Circuits of Civilization: Progressive Democratic Character Education in The Process of Globalization

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# Content

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1  
   1.1. Background ........................................................................................................ 1  
   1.2. Purpose and method .......................................................................................... 5  
2. The process of globalization .................................................................................. 7  
   2.1. Definition .......................................................................................................... 7  
   2.2. Moral aspects of globalization ........................................................................... 10  
   2.3. Challenges of globalization .............................................................................. 14  
   2.4. Summary .......................................................................................................... 15  
3. Dewey’s theory of the moral life .......................................................................... 17  
   3.1. Organism and moral judgment ......................................................................... 17  
   3.2. Standards of approval and blame ...................................................................... 22  
   3.3. Self and choice .................................................................................................. 26  
   3.4. Summary .......................................................................................................... 30  
4. Dewey’s view on progressive education ................................................................ 33  
   4.1. Social function and purpose of education ....................................................... 34  
   4.2. Character education ......................................................................................... 38  
   4.3. Education of democratic character .................................................................. 41  
   4.4. Summary .......................................................................................................... 45  
5. Implications of progressive education to the process of globalization ............. 47  
   5.1. Measures and measurement of educational intervention ............................... 50  
   5.2. Global conditions of the democratic character education ............................... 52  
   5.3. Critical issues of the democratic character education ..................................... 57  
6. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 61  
References ................................................................................................................. 63
1. Introduction

This chapter outlines the project of inquiry in general, its background conditions, purpose and method.

This thesis is not meant to invent, oppose or make a ground-breaking discovery. Instead, it is meant to review a line of philosophical thinking in order to outline possible solutions to the problems which the society of today faces.

1.1. Background

We live in the age of communication and technology. Within few thousands years human race developed from the stage of using iron axes to the stage of cosmo-, nano-, ultrasound and laser technologies. Homo sapience associated into communities all around the planet and gradually learned to communicate between the communities. The communication of today takes no time: we pick up the phone and communicate with the life of a community on the other side of the globe; we log in into internet and enter the global resource of communication. The process of changes from the crude capacities of human beings to the advanced technologies serving human race is what we usually call civilization.

Moral philosophers of today seek what constitutes the span of civilization and whether the changes are for good or for bad. What is common for all human beings all across the world and throughout the ages? What are the differences in human lives across the globe and throughout time? Is there a common human nature?

The complexity of human interactions in the globalizing technical world of today requires a fine-grained philosophical reflection which takes in account the multiplicity of human life forms across the planet and, at the same time, preserves a universal outlook on the continuity of the nature of human race in its entire wholeness. Looking for a comprehensive philosophical outlook on the globalizing changes of today I choose a philosophical theory which provides an account of the variety of
singular human life forms within a framework of the universal procreative nature of humanity.

The thesis is focused on philosophy of John Dewey. A founder of American pragmatism, he followed and developed Williams James’s and Charles Pierce’s philosophy towards the conception of philosophy as a practical experience. Born in Vermont in 1859, died in New York in 1952, he contributed forty books and over 700 articles in philosophy, psychology and pedagogy during the 49 years of his academic career. Dewey completed graduate education in John Hopkins University in Baltimore, pursued ten years of teaching at University of Michigan (1884-1894), one year of teaching at University of Minnesota (1888), and then took a position at the University of Chicago (1894-1904) where he became known as one of the most influential educators in America. Alone with the academic research on philosophy, pedagogy and psychology he founded a laboratory school in Chicago. Political disagreements with administration of the university over the Laboratory School led him to leave the position after ten years of teaching there. Shortly after that he took a post in the philosophy department at Columbia University in New York and remained there for the rest 26 years of his academic career.¹

Educated under influences of the theory of natural selection and German idealism, Dewey comes to appreciate both scientific methodology and naturalistic idealism. He seeks to unify them in a method of scientific inquiry which he calls the experimental logic: testing knowledge against physical realm in order to generate new knowledge. The continuous renewal of knowledge reversibly maintains the capacity of human race to procreate itself. The keyword in Dewey’s philosophy is growth; the basis of his outlook is evolutionary thinking.

Dewey’s epistemology is heavily influenced by Hegelian school of thought which suggests that historical development of social institutions unfolds the Absolute whole which exists implicit in the realm of human coexistence. However, in difference to Hegel, Dewey advocates for the practical worth of knowledge and the procreative role of a single human organism. There is no Absolute in Dewey’s view, the whole of

¹ http://www.iep.utm.edu/d/dewey.htm
humanity dynamically evolve and the constitutive organisms of it evolve in accord with it. Hence, the aim of knowledge in Dewey’s view is not historical unfolding of the Absolute, but the capacity to grow consciousness of organism in the dynamic process of renewing knowledge through experience.2

Dewey emphasizes that the growing knowledge should not be understood as a formal training of specific faculties of mind (reading, perceiving, remembering etc) because the subject matter plays significant role in the formation of organism.3 In order to learn perceiving we must target an object to perceive first, there is no reverse order. On the other hand, the growth of consciousness can not come from the liberation of individual nature as suggested by Rousseau, because the individual human nature requires directive intervention of society in order to grow from “the savage” to “the civilized” state.

“Why does a savage group perpetuate savagery and a civilized group – civilization?[…]In a sense the mind of savage peoples is an effect, rather than a cause, of their backward institutions. Their social activities are such to restrict their objects of attention and interest, and hence to limit the stimuli to mental development. Even as regards the objects that come within the scope of attention, primitive social customs tend to arrest observation and imagination upon qualities which do not fructify in the mind. Lack of control of natural forces means that a scant number of natural objects enter into associated behavior.[…]The advance of civilization means that a larger number of natural forces and objects have been transformed into instrumentalities of action, into means for securing ends. We start not so much with superior capacities as with superior stimuli for evocation and direction of our capacities. The savage deals largely with crude stimuli, we have weighted stimuli.”4

In this passage Dewey does not make an empirical claim; his context is methodological. He advocates for the value of accumulative communicated knowledge: without access to the collected through time and space knowledge a span of single human life is way too short to gain the advanced cognitive capacities which is only available through socially organized educative intervention. Single humans

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2 Dewey 1916, p 9
3 Dewey 1916, p 68
4 Dewey 1916, p 38
acquire the accumulated knowledge and skills through directive discipline formed by
society. The pool of knowledge accumulated through ages is so large that no single
human organism can aspire to know everything; what is accessible is only a narrow
choice of discipline and subject matter. Hence, we need the enterprise of public
education to protect, direct and strengthen the choice of a particular subject matter
which suits the organic inclinations of a particular human. Based on the view on
knowledge as a mode of accumulative communicated social experience Dewey
suggests the democratic criteria of educational practice: all human beings ought to
participate in accumulation of the communicated knowledge which, in reverse effect,
provides each of them a social space to realize the uniqueness of their individual
nature.

