSR has often been conceptualized, especially among nationalizing Eastern European intellectuals, in terms of ‘national revolution’, as another Springtime of the Peoples. Ukraine’s independence looks from this perspective as a successful realization of the centuries-old strivings of Ukrainians to become a full-fledged nation. However, other accounts of this event stress first and foremost structural factors like extensive economic crisis, system degradation and collapsed hegemony of the Moscow-based Politbureau of the Communist party as the main factors resulted in disassembling of the Union (Hobsbawm 1997: 72, Wilson 1997b, Brubaker 1996: 23-55, Molchanov 2000: 264). Nevertheless, the ‘national card’ did became an attractive means to legitimate a newborn state in the face of the world and its own population, as the idea of the nation and state sovereignty was also closely associated with democratization and overcoming of the Soviet authoritarian legacy.

Due to both historical circumstances and present political processes the national project in Ukraine lacks cohesion. On the one hand, the present-day Ukrainian political elites mostly regard the nation as a necessary formal pre-condition for existence of the independent state. On the other hand, the concept of nation which wider intellectual and political circles (especially the so-called national democrats) tend to adhere to, is a spiritual community rooted in shared culture and language. Definition of the nation in terms of the ethnic majority’s—or eponym nationality’s—culture is rooted in the concepts dominating East-Central Europe for more than a century (Brubaker 1996: 112, Smith and Law 1998, Schöpflin 2003: 487). However, the present-day efforts to institutionalize Ukrainian culture do not necessarily imply that a certain ‘nationalizing’ project is on the agenda. Ethnic and civic forms of nationalism are ideal types which invariably coexist in varying proportions in the majority of present national projects (Smith 1983, Zimmer 2003). Besides, in the words of a Ukrainian expert in cultural politics, a broad consensus on the basic principles of cultural policy is absent and, as a result, “Although the ruling elite has understood the importance of a strong national majority identity, which has been lacking in Ukraine, it has obviously put a higher priority on social peace and stability and has tried to avoid potential conflicts. Therefore, it has not pushed the nation-building projects too hard” (Hrytsenko 2001: 237, see also Kulyk 2006).

Despite official declarations about returning to ‘good old’ pre-Soviet and Europe-inspired traditions of nation building, up till now cultural policies in Ukraine, like in some other post-Soviet states, have been rooted in recent Soviet praxis to define and institutionalize nationhood (Brubaker 1996: 8). According to Grabowicz (2003: 320-321), what looks on the surface like nation building might be the appeal to all nationalities of Ukraine to support the task of state building—that one where state should be identified not with
the nation, but with the top of ruling political (and presently also business) elite. Hence, the new post-Soviet Ukrainian ideology is deficient in its understanding of the Ukrainian culture: the ‘cultural stuff’, according to this ideology, is solely a political instrument without any intrinsic value.

This implies that the significance of intelligentsia as official ideological producers might remain unchallenged. Moreover, in its efforts to form national consciousness, the post-Soviet intelligentsia might employ almost the same arsenal of symbolic means that their Soviet predecessors exploited in the project of transforming consciousness of their fellow-countrymen into that one of the prospective builders of communism (Verdery 1991b: 430). In the same vein, the national(ist) intelligentsia may seek to disguise rational elements of the national imagination (Billig 1995: 77, Lamont 1989: 137-143) in order to transform their compatriots into the full-fledged nation ‘as if by magic’. It should be remembered that after the crashing of the shiestsiatnyky movement, in the 1970s and up to the end of the 1980s, in many parts of Ukraine the standard literary Ukrainian language and ‘non-archaic’ (although gradually provincialized) Ukrainian culture became confined mainly to the narrow circle of the regime-supporting intellectual elite, among whom poets and writers played the most prominent role (Hnatiuk 2003: 62). In a way, they became the only legitimate ‘carriers’ and ‘defenders’ of the Ukrainian culture who could claim expertise in cultural issues with the advent of Ukraine’s independence. Notably, precisely this faction of Ukrainian intelligentsia became the harbingers of perestroika who launched a range of important initiatives. In particular, in 1988 the members of the Ukrainian Writers’ Union came with the initiative to create the People’s Movement for perestroika (Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy za perebudovu), or Rukh, which soon became a political force opposing the Communist Party.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s West Ukrainian intelligentsia’s expertise in the field of Ukrainian culture and its aspirations to forge the nation by means of disseminating the ‘unspoiled’ Ukrainian language, traditions and morality became a serious bid for power in the situation when the new—yesterday’s Soviet—political elite was not sufficiently strong. At that time some well-known (some of them former dissident) academicians, writers, historians and journalists got access to positions of power as parliament deputies, public debaters and even ministers. However, after the initial years of independence, when the wider range of political actors appropriated national rhetoric and cultural idioms of the intelligentsia and when not ideology (national or whatever sort), but economic capital became a decisive factor for exercising political authority in the post-Soviet Ukrainian society, the role of the intelligentsia in political realization of the national project noticeably decreased. Intellectual debate about the prospective development of the nation became increasingly limited to polemics in the milieu of academic intellectuals and patriotic intelligentsia. Enjoying a certain degree of intellectual autonomy, but, at the same time, effectively marginalized and divided by different ideological standpoints, in the second half of the 1990s the Ukrainian nationally-minded public intellectuals were pushed out from those positions that might give immediate political rewards.
Under such conditions frustrated intelligentsia easily reaches for national(ist) rhetoric. Its more benevolent forms are focused on issues of clear-cut identity, moral responsibility, Christian values and national dignity that have to become guiding principles for both nationally conscious power-holders and the patriotic people. This is exactly what happened during the Orange revolution in 2004. In Ukraine it was hailed as a ‘national’ one, as use of nationally informed symbols and rhetoric was extensive, and the ‘nerve’ of this political collision was symbolic presentation and (re-)definition of the nationhood.

Already in November 2004, the large-scale protest actions in Kyiv were labeled as a ‘bourgeois revolution’ by some Ukrainian intellectuals (Denysenko 2004). Attention was paid to the unusually high level of mobilization among the intelligentsia and the so-called new bourgeoisie who themselves rallied in Kyiv and supported the protestors both by means of symbolic authority as well as financially. Skillful elevation and manipulation of the collective memories about national grievances caused by the Soviet regime, as well as extensive use of Ukrainian national symbols, folklore and visual images, also indicated active participation of the ‘middle class’ and intelligentsia in the symbolic orchestration of the Orange Revolution. Last but not least, the wide-scale use of the Internet (McFaul 2005: 12) and other modern communication technologies for agitation and as means of practical organization of the protest activities can convey information about the approximate age and social status of the active participants and audiences of the Orange Revolution.

The Orange Revolution empowered the Ukrainian intelligentsia, professionals and the growing strata of petty and midlevel entrepreneurs—not in the sense that they suddenly gained real political power, but because their nationally-informed concerns and moral orientations became an apparent stake in the struggle for cultural hegemony in Ukraine. Topoi of moral obligation and service to the national community, which have been quite typical of Eastern European intelligentsia’s rhetoric, have been actualized both in political proclamations, intellectual commentaries and popular discussions. In one of his public speeches Viktor Yushchenko, the presidential candidate from the opposition, called his compatriots ‘the nation of intellehentnych people’ (Rusyna 2005: 11), and implied that they deserve to be ruled by ‘intellehentna authorities’. Although Yushchenko relied on massive support of the agrarian regions of Ukraine and his rival Viktor Yanukovych searched for support primarily in urban industrial centers, both candidates were aware that sympathy from the intelligentsia and the middle class could mean empowerment and increased legitimacy for the party who won. This contributed to the strong emphasis on questions of moral authority, and to the pronounced endeavors to create the ‘cultured’ and cultivated image of the presidential candidates and their supporters in both camps (Narvselius 2007). Numerous references to intellehentnist’ and intellehentnyi give a clue that in situations of overt political contestation discursive images and empowering narratives related to intelligentsia (especially when combined with national rhetoric) may be actualized as a discursive power resource by political actors.
Chapter 4. Theoretical Focal Points of the Study: Intellectuals and Problematics of Culture, Nation, Class, Power and Generation

4.1. Culture as a ‘toolkit’. Human agency and actorship

Conceptualizing intelligentsia and intellectuals as class-mediating social positions, a community of discourse, a structured social space or as a set of situated social practices presupposes a change of spatial metaphor: instead of a more or less bounded entity one should rather envisage fractions dispersed in several interconnected ‘fields’. Such a shift in imagining these protean actors corresponds to the shift in a manner of thinking about some other culturally-bounded phenomena (for example, ethnicity; Brubaker 2004) and about ‘culture’ itself. When writing about intellectuals and intelligentsia, it is necessary to address the concept of culture, as intellectuals and intelligentsia may be conceptualized as human actors who create, mediate and proceed cultural patterns and traditions (see Karabel 1996). Besides, “both the cultural and the structural can also be considered to be aspects of the ‘context’ in which the intellectual is constructed” (Eyerman 1996: 16).

Last but not least, the concept of ‘culture’, like ‘civilization’, is a West European intellectual invention and master metaphor which since the seventeenth century signaled the new mechanisms of social reproduction grounded in the alliance of power and knowledge (Bauman 1987b: 81-95).

In the rapidly changing ‘postmodern’ world, proliferation and complexity of cultural practices, forms and discourses evokes reexamination of the established thinking about ‘culture’. To begin with, influenced by cognitive psychology, a range of social sciences increasingly accept the idea that culture (in its wider, anthropological meaning) is not an all-penetrating ‘latent variable’ presupposing coherence and homogeneity of the social world, but rather a ‘toolkit’, that is, “a collection of stuff that is heterogeneous in content and function” (DiMaggio 1997: 267) and “the publicly available symbolic forms through which people experience and express meaning” (Swidler 1986: 273). This view of culture as heterogeneous and fragmented has several significant implications. Most importantly, it challenges the notion that people acquire ‘a culture’ by imbibing it, and no other, mainly through early socialization. It stimulates understanding of the capacity of individuals to participate in multiple cultural traditions and to share mutually contradictory cultural narratives. Hence, ‘anomalous’ research findings about inconsistent expressions and attitudes across time, as well as about cultural volatility in periods of rapid change (e.g., the fall of the Soviet system) become intelligible (DiMaggio 1997: 267-8). Last but not least, “The finding that culture is stored in memory as an indiscriminately assembled and relatively unorganized collection of odds and ends imposes a far stronger organizing burden on actors than did the earlier oversocialized view” (ibid: 268). The human social actor appears to be much more knowledgeable and strategic in her choices (Sewell Jr. 1992a) and, thus, her agency...
should be viewed as more conscious and consistent. The actors are also expected to bear much responsibility for their ‘poorly organized’, ‘insufficiently thought-out’ or ‘improper’ actions.

Another important development interconnected with the notion of culture as a toolkit is consideration of culture as a shared space in which human agency operates and which it also produces. Culture can function as a toolkit given that there exists “the actors’ capacity to interpret and mobilize an array of resources in terms of cultural schemas other than those that initially constituted the array”, i.e., agency (Sewell Jr. 1992a: 19, see also Emirbayer 1994: 1442-43). When taking this idea as a starting point, it is possible to argue against reifying concepts of culture as constituted by sets of clearly demarcated ‘cultures’ (national, tribal, occupational etc.). Life in the global ecumene presupposes that knowledgeable human actors increasingly share the same ‘habitats of meaning’ while they organize diversity of ideas and expressions into contemporary complex culture (Hannerz 1996: 23). Thus, it follows that the researchers cannot occupy ourselves only with the small-scale handling of meanings by individuals, or small groups, and assume that wider cultural entities come simply about through aggregation of their activities. To grasp the nature of culture we live with now, we must also take an interest in the management of meaning by corporate and institutional actors [my emphasis—E.N.], not least by the state and in the market-place (ibid: 22).

One can notice obvious contradiction between the postmodern metaphor of culture as a fragmented toolkit and the argument about growing importance of conceptualization of “the idea of culture in the singular” (ibid: 23). Singularity, nevertheless, should not be mixed with holism and homogeneity. Globally singular contemporary culture is unfolded in a plurality of locales and levels (local, regional, national, transnational) that are ‘glued’ together by ever-present agency of various actors (individuals, groups, classes, institutions, organizations). Besides, conceptualization of culture as a fragmented incoherent ‘collection of odds and ends’ refers to the level of subjective representations of culture. Culture nevertheless exists as a relatively coherent formation at the collective supra-individual levels, independently of persons in the broader environments. There it is ‘stored’ as various discursive, practice-related and iconic symbolic forms. In the modern societies where there exists a ‘cultural division of labor’, this collective domain of culture is increasingly managed by intellectual producers and actors who intentionally create and diffuse myths, images, and idea systems (DiMaggio 1997: 273).

I would like to mention in this connection that it is not by mere chance that I prefer to characterize intelligentsia and intellectuals as ‘actors’ rather than as ‘agents’. In the previous chapter I chose to conceptualize intelligentsia and intellectuals both in terms of their structural class positions and identity patterns constructed through embedment in historical and cultural processes. Here it is worth emphasizing again this interconnection of ‘the structural’ and ‘the cultural’. “Actors per se are much more than, and … much less than, ‘agents’ ” (Alexander 1992: 2). Empirical action of these subjects is not driven exclusively by human
agency, but is structured by other domains of action, such as social networks and cultural environments—even though it is never completely determined and structured by them alone (Emirbayer 1994: 1443). Thus, the notion of actorship does not solely imply that the actors are constrained and determined by their structural and cultural locations, but that they dispose with sufficient room for individual improvisation and interaction with their ‘publics’ when strategically choosing and applying items of their cultural ‘toolkits’. Conceiving post-Soviet intelligentsia as potentially mobilizable actors capable of performing a range of cultural scripts in certain circumstances (Alexander 2004), may be a possible solution to the dilemma according to which intelligentsia exists in fragmented ‘fields’ both as a category, a set of networks and as a structured position. Adapting the term used in network analysis, intelligentsia may be regarded as ‘catnet’ (from ‘category’ and ‘network’), that is, “a socially cohesive set of structurally equivalent actors hypothesized as more able and likely [my emphasis—E.N.] to share ideas or a common culture and to engage in collective action than other sorts of real or latent groups” (Emirbayer 1994: 1447, see also Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 20).

But let us continue with the short survey of the recent conceptualizations of culture. An interesting implication of the postmodernist revisions of this notion is that culture becomes increasingly conceived as autonomous in relation to social structure, especially when the latter is viewed as the structure of economic relations (Rubinstein 2001). Culture is no longer conceived simply as a domain overdetermined by and secondary in relation to the economic ‘base’. Conceptions about interrelation of these two domains presently tend to be more sophisticated also among a part of Marxian-oriented social researchers. For instance, according to Williams (1980: 5),

In the later twentieth century there is the notion of ‘homologous structures’, where there may be no direct or easily apparent similarity, and certainly nothing like reflection or reproduction, between the superstructural process and the reality of the base, but in which there is an essential homology or correspondence of structures, which can be discovered by analysis.

Other scholars, while admitting that cultural and structural determinants “empirically interpenetrate and condition one another so thoroughly that it is well-nigh impossible to conceive of the one without the other” (Emirbayer 1994: 1438), nevertheless argue that

cultural discourses, narratives, and idioms are also analytically autonomous with respect to network patterns of social relationships. These symbolic formations have emergent properties—an internal logic and organization of their own—that require that they be conceptualized as “cultural structures”… analytically separate from social structure. …symbols provide a non-material structure. They represent a level of organization that patterns action as surely as structures of a more visible, material kind… (ibid: 1438-9).

All in all, despite the recent shifts in understanding of culture, this complex concept maintains its continuity with older theorizations at least in one important point: culture goes on to be viewed as a
phenomenon of symbolic order. This consideration is essential for understanding the power-culture link formation, which is a theoretical issue of crucial importance for my study. Without undertaking a survey of numerous theorizations of the symbol in scholarly literature, suffice it to say that symbol is a type of sign whose specificity is determined by its inner mechanism of meaning-creation. Unlike other types of signs, symbol reflects the ‘reality’ in an undirected way and due to this encapsulates a potentially infinite range of meanings in its tangibly finite form. Symbol, hence, is always open to interpretation, but not to interpretation of every kind. As Sergei Averintsev (1971: 826) explains,

symbol inherited its communicative functions from myth, and the etymology of the term reminiscent of this. The ancient Greeks called pieces of a plate which passed each other along the line of break Σύµβολον. When putting these pieces together, people who never met each other, but who were bounded by the union of the inherited friendship, could recognize each other. … Unlike allegory, which can be decoded by strangers, symbol contains mysterious warmth uniting ‘our people’.

Hence, because of its symbolic nature, culture represents a comprehensive classificatory ‘toolkit’ mediating processes of boundary construction and creation of collectivities. In particular, ‘without high culture, one cannot claim the rights of nations. …Making a high culture is most important in the ‘early’ stages of nation making, and indeed an essential one for many nationalisms” (Kennedy and Suny 1999: 404). Accordingly, culture should be considered an inalienable part of societal mechanisms of power and symbolic domination.

4.2. Power‐culture link. Issue of ‘the national’ as a component of cultural capital

It may be summarized that the power-culture link embraces four conceptualizations of culture: “(1) a terrain where power relations develop; (2) a resource on which coercion is based; (3) a mediation of power relations via the shaping of desires and consciousness; and (4) mediation of power relations via exclusion based on cultural cues” (Lamont 1989: 134). The latter conceptualization of culture as a mechanism of wielding power via direct or indirect exclusion is especially promising in view of the specificity of my study. This approach not only addresses the question of what kinds of cultural signals, expressions and symbols are used as instruments of cultural exclusion, but also points out the structural issues of how these hierarchically organized cultural cues are institutionalized, who legitimizes them and who recognizes them as a part of ‘their own’ legitimate culture. Hence, attention should be paid not only to the issue of top-down cultural politics exercised by state elites, but also to more comprehensive issues of quotidian ‘micro-politics’ of exclusion (Lamont and Lareau 1988: 161) based on cultural cues used, among others, by intelligentsia for
“making friends and enemies”, for monopolization of its privileged positions and for development of its own, culturally superior, identities.

When taking up the issue of power-culture link one can hardly avoid discussion of the notion of the so-called cultural capital. In ‘Distinction’ (1984: 169-175) Bourdieu argues that class positions in social fields can be defined by volume and proportion of mutually convertible economic and cultural capital that socio-professional groups dispose with. Hence, cultural capital may be regarded as a type of symbolic boundary and basis for drawing social boundaries (Lamont and Molnár 2002: 174, Lamont 1992). However, the problem with the concept is multiplicity of its interpretations, as since the 1970s cultural capital has been operationalized in many different ways not only by a range of social researchers, but also by Bourdieu himself.

In view of the generalizing nature of Bourdieu’s theoretical constructions, it is often difficult to point out concrete sets of cultural cues (knowledge, tastes, behavior or attitudes) that can serve as cultural capital in every concrete case. Bourdieu’s ambition was to create a theoretical framework relevant in various contexts, but his analysis of cultural capital is mostly based on the concrete national case of French academic and artistic circles where the established ‘high-brow’ culture in the form of high-class manners, tastes and knowledge of classical literature, art, philosophy, languages etc. is widely accepted as the main source of cultural capital. France represents, according to Lamont (1989: 137-143) a typical example of ‘tightly bounded’ society with strong consensus on cultural hierarchies, where ‘high-cultural’ cues are attributed to privileged classes. These high-cultural cues are, of course, mostly ‘those French ones’, that is, relating to the legacy of the French state and French nation. But how does the state of affairs look in present-day Ukraine where political nation cannot boast some long-existing widely acknowledged high-cultural legacy and where, besides, since times of state socialism high-cultural markers have never been exclusive attributes of the dominating classes or groups? What cultural signals tend to be used there as sources of distinction between privileged (high-status) and non-privileged (low-status) groups and actors? What forms can this ‘high’ standard of national culture prospectively take on? Exactly what actors appropriate and institutionalize the cultural legacy, in what ways?

Markers of national culture in present-day Ukraine, especially in its western part, can both relate to an informal academic standard (particularly, within ‘nationally indoctrinated’ humanities) and serve as a power resource facilitating access to positions within certain institutions (political ones, among others). However, as Lamont and Lareau insist, one should think twice when labeling any culturally distinguished phenomena as cultural capital. These authors point out that one of the most important aspects of Bourdieu’s and Passeron’s (1977, 1979) framework is “The idea of cultural capital as a basis for exclusion from jobs, resources, and high status groups” (Lamont and Lareau 1988: 156). That is why they propose to preserve the term for narrower use as “institutionalised, i.e., widely shared, high status cultural signals (attitudes, preferences, formal knowledge, behaviors, goods and credentials) used for social and cultural exclusion, the
The reformulated question should thus sound: may cultural markers signaling Ukrainian-ness be regarded as a basis for social and cultural exclusion? I admit that the arguments ‘pro’ and ‘contra’ may be equally weighty in this case. Generally, one can express doubts whether it is at all logical to define markers of nationality/ethnicity as cultural capital. Cultural capital is tightly connected with ‘vertical’ class positions as an instrument of competition for getting access to high-status and profitable jobs and networks, while nationality and ethnicity presuppose existence of ‘horizontal’ in-group solidarity. Even though one may regard ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ dimensions of social fields as not mutually excluding, but articulating each other, nevertheless some other objections may be raised. In present-day Ukraine certain cultural markers of titular Ukrainian nationality have been institutionalized, as national culture is one of public goods provided to the population by the state (Bauböck 1996: 109-110). Nevertheless, in different parts of Ukraine different actors (such as local administrations, various political parties, institutions of secondary and tertiary education and NGOs) emphasize different aspects of the ‘national legacy’ and ethnic culture. This means that in the absence of unanimous all-national ‘cognizant publics’ (Verdery 1991a: 18), consensus about these cultural markers is minimal. On the other hand, even some widely shared attributes (like state symbols and ritual expressions of loyalty to the national state), constituting undoubtedly a basis for political exclusion cannot be viewed as a basis for systematic social and cultural exclusion on the scale of Ukraine as a whole. Besides, there is an abundance of more subtle, locally known cultural markers of ‘sincere Ukrainian-ness’ in L’viv that can provide a basis for informal selection to high-status jobs and prestigious circles, but even in this case other factors, such as one’s contacts and networks, might be more important. This is to say that potential cultural capital in the form of markers of nationality/ethnicity is not self-sufficient as a systematic basis for exclusion; it tends to be combined with various forms of social and economic capital.

Some authors, like Verdery, are on the whole skeptical about possibility of a whole-pack application of Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts mirroring realities of culturally ‘tightly bounded’, ‘stable’ market democracy of France for analysis of socio-cultural conditions in ‘transitional’, semi-democratic post-Communist East-Central Europe (Verdery 1991a: 18). I may agree with her argument that the concept of cultural capital presupposes existence of a cultural ‘market’ where different forms of access to privileged goods, circles and symbolic means can be freely converted and compete with each other. In the post-Communist, especially in the post-Soviet, space not only free market, but also coercive mechanisms still can play substantial part in production and distribution of legitimate national culture. Therefore, in countries where the advent of ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig 1995) has been delayed, national culture is not commodified.
throughout and does not exist as a minimally contested hegemonic\textsuperscript{21} form (Verdery 1991b: 428). However, even under conditions of limited and constrained cultural market space there exist cultural signals, taken for granted and subtle, which mark a boundary between the privileged and the unprivileged. In a situation of rapid socio-cultural transformations, not only originally high-status markers coming from power centers, but also cultural cues referring to marginalized groups and vernacular milieus, can become a source of cultural distinction. Previously marginalized markers of Ukrainian-ness in its more politicized and ethnically-specific West Ukrainian variant have been transformed into cultural capital both in circles of L’viv politicians, civil servants and academic and artistic intelligentsia. In my study I find evidence that as actors who still enjoy privileged access to the means of constructing and disseminating discursive visions of reality, intelligentsia in L’viv coin cultural and symbolic capital out of various near-hands, i.e., markers and dispositions of Ukrainian-ness which are familiar to them, and ‘export’ their own definitions of value, competence and superiority both to elites in other parts of the country and to ‘the people’. Hence, in this case local cultural cues may be successfully used for selective association and advantage, thus serving to reproduce mechanisms of exclusion (Gartman 2002: 267-274).

4.3. Nationalism, class, culture: connections and refractions
Discussion about cultural capital as an analytically conceived point where class, culture, ethnicity and nationality refract and articulate each other leads to a more multifaceted view on the present state of society and politics in the independent countries of the former Soviet space. The bulk of analytical literature dealing with issues of nationality and nationalism in this part of the world tends to focus on states and markets as material ‘bases’, while paying insufficient attention to the “cultural ‘superstructures’ of nationalism” (Calhoun 1993: 219). When trying to find a proper framing to the processes of socio-cultural transformation in the post-Soviet states, it is indeed important not to focus solely on the political aspects of the ‘national order of things’ (Malkki 1996). In order to succeed, nation building in Ukraine needs to promote culture that “articulates basic values and norms and creates new symbols that reinforce previously suppressed identities and symbols to which all members of society can comfortably relate” (Isajiw 2003: xviii-xix, see also Kuzio 2003). In public debates Ukrainian national culture, its formulation and implementation since the end of the 1980s is often mentioned in tandem with the politicized notion of the ‘National Idea’ whose “outcome will decide who will be culturally hegemonic in the state” (Kuzio 2002: 248). However, after decades of debates, there is still no consensus about what the essence of the National Idea is and what versions, forms and modes

\textsuperscript{21} “Hegemony suggests a society-wide regularization of discursive productions and practices that elicit minimal contestation from the subjugated. … Among those [societies] from which it was wholly absent are those of East European socialism” (Verdery 1991a: 10).
of Ukrainian-ness should be accepted as a founding ground for commonly accepted national culture and as a common-sense basis (Kulyk 2006) of national identity.

Much points to the fact that this uncertainty about ‘parameters’ and ‘definitions’ is an inherent feature of issues concerning nation and nationalism. Depending on the nature of the data selected for concrete analysis, nationalism may be classified as both a modern ideological construct (Billig 1995, Greenfeld 1992, Hroch 1985, Kedourie 1960, Schöpflin 2001), a diffuse set of nation-oriented idioms, practices, and possibilities impregnating modern cultural and political life (Brubaker 1996: 10), and as a social movement (Melucci 1996, Smith 2001). These seemingly polar conceptualizations are, however, not as much a sign of an inherent logical controversy as an acknowledgement of the wide scope of concrete manifestations this protean phenomenon can take on. If ideologies are to be conceived as “idea systems deployed as self-conscious political arguments by identifiable political actors” (Skocpol 1985: 91) and movements as “systems of action, complex networks among different levels and meanings of social action” (Melucci 1996: 4), then it is not difficult to figure out what nationalism is essentially about. It maps modern processes of wide-scale transformations of culture and structures of class and community through political (in the wider meaning of the term embracing politicking of states, collective actors and groups of individuals) action and discourses. In other words, “Nationalism is the process whereby culture is endowed with political roof” (Pratt 2003: 4).

Thus, as adherents of the ethnosymbolic approach are used to point out, the difference between modern nations and earlier forms of imagined collectivities is indeed not so drastic, as they both exist within culture and through culture (see Smith 1981, 1983, 1991, 1996). However, modernity introduced a range of large-scale ideational (individualism, critical thinking, secularism) and material (e.g., book-printing) novelties which revolutionized the nature of community. Instead of old-styled community ‘in-itself’, the self-conscious community ‘for-itself’ appears. The unity of this collectivity, which had been previously taken for granted, becomes constantly questioned and, consequently, its reproduction becomes a challenged enterprise occurring by way of permanent struggling for its territory, identity and loyalty of its members (Bauman 2005: x-xi, Bauman 1987b). The role of political and cultural elites grows, as a national culture becomes a precious commodity provided by the state to its citizens and guarded by the intellectuals to whom its maintenance is entrusted (Bauböck 1996: 94). Existence of the latter ones becomes inalienable from articulation of political claims and sophistication of arguments which establish the nation as a teleological entity aspiring to fulfill its destiny in the future while seeking justification of its sense of community in the past.

In nationalist paradigm culture is more or less instrumental as an arena for struggle over disputed political claims and as a toolkit used for a national community’s political and social self-reproduction. Further, “What counts as national culture is not some totality, but the parts which are distinctive; not static, but the result of competition between various groups to define the key experiences” (Pratt 2003: 13). Traditions, collective memories, historical accounts and even language are periodically revisited in order to be accommodated to the
demands of the day because ‘cultural stuff’ is all the time utilized by concretely situated actors who seek to make sense of their activities and of themselves in relation to other actors (Skocpol 1985: 91). Nevertheless, despite sometimes quite obvious manipulations, ethnic cues and cultural traditions usually are produced and reproduced as taken-for-granted attributes of politically constructed national collectivities without meeting substantial resistance from inside. It is not the contents of tradition that is of paramount importance in this case (Barth 1969). Instead, cultural and ethnic cues do matter when they trigger action and “when they effectively constitute social memory, when they inculcate it as habitus or as ‘prejudice’” (Calhoun 1993: 222). They ought to function this way both on the level of conscious ideologies and as “more anonymous, and less partisan” (Skocpol 1985: 91) cultural idioms which may structure actors’ arguments in partly unintended ways in order to mediate between—and simultaneously transform—a lived-in, ‘grass-root’ series of popular understandings and politicized representations elaborated by elites.

This argument leads us again to the issue of links and refractions between culture, power, class and nation. Culture and ethnicity function in the above-mentioned mediating and transforming capacity not in the field of nationality and nationalism alone. Pratt (2003: 20) makes the point that “If culture is invariably connected to ‘peoples’ then… we risk naturalising nationalism, and are likely to marginalise the study of other political movements built around other identities and other kinds of culture”. Both class and national movements (as well as the discourses they produce) have a strong teleological orientation and create a kind of horizontal solidarity in order to achieve a transformation of the existing situation. In both cases we encounter actors who forge categorical identities and visions of collectivity which put forward their own cultural experiences, and embrace certain political strategies to bring reality in accordance with their socio-cultural expectations (ibid: 16-17). Arguably, re-contextualized and idealized images of class cultures presented as ‘authentic’ ones are promoted by cross-class intellectuals who need some cultural reference points, some ‘Other’ in order to form their own identities and claims (Bauman 1992a, 1992b, Gellner 1983, Hobsbawn 1983, Smith 1982). In any case, “The fit between class and ethnic relations is absolutely central to defining the ‘social’ resources of intellectuals articulating the nation” (Kennedy and Suny 1999: 399). This fit is also of paramount importance for processes of political mobilization, as “Neither nations nor classes seem to be political catalysts: only nation-classes or class-nations as such” (Gellner 1983: 121). Such mutual amplification of class and national frames in processes of identity construction through political action was exactly what happened in Eastern Galicia at the end of the nineteenth century and what could be witnessed in 2004 in the course of the Orange Revolution.

Although national projects are directly or indirectly informed by intelligentsia’s and intellectuals’ class-related ‘visions of divisions’, policies and discursive frames inculcated by such a mighty actor as the state are of paramount importance for the direction and forms of these projects. The states can never totalize experience of their citizens and fix the essence of the nation on all levels, but “they are nonetheless able to set,
through their powerful and political commentary, the aesthetic and ideational framework in which experience is categorized and periodized, in which memory selectively recalls the past as legitimate history” (Borneman 1992: 285). On the other hand, what historical memories, myths and symbols of community the intellectuals and intelligentsia employ, what class cultures they put as a blueprint of national culture, what political claims they made out of this, whether conservative or liberal ideologies they embrace—all these factors are also of major importance for the outcome of the discursive process of nation (re-)building. Yet, nation building as a predominant concern of politicking elites, cannot produce a vital national identity without reciprocal response from wider populace and focused efforts of ‘nationalizing’ cultural elites. Also in the Ukrainian case, the ‘staging process’ of nation and nationality has included a complex interplay of various kinds of cultural scripts (Alexander 2004) and agency of state, class-related actors, ‘stage-workers’ and cognizant publics.

The outcome of these staging efforts has often been described in terms of ethnocultural and civic nationalism, one of the most resilient and simultaneously most debated themes in the literature on nationalism. This model is still vital and in many ways useful—however, with certain reservations. As in the case with any theoretical construction, it is an ideal-type distinction rather than an actually existing, tangible dichotomy. This model, which has been useful for comparative studies of different cases in historical perspective, nevertheless proves to be inadequate when applied to synchronic analysis of processes of public redefinitions of national identity and nationhood (Zimmer 2003: 174). Another problem with this standard distinction is the possibility of taking a reified picture of different constellations of political and cultural variables determining construction of national identity for steadily existing, insurmountable differences between types of society. This can imply that societies may be ranked according to principles of moral order: some of them then will be viewed as intrinsically more ‘advanced’, ‘virtuous’ and ‘liberal’ while others as inherently ‘backward’, ‘vicious’ and ‘illiberal’. Through the prism of distinction between ethnocultural/civic types, the ‘civic’, ‘Western’-type nationalisms can be represented as ‘good’ voluntarist civil associations and contrasted with ‘Eastern’, ‘bad’, primordial organic communities (Brown 2000: 50-69). Under closer consideration, however, civic and ethnocultural types of nationalism are not fundamentally different as both promote strong emotive commitment to homeland, are built around the myths of common ancestry, and seek to establish continuity of their communities by proclaiming visions of common destiny. Besides, both can exist in ‘liberal’ and ‘illiberal’ emanations (ibid: 52-53).

There have been elaborated some promising schemes of argumentation aimed at transgressing the normative division between ‘good’ civic and ‘bad’ ethnocultural nationalism, and simultaneously drawing attention to the concrete mechanisms contributing to formation of non-dichotomous models of national identity. One of these approaches focuses on the issue of the ‘architects’ of national ideologies and movements. Greenfeld (1992), Smith (1991) and Hutchinson (1987) advocate the idea that one needs to look more closely at the class conditions of the national elites and the boundary creation processes they articulate. In
other words, "we are led to look both at the ways in which political elites depict the nationalist goals, and the insecurities, threats or enemies which inhibit their attainment; and also at the receptivity of the wider populace to these nationalist visions and threats" (Brown 2000: 67). In this way, the classical model reifying inherent and insurmountable differences between civic and ethnocultural nationalisms can be blurred. Illiberal forms of nationalism should be associated not with a certain vision of collectivity or adherence to certain types of culture (‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ ones), but with insecurity and absence of upward mobility experienced by both the wider populace and actors who articulate nationalist claims. In such an atmosphere it is more likely that the society will be prone to mobilize itself as a collective entity against real or imagined threats and to promote mobilization at the price of suppression of individual liberties. By the same token, nationalism tends to take liberal forms when its major architects are upwardly mobile and do not regard their own status, human dignity and political and cultural identity as threatened (Greenfeld 1992).

Although it may be accepted that, viewed analytically, nationalism has two major ideological forms, one should be aware that their concrete political contents is “surely protean rather than Janus-faced” (Brown 2000: 69). In view of that some widely-accepted and catchy denominations, like, for example, the term ‘nationalizing states’22, which was coined by Brubaker (1996) and which refers to “twenty-odd new states of post-Communist Eurasia” (ibid: 79), should be regarded with a share of criticism. On the one hand, the problem is that Brubaker’s definition is focused on practices of elites and, hence, implicitly rejects agency of a wider populace in the construction of nationhood and national identity (Goshulak 2003: 498). On the other hand, the concept “is based on the assumption that the discourse promoting the titular ethnic group is fully realized in wide-range policies of the state in such spheres as the economy, demographics, politics, and culture, and as such it does not offer analytical tools to cope with cases where there is no full congruence between discursive practices and policies” (Wolczuk 2000: 675). Wolczuk’s study on the ‘official’ narratives of national identity in post-1991 Ukraine demonstrates that, under closer consideration, constructions of the nationhood and national identity propagated by the state elites are everything but non-contradictive and consistent. If the absence of common strategies and doctrines is so apparent at the highest political levels, then one may guess what cacophony of ‘voices and noises’ articulating Ukrainian-ness and other constructions of nationality and nationhood can be found on the regional political levels and, moreover, in everyday life.

In any case, this cacophony is not absolute; there are a number of recurring themes and concepts that allow distinguishing focal points of the post-1991 Ukrainian national project. One of these repeating and widely exploited themes is culture in all the abundance of meanings and connotations attached to the term. A specific feature of nation building in Eastern Europe is that its ideology (even in the Soviet era23) has been

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22 Nationalizing states have been defined as “states conceived by their dominant elites as nation-states, as the states of and for particular nations, yet as ‘incomplete’ or ‘un-realized’ nation-states, as insufficiently ‘national’ in a variety of senses” (Brubaker 1996: 79).

23 “Uncompromisingly hostile to individual rights, they [Bolsheviks—E.N.] eagerly, deliberately and quite
developed under the obvious influence of German Romanticism’s concepts about nations as collective individuals—historically unique, self-sufficient and autonomous. Accordingly, Romanticism forged its own interpretive framework within which culture has been viewed as ‘the soul of the folk’, that is, as an autonomous spiritual dimension of national identity. Unlike the Enlightenment which provided theoretical ground for interpretation of political individualism and civilizational identity as political principles, Romanticism established cultural individualism and ethnic/cultural identity as unquestionable concepts (Donskis 2005: 12-15, Hroch and Malecková 2001: 206). This legacy of Romanticism still informs efforts of political and public actors, among others, in Western Ukraine24, to present ‘culture’, on the one hand, as an autonomous, objectively existing field that stays above political manipulation and, on the other hand, as a subject of constant cultivation, refinement and purification. In this latter embodiment culture is viewed as a canonized body of relics and symbols which intelligentsia and, wider, every ‘cultured’ person should take care of and nourish piety for. Such understanding of culture is an important factor in evoking strong feelings of cultural commonality, as “to the extent one possesses the language of everyday and of one’s contemporaries, is one part of a communicative society, according to the extent one possesses the language of feasts and of one’s predecessors is one part of a cultural community” (Assmann 1991: 11, quoted in Niedermüller 1994: 24). Nevertheless, when understood in this way, ‘culture’ turns out to be a kind of gonfalon suitable for use only in situations of feasts and commemorations. In contrast, lived-in everyday culture in its ‘unrefined’ variants, such as social and regional dialects (for instance, surzhyk25), youth subcultures and other contemporary phenomena of style and stylization, tend to be presented as negligible, ‘unserious’ and even morally decadent.

4.4. Morality, intelligentsia’s mission and the project of cultural nationalism

That in the present-day Ukraine cultural distinctions tend to be viewed through moral spectacles is hardly surprising. On the one hand, sharpened attention to moral dichotomies is still rooted—and cultivated—in both everyday and political discourses embracing ethnicity and nationality. Especially in Eastern Europe the language of moral claims, coupled with concern about national values, has had great resonance (Verdery 1999: 304). On the other hand, processes of societal transformation in the post-Soviet consistently promoted group rights that did not always coincide with those of the proletariat” (Slezkine 1994: 415).

24 Riabchuk (2000b: 205) argues that the Romanticist conception of the Ukrainian nation characterised by messianism, a cult of the past and idealization of the national features, dominates, in particular, post-1991 Ukrainian scholarship as well as journalistic, literary and publicist discourses.

25 Surzhyk is the Ukrainian name for colloquial mixture of Russian and Ukrainian languages. For a survey on linguistic aspects and class situatedness of the contemporary debate on surzhyk in Ukraine see Bernsand 2006.
space include distancing from and negation of values and attitudes of (in local parlance) the unnatural, deceptive, uncivilized and immoral Soviet regime (Eglitis 2002:15, Holy 1996: 17-27). Under closer consideration, however, such distancing is not unproblematic as in Soviet times the authoritarian discourse and the language of intelligentsia’s moral claims were not clearly separated (Yurchak 2006). It has been even observed that

the Communist Party …blurred the lines further by claiming a monopoly on truth and knowledge, the standard claim of intellectuals. …While Communist Party surely did not ignore technical questions, their first concern was to establish a monopoly on the definition of virtue, of purity, of social entitlement, and of obligation. The opposition sought to establish its credibility on grounds already set by the past and by Party rule itself: morality (Verdery 1999: 304-305).

Coupling the rhetoric around the master metaphor of culture (Bauman 1987a, 1987b) with moral dichotomies proved to be an effective means of intelligentsia and intellectuals’ discursive empowerment even after the fall of the Soviet political system. The battles for morality unavoidably focused on culture which, in view of the East European intellectuals and intelligentsia, should be ‘purified’ from the Soviet legacy and ‘normalized’ according to the moral tradition of the present-day Western world or and in line with visions of the ‘uncorrupted’ social order preceding Soviet times. This morally toned aspiration to ‘normality’ (see Wanner 1998: 75, Kulyk 2006) is also a crucial factor underpinning radical social change in social, political, economic and cultural life in post-1989 Eastern Europe. In this respect the moral construct of ‘normality’ should be regarded as complementary to the concept of nationalism. The latter one, according to Eglitis, still has explanatory value, but at the same time it is “weakened by its failure to distinguish among different ideas about change, which, while often sharing a common commitment to the ‘interests of nation’, define those interests in fundamentally different ways” (Eglitis 2002: 9).

Such a view of nationalism is justified. Nationalism is not the only factor generating wide-scale changes in this part of the world—especially if this concept is taken in its narrower meaning, as a constellation of political doctrines and projects implemented by the state elites and aimed at forming a collectivity called nation. Nevertheless, as long as one accepts the wider definition of nationalism as “the process whereby culture is endowed with political roof” (Pratt 2003: 4), one may agree that since 1989 “nationalism played a part in all” (Armstrong 2001: 236), even though its concrete forms and stakes varied greatly. Wide-scale changes in post-Communist Eastern Europe have been inalienable from discourses on ‘national dignity’ and ‘national way of life’ in their numerous variants: introspective and retrospective, politically pragmatic and filtered through moral frames. Longing for ‘normality’ may be conceptualized as a typical feature of the so-called cultural nationalism which “has as its primary concern the regeneration of the nation as a distinctive moral community” (Hutchinson 2001: 40).
The concept of cultural nationalism may be criticized as analytically vague, as a mere description of the state of art in certain historical circumstances. Nevertheless, it brings to the fore processes of cultural transformation and therefore may help elucidate the dynamics of the national in the post-Soviet space. For a cultural nationalist nation is not primarily a rational political project implemented from above, but rather a community which, like family, is "composed of strongly differentiated individuals and groups, united by a love of its common historical achievements and an active participation in its way of life" (Hutchinson 2001: 41). Cultural nationalism arises on the 'peripheries' as a compensatory response (which may be called ressentiment (Greenfeld 1992: 15)) to prestige of the industrial 'core' nations of the West and puts as its main concern a moral regeneration of the society on all levels and its integration (in particular, cultural one) into the structures of the 'developed' modern world. Therefore, cultural nationalism, at least initially, is a movement and constellation of discourses which are aimed to build from below a common sense of values while taking into account regional and other diversities of the nation (Hutchinson 2001: 41). Besides, though reacting to the achievements of the 'advanced' nations, cultural nationalists do not argue for unconditional revival of traditional culture and institutions. Instead, they often act as moral innovators and focus on balancing traditionalist and modernist streams (ibid: 42).

As "both intellectuals and the intelligentsia [have] …a sense of moral mission: to protect culture, not merely to produce it" (Eyerman 1996: 24), they tend to become ardent proponents of grass-root national revitalization. In Ukraine these actors seek to be both moral watchdogs for the 'corrupted' elites and cultural awakeners for the 'inert' populace who reputedly share only "a basic passive national consensus for an independent democratic Ukraine" (Casanova 1998: 83). They translate their culture-focused moral concerns into discursive projects of collective identity construction and—potentially—into political agenda. Assuming that narratives are not only a means of representing life, but a fundamental cultural constituent of the lives represented (Sewell, Jr. 1992b: 482-483, Somers 1992), I suggest looking more closely at the narratives about the L'viv intelligentsia and its 'own' urban community. These narratives address intelligentsia’s multiple positioning and sense of change and continuity in the flow of everyday life. They also explicate quite rigid distinctions based on moral dichotomies and power hierarchies.

4.5. East-Central European intelligentsia and intellectuals in quest for symbolic power

The changing political and broader societal context of the post-socialist East-Central Europe brought about prophecies about intelligentsia’s ‘death’. However, downward social trajectories of intelligentsia in the post-Soviet societies, changing patterns of their cultural consumption and production and, finally, loss of positions in the political sphere may indicate not withering away of intelligentsia as a cultural representation
and historical tradition, but rather social and political disenfranchisement of wide circles of the highly educated. Viewed from a broader perspective, even reasoning of the New Class theorists that present-day intelligentsia lost its chance to seize class power (Konrád and Szelényi 1979, King and Szelényi 2004) may be justified. Nevertheless, I assume that the issue of intelligentsia’s and intellectuals’ power is not only about implementation of political class projects by the highly educated. Even though one may point out evidence of declining influence of intelligentsia in many societal spheres (e.g., political), one may find evidence, which, on the contrary, supports the conclusion about stable power patterns and even increasing influence of this category of actors in the so-called post-Soviet space.

In post-1991 Ukraine intelligentsia withers away as a “stratum of particular social calling” (Gella 1976: 18). As Kennedy and Suny (1999: 402) point out, “While Communism managed to preserve the distinction of an intelligentsia, the post-Communism scene threatens to undermine it”. Intelligentsia under state socialism used to be an actor that, in principle, used to occupy the same space of legitimation as the Party (Bauman 1987a: 178). Intelligentsia’s distinction and influence was to a great extent conditioned by its support of the modernization practices implemented by the Party-state but also by a special kind of symbolic resource defined as ‘moral capital’ (Verdery 1999: 304-305, see also Verdery 1991a: 247). Their moral capital was predominately accumulated according to the inverted logic of symbolic economy, which implied that persecutions and deprivation suffered by those who resisted the system in their quest for collective rights or personal autonomy, become a source of moral superiority. After 1989, factions of dissenting humanistic and even technocratic intelligentsia all over the former socialist block converted this symbolic resource, which is “rooted in defining certain values as correct and upholding them” (ibid: 304), to the political capital (King and Szelényi 2004: ix, Dascalov 1996: 80-83).

Humanistic intelligentsia and public intellectuals, full of determinacy to fulfill their historical mission and to lead the disoriented compatriots to democracy, civil society and ‘Europe’, temporarily filled the power vacuum created by the disintegration of the Communist apparatus in the early 1990s. However, as political power holders they were driven out of competition by other actors. This happened partly because the moral capital of politicking intelligentsia became exhausted as a result of internal struggles and awkward efforts to combine pragmatic politics with intelligentsia’s ethos and critical reasoning (Dascalov 1996: 80). Besides, in Ukraine the loss of positions by factions of politicking intelligentsia was spurred by the socio-cultural climate where social significance of intelligentsia as bearers of shared cultural values, habits of high cultural consumption and common consciousness emphasizing service to the community began to decline.

When accounting for ups and downs of the intelligentsia’s dominance in East-Central Europe in the twentieth century, one should also have in mind the argument according to which historical periods, when intelligentsia plays heightened political role, usually coincide with “moments of political definition, when future possibilities are open” (Kennedy and Suny 1999: 402). The initial phases of the formation of many
Central European nations in the nineteenth century was one such period, and the recent come-back of the intelligentsia to the political arena was connected not only to the system change, but to the re-definition of the newly emerged independent nations. Although impact of the intelligentsia’s activities and ideological discourses may be tremendous and long-lasting, the peak periods of its political influence generally tend to be short (Kennedy and Suny 1999: 402-403). When intelligentsia fulfils its ‘mission’ as a catalyst of certain historical processes, it tends to draw itself back from the spotlights of history.

King and Szelényi even assume that the highly educated, according to the social logic, should be deeply interested in not becoming ‘the new masters’ and not abandoning their autonomy, because they, “by resisting the temptation of class power, may actually gain a different type of power—namely, symbolic domination” (King and Szelényi 2004: xxix). Bauman suggests, however, that declining influence of the intellectuals and intelligentsia in politics may be an “unanticipated and hardly desired” (Bauman 1987a: 176) side effect of their cultivation of areas of autonomy immune to state interference. This may be a normal process which comes in tandem with ‘Westernization’ of the intellectual practice in this part of the world, because in the West “The growing skill of the body politics to function without the kind of services the intellectuals were best at supplying also meant the growing irrelevance of intellectual work to the political process” (ibid: 176).

Although intelligentsia and intellectuals seldom maintain powerful political positions, they still have a tremendous say in the production of political ideas—and, what is even more important, ideals. Their activities and criticisms have a deep effect both on the political atmosphere and on popular attitudes. Intelligentsia’s and intellectuals’ discourses represent the dominant understandings about human nature, nation, state and economy in a particular setting (Greenfeld 1992, 2001). Theirs is the power to formulate influential narratives about and for their particular communities. These narratives, retranslated and refracted in various societal domains, including politics, shape a whole society’s aspirations and choices.

In chapter 7 I argue that Ukrainian intelligentsia in L’viv, even in unfavorable political circumstances, seems to succeed in appropriating sites of intellectual autonomy, and that this “appears as the specific tendency of the intelligentsia” (Bourdieu 1966: 94). Further, it will be argued that when striving to expand the autonomous places for its own practices and discursive production, intelligentsia simultaneously promotes development of “a precarious but not unsustainable balance between the institutions of the modern state, the market economy and the family” (Bauböck 1996: 76) known as civil society. This entails that intelligentsia is a representative symbol associated with the concepts that are crucial for societal development (e.g., democracy, civil society, modernity, nation). It also identifies structural sites where tensions and controversies must be balanced, prevalingly by means of critical argument and cultural authority.

Although since 1991 ideological anchoring of the intelligentsia, which had been defined by the Soviet regime, lost its relevance, intelligentsia in Ukraine is still associated with a certain status and influence.
To get ahead of the story, the analysis of the collected data indeed suggests that despite social atomization and downward social mobility after 1991, intelligentsia continues its existence as a symbolically significant phenomenon. Similarly to the notion of ‘culture’ (Mitchell 1995), it is not intelligentsia as the actual reality, but rather its representation, its reified image that becomes a power resource. Although in its present shape it is usually not associated with traditional class-like markers (lifestyle, tendency to ‘endogamous’ marriages etc.), it continues to exist in more elusive incarnation as a symbolic point of reference, an ideal, a ‘myth’, a ‘key symbol’ and as a sort of dispersed discursive community articulating both political imagery and socially significant visions. In the political contexts intelligentsia, similarly to other power metaphors, is “spoken into existence and maintained as a relevant political term by dint of its continuing use” (Neumann 1999:15). Thus, intelligentsia goes on to be a significant player in the field of power (Bourdieu 1993a), discerned by certain claims, resources and strategies.

Knowledge becomes both a main resource and a necessary condition for the nexus of domination for intelligentsia and intellectuals (Mannheim 1952, Foucault 1980, Bourdieu 1977, Konrád and Szelényi 1979). Particular kinds of knowledge transformed into a power resource may be defined according to different criteria and named differently: teleological and technical knowledge (Konrád and Szelényi 1979, Szelényi 1982), culture of critical discourse (Gouldner 1979), cultural capital (Bourdieu 1991, Bourdieu and Passeron 1977), discourses supporting various regimes of truth (Foucault 1980). Nevertheless, intelligentsia is distinguishable not because of some indispensable practical or technical knowledge (Verdery et al. 2005: 6), but first and foremost due to its claim of the superiority of its knowledge. This ‘superior knowledge’ which is inseparable from “the properly symbolic power of showing things and making people believe in them” (Bourdieu 1990: 146), is primarily about ascribing value to objects and defining the classificatory frames, that is, about establishing what is ‘high’ and ‘low’, ‘distinguished’ and ‘vulgar’, ‘pure’ and ‘impure’, ‘aesthetic’ and ‘practical’.

Taking up the issue of ‘national intellectual practice’, Kennedy and Suny (1999: 413) provide a list of particular kinds of resources that may be employed by the national intellectuals in their quest for power. These resources are: cultural capital, sophistication of intellectualty, autonomy of activity, prestige, and articulation with other kinds of power. All these resources were recurrently discussed in the course of the interviews. Relation of intelligentsia, the people and the elites, stories about dignity, ‘culture of speech’, responsibility, morality, proper conduct, search for personal autonomy—ubiquitousness of these themes and topos in the interview implies that the issue of choice, appropriation and cultural transmission of the resources necessary for ‘conjuring up’ a distinct social category of intelligentsia and personal standing as an intelihent, were crucial for the informants.

With the end of the Soviet period in Ukraine, it makes sense to talk about the relative disempowerment of intelligentsia as a category of social subjects who inculcate their classificatory patterns of
morality and ‘taste’ in the rest of the society. However, fading of intelligentsia as an actual, empirical position in the hierarchy of ‘masters of minds’ in present-day Ukraine, paradoxically, occurs simultaneously with preserving and even heightening the role of intellectual field as well as discourses relating to normative narrative identity of intelligentsia. Presently, the pool of meanings, practices and discourses, which had been developed around the category of intelligentsia in Ukraine, tends to be so broad, elusive and almost all-inclusive, that it can easily be appropriated by various social (oftentimes political) actors (see discussion about intellehentnist in chapter 5).

It may be argued that intelligentsia’s power stems from two related aspects of intelligentsia’s realization. One of them, discussed in chapter 5, is the narrative identity that articulates intelligentsia’s special standing as cultural producers (and consumers). Another aspect is the products (discourses, practices, narratives etc.) of intelligentsia, which circulate in public sphere (some of them will be discussed in chapters 8 and 9). In the former case, the particular form of power exercised by intelligentsia is authority, as “in authority, it is not the content of communication but its source, that is, the perceived status, resources or personal attributes of the communicator, which induces compliance” (Wrong 1995: 35). Indeed, as has been explained, intelligentsia (especially the ‘old’ intelligentsia) is often imagined as a community of high status that stems from ascribing this community certain intrinsic values and virtues. Due to this, products (opinions, ideas, initiatives etc.) of those who are attributed as intelligentsia are of significance for the rest of the society. It does not mean that intelihenty does not reach for persuasion in order to ensure their positions, but this form of power seems to be of secondary importance. On the other hand, ‘non-intelligentsia’ can also use elements from the ‘repertoire’ of intelligentsia (e.g., topoi of responsibility, ‘mission’, unselfish serving to and defense of high ideals etc.) as empowering discursive devices. Among these actors are not only politicians of various sorts, but also those who might be defined as organic intellectuals and public intellectuals.

Hence, I suggest that the predominant exercising of different forms of power may be one of the grounds for analytical distinction between present-day intellectuals and intelligentsia. Unlike the intellehent, the intellectual is perceived first and foremost as a definition of an individually achieved standing. Unlike ‘intelligentsia’, this term lacks a connotation of belonging to the community of ascribed virtue (observe: unlike in the case with intellehent, a correlative collective noun for ‘intellectual’ does not exist). In principle, the core criterion which distinguishes an intellectual is, in the first turn, his/her individual faculty of critical reflection and analysis. Power of the intellectual stems primarily from the skill to persuade a cognizant public which is not necessarily and sometimes not even predominately one’s ‘own’ local or national community, but instead embraces an international audience. It may be argued that intellectuals tend to emphasize specificity of their production in the first turn. Unlike them, when attempting to influence public opinion, intelligentsia appeals primarily to its position of actors endowed with cultural authority.
Difference in the forms of power which these actors reach for results in a different relation of intellectuals and intelligentsia to the nation. Intelligentsia is used to playing a (self-appointed) role of "traditional symbol of the unity of the nation" (Daskalov 1996: 71) and explicitly identifying itself with its 'own' cultural (national, regional, local) communities. Intelligentsia needs its 'own' people, folk, nation and culture as objects of influence in order to implement its 'mission' and, although exact forms of the mission and definition of its objects may be contested by various factions of intelligentsia, the value of the 'specific', 'own' (not necessarily 'own' by power of ascription, but often by power of choice) remains non-discussible. Meanwhile, relation of the intellectuals to the nation is more complicated as intellectuals strive to be anchored (and make their voices heard) in international (transnational) fields of arts, science and scholarship. There they accumulate specific cultural capital which they convert into general cultural and symbolic capital in the national context (Jakobsen 2008). Besides, "Intellectuals had to make argument; it was not something embedded in the nation. And that suggests a power for intellectuals that ideologies of nationalism tend to undermine, especially since that power also implies a potential divergence of interests" (Kennedy and Suny 1999: 400).

Despite this difference between intellectuals and intelligentsia, both these actors articulate the nation by wielding cultural authority or putting forward ideological arguments. As cultural producers, they enthusiastically engage themselves in re-formulation and adjustment of elements of local traditional cultures in order to create a basis for national high culture. Also, both are benefited from this articulation—and, simultaneously, they benefit the national community as they formulate criteria of belonging, make the nation distinguishable and, hence, formulate conditions for its agency. In other words, intelligentsia and intellectuals exercise pastoral and proselytizing power over the nation. Bauman (1987b: 49) defines the former kind of power as "exercised not for its own, but for its subjects' good; it had no selfish ends—only the improvement of its subjects". Proselytizing power, which may go in tandem with the pastoral one,

was distinguished by being bent on converting its subjects from one form of life to another... proselytizing power does not necessarily aim at remoulding the subjects after its own image, and thus dissolving the difference between the two modes of life. What it does seek, remorselessly and uncompromisingly, is the recognition by its subjects of the superiority of the form of life it represents and derives its authority from (ibid: 49).

Pastoral and proselytizing power, even though they seem to be 'milder' forms of social power, presuppose no reciprocal influence from their objects which oftentimes become transformed into the inferior 'others', and they may be equally effectively used for social control and disciplining as 'harsh' forms of power.

The crisis of the Soviet system at the end of the 1980s gave intellectuals and intelligentsia not only a unique opportunity to question policies of the authoritarian state and to revisit its ideological grounds. Massive flow of the new knowledge and implosion of global trends into the society expanded the limits of the
imaginable (Appadurai 1996), and brought awareness that definitions of cultural, socio-political and territorial communities imposed by the Soviet system cannot be left unchallenged. When trying to redefine criteria of belongingness in accordance with national frames, Ukrainian intellectuals and intelligentsia, much like their predecessors in the nineteenth century, started, in witty expression of Himka (1999), ‘Icarian flights in almost all directions’. Redefinition of Ukrainian-ness (from the ‘softer’ term of nationality (natsional’nist’) to the term of nation, which wakes much stronger emotions) was presented not only as a key to success in the international and regional political arena, but also as a means for promoting internal social cohesion and favoring economic growth. Hence, redefined symbolic boundaries of the national community were expected to have immediate and massive impact on its social boundaries26. However, effects of this transformation proved to be more complicated, as they impacted not only ‘objects’ of classification, but also those who were entitled to classify.

Performative discourses of the nation in changing historical and political circumstances may equally be a power resource and a power constraint for those involved (Kennedy and Suny 1999: 389). Renaissance of the idea of nation as a defensive and exclusive community among a part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in L’viv (see, for example, the story about ‘Spadshchyna’ in chapter 7) became possible in a social climate where both social disenfranchisement of the intelligentsia and inadequacy of its ideological claims became evident. Besides, as it will be argued in chapter 5, the tendency which has been observed among the younger generation to identify themselves as intellectuals, middle class etc. rather than as intelligentsia, may also have something to do with expansion of national frames of reference in the discourses and practices of everyday life.

4.6. The notion of generation and dialectics of continuity and discontinuity of cultural production
The concept of generation helps to conceptualize age- and life-course specific relations and attitudes that do matter in processes of socio-historic reproduction and innovation. Generational unity is usually revealed through similar collective responses to the shared problems and objective conditions of the

26 Lamont and Molnár make an important point when distinguishing between social and symbolic boundaries: “Symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space. They are tools by which individuals and groups struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of reality. Symbolic boundaries also separate people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and group membership. …They are an essential medium through which people acquire status and monopolize resources. Social boundaries are objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources …and social opportunities. …Only when symbolic boundaries are widely agreed upon can they take on a constraining character and pattern social interactions in important ways. Moreover, only then can they become social boundaries, i.e., translate, for instance, into identifiable patterns of social exclusion or class and racial segregation” (Lamont and Molnár 2002: 168-169).
time (e.g., war, poverty, geographical resettlement, change in political regime etc.) (Borneman 1992: 48). According to the pioneer of generational approach Karl Mannheim, “The social phenomenon of ‘generations’ represents nothing more than a particular kind of identity of location, embracing related ‘age-groups’ embedded in a historical-social process” (Mannheim 1959: 292).

Although generation is quite an arbitrary and ambiguous analytical inventory (Spitzer 1972: 1358), nevertheless I regard it as an important recurring theme and a practical tool for organizing my study. This notion is useful as it helps to frame processes of discursive (narrative) creation of national cohesion on the levels of both state strategies and everyday practices. As, for instance, Borneman (1992: 32-47) explains in his study on belonging in ‘the two Berlins’, development of a subjective sense of nationness27 is inalienable from the uniformizing strategies of the state which constantly seeks to embed individual life-course experience into its meaningful frames. Both individuals and states deploy ‘culturally fictitious’ narratives intended to endow actual events with mythical meanings. The process of such mutual adjustment of individual and collective state-sanctioned frames to specific master narratives should—in ideal situations—lead to construction of solidary ‘meaningful subjects’. “To the extent that the same master narratives are appealed to by different subjects,—continues Borneman,—they become instruments for producing social and possibly national cohesion; subjects then unite as a generation, and they demarcate themselves from other groups” (Borneman 1992: 47). This approach, which views generation as a narrative device inalienable from formation of national cohesion, is especially relevant for my research.

Generation may be conceptualized as an imagined community or, more precisely, ‘community of memory’ (Irwin-Zarecka 1994: 53-54, Reulecke 2008) of people sharing collective time-specific experience of socialization that distinguishes them from other age groups as they move through time. Therefore, not all the segments of population in a certain age can be automatically regarded as representatives of a respective clear-cut generation. One should both receive knowledge about certain continuum of time-specific social discourses and practices together with one’s peers and internalize these ideas and practices as a part of his/her narrative identity. Therefore in my study it was particularly advantageous to concentrate on the intelligentsia who as a ‘community of memory’ might be quite reflective on their time- and age-specific collective identities.

Limits of every generation can be defined—with a share of arbitrariness unavoidable in such cases—in connection with political chronology formally defined by official narrative (Borneman 1992). In Western Ukraine and Galicia the political chronology of the twentieth century differs from that one which is most often addressed in the studies of the Soviet and post-Soviet space. Because Soviet rule was definitely

27 Borneman conceptualises ‘nationness’ (in contrast to nationalism) as a subjective construction referring to praxis of belonging: “Nationalism comes and goes (hence, opinion polls can, to some extent, measure it), whereas nationness is fundamentally tied to identity structures and has a tenuous relationship to opinion” (Borneman 1992: 339).
established in these lands only after World War II, the generation of still living L'vivites who were educated in primary and secondary schools before the Soviet period and, hence, imbued non-Soviet narratives and ethos, is still sufficient in number as well as in influence on the cultural imagination of the younger generations. They and their slightly younger counterparts who were embraced by the Soviet system of education in the 1950s, but still were receptive to the pre-Soviet discourses and cultural patterns, are the individuals whom I refer to in my study as ‘older generation’. The opportunity to expose and analyze collisions and continuities in the views and practices of this older generation and their ‘Soviet-bred’ counterparts has informed my scholarly enthusiasm throughout the study.

Yurchak’s study on socio-cultural practices of the “last Soviet generation” also addresses the way to define generation which takes political chronology as a point of reference. In particular, he advocates the view that the period of late socialism (mid-1950s to mid-1980s) may be divided in two shorter periods, namely, the period of Khrushchev’s reforms (often called ottepel’, ‘the thaw’), and the stagnation (zastoi) of Brezhnev’s period. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968 is considered as the symbolic divide between them. Accordingly, these two periods gave rise to two different generations: “the older generation that is sometimes called the ‘sixtiers’ (shestidesiatniki, identified by the name of their formative decade) and the younger group, here called ‘the last Soviet generation’” (Yurchak 2006: 31). I have already addressed the issue of views and ideational developments of the ‘generation of the 1960s’ in Ukraine. However, among my respondents this generation was underrepresented. Instead, middle-aged informants, who came of age in the Brezhnev period and would be identified as ‘the last Soviet generation’, prevailed. This generation is unique in that they,

unlike previous and subsequent generations, had no “inaugural event” around which to coalesce as a cohort... The identity of the older generations was formed around events such as the revolution, the war, the denunciation of Stalin; the identity of the younger generations has been formed around the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike these older and younger groups, the common identity of the last Soviet generation was formed by a shared experience of the normalized, ubiquitous, and immutable authoritative discourse of the Brezhnev’s years. … At the same time, they also became actively engaged in creating various new pursuits, identities, and forms of living that were enabled by authoritative discourse, but not necessarily defined by it (Yurchak 2006: 32).

In my study I prefer to address this group of respondents with a reputedly specific worldview and social skills as belonging to the ‘middle-aged’ generation. Finally, I call the ‘younger generation’ those informants who came of age during perestroika and for whom the fall of the USSR and advent of Ukraine’s independence was the “inaugural event” marking their socialization—and those who already grew up in post-1991 Ukraine.

General acknowledgement of generational issues, mostly defined as ‘generation conflicts’ and ‘gaps’, is explicit in the field of national and ethnic studies. It is evident, for example, in Hroch’s typology of the structural phases in development of national movements among ‘smaller European nations’ in the
nineteenth century (Hroch 1985: 63). Smith also recognizes ‘conflict of generations’ as one of the factors underlying the continuing struggle of national intelligentsia for their ‘nationally unconscious’ countrymen (Smith 1996: 125). Younger generations of activists and intellectuals who find themselves at peripheral social positions and whose social and cultural capital is marginalized by older generations in power often become adherents of radicalism and organizers of national resurgence movements. That was a case in Galician Ukraine, where radical ideas of Ukrainian political self-determination were formulated by young political activists already in times of the rather tolerant Habsburg rule. In the first decades of the twentieth century the young West Ukrainian intelligentsia inspired by the voluntarist philosophy of Nietzsche became active participants in the armed struggle for ‘the National Idea’. In the milder political climate of the ‘thaw’ the young shistdesiatnyky saw their chance to affect changes in the Soviet totalitarian system. At the end of the 1980s dynamics of ideational interaction between different generations fuelled the oppositional political activism in L’viv. Already in 1988 national activism in L’viv “was confined to three spheres: an older, intellectual elite (…the dissidents who formed the Ukrainian Helsinki Association), a young activist core (around… Tovarystvo Leva); and a more radical cultural fringe (including the punks and hippies)” (Kenney 2000b: 337). Although objectives, ‘stakes’ and methods of these circles had little in common, nevertheless oppositional moods of the younger generation influenced by subcultural trends (mainly hippie culture) resonated with the political dissent of the older generation. The younger generation of national activists protected by the Komsomol officials managed to start the process of ‘cultural awakening’ in L’viv, which very soon gave way to strictly political concerns of national autonomy and systemic change of the society. In 1990 students from L’viv and Kyiv initiated a hunger strike at the monument of Lenin in the Ukrainian capital and thus acted as harbingers of the crash of Soviet political dominance in Ukraine.

One of the possible explanations of the young intellectuals’ activism and engagement in national movements is their marginalized position in the social structure, a position which predetermines their border-transgressing potential and special sensitivity to new meanings and expressions not yet established in ‘wider society’ (Ålund 1998: 124). Bourdieu’s theory of practice emphasizes the significance of habitus in construction of ethnic/national discourses and ideologies differing from generation to generation. When younger generations try to acquire the leading positions in the fields of theoretical development and practical implementation of ethnic/national ideologies, their impetus is not just a clearly articulated desire to get access to resources usurped by elder generations but also “intergenerational differences in habitus” (Bentley 1987: 45). Having this in mind one can for example argue that a revisiting of the social roles of intellectuals and intelligentsia in the post-Communist European societies might be an evidence that the younger generations managed to invest their cultural and symbolic capital in new ways while acquiring habituses differing from those of older generations.
Political and ideological projects of the post-Communist European democracies presuppose the changed understanding by the intellectuals of their social roles and activities in the new socio-political situation. Allegedly, as older generations of intelligentsia used to take upon themselves a role of ‘legislators’ (Bauman 1987b) and ‘civil magi’ (Burszta 1994), they cherished their image as separated both from the ‘folk’ and ‘authorities’ missionaries in the sphere of morality and patriotism. However, in the new circumstances the situation has changed, as intelligentsia is expected not to come with ready-made ideological narratives, but “to provide society with the ability to make free choices from the widest possible range of alternatives, and encompassing all domains of public life, not only political” (Kempny 1999: 161). Nevertheless, the result of the intelligentsia’s agency under the new circumstances may significantly diverge from the clearly formulated expectations. As will be argued in the following chapters, this may happen due to an ongoing interplay between the agency and narrative identities of cultural producers. This interplay is predetermined not only by pragmatic (political or politicized) interests, but by complex constellations of cultural, historical and social factors.
Chapter 5. Incarnations of the Protagonist: Old Intelligentsia—New Intelligentsia—Pseudo-intelligentsia—Non-intelligentsia

5.1. Ukrainian intelligentsia: not dead yet

According to some authors, drastically decreased state support of intelligentsia’s ‘cultured’ lifestyles, lost ideological-cultural identity, and an absence of united political action and common critical discourse resulted in the fading of intelligentsia in the post-Communist space (Roberts et al. 2005, Daskalov 1996, Gessen 1997). I do not agree with this generalizing statement because, in line with the argument presented above, intelligentsia should not be regarded as a bounded status group accommodating a certain lifestyle and definite identity components. It is rather a category and social standing mediated by participation in intellectual fields and cultural discourses—much like the position of the intellectuals in the West.

Further, when viewed as an identity phenomenon, being (and becoming) an intellectual and an intellehiert presupposes self-identification with the concept (Bauman 1992a: 81) and with the ‘discourse community’ (Wutnow 1989) of intelligentsia and/or intellectuals. Both elusive and over-explicit definitions indicate that ‘intelligentsia’ is conflated with complicated relations of power which “act most significantly in ways that are nonobvious and, for this very reason, are especially important to identify” (Verdery 1991a: 241). Therefore, one of the important tasks of my study has been to learn from the respondents about the scope of opinions about and presentations of intelligentsia in order to get preliminary understanding of the structured “space of ideology and legitimation” (Verdery 1991a: 17) this category is located in.

In the course of my fieldwork I found that when I asked direct questions about the meaning of the terms ‘intelligentsia’ and ‘intellectuals’, often I got responses spiced with a solid share of skepticism and negation. However, when submitting the informants’ narratives to a deeper analysis, it became evident that many informants tacitly share the notions of moral responsibility and cultural superiority which are quite typical of intelligentsia’s self-identification. Thus, it is important to add that “who or what intelligentsia is, is more than a matter of self-definition, it is also a matter of historical consciousness and its realization” (Eyerman 1994: 3). Also, speaking about the dissolution of the ‘old’ intelligentsia, who in Eastern Europe used to form a social stratum, should not prevent us from recognizing important continuities which this concept implies. ‘Classical’ intelligentsia may have an afterlife in certain concerns and discourses, communities and personalities, ethos and myths (Daskalov 1996: 50).

Any statement about intelligentsia’s ‘death’ is a generalization that should be proven against the background of concrete cases because intelligentsia’s, as well as intellectuals’, roles are “taken on and reinvented by actors out of the possibilities and constraints provided by tradition and context” (Eyerman 1994: 1). Roberts et al. (2005) acknowledge that the cultural consumption, indicators of the life-style and choices
measured in L'viv and other settings of their study, proved to be substantially different. Hence, it can be
posited that intelligentsia in L'viv is not 'as much dead' as somewhere else because the interplay of local
structural conditions, cultural models and forms of intelligentsia's actorship indicate quite a high level of
intelligentsia's self-consciousness and a high probability of its mobilization.

Finally, it may be assumed that under present-day conditions the post-Soviet intelligentsia
performs in intellectual and cultural fields (which by definition are sites of constant struggle and changes) of
not the same quality as in the Soviet period. For instance, the sites and arenas where discourses and practices of
'the Soviet' used to be forged, today may function as crucibles of 'the national'. Yet, it may be presumed that
intelligentsia, when changing its appearances and ideological 'gowns', keeps the 'fashion' in which these
gowns are worn and appearances are styled.

The initial insight into the cultural codes and categories scaffolding the intellectual and cultural
fields may begin with the description of the main 'protagonist' (or, in some cases, 'antagonist') in the
narratives of the informants. My interlocutors defined 'intelligentsia' and an
intelihent

from self-description and one of the pivotal concepts in one's vision of the social world to the term describing
a more or less peripheral category which the interlocutor tried to outline according to the demand of the
interview situation. When raising arguments for the importance to look more closely at popular presentations
of intelligentsia and intellihent, it is useful to have in mind Bourdieu's observation that

Knowledge of the social world and, more precisely, the categories that make it possible, are the
stakes, par excellence, of political struggle, the inextricably theoretical and practical struggle for the
power to conserve or transform the social world by conserving or transforming the categories
through which it is perceived (Bourdieu 1985: 729, see also Bourdieu 1993: 42).

As American-Ukrainian historian Martha Bohachevska-Khomyak (2005: 2) put it,

everyone who lives in Ukraine not only knows what is intelligentsia, but will be surprised by the
simple fact that someone can pose such a question at all. Intelligentsia is the same concept as fine
weather, delicious food or man's beauty—you recognize it when you see it, but you cannot describe
it.

At the same time, in the official discourse of Ukrainian academe and politicking cultural producers one can
encounter over-explicit definitions of the intelligentsia's essence and role. For example, a professor at a
prestigious Kyiv university formulated his vision of intelligentsia like this:

Combination of the high culturedness, intellectuality, tactfulness, philanthropy and altruism and, in
general, special state of mind [stan dashi] in one person is probably the definition of intelligentsia's
quality. Exactly such kind of people must be taken to power in Ukraine. It is because Lenin's
formula 'every cook must be able to rule the state' does not suit here at all (Intellihentsia 1999: 88).
A highly positioned public activist echoes:

Intelligentsia’s essence, as for me, is not only and not so much a level of education, although it is also important. It is, first of all, the state of mind, the proper breeding, high level of patriotism, tolerance of the opponent’s opinion and simultaneously uncompromising defense of the statehood [deržavnist'] and spiritual values of the nation. Intelligentsia’s essence is also high professionalism. An amateur cannot be an intelihent. Unfortunately, many representatives of the authorities are exactly of that former kind (Intelligentsia 1999: 15).

Definitions of this kind exemplify power-claiming rhetoric of certain well-positioned circles aiming to ‘conjure up’ and incalculable the vision of intelligentsia which suits their own interests and ambitions. Nevertheless, independent and anti-establishment milieus and individuals in Ukraine may also frame their political demands and cultural aspirations as those of ‘intelligentsia’. As an example one can mention “The open letter of the remnants [sic!—E.N.] of the young Ukrainian intelligentsia” (Vidkrytyi lyst nedobytkiv molodoi ukraïns’koї intelihentsii, in Donii 2002), a petition for President Kuchma’s resignation which was signed by a range of highly qualified professionals and famous personalities (for example, rock musicians, managers and IT-specialists) who in any other context would probably disagree with being labeled as ‘intelligentsia’.

As has been pointed out, in order to approach such a complex socio-cultural phenomenon as intelligentsia one should combine emic and etic levels of analysis. This chapter takes up the issue of the ‘emic’ interpretations and presentations provided by the informants. Behind the facade of more or less conventional stories, one can discern cultural ‘maps of meaning’ (Jackson 1989) and schemes of categorization telling us about the location of the intelligentsia in social and cultural hierarchies, about lines of co-operation, identification and competition with other actors. On the one hand, the respondents’ stories reveal that “The intellectual world at its most intense has the structure of contending groups, meshing together into a conflictual supercommunity” (Collins 1998:73). Despite apparent differences in opinions and choices, people coming with certain claims, struggling for certain stakes and sharing key concepts of the intellectual, artistic and literary fields can still be regarded as members of these fields of cultural-symbolic production (Bourdieu 1993b: 46, Lamont 1992). On the other hand, these stories provide us with cues as to how this internal coherence of the fields has been ‘fabricated’ in the concrete cultural milieu which defines and directs choices, voices and noises of the L’viv intelligentsia.
5.2. Intelligentsia in general and intellihenty in particular

[O]ne of the most significant properties of the field of cultural production, explaining its extreme dispersion … is the extreme permeability of its frontiers and, consequently, the extreme diversity of the ‘posts’ it offers … However, precisely because it represents one of the indeterminate sites in the social structure, which offers ill-defined posts, waiting to be made rather than ready made, … it attracts agents who differ greatly in their properties and dispositions … (Bourdieu 1993b: 43).

Out of the respondents’ answers, the cluster of attributes according to which belongingness to intelligentsia may and should be judged varies greatly. The diversity in opinions reflects the complexity of discourses which the notion of intelligentsia is ‘implanted’ into. It is also important to have in mind that this diversity discloses internal heterogeneity and contrasts of a structured space of social relations called the field(s) of cultural/symbolic production.

The most general observation, which may serve as a point of departure for analysis of the interview material, is that the respondents defined collective identity of intelligentsia and individual affinity of its representatives in terms of both formal collective attributes and personal qualities, choices and claims. The respondents often preferred to discuss culturally valued powers of character of an intellihent rather than collective features of intelligentsia. Such willingness to describe some ‘tangible’, concrete persons instead of a ‘nebulous’ discursive category is an interesting detail, which I am going to come back to later. Many respondents began their descriptions with statements that such formal characteristics as tertiary and higher education (often not only attributed to a person but also as a family background) and, accordingly, a non-manual ‘intellectual’ work is essential for being defined as an intellihent. Higher education credentials, however, were presented as neither the ultimate nor a sufficient feature for being regarded as a ‘genuine’ intellihent. Formal education and, in particular, interest in arts and humanities were rather viewed as an advantageous precondition for development of the practices and habits of the ‘cultured’ person.