The view on public education as a crucial social enterprise promoting individual
democratic choice is the subject which I review in the context of the globalizing
world. Dewey created an account of democracy as a “natural” moral choice and a
communicative mode of social experience. He explored the relation between
democracy and enterprise of public education in the work called “Democracy and
Education” published in 1916. The intention of his inquiry was to analyze the
meaning of democratic ideas in relation to the human faculty of learning and
enterprise of public education. Apart from Dewey’s strong personal beliefs
“Democracy and Education” mirrors the spirit of its time. In this work Dewey
pioneers in considering moral discourse as a communicative practical life experience.
Despite its contextual and historical boundaries, his philosophy still provides a
theoretical framework for justification of the democratic values of our social co-
existence today. This thesis reviews also a theory of the moral life by John Dewey in
order to outline the moral challenges which the globalizing society faces today. The
“Theory of the Moral Life” is the main part of Dewey’s and Tufts’s Ethics published
in 1932. It suggests a reflective account of the moral life and ontogenesis of the moral
values as opposed to static and fixed views on morality. I apply his perspective as a
basis for the further discussion about the democratic character education.
1.2. Purpose and method

The wide purpose of this thesis is to derive a theoretical basis for possible justification of democracy in today’s globalizing world from Dewey’s outlook on the ontogenesis of moral life. The narrowed purpose is to outline the natural relation between democracy and public education in the process of globalization. But, I do not suggest “a patent on the truth” for Dewey. Reviewing Dewey’s perspective on the democratic character education I point out weak points of his outlook.

The thesis proceeds as follows:

Chapter 1 explains background conditions of the choice of topic and general philosophical standpoints on which the thesis relies. The purpose of inquiry is two-folded: the general philosophical and the applied abstraction levels.

Chapter 2 describes the global situation by addressing theoretical problems of the definition of globalization. The description is narrowed to the moral aspects of globalization and a set of ethical challenges posed by it. I present a major tension in ethical discourse on global justice – cosmopolitanism versus nationalism and its implication to the global democracy.

Chapter 3 inquires in Dewey’s basic evolutionary theory of the moral life. I present its main philosophical features which, according to my point of view, are crucial for insight in the moral challenges of globalization. However, my interpretation of Dewey’s theory relies on other features of it which I leave out of the content of this thesis. I take in particular consideration his general outlook on faith development, presented comprehensively in the work “A Common Faith”(1934).

Chapter 4 interprets the basic features of Dewey’s educational philosophy. The previous conception of the moral life evolving throughout the social and political context brings the enterprise of public education in focus. Apart from its trivial sociological and practical functions, the democratic character education, in accordance with Dewey’s view, is in its essence an institution which forms the best possible social make-up of the human nature.
Chapter 5 generates conclusions by considering implications of Dewey’s perspective to the global situation. My underlying assumption is that, all other things equal, human race risks breaking the continuity of human nature by fragmentation of moral values in the globalizing communication. Therefore, Dewey’s outlook may be useful in setting goals of the global policy-making and shaping the methodology of education. But, if abused, the evolutionary purpose of social development due to its open-ended idealism may destruct the existing educational practices.

Chapter 6 is a summary of the thesis which outlines possible conclusions.
2. Globalization

This chapter clarifies the definition of the process of globalization and the moral challenges imposed by it.

Globalization is a term used in many discussions and contexts. Some may think that we live in the epoch of globalization because it is a course of history; while others may think that it is a side-effect of information and technology development. Some think that it is liberation and others that it is colonization. Many books are written on the subject. One competent author holds: “Yet, if asked to specify what they understand by “globalization”, most people reply with considerable vagueness, inconsistency and confusion. Moreover, much discussion of globalization is steeped in oversimplification, exaggeration and wishful thinking. In spite of a deluge of publication on the subject, our analyses of globalization tend to remain conceptually inexact, empirically thin, historically and culturally illiterate, normatively shallow and politically naive. Although globalization is widely assumed to be crucially important, we generally have scant idea what, more precisely, it entails.”

Considering this problem of defining the term globalization, I hold a provisional functional meaning of it.

2.1. Definition

Current debates on the process of globalization show diversity in the meaning ascribed to the word “globalization”. A wide definition of globalization suggests that it is:

(1) processes and relations (social, economic, political, cultural, etc) that are
(2) transcending national borders that
(3) link distanced people and that are
(4) spontaneous rather than result of political decisions

The definition applies to many perspectives on globalization which ascribe to the word cultural, political and economic meanings: colonialism, imperialism,

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5 Scholte p 1
6 Collste p 64
westernization, internationalization, universalization, modernization\textsuperscript{7}. All these processes go on in many spheres of human activities across the planet. Politicians, sociologists, economists and philosophers talk about globalization in governance and politics, market and production, culture and justice, communications and consciousness\textsuperscript{8}.

One of the meanings ascribed to globalization is supra-territorialization\textsuperscript{9}. The author of this conception suggests a distinction between the worldview of methodological territorialism as “a view through the lens of territorial geography” and the four-dimensional view on space consisting of longitude, latitude, altitude plus globality. Although we are still widely using the methodological territorialism to define people and their cultural, economical and political activities in the context of geographical location, in the sense of supraterritoriality we also relate the local activities to the human activities on the planetary scale.

Many ethicists agree that a crucial dimension of globalization is the global economy\textsuperscript{10}. Discussions about the economic globalization are concerned about relations of the global market and production to the local economies and individuals. Different theories suggest controversial view; the economic globalization may bring both positive and negative effects to individuals or collectives in relation to their initial position in the global market. The economic effects of globalization depend largely on how globalization is described: when did it start, how did it start and how we conceive the causal connections. We may say that some countries gain economic benefits from global market, while others are being exploited and disadvantaged. Even if the poor countries get some economic betterment from the global trade, there is still concern about global inequality. But it is also possible to describe the causal connection in other terms: global communication makes us aware about the economic inequality on the global scale.

The economic globalization is inevitably related to activities of the global political structure: traditions of the international trade and diplomacy historically evolved into

\textsuperscript{7} Scholte pp 15-16
\textsuperscript{8} Scholte, pp 51-54
\textsuperscript{9} Scholte pp 50, 56, 59-61
\textsuperscript{10} Collste 15-18, Scholte 111-133
the global political network where countries communicate and influence each other. This resulted in the global situation where former national sovereignty as the power of local decision-making is weakened by formation of global governance structures. Nations came to give up some of their local interests for the sake of participation and influence in the global/supra-territorial political networks. The way we conceive political globalization affect the ways to see whose interests and how much of the interests are given up. Some nations embrace the decrease of sovereignty and engage in broader political alliances (EU), while others resist it and strengthen the national borders (USA).

The political and economic globalization interrelated with the cultural globalization. The increase of political communication happens in parallel with formation of non-territorial communities: gender (homosexuals, feminists), profession (doctors, scientists), cultural heritage (Jewish, Amish), class (workers, housewives), and race (black, white). There are yet many theories of causal connections: it is not clear whether the economic and political globalization caused the globalization of non-territorial cultural connections or vice versa.