No doubt, an ignorant person (neuk), an uneducated person, even if he tries to demonstrate refined cultured manners—no, he will look ridiculous anyway. He will not be a cultured person in the eyes of other people. In our time in Ukraine there are many spheres where people don’t need to work hard physically, even if a person works in agriculture or at a factory. So it doesn’t mean that those who don’t work manually all are intellihenty. I think it must be a combination of general knowledge

28 The expression ‘cultured person’ seems to have different connotations in Russia and Poland, i.e. in the countries where ‘classical’ intelligentsia used to form a social stratum. In the Polish tradition intelligentsia has been viewed as the developers and disseminators of selected aspects of human culture. “‘Cultured’ men and women are supposed to possess knowledge… of not only the history and literature but also of ‘the arts of good manners’…, able and willing to take an active part in the social structure” (Lopata 1976: 63, see also Znaniecki 1940, Szczepanski 1962 and Chalasinski 1945). In Russia the concept of ‘culturalization’, or ‘cutureness’ (kul’turnost’), especially in the early Soviet period, alluded rather to ‘proper’ urban style and habits of consumption (see Boym 1994: 102-106; Ries 1997). In more categorical formulation, “Kulturnost’…was a key word in the Soviet lexicon, denoting anything from being properly washed to owing a library” (Gross 1988: 170).
and interest in issues of history, art, social life, literature, education, and high professional level […] One must be a good professional who works intellectually. A solid responsible professional (fakhivets’) who works intellectually. (Volodymyr S., 72 y.o.).

An intelihent is defined by his level of knowledge and his level of culturedness (riven’ kul’tury). If someone is an ignoramus (nehramotnyi) then he cannot analyse his behaviour—is it proper and full of dignity (hidna) or not. An intelihent must have knowledge, and, consequently, culture is formed on the basis of this knowledge (Teodor D., 70 y.o.).

What does in mean to be an intelihent? To read a lot. To talk to people. To be interested in culture. To visit museums, exhibitions, theatres, concerts. It gives a lot for your soul. As for me, it’s a necessity (Marta B., approx. 70 y.o.).

The latter informant also stressed that not only an educated person belonging to the social stratum of intelligentsia can be called intelihent:

You know, a peasant can also be an intelihent. There used to be many peasants who were intelihentni in their souls. Nobleness, nobleness of the heart! They were interested in the national, in the history and culture of their people, in the ethnography of their people. Not like—you just sit close to a feeder, like a pig, and have no interest in anything! (Marta B.).

Several informants declared that formal education and possession of diploma is not at all a necessary variable in the definition of intelligentsia and an intelihent. Higher education is a mass phenomenon, it provides a person with more or less specific knowledge, but in order to be reckoned as intelihent a person should enact some (liberal) moral principles, such as, for example, respect of other people and tolerance:

Higher education is not an indicator of intelligentsia. For me a diploma is a piece of wrapping paper. I cannot call intelihent a person with a diploma and courteous manners who litters outdoors. Intelligentsia is a modern variant of aristocracy. […] To be a noble (shliakhet!a) person means to do what pleases you, but to do this tactfully and without disturbing people around you (Andrii I., 23 y.o.).

Intelligentsia? I see no special reality behind the word. Formal higher education? No. It’s not a criterion. For me, probably, to be an intelihentna person means to respect yourself and people around you. It’s simply an ability to accept people as they are, to tolerate them (Tamara K., 25 y.o.).

An intelihentna person wishes well to people around her, she doesn’t try to thrust her opinions on someone. Instead she tries to defend this opinion and to explain it by the methods which she assumes are most appropriate, it means, by verbal conviction (perekonuvannia slovom). This person is also able to listen to the opponents and accept their points of view (Stefania L., approx. 45 y.o.).

The last quotation is taken from an interview with a female schoolteacher. Notably, even she, whose professional activity lies within the sphere of education, did not emphasize importance of some kind of
formal education for being regarded as a representative of intelligentsia (one of her colleagues, pani29 Vira, also stressed that education alone does not make a person an intelihent). This paradox can be partly explained as a reaction against the Soviet legacy, as intelligentsia (and, in particular, ‘working’ or ‘toiling intelligentsia’) in the USSR was a catch-all category “officially used to designate all more or less educated people, ranging from the academician to the clerk of lowest rank” (Gella 1976: 11, see also White 2004: 144). This new Soviet intelligentsia, who inherited the name and occupations of the ‘classical’ intelligentsia, had otherwise little in common with this latter one. Under the new conditions the old name has been applied “to a new emerging social phenomenon: the shapeless and ambivalent new middle class of the socialist societies” (ibid: 16-17).

Also, the higher education after 1991 has been often viewed simply as a ‘sorting station’ for coming into the job market rather than as an institution that cultivates certain types of ‘elite’ cultural affiliations and subjectivities. Accordingly, intelligentsia in popular opinion became a ‘mainstream’ social identification which also allows the avoidance of class labeling in the situations when one is not certain about one’s ‘definite’ class identification or feels threatened by the implications of relating class to his/her own personal identity (Savage et al. 2001: 875). In a way, when naming themselves as representatives of intelligentsia, people stress their ordinariness and ‘normality’. Notably, in the post-Soviet space this striving to restore a ‘normal’, routine and predictable order of things (Ries 1997: 162, Wanner 1998: 75), which takes many expressions, may be treated as a part of efforts of the newly emerged independent nations to emancipate from the Soviet meta-narrative that used to stress power, heroism and even superhuman features (Eglitis 2002). Besides, the still widely held view that formal education does not mean everything, that a person can be ‘naturally’ intelihentna despite the absence of a diploma or other official certificate, may connote deep distrust to the educational institutions which consecrated and legitimated ‘alien’ states and regimes (in the twentieth century the Polish and the Soviet) and which were all but free harbors of Ukrainian culture, political thought and science.

The story told by one of my respondents may illustrate this. Oleh D., presently a lecturer at one of L’viv’s universities, told about his grandfather who in the family stories had been presented as an example of a genuine Ukrainian intelihent. The grandfather, son of a Galician peasant, faced difficult choices in the 1920s and 1930s, as this talented young man who desperately struggled after getting to the university, was torn between loyalty to his family, his Ukrainian-ness and the demands to pass for a Pole in order to be accepted to

29 Pan and pani are common polite address words to (older) men and women in both the Ukrainian and Polish languages. “The meaning of the word [pan—E.N.] in Polish is ‘mister’ and ‘master’ simultaneously. It is a polite, commonly used form to address to strangers. Soviet propaganda locked on to the second meaning: pan (female equivalent—pani) epitomizes the class enemy of peasants and workers. Pan is different from a capitalist; there is a clear aristocratic component of status differentiation in the concept. It includes a notion of superiority and therefore contempt toward ‘the people’, reciprocated with hatred” (Gross 1988: 24). In Galicia pan was used even in Soviet times, especially in countryside. With the end of the Soviet period, the word was reintroduced into public discourses and substituted the Soviet official address tovarysh (‘comrade’ in Ukrainian). Nevertheless, pan is still the form of address which is normally used in daily encounters in ‘least Sovietised’ Galicia and Western Ukraine.
the Jan Kazimierz University in L’viv. He chose to maintain his national pride, while not abandoning his interest in culture and societal life (for example, he organized a branch of the ‘Prosvita’ society in his native village). Nevertheless,

*It was like the grandfather became suspended between heaven and earth: he was not admitted to the university, but when the Soviets came he was again under suspicion as a freethinker and intellihent. On the other hand, he had never become fully accepted in the peasant milieu. Peasants said about him: ‘Look, he goes around with a newspaper, like some Jew.’ For them he was a strange person, an outsider* (Oleh D., 45 y.o.).

The possibilities of obtaining higher education at Polish institutions of higher learning were indeed limited for nationally aware Ukrainians under the political regime of the Second Polish Republic. On the other hand, in Galicia since the sixteenth century acquisition of a high culture had often been synonymous with adopting Polish culture and, thus, for ethnical Ruthenians (Galician Ukrainians) “there was something like a mathematical formula in operation: Ruthenian + higher education = Pole” (Himka 1999: 114). That is why the Ukrainian Galician peasants could view educated people from their own milieu as strangers: not only as socially ‘others’, but also even as ethnically ‘others’.

Anti-intellectualist stances, priority of the ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ above the ‘reason’ have been typical of Romanticism, which has been influential in Ukraine since the nineteenth century. Viewed from this perspective, deep national sentiment, a sense of unity with a mystic ‘national soul’ and rationality of the mind formed by education cannot be brought into coherence. Besides, one should not discard religiosity, both in its folk variant and in a more institutionalized form, which presupposes knowledge of doctrine and rituals of the Greek Catholic church, which in Galicia is an important part of popular conceptions on what it means to be a ‘true Ukrainian’. For some elder respondents it was a matter of fact that a ‘genuine’ intellihent (especially of the older generation) must be a believer, even though opinions about whether s/he should also follow Christian doctrine strictly and be a church-goer varied:

*Believer and an intellihent—these notions are connected. An intellihent embraces both knowledge and faith, and they both make a person even more intellihentna. If a person goes to church, she commits less sins. And it means that culture in public places improves. A person will not litter the pavement, because she will have in mind that this is both immoral and uncultured. [...] I am sure that a true believer is an intellihentna person* (Teodor D., 70 y.o.).

- (Volodymyr B., 67 y.o): *I don’t think that it’s very important for an intellihent to be a believer.*
- (Volodymyr F., 75 y.o): *Don’t you? I suppose that if a person is an atheist it means that she is simply stupid, she cannot understand with her meager mind all the greatness of the Universe, you know. She is unable to feel God’s presence in it. How can such a person be called an intellihent?*
- (Volodymyr B.): *I mean it is not necessary to be pious, to follow all the religious rules. For example, I knew two famous artists, N. was very pious, L. was not pious, but, for God’s sake, he was not an atheist. He was moderate in this respect, he used to joke: ‘Tell me, N., is it possible that God*
will allow me to paint in heaven when I die?" But he was an extremely polite and clever person. He was never rude with his disciples. And I regard them both as genuine intellectuals.

Yes, in the case of Ukrainians in L'viv it’s probably important for an intellectual to be a believer as well. It’s important because the Greek Catholic Church and Orthodox Church are important societal institutions here. Therefore, to visit church regularly may be an important way of being an intellectual. Maybe for someone this is one of the important practices that allow a person to feel she is an intellectual. Personally, I go to church, but not in order to feel that I am intellectual [chuckles] (Mykola G., 36 y.o.).

Thus, the intellectual may adhere to a scientific worldview and rational thinking, to religious faith or to both\textsuperscript{30}. Both scientific and religious paradigms may form a person’s ‘proper’ subjectivity of intelligent. In order to be regarded as intelligent, one should be first and foremost identifiable, one should look, talk and react in certain ways (as one of the respondents formulated it in a very laconic manner: “To be an intellectual is to behave like an intellectual”). What is performed is more important than motivation behind the performance. This view relates to the widespread opinion that formal higher education does not necessarily presuppose intellectualism and cultural refinement—and vice versa. Also, not even every kind of formal education might be perceived as a sufficient precondition for being regarded as intelligent:

\textsl{To tell the truth, I had no opportunity to ponder on what is intelligentsia, but, on the basis of the general opinion, I assume that those who work intellectually are reckoned intelligentsia. Even though a person has a higher education… Well… But it should be neither an administrative work, nor managerial work, nor a work in the ‘apparatus’ (robota v aparati), even at the City Council. It’s those who work intellectually, first and foremost teachers and lecturers. It’s such a milieu. On the other hand, it is artists—to a lesser extend. Maybe even… No, artists are a separate category. Intellectuals—it’s those who analyze and work mentally: researchers, teachers, lecturers. Engineers—no, it’s another type of thinking. For me, intelligentsia is something associated with the humanities, with an educational sphere in the first turn (Olena K., 36 y.o).}

The understanding of intelligentsia as “something associated with the humanities” has been influenced by the popular knowledge about ‘older’, ‘classical’ Eastern European humanistic intelligentsia\textsuperscript{31}.

\textsuperscript{30} Opinions about whether clergymen should be generally regarded as an integral part of the intelligentsia are divided. Some Ukrainian historians (e.g., Kasianov 1993: 176) do not include them into their definition of intelligentsia, while others (Lysiak-Rudnytsky 1994: 361-380) insist that clergymen have to be regarded as the pivot of intelligentsia as a societal formation. In my study I leave aside such important issues as relations between the present-day laic Ukrainian intelligentsia and the Greek Catholic Church and the role of religion in national discourses stemming from Galicia. Although the Church and religious discourses surely cannot be discarded as factors influencing present-day West Ukrainian society, secular intelligentsia and intellectuals keep their positions as the core figures developing and transmitting narratives about ‘the cultural’, ‘the national’ and ‘the Ukrainian’.

\textsuperscript{31} “The humanistic intelligentsia, especially people in creative (scholarly and artistic) pursuits, perceived themselves as the nucleus of the intelligentsia and were widely regarded as such by the society. It was these circles that assimilated or claimed the attributes and values of the older intelligentsia… A specific criterion for this narrower concept of intelligentsia would be a general civil engagement and a critical spirit, which excludes the pure scientific or the technological mentality from the category” (Daskalov
(Daskalov 1996: 61, Gella 1976). Also, note that this informant first says that she only translates the “general opinion” about intelligentsia, but in the end she gives her own, narrower definition of intelligentsia which tacitly, but unequivocally places her as a researcher in the sphere of the humanities in this category. This detail may illustrate Bauman’s observation that intelligentsia (in the same vein as intellectuals) is a matter of self-definition. Self-definitions of this kind, hidden behind the general reasoning, disguise “reproduction and reinforcement of a given social configuration, and—within it—a given (or claimed) status for the group” (Bauman 1987b: 8-9). Defining intelligentsia in a similar manner, another informant referred not to an unspecified ‘general opinion’ as a source of justification, but to the ‘non-Soviet’, ‘Western’ paradigms:

Really, intelligentsia—it’s just a borrowing (kal’ka), it’s a concept which was earlier brought in from the Russian empire. The Russian empire was a real slough at that time. And later it grew in organically into the post-Soviet consciousness and culture. There exists an opinion that intelligentsia—well, it’s people who tried to foster some moral characteristics, behavioral characteristics, who tried to distinguish themselves from this peasant-proletarian sea. But in reality, in the West there exists, I think, a strictly formal approach to the matter. Intelligentsia—it’s a characterization of people of those occupations that belong to the socio-cultural sphere of the humanities (Antin B., 38 y.o.).

According to a widespread opinion, in private life as well as in public appearance, the ‘genuine’ representatives of intelligentsia should expose a spectrum of cultural predilections and firm principles which, on the one hand, are highly estimated and prized, but, on the other hand, can hardly be applied as a realistic guiding scenario in everyday post-1991 realities. These characteristics are a combination of outer signs of a ‘noble’, cultivated behavior and internalized moral principles. Notions about what it exactly means to behave as a representative of intelligentsia vary on a wide scale. Nevertheless, on the basis of the interview material, it may be concluded that the ‘proper’ conduct is inseparable from language use, from how someone talks. Even though an intelyentna person is expected to be interested in arts, literature, science and be able to participate in intellectual conversation, the topics of conversation are not the crucial feature by which one might detect an intelyent. Instead, the respondents insisted that the Ukrainian intelyent in L’viv must possess a certain ‘culture of speech’, which means to talk in Ukrainian unpolluted by vulgar expressions and borrowings from Russian. This seems to be, however, not as much a matter of language purism and nationalistic vigor as a desire to emphasize local Galician specificity inasmuch as some Polonisms are usually acceptable as tints of this specificity. Opinion that an intelyentna person has to keep her Ukrainian language ‘active and fine’ is, nevertheless, widely accepted by both older and younger L’vivites:

32 A freelance author from L’viv has even published a book-long pamphlet called ‘Surzhyk for the intelligentsia’ (Matsyuk 2004) where he attacks L’viv intelligentsia whose allegedly refined Ukrainian language, on closer examination, proves to be polluted by grammatically faulty constructions and borrowings from Russian (and, respectively, by ideological ‘trash’ of the Soviet epoch).
I hate when people speak surzhyk. Can you imagine a person who has ambitions to be treated as an intellihent and who says ‘koroche’ in every sentence? At our university I hear this everywhere (Bohdan K., 20 y.o.).

Moreover, switching to Russian when talking to compatriots may be viewed as a token of bad taste and ‘pseudo-intellihentnist’:

You know what makes Galicianer a Galicianer? It is that, probably, every Galicianer, whether intellihent or not, masters the language of those occupants who conquered her fathers. My parents mastered German. […] The media in L’viv are presently overwhelmingly Russian-speaking. […] Common Galicianers have nothing against speaking Russian if someone talks to them in Russian. But I think that speaking a foreign language in such situations is a token of pseudo-intellihentnist’. I can make an exception for some Moscovites who do not understand Ukrainian at all, but otherwise I never switch to Russian in daily conversations (Maria L., 51 y.o.).

In a similar vein, an intellihentna person should not tolerate bad language in her surrounding. This opinion about necessity of ‘culture of speech’ seems to be shared both by older and younger people. Vasyl’, a 28-year-old political activist, told about an episode when he realized that artistic refinement cannot equal genuine intellihentnist’ and internalized ‘moral culture’. Once he attended an artistic presentation in a so-called club of creative youth. There were some well-known artistic and literary personalities. During an artistic reading of a newly published bestseller Vasyl’ suddenly realized that “a young, respectable, nicely dressed actress” was reading “bad” words.

It was not mat, but it was anyway something that should not be pronounced in fine society. And it was repeated, over and over again. I looked at the public—everybody smiles, it was perceived like something proper, like an artistic achievement. I left the room. And since then I do not attend presentations made by people who consider themselves intellihenty, who play with language nuances, but do not possess some moral culture. You can perceive language nuances and so on—nice. But where are your moral values, where is your intellihentnist’, why do I have to regard you as some elite?

In practically every interview intellihenty were pointed out as people concerned about the well-being of their smaller and larger cultural communities, as patriots who work (in symbolical or practical ways) for their city, region, country, people, nation. Intelligentsia is unthinkable without adherence to ‘universal’ moral principles, but, eventually, these principles are unavoidably performed on the distinct arena of national culture and everyday life charged with ethnic/national symbols and ritualized activities:

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33 Colloquial mixture of Russian and Ukrainian.
34 Russian word which means ‘shortly’, ‘in short’.
35 An obscene expression in Russian.
Intelligentsia is not a definition, it’s a kind of mosaic. It’s a complex of outer manners plus inner state of the soul plus level of education. […] In separation, neither level of education nor social status can be defining. One can meet lots of people from the countryside—and they are very intelihentni. Of course, the majority of intelihenty are probably people with higher education, but, anyway, I’ve met a lot of people even with scientific degrees whom I would never apply the word ‘intelligentsia’ to. […] And, on the other hand, I had a neighbor, an elderly women who worked at a factory and was born in a village. I’ve met very few such inherently intelihentni persons as her. How many of the pedigreed, or rich, or modern, or new intelihenty could come to the idea that this simple woman came to; to take all her three grandchildren to the Shevchenko monument on the ninth of March? (Maria L., 51 y.o.).

Similarly to the political discourses of Ruthenian-Ukrainian intelligentsia in the nineteenth century, the main subject of intelligentsia’s loyalty is defined (in overt statements or contextually) as semi-sacralized ‘people’ or ‘folk’ (narod). Nation in its various meanings is also often mentioned in this connection. Formulated with almost propagandistic zeal, the responsibility of intelligentsia as the nation’s and the people’s spiritual leaders has been one of the central organizing themes in the interviews with older and middle-aged respondents:

The lines from Andrei Voznesenskii’s verse about Russian intelligentsia have been carved into my memory. Such lines: “Russian intelligentsia exists. You believe it does not, but you are wrong! It’s not an indifferent mass, but consciousness and honor of the country.” And I believe that Ukrainian intelligentsia is also the consciousness of the country. […] Courteousness, politeness, aristocracy—it’s one configuration. The other one configuration is intellectualism—at least relative intellectualism, combined with creativity. And the third—it’s a deeply internalized feeling of responsibility for the fate of the people. […] Here we had a lot in common with Russian dissenters (Pavlo K., 56 y.o.).

Those who originated from the people can be intelihentni in a natural way, because these persons share the mentality of our people. […] All the authoritarian regimes, all the imperialists—they always exterminate intelligentsia in the first turn. It’s because intelligentsia is the brains of the nation (Liubomyra L., 75 y.o.).

The intelihent feels responsibility for his community (spil’nota). And this feeling has a transcendental character. In the face of not only the past, the future and in the face of the people, but in the face of eternity. It’s a feeling of responsibility for the nation’s existence or non-existence (Teodor D., 70 y.o.).

I am an activist according to my nature, I cannot sit and watch when our ‘beloved’ City Council proposes some idiotic projects that could devastate the city’s architectural landscape. […] If every intelihentna person opposed such decisions by the authority, the city could not be in such a disastrous state now (Maria L., 51 y.o.).

Constellations of cultural meanings focused on the notion of ‘genuine’ representatives of intelligentsia can be

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36 Shevchenko’s birthday is a symbolically charged date, highly significant for the nationally aware Galicianers.

37 It should be mentioned that Voznesenskii’s verse plays up and symbolically negates one of the ubiquitous Soviet slogans ‘The Party is mind, honour and consciousness of our epoch!"
extrapolated and presented as an attributive characteristic called "intellehentnist'.

...Well, this new girl, a secretary is our organization, I like her very much. I like her intellehentnist', her way to converse, her mild temper. She is a patriot. She is a genuine representative of the younger generation of intelligentsia (Volodymyr F., 75 y.o.).

"Intelhentnist'— it's a psychological aspect. It's especially typical of us, Ukrainians. The roots of our culture are extremely deep. Extremely! [...] A person who originates from the people can be an inborn intellehent just because the mentality of our people (Liubomyra I., 75 y.o.).

There is an enormous lack of intellehentnist' in our society. It's a moral dimension of the personality. It cannot be obtained merely by education. [...] But in order to be able to develop the society one needs intellectualism as well, not only moral aristocracy (shliakhetnist') (Roman M., approx. 60 y.o.).

"Intelhentnist', in my opinion, can be described as a configuration of several concepts or constructions: courteousness (grechnist')—it's a breeding of a certain type, it's a discretion, restraint and knowledge of how to behave yourself in certain situations, what conventions, what rules of behavior to apply, how to react adequately in a given situation. It means how to react in typical situations in a proper way. Further, it's a repertoire of language constructions typical of intelligentsia. Sometimes one can hear such a softened 's', like in Polish. [...] It's also a repertoire of certain themes for discussion during some informal meetings, festivities, birthday parties, which have always been a good excuse for conversation. [...] Also intellectualism—to a certain extent. Intellectualism as a value, as a person's creative potential. And the cult of the book comes into the picture as well (Pavlo K., 56 y.o.).

The last two statements emphasize that intellehentnist' as a collective characteristic embraces not only manners, behavior and 'mentality'. Representatives of intelligentsia cannot dispense with a share of intellectualism and expert knowledge in order to fulfill their ambitions as self-proclaimed spiritual leaders of their local, regional and national communities. Thus, the connotative sphere of "intelligentsia", even though excludes a requirement of solid formal education, implies in any case intellectual ability and the mastering of some professional knowledge. In this respect it definitely overlaps the notion of 'intellectuals', as the social practices of the latter invoke claims both to some expert knowledge and to the creation and maintenance of cultural values (Verdery 1991a: 16). Nevertheless, one may agree with Daskalov that the sophisticated intellectual input has never been a defining feature of intelligentsia: “The extraordinary achievement of the intelligentsia was not in the scholarly field; it consisted in spreading education and fostering national sentiment through the schools” (Daskalov 1996: 60).

The terms intellehentnist, intelligentsia and the adjectival form intellehentnyi are notable in that, as discursive constructs outlining general characteristics of a certain category of people, they are diffuse and ambiguous, but in order to apply them correctly one needs to have an idea about their precise meanings which are actualized in concrete situations. Similarly to the metaphor of narod ('folk', 'people') which embraces a number of situational connotations that make it difficult to operate with for a foreigner (Ries 1997: 28),
intelihentnist’ is a discursive device reserved for ‘insider’ use. Its erroneous, unexpectedly demonstrative or sarcastic application in the ‘outsider’’s speech cannot pass unnoticed. A middle-aged female academician’s story illustrates this:

For me, to behave as an intelihent or to behave as a cultured person—it’s only words. It means, these words gain some meaning only in a concrete situation. One ‘classical’ example. My mother has an acquaintance, a simple woman, and she was involved in some conflicts, and the phrase that she dropped when she told about it became infamous in my family. She said: “And I answered them in a very ‘intelihentnyi’ way: ‘Go to hell, you f…ing bastards!’” The whole intelihentnist’ as it is! [laughs]. Indeed, it’s difficult to say what she meant by this. Maybe, comparing to what she could otherwise do—to punch that person on the jaw or something—it was a peak of cultured behavior. Maybe in that concrete situation it was a very restrained behavior, full of dignity and tact. But, obviously, in some other situation it would be regarded as the peak of vulgarity and as having nothing to do with intelihentnist.’ (Olena K., 36 y.o.).

I have been told a story about another case of ‘faulty’ use of the term ‘intelligentsia’—this time as an unsanctioned self-identification. During an academic seminar a young sociologist from L’viv told how her colleagues had to sort out quite a large number of forms when processing data for a poll regarding social stratification among L’viv residents. The reason was that these respondents defined their social belonging in an ‘incorrect’ way. “There were many people of typical working class professions, like work superintendent—and they regarded themselves as intelligentsia”, said the sociologist. She and her colleagues accounted for the situation as an example of how people ‘re-classify’ themselves in order to escape a stigmatized working-class designation. This interpretation may be correct, but for me the case looked curious for two reasons. For the first, it is a snap shot capturing a constellation of power relations which assignment of social categories and definitions is embedded into. The respondents who probably wholeheartedly relied on such yardsticks as education level higher than secondary, non-manual work and self-perception and also having in mind the ubiquitous opinion that “even people without higher education can be intelihentni” had attributed to themselves a certain identity, social position and status. These claims to being regarded as representatives of intelligentsia were rejected by other people who made their evaluations (probably, not always guided by some strictly defined criteria either) out of their legitimated positions as academicians.

This case also points out ambivalence as an inherent aspect of categorizations and identifications in terms of class in general. A range of empirical studies (Lamont 1992, Lamont 2000, Skeggs 1997, Savage et al. 2001) have confirmed that people are generally aware of class terminology and have little difficulty in talking about classes as social forces and structuring principles of the society. Nevertheless, they may have difficulties with placing themselves within a certain class category as “The idea of class invites respondents to make sense of themselves, but it is not an identity that is internalised” (Savage et al. 2001: 882-883). Besides, positioning of people in terms of hierarchical social divisions is a complex process in itself, since it actualizes classificatory mechanisms of not only class, but of gender and ethnicity. Therefore individual positionality and
identity “may also involve psychological costs where you may identify with one position but are located in
another” (Anthias 2001: 852). And, finally, in this concrete case with ‘faulty’ positioning, one should have in
mind that as an intermediate, betwixt and between class position intelligentsia may also be regarded as a
‘mainstream’ identification which allows the avoidance of class labeling in the situations when one is not
certain about one’s ‘definite’ class identification or feels threatened by the implications of relating class to
his/her own personal identity (Savage et al. 2001: 875). Hence, identification with intelligentsia may be used to
emphasize one’s ordinariness and (political) neutrality.

The words ‘intelligentsia’, ‘intelihentni’, ‘intelihentnyi’, ‘intelihent’ interpreted as a kind of
empty figure of speech, and as a linguistic form with unclear connotations that is routinely employed as an
evaluative marker of a proper social behavior can oftentimes provoke quite a negative response among
‘insiders’ themselves. Positive evaluations of intelligentsia as a spiritual elite, strongholds of morality,
culturedness and (Ukrainian) patriotism have been mostly given by the middle-aged and elder respondents.
However, only a few of them unequivocally admitted that they regard themselves as a member of
intelligentsia – like, for example, the schoolteacher pani Vira:

-(I): Do you regard yourself as an intelihent?
-(Vira D., approx. 50 y.o.): Yes! Why not? [a little bit confused]
-(I): What does it mean for you personally?
-(Vira D.): For the first, I perceive myself in this way (ia sebe tak vidchuvaiu). I was born and
brought up in an intelligentsia family. I didn’t investigate in what generation I am an
intelihent, but maybe I have some noble (blahorodni) ancestors too, from the older intelligentsia. What else? I
have a higher education, I know how to behave properly. I respect elderly people. I love my
fatherland. I speak Ukrainian. These are ingredients that make up an
intelihent.

For pani Vira, as for some other informants, identification with intelligentsia has been a source of pride and
superiority. It is definitely a positive identification which is taken for granted by the ‘established players’ in the
field of symbolic production and thereby plays the role of a classifying device denoting those who ‘fit the
picture’ from those who do not. Thus, the concept of intelligentsia is an instrument of symbolic violence
exerted by the consecrated (and, as Bourdieu 1993b points out, self-appointed) holders of positions within the
fields of cultural/symbolic production. Furthermore, this narrative identity is sometimes consecrated to the
extent that its cultural constructedness becomes misrecognised as something ‘primordial’, inborn, as a sort of
biologically inherited talent that only a few people, notwithstanding their social origins, have been lucky to be
dowered with. “Boundaries conceived as organic and genetic are nearly always more rigid and exclusive that
those conceived as ‘cultural’: one can learn a new language and new customs, and one can change one’s
religion, but one’s bloodline is a given, manipulable (if at all) only by a lengthy process of genealogical
revision” (Verdery 1991a: 211-212, see also Eriksen 1993, Tismaneanu 1998). Obviously, some of the
respondents find comfort in imagining intelligentsia as a distinct ‘naturally’ bounded community, which keeps
old traditions and is ‘pure’ and impenetrable for strangers. In a way, such cultural imagination, which harbors retrospective images of the naturalness and purity typical of ‘good old times’, is a token of dissatisfaction with the present socio-political reality and a search for a solid anchor in a turbulent world stripped of much of its previous meaning (Tismaneanu 1998).

5.3. Rigid boundaries and striving for elitism: the old Galician intelligentsia and its descendants

Oftentimes, the tendency to envisage intelligentsia as a distinct ‘closed’ community is evident when the respondents ponder not some abstract, generalized category of intelligentsia, but when they address a concrete—historical and local—type of symbolic referent called ‘Galician intelligentsia’, and its even more symbolically significant variant, ‘old Galician intelligentsia’. Stories about ‘genuine Galician intelligentsia’ tend to appear in the context of tales about ‘good old times’ before the Soviet epoch as well as in heroic narratives about resistance (either in the form of dissent or as a silent spiritual resistance to ‘brutal’ and ‘immoral’ Soviet mores and policies). In a way, this collective figure is a key symbol (Ortner 1973) that provides a discursive frame for imagining the bygone L’viv as a city endowed with special symbolic significance and spiritus loci. Old Galician intelligentsia is depicted as persons educated according to West European standards (prestigious universities in Vienna, Prague, Berlin, Cracow and Warsaw are often mentioned), as bearers of Christian morality, conservative spirit and values, and as sincere (shchyri) and aware (svidomi) Ukrainian patriots:

Galician intelligentsia is outstanding in many respects. It’s the pre-war intelligentsia, the last of the Mohicans. Yes, the last of the Mohicans. Old intelligentsia—they were not numerous, I mean those who were Ukrainians by origin. And therefore they had to be people of universal scope. It means they felt responsibility. They studied all their life, they practiced self-education because they felt that they ought be leaders in those milieus where they had to work. A person had to be able to lead a choir, even though this person was, for example, a teacher of mathematics according to his education. And they had to find a common tongue with peasants, if they worked in the countryside. […] They were people ready to sacrifice their personal interests (Volodymyr S., 72 y.o.).

Galician intelligentsia is, as a rule, the patriotic intelligentsia. Mostly originating from families of the Greek Catholic priests. […] The conscious Ukrainians. Old-fashioned Ukrainian language. Lots of figures of speech from Polish, even from German, you know. Women used to be excellent mistresses of the house. Culinary art, you know. It was impossible not to bake at least five cakes for the day of the angel (imenyny). […] And very, very polite people: addressed their own mothers and fathers in the third person: ‘Would mother like to taste this cake?…” (Liubomyra I., 75 y.o.).

Several older respondents pointed out that Ukrainian-ness of the old Galician intelligentsia was of a particular kind because it incorporated borrowings from other national traditions:
I remember these people, old Galician intelligentsia. There were manners, there was conduct—it was not like in Eastern Ukraine. Of course, nobody conceals that we borrowed a lot from Poles, from Germans too. It’s all features of European-ness (i.e., European-ness), lots of elite features (tyshy elitarnost). Some of these people had the opportunity to study abroad, in Vienna, in Warsaw. It was like this 50, 60 years ago. Now everything is so deformed, diminished (Voldymyr B., 69 y.o.).

Galician intelihtent, well, you know, his manners, his way of thinking, his way of communication, everything was European! Of course, the Poles influenced him quite a bit. Despite everything, we had a common history over many centuries, and Poles introduced intelihtentni features to us. It was like this, indeed! And Poles, in their turn, borrowed a lot from Germans and Frenchmen whom they have always kept contact with (Zenovii K., 73 y.o.).

Of course, these people [old Galician intelligentsia] were influenced by other cultures, by Polish culture in particular. All these polite Polish expressions, ‘please, if you would be so kind’ [czy nie bedzie pan laskawzy—in Polish], ‘I’m kissing your hands’ [caluje rączki—in Polish], all this courtesy (shanoblyvist) came from Poles. It was normal behavior (Volodymyr F., 75 y.o.).

Apparently, when talking about old Galician intelligentsia the informants had in mind not only a distinguishable circle of cultural elite, but also a historical tradition characterized by specific patterns of sociocultural distinction. As the statement of Volodymyr B. reveals, these patterns included orientation towards ‘European’ tradition which in the pre-Soviet L’viv was coterminous with ‘grand’ cultural narratives of Poland and the German-speaking part of the continent. As one of the respondents, an editor of a L’viv newspaper and a renowned public intellectual, pointed out, ‘Europeanness’ of the old Galician intelligentsia was not only about assimilation of manners, civility and forms of public behavior, but implied a more profound indoctrination with certain traditions of philosophy and world outlook or, one may say, ‘emplotment’ into a certain meta-narrative. In this respect the old Galician intelligentsia, unlike the recent groupings of the Galician intelligentsia and intellectuals, seem to have presented quite cohesive historical ‘community of discourse’ (Wuthnow 1989):

Well, indeed, there was Galician intelligentsia which was created due to endeavors of the enlighteners at the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century. These enlighteners founded gymnasiums where graduates of the Vienna, Prague and Cracow universities gave lectures. They developed a milieu of highly educated people who were oriented toward German and Austrian philosophical and intellectual tradition, well, mostly toward the German one. In any case, not toward the French, or Anglo-Saxon ones. It is a very important feature. These people grew up under conditions of confrontation between Polish-ness and Ukrainian-ness (pol’skosty i ukrains’kosty), and almost all of them perished in the twentieth century’s cataclysms—either in the Second World War or Stalinist repressions. Many of them emigrated, they became dispersed all over the globe. Their very typical and paradoxical feature is total ill will (total’na nenavyst) against Poles. Why? Because they were sure that if Poles had not deprived them of their statehood (derzhavnost), they would have become state officials, would have gotten capital and high offices and would have lived another sort of life. Instead, Poles took away their precious toy. Therefore they hate Poles even more than they hate the Soviets who expelled their generation, who repressed them, killed their relatives, because the Soviets were the obvious foe, there was nothing to do with them. They were barbarians, savages, and it would be of no use to appeal to them, in the same manner as it is of no use to appeal to wolfs,
mosquitoes and other pests. Instead, the Poles, who are cultured and in all respects very similar to us are the archenemies for the old Galician intelligentsia. And then the Germans, paradoxically, are regarded as friends a priori. And this is despite the fact that Germans did not allow the creation of a Ukrainian state during the war and killed and repressed Ukrainian intellectuals on no less a scale than Poles and the Soviets. Nevertheless, Germans are respected thanks to the philosophical-intellectual tradition that the Ukrainian intelligentsia assimilated. That’s how it is. Well, now we can talk about old Galician intelligentsia as about a virtual generation (virtual’ne pokolinnia) which either perished, or exists somewhere far away in emigration. The present-day Galician intelligentsia is simply intelligentsia that lives in the geographic region of Galicia, nothing more (Andrii P., appr. 45 y.o.).

As a middle-aged L’viv intellectual who witnessed the last decades of the Soviet period and was in the first wave of the Ukrainians who got the opportunity to live and study in the West in the 1990s, Andrii is aware of internal contradictions and ethnic prejudices which split the legendary generation of the predecessors of the present-day Galician intelligentsia. In a similar vein, the portrait of the Galician intelligentsia (both its older and younger representatives), while oftentimes depicted with sincere piety and respect, is far from idealization even in the narratives of the older informants. One should have in mind that oftentimes it is not merely the time-specific portrait of people who, even without being contemporaries, are still regarded as equals, as members of ‘our’ imagined community. The collective portrait of the old Galician intelligentsia is often the glance from the outside, it is a depiction made by people initially belonging to another class, namely, by those socially mobile descendants of peasants who after 1944 advanced to the status of intelligentsia by making their careers in the academic and artistic sphere. Galician intelligentsia is more often addressed as ‘they’ than ‘we’, and, alongside with attractive features, the respondents readily pointed out its less attractive collective characteristics:

There are some specific features [of Galician intelligentsia]. For example, blaming Jews for everything that goes wrong. ‘Jeeews’, they are always guilty. Such anti-Semitism, not an active one, and I don’t mean everyone had it, for God’s sake, but such antipathy was widespread. I don’t mean that I’m personally extremely fond of Jews. I would never marry a Jew, for example. But it doesn’t mean that if a person is a Jew she is to blame for everything. There are lots of talented artistic personalities among Jews (Liubomyra I., 75 y.o.).

I wouldn’t like to emphasize it too much, but Galician intelligentsia had their negative features, too. Some Philistine (dribnomishchans’ki) features could come to the surface. Like to look down on those who were not equals. I mean, on simple people. It was widespread, and possibly it was not typical of Galician intelligentsia themselves, but rather of members of their families, relatives, those who stood near them. They could sometimes demonstrate this: look, we broke out from simple life, we are intelligentsia, and you simpletons must know your place (Volodymyr S., 72 y.o.).

Galician intelligentsia, those who survived the war, they were very scared, they were afraid to say something in a loud voice. Usually they were quite wealthy people, there were no poor ones among them. They were patriots in their souls, but they had to collaborate with the Soviets because they were afraid of persecutions (Volodymyr F., 75 y.o.).

Old Galician intelligentsia has one serious negative feature—which I personally don’t have. I will
not tell you the name, but it was a person from an old Galician dynasty whose motto was: ‘Go ahead—but without me’ (‘Proshu, proshu, tse bez mene’). It means to observe tongue-in-cheek everything that happens around oneself and to mind one’s own business. It’s very sad, but I’ve observed things like that for several decades already (Maria L., 51 y.o.).

Two younger respondents even depicted the Galician intelligentsia in a mocking style, as pathetic figures:

Once upon a time I myself was in a situation when I felt I was a genuine Galician inteligent![laughs] I gave a guided tour to a friend of mine from Russia, we were on foot all day long and eventually we found some pleasant café—you see, not some bench in a park where one can sit and drink beer from the bottle. And suddenly we both realized that we must go to the lavatory. I went first and found that a visitor sat not far from the restroom door. I thought that it was improper to ask him directly: ‘Are you in line for the toilet?’ You know, a person has his coffee in a pleasant atmosphere—and suddenly someone spoils everything by asking about the toilet. So I went back and wanted to wait a little bit, to see if the man was in line or not. My friend was astonished: ‘What? You didn’t ask him?! Let me do this!’ He got the impression that I was the worst sort of an old-fashioned inteligent, and we both got a good laugh. You see, it’s Galician politeness in its worst variant! [laughs] (Mykola G., 36 y.o.).

Fortunately, I am not a Galicianer [chuckles]. In my view, Galician intelligentsia is rather a caricatured character. Well, if I theorize about this point of view, probably what I say will be equally stereotyped and caricature-like. But, unfortunately, caricature features are typical of those representatives of the Galician intelligentsia whom I know personally. For example, the mother of one of my friends, she says [takes an exalted tone]: ‘How can you waste your time on dance courses at a time when Ukraine rises from her knees after the Orange revolution?! You must work for your country instead of dancing!’ Such bullshit. Or: ‘Women must wear skirts and not go around in trousers!’ This stiffness is typical, I suppose (Tamara K., 25 y.o.).

One of the respondents, a middle-aged university lecturer, expressed an insightful opinion which may explain why the younger generations of the highly educated may be skeptical about the aura of glorification which surrounds old Galician intelligentsia and their descendents in the typical presentations by the popular L’viv press and media. Possessing enough knowledge about everyday realities in the Soviet-occupied Western Ukraine, these critically-minded young people realize that the theme of old Galician intelligentsia cannot be wholly confined either in heroic stories or in narratives about martyrdom. This theme could probably be defined as belonging to the “topos of defeat”38, despite its heroic overtones and plots about individual cases of resistance:

I: What about nostalgia for so-called old Galician intelligentsia?

Oleh D., 45 y.o.: But this intelligentsia does not exist anymore. Does not exist! That part which persisted for a while—well, to tell the truth, it persisted because it sold itself out. Or due to its moral mimicry, adaptation and so on. Those who were ‘normal’, they emigrated or perished. The Soviet Union was a totalitarian system, it did not allow any such… you know… They caught people on the streets only because the expression on someone’s face looked suspicious to them! And many people

38 See the subtitle of ‘I’ magazine’s thematic issue no. 26, 2002.
survived only because they stepped over their principles and adapted to such life. And this put its trace on the entire generation. They [descendants of the old Galician intelligentsia] cannot be seen anywhere. They cannot! In the Soviet Union there were these alternatives: death or adaptation. We had here [at the Ivan Franko National University of L’viv] a certain N., a professor in classical languages. He was a person who made a translation of the whole of Homer, he was in charge of publishing classical literature for all these [postwar] years. A brilliant person. And I will tell you that his apartment was regularly searched after the war. And you know what they [KGB-people] did? They methodically broke down the bust of Socrates that he had on his table and searched inside—maybe something was hidden there. And he repaired the bust again. And they broke it the next time. And he repaired it. What a symbol, eh?

Despite all these nuances, old Galician intelligentsia is mostly viewed as fascinating symbolic figures inherent in the bygone exotic cityscape and an important ingredient of ‘L’viv myth’. The narratives about old Galician intelligentsia generally convey prewar notions about intelligentsia as a specific social stratum that existed in Russia and Poland during the latter half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. As Gella (1976: 20-21) notices, “Because it was a social stratum the mere fact of being born into the family of a member of the intelligentsia usually determined one’s membership in this stratum”. Therefore, the older respondents sometimes describe the old Galician intelligentsia not only as a social category, but as a special local ‘species’ of people, whose typical features had been predetermined, so to speak, not only by nurture, but by nature:

The old L’viv intelligentsia—it’s impossible to point out what made them so unique. […] I feel nostalgia for these people because for me they are a part of that pre-war Austria-inspired atmosphere, nowhere else in the world can one find something like this. An old colleague of mine, L. died eight years ago. Nobody could kiss a lady’s hand like he could! Some people tried to imitate this, but, you know, it’s inimitable, I don’t know how to describe this, but now they do this in such a constrained manner. Or: the gesture by which he passed you your raincoat! […] It is probably something in the blood, it transmits genetically to the third and fourth generation (Maria L., 51 y.o.).

Notably, the respondent, a female academician in her fifties, told me proudly at the beginning of our conversation, that she originated from a family of L’viv residents in the seventh generation. Thus, she implied that long and well-preserved family tradition, ‘ties of blood’, embodied cultural capital and refined urban breeding are indisputable values and a source of feelings of superiority—much like in the case of nobility with a well-documented pedigree. In a way, for her it was natural to place intelligentsia in the same context of the ‘ties of blood’ and long-cultivated refinement transmitted from generation to generation. Another respondent of approximately the same age, who originated from the family of a Greek Catholic priest, also emphasized importance of the long-term cultivation of (national) elite qualities in the families of old

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39 Such a long tradition of urbanity of this family is remarkable, if one takes into account that according to poll data from 2006, only one third of all the respondents proved to be L’vivites in the second and higher generation, and among them only one third (i.e. approximately 12 percent of the whole of the sample) proved to be L’vivites in the third generation (Syryvko 2006).
Galician intelligentsia:

Peasants cannot build the nation. Workers cannot build the nation, you know. I suppose that to become a ruling stratum (verstva) in the state—it’s impossible for an individual to learn this during the whole of his life. A life is not enough. One must inherit [this ability], must get a proper family breeding in the first turn, and transmit it to one’s children and grandchildren. This is in order to have honor (honir), to have principles, to have fear of God—for not neglecting your duties and not betraying responsibility that is laid upon you (Roman M., approx. 60 y.o.).

Hence, the symbolic boundary dividing (Galician) intelligentsia from the rest of the society may be imagined as rigorously defined and impenetrable for the newcomers with reputedly bad manners and ‘improper pedigree’. Preservation of such a symbolic mechanism of cultural exclusion (Lamont 1992: 8) which looks like a conserved copy from the end of the nineteenth century, can be partly explained by repressive social and political conditions which Ruthenian-Ukrainian intelligentsia experienced for more than a century. In some respondents’ opinion, this determination of certain circles in L’viv to guard the ‘noble’, ‘non-Soviet’, ‘strictly Ukrainian’, pure and iconic identity of intelligentsia is worthy of respect and imitation:

I don’t know, for some strange reason I cannot agree with the opinion that intelligentsia has been passing away. They may be not well off, not someone whom anyone reckons with, but it surely must exist and create that special spirit—and to pass farther those things that we inherited from the nostalgic Grandmother Austria (Maria L., 51 y.o.).

However, others insisted that such an image of the ‘genuine’ L’viv intelligentsia is an anachronism which either irritates or can serve as a target for ironic comments. This group includes first and foremost the younger respondents who were brought up in the late decades of Soviet rule, who could not boast with their long pedigrees as urbanites and who internalized other, more egalitarian concepts:

I recalled a case: a lecturer at the Polytechnic University declared to my brother that a genuine intellihent is a person who is intellihent in the third and fourth generation, you know, that it is a pedigree (rodovid). Such bullshit! In my circle they talk about intelligentsia like this [in annoyed tone]: oh, look, an intellihent! They deserve this! Look at all those who come to the Shevchenko monument, they tear their shirts in pieces and cry that they spilled liters of their blood for Ukraine—and then this Galician ‘intelligentsia’ merely sells their voices for a better price (Roman R., 28 y.o.).

I cannot reckon myself Galician intelligentsia solely because I live on this territory. If we talk about Galician intelligentsia as an inheritance (spadkoiemnist’), as a tie with previous generations, then, I think, not too much remained here. Neither my family tradition nor my Soviet education provides me with grounds to talk about my belongingness to some specifically Galician intelligentsia. I am aware

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40 The boundary of the field is a stake of struggles. … One could thus examine the characteristics of this boundary, which may or may not be institutionalised, that is to say, protected by conditions of entry that are tacitly and partially required (such as a certain cultural capital) or explicitly codified and legally guaranteed (e.g., all the forms of entrance examination aimed at ensuring a numerus clausulus)” (Bourdieu 1993b: 42-43).
that I am a new inteligent. I don’t think it is appropriate for me to create some special personal mythology about my belonging to this tradition. There are some younger people who create such myth about themselves, but, on the other hand, they do it sometimes with a good share of irony. But, again, I don’t think that my personal experience and experience of my family provide any grounds for this (Iurko Z., 38 y.o.).

For the politically engaged journalist Roman those who presently call themselves Galician intelligentsia are false patriots, they only galvanize old images of the national elite, corrupt-proof, highly moral, unspoiled by the Soviet hypocrisy, in order to legitimize their positions as taken-for-granted inheritors of these heroic figures. The old-fashioned identity of intelligentsia (together with its specific local variant of Galician intelligentsia), in his view, should be rejected out of hand. Meanwhile, Iurko, a young historian working at an academic institution, does not condemn those who fabricate a “special personal mythology” of belonging to Galician intelligentsia on the basis of “inheritance” or territorial affinity in order to use it as symbolic capital. But neither does he himself feel entitled to invoke any claim to this status-elevating standing. However, by emphasizing his moral principles (“I don’t think it’s appropriate for me to create some special personal mythology…”) and by choosing cautiously the instruments which can improve his symbolic position, he also demonstrates his belonging to the field—however, in the capacity of a self-made “new inteligent”.

5.4. Old boundaries redrawn: the case of the Soviet intelligentsia

Although in Iurko’s statement the self-definition ‘new inteligent’ alludes to a critically thinking professional who is not burdened by ‘older’ social loyalties, this term used to mean something else for people of the older generation. While the ‘old’ intelligentsia is oftentimes associated with prewar Galician intelligentsia and its afterlife, the ‘new’ intelligentsia is a euphemism for the Soviet intelligentsia. Changes in understanding of intelligentsia’s position and role in the Soviet epoch were triggered, in particular, by “a massive increase in the number of specialists in the knowledge-based professions within a system where political controls and stringent deprofessionalisation precluded collective action” (Balzer 1996: 3). Soviet intelligentsia became a mass phenomenon in the sense that not only the number of legitimate performers of the function (Bourdieu 1993b), but also the number of available positions in the cultural/intellectual fields increased dramatically. Corroboration of the state and performance of the role of producer of ideological discourses for the state became a normal praxis that made it possible to maintain a recognized position within the intellectual and cultural fields. Hence, it became possible to be upgraded to inteligent simply by virtue of occupying an appropriate formal position and ‘without having the properties—or not all of them, or not to the

41 Deprofessionalisation is defined as the “process of declining autonomy and social status of professional groups. The phenomenon was seen in the Soviet Union after the Bolshevik Revolution and in a somewhat different form in Nazi Germany” (Glossary, in Balzer 1996: xvii-xxi).
same degree—that has to be possessed to produce the position” (ibid: 63).

’Soviet intelligentsia’ is an umbrella concept, as conflicting notions about the social and political roles of highly educated citizens coexisted in the Soviet scene (Tromly 2007: 18, 22). Here, nevertheless, we take up the issue of representations of this socio-cultural phenomenon. Within the domain of folk ideas (Dundes 1972) and everyday discourses the rich texture of multiple actual incarnations of this category has been inevitably reduced to several stereotypes which might be easily interiorized and manipulated. Although the older informants mention ‘Soviet intelligentsia’, it is nevertheless obvious that for them a combination of these two notions stretches the boundaries of the acceptable almost to the point of bursting. Using a rough comparison with fairy-tale characters, one may say that the Soviet intelligentsia is presented as the protagonist’s (‘old’ intelligentsia’s) vicious brother. This auxiliary character is a deteriorated double of the protagonist, as he is placed to fulfill the same functions, but the outcome of his activities is mostly negative (Propp 1928). The older informants usually do not spare dark colors when depicting this category. Some of these descriptions can be identified as litanies42 in their modality and content:

Old intelligentsia and Soviet intelligentsia are different types of intelligentsia. As a rule, old intelligentsia had aristocratic (shliakhety) manners. The Soviet intelligentsia was a mass product of the Soviet system. Generally the level of knowledge, of education was not low, because education was a cult—you know, it was important to graduate, to gain knowledge in some narrow professional area. But otherwise a person might remain very rude (brutal’na). It was even reckoned as guts. A person could be a hopeless drunkard, hooligan, his language could be absolutely rude, with obscene words (maty) in every sentence. And it was even occasionally accepted in a cultured society as a kind of bravado, you know. I don’t exaggerate, it simply was like this (Volodymyr S., 72 y.o.).

We lived with our traditions. The Soviets came, cancelled these traditions, exterminated a part of the population—and implanted new traditions. Traditions of brutality, rudeness (khamstvo), dirtiness and irresponsibility. […] Ukrainians proved to be susceptible to the temptations of disorganization of social life, you know. Those who did not want to become rude and stupefied found themselves in a kind of psychological ghetto. Like I did. And the Soviets brought up a ‘new intelligentsia’ instead. A type of homo sovieticus (sovky). Under the Soviets descendants of poor peasant families were sent to universities. And what did they learn? They learned to adapt and collaborate. They have no scruples. My father used to say that the peasant could be very aristocratic by nature, more aristocratic than any worker. But in order to become an elite one must combine spiritual aristocratism with intellectualism. And under the Soviets people bought diplomas, gained high positions because they were the Party members—it was disgusting. It was the ‘red ones’ who took sailors to the highest posts in the Soviet government. They had no relation to intelligentsia, to Ukrainians, to culture, but they reproduced themselves, and now their descendants rule both in Moscow and in Kyiv (Roman M., approx. 60 y.o.).

42 “Litanies were these passages in conversation in which a speaker would enunciate a series of complaints, grievances, or worries about problems, troubles, afflictions, tribulations, or losses, and then often comment on these enumerations with a poignant rhetorical question…. a sweeping, fatalistic lament about the hopelessness of the situation” (Ries 1997: 84).
The younger generations seem often to perceive collective image of intelligentsia through the prism of stereotypes, which were formed in Soviet times. These stereotypes are especially evident in urban folklore, where the typical inteligent is a ridiculed figure represented as a poor, deprived and impractical ‘academic type’ (see Hawryliuk 2001). Although present 20-30-year olds know about the tragic circumstances of the dissenting intelligentsia and about the quite harsh reality which rank-and-file representatives of this stratum experienced under the Soviet regime, this derogatory image remains firmly implanted in the daily consciousness of the post-state-socialism generation:

To begin with, there were times when a person could be shot in the street only because she was unlucky enough to have ‘a face like an intelligent’ (intelihtentne oblychchia). There even were endeavors to abolish the word ‘intelligentsia’ itself. And, as a result, people began to apply this word as a joking offence. Like: look, here comes an intelligent with spectacles. I recall a Russian anecdote: a three-headed dragon comes across a knight and asks him: ‘Listen, could you chop off one of my heads?’ ‘What’s the matter?’ ‘Well, you see, these two heads of mine are normal guys, we wanted to go to the cinema and watch ‘The Clones Attack’, but the third head is an intelligent with spectacles, it wants to drag us to some poetic session!’ So, you see, it’s like this: ah, you intelligent, go and read your books. Therefore I personally cannot take this word seriously (Andrii T., 23 y.o.).

When I look at the portraits of the writers, artists, intellectuals from the beginning of the twentieth century, I see that they were strongly built men. Bread shoulders, strong necks. And in the Soviet period there came another image: such a meager type… Big head, spectacles, a type of dystrophic. The idea of some harmonic combination of the intellectual, the moral and the physical was abandoned (Vasyl’ R., 28 y.o.).

Thus, the figure of the Soviet intelligentsia encompasses a spectrum of schematic representations: from a social mutant who used to be scorned, but feared in his capacity as the pillar of the Soviet regime, to a poor creature whose claims to being treated as a sort of elite (cultural, intellectual, or whatever sort) miss the point. As a symbolic point of reference these embodiments of intelligent are hardly attractive today. However, the implications of quick career growth, social mobility and boundary-transgression (from peasants or workers to a social and professional elite) projected by the figure of the Soviet intelligentsia may not be easily discarded in the post-state-socialist society. And so, the struggle between the symbolic orders incarnated in the figures of the Galician intelligentsia (‘local’, sophisticated, belonging to the closed milieu cultivating traditional values of the higher social layers) and the Soviet intelligentsia (‘newcomers’, semi-educated, transgressing social and symbolic boundaries and demonstrating much flexibility in tastes and strategies) continues in the new circumstances.

Using Bourdieu’s (1993b: 41) terminology, the symbolic struggle between the ‘old’ Galician and ‘new’ Soviet intelligentsia may be interpreted as a conflict between two principles of hierarchization in the fields of cultural production: the heteronomous principle, favorable for those who in given socio-cultural circumstances dominate the field economically and politically, and the autonomous principle which is
advocated by the actors who are richer in cultural capital. Bourdieu’s (ibid: 41) observation that “intellectuals are, other things being equal, proportionately more responsive to the seduction of the powers that be, the less well endowed they are with specific [e.g., cultural—E.N.] capital” is highly relevant.

However, in the case of ‘new’ Soviet intelligentsia it would be correct to speak not of relatively less cultural capital, but about qualitatively different cultural capital and/or different opportunities for its investment. The ‘new’ intelligentsia (both migrants from the USSR and those recruited among the local Ukrainians) in L’viv was obliged to be the agent of radical change, that is, the disseminator of the ‘Soviet modernity’ (Borrett 2002). The cultural resources and emerging national capital (Bourdieu 2003a: 91) which might otherwise have been utilized by them, were to give way to ideological formulas of ‘internationalism’; their ‘reactionary’ peasant and ‘petite-bourgeois’ habits ought to be abandoned for the ‘progressive’ ones of the new Soviet man. Accumulation of capital in the form of education credentials, technical43 or other ‘socially-useful’ knowledge and a scientific worldview was encouraged instead. Moreover, in the Soviet period “a firm link existed between culture, higher learning, and social status” (Tromly 2007: 25). Relative wealth, intellectualism and the influence of a significant part of the Soviet intelligentsia were mostly overlooked as something ‘normal’ and, thus, practically absent from unofficial popular representations. Nevertheless, the Soviet intelligentsia had enough specific capital allocated to them and, what is even more important, in the changing socio-political circumstances was able to invest it into a wide range of spheres were it could be converted into social, economic, political and symbolic capital.

Heterogeneity of specific capital, social positions and social trajectories of the Soviet intelligentsia became particularly evident in the 1980s, when in the new socio-political circumstances quite a few representatives of intelligentsia realized that they could take a chance to become real agents of change (Susak 2005). Also, the national movement in Galicia and Ukraine gained momentum not in the last turn because the activists (especially the youth and students) “were already being groomed for leadership positions in their respective fields. Leadership of the movement was a simple extension of the roles these young individuals had been encouraged to adopt by the Komsomol and other Soviet institutions. Rather than rejecting their society, they were products of it” (Hrycak 1997: 81).

The popular post-1991 narratives have habitually painted retrospective panorama of the native intelligentsia’s situation under the Soviet regime in dark colors. In the words of a journalist from L’viv, in the 1970s “Intelligentsia either was frightened and kept silence, or shoveled snow behind the polar circle, or cynically trusted the Soviet leaders. Peasants fought struggles for harvest against the rodents and unexpected

43 Notably, there is evidence that technical professions have been scorned in families of Galician intelligentsia in L’viv as something ‘typically Soviet’. Residents of the suburban L’viv villages who used to commute to their jobs in L’viv described how, during the Soviet period, ‘native’ L’vivites sent their children mostly to the Medical Institute and the Ivan Franko State University of L’viv, and rarely to the Polytechnic Institute. Women in families of the ‘native’ L’vivites were encouraged to become teachers or artists, and in no case engineers (Bodnar 2007: 131-132).
winters. Burghers lost orientation completely and became absorbed by severe daily problems” (Pohranýchnyi 1997: 111). Nevertheless, the older respondents could point out that they sometimes saw evidence of quite sympathetic features and even genuine inteligentist’ behind the obligatory masks of the ideological correctness of the Soviet intelihenty. These features of an ‘intelihent in the soul’ could be typically glimpsed in situations when ideological prescriptions collided with human feelings of the persons in question. Thus, even if they maintained a negative stereotypical image of the Soviet intelligentsia as a symbolic collectivity, the respondents usually could ‘see trees behind the forest’ and develop non-antagonistic everyday relations with some of its representatives.

*I felt deep respect for one of my older colleagues at the Conservatory, he used to say: ‘My father is Ukrainian, my mother is Estonian, and I myself am a Leningrader’. He was a Communist, he spoke Russian all the time, but he was an extremely delicate inteligentna person, the students admired him, and he never made such things against us, you know. He made ideological statements, about the Party and so on, but it was only when some inspectors came to the lectures. He demonstrated his ‘parade trick’ with quotations from Party meetings and all this abracadabra. And then, when the inspection was over, he joked: ‘Did you see my performance? Not bad, was it?’ (Liubomýryna I., 75 y.o.).

It was very harsh times after the war. Stalinism, every child must be a pioneer, anti-religious propaganda [...] We had a young teacher, she was from Eastern Ukraine, a young, very kind person. And during one lecture on atheism she asked an obligatory question: ‘Children, is there someone among you who believes in God?’ It was like everyone in the class knew that one must sit quiet and not raise her hand. But I and my best friend raised our hands. Naïve children, we were taught in our families that to believe in God is something natural and good. The teacher said nothing, but then [said after the lecture]: ‘Marta and Kateryna, stay here after the lecture’. She told us that it was dangerous to behave like we did. Then she talked to our parents, discretely. She did not want us to get into trouble (Marta B., approx. 70 y.o.).

Some Ukrainian scholars assumed that the Soviet regime, as well as other non-Ukrainian regimes on the present Ukrainian territory, was not at all interested in cultivation of some Ukrainian intelligentsia (see critique in Hrytsak 2003). Far from being ideologically neutral, this view rather reflects a popular opinion formed under the influence of the dissenting intellectuals. The central points of this story are victimization, persecutions and sufferings of the intelligentsia under the Soviet yoke, all this resulting in an ‘intellectocide’ (Vovkanych 2005) and moral degradation of the entire people. Such a reductive discourse on the Ukrainian intelligentsia became a part of the widespread post-1991 narratives which stress only the darkest sides of the Soviet period. However, there is historical evidence which reveals that rather than being solely victims or passive objects of ideological manipulation, Ukrainian bureaucrats and intellectuals played an active role in developing the official Soviet politics of memory and producing a socialist variant of Ukrainian national ideology (Yekelchyk 2004: 5-6).

Intelligentsia and intellectuals occupied positions within the ‘space of legitimation’ (Verdery
1991a: 89), a space of vital concern to the Soviet regime. The negative baggage that burdens intelligentsia in L’viv since Soviet times (declined educational standards, ‘provincialization’ of the humanities and social sciences, internalization of the ideologized doxa in the scholarship (Grabowicz 2005)) came partly as a result of general Soviet policy to select and tame the educated strata (Dziegieł 1997). The Soviets “tipped and flattered the intelligentsia in various ways—positions, honorific titles and awards, and by creating a privileged ‘aristocracy’ within it” (Duskalov 1996: 75-76). Using again the metaphors of field and space, in the period of state socialism intellectual space was structured in such a way that the field of power incorporated mostly the positions organized around the heteronomous principle, while positions legitimated by the ‘inner’, autonomous logic of the field, were gradually marginalized.

The states of the Communist block generally succeeded in creating a climate in which intelligentsia’s largest part neither could nor was especially prone to oppose the regime openly (ibid: 74-75). However, manipulation of the Soviet phraseology and tacit mocking of the Soviet conventions was a normalized strategic behavior as well as a practice of resistance for many holders of positions within the intellectual field (Ries 1997: 81). The older informants told plenty of stories about how they managed the situations when their national loyalties collided with the demands of maintaining their institutionalized positions:

*It was life according to two different standards: one for the outside, and one for your own use, for inside. It is probably a little bit funny to tell about this, but I’ve never been a dissenter, even in the slightest degree. […] I have always been aware that the Soviets are something strange, strange and foreign for me. […] Of course, one could choose an open riot, but I am not capable of this. I have worked at schools, then at the university for all my life, I could not put my work at risk. Maybe it’s ridiculous, but I found some other ways. For example, I was an ardent anti-Soviet sports supporter! [chuckles]. […] If the Soviet Union’s hockey team lost to Canada or the Czechs, I felt a great satisfaction! [chuckles] […] Then my son was born. I hated all these perverted versions of our Ukrainian names which became popular in Soviet times. ‘Pasha’, ‘Liokha’, ‘Misha’—it strikes my ears, so I chose the name Hnat, it was impossible to misshape it in that way (Volodymyr S., 72 y.o.).*

*It has always been difficult to be a Ukrainian, to maintain your national dignity. Especially then [in Soviet times]. Especially for me, because I am a person who cannot sit and be silent. Of course, I am able to keep silence and I know where and when I may tell the truth to someone. […] I am an activist according to my nature, so they [bosses at her work] wanted me to become a member of the Communist Party. What could I do? You cannot say ‘no’, for you get into very big trouble. But to say ‘yes’?! I pretended that I was deeply touched, I promised to think about it. And I thought for a ve-e-e-ry long time [laughs]. But the secretary of our Party organization [at her working place], such a disgusting type, chased me everywhere. […] So I played the fool and said to him in a very sincere tone: ‘It is such an honor for me, but I am very young, and I must first do this and this and to earn this honor’ [laughs]. He could do nothing with it. Then I became a mother and they realized that it was better to leave me alone (Marta B., approx. 70 y.o.).*

Efforts to maintain or secure position as a cultural producer oftentimes led not only to frictions between the intelligentsia and the authorities, but to the internal struggles of various factions of intelligentsia—in
accordance with the logic of the reproduction of the intellectual space. These struggles certainly were not always fought in line with moral imperatives: “The competition [among intellectuals—E.N.] took several forms that left no publicly written trace: quests for patronage and influence, gossip and backbiting, deals and compromises, and so on. In addition, it took the most typical form of combat among intellectuals: written words” (Verdery 1991a: 137). However, in the narratives of the elder informants this theme was practically absent.

5.5. **Defending the established boundaries: the post-Soviet ‘quasi-intelligentsia’ and the conflict of generations**

Some informants pointed out that the post-Soviet ‘quasi-intelligentsia’ occupying lucrative or prestigious positions within academe and other spheres is not only a vestige of the Soviet ‘pseudo-intelligentsia’\(^4\), but a new hybrid form. Its distinguishing features are a combination of nationalist rhetoric and deeply rooted concepts and socio-cultural dispositions from the Soviet epoch. Volodymyr Ieshkiliev, the celebrated West Ukrainian writer of the 1980s generation (вишнедесетники), gave an openly scornful depiction of the former Soviet intelligentsia originating from the ‘masses’, pathetic and grotesque under new historical conditions:

Rural intelligentsia throw away on the road their favorite ideological toys, seduced folk masses and underdeveloped statist projects. They weep, presage Armageddon and accuse everyone of collaboration and unconsciousness. Everyone, except themselves and God. They are afraid of the Old Man in the Sky, because mummy said not to swear in front of sweet Lordy. One must, much like a hundred years ago, clean after our intelligentsia. With a broom. To take away their verbal litter: all these slogans, appeals and abandoned portraits of cheap prophets. To wash away the filth of the words which became greasy after their love. To air rooms to get rid of the stink of their mean hatred. To restore the values which they have broken. To grant amnesty to the notions and values which their talking has placed under arrest (Ieshkiliev 2003).

The informants who mentioned ‘pseudo-intelligentsia’ in their narratives, presented it as an antagonist whose presence is an unavoidable effect of societal transformation and generational discontinuity. ‘Quasi-intelligentsia’ was constructed as a reversed presentation of the qualities which the informants aspire to or ascribe to themselves. Notably, the recurring topic of these stories about internal struggles of different factions

\(^{4}\) In his study Volkov (1999) condemned the Soviet educated class for being a ‘pseudo-intelligentsia’. Pipes (1961: 52) pointed out that a technical and administrative ‘semi-intelligentsia’ took place of the eclipsed old (Russian) intelligentsia who either perished on the wave of repressions, or emigrated from the Soviet Union. Shlapentokh (1990: x-xi), in his turn, makes an analytical distinction between ‘genuine’ and ‘bogus’ intellectuals and assumes that the later one “survive as parasites, demanding public reward for work that has little to do with true creative activity”. He further assumes that in the late Soviet period ‘bogus’ intellectuals and intelligentsia took the upper hand in the intellectual community (ibid: xi).
In Soviet times, in the 60s and 70s intelligentsia were symbolic personalities. Ukrainian intelligentsia was partially exterminated, partially barbarized, brutalized and Sovietized—it’s all the same. […] Presently we have a phenomenon of quasi-intelligentsia. They are extremely provincialized and ignorant (zatsofani). They have no existential experience of freedom, they’ve never experienced freedom as an internalized feeling of autonomy and dignity of an individual. Even in those dark times of the Soviet the situation was not so acute. One should also probably blame the postmodern situation with its relativism. […] Another feature of this Ukrainian quasi-intelligentsia: they are extremely lazy. Lazy in a spiritual sense. They are like a hopeless sentimental dreamer (Hryts’ko Pozikhailenko) who got stuck on the crossroads of history and dreams about times of Ukrainian national greatness. Instead, they should begin to study again, to go abroad and to learn something new and modern, to begin to self-educate themselves. […] They go on picking up conceptual crumbs which fall from the Marxist-Leninist table because they are unable to open their eyes and to admit that they live in the modern dynamic world (Pavlo K., 56 y.o.).

This milieu reproduces itself. They are not consciously vicious, they mostly lack talents. They are not strategic, not at all. Their main problem is that they are extremely primitive. Alas, alas. They are simply post-homo sovieticus (post-sovky) who have accepted the Decalogue of the Ukrainian Nationalist as the basis of their intellectual and institutional development. […] At my dear alma mater they take bribes and earn money—and, accordingly, what kind of elite can they bring up? (Antin B., 38 y.o.).

What type of intelligentsia is most visible in L’viv? It’s such a Sovietised (radianyzovana) intelligentsia, or at least it is people who try to monopolize their right to speak as true representatives of the local Ukrainians and to stand guard over some true version of Ukrainian identity. They are most visible in media. I don’t know, maybe it should be so. They are hegemonists here. I don’t want to judge whether it’s good or bad. It’s simply a fact, that’s all (Iurko Z., 38 y.o.).

I mean, it is supposed that their [older academicians] works are of greater significance because they are more patriotic, because they defend the Ukrainian Idea. I think it is… it is the same model as in Soviet times! Like: the work which insisted on rightness of Marxism-Leninism most ardently was the best one. […] These people are ideologically over-indoctrinated (zaideologizovani). They are not mobile in an intellectual sense. They are not capable of some revisions of their own views, of some criticism of these views—they simply do not want to do this. But in this situation the most pitiful thing is that they not only maintain their views, but they block others’, younger scholars’, development. They block some alternative approaches. And, besides, they have a decisive voice when it comes to choosing new employees, and their choice is guided by criteria of patriotism, ethnic origin and family connections. Of course, this does not facilitate development of Ukrainian scholarship, but it supposedly contributes greatly to development of national and nationalistic ideas, doesn’t it? (Olena K., 36 y.o.).
‘spiritual laziness’ might indicate that in their argumentation those who try to distance themselves from ‘retrograde’ intelligentsia, still employ categories having to do with subjective tastes and liking rather than some strictly defined professional criteria. It may prove to be that on the discursive level of categorizations and evaluations the difference between world-open academicians and their conservative colleagues is not as drastic as one might imagine.

In the course of my fieldwork I often heard emotionally laden stories of the younger people about the older ones and vice versa. Nevertheless, some informants approached the issue of the different milieus of intelligentsia in post-1991 L’viv with a more analytical attitude. For example, a middle-aged male journalist shared his vision of the post-1991 Galician intelligentsia whose internal differences have been conditioned, in his view, not only by various degrees of indoctrination with dominant political ideologies, but first and foremost by generational differences and conscious orientation toward different intellectual traditions and discourses:

*Let us say, the old Galician intelligentsia died out as a generation. The contemporary Galician intelligentsia are simply those who live in the geographical region of Galicia. They live in a certain milieu which in line with its tradition tends to self-organization, to the forming of a civil society. They try to gather together, to converse, to make alliances. However, the intellectual tradition of the 50 and 60-year olds is notably influenced by the Soviet tradition or Russian tradition. Those who had high offices, some professors and other bigwigs, have been under a very strong influence of Communist discourse. And, whatever they say, they cannot get rid of it so easily. Others, those who were in the opposition, were close to the paradigm of the Russian underground anti-Communist movement with all its positive and negative sides. And they come very close to the figure of the Russian intellihent with all his typical features. In contrast, the younger generation of the free professionals (liudy vil’nykh profesii) in Galicia, those 20, 30 and 40-year olds, have made contact with contemporary European traditions, and the gate to these traditions was oftentimes opened by contact with Poland. And in Poland the French and Anglo-Saxon liberal traditions have been very fashionable. And, no wonder, these younger generations of the Galician intellectuals are under the strong influence of these traditions (Andrii P., approx. 45 y.o.).*

Notably, when speaking about the younger generations, Andrii called them not intellihenty, but “the free professionals” and “the Galician intellectuals”, which by itself signals the shifts in conceptualization of intellectual activities under new socio-historical conditions. Indeed, with the end of the Soviet period the younger generations of the highly educated resist the notions and categorizations from the Soviet ideological arsenal. Nevertheless, it may happen that those who challenge established hierarchies do it by way of ‘returning to the sources’ and, thus, reproduce and confirm the old principles of the fields of cultural production as well as the structures of social domination defined by class, ethnicity and gender (Bourdieu 1993b, 1984, 1988).
5.6. The boundaries questioned: what are we going to (never) become?

The tendency of making a stake on cultural rather than economic and social capital is quite
typical of newcomers into the field of symbolic production (Bourdieu 1993b: 41). On the basis of my
interviews, one can surmise that nowadays in L’viv the ‘newcomers’ in the intellectual/cultural field
emphasize personal cultural capital, individual creative abilities, personal autonomy, resistance to enslaving
‘group opinion’ and internalization of universal moral principles as the guidelines which they view as
important. It is also typical of the middle-aged and younger respondents to reject the term ‘intelligentsia’ as a
category of self-identification in favor of other definitions, such as intellectual, academician, middle class and
bourgeoisie. This finding correlates with the data of a recent all-Ukrainian poll on socio-class identifications
of the Ukrainian population (Brods’ka and Oksamytna 2001). According to these data, “self-identification with
middle class is most typical of people under 30” (ibid: 48). When I directly asked the younger respondents
whether they regard themselves as representatives of intelligentsia, the typical reaction was the brows lifted in
surprise:

Intelligentsia—hm, it’s puzzling […] It does not mean that I’ve never met some intelihiintni people in
my life. My boss D. [the director of one of the academic institutions in L’viv] can serve as a good
example. When you talk to him, when you observe his manners, it comes into your mind that this
almost extinct species of intelligentsia should look and talk like he does. But to point out some
criteria that distinguish an intelihiint— it’s difficult, frankly speaking. However, I think I can easily
define who is intellectual. And I would rather reckon myself as belonging to this category—if it
means that it is people who are professionally engaged in intellectual work (Iurko Z., 38 y.o.).

Intelligentsia? No-o-o. We are a kind of intellectual milieu. Yeah, I think so. I don’t mean that we all
are very tough (kruti) intellectuals. […] But people grouping around our organization—they are
thinking people, they can think logically, they know what they want, and money does not mean
everything to them (Roman R., 28 y.o.).

I am more acquainted with the milieu of the new middle class in L’viv. Advocates, some
businessmen and so on. It’s mostly people with higher education, but they are not intellectuals. […]
This new bourgeoisie (buzhuaziia)—I like them most of all other social sub-strata (prosharky
suspil’stva). In contrast to Galician intelligentsia, they lack snobbery, they lack these stupid hang-
ups and an exaggerated religiosity. […] This social sub-stratum was ridiculed in the nineteenth
century, but I think it is the healthiest stratum which has a potential to became a basis for building
some new nation or state and so on. In contrast to Bohemian intellectual circles, they have a kind of
moral pivot, they have some healthy basis in themselves (Tamara K., 25 y.o.).

I suppose I identify myself rather with my position as an academician than with intelligentsia or
intellectuals. Intellectual is a person who not only masters a corpus of some encyclopedic
knowledge, but possesses a certain way of thinking which opens a possibility of orientation in
practically every sphere of some field of knowledge. […] I don’t think I belong to such people. […] I
hope I have certain potential for this, but today I cannot call myself an intellectual. I must work a lot
to reach this level. I’m on my way to this (Olena K., 36 y.o.).
This latter respondent, a person of Galician origin who told about her Ukrainian-ness as something taken for granted, later on expressed the opinion that her individual social position as well as position of her parents would be most adequately described as ‘intelligentsia’. Nevertheless, when I asked her if she regards herself as a representative of ‘Ukrainian national intelligentsia’, her reaction was strictly negative:

*I would never reckon myself to some Ukrainian intelligentsia, or national intelligentsia, or nationally conscious intelligentsia. It sounds no better than some ‘Soviet intelligentsia’, ‘socialist intelligentsia’ or ‘Communist intelligentsia’. It has a connotation of xenophobia, of a tendency to superiority. Well, what is ‘national’ intelligentsia, who is ‘national’ intelligent? Everything is so mixed here, so many people are of mixed origin. And to talk about ‘national’ intelligentsia looks like a certain obligation: you want to be accepted in some circles, and you are obliged to follow their limitations. It is a rather political and ideological definition. As for me, it is one of the bad traditions typical of the older generation of those who think that they are genuine intelligentsia (Olena K., 36 y.o.).*

Thus, it is evident that the younger generation of the respondents who might objectively share cognitive and performative principles of the cultural and intellectual fields and occupy positions within them, are not inclined to identify themselves in terms of belonging with some special ‘sort’ of intelligentsia or even with intelligentsia in general. Here we have an interesting example of how cultural identification may differ from the sense of belonging: a person may have cultural preferences and dispositions ‘typical’ of intelligentsia, but that does not mean that she sees herself as the same (Anthias 2002: 505). In this case we deal not solely with misrecognition of empowering social positions by their occupants (which is a necessary condition for legitimation of this position), but the conscious polemics with definitions established by the older generations. This polemics with old ‘key symbols’ is also a form of discursive resistance aiming to undermine symbolic dominance of certain taken-for-granted semiotic codes and discursive structures (Ries 1997: 157).

For the younger ‘players in the field’, intelligentsia relates to the outdated ideological phraseology, and thereby provokes mostly negative associations. On the one hand, it is associated with Galician intelligentsia as an inborn group identity that stresses loyalty to conservative values of patriotism, religiousness and bourgeois civility at the expense of individual searching and critical reflection. On the other hand, intelligentsia wakes associations with the Soviet intelligentsia, a ‘manipulated instrument of manipulation’ and docile ‘social layer’ whose actual socio-cultural position in the state socialist system was in discord with their self-proclaimed position as a spiritual elite. When accepting neither Galician nor Soviet intelligentsia, the younger and middle-aged respondents react against incongruity between what one of the respondents called the ‘myth’ (meaning collective representations constructed for propagandist aims) and the actual content—and context—which this category is associated with. With all its mixture of vague and arbitrary criteria of membership, the concept of intelligentsia is far from being egalitarian, but, nevertheless, it is not exclusive enough. Besides, as a self-categorization it might be perceived as pre-programmed by previous outdated political discourses and thus useless for the expression of new facets of cultural subjectivities. The
intellectual ‘style’ of the intelligentsia may also appear romanticized and emotionally charged (Daskalov 1996: 59), at odds with more pragmatically oriented concerns of the contemporary educated strata.

Several interviewees admitted that they regard intelligentsia as a repository of the moral principles of the Ukrainian society; some defined their own socio-cultural affinity as a representative of intelligentsia. However, even among the older generation the scale of attitudes to this category, and the range of ‘visions and divisions’ involving it, is broader than this. Older people who might readily be pointed out by others as representatives of intelligentsia (even as ‘typical’ representatives of intelligentsia) are sometimes reluctant to admit openly that they are intelihenty. On the one hand, such prudence may be explained by the fact that memories and narratives about dangers which this social standing involved (‘There were times when one could be killed in the street because his face was that one of an intelihent’) are difficult to forget. On the other hand, intelihent is often viewed as a kind of socio-cultural personality one should not admit to openly because of a fear of looking boastful or pretentious. One should not call oneself an intelihent in the same vein as one should not call oneself a beauty. In fact, this analogy between physical beauty and intelihentnist’ gives us a clue that the latter one may be imagined as an inborn ‘spiritual beauty’, as a gift of nature which can be refined, but not created from the scratch. Also, for some people it may be difficult to admit this identification because of other reasons. One of my female respondents told me:

My mother might be called an intelihent, she possessed all the necessary qualities, she was both a well-educated and responsible person, and she had a great sense of humor. But I’ve never heard her call herself intelihent. She was a doctor, and I remember that when she had to fill out some forms, she wrote ‘from civil servants’ (zi sluzhbotsviv) in the column for ‘social origin’ (Halyna S., 50 y.o.).

Quite possibly, the respondent’s mother was reluctant to define herself as an intelihent in the context of the official classificatory routine because the definition ‘(originating) from civil servants’ was perceived by her as more appropriate in that situation. However, I would suggest another explanation, which emphasizes the context of the term’s functioning. Intelligentsia and intelihent are verbal markers that may be perceived as inappropriate in the contexts of daily practical arrangements, while in the context of some ideologically charged or academic texts its use looks more germane. In this respect ‘intelligentsia’ and ‘intelihent’ evoke tabooed designations of symbolically important phenomena. Members of the community have knowledge of these words and their meanings, but as vessels of discursive power they can be used only in situations of publicly articulated contact with ‘sacral’ symbols and concepts.

Having this in mind, one can probably better understand why among L’viv youth the word ‘intelligentsia’ as well as narratives operating with it are often perceived as vestiges of bygone ideological

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discourses. In the socio-cultural post-1991 reality relations of power are constellated in different way, and
verbal constructions like ‘intelligentsia’ indeed may look like beheaded and overthrown idols of the past.
However, the new identifications and positions of part of the educated youth tend nevertheless to emphasize
and thus reproduce some pivotal notions and points of reference typical of the generations of older
intelligentsia. Such a state of affairs is well in line with observation that the dominated players in the field
have to resort to subversive strategies which will eventually bring them the disavowed profits
only if they succeed in overturning the hierarchy of the field without disturbing the principles on
which the field is based. Thus their revolutions are only ever partial ones, which displace the
censorships and transgress the conventions but do so in the name of the same underlying
principles (Bourdieu 1993b: 83-84).

This comment may be illustrated by several excerpts from the interviews with the representatives of ‘the last
Soviet generation’ (all of them academicians) where they, one may say, formulated their credos. Rebellious
stances in their statements are interwoven with easily distinguishable intelligentsia-spirited topoi of moral
responsibility, service to the community and indifference to material rewards:

*My attitude to formal points of reference (pryv’iazky) is quite cynical. […] An educated, clever
person is always estimated according to her personal output, and not exclusively according to her
social place and signs of prestige. Such a person relies on the power of her intellect and not on
participation in some coteries to be able to keep the spark of Promethean resistance. […] Well, I
try to do something useful. Something that can be described as Ukrainian Prometheusism, a will
to change some important things. Well, in any case, there is some difference between me and our
neighbors [nooding toward a company of young males occupying a table next to ours in the café,
who were speaking loudly and using bad language]. Maybe they have diplomas from some
universities. But they have no idea of and no striving after some abstract moral principles, it is
something absolutely foreign to them* (Antin B., 38 y.o.).

*Under Ukrainian conditions intelligentsia is a group responsible for the Ukrainian national
project. […] Do I personally belong to intelligentsia? I don’t know. I feel a kind of responsibility. I
will criticize this project, ponder on it, think about it in terms of strategies of domination. But I feel
this responsibility. Definitely. So, probably, I belong (Mykola G., 36 y.o.).

*At the beginning of my married life I had to make some choices. I used to think that in any case I
would make choices on behalf of my family, of my child, because Ukrainian academe can dispense
with me, but my child cannot. But over the last years a lot happened, and some of those who
developed the same scholarly approach died, very tragically, and I feel that Ukrainian scholarship
cannot dispense with me. […] I have no right to leave it—because it’s my vocation, it’s my credo. I
cannot and don’t want to refuse (Olena K., 36 y.o.).

*I am a liberal person, I am a philosopher [lecturer in philosophy at one of L’viv universities] and I
think I should not join any ‘clan’. I have my own business, but I am engaged in it not because it’s
my calling, I simply need some income, but I do want to continue to be a philosopher. It’s
important for me, […] I belong to the generation that did not receive some material benefits from
the Soviet system. My conscience will never allow me to take bribes from the students. So I survive

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in an honest way. [...] Frankly speaking, I have a dream that I might create my own educational institution, a kind of scientific centre, and I work for this. And there will be different order there, not like at other L'viv educational institutions. Everything will be different there. As Hegel used to say, 'it's my last romantic hope'. If one abandons his romantic dreams, then one turns into an ordinary Philistine [chuckles] (Oleh D., 45 y.o.).

As Tromly (2007: 19) notices, “While intellectual is also a word laden with subjective meanings, it is less loaded than intelligentsia in the Soviet [and post-Soviet—E.N.] cultural space”. Generally, the younger respondents more frequently agreed to be defined as intellectuals and readily discussed what it means to be an intellectual. Out of these statements one may conclude that, unlike the intelleht, the intellectual is primarily a definition of an individually achieved status or affinity. Unlike ‘intelligentsia’, this term lacks a connotation of belonging to a community of ascribed virtue and, in principle, the core criterion distinguishing the intellectual is his/her outstanding ability of critical reflection. Such frequently mentioned features of the intellectual as creativity, participation in public debate and pursuit to change the actual state of affairs in different spheres of life correlate to this intellectual capacity. However, there was no concord in the issue of how intellectuals and intelligentsia correlate, which category should be viewed as the other’s ‘subtype’ and which one is valued higher:

Intelligentsia is a meta-category, and intellectuals are comprised by it. Not every intelleht is an intellectual, and not every intellectual can become an intelleht due to his psychological constitution (za psykhholohichnym skladom) (Liubomyra L., 75 y.o.).

As I understand it, an intellectual is an Intelihent, with a capital ‘I’. I mean, it’s a person of broad erudition, a person who is capable of deeply understanding and analyzing, even of making a philosophical analysis of situations, not only from her narrow professional point of view, but in the context of different problems: social, political, economic, scientific. Not everyone is born to become an intellectual. And it must be so, for otherwise this noble title (blahorodne zvannia) would loose its sense. Therefore there are very, very few intellectuals in every society (Volodymyr S., 72 y.o.).

No, an intelihent and an intellectual are different things. Intellectual means that a person is clever, an erudite, that she has a proper education. There are some people who have higher education and are very clever, but they are rude. But an intelihent is first of all a matter of breeding, manners, proper behavior (Vira D., approx.50 y.o.).

In our banana republic called Ukraine one can still find people who take responsibility not only for working at some prestigious Rutgers university, but, also, for working ‘in the field’ with the people (pratsiuvaty v tereni z narodom). [...] This is precisely what differentiates an intellectual from an intelleht. Intelihenty feel responsibility. [...] They are so stupid that they still want to build this country, they worry for this country. [But] Intellectuals sit at the universities and make thick journals—for themselves (Taras L., 48 y.o.).

I admit that for an intellectual the value of cognition comes first, whereas for an intelleht loyalty to his community comes first, a feeling of responsibility for his community. [...] Intelligentsia creates the myth in the first turn; intellectuals reflect on it (Mykola G., 36 y.o.).
Intelligentsia is connected to performance of some social roles. [...] An intellectual is a more complicated business than that. I suppose that it is a development according to some Western paradigm. The formal or moral aspect is less important. You are estimated by others on the basis of your production, your individual production. You cannot enroll yourself in something called 'intellectuals' (Antin B., 38 y.o.).

I admit that every person, notwithstanding her social origin, a person who reflects on the essence of things, can be called intellectual. It is democratic, but at the same time a kind of elitist notion, because it goes along with the issue of who has power to define others as intellectuals. Intellectual has less to do with social origin (Oleh D., 45 y.o.).

Informants of different ages talk about intellectuals in terms of distinction, which is achieved due to personal talents and the faculty of analytical thinking. According to widespread opinion, the intellectual is first and foremost a competent professional who masters a certain sector of knowledge. Nevertheless, for the older generation the urge of the intellectuals for personal achievement and recognition is associated with distancing from collectivity, with indifference to its moral principles and conventions and, in the last turn, with rejection of responsibility for their ‘own’ cultural community. Remarkably, this line of reasoning has much in common both with opinion about the nineteenth century Russian intelligentsia as “alienated from the very culture to which it was giving birth” (Knight 2006: 735) and with depictions of ‘ivory tower’ intellectuals in the West. However, when the younger informants stress that “the formal or moral aspect is less important” for the intellectual, they tend to present this aspect as positive orientation toward ‘Western’ intellectual paradigms which stress autonomy and critical reflection as essential parameters of intellectual creativity.

All in all, not only knowledge and talent, but critical reflectivity, civility, ‘universal’ moral principles and responsibility for the community one identifies with (be it national, local community or community of scholars) are still regarded as important attributes marking intellectuals as a cultural space and as a category of membership. However, one can detect a constellation of meanings conveyed by the word ‘intellectual’ whose actualization became facilitated by post-1991 conditions. It is, namely, the association with Western patterns of thinking, adherence to liberal values and emphasis on individual intellectual achievement unconstrained by the demands of (moral, cultural etc.) solidarity with one’s community. Two informants belonging to different generations clearly stated that in their view the intellectual is a notion belonging to the same ideational paradigm as ‘the West’, modernity, rationalism and secularism. It is extremely significant, however, that these two respondents estimated this connection in diametrically opposite ways, and fashioned their statements in line with different narratives on modernity:

I’ve always thought about intellectuals as about people possessing a cold, Western mind. They are erudites, extremely talented people, but they are cynical. They can easily change side in political affairs, if it suits their aims. Well, I think they do not feel some moral imperative above themselves. It is a crucial difference between them and intelligentsia (Teodor D., 70 y.o.).
Intelligentsia, intellectuals… Hmm… It’s just words. But I would say that intellectual is a Western term. Moreover, it’s a secular term. It implies that a person should not claim some transcendental essence as a justification for the existence of some group of people. Well, I would agree to be called intellectual rather than intelleht. It’s because intelleht has to do with something transcendental. He seems to levitate over the heads of the rest of the people. It’s a typically Eastern European notion. […] Intellectual is a professional, while intelleht is almost a saint (Oleh D., 45 y.o.).

Another respondent, a journalist of approximately the same age as Oleh D., localized the notion of intellectual even more concretely, namely, at the liberal pole of the Western intellectual tradition, while intelligentsia was regarded by him as a concept with pro-Russian (and, one may guess, West-skeptical and even overt anti-Western) overtones. Notably, this informant insisted that “liberal intellectual paradigms” have been a kind of ‘normal’ orientation within the present-day elite intellectual circles of L’viv:

The distinction between an intellectual and an intelleht is an issue which is probably more current for Russian-centered circles in Kyiv, but not for us here. In my view, it is a purely theoretical problem which serves to segregate the space of intellectual work, but in practice this distinction does not make much sense. For me it is important that the person in question is educated, professional, follows her principles consequently and writes good articles. I think that among the younger and middle-aged generation of political scientists, historians and cultural sociologists it is not a matter of much discussion, as we all are rooted in the West European, predominately liberal, intellectual paradigm, and share the respective values (Andrii P., approx. 45 y.o.).

The notion of intellectual connoting adherence to ‘Western’ intellectual rhetoric and rejection of authoritarian ideologies, is hence constructed as an opposition to intelligentsia with its reputedly ‘Eastern’ focus and susceptibility to populism and communism. Nevertheless, concrete meanings of both need to be perpetually negotiated in some typical social contexts—especially in encounters with social and cultural ‘others’.

5.7. Features of local specificity of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in L’viv
My interlocutors preferred to talk about ‘intellehty’ and ‘intellehtni persons’—not about ‘intelligentsia’. This formal detail may indicate a quite significant distinction in modality and connotations of these notions. As the singular collective noun, ‘intelligentsia’ conveys “positive, value charged cohesiveness which has in turn enabled the group to rise to various social and political occasions” (Björling 1995: 8). Ideologically charged, associated with bygone times (and culturally distant places), projecting implications of groupness, boundedness and definiteness, this word is however perceived as inadequate for summarizing social identifications and practices of the highly educated in the post-1991 reality of L’viv. Instead, the respondents chose (maybe consciously, but I think that they did so more or less automatically, in accordance with prevailing forms of discursive use) to apply the singular noun ‘intelleht’, ‘intellehty’, and the adjective


'intelihentnyi' to various daily situations, characterizations of personal behavior, looks etc. Besides, the younger respondents were more inclined to identify with those categories, which because of their 'Western' and 'bourgeois' allusions, were marginal in the repertoire of the social identifications in Soviet times—namely, intellectuals and middle class. In view of this, one might draw conclusions about the impact of trends and styles which came from the West with the collapse of the Communist ideology and introduced an 'individualistic drive' to a predominantly 'collectivist' post-Soviet society.

Nevertheless, for deeper interpretation of the obtained narrative material, one should adopt a perspective that takes into account not only external influences, but also internal factors. In particular, the social boundaries separating the L’viv intelligentsia from ‘the rest’ became much more permeable after 1939. This does not by any means indicate that the social standing, which the ‘old’ intelligentsia used to occupy, the ‘myth’ it used to refer to and the values it used to advocate, became completely dissolved by the class-blurring Soviet ideological project. Nevertheless, subjection to the Soviet system changed intelligentsia’s, and the entire Ukrainian society’s, ways of being in another important aspect which proved to be difficult to overcome. Namely, it triggered mechanisms of social atomization (Gross 1988) and undermined trust and solidarity among the citizens (see Åberg 2002, Morawska 2000: 1072). One of the informants, Pavlo K., who participated in semi-underground groups of creative youth in L’viv, estimated that intelligentsia ceased to exist as a cohesive social and discursive space by the end of the 1970s. Instead, this space took the shape of scattered islands of close friends and relatives gathering privately (so-called ‘kitchen table’ gatherings) and often clandestinely in order to talk and perform ‘not like homo sovieticus’—and having no intention or opportunity to spread their views outside their coteries. In a sense, dissenter circles were also the product of such cultural isolation, as they created “a parallel world, another sort of reality which remained unknown and foreign to the millions of [dissenting intelihenty’s—E.N.] compatriots” (Kasianov 1995: 192). That is why after 1991 references to intelihentnyi (an attribute) and intelihent (an individual), but not to intelihentsia (collectivity), seemed to be more ‘normal’ and understandable for my L’viv respondents.

The respondents had different opinions about how to outline intelihentnist’ (or intelligentsia’s ‘essence’) and all that it connotes, but they were unanimous that it is an extremely honoring estimation which may be applied when describing other persons or being described by them. Intelihentnist’ seems to be a denomination of a cultural competence traditionally ascribed to the educated and wealthier classes, especially bourgeoisie (“discretion, restraint and knowledge of how to behave yourself in certain situations, what conventions, what rules of behavior to apply, how to react adequately in a given situation”). In a way, intelihentnist’ addresses such aspects of modern ‘European’ social realities as civility and bourgeois control of conduct (Elias 1994). But, alongside this, it also connotes universally shared normative notions of modern national societies—for example, patriotism, responsibility and service for the entire national/cultural community. It is exactly those concepts, values and reference points that ‘mismodernized’ (Molchanov 2000:
post-Soviet societies, striving to find their ‘proper’ place in the new interconnected world, seek to appropriate on a broad scale. Therefore rhetoric which addresses intelihtnist’ is not rigidly confined to certain groups, social classes and categories, but may be ascribed depending on circumstances and appropriated by various actors as a means of discursive empowerment.

Hence the persistence of ideas about Galician intelligentsia and intelihtenty as first of all bearers of proper manners, moral standards of behavior, ‘inborn’ courtesy and intelligence may be partially explained. However, not only demands of coming to pace with the Western modernity have been reflected in processes of restructuring the socio-cultural hierarchies inherited after the Soviet epoch. Pronounced retrospective trends expressed, for example, in the rhetoric of ‘returning to L’viv its historical face’ and bringing it ‘back to Europe’, have been observable among those urban milieus and institutions which presently claim a monopoly on cultural authority. These actors are also among those who argue for ‘revival’ of the prewar concepts and social divisions which used to be part and parcel of the Central-European local color of L’viv. The conservative ethos of the old Galician intelligentsia is an important part of this retrospective imagination. In the case of L’viv, the supposedly revolutionary return of history proved to be the return of narrowing traditionalist imagery, which has a good ground in this under-industrialized part of Ukraine, a part which since the end of the nineteenth century has been subjected to strong currents of modernity (in the form of cultural and intellectual trends), but not of modernization (understood as radical social and economic transformations) (Hrytsak 2006: 16-18). In this context, one can better understand the recurring fascination of many cultured Galicianers with the mythology of the ‘noble’ old intelligentsia as well as their dislike and moral indignation as regards rahuli, hopnyky, sovky and other khamy46, which the decades of Soviet rule could not erase.

Emphasis on (actual or aspired-to) class-like markers of the Galician old and present-day intelihtenty seems to be an important feature of the local specificity of the ‘parochial’ West Ukrainian cultural environment which distinguishes it, for example, from urban Russian intelligentsia (including those ethnically non-Russian nationals who have been drawn into its cultural orbit). It has been argued that the essence of being a rank-and-file Russian intelligent is to be involved first and foremost in shared intellectual discourse and verbal practices (Ries 1997: 6). Typically, this intellectual discourse of the Russian intelligentsia, even in the Soviet period, has been focused on ‘Culture’ (with a capital C) epitomized, in particular, in the cult of Russian world-famous literature47 (Boym 1994, Ries 1997, Rapoport and Lomsky-Feder 2002). Galician intelihtenty, however, could not refer to their own widely recognized high-cultural tradition in the same manner as Poles and Russians. Moreover, in the socio-political climate of the Soviet-occupied Eastern Galicia, an emphasis on some specific conversational practices of the local intelligentsia was out of the question. Instead, personal

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46 See the next chapter.
47 Boym even writes about Russian intelligentsia’s “quasi-religious cult of culture” (1994: 103) and argues that in accordance with the nineteenth century tradition, up to the perestroika years Russians were “defined less by blood and by class than by being a unique community of readers of Russian culture” (ibid).
dignity, silent resignation and ‘embodied’ (in Bourdieu’s terminology) cultural dispositions might reputedly detect adherents to the Galician cultural values better than commonality of discourse.

Nevertheless, preoccupation with formal, easily detectable parameters of daily speech and conduct of the Galician intellehenty were in themselves a demonstration of strong national awareness. In Eastern Galicia intelligentsia was both one of the core actors defining the shape of the Ukrainian national project in the twentieth century and a part and parcel of the national body. In many obvious and more subtle ways, national ‘consciousness’ (svidomist’), refined language and manners of the Galician intelligentsia, have been presented as ideal features which should be extrapolated to the whole Ukrainian nation. In this respect the situation of the Russian intelligentsia was more contradictory, as the unambiguous role of articulators and disseminators of national identity has not been its hallmark (Knight 2006: 758, Gella 1989: 136). Instead, in the twentieth century this milieu rather distinguished itself as adherents to common good, cosmopolitan trends and as ardent protectors of the people against ‘petty-bourgeois’ features and Philistinism (Vihavainen 2006).

Among other possible factors determining local specificity of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in L’viv one should mention specific clustering of symbolic boundaries defining this category and corresponding social space. According to Lamont (1992), it is possible to distinguish analytically three types of symbolic boundaries, i.e., criteria that are used to evaluate status, actualized by the representatives of a class. Moral boundaries are drawn “on the basis of moral character, they are centered around such qualities as honesty, work ethic, personal integrity and consideration for others”, socioeconomic boundaries are defined by “judgments concerning people’s social position as indicated by their wealth, power and professional success”, and the basis for drawing cultural boundaries are estimations of “education, intelligence, manners, tastes, and command of high culture” (ibid: 4). All three criteria are highly relevant for my study. However, although the moral dimension is an extremely important factor in drawing social (especially class, see Sayer 2005: 948) boundaries, in the case of the East-Central European intelligentsia cultural and moral boundaries may easily converge because humanistic ideals, personal integrity, ‘cultured’ conduct and manners presuppose each other in many respects. On the other hand, it may be that demarcation lines conditioned by different education, (visible) manners and tastes do not form some monolithic cultural boundary. Besides, it seems to be that in the case with the L’viv intelligentsia command of high culture does not have the same potential as a principle for symbolic boundary construction.

5.8. Structures of plot development evident in the narratives of the informants
Initially, the interviews were not structured around a certain (chrono)logical axis as defined by unique events and situations of the interviewee’s lived experience. The material mostly consists of fragmented considerations about certain categories and notions, and this may make a comprehensive narrative analysis of
several ‘most complete’ and informative individual interviews quite problematic. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some persisting plots, motifs and significant characters on the basis of the totality of the textual material. Some central characters of the intelligentsia narrative identities will be discussed in the following chapters. As for the plots, first and foremost those which conflate the conceptual ‘life story’ of intelligentsia with the personal experience of the narrator have been of interest.

According to Lieblich et al. (1998) and Murray (1988), the structures of plot development may be schematically represented in four narrative types: romance, tragedy, comedy and satire. Hence,

In the “romance”, a hero faces a series of challenges en route to his goal and eventual victory, and the essence of the journey is the struggle itself. The goal of “comedy” is the restoration of social order, and the hero must have the requisite social skills to overcome the hazards that threaten that order. In “tragedy”, the hero is defeated by the forces of evil and ostracized from society. Finally, the “satire” provides a cynical perspective on social hegemony (Lieblich et al. 1998: 88).

Traces (or segments) of at least three competing plot types are discernable in the obtained material: romance, comedy and satire. The following excerpts were taken from interviews with persons born between the late 1960s and early 1980s (and, thus, socialized both under Soviet and post-1991 conditions) in order to demonstrate that different kinds of narrative identity and location may be actualized by the people belonging (approximately) to the same generation in the period of wide-scale socio-cultural transformation.

**Romance** is one of the typical narrative models framing collective stories about intelligentsia in L’viv and Galicia. Intelligentsia and intellectuals (and their individual representatives, personified in the figure of the narrator operating in every interview) are depicted as experiencing a series of defeats and losses which, however, do not undermine the determination of the character to continue his/her advocacy of moral principles and intellectual autonomy. The plot is not constructed around one culmination point, but rather exposes a multiplicity of dramatic ups and downs. Persons who have ‘written themselves into’ this type of plot might stress that despite all the frustration and dissatisfaction with the harsh realities, they could not quit their professional or intellectual activity as advocates and promoters of (Ukrainian, ‘European’ and, more broadly, all-human) culture, science and arts. These respondents did not invoke some moral ‘mission’ of intelligentsia or a pronounced desire to restore the order of things to its ‘normal’ condition. Historical circumstances and political regime notwithstanding, the protagonist in this kind of narrative is envisaged as an individual who meets challenges and strives for self-realization and autonomy. Some of the respondents mentioned moral choices which they were compelled to make in order to keep their position as *intelyentsyi*. The narrators might (overtly or covertly) assume that they took up the baton from their mentors, spiritual guides and predecessors in the fields of cultural production but nevertheless they strive to develop their own routes. Intelligentsia’s tradition, which may be embodied in the unattainable figures of the ‘old’ intelligentsia, is viewed critically and provides rather historical examples which one should analyze, but not try to extrapolate to the present
circumstances. Heroization and pathos are mainly avoided in such narratives. This type of narration, it may be suggested, is quite typical of intellectual circles attracting younger generations of critically thinking academicians. Examples of the romance narrative model have been already introduced in this chapter (see, in particular, excerpts from interviews with Antin B., Oleh D. and Olena K. on page 121).

The comedy type of plot development may be visualized as a U-formed structure with one definite culmination point. If the romance is a more or less open-ended structure, the comedy is definitely teleological, i.e., striving to achieve some definite aim (for instance, to repay a loss). In several interviews the Soviet period has been presented as obvious locus of downward development entailing loss and danger, corruption of mores and the impossibility to think and act freely. The culmination point of these stories may be located in times immediately before 1991, but also in the decade of ‘Kuchmism’ preceding the Orange Revolution in 2004. The imagined point of departure in such narratives, i.e., the top point represented as the lost time of flourishing culture, order and freedom, was sometimes associated with the pre-Soviet life, with the years when L’viv was a significant Central-European cultural centre and the capital of the ‘Ukrainian Piedmont’. Sometimes, however, like in the following excerpt, the idyllic condition is presented as a timeless (indeed, mythical) state of unity and harmony. Nationally conscious Galician intelligentsia (‘we’) have lost their positions in the past because of the circumstances which they could not avert, but one day its prestige and authority will be restored—and maybe even extended. The respondents who utilized the comedy structure in their narratives, also implied that present-day Galician intelligentsia had been endowed with a mission of restoring all-Ukrainian societal and cultural values (including those of prewar Ukrainian ‘integral’ nationalism). Elements of heroization and victimization were discernable in such narratives, and respondents also were more predisposed to employ dramatic contrasts\footnote{Inclusion of dramatically different elements in the same plot may prove to be extremely appealing, and such mixed narratives may provide attractive frames for construction of collective identity: ‘The ‘glorious past’, when such exists, carries its own appeal. Yet …for remembrance of victories and progress to be meaningful at all, it must contain its own ‘dark’ reference points. A mixed narrative, then, is needed even under the best of circumstances’ (Irwin-Zarecka 1994: 58).} and emotional modes of speech. Here is an example of such a narrative:

\begin{quote}
It was the year 1988, we founded our organization [a patriotic youth organization affiliated with one of the right-wing parties in L’viv]. Soviet Union lived its last days, the West broke through. And those who founded the organization saw the disorder on the level of the state, that it was an absolutely foreign structure in our land. They saw lies, they saw perversion—I mean, that it was a normal condition, that it had been propagated. […] For example, my mentor (vykhovnyk)—well, he was confused, he wanted to know if it were him who was ‘abnormal’ or if it was the abnormal reality. Because the world is big, but it is not like we read in books. Not like those positive characters, not like in our dreams from childhood. […] And then we found each other. Our destiny gathered us together, we started to make expeditions to the mountains, and we also renovated old gravestones. […] We saw that the world was abnormal, that it was mixture of everything, that
\end{quote}
ideology was distorted, that everything was not in its rightful place. Therefore someone must recover the values. Of course, it must be launched on the high state level, it must come from above. […] but we go to the mountains to build our own world. The world which, as we think, is the right one. […] My mentor is used to tell a legend about lost people. Once upon a time there was a strong and courageous people, great warriors and artists. Their enemies could not conquer them by force of weapon, so they sent them a wizard who made it so that they stopped recognizing each other. And this mighty tribe became scattered and conquered. But the legend says that the day will come when these lost people will begin recognizing each other again, and they will revive their glory. The idea is that we, too, must find each other, recognize everywhere those who think like we do and become strong together (Vasyl’ R., 28 y.o.).

Ingression of satire plot development might be anticipated in an interview when a narrator was inclined to exploit specifically expressive forms of language. In satirical narratives the serious modality and conventionalized forms of speech typical of ‘cultured’ nationally conscious Ukrainians are usually suspended (at least partially). Instead, the narrator uses jargon expressions excessively (in the case of the interviews conducted for this study, youth jargons prevailed) and colloquial expressions and, thus, tones down the ‘serious’ modality of the discussion. The dynamics of the narrated story, with its ups and downs, may resemble the one of romance. However, unlike romance and, moreover, comedy, this type of narration reveals an absence of some conventional symbolical models of identification or, alternatively, these models are mocked or not taken seriously. In a way, it is not a story of achievement, but of emancipation. A young journalist told about an informal group of activists who became engaged in the propaganda campaign against the powers-that-be in 2004:

We actively utilized mass media in our work. We were very much concerned with our local, L’viv problems. People are much more sensitive to their own pains. I don’t care too much that some oppositional politician was beaten in Donets’k—but there is a hole in the pavement right in front of my entrance door, and I am much more concerned about this. We tried to point out our local problems and suggest that ‘People, look, roads with holes, and you know where fish decays first? In the head. So, look at our authorities, they don’t repair roads, they steal, they are corrupted.’ […] We keep distance from all existing political parties. We have decided to act in an absolutely different way, because their activities did not result in something real. It’s only bla-bla-bla. […] We did not gather in rallies, like they do, we did not shout that ‘Kuchma is a bloody bastard’ [then tells in detail about mocking public performances made by the group] […] We made funny and apolitical performances, we entertained people and by this we reminded them that the election [presidential election of 2004] would be soon. We used the experience of Serbian ‘Otpor’ and Georgian ‘Khmara’ in our activities. […] Our main principle is ‘copy-left’ as opposition to ‘copy-right’. It means, none tries to make a brand of his or her activity, none tries to promote himself and become a celebrity. […] I recalled a case: one lecturer at the Polytechnic University declared to my brother that an intelligent is a person who is intelligent in the third and fourth generation, you know, that it is a pedigree (rodovid). You know, such bullshit! In my circle they talk about intelligentsia like: oh, an intelligent! [in annoyed tone]. They deserve this! Look at all those who come to Shevchenko monument, they tear their shirts in pieces and cry that they spilled liters of their blood for Ukraine—and then this Galician ‘intelligentsia’ merely sells voices for a better price (Roman R., 28 y.o.).
In my interview sample, pronouncedly satirical narratives were conveyed by two male respondents, the youngest ones, who at the time when the interviews were conducted, recently graduated from their universities and combined their professional engagement (journalist and programmer respectively) with public activity. Thus, such a modality of narrative identity and challenging of the established cultural, social and even political conventional order is not necessarily an attribute of some marginalized frustrated youngsters.

Notably, I did not discern any obvious examples of tragedy plot development (which may be schematically presented as inverted U-shaped curve) among the interviews. The stories that in some way approximated this type dealt with ‘ghettoization’ of the present-day Ukrainian intelligentsia. Nevertheless, despite bitterness of the stories which bemoan the fading of the intelligentsia as an influential actor and moral backbone of the society, they do not end with litany-like comments about the hopelessness of the situation in general. For example, Maria L., 51 (see p. 107, 108) did not regard disappearance of “the last of Mohicans” from the old days the end of the story about the L’viv intelligentsia. Another respondent addressed quite a gloomy situation of the present-day disillusioned and disenfranchised intelligentsia, but neither did that story end with a conclusion about the hopelessness of the respondent’s personal circumstances and of the intelligentsia’s condition in general:

Fight, and you shall win! (Boritesia—poborote!) Our ghettoized intelligentsia must bring up their children in the proper spirit, to make them believe in high ideals. I think I achieved this with my children. Aristocracy of spirit is something that still attracts people, even those young ones who have been regularly stupefied by advertisements and idiotic TV-programs. As long as we [Ukrainians] exist as a race (rasa) there will be a demand for intellectual elitism and high moral values (Roman M., approx. 60 y.o.).

Hence, even in such cases we deal rather with a kind of romance plot than with tragedy. In my view, the absence of pure ‘tragic’ plot development in the respondents’ stories strengthens the hypothesis that, as a symbolic referent, intelligentsia is still associated with empowering narratives and strategies. It is, one may say, a floating signifier (Jørgensen and Philipps 2002: 28-29) that in the contemporary narratives of the highly educated L’vivites signals relations of power and dominance, and therefore it does not fit in the stories that develop the theme of powerlessness and complete degradation.

5.9. Summary
This chapter has provided a discussion about idealized images, self-identifications and ‘outdated’ categories which all—in different ways and to different extents—address intelligentsia both as real people and as discursive construct. It explores ‘emic’, contradictory and multilayered presentations of intelligentsia which circulate in daily discourses of the highly educated L’vivites. Narrative identities of intelligentsia may look
inconsistent and fragmentary. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern some recurrent narrative structures, metaphors and discursive connections that allow conceptualization of ‘intelligentsia’ in L’viv as a changing social position, perennial symbolic referent, continuing ‘myth’, ideologically laden collective presentation, historical tradition and community of memory. Contested definitions of intelligentsia proliferate in the post-1991 socio-political climate which vitalizes discussions about national community and cultural identity, and actualizes the quest for sources of manifest cultural authority.

In L’viv, as well as in other parts of Ukraine, the ‘national’ (both as a stake and as a resource) has been reinterpreted in a variety of contexts, not least in the domain of political rhetoric and academic production of knowledge, by the representatives of several presently coexisting generations. In view of this, and also given historical circumstances and the present political striving of L’viv and Galicia to play the role of a producer of national-cultural ‘package’ in Ukraine, the issue of politics of national identity construction and its empowering aspects actualized by present-day Galician intelligentsia and intellectuals will be further explored in the following chapters.

The interviews provide an abundance of material which relates to the present-day processes of generational transmission in L’viv. The middle-aged respondents who may be described as representatives of ‘the last Soviet generation’ combine both pre-Soviet and Soviet-laden notions and symbolic constructions in order to conceptualize their own positions as an educated stratum and as cultural producers. Among these constructions and conceptualizations are both the opinion that an intelligent should live up to a certain ethos, make distinct (superior) cultural choices, and the awareness of ideological embedment and the vulnerability of intelligentsia’s standing. Unlike the older generation, these respondents tended to demonstrate more critical and skeptical stances towards intelligentsia as a historical phenomenon and the definition of certain positionality (identification). Meanwhile, the younger ‘independence generation’ seems to make efforts to outline some more empowering and at the same time symbolically neutral points of reference alluding to meritocratic order, intellectuality and individualism. At the same time, these young people—educated, skeptical and pragmatically thinking—continue to make a distinction between themselves and ‘the rest’ on the basis of the same principles of cultural authority, moral superiority and service of (national, local, cultural) community as their predecessors in the fields of cultural production. Hence, speaking figuratively, although they play in other costumes (or, rather, wear casual suits instead of a uniform) and act in front of a changed backdrop, they nevertheless continue the game for the same stakes and according to the same inherent rules of the field. In the next chapters I am going to examine these cultural fields and social spaces in L’viv where intelligentsia has been reproduced both as a discursive concept and as milieus of cultural producers.
Chapter 6. Between Kham and Knight: The L’viv Intelligentsia’s ‘Others’ and Alter Egos

6.1. Protagonist and antagonists: intelligentsia and its ‘others’

“For a term to have meaning, it must be possible to specify what, in particular circumstances, would count as the other of it—which doesn’t necessarily mean specifying something which would be always and everywhere the other of it” (Eagleton 1991: 7-8). The assumption that development of both individual and collective identifications presupposes interplay with and opposition to some ‘others’ is one of the commonplaces in the social sciences (Jenkins 1996, Goffman 1963, Eriksen 1993, Irwin-Zarecka 1994). It has also been argued that “narratives of location are structured more in terms of a denial (through a rejection of what one is not rather than a clear and unambiguous formulation of what one is)” (Anthias 2002: 501).

Narratives localizing intelligentsia as a social standing, collective representation and a more or less detached ideological construction are no exception in this respect. Narrative identity of an intelligentsia implies involvement in classificatory struggles and, thus, presupposes the claims to define, categorize and distinguish. Out of their position in the field of power intelligentsia is able to influence the process of social division which “involves a classification of a population (i.e., taxonomy of persons) and a range of systematic social processes which relate to that taxonomy, and which then serve to produce socially meaningful and systematic (although not unitary) practices and outcomes of inequality” (Anthias 2001: 837). In this respect, the space where intelligentsia’s discourses and classifications are produced is political and politically significant.

The position of intelligentsia is privileged not only when it comes to self-definition, but also when it comes to the presentation of the counter-players beyond the intellectual field. In this study the issue of the intelligentsia’s narrated antagonists cannot be avoided also because they are the supposed addressees of the intelligentsia’s cultural production and narratives of identity. Without these ‘others’ and without possibility to address them, positioning as an intelligentsia and/or intellectual loses its sense, because “any claim to competence, to scientific authority, to stature in the cultural world requires a corresponding recognition somewhere else in society—first by other ‘intellectuals’ accepting or contesting one’s claims, but beyond this by holders of power, who thereby authorize the view presented, or by others in the broader public” (Verdery 1991a: 18). These ‘others’ do not necessarily form a cognizant public in a sense of “stably socialized groups orienting to a more or less secure set of values” (ibid: 18), but they must at least admit existence of some common cultural values and moral principles and thereby become prospective recipients of the intelligentsia’s discourses and cultural production.

Since present-day intelligentsia is not some easily identifiable social segment, but is rather defined contextually and is, so to speak, “stretched or compressed to fit the rhetorical task at hand” (Knight
2006: 751), one cannot point out some definite image of its ‘Other’. Instead, as Russian cultural anthropologist Cherniavskaia suggests, one can talk about dominant values organized in binary terms and scattered in the linguistic-social space of intelligentsia, which may be used for elaboration of fragmentary images of multiple ‘others’ (Cherniavskaia 2007: 26-27). Despite fragmentation and ambiguity of such presentations, these ‘others’ may be conceptualized as antagonists whose roles in the intelligentsia’s narrative identity did not come ‘naturally’ or by chance, but were negotiated in the course of history. As will be discussed in this chapter, the semantic field within which the concept of intelligentsia functions is structured by complicated relations (not only oppositions, but also overlaps, analogies and constellations) with such significant ‘others’ as the people (narod) and political elites.

6.2. Turning a deaf ear to the intelligentsia’s rhetoric: khamy above and below

Throughout the 1990s the debate about the role and place of intelligentsia and intellectuals in Ukrainian society gained intensity in tandem with presentation of different visions of the Ukrainian nation-building project on the political arena. One of the key issues of the debate has been what actors and social forces should be allied in order to implement a successful national- and state-building project. Accordingly, intelligentsia and intellectuals gained the opportunity to consider and, consequently, revise their positioning in the changing system of socio-cultural relations. The issue of intelligentsia’s ‘others’—alter egos and antipodes—has become a recurrent topic in the popular media discourses and more specific discussion forums of intelligentsia. Apparently, these debates also influenced the opinions and understandings of my informants.

During the interviews respondents were not directly asked about who can be generally thought of as intelligentsia’s antipodes or ‘others’. However, at various stages of the interviews, they, among other things, reflected upon and gave examples of what could be thought of as non-intelihentni conduct and statements, whom these sorts of presentations can be most often attributed to and who may be disqualified in his/her claims to be an intellect. Most often, the opposite of intelihentni speech and behavior has been referred to as khams’ki. The adjective khams’kyi and substantive khamstvo are derivatives from kham—the word that nowadays most often means a rude vulgar person. Biblical Ham was one of the sons of Noah, the one who ‘uncovered the nakedness of his father’. For such inappropriate behavior Noah cursed Ham’s descendants who thereby were destined to be held low in society. Accordingly, the meaning of the word kham in Russian

49 In this meaning kham has been also used in recent political squabbles in Ukraine. In the autumn of 2007 the Ukrainian press reported that Yulia Tymoshenko, leader of ByuT party, called her rival Viktor Yanukovych from The Regions Party kham in response to Yanukovych’s statement that in the capacity of the Prime Minister Tymoshenko “looks like a cow on ice”. ByuT’s press service was not slow to announce that “We are not surprised by such obviously rude khamka behaviour of the Regions’ leader. No one expected anything else from him. All in all, the whole country knows that his nickname in prison used to be ‘Kham’. Everything is explained by this” (http://www.newsukraine.com.ua/news/75166).
and Ukrainian used to be a person of low social standing, that is, a serf or servant (Dal’ 1882: 542, Hrinchenko 1909: 385). It was commonly assumed that one (or, more exactly, a person from the privileged estates) could expect nothing but rude and treacherous behavior from persons of low social origin. Presently, the word *kham* still has this connotation of not only occasionally coarse performance, but of a permanently rude personality most often correlating with low social positions. Folk proverbs and sayings suggest that ‘low’ people maintain their vulgar ways even when endowed with positions of high prestige and power (for example, ‘God forbid that a servant becomes a master’ (’*Ne daï, Bozhe, z khama pana*’)).

The opposition *intelihenty/khamy, and intelihentnist’/khamstvo* as general attributes of two ‘sorts’ of people, have been frequently invoked by informants of different generations:

*Non-intelihent* (ne-intelihent) is, generally speaking, a person of low literacy and low culture of behavior. It is rudeness, disrespect to generally accepted norms of behavior, elementary *khamstvo* (Volodymyr S., 72 y.o.).

*We have here a neglected, shrunken societal sub-stratum (prosharok) called intelligentsia [in bitter tone]. And strong people—they are khamy, but they are strong, they have money. They do not care about the general good. May one call them elite? Obviously not (Pavlo K., 56 y.o.).*

-{Volodymyr F., 75 y.o.}, […] *And our Kuchma [former Ukrainian president], for example. What do you think: is he an intelligent? He is an educated man, he used to manage such a big plant complex…*

-{Volodymyr B., 67 y.o.}, *Kuchma? He is as much intelligent as Yanukovych is ’professor’! Both are khamy and nothing else.*

*There are many things around me that I dislike. Khamstvo reigns everywhere. Intelligentsia lacks culture. Students don’t make place for elders on public transport. Elementary rules of conduct, respect for elderly people—nothing like that. And nobody can achieve something relying on one’s own intelihentnist’ (Marta B. approx. 70 y.o.).*

*There is a new caste which emerged in Russia,’the new Russians’, and their copies in Ukraine,’the new Ukrainians’. It doesn’t matter how you call them. Their attributes are uncontrolled pursuit of luxury, glamour, wastefulness. It is incompatible with intelihentnist’ in the same way as khamstvo (Volodymyr T., 65 y.o.).*

*Well, we must try to be above the level of the simple people (prostyi lud) who usually have less intelihentnist’. One must be higher than this level. If some kham offended you with some brutal words, it is better to ignore such a person, it’s better to go away because anyway you cannot change this person in the course of one episode. There are people in L’viv who are low in respect to culture and they have no breeding. But, generally, it is prestigious to be an intelihent in L’viv. The majority of people in L’viv are intelihenty, especially people of the older and middle-aged generation (Teodor D., 70 y.o.).*
FIGURE 1. ‘I know some historians who prove that those khamy are a part of our people!’ (caricature by Volodymyr Kostyrko in the L’viv periodical ‘Postup’, 20.08.2002).

The drawings of L’vivite Volodymyr Kostyrko provide an artistic commentary on the topic of the alleged Galician cultural superiority. The caricature pictured above addresses the issue of khamy and echoes the statements of the respondents in my study. The picture shows two respectable middle-aged gentlemen against the background of strange looking types with retarded facial expressions. Such detail of the gentlemen’s clothing as bow-ties signals that these figures represent educated, ‘cultured’ and well-positioned Galicianers. The beret on one of the gentlemen’s heads may also hint that he belongs to artistic or academic—in other words, intelligentsia—circles. The two of strange background figures that the gentlemen call khamy may be unmistakably detected as caricature images of skhidniak and sovok. The pipe-smoking figure in the high Cossack fur hat, with the historical hairstyle called oseledets’, represents skhidniak, a Ukrainian from eastern and central parts of Ukraine. The caricaturist alludes to a different cultural orientation and confession (Eastern Orthodox), as well as historical connotations connected to Cossack myth (in particular, political union with the Russian Tsar in 1654) that may be treated by Galicianers as signs of the inferior culture of skhidniaky. The grotesque image wearing the budionovka hat marked with red star is a homo sovieticus. The figures with mongoloid features probably were meant as an allusion to Bolshevism’s ‘Eurasian nature’ or may simply present racially different people who migrated to Ukraine during the Soviet era. However, all these types have one feature in common: namely, they, unlike the two intellhenti gentlemen, are not ‘normal’, ‘cultured’ and
‘civilized’ people. Hence, *khamy* are not a part of ‘our people’, they are cultural, civilizational, racial, ethno-cultural and ideological strangers who suddenly appear among ‘us’ and threat to pollute ‘our’ supposedly ‘normal’ (‘decent’, ‘national’, ‘European’) way of being.

It is debatable whether this drawing should be taken at face value or rather viewed as a tongue-in-cheek commentary on the opinions about the alleged cultural superiority of Galicianers (in fact, the author of the caricature has been known to be an ardent proponent of Galician autonomy, see chapter 9). Nevertheless, the presented gallery of the *khamy* (of course, incomplete and refracted through individual artistic perception) and their emplotment into the context of nationality and nationhood is symptomatic. Also, it provides us a clue that distinctions which underpin the construction of cultural superiority may arise from a combination of various principles of division.\(^{50}\)

Not only culturally inferior ‘plebs’, but also the state and the political elites (both in the Soviet and post-1991 variants) were often mentioned by the respondents in connection with the question about intelligentsia’s ‘others’. States and authorities have been intellectuals’ significant ‘others’ since the very times when intellectuals were singled out as a social category in Europe (Le Goff 1993). The relation of professionals and intellectuals to the states has been always marked by a tension as those former ones are “concerned with making general statements about humanity and about society in a context of criticism, if not outright opposition, vis-à-vis the state” (Balzer 1996: 9). Nevertheless, when talking about critical and oftentimes negative attitudes of the present-day Ukrainian *intelihenty* toward the state and state authorities, one should point out not only ‘opposition by definition’, but also a range of other factors such as the political and social situation in Ukraine and the inability of the ruling elite to change it drastically both before and after 2004. The data obtained from an all-Ukrainian poll organized by the authoritative Razumkov Center in Kyiv in 2003, before Presidential elections in Ukraine, confirmed that the prevailing attitudes of the Ukrainian citizens to the political elites were extremely negative.\(^{51}\) Opinions of Galicianers about the political elites cannot be in sharp contrast with this statistically confirmed large-scale picture. An association of ‘masters’ with *khamy* has also been apparent in the narratives of my informants.

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\(^{50}\) As adherents of a ‘cultures’ structures’ approach point out, closer examination of binary interpretive frameworks and classifications often reveals that they may be the outcome of multiple and contingent meaning-making processes of specific actors which does not presuppose enactment of some singular binary code (Battani et al. 1997: 787).

\(^{51}\) The majority of the respondents agreed that the leadership should be described as not democratic (63 percent), unprofessional (67 percent), corrupt (88 percent) and indifferent to common people’s interests (88 percent). To the question “Has the ruling elite in Ukraine changed after independence?” 36.8 percent of the polled answered “has not changed” and 36.1 percent answered “changed partially”. While the polled agreed that the most important quality of a representative of the Ukrainian political elite should be “competence, professionalism, intellect” and “responsibility” (84.3 percent respective 82.9 percent), the same respondents pointed out that in order to become a part of the present political elite in Ukraine one needs to “have connections with the authorities” (73.8 percent), “support from business structures” (71.2 percent), “to be rich” (52.8 percent) and even mobilise “support of the criminal structures” (41.8 percent) (Politicheskaia elita Ukrainy 2003).
Not only does intelligentsia form, accentuate and translate opinions about the present Ukrainian elites (first and foremost, political ones), but the elites also scan, evaluate and implement their views on the role and expediency of intelligentsia in various state projects. In this mutual discursive monitoring the Ukrainian political elites (both local and all-state ones) send signals about the social and political value of intelligentsia, which impact the entire society. When interpreting the statistical data presented recently by the Ukrainian sociologists Brods'ka and Oksamyt'na (2001), one can conclude that, generally, the authorities project the message about the weakening and marginalization of intelligentsia in post-1991 Ukrainian society. Brods'ka’s and Oksamyt'na’s analysis of the statements about ‘middle class’ in the addresses of the highest state dignitary of the country, the President, demonstrates that when talking about ‘middle class’ (i.e., the relatively numerous, well-to-do, dynamic and socially stable stratum which is meant to become a cornerstone of the entire post-Soviet societal order and an important actor in the state-implemented reforms), the authorities first and foremost mean such social categories as entrepreneurs, farmers, land and estate owners, managers, officials and civil servants. Intelligentsia is frequently absent in the definitions of the middle class as judged by the authorities (comparable with conclusions of White 2004: 142-165). At the same time, according to the estimations made by the respondents who participated in this sociological poll, intelligentsia is the category which ordinary Ukrainians most frequently associate with the notion of middle class. Hence, a discrepancy between the opinion about intelligentsia which is projected by the authorities, and the judgment of the rank-and-file citizens, is obvious. The post-1991 authorities indirectly, but systematically have conveyed the message that people with a high level of education and low income should be reckoned rather as ‘new poor’ than as middle class (Brods'ka and Oksamyt'na 2001: 49). Negative consequences of such projections from ‘above’ for the image and self-esteem of those who in this or that way are associated with intelligentsia are obvious.

6.3. Intelligentsia and the powers that be: waiting for Knights

According to the statements of the informants submitted in the previous sub-chapter, the gallery of khomy is quite extensive: from a faceless mass of have-nots to the nouveau riche, from well-known political figures to rank-and-file bureaucrats, from poorly educated everymen to bad-mannered students. With such a range of ‘others’ addressed in negative terms, intelligentsia indeed looks like a beleaguered settlement threatened from above, from below and, besides, undermined from inside by infiltrators. In a way, intelligentsia and intelihenty seem to be presented as the last bastion of ‘normality’ while its antipodes are presented as deviants. Salient prevalence of cultural-ideological orientations (towards ‘truth’, ‘spirituality’, ‘morality’, ‘manners’, ‘patriotism’, ‘knowledge’) over (and even at the expense of) all other interests and
motivations such as, in the first turn, pragmatic orientations and material wealth, has been presented as the cultural standard of worth (Lamont 1992: xxi) for those who identify themselves with intelligentsia.

Celebration of spiritual wealth in contrast to material prosperity is a well-known empowering strategy widely applied in both folk and elite cultures. Ries (1991: 126-160) describes it as an ideology which reflects folk ideas concerning the principle of limited good. According to this inverted logic, “the material wealth means spiritual poverty, while material poverty indicates spiritual wealth. …material striving subtly indicates immorality, loss of sacredness, and disconnection from one’s peers” (Ries 1991: 129). In the eyes of an intelligent both ‘corrupted authorities’ and ‘stupefied folk’, while being antipodes in one sense, are, nevertheless, equally motivated by material aims (accumulation of wealth and power in the former case, and material survival in the latter). At the same time, being relatively disempowered in the daily economic struggles for ‘a better place under the sun’, an intelligent is privileged in the domain of symbolic economy where his/her different life conditions and interests become currency of moral value. Thereby ‘genuine’ intelligentsia is constructed as a spiritual authority in contrast to the ‘elites’—a notion which in post-1991 media and popular discourses often has derogatory connotations. ‘Elites’ may be presented there as khamy who lack civility and scruples but are endowed with political and economic power. Such an unflattering picture of elites is oftentimes exploited in journalist polemics. The ubiquitous ‘unbiased’ appeals to post-1991 political and economic elites to ‘come to reason’ and to be guided by firm moral principles seem to be informed by these principles of inverted symbolic economy which underpin intelligentsia’s rhetoric:

...the process of establishment of the Ukrainian national elites, or the guiding sub-stratum, who ... is called to lead the people, to embody its best strivings and take responsibility for the future of the country, can provoke no other feeling than disgust. ... This ‘leading sub-stratum’ has been formed exclusively on the basis of the business circles and the transformed Communist Party nomenklatura. The only exceptions are ‘living Legends’ who by their own life and individual qualities deserve the right to be the best representatives of the Nation. However, these respectable ‘knight of the idea’ are the minority among the ubiquitous degenerates belonging to the diabolic circle ‘money-power-money’. They do not care about the decisive qualities of the genuine elites such as patriotism, honor, sacrifice, courage, honesty, for they declare professionalism as the only prior criterion for their ‘state activity’. It is professionalism which is not a professional experience acquired on the basis of spiritual and moral values, but as a criterion which is above these values or independent from them (Pigol’ 2005: 4).

Nevertheless, with advent of the independence, the prevailing images and symbolic embodiments of the holders of power positions within political, economic and cultural domains have not always been overwhelmingly negative. The image of the knight projecting both superiority of spirit and efficacy of action (as, for example, in the text above) has been frequently employed in public and media discourses as an opposition to all sorts of khamy. In Western Ukraine his image has a long history as an embodiment of both the politically engaged nation-builder and the unselfish devotee of cultural values of the
nation—two personifications which nationally conscious West Ukrainian intelligentsia frequently identify themselves with. Also, the young Ukrainian nation has often been visually personified in the easily recognizable figure of Jeanne d’Arc—the spiritually inspired virgin, full of feminine charm and masculine military zeal. The knight has become an attractive personification of a positively evaluated public person due to the combination of such symbolic implications as action, power, leadership, militancy, independence, nobility of both birth and spirit, Christianity, traditionalism, protectiveness towards the weak and needy, and ‘European-ness’. Retrospectiveness and traditionalism as well as the idea of belonging to Europe projected by this symbol corresponds to and exposes the features of the national project which West Ukrainian intelligentsia and intellectuals might identify with.

Several examples may give a clue as to the spectrum of the local actors who may use this image (in both visual and discursive variants) as a positive symbol with pronounced national(ist) connotations. In 1989-1990 one could see posters with agitation on behalf of the Ukrainian radical nationalist organization UNA-UNSO (Ukrainian National Assembly—Ukrainian National Self-defense) pasted in the centre of L’viv. A canonical image of the slim pale beauty with short-trimmed black hair and an oriflamme in her hand looked even more striking with the sign of a Trident carved on her armor. This portrait of the virgin from Orleans, painted in a recognizable romanticist manner, represented the young Ukrainian nation and was to be an object of identification for the members of the paramilitary UNA-UNSO. Also, this image had to appeal to the younger generation who was longing for imagery and symbolism of some other sort than those of socialist realism. At that time the figure of knight as a pre-Soviet ideologically loaded image detectable in the public sphere looked positively exotic and arrested the attention of many. In post-1991 reality the knight has definitely become a vogue (on the edge of a platitude) figure in the public semiosphere. At least two monuments in L’viv erected after 1991 play up this image: the monument to the Galician king (prince) Danylo—and the monument devoted to the servants of the Ukrainian security services. The latter monument has been styled as George the Triumphant defeating the dragon (assumedly, the dragon of criminality and corruption). The most recent use of the knight symbolism could be traced to the events of the Orange Revolution. The West-oriented and allegedly uncorrupted politicians Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko52 were often represented as the ‘knights of the spirit’, defenders of the Ukrainian Idea and, correspondingly, were decked with knight suits of armor in various glorifying pictures. Symptomatically, however, the reformer Yushchenko depicted as the knight evoked other associations when the hopes for radical changes for the better in Ukrainian politicking were not justified—namely, connotations of a lonely knight or even a Don Quixote.

Since Ukraine emerged as an independent state, L’viv has witnessed numerous endeavors to promote the city as a tourist magnet and to recreate its spiritus loci, romantic charm, ‘elite’ culture and the pre-

52 Yulia Tymoshenko was especially keen on projecting an image of ‘the Ukrainian Jeanne d’Arc’ and was often portrayed vested in armour à la Jeanne d’Arc (see Kis’ 2007 for scrupulous analysis of representative strategies appropriated by Julia Tymoshenko).
Soviet image. Very symptomatic in this context became the initiative of honoring prominent Galician public figures with the award called Galician Knight (Halyts’kyi Lytsar). The awardees to the Halyts’kyi Lytsar are chosen according to the results of a contest annually announced in the L’viv media. Principles of the assessment have been elaborated in order to guarantee transparent selection, and the ceremonies of ‘dubbing’ held in the L’viv Opera House have become increasingly sophisticated. As one journalist writes,

to qualify for the Halytsky Lytsar award, you have to “be free from the post-Soviet mentality” and to be “of a good name”. The first Halytsky Lytsar contest was held in 1999, and then those who were found to be the best in politics, art, business, law, financial work, science and journalism were awarded. Next year, no financiers or lawmakers were among the awardees; instead there were a physician, an athlete, an actor, a writer and an artist who were dubbed Halytsky Lytsar. … [This award] honors those whose contributions and prominence have not been properly recognized by the state, and hence the contests established “social justice” (Kosmolinska 2004).


One of the latest prize winners (a known public intellectual and editor in chief of an influential L’viv intellectually-oriented periodical) who was declared the symbolical king of Galicia, was granted his title, as it was put in the award address, “for [his] exceptional noble and knightly qualities, for civil courage, for resistance to the fleeting earthly temptations, for the loyalty to the ideals of the Halychyna community, and for protecting its community values” (ibid.). The Halytsky Lytsar award is therefore an interesting phenomenon
indicating striving of the intelligentsia and professionals for autonomy from the state and the willingness to symbolically reward those peers who put their professionalism, ‘nobility of spirit’ and ‘good name’ before the temptations of ‘earthly’ power. Besides, it is also an interesting local cultural event aimed to promote—and construct—non-Soviet, typically Galician ‘community values’. These newly recovered values, in principle, correlate with the ethos of the old Galician intelligentsia and refer to elite attitudes and expressions that have allegedly been destroyed during the Soviet era.

6.4. Resisting the khamy: ghettoized intelihenty versus politicking intelligentsia

Appeals to ‘elite’ spiritual and moral values and to a sense of responsibility seem to be the panacea massively introduced into the ‘nationalized’ public discourse of post-1991 L’viv by the intelligentsia and intellectuals. This panacea was to cure khamstvo, corruption, economic hardships and (nearly) all social problems. Totalizing solutions to the variety of problems of the transitional period are a logical response in the situation where there seems to be one and only one source of all of them. One of the widespread images of the society since perestroika has been the biological metaphor of an infected, ill organism. Like, for example, in Latvia (see Eglitis 2002: 7-19), in Galicia popular imagery and political discourse endorsed by Ukrainian national democrats, powerfully conveyed the belief that the Soviet system was both alien and unnatural. A societal body, which used to be healthy and harmonious, suddenly became corrupted by the foreign rule and its alien ideology. ‘Soviets’, with their propaganda of collectivism and atheism, have been viewed as a quintessence of khamstvo and had to be blamed for spreading it among both common people and ‘those on the top’.

-(I): What, in your opinion, causes the khamstvo you’ve been talking about?
-(Marta B., approx. 70 y.o.): It came to us from the northeast [Soviet territories]. It was not like this before 1939. It was not, indeed! And all these dirty expressions, you go along the street and hear them everywhere, from both youth and the grey-headed. Every second word, just to connect the words, and they use this kind of lexicon. For us [people of older generations] such words did not exist, they did not exist at all, you know. Now it’s an absolutely natural thing. No respect for elderly people, and everyone takes bribes—even teachers in the schools.

I had never seen drunken people in the streets before I came to Moscow to study at the university [at the beginning of the 1960s]. This filth and khamstvo came to us from the east, and we witness the results of this cultural expansion (kul’turnoi ekspansii) now (Teodor D., 70 y.o).

Reportedly, only genuine intelihenty, dispersed, persecuted and marginalized, have been able to maintain their autonomy and moral health. However, the only way to remain untouched by the ‘disease’ was, in the apt metaphor of Maria L., Roman M. and Pavlo K., to doom oneself to life in the intellectual ‘ghetto’—
choice that is not at all apolitical. Notably, on the surface the life trajectories of these three middle-aged academicians may be viewed as a quite successful realization of the Soviet intelligentsia career. Despite frictions with authorities and dramatic swings of fortune\textsuperscript{53}, they managed to find application for their talents and intellectual strivings in the realities of the late Soviet period. Later on they became actively engaged in public debate about the Ukrainian national project and from time to time were involved in political activity defending and lobbying for various initiatives of L’viv academicians. Nevertheless, despite involvement in different intellectual and academic circles and despite the impact of ideas coming from freethinking humanistic intelligentsia in other parts of the USSR that reached L’viv in Soviet times, these informants have preferred to vocalize the metaphor of intelligentsia’s intellectual ghetto. This complex dramatic image is emotionally laden and very appealing as a representation of intelligentsia’s victimization. It also conveys the claim that the “moralizing, edifying, exhortative, and popularizing stance” (Daskalov 1996: 78)\textsuperscript{54} of the old intelligentsia, and, in particular, their ethos and nationalist concerns, have been preserved ‘unspoiled’. As a founding myth of the post-Soviet intelligentsia, ‘ghetto’, may be interpreted as a representation emphasizing continuity of the pre-Soviet intellectual order and at the same time symbolical denial of the ‘spoiling’ influence of the Soviet policies and daily arrangements on identity templates of the local Ukrainian intelligentsia (see Yurchak 2006).

One may formulate a range of explanations for the generally low level of political activity among the younger (25-35 years old) generation of the university-educated Galicianers. On the one hand, lack of interest or participation in particular political activities does not necessarily signify a lack of knowledge or political alienation (Gutmann 2002: 159), and, on the other hand, the capillary system of politics and power penetrates everyday life even if it does not result in political activism. The attraction of silent dignity and restraint against the ‘polluting reality’, as projected by the surviving ‘ghettoized’ old urban intelligentsia and their descendants, should be also taken into account. Such an—indeed, deeply political—strategy of encountering the social reality is not something exceptional among present-day youth in L’viv. In the words of one of the respondents, a student of architecture whom I talked to in 2001,

\textsuperscript{53} For example, Maria L. was expelled from the university for her participation in activities of an underground student circle engaged in studies of Ukrainian history, but a couple of years later she was accepted as a correspondence student in another L’viv institution of higher education, obtained a scientific degree and launched a successful professional career.

\textsuperscript{54} Daskalov (1996: 77-78) writes about a similar pattern of identification with old intelligentsia among critically minded, “non-participating”, but not directly dissenting intelligentsia in Bulgaria: ”Many people (party members as well) guarded an inner stance of ‘non-participation’ and tried to preserve self-respect and decency through a kind of moral resistance to the regime, unlike the cynics, …It was this group of intellectuals that restored and sustained the idea of the older intelligentsia. …Their criticism was usually voiced in the name of spiritual, cultural, or moral values and principles, often as a concern for the national traditions. However, because of the fear of persecution, direct social criticism …was either avoided or expressed in a rather unfocused and vague manner, without a precise target.”
I don’t meddle in others’ affairs. If I am not asked for something, then I simply observe, but don’t interfere. I have elaborated this style of conduct over the last several years. It’s my credo, I think. Do not meddle. I originate from intelihentna family, I have this in view all the time. And I think that the best I can do is to work hard, to become an excellent professional and to keep myself away from the politics, from parties and things like that (Andrii O., 21 y.o.).

The ‘ghetto attitudes’ of some representatives of the surviving ‘old’ Galician intelligentsia (expressed in the motto “Go ahead—but without me”) was obviously a forced solution. However, when de-contextualized, cultural phenomena may be easily misinterpreted. Constrained silence and withdrawal from the public scene might be interpreted by the student youth as the markers of genuinely Galician cultured behavior as well as of moral power. This latter may become possible due to the inverted logic of symbolic power relations, which implies that “The dominant are drawn towards silence, discretion and secrecy, and their orthodox discourse… is never more than the explicit affirmation of self-evident principles which go without saying and would go better unsaid” (Bourdieu 1993b: 83).

The skeptical stances toward intelligentsia and intellectuals (even toward those who cannot be suspected of pro-Soviet sympathies) who presently want to be heard, to popularize their opinions and to ‘mix with the big politics’, might be partially explained as a response to this situation of intellectual ghettoization and taking silence for a sign of symbolic power. The cultural producers (celebrated artists, writers, actors, musicians etc.) who “converted to politics” (Bourdieu 1992: 184) may look misplaced and even ridiculous in the eyes of my interviewees. This view of the politicking intelligentsia and intellectuals is not a particular product of the local socio-cultural circumstances, but reflects quite a general assumption that “certain kinds of resources may undermine the claim to being a good intellectual or a good nationalist. Some definitions of the intellectual even rely on their resource poverty. Becoming a political leader, for instance, could mean compromising one’s intellectual status” (Kennedy and Suny 1999: 408). It has even been concluded that mixing the roles of the intellectual and the politician in the post-Communist countries is “a kind of unholy union to the detriment of both pragmatic politics and classical reasoning” (Daskalov 1996: 80-81). The ideal of service to the people, which saturates intelligentsia’s tradition, is regarded as rather a matter of symbolic manifestation, as a ‘part-time’ intrusion into the political terrain with the authority of the figures defending autonomy and values of the cultural field. In popular opinion, the political sphere in itself is inherently ‘immoral’ and ‘polluting’ and, hence, intelihentni people should avoid the seduction of political power.

The author hidden under the pseudonym Iuzio Observator plays up the idea that within the domain of politics ‘creative intelligentsia’ is in the best case useless, and in the worst case they compromise their right to claim moral authority, become ‘collaborationists’ and even put in hazard their talents and creativity:

Once upon a time, under the old regime, the ranks of those ‘elected-by-the-whole-of-the-people’
must absolutely necessarily include the dairymaids and pig-tenders who were honored for their work. They, to tell the truth, voted in the same manner as the whole Communist elite, but they did it as if they demonstrated the will of the people. Nowadays the role of honored dairymaids and pig-tenders is taken on by honored writers, singers, actors, sportsmen and cosmonauts. What all these nice people are good for in politics is difficult to say. … We already had a sufficient number of writers and dissenters in power, but for some reasons they did not justify expectations. The majority of them turned to collaborationists and Daddy’s [former president Leonid Kuchma’s—E.N.] ass-lickers. And those, who did not want to bend, were pushed out from the political Olympus. Therefore the collaborationists first and foremost must be charged with responsibility for total Russification of Ukraine and destruction of the Ukrainian press and printed production. … sitting in parliament until one’s trousers were worn through and through did no good to any writer. Because none of them published anything of significance all these ten years. … And the slogan that people still trust the above mentioned intelihenty is very far from the truth (Observator 2003).

Iaroslav Hrytsak, the historian from L’viv and celebrated Ukrainian public intellectual of the ‘middle-aged’ generation, in his essay The Intellectual and Authorities (‘Intelektual i vlada’, 2005b) wholeheartedly advocates intellectual autonomy. He argues that the common interest of the intellectuals in Ukraine is ‘creation of a situation in which authorities and intellectuals are not merely separated altogether, but are autonomous with respect to each other. When the dilemma of whether to cooperate with the authorities or not, is a matter of free choice, and not of necessity’. Nevertheless, he also points out that the Ukrainian intellectuals and intelligentsia have always been endowed with a special vocation and, hence, with particular responsibility for society. In another article he concretizes that this vocation—and constraint—of the Ukrainian and, generally, East-Central European, intelligentsia is to be nation-builders (Hrytsak 2004: 260). Such a line of argumentation leads to the conclusion that the Ukrainian intellectual who withdraws from the nation-creating mission for the sake of maintaining his/her intellectual autonomy, should be condemned as irresponsible. The image of the intellectual torn by conflicting loyalties and involved in political struggle for the right to implement his/her mission is quite depressing: “There is something tragic in the gestalt of the intellectual—if not directly tragicomic. … He initiates big societal changes, which he himself most suffers from in the first turn” (Hrytsak 2004: 263).

Another public intellectual from L’viv, Volodymyr Pavliv, has recently addressed the same issue of intellectual autonomy, collisions with authorities and the mission of intelligentsia in his essay with the catchy title About L’vivian ‘Pearls’ and ‘Swine’ (‘Pro l’vivs’ki “perly” i “svynei”’, 2008b), which stirred emotions and provoked intense debate on the site www.zaxid.net. Pavliv accuses his colleagues of snobbism; according to him, the L’viv intelligentsia prefers to work within and for their own narrow circles of fellow intellectuals and artists. When refusing to “cast pearls before swine” they miss the chance to “sow the grain” of high morality among the L’vivites and to promote the image of L’viv as “the city of particular culture, of strong intellectual and creative potential”. In order to realize this project,
the L’viv intellectuals together with artists should create an enthusiastic and active milieu. This milieu has to do the same as it has always done—to read and write, to sing and paint, to discuss and provoke, to reveal unrealizable ideas and to disseminate hints about the existence of the secret [taienmytsia]—and to do this all without glancing back at the authorities and politics, and also at the mediocre Philistine [siroho obyvatelia]. We can afford this, for the majority of us is sufficiently well-to-do enough not to have humiliating concerns about daily bread, and everyone is free enough to stop caring about loyalty to the power holders. I hope that when we create, or rather recreate, such a milieu, the L’vivites will experience the magic effect of our words and thoughts which simultaneously will be the grains for the initiated and the pearls for the swine.

Pavliv’s rhetoric (for instance, reference to “recreation” of the intellectual milieus, as well as taking for granted that the idealist-minded intellectuals should “disseminate hints about the existence of the secret” and have a “magic effect” on their compatriots by their “words and thoughts”) reveals that his picture of the prospective development of the L’viv intelligentsia has been inspired by the retrospective images of the missionary attitude and cultural patterns of the old Galician intelligentsia. The logic of the essay’s argument is circular and self-contradictory. Professional snobbism is supposed to be overcome by the no less snobbish “mission of creation of the genuine values, no matter whether it will be noticed by the authorities and the people or not”. As the panacea against the present-day problems of the L’viv intellectuals the author proposes reviving the Galician intelligentsia’s project of dissemination of high Christian morality and national awareness among the people. The problem is, however, that unlike in the interwar period, Ukrainian intelligentsia in Galicia has not only its ‘own’ people, but ‘own’ state and ‘own’ authorities which it cannot abstract itself from and treat as irrelevant actors who are hardly interested in the outcome of the intelligentsia’s struggles for culture and morality.

Unlike Pavliv and other authors who suggest that the intelligentsia and intellectuals in post-1991 Ukraine are free enough not to “glance back” either on the people or the elites (authorities, political establishment and economic powers), the respectable literary critic and writer Mykola Riabchuk (2003) paints a more bitter picture of the relation between the influential public intellectuals and authorities:

A public intellectual who holds a governmental or diplomatic position or simply stretches his hand to the characters of the Mel’nychenko’s tapes makes by this a public gesture, as if signaling to the society: you may greet these people, you may make deals with these authorities, these authorities are, of course, bad, but they are ours. Given that we have public intellectuals who think and talk this way, we shouldn’t be surprised that we have the population and the rulers as they are (Riabchuk 2003).

The opinion that the intellectuals and intelligentsia should not play both sides of the fence and instead should keep their autonomy and intellectual authority in the face of the corrupting and corrupted elites and their ‘big politics’, has been criticized by a range of other participants in the Galician/L’viv debate around

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55 The so-called tape scandal over secret recordings made by major Mel’nychenko revealed incriminatory affairs of the highest state officials, including President Kuchma himself.
the role and place of the intelligentsia in the national project. In the forthright (though spiced with a solid share of irony) opinion of the West Ukrainian writer and cultural scientist Volodymyr Ieshkiliev, who proclaims the advent of a “new totalitarianity” opposed to postmodernism’s plurality, intelligentsia should abandon empty humanistic phraseology. Instead, they should combine their efforts with the political elites and create a new ideological “mirage for construction” (prymaru dlia budivnytstva), which could take the place of the outdated Communist doctrine and could channel violent impulses of the “non-zombified plebs” (Ieshkiliev 2004).

Over the last decade, collisions between ‘we’ (often understood as embracing both ‘the people’ and intelligentsia and intellectuals) and ‘elites’ has been one of the perennial topics of the polemics in the Ukrainian media and intellectual circles. In the same vein, a recurrent motif in the stories told by the informants was the pitiful state of present public cultural life which both the local and state authorities were blamed for. My somewhat equivocal question about the problems of intelligentsia in L’viv was interpreted by many respondents as an opportunity to speak on the subject of the authorities’ indifference to the intelligentsia’s material problems and even hostility to the intelligentsia’s concerns about morality and culture. This, as one of the respondents put it, ‘habitual moaning of the intelligentsia’, may, on the one hand, express intelligentsia’s daily engagement in defense of the economic and social conditions which make possible the autonomy of the different fields of cultural production (Bourdieu 1989). On the other hand, absence of a broad consensus on the basic principles of cultural policy as well as scarce and irregular financing of cultural and academic institutions from the state and local budgets (Hrytsenko 2001: 229) indeed send an unequivocal message about (doubtful) expediency and (lowered) status of the intelligentsia in post-1991 Ukraine. No wonder that under such conditions the respondents painted a dark picture of their daily existence and suggested that perspectives for the future in the capacity of intelligentsia and cultural producers are presently not the brightest ones. One of the informants pictured the dramatic situation of not only deteriorating material standards of life, but of the declining cultural authority and estrangement of the intelligentsia from society in general:

Our society at a certain stage of its development shut itself off from the sub-stratum of intelligentsia. Intelligentsia has always been facing only responsibilities and, in practice, we were not allowed to claim some rights for ourselves. We work as teachers, and we cannot say that we meet with a good attitude from society. Take our media, for example. When an academic year begins and ends, when the first and last bell rings, the issue of corruption in the educational sphere immediately comes first from the journalist pen. This is far from the truth. We can change our role in society for the better probably only when society changes its attitude to the intelligentsia (Stefaniia L., approx. 45 y.o.).

Teachers whom I interviewed told about their feelings of powerlessness, because their advocacy of cultural values is in discord with the pitiful condition of public cultural institutions and the pauperization of cultural and education workers:

-(Hanna V., appr. 45 y.o.): Walk along Shevchenko boulevard, there you can see plenty of
unemployed musicians sitting and playing for some coins. And recently I’ve seen there one of the musicians who used to play the piano for choreography lessons at our school!

-(Oksana I., appr. 40 y.o.): And our theatres! I remember, when I was a schoolgirl, our class used to go to the Young Spectator Theatre, and it was like a holiday, children were dressed in their best clothes. But at those times there were other material conditions. Now we teach our schoolchildren to respect culture, to be fond of culture, and when such children come to the Young Spectator Theatre they see its walls covered with fungus. Well, the state must support culture. Because a child comes to a theatre and sees its shabby walls covered with fungus, and if this child lives in an expensive freshly repaired apartment, you see, this child will draw her own conclusions.

An elderly professor of the arts also took up the issue of theatres in this connection:

Among my good friends are N. and his wife T., both are from Maria Zam’kovets’ka theatre. Respectable and intellectual people, and they are compelled to go with an out-stretched hand and to beg the Lviv administration and the Ministry of Culture for money which they need for repair of the theatre’s façade and interior. The theatre is an extremely poor institution nowadays. It has not been restored for over one hundred years! I know that culture was not respected by the former [Soviet] authorities, but the present rulers, pitifully, argue that there is no money in the budget for the restoration of the theatres. […] I think the Ministry of Culture should pay attention to such things. All in all, they are the people who bear responsibility for all these things. Moral responsibility, I mean (Teodor D., 70 y.o.).

This emotionally charged narrative about intelligentsia as marginalized, victimized, estranged and, respectively, freed from responsibility for all the injustices that emanate from the ‘higher’ spheres, has been balanced by other narratives where intelligentsia, and likewise the whole nation, bears its share of responsibility for the present state of affairs in Ukrainian society. As has been pointed out, depictions of ‘the elites’ in public polemics in Lviv may vary, although a negative tone seems to prevail. These negative depictions tend to be informed by two basic models. On the one pole is the narrative about ethnically, culturally and socially alien actors who dominated Ukrainian political and cultural life throughout history and whom no one can expect to be guided by responsibility in the face of the Ukrainian nation (Vozniak 1998). The other pole presents the post-1991 elites as ‘the part and parcel of ours’ who bring ‘our’ worst features into the politics and other domains of the nation’s being. In both cases, however, the ‘the elite’ is viewed as both unable and reluctant to understand intelligentsia’s concerns. The second model, according to which the ruling elites and authorities are ‘one of us’, a part of the national body, and therefore are burdened with all ‘our’ faults and shortcomings, became especially articulated after the Orange Revolution, when the frustration over the pace and scope of reforms promised by the credited Orange coalition began to grow. When the authorities, who had been definitely elected by ‘us’ and no one else, failed to meet ‘our’ expectations, the appeals to the total moral transformation of the entire society (even the transformation implemented by the ‘hard hand’) become more and more pronounced:
One of the elements of the national idea is bringing to power a genuine national elite, it means honest and just individuals. … The elite, which is brought up on the values of patriotism and national pride... But the problem is that the majority of Ukrainians traditionally regard modesty as weakness, and honesty and seriousness as suspicious features. The biggest liars and manipulators always have the greatest success during elections. In order to purify the people from wrong habits and predilections and to cultivate civilized norms of conduct, the authorities must become strong, even employ elements of coercion when fostering irresponsible citizens. Of course, only honest authorities who are aware of their moral power and the rightfulness of their politics, can afford such policies. We must turn modesty into a cult in everyday life and to worship high moral values (Romantiuk 2005).