One sociological theory suggests that globalization in its broad meaning is a long historical process of complex interaction between four components of the state of global humanity: nations, individuals, international relations and humanity as a whole. This interaction occurs between two conflicting poles: the global and the local. Humans are bounded in different extent by local circumstances, but the global conditions progressively affect the local situation. This sociological perspective provides a substantially wider view than the theories reduced to the economic, political or cultural domains: instead of defining globalization as a single force (political, economical, cultural) it suggests that globalization is the expanded consciousness about unity of the world resulting from the multiple conflicting influences. The author refers to the world religions which have been holding the wider perspectives/holistic worldviews at least since 1400th. But the holistic (religious an non-religious) outlooks are usually heavily depend on normative assumptions about

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11 Collste p 13, Scholte pp 135-138
12 Scholte, lecture at Liu
13 Scholte pp 172-178
14 Robertson in Collste pp 42-44
desirable state of global humanity: whether we want to see the global society consistent of individuals under the central governance, or a free exchange among individuals, or should the world be communitarian with multiple systems of values, or just a single community with a shared value system.

Talking about globalization in terms of worldviews, another sociological theory suggests that religions have original universalistic tendency.\textsuperscript{15} The author holds that humans exchange different goods; he grades the subjects of exchange by the grade of their bound to the physical and geographical domain. According to this grading, there are material, political and symbolic exchanges. The three types of exchange produce different outcomes: “…material exchange localizes, political exchange internationalizes and symbolic exchange internalizes.”\textsuperscript{16}

According to this typology, the genuine globalization occurs when geography does not play any significant role in the symbolic exchange. This view pin points significance of information, religious beliefs, education and communication in the process of globalization. However, the author leaves the causal connection between the three types of exchange unclear.

From all above we may conclude that definition of globalization depends largely on disciplinary limits and the purpose of talking about it. For the purpose of this thesis I hold in focus the initial broad definition of globalization while narrowing the discussion to the global symbolic exchange which affects the global consciousness.

2.2. Moral aspects of globalization

The global symbolic exchange occurs via channels of communication: press, television, books, and internet. The mentioned author of the typology of human exchanges suggests that communication as symbolic exchange gives individual the ethical choice.\textsuperscript{17} In the common channels of communication individuals receive multiple symbolic choice alternatives and are free to choose among them; within the

\textsuperscript{15} Waters in Collste pp 45-49
\textsuperscript{16} Collste p 48
\textsuperscript{17} Collste p 49
symbolic dimension individual may choose any value from any part of the globe or any time of history. But as soon as we relate it to the material and political exchanges of the time and space where the individual is physically placed, the individual freedom of consciousness requires justification of the ethical choice in relation to the real-life material and political conditions. For example, the greenhouse effect problem communicated globally supplies alternative choices for individual consciousness. One can choose to preserve the environment, but the local conditions limit the possibility to enact the choice by local customs and politics. In many countries the environment is not being cared for which makes it difficult for an individual to act upon the choice.

Globalization enforces ethical discussion about the global justice. According to a widely accepted Aristotelian view, the ideal good society is a just society where all individuals have opportunities to realize their personal potential in social interaction. The main ethical concern of this view is fair distribution of opportunities and essential assets in a society. It is led by the question: What constitutes a just society? But in the context of globalization the ethical inquiries are expanded to the question of how justice among many societies of the globe may be attained.

An influential philosophical outlook on justice by John Rawls “A theory of Justice”(1971) suggests that justice in a particular society must be attained on the basis of two principles of equality: 18 (1) First principle: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. (2) Second principle: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity

When we design a structure of a fair social arrangement we are to take that decision from a hypothetical position of not-knowing our social placement. Considering abstract reversibility of social positions and the possibility of being in the worst social position, we justify fairness and arrive to the two principles of justice.

18 Rawls 1971, pp 52-65, 130-139
However, according to the same author’s perspective on justice among plural societies in “The Law of Peoples” (1999), the two principles of justice must be reviewed in the context of global plurality of societies. It appears though that the first principle as the democratic core of social life remains the same: we owe respect to the basic human rights of the individuals of every society disregarding their placement in the global political structure. The inherent democratic respect to the basic liberties and opportunities of the individual is to motivate the politically well-off societies to promote democratic standards to the politically worst-off societies. The political interactions among nations/societies are to be based on this core principle of democracy.

While the first principle should be held as a democratic core of ethical deliberation, the second principle of redistribution of access to material and political powers must be reconsidered within the global context, suggests Rawls. Since the second principle reflects material conditions, the effort to bring betterment to the economically worst-off global citizens should be based on significantly more complex considerations of justice. Rawls suggests eight other principles instead of the second one. In regard to contextual differences of plural societies we should take in account different types of democratic arrangements and material conditions within and between societal structures.

The consideration of global justice as opposed to local justice raises a wide range of ethical problems. In the discussion there are two major opposing positions: cosmopolitan versus communitarian. Cosmopolitan view suggests that the individual is the ultimate unit of moral concern on the global scale, while communitarian views hold that individuals are interdependent with the local community and the sense of local friendship is necessary for the individual to develop as a citizen. Rawls’s theory The Law of Peoples attempts to reunite the two poles. But the success of this attempt is questioned by many critiques referring to contra-productivity of the theory: it compromises democratic practice in the material and political dimensions.

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19 Tan pp 1,89-93,102-105
20 Tan pp 22-29
Another attempt to reconcile cosmopolitan and communitarian views has been made by Kok-Chor Tan in the theory “Justice Without Borders” (2004). According to his perspective, the efforts to attain global justice must be ultimately focused on the individual citizens of global population. All political exchanges between societies should aim to promote the individual participation in the global political decision-making. But patriotic moral claims about the inherent intimate ties among co-nationals and the claim of national self-determination restricts the moral concern about the individuals who belong to the remote societies. Therefore, to reconcile the claims of justice, Kok-Chor Tan suggests to consider legacy of patriotic claims only in the form of the limited nationalism based on the intimate symbolic ties of compatriots. He suggests the incentives to limit the patriotic commitments by the cosmopolitan concern about humans all around the globe. Limitation of nationalism by the transcendent commitment to individual becomes a prerequisite for the global cosmopolitan justice.

The discussion of Kok-Chor Tan points out the problem of nationalism as a weak moral standard which neglects the morally arbitrary background (natural contingencies and history) against which nations define themselves. But on the other opposite, cosmopolitan claims seem to be idealistic in reference to the real situation of global politics. Furthermore, there is an epistemological problem that both nationalist and cosmopolitan claims rely on a rather thin conception of the moral self.