Oftentimes, the position from which the demands of bettering the morality of the entire people or its concrete parts is not specified in the debates. However, the ‘we’ who know best how to resurrect this ‘cult of modesty’ may be unmistakably identified as intellihentni people. The ‘moral transformation’ of the whole society is a well-known rhetorical device, which indicates intelligentsia and their cultural authority and traditional moral-ethic solutions coming into the focus. Notably, here we deal with the old populist discourses of the moral responsibility of the ‘chosen ones’ in the face of the people, conflated with both the neo-liberal discourse of individual responsibility and the logic of national ideology which privileges group rights, but also emphasizes individual responsibility for the group (Einhorn 2007: 21). A typical example of this latter rhetoric can be found in a debate article of Riabchuk published in one of the L’viv newspapers:

I am a convinced individualist and I do not like collectivists. ... I’ve always believed that a person should care first of all about herself, about her family and her house. ... Societal interests grow out of the deeply internalized private ones. A person who really likes herself, her family, her house, will not be slow to sweep the courtyard, to wash the doorway, to plant geranium on a windowsill, to wipe off all the Soviet-styled [sovkovi] inscriptions in the elevator. Such a person works hard, because she does it for her own satisfaction, for good and stable earning, and not for the sake of some abstract good for the society which is anyway exploited not by the entire society, but by some few scoundrels. …Finally, such a person, in spite of the delusiveness of the hopes for changes, anyway goes to vote in order to put an end to the endless, like a nightmare, eighty-five years old ‘heritage’ of the Soviet-Bolshevik regime in Ukraine (Riabchuk 2003).

Hence, the various problems of post-1991 Ukrainian society are reportedly caused, paradoxically enough, both by the lack of individualism (which had been unacceptable for the Soviet ideology) and, as the author points out in the same article, by the absence of crystallized national consciousness, i.e., internalized awareness of belonging to an imagined community of nationals. The opinion that has been frequently taken for granted in the post-1991 debate in the West Ukrainian mass-media and intellectual circles, was that the changes for the better in people’s and elites’ ‘cultural level’ and morality are impossible beyond the national frames. The passage below is taken from a newspaper article entitled (as it seems to be, with no trace of irony) in the style of the classical Marx and Engels’ work The Manifesto of the Ukrainian Idea of the Nation’s Culturization (‘Manifest ukrains’koi idei sotsial’noi kul’turyfikatsii natsii’). The entire article, printed in L’viv daily ‘Postup’,
is a curious example of the rhetoric combining moral concerns with appeals to implement the “social culturization” through national(ized) institutions, especially through the institution of Presidency:

…the ethnic culture, however developed, cannot compensate underdevelopment of another culture, namely, the so-called social culture of the citizens, that is, the culture of social relations between people. …The function of the social culture is that it contributes to the naturalness of people’s lives, it means its coordination with laws of social nature. …It is precisely this destruction (in the not so distant past, by totalitarianism) of this special culture in Ukraine …that causes all the problems in our country. …Who in contemporary Ukraine has a mission of social culturization of the citizens? Obviously, this mission should be allotted to the President of Ukraine. …Notwithstanding how the Ukrainian national idea is to be formed, the idea of ‘cult of culture’ should be its part and parcel. …only those who promote development of the social culture of the citizens will do the best service for the people (Kostenko 2007).

The concept of the ‘social culture’ suggested in Kostenko’s Manifesto is a bizarre combination of social capital, inborn ‘social instinct’ and ethnic culture. Unfortunately, the article does not provide a more tangible description of this ‘socio-cultural’ panacea. However, such a totalizing view of (national/ethnic/everyday) culture could possibly be generated within a particular section of the field of symbolic production, namely that one based on the heteronomous principle and intersecting with the symbolic domain of the conservative ideologies. Although such statements of cultural fundamentalism have been articulated in the public debates quite seldom, nevertheless the tendency to suggest implementation of ‘non-Soviet’ culture and morality as wholesale solutions for the range of societal problems in Ukraine has been salient in L’viv. A similar line of argumentation of the nationally aware Ukrainian intellectuals is, for example, that if Ukrainian intelligentsia fulfilled their functions of social criticism and defense of morality properly, the notorious ‘absence of culture’ and khamstvo of the elites and everymen would be gradually uprooted:

The authorities which we have—in L’viv, in Kyiv, in Donets’k—neither fell to us from Mars nor came from some Katsapia or America. They are the same ‘people’, the flesh of its flesh, even its quintessence. Our authorities are exactly of that kind that we deserve, and its quality can be improved only in one way—namely, by improving the quality of that common “kham” who, even when becoming a part of the authorities, or becoming “master” [pan], anyway remains the same “kham”. In other words, the time is right for our intelligentsia to stop flattering the ‘people’ and to say that it is exactly the same as its authorities: lazy, thievish, corrupted, xenophobic, poorly educated (Riabchuk 2008).

Although this critical zeal and aspiration for moral, cultural and civic recovery articulated by the West Ukrainian intelligentsia has significant mobilizing potential, it is nevertheless obvious that this approach can hardly fulfill what it promises. Its weakness stems from its idealism, from the eagerness to “overcome the marginality in our heads” (Riabchuk 2008) without resorting to some other means of influence than ‘magical words’ and magical thinking (Verdery 1991a: 90, Ries: 1997: 165).
Post-1991 intellectuals and intelligentsia, unlike in perestroika times, seem to resort to the genre of litany to a much lesser extent. Nevertheless, frustrated accounts of the producers of public intellectual discourses about their alienation are quite usual. For example, Mykola Riabchuk, one of the most reputed Ukrainian public intellectuals, addresses the issue of the recipients of the public intellectual’s discursive production and comes to the conclusion that in absence of the cognizant public which for him is equivalent to the nation united not only by the territory and belongingness to the same political entity, but by common cultural values, the public intellectual by necessity writes primarily “for himself”:

I do not trust those authors who insist that they write for the ‘people’. Indeed, that ‘people’ whom they allegedly write for, must be created first. … Of course, my sympathies are on the side of those who try to create a modern Ukrainian nation… It could be, however, an oversimplification to insist that I write my ‘poliological’ texts precisely for them, for those Ukrainian ‘nation-builders’… In the long run, I write for all those who are interested; of course, first of all it must be interesting for myself… In this context, my old belief that one should write first and foremost for oneself, for one’s own satisfaction, may look a bit strange. But I still keep this belief (Riabchuk 2003).

Although Riabchuk presents such crying in the wildness as more or less ‘normal’ for the intellectual who strives to be impartial and independent, one may guess that the opportunity to share his views with a more extended and advanced “community of conscience” (Balzer 1996) would suit him better. The present Ukrainian political elites envisaged as a mixture of the aging former Soviet bureaucrats, ‘new’ politicians combining business with political activity, and a few sincere, but ineffective ‘nation-builders’ can hardly be the cognizant publics for the nationally conscious intelligentsia and intellectuals.

Given this Enlightenment rhetoric and no crucial means of political influence at their disposition, the nationally conscious intelligentsia and intellectuals might risk turning their discursive weapons to the ephemeral, or inadequate, or defenseless ‘foes’. One of them is the eternal object of the intelligentsia’s love and hate: ‘the people’ (narod). ‘The people’ and everything having to do with ‘the popular’ is a primary stake in the struggles within the field of symbolic production. The fact that someone regards him/herself as authorized to speak about ‘the people’ and on its behalf is in itself an empowering claim in the internal struggles taking place in various political, religious and artistic fields (Bourdieu 1992).

6.5. Superiority and inferiority of cultural choices: intelligent versus rahul’ andsovok

Even viewed from a synchronic perspective, narod is a kind of nodal point and master metaphor which encompasses a corollary of both normative linguistic and situational cultural meanings. Given development of the term throughout history and overlapping of various time-specific connotations (Knight
2006: 748), its semantics provides an even more complicated picture. The notion of narod encompasses symbolically charged images of the dominated, silent and oppressed as well as of the powerful mobilized ‘masses’, ‘the salt of the earth’ emanating moral authority, and the whole nation. As Ries (1997: 30) puts it, “narod… is a word which refers not to any literal demographic entity as much as to a mythical conceptual one, with a range of implications and metaphoric ramifications”. Hence, the demarcation line between ‘the people’ and its antipodes oscillates depending on the context, and one often should ask him/herself what categories and collective representations are labeled as narod in every particular case.

A tradition of populism has been strong in East-Central Europe throughout the nineteenth century, and in many respects it retained its conceptual influence in the next century too. Within this tradition the typical representatives of ‘the people’ are peasants—the oppressed laboring masses in possession of bright folk culture and as such very promising material for the various modernizing and enlightening projects. In this part of Europe peasants used to be viewed as especially apt objects for the projects of nation building and therefore various political actors engaged into nationalizing projects viewed the peasants as both allies and subjects for their ideological efforts (the latter role presumably prevailed). The history of intelligentsia’s relation to and mission for the people in Galicia has been full of swings and tensions, as the development of modern identities was not a one-directional ‘up-down’ process but rather a range of efforts to adjust to each other and to shorten the great distance between the peasants and intelligentsia (Hrytsak 2006: 273). Despite intelligentsia’s paternalism and oftentimes lack of understanding of the peasants, the success of these efforts became evident in the 1920s and 1930s when the Ukrainian (formerly Ruthenian) ‘Ruritanians’ (Gellner 1983) and their class mobile descendants became ‘awakened’ to the live as socially and politically conscious members of the modern Ukrainian nation. Recollecting the good old times of their childhood and school years, the older respondents originating from Galician villages and small towns were nostalgic about relations, full of mutual respect and piety, between the rural intelligentsia and the peasants before 1939. Peasants and intelligentsia, though divided by their occupations and everyday concerns, were nevertheless depicted as sharing the same interests as members of the Nation. In the respondents’ words, due to their undeniable moral authority the old intelligentsia were the leaders of the nation (providnyky natsii) and served as a good example for narod.

Under the Soviet regime the hierarchical nexus ‘intelligentsia/the people’ became reversed. In line with the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, narod which encompassed the ‘laboring classes’ of the proletariat and ‘non-exploitative’ part of peasantry supposed to be a historical actor that could pave the way to the bright Communist future on its own. Intelligentsia’s mission with respect to the people was exchanged for the view that the toilers should use intelligentsia for development of socialist consciousness and for enhancing of the cultural level, but later on even this intermediate stage called ‘working intelligentsia’ must disappear from the historical arena. With the victory of communism and the advent of a classless society, the
intelligentsia as a distinct social stratum would become obsolete as the future everyman (‘the Soviet man’) was expected to harmoniously unite mental and physical labor. In a sense, the Communist Party appropriated intelligentsia’s mission as the articulator of the interests of the working class (Tromly 2007: 49, Halfin 2000). Hence, intelligentsia was to become a part and parcel of ‘the people’, which, on the one hand, implied devaluation of its societal status, but, on the other hand, made possible its symbolic empowerment since ‘in contexts where they asserted their attachment to the ‘suffering masses’ members of the intelligentsia might include themselves in its positive connotations’ (Ries 1997: 28).

Post-1991 Ukrainian society has been subjected to the rhetoric and practices demarcating its break with the Soviet tradition. Dreams about classless utopia were abandoned for visions of a class society reformed according to the ‘Western model’, with an extensive and prosperous middle class as the pillar of the society and with social cleavages smoothed by the benefits of the welfare system. Intelligentsia was supposed to recover its position as the leaders of the nation and promoters of the democratic reforms, non-Soviet political culture, moral values and civility for ‘the people’. In particular, in Galicia which once again was announced to be the ‘Ukrainian Piedmont’ and the centre of national revival, representatives of intelligentsia readily embraced the rhetoric of the new mission of desovietization, normalization and fostering of the Ukrainians into a nation. In this sense, the statement of the authoritative L’viv historian Iaroslav Hrytsak (1998: 29-30) is quite revealing:

In my opinion, and in the opinion of my many colleagues, for the Ukrainian intellectuals there is no more important task today than building the new Ukrainian nation. …Presently we do not talk about sole re-writing of history for the new generation. We talk about co-ordination of the Ukrainian experience with the tremendous changes related to the crash of the socialist system and disassembling of the Soviet Union.

This self-imposed mission of co-ordination of the national experience in accordance with the new socio-political circumstances relates to the East-Central European model of nationhood where narod represents an ‘organic’ expression of national uniqueness through lived experience, while the intelligentsia represents the national essence refracted through the rational consciousness of cultural elites (Knight 2006: 749). Nevertheless, ‘restoration’ of the intelligentsia’s privileged position in post-1991 Ukraine took other forms than could be expected. As the Ukrainian sociologists revealed, with a bit of surprise, “the former Soviet intelligentsia, who, according to the standards of the Western societies, should prospectively become the middle class, turn out to be occupying the lowest stages of the economic hierarchy—although its social-professional status remained unchanged and its cultural capital intact” (Brods’ka and Oksamytna 2001: 44). Given the situation of economic distress and downward social mobility of the post-Soviet intelligentsia (Balzer 1996: 305-306), radical changes in the nexus ‘intelligentsia/the people’ could hardly occur. Moreover, also the statement that post-1991 intelligentsia’s social-professional status and cultural capital remained intact hardly
corresponds to the real state of affairs. Since Soviet times, many cultural producers have even less opportunity
to elevate themselves above the level of ‘the people’ in terms of the better material standard and unhindered
access to cultural resources—unless they do not move from the more autonomous sectors of the field of
cultural production or break out from this field at all.

Whether they want it or not, intelihenty frequently find themselves in the situation in which their
claims to cultural superiority cannot be addressed to a diffuse narod, but to more concrete and distinctly
outlined ‘characters’ in the style of those caricatured folk types of khany which were discussed above. Among
all the negatively loaded personifications of narod which L’viv intelligentsia frequently attacks in public
discourses and in private conversations, two types are especially prominent, namely, rahul’ and sovok.
Allegedly, the word rahul’ derives from rohachka or rohatka, that is, control stations which the peasant
transports coming to L’viv had to pass in the ancient times. Hence, even the popular etymology emphasizes
strangeness and necessity of vigilance and control which this category of people projects in the eyes of the
urban cultivated public. A couple of decades ago rahul’ used to be the derogatory word that Russian-speaking
L’viv dwellers applied to the ‘underurbanized local population’. However, presently much wider circles of
L’vivites apply it when talking about labor migrants and first generation of urbanites originating from Galician
villages or small towns, who often speak with recognizable ‘rural’ accent, who expose no sophistication in
their manners and speech and smell of alcohol in the public transport early in the morning. Rahul’ is a
backward male rustic, a brawler, who feels discomfort in the city full of remnants of ‘high’ foreign cultures, a
person who allegedly abandoned the best features of rural ethos and morality, while maintaining survival
strategies and material concerns of peasantry compelled to move to the city by force of circumstances. In
contrast, the female form of the word rahul’—rahulykha—may depict women who take upon themselves a
gender role of guardian protecting traditional forms of the Galician rural order and morality. Such
‘underurbanized’ women usually demonstrate allegiance to traditional norms of sociality and sexual behavior,
dress with no ‘taste’ and, even when taking waged jobs, confine their interests and concerns almost entirely to
the domestic sphere.

The stigma of rahul’ and rahulykha is of double nature: s/he is scorned both as an under-class
and as a bearer of a non-mainstream (non-urban) variant of Ukrainian-ness, i.e., represents a ‘deviating’ form
of ethnicity. It must be pointed out, however, that this non-mainstream Ukrainian-ness was on the way to
being reconsidered in the early 1990s. In apt contexts cultural stigma may be easily transformed to a site of
resistance to and even transformation of dominating norms and styles (Goffman 1963). In some artistic circles
rahulism has been reinterpreted as an exotic local cultural style with a distinct rebellious tinge in opposition not
only to Soviet ‘internationalism’, but also to the absence of regional color in the ‘standard’ Soviet-confined
Ukrainian-ness as presented in schools and official discourses. The phenomenon of the L’viv rock band ‘Braty
Hadiukiny’ (‘The Snake Brothers’) was possible due to the artistic refraction of the expressivity of the rahul’
sociolect and the triviality of the rahul’s everyday concerns with undertones of earthly realism, traditionalism and sexual virility. One of the most celebrated songs by ‘Braty Hadukiny’—‘We are boys from Barderstadt’—gives a clue that ‘banal rahulism’ and ‘genuine’ Ukrainian nationalism might be conflated:

All our family are daredevils from L’viv,  
Apple did not fall far away from apple-tree.  
Mummies and daddies broke so many beds  
For stork could bring us to God’s world.  
Because we are boys from Barderstadt,  
We go to church, we respect our parents.  
None can party like us  
Till the bugles don’t play, till the drum doesn’t beat  
Some say we are bandits, hooligans,  
From this swamp there won’t be human beings.  
But we will see, when there will be need,  
Who will crawl down to the cellar, and who will go under bullets.

In the popular consciousness of L’vivites (especially the newcomers of non-West Ukrainian origin) rahul’ used to be a kind of a scapegoat and an object of numerous scornful commentaries long before perestroika and times of independence. However, when in the aftermath of independence the numerous problems of the city’s everyday reality became strikingly obvious, the theme of uncultured and irresponsible ‘others among us’ burst out in L’viv media. Notably, ‘marginalization’ and ‘rusticalization’ of L’viv which rahuli are directly and indirectly blamed for, have also been connected with the fading away of the old Galician intelligentsia, i.e., ‘genuine’ urbanites with their particular ethos (see Klekh 2000).

A prominent figure in the L’viv artistic circles, Volodymyr Kaufman accuses both the rank-and-file ‘consumers’ and the city officials in rahulism, which in this case addresses absence of both ‘good taste’, patriotism and interest in preservation of the cultural heritage of the city:

[Roman Viktiuk, the celebrated theatre producer from L’viv] was pushed out of here, and when he became a star in Moscow it proved that L’viv is proud of him. But only from the distance of the stretched hand; it means, Viktiuk is our guy (!), but we don’t accept his play “Let’s have sex”. Therefore the rahulism of L’vivites was demonstrated clearly. Unfortunately, since Soviet times rahul in L’viv did not decrease, they reproduce themselves and nothing can be done. …L’viv

56 See commentary on nationalistic message of this song and allusions to the guerrilla struggle of Banderites during World War II and after it in Wanner (1998: 129-130). Partial translation of the song’s text is taken from Wanner’s study (ibid: 130).
57 Even one of the most celebrated contemporary Ukrainian writers, Iurii Andrukhovych, whose creative life is connected both to his native city of Ivano-Frankivsk (former Stanislaviv) and L’viv and who addresses Galician themes in his works, paid tribute to these problematics. The theme of the ‘rural conquerors’ who, while “preserving all the worst features typical of the peasant nature and losing all the best ones”, erode the urban culture of the West Ukrainian cities, has been attended to, for example, in his essay ‘Erz-herz-perz’ (Andrukhovych 1999).
decomposes, breaks down, and the smell of sewer becomes more persistent. Consumers are a little bit irritated, … and they do not realize that it is the smell of death. … The most pitiful is that 90 percent [of those who should be concerned about the state of L’viv’s heritage] is made up of our officials who are concerned about their own problems, although the state of L’viv depends on their decisions. They are those rahuli who are not interested in culture (Kaufman 2008).

The problem discourse created around rahuli in L’viv media and in popular opinion indicates an interesting dimension in the relation between the intelligentsia, with its self-appointed role as spokespersons for narod, and narod as allegedly speechless, deprived, predominately peasant masses. It has been argued that “The discursive interest in peasantry accomplished several things…: it distanced and silenced them, and it rendered them an open field for intellectuals and the state to colonize” (Verdery 1991a: 57). Narod frequently serves as a source of identification for ‘literati’ when it is presented in accordance with enduring populist tradition, or in terms which are accepted by intelligentsia, i.e., as powerless, deprived and stupefied humans. Then it can easily become an object of the intelligentsia paternalism and rhetoric focused on morality and teleological rationalizing projects (Bauman 1987b).

However, as the case with rahuli demonstrates, the semi-rustic everymen (especially in conditions of wide-scale societal transformations, when physical survival becomes the matter of the everymen’s greatest concern), even when deprived and powerless, are nevertheless sufficiently rational and self-reliant to be treated in a paternalizing style (see Gutmann 2002: xxii-xxx). Rahuli may not only be scorned, but also feared by the intelligentsia. Allegedly ‘uncultured’ and scarcely educated, they are also virile, assertive, endowed with practical reason and untamed emotions (including those relating to the “univalent” ethnic/national orientations (Morawska 2000:1054-1055)) and hence can hardly become docile material for the projects of rational-teleologic organization of social reality advocated by the educated classes (Bauman 1987b). In a way, these ‘underurbanized backward rustics’ slip through the definitions of value and esteem which intelligentsia and intellectuals strive to impose upon persons belonging to the same national community. It may be argued that rahuli is an intermediate construction which overarching connects the imagined polarity of such concepts as ‘mob’ and ‘nationally aware citizens’. Rahuli may serve as an apt example of the fact that dualist constructions of the ‘others’, which contain pronounced moral undertones, may be relevant on the level of public discourses, while the concepts and meanings on the micro-level, in the daily life, may mediate and even transgress these dualisms.

Survival strategies, practicality and social networks of the self-reliant ‘semi-urbanites’ proved to be useful in the city, which they ‘invaded’ when taking up available jobs. Owing to these strategies and networks, some of them cope with harsh economic circumstances much better than urban intelligentsia and professionals whose dependence on the scarce financing of the so-called budget institutions undermines not only their status, but their very existence (Balzer 1996: 306). Concerned with providing opportunities for higher education for their offspring, they usually make stake on the ‘useful’ educations applicable under
market conditions. Students of the institutions of higher education are usually aware of this. For instance, two
of my respondents, both student activists at the L’viv Polytechnic University, where a range of applicable
technical subjects is taught, characterized their alma mater and the neighboring L’viv National University in
terms of class divisions:

- (Andii Z., 22 y.o.): Generally speaking, our university (vuz) is a proletarian one. Such a big mess,
both very clever people and overtly stupid ones in one mess.
- (I): What do you mean by ‘proletarian’?
- ‘Laboring people-and-peasants’ one (raboche-krest’ianski58). The percentage of people from
intelligentsia families is lower, much lower than at the University [the Ivan Franko National
University]. There are many people from families with problems (neblahopoluchni rodyny), or
whose parents are workers or from villages—but many of them proved to be clever people. And we
also have many of those who were sent here by parents. Mummy and daddy decided what
department to send the child to. At the University, as far as I know, the situation is different.

There is a dominance of theoretical—or, as one might say, non-applied—branches there [at the
Ivan Franko National University], and quite a few come from intelligentsia families. You can even
observe this. You go across the Politekhnyka [campus] and see the folks smoking, spitting on the
ground, the language is often mixed with dirty words, if you ask about the way to some department
or something like this, they can simply ignore you. At the University people are dressed more in
European style (po-ievropeis’ky), like, well, jeans, t-shirts with funny inscriptions. When it’s warm,
people sit on the lawn in front of the Franko monument, read books or discuss something (Oleh B.,
23 y.o.).

Managing their lives without feeling any need for admiring the city’s historical architecture
downtown, as well as for attending theatres, museums or concerts of classical music, rahuli are usually out of
reach for intelligentsia’s philippics and scornful remarks. In such circumstances, one advice that the frustrated
intelligentsia and ‘cultured’ people in general may receive is not to lament about rude manners of the urban
simpletons, but—again—in a manner typical of intelligentsia discourses of responsibility and service for the
community, to blame themselves for their own powerlessness:

It’s time for L’vivites to stop complaining about liakhy59, moskali60 and, according to the most
recent fashion, about rural ‘rahuli’ who supposedly spoil their (once upon a time) beautiful city.
Both homo sovieticus [sovky] and rahuli are inside every one of us, and up to the time we learn
ourselves to squeeze them out from us, L’viv will remain the city of rahuli—which it has
however always been. At least it has been the case since the wartime, when the city lost its
Jewish, Polish and, as a matter of fact, all Ukrainian intelligentsia. Rahuli are not only those
who litter the city up to the edges and who pour Russian pop-music over it; it is also those who
observe this all and keep silence. Rahuli are not only those who elect rahul’s’ka authorities, but
also those who cannot or don’t want to persuade those people to elect different ones and to
make them work (Riabchuk 2008).

58 This phrase was said in Russian, as an ironic allusion to the Soviet terminology.
59 Nickname for Poles.
60 Nickname for Russians.
The derogatory term *sovok* means *homo sovieticus*\(^1\). Nobody normally refers to him/herself as *rahul*, and in the same manner nobody would normally call him/herself *sovok*. However, while *rahul* implies a certain (un)cultural framing which lacks some specific historical point of reference, nostalgia for the ‘good old’ Soviet times with their collectivist ethos, ‘internationalism’ and the strong hand of the state defines the political predilections and daily cultural choices of the *sovok*. In its meaning ‘*homo sovieticus*’ the word seems to have been coined in the 1960s or 1970s within youth cultures\(^2\), where *sovok* became an acronym for *sovetskii* (‘the Soviet one’) and at the same time homonym of the Russian word *sovok*, which means dustbin. Hence, the form of the word itself implies that *homo sovieticus* is a passive trash receptacle of the Soviet propaganda, a person with paralyzed political will\(^3\), with no opinions of her own\(^4\)—and with complete absence of ‘style’. Accordingly, as a category marking ‘bad’ taste and absence of originality, *sovok* has much in common with *rahul*.

*Rahuli* may feel they are Ukrainian patriots, they may participate in political rallies and even get into a fight with those who do not share their opinions, but generally they are viewed as everymen who prioritize personal petty material interests and rely on individualistic survival strategies. Unlike *rahul*, *sovok*, however, is first and foremost a figure for whom ideological orientation and identification with the Soviet ethos of collectivism, trust in all-powerfulness of the state and bureaucracy, political docility and ‘internationalism’ still matter. Due to this, *sovki* could be easily detected during recent sociological pools. According to one of them, the share of persons who defined their own affinity as ‘the Soviet people’ (*radians’ki liudy*) was insignificant in the L’viv region (0.75-0.85 percent of all the respondents) compared to, for example, 17.28 percent in the Luhans’k region (Kolodii 2002, compare with Hrytsak 2000b for different figures on the same issue). Besides, it follows clearly from the statistical data presented by Kolodii, that among those who identified their affinity as a Soviet man, the percentage of persons with education higher than secondary was quite high. Hence, even relying on this data, it may be concluded that not so few of those who ‘statistically’ or in terms of self-identification belong to intelligentsia could be called *sovki*.

To recapitulate, as the fragment from Riabchuk’s article cited above suggests, *sovok* and *rahul* are not at all mutually exclusive ‘negative’ personifications of *narod*. They both include connotations of bad manners and tastelessness, and they both may be viewed as pejorative categories at the intersection of class

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\(^1\) About *homo sovieticus* in its historical aspect see: Kozlova (2005), Mikheyev (1989).

\(^2\) Information from an interview with Alik Olsievyych, a veteran hippie from L’viv. About language innovations developed within the youth subculture of hippies in the USSR see Mazurova and Radzikhovskii (1991).

\(^3\) ‘People who prefer to call themselves ‘Soviets’ seem to have bought into the whole package of Soviet ideology, including the unrealistically high expectations of government support and the lack of private initiative. Part of this package is an inability to organize continuous and efficient pressure on decision makers and power centres ‘from below’” (Hrytsak 2000: 276).

\(^4\) Even in the Western scholarly discourses painting the stereotypic *homo sovieticus* uncompromisingly black, as an individual with no agency and will, is not a rarity (see, for example, Ellis 1998).
and ethnicity, that have been put into circulation by the relatively more well-established and/or ‘cultured’
public. In the case of sovok, however, ethnic affiliation of a person is more ambiguous, although in L’viv it is
frequently assumed that moskal’ (person of Russian nationality or Russophone) and sovok are the same. The
idea that “the Soviet identity is not purely a ‘political one’, but in fact comprises some ethnical elements”, has
been defended by Hrytsak (2000: 276) who even points out that according to his findings ‘Soviets’ may be
viewed as an intermediate category between Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine and that also in terms of
political choices the ‘Soviets’ are not in out-and-out opposition to Ukrainians. Moreover, it seems to be that “it
is the ‘Soviet-ness’ of the Ukrainian population that provides Ukrainian leaders with an opportunity to keep the
country together” (ibid: 276-277).

Paradoxically, even in respect to cultural preferences sovok and rahul’ might have something in
common. They both are consumers of the cultural mass products, which in L’viv have been mostly presented
by pop-music, video and TV products, entertaining periodicals and so on which are either made in Russia or at
least use Russian language. Certainly, different categories of consumers may ‘filter out’ the contents of these
songs, films and texts in different ways and detect different messages from the same source. Nevertheless,
Russian language as a mass cultural medium is acceptable for the wide majority of the consumers who, unlike
intelligentsia, do not seem to care about possible consequences of this supposed cultural neo-colonialism65.

This undermines the hopes of the Galician cultural and intellectual elites to resurrect L’viv and Galicia to the
position of the ‘Ukrainian Piedmont’ translating its cultural and national models for the rest of Ukraine: “The
cultural expansion assumed by the Piedmont model (west-east) has gone into reverse, and ‘creolic’ Russian-
language mass culture . . . is making inroads (east-west) in Galicia instead” (Wilson 2006: 166).

However, the issue of Soviet-ness (rhadianshchyta) is not limited to consumption of Russophone
mass cultural products. If one assumes that in the case of sovok we deal not only with emotional attachment to
the ‘State of workers and peasants’, but with internalization of its ideological schemes and with continuation of
practices corresponding to this ideology, then the scope of sovki may be considerably wider. As an
authoritative Ukrainian sociologist Ievhen Holovakha points out, in this respect Soviet-ness of post-1991
Ukrainian society is obvious. It manifests itself first and foremost in readiness of the Ukrainian populace to
regard as equally legitimate both old and new societal institutions. Such ‘double institutionalization’ results in
relatively high social stability of contemporary Ukrainian society, while at the same time impeding its
development in line with the ‘Western’ models. This ambivalence of expectations and choices with respect to
the authorities and other actors can be resolved by promoting ‘non-institutional politics’ of Ukrainian civil
society (Holovakha 2005: 11-12). To this one may add that the task of developing civil society should not

65 There is no consensus of opinions about the scope and nature of the Soviet colonialism and post-
communist (neo)colonialism. For example, Smith et al. (1998) assume that the state of economic, political
and cultural relations between Moscow and Kyiv may be aptly described in terms of ‘federal
colonialism’. However, as Molchanov (2000) suggests, the state of affairs was not as simple as this,
especially in the sphere of Soviet nationality policies.
remain exclusively a concern of the intelligentsia, presumably not infected by Soviet-ness, but of the wider strata and categories with their own ‘voices and noises’.

6.6. Antagonism of virtue and vice: intelihent versus blatnoi

Non-acceptance of nationalism as a political ideology and nation as a master symbol\(^6\) was not the only distinctive feature of the Soviet narrative. The core element of the Soviet ideological canon was the assumption that the Soviet society consists of ‘non-antagonistic’ classes of workers and peasants and the substratum of working intelligentsia. Despite the wishful thinking of the Soviet ideological commissars, the social relations in the Soviet society were far from non-antagonistic and non-hierarchical. Indeed, “one of the ways in which Soviet-type systems failed miserably to live up to the ethical aims of socialism was in the replacement of one form of class society with another” (Verdery et al. 2005: 8). Absence of social antagonisms was solely an outward appearance, an illusion created by standardization of everyday life, by absence of drastic differences in cultural consumption and by the all-penetrating ideological narrative. Behind the Soviet ideological façade lurked distinctions and discourses that indicated everything but social harmony between intelligentsia, ‘toilers’ and ‘elites’ in general terms as well as between and among their numerous subdivisions.

Although social tensions between the ordinary toilers (including rank-and-file Soviet intelihenty) and mighty Party officials, apparatchiks and people ‘with positions’ (na posadakh) come to mind in the first turn, one can point out other demarcation lines and social distinctions that outlived the Soviet system. One of them is the divide between the persons who had experience of ‘the zone’, which means served sentence in prison, and those who did not. The Polish-American historian Jan Gross comments sarcastically that “Among the many items that were brought from the USSR to the Western Ukraine and Belorussia in September 1939, one of the most appreciated was a maxim: ‘In the Soviet Union there are only three categories of people—those who were in prison, those who are in prison, and those who will be in prison’ ” (Gross 1988: 144).

As authors of a post-1991 anthology of Soviet prison jargon and customs stated, in the Soviet Union intersections of the cultures of law-abiding citizens and the anti-cultures stemming from ‘the zone’ were an ordinary fact of daily life (Baldaiev et al 1992: 5-11). The folklore and jargon of the Soviet zone have been, for understandable reasons, Russophone, and hence comprehensible for the majority of the Soviet populace. According to the authors’ estimation, in the last Soviet decades “every one hundredth” adult Soviet citizens could identify him/herself as “the Soviet zeka (‘the one who was in ‘the zone’’)” (ibid: 5). In a sense, not only intelihent and ‘backward rustic’ rahul’, intelihent and sovok, but also intelihent and blatnoi, i.e., a criminal type sharing the anti-culture of ‘the zone’, represented the extreme poles in the gallery of everyday types of the

\(^6\) “…the Nation- that we might call a master symbol, one having the capacity to dominate the field of symbols and discourses in which it was employed, pressing the meanings of other terms and symbols in its own direction” (Verdery 1991a: 122).
Soviet people. To be sure, a similar kind of cultural division existed in the prewar L’viv, and the criminal subculture of the city even used to be viewed as one of the local Galician exoticisms. Nevertheless, the criminal subcultures used to be harbored on the margins, without notably penetrating the everyday patterns of sociability, language and conduct of the majority of urbanites. In the postwar daily realities, however, the intrusions of ‘the margins’, especially when perceived against the background of the propagandistic clichés about happy harmonious life of the Soviet people, might indeed look shocking for those who could compare this with the prewar state of affairs in L’viv. An older informant said that one of the most frustrating sides of life under the Soviets was people’s acceptance of criminality and even boasting about one’s criminal past:

*It was very strange for me, for my friends, who remembered how it was before [before 1944] that there was such tolerance of criminality. I mean, like when people meet in the street: 'Where have you been? I have not seen you for ages!' ‘Well, I was in prison…’. Simple petty criminals, you know, not some political ones. Before the war it was such a shame when you had some relative who was in prison, people kept silence about it, it was a great shame. And now it is like nothing special. Even little children boast at schools that ‘my older brother has been in the zone’* (Liubomyra I., 75 y.o.).

At the end of the Soviet period the discourses of *perestroika* made this tendency even more visible, as those who used to be officially stamped as anti-heroes became in a sense the new heroes of the emerging post-Soviet society (Ries 1997). Moreover, fusion of political and criminal elites have been a reality of life in the post-Soviet space. Western Ukraine was no exception in this respect (Vozniak 1998b: 35). The ‘zone’ mores (*poniatiia*) and expressions penetrate present daily life in many ways. Tastes and preferences of the nouveau riche, which had been often formed under influence of *blatnaia* criminal subculture, became trendy, especially among young people. In the vacuum of political and moral power generated by the collapsing Soviet system, the mass culture overflowed with production reckoned for the *blatnoi* and *priblatnoi* tastes. In pop-music the genre of *blatnoi chanson* made a sortie.

Among those whose tastes are oriented towards other cultural and mass-cultural models, the omnipresence of the *blatnye* expressions, songs and looks in daily L’viv life came to be regarded as the disturbing reminder of an enduring Soviet meta-narrative and the ‘post-colonial’ influence of Russia. Especially Russophone pop-music appealing to the ‘vulgar’ tastes of the *blatnye*, has come to be interpreted by the cultured public not only as a nuisance, but as an offence to morality and a threat to the cultural environment of L’viv (see more about this in chapter 8). Hence, the oft-repeated complains among the L’viv intelligentsia about the preponderance of the Russophone low-quality *popsa* in the cafes, busses and other public spaces should be regarded not only as an expression of awakened nationalist feelings. In this, as in many other cases, it is tempting to view this cultural conflict solely through the prism of the national paradigm. However, it is not only the language of this mass cultural production that outrages in the first turn, but its ‘vulgarity’, that is, the quality of the product reckoned for uncultured *khamy*, for those reputedly criminal and semi-criminal, ‘vulgar’
and ‘immoral’ types who represent antipodes of the intelligentsia. It means that ‘class’ aspects of post-Soviet normalization and cultural struggles against the Soviet legacy should not be overlooked.

6.7. *Narod* and intelligentsia as mirrored in youth cultures in L’viv in the late 1990s and early 2000s

Cultural diversity, abundance of intermediate unstable socio-cultural arenas and positions as well as the frequent appearance and disappearance of so-called hybrid identities and styles are inalienable features of modern cityscapes both in the West and in Eastern Europe. The most spectacular forms of this cultural diversity, hybridity and multiplicity of semiotic codes may be observed in urban youth cultures. These loci of youth socio-cultural contestation, despite all the exoticism and expressivity of their stylistic statements, are nevertheless formed around and divided by the same principles of social division (ethnicity, class, gender) as the society of adults (Hall and Jefferson 1977, Pilkington 1994, 2002, Olsson and Havrylyuk Narvselius 2003, Narvselius 2006). During my fieldwork in L’viv, I encountered evidence of quite discernable divisions according to class affinity and nationality, which were recreated in the sphere of typically subcultural concerns about style, relations with peers and forms of public conduct. In short, the maps of meaning of the L’viv youth, as they have been presented in the narratives of the younger respondents, were distinctly trilateral. They were exhibiting a homology with the similar models of the social world adopted by adults. The social worlds of adults are usually imagined as consisting of three distinguishable parts: dominated ‘common people’ (*narod*, ‘masses’, ‘working people’), the dominant strata (authorities, bureaucrats, the rich) and ‘creative’ or ‘thinking’ strata in-between (intelligentsia, professionals, middle class)67. In a similar manner, some of my younger respondents presented their picture of the youth milieu in L’viv as consisting roughly of three main categories that matter in subcultural divisions68: *hopnyky*, *hopy* (*gopniki* in Russian) (youth gangs), *neformaly* or *subkul’tura* (adherents of West-oriented youth styles), and *mazhory* (children of the new rich). Others contested such division, but nevertheless also presented the three-part structure of those who matter: ‘mainstream’ (*zahal*), *hopnyky* and *subkul’tura*.

The modality of relations between all these loci of L’viv youth culture ranges from ironic commentaries and mutual ignoring to open conflicts ending in fights. The hottest field of struggle, however, is not contestation between the most privileged (*mazhory*) and least privileged (*hopnyky* as well as *neformaly*)

67 According to the results of a recent all-Ukrainian poll, presented by Brods’ka and Oksamytna (2001: 45-46), the list of the class affinities as they were defined by the respondents, include 9 categories (workers, middle class, lower class, peasants, civil servants, intelligentsia, entrepreneurs, managers, higher class). Nevertheless, it may be viewed as reproducing the basic tripartite structure of higher-middle-lower classes.

68 It may be mentioned in this connection that the issue of subcultural divisions among the youth has been a nerve of the novels of the young celebrated writer from L’viv Liubko Deresh.
companies of youth, as one could expect. The offspring of rich and influential parents, mazhory with their ostentatious lifestyle are in a sense ‘beyond the brackets’ for the majority of their less privileged peers. Open confrontation, which one often hears about, takes place between hopnyky—gangs of youth coming mostly from unprivileged families, whose cultural tastes allegedly are being formed under influence of criminal subcultures—and ‘progressive’ neformaly originating mostly from families of intelligentsia and professionals. Reportedly, when hanging around downtown, gangs of hopnyky frequently attack companies of subcultural youngsters whose looks they find provoking. In a way, irreconcilability of the sworn foes neformaly and hopnyky is modeling in grotesque and even parodic forms those problematic attitudes marked by mutual scorn and distrust that have always marked the relation between narod (in its derogatory personification as khamy) and intelligentsia. A fragment from the article devoted to ethnographic description of hopnyky subculture is quite a typical example of the mainstream modality of moral indignation, which has marked the public discussion about youth subcultures in L’viv since perestroika times. The young author explicates the class dimension of her stance towards the subject of her study and demonstrates typical moralizing attitude of intelligentsia towards the ‘proletarian khamy’.

Gopniki. They disturb our lives. …I am not some professor Preobrazhenskii69, but neither do I like proletariat, or, more precisely, a new-Ukrainian proletarian variant of the youth subculture. Probably, it is nothing unusual that a rank-and-file person do not associate these lads with some subculture when she hears talk about it. …It is understandable. Subculture is a result of protest, of striving after social changes—or at least after some attention. Most frequently it is something outstanding, saturated with meaning and challenges, and in any case it is always something DIFFERENT and special. The ‘lads’ (patsany) are like everybody else. They are grey and inconspicuous, ordinary and trivial, and most important—they are mass-like. A complete set of mediocre features and no ambitions for subculturality (Khoma 2002).

The common stereotype portrait of a hopnyk used to be a short-cut primitive boy in baggy trousers, coming from a humble background. He was recognizable also by his aggressive behavior and abundant use of obscene Russian slang and colloquial mixture of Russian and Ukrainian known as surzhyk—in other words, the Russified semi-criminal type. This often gave a pretext to see in such male youth mobs a typical post-Soviet plague rooted particularly in a Russian cultural substrate. The appearance, customs, attitudes as well as family origins of hopnyky are not, however, as homogeneous as has been depicted in post-Soviet media. A middle-aged right-wing politician presently holding a high office in the L’viv Provincial Council, a man with higher education who as a teenager used to be a member of a street gang, said that some youth groupings of this type upon closer inspection demonstrated features of patriotic Ukrainians:

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69 A character in the novel Heart of a Dog by Mikhail Bulgakov, the professor of medicine who overtly demonstrates his dislike of ‘revolutionary proletariat’.
In that period, in 1986, a range of such groupings in L’viv had bright features of national orientation. Of course, they were concentrated not in those central districts of L’viv, where the majority of Russian-speakers live, but at the outskirts. There used to be a raion called ‘Vatican’. The guys used to go collectively to church on Sundays and they even were seen wearing shirts with traditional Ukrainian embroideries on holidays. Other raioni could call them rahuli and byky because of this, and regarded regular attacks on this raion as a matter of honor (Stepan O., 40 y.o.).

One can suspect that Stepan could hardly be impartial when describing the street milieu in which he grew up. It is quite possible that he presented a romanticized picture of simple-mannered, but open-hearted street-fighters which may be said to parallel the popular image of similar young street-fighters and pranksters from the prewar Lwów, ‘batiary with a heart of gold’. There are, however, other pieces of evidence, which give a clue that these youth groupings, like neformaly, have been heterogeneous as regards language and cultural patterns (see Narvselius 2006).

Nevertheless, differences between these two ‘subcultural tribes’ are painstakingly articulated. For instance, different strategies of behavior, which hopnyky and neformaly employ in situations of conflict, might mirror more profound differences in cultural dispositions between ‘lower’ and ‘literati’ strata. While hopnyky are not slow to demonstrate ‘who is the master here’ and to launch attack, companies of neformaly usually try to calm down and bring to reason their opponents, and in the ultimate cases to retreat.

I had an opportunity to observe a group of neformaly in Virmens’ka street [in the mid-1990s], just at the entrance door of our house. In my opinion they were educated and polite young people, they played guitars, talked. […] They had their ideas about many things, I think if they were some uneducated blockheads they would never come to such ideas. […] There were some old hags who didn’t want them to gather near our house. They went to quarrel with those ‘hairy types’, but they soon came back with nothing, because those people spoke in a friendly way to them and explained why they gathered here and why they looked different (Mar’iana O., 22 y.o.).

Our boys [members of the patriotic organization where Vasyl’ is one of the leaders] have a clear advantage compared with those subcultural boys (subkul’turni khlopchyky). Our boys are maybe not so intellectual, they probably know less about exotic religions and Western music, but they are not afraid to go downtown after dark because they are able to defend themselves and their girlfriends. They will not jump away in at sight of some delinquents. I am not sure that subcultural boys have any fighting qualities or discipline at all (Vasyl’ R., 28 y.o.).

Hence, cultural expressions of the youth in L’viv are fuelled by ethnic, class, gender and other, more subtle socio-cultural divisions. Nevertheless, these cultural expressions are not simple projections of the ‘visions of divisions’ of the adult society. Youth subcultural milieus of L’viv provide their participants with answers to questions about identity, cultural choices and intellectuality. Although the influence of these youth milieus and their discourses is not always obvious in spheres other than clothing styles and musical tastes,

70 Name for both grouping and ‘its own’ territory.
71 An offensive nickname for Western Ukrainians considered to be of rural origin.
nevertheless they cannot be discarded as sources of cultural imagery for the place-making intellectual projects in L’viv after 1991, as will be exemplified in chapter 8 and 9.

6.8. Summary

Contradictions and ambiguity in the socio-cultural nexus of those who are positioned and position themselves as intelligentsia and those who are imagined as elites and narod, have been intensely articulated in both mass media discourses and private conversations in L’viv since the end of the Soviet period. Symbolic and social boundaries between intelligentsia and the ‘others’ change their shape and quality perpetually and, as a consequence, the range of intelligentsia’s antipodes as well as potential alter egos (i.e., categories and actors to be identified with in certain contexts) extended since the Soviet era. One of the factors behind such shifts and negotiations of boundaries has been a more general postmodern trend to ‘rewrite’ social reality (Zayarniuk 2008). The other one has been a vivid debate focused on the national project(s) and National Idea—with Galicia, and L’viv in particular, as one of its epicenters.

The debate centered on the issues of the national includes a powerful, though not always clearly articulated, undercurrent whose ‘class’ vision is to become a winning concept for the Ukrainian nation building. Different factions of intelligentsia and non-intelligentsia suggest various more or less coherent, both retrospective and future-oriented, elitist and populist visions of the nation and national culture. However, like elsewhere, not only Galician cultural elites, but narod in its different incarnations disposes with massive cultural resources in the form of cultural tastes, knowledge of ethnic traditions, language, recent historical experience and memories about its ‘small motherland’—and about the Fatherland of Ukraine. As the presented data reveal, this circumstance may become a source of anxiety for the L’viv intelligentsia and intellectuals who feel their monopoly on cultural authority in post-1991 nationally-framed society endangered. Although there exists an abundance of common features in various socially anchored visions of Ukrainian-ness stemming from L’viv, nevertheless in discourses of the L’viv intellectuals and intelligentsia these versions tend to be presented as something non-transformable and irreconcilable.

Since the late 1980s, (re-)introduction of the concept of nation with its connotations of both the inclusive political entity and exclusive ethnocultural community into the daily discursive circulation, has intensified intellectual debates in Galicia and Ukraine but, still, has not brought much clarity to the issue of how, for whom (or against whom) and why intelligentsia matters. This absence of clarity in positioning pro and contra certain societal categories and interest groups, although there is nothing surprising about it from the sociological point of view, certainly contributes to the opinion that intelligentsia has become a disappearing identity and dissolving sub-stratum. In this context ‘unclear’ might be coterminous with ‘invisible’ and ‘disempowered’.

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Chapter 7. Intelligentsia’s Spaces in L’viv

7.1. Where is intelligentsia? Space metaphors of ‘field’, ‘cityscape’, and ‘arena’

In this chapter I proceed with mapping the L’viv intelligentsia within the texture of socio-cultural relations and discourses. Namely, I present a brief outline of the L’viv ‘landscape’ of institutions and networks which have been the spaces for intelligentsia’s and intellectuals’ discursive production and the arenas of competition between various factions of these cultural producers. It is hardly possible to outline a ‘statistically correct’ and exhaustive picture of these sites, although geographically the place of my study has been only one city. Nevertheless, the interview data, combined with material from other sources, provide some clues.

It is important to distinguish some actually existing sites which may be constructed and considered as spaces of (relative) intellectual autonomy in order not to be trapped into the mythologizing metaphors of ‘inner territories of freedom’ which have been a part of intelligentsia’s empowering rhetoric. Behind this rhetoric lies a dualistic metaphor of power (Mitchell 1990), according to which ‘outer’ oppressing political (social, economic etc.) forces are opposed by an ‘inner’ freedom of the thinking person. The logical consequence of this metaphor of power may be, for example, the assumption that ‘genuine’ intelligentsia and intellectuals as inherently autonomous subjects possess a constant resource of mental resistance, and when the pressure of some ‘outer’ oppressive power disappears or diminishes, they immediately begin to realize their striving for autonomy. However, as it has been widely acknowledged, identity (and positioning) is hardly a kind of latent state of mind, but a constant process of identification, of endowing with meanings, and participation in practices which lead to maintaining or abandoning certain vectors of identification. Statements of the informants about the necessity of being visible, of behaving and of making certain claims as a representative of intelligentsia or as an intellectual, relate to this issue (see chapter 6).

In contemporary scholarship spaces and places are regarded not only as backgrounds, but also as important components of identity processes. Societies and their fragments may be conceptualized as spaces, or the systems of relations involving both agents and their social positions (Bourdieu 1990: 126). The fields of cultural production are also social spaces. More precisely, they are structured spaces of social positions in which the positions and their interrelations are determined by the distribution of different kinds of capital (ibid: 138) (see more about fields in chapter 4). While social spaces and fields are examples of utterly abstract thinking in terms of spatial metaphors, ‘cityscape’ and ‘arena’ are more closely connected to organization of physical topography. When talking about ‘cityscape’, I refer to complex constellations of the symbolic and the topographic that impact daily socio-cultural realities in urban locations. In chapter 2 the history of multiethnic, multicultural and nationalistic L’viv has been addressed. It is, however, important to be aware not only about historical, cultural, social and political circumstances and events associated with L’viv, but also about
peculiarities of the place itself. L’viv’s everyday and institutional milieu preconditions historical action and human agency in a variety of ways in the same manner as characteristics of the scene and type of decorations do impact in subtle ways the performance on the stage. In particular, I will look more closely at some distinguishable ‘sites’ and ‘spots’ which may become ‘arenas’ for the L’viv intelligentsia and intellectuals, particularly for Ukrainian-speaking ones.

Victor Turner (1974) suggested a conceptualization of ‘arena’ that is highly relevant for my study. In his interpretation ‘arena’ is a spotlighted, articulated fragment of social reality where performing social actors become visible. Arena is "a framework—whether institutionalized or not—which manifestly functions as a setting for antagonistic action aimed at arriving at a publicly recognized decision" [original emphasis—E.N.] (Turner 1974: 133). Thus, the main features of arenas are symbolical and actual antagonism, explicitness and impact on the making of politically significant decisions. Despite the emphasis on antagonistic processes explicated in the arenas, Turner also stresses that arenas appear in localized areas of social life where there exists strong social linkage and cultural consensus. He also points out that this consensus is ruled not merely by pragmatic political and economic interests, but also by idealism and sacrifice of self-interest (ibid: 140). The consensus stems primarily from a tacit acknowledgement of meaningfulness and potency of the basic symbols of a given society, which fuel struggles in the areas. This kind of reasoning is close to Bourdieu’s theorization of struggles in the social fields which presuppose existence of a basic consensus over ‘stakes’ and the unchallenged doxa that is confirmed over and over again in these struggles.

7.2. Civil society and sites of autonomy

Various arenas, and among them arenas of intellectual debates and ideational struggles, do not exist in a social vacuum. In modern societies they usually function as parts of broader societal contexts and are inalienable from “a precarious but not unsustainable balance between the institutions of the modern state, the market economy and the family” (Bauböck 1996: 76) known as civil society. When discussing the space of post-1991 Ukrainian intelligentsia’s discursive production it is impossible to omit the issue of civil society because this latter requires existence of the sites, places and arenas for individual autonomy and also contributes to their formation. “One of the most persistent effects of the peculiar circumstances of the birth of the intelligentsia in East-Central Europe is the tendency to view the relation between the political state and civil society as one of conflict and competition rather than of consensus and mutual support” (Bauman 1987a: 172). Before the advent of the period of state socialism, and to some extent during it, this split allowed the national intelligentsias to be relatively independent from the political elites and at the same time to get “privileged access, through shared language, to their respective ‘peoples’ ” (ibid: 172). Hence, as producers of critical
discourse and as ‘legislators and interpreters’, intelligentsia must make bids for power in the sphere of civil society, notwithstanding how narrow and weak it may be.

The issue of (non)existence of civil society in the former Soviet Union and in the post-Soviet successor states renders much controversy. Civil society as a kind of social organization can emerge only under conditions of modernity, for civil society “requires a common and shared public culture as well as a generalized practice of the virtues of civility—i.e., willingness to use arguments, to listen to them in the pursuit of one’s interests and to refrain from coercion” (Bauböck 1996: 76). But when violence becomes endemic in a society or when people are ready to submit to illegitimate political authority, civility declines and civil society breaks down (ibid). The case of the totalitarian USSR may serve as a typical example in this respect. The free market as a cornerstone institution that together with the state and the family defines the sphere of civil society, has been absent here. Existence of autonomous voluntary associations and organizations was unthinkable due to the repressive power of the state and its omnipresent agents. Also on the official ideological level the Soviets implemented such agenda of the intelligentsia that conspicuously excluded the autonomy of intellectual work and cultivation of immunity to state inference (Bauman 1987a: 175-176).

This all was the reality of life in the Soviet Union. However, it could be wrong to straightforwardly deny existence of some vestiges of civil society, or, if one prefers, presence of its thinned and marginalized incarnations in different periods of USSR history. In Ukraine, it seems to be, since the end of Khrushchev’s ‘thaw’, when shistdesiatnyky’s ‘Clubs for creative youth’ gathering freethinking intelligentsia were banned, there were no definite visible arenas where critical discourses could be expressed. Nevertheless, a “background culture” as culture of daily life, as ties between different individuals within the sphere of civil society understood as an ongoing cultural discourse, never disappeared. Culture of daily life in L’viv since 1944, with its ubiquitous networks of mutual favors (so-called blat (see Ledeneva 1998)), interest in mass-cultural trends and products from abroad, with readings of forbidden literature, with ‘kitchen’ discussions on various existential and philosophical themes, with clandestine gatherings of believers belonging to prohibited underground confessions and sects, and with an abundance of other phenomena unsanctioned by the Party and the state, provided a restricted, but nevertheless vital space for voluntary cooperation and individual autonomy. Due to this background culture emergence of both political dissent as well as ‘deviating’ cultural discourses and intellectual trends became possible in the times of Khrushchev’s ‘thaw’ and Brezhnev’s ‘stagnation’.

Compared with other parts of Ukraine, L’viv and Galicia exposed a remarkably high level of political activity, national consciousness and, presumably, more social capital (Åberg 2002) in the years preceding the break-up of the Soviet Union and thereafter. Subscription statistics from Galicia reveals that the region’s population in the last years of the Soviet Union’s existence was the most active consumers of the

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72 “Comprehensive doctrines of all kinds—religious, philosophical, and moral—belong to what we may call the ‘background culture’ of civil society. This is the culture of the social, not of the political. It is the culture of daily life, of its many associations…” (Rawls 1993: 14, quoted in Bauböck 1996: 98).
magazines and newspapers in the Ukrainian language committed to the case of Ukrainian sovereignty (Szporliuk 2000). One of the explanations for L’viv’s and Galicia’s special role in Ukrainian politics has been that local habits of political activism and civic self-organization were not uprooted here completely due to persistent legacy of the political culture of the Habsburg Empire (Hrytsak 1996, Wilson 1997, Riabchuk 2000a, Dubenton 2001, Katchanovski 2006).

It should be noted in this connection, that Galician intellectuals often concentrate solely on the political achievements of the ‘liberal’ Habsburg era, while the political culture of the Second Polish Republic has been overlooked. Obviously, collective memory of the older generation who experienced non-Soviet everyday and political realities in the first decades of the twentieth century, played a significant role in preserving (and biasing) this kind of narrative. The issue is, however, that it has been tacitly implied that political orientations, dispositions and values of civil society inherited by the older generations could ‘hibernate’ and then suddenly be actualized under favorable circumstances by younger generations. Needless to say, this reasoning reifies elements of cultural heritage as unchangeable entities that can be freely passed around and do not need to be involved in the processes of active co-construction. Instead, I agree with the argument that in order to be reproduced and sustained, “meanings must always be related to the material world from which they derive” (Jackson 1989: 185) and in some way mediated by actually existing “culture-making classes” (Mitchell 1995: 112). The view, according to which elements of civil society in Galicia have been preserved in some way under the Soviet regime, has been criticized by L’viv political scientist Antonina Kolodii. She argues instead that, indeed, in Western Ukraine traditions of civil society used to be stronger and richer than in other parts of Ukraine—but only until 1939. Repressions combined with relations of patronage and clientelism between the authorities and the people resulted in complete submission of the individual to the totalitarian state and in personality deformations (Kolodii 2001: 25). Nevertheless, Kolodii omits the issue of why in the late 1980s the Galician populace suddenly ‘woke up’ to political and cultural activity not sanctioned (or sanctioned only halfheartedly) by the authorities.

In my view, this picture of the complete gap in socio-cultural practices of civil society between 1939 and 1987 is incorrect. One should put aside the Sleeping Beauty approach (Suny 1993: 3) which emphasizes the essential elements of historical and political cultures as preserved and transmitted in some miraculous way by generations of intelligentsia and intellectuals and then woken by the kiss of freedom. Even such ‘non-material’ elusive elements of historical and political cultures as collective cultural memories “are sustained in various sites and need to be encapsulated in some form in order to be kept alive through recall, particularly as they move further from personal experience over generations” (Wanner 1998: 45). Accordingly, one should consider the probability of the existence of (however marginalized and disguised) socio-cultural spaces and ‘background culture’ that persisted through decades and provided ‘the thinking part
of the population’ with opportunities to sustain, create and practice alternative (or simply diverging from the
official visions) identity discourses.

These persisting sites where some minimal intellectual and creative autonomy could be practiced, later on became the ground for activities of the expanding civil society. The view about importance of figuring out the spaces where certain intellectually sustained practices and discourses continue their covert existence has been advocated by Bauman (1987b: 19) and, especially in regard to national discourses, by Verdery (1991a: 315, 1991b: 429). A similar opinion about embedment of intellectuals in intermediate spaces which form both structural preconditions and cultural context for the construction of this category of actors has been expressed by Eyerman (1994: 16): “The intellectual is constructed by individuals in a social and political space, socially between capital and labour, politically between the state and civil society, and culturally through traditions which relate the intellectual to other social identities…”

As this study is not profiled as research in history or political science, I have no ambition to suggest a comprehensive picture of civil society in L’viv during the recent decades or in retrospective. Nevertheless, the material presented here (interviews, publications, personal observations) may probably be used for future studies of that kind. I will first discuss sites of more or less autonomous intellectual activities and discourses that existed in L’viv in the Soviet period—although some of these sites at first glance may hardly look like sanctuaries of intellectuality or as significant for development of identification as an intellehent. I will also address the contemporary post-1991 sites and arenas of—and for—intelligentsia of different generations in the city.

7.3. Academic spaces and the domain of student life
Development of many cultural habits and skills needed for becoming an intellehent (and passing for an intellehent) such as the habit of reading, general interest in art and science, mastering of certain speech forms, ‘politeness’ etc. often begins at home, where socio-cultural dispositions for certain behavior, choices and strategies used to be transmitted from generation to generation (see Bourdieu 1988, 1996). “As our old Galician saying put it, one must have three gymnasium certificates (matury) to be an intellehent”, commented one of my respondents, having in mind the certificates of one’s parents and grandparents—the certificates of the old, prewar kind. It should be noted that gymnasium played a more significant role in fostering and preserving the stratum of intelligentsia in Poland than in pre-revolutionary Russia (Gella 1976: 149). Nevertheless, more often than not, in order to be qualified as an intellehent, a person herself must graduate from an institution of higher learning, which under present conditions most often means a university.

The interview material confirms a widespread view (Gella 1976) that, generally, university is regarded as an institution where one is not only (and even not in the first turn) taught some subject or
profession, but where a young person becomes a member of the cultural elite. Both younger and older informants were unanimous in this point. Despite all the vicissitudes that the higher education in Galicia (especially Ukrainian higher education) have faced, it maintains its symbolic value as a domain where an act of social magic takes place, i.e., where ‘raw’ student material is transformed into intelligentsia. According to a view shared by many, whatever the actual quality and status of the obtained higher education, the diploma certificate is both a key that may open the door to attractive jobs, and a quality stamp insuring that the person in question is a mature and responsible member of the socio-cultural community. That institutions of higher education have actually functioned as loci for ideological indoctrination, and even as sites where there flourished practices and discourses having little in common with intellectual autonomy and the ethos of intelligentsia, is, however, something the same respondents readily admit too. The nexus of both approval and disapproval, like and dislike often connects L’viv intelligentsia with their alma maters.

Within the limits of this study there is no place for addressing the history of Ukrainian educational institutions in Galicia and in L’viv in particular. Suffice it to say that L’viv has been a centre of higher learning for almost 500 years. By 2007 there where 6 academies, 13 universities, 8 institutes, and a number of colleges in the city were a total of 165 600 students studied. Two academies and five universities have been granted official status as ‘the National’ ones. Some of these institutions of higher education (like for instance, the Ivan Franko National University of L’viv) boast a long history. Throughout history L’viv used to be the residence of famous scholars and scientific schools. However, viewed from a Ukrainian national(izing) perspective, studies of Ukrainian culture, language and, moreover, development of the Ukrainian-related intellectual polemics have been restricted or banned for most of the time in the L’viv institutions of higher education. It may be said that especially in the latter respect the L’viv institutions of higher education have been Ukrainized only recently. Nevertheless, in different periods, the L’viv institutions of higher learning provided their students with educational credentials and institutional legitimation and thus created that important distinction which made possible the social metamorphosis of a person into the Ukrainian intellihent.

After World War II the city accommodated a number of academic research institutions, some of them specializing in Ukrainian history, literature, ethnography and arts. These institutions used to be places that, until recently, could hardly be viewed as genuinely autonomous intellectual spaces. However limited and subjected to restrictions these places were, they nevertheless marked the existence of Ukrainian intellectual circles in L’viv. These academic institutions provided access to sources and resources that could be used both for ideologically charged research and for production of knowledge that might sufficiently deviate from the propagandistic schemes inculcated by the authorities. Although the link with prewar intellectual traditions was seemingly broken with the disappearance of the repressed, ‘resettled’ and killed representatives of the ‘old’ intellectual Galician elite, the intellectual life in Soviet L’viv could not be interrupted. Even restructured, subjected to ideological pressure and populated with other ‘sorts’ of people, the academic institutions and
institutions of higher learning continued to mould an educated, thinking and creative stratum. The explanation of this paradox lies not only in inalienable qualities of cultural space provided by academic institutions, not only in vestiges of the prewar intelligentsia in Soviet-occupied Eastern Galicia, but also in the contradictory nature of Soviet cultural policies (Yurchak 2006: 12).

Notwithstanding ideological and political agendas implemented in various historical periods within and through L’viv academic and educational institutions, these latter ones have always been the sites of a nexus of power between the students, professors, administrators and other categories of actors. Students have always been that part of the university institutional body which was difficult to control, although attempts to restrict student autonomy, to ‘tame’ the students (Dzięgiel 1998) and to limit the flow of ‘dangerous’ ideas into student milieus have been numerous. Student life generated the fluctuating, constantly changing subcultural aura with its rituals, folklore, symbolic topography, communicative networks and plenty of other symbolic aspects connected to daily practices (Havrylyuk 2001). These symbolic and communicative forms could often pass unnoticed for an uninitiated observer. Hence, the student subculture functioned as the background and toolkit for ‘unsanctioned’ and even ‘subversive’ activities because when taking part in self-education, discussion groups and entertainment students had plenty of opportunities to engage in intellectual experimenting and search for new knowledge. Simultaneously, student collectivities have been a specific locus where intellectual autonomy, moral solidarity and other features of the intelligentsia were fostered. In general, as Tromly (2007: 95) formulates this, in the Soviet universities

Student collectives fostered feelings of mutual obligation and self-reliance that provided an opening for students to form other kinds of social networks with different agendas. In particular, belonging to the postwar student family enabled the creation of more independent social entities commonly called “companies” (kompania), and later on “tusovki”—friendship groups of interests in which students fashioned themselves as members of a cultured intelligentsia. In sum, student collectivism meant that power was far more decentralized in the universities than the reality of Party oversight would suggest.

Notwithstanding constant surveillance by the functionaries from the Party, the Komsomol and university administrations, the students in L’viv could find some niches for more or less unconstrained cultural activities both within and outside their high schools. One of the elder informants, 78 years old pan Volodymyr, told about an amateur theatre circle that he and his student colleagues organized in a L’viv suburb in the late 1950s:

_We staged, for example, the play ‘Don’t Go to Parties, Hryts!’_. I played Dmytro the orphan. We had our own musicians, for there were some students from L’viv Conservatory among us. And I used to have an uncle who worked as a director of a travelling theatre troupe before the war, under Poland, he travelled with his theatre in our [Ukrainian] villages. He helped us a lot. So, we staged “Hryts”’ in [the suburban village of] Vynnyky, in a culture house (budynok kultury). Even people

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73 ‘Oi ne khody Hrytsiu ta i na vechnoryntsii!’, a classical Ukrainian play by Mykhailo Staryts’k’yi.
from Maria Zan’kovets’ka theatre [in L’viv] came to see our play, and they liked it! All my family, my mother in particular, and then also my wife, we loved to go to theatre. Especially to Maria Zan’kovets’ka theatre. You know, many of the Ukrainians who resettled from Poland after the war (pereselentsi) used to be ardent theatre admirers, it was a kind of habit that we had there, and we tried to continue with it here (Volodymyr F., 75 y.o.).

Another older informant recollected that his student company used to celebrate Christmas and New Year’s Eve in improvised Ukrainian style, accompanied with the singing of traditional Christmas carols (koliadky). It was too risky to organize such celebrations in the city74, but in the countryside they were not unusual:

When I was a student, our youth—Ukrainians all of them—used to gather in a culture house [in a suburban village], everyone took something to eat, we locked the premises and then celebrated all night long. Sometimes up to fifty people, in an organized manner, we gathered and sang carols (koliadivaly), and celebrated. If some people from NKVD would find us there, I cannot imagine what would have happened, indeed! But we took the risk. It was the year 1958 or 1959. I don’t know how we managed not to get caught. Every time, our songs, our carols, something to eat and drink. But then, anyway, someone informed ‘the organs’, and they forbid our musical rehearsals. A commissar woman came to our rehearsal and said: ‘Stop this immediately and get out!’ (Zenovii K., 73 y.o.).

The same respondent also mentioned that

In autumn we always celebrated the days of Roman and Mykola75. In our institute lecturers knew very well that when it was time for Roman and Mykola the Ukrainian students did not come to the lectures. We indulged ourselves with such things, and our lecturers were lenient with us—what to do, the youth entertain themselves [chuckles].

Serving as the headquarters of such self-reliant cultural activities of the students were usually some private dwellings—flats of some students, or even dwellings of more radical cultural activists and dissidents. Private gatherings could also with some precautions take place in student dormitories. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, as another respondent told, it was possible to organize small loci of semi-informal communication focusing on cultural issues even within the premises of the high schools:

74 In L’viv the first public celebration of Christmas in Ukrainian folk style, with a vertep procession and singing of carols, became possible only in 1988. It was organised on the initiative of the Lion Society (Tovarystvo Leva). This non-official organization, one of the first of this kind in the late-Soviet Ukraine, focused its activities on preservation and popularisation of local Ukrainian traditions and cultural heritage. The Polish researcher Ola Hnatiuk points out that vertep was a typical example of the invented tradition because, for the first, this folk custom did not exist in the prewar L’viv, and, for the second, the name ‘vertep’ came from Central and Eastern Ukraine. A vertep procession in L’viv should thus be viewed as an ideological effort to cultivate an all-Ukrainian cultural identity (Hnatiuk 2003: 78-79).

75 These holidays are devoted to the Christian saints, and in Galicia they are usually combined with elements of traditional folk celebrations.
I would say, in an academic milieu some informal networks of contacts were established among the students. Children from intelligentsia’s families were attracted to each other, they acted under the disguise of some allowed organizations, they tried to keep in touch all the time. For example, at that time the activities around preservation of historical and cultural monuments were viewed as quite legitimate, a local branch of this organization was created, for example, in the Ivan Franko University. During the sessions of the Society for the preservation of historical and cultural monuments it was permissible to talk about the history of Ukrainian culture, about Ukrainian architecture. Or, let’s say, the semi-formal, semi-informal poetic group or poetic studio ‘Franko’s forge’ (Frankova kuznia). Its sessions consisted of two parts: one official and one unofficial. The unofficial part was usually held in some lecture auditorium, where some poets could suddenly burst into, like a storm, like a wind! For example, [underground Ukrainian poet] Hryts’ko Chubai. He gathered people around the underground ‘samizdat’ journal ‘Skrynia’. There was a circle of very talented people: Lysheha, Riabchuk. […] It was enough with just one charismatic person, one powerful splash of creativity to attract people who potentially were longing for something like this. You can imagine: students expect that some boring mentor will come with a lecture, and instead Hryts’ko Chubai comes! But such gatherings could exist only for two-three years, because ‘organs’ made their best to crush, to devastate, to expel from the university, to send to the army. But such circles did exist, information circulated, and this very fact, that despite all the persecutions something remained all the time, this very fact fuelled, stimulated our, so to speak, national expectations, it confirmed that we were different. All these groups and gatherings were very closed, they came and went, or they were crushed [in 1973], like the one at the history department. This group was nationally and politically oriented. They were caught by militia while spreading leaflets. But the absolute majority of these circles and groups had no special political, or nationalist, or even pronouncedly Ukrainian orientation. We simply didn’t want to decay, we wanted to be engaged in something meaningful and to feel ourselves a part of the world (Pavlo K., 56 y.o.).

Afterward I had an opportunity to meet Maria L., who participated in the underground student group mentioned by pan Pavlo, and asked about her activity there. After several small sips of coffee pani Maria answered:

Well, they expelled us from the university for nothing, frankly speaking. It’s funny, indeed. They could not incriminate us with any ‘real things’. It was simply an underground circle (huřťusk) that studied the history of Ukraine. We were caught with a [forbidden] book of Iurii Lypa and two articles of Valentyn Moroz. The formulation in the documents was: “For actions incompatible with being a Soviet student”, with no further explanations. Seventeen years of my prospective intellectual activity, of carrier growth, were wasted. But I still think that we were expelled for no reason. […] Indeed, we did nothing heroic, nothing very special, nothing that today could mobilize people. […] I simply could not say ‘no’ when I was given the suggestion to join that group. I was aware of possible consequences, but I am as I am. I hate to be politically or publicly...

76 This underground organization called Ukrains’kyi natsional’no-vyzvol’nyi front (‘Ukrainian National Liberating Front’) consisted of students from the Department of Philology and the Department of History at the Ivan Franko State University of L’viv. The organization existed in 1972-1973, and when it was disclosed fifteen of its members were excluded from the university and two leading figures were sentenced to prison (Zakharov 2003: 94-95).

77 Prominent Ukrainian diaspora writer.

78 Historian and one of the most radical figures in the Ukrainian national movement in the 20th century, twice a political prisoner.
I am inclined to think that pani Maria was sincere in her estimation of this dramatic episode of her life. When positioning herself as an intelihten, a person must constantly confirm this standing by concrete actions. Repressions for the ‘unsanctioned’ intellectual activity might indeed have proven to be a lesser evil than ‘disqualification’ as an intelihten na person, first and foremost in one’s own eyes. This and similar cases when individuals act according to certain internalized dispositions, even when their actions may appear to serve no rational end or lead to no personal gain, may be interpreted as examples illustrating the ‘strange logic’ of symbolic economy. Also, one may ponder over why, although my interlocutor made a conscious and dramatic moral choice when putting in hazard her studies, carrier, and, possibly, even personal freedom, she presented the entire story as “nothing heroic, nothing very special”, as something natural, which she simply could not abstain from. Using conventional terms of popular media discourse, this case could be presented as “self-sacrificing service to the high ideals of the Ukrainian intelligentsia”. However, it may be argued that there might be nothing especially ‘high-idealistic’ in reading officially forbidden samvydat and tamvydat literature on Ukrainian history. When declaring that there was nothing heroic in her and her friends’ activities, Maria L. also assured naturalness of her socio-cultural orientation and her ‘taste’ as a counterweight to the ‘unnaturalness’ and ‘tastelessness’ of the Soviet realities. It is quite possible that similar ‘non-heroic’ motives, stemming from nothing else than ‘power of taste’, determined decisions of other students engaging in non-conventional cultural activities at that time. As Bourdieu (1984) articulated that in academic terms, and the famous Polish poet Zbigniew Herbert in poetic expression, taste classifies, and it classifies the classifier. By making distinctions between beautiful and ugly, tasteful and vulgar, social subjects, such as the culturally engaged L’viv students, distinguished themselves by the distinctions they made, and thereby empowered themselves symbolically against the uniforming influences of the authoritarian state.

The situation of the academic staff was different. The control and surveillance of this category of university actors was much more rigorous than in the case of the students. University professors also were burdened with an abundance of administrative work and obligations to participate in various arrangements organized by the Party organs. Academic staff at the institutions of higher learning was also overloaded with teaching, as the student groups were large, and this did not leave much time for research. Contacts with

79 Colloquial Ukrainian word for printed production smuggled to the USSR from abroad.

80 I am grateful to Barbara Törnquist-Plewa for the information about the verse of this L’viv-born poet which is titled Power of Taste (‘Potęga smaku’). It contains such revealing lines: “Our eyes and ears refused obedience/ the princes of our senses proudly chose exile/ It did not require great character at all/ we had a shred of necessary courage/ but fundamentally it was a matter of taste/ Yes taste/ that commands us to get out to make a wry face draw out a sneer/ even if for this the precious capital of the body the head/ must fall” (English translation is available at: http://www.affecti.com/fragments/herbert_en.html).
colleagues from abroad were very sporadic, and with those from the West practically absent. The combination of these factors narrowed the scope of independent research and intellectual discussion, especially in the humanities and social sciences, to the extreme, which resulted in rapid depersonalization (Baltzer 1996) of the greatest part of the academic staff. The situation was further aggravated by two factors. On the one hand, the city and the L’viv Province (oblast’) became viewed as a politically unreliable zone by the Soviet regime (the authority’s campaigns against ‘bourgeois nationalism’ and ‘clericalism’ took extreme forms here). On the other hand, the majority of the academic institutions in L’viv came to be regarded as provincial. In terms of prestige, financing and access to other resources the majority of them could not be compared to their counterparts in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa, not to mention Moscow, Leningrad and Novosibirsk. Dominating authoritarian postures of the staff towards the students who were treated as merely objects in the educational process, made unrestricted circulation of views and ideas between these two parts extremely difficult.

Nevertheless, talented, enthusiastic and morally superior lecturers were often mentioned by the respondents when they were asked to name persons that could in their view exemplify an intellektua person and intellektenist’. It is of significance that in many cases the persons in question were aged academicians, people ‘of the old stuff’. The latter includes not only rare cases of the old Galician intelligentsia (who were almost nonexistent in the Soviet higher schools in L’viv), but also a wider scope of ‘genuine intellekteny’:

Blessed are those who had the luck to listen to the lectures of a few old professors, of those rare ones who remained here [at the Ivan Franko State University of L’viv] in the early 1980s. I attended the lectures of K. at the history department. It was an amazing feeling! Or, for example, G., a Jew by origin, who taught history of the ancient world. You listen to him, and you realize that he puts something different [emphasizes this word] into your head, and after this you cannot live the same life as before. Plato used to say that reason has such a great power that all the dark forces fall down and never rise again in its presence. Those old professors had the same impact on our minds. Unfortunately, we have now the generation that grew up and never had a chance to listen to these people. They are a herd. It’s a big pity (Oleh D., 45 y.o.).

At the Polytechnic institute we were taught by one very, very old professor. It was hydraulics, an extremely unpleasant subject. Our student group was absolutely like any other, although we took evening courses. We also were concerned about our grades. His name was B. [Polish family name]. Once he examined one of my friends and gave her a ‘3’, unjustly. Evening course students, you know, what’s the matter. She was very upset, but he did not know about this. A couple of weeks passed, and he suddenly comes to our lecture hall, apologizes, says that he was wrong and corrects her ‘3’ to ‘4’. She gets confused, says “It wasn’t worth your trouble…” Mutual apologizes follow. But, anywhere, only a lecturer who studied under Poland could do something like this. It’s because in the old times teachers were taught to respect their students, and students were taught to respect their teachers (Maria L., approx. 51 y.o.).

Out of these fragments one can understand that, with some rare exceptions, the atmosphere in the institutions of higher education, with their malformed nexus of power between the staff and students could be far from harmonious. Student folklore in L’viv in the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s pictured students as
constantly boozing, flirting and looking for means to cheat lecturers or to bribe them, while high school teachers were often presented as idiots or psychopaths. Institutions of higher education were informally ranked according to the number of ‘connections’ one should mobilize to enter there. Constant interference of the authorities (functionaries of the Party, Komsomol, ‘tamed’ trade unions, administrators etc.) into the life of academic and student communities aggravated the situation. In such circumstances different parties oftentimes became estranged from each other, and the forms of their relations became dictated by motives other than common participation in creative intellectual activities. Academic institutions became places where cheating, bribery, mutual services (blat, ‘connections’), nepotism and other ‘corrupted’ daily practices were tolerated in the same scope as everywhere in Soviet society.

In sharp contrast to such discourse on vuzy (institutions of higher learning, vyshchi uchbovi zaklady in Ukrainian, vysshie uchebnye zavedeniia in Russian) and the Soviet higher education stood stories of elderly people who remembered how it was ‘under Poland’. The elderly informants mentioned the negative treatment which Ukrainians were subjected to in the interwar Polish Republic, but they invariably praised the quality of education, ethos of relations between teachers and students and absence of ‘corruption’ at that time.

My father [teacher of music] was expelled from his job in the 1930s, because, as they [Polish administrators] said, “Mister, you are Ukrainian, so how can you teach our Polish youth with a patriotic spirit?” Yes, absolutely clear. Discrimination. But listen, I passed entering exams to the gymnasium [in Jaroslaw] without any trouble. With no ‘connections’, or bribes, without all this filth that came with Soviet times. There was not even an idea of asking someone to ‘help’, to fix things. Not even such an idea! They knew that my father was an unemployed Ukrainian teacher, and that I myself was a pure-blooded Ukrainian. And I was accepted on the result of my examination. Two acquaintances of mine, two Polish girls, were not accepted. Very simple: it’s because their results were not good. You see? Two pure-bred (chystokrovni) Poles were not accepted! They [administration of the gymnasium] knew all about my background, but they were guided by principles other than the national one. This principle was, like bribes, beyond consideration in such affairs (Liubomyra I., 75 y.o.).