The global accumulation of knowledge occurs through the increasing supraterritorial exchange of information. The global symbolic exchange offers multiplicity of the models of reality: religion, humanism, ecocentrism, rationalism, post-modernism and etc. These representations of reality affect human consciousness and challenge the individual ontological commitments by suggesting various sets of moral values deriving from the locally borne representations of the world. The multiple representations of the world compel the individual to weight and prioritize the values against the commitments to locally accustomed values. The commitments to local values in relation to the global values is a crucial element of global justice, but cosmopolitan and communitarian claims appear to fall short in explaining the process

21 Scholte pp 186-197
of moral choice between competing values. It points out a necessity of a theory of the moral self, which exposes the process of moral choice between the multiple values which constitute societal structure.

### 2.3. Challenges of globalization

As described above, justification of the moral choices in the global context requires consideration of the local conditions against the global knowledge. The symbols, traditions and values which has been accumulated locally through history in physical artifacts, modes of living and modes of behavior increasingly influence each other. This symbolic exchange generates the supraterritorial dimension where we relate our locally formed knowledge to distanced places and peoples represented by the incoming symbolic representations. The distanced “virtual” relations change our way of perceiving the world: our image of the worldview is being influenced and expanded by knowing the places where we have never been and peoples whom we have never met. The relation to the distanced peoples and placed is one of the challenges that globalization poses to humanity: how do we perceive that relation, how do we respond to the peoples with whom we are connected only virtually and what is our responsibility in the symbolic relationship with the global community?

But on the opposite pole of locality we have our direct surroundings: peoples with whom we physically meet, speak and cooperate. How the global and the local poles of relations affect each other? Most of us are used to think that we have a certain range of roles and responsibilities towards the nearest peoples around: family, friends, colleagues, and special acquaintances. In every relation with the nearest we reserve a certain range of rights to ourselves and grant them to others: autonomy, respect to basic needs, pursuit of happiness etc. The direct relations are dynamic in time and the content of responsibilities and rights are subject to changes; but most of us perceive that the very nature of human relation has an intrinsic value which implies responsibilities, rights and commitments. Traditionally, psychology explains that this perception derive from early childhood experiences when “the significant others” care about a helpless newborn member of human community.
The intrinsic value of human relationship acquired in the direct relations necessarily projected by analogy to the global dimension; the global communication transcends out direct relations to the symbolic relation with many distanced peoples. Although uncontroversial, this statement points out another considerable challenge of globalization: justification of rights and responsibilities to the remote peoples in relation to the rights and responsibilities to the nearest and dearest. How do we weight responsibility to our own family against responsibility to a virtually known dying child on the other side of the globe? Whose rights are we to respect in the global virtual space with many conflicts between political powers? How do we assess symbolic representations of voices of the distanced peoples we never met?

It has been widely suggested that the global politics heads today towards the ideal justice by democratizing regulatory institutions. Democratization of the global regulatory institutions per definition implies making them answerable to the peoples they affect. But in a closer assessment of the global political structure the tendency to democratization is not self-evident and clear. It is easy recognizable that voices of distanced from each other peoples represented unequally in the global regulatory institutions. Some may think that bad democracy is better than no democracy at all. But others suggest that the ideal of democracy is being undermined by global bureaucratic structures because the voices of the economically and politically well-off peoples are represented much stronger than the rest of global population. There are local democracies in some societies, but there is a question how democratic is the global community.

2.4. Summary

The meaning ascribed to globalization depends on the perspective applied and purpose of inquiry. In the context of this paper I hold the functional concept of globalization suggesting that it is:

1. processes and relations (social, economic, political, cultural, etc) that are
2. transcending national borders that
3. link distanced people and that are
4. spontaneous rather than result of political decisions
Overview of the meanings of globalization implies that globalization may be seen in holistic perspectives or reduced into domains. One suggested here view narrows the definition of globalization into a framework of human exchanges which consist of three types: material, political and symbolic exchanges. Globalization in the sense of symbolic exchanges connects distanced people and places and affects local relations.

The domain of symbolic exchanges is the space where individual consciousness is being offered ethical choices. The individual choices among many alternative values affect the direct physical surroundings and, or, reversibly, the physical surroundings affect the ethical choice in symbolic relations. The intrinsic value of human relations learned in local relations makes the global relations valuable by analogy. Distanced to each other peoples become related in the symbolic exchange of humanity but the problem is what this relation implies and what differences are in the substantial properties of local and global relations.

Ethical discussions on globalization suggest that there is a tension between global and local justice. It implies the tension between the local and the global moral values. The content of moral choice appears to be substantially different whether it is an abstract symbolic choice or it is to be locally acted upon. Among many choices in the global exchange, the moral choice of democracy for many may seem to be a self-evident assumption. But the existence of hierarchical societies on the local scale undermines democracy as a universal moral value. Since many are used to think that democracy is the superior moral choice because it is “natural”, this thesis aims to make a restatement of what makes it natural. This renewed knowledge may provide an insight in what makes it otherwise “unnatural”.

What makes democracy a superior value? Is this value universal for all global societies? These questions point out the need of a theory which explains the nature of values, the moral choice between values and the self that makes that choice.
3. Dewey’s theory of moral life

This chapter provides an interpretation of John Dewey’s view on the ontogenesis of moral life. The moral aspects of globalization are explained further within Dewey’s framework of the social formation of individual moral judgment and habits of the moral self.

This inquiry focuses on democracy and pluralism of values challenged by the tension between locality and globality. As discussed earlier, there are shortages in theoretical outlooks on globalization on account of democracy in the context of globalization. Dewey’s theory is suggested to provide a basis for justification of democratic values.

Prior to discussion on the moral value of democracy, I review the moral aspects of globalization within Dewey’s perspective on formation of the moral self.

3.1. Organism and moral judgment

“Moral theory emerges out of a conflict” says Dewey following the footsteps of Plato and Aristotle. “Moral theory can not emerge when there is a positive belief as to what is right and what is wrong, for there is no occasion for reflection. It emerges when men are confronted with situation in which different desires promise opposed goods in which incompatible courses of action seem to be morally justified. Only such a conflict of good ends and of standards and rules of right and wrong calls forth personal inquiry into the bases of morals.”

This conflict that philosophers traditionally refer to is a conflict between aims, responsibilities, duties and rights. The conflict outlines a distinction between the customary and the reflective morality. When the customary morality relying on principles and rules does not hold against the demand of situation, the genuine reflective morality emerges.

But the reflection that Dewey points out is not an abstract one. Because the shift from conformity to the customary morality towards a voluntary reflective morality implies that some (rational) agency breaks the pattern of habitual customs by

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22 Dewey 1932, p 5
conscious reflection, there must be a moral agent, a doer of action which manifests a choice. The conscious choice in order to be moral ought to derive from a stable trait of personality rather than from capricious rebellion against authority. The general property of choice is voluntariness: “there no choice, no implication of personal disposition, when one is coerced by superior physical power.” The stable trait of personality is often referred as character, but Dewey warns that there is no human being that has completely formed character; it is a moral feature constantly under construction. The character consists of dispositions, i.e. of moral make-up formed by series of choices. But character is a notion of consciousness without connection to the physical realm. When character is expressed in physical conduct, it forms a habit. Hence is a distinction between habit and character; habit reaches down to the solid physical structure of the self, it is a structure of the physical life of organism resulted from serial choices of consciousness.