There is no respect for older people in the present day. No respect for teachers, and teachers only look for bribes. […] My father was a gymnasium teacher. It was unthinkable that someone could come to him with a bribe, with some chicken, meat or eggs. People studied because they wanted to learn something, and not because they wanted to get grades (Marta B., approx. 70 y.o.).

These stories may be opposed to the narratives of the representatives of the ‘children of stagnation’ generation, born in the 1960s and early 1970s. Two middle-aged lecturers pictured the academic institutions where they presently work as malfunctioning milieus where usually the greatest concern of the staff is not quality of high school teaching or their own intellectual development, but rather money-earning. The local situation in L’viv and deformed structural relations of power in the Ukrainian society in general have been named as possible explanations for such a state of affairs.
Our ‘beloved’ university is provincial in its spirit, essence, bureaucratic mechanisms, selection of staff and corruption. All such things flourish, and I think that no changes should be anticipated. The rector seems to be an intellektynyi man, but he doesn’t do enough. The institution expands, but the professional level decreases catastrophically. I was teaching for three years, I was shocked by the level of many people there, and this is not only tolerated, but cherished and preserved. [...] Unfortunately, L’viv has maintained its provincial status, and became further marginalized in many respects. Bureaucratic continuity has not disappeared. Not normal creative and intellectual processes, but bureaucratic decisions determine everything. There are very many people who could realize their potential in better way if they had managed to start some business. But the opportunities for this are limited in L’viv, and these people do their best to remain at the university instead. There is economic stagnation in the region. And instead of cherishing future elites at the university, they simply earn money. And build some kingdom of distorted mirrors there. Kuchma’s ‘stagnation period’ facilitated this all—we don’t need to demonize him [Kuchma]. He simply allowed many negative things to go on (Antin B., 38 y.o.).

Corruption, bribes— it’s the reality at the *** [institution of higher education]. Why? Because the situation is such in Ukraine now that intellectuals cannot make use of themselves. On the one hand, they studied something, they are educated—but the concepts they operate with, their mental apparatus, all this is on the level of the nineteenth century. Their education is a bit strange, I think. There is the root of problem, I think: they did not become good professionals, they don’t understand new tendencies. [On the other hand] look at the general situation in Ukraine now—everything is determined by what connection to the authorities one has. These people [intellectuals] serve to some political structure. In our country a free person and an intellectual are practically absent. It is preferable to be a political scientist than to be a philosopher, because as a political scientist you can earn your living. The pressure of political powers—this is what makes our existence in Ukraine so dramatic (Oleh D., 45 y.o.).

Representatives of the younger generation have also expressed criticism of the academic intelligentsia:

Maybe I put it a little bit too harshly, but, anyway, if our university intellectuals would have shown themselves in some public space more often, in the media, for example, then everyone would see who of them is a fool and who is not. [...] There is no open discussion, broader polemics and so on. […] If we assume that lecturers at institutions of higher education and school teachers belong to intelligentsia, then, I think, the absolute majority of intelligentsia is not interested in much at all. Take a typical university lecturer, for example. I don’t think these persons are interested in something other than the narrow topic of their own research (Tamara K., 25 y.o.).

It seems that ‘banal’ narrative about academe and institutions of higher education, which emphasizes their negative sides, has been a persistent part in the L’viv intelligentsia’s discursive repertoire around 1991. It has been shared by representatives of both old and younger generations and, hence, has been one of the discursive elements of cultural continuity. Within this discourse the postwar academic institutions in L’viv have been conventionally presented as bureaucratized structures, as stagnating (or even obscurantist) institutions tolerating no fresh ideas, as places of sharp contrasts where harmonious human relations between people as well as the intellectualism and morality of some few devoted and talented personalities look like sporadic flashes of light in the darkness. Oftentimes, contrary to both old and new ideological discourses about
intellectual progress, such ‘bright spots’ have been presented rather as vestiges of bygone old times than as elements heralding a better future.

Such fixation on the authenticity of the past is quite understandable in the case of the intelligentsia educated within the Soviet system. Generally, actors who make their claims from the position of cultural authority, that is, on the basis of the superiority of their cultural identities, must unavoidably elaborate persuading narratives about authenticity and strong historical rootedness of these identities. However, there were also other reasons for the emphasis that related to the particular circumstances of the intelligentsia at that time. While information about the latest intellectual and cultural trends from the other side of the Iron Curtain was extremely limited, interest in the silenced and scarcely known elements of the local past (intellectual trends, history, literature, folklore and religious traditions, daily customs, cuisine) grew among the critically thinking part of Lvivites. Nevertheless, after 1991 this retrospective orientation, combined with pessimistic views on the present state of affairs and uncertainty about the future, might also have fueled persisting cultural autarky and an unwillingness to open the academic sphere and higher education for new ideas coming ‘from outside’. In an article which was published in 2002, the dean of the Ukrainian philology department at the Lviv National University together with a literary critic known for his propagandistic statements demonstrated exactly this kind of attitude:

If the old methodology of “schooling the staff” does not suit anymore, does it mean that we must get a new one? And where is it then? It is imperceptibly suggested under the guise of various stipends, grants, trainings etc. on the condition that one speaks English. Seemingly, we must gratefully take off our hats and bow…. but what are we thanking for? …Without exaggeration one may say that due to such imported “trainings” [Soros Foundation’s activities have been targeted, among other things, in this interview—E.N.] in the devilish elderberry bushes grows a “blossom” that penetrates our bodies and injects poison into our souls (Konflikt 2002: 150).

Since independence, the established academic institutions in Lviv have been constantly restructured, reformed and renamed (suffice it to say that a range of institutions of higher education in Lviv after 1992 were turned into ‘academies’ and ‘universities’, some of them were granted the status of National ones), but the effects of these novelties have oftentimes been too weak to change the persistent (dis)balance of power and to spur new intellectual activities. The Lviv academic sphere, like everywhere in Ukraine, continues to be strongly dependent on administrative decisions as well as financing coming ‘from above’, and burdened by ‘corruption’ (Grabowicz 2005: 22-25). Besides, as recent events connected to defense of a controversial Ph.D. thesis at the Ivan Franko National University revealed, a new trend of post-1991 nationalist ideologization of scholarship is growing: “national realism instead of old socialist realism, which now proclaims the monolithic principle of ‘the Ukrainian approach to Ukrainian themes’” (Grabowicz 2007: 14). With few exceptions, this academic sphere can hardly be viewed as an autonomous space ensuring constructive intellectual discussion. Nevertheless, after 1991 there appeared some new academic institutions in
L’viv which were intended to be harbors of independent intellectual activities. Financed wholly or partially by private donors, foundations and non-state organizations (often connected to the Ukrainian diaspora), these institutions often face obstacles created by bureaucracy on both local and central levels. Nevertheless, as they managed to bring together many promising younger scholars, especially those who were trained in Europe, Canada or the USA, they proved to be competitive and productive even under unfavorable conditions.

One of the most prominent institutions of this kind is the Ukrainian Catholic University (UCU), opened in 2002 on the basis of the L’viv Theological Academy. This university, which combines laic humanitarian and theological education, and besides stresses its Ukrainian orientation, is unique in the country. It must be pointed out that the adjective ‘Ukrainian’ does not solely imply the Ukrainian national community, but rather addresses the transnational Ukrainian community distinguished by culture, language and religion. The ‘mission’ of the university is to be “an open academic community living in the Eastern Christian tradition and forming leaders to serve with professional excellence in Ukraine and internationally—for the glory of God, the common good, and the dignity of the human person”. Note that this passage omits one of the almost obligatory phrases used in the official formulations of this kind in post-1991 Ukrainian academe. Namely, the university does not declare breeding of intelligentsia (national, Ukrainian or whatever) among its priorities. Instead, references to ‘leaders’ and ‘professional excellence’ are used as tokens of the non-Soviet and ‘non-post-Soviet’ orientation (though the verb ‘to serve’ still may be associated with discourses about intelligentsia serving the people, the nation, and high ideals).

The national, the transnational, the elite, the humanitarian and the Christian have often been pointed out as elements absent in the Soviet model of higher education, and thus the UCU has been intended to fill these lacunas and, in a way, to serve as a model for future transformation of the whole system of higher education in Ukraine. This later ambition has been clearly stated: “The opening of UCU, with its new approach to learning, with the only university-level faculty of theology and philosophy and the largest modern humanities library in Ukraine, is a major step in the effort to change higher education in Ukraine. Because the UCU is not a government institution, it has wider possibilities to innovate and to aid in the push for the general reform of university education”. Practical steps for fulfillment of this ambition have been constantly made. At the university, which has established partnership connections with, for example, Harvard and Oxford universities, students obtain a full-fledged university education and scientific degrees in such subjects as classical philology, sociology, history and theology. The university’s academic staff includes both renowned

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81 For example, the authorities in charge of higher education in Ukraine were reluctant to accept the papers confirming the academic degrees of Borys Gudziak, presently the rector of the Ukrainian Catholic University in L’viv, which he obtained at Harvard University. Allegedly, they were puzzled that a person with diplomas ‘inconvertible’ to the Ukrainian academic degree system was seeking permission to lead a Ukrainian institution of higher education.

82 www.ucu.edu.ua/eng

83 www.ucu.edu.ua/eng/about/history
Ukrainian scholars and researchers from abroad (such as, for instance, the UCU’s rector Borys Gudziak, an American of Ukrainian origin) and, in addition, prioritizes the intellectual brilliance of the entrants. All in all, a challenging and unusual academic milieu was created, whose reputation in L’viv is overwhelmingly positive. A number of the respondents (two of them actually teaching part-time at the Ukrainian Catholic University) described it as the most intellectually stimulating academic institution that could be presently found in L’viv.

Nevertheless, despite the existence of several reputed academic institutions and milieus, and despite some positive changes within higher education, post-1991 transformations of academic space in L’viv have been rather superficial. Whether the academe is viewed as a greenhouse for intelligentsia, as a nurturing soil for professionals and intellectuals, or as a fosterer of intellectuality and human dignity, it should provide an autonomous intellectual space and ensure the possibility of free intellectual polemics. Under post-1991 conditions, this autonomous space could not be sufficiently widened because of the continuing political pressure of the authorities, of ‘corrupted’ private interests and of growing marketization of social life. Besides, “Under conditions of general crisis and the financial bankruptcy of scholarly and cultural institutions, it is more difficult for scholarly excellence to assert itself. Constant politicking and intrigues in the academic sphere create a rather peculiar selection mechanism” (Daskalov 1996: 82).

As a consequence, intelligentsia and intellectuals strive to create their forums and spaces for communication and intellectual and cultural activities outside official academic institutions—although their discussions and activities still revolve mostly around the issues actualized within the ‘official sphere’ (e.g., national culture and traditions, nexus Ukraine—Europe etc.). Possibilities of ideational and financial support from various foreign organizations, foundations and private donors operating in the borderline space of Galicia facilitate this process. These intellectual forums and spaces, with few exceptions, evolve on the basis of personal acquaintance and face-to-face communication. Mostly their activities are not announced through accessible popular media, and access to these circles (and, accordingly, to their resources) is limited for ‘outsiders’. This feature may indeed serve as an illustration of the thesis about chronic lack of social trust in the post-Soviet socio-cultural space. Nevertheless, intellectual and artistic novelties and experiments taking place in these milieus should not be underestimated. Besides the fact that these activities have been crucial for maintaining L’viv’s hallmark of the ‘Ukrainian cultural capital of Ukraine’, they may be viewed in a broader perspective as the sites where the cultural discourses of civil society in Ukraine are being (re-)formed.

7.4. Theatre and other sites for art consumption

When discussing private and semi-private spaces that can harbor autonomous intellectual discussion, it is relevant to address Victor Turner’s (1977) conceptualization of a specific type of group experience called ‘communitas’. Communitas usually exist within social structures, but on the margins, in
breaches of institutionalized relations and rigid structures, as spots of suspended social order. They are formed on the basis of the sense of a common goal and collective emotional bonds, they create a collective feeling of equality that transcends individual social status. In a way, sites of intelligentsia’s and intellectuals’ communication include elements of communitas as they tend to break out from the habitual ‘structural’ order in order to function as autonomous intellectual spaces. The urban sphere of L’viv, even in the circumstances of the political oppression, provided the educated urbanites with opportunities to gather, converse and even experience solidarity typical of communitas under various occasions and pretexts. Especially the sites reserved for exhibition and performing of arts, i.e., the sites which generally may be regarded as small territories of ‘anti-structure’ (Turner 1974), have been especially apt for this aim.

After World War II, as before it, one of the most popular cultural attractions for L’viv’ cultivated public used to be visiting theatres. Interest in theatre was high in the first decades of the twentieth century in Galicia, as development of high cultural forms here, like in many other East-Central European peoples, was part of their national awakening (Himka 1999: 110-111, Steperi 2005: 63-64). Many villages boasted their own amateur theatre circles, and theatre scenes in L’viv attracted internationally famous actors and opera singers. Theatre used to be both a principal artistic form and one of the important institutions of civil society in the nationally mobilized Ukrainian Galician society at that time. Attending theatre in L’viv in the Soviet period, in accordance with previously existing tradition, used to be both an aesthetic event, a festivity, an occasion to expose the best items of the wardrobes, an opportunity to mingle with acquaintances, a chance to mark one’s own status as a member of cultured public and, oftentimes, the starting point for discussions which after the end of the performance could be transferred to someone’s kitchen or a bar. It was prestigious to have acquaintances among theatre staff, and in particular, among theatre actors. It may be suggested that for the intelligentsia the artistic reality of the theatre at that time was a kind of anti-structure, a ‘breach’ in daily routine and a temporally emerging autonomous site stimulating intellectual and aesthetical discussions. Several older respondents mentioned that they used to be ardent theatre-goers. One of them pointed out that in the times of ‘stagnation’ intelligentsia who attended unconventional theatre performances, which as if by miracle were not stopped by the censure, could experience overwhelming feelings of a common goal and community typical of ‘communitas’:

_Ukrainian-ness was implicitly manifested [in the times of ‘stagnation’] in a way that we too are a part of the world, a part of Europe. […] Non-identification (ne-identyfikatsiia) with the Soviet style was important. Submerging in some inner world, where the Ukrainian correlated with the European was important. I recall that I saw a play performed by some Polish theatre here, in L’viv, in 1973, if I am not mistaken. It was a Polish variant of the French absurdist theatre, a play by Tadeusz Różewicz. Poles were allowed to perform such things from time to time. I remember that plenty of L’viv intelligentsia attended this play. I myself was encouraged to come there by a friend of mine, N. [presently a famous Ukrainian public intellectual, writer and literary critic]. Sheer presence at this performance was viewed as an act of civil courage. It could be regarded as a kind of_
moral choice, a manifestation of non-acceptance of social realist orthodoxy. It was a colossal feeling of participation in something extremely meaningful, almost a sacral feeling (Pavlo K., 56 y.o.).

Theatre used to be one of those unique public spaces which made it possible for the intelligentsia to make themselves visible and experience a kind of community feeling, even in those cases when the aesthetic event which this spiritual unity was triggered by, was of a more conventional type (for example, classical plays). Visiting numerous L’viv museums and the Art gallery on weekends was also important for being and becoming a representative of intelligentsia. As a retired female teacher expressed it,

For me it is extremely important sometimes just to watch other intelleihentni people who come to the museums, to the concerts, to the theatre. When I was young it was unthinkable not to go to the opera, to the theatres. There were plenty of performances all the time, and for me and my friends to go to the theatre was as natural as to breathe. You know, it is so depressing that young people don’t go to the theatre nowadays. Teachers do not take pupils to the museums. […] I don’t know why. Probably, people simply don’t care about culture anymore (Liubomyra I., 75 y.o.).

Thus, in the Soviet period it was still possible—and important—to mark one’s belonging to intelligentsia by way of visiting public spaces that were associated with ‘old’ intelligentsia and the consumption of the high culture. In the early 1990s, because of the economic crisis in Ukraine, L’viv theatres, like many other state-financed cultural institutions, faced extremely harsh times. Nevertheless, L’viv was chosen to host the international theatre festival Golden Lion (‘Zolotyi lev’), organized at the cost of various non-state sponsors. This initiative became extremely popular among L’vivites, who got a chance to attend performances of experimental theatres from Poland, Germany, Russia, Hungary, Great Britain and other European countries. Yet, because of financial problems, Golden Lion did not become a regular artistic event.

Aside from museums, galleries and theatres with older history, which use to be—and to various extent still are—financed by the state, there appeared some new artistic sites which manage to survive independently, to set standards of artistic quality and to attract wider circles of the public interested in contemporary Ukrainian arts and culture. One of such site is the art association ‘Dzyga’ (‘Spinning top’), located, not by chance, on Virmens’ka street (see the next sub-chapter). ‘Dzyga’ provides L’viv artists (many of them younger ones) with a location, financing and informational support for their projects. This art centre keeps its distance from the officially supported art institutions of the city, and for many it is the heart of the present L’viv artistic and Bohemian life. It has been observed that ‘Dzyga’ has been responsible for changing the location of cultural interaction in L’viv. In the early 1990s, social gatherings for the L’viv Bohema took place as in the 1970s and 1980s—in small groups, often randomly assembled, meeting at someone’s art studio or basement. With a bottle of wine or cognac, new songs were introduced, the latest poems were read, and fresh paintings were displayed in intimate domestic settings. Today, most of these people gather at one of Dzyga’s three
It is notable that the core figure behind ‘Dzyga’ is Markiian Ivashchyshyn, a successful businessman who used to be the head of the Student Brotherhood of the L’viv Polytechnic University84 and one of the organizers of the Granite Revolution in 1990.

7.5. Private and semi-private spheres for ‘companies’, friends and acquaintances

Small territories of intellectual and spiritual freedom used to be spontaneously created by companies of friends and acquaintances in a private atmosphere, at somebody’s home. Also, spontaneous discussions and conversations used to be a part of the so-called sabantui: a ‘non-official’ part of the official Soviet celebrations, drinking parties with colleagues from work, which usually took place on the office premises, but could be also moved ‘to the fresh air’ near the city. The custom (as well as the name) came from Russia after World War II, and at the end of the 1960s this “semi-legal attempt of free celebration” became popular among the city’s technical intelligentsia, teachers, doctors, personnel at research institutes, museums, banks and stores (Matuchina 2000: 42-43). Surely, such informal communication with colleagues from work had its limitations, and these festivities could seldom become occasions for sincere talk about political and spiritual issues. Talk on issues which could be perceived not only as directly anti-Soviet, but simply as inappropriate or controversial, were habitually self-censored in such circumstances. Such talk, anecdotes about Soviet political leaders and songs of the Ukrainian Sich riflemen (Sichovi stril’tsi) used to be attributes of parties with trusted persons: relatives and close friends. For the representatives of nationally aware Galician intelligentsia, for example, the sheer fact of celebrating traditional Christian holy days, which were condemned by the authorities, in the circle of the intimates and friends could be perceived as winning a little ‘territory of freedom’.

This tradition of private gatherings of artistic-cultural circles has not disappeared with the end of the Soviet period. In 1998, during my field work in L’viv, I came into contact with students who, besides their participation in the Student Brotherhood of L’viv Polytechnic University, known for its work on defending students rights, used to get in touch with various artistic and culturally-oriented circles. These young people invited me to attend an artistic-literary party given by the young poetess and bard Iaroslava85 known for her songs in the style of Ukrainian folk ballads. That early afternoon approximately twenty persons gathered in Iaroslava’s dwelling on the first floor of an old ‘Polish’ house. The flat, consisting of a tiny kitchen and two

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84 See more about this organization in the sub-chapter 7.8.
85 The name has been changed.
light spacious rooms, was not especially remarkable: thick woolen carpets in the living room and a couple of
colorful paintings with floral motifs were the only catchy details of the interior. Guests arrived with packets of
biscuits, cakes, chocolate and candies with them, all to be contributed to the concluding part of the event,
namely, mingle and tea and coffee drinking. The majority of the guests were students, typically dressed and
looking quite usual, though a couple of girls (as it proved to be, students of the Art Academy) had fine hand-
made leather belts and bracelets, one of the older males had a long moustache in Sich Cossack style and a
couple of young boys were long-haired. Needless to say, everyone spoke Ukrainian. Iaroslava, a pleasant
looking young woman who managed to combine her life as a single mother with quite a successful carrier as
poet and singer, was obviously accustomed to the role of the mistress of the artistic salon. She introduced
people to each other and mingled with the guests for a while. Then everyone took a seat: some on the sofa,
some in a couple of chairs, and some guests sat unpretentiously on the floor. The mistress of the house
announced the agenda. First the man with Cossack moustache told about an expedition down the Dnipro in a
replica of the Cossack chaika boat and about the building of the boat by a group of enthusiasts. The public was
obviously interested, as in the course of the talk the man was interrupted with the questions of the curious
guests.

Then the floor was given to me, for the ‘official’ reason of my visit to Iaroslava’s was to tell
about my research project focused on subcultural youth styles in L’viv. Some of my statements about youth
culture resulted in quite lively discussion. Remarkably, two younger men whose hairstyle was reminiscent of
those of rock-musicians and hippies, preferred to keep silence. The polemics was concluded by Iaroslava, who
said, seriously and resolutely: ‘We don’t need chaos. We had plenty of it during all the years under the Soviets.
The youth needs light and order, and our folk heritage is a source of this light and order’. By 1998 this kind of
‘nativist’ (Hnatiuk 2003: 42) discourse, inherently connected to the narrative about the ‘abnormality’ of the
Soviets, has become an established figure of thinking among the L’viv intelligentsia. Although this dualistic
model was first and foremost omnipresent in the local media discourse (most obviously, in the L’viv literary
magazine ‘Dzvin’, which is an official regional magazine of the Writers’ Union of Ukraine), it proved to be
that even the younger generation, regardless of (or separate from) their efforts of ideational emancipation,
might be susceptible to dualistic models of this kind.

In the 1970s and 1980s it was quite usual to gather in smaller companies in some ‘enterprises of
public nourishing’ (zaklady hromads’koho kharchuvannya), which was the official Soviet name for cafes, bars
and canteens where, alongside other beverages, tea and coffee ‘in Turkish style’ used to be served. Some of
these places (called knaipy in colloquial Galician argot), like, for example, the one situated in the city’s
historical centre, in the narrow and quiet Virmens’ka (Armenian) street, known for its historical architecture
and special atmosphere, became particularly famous. Artistic intelligentsia and Bohemian types of different
generations, attracted by the coziness of the place and ‘the best coffee served in the city’, became its habitués in
the 1970s. At the end of the 1980s Virmenka (the café and surroundings, Armianka in Russian) got an almost legendary status—and was mentioned in several songs by popular L’viv musicians—as a place associated mainly with youth subcultures. Unconventional looking young people (mostly hippies), students, representatives of the artistic underground and other ‘strange types’ used to meet in Virmenka, which in this capacity was known far beyond L’viv. One of Virmenka’s habitués spoke about this famous place on the occasion of its 20-year jubilee:

Virmenka, it is in general a phenomenon of tusovka. It was, in principle, international, and mostly Russian-speaking. Perhaps, because of this, when the independent Ukrainian state appeared, this tusovka in fact stopped existing. But Alik [Olisevych, a veteran hippie from L’viv—E.N.], for example, has always been a cosmopolite, he took part in the international movements, but he’s never felt ashamed that he is Ukrainian, he spoke Ukrainian wherever it was possible. He never felt ashamed because of his Ukrainian-ness. I’ve recently heard such proclamations: “That was just an assemblage of moskali!” But just recall these years, in 1987 none could talk about an independent Ukraine. … If now thousands say they were born in embroidered Ukrainian shirts, it’s not true (Horelyk 1998).

Hilary Pilkington (1994: 234), who investigated the phenomenon of tusovka among youth in Moscow, defines it as a distinct form and the basic unit of youth cultural activity in the cities. More concretely, this is the name for various young groupings of unstable composition regularly meeting in certain places to hang out and to converse. In L’viv, Virmenka was only one in the range of such semi-private places associated with freethinking and strange looking young people in the late Soviet period. Nevertheless, it has been unequivocally defined as a gathering place of just intelligentsia—in contrast to other cafés that were usually monopolized by other kinds of visitors. According to a middle-aged respondent, who claimed to be well-informed about the ‘underground’ life of L’viv in the 1980s,

This café was beyond the sphere of interest of the gangs. They didn't like the place. Virmenka was definitely a ‘spot’ for intelligentsia, especially for those from the Institute of Arts. The coffee was good there, they said, but I don’t remember that Virmenka was associated with some particular lifestyle at that time. It was not a strictly student milieu, it was mixed, but when someone mentioned Virmenka, the direct association was ‘intelligentsia’. But later on it turned to the youth place, for those ‘hairy ones’ and company (Dmytro D., 42 y.o.).

Virmenka became more than just a street corner, not in the last turn due to the atmosphere of the place, with the unique architectural complex of the ancient Armenian church in the vicinity, and the ‘typically old L’viv’ feature of coffee-drinking, which evoked the omnipresence of the ‘European’ cultural heritage in the city. ‘Otherness’ of the place resonated with eccentric features of people hanging out there. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, when numerous new cafés and bars became a permanent feature of the city landscape,

86 The widespread term moskal is an offensive nickname for Russians in Ukraine.
they became a usual place for meetings of the younger generation of intellectuals and culture-interested L’vivites. Although in popular opinion the proliferation of cafés in L’viv centre has been ‘just’ quite natural restoration of the L’viv centuries-old tradition of urban public interaction, closer investigations have revealed that “until the summer of 1996, there were very few sidewalk cafés in L’viv, and without Western advertising strategies they probably would not exist in such numbers as they do today” (Andryczyk 2004: 248). Nevertheless, the crucial factor behind the mass re-introduction of cafés as taken-for-granted places for public conversation was willingness of the L’vivites to consciously affirm the Western European heritage in L’viv and to embrace the European style of café life as something typical of their city (ibid: 247). One of the most famous places of meeting for the L’viv young intellectuals and Bohemians has been club-café Doll (‘Lial’ka’) which for over ten years has been a popular meeting point for L’viv ‘informal’ youth interested in contemporary music styles. When in 2004 ‘Lial’ka’ was threatened with closure because of a conflict with the L’viv tax administration, the youth organized protest actions and, eventually, their favorite club with its live music performances was open again.

Among the more recent ‘culturalizing’ initiatives was the so-called literary café Open Book (‘Vidkryta knyha’) adjacent to a big bookstore. Notably, the café was opened by a business structure engaged in publishing books in Russian, and the signboard Russian Book (‘Russkaia kniga’) was initially hung above the café’s entrance. However, the organizers, who intended to attract first and foremost creative young people and intellectual elite in L’viv, soon changed the café’s name (as the ‘irritating’ signboard ‘Russkaia kniga’ was reportedly smashed by unknown persons) and announced that, while drinking coffee, the visitors would be able to get acquainted with recently published books: “not only those of Russian writers, but also of the great authors of world literature and, of course, publications of the best L’viv publishing houses” (Postup 22.09.2003).

Contestation of cultural influences from Russia takes different forms in L’viv. One of the informants, an IT-specialist and activist of the youth organization Youth National Congress (‘Molodizhniy Natsional’nyi Kongres’) told about gatherings arranged by young poetry admirers in the café Under the Blue Bottle (‘Pid syn’oiu pliashkoiu’). Notably, the place chosen for these gatherings became a tourist magnet and a typical example of how ‘Austro-Hungarian myth’ has been commercialized in the recent years. The café on the dark ground floor of an ancient stone house in the city centre is decorated in à la Habsburg style with portraits of the Emperor Francis Joseph I and other known personalities, and food and drinks which ‘convey the spirit of the epoch’ are served.

87 See, for example, the introductory description of L’viv knaipy which served as a background for the conversations focusing on the Ukrainian theme that took place between a young intellectual L’vivite and his older German colleague at the beginning of the 1990s (Mossmann 1998).
Recently there were gatherings for literature admirers in 'Pid syn'oiu pliaškoiù'. These gatherings were called 'Dots' ('Krapky'). From the beginning everything was very nice. Everyone came with his own poetry, with his own creative works and, while drinking coffee, read them to others and then there was a discussion. Extremely pleasant atmosphere! You know, Galician separatists used to have their meetings there for a while. Unfortunately, our gatherings did not last too long. For one thing, the guy who arranged these meetings was primarily interested in finding material for his website, and when he found what he was after, he withdrew. And then everything was left to take its course. More and more people came only to look and to listen. The wider the circle became, the worse the quality became. [...] We gathered for almost one year, every Sunday. Toward the end the public who attended these gatherings became too noisy and too undisciplined. People started to behave badly, to shout, to litter on the floor. It started to look like a typical tusovka, like many others. So the owner of the café asked us politely not to gather there anymore. There were other efforts to arrange such meetings with poetry readings and discussions. Someone publishes a little anthology and invites people to readings at a lecture hall at the University, for example. Interested people come, it’s nice. But I miss such literary meetings on regular basis. Youth needs them (Andrii T., 23 y.o.).

7.6. To the Carpathians!

While theatres, museums, galleries and to some extent cafés function as public places which ‘cultured’ people in L’viv attend in order to be seen and distinguish themselves symbolically from ‘the masses’, there were not so few L’vivites who searched ‘territories of freedom’ and spaces for culture-related interests outside the city. The compact phrase ‘to go to the Carpathians’ (khodyty v Karpaty) has addressed a range of free-time activities: from skiing and mountaineering to camping in some picturesque scenery or
wandering between the Carpathian villages. Trips to the Carpathians used to be popular among educated L’vivites before 1939 (Mysak 2005: 191, Nadraha 2004: 127-139). After the war the Carpathian area for a long time was too dangerous a place for tourism, as uprooting of guerrilla groups continued there long into the 1950s. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, trips to the Carpathians became an established part of youth and student culture in L’viv. Since 1993, subcultural youth have gathered for several weeks each summer in the Carpathians, near Shypit waterfall, for camping. Views about these meetings differ fairly widely, but the fact is that annually several dozens of punks, hippies and other representatives of youth subcultural styles from the Western and other parts of Ukraine, from other places of the former USSR, and even from other European countries come to their meetings in this picturesque place.

Scout camps, during which participants of different ages exercise survival skills in nature as well as improve their knowledge of Ukrainian history and traditions, oftentimes have the Carpathians as their scenery. For amateur historians, history students interested in the recent war history, as well as for hunters after war relics, the Carpathian forests became a real gold mine where remnants of ammunition, shelters and even vehicles of several armies could allegedly be found in abundance88.

Since the 1990s, the range of activities attracting young people to the Carpathians include, among other things, amateur ethnographic expeditions, which are sometimes organized by youth branches of some political parties, by the so-called clubs of studying youth, by teachers, students and other enthusiasts. Collecting folklore, searching for old embroideries, pieces of traditional hand-made clothes and other remnants of local rural culture in the Carpathian villages used to be the core cultural concern of the Lion Society, one of the first culturally-oriented non-governmental organizations which appeared in L’viv in the late years of perestroika (Kenney 2002). Nevertheless, as the rumors assure, amateur trips to secluded mountain villages in search of old icons, embroideries, carpets and folk costumes started at least a decade earlier. One may doubt that such hunting for local antiquities used to be inspired by concerns for recovering and preserving the local ethnic culture in the first turn. As Dziegiel (1998: 243) points out, during times of real socialism possession of pieces of folk art used to be vogue among urban intelligentsia in Poland, because more demanding urban consumers were tired of mass products that were dull and of a poor quality. Quite possibly, the same vogue appeared in L’viv at that period as well. From the late 1980s the interest of educated L’vivites in local cultural traditions, history and folk crafts grew exponentially as it also became fuelled by the old-new traditionalist discourse stemming from the Ukrainian cultural establishment and the authorities. For this and other reasons, these amateur ethnographic expeditions, and simply wandering in the Carpathians to encounter the half-known world of rural natives and the magnificent nature, maintain their symbolic significance for a part of L’viv intelligentsia.

88 According to the information obtained from history students Oleksandr L. and Ruslan S.
### 7.7. Public activities and organizations

Due to the political and socio-cultural situation, from the end of the war until the middle of the 1980s, L’viv intelligentsia’s independent initiatives and activities were mostly confined to the private sphere or, alternatively, took their root in the narrow grey zone of the artistic, intellectual and political underground, whose most known representatives belonged to the milieu of ‘the generation of the 1960s’ (shistdesiatnyky)\textsuperscript{89}. ‘Prolisok’, the L’viv branch of shistdesiatnyky’s famous Klub Tvorchoi Molodi (Club of Creative Youth), which was founded in 1960 in Kyiv under the auspices of the local district committee of the Komsomol, functioned openly in 1962-1964. Such diffuse associations of freethinking intelligentsia, which appeared in the wake of Khrushchev’s ‘thaw’, existed only for a short time, and up to the end of the 1980s public associations of the Ukrainian intelligentsia remained under the strict control of the authorities.

Since the late 1980s the public space in L’viv, previously dominated by politically docile institutions loyal to the existing regime, became suddenly open to activities of more or less emancipated non-governmental actors (political parties, movements, organizations, creative networks, religious communities etc.). Representatives of intelligentsia eagerly took the opportunity to apply their knowledge and organizational skills in the new political circumstances where the collective action frame, being alternative to the Soviet model of nationalism, was itself a nationalist one (Hrycak 1997: 78-79). Notwithstanding different agendas, the recently created public forums and NGOs engaging intelligentsia programmatically address the discourses of nationalism and state-building which imbue the political rhetoric in Western Ukraine. In other words, there is a tendency to uniformity of reference behind multiplicity of forms.

Cultural activists, intelligentsia and students challenged the state monopoly on directing both elite and mass culture primarily by reaching for the rhetoric and practices they had already learned to master. Besides, they quickly adopted new ideational models, due to which the intellectual and artistic scenery in L’viv after 1991 became more diverse, but also more fragmentary. For these and other reasons, various milieus and circles did not manage to lead continuous discussions and maintain regular contacts with each other. One of the respondents admitted internal divisions in the circles of L’viv intelligentsia and intellectuals, which might be accounted for in terms of differences in world outlook and ideological predilections of different generations:

\begin{quote}
I am aware that my observations may be quite one-sided, because I myself belong to a certain milieu, but, anyway, I am sure that the circles that I know and those whom I am used to encountering more or less frequently, are only the tip of the iceberg. People who gather around [magazine] ‘\textit{I}, [clubs] ‘Lial’ka’ and ‘Dzyga’ may think about themselves that they are the core of intellectual life in the city, but, probably, their milieu may prove to be quite marginal on the scale of L’viv. They are quite numerous, maybe a couple of hundreds persons, they may be opinion-makers, they may be important and visible, but they are not at all a dominant phenomenon in L’viv. There
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{89} See chapters 3 and 4.
exists a huge silent sphere which is impenetrable for us in the same way as the milieu of Islamic extremists is impenetrable for secret services. They see no reason to have discussions with us, they do not accept strangers and they verbalize their own persuasions somewhere in kitchens, in closed company. Probably they are afraid of being ridiculed, who knows. In my opinion, anyway, there are quite many people, especially young people in L’viv, I mean those educated ones, who propagate liberal views, left-centric views. It is first and foremost people of the young and middle-aged generation who master foreign languages, who studied abroad, who travelled, and for them liberal orientation is quite natural. On the other hand, I personally know quite many people of the right-centric, even right-conservative, orientation. I am not welcome in their circles, because they feel threatened by people with liberal views. They simply avoid them, and their coteries are based on a kind of tribalism (tribalizm), the main principle is family relations, personal acquaintances and so on. They are more numerous than propagators of the liberal choices, but for some reasons they do not have access to the public arenas. They are more hidden, while the liberal and demo-liberal milieus are more expressive. Besides, and this is important, conservative milieus usually do not have support from western sponsors, from all these Fulbright Foundations, Soros Foundations, Gaudi Polonia and so on. Therefore they cannot crystallize their opinions, theorize them and actualize them in public discourse properly. It is not good, I think. I feel that the young generation is going to revolt against such situation, I see already some signals that the youngest generation is turning to conservative ideas, but they do not have access to quality products, so to speak. And, unfortunately, they often take up that rubbish that is in supply. But, anyway, I think this youngest generation, on the one hand, is world-open, but, on the other hand, it strives after a combination of this world-openness with some traditionalist patterns, with a quite conservative nationalist paradigm (Petro A., approx. 40 y.o.).

In the course of my fieldwork I contacted representatives of several L’viv-based non-governmental organizations which reputedly attracted educated L’vivites of different ages, interested in independent cultural activities. One of them was the Student Brotherhood of the L’viv State Polytechnic University (Students’ke Bratstvo Derzhavnoho Universytetu ‘L’vivs’ka Politekhnika’), or, in short, ‘Bratstvo’, founded in 1989. In 1998, when I got in touch with ‘Bratstvo’, it had reputation of one of a few ‘non-pocket’ youth associations as it strived to defend the often violated rights of high school students to a range of social benefits (for example, the right to a regularly paid meager allowance called stypendiia, to ticket reductions in public transport etc.) and was actively involved into a number of non-profit public initiatives and cultural activities. In particular, ‘Bratstvo’ figured as a main organizer of such successful wide-scale projects as art festivals ‘Vvykh’ (1990, 1992) and ‘deFormatsia’ (1994), the student art competition ‘Blue Bird’ (‘Synii ptakh’) (1998) and an exhibition devoted to the history of youth culture in L’viv ‘We came out from rock’n’roll’ (‘My vyishly z rok’n’rolu’) (1999). Announcements of ‘Bratstvo’ inviting fellow students from other universities to participate in protest meetings, street carnivals, discussions on politics, art exhibitions, poetry evenings (vechory poezii), bicycle tours, painting of traditional ornaments on Easter eggs ( pysanky) and

90 They are usually called ‘hromads’ki organizatsii ta ob’iednannia’ in Ukrainian.
91 This student organization signalizes its affinity with historical brotherhoods, i.e. fraternities that played a significant role in the urban life from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries in Ukraine and Belarus. Fraternities performed a number of religious and secular functions, among them defence of Orthodox faith against Catholic expansionism, and promotion of cultural and educational activity.
plenty of other opportunities, could be seen on the premises of the neighboring universities. Besides, this student organization was still remembered as being one of the principal organizers of such a symbolically charged event as the student political hunger strike in Kyiv in 1990, known as the Granite Revolution.

‘Bratstvo’s concern of being independent from the university, the political parties and other epicenters of power in L’viv resulted in settling of its little office in a ‘neutral’ space not connected to some ‘official’ premises, namely, in the cellar of an ordinary old dwelling house not far from the Polytechnic University’s campus. The office’s anonymity outside (no plate or inscription bearing the name of the organization could be seen) was compensated by plenty of serious and amusing inscriptions, plates, and pictures inside. The interior of the shabbily decorated and constantly crowded office bore more resemblance to cellar studios of underground rock-groups than to the official premise where regular meetings of the activists were held according to protocol. Among the inscriptions one could see the semi-parodic ‘Rules of behavior on the office territory of the Student Brotherhood’, which included quite a seriously stated point: “Speaking Russian is strictly forbidden”. I witnessed violation of this point only once, but then, as it was explained to me, the male student who spoke Russian in the office was a person ‘whom we know very well, he is one of us anyway’. Indeed, it looked like every friendly and interested person was welcome in ‘Bratstvo’.

The activists told me that they have never been especially bothered by inspections sent from some local authority, as the rent, electricity and water bills were paid in time, and the neighbors from the flats above had seldom complained about noise. However, in 1997 their office had been attacked, its furniture demolished and a couple of activists were beaten by perpetrators whom the students recognized as adherents of an ultra-right political organization. As the ‘Bratstvo’s leaders explained, this organization was eager to convert ‘Bratstvo’ into its subdivision, and this attack was meant to make the students more compliant. At the time when I did my fieldwork, ‘Bratstvo’ used to support a number of centrist and centrist-right political parties during local and all-Ukrainian elections, but was categorically against the idea of “becoming a Komsomol to some Communist party”. Political actions arranged or supported by ‘Bratstvo’ were explained as a means for promoting cultural and societal interests of the students. Nevertheless, as one of the then ‘Bratstvo’s leaders explained, after 1991 it was clever to claim a stake in culturally-oriented initiatives in order to keep the students interested in public activities:

The organization was created in 1989, and at that time the aim was strictly political: to gain independence for Ukraine. The methods were chosen that matched the aim: protests, rallies, hunger strikes. Then independence was gained, and it became clear that the direction of activities must be changed. And so splits within the organization began. Someone assured us that we must go on, so to speak, shooting and shouting, others said that we must press the authorities, someone else said that we must be engaged in issues of education and such things which fit students better. I think it was not solely our problem, it was like this everywhere in Ukraine. We struggled, shouted—and then? We came to the conclusion that the easiest way to keep the students active, to draw them from the dormitories and homes, was to make something culture-oriented and entertaining: concerts, disco
parties, exhibitions. People who come to us are usually not interested in becoming politicians and [parliamentary] deputies. They want to do something useful and interesting, they want to widen their circle of acquaintances, to get some leadership experience. [...] It is a principal issue for us now: we must keep ourselves beyond political groupings. The time of politicization is over, we must make a distinction between politics and public activity (Andrii Z., 22 y.o.).

Indeed, ‘Bratstvo’ s leaflets and brochures reflected this development. In 1997, ‘Bratstvo’ was generally defined as a “voluntary, independent youth public (hromads’ka) organization” whose main aim was “participation in the processes of building up (rozbudova) of the independent democratic Ukrainian state, forming youth politics on all levels, and attracting the students and youth to this” as well as “propagating of the ideas of Ukrainian patriotism and public activity among the youth”. Prior directions of ‘Bratstvo’ s activity in 1997-1998, however, were formulated in another modality, and jargon of the political proclamation gave place to more ‘banal’ formulations and concerns such as “active participation in the decision-making processes concerning educational process at the university” and “arranging artistic and cultural events, scientific conferences etc”. Nevertheless, in its founding documents and advertisements ‘Bratstvo’ consistently explored the popular nationalist phraseology even in more ‘trivial’ contexts. The student organization itself was imagined as a part of studentship community (studentstvo) which, in its turn, was described as “a particular folk (narod) with its customs, jokes and problems”92. The Student Brotherhood claimed to be “the tight family, the circle of friends, with whom you can always find understanding, support and help”. In this capacity the association was thought to be a kind of imagined community of culture, which was, however, based more on discourses and traditions of motley student milieu rather than on patterns of the Ukrainian ethnic culture proper. Thus, we have an interesting case of efforts to win a certain organizational autonomy correlated with efforts of the young intelligentsia to imagine a kind of boundary-transgressing community of class-like student culture. ‘Culture’ was not only exploited as an empowering means for realization of certain political aims, but also became an overarching frame for constructing their ‘own’ community which could attract the educated youth who felt the urge to do ‘something useful’ and to release their creativity.

Another non-governmental association created by youth and for youth which drew my attention, was Heritage (‘Spadshchyna’) founded in 1988. As the name of the organization suggests, ‘Spadshchyna’ has clearly nationalist-patriotic orientation; moreover, it has been known for supporting and being supported by right (even ultra-right) political forces. The main direction of its work is fostering activities for schoolchildren under supervision of the elder members of the organization. ‘Spadshchyna’ attracts quite a wide spectrum of youth: boys and girls, from intelligentsia and ‘simpler’ families, with richer and poorer parents. The principal demands for the candidates, however, are to be Ukrainians (and speak Ukrainian) and to believe in God (in patriotic circles in L’viv this often implies belonging to the Greek-Catholic church). The association bears

92 All the quotations in this passage are taken from the Student Brotherhood’s informational leaflet ‘Students’ke Bratstvo L’vivs’koi Politekhniky’ (L’viv, 1997).
much resemblance to the interwar Ukrainian Scout organization ‘Plast’ (which was revived at the end of the
1980s) in regards to its aims, hierarchic divisions and activities. Nevertheless, as one of the ‘fosterers’
(vyhovnyk, an elder member of the organization who takes care of the younger ones) pointed out, the principal
difference is that ‘Spadshchyna’ has more strict demands when it comes to discipline and proper behavior of
its members.

Popularity of the association may be partially explained by the fact that many parents encourage
participation of their offspring in this organization with openly ideological agenda because it effectively keeps
the children away from ‘the streets’, that is, from involvement in criminal gangs, from drug abuse and other
things which parents in the city are typically scared about. ‘Spadshchyna’ is an association striving to unite its
members around an ideologically laden narrative with strong elitist undertones. This narrative is meant to form
a type of personality suitable for the ‘future leaders of the nation’. The core ingredients of this narrative have
been obviously inspired by the ideas of the Ukrainian integral nationalism and other ultra-right movements,
but it also resembles the grand narrative of the Soviet period in the sense that, for example, it tries to look over
and blur actually existing social inequalities with help of romanticized pseudo-historical rhetoric.

The founding documents of ‘Spadshchyna’ are remarkable reading because of the whirl of
metaphors and phraseology that are supposed to appeal to the reader’s feelings of ressentiment (Greenfeld
1992) in relation to threatening ‘others’. The narrative is built according to a clearly dual teleological scheme
and actualizes all the powerful nationalist metaphors, even those belonging to ‘imperial’ discourses (see my
emphases below). Hence, it is not surprising that even typical phraseology of the Soviet media (‘the backyard
of history’, ‘the cult of money and sex’, ‘immortal ideals’) lurks in the text. The image of knights as saviors
and revivers of the nation indicates that ‘Spadshchyna’’s narrative draws into its orbit elements of elitist
imagery with a strong appeal to intelligentsia:

There are theorems and there are axioms. …An axiom is an undeniable truth which does not need to
be proved. That the good of the nation is the highest aim of every Ukrainian is as true as our mother
is the dearest for us, and the land where we were born is the most sacred. Everyone takes care of his
own family, and in the same manner everyone must take care of our common family. It is because all
of us, Ukrainians, are of the same blood, we are descendants of the great warriors [lytsariv, i.e.,
‘knights’ in the original—E.N.], who amazed the world with their bravery, [who were] the creators
of the greatest spiritual culture of the world. Indeed, we all live according to the old laws which have
been transmitted from generation to generation.

…The nation is a spiritual bond between “the dead, the living and the unborn”. This is the call of
blood…

…Ukraine was under the cruel foreign yoke and to a certain extent lost its power and position.
…Time after time, when beginning the struggle for liberation, its best sons went to battle and died.
…Our generation carries on the struggle of the warriors [lytsari] of Ukraine. …Today we bear the
responsibility for whether the Ukrainian nation and, hence, the [Ukrainian] state are on the backyard
of the history—or whether it will dictate its will to the entire world [sic! chy bude vsiomy svitovi
dyktuvaty svoiu voliu—E.N.].
In order to conclude the liberating struggle, people of the new spirit are needed, of the new ways of thinking. Brave and noble, fearless and devoted to the idea. All that time when Ukraine was enslaved the enemy methodically annihilated the elite of the nation, tried to squeeze out the feeling of dignity from the consciousness of the Ukrainians. When the enemy failed to defeat Ukrainian warriors [l'ytsari] in open battle, he took a different way. Totalitarian propaganda was aimed to change the values typical of the consciousness of the Ukrainians. Softness was propagated instead of steadfastness, slyness instead of nobleness, anarchy instead of discipline, the cult of money and sex instead of idealism [sic!], submission instead of struggle. We were taught to worship not the high ideals, but our own fleshly ego and to put the perishable before the divine. Introduction of these values aimed to make Ukrainians a nation of slaves. Our aim is to revive in the consciousness of Ukrainians those high values which have been inherent to the nation from its beginning; to foster the generation of Ukrainian youth inspired by the spirit of struggle, which led the warriors of Ukraine to battle. Only people of this kind will be able to revive the strength and to spread the glory of the Ukrainian nation.1

Interviews, conducted with two ‘Spadshchyna’ s activists (one of them, a university graduate in his twenties, with the title of vykhovnyk — ‘fosterer’), revealed that the ideology and guiding lines of action, presented in the organization’s official narrative, are popular in present-day L’viv. It seems that ‘Spadshchyna’, which lays emphasis neither on intellectualism, individualism nor dialogue with opponents, nevertheless succeeds in recruiting its members among the strata of university-educated urbanites. As vykhovnyk Vasyli’ told,

Obviously, we expect that children from intelligentsia families come and stay with us. We don’t recruit them on purpose, we come themselves, we are able to attract them. It is not due to some pathos. We don’t preach our message for them, we simply take them to the mountains, we see how they behave, and they see how we do things. It is impossible to cheat them in some way. They are clever, they see everything we [the older members] do. But, anyway, of course, the majority is from urban intelligentsia families. […] Money is not the most important thing for us. It’s not like in those elite schools, where one pays a crazy amount of money, but the level of education and morality among the pupils may be quite low. […] We [the older members] are examples for them. Can you imagine that in our so-called democratic-liberal world, where everyone knows that he can do what he wants, one person may lead fifty teenagers in the mountains? With us this is real. […] Subcultures [youth subcultural companies] cannot compete with us. On the contrary, they want to be like us in many respects. Their sphere of interests is extremely narrow—for God’s sake, no reasonable young man can be attracted to some music style forever. There must be something bigger, some kind of worldview. Scouts (plastuny)? Yes, they are popular too. But people come and go, nobody stays for a long time with them. They lack discipline in everything. […] There are many courses and clubs were young people are taught to dance ballroom dances, all this stuff about etiquette and how to converse in good society, how to play chess. It’s very nice. It’s very clever conversations. But look at them—they are boys with feminine shoulders. They can only talk. Do you think some of them can defend his girlfriend against hooligans in some dark street? Our guys are not so intellectual—yes, of course they read books, they can converse, but their intellect is not something abstract. They don’t only talk. They act. We encourage their physical development too. […] We are nationalists, we are traditionalists. All old proven values are important for us (Vasyli’ R., 28 y.o.).

93 The quotation is taken from the unpublished manuscript Pravyl’nyk organizatsii uk rains’koi molodi “Spadshchyna” (“The Code of the Ukrainian youth organization ‘Heritage’”).

94 Needless to say, ‘Spadshchyna’ s rhetoric is not gender neutral. Girls who participate in the
That youth from intelligentsia families might be attracted by this pronouncedly masculine, strong-handed ‘line of action’ does not need to be in the first turn an indicator of frustration or disappointment of the youth in the values which intelligentsia allegedly should adhere to. Rather, ‘Spadshchyna’’s leaders seem to be responsive to the moods of the L’vivites dissatisfied with the liberal discourse that does not point out some definite cultural authority implementing a moral ‘mission’95. However, under closer consideration, ‘Spadshchyna’’s counter-narrative proves to be contradictory and thus leaves many doors open. For example, the principle ‘not empty words, but action’ may encourage youth to apply their creative potential and to act as cultured, well-bred and responsible ‘future leaders of the nation’. On the other hand, when constructing its mythology of the ideal ‘community of blood’, ‘Spadshchyna’ actively uses many ‘archetypal’ elements of intelligentsia’s class narrative, such as dualism of ‘high’ and ‘low’, ‘spirit’ and ‘flesh’, ‘money’ and ‘nobleness’, ‘true elite’ and ‘corrupted elite’, ‘leaders’ (‘knights’) and ‘people’ (‘slaves’), ‘power of spirit’ and ‘power of raw force’, ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’. ‘Spadshchyna’’s ideological narrative also implies that intellectuals and intelligentsia in principle should be viewed as opposed: the former are regarded as a kind of ‘pseudo-elite’, because they only talk and make reasons instead of acting. However, intelligentsia, with their defense of culture and moral values and with their loyalty to the community is allegedly better material for the knight-like leaders of the nation.

Unlike the Student Brotherhood and ‘Spadshchyna’, active members of the association ‘Nadsiannia’, which unites Ukrainians expelled from the Polish territories after World War II, are, with very few exceptions, elderly people. Many of them left their old homes under very dramatic circumstances, abandoning their property, leaving behind symbolically charged places and tearing old bonds of friendships and kinship. The reality of the postwar Soviet-annexed Western Ukraine, where many of them settled, was not easy either, as ‘the resettlers’ (pereselentsi) were often met with suspicion and reluctance. When in the late

95 Addressing the ‘moral crisis’ of Bulgarian intelligentsia after 1989, Daskalov points out that “The values and principles of liberal democracy do not seem to be an appropriate basis for a [intelligentsia’s—E.N.] mission for a number of reasons: they are too formal and pragmatic (at least for people trained in a “transcendent” [Marxist-Leninist—E.N.] ideology); they do not go deeply enough into the national tradition; and the inflation of liberal discourse in politics is self-defeating. Besides, liberalism seems hardly in need of a special group of persons to advocate it. The intelligentsia, therefore, lacks credible objects and values on which to build a new group identity and a public role. In an effort to regain prestige, part of the intelligentsia has taken recourse to nationalism again” (Daskalov 1996: 83).
1980s it became possible to talk openly about the dramatic events of the postwar population expulsions, several ex-expellees who had already had long experience of work in some public organizations (for example, in Soviet times some of the activists used to be active in trade-unions, amateur associations etc.) founded ‘Nadsiannia’. It was initially aimed at establishing contacts between the former graduates from schools and gymnasiams in the borderline territories and at lobbying for the interests of the resettlers in L’viv and the region. The organizers also had in mind similar associations of expellees that existed by that time in Poland. As one of the initiators behind the arranging of ‘Nadsiannia’, 71 years old Marta B., recalled:

In 1988 I met pani N. She told me that she was in Poland and there she learnt that in Chicago our diaspora had published a book about lands around Iaroslav (Iaroslavshchyna), and in this book there were stories about our parents [both of them were gymnasium teachers]. And the older gymnasium pupils, those who were 17, 20 when the war was over—I was only 9—they wanted to find each other after so many years. And why not create an association for the resettled (pereselentsi) from the lands above the San River? In almost every Polish city they have clubs for admirers of Lwów [in Polish, miłośników Lwowa], so why not to make something of that kind here? So we created an initiative group, wrote all the needed documents. […] First we told our acquaintances, but then we made announcements on TV and on the radio. Many people came to us because with our certificate of membership it was easier to get a passport for trips abroad. But, anyway, many people stayed. We first gathered on the premises of the Foundation for culture (Fond kul’tury), in the office of the Writers’ Union of Ukraine, on the Rukh’s premises. Many people used to come to our meetings. […] Every year after Trinity holidays some of us go Poland, to visit the graves of the Ukrainian Sich riflemen. There was such a tradition before the war, we revived it. And we also restored a very fine cross on these graves, like it used to be before the war.

‘Nadsiannia’ is, however, not only and not primarily a community of memory. It is an association actively involved in political opinion-making and the state-creating processes (derzhavotvorchi protsesy), as many of its activists are respected professionals, occupying high positions within academia, having organizational experience and connections with local political circles, media and the Ukrainian diaspora in the West. The present office of the association is situated in the core of the historical city centre, opposite the building of the L’viv Municipal Council, which in itself may be viewed as not only symbolical, but even topographical nearness to the local political establishment. One of the ‘Nadsiannia’ activists, the then 69-year old pan Volodymyr, when comparing his organization with ‘Lemkivshchyna’66, another association gathering Ukrainians coming from a certain territory, pointed out the different agenda of these two entities:

Take ‘lemky’ [members of ‘Lemkivshchyna’] that sit [have their office] above us. They are also from the same lands, but they lived under other conditions there. They lived scattered in those forests and mountains. We used to live in the urban centers, near cities, where there was culture, you see? They like singing, all the time when they gather they sing. They are singers, and we […]

66 Lemkivshchyna is the name of an ethnographic territory inhabited by an ethnic group called Lemkos (Lemky). Lemkivshchyna stretches through Polish and Slovak territory. A small part of the Lemko region extends into the present territory of Ukraine.
"Nadsiannia" are fighters. We talk to them, but… I don’t want to say they are bad people, but they are very different. Another mentality. They are singers and artists, and we are fighters.

Cultural concerns are also an important part of ‘Nadsiannia’’s agenda, as its members are actively involved in arranging meetings with writers and poets, artistic presentations and in spreading knowledge about the culture and history of the territories they came from. However, the heritage they promote and mediate has been viewed as controversial on both sides of the Polish-Ukrainian border. Moreover, being “fighters and not singers”, ‘Nadsiannia’ often makes things even more controversial when it confronts Polish and Ukrainian authorities with sharply formulated demands and propositions.

The association has the reputation of a milieu with pronounced nationalist agenda, gathering under its roof quite radically oriented Ukrainian patriots ‘of the old kind’. It implies (and this view has been either passionately opposed or readily accepted among my respondents who did not belong to the organization, but knew about its activities and rhetoric) that their Ukrainian-ness, which they maintained despite traumatic experiences, endows them with the moral right to define for others what it means to be Ukrainian under new conditions. ‘Nadsiannia’ is thus a particular circle of the mobilized elder L’viv intelligentsia who after 1991 might have influenced both the understanding of intelligentsia’s role as well as views on the nature of Ukrainian-ness and the national project in L’viv. Up till now the association did not manage to recruit to its ranks a sufficient number of younger activists who might identify themselves with ‘Nadsiannia’’s concerns and methods of work. It is quite possible that in ten years this organization, which is going to celebrate its 20-year jubilee in 2009, will cease to exist. Nevertheless, the rhetoric, ideas and ‘fighting spirit’ of ‘Nadsiannia’ have not been unique in L’viv, and there already exist (for instance, ‘Spadshchyna’) and will in all probability appear, other associations transmitting them to younger generations.

7.8. Media

As it may be concluded from the materials presented in the previous chapters, in different political circumstances intelligentsia living in present-day L’viv was able to create niches for its identity-forming activities and thereby to expand and activate the public space in the last years of the Soviet Union’s existence. With the advent of Ukraine’s independence this public space became open for new discussions, discourses and practices. Nevertheless, it would be too hasty to assume that this public space became immediately so much open and autonomous that it provided various associations with equal opportunities of expression. Pressure of various political forces and business interests, inculcation of thinking in bipolar categories and ideological clichés (defined as ‘repeated ideologization’ of public discourse (Hnatúk 2003: 151)), and ubiquitous private allegiances have been among factors that exhausted and simplified polylogue within the public sphere. In more general terms, this reflects the state of affairs in a weak civil society, which
“may lack any specific cultural dynamic of its own and simply reflect in its various associations the different
tendencies emerging from markets, states and family networks” (Bauböck 1996: 90).

One of the results of narrowness and polarization of the public space in present-day Ukraine is
that socially significant intellectual polemics and debates often get resonance solely in the closed circles of the
‘initiated ones’, without reaching the broader public. Nevertheless, after 1991 these debates which combined
‘the political’ with ‘the cultural’ gave rise to a number of new media forums and arenas in L’viv. Here I
consider only those addressing primarily educated and intellectual public.

As Hnatiuk (2003: 122) points out, Russification which progressed after the oppositional circles
of Ukrainian intelligentsia had been crushed in 1972, decreased neither the number of the Ukrainian literary
periodicals, nor their circulation. According to official directives, every significant city and the centre of a
province (oblast’) must have its own budget-financed literary periodical subordinated to the local branch of the
Writers’ Union, alongside ‘youth’ periodicals subordinated to the Komsomol. By the time the processes of
breaking out of the Soviet system became obvious in Galicia, i.e., in 1988-1989, L’viv was home to a ‘thick’
literary magazine targeting Ukrainian-speaking intelligentsia (in the first turn, teachers, cultural workers and
other people dealing with the sphere of the humanities). It was the local official periodical of the Writers’
Union of Ukraine called October (‘Zhovten’), later renamed to Bell (‘Dzvin’). A number of all-Ukrainian
journals and magazines of this kind in Ukrainian language used to be in supply.

The reading public in L’viv used to look for alternative printed sources containing critical,
‘forgotten’, forbidden, or simply contemporary and more intellectually challenging literary, publicist,
philosophical etc. works. As everywhere in the USSR, samizdat (in Ukrainian samvydav) and tamizdat
(tamydav) materials circulated among the non-conformist Ukrainian intelligentsia. Samizdat, which was one
of the most significant manifestations of ethnic politicization in the USSR, was limited both in
number of titles and their problematic, in actual size of the texts and in their circulation (Zisserman-Brodsky
2003). Thus, although it addressed the core issues engaging oppositional circles and ‘ghettoized’ Ukrainian
intelligentsia trying to keep their distance from the Soviet system—such as the Ukrainian history, human rights
and the Soviet ethnic politics—it could not cover all the demands of the intellectuals and intelihtnna reading
public.

Intelligentsia and academicians in L’viv, who aspired to get some notion of philosophical, literal,
artistic and general cultural trends in the ‘big world’ without coming too close to the potentially dangerous
sphere of the underground literature on political and system critical issues, used to turn their gazes to
neighborly Poland. Under the Soviet period opportunities for visiting Poland were almost non-existent for a
rank-and-file L’vivite, as policies of the Iron Curtain age restricted to the limit even tourism between the
‘friendly’ states of the socialist block. Nevertheless, the flow of information from Poland and the cultural
exchange never ceased in this borderline zone. As L’viv journalist Oles’ Pohranychnyi, born in the mid-1960s,
admitted, “I belong to the generation which grew up reading Polish magazines ‘Przekrój’, ‘Szpilki’, ‘Kobieta i życie’. Nearly the only source of information about western culture open thanks to language propinquity for wider circles was Polish radio and TV” (Pohranychnyi 1997: 112). To be sure, the majority of TV-admirers receiving Polish channels with the help of simple, often self-made antennas, ‘watched Poland’ for the sake of Western entertaining production, such as soap operas, action and porno movies. Nevertheless, while ‘watching Poland’, an educated culture-interested audience was for the first time given the opportunity to be acquainted with many European and American movie classics as well as with original Polish cinematography and theatre. Polish radio and TV programs, even Polish popular fashion and women’s magazines from time to time sold in bookstalls were generally regarded as more interesting, informative and entertaining than the respective products on the Soviet side of the border (Matukhina 2000: 149-168).

When it comes to printed production, interesting findings could be made among Polish books in the bookstore Friendship (‘Druzhba’) in the city centre. This bookstore was regularly supplied with literature in the languages of some ‘friendly’ countries of the socialist block. Books in Hungarian, German and Czech were usually in supply, but literature in Polish was most coveted. Mastering of Polish was a phenomenon not limited to the older L’viv population who used to live ‘under Poland’ or to the non-numerous Polish minority remaining in the city. People of different generations, professional interests, with different ethnic affiliations and belonging to different urban strata, used to learn Polish both actively and passively (when, for example, listening to Polish radio programs and watching Polish TV). Polish could be relatively easy learnt by both Ukrainophones and Russophones, and in the borderline city it could be used in various contexts. Intellectual and artistic life in Poland was not so starkly regulated by the Party directives and was not suppressed to such an extent as it was on the other side of its eastern border. Therefore, intelihentna public used to read quite a good deal in Polish and to take in the information, especially cultural discourses, coming from Poland, in search of new, exciting, diverse—and with the rising of Solidarność also rebellious—forms and contents. According to one informant, publications from the oppositional magazine of the Polish intellectuals ‘Kultura’, passed with great precautions to L’viv by Polish acquaintances, was eagerly discussed in certain intelligentsia circles. Among the Polish literature sold openly in the ‘Druzhba’ bookstore one could find both mass-cultural genres (detective novels used to be especially popular) as well as modern classics by, for example, Camus, Kafka, Beckett and other authors whose works were not translated into Russian or Ukrainian then.

Hence, in conditions of informational hunger created in the USSR, the situation in L’viv was not so extreme thanks to the penetration of the Polish informational field. The all-Union cultural capitals such as Moscow and Leningrad were also those places of cultural exchange where Ukrainian intelligentsia both got information about new trends and spread their own views. As one of the informants recalled,
There existed an asymmetry between what was Russian and what was Ukrainian. It was the situation described by the Latin proverb “What is allowed for Jupiter is not allowed to an ox”. One of my good acquaintances, R., studied at the Gorky Institute of Literature. If such an institute existed in Ukraine at that time, R. would never have been allowed to study there. But in Moscow it was possible for people with his views. It is a paradox: those who were suppressed, who could not publish even two lines of their works in Ukraine for decades—like D., professor in Slavonic studies whose works were acknowledged abroad—they could be published in Russia. D.’s articles were published in Moscow journals in the 1970s and 1980s. But here [in Ukraine] he could not publish a single line. X., and also A. [presently a famous Ukrainian writer], and many other talented people who could be sorted out in Ukraine because they ‘did not fit the pattern’ (ne vpysuvalysia v skhemu), were accepted in prestigious Moscow universities and institutes. Some progressive ideas at that time were developed in Russian literature studies and philosophy. Some of my friends attended Bakhtin’s seminars in Moscow. Samvydav was inspired from Moscow, many publications of this kind were passed to us from Moscow. For example, Berdiaiev’s tracts. In Russia some theatres at that time could openly stage such plays as Ukrainian theatres could only dream about. For example, Ionesco’s plays. It was so in Russia: “Well, let that rotten intelligentsia stage what they want for their own pleasure, on small stages. Let them do this and be quiet” (Pavlo K., 56 y.o.).

Thus, by the late 1980s, the milieus of intelligentsia and the educated culture-interested people in L’viv had been acquainted with and actively searched for information about ideas, trends and discourses which diverged from those propagated by the official cultural-ideological Soviet institutions and media. Although the state structures and official media made efforts to preclude these processes by way of campaigns against ‘bourgeois nationalism’, ‘clericalism’ and ‘western propaganda’, breaches and gaps in the informational barriers artificially created by the Soviet ideological machine went on growing slow but sure. When the first opportunities to come up from underground and private spheres were given to those whose minds were already impregnated with knowledge and ideas different from the conventional Soviet ones, the media sphere was swept over with new contents. It should be remembered, however, that the glasnost which resulted in a seemingly unrestricted flow of media production exposing what was hitherto ‘unknown’, silenced and forbidden, was initiated mainly ‘from above’. In many ways, an emphasis on the voices of certain actors and the framing of arguments in discussions launched on history, literary canon, identity and ways of future societal development (themes of topical interest for intelligentsia) depended on positions taken by the authorities and official structures. In Ukraine one of such official bodies was, for example, the Writers’ Union of Ukraine, the structure on whose initiative rehabilitation processes of the Ukrainian creative intelligentsia repressed by the Soviet regime started in 1987, and which in 1988 promoted the idea of creating Rukh, the People’s movement for perebudova (which means perestroika in Ukrainian).97

Accordingly, discourses and agenda of this and other official structures determined ‘the field of battle’ and accents of the discussions centered on cultural processes in Ukraine (Hnatiuk 2003: 92-120). This, as Hnatiuk emphasizes, in its turn contributed to the fact that discussions about identity and culture in post-

97 Already in September 1988 the decision was taken at the Rukh’s Constituent Congress to transform it into the political platform alternative to the Communist Party.
1991 Ukraine mostly developed in two main streams: the traditionalist (‘nativist’) and the ‘post-Soviet’. In post-1991 Ukraine these streams, however differing from each other and mutually excluding, seem to perfectly coexist in the cultural atmosphere where ambivalence as well as avoidance of explicit evaluations and nuanced discussions on conflicting conceptions prevail. “Soon after the proclamation of independence, the ambivalence, which dominated at the end of the 1980s, took a somewhat different form, implanting an attitude combining nationalism (anti-communist at its root) with post-communism”, concludes Hnatiuk (2003:90).

L’viv media have faced serious ‘external’ and ‘internal’ problems since the late 1980s, which impeded the development of independent media production in the Ukrainian language oriented to the intelligentsia and intellectuals. Problematic combination of the nationalist discourse with basically Soviet phraseology and strategies of argumentation have been quite distinguishable in publications of local journals and newspapers in Ukrainian language—both those which continued their existence after 1991 (oftentimes under a new name) and those created recently. This mixture has been viewed with skepticism and reluctance first and foremost by the intellectual segment of the ‘last Soviet generation’, who easily distinguished totalizing rhetoric and hoped for novelty and more nuance in the new media production. Independence of the Ukrainian media has been questionable in view of constant interventions ‘from above’. Besides, Ukrainiophone press is still inferior in number and circulation to the one accessible in Russian language. The situation is aggravated by the fact that talented local journalists often take better paid jobs in the capital city of Kyiv, and, hence, the quality of many local L’viv media cannot meet expectations of critical public. Nevertheless, L’viv became the cradle of several successful Ukrainophone initiatives which attracted educated readers and diversified and heightened the level of cultural debates not only on the local, but also on the national scale.

One of the most known L’viv newspapers which appeared in the last years of the Soviet period was ‘Post-Postup’ (literary—‘Post-Progress’). The newspaper was issued between 1991 and 1995, but as a publishing project it was started in 1989 under the name ‘Postup’. The initiative was obviously supposed to continue pre- and non-Soviet journalist traditions, as its name alluded to another ‘Postup’, which was published in L’viv by Ivan Franko almost a century ago. ‘Post-Postup’ was one of the first popular newspapers in Ukrainian language that were critical of the government and establishment. This periodical ascribed to a critical style of reporting inspired by Western journalism, but with a heavy dose of sharp wit, irony and satire, which much distinguished ‘Post-Postup’s journalistic style from that of the Soviet-era newspapers, with their pompous propagandistic clichés, serious tone and false optimistic modality. ‘Postup’ and ‘Post-Postup’s editor-in-chief Oleksandr Kryvenko, who died at 40 years of age in a car accident in 2003, has been a legendary ‘gadfly’ figure in Ukrainian journalism. Ukrainian philologist by education, Kryvenko was one of the core figures in dissident L’viv circles, a founding member of ‘Memorial’ and Rukh. He was

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98 Memorial in Ukraine, like its better-known Russian branch, strives to bring to light the crimes of Stalin’s and his successors’ regimes.
engaged in politics in the capacity of chairman of the Committee in youth affairs in the L’viv Provincial Council, and later entered politics on the national level. Out of the interviews and other materials presented by Bilinsky (2005), one may conclude that Kryvenko’s line of action and self-expression were inspired by the idealized image of a revolutionary intelihent viewed as ‘the conscience of the nation’ and awakener of fellow-countrymen to political activity. As representatives of the younger generation, Kryvenko and his fellow journalists belonged to the circle of politically engaged L’vivites that challenged the authority of the shistdesiatnyky, who “adopted the Soviet methods of character assassination once they themselves were in power” (Bilinsky 2005: 520). Kryvenko refused to be classified as a member of the political elite, even in the capacity of a representative of an ‘anti-establishment’ elite. In both his journalistic style and political activity, Kryvenko contested dualist ‘visions and divisions’ cultivated by the previous political era (ibid: 521). The significance of ‘Post-Postup’s’ and Kryvenko’s agenda of intellectual daring, political engagement, searching for dialog and overcoming of dualisms, is confirmed by the fact that ‘Post-Postup’s’ tradition has been continued and renewed by the younger L’viv journalists in the 2000s.

Another successful publishing project, initiated the same year as Kryvenko’s ‘Postup’, was conceived as a periodical which would provide more sophisticated discourse and a more abstract level of debates on current cultural and societal issues. The first issues of the independent magazine for cultural studies ‘Î’ came out in 1989, and since a break from 1992 to 1995, the magazine has been issued on regular basis. ‘Î’ has been financed by both Ukraine-affiliated and foreign sponsors (such as the Heinrich Böll Foundation, which is an association close to the German Green Party). Continuity and tenacity of the ‘Î’ project depends, not in the last turn, on well-connectedness and the influence of its founder and editor-in-chief Taras Vozniak, who since 1987 has held political offices in the L’viv City Council and, later, in the L’viv Provincial Council.

‘Î’’s founders declared the ‘elite’ orientation of their project, but not as a deliberate or exclusive orientation to a narrow circle of high-brow intellectuals, but as cultivation of intellectual daring and sophistication among wider public. In a half-ironical style, playing on intelligentsia’s cliché, Vozniak commented: “There are two ways to talk to the people. The first one is to squat and to sink to their level. The other one is to make efforts to change the situation. There exist initiatives that, without being some business projects, are focused on talking to the people without kneeling in front of them too much” (Shtovhdaty Ukrainu 2000). Open seminars organized by ‘Î’ proved to be a successful initiative that usually attracts people of different generations (although students and middle-aged people prevail in the audience) interested in cultural and societal issues. Many of them are academicians and activists of various NGOs. These seminars became one of a few arenas in L’viv were intellectuals and intelligentsia may participate in open public debates ‘live’.

99 Î (pronounced as ‘ii’) is the thirteenth letter of Ukrainian alphabet, which is non-existent in other Slavonic alphabets.
The first issues of \( I \) contained, among other things, Ukrainian translations of significant Western philosophers such as Gadamer, Jaspers and Heidegger and literary works of internationally famous authors connected to Galicia such as Bruno Schultz and Joseph Roth. From 1995 on the periodical has published thematic issues focusing on the cultural-political topics such as cross-border dialogue, on Galicia and Ukraine in the context of the European (Central-European) space, on Galician multicultural heritage, on relations with Russia, on L'viv urban culture and other issues that waken the interest of the intellectual readership in L'viv. Several issues devoted to gender issues and youth culture were also aimed at putting into wider circulation some western academic concepts. Nevertheless, the L'viv and Galician multicultural locality embedded in wider cultural and civilizational contexts remains the conceptual core of the periodical and the seminars. \( I \) initiated at least two wide-scale discussions which had an impact on identity debates in Ukraine, namely, discussion about Galicia and Ukraine as a part of Central Europe and about Galician autonomy. Selection of the texts published in \( I \) as well as quality of the discussions during the seminars tend to be quite uneven, but generally the \( I \) project has been a successful enterprise which has contributed to enlivening cultural activities and intellectual discourses in L'viv.

\( I \) has been a unique project in Galicia and on the all-Ukrainian scale for a number of reasons. Aside from the Kyivan magazine 'Krytyka' it is, in principle, still the only one regularly issued consistently pro-western (pro-European) intellectually oriented periodical in Ukraine. Also, it has been founded as a part of an NGO with the same name, which, aside from publishing, regularly organizes seminars open for wide public as well as conferences and round tables gathering selected researchers, writers and opinion-makers both from Ukraine and from abroad. Transcripts of the discussions, information about continuing projects as well as the magazine's issues in electronic format have been regularly published on \( I \)'s website which is in itself a token that the magazine's activities are intended for a modern and mobile audience.

In 2008 another successful web-project was launched, namely the news site and web-forum ZAXID.NET which focuses first and foremost on the actual issues of Galician and L'viv culture and politics. A number of reputed academicians, politicians and cultural personalities (among them intellectuals connected to \( I \)) spurred the discussion about the historical heritage and the present-day perspectives of L'viv. Every new thematic article on L'viv is followed by animated debate in the site's chat-forum. The most enthusiastic (and often strident) response usually comes to the polemic articles which take up the issues of nationalism, multiculturality and collective memory. Given the popularity of this Internet-based discussion on L'viv, it has been recently published as a book.

In one of the Ukrainian dailies \( I \) was described as a “concrete, original and patriotic” periodical (Kut’ko 2004). Despite the fact that \( I \) focuses on issues that are topical in contemporary Ukrainian cultural polemics and, besides, aspires to adjust Ukrainian language to the demands of (post)modern academic and

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intellectual discourses (Postup no.149, 2000), it is nevertheless difficult to squeeze 'Ï’s agenda into the present-day ‘patriotic’ stream. After 1991, when nationalist rhetoric was adopted as a part of official discourses, the notions ‘patriotism’, ‘patriotic’, ‘patriot’ usually have been associated with the state and authorities, with the dualist, emotionally charged stories about heroism and martyrdom, and with the traditionalist world outlook. Patriotic overtones are indeed present in ‘Ï’s publications and contribute to its agenda. Nevertheless, ‘Ï is not oriented predominantly to nationalist circles of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, nor does its general discourse address conventionally understood Ukrainian patriotism. A number of other periodicals in L’viv implement the ‘patriotic’ line in much more open, consequential and persistent ways.

Aside from the already mentioned ‘Dzvin’, which was published in the Soviet period under the name of ‘Zhovten’ and is profiled as a literary, publicist and literary-critical academic periodical, another magazine which attracts Ukrainian patriotic intelligentsia is ‘Universum’. It was founded in 1993 and is profiled as a “magazine for political science, futurology, economy, science and culture”. While ‘Ï is oriented towards more abstract, philosophical, identity-related and cultural studies-inspired academic discourses, ‘Universum’ is engaged in discussion on more concrete topics relating to Ukrainian politics and makes use of more popular journalist styles. Ukraine is the obvious centre of the universe in the ‘Universum’’s concept, as the absolute majority of the materials contain reader-friendly analyses of Ukrainian politics, history and societal life. While the intellectual authority of ‘Ï is based on ambitions to catalyze knowledge based on Western academic paradigms, ‘Universum’ seems to choose a more conventional path in this respect. For example, by including people with high academic titles on its board of editors, the magazine employs, in Bourdieu’s terms, a typical heteronomous mode of legitimation within the intellectual field. Also, ‘Universum’ seems to be more closely connected to the circles of patriotic Ukrainian diaspora in the West. The ambition of ‘Universum’ was proclaimed as “overcoming the provinciality of L’viv and periodicals from L’viv” (Bagan 2007).