When we recognize the distinction between character as a faculty of consciousness and habit as a faculty of physical conduct, we should consider the single organism in relation with others. “The individuals are interdependent. No one is born except in dependence of others. Without aid and nurture from others, he would miserably perish. The material of his intellectual subsistence as well as of his physical, comes to him from others. As he matures he becomes more physically and economically independent, but he can carry on his calling only through cooperation and competition with others; he has needs which are satisfied only through exchange of services and commodities. [...] Social ties and connections are as natural and inevitable as are physical. Even when a person alone he thinks with language which derived from association with others, and he thinks about questions and issues that have been born in intercourse. Independence of character is to be praised. But it is an independence which does not signify separateness; it is something displayed in relation to others.”

The relation between the single organism and the others which Dewey describes apply to the global dimension of symbolic exchange and shed a light on one of the moral challenges of globalization. With the increasing intensity of global

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23 Dewey 1932, p 8
24 Dewey 1932, p 9
25 Dewey 1932 pp 79-80
communication we may expect increasing tension between the self and the others because in the process of globalization the quantity of others with whom we become related grows rapidly. The variety of values influencing individual consciousness through the channels of communication overloads the moral choice by many possible alternatives of the moral values. Some values may be compatible, but some may be conflicting or incommensurable. When the choice is between conflicting values it challenges consistency of the character of consciousness. If choices of the individual are not consequent in a serial manner (i.e. every next choice arise from the living experience of the previous choice), but spontaneous and capricious, eroded by conflicting desires, impulses and values the moral fragmentation may become a disposition of character. Since we need the character to link between the choice of consciousness and the conduct, the distorted moral character fails to form the habit of moral conduct and thereby it erodes the domain of moral life.

The single organism is born into surroundings which already have a set of common goods and values. A society may value pleasure, or self-involvement, or success, or disciplined asceticism, or rationality, or other, depending on the accumulated in customs knowledge. When a newborn organism meets the social custom, he is driven from inside by only raw impulses and desires. The impulses and desires constitute immediate interest to the near-by objects. On the opposite, the social customs provide the interest to far-away objects and ideas. When the raw desires and the inherent social ideas meet, the organism is to learn sacrificing the near-by interests for the sake of socially lasting ideas which should reattach the interest to more universalistic objects.26 But, Dewey asks how these universal and enduring social ideas enter the mind: is it moral reflection, or emotions, or religious insight, or is it civil obedience to law and institution? On the one hand, newborn member of society has no choice but to obey the family customs interconnected with social customs. On the other hand, mere compulsion has no moral worth. Therefore Dewey suggests the moral claim to be a natural property of human relationship which plays a significant role in connecting the individual and the social good.

26 Dewey 1932, pp 56-62
Moral claim as a natural feature of human interaction is exercised in all kinds of human relations. Moral claim is a demand of the individual to the group and the group to the individual. It gives expression to the impulsive dispositions of organism by relating it to the established good of a number of people and, vise versa, it imposes demand of the group upon impulses of the individual organism. A moral claim gives rise to the reflective morality and reversibly, in the absence of moral claims there is only the customary morality of conformance.

Dewey holds that the moral claims generalized into laws and rules constitute Right as an independent moral category clearly distinguished from Good. Right formally regulates the intrinsic ties among members of community when they pose demands on each other, but the content of right should remain a subject of justification against the customary good of a group.27 The idea of Right is different to the idea of Good in having the element “should”, says Dewey. “The essence of the claim which Right puts forth is that even of the thing exacted does not appeal as his good to the one to whom it is addressed, he should voluntarily take it to be a good that in short, should become his good, even if he does not judge it at the time.”28

Hence, Dewey proceeds that conformance or disobedience to law and custom are not criteria of moral wrongness or rightness. Individuals may have Right in refusal to conform. History provides many examples of the moral rebels, who turned out to be the moral heroes at later time. But this should not lead to conclude that there are no objective criteria of wrongness. Wrongness consists of violating reciprocity of general Good. A wrongdoer betrays the principles upon which he depends and benefits from others’ values denying others to benefit from his. Thus, if disobedience is not justified by a formal Right, there must be a moral claim that gives rise to it and the claimed values must be justified in relation to the customary Good. The burden of proof is on the wrongdoer: if there is a moral claim of divergence from others’ accustomed good, in order for it to be Right, it must be justified in ethical reflection. “The heart of reflective morality is reflection, and reflection is sure to result in criticism of some

27  Dewey 1932, pp 77-85
28  Dewey 1932, p 82
matters generally accepted and in proposals of variation of what is currently regarded as right.” 29

This insight goes further: not every ethical reflection is equally valid. There are special properties of the content which make one reflection better than another. Moral judgment is always a judgment of value: it validate worth of acts, objects and dispositions of character in relation to a particular set of Good. But there is a difference between the immediate spontaneous judgment of esteem by emotions and the reflective judgment of objective measurement by intellectual efforts. We esteem an object spontaneously and then justify our immediate likes and dislikes by a conscious reflection which places them into relation to other things. But, as suggested by Aristotle, “the spontaneous judgments of good and evil of a good man are more to be trusted than many of the elaborately reasoned out estimates of the inexperienced.” 30 This is a cornerstone of Dewey’s view on the moral judgment: the immediate emotional reactions of esteem largely depend on social interests, education and experiences that formed organism. But this also means that the immediate esteem may be driven by impulses and desires to the near-by objects and goods. From the discussion follows that the organism naturally comes into conflict between the desires towards the near-by objects of attraction and the general remote good accumulated in custom. The main idea here is that the emotional esteems can not weight values one against another; only the intellectual reflection can justify the content of claims against a certain societal ideal.

By the notion of organism Dewey takes in account the physical realm of moral judgment. He emphasizes the relation between the physical structure of organism and dispositions of the character. The earlier life experiences and family education are heavily imprinted in the physical life of organism, and accordingly, the physical habits as the organic dispositions of character naturally affect ethical reflection. From the view on formation of ethical judgment within the organism follows that the moral judgment of the values in the global symbolic exchange relies heavily on the spontaneous habitual esteems formed by local surroundings of the organism. The habitual intuitions imposed by the physical conditions constitute characteristic traits

29 Dewey 1932, p 84
30 Dewey 1932, p 125
of consciousness. But, in reverse effect, the reflective validation of the symbolic values against customary habits reforms and reshapes the character of consciousness. Therefore the quality of moral judgment is an important factor of the formation of moral character.