As a magazine adhering to a “consequential nation-defending line”, ‘Universum’ combines aspirations to place Ukraine in global context, to praise technological and scientific innovations and at the same time to demonstrate the depth of the Ukrainian cultural universe. However, the magazine oftentimes makes use of the quite old-fashioned denunciating and moralizing journalist style with its dualistic rhetorical clichés, and adheres to narratives on victimization and heroization which have strong propagandistic overtones. The attitude of a number of authors publishing in ‘Universum’ to the project of bringing Ukraine to ‘Europe’ has been quite cautious and reserved. The fear that ‘rational’ and ‘calculating’ Europe might, in particular, endanger Ukrainian cultural traditions and spirituality, has been repeatedly expressed. The archenemies of the nation (on the one hand, ‘imperialist Russia’, Ukrainian ‘corrupted authorities’ collaborating with it and, on the other hand, globalization and ‘cosmopolitism’) have been targeted. Traditionalist (‘nativist’) rhetoric and modes of presentation in ‘Universum’ coexist with appeals to modernize Ukrainian education, science and
cultural life according to the demands of time. Such a combination looks quite mechanical and generally the picture of such a modernity looks like a patchwork. Exactly this kind of image has been presented on one of the ‘Universum’s’ cover-pages: a mythological figure of Cossack Mamai holding a cellular phone in his hand, on the background of a starry night sky and the inscription ‘XXI’, paired with a computer showing the Ukrainian trident surrounded by the EU stars on its screen.


The magazine has tended to present Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian intelligentsia as eternal victims of repressive political regimes and internal enemies in the form of bureaucracy, immoral political elite and so on. One of the editors even coined the word ‘intellectocide’ meaning by this that the intellectual ‘blossom of the Ukrainian nation’ was systematically exterminated by the repressive anti-Ukrainian powers. This discourse combining nationalist orientation with anti- and post-communist phraseology is presently the mainstream in the media sphere of L’viv. The popularity of ‘Universum’ and its longevity under the conditions when periodicals seldom survive more than a couple of years confirms this conclusion.
7.9. Summary

In this chapter, descriptions of spaces and arenas utilized by intelligentsia provided further insights into the conditions under which intelligentsia’s identity work has been done and in what distinguishable directions it developed in L’viv. It was demonstrated that since the end of the Soviet period intelligentsia’s circles, groups, arenas etc. have been quite fragmented injections in the cityscape of L’viv. Most often people belonging to different circles have neither opportunities nor the desire to meet opponents in open discussion and develop a multifaceted dialogue. One of the L’viv intellectuals pointed out in this connection that

Presently L’viv is a strange city where there is an abundance of good-quality [kvalitetnykh] intellectuals, but the intellectual life is extremely marginalized or practically absent. There appear clever and important articles in the press and Internet, but dialogue is absent in media space, because these articles are for the most part the sum of monologues (Pavliv 2008b).

Such a state of the intellectual polemics, which mostly exists in dispersed and quite hermetical circles of the ‘initiated’, according to Riabchuk (1998, 2002) and Hnatiuk (2003: 273), may be observed not only in L’viv, but all over Ukraine. It is one of the manifestations of the Ukrainian ‘postcolonial syndrome’ and a consequence of the socio-political situation of the Ukrainian society. Nevertheless, more subtle factors (often underpinned by generational differences) such as divisions in world outlooks, agenda and degree of autonomy, orientation to a certain audience, and contacts with different milieus and institutions from abroad seem to hinder dialogue between various milieus of intelligentsia and intellectuals in L’viv. This does not mean that contacts on personal level are excluded as well, as there always exist individuals and even small groups bridging the gaps between different milieus. However, it seems that one of the legacies of the pre-1991 period, which can still be traced in the attitudes of different generations of the L’viv intelligentsia, is an absence of will and/or skills to lead cultural polemics, to introduce results of this polemics to the wider audience and to disseminate public critical discourses about local, national and international (transnational) matters of concern. Sites of and for intelligentsia and intellectuals rarely become arenas where balanced polemics is held and where consensus is reached.

Intellectual autonomy has often been coupled with the retreat of intelligentsia and intellectuals to their closed milieus and, hence, with a weakening of the opinion-making capacity of these cultural producers. Fragmentation of the intellectual field and canalization of the debates on culture, identity politics and prospective development certainly do not strengthen the position of intelligentsia and intellectuals in Ukrainian society. Nevertheless, even in such circumstances, the narratives, ideas and practices addressing issues of empowerment of these actors penetrate public and semi-public spheres where civil society is coming into being.
Chapter 8. Empowering Projects of the L'viv Intelligentsia and Intellectuals after the End of Soviet Rule: Narratives about L'viv's Centrality and Peripherality

8.1. L'viv über alles

This and the following chapter address discursive projects of the L'viv intelligentsia and intellectuals which, in my view, explicate symbolic power of these actors to make both groups and things with words (Bourdieu 1990: 138) and thereby establish their ‘own’ communities as territories for legislative practices (Bauman 1987b: 5). These discursive projects are focused on redefinitions (and thereafter discursive transformations) of the local (L’vivian), the regional (Galician), the national (Ukrainian) and the supranational (‘European’). Like concentric circles, they run from L’viv as a concrete locality with its particular cityscape and urban community. Articulated by intellectuals and intelligentsia, the multilayered narrative about the ‘Leo’s city’ refracts these four levels which explicate imagined communities of various range. In the discussion that follows I am going to demonstrate that the urban space of L’viv becomes both the terrain and resource of intelligentsia’s struggles for cultural authority and political influence.

Formation and culture-making activities of intelligentsia have been inalienable from the development of urban life. Social diversity and the multiplicity of sites for cultural contacts generated within the city provides a context for invention of new patterns of cultural difference and new forms of imagining community. Moreover, urbanity may ‘work’ in such a way that cultural differences and new forms of community become not only imagined, but also intellectually elaborated, conceptualized and transformed into scaffolds for relations of social, cultural and political domination. Identification of various groups with a certain cityscape and its history can be wielded as a powerful instrument of political mobilization (Czaplicka 2003: 373), which is something that various factions of intelligentsia are quick to make use of. A city encapsulates multilayered hierarchical relations and empowering projects, but it also harbors multiple sites of intellectual and personal autonomy.

Intelligentsia is not merely a product of specific urban circumstances and of specific outcomes in the battles for autonomy in urban contexts. The cultural authority of intelligentsia implies that it may “provide the scaffolding upon which ‘ways of life’ are made and made known” (Mitchell 1995: 111, see also Danjoux 2002) and ascribe value to these ways of life. Further, as intelligentsia by way of its discursive and practical

101 Reference to L’viv as Leo’s city (Misto Leva) is a play on words, since in Ukrainian and Russian the personal male name Lev (corresponding to Leo) is homonymous to lion (lev). The city’s founder Danylo of Halych built it for his son Lev, hence the name of the city in Ukrainian literary means ‘Leo’s (property)’. A lion appears as L’viv’s ancient heraldic symbol and throughout history it has been replicated in numerous ornaments on the facades of L’viv buildings, in sculptural form etc.
activities strives “to solidify culture in place” (ibid: 111), in East-Central Europe it is an important actor molding discursive images of the cities, creating their ‘reputations’ and mediating their ‘myths’—both exclusive and pluralistic ones. Nevertheless, intelligentsia is only one in the range of powerful institutions and actors (and, under the conditions of post-1991 Ukraine, not the mightiest one) which “have a pre- eminent capacity to impose their view on the landscape—weakening, reshaping, and displacing the view from the vernacular” (Zukin 1991: 16).

L’viv is “one of many divided, contested cities, cities that switched hands and now belong to …separate and competing histories” (Grabowicz 2002: 314). Due to this it has been “an Eden for intellectuals” (Zayarniuk 2006) both as a stage for intellectual debates and as an apt reference point for intellectual and artistic interpretations. Its separate and competing histories and mixture of cultural influences contain abundant material for various collective memory projects and scenarios of cultural development. In the course of the twentieth century, the nation has appeared as a master signifier articulated in these L’viv-focused narratives about the local, the regional, the all-Ukrainian, and the supranational. Nevertheless, the nerve of these narratives focusing on the city, its history(ies) and its community(ies) is not only appropriation, but constant subversion of the national. These narrative constructions of otherness and sameness not only address contradictory discursive constructions of a ‘national body’ (Wodak et al 1999: 30), but also expose changing values, loyalties and concerns typical of those who aspire to endow this national body with the ‘national soul’.

In L’viv, as in other historically significant East-Central European cities, intelligentsia has been actively involved in processes of re-imagining the cityscape, and has thereby transformed it into a space for various intellectual projects. In this respect, L’viv has always been less a topographic site than “an imagined state of being or moral location” (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 10), an embodied moral order (Zukin 1991: 254). It has been an idealized object of longing and nostalgia for some, and a concrete and, in a way, intractable historical heritage for others. The city has been a powerful symbolic referent generating its own ‘myth’ or, rather, a range of myths about ‘presence’ and ‘absence’ (Grabowicz 2002), whose components one can distinguish, in particular, in literary works, political discourses and urban folklore. And so L’viv became a core reference point in all-Ukrainian discussions about national and cultural identity after 1991 (Hnatiuk 2003).

Adjustment of various symbolic fragments to distinct narratives about some city’s past, present and future depends on the logic of discursive strategies applied by those actors who make their voices heard in the public sphere and/or seek empowerment. Such discursive strategies may be, for example, discontinuation/dissimilation, continuation, avoidance, portrayal in black and white, singularization, downplaying/trivialization, and shift of blame and responsibility (Wodak et al. 1999: 36-42). It is hardly possible to reconstruct a post-1991 debate about L’viv, ‘L’viv-ness’ and L’viv ‘identity’ and include all of the details. Therefore, in what follows I will present a selection of popular post-1991 narratives about L’viv, its role, its history and its perspectives, as represented by the L’viv intelligentsia and intellectuals, and will argue
that these narratives may provide clues as to how intelligentsia might empower (but also disempower) itself while empowering its ‘own’ situated community.

8.2. The tales of centrality: L’viv as a cultural metropolis and the capital of the ‘Ukrainian Piedmont’

In several interviews the older informants expressed an opinion that the Ukrainian intelligentsia in L’viv, compared with its counterparts from other Ukrainian cities, is of a superior kind. As the proof of this superiority the informants mentioned emotional attachment to L’viv’s historical landscape, unquestionable national orientation, good manners, and cultivation of ‘better’ Ukrainian language unpolluted by Russianisms among the L’viv intelligentsia. The special faculties of the ‘genuine’ Galician intelligentsia (be it old Galician intelligentsia or the contemporaries continuing the old intelligentsia’s tradition) were viewed as inseparable from the spiritus loci of L’viv. The city’s peculiar cultural heritage has been presented as a crucial factor in the forming of the special type of intelligentsia devoted to maintaining older traditions and endowed with the mission of disseminating ‘genuine’ Ukrainian culture. My informants claimed that L’viv’s spiritus loci articulates intelligentsia’s traits, and intellehentnyi, in its turn, was presented as a distinguishing feature of the ‘genuine’ L’viv urbanite, especially the ‘true’ Galicianer (pravdyvyi halychany):

One cannot speak about L’viv without speaking about the L’viv intelligentsia! Intelligentsia has always had a special status here, not like in other places. People come to us and say that our people are more polite, friendly, and cultured than elsewhere. I think it is impossible to live in such a beautiful city, ancient city, and not to absorb its culture. […] I can distinguish people from L’viv when I come to Kyiv, for example. They speak nice Ukrainian, they behave with dignity, like intellehenty (intellehentno), they are dressed with taste, without all this extravagance, you know. We live in a European city, a city of culture (misti kul’tury), and due to this we still keep this intellehentnyi style of conduct (Liubomyra I., 75 y.o.).

Galicianers are all normal people (normal’ni ludy), they feel very comfortable in L’viv, they admire its architecture. I have lived in L’viv since I was fifteen, I have lived here all the time, and I am so proud of L’viv! I have acquaintances living in many parts of the country and abroad, and [when they come for a visit] I always try to show as much as possible of the city. I think that Galician intellehentnyi—well, I don’t know if there exist some other true intellehenty [chuckles] (Teodor D., 70 y.o.).

Indeed, one of the commonplace representations of L’viv, which defines its perception by both the long-term residents and the visitors, is the ubiquitous discourse about ‘a city of culture’ and ‘the cultural capital of Western Ukraine’. As a symbolic model coined and supported through time by the educated classes concerned about their own distinction, the narrative about L’viv as a city of culture has a special appeal in the eyes of the “workers in the critical infrastructure” (Zukin 1991). Meticulously reproduced nowadays in tourist brochures,
websites, media discussions and historical surveys, this double-edged concept of power (‘capital city’ plus ‘culture’) has been a part of transmitted cultural knowledge shared by both older and younger generations. Connotations of the symbolic image of the ‘capital city of culture’ may be different for different audiences, but the implication of symbolic superiority is a common denominator for all of them. In the same vein, ‘genuine L’vivites’ are viewed as a special and superior sort of people due to their ‘emplotment’ in the multiple cultural distinctions.

In the web-forum ZAXID.NET, created in 2007, a range of well-known personalities (mostly academicians, politicians, writers and journalists) connected to L’viv and Galicia express their opinions about L’viv, its history and contemporary life, its problems and perspectives of its development. Iurii Andrukhovych, one of the few internationally recognized contemporary Ukrainian writers, in an essay placed on ZAXID.NET, mentions a feeling of superiority in relation to other cities, which L’vivites cultivated in the Soviet period and which used to override the internal tensions between L’viv’s ethno-national communities:

A feeling of leadership engendered special L’vivian superiority with respect to other cities and regions of the USSR, and the old Galician word ‘honor’ became relevant here as never before. L’viv was nearest to the West, and hence, luckiest. …Exactly this feeling of L’vivian superiority also caused a special effect, which was typical of L’viv in Soviet times—‘the city closed to strangers’. At the end of the 1970s, when the urban community of the Soviet period already, as they say, was settled, this effect became embodied in a particular internal solidarity of L’viv residents, independently from their personal linguistic national identity. There existed, by the way, two such identities: Ukrainian-Soviet and Russian-Soviet ones, and, understandably, lines of conflict between them have been numerous. However, when encountering something external, non-L’vivian, they usually co-operated with each other. I will never forget how my Russian-speaking friends, during a student field trip in totally Russian-speaking Kyiv in 1979, all as one, and, in fact, without some prior agreement, switched to Ukrainian, a Ukrainian which was, in addition, irreproachable, and not without a certain Galician tint—and the more crowded was the place, the louder they spoke. In was a manifesto: we are not you, we are different, we are western, we are from L’viv. It means we are better. The myth about a “hornets’ nest of nationalism” had to be cherished in various ways (Andrukhovych 2008).

Andrukhovych, who himself comes from the West Ukrainian city of Ivano-Frankivs’k, suggests that this boundary-transgressing feeling of superiority reputedly shared by L’vivites resulted from several overlapping distinctions, namely, the distinction of L’viv as the Ukrainian city closest to Europe (and thus “the luckiest one”), as a “hornets’ nest” of Ukrainian nationalism and, in effect, as an exotic and rebellious impregnation in the texture of the conformist drowsy Soviet life in the 1970s. The observation is significant, that long before the advent of Ukraine’s independence, L’vivites found ways to challenge the stigmatizing Soviet image of a “hornets’ nest of nationalism” and to re-imagine it as a basis of ‘positive’ cultural distinction of their native city. Indeed, demarcation lines on one level may become a basis for solidarity on others, and probably such a frame shift contributed to the fact that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, despite pessimistic prognoses, the city did not become an arena of violent interethnic conflict.
In his interview to ZAXID.NET Taras Prokhas’ko (2008), a known writer and journalist, also told about attitude of superiority of ‘true L’vivites’ towards those who “don’t know what L’viv and life in L’viv are”: 

…some caste qualities [kastovist’] are present in the L’viv character, they are typical of those people who are aware of their L’vivness [l’vivs’kist’]. One L’vivite treats another L’vivite not like he treats others. … Maybe I exaggerate, but sometimes I felt that the true [pravdyvi] L’vivites treat me in the same way as people who fond of animals, and it is as if I were some doggy who was very loved and looked after, but at the same time they are aware that it is only a doggy who cannot understand all the superiority of this human love. Very often people from other provincial cities talk about the arrogance of L’vivites, but I wouldn’t call it arrogance—it is rather … empathy toward people who don’t know what L’viv and life in L’viv are.

Notably, while Andrukhovych implies that a feeling of superiority common to many L’vivites has little to do with sharing the same cultural patterns, Prokhas’ko seems to mean the opposite. He argues that what makes L’viv a “powerful city” (syl’ne misto) is L’viv’s spiritus loci which is conceived not only by its prominent personalities and ‘creative intelligentsia’, but by all its dwellers who “love their city, but don’t have access to public expression” (ibid). One does not need to be a professional producer of culture in order to be immersed in “L’viv and life in L’viv”. However, the superiority of the presently living ‘true L’vivites’ who identify themselves with their own city to the extent that they “feel bad without L’viv” (ibid) has much to do not with some officially recognized status of their city, or with its material standard, but with long-term exposure to the life in L’viv, that is, L’viv’s urban culture. Culture, or rather, the ‘idea of culture’ (Mitchell 1995) as it was discussed above, is an ambiguous concept, which may be defined differently in response to different contexts, interests and aims, but its principal feature is that “Culture makes ‘others’. ‘Others’ do not make culture” (ibid: 111). The wholesale concept of ‘culture’, habitually used in the local media and popular discourses as a typical attribute of L’viv, functions as a metaphor of power. In this capacity, “the currency of ‘culture’ is precisely its ability to integrate by denying connections at some scales and by over-valorizing localism. The value of the idea of culture is that it can represent and reify difference by obfuscating connectedness” (ibid: 111).

That superior L’viv ‘culture’ is an imagined distinction and a metaphor of power becomes obvious when one looks more closely at the forms of difference this concept addresses in every concrete case, what distinctions it emphasizes and what connections it omits. In what follows I will discuss several recurring thematic types of narratives, which address the issues of culture ‘of, for and within L’viv’. The first of these types is of a more general nature, as it is focused on the position of L’viv in hierarchies of symbolical territorial entities. Namely, the focus is on whether L’viv should be viewed as a symbolic centre or as a periphery.

Establishing L’viv’s position as a principal cultural centre of independent Ukraine became one of the main concerns of the national-democratic politicians who came to power in the L’viv municipal and provincial councils in the 1990s. As has already been mentioned, L’viv was the first Ukrainian city where such
crucial Soviet symbols as the Lenin monument and the red banner on the building of the municipality had been removed. After these and other political actions, which seemed to confirm L’viv’s reputation as the ‘least Sovietized’ Ukrainian city, in the opinion of many it had to become a crucible where the new, non-Soviet cultural standards and models would be developed. Here historical tradition of the Ukrainian national movement coupled with categorical thinking in terms of ethnic nationality and territorial nation-ness (Brubaker 1996) established in the former USSR served as a comfortable frame of re-interpretation of the ‘non-Soviet’ as the ‘national’. In its turn, the ‘national’ became automatically translated into the ‘Ukrainian national’. Once again in the twentieth century L’viv was expected to become the heart and soul of the ‘Ukrainian Piedmont’ and the exporter of the Ukrainian national culture and ‘National Idea’ to the rest of Ukraine.

However, in order to convince the compatriots in other, more ‘Sovietized’ or more ‘Russified’ parts of Ukraine to become more ‘Ukrainian’, the new narratives of identity had both to be impressive and to provide positive referents for identification. Ukrainian history is full of tragic episodes of bloodshed, martyrdom, sufferings and human catastrophes. Chernobyl and the Famine of 1932-33 were often cited in the rhetoric of the Ukrainian national-democratic movement at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s as symbolic referents which would unite the people of Ukraine against the Soviet regime. However, to compete with the Soviet meta-narrative emphasizing industrial progress, military strength, collective heroism, achievements in science and education, and social optimism, the intellectual project of national identity building had to counterbalance the narrative of Ukraine’s victimization with optimistic, ‘positive’ visions.

Some experts assume that nationalism has been “the natural vehicle for the intelligentsia’s opposition to the form of communism characterizing the Soviet-type system in Eastern Europe” because “nationalism typically had no inborn animosity to the intellectual” (Kennedy 1992: 33). In her ethnographically-oriented study, Catherine Wanner (1998: 75) suggested that “Nationalism in post-Soviet Ukrainian society is increasingly conceived of not only as nation building, but also as a project of cultural ‘normalization’, as a means of desovietizing oneself and society”. However, when ‘normalization’ and ‘desovietization’ are determined by the ‘intellectual-friendly’ frames of nationalism, they may easily result in new dichotomous visions of the social life. Desovietization and normalization in such circumstances may not only facilitate elaboration of some emotionally ‘neutral’ explanatory narratives, but may also reproduce the structures of feeling and categorizations that give rise to new antagonistic stories—whether it will be stories about the greatness of sufferings and martyrdom, or stories about priority in the cultural sphere and outstanding spiritual achievements. Still, according to some observers (Grabowicz 2002), the new image of L’viv tends to include more nuances and sober evaluations than in the Soviet and earlier periods. It seems to be that the prevailing attitude among the actors defining conceptual directions of L’viv’s present development (politicians of higher rank, ‘city fathers’, city planners as well as public intellectuals and rank-and-file intelligentsia) is that the most attractive image which present-day L’viv might project is one of comfort, safety and prosperity. Such
an image of L’viv correlates not so much with any particular post-1991 ‘national order of things’, but first and foremost with the common modern "myth about a fine world, where trams go regularly, where there is always water in the bathroom, and where one may safely go to the cinema in the evening. This is a myth about a civilized city in a civilized land" (Hrytsak 2004: 246).

According to a quite widespread opinion, these features of “a civilized city in a civilized land” wake associations with the lifestyle of L’viv’s prewar bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. American-Ukrainian historian Roman Szporluk argues that the L’viv intelligentsia was that group of urbanites whose lifestyle upgraded the city symbolically. This became especially obvious after World War II, when the majority of old L’viv intelligentsia disappeared. Many of the former L’vivites who moved to Wroclaw (Breslau), managed to create a ‘big city lifestyle’ there instead:

A statistically small share of former L’vivites—its intelligentsia—endowed this new Polish city with big city style and convinced, if not the migrants from Volhynian and Ternopil’ villages themselves, then at least their children, that they were also urbanites, urbanites from the big city, and that they also are successors and continuers of the Polish Lwów (Szporluk 2007).

Presently the L’viv cultural producers, intelligentsia and intellectuals, tend to be discursively constructed as bearers of double function. Namely, they are presented not only as actors striving to (re-)formulate a new ‘positive’ identity for post-1991 L’viv, but also as a cultural essence and the ‘true’ human resource of L’viv. On the one hand, they are compelled to continue their ‘Icarian flights in almost all directions’ (Himka 1999) in order to re-evaluate fragmented narratives about L’viv and to reshuffle them into some logical consistency. On the other hand, theirs is also the task of elevating the city’s symbolical image. The reputation of the cultural capital of Western Ukraine, which was semi-officially ascribed to L’viv in Soviet times, could already serve as a significant basis of these narratives about centrality and glory. Besides, in 1998 L’viv was added to UNESCO’s World Heritage List. This was possible not in the last turn due to the efforts of the city’s popular mayor Vasyl’ Kuibida, a physicist with academic merit, who made the task of returning L’viv to its former—pre-Soviet—prominence one of his political priorities.

Symbolical reintroduction of L’viv to the ‘big world’ and presentation of the city as a part of the world cultural patrimony undoubtedly contributed to the ideological construction of grandness and legitimacy of the cultural heritage of Ukraine which, as many triumphant voices announced, from now on no one would look down on. However, this symbolical gesture of recognition of L’viv’s cultural patrimony did not resolve but rather emphasized dilemmas and sharp contrasts which actors concerned with keeping L’viv’s image as a cultural centre are confronted with all the time. One of the principal lines of tension in narratives about L’viv was formed by the axis ‘historical’ versus ‘contemporary’ culture. The splendid architectural monuments, as well as cultivated good manners and intelleitnentist’ of the ‘pedigreed’ L’viv urbanites are the relics of the legendary historical epochs and at the same time reminders of the fact that in those times L’viv was dominated
by other ethnic groups and other cultures than Ukrainian ones. The historical narratives about the uniqueness and superiority of L'viv cannot be effortlessly adjusted to the national frames in the capacity of narratives about achievements of the Ukrainian culture, ethnos or nation. The first ‘genuinely Ukrainian’ period in L’viv modern history coincided with the Soviet epoch which nowadays can hardly serve as a reference point for some widely accepted positively laden narrative of identity—at least, not in the eyes of the L’vivites themselves.

These contradictions which seem to be intractable might potentially lead not only to a re-evaluation of the one-dimensional national narrative, but also to frustration because of “missed opportunities and the all-but-impossible task or restoring the city’s erstwhile cultural and artistic prominence” (Grabowicz 2002: 317). On the other hand, as other voices pointed out, this situation of disparity between the ‘then’ and ‘now’, of puzzlement in the face of contradictory historical and cultural heritage, should not discourage optimistic visions of the city’s future:

L’viv is undoubtedly the capital city of Galicia that embodies the historical role of this region… In the nearest decades L’viv will be different—in some respects, probably, strikingly different. One thing in it will remain unchanged: there will always be a critical mass of those who are fascinated by L’viv, and this feeling will make them enthusiasts102 who will keenly listen to the voice of Providence and will restore its eternal glory (Marynovych 2008).

The author of these lines, a philosopher, former dissident and the vice-rector of the Ukrainian Catholic University Myroslav Marynovych, further pointed out that the present-day difficulties with maintaining L’viv’s image of cultural centre are not the unavoidable result of some impersonal objective factors, but depend on the changing attitudes of its dwellers, first and foremost intelligentsia, who, unlike in earlier historical periods, are less dedicated to spirituality, freedom and the implementation of high ideas.

At the end of the 1990s many L’vivites realized that the narrative about L’viv as a discursive generator of ‘non-Sovietness’ and ‘Piedmontism’ did not correlate with the city’s actual cultural and political influence on the scale of Ukraine as a whole. Therefore cultural producers and cultural entrepreneurs began to popularize ideas about a new ‘branding’ of the city which would allow its prominence to be restored in other ways. Two correlating visions have been often discussed in L’viv intellectual circles. One of them suggests further commercial exploitation of the cultural-historical heritage of the city and the already existing narrative about L’viv as ‘the least Soviet, most European city in Ukraine’. This vision should be implemented through further development of tourist business, restoration of historical monuments, and investments into the cultural sector and infrastructure. In addition, as it was, for example, recently proposed by a young official from the L’viv City Council, L’viv’s image should be presented as a series of catchy popular ‘brands’. Besides L’viv ‘brands’ as a city of multicultural heritage, Ukrainian nationalism, coffee and chocolate, intelligentsia and

102 In the original the word pasionarii coined by Russian poet and philosopher Nikolai Gumilev was used.
professionals should support new ‘brands’ such as, for example, a city of books, football, and even ‘the capital city of Masochism’103 (“Not too positive an image for the city? But look at our neighbors, Romanians, who do not mind that their country is called ‘Dracula-land’ in tourist guides, and the city Sighisoara became the capital city of vampires. On the contrary, it brings in money to this region’s budget” (Kosiv 2007)).

As for another prospective vision, it focuses on making use of such resources as the city’s educated workforce, and its academic and research institutions. L’viv should restore its ‘normality’, European-ness and prosperity by way of becoming not only a tourist magnet, but also a centre of modern cultural life, research and education (see, for example, Hrytsak 2007, Vozniak 2003). These two suggested paths for the city’s development are formed in overt opposition to the Soviet strategic visions, which prioritized quick industrialization (and, accordingly ‘proletarianization’ of its population) and cultural unification of the city. Post-1991 prospective visions of L’viv emphasize instead the role of intelligentsia, academicians and professionals as those groups of residents who might not only reformulate the symbolic image and ‘identity’ of the city, but also greatly contribute to resolving its socio-economical problems.

Nevertheless, concerns about L’viv’s symbolic image and reputation remain a prerogative of the cultural producers of various kinds. ‘The national’ has been an important component of this image. The daily social, economical and not least cultural realities of post-Soviet L’viv can hardly become a basis for narratives about grandness and superiority. This disparity between the high symbolical status of the city which underpinned the claims to its centrality in Ukrainian national culture as well as in the present political processes of nation building—and the actual state of affairs with L’viv’s infrastructure, material standards of life and economic development—was obvious for many L’vivites. This dilemma was addressed on the local political level in polemics between adherents of two contrasting visions of Ukraine’s development: sobornyky who defend the idea of Ukraine as a politically centralized unitary state, and avtonomisty, federalisty or, in more radical variant, separatysty, who insist on the necessity of decentralization and promotion of regional interests in economic and other spheres.

The socio-economic problems of L’viv and its ‘identity crisis’ are to be resolved, according to the adherents of Ukrainian sobornist’ (unity), when L’vivites will succeed in acquiring more influence in ‘the centre’, i.e., in Kyiv, especially in the political sphere. This would facilitate, on the one hand, the dissemination of Ukrainian culture among the compatriots in other parts of Ukraine, and, on the other hand, the relocation of resources to the urgent economic needs of L’viv and Galicia. However, as participants in the polemics at ZAXID.NET have stressed, although this scenario is still attractive as a prospective model of empowerment for L’viv and Galicia, so far it has not been put into action. Those who should be blamed in the first turn are

103 Leopold von Sacher-Masoch (1836-1895), the Austrian writer whose name was given to a sexual anomaly, was born and spent much of his life in L’viv (Lemberg).
representatives of the L’viv and the Galician political establishment. For example, Ihor Koliushko, a L’viv politician himself, has recently noted that

If L’vivites were different, who knows whether Ukraine would get such a phenomenon as the Orange Revolution, and, in general, whether we would exist as a democratic state. Because of this general democratic potential stemming from L’viv, we as a people were victorious on the political fronts, also on the all-national scale.

Nevertheless, Koliushko continues,

Many politicians from Galicia have never gone beyond the issue of struggle for the Ukrainian language or culture. Someone needed to do this, of course. However, unfortunately, quite often representatives from L’viv confined themselves only to this part. And this happened while other regions competed in the first turn for money, investments and economic advantages (Koliushko 2008).

Some authors, like for example another participant in the polemics at ZAXID.NET, Andrii Mykytyn, even argued that leadership of L’viv in Galicia is empty talk, as contemporary L’viv can be called neither the administrative, political nor cultural capital of the region anymore. The reason is that

Not a single time in 16 years of independence has L’viv (as an alleged capital of Galicia) resolved or lobbied any strategic, economic or investment issue for other parts of Galicia, to say nothing about issues of Galician politics. …Although there are still many working museums, exhibitions and theatres in L’viv, they all are either national or L’viv provincial [oblasnyi] ones. They have nothing in common with similar institutions in Frankiv’s’k or Ternopil’ provinces. L’viv culture is stewing in its own juice, and cultural intelligentsia in L’viv is simply mad about great-state patriotism (some call it nationalism)… Undoubtedly, the better displays, the better works and the better artists have settled on the Kyivan hills (Mykytyn 2007).

Other voices, according to the logic of inversion, called for abandoning the ‘myth of the Ukrainian Piedmont’, that is, the stories about the unquestionable centrality of Galicia and L’viv in modern Ukrainian political and cultural development. These authors point out that, historically, Piedmont not only was a symbolical centre for the Italian nation, but also succeeded in becoming one of the most economically developed Italian regions, which provided the other regions with a good example. Hence, the suggestion was to shift the focus from issues of culture and language to a focus on local economic concerns, the development of regional cooperation, and ‘making law and order in one’s own house’. When it successfully resolves its socio-economic problems, L’viv will serve as an example of ‘true’ cultural superiority and political wisdom for all of Ukraine (see, for example, Lozyns’kyi 2002). In line with this argument, the focus should be shifted from the ‘extreme’ and, primarily for people from Eastern and Southern Ukraine, even repulsive image of L’viv as ‘Banderstadt’, i.e., as the capital (or, rather, according to the Soviet expression, a ‘hornets’ nest’) of
militant Ukrainian nationalism. Viewed from this perspective, “symbolic transformation of L’viv to Banderstadt is nothing else but the direct continuation of Soviet stereotypes …which… served to divide and rule Ukraine, to scare the East with the image of the nationalist ‘wild West’ and its treacherous Banderstadt” (Amar 2008). Also, cultivation of the nationalist image of the city is harmful, because it may undermine the proclaimed ‘European perspective’ of L’viv (Rasevych 2008c). Instead, a more appealing presentation of L’viv as a prosperous ‘normal burgher’ city attractive not only for tourists and investors, but for all categories of its (both present, used-to-be and potential) residents, must be elaborated.

Iurii Prokhas’ko, a L’viv intellectual of the younger generation, advances the argument that not only envisioning L’viv as the city endowed with the mission of nationalizing all of Ukraine, but any effort to present L’viv in terms of any ‘mission’ is groundless:

…in my opinion, in the last several years L’viv lost its right to claim …[fulfillment] of wishes, which we recently, with no bad conscience, could classify as “mission”. Neither “Ukrainization”, “Europeanization”, “democratization”, mobilization of civil society, nor cherishing of local peculiarity—to name only the most often repeated [positions]—are the attributes of some exclusively L’vivian holy duty anymore. …Therefore, here comes a conclusion which is important for the formulation of L’viv’s present function. Namely, this function is to be oneself, and …not to teach others what they should be (Prokhas’ko Iu. 2007).

For Prokhas’ko, one of the most obvious reasons why a grand-narrative about L’viv should be discarded is numerous daily problems of present-day L’viv. Notably, the line of reasoning and the concepts used by Prokhas’ko for depicting the state of affairs in the city may be easily extrapolated to the discussions about L’viv intelligentsia and intellectuals after 1991. Talking about present-day L’viv, Prokhas’ko in fact talks about present-day intelligentsia. Intelligentsia should resign from ritualistic enchanting of master metaphors (nation, democratization etc.), abandon its missionary attitudes, and address the most urgent, concrete problems of their urban community instead. The uniqueness of the city, according to him, is not in its ‘mission’, but in

Its image, traditions, cuisine. The level of identification of its residents [with the city]. Knowledge of cultural landscape and historical horizons. Ability to interpret the city. To perceive its uniqueness not only as a selection of anecdotes, odd collection of relics, fragments of exoticisms, but also as a semantic system. Ability to find inspiration and a resource of actualization in it (Prokhas’ko Iu. 2007).

L’viv becomes a metonymy of those residents who identify themselves with the city’s unique culture and for whom knowledge, interpretation and actualization of cultural heritage are cornerstones of their identity. In other words, L’viv and its intelligentsia residents become one another’s projections. Intelligentsia L’vivites and their cultural sensitivity, thus, become the ‘most authentic’ element of the L’viv human landscape and, if one further sharpens the argument, probably even the only one endowed with positive value. This
symbolic amplification of a category of urban dwellers to such proportions that they become both ‘typical’ and ‘best’ representatives of their urban community is undoubtedly an example of discursive empowerment. In another article for ZAXID.NET, Prokhas’ko continues to conflate visions of the prospective development of L’viv with claims and conceptual demands of its community of intellectuals and intelligentsia. Given that L’viv intellectuals aspire to join the international intellectual community and to be accepted in ‘the big world’, L’viv may actualize its potential as Weltstadt, as a world-open city (Prokhas’ko Iu. 2008).

The idea that the fate of L’viv not only reflects the situation of its intelligentsia, but directly depends on consolidation of the intellectual milieu, has been straightforwardly and unequivocally expressed by another L’viv intellectual, the political scientist Volodymyr Pavliv:

Sober pragmatism, which is to be expressed in consolidation of forces and expansive propagation of a system of values, should become a matter of survival for the L’viv intellectual milieu… The “genuine L’vivites” must return to their influential position, which they had, although for a short period, at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. The broader, more authoritative and more creative the milieu of the “genuine L’vivites”, the more visible it will be in the city and the more influence it will wield both on the city’s “ups” and “downs”. This influence is necessary for taking the city’s fate in our own hands. The easiest thing is to close ourselves into our kitchens, studios and cafes and to pretend that we do not notice the new barbarians in the streets of our city which we care so much about (Pavliv 2008b).

Thus, for Pavliv the (only) ‘genuine’ L’vivites are coterminous with intellectuals (or, rather, intelligentsia), whose attributes are presented in accordance with the ‘classical’ East-Central European model. Namely, intellectuals are described by the author as ‘genuine’ urbanites, as those who bear responsibility for defending the city against “the new barbarians”, who are engaged in “expansive propagation” of moral values, who mediate between “ups” and “downs” and whose periods of influence coincide with rise of the national movement. Also, within this vision, the symbolic centrality of the L’viv intelligentsia becomes inseparable from centrality of L’viv in the Ukrainian national movement and in cultural battles with the “new barbarians”.

Whether discarding the vision of L’viv as a unique generator of Ukrainian-ness and the National Idea or reformulating it, the participants in the discussions about L’viv argue that a more nuanced and historically adequate picture of the ‘Ukrainian Piedmont’ and the ‘cultural capital of Western Ukraine’ should be presented. One could say that centripetal discourses on L’viv, which emphasize ‘centralities’ of various kinds, have come into question. More and more often narratives appear which exemplify the ‘novel’ structure, i.e., the model with multiple ups and downs and with an absence of some teleological point of destination. While emphasizing the complexity of L’viv’s history and the absence of some definite hegemonic narrative about the city, these accounts dismantle the romantic aura of grandness, centrality and particularity which had been created around L’viv in Polish and Ukrainian national(ist) discourses. In particular, the stories that L’viv
has always been a cultural metropolis were challenged as contradicting both historical accounts and present-day experience.

8.3. The tales of peripherality: charming province, post-Soviet backwater or East-Central European Strasbourg?

Literary critic and public intellectual Mykola Riabchuk states that L’viv has never been ‘central’ in any states which it used to belong to, and, moreover, it has never been a really significant political, cultural or economic centre on the European or world map. However, it has often played the role of symbolic centre where cultural and political Ukrainian-ness could be preserved until better times. If L’viv is still eager to play this role in independent Ukraine, then the city’s elites should lobby reforms which would reduce their political and economic dependence on Kyiv, while rank-and-file L’vivites should overcome the “marginality implanted in their heads” (Riabchuk 2008).

In his article ‘Passions about L’viv’ (‘Strasti po L’vovvu’), Hrytsak argues that, viewed from a wider historical perspective, L’viv was provincial even during its ‘golden age’, which in the opinion of many coincides with the time of Habsburg rule. As a capital of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, L’viv was an island of ‘European’ urban culture in the ocean of ‘half-Asian’ Galicia. The reputed ‘superior cultural life’ of L’viv was associated not with some outstanding achievements in the sphere of high culture, but first and foremost with the benefits of modernity, bourgeoisness and ‘civilization’ reflected in the lifestyle of ordinary urbanites (Hrytsak 2004: 231-232). Viewed from this perspective, L’viv was definitely a cultural metropolis, and therefore the decline of bourgeoisness and ‘civilised’ standards of everyday life in Soviet L’viv should be regarded as an obvious token of provincialization. During the seminar organized by ‘Ï’ magazine, Hrytsak developed some ideas about L’viv’s provinciality and, in particular, pointed out that L’viv succeeded in restoring its superior status under Soviet rule. The basis of this superiority was, however, different: ‘L’viv was not provincial in the Soviet Union because it had the function of a capital city of certain kind. It functioned as another one, the real one, the hidden ideological, patriotic and national capital of Ukraine’. Hrytsak also pointed out that as a center of the Ukrainian nationalist movement in the twentieth century, L’viv lost its centrality in the new Ukraine whose capital is Kyiv, and “became a victim of its own victory” (Hrytsak 2002d). In this respect the destiny of L’viv is comparable to the destiny of a nationally-minded intellectual who, as Hrytsak argues in another article, “initiates big societal changes, which he himself most suffers from in the first turn” (Hrytsak 2004: 263).

Generally, when something or someone is called provincial, the immediate associations evoked are those of backwardness, ignorance, bad taste and dullness. Provinciality is usually something negative. When Vozniak in polemical zeal calls L’viv a post-Soviet city like many others, he adds caustically: “It
[L’viv] is an eclectic combination of hopeless provincial Soviet-ness with its pop-music appealing to the tastes of petty criminals [blatna popsa], mass (sic!) celebrations of the Eighth of March\(^{104}\) and the weekly ritual of political rallies after church services” (Vozniak 2001). Another voice in the choir lamenting the provinciality of L’viv related the city’s ‘mediocrity’ and ‘provincialism’ to the difficulty of sustaining an intellectual life there: “Centers of intellectual and cultural existence such as the artistic association ‘Dzyha’ and ‘I’ magazine are only isolated islands in the sea of post-Soviet mediocrity and provincial glamour whose mixture in fact is L’viv” (Pavliv 2008b). However, such disdainful commentaries about L’viv probably should not be taken at face value. They are neither tokens of some particular snobbism of the L’viv intellectual milieus nor reliable evaluations of L’viv’s cultural aura. They, rather, exemplify a topos typical of the rhetoric of intellectuals, as “The intellectual is… structurally disposed to lament the anti-intellectualism of his national context” (Jakobsen 2008: 6). Provincialism is one of many shapes of anti-intellectualism, and not only intellectuals from L’viv feel themselves threatened by the ‘provincialism’ of their local milieus.

Nevertheless, in the opinion of adherents to the idea of ‘small motherlands’ and proponents of regional development, provincialism may be not only something threatening, but also something empowering. For example, the respected Ukrainian philosopher and civil activist Myroslav Popovych assumed that

Fortunately, Ukraine is not the sort of state where province is something very bad. Can you name a land in Germany which is a province in comparison with the capital city of the country? You cannot, because Bavaria, Prussia or Saxony are parts of Germany, and each of them has its function, its mission, its face. It is the same with us. Every part—Kharkiv, Donetsk, Kyiv, Poltava and other cities—have their own mission. … And L’viv is like it is. Let it be as it is. And it will be exemplary in this respect (Popovych 2007).

Similarly to marginality and peripherality, provinciality should not necessarily be viewed as another name for backwardness. On the contrary, it may be re-evaluated as a synonym for uniqueness and potential opportunities. It may signal rootedness in local culture and submersion in local collective memory, it may evoke positive associations with coziness, peacefulness, local color and a good standard of life. It may be even viewed as a cultivated resistance to the colonizing influences of cultural metropoles and a necessary attribute of regional identity essential for East-Central European societies. Also, the ‘marginality’ of L’viv, the Galician region and even the whole of Ukraine may mark an important geopolitical and cultural borderline: “Ukraine and L’viv ended up on the post-Soviet–EU borderline. Our only chance is to be the centre of the whole borderline. However, we don’t have enough spirit to acknowledge our marginality in order to finally realize our intermediary function” (Vozniak 2003). This intermediary function may be realized in that “L’viv,

\(^{104}\) International Women’s Day on the 8th of March. Initiated by Rosa Luxemburg as a day of women’s solidarity and struggle for equal rights, it became an important political holyday in the USSR. In the late Soviet period, however, the Eighth of March gradually transformed itself into a popular holiday, ‘a celebration of spring and beauty’, with flowers and sweets presented to women as its usual attribute.
historically a city of many nationalities and cultures, has a chance of becoming a sort of Strasbourg of East-Central Europe, a city where the West and East meet” (ibid).

In the writings of Andrukhovych provincialism and marginality also become a starting point for the invention of a new post-Soviet identity for L’viv and Galicia. L’viv and Galicia may be provincial and peripheral, but that is the condition for their emotional appeal, particularity and even superiority. For Andrukhovych, the provinciality of his ‘small motherland’ is related to the original and vital artistic expressions of such an unconventional symbolic centre as Central Europe:

…I understand my “post-modern” also as the provincial, the marginal—in that meaning that Central Europe has never been able and never wanted to be the centre (but this did not prevent it from insemination of the centers with its vital sperm, from turning upside down value systems and forming streams of consciousness…), because Central Europe is a special state of soul… And I dare to add: it is a province where everyone knows that he in fact is in the very centre, because centre is nowhere and everywhere simultaneously, and that is why one can from the ups and downs of his own studio look with absolute calm at everything, including New York or some Moscow (Andrukhovych 1999: 121-122).

For Viktor Neborak, who like Andrukhovych used to be a member of the experimental artistic group ‘Bu-Ba-Bu’ affiliated with Ivano-Frankivs’k and L’viv, the issue of periphery and provinciality has a quite different dimension. Both Ukraine and Ukrainian L’viv may be called periphery and province, but in the same manner New York is also a province if one places the imaginative centre in an eternal spiritual continuum, in the domain of the Absolute. ‘Provinciality’ of present-day L’viv is not a token of its cultural inferiority. Rather, it is a modus of its particularity that has to be recovered from ‘non-authentic’ layers that endanger L’viv’s true nature (Neborak 2003: 126-127). Notably, Neborak’s vision of the centrality and greatness of L’viv is in discord with Andrukhovych’s playful dissolutions and inversions of centre and periphery and with his appeal not to discard “various layers and coverings”, but, on the contrary, to “open [L’viv’s] gate and to give the keys of the city to everyone” (Andrukhovych 2008).

Nevertheless, for both authors admission of alleged backwardness may in the end effect be used as an element of positive image construction for post-1991 L’viv. Arguing that provinciality may be reframed as something that gives one the right to claim a unique cultural heritage, L’viv intellectuals and intelligentsia search to change nuances and modalities in the established narrative identity of their ‘own’ community (and, in a way, of themselves) without trying to turn it upside down or discard it. These discursive strategies of continuation and downplaying/trivialization (Wodak et al. 1999: 36-42) that help to draw attention to other possible—in this case positive—meanings and effects of the same phenomenon without radically changing the existing narrative structure, seem to be a quite usual means of gradually changing the balance of power in the desired direction.
While typical discourses of perestroika hyperbolized negative aspects of everyday life and history and, in a way, contributed to the paralysis of constructive practical solutions at that time (Ries 1998), post-1991 cultural narratives, by contrast, stress the contradictory nature of cultural-historical events, personalities and phenomena and refrain from definite judgments (Hnatiuk 2002, Kulyk 2006). Using the discursive strategies of downplaying/trivialization and continuation which are quite similar to the mythological logic of bricolage described by Levi-Strauss, the opposites may be suspended and even discarded by way of finding more and more intermediate stages and similarities between them. The logical schemes and discursive strategies which underscore the relativity of cultural dichotomies may be used for deep interpretations and for the exposure of complexities, but they may also have such a side effect as impediment of definite evaluations of events, personalities, historical periods and places. Hence, L'viv may be presented as a symbolical ‘centre’ in certain senses (e.g., as the 'Ukrainian Piedmont'), but it also may be discursively transformed into a province, which, in its turn, becomes the ground for reframing the city in terms of inclusion into the orbit of another metaphor of power (e.g., ‘Europe’), and so on.

The risk is, however, that when a certain cultural distinction becomes blurred (for instance, when statuses of both cultural metropolis and province are presented as equally ‘good’ or equally ‘bad’, desirable or undesirable), the envisioning of alternatives to it seems to be obsolete. If L'viv may always be presented in an advantageous light and ‘emplotted’ into some self-gratifying accounts, then, one may assume, appeals for real social and political changes in the city may be easily downplayed. Likewise, in inverted projection, if in someone’s opinion L’viv has always been and will always remain a province, then any positive changes in post-1991 L’viv’s cultural ambience will be in vain because L’viv is on the wrong side ‘existentially’. In present-day Galician intelligentsia’s discursive production, L’viv nevertheless runs the risk of remaining always on the ‘right’ side of the fence, although the everyday realities constantly reshuffle the criteria of what may be counted as ‘right’.

Those who suggest that L’viv, as an ambivalent ‘peripheral centre’ or ‘capital of the province’, may become a model for a ‘city on the borderland’, ‘a city of blurred boundaries’ and, thus, of new possibilities and experiments on the European continent (Schloegel 2003: 252-259), deserve more attention. This, however, does not mean that such a place needs to become a liminal “‘no-man’s-land’ open to everyone’s experience yet not easily understood without guide” (Zukin 1991: 269). Exactly this kind of representation of post-1991 L’viv as a ‘city of sin’, a transit station of people, goods, drugs and cultural stereotypes, a city inhabited by ‘liminal’ creatures such as prostitutes, corrupted officials, gangsters and smugglers, becomes distinguishable in present-day popular literary production. As any other city, L’viv has experienced—and will certainly experience in the future—rapid inversions of spatial categories: “from landscape of power to vernacular, or vernacular to landscape of power” (ibid). As Zukin points out, such inversions are “not the results of individual or even group mobility so much as it is the result of both structural
changes in the economy and cultural strategies for social and spatial differentiation” (ibid.). Presentation and perception of L'viv as a cultural centre (‘landscape of power’) or as a province (‘vernacular landscape’) cannot be determined solely by discursive strategies of cultural producers and entrepreneurs. Neither does intelligentsia alone have the prerogative to decide about exactly “which-man’s-land” it is to be—although often its representatives express exactly this idea in their accounts about L’viv.

The intermediacy of L’viv as a city captured in orbits of different centers of power in its capacity as a centre or a periphery, may be interpreted as a projection of intelligentsia’s and intellectuals’ intermediate situation. Drawn between different gravitation centers (‘folk’, ‘elites’, authorities, nation, ‘Europe’, international and transnational trends etc.) these actors are compelled constantly to negotiate their positions and attitudes. Hence, claims to the ‘centrality’ of L’viv as a major cultural, educational etc. centre in the country and the region as well as in the context of the whole Central-European areal, may be interpreted as L’viv intelligentsia and intellectuals’ bids for status, resources and decisive ‘voice’. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that relative marginality is a basic determinant of the cultural producers’ position in the social field. While drifting between ‘centrality’ and ‘marginality’, intellectuals exploit the paradox that not being in power may be a source of authority and thus of counter-power (Kennedy and Suny 1999, Jakobsen 2008). Resolving L’viv’s ‘dilemma’, the cultural producers are in search of solutions to their own problems of defining their role, obligations and (im)possible mission in post-1991 Ukrainian society. They are compelled to scrutinize and re-evaluate their narrative identities and positions as actors ‘central’ and/or ‘peripheral’ for their socio-cultural and political communities. But in order to do this, they are compelled to reframe and reconsider not only safely distant historical periods, but also the nearest, several decades long, period of Soviet rule, which stirs up the most emotions and controversies. The situation of intelligentsia and intellectuals during that period seems to be especially controversial and even paradoxical. That is probably why these actors greatly contributed to conceptualization of that period as a kind of counter-narrative.

8.4. Soviet L'viv: the power of the ‘counter-narrative’

When reviewing recent Ukrainian intellectual polemics on identity and history, Western scholars were quick to notice that “the Soviet past has not only remained an alternative, but also an unresolved history. … Not explaining, not rewriting and not rethinking the Soviet past have been the norm” (Dietsch 2006: 292). Tendency to avoid the ‘Soviet theme’ is indeed noticeable in analytical and scholarly discourses. Nevertheless, narratives about Soviet times and Soviet-ness in its different incarnations have appeared on various occasions in media and academic discourses, to say nothing about daily contexts. Although the majority of the Ukrainian population in L’viv do not identify themselves with the Soviet heritage openly, they nevertheless use it as a part of their daily cultural arsenal and may express their own anxiety and discontent with its help (Zayarniuk
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Nowadays the stories about the time when the city was a part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic are laden with strong emotions for the majority of L’vivites, especially for those who as adults experienced different aspects of Soviet life. L’vivites of different generations and with different cultural backgrounds may assess this period in different ways, but the common feature of their stories is that they depict Soviet realities in sharp contrast to other periods and places.

The body of popular stories about the city, which circulate in the L’viv media and academic forums, is usually presented in accordance with a distinctly dualistic model and is charged with strong moral undertones. Generally, present-day narratives about the Soviet period belong to the ‘negative’ pole. Surely one cannot discard the opinion of those L’vivites who conceive the Soviet era, especially its late decades, in definitely positive terms, as a time of relative prosperity, predictability and generally cordial relations between people. These stories also tend to provide simplified and biased visions and are also framed as a kind of extreme—however, a ‘positive’ one. Accordingly, the preceding periods and contemporary life ‘after independence’ are depicted as a negative counterpoint to the ‘good old’ Soviet times. However, these nostalgic narratives are mostly excluded from public debates and the sphere of media in L’viv, which are dominated by the Soviet ‘counter-narrative’. This counter-narrative is structured according to the argumentation scheme called *locus terribilis* (topos of terrible place), while the alternative topoi (for example, topos of idyllic place, *locus amoenus*) (Wodak et al. 1999: 36-42) are marginalized and suppressed. The statements of Tarik Cyril Amar, the director of the Centre for Urban History of East-Central Europe in L’viv, and of L’viv artist Volodymyr Kostyrko, are quite typical examples of post-1991 representation of Soviet L’viv in terms of tragedy and catastrophe:

The Soviet empire undoubtedly had its specificity. It was assumed that it would become the beginning of the New era, of Communist end of the history, and L’viv was granted the doubtful privilege of taking part in one of the greatest, most obstinate and most unsuccessful experiments on human beings in world history. Of course, the future is unknown, but nowadays the failed Soviet effort of Communism building may be “rightly” placed among the greatest catastrophes of all times… Forced participation in this tragedy is the most obvious connotation of the term “Soviet L’viv” (Amar 2007).

I didn’t like anything Soviet. Soviet-ness was an aesthetically unattractive ethical evil, it was worker-peasant doctrinairism which led L’viv to catastrophe. The largest part of the city’s population was expelled based solely on its nationality. The system built its order on the basis of the evil part of the human being. Complete de-classation of urban culture was implemented, and human relations became deprived of ethical personalism (Kostyrko 2008).

The Soviet period is generally conceived in terms of rupture, of sudden catastrophic changes, which deeply affected patterns of life and human relations in L’viv. While Soviet propaganda justified the establishment of Soviet rule in Western Ukraine as ‘liberation’ and fulfillment of the ‘everlasting dream’ of Western Ukrainians to be included in the ‘family of brotherly people’, the nationally-aware Galician Ukrainians preferred to call it...
occupation. When members of the older generation of Galicianers talk about those times, they usually prefer the derogatory adjective soviets’kyi (a copy-word of the Russian sovets’kyi), in contrast to the Ukrainian-translated official term radians’kyi which connotes nateness of the Soviet bodies of power for Ukraine. ‘The last Soviet generation’ used to mark discursively their non-acceptance of the Soviet realities by using a colloquial substantive sovok, homonym of the Russian word sovok, which means ‘dustbin’ and may be applied both to persons (in the meaning homo sovieticus) and to the whole way of life. Although both soviets’kyi and sovok are derogatory terms, they have different connotations. While the former one alludes to the repressive nature and foreignness of the political order, the latter is used to convey the mediocrity, dullness, primitiveness and stupefying routines of everyday life in the late Soviet period. L’viv of the late Brezhnev period is depicted as a grey ‘housing area’, much like other Soviet cities, with their standardized material culture and Russian as a dominant language. It is not a place of horror, but rather a semi-rural backwater:

The Soviet L’viv is post-rural, with the obligatory “grandmother in the countryside”, with digging potatoes at one’s private plot on the First of May, with identical furniture, …with Olivier salad, with steak and salad with herring and red beet, with the forms of address “man/woman” [here in Russian—muzhchina/zhenshchina—E.N.] and for the most part, with no words of apology. This L’viv dominates today, and if it wins, then our city will become one big “housing area” [zhylmasyv] (Kryvdyk 2007).

Despite a difference in emphasis, representatives of both older and younger generations tend to present the Soviet way of life and relations of power as something abnormal, although the scale of reactions to this ‘abnormality’ may vary from simple annoyance to diverse forms of resistance.

In the previous chapters, I have already addressed the subject of ‘the Soviet’ as it relates to intelligentsia’s narrative identity and the evaluation of social and cultural ‘others’. In the stories of the informants those who are called ‘the Soviet intelligentsia’ are usually presented as an ersatz type which is not recognized as a ‘true’ intelligentsia. In the same vein, the ‘nationally unaware’ compatriots as well as those hostile to the National Idea are oftentimes defined as sovky. The Soviet period has been depicted as a kind of ‘dark ages’ for intelligentsia and its cultured urban lifestyle in L’viv, which entailed the disappearance of the old Galician intelligentsia, deterioration of educational standards, primitivization of cultural tastes and the impossibility of intellectual freedom. Soviet L’viv, in accordance with this line of narration, is portrayed as a typical locus terribilis where, in the words of one of the informants, “all the filth, the cursing children and drunken people lying in the streets in the middle of the day, appeared”, and as such it is associated with loss and deterioration. However, in a sense these narratives also play a constructive and mobilizing role in the processes of reformulating collective post-1991 identities in L’viv and in Ukraine. This is because “A revised sense of collective identity is …inextricably linked to a Soviet identity and dependent on it to define what the new collective identity is not” (Wanner 1998: 74-75).
The persistent narrative presentation of Soviet L’viv as a *locus terribilis* in the local media at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s was in no way a ‘normal’ and expected reaction of the city’s populace, who at last got a chance to express all their ‘true’ feelings toward the Soviet regime and state socialism. Undoubtedly, L’vivites had for decades shared oral accounts about repressions, deportations and militant resistance to the Soviet regime, and the negative color of this period in L’viv’s history has not been solely the creation of a group of dissenting intellectuals persecuted by the regime. Knowledge—however fragmentary and subjective—about the aspects of Soviet reality which contradicted the official ideological narrative was implicitly present in practically every family of L’vivites during that period. However, this knowledge was in many cases unarticulated and unsystematic, and it could not grow up into a coherent counter-narrative in one night. As Yurchak points out, much critical knowledge about Soviet socialism “has been produced either outside of, or in respect to, socialism, in contexts dominated by antisocialist, nonsocialist or post-socialist political, moral, and cultural agendas and truths” (Yurchak 2006: 6). It may be suggested that the overwhelmingly dark coloring of the retrospective narratives about Soviet times and Soviet L’viv has been a discursive product of several actors, among them the former dissidents who in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet system became figures of power in the L’viv politics, and the Ukrainian diaspora from the West disseminating its own, prevailing dualistic, visions of Ukrainian history (Dietsch 2006: 291)105, especially of its modern period. In other Ukrainian cities, where the influence of these actors and their adherents has been not as strong as in Western Ukraine, attitudes toward the Soviet past tend to be more ambiguous and even positive (see Hrytsak 2000).

When considering the formation of a hypercritical description of Soviet L’viv, one should also have in mind not only the role of political actors *per se*, but also the influence of wider circles of politicking and rank-and-file intelligentsia in this matter. For these categories of cultural producers and entrepreneurs, articulation of the negative sides of the ‘old regime’ became an important means of preserving their cultural authority, as already

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105 Dominance of the national paradigm in contemporary history writing in Ukraine is allegedly one of the results of the diaspora’s influence: “The ‘wave of national myth making’ and the turn towards the nation and its credentials in independent Ukraine have been explained as a result of interpreting diaspora scholarship as the norm for historical and social science scholars. Historians in Ukraine have found the works of North American Ukrainian studies particularly attractive. Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak has claimed that the paramount role played by the diaspora in both financing research institutes and influencing ideas, theories and methods of research, was specific to the Ukrainian situation after independence. Diaspora intellectuals have thereby projected onto their colleagues in Ukraine the diaspora community’s agenda. When their positions are reflected back at them, they perceive it as the genuine position of Ukraine’s intellectuals working with the same topics and arriving at the same conclusions” (Dietsch 2006: 291).
language of power with their own language” and that their own language was “a free space to be extended through struggle” (Yurchak 2006: 6-7).

Present-day intelligentsia in L’viv readily accepts black-and-white presentations of the recent past because it is easier to frame episodes of one’s passive or active resistance in terms of heroic tale and at the same time to cast into doubt the issue of individual and collective responsibility when the foe is totally demonized.

What is the Soviet regime particularly blamed for in L’viv? One can name three categories of losses and damages which are, however, tightly interconnected. The first is irretrievable losses of human lives and atrocities caused by the Stalinist repressions of ‘class enemies’, postwar deportations, collectivization, eradication of the Ukrainian nationalist underground, persecutions of the dissenting intelligentsia and other methods of Soviet terror. The second category embraces changes in the material environment of L’viv, which came in the aftermath of industrialization and Soviet urban planning policies. Here one most often talks about deliberate efforts of the Soviet authorities to make L’viv a Soviet city like many others, about the building of industries in the proximity of the historical centre, demolition of landmarks of the ‘reactionary regimes’, about mass building of standard apartment blocks around the city etc. Many ambitious plans of the new authorities to reconfigure the architecture of the city in accordance with Soviet ideological principles have never been realized and L’viv was largely spared from the wholesale demolition of its historical monuments. Nevertheless, soon after the re-establishing of Soviet rule in Western Ukraine, “The once thriving individual visions of prominent architectural community were entirely sacrificed to Stalinist conformism, a capitulation that allowed the image of the city in the years following the Second World War to be transformed into a more fundamentally Soviet city” (Tscherkes 2000: 218).

The third type addresses ‘Sovietization’ of the everyday relations and public sphere in L’viv. By this one means dissipation of the particular urban culture and spíritus loci of L’viv under the conditions of ideological pressure and shortage economy that characterized the Soviet variant of state socialism. The hostility of the new authorities to intelligentsia and pedigreed burghers whose lifestyles and cultural predilections contradicted the ideals of ‘proletarian simplicity’; facilitation of ‘corruption’, favorable conditions for ubiquitous relations of mutual services (blat), devaluation of the norms of civility in everyday life, imposition of canons of social realism in arts and architecture, the inculcation of ideologically oriented scholarship—these are only some often repeated accusations. In a sense, ‘Sovietization’ became retrospectively imagined in direct opposition to the ‘Europeanization’ which present-day L’viv allegedly aspires to. Thus, Sovietization connotes rather industrialization, massification and ‘mismodernization’ than the values and ideology of socialism whose ‘really existing’ variant the authorities implemented in the USSR and all around the Block.

According to the local media, one of the most infamous phenomena which L’viv inherited from the Soviet period, is the mass of new ‘urban barbarians’. Although there are only a few authors who turn the
theme of L’viv’s ‘de-urbanization’ and ‘rusticalization’ into a leitmotif of their writings (one of them is Igor’ Klekh, a former L’vivite who moved to Moscow at the beginning of the 1990s), the discourse on rahuli and ‘de-urbanization’ became pervasive. In line with this discourse, L’vivites who do not fit the image of the cultured person, who are not concerned with L’viv architecture and history, who tolerate ‘pollution’ of the city’s sonic environment with Russophone blatnaya popsa, who are concerned solely about their own comfort and who exchange wooden frames of the windows in their apartments overlooking the historical city centre for plastic ones, are presented as a contingent, ‘inauthentic’ and ‘inassimilable’ infusion into L’viv life and hence are symbolically excluded from the noble community of ‘true’ urbanites. As Andrii Zayarniuk, a L’viv intellectual of the younger generation observes, such a vision of urban culture communicated by a part of the L’viv cultural establishment looks retrograde when compared with Soviet policies. Unlike the Soviet authorities and cultural elites who regarded ‘culture’ as something that should and could be acquired by every Soviet citizen, the contemporary Galician intellectuals are persuaded that a significant part of their countrymen cannot acquire it, for it must be cultivated from generation to generation (Zayarniuk 2008).

Other L’viv intellectuals have argued that antagonism between the ‘culture’ associated with educated urban classes and the ‘non-culture’ or ‘anti-culture’ of the rest of the city populace persists despite the change of political regimes. Viewed from this perspective, it is wrong to present the Soviet period in terms of a radical counter-narrative and interruption of the cultural tradition. While introducing new radical elements of cultural imagery in some cases, the Soviet reality reproduced elements of the symbolic hierarchies of prewar Galician society in others. Hence, the ‘new barbarians’ in L’viv are not principally different from ‘the old ones’, and today, like centuries ago,

Rurality [selo] bursts from every crack, rurality dictates its conditions, rurality hates the L’viv of lords [pans’kyi L’viv]. That’s why it destroys unique ancient gates and puts the new and not at all unique ones instead, it remakes balconies according to its taste, it fastens satellite antennas in the middle of a bas-relief, it paints over the old inscriptions on the buildings. It wipes off all traces of the city of lords in order to make it into a countryside [selo] or into a village [derevnia, in Russian—E.N.] (Vynnychuk 2007).

Hence, the discussion about the ‘new L’viv barbarians’ drifted all the time between a discussion about the legacy of the Soviet system and the ‘always existing’ class and ethnic patterns of the Ukrainian community of the city. In the former case the accent has been set on ‘external’ factors such as the policies of Soviet authorities, which reportedly resulted in the creation of a local type of homo sovieticus with no historical memory or striving for spiritual achievements. In the latter case the ‘internal’ cultural and social factors are stressed, and this, in some extreme cases, could lead to conclusions of this sort: ‘The majority of the Soviet disasters, which were wrathfully stamped by representatives of the national-democratic camp, were in fact a
result of our civilizational karma, and therefore independence, democracy and market proved to be too weak to eliminate them” (Vitkov's'kyi 2008).

In his determination to provide a more balanced evaluation of the Soviet period and to oppose the hypercritical writings of the nationally oriented intelligentsia about Soviet L’viv, the same author continued to couple valid arguments with quite cynical remarks that eventually undermined the credibility of his analysis:

The L’viv-centric national movement of the 1980s and 1990s, which resulted in the downfall of Bolshevism and the creation of independent Ukraine, was to 80 percent a product of the Soviet regime. ... Exactly this regime, with its brutal and effective methods, created—for the first time for many centuries!—the phenomenon of a L’viv where Ukrainians ceased to be a minority. It created the system of mass national education, which was infected by the ideological viruses of Bolshevism, but otherwise quite effective. This regime was on its way to liquidating the social-economic backwardness of Galicia... At last, the Soviet regime provided future dissidents with the opportunity to obtain national training in numerous institutions of mass national culture, and then to gain the non-discussable spiritual authority behind the barbed wire of the prison camps of Mordovia and Kolyma… (ibid).

One may partially agree that revival of the Ukrainian national movement at the end of the twentieth century was not only a response to repressive Soviet policies, but also a consequence of the input of the new authorities in the Soviet-styled modernization of the West Ukrainian provinces. However, due to the fact that Ukrainianization in Soviet times could in principle be regarded as Sovietization with a touch of local color, even Ukrainians in ‘the least Sovietized Ukrainian city’ internalized many Soviet ideological concepts and dualist structures. The Soviets authorities consequently inculcated the vision of L’viv as an ancient Ukrainian city and made significant efforts to hush up or trivialize the cultural heritage of other peoples settled in prewar L’viv. For example, the Soviet school curricula limited the teaching of local history to an absolute minimum, and even these fragmented lectures were formed mostly as stories about ancient struggles with class oppressors and modern achievements of the Soviet era. To teach the children about the cultural heritage of Poles, Germans and Jews in L’viv was out of the question. Instead, such subjects as history of the USSR and its peoples were prioritized in the curriculum. The postwar generations were supposed to possess the same limited knowledge about their localities as about distant Soviet republics, because the principal object of loyalty and affection of the citizens had to be the common Soviet Motherland. The young L’vivites were expected to take the city’s ‘exotic’ environment for granted and not to pose questions about its historical meaning and the residents in its past.

The postwar Ukrainianization of L’viv implied not only changes in terms of ethnic composition and repression of memory about non-Ukrainians and non-Russians. It also brought about a reshaping of the entire prewar social class structure of the city’s population. L’viv’s special image in interwar Poland included not only a middle class component (urban lifestyles of intelligentsia, professionals, bourgeoisie), but also romanticized presentations of the city’s aristocracy as well as lower classes, lumpens (such as the famous...
L’viv batiary) and eccentrics (świrki). In terms of numbers, at that time Ukrainians were better represented among the lower urban strata and, hence, as some participants of the discussion on ZAXID.NET argue, in historical terms it is wrong to equate Ukrainian urban culture solely with its middle-class variant (Maikl 2007). Nevertheless, representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the city, although not so numerous as their Polish and Polonized counterparts, did contribute to the culture and urban lifestyle of Habsburg and then Polish L’viv. Moreover, they were those urban actors who elaborated cultural models of conduct and national awareness that the other Ukrainian urbanites as well as the Galician Ukrainians in the countryside emulated.

Under the Soviet regime numerous representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were repressed in tandem with Polish and Jewish ‘leisure classes’. However, the issue under discussion is still who exactly was repressed, on what grounds, by whom (Rasevych 2008b)—and whether the Ukrainiaization-Sovietization of L’viv may be unequivocally regarded as a project of assimilation or extinction of the non-peasant Ukrainian-ness. When viewed from the latter perspective, repressions and expulsions of the prewar intelligentsia from L’viv may be presented as measures intended to strip the ‘Ukrainian Piedmont’ of its European-ness and cultural superiority and thereby to undermine the dignity of the Ukrainian nation. The centrality of intelligentsia as a martyr figure in the national narratives unfolding from L’viv implies empowering potential of this symbolic point of reference in the social reality viewed through the prism of the ‘national order of things’ (Malkki 1996). The decline of Europe-oriented ‘old’ Galician intelligentsia and broken ties of generational transmission between the old and the new intelligentsia, are directly related to ‘disempowerment’ of the Ukrainian nation under the Soviets. Hence the revival of Galician intelligentsia and its desovietization is represented as a matter of priority after 1991, since advancement of cultural Ukrainian-ness and of the Ukrainian nation allegedly depends on the regained authority of the intelligentsia.

Although such reasoning dominates, recently voices of L’viv intellectuals have been heard that cast doubt on such taken-for-granted accounts about the totally distressing circumstances of L’viv intelligentsia under the Soviet regime. Remarkably, these narratives which have been intended to correct the ‘distorted’ pictures of Soviet reality, may be grounded in another biased view. They may, for example, diminish the role of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in pre-Soviet L’viv and also present tendentious accounts of intelligentsia under Soviet rule. Aleksandr Khokhulin, the L’viv artist of Russian origin who takes part in the L’viv-focused polemics under the pseudonym Mankurt106, argues, for example, that

One may doubt the point of view, widely accepted in the present-day L’viv, according to which all the Galician intelligentsia was eliminated by the bloodthirsty Communists who allegedly shot thousands of intelligentsia and filled whole trains with them and sent them to Siberia. Those who say

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106 According to a legend presented in the novel The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years by Chingiz Aitmatov, a mankur is a person turned into a slave by means of a torturous procedure which made him forget his past, his own name and his own mother. Since perestroika, Russified-Sovietized everymen, who allegedly forgot their language and history, have been scornfully called mankury.
this simply do not have information about numbers of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in L’viv before the war. In fact, all of them could find room in one normal-size cinema… From a moral-ethical point of view repression of even only one Galician intelligently (and they were quite numerous indeed) is an undeniable crime which cannot be justified. But from the point of view of a historian only a small share of L’viv intelligently was subjected to repressions. …In fact, despite repressions of a part of the L’viv intelligentsia, the biggest part was engaged by the new authorities and successfully worked, while the new postwar L’viv intelligentsia was created exactly by Russians, or the Soviets, if you like (Mankurt 2008).

Kholodulin reaches here for an argument that seems to substitute quantity with quality, because he suggests that the prewar Ukrainian intelligentsia was not numerous and, as a result, lacking influence. In a sense, it looks like the Soviet authorities, despite all reservations, did the right thing when they purged the old ‘impotent’ prewar intelligentsia in order to give place to its more vital and ‘competitive’ Soviet counterpart. Such reasoning evokes associations with social Darwinism and with Machiavellian credo about the aim that justifies the means, both of which were a part of Soviet (especially Stalinist) authoritative discourse (Yurchak 2006). The final statement that “the new postwar L’viv intelligentsia was created exactly by Russians, or the Soviets, if you like”, demonstrates that the author obviously ignores pieces of evidence about a certain continuity of the prewar ethos of the ‘old’ Galician intelligentsia in Soviet L’viv. The author makes an effort to do justice to the Soviet period in L’viv, but tries to achieve this by diminishing positive sides of the pre-Soviet historical realities. Needless to say, such discursive strategies of shifted emphases and trivialization contribute neither to nuanced historical accounts of the pre-Soviet periods nor to unprejudiced opinions about several decades of Soviet rule in L’viv.

The alleged weakness and inferiority of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in L’viv had been addressed in other connections. For example, it has been argued that adherence of the Galician intelligentsia to the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism (“caricature-like, backward and marginal ideology” (Klekh 1998: 49)) both in the interwar period and up to the present has resulted in marginalization of the L’viv intelligentsia on the all-Ukrainian scale. Also, L’viv’s alleged ‘de-urbanization’ and ‘ruralization’ is placed in connection with this. However, the interesting thing with this reasoning advocated by the former L’vivite Igor’ Klekh, is that, without denying negatives of the Soviet era, it nevertheless promotes a vision of this period as a period of ‘normalization’ whose main virtue was that it sustained ‘excesses’ of the Ukrainian nationalistic intelligentsia. While according to the presently dominant opinion, Sovietization and the lack of national commitment have become the source of post-1991 problems in L’viv, Klekh and like-minded intellectuals blame the problems on the excess of ‘the national’ (sentiments, ideology, demagogy, you name it). For the Russophone writer Klekh, not Soviet intelligentsia, but the nationally-minded part of the L’viv intelligentsia is one of the main anti-heroes in his vision of recent Galician history. The Soviets are presented as an external actor that eventually failed to cope with the internal Galician ‘malady’.
In one of his essays Klekh tells about an episode that demonstrates his evident dislike of the Galician intelligentsia. At the beginning of 1994 L’viv was visited by an official Israeli delegation charged with the task of rewarding Galicianers who helped the Jews during World War II. Klekh, who was present at the reward ceremony, makes the following observation:

So, among almost a hundred faces which passed before my eyes, the faces of those who were rewarded, I could not recall one single even slightly intelligentaia appearance. All these people who risked their families being executed were common simple people, who either worked in the field, or were residents of poor industrial areas, their hands and figures deformed by hard physical work (Klekh 1998: 50).

In other passages of the essay Klekh laments worsening Ukrainian-Russian relations and then comments:

Galicianers—not all of them, but the so-called “educated class” (a majority, to be sure, educated very superficially) succeeded in this most. …Their caricatured, backward and marginal ideology is opposed solely by inborn pragmatism and the common sense of Ukrainians, which however under conditions of the protracted crisis cannot be a sufficiently effective vaccine against social rabies (ibid: 49-50).

It should be specified that Klekh is not at all a persona non grata in the Ukrainophone intellectual circles of L’viv. On the contrary, his essays have been published in the respected ‘I’ magazine and he is an active participant in the debate on L’viv. His writings, critical and in many ways provocative, have contributed to intellectual diversity of this debate. Nevertheless, his intolerance of non-Soviet (and anti-Soviet) identity models which parts of the Galician intelligentsia have been actualizing, interferes with an unbiased discussion of the subject.

The aspiration of L’viv officials and politicking intelligentsia to ‘normalize’ daily life in L’viv and to get rid of ‘vulgar traces of Soviet-ness’ from time to time took puzzling forms indeed. Curious episode of these cultural battles for the ‘ecology’ of the public places in L’viv took place in 2000. In the spring of that year the governor of the L’viv Province (oblast’) Stepan Senchuk issued an executive order to discontinue the retransmission of a Kyiv-based musical FM station, ‘Nashe Radio’, in the L’viv Province. This controversial order immediately became the talk of the town. According to the official explanation, the radio had broken the Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting by devoting almost all its air time to mere retransmission of Russian pop songs coming from a top pop-music station in Moscow. The skeptical voices rightfully pointed out that this decision was a matter of political expedience, a political move for increasing the popularity of the governor among nationally-minded voters. Other observers, while not questioning the sensibility of this decision, pointed out that it would be a mere gesture without any real effect, because a governor had no legal power to grant or cancel broadcasting licenses. Indeed, the practical impact of this prohibition on music broadcasting in L’viv was negligible, as ‘Nashe Radio’ managed to win the case in court, and, besides, the
radio stations supplying similar and even more ‘vulgar’ music continued to ‘pollute’ L’viv radio air. In the
same year, the L’viv City council adopted a resolution On Protecting the Sonic Environment in the City of
L’viv, which imposed “a temporary moratorium on the transmission and performance of foreign-language
songs of immoral content and low aesthetic quality in the streets and in other public places” (Hrytsenko 2003:
234). The moratorium was in reaction to the tragic incident of the famous L’viv songwriter Ihor Bilozir being
beaten to death by two drunk ethnic Russians who objected to the Ukrainian songs he performed in a
restaurant. Later on, this resolution was nullified as unlawful, but shortly before that the L’viv Province
Council adopted another resolution On the State of the Functioning of the Ukrainian language in L’viv
Province, which was better grounded from a legal point of view. Among other things, this resolution “banned
the use of Russian-language official forms, certificates, and commodity labels in the oblast and ordered all
institutions and businesses to ‘take measures to insure the priority of the Ukrainian language on their premises,
including their musical setting’ ” (ibid: 235).

Outside Western Ukraine these prohibitive measures of the L’viv authorities were most often
viewed either as an eccentric, but ineffective political trick of the ‘nationalists’, or as a political provocation (the
later reaction was typical of the Russian media). A journalist from Ukraine’s biggest tabloid, the Kyiv-based
Russophone daily ‘Fakty’, while ridiculing the decision of the L’viv authorities to prohibit “foreign-language
songs of immoral content and low aesthetic quality”, made the important point that the L’viv politicians and
their supporters were “not extremists or nationalists, but typical nineteenth-century idealists who believe that it
is possible to compel people to be less vulgar” (quoted in Hrytsenko 2003: 235). This explanation is quite
plausible, as supporters of these prohibitive political decisions could be found not only among ‘extremists and
nationalists’, but among wider circles of the intelligentsia (including many Russian-speaking inteliherity)
concerned about protection of the cultural milieu of the city from ‘vulgarity’ and blatnye trends. They took for
granted that the ‘proper’ cultural environment of L’viv should be formed by the ‘high quality’ tastes and
preferences of its cultivated public who tend to denounce some mass-cultural and counter-cultural expressions
as the Soviet and the Russian ones (Zayarniuk 2008). The notions of post-1991 L’viv intelligentsia about ‘high
quality’ cultural production are time-specific, because the ‘high quality’ is viewed not only as something
opposed to the ‘vulgar’ choices of the ‘uncultured’ low classes in general. What is tasteless and what is not is
defined by an interplay of several socio-cultural distinctions, and ethnic/national divisions are only one of
them. As has been pointed out in chapter 6, the cultural distinction between those who, regardless of their
origin and social position, distance themselves from the Russian-language blatnaia subculture, and people
whose cultural choices are guided by it, should be taken into account. The same may be said about youth
subcultural trends in L’viv and their expressions in everyday life and the arts (Olsson and Havrylyuk
Narvselius 2003).
Despite the fact that the adjective ‘Soviet’ evokes negative emotions among many L’vivites and that the narratives about Soviet L’viv play the role of the counter-narrative, how cultural production is evaluated still depends on the cultural patterns of the late Soviet period which had been adopted by the intelligentsia. It has been observed that in post-1991 Ukraine “It is possible to be an anti-Communist and, at the same time, a *homo sovieticus*” (Hrytsenko 2003: 237). One of the aspects of the Soviet legacy is a widespread refusal to tolerate cultural expressions which do not correspond to the mainstream (i.e., defined by categories of actors of a certain age, gender, ethnicity and social status) discourses about ‘decency’ and an impulse to ban these diverging cultural expressions. Besides, the black-and-white accounts framed in terms of a dominant national paradigm reproduce the ideological distinctions that were also typical of the Soviet authoritative discourse (polarization of ‘we’ and ‘the others’, ‘naturalizing’ metaphors, strong moralizing undertones, construction of clear-cut narratives about ‘heroes’, ‘victims’, ‘martyrs’, ‘traitors’ etc.)