The character as consequent series of moral choices has been traditionally referred as virtue. Virtue as a property of a consistently good man ultimately means a good character which expresses itself without special efforts. However, in Dewey’s perspective, virtue may not be the end in itself since it may produce narcissistic idolatry of the self separated from the conduct instead of forming the organic wholeness of character.\(^\text{31}\)

### 3.2. Standards of approval and blame

As suggested above, the moral judgment based on organic dispositions validate worth of actions, objects and characters. But how does the validation proceed? Dewey ascribes to the word “moral judgment” two senses. In relation to knowledge it has an intellectual sense of weighting pros and cons while looking for the reliable evidences. In the everyday life judgment has a practical meaning of manifestation of favor or disfavor in condemnation, approval, praise or blame. However, the first one is not always employed. It is rather natural to exhibit the second usage of judgment.”[…] Judge not? is a familiar instance of this usage of judgment; it also indicates that indulgence in such judgment itself is a moral matter. The desire is on one side to escape censure has a counterpart, as a motive of conduct, in a tendency to exhibit superiority by indulging in condemnation of others.”\(^\text{32}\) Hence, the nature of habitual attitudes of favor and disfavor formed by the influence of direct physical surroundings brings in focus the question of universal standard of validation. The habitual punishment, reward, ridicule and praise constitute the customary morality. Reflective morality reviews the customary habits and suggests intelligent standards of judgment.

To approach the moral standard of judgment, Dewey employs a functional distinction between virtue and vice. “… the virtuous at first signifies that which is approved; the vicious that which is condemned. In customary morality, acts and traits

\(^{31}\) Dewey 1932, p 147-151  
\(^{32}\) Dewey 1932, p 90
of character are not esteemed because they are virtuous; rather they are virtuous because they are supported by social approval and admiration.[…]Reflection tries to reverse the order: it wants to discover what should be esteemed so that approbation will follow what is decided to be worth approving, instead of designating virtues on the basis of what happens to be especially looked up to and rewarded in particular society."33 This approach may guide the moral choice of what is approved and what is condemned in the global dimension of consciousness. But, as mentioned earlier, whether the choice is based on intelligent reflection or an immediate intuition, it remains to justify the actual moral conduct against the local custom.

As suggested, the local habitual judgment inevitably affects immediate favors and disfavors imprinted in the individual organic dispositions. It means that if the individual moral choice in global dimension relies only on the customary morality of habitual judgment, the choice of values will be based on conformity to the local standards. In other words, if emotional commitment to the local standards of approval and blame are not reviewed in a conscious reflection upon the causes of this approbation, the moral values in global dimension are not chosen because they are worth approving; instead, the choice only approves values that fit into a set of already existing habitual customs and condemns the ones which do not fit in it.

The distinction between customary and reflective standards of approval imposes a set of problems. If the organic dispositions are formed by habitual judgment of local customs, how the reflection can detach judgment from the physical structure of the organism? Should reflective morality replace the customary moral validation? Dewey holds that the customary and the reflective standard of moral validation do not exclude each other. In his epistemological view, their interaction strengthens the universal standard of moral validation in the evolutionary selection of the most sustainable moral values.

The reflective moral validation objectifies the immediate emotional response by relating it to a set of circumstances. But, what defines good or bad intuitive responses? Dewey suggests: “They [intuitions] are indications of formed habits, rather

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33 Dewey 1932, p 91
than adequate evidence of what should be approved or disapproved." 34 If they are not followed by a conscious investigation, they are deemed to remain the habitual intuitive responses. Their unconscious status leaves them outside the accumulative communicated knowledge. The knowledge objectifies the responses of likes or dislikes in order to bring the reasons of favor and disfavor to consciousness. Thereby it differs from the animal brute rage or gratification.

But, on the other hand, Dewey suggests, the unconscious property of the habitual intuitive response naturally accumulates human sensitivity to each other and the capacity of sympathy. The immediate emotional appreciation or depreciation produces the natural sense of spontaneous response to others’ moral claims. Dewey invests much trust in the capacity of sympathy "It is sympathy which saves consideration of consequences from degenerating into mere calculation, by rendering vivid the interests of others and urging us to give them the same weight as those which touch our own honor, purse and power[…]Sympathy is the animating mold of the moral justification not because its dictates take precedence in action over those of other impulses(which they do not do), but because it furnishes the most efficacious intellectual standpoint. It is the tool, par excellence, for resolving complex situations." 35

Thus, the relation between customary and reflective standards of approval shows its circular dependence. Habits of customary approval give rise to the intuitive emotional responses. In the best scenario, after conscious identification of the objects of responses, the emotions undergo reflective approbation which chooses the most adequate in the particular context standards worth appraisal and condemn the other ones. Extending Dewey’s view to the global dimension of consciousness, we may suggest that the standard of reflective approbation should reverse the customary moral approval and ask if it is the standard worth approbation in relation to the global context.

But this reverse reflection is still insufficient, considering the moral challenges of globalization. In the present state of the global political affairs, the reverse reflection

34 Dewey 1932, p 126
35 Dewey 1932, p 130
upon the local customary values of the politically well-off are often approved because these values appear to be worth approving in comparison with other existing customary values. But this standard is as fallacious as “In a country of the blind, a one-eyed man is king”\textsuperscript{36}. Dewey’s view on the evolutionary selection of values suggests a dynamic method of selecting universal standards: only those values in the heritage of customary morality are worth reflective approval which may serve for development of the entire humanity in the future. This standard seems to transcend the habitual moral validation of the local customs by concern about the global procreation of humanity.

In every moral validation humans employ the natural capacity of deliberation. The genuine deliberation is not a cold intellectual calculation, but neither is it an instinctive response. Dewey refers to the Greek standard of moral validations: moral validation always associated with aesthetic appreciation of a harmonious beautiful wholeness. The wholeness of moral judgment formed by the harmonious character is able to bring to coherence all the components of moral deliberation in a dramatic imaginative rehearsal. It is an artful performance of mind, Dewey contends, to try various courses of possible conduct in imaginative approbation of various consequences. It is a dramatic acceptance of all available impulses into our mind in order to play them against each other and make a moral choice which is appreciated by both senses and intellect.

But, in accordance with Dewey’s epistemology, the cognitive capacity of a single organism is limited if it is disconnected from the accumulative communicated knowledge. If the dramatic rehearsal of impulses would start anew for each new member of humanity, nobody could ever evolve to “the civilized man”. The communicated knowledge offers the crystallized ideas of accumulated experience of the human race. The ideas communicated in moral principles enter the dramatic deliberation in form of the customary moral rules. Principles are intellectual and rules are practical. But since the origins of the principles and rules tend to be forgotten throughout the long line of inter-generational transmission, they are often taken as moral standards existing by themselves independent of experience. Moreover, the

\textsuperscript{36}“In regione caecorum rex est luscus” in Adagia, 1500, by Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam.
principles, rules and institutions are taken as the external mode of moral standard – the control of organism from outside by some abstract entities. The cure to this problem on the global scale is to reverse this external identification of principles and review the standards within organism, let their influences play “new drama” in mind. But, as soon as the reviewing builds new ideas, takes the form of principles and hardens in customary rules the new static standards arise; they are to be reviewed again and again.

### 3.3. Self and choice

Differentiated from the wholeness of organism by the property of intelligence, self is one important feature of the moral life employed in the ethical discourse. According to Dewey, Kantian theory suggests exclusiveness and superiority of the self as the final moral end; accordingly, everything else in life is the means for formation of the good self.\(^{37}\) Hedonism holds the opposite – self is the means to achieve good consequences.\(^{38}\) Dewey’s theory shifts the discourse to the holistic assertion that the self, consequences, acts and conduct altogether play important role in the growing organic wholeness. All elements of life that come into interplay with an organism test, reveal, constitute and form the future self. This view on self implies that choice is the main moral property: in order to become a well-formed self an organism should be able to choose the elements of life that form his constitution. But, as attractive as it sounds for the proponents of liberalism and existentialism, the choice of the formation of self is not a self-evident exercise of the power of will.

Prior to the choice in the sense of deliberate decision comes the spontaneous impulses arising in mind. Among those impulses we are instinctively attracted to those which are the easiest to suit the organic dispositions which already exist. This unconscious mode of preferences is antecedent to the judgments of values. Peaceful co-relation between many instinctive impulses ends very soon after infancy and every organism arrives to the conflict between multiple directions dictated by dispersing or opposing impulses. In many cases the conflict enforces objectification of the impulses, followed by a conscious deliberation among the objects of choice.

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\(^{37}\) Dewey 1932, p 147  
\(^{38}\) Dewey 1932, p 148
Dewey suggests that in order to understand constitution of the self we should inquire what constitutes the process of deliberation. This inquiry should hold two perspectives – regressive and progressive. Dewey says:

“Now every choice sustains a double relation to the self. It reveals the existing self and forms the future self. That which is chosen is that which is found congenial to the desires and habits of the self as it already exists. Deliberation has an important function in this process, because each different possibility as it is presented to the imagination appeals to a different element in the constitution of the self, thus giving all sides of character a chance to play their part in the final choice. The resulting choice also shapes the self, making it, in some degree, a new self.[…] But every choice is at the forking of the roads, and the path chosen shuts off certain opportunities and opens others. In committing oneself to a particular course, a person gives a lasting set to his own being. Consequently, it is proper to say that in choosing this object rather than that, one is in reality chooses what kind of person or self one is going to be.”

From this substantial perspective on the choice that forms self Dewey proceeds to elaborate that action is the essential feature of the self which connects it with the organism. Comparing the natural occurrences such as tornado or earthquake with the action of a self, we may discover that a tornado occurrence is usually not considered as manifestation of a self. In comparison, cry of a child, however unconscious, is usually referred as a self-manifestation. This means that every manifestation of the self goes through the process of objectification by surrounding humans who ascribe the agency to the self.

Whether a self acts upon instinctive preferences or in accordance with a conscious choice, the action is the object of moral validation of the surroundings. Normal development presupposes that for a short while after birth the infant exists as an organism which is free from subjection to the moral validation. In the earlier years of life the self develops as a manifestation of the raw impulses of organism towards surroundings. But at a certain point of life the organism encounters the first moral

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39 Dewey 1932, p 149
judgment imposed from the outside. The judgment infers that a certain action manifested by the self is wrong or right; it makes the first conscious connection between constitution of the self and the quality of its act. The serial acts judged as right or wrong objectify the self which forms his dispositions towards one or another conduct.

The conception of the self constituted by the action and the choice provides a crucial explanation of motive and stimulus. Dewey emphasizes that many bizarre psychologies come out of the erroneous assumption that every stimulus is the cause of activity. The error is in leaving out the organic physical activity. The organism is always active from inside; the incoming from outside stimulus only changes and reshapes that activity. Motivation is another notion erroneously taken as a force that produces activity. But, in a closer look it consists of a dominant direction of the organic activity towards a particular object of interest. The interest as a direction of organic activity is always fixed upon an object; the object moves a person because the self objectified the object. Thus, the active force of objects incorporates the objectifying self within it. Reversibly, the objects of interest constitute the internal structure of the self which objectified them.

It means that the objects and the process of objectification that alter the self and the conduct have an important practical meaning. Every person, sensing the natural interdependence of human beings, engages in objectification of others and surroundings and by that he exercises the influence on others. Primarily it happens unconsciously in objectification of the home environment, but continues further in every segment of human collective activities. Every effort to objectify the social make-up of others influences their selves and brings changes and redirections in their conduct.

The insight in the process of objectification of the self explains the tension between egoism and altruism, Dewey contends. He holds that a proper insight in motivation as direction towards objects of interest shows that both egoism and altruism are the acquired dispositions of character. The disposition to egoism or to altruism depends on the acquisition of the social interest in the process of influencing others. He suggests: “Psychologically speaking, our native impulses and acts are neither egoistic
nor altruistic; that is, they are not actuated by conscious regard for either one’s own
good or that of others. They are rather direct responses to situations. Thus, no
organism is egoistic or altruistic by nature. The egoistic or altruistic selves develop in
human communication through influencing each other by manifestations of choice
expressed in the moral claims.

An impulsive action receives an instruction by the social objectification which alters
consciousness about the act. Thereby the individual consciousness acquires
experience of moral validation and on its experimental basis acts with a foresight of
consequences in the future. Human connectedness and interdependence attach the
interest of a single self to the social wholeness which maintains the individual self.
But the social interest to humanity as the harmonious wholeness can not arise from
the native raw impulses. Pure impulses of sympathy or benevolence can not carry
farther than direct physical surroundings; they need knowledge about the wider social
horizon that transcends their habitual intuitive attachments. We would not be able to
carry any large-scope social or political projects if the motivation force was pure
sympathy. The sympathetic response should be reviewed in the light of accumulative
communicated knowledge in order to bring effects to distanced peoples and produce
enduring results of the social activities.

The social interest develops from zero-point of egoistic attachments through
reciprocal concern about family members to the concern about the closest physical
community. The global domain of symbolic exchange is the means of developing
social interest further from local scope towards the planetary. But, the objectification
of the others in the global communication ought to be manifested in active experience
in order to form a living self connected with the real-life organic dispositions. If the
social interest takes form of abstract knowledge about something remote but no
actions of the organism manifest that knowledge, it separates physical organism from
the conscious self and thereby risks degenerating organism and making the self into a
virtual simulation of experience instead of the organic wholeness of living experience.

40 Dewey 1932, p 156
3.4. Summary

To understand the significance of tension between locality and globality imposed by globalization, I suggest rethinking Dewey’s view on morality. First of all, the moral life may be either customary or reflective. The customary morality is conformity to a particular set of collective good. Local societies build the customary moralities and individuals in the societies tend to build up habitual conformity to the custom. But, it is in nature of human relationship to impose moral claims on others, which results in conflict between the customary social good and the individual good. In order to settle the conflict humans engage in the process of moral approbation. The conscious moral validation of claims based on the standards which are abstract units of the locally accumulated custom. In order to justify changes in the moral standards, we review consciously these standards in order to renew the most sustainable values contended in it and to leave behind the outmoded ones. The most sustainable values are the ones that provide universal long-lasting grounds of social coexistence. But in order to renew those values individuals proceed objectification of the standards presented by society.