Oddities and tragedies of Soviet rule in Galicia notwithstanding, it makes sense, as some L’viv intellectuals point out, to suggest more nuanced and multidimensional accounts about that time. The reason for this is not only that uncritical acceptance of the Manichaean narratives prepares the ground for practices of exclusion and victimization, but also because

What tends to get lost in the binary accounts is the crucial and seemingly paradoxical fact that, for a great number of Soviet citizens, many of the fundamental values, ideals, and realities of socialist life (such as equality, community, selflessness, altruism, friendship, ethical relations, safety, education, work, creativity, and concern for the future) were of genuine importance, despite the fact that many of their everyday practices routinely transgressed, reinterpreted, or refused certain norms and rules represented in the official ideology of the socialist state (Yurchak 2006: 8).

Hence, analytical accounts about not only gains and losses, but also about socio-cultural continuities and discontinuities of Soviet L’viv compared with both earlier and subsequent historical periods are in demand. Obviously, it is not only a matter of retrospective academic interest. Namely, in order to be able to make estimations of the present state of affairs in the political, economic, cultural and other spheres in Ukraine it would be useful to learn what the persistent legacy of Soviet ideology and policies is, and what should be regarded as qualitatively new phenomena resulting from the political decisions and wider social circumstances after 1991. Hopefully, these estimations and narratives will accentuate not only ‘voices and noises’ of the intelligentsia and other ‘cultured’ urban strata, but also of the silent (and also not-so-silent) majority of L’vivites. Formation of narratives of identity in post-1991 L’viv would be also benefited by a non-dualistic view of the Soviet legacy of L’viv, because

A L’viv that imagines itself as “cleaner” and less “contaminated” by the Soviet power, as protected from it with a thick layer of idealized nationalism, would be incapable of conversing with, and especially listening to the [Ukrainian] “East” devalued to the position of the stereotyped
“corrupted” Other. Only when L’viv will acknowledge its own Sovietization will it be able to respect those who must face their own (Amar 2007).

However, although re-evaluation of the black-and-white narratives about Soviet L’viv is on the way, for the majority of L’vivites the stories about this period obviously cannot be thought as the basis of a positively charged representations of the city after 1991. The role of this cornerstone in the revived ‘myth’ of L’viv is assigned to the tales about the ‘golden age’ of the Habsburg rule.

8.5. The ‘golden age’ and present-day dilemmas: stories about the Habsburg past
In Ukraine, as elsewhere in the post-Soviet space, the urge to regain self-respect (Kymlicka 1996: 89, Kuzio 2005: 232) and create a self-gratifying narrative of identity frequently took the shape of reinterpretation of the past and revival of historical collective memory (Hnatiuk 2003: 196). Post-1991 quest for glorifying and optimistic narratives of identity became especially urgent in view of the massive implementation of accounts about martyrdom and the victimization of Ukrainians that was introduced at the end of the 1980s by the national-democratic intelligentsia. From the perspective of a post-1991 nationalist paradigm, the history of L’viv and Galicia could contribute to the formation of new Ukrainian discourses of identity through the introduction of basically non-martyrological narratives addressing the events of modern history. The most familiar narratives of identity stemming from this part of Ukraine and challenging the Soviet discourse have been the stories about the armed struggle in the name of the National Idea in the twentieth century—and about the ‘golden age’ under the Habsburg rule. These two collections of stories, although opposed in many respects, have been presented as logically consistent in modern Ukrainian historiography. The accounts about the ‘awakening’ of a strong nationalist sentiment among the Ruthenians relate to the theme of the European roots of the Ukrainian national movement and, in perspective, provide additional arguments for the adherents of Europeanization of independent Ukraine.

Nevertheless, academic arguments alone cannot account for the enthusiastic response of both the cultivated public and consumers of the mass culture to the ‘Habsburg myth’, which became evident in L’viv at the end of the 1990s. In the Soviet historical narrative the Habsburg past of the Soviet-ruled Eastern Galicia, Northern Bukovina and Transcarpathia was hushed up. One of the reasons for silencing and distortions was that positive achievements of the ‘reactionary and oppressive’ Austro-Hungarian state contradicted the Soviet ideological scheme which emphasized that Ukrainians owed everything to Soviet rule. Galician Ukrainians were allowed to remain Ukrainians, but in return they were demanded to accept the Soviet identity. ‘And what did Soviet Ukrainian mean? In essence, it meant forgetting everything that previously had been considered
positive in the Galician past, in particular since the onset of Habsburg rule in 1772, as well as events …that were associated with the Polish [not to mention German—E.N.] presence in the area” (Magocsi 2002: 61).

Imagining Habsburg rule as a golden age in the history of L’viv and Galicia indicates, on the one hand, a strong post-1991 reaction against the Soviet ideological constructions in the realm of historiography and mass culture and, on the other hand, rehabilitation of the ‘multicultural’ heritage of the region. However, the Habsburg period was not the only historical prototype which had been discussed as a possible reference point for the construction of positively charged and, one might say, empowering narrative of identity in post-1991 L’viv. Another historical era presented as a model for the ‘golden age’ was the medieval period, especially the times of Galician-Volhynian princedom of the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries. In this case the myth of the golden age was supposed to coincide with the foundation myth. This period, when presented in accordance with the tradition of Romanticism, as a legendary heroic time, might spark popular imagination with images of ethnic (defined as Ukrainian) authenticity, mightiness and faithfulness to the traditions of the ancestors. Besides, popular stories about Galician-Volhynian princedom and its glorious ruler and L’viv’s founder prince Danylo of Halych could be smoothly presented as a part of the supposedly common historical heritage of Ukraine, as this narrative emphasizes that the princedom was a successor of Kyivan Rus.

So far this story does not diverge from the historical-ideological narrative which used to be inculcated by the Soviets. Significant revision of the pre-1991 historical-ideological narrative about Galician-Volhynian princedom was carried on two counts. On the one hand, in the discourses of mass media and popular culture this medieval state was reframed in terms of national belongingness and thus turned into the ‘originally Ukrainian’ one. On the other hand, in the wake of the official political declarations about the European course of Ukraine the story about prince Danylo’s coronation to Rex Russiae in 1253 was enthusiastically reintroduced in L’viv. L’viv as the Ukrainian ‘royal city’ became equated in symbolic status with another ancient monarchic residence of the region, Polish Cracow. The equestrian statue of King Danylo was opened in the centre of L’viv in 2003 as a declaration of the greatness and original belongingness of L’viv and Galicia to Europe. This new emphasis which turned Danylo of Halych from a ‘mere’ local prince to a peer of the European monarchs and a ruler of the fully vested independent kingdom was a significant revision of the pre-1991 historical-ideological narrative about the Galician-Volhynian princedom. It drew attention to both the Ukrainian-ness and European-ness of the history of L’viv and Galicia while toning down the East Slavic roots, i.e consanguinity with Russians and Byelorussians.

Until now, no monument has been erected to some well-liked representative of the Habsburgs in L’viv, although talk about it has gone on for almost a decade. Indeed, reaching for the heritage of that period is not unproblematic given that the mainstream counter-Soviet discourses of the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s were anti-imperialist and nationalist. The legacy of the period between 1772 and 1918 has been one of a multinational European empire where Ukrainians have been loyal second-line subjects. In this respect the
Austro-Hungarian state resembled the Soviet one (Magocsi 2002: 57). Also, these two empires, each in its way, were quite successful in the introduction of a unifying, common way of life which has a material and ideational afterlife.

The story about the Galician-Volhynian princedom (or kingdom) is also controversial in many respects, and the fact that it was used by the Soviets as a historical-ideological argument for ‘uniting’ West Ukrainian lands with the Ukrainian SSR, is one of them. Nevertheless, a degree of ‘contamination’ with the Soviet ideological narrative, romantic appeal and its fitting to national(ist) paradigm were not the only factors that decided what fragment of the past would be more appealing in the role of the ‘golden age’. The non-ascetic and prosperous burgher culture of the Habsburg age looked much more attractive and comprehensible when compared with heroic narratives about military valor of ancient Galicianers (as well as about the almost supernatural heroism of the Soviet builders of Communism during the first five-year plans). Besides, the symbolic presence of Francis Joseph’s times in the historical memory of L’vivites who are still living, in the city’s landmarks, and even among items of antiquity in some Galician families, made it an important point of reference in the post-1991 popular imagination. One may agree with the opinion of a participant in the discussion on ZAXID.NET that “The foundation of our present-day Galician ‘nostalgia for the Habsburgs’ or ‘the Austro-Hungarian myth’ is the connection between perception of the world, self-identification, evaluation
While the distant medieval period may awaken the same kind of curiosity and fascination as museum items do, emotional response to the abundant pieces of evidence of the Habsburg epoch is of another sort. This response, which may be called longing (‘nostalgia’), should be viewed, as many other revived cultural phenomena in this part of the world, not as ‘natural’ attitudes which have been preserved unchanged for almost a century in secrecy and are now coming to the surface, but rather as a quite recent product of cultural imagination resulting from a range of contemporary socio-political circumstances. In some lands that used to be a part of the ‘grandma Austro-Hungary’, its achievements did not give rise to a distinct myth about a ‘golden age’ after the breakdown of Communist rule. In order to account for this, one should examine not only the objective historical legacy of that period which was different for different nations populating Austro-Hungary, but also the constellation of contemporary political interests and social circumstances. In the case of post-1991 Galicia, the ‘golden age’ of Habsburg rule not only has an immediate aesthetic appeal of fin de siècle culture and not only awakens personal memories about refined manners of someone’s grandparents, but also serves as an important reference point for a range of collective narratives of identity and future-oriented political projects.

From the vantage point of post-colonial studies, the situation of Ukrainians (Ruthenians) in the Habsburg monarchy was not at all unproblematic. Despite access to relatively good printing and publishing resources and good opportunities to make their voices heard (Reisenleitner 2002: 26), they remained one of the most marginalized subaltern ethnicities in the empire. Nevertheless, historians agree that in the Austro-Hungarian empire Galician Ukrainians enjoyed the reputation of loyal ‘Tyroleans of the East’ and also that there existed historical reasons due to which Ruthenians were predisposed to the kind of rule offered by the Habsburgs (Magosci 2002: 73-82). At the same time, present-day popular presentations of the Habsburg period as the golden age of Galicia is a reactive construction, which exists in the same discursive sphere of narratives of identity as the Soviet ‘counter-narrative’ and is created as a negation of this latter one. While the retrospective visions of the society under the Soviets stress authoritarianism, ‘internationalism’, lack of aesthetic sophistication, ‘rural-proletarian’ lifestyle, an absence of distinct class hierarchy, ‘Asian-ness’ or ‘Eurasian-ness’, the present-day tales about ‘grandma Austro-Hungary’ emphasize the rule of law, multiculturality, aesthetic refinement and glamour, urban lifestyle, the orderliness of class society and ‘European-ness’. Besides, among representatives of the middle classes, nostalgia for the Habsburg ‘golden age’ might be an expression of longing for another non-Soviet phenomenon—namely, an effective German-styled bureaucracy (Hrytskyi 2004: 271).

Although interest in the culture of this epoch became widespread to that extent that it became possible to make money on its symbolic re-presentations (for example, a range of cafes and restaurants in
L’viv re-create the ‘atmosphere’ and serve dishes in fin de siècle style), the circle of admirers and promoters of the ‘Habsburg myth of Galicia’ is quite narrow. Historian Andrii Zayarniuk, when analyzing the recent celebrations of the Emperor Francis Joseph’s birthday in L’viv, claims that nostalgia for the Habsburgs has been a product of and for those who have taste for exclusive cultural commodities and can afford some luxury in their daily life. He concludes: “This emphasis on popular sentiment serves to hide the fact that the event [celebration of the Emperor’s birthday—E.N.] has much more to do with the construction of a visible Galician past than with some real continuity from that past, and is part of the project to legitimize itself through the past” (Zayarniuk 2001: 16-17).

This recent project of constructing a distinct and definite past other than the Soviet one, bears resemblance to other identity-articulating undertakings of the Galician intelligentsia in the course of the last century. They were often coupled with intelligentsia’s universalist rhetoric focused on the mission of defending moral and aesthetic values. For instance, one of the participants in the discussion forum ZAXID.NET explained ‘nostalgia’ for Habsburgs as a timeless longing for Freedom, Order and Beauty—the longing which in his view does not have much to with the historical realities of the Austro-Hungarian empire or with the desire to be accepted into ‘Europe’:

…our present-day “longing for the Habsburgs” is neither a longing after “that” particular social-political order nor the dream about unity with contemporary Europe. …At the foundation of our nostalgia is longing for the lost values of Freedom, Order, Beauty and Optimism. This longing takes the shape of nostalgia only because there is no clear prospect of reaching these ideals in our foreseeable future. In the East you see the oligarchic Ukraine. In the West you see Europe which “knows price but does not know values”. …That is why our nostalgia for the past . . . is the longing after a harmonizing of our spiritual world, which includes both past, present and future (Pavliv 2008a).

One of my informants, on the contrary, pointed out a quite ‘prosaic’, but, in his view, conspicuous feature of L’vivites and Galicianers, which relates to the Austro-Hungarian heritage:

L’vivites and Galicianers have a feature that is a little bit foolish. I mean, we like to flock together (kuchkuvatysia) and create some milieus. It is probably a European feature, it is something maintained from the Habsburg times. Very simply, it is the need to create civil society. We are neither especially bright nor especially strong, so we need to flock together and to feel that together we are many, we will not be defeated (razom nas bahato, nas ne podolaty)¹⁰⁷ [chuckles] (Andrii P., approx. 45 y.o.).

Similar to the century-old ‘Icarian flights’ of Galician intelligentsia between Ukrainophile, Russofile, Ruthenian and pan-Slavonic orientations, the recent detour which underscores the heritage of the Habsburg Empire in Galicia is an intellectual project focused in the first turn on elaborating distinctions with

¹⁰⁷ Allusion to the refrain of a popular song which became an unofficial anthem of the Orange Revolution.
those outside the community rather than on discursive dissolving of differences within the community. In a sense, this defensive counter-project which plays the role of an (in some versions, the) alternative to both all-Ukrainian official discourses of nation building and to the Soviet counter-narrative, does not seriously undermine or revisit existing binary patterns of nationalism, but rather draws other principal boundaries across them. These additional boundaries articulated through the myth about the Habsburg ‘golden age’ are the regional one (the fault line between Galicia or, in wider terms, Western Ukraine and the rest of Ukraine), the supranational one (the ‘civilizational’ boundary between Europe and non-Europe, ‘Asia’, Eurasia) and, last but not least, the social-class one (the sharp distinction between superior culture of the ‘well-bred’ public and the inferior culture of the homo sovieticus, ‘backward rustics’ and other brethren).

Articulation of these symbolical boundaries in recent culture-oriented intellectual discourses around Eastern Galicia and its centre L’viv relates to a range of intellectual projects and conceptualizations, which exploit historical, cultural and political arguments. Basically, however, all these conceptualizations are politicized as they address the ‘crisis of identity’ in post-Soviet Ukraine and call for certain political solutions.

8.6. Summary
Explicitly past-oriented frameworks of meaning are prominent modes of legitimation and explanation (Olick and Robbins 1998: 108). Accordingly, the turbulent and ‘different’ historical past of L’viv has been a valuable asset for the city’s public intellectuals, politicians, academicians and artists as the quest for new optimistic, ‘normalized’— and last but not least selling—narratives of identity gained momentum with the collapse of Soviet rule. As the narratives on centrality/peripherality of L’viv demonstrate, presentations of the city as a unique and particularly meaningful symbolic space correlate with efforts of the intelligentsia to negotiate their position of prominence as cultural actors and figures of moral authority. Practically every current ‘place-making’ empowering narrative addresses historical issues and is anchored (or at least claims to be anchored) in the collective memory. In a way, the counter-narrative about Soviet L’viv has served as a core reference point in relation to which the other narratives (L’viv as an exemplification of the Habsburg ‘golden age’ and ‘Ukrainian Piedmont’) are structured and evaluated.

Various constructions of the past (especially the stories and presentations which highlight positive collective images of intelligentsia), quite predictably, provide suitable justifications of choice between identity patterns and political orientations in the present. Nevertheless, as will be argued in the next chapter, some narratives (about Galician distinctiveness, ‘Europe’, multiculturality and the axis L’viv—Kyiv—Donets’k) are more explicitly informed by concerns about the future and are, so to speak, of a more project-like nature. Leitmotifs of these narratives are the longing for inclusion into a culturally specific meta-national
community (‘regional’, ‘European’ or transcultural) as well as colonization of this community and its transformation into the arena for intelligentsia’s ‘own’ cultural-political projects.
Chapter 9. Empowering Projects of the L’viv Intelligentsia and Intellectuals after the End of Soviet Rule: Narratives about (Be)longing, Ambiguity and Cultural Colonization

9.1. ‘Galician project’

Since the late 1980s, narratives and ‘myths’ about Galicia’s distinctiveness, its Habsburg heritage, its anti-Soviet-ness and genuine Ukrainian-ness have served as a scaffold for the revived nationalist discourses about this historical region as the ‘Ukrainian Piedmont’. This has been an obvious challenge to the Soviet ideological narrative. In particular, the word ‘Galicia’ was not used in Soviet official discourses because of negative historical stereotypes inculcated by Soviet propaganda. For Soviet everymen Galicia became steadfastly associated with collaboration with Nazis (namely, with the SS Galicia Division, a Ukrainian force trained by Nazis) and with ‘bourgeois nationalism’. ‘Galicia’ gave place to the descriptive phrase of ‘Western Ukraine’ (which included the Soviet provinces of L’viv, Rivno, Ternopil’ and Ivanofrankivs’k) and to terms of the Soviet administrative division: L’vivs’ka oblast’ (L’viv province), L’vivshchyna. “It was the period when the word ‘Galician’ became a means of othering, and for all those willing to make a career it became the curse of their origin” (Rasevych 2008a). Notably, the political regime of the Second Polish Republic was also reluctant to admit Galicia as a part differing from the rest of the Polish national state. For instance, instead of Galicia, after 1918 the name Eastern Little Poland (Malopolska Wschodnia) was often used in the official jargon.

Within the dominant national(ist) discourse Galicia has been imagined as the ‘most Ukrainian part of Ukraine’ endowed with mission to consolidate independent Ukraine. This image of Galicia in the post-1991 nationalizing discourses has been recently challenged. Some L’viv historians drew the attention of the mass audience to the fact that Galicia has been “one of the greatest inventions made by the Habsburgs” (Hrytsak 2004: 268-269, see also Rasevych 2008a), and that as a political construction it has no distinct ‘primordial’ character. Galicia proves to be quite a contingent space, whose multilayered cultural-historical legacy (including the legacy of the Dual Monarchy) cannot be easily squeezed into the conventional national paradigm. Being a Galicianer proves to be not only a taken-for-granted association with a certain territory, but first of all a reflective and conscious development of cultural identity:

It is a worthy thing to be a Galicianer, it means, to feel responsibility for the territory, which greatly exceeds a little motherland—whether it will be Ukraine, Poland, Eastern, Central or ordinary Europe. Galicia was and still is a Ruritania. But in its capacity of Ruritania it has influenced and will influence the fates of Megalomanias that established their political rights to control this territory (Hrytsak 2004: 278-279).
Remarkably, in this passage the positively charged image of a ‘common’, unspecified Galicianer includes such specific features as responsibility and developed cultural imagination which allows her to deal with the complexities of (post)modern identity projects. Thereby positive attributes of a self-reflective, culturally concerned intelligent are presented as something that is or should be inherent for all Galicianers—and, moreover, something that should empower them in the face of assimilating Megalomanias.

Opinion that to be a Galicianer means to be engaged in a kind of cultural identity project has been expressed on other occasions by other authors. Variations of the theme are numerous. For L’viv intellectuals who, like Hrytsak, master the latest approaches in history and cultural studies, strengthening Galician identity is coterminous with an open-minded and, basically, quite a pragmatic intellectual quest for an “alternative and attractive model of culture, politics and societal life” (Hrytsak 2004: 271, see also Zayarnuik 2001). However, other authors suggest not a creation, but rather a retrospective ‘recalling’ of the immanent, even transcendental, authenticity of Galician cultural orientation:

Acknowledging oneself as a Galicianer does not mean creation of a new, better identity, but returning to the authenticity, to the streets and courtyards of one’s childhood... It is Galicia with its burgher culture [misochans'ka kultura] of silver sugar spoons and china coffee cups, with individual epos and ethos of its towns and city districts. It is Galicia as an archipelago consisting of small islands of people close in their spirit. It means, it is everything that facilitated the Galicianer’s quest for harmony between the internal and external world, and his relation to God. …Today Galician identity…is present among very few dwellers of Galicia and among emigrants from Galicia. Among the majority of people in this region (and, in fact, a range of others) schizophrenic identification simultaneously with East and West, with Russia and Europe dominates (Pavliv 2007).

After reading these passages one may get the impression that ‘genuine’ Galicianers are those who remain when all ‘non-authentic’, culturally ‘schizophrenic’ and ‘non-spiritual’—indeed, ‘polluting’—humans populating Galicia are filtered away. Reaching for historical memories about “burgher culture of silver sugar spoons and china coffee cups” has been impossible for many persons whose families migrated to Western Ukraine from places where a similar variant of culture was uprooted by the Soviet regime decades ago, or never existed in the first place. Hence, such a variant of the Galician project, which emphasizes the commonality of historical memory and the non-Soviet culture of burghers and higher classes, unavoidably strengthens divisions between the ‘genuine’ Galicianers who inherited cultural capital with roots in the Empire age, the ‘non-pedigreed’ Galician everymen labeled as rahuli, and the ‘non-authentic’ Galicianers. The latter ones may include L’vivites who appropriated identification with Galicia and became ardent local patriots despite the non-local origin of their parents and grandparents. Although such Galician-ness is generally accepted, nevertheless it is treated in a rather condescending manner by ‘genuine’ Galicianers. For example, the episode which one of my informants told me about, illustrates that subtle cultural distinctions between ‘genuine’ and ‘non-genuine’ Galicianers do not go unnoticed in some contexts:
I have, by the way, unmasked one author, he is published quite a lot, he likes to call himself a Galicianer. But I exposed him, not to someone else, just to myself; you know. He is not a true Galicianer (spravzhnii halychanyn). How did I find it out? Well, he wrote in his book that in the [Soviet] L’viv of his youth women could bake only two sorts of cake: white cheesecake and brown honey cake. But I know for sure that my aunts would laugh very loudly at this, because in their families, in their circles any respectable mother of the house could bake at least twenty sorts of cakes, not to mention cookies. This writer knew only how it used to be among those who came from Soviet Ukraine. Two sorts of cakes! For my aunts such things would not even appear in their nightmares (Maria L., 51 y.o.).

In fact, such envisaging of ‘true’ Galician identity in terms of cultural patterns spread among the privileged classes (the educated, the noble, the burghers) has become ubiquitous in current popular historical writings, in fiction and in journalistic essays. This happened not in the last turn due to the rediscovery of the Polish and Ukrainian diaspora literature fabricating the ‘L’viv myth’ (Rasevych 2008a). The problematic nature of such idealized retrospective presentations mostly goes unnoticed, but some critical voices have been raised in different contexts. For example, a L’viv journalist writing under the pseudonym ‘Maikl’ puts it bluntly:

One may get the impression that L’vivites of that time [he means L’viv’s ‘golden age’—E.N.] were exclusively lawyers, doctors, ladies and a mass of diverse lazybones. …The majority of L’vivites consisted of working people, the urban poor, the lumpen and proletarians who populated the workers’ ghetto. The architecture and the poverty of inhabitants of these districts have been “phenomenally primitive”. These people did not create something exceptional at that time, and neither did their descendants, L’vivites in the third generation or something similar, create something outstanding nowadays. Folklore of batary, ‘Tylko wy Lwowski’ [a popular prewar song—E.N.]—it’s lovely, it’s nostalgic, especially for former L’vivites and the present residents of Wrocław, for example. But it is not an opera and not at all great literature. Every city has such nostalgic motifs, all these pies with rhubarb, pastry shops, noble officers and ladies waving with fans (Maikl 2007).

Opinions that Galicia and other West Ukrainian territories annexed by the USSR were ‘strange’ and differing from the rest of Ukraine circulated in the popular consciousness of Soviet citizens for quite a while. Meanwhile, ideas about Galicia’s otherness in terms of mentality and political orientations were developed in Ukrainian diaspora literature, most notably in Mykola Shlemkevych’s work ‘Halychanstvo’ (‘Galicianism’) (1956). Nevertheless, Shlemkevych advocated a pronouncedly pro-Ukrainian orientation of ‘Galicianism’. He wrote:

Galicianism is rationally organized mediocrity, and in this form it is creative and useful. But when it repudiates its rational foundation in truth, morality and logics, when it repudiates its rational function of serving the great motherland [Ukraine] and reaches for …power over it, then Galicianism looses ground under its feet and becomes a caricature (Shlemkevych 1995).
Since the mid-1990s, discourses about Galicia’s peculiarity became increasingly politicized, and eventually the counter-discourses of regionalism and federalism that until that time had been overshadowed by the nationalist myth of the ‘Ukrainian Piedmont’, became more pronounced. On the one hand, Galician intellectuals complained that in other parts of Ukraine negative Soviet stereotypes about Galicianers as fundamental nationalists and Nazi collaborators were still proliferating. On the other hand, they formed the overarching alternative narrative, in line with which Galicia should be envisaged as the bridge between Ukraine and Central Europe, “the area of double limen, both as a peripheral region in the new Ukraine and as a lost fragment of the Central Europe that joined the EU in May 2004” (Wilson 2006: 161). A part of intellectuals and politicking intelligentsia eagerly accepted the thesis that Galicia and other West Ukrainian territories which used to be a part of the Habsburg Empire, are not only different in terms of cultural tradition and historical heritage, but also in terms of political culture and ‘mentality’. Some West Ukrainian intellectuals have claimed that while Galicia has always been in the orbit of Central Europe, the rest of Ukraine is “culturally neo-Russian and politically neo-Soviet” (ibid: 167). Nevertheless, there also were skeptics who doubted that the ethnocultural difference of Galicia could be a sufficient ground for viewing it as more European, more democratic or more politically dynamic than the rest of Ukraine. In the words of L’viv political scientist Antonina Kolodii, “Galicia is different, but is this difference something which is needed for establishment of [the new—E.N.] political and societal institutions? That’s the issue.”

Despite these reasonable doubts, the statement that Galicia is the most European part of Ukraine or even its only European part has been mostly taken for granted. In order to stress this European-ness, some radically inclined Galician intellectuals even advocated the idea of changing the codification of the Ukrainian language from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet (in fact, several articles published in ‘I’ magazine have been written in Latin script; ‘I’ has also organized a seminar on Latin codification of the Ukrainian language). Because of the lack of resources and lack of mass support, even less radical visions of the ‘Galician project’ can hardly be realized in the near future. Nevertheless, as an alternative intellectual discourse which mixes the ideological paradigm of nationalism, postmodernist ideas about plurality and polycentricism, and a supranationalist vision of a ‘Europe of regions’, it still remains an attractive field of conceptual battles for various factions of Galician intellectuals.

The new-old political visions elevating Galicia are diverse and contradictory. On the one hand, one finds more conventional suggestions that Galicianers should rediscover their internal resources and put an end to provincialization of Galicia without challenging the existing political and administrative unity of Ukraine (Vitkovs’kyi 2002). On the other hand, there are so-called Galician autonomists who raise the

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question of the possibility of political federalism in Ukraine (see, for instance, Druľ 2001b). The most radical position is taken by ‘separatists’, who argue for political independence of Galicia and its quick ‘returning’ to Europe. Ukraine’s independence, it has been argued, did not bring Galicia such expected gains as access to the wider world unmediated by Moscow and Kyiv and, besides, marginalized it on an all-Ukrainian scale. Instead, Galicia, in their opinion, is being assimilated to the Russified Ukrainian culture of the east. The region must defend its own ethnocultural particularity by all means, because otherwise “in two or three generations, given the preservation of existing tendencies of cultural assimilation… the problem of the Ukrainian otherness in Galicia may disappear completely” (ibid: 170).

Since 1999 the popular L’viv daily ‘Postup’ and magazine ‘Ìî’ (issue 23, 2002) published a range of articles whose authors tested ideas of Galician particularity. The most radical opinions about principal otherness of Galicia were expressed by the artist Volodymyr Kostyrko, who cast into doubt the very idea that Galicia historically fits in the project of a Ukrainian nation. Notably, Kostyrko pointed out not only ethnic differences between Galicianers and Dnipro Ukrainians and stronger rootedness of the former ones in the European tradition, but also different class orientations of these two communities. He argued that inclusion of Galicianers into Europe resulted in their orientation toward the “higher culture” characterized by a “more intellectual style of life, which is realized in greater autonomy of various fields of social existence” and “possibilities of self-realization of the person”. However, historical circumstances were such that

Without the opportunity to have their own aristocrats and to work for them, Galician intelligentsia became dependent not only on the Austrian and Polish, but also on Russian and socialist (Ukrainian) purses. In this way, by serving these financiers, they realized their striving for forming Galicianers into a nation. Galicianers turned out to be of such kind that they did not meet anyone’s expectations, including Ukrainians’, whose national idea presupposed the creation of a socialist federation of the Slavic peoples free from the lords (Kostyrko 2002b: 286).

Thus, the main fault of the Ukrainian project, which Galician intelligentsia was tempted to accept in the end of the nineteenth century, allegedly inhered in its socialist orientation. Proponents of the Ukrainian national project, Kostyrko continues, chose the “primitive culture” of peasants, of “the eternally oppressed simple people” as the cornerstone of national unity. Ideologists of the Ukrainian national movement, who rejected the aristocratic culture in Galicia as “German-Polish influences”, are held accountable in that

when denying Galician civilization [sic!]—E.N., they rejected people’s longing for well-being and their need to confirm their advantage, to be better than others; they challenged the role in historical processes when they began to look after unity of Galicianers and Ukrainians in the distant past and in the primitive daily culture of “the eternally oppressed simple people”. Hence, Ukrainians most of all call to mind Gypsies and blacks (ibid: 287).
Such a ‘non-noble’ model of culture, which leaves no space for a feeling of cultural superiority, concludes Kostyrko, makes Ukrainians susceptible to assimilation with Russians. In order to preserve their cultural distinctiveness, Galicianers have to abandon the variant of the Ukrainian national project exported from Dnipro Ukraine.

These views were immediately subjected to harsh criticism by other L’viv intellectuals. Some critics looked at the issue from the ‘Piedmontist’ point of view and argued that Ukraine still needs Galicia as a ‘European facade’ and bastion of Ukrainian culture (Vitkovs’kyi 2002). Others accused Galician ‘separatists’ of clandestine promotion of Russian interests (Kyrchiv 2002) while yet others, like ‘I’s’ editor-in-chief Taras Vozniak, pointed out that Galicianers should abandon their ambitions to Ukrainize the new-Soviet ‘gosudarstvo Ukraina’ (‘the state of Ukraine’ in Russian) and cast themselves into the struggle for decentralization of Ukrainian political structure instead (Vozniak 2002). In the editorial foreword to the ‘I’s’ issue devoted to the discussion of Ukrainian federalism, Vozniak admitted that Galician separatism is not the fruit of wild fantasy of some snobbish intellectuals, but a predictable reaction to the situation of L’viv and Galicia under centralized political rule in independent Ukraine (ibid: 3). Even Kostiantyn Bondarenko (2002: 232), a well-known political figure from L’viv who openly expressed his support for Galician separatism as a bold political vision, admitted that in the present political situation this vision remains marginal and utopian.

For some L’viv intellectuals, however, efforts to withdraw Galicia from the rest of Ukraine in order to preserve the supposedly more European and more Ukrainian orientation of the former against the ‘Soviet-Russian-Eurasian’ influence of the latter are not only difficult to realize in practice. They are simply senseless, because the social and cultural distinctiveness of Galicia belongs to history, and, consequently,

If Galicia became independent, then we would get here a little copy of present-day Ukraine and yesterday’s Soviet Union. It’s because the social capital of present-day Galicians is basically Soviet. This is no surprise if we take into account Galician history after 1939. Due to that history, the social capital that Galicianers could be proud of in times of Francis Joseph and Józef Piłsudski vanished under Josef Stalin. …It vanished together with its last bearers, with the old Galician intelligentsia who were either annihilated or compelled to rescue themselves by escaping to the West; with sub-Soviet dissenters who are now experiencing the end of their political careers in Kyiv, and with gymnasium pupils before 1939 (Hrytsak 2002c).

The prevailing opinion of the L’viv intelligentsia has been that the radical idea of separating Galicia from Ukraine through political action should be abandoned for this or that reason. Nevertheless, the theme of Galician peculiarity and otherness did not disappear from the media, political discourses and intellectual debates where it has been actualized depending on swings of Ukrainian politics.
The explosive mixture of opinions, conceptual frames and suggested solutions is probably one of the important features of the ‘Galician’ debate that makes it attractive to the intelligentsia. It is highly symptomatic, however, that in this polemics ‘Galicia’ often appears not only as an idealized image of a really existing territory and not only as a master metaphor. In a sense, ‘Galicia’ is imagined as a symbolic space, which ‘normally’ must be autonomous and different. This might be related to the longing of post-1991 Galician intelligentsia and intellectuals for a space of genuine intellectual autonomy and, equally, of cultural authority, distinction and superiority. The Galician theme awakens a strong emotional response in some intelligentsia circles because, to use the title of an essay by Andrukhovych (1999: 115-122), it is imagined as an embodiment of the conceptual ‘last territory’ where they still have the power to define people, things and events.

The Galician theme, as refracted through the Habsburg myth and the concept of Central Europe, has been not only an object of political and identity-focused intellectual discussion, but also of artistic interpretation. In fact, the evocative literary works of Andrukhovych, which mix literary-critical polemics, historical cues, personal experience and vivid artistic imagination, elevated the Galician debate to an existential and historical-philosophical level. The popularity of Andrukhovych’s works, especially among younger generations of urban Galician intelligentsia, may be partially explained by the fact that, in a sense, he suspends
collective definitions of culturally-based identities and suggests instead an individual, intellectually demanding quest for historical memory, cultural embedment and a personalized world outlook. Such an intellectual quest is, as has been mentioned in chapter 4, a basic process which accompanies post-1991 drifting between an identity of intelligentsia that is old-fashioned, collective, burdened by dualistic ideological visions, and status-based, and standing of intellectuals that is ‘modern’, influenced by international trends, and individually achieved. Andrukhovych’s colorful depictions of Galicia as partly ‘lost’ (separated from its Habsburg past and European future) and ‘last’ (threatened by pervasive neo-Soviet materialism and *khamstvo*) territory expose the vulnerability of this cultural space ‘betwixt and between’—and equal vulnerability of the intellectual, culturally sensitive, unconventional person in post-1991 reality. This space, imagined in a post-modernist manner, is a patchwork of various historical epochs, styles and peoples, it is a transitional zone, where ephemeral encounters replace belongingness and rootedness. The cultural hybridity and complexity of Galicia makes it an apt object for various kinds of intellectual, artistic and political identity games:

Galicia… is thoroughly artificial, obviously cobbled together with pseudo-historical fantasies and political intrigues. Those who state that Galicia is merely a one hundred and fifty year-old invention of a few Austrian ministers are thousand times right. … Galicia is a non-Ukraine, some kind of geographical makeweight, Polish hallucination. Galicia is thoroughly dummy and doll-like, puffed up, in everything and everywhere trying to impose upon Ukraine its non-Ukrainian will, that has been infused in dark Zionist laboratories. Galicia is deprived of epic, this is the place where from time immemorial the anecdote reigns, and base one at that. To be more precise, this is a rootless space, fit only for nomadic tribes—hence all those Armenians, Gypsies, Karaims and Hassids. Galicia is a Philistine motherland of Freemasonry and Marxism. …Galicia is ostentatious and superficial, like plated mannequins; ridiculous shuffling in all directions, kissing hands and door-knobs with a preserved peasant smack; Galicia is endless and drowsy, boringly hackneyed conversations about Europe, Europa, Ouropa, about “we are also in Europe,” while the whole printed production of Galicia can be accommodated in the single mid-sized L’viv suitcase… (Andrukhovych 1999: 118-119, translated in Zayarniuk 2001: 32-33).

This presentation of Galicia is subordinated to the artistic vision of Andrukhovych, and as such it is not a description of some historical or contemporary realities, but a personalized and emotionally charged symbolic construction. It has been pointed out that

His Galicia, with its Polish Count and Barons, its balls, its Yiddish speaking Jews, Ukrainian peasants unspoilt by industrialization (or Sovietization), has nothing in common with the contemporary Western Ukraine except that it’s the same territory. His Galicia was possible only because of the Soviet system in and against which it was constructed (Zayarniuk 2001:25).

For Polish observers it has been obvious that Andrukhovych’s vision of Galician history may be called at the very least selective (Hnatiuk 2003: 206). Revival of historical memory in Andrukhovych’s writings is not a simple recalling, but deliberate creation of a new pattern where, in particular, the culture of
German-speaking space is celebrated in the first turn (ibid: 205-207). Coupled with post-modernist models of expression, this radical change of focus which obviously contradicts Russian-centeredness of cultural discourses in Ukraine in the twentieth century, contributed to the comprehensibility of Andrukhovych’s works in the West, but at the same time impeded adequate perception of his writings in Ukrainian East and South. Nevertheless, the popularity of the Galician theme exploited and explored by him, as well as by the range of other authors, like, for example, Vynnychuk, Irvanets’ and Neborak, does not decline among wider circles of, first of all, West Ukrainian readers. Attractiveness of Galicia as an artistic construction stems not in the last turn from its local color and unpredictable re-combinations of various grand narratives of modernity.

Although Andrukhovych on several occasions has been stamped as Galician separatist, his sympathies seem to be rather on the side of proponents of the unitary, independent, non-Soviet and Europe-oriented Ukraine. His creative works and interviews reveal that he shares typical topoi of intelligentsia, such as responsibility for the nation’s spiritual development, and identifies himself with nationally aware Ukrainian intelligentsia (see Anketa 1990: 183-184). He may be seen as both a Ukrainian and a Galician patriot. In his writings Galicia embodies a ‘post-modern’ project with its emphasis on cultural heterogeneity and individual freedom. This is his own ‘last territory’, the territory of the Galician inteliinent, where “my line of defense am I myself, and I have no other choice except to defend this piece, this bit, these bits which fall apart” (Andrukhovych 1999: 119). It proves to be, however, that “these bits which fall apart” may become “relatively good terrain for guerilla warfare [partyzanky]” (Andrukhovych 2002). This allegorical picture conveys, in my view, quite an adequate vision of the actual ‘de-centered’ standing of the Galician inteliinent and intellectual, a standing which, despite its elusiveness and precariousness, nevertheless opens possibilities of influencing and even manipulating others’ opinion.

This empowering potential of the ‘Galician project’ articulated by Andrukhovych did not go unnoticed by other intellectuals. As one author puts it,

The concept of Galician difference presently is sufficiently attractive to become a new idee fixe of the next “frustrated generation” of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia, and, also, to become a societal myth with so far unexplored opportunities for mobilization. Exactly this pre-start, “larval” point of the beginning of a new ideology leaves open the question whether “Central-European revisions” that are implemented in cafes and salons by a part of Galician intelipline is just another expression of our provincial inferiority or whether it may be turned into an alternative really acceptable for the wider strata of the Galician society, an alternative both to “Ukrainian nationalism”, “creolization” and to “Latin American” realities of Ukraine. …potential opportunities of this alternative stem from the fact that it is the last illusion which “disillusioned” Galician intellectuals may suggest today. …And may the ghost of the Emperor Francis Joseph help us (Kvik 2000: 102-103).

Another representative of the younger generation of Galician intellectuals confirms that the Galician project, despite its problematic sides,
is actually very appealing because it is a counter-hegemonic project (if we assume that hegemony is a useful term for the description of the cultural politics in contemporary Ukraine), probably the only project in contemporary Ukraine that pays attention to the identity politics involved and provides us with an opportunity to revise existing approaches which neglect a cultural perspective on the processes in contemporary Ukraine (Zayarniuk 2001: 19-20).

For the post-1991 Galician intelligentsia the projects of recovering a collective past and cultural heritage have been inseparable from efforts to maintain their privileged status in the society which is longing for ‘normality’ and stability. The problem, however, is that highly estimated knowledge of the past and inventions of superior tradition with the help of this knowledge cannot guarantee that society will be mobilized for a better future. People who had already faced the teleological ‘scientifically-based’ narrative about a superior Communist future do not seem to be especially delighted by the ‘Galician project’, which suggests ‘recalling’ the bright European past as the way to a bright future in ‘Europe’.

However, the weakness of the ‘Galician project’ stems not only from its ignoring socio-economic realities and from the alleged non-practicality of its ideologists and supporters. The problem with this intellectual conceptualization is not only, as its opponents persistently point out, that withdrawal of the ‘inherently European’ Galicia from the all-Ukrainian national project is going to play into Russia’s hands (Kyrchiv 2002). Its main deficiency is that “At least in the strategies of the proponents of Galician regionalism, we do not see attempts to mobilize people against …power-block, to build up a political alliance” (Zayarniuk 2001: 18, see also Rasevych 2008a). Retrospectiveness of the project of Galician regionalism and its selectiveness in terms of attributes of class and culture are most obvious when the Habsburg ‘golden age’ is being addressed. But these two problematic features have also been reflected in discursive constructions of ‘Europe’, which has been another pivotal notion of the ‘Galician project’.

### 9.2. Europe! Europe... Europe?

References to ‘Europe’ and ‘European-ness’ have already emerged in the previous chapters in connection to discussions about L’viv’s centrality/peripherality, about the Soviet counter-narrative and the Habsburg ‘golden age’ of L’viv. Nevertheless, it will be useful to summarize some points of the ‘European’ debate unfolding from L’viv and Galicia, in order to proceed with further analysis of the L’viv intelligentsia’s construction of symbolic distinctions and cultural authority.

In the post-socialist space return to the national is ubiquitously presented as coterminous with return to Europe (Czaplicka 2003: 395). Media discourses and popular opinion present Galicians and especially L’vivites not only as firm nationalists, but also as the most Europe-oriented part of the Ukrainian population. However, results from a number of polls conducted in the 1990s have demonstrated that
enthusiastic acceptance of Europe as a pole of political and economic dominance is not overwhelmingly predominant among Western Ukrainians, although it is much more pronounced than, for example, in the Crimea or the Donbas (see Riabchuk 1998a: 19). Obviously, polls cannot reflect the whole spectrum of popular understandings and conceptualizations which the word ‘Europe’ triggers. In different parts of Ukraine and for different categories of people it is surely not one and the same. ‘Europe’ was immanent in the popular consciousness of Western Ukrainians despite the Iron Curtain and propaganda of a uniform Soviet culture. It was implicitly and explicitly present as geographical space as well as historical past revealed in landmarks and architectural styles. In the Subcarpathian town of Rakhiv one could see the marker from Austro-Hungarian times that was nothing less than ‘the centre of Europe’. For the common Soviet citizen L’viv was one of the few cities where in the last decades of the Soviet period one could get the impression of what ‘genuine’ Europe might have looked like. For example, since the 1970s L’viv became the backdrop for a popular musical ‘Three Musketeers’ and for some other movies enacted in a ‘European’ milieu. Since that time presentations (although misleading ones, when taking into consideration the visual difference of architectural styles) of L’viv as a ‘little Paris’ became a part of popular discourse.

References to the ‘classical’ ideological division between Eastern and Western Europe are still widespread in Ukraine. However, in the circles of L’viv intellectuals and intelligentsia notions of Central Europe and East-Central Europe became a topic of quite intense debates at the end of the 1990s. Remarkably, some representatives of L’viv academic intelligentsia even made efforts to appropriate ‘Central European-ness’ as a part of personal cultural identification. One of my informants, an academician of merit who spent several years studying abroad, said:

> I studied at the Central European University [in Budapest], and it was an extremely interesting experience for me. Why? Because there I began to feel I was a Central European... no, not as a historian, not in an academic sense. Central Europe—many people think that it is the sort of identity, which has been constructed in order to stress one’s difference from Russians. But at that time it was not about this. It was not that we, here in L’viv, are Central Europeans and hence we are certainly not Russians. It was not about this. The matter is that when I studied in Budapest, I could travel in many countries, to many cities, to Zagreb, Prague, Vienna, and I could see the unity of this post-Habsburg space. And when I talked to the students, they were from different [Central European] countries, and it was obvious for me that there were many topics, you know, like: “You have this, and we have something similar too!” Simply for me as a historian it was not difficult to grasp this unity (Mykola G., 36 y.o.).

Such examples of identification with Central Europe on a more personal level are, probably, not exceptions, but they do not reach outside the circles of humanistic intelligentsia whose professional interests provoke reflections on this concept. It is doubtful that Central Europe as an open-ended and very flexible intellectual construction can serve as a point of reference in the personal narrative identities of the wider circles of L’viv intelligentsia.
The master narrative of Western Europe has been criticized within recent post-colonial studies as it “implicitly and explicitly reproduces binary categories of the Cold War and of the opposition between ‘first world’ and ‘second world’” (Yurchak 2006: 9). Reaching for the concept of Central Europe, which used to be one of the top subjects in European intellectual debate in the 1980s, has been a challenge not only of the dichotomies of the real-socialist political order, but also of the popular ‘nativist’ discourses: “…talking about Central European identity, about belongingness to a certain particular region in Europe, where cultural multiplicity dominated, which by virtue of its sheer existence compelled openness to the Other, became a gauntlet thrown down in front of adherents of cultural uniformity” (Hnatiuk 2003: 174). However, in the post-Soviet space of Ukraine, Central Europe became just another tale about belongingness whose circulation in practice became limited to the narrow circles of intellectual elite, even though the unconventionality of this tale made it particularly attractive (at least for a short period in the second half of the 1990s).

A challenge of the dominant discourses of nationalism and the mono-dimensional cultural identities had been pointed out as a hallmark of the debate around Central Europe long before this debate became actualized in independent Ukraine. It has been stated that Central Europe is a “cultural counter-hypothesis of minority, while a majority in many societies still thinks in national categories” (György Konrád quoted in Hnatiuk 2003: 183). It has been observed that Central Europe is a reactive construction promoted not only by the Central European cultural and political circles, but also by Western intellectuals. Indeed, it seems that, in opposition to the allegedly segregating and over-rational West, Central Europe became imagined as a postmodern society distinguished by plurality, self-irony and tolerance (Törnquist-Plewa 1999), and as a historical and cultural area distinct from both Western consumerism and Soviet collectivism (Delanty 1996: 93).

In its capacity as an intellectual ‘counter-hypothesis of minority’, in independent Ukraine the concept of Central Europe has been scrutinized by the L’viv intellectuals grouping around ‘Ƞ’ magazine, which devoted several issues to the discussion about Europe, among them three (6, 1995, 9, 1997 and 13, 1998) addressed Central Europe in particular. One may think that it is remarkable that the “Central-Eastern revision”109 in its Ukrainian variant was initiated from the part of the land that is allegedly most nationalistic. However, Galician and L’viv intellectuals had special reasons to be interested in the concept of Central Europe. Namely, within this symbolical construction L’viv and Galicia have been conceptualized as an especially significant outpost of ‘Central-European-ness’. It has even been said once that “The triangle between L’viv, Trieste and Gdańsk, painted onto a map, contains the space of Central Europe. For some it is a moldering myth, while for others it is a continent of still vital ideas, which have always held these cities several centimeters above the ground” (Pawel Huelle cited in Hnatiuk 2003: 173). Besides, as it has been mentioned, the concept of Central Europe was re-introduced by ‘elite’ intellectuals and initially circulated within their

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109 This is the title of one of Iurii Andrukhovych’s essays.
milieu. The circle grouping around ‘I’ and the newspaper ‘Postup’ has included influential academicians and politicking intellectuals united by anti-Communist sentiments who on many occasions declared their patriotism and support of national-democratic political forces. For them Central Europe was in no way an opposite to the Ukrainian nation-building project as such. It was rather opposite, on the one hand, to the rhetoric of ultra-right nationalist groupings who discarded Europe as a (symbolical, political, cultural etc.) centre of power and, on the other hand, to the hesitant, ‘multi-vector’ ‘Ukrainian state without Ukrainian spirit’ under Kuchma’s rule. Hence, “‘Central Europe’ …covers Galicia’s longing for the modern nation-state that contemporary Ukraine is failing to consolidate” (Zayarniuk 2002: 18-19).

Debates focused on the European orientation of Galicia and Western Ukraine were inseparable from the quest for an alternative to Galician ‘Piedmontism’. A centripetal Kyiv-centered national project has been revised in light of the possibility of a multi-centered model of European regionalism. In the words of ‘I’ editor-in-chief Taras Vozniak,

Western Ukraine, to the detriment of its interests, still makes efforts to play the role of an integrating factor of the Ukrainian state-building. Simultaneously it [Western Ukraine] tries, according to its ability, to draw all Ukraine to Europe. …it has already fulfilled its task as a centre of Ukrainian-ness and the generator of separatist efforts, and instead its task as the “integrator” to Europe comes into focus (Vozniak 1998: 38).

What is this ‘Europeanizing’ vision based on? After 1991 neither West Ukraine, nor Galicia in particular, could serve as an example of quick economic growth or some outstanding achievements associated with Western conceptions of democracy and rule of law. Instead, first of all the “Austro-Hungarian ‘pedigree’ of Galicia becomes the passport to genuine, non-Eastern Europe” (Hnatiuk 2003: 205). Therefore, no wonder that one of the key texts in ‘I’ s ninth, ‘Central-European’ issue (1997) was an exclusive interview with no less than Otto von Habsburg himself. In his interview this respectable heir of the dynasty expressed clearly that all of Ukraine belongs to Central Europe, which is the ideological construction differing from Russia-dominated Eastern Europe. The ‘recovering’ of Central Europe is important for defeating the legacy of the Soviet totalitarianism, and Ukraine, in view of Otto von Habsburg, should play one of the leading roles in this process. It is not insignificant that Habsburg talked not only about Galicia, but about all of Ukraine as a part of Central Europe. In fact, in Ukraine the non-Eastern European heritage of the territories other than Galicia tend to be overlooked. For example, it has been pointed out that another West Ukrainian territory, Volhynia, which in many respects is similar to Galicia, has not been presented as obviously ‘Central European’. The reason is that Volhynia used to be a part of the Russian Empire, while neighboring Galicia was a part of the Habsburg Monarchy. That both Galicia and Volhynia were included in the interwar Polish state does not change the matter (Zayarniuk 2001: 20). In the opinion of some Ukrainian intellectuals, even the ‘non-Eastern European-
ness’ of Slavic Poland seems to be inferior to the ‘genuine European-ness’ of the German-speaking world\(^\text{110}\) (Hnatiuk 2003, Zayarnuik 2001: 20).

At the end of the 1990s, when many Ukrainians cherished hopes of joining Europe in the wake of the planned expansion of the EU, West Ukrainian intellectuals cheerfully referred to Central Europe in various contexts. For example, one author put forward such arguments for the idea, once popular among politicians, to create a ‘buffer zone’ of European integration:

Historically, geographically and mentally Western Ukraine is the territory linked with Central Europe, so the perspective of European integration is perceived there as a vital necessity. It is expedient to start creating the “buffer” zone and try out the proposed concept in the L’viv region, which is the most prepared area in Western Ukraine (Pankevych 1998: 46).

During a round table devoted to Bruno Schulz, a known L’viv intellectual exclaimed:

It would be nice to found the museum in Drohobych, in Schulz’s motherland, in the motherland of the great culture which is known to the entire world. …Here, in Schulz’s motherland, in the motherland of the great culture of Central Europe, which we Ukrainians also belong to as an important element, [it would be nice] to found his museum! (Postup, 14.06. 2001).

In that context, Central Europe, as well as its other variant—East-Central Europe—became smoothly and easily adopted as the sphere where Western Ukraine and, by extension, the entire Ukraine belongs naturally and inalienably. The usual arguments of historical, geographical and mental affinity were reached for in order to form a positive narrative of belongingness to a special part of Europe, which, someone may think, is still inferior to Western Europe in terms of economic development and political order, but which is equally great, and maybe even superior, in terms of culture, spirituality and ‘mentality’.

\(^{110}\) In Galicia such ‘typically German’ features as discipline and orderliness have not seldom been pointed out as indicators of a ‘higher’, ‘genuinely European’ culture. Here ‘German-ness’ has been coterminous with rational order and civilisation, while ‘Russian-ness’ has been presented as synonymous with barbarity. For example, sympathy to Germans as bearers of a ‘higher’ civilizational order was expressed by two of my respondents (one in his 60s, the other one in his early 20s), who in particular praised Nazis for their neatness and ‘Ordnung’ (features directly opposed to those ascribed to the feared, but also scorned and ridiculed Soviets). In this respect, as in many others, oral historical discourses in Galicia differ from the rest of Ukraine, where Nazis have been unconditionally perceived as barbarians and murderers. Attempts to connect the otherness of Galicians with patterns of German ‘mentality’ are not so unusual, even though they rather belong to the sphere of informal discussions and discourses, like in this remark of Taras Vozniak during a workshop dedicated to Bruno Schulz: “…indeed, it is an element of our identity here. I speak about German language. Of course, other languages which functioned in Galicia have also played a role of such elements. Polish—doubtlessly, there can be no doubt…one [also] hears echoes of… Yiddish. … But if Galicians form a German wedge in divisions of some Ukrainian rufflemen’s army, they plow the whole of Ukraine from one end to the other in the force of their organization, in the force of this miraculous organizational element…. of that Ordnung, which in a sense determines Galician specificity” (Postup, no. 91,92,93, 14.06.2001).
Such efforts to imagine one’s ‘own’ different Europe, which is already here and does not need to be achieved through some combined efforts and joint political, ideological etc. actions, exposes a well-known attitude of ressentiment toward the master narrative of ‘properly national’, modern and prosperous Europe. Ressentiment, as Greenfeld (1992: 15) notes, is a quite common psychological reaction in situations when a society imports and tries to accommodate some supposedly superior foreign idea (in this case, a supranational model of ‘Europe’). In fact, ressentiment may become a creative power, as it may eventually lead to the “transvaluation of values”, which implies “transformation of the value scale in a way which denigrates the originally supreme values, replacing them with notions which are unimportant, external, or indeed bear in the original scale the negative sign” (ibid: 16). Hence, ressentiment may become an organic part of the so-called post-colonial cultural projects aimed at transfiguration of the established hierarchies of cultural inferiority and superiority. This transfiguration presupposes not only inversions of ‘high’ and ‘low’, ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’, but also decentralization and, in a sense, atomization of these hierarchies. In such cases, intellectuals not only articulate multiple collective identity projects, but also describe more individualized ways of solving one’s (oftentimes their own) identity crisis.

Actually, in the intellectual polemics around (Central) European-ness and Ukrainian-ness, which stem from Galicia, the voices praising multiplicity and individual search are discernable. In the opinion of Hrytsak, expressed in the polemical essay called And we are in Europe too? (‘I my v Ievropi?’), it is justifiable to cultivate one’s own vision of European-ness:

On the level of mass consciousness a majority still believes in the existence of centers and periphery, in historical-natural split of Europe on the East and the West, in existence of one and only recipe of modernization. …To abandon such a belief means to recognize normative plurality. There are various recipes for being modern, there are different ways of being European, and one may be Ukrainian in different ways, and in the same vein there are different ways of being human (Hrytsak 2004: 322).

In works of Andrukhovych this idea finds its artistic realization. In one of his most known essays called ‘The Central-Eastern Revision’ (‘Tsentral’no-skhidna reviziia’) the focus is placed on presentation of the history of the narrator’s family as refracted through the large-scale historical collisions of Central Europe. For the writer, Central Europe, like Galicia, is marked by its precariousness, insecurity, existence ‘betwixt and between’ and profound tragedy:

Existence between Russians and Germans is the historical predestination of Central Europe. Central European fear historically swings between two anxieties: Germans are coming—Russians are coming. The Central European death is either the one in a prison or in a camp [ Nazi’s concentration camp or Soviet labor camp—E.N.] and, besides, the collective one, Masseinmond, cleansing. Central European travel is an escape. But what from and where to? From Russians to
Andrukhovych identifies himself with Central Europe not only because it symbolically incorporates and makes intelligible historical memories of the older generation. Central Europe is also an allegory of the intermediate and precarious existence of the intellectual and the *intelligensia* in this part of the world. Intelligentsia are not only those who get caught between geopolitical millstones; they are also those who are most prone to be milled by them in the first turn (“either …in prison or in camp”). The features which Andrukhovych emphasizes in his vision of Central Europe wake immediate association with narrative identities of intelligentsia as a category betwixt and between folk and power-holding elites, who long for ‘escape’ to some space of autonomy and aspire to cultivate their ‘otherness’ as a cornerstone of their existence. Central Europe as an intellectual construction and identity project (Hnatiuk 2003: 182) also becomes an extension of the narrative identity of Central European intellectuals and intelligentsia. Hence, while acknowledging an individual artistic interpretation of Central Europe suggested by the celebrated Ukrainian writer, one may discern contours of collective representation models, which he identifies himself with.

While Andrukhovych implied that carving the ‘different’ Central Europe may become an emancipating project which opens the door to suspensions and carnival inversions of centre and periphery, the collective and the personal, the inferior and the superior, other Ukrainian intellectuals were more sceptical. Their publicly expressed criticisms mixed undertones of ressentiment with attempts at unbiased analysis of Central Europe as an empowering concept. For some West Ukrainian intellectuals the efforts to imagine a special kind of Europe and to exchange the project of political and economic integration to ‘proper’ (i.e., Western) Europe for already realized historical and cultural belongingness in a kind of semi-Europe looked doubtful. In the opinion of some Galician intellectuals, in order to find its proper place in Europe, Ukrainians should first realize the national project and put an end to their cultural marginalization in their own land (see Hnatiuk 2003: 186-193). Others, like, for example, Mykola Riabchuk, point out discriminatory features of the ‘Central European project’: “Since ‘European belonging’, under peculiar political circumstances, had been far more than just a cultural/geographical notion, the detachment of some ‘Central’ European nations from Eastern Europe implicitly meant that the non-members of this privileged club did deserve less, if any, Western attention and help” (Riabchuk 1998a: 16). Yet others expressed skepticism about whether Central Europe is useful as an instrument for achieving strategic political goals and whether it is worth being identified with this concept. For instance, in the editor foreword to the ninth issue of *I* one could read:

Small states quarrelling between themselves can guarantee neither safety nor genuine …flowering of culture. Dislike of the neighbor overcomes the instinct for self-preservation. Therefore, the political and military vacuum of small and powerless states unavoidably had to be filled either...
Something similar may be observed today. The failure of integration efforts of the Vysegrad Group of Four or the Central European initiative again makes evident the shortsightedness of not yet fully formed nations. Everyone strives to run to the longed-for United Europe or NATO on his own, forgetting about others, leaving them in the middle of the road, trying to jump off of the realities which are called existence in Central Europe. ... At the same time, what is the role of Ukraine in this all? Does she want to join this illusory Central Europe, which up till now did not manage to become something really independent and self-determined? ... But will not Ukraine... turn into ... the Eurasian centaur with its eternal inner conflict with itself and with the surrounding world—both the European and the Asian one?

As this passage reveals, the attitude to Central Europe, as well as to Europe in its other appearances, has not been overwhelmingly enthusiastic even in the circles of the pro-European Galician intellectuals. The discursive strategy of downplaying/trivialization that has been used in the text is quite revealing. On the one hand, association with "small states quarrelling between themselves", "small and powerless states" cannot be so extremely attractive for big (and, having in mind the epithets of nationalist rhetoric, great) Ukraine. These states were not fully formed as nations several decades ago, and, who knows, maybe they still have not managed to get rid of this defect. On the other hand, their political egocentricity might look a bit distasteful from the point of view of the pro-European inteliherent. Besides, they are still parvenus who strive to be accepted by the privileged Western European club, and allegedly they cannot propose some wide-scale, original identity project. Nevertheless, unwillingness to be drawn into the orbit of Russia and to be once and forever viewed as a 'betwixt and between' entity, an amorphous buffer zone and "Asian-European centaur" proves to be stronger. Underpinned by ressentiment, such conceptualization of (Central) Europe is not exceptional in intellectual debates in Ukraine (Hnatiuk 2003: 193).

Polemics around Central Europe and efforts to place Ukraine or at least Galicia into this context culminated at the end of the 1990s, and thereafter interest in this theme declined. In Ukraine, as it was in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary a bit earlier, this idea was denounced as outdated, 'under-European' and not corresponding to the European ambitions of the societies in question (ibid: 189). For a range of reasons, the Central European project did not prove to be effective as a catalyst of political processes of Ukraine’s integration into ‘Europe’. Moreover, it has even been argued that the ‘myth’ of Central Europe proved to be “extremely exclusivist and, thereby, harmful; its side effect was not only mystification of ‘central’ Easterners with too pinky visions of their pasts and futures, but it was also establishment of a very distasteful hierarchy of ‘more’ and ‘less European’ nations in Eastern Europe” (Riabchuk 1998a: 16). The weakening of interest in the Central European project was also inseparable from a general decline in enthusiasm towards the ‘Europeanization’ in Ukraine, which came around 2000. Partly it was a consequence of frustration over broken dreams about membership in the EU, but also a predictable reaction of ressentiment with respect to the idealized and elusive object of emulation and longing (Hnatiuk 2003: 280-281). For this or that reason, Central
Europe as an intellectual construct and identity discourse ‘not for mass use’ did not find enough support among wider circles of intelligentsia in Ukraine, and in L’viv in particular. Problematic relation of the intelligentsia to cultural diversity surely played its role.

9.3. What to do with multiculturality?

Since the time when Central Europe was reintroduced and reframed in Milan Kundera’s famous essay *Un accident kidnappé, ou la tragédie de l’Europe centrale* (1983), this concept has been regarded as an effort to overcome sharp dichotomies between ‘East’ and ‘West’ and to point out the existence of an intermediate zone of cultural mixture between them. It has often been stated that one of the basic features of Central Europe is cultural diversity, or, as it often has been called, ‘multiculturality’. Unlike Western Europe that embraces ‘old’ full-fledged nation states, Central Europe has been conceptualized as a historical space where numerous ethnoses and ‘smaller nations’ (Hroch 1985) coexisted within the borders of the European empires. Some authors, like, for example, the Polish intellectual Antonin Liem whose article opens the ninth, ‘Central European’ issue of *I* magazine, even argued that the historical conditions of Central Europe formed such a feature of its inhabitants as “implicit, unconscious and non-snobbish cosmopolitanism”. According to Liem, this might be something which Western European nations, for whom “coexistence and intersection of cultures and religious tolerance is something new and not yet comprehended” (Liem 1997: 6) should learn from the Central Europeans. An idyllic picture on non-conflicting coexistence of different cultures and religions has thus been presented as a hallmark of Central Europe. Such efforts to imagine Central Europe as a space of non-problematical coexistence of peoples and cultures are problematical in themselves. Although some ideological conceptualizations of multiculturality may raise objections, the very idea of cultural difference and diversity may be difficult to come to terms with. In the words of Bhabha (1989: 72), cultural difference becomes a problem not when you can point to the Hottentot Venus, or to the punk whose hair is six feet up in the air; it does not have that kind of fixable visibility. It is as the strangeness of the familiar that it becomes more problematic, both politically and conceptually… when the problem of cultural difference is ourselves-as-others, others-as-ourselves, that borderline.

“Transitions out of authoritarianism do not necessarily lead to democratic and pluralistic regimes that honor difference” (Ruble 2003: 13). Acknowledgement of the significant presence of ‘others’ in Galicia’s history and contemporariness as well as dealing with their cultural heritage and present claims proved to be one of the stumbling blocks in the intellectual polemics not only about Central Europe, but in the whole range of identity discourses on L’viv, Galicia, Ukraine and Ukrainian-ness. The habit of thinking in dichotomies—formed within both ‘old’ Soviet ideological and ‘new’ post-1991 nationalist paradigms—is quite usual both
among influential West Ukrainian intellectuals and among rank-and-file intelligentsia. Besides, the ‘post-colonial’ vulnerability of Ukrainian culture in the face of Russian and global cultural expansion brings about feelings of endangerment and resentment. In such a context ideas of diversity in unity and ‘normality’ of intermediate, hybrid cultural identities have been perceived as a threat to Ukrainian-ness.

It has always been difficult to deny the cultural diversity of Western Ukraine and Galicia. It was especially obvious in the case of L’viv, which throughout its history was inhabited by several ethnic communities, of whom the Ukrainian community became the largest only after World War II. Efforts to get rid of the city’s image as a commonplace Soviet centre of the province and the ambitious project of transforming it into a major European educational centre and tourist magnet might imply keener interest in its multicultural legacy. In the words of Taras Vozniak, a respectable L’viv intellectual and at the same time an influential political figure, the multiculturality of L’viv should become an important resource in the ‘European game’ of Ukraine:

We are often asked if L’viv is a European city, in the full sense of the word, by European meaning only its positive aspects. Yes, of course, it is, just like Venice or Seville, where, as in L’viv, quite a bit of historical East has been retained, and whose obligation and opportunity today is to preserve this variety, which is both an instrument and an advantage. … L’viv, historically a city of many nationalities and cultures, has a chance of becoming sort of a Strasbourg of East-Central Europe, a city where the West and East meet, a city of Ukrainian-Polish, Ukrainian-Jewish reconciliation after centuries of conflicts and misunderstandings. The European appearance of L’viv is an important resource in convincing Europeans of the European quality of Ukraine (Vozniak 2003: 456).

The actual state of affairs is, however, that acknowledgement of L’viv’s cultural and ethnic diversity often does not go further than formulaic statements in tourist brochures and official proclamations of L’viv municipal authorities, i.e., in production reckoned for visitors and external audiences. On the internal plane, however, attitudes toward actual and symbolic presence of ethnic (and other culturally distinguishable) ‘others’ are not so uncomplicated. For example, in the 1990s the regional newspaper ‘Za vil’nu Ukrainu’ published anti-Semitic and anti-Polish articles with astonishing regularity. The premises of the Pushkin Russian cultural centre have been repeatedly vandalized. A conflict around Polish military gravesites at the Lychakiv cemetery in L’viv drew international attention.

Political and intellectual-academic discourses also provide numerous examples of strategies that successfully marginalize and limit the issue of multiculturality. One of the conventional modes of discussing multiculturality in L’viv and Galicia coincides with the prevailing mode of talking about Europe. Namely, it addresses both the former and the latter in terms of cultural heritage and historical past:
FIGURE 7. One of the official symbolic presentations of L’viv’s multiculturality: towers of L’viv churches belonging to different Christian congregations and architectural styles gathered around the tower of the L’viv town hall. This image has been introduced as an official logotype for the celebration of L’viv’s 750th anniversary (the picture is taken from the official website of the L’viv Municipal Council http://www.lviv.ua)

With all the talk about multiculturalism, especially in the context of Central Europe, the most important thing about multiculturalism is that it belongs to the past. Those who see the Habsburg Empire as a multicultural society can do so easily because this multiculturalism is pacified by the framework of the contemporary state borders. Discussing the multiculturalism of days gone by is a handy way for not discussing the new multicultural problems of Central Europe, such as those connected with migration and racism (Zayarniuk 2001: 25).

When some phenomenon is framed in accordance with a strategy of discontinuation as a matter of days gone by, this may lead to its discursive ‘encapsulation’ in the past and to a refusal to trace contemporary connections of this phenomenon. However, even such ‘pacified’ past may be viewed through different conceptual frames, some of which may provoke tensions in the present.

The historian from L’viv Vasyl’ Rasevych has paid attention to the problematic attitude of many of his colleagues to L’viv’s multicultural past. He claims that in the works of professional Ukrainian historians, one does not often come across the idea that L’viv has always been culturally heterogeneous. Such a state of affairs may be explained, in his opinion, both by the persisting view of history as a field of ideological battle and historians as “ideological fighters”. Reluctance to address multiculturality is dictated by the mistrust of the ‘others’ and by a fear of provoking their revanchist claims. If such an attitude prevails among professional historians, then, according to Rasevych, it is no wonder that ordinary L’vivites are trapped in “old stereotypes”.

It is unclear whether Rasevych assumes that such biased narratives about the city’s past, which prevail among contemporary L’vivites, are vestiges of the official Soviet historical model, or whether they have always been
deeply rooted in popular semi-private discourses. In any case, he argues that in present-day popular discourses, the cultural diversity of L’viv is hushed up:

While observing various L’viv [Internet—E.N.] forums, I has come to the conclusion: either the present-day educational level is very low, or the publicly active people are deliberately falling into the trap of old stereotypes. I draw attention to the forums because there people express incognito what they think and reach for “convincing” arguments. When scholars and politicians speak to their audience, they are constrained by many taboos and proclaim only such things as “must be”. So, what does L’viv look like according to the Ukrainian-speaking forum participants? Well, it is an eternal Ukrainian city, where various strangers have appeared from time to time, then it was occupied by a Polish king, and Poles oppressed the L’vivites. …Life of every generation of L’vivites was subordinated to one single idea, which was the building of their own independent united state, because the residents of the city have always been the most nationally aware Ukrainians. …“Soviets” destroyed the Ukrainian urban culture of L’viv, and the only thing they did this whole time was to persecute everything Ukrainian. … Such teleology dominates the mass consciousness of present-day L’vivites (Rasevych 2007).

In Galicia and L’viv, like everywhere in the world, signs of multiculturality not only stimulate intellectual comprehension of a limited group of cultural ‘legislators and interpreters’. Over the last decades, cultural difference and diversity have been principal objects for both physical and discursive transformation, which involved various actors. Demolitions, ignoring, renaming of places, changes of initial function and other transformations of material landmarks and artifacts have been carried out in order to erase traces of the non-canonized cultural presence in L’viv. In the Soviet era “[a] combination of dominant Soviet and Ukrainian symbols was intended to create a Soviet Ukrainian image of the city. This was a part of a larger project to create a political Soviet nation” (Hrytsak and Susak 2003: 151). In the realm of discursive practices one of the most usable strategies in this respect was silencing and avoidance of some ‘delicate’ facts as well as refusal to comment on obvious traces of ‘others’ presence. After 1991 the cultural space of the city was symbolically transformed by means of all these strategies to various extents. Visions of a Galician multicultural heritage have been re-accentuated according to new priorities. L’viv intelligentsia, in particular, academic intellectuals, journalists and writers, have played one of the mayor roles in this still ongoing process. Other significant actors have been politicians of the local and regional range. Also, wider circles of L’vivites contributed to transformation of the post-1991 discourses and practices that address L’viv’s multiculturality.

With advent of independence Ukraine found itself in the same situation as other former Soviet non-Russian republics, where “the titular nationalities began to reclaim some of the political, cultural and economic positions of power from ethnic Russians in an attempt at redressing some of these aspects of Soviet internal colonialism” (Kuzio 2005: 230). In L’viv this process took very pronounced, and occasionally extreme forms. One of the manifest features of the new discourses on L’viv cultural diversity is a tendency toward a negative presentation of Russians in general as well as the ignoring and marginalization of the Russian-speaking L’vivites in particular. In popular discourses Soviet-ness is directly associated with Russian-
ness. Moreover, despite a reputedly significant level of assimilation of ‘Russians’ into the dominate Ukrainian culture of Galicia (Drul’ 2001a: 184-185), and despite all the talk that ‘Soviet-ness’ is equally spread among Ukrainians too, under influence of ultra-nationalist propaganda ‘Russians’ became imagined as a culturally inferior and inassimilable group which ‘pollutes’ the city with its language and primitive mores. Posters spread in L’viv by the right-wing association ‘Svoboda’ in 2007, reinforce these stereotypes about Russians (known in Western Ukraine by the pejorative name moskali). Remarkably, these posters relate to a typical concern of the L’viv intelligentsia, i.e., the ‘culture of speech’ (see chapter 5), as they agitate against the ubiquitous use of Russian obscene expressions (maty, matiuky) in public spaces in L’viv. The posters state: “Remember! In Russia they do not swear in mat… There they talk in mat. Matiuky turn you into a moskal’”. This rhetoric refers to a stereotypical opinion that maty, which come from lumpenized ‘half-Asian’ moskali, contaminate the urban milieu of L’viv that was initially culturally sophisticated and pure from filth.

FIGURE 8. ‘Matiuky turn you into a moskal’*. Posters published by the all-Ukrainian association ‘Svoboda’ (available at: www.tiahnybok.info/media.html)

This type of discourse is a propagandistic extreme that employs images of Russian-ness as something contaminating, impure, as something that must be avoided. Offensive and discriminating, it is a part of political discursive practices with their own rationale. However, and this is even more disturbing, avoidance as a strategy resulting from the basic idea of someone’s or something’s impurity and danger (Douglas 1984) became a dominant mode of dealing with Russian-ness in the intellectual and scholarly sphere. Studies of native researchers that deal with the topic of Russians and Russophones in L’viv are available, but they are
very few. Some of them, like for example the book of Russian L’vivite Aleksandra Matyukhina ‘W Sowieckim Lwowie’ (‘In the Soviet L’viv’, 2000), which was financed by a grant from Jagellonian University and published in Polish language, stirred up emotions in the intellectual circles in L’viv.

Such a tendency to avoid the balanced discussion of the issue of Russians and Russian language in L’viv affected even T’ magazine, which otherwise pays much attention to L’viv’s and Galicia’s multiculturality. Geopolitical and socio-political aspects of Ukrainian-Russian relations have always been a central topic for T’; Russian and Russian-speaking authors and texts in Russian have been published there as well. However, remarkably, any focused efforts to conceptualize Russian-ness/Soviet-ness in L’viv in the same way as was done in the case of Polish-ness, Jewish-ness and German-ness, have never been made. Discarding of Russian-ness/Soviet-ness as a part of ‘normal’ multiculturality was signaled on the cover page of one of T’ s special L’viv issues. Namely, among the range of historical names which L’viv was known under, one cannot see the well-known Russian name of the city, ‘Lvov’. Conceptual framing of L’viv’s cultural diversity, determined by the image of the king’s crown and the notion genius loci, simply leaves ‘Lvov’ outside. Proletarianization and cultural uniformity, which the Soviet variant of Russian-ness is associated with, do not fit the image of the European, culturally unique Ukrainian ‘city of kings’. In a sense, such a variant of multiculturality turns out to be a kind of belongingness to a club of chosen ones. Nevertheless, such an attitude and many other biases against Russians and Russian-speakers in L’viv have been effectively challenged. In particular, a popular Internet community called ‘Mankurty’ (www.mankurty.com) gives voice to the Russophone L’vivites who aspire to participate in the debates about the city’s past, present and future. Discourses of this community refute completely the opinion that after 1991 “the ‘Ukrainian’ L’viv was finding its new Fatherland (Bat’kivshchyny) which it longed for, while the ‘Russian’ one was losing its ‘great boundless motherland (rodimu)’ without which it could not imagine its small fatherland, its ‘own’ L’viv” (Mavko 2008).

Post-1991 relations of the Ukrainian majority to other significant minorities in L’viv and attitudes to their symbolic and actual presence in the city have not been unproblematic either. The case of Poles—another culturally and politically dominant community that in the twentieth century was turned into one of the city’s minorities—is quite revealing in this respect. Poles have been mostly viewed through the prism of the stereotypes formed during centuries of Polish cultural and political dominance in L’viv, as well as those that were elaborated in the Soviet period. Different generations of L’viv intelligentsia tend to have different views on Poles and Polish-ness. As it was mentioned in chapter 6, for many educated L’vivites who came of age during the Soviet period, Poland used to be a window to Europe, a translator of cultural novelties and global trends. Among the elderly Galicianers the attitude tends to be more restrained and even hostile.

because of negative experiences in the interwar Rzeczpospolita and during the wartime. The generation which came of age in the 1990s and has had opportunities to travel, work and study in Poland, seems to have developed much more pragmatic and nuanced views. Nevertheless, controversies around the opening of the so-called Cemetery of Young Eagles in L’viv have shown that negative sentiments rooted in collective memory, in particular the one of older generations, still color the relations of Galician Ukrainians with Poles.

To make a long story short, there arose tensions around military graves which appeared at the Lychakiv cemetery in the aftermath of the Polish-Ukrainian warfare in 1918-1919. Among the buried are Polish defenders of L’viv (in particular, the legendary Lwów Young Eagles (Orłeta Lwowskie), schoolchildren who struggled on the Polish side), Ukrainian Sich riflemen, French soldiers and American pilots. The Polish military Pantheon was vandalized by the Soviets, but since the late 1980s Polish volunteers initiated its restoration. In tandem with this, the Ukrainian party began to restore the Sich riflemen’s graves. The crux was that the municipal authorities under whose jurisdiction the issue was placed, opposed the renovation of the Pantheon in the form which was suggested by the Polish side. In fact, under Kuchma’s presidency the Ukrainian central authorities, which declared their keen interest in not hazarding good relations with Poland, did not manage to bring L’viv politicians to reason. The war of words between L’viv and Warsaw continued for several years, but eventually the parties came to compromise, and the joint Ukrainian-Polish war memorial was opened in 2005, during Yushchenko’s presidency.

The issue, which stirred emotions in L’viv, was the form and conceptualization of the Polish commemorating site. The L’viv authorities, whose opinion resonated with the opinion of a not-so-insignificant
part of L’vivites, opposed the idea of the Pantheon and other symbolic markers of Polish victory in the Polish-Ukrainian war. In particular, the commemorating inscription “Here rests the Polish warrior who died for the Fatherland”, which Polish officials insisted on, aroused much controversy. It was said that it offended the national feelings of Ukrainians and disgraced the memory of the Ukrainians who fought for L’viv as it clearly demonstrates that Poles still regard L’viv to be a part of their homeland. Eventually, however, this variant of the inscription was accepted on the Polish side of the memorial, and the more neutral inscription “Here rest the Ukrainian and Polish warriors who died in the war 1918-1919” was placed at the entrance to the joint commemoration place.

The whole quarrel was not only about different politics of memory and views on historical fatherlands, but also addressed current political and geopolitical transformations that marked Polish-Ukrainian relations. The issue of the military graves at the Lychakiv cemetery was much discussed both in media and during numerous meetings and round tables where politicians as well as representatives of the L’viv intelligentsia could express their points of view. This conflict revealed the atomization of L’viv intelligentsia and intellectuals and their inability to seriously challenge the dominant nationally exclusive discourses, which define ‘the strange politics of L’viv’. This became one of the factors due to which different political forces could manipulate the opinion of the L’viv population in this question. In fact, in 2000 some renowned L’viv academicians, politicians and civic activists send an open letter to President Kuchma in which they stated that when restoring the Young Eagles cemetery the Poles aspired to commemorate the occupation of the region and the suppression of the West Ukrainian People’s Republic (Iegorova 2005). Nevertheless, voices that called to view the issue from other perspectives than a narrowly nationalist one, came from authoritative intellectual milieus in L’viv (like, for example, the one grouping around І.). In fact, both L’viv and Polish intellectual elites called for the seeking of a consensus on the basis of Christian values and respect for the dead, hence, in a sense, admitting that dispute about historical injustices in the Ukrainian-Polish relations should be temporarily suspended112. Nevertheless, even these influential intellectuals could not break the dominant tendency of looking with suspicion on the symbolical and actual presence of ‘others’ in the urban semiosphere of L’viv. One may guess that the official opening of Polish and Ukrainian military memorials at the Lychakiv cemetery

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112 In The Open Letter of Representatives of L’viv Civil Activists and Democratic Intelligentsia to the Presidents of Ukraine and Republic of Poland one could read: “We, civil activists and representatives of the democratic intelligentsia of L’viv, … are persuaded that an unfriendly attitude of some L’vivites, which sometimes results in xenophobic dispositions, is not at all representative of the convictions of the majority in the L’viv community. The L’viv community is interested in the comprehensive development of contacts with the world, first of all with Poland and Poles, in strengthening its good name as well as the best traditions of its city; it associates itself with the humanistic heritage of a multicultural and tolerant Europe, to which we have always belonged and will belong… It is very important that the issue of the ordering of the military graves at the Lychakiv cemetery is to be regarded beyond historical scores, and resolved in the spirit of Christian unity, in the manner that the issue of graves [should be resolved] in a land where the majority of the population confesses Ecumenical Christianity, although according to different rites” (available at: http://www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/inform/orlata/appeal-kk.htm).
would have been delayed over and over again if the Ukrainian and Polish central authorities had not made it a matter of political priority. Notably, Galician autonomists were quick to point out that the central Ukrainian authorities took the side of Poles against the will of Galicianers in the dispute over the military memorial, and that this demonstrates clearly that the interests and priorities of Galicia and Ukraine differ significantly (Kostyrko 2002a: 242-243).

Opinions about whether politics of memory in post-1991 L’viv reveal a tendency toward principal acknowledgement of the city’s multiculturality have been split. On the one hand, it has been argued that recent commemorative practices expose a gradual shift of focus from articulation of the heroic-national past to the multicultural aspects of the history of L’viv (Serda 2008). On the other hand, the fact that since independence the absolute majority of newly erected monuments in L’viv commemorated Ukrainian historically significant events and figures, suggested the opposite conclusion. In the bitter words of historian Vasyl’ Rasevych,

> We are accustomed to be outwardly proud of our multicultural history. We organize conferences and seminars, we announce the “right” texts, we hope to become a European tourist centre. But if one looks at the monuments [it is apparent that] we remember only ourselves… (Rasevych 2008d).

Attitudes to multiculturality in L’viv, even in academic and intellectual circles, to great extent have been defined by an overtly dichotomous national frame. One of the most revealing cases in this respect has been the renaming of L’viv streets. This long-term and methodical project (the expert group worked for seven years, between 1990 and 1997, and submitted 550 proposals) was conducted by the L’viv city council’s Committee for national and cultural revival in cooperation with an expert group of L’viv academicians (Hrytsak and Susak 2003: 152). The expert group, which initially included six persons, was an interesting selection in itself, as it reflected features of an oppositional faction of L’viv’s academic field at the beginning of the 1990s. The majority of the expert group were professionally trained historians, all of them Ukrainians and males (though one female member joined the group later), and only two of them were L’vivites in the second generation. Professional careers of practically every member suffered at the hands of the Soviet regime because of their engagement with non-censored variants of Ukrainian history. Notably, as Hrytsak and Susak (2003: 152) point out, “No expert was ever paid for serving on the committee; they felt committed to their civic responsibility and their intellectual independence”. The situation of the expert group was uneasy, but no explicit conflict within the group or between the group and the city council disturbed its work. Instead, a constant pressure from below, from individuals and civic organizations, was much more perceptible. Hence, the suggestions for renaming presented by the expert group reflected not only choices of the local politicians and a group of nationally-minded academicians, but also the opinion of wider circles of L’vivites.
Quite predictably, the post-1991 topography of the city was supposed to embody a national version of Ukrainian history and Ukrainian historical memory. The post-Soviet renaming of the L’viv streets finds clear parallels with general patterns of the renaming in the interwar period, which was done by the nationalizing regime of the Second Polish Republic, as

The principle “cuius regio eius historia” (who has the power, dictates history) is clearly displayed here. And in both cases, the ethnic concept of a nation prevails. Historical figures and symbols of other groups were permitted to the extent they fit into the paradigm (as a symbol of political or cultural assimilation of city ethnic minorities into the dominant group), or, if they were not, they were relegated to a second-rank status (ibid: 157).

Symbolic importance of different national groups and cultural communities in L’viv’s history was reflected, in particular, in the general number of streets whose names are associated with a particular group. The number of streets reflecting Soviet and Russian history and culture diminished drastically. Nevertheless, the largest non-Ukrainian group is still represented by Russian names, which may serve as an argument against the widespread opinion about unprecedented Russophobia in L’viv. Remarkably, however, the names of the poets Alexander Pushkin and Mikhail Lermontov, who are very important for the Russian-speaking population, especially for intelligentsia, were erased. Moreover, Lermontov street was replaced by that of the Chechen leader Dzokhar Dudaev. The second largest group of non-Ukrainian names was Polish ones, whose number was doubled because of a partial restoration of the pre-1939 names (ibid: 155). Some old Jewish street names were restored as well. ‘Nostalgia’ for Austro-Hungarian times was not reflected in the new names of the streets, although some Habsburg names were suggested. Remarkably, world-famous ‘transcultural’ personalities connected to Galicia, such as the writers Leopold von Sacher Masoch113, Joseph Roth and Bruno Schulz, were also denied inclusion into the officially defined public space of the city.

Notably, the number of streets bearing names of famous persons known the world over decreased drastically after 1990, and that is certainly not by chance. A focus on names reflecting the twentieth-century Ukrainian national movement, where especially “the military nationalistic trend was represented in much larger proportions and by more minor figures” (Hrytsak and Susak 2003: 154), became dominant. This trend may be attributed probably not so much to the preferences of the intellectuals from the expert group as to the pressure of the older generation of Ukrainian Galicianers whose historical memory has thereby been represented on wider scale. Even more outstanding in such a context is the fact that one of the streets in L’viv was named after a world famous person obviously having nothing to do with either the historical memory or worldview of the older Galicianers. The name of John Lennon114 appeared among the suggestions for street

113 Although the famous ‘father of Masochism’ was denied some official commemorating landmark in L’viv, the commercial potential of the figure of Leopold von Sacher Masoch did not go unnoticed. Recently, a bronze man-size statue of Masoch decorated the entrance to one of numerous L’viv cafés.

114 In fact, The Beatles left another, though quite brief, trace in the L’viv cityscape. At the beginning of
renaming because of an initiative of L’viv student organizations that submitted a petition signed by several hundred L’vivites. In the opinion of the city authorities this looked unserious, and

This proposal was initially denied by a majority of the experts, as it was believed John Lennon had nothing to do with either national or city history. It was accepted only on the insistence of the historian Ivan Svarnyk. His argument was based on his own experience of the Ukrainian student dissident movement of the 1970s, when John Lennon was a powerful symbol of nonconformity. After much controversy the street named for John Lennon was accepted; the case raised protests by some nationalistic-minded former dissidents (ibid: 156).

Ironically, the name which for numerous young highly educated L’vivites is much more evocative than many outstanding figures of the national movement or local ethnic minorities, was accepted due to its association with the pantheon of fighters for the freedom of the Ukrainian nation. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that because the renaming was a matter of codification of the Ukrainian national narrative and Ukrainian historical memory, the experts undoubtedly acted in line with their task. Moreover, they should be given credit for this little experiment with symbolical inclusion of cultural ‘otherness’ that diverged from the variant sanctioned by the conventional Ukrainian national narrative.

This story is remarkable also inasmuch as it reveals significant generational gaps in positioning and identity processes among different factions of the L’viv intelligentsia. For the older generations of L’vivites (not only Galician Ukrainians, but also the newcomers from the Soviet Union) ethnic/national frames play the principal role in evaluation of the local ‘others’ and the world. For the generation of their grandchildren it is not such a simple matter. I have suggested elsewhere (Narvselius 2006) that on the grass-root level there exist spaces (however limited and unsteady) in present-day L’viv, where solidarities are built across the multiple cultural, ethnic, national and even transnational lines. In particular, such groupings can be found among the youth. The attitude to cultural/ethnic diversity that emerges today among subcultural youngsters as well as their ‘non-involved’ peers is marked both by ambivalence and by increasing reactivity. As has been argued in the previous chapters, this shift in identity processes may be parallel to the reluctance of young highly educated L’vivites to be identified with the collective category of intelligentsia and its self-ascribed mission of promoting the values of its cultural/ethnic/national community. Instead, positioning as the ‘intellectual’, which is characterized by individual achievements, criticism, reflectivity and openness to the inter(trans)national ideational trends, has become more pronounced.

Those L’viv intellectuals and intelihenty who approach L’viv’s ethnocultural diversity from the analytical point of view, admit that this phenomenon (even in its ‘Kakanian’, Habsburgian variant) can hardly

the 2000s some enthusiasts opened the café ‘Yellow Submarine’ in the centre of the city. The cafe was a curious ‘place with atmosphere’, decorated with memorabilia relating to the four world famous Liverpudlians. However, the café was soon closed because of the financial difficulties of its owners.
become a cornerstone for the optimistic ‘positive’ narrative connecting L’viv and Galicia with ‘Europe’. In the words of Andrukhovych,

Idyllic and painless multilayerdness of cultures is a myth and I am not sure that this myth is harmless. …Multilayerdness of cultures is not only a celebration of erased borders, it is also blood, dirt, ethnic cleansings, cannibalism and deportations. Probably, I used the wrong expression and should be talking about “multilayerdness of anti-cultures”. But this is also unavoidable in multiethnic milieus (Andrukhovych 1999: 29).

Similarly, Hrytsak (2004: 273-274) argues: “The history of Galicia may be imagined as the history of multiculturality, which had many chances to win, but which lost in the last account. Civil solidarity and cooperation between Galicianers seldom overcame religious, social, ethnic, and later on national barriers”. He also admits that the present state of affairs is not comforting either: “In fact, we are afraid of multiculturality because we cannot manage it, we cannot digest it”115. Cultural and ethnic diversity is presented in this line of argument as splashes of ‘chaos’, which should be first and foremost ‘digested’, curtailed and appropriated within the ‘order-infusing’ national frame. In accordance with this logic, cultural diversity should become a suitable field for colonization by the dominant national discourse:

There is no other equally important task for the L’viv milieu, and also for the cultural integration of the L’viv urban milieu, than to make an effort to integrate the bygone multicultural heritage of L’viv into Ukrainian culture. In other words, to make certain phenomena which we have always regarded as non-Ukrainian into normal, functioning L’vivian and, ergo, Ukrainian phenomena. …I have such an example: Estonians are not afraid of Dostoevsky if it is in Estonian, because Dostoevsky in the Estonian language becomes a phenomenon of Estonian culture.116

Such a suggestion may look appealing for intelligentsia who is thereby tempted to assume the role of demiurges creating order out of chaos by means of applying ‘normalizing’ national discourses and categorizations. However, one may still hope that the generation of the educated 20-year olds in L’viv may develop other, more individualized ways of meeting, embracing and conceptualizing the ubiquitous presence of ethnocultural—and also social—otherness.

9.4. L’viv—Kyiv—Donets’k: quests for a common myth?

After “a decades-long moratorium on any imaginative discourse of the city” (Grabowicz 2000: 333) in the Soviet period, L’viv became (re-)included in a wide range of political, artistic and academic

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narratives. It became possible not only to insert L’viv into intellectual meta-discourses on nationalism, Europe, multiculturality and historical heritage, but also to elaborate individual narrative identities centered on L’viv which refract these meta-discourses in highly personal ways. In the domain of literary and artistic ‘L’viviana’, which gained popularity after Ukraine’s independence, L’viv became reinserted into the romanticizing narratives similar to those that have been developed around L’viv in Polish and diasporic Ukrainian literature. Exotic images of L’viv as a city-ship and city-island, created by Andrukhovych and Neborak, also provided artistic comment on the city’s transcultural past and present.

However, these and other symbolically laden images and themes focused on L’viv have also articulated the ‘otherness’ of the city and conveyed the idea that, like all humanistic culture, it has been under siege (Grabowicz 2000: 336). Defensiveness and a feeling of threat have been constantly present in identity discourses of the ‘cultured’ segment of L’vivites. The declaration of striving for autonomy and a desire to carve out ‘my last territory’ that has been pronounced by the post-1991 L’viv intelligentsia, further interconnects intelligentsia’s narrative identity and historical narratives focusing on the city. As an example one may take a passage from an essay by writer Kostiantyn Moskalets’, where he admits that L’viv is a crossroad of various cultures, a city open for everyone. However, there exists his ‘own’ L’viv, which is a personally defined autonomous space threatened not by (ethnic, cultural) ‘strangers’, but by dangerous insiders such as “the politician, the businessman and the everyman (profan)”:

There are several L’vivs which are compelled to coexist in one space and time. There is Russified and post-Soviet L’viv, and there is Ukrainian and nationalist L’viv. There is L’viv populated by the former inhabitants of the nearby villages, but there is also a L’viv of the old families of intelligentsia, whose roots go back to the Austrian times. …I know about the existence of all these parallel L’vivs which from time to time intersect in some problematic, occasionally even explosive points, but I also know another thing: I have my own L’viv, which the greedy clutches of the politician, the businessmen and the everyman …cannot reach (Moskalets’ 2008).

It may be argued that any more or less significant city is inseparable from its image which emerges in historical whirls, cultural collisions and individual artistic interpretations. L’viv is not an exception in this respect. However, despite the complexity of its discursive representations, the city as a symbolic referent still addresses a certain core of meanings due to which it becomes discernable against the background of other cities. Themes and topoi, which become evident when L’vivites compare their city with other Ukrainian cities, in some respects continue and refract significant points in the narrative identity of the city’s intelligentsia. Here I would like to take a closer look at juxtapositions and comparisons of L’viv, Kyiv and Donets’k which have been revealed through intellectual polemics and artistic interpretations.

Several visions of ethnocultural and ideological differences, which determine the present-day processes of (re-)construction of Ukrainian identity, have been suggested. Among them, for example, the competing models of ‘two Ukraines’ (Riabchuk 2001, 2002b) and ‘twenty-two Ukraines’ (Hrytsak 2002a). In
some respects, discussions about L'viv, Kyiv and Donets'k have concretized general views on particular
‘types’ of cultural-political identity of different Ukrainian regions. These discussions also articulated another
important dimension of the post-1991 narratives of identity in Ukraine, namely, the socio-cultural one. In the
triple model L'viv—Kyiv—Donets'k, L'viv (in auto-reflective discourses) not only stands for the most
nationally aware, most European, most Ukrainophone part of the spectrum. It is also frequently imagined as
the ‘cultural capital of Ukrainian-ness’ and the city of intelligentsia. Kyiv and Donets'k typically are viewed
from L'viv, as, respectively, ‘business/nomenklatura' and ‘proletarian/mafia' centers, whose Ukrainian-ness is
mostly nominal. These images have been a part of popular talk, artistic reflection and media discourses for
quite a while, and they have been either eagerly confirmed or passionately opposed by the L'viv intelligentsia
and intellectuals.

Under conditions of different political regimes, narratives comparing and juxtaposing L'viv and
Kyiv have tended to stress various aspects of this complex and contradictory symbolic relation. For instance,
in the official Soviet discourses it was presented as a relation of the capital and a provincial (regional) centre.
From this perspective, L'viv was related to Kyiv as any other Sovietized industrialized city in the Ukrainian
SSR, although L'viv was not ordinary in its capacity of the newly-joined Soviet territory, a ‘special regime'
city and the half-official ‘capital of Western Ukraine'. In the counter-narratives of the Ukrainian dissenting
intelligentsia, the relation of L’viv and Kyiv was framed differently, as, in one variant, both these cities have
been regarded as the centers of the Ukrainian national movement or, in another variant, L'viv has been viewed
as superior to Kyiv in this respect. The counter-discourses of youth subcultures tended to picture both L'viv
and Kyiv (as well as Moscow, Leningrad and capitals of the Baltic republics) as centers of the all-Soviet youth
subcultural network called Sistema (Olsson and Havrylyuk Narvselius 2003).

As has been pointed out above, in the late 1980s and early 1990s L'viv in different contexts was
defined simultaneously as a centre and a periphery. In the recent discourses of the L'viv intelligentsia and
intellectuals, Kyiv's centrality in the project of Ukrainian cultural nationalism has been questioned over and
over again. In the opinion of some, ‘Europe’, Central Europe or, generally, the West should become a
symbolic gravitation center defining ideational and cultural trends in L'viv. In others' view, Galicia, or, more
widely, Western Ukraine is self-sufficient as a culture-generating Ukrainian centre. The relation between Kyiv
and L'viv, as conceptualized by some leading L'viv intellectuals, presently calls to mind rather the relation
between recipient and donor. While some authors stress that the capital city of independent Ukraine pumps out
L'viv’s economic and material resources (Druž 2001b), others claim that Kyiv drains L'viv first and foremost
of its human capital (Vozniak 1998: 29).

A more nuanced, but basically similar picture of L'viv and Galicia as the principal catalysts of the
Ukrainian-speaking intellectual and cultural milieus in the capital has been presented by one of the informants,
a journalist and public intellectual with a wide network of acquaintances among Ukrainian intellectuals:

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It my view, L'viv and Kyiv are today such particular intellectual centers where crystallization of certain milieus has happened. By contrast, in other cities there are some very talented people and some universities, but there are no intellectual milieus. This is my opinion. Maybe, there exist similar intellectual milieus in Kharkiv, but I don’t know the situation there well. But I suspect that, anyway, if something happens there, then it happens due to numerous emigrants from Galicia. It is in the same way as in Kyiv: Galicianers left for Kyiv, there they feel the need to get together and, as a result, certain intellectual milieus appeared. Maybe I am deluded, because I know only these people well, but for me it looks like this anyway (Andrii P., approx. 45 y.o.).

Another common allegation is that the political establishment of Kyiv capitalizes on the National Idea which was developed in Galicia. Moreover, as some authors lament, in independent Ukraine, after a short initial period of elevated symbolic status, L’viv again degraded to a province because “Ukraine, as the Kyiv-centric phenomenon, deprived L’viv of its own history, the glorious history of a regional capital city with its own parliament [seim]. Or, to be precise, L’viv renounced itself in the name of independent Ukraine” (Drozdov 2007). It has been pointed out that despite a concentration of huge financial and human resources, under the period of independence Kyiv did not manage to propose some working ideological model that could consolidate Ukrainian society.

For a part of the Galician intellectual milieu, Kyiv has become associated with corrupted nomenklatura, oligarchic capitalism and Russified urban masses. Kyiv has also been presented as a faceless neo-Soviet megalopolis susceptible to cultural ‘Americanization’, which both politically and ideationally pushes the city away from ‘Europe’ towards Russia (Vozniak 1998, Kvik 2000, Drul’ 2001b). Under such circumstances, it has been argued, L’viv and Western Ukraine should become the ‘Ukrainian face of Ukraine’ and take leadership in the domain of Ukrainian culture: “In a cultural respect, one might say, it is the out-and-out Ukrainian region. This opens before it great opportunities to become a bulwark of the new culture based on Ukrainian language” (Vozniak 1998: 31). The problem is, however, that “actual conditions of the Ukrainian society do not provide this process with opportunity to be developed. In fact, there are two kinds of obstacles—traditional Galician conservatism, an absence of a broader view as well as de facto bankruptcy of the cultural institutions because of economic difficulties” (ibid). The latter problem should be blamed on Kyiv, as the lion’s share of the cultural, scientific and educational institutions are subordinated to Kyiv-based ministries and councils and depend on financing from the state budget.

A tense symbolic relation between L’viv and Kyiv has been conceptualized not only in various publicist texts, but also in the domain of fiction. One of the most interesting works, which presents the complexity of this relation and points out its comic and paradoxical aspects, is the phantasmagoric story ‘L’viv Gate’ (‘L’viv’ska brama’) by Olexandr Irvanets’, the artistic rebel from L’viv who, like Andrukhovych and Neborak, used to be a member of the group ‘Bu-Ba-Bu’. The story is written in a style that has much in common with the ‘magic realism’ of Gabriel Garcia Marques. Daily encounters and routines suddenly
explode into paradoxical and phantasmagoric sequences, everyday banalities prove to be saturated with powerful symbolism. What distinguishes Irvantets’ story is trivialization of the ‘serious’ cues and postmodernist carnivalesque of the described reality, as well as some surprising insights about intergenerational transmission and national heritage.

The plot of the story is worthy of closer consideration. The author’s alter ego, a younger L’viv writer who comes to the capital city of Kyiv on some trivial business, suddenly is lost in the unfamiliar nightly cityscape and gets into a strange underground ‘station-in-between’ called ‘L’viv Gate’. A mysterious elderly pipe-smoking mister (pan) Iuzio who proves to be a guard of the ‘L’viv Gate’ gives him shelter overnight. Pan Iuzio is depicted as an archetypal elderly L’vivite smoking a pipe and speaking a Galician Ukrainian dialect spiced with Polonisms. Neither the little courtyard where pan Iuzio lives, nor the interior of his room full of antiquities and saturated with scent of coffee, belong to Kyivan scenery. He is a part of the prewar L’viv myth that has been miraculously transferred to the modern Sovietized megalopolis of Kyiv where it continues to exist secretly and autonomously. Moreover, Iuzio himself is a surreal person, he is a magician with fetishist inclinations who collects in his ‘curiosity shop’ hair, saliva and nail clippings belonging to both Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian ‘publicly-known people’. One of the relics in his collection, however, discomforts him:

After passing rows of bookcases, pan Iuzio stopped, stuck his pipe into the mouth and pointed to the floor:
—Look here, please…
It was nothing special to look at, however. On the parquet floor, which was covered with some old newspapers, lay leaking here and there with dirty streams quite a big formless polyethylene package wound with a rope in several places.
—What is this?—you looked up at pan Iuzio.
—This is, I beg your pardon, my biggest problem,—pan Iuzio suddenly became serious and began to talk through clenched teeth, without taking the pipe out of his mouth:
—It litters my accommodation, it has been lying here for several years already, and I can do nothing with it. That’s why you must help me. You are not a public person, so I don’t need either your hair or, I beg your pardon, even a little snot from your nose. I need just a little help.
—But what is it?
—It is, I beg your pardon, the Ukrainian Idea. Yes, yes, don’t be surprised…—overwhelmed by emotions, pan Iuzio again added Galicianisms into his speech, took the pipe out of his mouth and abruptly knocked it out into his palm.—As it is known, it doesn’t work—at least, so it has been announced to the citizens. And thus it was brought here, to me. Because they, you see, did not know where else they could store such things!—angry notes sounded quite distinctly in his otherwise plain and calm speech.—They found out that there is such a repository in L’viv, delivered it here and dumped it right in front of my door. What did I have to do? I took it, dragged it here, registered it, wrote it in into my book-keeping accounts… And it lies here, stinks and resists any classification!
—But what does it consist of?—you continued to clarify.
—Oh, it’s better not to look inside. You’ll not see anything good there… It must be accepted and consumed just like it is, without unwrapping it. As an idea in whole, without taking into account its components… But, no, I put it wrong—“accepted”. I want to get rid of it!
The formless, half-rotten corpse of the Ukrainian Idea that “resists any classification” does not fit pan Iuzio’s collection of relics. It rather pollutes the place. His unexpected (or, rather, on the contrary, long-awaited) guest agrees to do a favor for the hospitable pan Iuzio and promises to get rid of the package precisely in Kyiv, and “in any case not somewhere else, not on the way”. The whole adventure, however, does not end in a discrete dumping of the Ukrainian Idea. The polyethylene cover bursts, and its contents prove to be a

...a skull with a hole in it, covered with soft thin hair, like on a coconut, a handle of a sword with the debris of a blade, some well-thumbed little paperback book, some yellow bones. I stuffed all this back into the hole—the inscription “Kobzar’” was revealed on the little book for a moment, strangely enough, with the Russian letter “ь” in the end. …From afar, coming closer, sirens howled. I raised my head and high above me, among the cupolas of Kyiv Lavra, beside its bell tower, I saw the swift, patterned silhouette of the Korniakta tower.117. “It is impossible not to love you, my Kyiv.”

Behind the phantasmagoric scenery of the story where different places and times are fused into a texture of the postmodernist chronotope, it is not difficult to distinguish a range of concepts and cues that have fuelled Galician political and intellectual discourses since the late 1980s. The image of the ‘ancient’, ‘European’, ‘mysterious’ Lviv, saturated with Galician color and the scent of coffee, is painstakingly constructed as a direct opposition to ‘Soviet-modern’, ‘half-Russian’, ‘pragmatic’ and ‘faceless’ megalopolis of Kyiv. The Ukrainian Idea, whose ‘rotten inside’ is grotesquely exposed in the story, proves to be brought to Lviv and Galicia from outside, by some anonymous persons who simply dumped it into Iuzio’s repository. Iuzio’s wish to have the package disposed of precisely in Kyiv is, however, quite understandable, as the whole package of the National Idea with its Cossack-Romanticist allusions originates from central-eastern Ukraine and must be left in its capital. Galicianers were simply entrusted to store the Ukrainian Idea—until it became rotten through and through. The story gives a hint that the archetypical Lvivite Iuzio was charged to deal with the Ukrainian Idea not by mere chance. His collection of political trash (embodied in Iuzio’s passion to collect publicly-known people’s saliva and nail clippings) and painstaking cataloging (probably an allusion to ‘German’ academism and orderliness as a part of Austro-Hungarian heritage) logically led him to this.

The issue of historical transmission of national ideology (materialized in the shape of the macabre package with the Ukrainian Idea) between Kyiv and Lviv is not the only nerve of the story. Allusions to the generational problematic (an elderly collector of curiosities pan Iuzio versus the younger writer, the author’s alter ego) are quite explicit. Despite differences in age and status, there is much in common between pan Iuzio and his young nighttime guest. Both of them are Galicianers, they preserve strong emotional and existential bonds with Lviv and both dislike Kyiv (pan Iuzio to the extent that he wishes to pollute the city with the content of the package). Besides, the curiosity keeper Iuzio and the anonymous writer

117 A famous architectural monument in Lviv.
are representatives of the feeling and reflecting Ukrainian intelligentsia (the former in its rank-and-file and the
later in a more refined, but equally materially destitute version). In some mysterious way they both become
connected to the allegedly dead and rotten National Idea whose ‘substance’ alludes to the Cossack myth
(broken sword, old bones) and to the nineteenth-century Ukrainian Romanticism (‘Kolhur’, the collection of
poetry works by the ‘national prophet’ Taras Shevchenko). For both men the Ukrainian Idea is burdening
historical trash having nothing to do with their everyday life. Their Ukrainian-ness is alive, it stems from their
daily choices and habits that do not need to be justified and consecrated by ancient relics. Their Ukrainian-ness
is not identification with the national myth, but a concrete lived-in local Galician affinity. Nevertheless, one of
the characters stores the ancient half-rotten stuff in his flat and the other seems to be forced by circumstances to
deal with it. Or maybe not by circumstances, but by fate? And why does Iuzio pass it on to his younger
contemporary instead of dumping it himself? He seems to be quite aware that his guest is incapable of getting
rid of the fatal package. And why does the young writer agree to take on the task?

Many other questions may be raised. Nevertheless, the general idea of Irvanets’ story is quite
transparent. Despite all the contrasts between Kyiv and L’viv, they are fatally connected and present two faces
of the Janus-like Ukrainian national myth. The present-day bond of Kyiv and L’viv is not the bond of mutual
attraction or similarity, but rather association of two accomplices involved in dumping and re-dumping of the
‘dead body’ of the National Idea. Kyiv and L’viv exist in the same dimension, they are embedded in the same
national ideology and cannot dispense with each other. As symbolic loci defining parameters of the Ukrainian
national myth both are contrasted to Donets’k.

The binary opposition L’viv/Donets’k has been formulated in Ukrainian intellectual debate and
put into wide circulation as an incarnation of regional differences that split Ukraine first and foremost
politically. In the words of Riabchuk, who has developed the idea of ‘two Ukraines’,

The metaphor of “two Ukraines” points out two geographical and ideological poles, whose
symbols may be L’viv and Donets’k. One pole is Ukrainian and European Ukraine, which aspires
to NATO and the EU; the other one is the Soviet and Eurasian Ukraine, which aspires to Eastern-
Slavic union, i.e., to the way of Lukashenka’s Belarus. The metaphor provides a good explanation
of the nature of choice, which was made for years and still cannot be made definitely by Ukraine,
which lingers at the civilizational, cultural and geopolitical crossroad (Riabchuk 2001).

With the advent of Ukraine’s independence, Donets’k in the eyes of many enthusiastic L’vivites
became a metonymic image of their Russified compatriots spoiled by the Soviets. It was suggested that they
could easily be turned into ‘normal Ukrainians, like us’ if they abandoned the Russian language and learned
more about ‘genuine’ Ukrainian culture. At the beginning of the 1990s civic and cultural organizations in
L’viv (among them, for example, Student Brotherhood) used to send ‘cultural paratroops’ who performed in
Donets’k, Kyiv and other Russified cities. There was also a popular initiative to invite people (usually
schoolchildren) from Donets’k to stay with L’viv families, especially during Christmas vacation, to teach them more about Ukrainian traditions and improve their Ukrainian language.

In the second half of the 1990s, when socio-cultural and ideological differences between L’viv and Donets’k proved to be too evident and it became clear that ‘easterners’ were not going to abandon their Russian language and Soviet-influenced traditions, the popular feelings toward Donets’k became more ambivalent and even restrained. Remarkably, contacts between the academic and intellectual milieus of these two cities remained quite sporadic and narrowly defined, although numerous differences in opinions and predilections could stimulate interesting intellectual disputes. The commentary of a middle-aged informant, the cultural and civil rights activist, shed some light on this situation. On the one hand, for many practical reasons L’vivites seem to be more inclined to look westward in search for partnership and support, but, on the other hand, ‘biased views’ and different political sympathies might also be a factor hindering intellectual contacts with ‘easterners’:

I am much more informed about what happens in the intellectual milieus of Oxford than of Kyiv and, moreover, Donets’k. I have acquaintances among civil rights activists in Donets’k, because they participate in the all-Ukrainian network. We keep contact, we share the same values in this sphere, although when it comes to politics they have voted for Yanukovych and we for Yushchenko. Anyway, there is some cooperation on this level. But there is no cooperation in the intellectual sphere. I think it may be the result of some disillusionment, absence of information or maybe simply biased views (Pavlo A., approx. 45 y.o.).

The events of the Orange Revolution strengthened the polarization of L’viv and Donets’k, but also compelled L’viv intelligentsia to revise their cultural missionarism and to ponder over ambiguous bases of national belongingness in Ukraine. One of the respondents, a middle-aged academician, addressed this issue and formulated his argument using a typical element of intelligentsia’s rhetoric, i.e., the topos of moral responsibility:

Well, here we are and there they are. It is more or less established, and we are aware of it. We stand up when ‘The Testament’ is sung, and these blockheads do not. Well, what to do. But, at the same time, there exists a political project which implies cultural tolerance and civic values. And how can we find something in common, some common symbols, how can we comprehend who we are and who they are? It is still an open question. […] Frankly speaking, I have prejudices against residents of south-eastern Ukraine. I can understand those miners who support Yanukovych, those university lecturers from Donets’k who support Yanukovych. But I cannot understand how can we live together in one political community after all this. That is why I suggest that unless we get rid of the southern-eastern provinces—and we will not, they will be with us all the time—we will be confused about our situation, there will always be the situation “we-they”. I am not going to idealize the state of affairs in L’viv, not at all, but their intolerance against everything western, non-Christian

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118 Zapovit, one of the most significant poetic works of the national Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko, which patriotic Ukrainians revere as much as the national anthem.
Orthodox is evident for me, and I react strongly against it. It is also a kind of nationalism, though they do not call it nationalism. But both parties must make a step toward each other, it is unavoidable. It is not a question of language and culture but rather of moral responsibility for the society where you live (Ihor S., 40 y.o.).

Despite all differences, L’viv and Donets’k, as has been argued over and over again by scholars who examined the issue, cannot be viewed as urban localities with diametrically opposed characteristics (see Hrytsak 2000, Rogers 2006). In a similar vein, some of my respondents stressed that splits between ‘easterners’ and ‘westerners’ exist rather on the political scale, and that they had not experienced any significant problems when communicating with ‘easterners’ who visited L’viv: “I simply do not switch to Russian when talking to ‘easterners’”, assured a middle-aged female respondent. “They understand me, I understand them, nobody needs to be tense and to speak a language which he does not master so well. And common topics can be always found”.

Notably, one of the Donets’k municipal politicians, a historian by education, described a similar strategy of relations between cities where mutual tolerance and willingness to solve common problems should prevail. This essay written for the L’viv Internet forum ZAXID.NET and titled in Russian Lvov i Donetsk—goroda ne pervye, no i ne vtorye (‘L’viv and Donets’k: cities not of the first, but neither of the second range’) was aimed to provide the readers in L’viv with the point of view of the Donets’kites. Supposedly, the arguments of this essay reflect not only the personal position of its author Mykola Levchenko, but also the stances of other Donets’k politicians and ordinary urbanites. According to Levchenko, the principal similarity of L’viv and Donets’k, beside their location in independent Ukraine, is that they are places with a definite image and significance, homes of people of different nationalities, and cities with ambitions to be modern and ‘European’. For Donets’kites, however, identification as ‘working people’ is reportedly of greater importance than national divisions. In this respect, the author suggests, Donets’kites differ essentially from L’vivites. Remarkably, at the end of his essay Levchenko uses the same topos of ‘mission’ as those representatives of the L’viv intelligentsia who view Donets’k as an ‘under-nationalised’, ‘culturally poor’ territory which must be subjected to Galician cultural expansion. He suggests that L’vivites themselves have to learn an essential lesson from Donets’k:

L’viv may learn national tolerance and respect for its past, whatever it was, from Donets’k. People of a hundred nationalities have lived in Donets’k. From the moment of the settling of the region the workers’ towns were places where Russians, Byelorussians, Romanians, Armenians, Poles, Moldovans, Assyrians, Greeks and Germans went together to the mines. The national question has never been of importance here. To be a good person, to be a toiler is not a question of nationality. In Donets’k people respect the past. Probably the urbanites are not especially glad about the fact that their city and industry was not founded by Russian generals or Cossacks, but by a foreigner. Nevertheless, the monument of John Hughes stays in the city centre. In the same manner, the monuments of Lenin, Vatutin, Artem and Gorky stay there. To demolish monuments, in our view,
is the same as to vandalize graves. It is not right to pretend that this past did not exist (Levchenko 2008).

Nevertheless, this appeal to learn tolerance from Donets’kites is hardly persuasive. In Donets’k, like in L’viv, there exist both popular discourses and political organizations having nothing to do with national tolerance, and, besides, a widespread suspicious attitude of ‘easterners’ toward ‘Banderites’ (West Ukrainians) who, as has been stated, wanted to sell Ukraine to the USA or NATO, was turned against one of the principal presidential candidates during the election campaign in 2004.

Quite a noticeable feeling of superiority, which L’vivites in different ways express towards their compatriots in Donets’k, has often found its expression in media discourses and intellectual debates. At the beginning of the 2000s, in anticipation of the next presidential elections, L’viv media overflowed with reportage describing Donets’k in an exoticizing—and often negative—manner. On the one hand, it was persistently stressed that Donets’k was ‘the least Ukrainian part of Ukraine’, that it was still a Soviet reservation where everyone speaks only Russian, where the Soviet holidays are still celebrated, where the streets bear the names of Soviet leaders and the Lenin monument is still in its place. On the other hand, journalists tended to stress the ‘simplicity’ and even the naivety of the daily conduct of the Donets’kites, which was a negative reformulation of the reputation of Donets’k established during the Soviet era as a major industrial city of ‘working people’. Some authors of reportage wrote with dislike about the absence of religiousness in their compatriots from Donets’k, others spoke about hostility toward people who speak Ukrainian in the city’s streets, yet another complained about the low level of ‘culture’ among Donets’kites.

Nevertheless, alongside these descriptions of negatives, some journalists balanced the general picture by admitting that the urban environment of Donets’k is clean and comfortable, that there exists cultural life there too, and even that in terms of the infrastructure and wealth of its ordinary urbanites Donets’k is not inferior to L’viv. According to quite widespread (and partly grounded) opinion, the ‘least Ukrainian’ Donbas region with its centre in Donets’k benefited from Ukraine’s independence due to its initially high level of industrial development. The richest Ukrainian oligarchs and influential ‘clans’, who have in many ways defined both economic and political climate in Ukraine, are also connected to Donets’k. The image of this part of Ukraine as the ‘mafia capital of Ukraine’ has become rooted in the popular conscious of Galicianers. In line with this theme, one L’viv intellectual wrote sarcastically that “Only people, who …bring their heads below the rest of their extremities can think that Galicia is the Ukrainian Piedmont. Obviously, the Ukrainian Piedmont is Dnipropetrovs’k, and the Ukrainian Sicilia is Donets’k” (Kostyrko 2002a: 242).

The typical image of a Donets’kite as represented in L’viv media and in popular discourses, is constructed as an opposition to the L’viv intellect. Unlike the ‘typical’ L’vivite, distinguished by first and foremost his/her cultural capital (Ukrainian language, Ukrainian patriotism, knowledge of Ukrainian religious and popular traditions, ‘European’ civility, feeling of historical ‘rootedness’ etc.), the ‘Russified’, ‘Sovietized’,
‘bandit’, ‘tasteless’ and ‘rich’ Donets’kite accumulates economic capital. Nevertheless, in the opinion of many, the gap even between these two schematic types, as between the two cities, does not preclude their mutual influence. L’viv may attract people from Donets’k because it provides them with opportunity to convert a part of their economic capital into cultural capital. Allegedly, many ‘easterners’ who visit L’viv are delighted by its European image and the ‘genuine’ culturedness of L’vivites, they want to experience a different and, for them, exotic atmosphere of the city. It can even seem as if the ‘high-cultural’ aura of intellehnts’kyi L’viv appeals to ‘easterners’ who are tired of the Soviet-like cultural lifestyle. In a foreword to one of ‘l’’s special issues devoted to L’viv, journalist Iryna Mahdysh wrote:

The city became fashionable. People from Donets’k, Dnipropetrovs’k, …s’k, …s’k, and, generally, the Soviet people who, understandably, became tired of bandit fights in their native Luhanshchynas, suddenly, unexpectedly to themselves, saw in “scary Banderite” L’viv a calm and beautiful European city, which would be good enough for an aristocratic upbringing [of their children]. The city is calm also in the sense that it does not refuse to accept surzhyk, which is so unusual for the tourists, in its own streets, it has nothing against plastic window frames in the houses built in the Secession style and against the concentration of imported cars with Kyiv license plates on the cobblestones (Mahdysh 2004: 5).

Thus, the situation seems to be ambivalent: on the one hand, L’viv may attract ‘the Soviet people’ because of its cultural difference and exoticism. On the other hand, however, behind the differences many common features of post-Soviet daily routines and structures are recognizable for the ‘easterner’. This ambivalence of L’viv stemming from the multilayeredness of its cultural heritage may be viewed both as a negative and positive factor. Soviet patrimony of L’viv is especially controversial, but it also may have a consolidating potential:

Although the Soviets in the majority of cases were unacceptable and foreign to L’viv, the conquerors and the conquered naturally found some common points, however unstable and temporary. These common points, most probably, can become poisoned sites not only for memory, but also for contemporary sterile myths, which may help more in manipulation and restriction than in gaining of new rights and freedoms for people. On the other hand, just because of these common points L’viv may contribute to the internal consolidation of Ukraine. Namely, the L’viv which imagines itself as “cleaner” and less “contaminated” by the Soviet power, as protected from it with a thick layer of idealized nationalism, would be incapable of conversing with, and especially listening to the [Ukrainian] “East” devalued to the position of the stereotyped “corrupted” Other (Amar 2007).

An interesting vision of relations between L’viv and Donets’k, between the Ukrainian East and West, has been recently presented by the intellectual whose fondness for conceptual inversion of centers and peripheries has been expressed in both artistic and publicist works—namely, by Iuri Andrukhovych. He argues that, instead of mutual exclusions and othering, these two symbolic spaces should be united by means of the construction
of innovative ideological models (“creation of …alternative mythology”) that should explicate various ways of reaching Europe:

I think it is already something unavoidable that the Donbas be in vogue. It is something floating in the air, namely, the creation of its alternative mythology, the quest for and restoration of the “different East” on its territory. It is not even an intellectual task, it is an intuitive requirement which stems from the undeniable attraction of its post-Soviet and post-industrial space which, to be sure, up till now has not been filled with something. This space is extremely suitable for shifting the centre. That moving centre, a Centre of Europe, which we will try to place this time somewhere on the background of … polluted wastelands of the Donets’k-Donau steppe (Andrukhovych 2005: 2).

To be sure, a similar idea was expressed by Andrukhovych earlier, although in a different modality and with different connotations. That time the idea looked like a half-ironic, half-serious fantasy about the time when a monument to Francis Joseph I will be erected in Donets’k. For Hnatiuk, “In this joking commentary one can nevertheless distinguish an element of a certain vision, namely, the disseminating of Central European identity in all of Ukraine” (Hnatiuk 2003: 225). However, Andrukhovych’s commentaries on the Central European dream and the Centre of Europe explicate another dimension. Expansion of ‘Central Europe’ to all of Ukraine is not solely a matter of superficial appropriation of some core symbols and idealized concepts for the sake of political expediency, but the task of internationalization—and intellectualization—of the Ukrainian life in its various dimensions. The task of intellectuals (i.e., ‘we’ who are able to move centers and peripheries conceptually) is challenging. ‘We’ not only have to come to ‘Europe’, but to bring ‘Europe’ into Ukraine and to fill “the post-Soviet space not filled with something” (he obviously means “not filled” with some innovative symbolic paradigms, narratives, and trends).

The logic of this intellectual project is the logic of internal cultural colonization and at the same time the general logic of intellectual intervention which may be described as "internationalism (or better transnationalism) faced with the constraints of the national context” (Jakobsen 2008: 6). Maintaining and expanding the intellectual autonomy that is of vital importance for arts, science and scholarship in Ukraine, is inseparable from their internationalization and ‘Europeanization’. The project of uniting two or twenty-two Ukraines into a common competitive cultural space is unthinkable without the solidarity of the intelligentsia. In L’viv, Kyiv and Donets’k, dichotomies and binary oppositions charged with connotations of moral and ‘civilizational’ superiority/inferiority ought to be suspended. This process will in all likelihood go more smoothly if cultural producers in various cultural centers in Ukraine will abandon their ambitions ‘to teach lessons’ and to come with a mission to each other on behalf of transforming their ‘last territory’ to a primary site of multidimensional intellectual influence on Ukrainian society—and not only there. “The wider the presence of L’viv is on the scene beyond Ukraine, the stronger the city’s weight on the Ukrainian scene will be” (Hrytsak 2007). The same may be true for Kyiv, Donets’k, Dnipropetrov’sk, Kharkiv and other Ukrainian centers of education, urban culture and intellectual life.
9.5. Summary

The scale, complexity and, one may argue, the results of the intellectual debate concerned with redefinition of the cultural-historical ‘place’ distinguishes L’viv among other post-Soviet Ukrainian cities. Activation of ‘place-making’ discourses and practices after 1991 may and should be viewed as a part of a wide-scale envisaging, evaluation and redefinition of the socio-cultural order that gained momentum with the collapse of the USSR. In post-1991 L’viv the discourses and practices focused on the urban community and its embodiment in various (local, regional, national, supranational) symbolic contexts have resonated with endeavors of the intelligentsia to elevate its role and, respectively, to exercise so-called pastoral and proselytic power (Foucault 1980, Bauman 1987b).

With the help of various discursive strategies (in particular, avoidance, portrayal in black and white, singularization, downplaying/trivialization), the L’viv intelligentsia and intellectuals have been presented as a category with a dual function. On the one hand, they have been imagined as actors who strive to (re-)formulate a new ‘positive’ image for post-1991 L’viv and thereby to empower their community. On the other hand, intelligentsia and intellectuals are persistently depicted as the (only) true urbanites, as the cultural essence and most valuable human resource of L’viv. Stories illuminating the crucial role of intelligentsia are an important part of the positively laden present-day narratives about the city (L’viv as the cultural capital, a ‘European’ city, a city boasting the Habsburg tradition of urban culture, a city with a definite national image). In a way, it is impossible to speak about some ‘positive’ aspects of L’viv’s past and present without mentioning the city’s intelligentsia. Also, it is difficult not to be trapped by the rhetoric of power relating to intelligentsia, and to distinguish some competing narratives about L’viv that challenge intelligentsia as a construct accumulating class-related visions of cultural authority.

In the case of L’viv, practically every empowering narrative addresses historical past and is anchored (or at least claims to be anchored) in collective memory. One may agree that “much of heritage recovery after the fall of fascist, socialist, or other authoritarian regimes expresses an opposition after the fact” (Czaplicka 2003: 377). Nevertheless, the past may serve as a very favorable ground for anchoring one’s claims to be identified as a figure with superior cultural identity and, hence, with right to wield cultural authority. Nevertheless, although addressing the historical (pre-Soviet) heritage of L’viv is an omnipresent topic, some narratives (such as about ‘Europe’ and multiculturality) are also explicitly informed by concerns of the city’s cultural elite and rank-and-file intelligentsia about the future. Leitmotifs of these narratives are longing for and justifications of inclusion into some culturally specific community (regional, ‘European’, transnational) as well as ‘colonization’ of this community for intelligentsia’s identity projects.

In the aftermath of Soviet rule L’viv is presented as a culturally superior site, a field of principle cultural battles, a site projecting the image of the city of burghers and intelligentsia and a strategically important locality where visions of the Ukrainian national project are being developed. The empowering narratives about L’viv which have been considered in chapter 8 and 9 correlate with structures of plot development of the L’viv
intelligentsia’s narrative identity which have been presented in chapter 5. The ‘European’ narrative may be viewed as a realization of a ‘romance’ type of narrative development, which lays emphasis on a series of ups and downs, challenges and difficulties that eventually lead to economic prosperity as well as respected values of the national culture, democracy and modernity. The counter-narrative about Soviet L’viv corresponds to a ‘comedy’ type, which may be read as a story about violated social and national order, which eventually is restored. The story about the ‘golden age’ of L’viv within the Habsburg Empire comes close to the ‘tragic’ structure, as it stresses loss of the harmonious social order and irreversibility of changes. However, the modality of this narrative is not thoroughly tragic, as the persistence of the Habsburg heritage and continuity of the collective memory about the ‘good old times’ has been constantly stressed. Hence the plot structure of the narrative about the ‘golden age’ combines features of ‘romance’ and ‘tragedy’. It may be suggested that the narrative about L’viv’s multiculturalism calls to mind a ‘satirical’ type as it suspends the dominant narrative (in this case, the dualistic national paradigm) and, in a way, emancipates itself from it.

Although the contemporary ‘legislators and interpreters’ in L’viv succeeded in the promotion of their voices and in mediating their own ‘visions of divisions’ in the debates focused on the city, it is noticeable that their place-making narratives also transmit uncertainty and insecurity in the face of the new, post-Soviet and post-modern, situation. One of the recurring themes in the narratives about L’viv is precariousness and endangerment conveyed by the metaphor of a besieged fortress. This image directly corresponds to the other metaphors, which depict the free intelligentsia as a ‘ghetto’ and ‘last territory’. The sources of danger are multiple, and some narratives (as those about multiculturalism and ‘Europe’) point out the ‘external’ forces and communities (ethical/national/civilizational ‘strangers’) while others (as the ‘Soviet’ and ‘L’viv-Kyiv-Donets’ narratives) are focused on the allegedly non-reconcilable internal tensions. The dispersed ‘last territories’ of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and intellectuals, which are confined within steadily contested overlapping boundaries of ethnocultural, social (among them, generational) and ideational distinctions, seem to be sufficient for intelligentsia’s social and discursive reproduction as cultural producers. However, these territories alone are too narrow for reproduction of the intelligentsia in its role of legislators providing the state and the nation with legitimation, i.e. with the “intellectually articulated rights to rule” (Bauman 1987b: 107). They are also problematic as the bases of collective political mobilization in Ukrainian society. However, in my view, it is too early to conclude that in Eastern Europe intellectuals and intelligentsia have been completely marginalized because, generally, “authority has become redundant, and the category specializing in servicing the reproduction of authority has become superfluous” (ibid: 122). Cultural authority and moral power stemming from the ‘last territories’ of intelligentsia are still indispensable, not only in strictly cultural, but also in political struggles in Ukraine, as the events of the Orange Revolution have exemplified (see Narvselseius 2007).
Conclusions. Intelligentsia in L’viv: The Power of Location and Narration

This study brings into focus the issue of socio-cultural reproduction and transformation of cultural authority in post-Soviet Ukraine. It argues that cultural authority of the actors active in nation-building is fueled by intergenerational transmissions of their narrative identities. These identities connect to issues of particular location of these actors in socio-cultural hierarchies, historical narratives and political order.

The work combines theoretical approaches and methodology of ethnology and cultural sociology, and addresses two interconnected issues, which generally remain under-investigated in the field of East-Central Europe studies. On the one hand, this study examines how intelligentsia may be envisaged and ‘emplotted’. On the other hand, it analyses empowering narratives actualized by intelligentsia in a concrete locality, namely, in the post-1991 West Ukrainian city of L’viv. Intelligentsia is presented in those narratives as an essence of the nation, as its both typical and brightest representatives. Hence, this category assumes the right to speak in the name of the entire nation and to extrapolate its own tastes, values and choices to it. Therefore, intelligentsia’s voices are in many ways decisive in the discussions about Ukrainian national identity, which gained momentum in the post-1991 Ukrainian society. Simultaneously, in changing socio-political circumstances the notion of intelligentsia was itself submitted to multiple transformations. Presently, its shifting contents reflect the new focal points of the post-Soviet political-ideological and popular discourses that embed this notion. Differing understandings of intelligentsia also reflect changes in the socio-cultural hierarchies and historical experiences of the Ukrainian society in the last two decades.

The historical and cultural cityscape of L’viv is an especially apt site for investigation of the nexus intelligentsia-nation not only in the Ukrainian, but in the East-Central European context. This borderline city, while not being a remarkable industrial, administrative or political centre, has acquired the reputation of a mythogenic urban space, a site of unique cultural production and a principal centre of the Ukrainian nationalist movement throughout the twentieth century. Here the popular conceptions of intelligentsia have been elaborated at the intersection of various cultural, historical and political traditions. This study has addressed Ukrainian-speaking intelligentsia and intellectuals in L’viv both as a discursive phenomenon and as the social category of cultural producers who in the new circumstances both articulate the nation and are articulated by it.

Analysis of the material has led to the conclusion that the narrative identity of the Ukrainian (Galician) intelligentsia in L’viv has been predominantly developed according to the Central European model which conceptualizes intelligentsia not as an alienated stratum, but as a part and parcel of the national community, as its spiritual leaders and cultural elite.

Intelligentsia and intellectuals are notions embedded in the same semantic field, and hence they may both vary from and overlap with each other depending on the context of a situation and intentions of the
particular persons who apply them. Nevertheless, they expose a range of different connotations, which, among other things, address the differing relations of these two categories to the national communities and national projects. In post-1991 Ukrainian society intelligentsia is mostly coterminous with cultural producers distinguished due to their collectively accumulated cultural authority. Generally, intelligentsia is more focused on converting its cultural capital within and on behalf of its ‘own’ national communities. Intellectuals, in their turn, tend to invest their cultural capital in the ‘international’ (‘cosmopolitan’, ‘transnational’) fields. While intelligentsia exercises cultural and moral authority in order to consecrate its national community, and becomes envisaged as a part of the cultural heritage of the nation, intellectuals oftentimes strive to disclose rational bases and power relations of the national projects. The power of intellectuals stems from the specificity of their production and from their ability to persuade a cognizant public which is not necessarily their ‘own’ local or national community, but embraces an international audience. Unlike intellectuals, when attempting to influence public opinion, intelligentsia appeals primarily to its position as actors endowed with symbolic power.

Despite the differences, these two incarnations of cultural producers have much in common. Both intelligentsia and intellectuals articulate the nation by wielding cultural authority and putting forward ideological arguments. Also, both are benefited by this articulation—and, simultaneously, they benefit the national community as they formulate criteria of belonging, make the nation distinguishable and, hence, formulate conditions for its agency. The popular discourses as well as the swings of the L’viv intellectual debate demonstrate however that intelligentsia (both as a cultural tradition and adherents of this tradition) has been a core representational symbol of the discourses relating to the post-1991 Ukrainian identity.

This study has demonstrated that, unsurprisingly, intelligentsia is quite an elusive historical, social and discursive phenomenon which neither can be comprised in one clear definition nor can be operationalized according to inherently non-contradictory parameters. In the course of my work I have addressed intelligentsia in various contexts as a collective representation, discursive space, ‘catnet’, representative symbol, cultural myth, historical tradition, community of memory, class-like actor and group of cultural producers. Intelligentsia may be regarded as both concrete observable milieus oriented towards certain values and historical cultural patterns, as well as intangible, evasive ways to appropriate and confront these discursive patterns. Nevertheless, as the case of L’viv demonstrates, various conceptualizations and incarnations of intelligentsia do have one common feature. Namely, they identify intelligentsia as a construct accumulating class-related visions of cultural authority typical of certain historical periods. As this study points out, diffuseness of the concept ‘intelligentsia’ and its derivatives may indicate their embedment into a subtle and at the same potent nexus of power relations which play a crucial role in the (re-)production of social hierarchies and cultural-historical patterns of dominance.

In the theoretical chapters of the study I have assumed that ‘culture’ (and the idea of ‘culture’)
should be considered as an inalienable part of societal mechanisms of power and symbolic domination. I have reviewed a range of possible conceptualizations of the intelligentsia and intellectuals as the actors (fields, spaces, categories, class-like factions) who are discernable due to utilization of cultural and moral capital in their bids for power. The power exercised by intelligentsia and intellectuals is basically a symbolic power, i.e., a handling of performative discourses which help to ‘reveal’, construct and consecrate boundaries of groups and communities. In the essentially chaotic and fragmented post-Soviet cultural market, intelligentsia strives to impose its own definitions of value and to gain recognition for its version of social reality. The influence of West Ukrainian intelligentsia on the political arenas has ebbed since the early 1990s. Nevertheless, as a cultural gestalt informed by cultural authority and moral capital, it is still an essential instrument of discursive empowerment. As the cultural producers who still enjoy privileged access to the means of constructing and disseminating discursive pictures of reality, intelligentsia in L’viv is prone—and willing—to coin cultural and symbolic capital out of various near-hands, i.e., internalized cultural markers and dispositions of Ukrainian-ness, and to ‘export’ their own picture of reality to cultural and political circles in other parts of the land.

One of the general theoretical assumptions of the study has been that positioning of individuals within the system of socio-cultural meanings correlate with generation-specific narrative identities. Which plots of the intelligentsia’s narrative identity will predominate among representatives of different generations is contested in the course of history, in the domains of politics and the media, as well as through daily cultural practices and discourses. This study has confirmed that since the end of the Soviet system L’viv (presumably, like other urban centers of East-Central Europe where the concept of intelligentsia has been a part of the historical cultural tradition) has witnessed contestation of the established narrative identities of intelligentsia. For the younger academicians and cultural producers the word ‘intelligentsia’ presently connotes outdated ideological phrasology and exclusivity in line with the principle of ‘inborn’ cultural belongingness, and thereby provokes mostly negative associations. This happened because, on the one hand, intelligentsia may be associated with the ‘old’ Galician intelligentsia, who have been envisaged as an inborn group identity discernable due to conservative values of patriotism, strict morality and time-specific bourgeois civility. On the other hand, intelligentsia evokes associations with Soviet intelligentsia regarded as a ‘manipulated instrument of manipulation’, as a docile ‘social layer’ whose actual socio-cultural position in the state socialist system was in discord with their self-proclaimed position as a spiritual elite. By accepting neither Galician nor Soviet intelligentsia as role models, the younger respondents seem to react against too obvious incongruity between what may be called the ‘myth’ (meaning collective representations constructed for ideological aims) and the actual content—and context—which ‘intelligentsia’ is associated with. In the socio-cultural post-1991 reality relations of power are constellated differently, the political (and, moreover, economic) power in independent Ukraine does not need cultural-ideological consecration to the extent that it did before 1991, and ‘intelligentsia’ indeed may look like the conceptual debris of bygone epochs.
With its vague and arbitrary criteria of membership, intelligentsia, on the one hand, is far from being egalitarian concept, but, on the other hand, it is not entirely exclusive. The ethos and historical connotations of intelligentsia may appear ideologically distorted, romanticized, emotionally charged, and at odds with the more pragmatic concerns of the present-day educated strata. The present-day semantic core of ‘intellectual’, which connotes adherence to Western intellectual paradigms and rejection of authoritarian ideologies, is constructed as an opposition to ‘intelligentsia’ with its reputedly ‘Eastern’ focus and susceptibility to populism and authoritarianism. Among the middle-aged and younger highly educated L’vivites, identification as an intellectual is coterminous with adherence to the ‘West’, ‘Europe’, ‘normality’ and ‘(post)modernity’. Under present socio-cultural conditions, this re-established pattern of meanings connoted in the term ‘intellectual’ provides valuable reference points for one’s personal identification.

However, despite the changing identification patterns and attitudes on the part of the younger generations of the academicians, artists and professionals, the topoi and points of reference typical of the older generations of intelligentsia tend to be reproduced. Among them, for example, such recurrent motifs as responsibility, cultural ‘mission’, service to community, and moral and cultural superiority in relation to ‘folk’ and the powers that be. Also, the absence of pure ‘tragic’ plot development (which lays emphasis on eventual loss of socio-cultural positions or on the vanity of efforts to reach an optimal moral condition) in the respondents’ stories strengthens the hypothesis that, as a symbolic referent, intelligentsia is still associated with empowering narratives and strategies. It is, one may say, a floating signifier that in the contemporary narratives of highly educated L’vivites signals relations of power and dominance, and therefore does not fit in the stories developing the theme of powerlessness and complete degradation.

As the interview material indicates, the respondents have different opinions about how to outline intellihentnist’ (or intelligentsia’s ‘essence’) and all that it connotes, but it is, nevertheless, still an extremely honoring way of describing other persons or being described by them. Intellihentnist’ is a denomination of a cultural competence traditionally ascribed to the educated and wealthier urban classes. In a way, intellihentnist’ also embodies modern ‘European’ concepts of civility, patriotism, responsibility and service for the national/cultural community. Therefore, rhetoric which addresses intellihentnist’ is not rigidly confined to certain groups, social classes and categories, but may be ascribed depending on circumstances and appropriated by various actors as a means of discursive empowerment.

What exactly is meant when someone is called intellihent or when one’s attitudes and conduct are described as intellihenti depends not only on the context of a situation, but also on who is presented as social and cultural ‘others’ to intelligentsia’s narrative identities. The semantic field within which the concept of intelligentsia functions is structured by complicated relations (not only oppositions, but also overlaps, analogies and constellations) with such significant others as the people (narod) and political elites. Negative collective representations of both the elites and the people, which are often addressed by the L’viv intelligentsia, are
known by the derogatory name of khamy (‘low’, uncultivated, primitive individuals). Positive features of the political elites may be condensed in the image of a knight, which is also a positively laden metaphor in the narrative identity of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia. Contradictions and ambiguity in the socio-cultural nexus of those who are positioned and position themselves as intelligentsia and those who are imagined as narod in its different incarnations, have been intensely articulated in the popular everyday discourses in Lviv since 1991. Symbolical and social boundaries between intelligentsia and the ‘others’ change perpetually and, besides, images of intelligentsia’s symbolic antipodes as well as potential alter egos (i.e., categories and actors to be identified with in certain contexts) became more nuanced since the Soviet era. The multiplicity and ambiguity of these images is a predictable consequence of the vivid intellectual and popular debate focused on the Ukrainian national project(s) and National Idea—with Galicia, and Lviv in particular, as its epicenter.

Since 1991, reintroduction of the concept of nation with its connotations of both the inclusive political entity and exclusive ethnocultural community, has diversified intellectual debates in Galicia and all over Ukraine. The debate focused on the national issues includes a powerful, though not always clearly articulated, undercurrent of whose ‘class’ vision is to become the winning concept for Ukrainian nation-building. Different factions of intelligentsia and non-intelligentsia suggest various more or less coherent, retrospective and future-oriented, elitist and populist visions of the nation and national culture. However, in Galicia not only cultural elites, but narod in its different incarnations possesses significant cultural resources such as cultural tastes, ethnic traditions, language, recent historical experience and memories about its local motherland—and about the Fatherland of Ukraine. As the presented material reveals, this circumstance may become a source of anxiety for the Lviv intelligentsia and intellectuals who feel their monopoly on cultural authority in the post-1991 nationally-defined society endangered. Hence, although an abundance of common features in these various socially anchored versions of Ukrainian-ness stemming from Lviv exists, nevertheless in discourses of Lviv intellectuals and intelligentsia these versions tend to be presented as something primordial, non-transformable and irreconcilable.

Exploration of intelligentsia’s spaces and arenas in Lviv has provided further insights as to the conditions under which intelligentsia’s identity work has proceeded. This study shows that after 1991 intelligentsia’s circles, groups, arenas etc. have been fragmented injections in the urban continuum of Lviv. People belonging to different circles keep sporadic or no contact with each other, which means that they have limited opportunities to meet opponents and develop some kind of dialogue. Such a state of the intellectual polemics, which exists in dispersed and quite hermetical circles of the “initiated”, may be observed not only in Lviv, but all over Ukraine. This may be interpreted as a manifestation of the ‘postcolonial syndrome’ in the cultural sphere as well as a consequence of the socio-political situation in present-day Ukrainian society in general. Besides, a range of particular factors, often underpinned by generational differences, seem to prevent continuing contact and mutual influence of various milieus of intelligentsia and intellectuals in Lviv. This

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does not mean that contact on personal level is non-existent. Nevertheless, one of the legacies from the period before 1991, which still left its trace on attitudes of different generations of the L’viv intelligentsia, is the absence of will and/or skills to lead cultural polemics, to introduce results of this polemics to a wider audience, and to disseminate critical discourses about local, national and international (transnational) matters of concern. Sites and places of and for intelligentsia and intellectuals rarely become arenas of balanced polemics. The intellectual autonomy has often been substituted with segregation of intelligentsia’s and intellectuals’ milieus and, hence, with weakening of the public opinion-making capacity of these cultural producers.

The significance of L’viv as a city at the crossroad of religious, ethnic, political and ‘civilizational’ borders, as an epicenter of the nationalist mobilization and a cultural capital rose and fell in the twentieth century, but in different historical circumstances the city projected the image of a place where specific urban culture has been generated and a multiethnic cultural heritage preserved. Accordingly, in my study I present the post-1991 place-making narratives focusing on multiple (normalizing, selling, glorifying, exotic etc.) images of L’viv and its dwellers as an important means of discursive empowerment for present-day L’viv (Galician) intelligentsia.

Processes of nation building in post-1991 Ukraine have been predominantly centripetal. Nevertheless, it may be argued that they have unfolded parallel to the discursive ‘place-making’ of concrete localities, which cultural producers appropriate as crucibles for forming their ‘own’ communities and near-at-hand cognizant public. Implosion of ‘place-making’ discourses focused on the city’s past, present and future has not been a contingent isolated phenomenon distinguishing L’viv from other post-1991 Ukrainian cities. The process of symbolic reinterpretation of urban space has not been unique in itself, but the scale, complexity and, one may argue, the results of the intellectual debate concerned with redefinition of the ‘place’ sets L’viv apart in this respect. Activation of ‘place-making’ discourses and practices after 1991 may and should be viewed as a part of wide-scale envisaging, evaluation and redefinition of the social order, which gained momentum as the political system of the USSR was in collapse. Simultaneously, in post-1991 L’viv discourses and practices relating to the urban community and its multiple embedment in various (local, regional, national, supranational) symbolic contexts resonate with the symbolic projects of intelligentsia and intellectuals aimed at (re-)gaining control over reproduction of their social positions and power-generating cultural narratives.

With help of various discursive strategies (in particular, avoidance, portrayal in black and white, singularization, discontinuation, downplaying/trivialization), the L’viv intelligentsia and intellectuals appear as a category with a dual function. On the one hand, they have been presented as actors aspiring to (re-)formulate a ‘positive’ identity for post-1991 L’viv and thereby to empower the urban community. On the other hand, in L’viv-centered polemics in the media and academic circles, intelligentsia and intellectuals are persistently depicted as the (only) true urbanites, as the cultural essence and most valuable human resource of L’viv.
Stories illuminating the crucial role of the intelligentsia are an important part of positively laden contemporary narratives about the city (L'viv as the cultural capital, a ‘European’ city, a city boasting a Habsburg tradition of urban culture, a city with a definite national image). In a way, it is impossible to talk about some ‘positive’ aspects of L’viv’s history and contemporaneity without mentioning the city’s intelligentsia.

In the case of L’viv, practically every empowering narrative addresses historical issues and is anchored (or at least claims to be anchored) in the collective memory, as the past serves as a favorable ground for justifying one’s claims to be regarded as a figure with superior cultural identity and, hence, with the right to wield cultural authority. Hence, the past provides suitable justifications for present-day cultural and political choices. Nevertheless, some narratives (about ‘Europe’, multiculturality and the axis L’viv—Kyiv—Donets’k) are more explicitly informed by concerns about the future. Leitmotifs of these narratives are longing for inclusion into some culturally specific supranational community as well as ‘colonization’ of this community and its transformation into an arena for one’s own cultural-political projects.

In the narratives analyzed in this study L’viv is presented as a culturally superior site, a field of principle cultural battles, a site projecting the image of the city of burghers and intelligentsia and a strategically important locality, where new visions of the Ukrainian national project are being elaborated. The most developed narratives about L’viv correlate with the structures of plot development of the L’viv intelligentsia’s narrative identity. The ‘European’ narrative may be viewed as a realization of the ‘romance’ narrative type, which lays emphasis on a series of ups and downs, challenges and difficulties on the way to economic prosperity as well as to realization of the respected values of national culture, democracy and modernity. The counter-narrative about Soviet L’viv corresponds to the ‘comedy’ type, which may be read as a story about violated social and national order that eventually becomes restored. The story about the ‘golden age’ of L’viv within the Habsburg Empire comes close to the ‘tragic’ plot structure, as it stresses a loss of the harmonious social order and the irreversibility of the change. However, the modality of this narrative is not overwhelmingly tragic, as the persistence of the Habsburg heritage and the continuity of the collective memory addressing the ‘good old times’ have been constantly stressed. Hence the plot structure of the narrative about the ‘golden age’ combines features of ‘romance’ and ‘tragedy’. It may be suggested that the narrative about L’viv’s multiculturality calls to mind the ‘satirical’ type as it suspends dominant narrative structures (in this case, the dualistic national paradigm) and, in a way, emancipates itself from them.

Although the present-day L’viv intelligentsia and intellectuals succeeded in mediating their own ‘visions of divisions’ in the debates focused on the city, their place-making narratives also express uncertainty and insecurity in the face of the new, post-Soviet and post-modern situation. One of the recurring themes in the narratives about L’viv is precariousness and endangerment conveyed by the metaphor of a besieged fortress. This image directly corresponds to recurring metaphors which depict the free intelligentsia as a ‘ghetto’ and ‘last territory’. The sources of danger are multiple, and some narratives point out the external forces and
communities (ethnic/national/civilizational ‘strangers’) while others are focused on the allegedly non-reconcilable internal tensions. The dispersed ‘last territories’ of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and intellectuals, which are confined within steadily contested overlapping boundaries of ethnocultural, social (among them, generational) and ideational distinctions, seem to be sufficient for intelligentsia’s social and discursive reproduction as cultural producers. However, these territories alone are too narrow for reproduction of the intelligentsia in its role of legislators providing the state and the nation with legitimation. They are also problematic as the bases of collective political mobilization in Ukrainian society. However, cultural authority and moral power stemming from the ‘last territories’ of intelligentsia are still indispensable not only in strictly cultural, but also in political struggles in Ukraine.

On the whole, this study resulted in several important findings. The author found concrete evidence for the cultural-sociological hypothesis that both social locations and historically determined identifications of cultural producers have important consequences for the culture that gets produced. In Galicia, ‘intelligentsia’ has been a power-accumulating concept presenting cultural templates of the wealthy and privileged as a source of cultural authority. Reproduction of this concept becomes possible due to existence of spaces and sites characterized by certain degree of autonomy and adherence to cultural tradition. In conditions of post-1991 L’viv cultural authority is predominately exercised within a fragmented field of semi-autonomous cultural producers influenced by various sources of power and elaborating different empowering narratives. The new generation of cultural producers grew up in East-Central Europe in the time when ideological narratives of totalitarianism and authoritarianism were fading away. Their views and agency may differ from those of the older generations, though it is probably too early to draw conclusions about any radically different quality of narrative constructions and practices developed by this new generation. Nevertheless, those who predict democratization and at the same time professionalization of the social standing of cultural producers in East-Central Europe may have a point.
Appendix 1. Questionnaire\textsuperscript{119}

1. Socialization and fostering of 'Ukrainian-ness'
Tell me about your family. Have you been brought up as Ukrainian (non-Ukrainian)? Reflect upon by what means and how it was done in your family. Do you remember some particular events, situations etc. when you understood yourself to be Ukrainian (non-Ukrainian)? Was awareness of your Ukrainian-ness (non-Ukrainian-ness) intensified/weakened during your school studies? university studies? employment? participation in certain organizations? Examples, reflections. Are there some places, groups, situations where you feel you should behave or present yourself as more/less Ukrainian?

2. Ethnic/national/regional identity
What does it mean in your view to be a Ukrainian, to behave as a Ukrainian? What “makes” a Ukrainian Ukrainian—in contrast to other nations/nationalities? Reflect on what nation and specifically Ukrainian nation is in your view. What does it mean to be a Galician, a L’vivite?

3. Social identity and categorizations
In your personal opinion, what does ‘intelligentsia’ mean? What does it mean to be an intelihent? What in your view distinguishes you as intelihent? What kinds of intelligentsia can be distinguished (e.g., ‘old intelligentsia’, ‘new intelligentsia’, ‘Galician intelligentsia’, ‘Soviet intelligentsia’, ‘small-town intelligentsia’, ‘national intelligentsia’ etc.) Which of them are more “visible” in L’viv? What does it mean to be an intellectual? What is the difference between an intelihent and an intellectual? Name some persons (among your personal acquaintances, among the known personalities in L’viv, in Ukraine) who, in your opinion, may be called intelihenty and/or intellectuals. Is it prestigious to be an intelihent, in L’viv in particular?

4. Intelligentsia’s and intellectuals’ milieus
Are intelligentsia and/or intellectuals generally "visible” and "heard” in public spaces? In which ones (organizations, institutions, movements, interest groups etc.)? What are intelligentsia’s activities in these spaces? Do you know/participate in some intellectual/intelligentsia gatherings, groups, circles? Tell more about their participants, activities, specializations etc.

5. Intelligentsia’s and intellectuals’ role in the social and national development in Ukraine
What are intelligentsia’s/intellectuals’ special roles in present-day Ukrainian society? How can intelligentsia/intellectuals increase their influence in society? What are the obstacles to this? What role did intelligentsia play in days of the Orange Revolution?

\textsuperscript{119} Initially in Ukrainian.
Appendix 2. List of Informants

1. Teodor D., 70 y.o., male, Ukrainian, resident of L’viv, married, rural background. Degree in Technical Science, retired university lecturer, author of several textbooks, publicist and debater. 2005\(^{120}\).
2. Marta B., approx. 70 y.o, female, Ukrainian, resident of L’viv, widow, originates from academic family. Retired schoolteacher of physics, one of the organizers of ‘Nadsiannia’. 2005.
3. Volodymyr S., 72. y.o., male, Ukrainian, resident of L’viv, married, rural background. Lecturer at one of the L’viv institutions of higher education, political activist. 2005.
5. Tamara K., 25 y.o., female, Ukrainian, resident of L’viv, single. Young academician with degree in humanities, public activist, presently works at an academic institution in Kyiv. 2005.
7. Oleh D., 45 y.o., male, Ukrainian, resident of L’viv, married. Lecturer in one of L’viv’s institutions of higher education, businessman and public activist. 2005.
8. Stefaniia L., approx. 45 y.o, female, resident of a suburban L’viv village, married. Teaches Ukrainian literature in one of L’viv’s secondary schools. 2005.
9. Mykola G., 36 y.o. male, Ukrainian, resident of L’viv, married, originates from an academic family. Merited academic, degree in humanities, researcher at one of L’viv’s academic institutions, studied and worked abroad. 2005.
10. Volodymyr B., 67 y.o., male, Ukrainian, resident of L’viv, married, rural background. Degree in history, lecturer, director of the publishing house at one of Lviv’s institutions of higher education. 2005.
11. Volodymyr F., 75 y.o, male, Ukrainian, resident of L’viv, married, rural background. Special technical education, retired engineer, activist of ‘Nadsiannia’. Author of unpublished memoirs where he depicted fostering of his national consciousness under conditions of several political regimes. 2005.
13. Olena K., 36 y.o, female, Ukrainian, resident of L’viv, married, originates from an academic family. Merited academic, degree in humanities, researcher at one of the academic institutions in L’viv, studied and worked abroad. 2005.

\(^{120}\) The year when the interview was recorded.
14. Maria L., 51 y.o., female, Ukrainian, resident of L’viv, single, L’vivite in the seventh generation. Academician, author of a number of works on L’viv’s urban milieu and architecture, public activist. 2005.


17. Roman M., approximately 60 y.o., male, Ukrainian, resident of L’viv, married, originates from the family of a Greek Catholic priest. Academic degree in technical science, works at one of the academic institutions in L’viv. Debater, author of a book and polemic essays on Ukrainian language and culture. 2005.

18. Pavlo K., 56 y.o. male, Ukrainian, resident of L’viv, divorced, originates from an academic family. Researcher at one of L’viv’s academic institutions, author of several academic books on culturology. 2005.


20. Vira D., approx. 50 y.o., female, Ukrainian, resident of L’viv, married. Teacher of physical culture at one of L’viv’s secondary schools. 2005.


24. Iurko Z., 38 y. o., male, Ukrainian, resident of L’viv, married. Degree in humanities, researcher in one of L’viv’s academic institutes, studied and worked abroad. 2005.


27. Taras L., 48 y.o., male, Ukrainian, resident of L’viv, married. Editor-in-chief of one of L’viv’s periodicals, holds a political office in L’viv. Author of numerous political science and cultural essays. 2005.


33. Oleh B., 23 y.o., male, Ukrainian, lives permanently in a small town near L’viv, single. Student at L’viv Polytechnic National University, one of the leading figures in the student organization ‘Students’ke Bratsvo’. Interview recorded in 1999.

34. Alik Olisevych, approximately 45 y.o., male, Ukrainian, resident of L’viv, single. Hippie, one of the cult figures in the L’viv subcultural circles. Activist of Amnesty International, works as a scene technician at the L’viv Opera Theater. 1999.


39. Petro A., approx.45 y.o., male, Ukrainian, resident of L’viv, married. Degree in humanities, works at an academic institution in L’viv, public activist, worked and lived abroad. 2005.

40. Ihor S., 40 y.o., male, Ukrainian, resident of L’viv, single. Degree in humanities, works at an academic institution in L’viv, member of a right-centrist political party. 2005.
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