Globality drastically influences the frequency of the moral claims and the intensity of moral validation in the customary morality. Individual who accesses to the virtual space of the global symbolic exchange receives the impulses that affect his customary moral standard. But what happens at the moment of encounter of those new impulses with the organic customary activity is not clear. In Dewey’s perspective, the impulses undergo a dramatic rehearsal in mind. This process called thinking. But, the thinking he has in mind is not that trivial as it sounds. Thinking is not computing, he emphasizes. The trademark of Dewey’s pragmatism is that thinking ought to be based on the organic experiences and the dispositions of character which are unique in each individual. That kind of thinking is generated by a unique organism which is constantly active within itself. The organism constantly reorganizes its conscious self on the basis of available data of physical facts and produces knowledge by serial objectification of experience.

This view suggests that formation of the moral self depends on the local physical conditions: social system, politics, tradition, family structure, climate, genetic
influences, and physical bodily constitution – all these facts define the solid organic basis of self. The global dimension of consciousness, in the opposite, transcends the self in time and space and makes it plastic. However, in accordance with Dewey’s view, in order to be a well-formed self, it must have (1) capacity of conscious deliberation and (2) ability to act in accordance with the conscious moral choice. While the deliberation balances the individual mind between the local and global symbolic commitments, the acting upon the choice of consciousness is a genuine moral problem. A state of the art moral conduct is the conduct which is able to enact moral choice of consciousness within the context of physical surroundings. The choice of symbolic values without the physical manifestation of it is “empty words” or “empty thoughts”. The moral action breaking the rigid rules for the sake of renewal of the values of the accumulated living experience of humans is the recurring phenomenon of moral evolution. History provides many cases of discrepancies between the choice of consciousness and the constraints of customary morality: the moral action may produce drastic results such as Jesus’s crucifixion, or less drastic Robin Hood’s adventure. (The moral evolution also includes the conscious choice of a specifically religious kind of action found in monasteries, or in more extreme cases of hermits.)

In Dewey’s view, action is a physical experience of knowledge deriving from series of previously objectified experience. It means that the genuine moral knowledge may be only based on conduct. Everything else may classify as a virtual simulation of it. The global symbolic exchange per definition has the property of virtual reality. If the virtual stimulation is too artificial, remote or alien to the organic disposition, it breaks the connection between the self and the organism. Both deteriorate: self becomes rootless and the organism regresses to the crude impulsive activity. Many observations can be drawn from politics. Politicians represent the virtual selves “wholeheartedly” advocating for the remote common good but their local habitual behavior instinctively conforms to the corrupted institutions and shut off consciousness in a direct physical encounter with injustice. In the everyday life there are also many who promote good for the remote world and advocate for the values of humanity, but fail to recognize and meet the need of others in an ordinary daily encounter. What makes the individual to perceive the interdependence of the whole humanity in an ordinary encounter with a single human? When the direct physical
relations fail to communicate the symbolic knowledge from and to the whole physical organism, the symbolic choice of values becomes the empty shell of a virtual, and therefore “false”, self.

While the global dimension of communication functions as a medium which transmits abstract knowledge, it is remains to sustain the genuine moral life of the organism by the physical manifestations of the symbolic moral choices. It means, in other words, that mere symbolic choice is not enough; it should be physically acted upon.
4. Dewey’s view on progressive education

This chapter suggests an interpretation of Dewey's educational philosophy featuring the conceptions which provide a theoretical basis for explanation of the moral challenges of globalization.

It is the very nature of the living organism to continue its being, says Dewey. Human organism incorporates a self which develops in social interaction with other selves. Newly born self is a bare physical organism, without language, beliefs, ideas or social standards. Newborn self is a savage without any experience, skills and knowledge; therefore the bare organic self has no capacity to reproduce neither its own life, nor the life of the group.

Human selves reproduce in civilization. The continuity of human life occurs in transmission of civilization through renewal of its constituents. The fact that many constituent members of civilization die at the same time as many new are born gives the idea of transmission of the physical continuity of civilization. It also supplies the idea that the graded life-span of a single human is genuinely related not only to other contemporary members, but also to the span of civilization – to those who already died and to those who are to be born.

Dewey holds: “With the growth of civilization the gap between the original capacities of the immature members and the accumulated standards and customs of the elders increases. Mere physical growing up, mere mastery of the bare necessities of subsistence will not suffice to reproduce the life of the group. Deliberate efforts and the taking of thoughtful pains are required. Beings who are born not only unaware of, but quite indifferent to, the aims and habits of the social group have to be rendered cognizant of them and actively interested. Education, and education alone, spans the gap.”

He ascribes the procreative function of civilization to education and elaborates the holistic meaning of education which transcends its contemporary triviality.

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41 Dewey 1916, p 3
4.1. Social function and purpose of education

Immaturity is the point of departure to explain the meaning of education, Dewey suggests (however, there is no cut-off point of maturity). The natural raw impulses of the young organism are indifferent to the group and civilization. As explained earlier, the organic activities are directed (but not motivated) by immediate stimuli of the near-by objects. The same occurs in the encounter with human beings – communication stimulates changes in the organic dispositions and thereby directs formation of the selves. In the encounter between the elder and the young organisms the older one is directed by customary social habits of self which incline him to affect the young. The young objectify their self in relation to the old and thereby make the self fit in the relation with the customary habits. The process of objectification of the young self in relation to the existing life customs constitutes the social control over the formation of young selves.

The essence of social control over the new-born selves is the joint understanding of social ends and aims; the young savage self ought to learn meaning of the social ends and aims maintained by the old. The immature human organism is to be directed to form a human self in relation to other selves on the basis of his natural organic impulses. This makes a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic social interest. The living organism’s intrinsic social interest consists of his primary impulses and drives aimed at the objects immediately perceived as valuable. The extrinsic social interest consists of the values imposed by the surrounding social context.

Traditionally, society uses paternalistic enforcement to impose aims of the extrinsic social interest to the intrinsic individual social interest. Considering the impulsive and indifferent nature of the savage mind, the paternalistic enforcement of social interest appears to be a reasonable view on the function of education. However, Dewey’s view implies that the pure paternalistic function is far short-sighted on account of the renewal of civilization by evolutionary reorganization and progress of social ends. He argues that in order to renew the whole of humanity by incorporating a new human member and providing him a space for social self, the aims of social control should coincide with the organic dispositions of a person. The means of this intrinsic coincidence is the objective identification of the joint interests of the young and the
old. The social function of education than, in addition to the paternalistic enforcement of social aims, is to identify the intrinsic unity of the social interests of society and individual.\textsuperscript{42}

The social interest demarcates the difference between the informal learning in spontaneous activities and the formalized social enterprise of education. In difference to the informal spontaneous learning the socially organized education has aims. Dewey refers to the history of philosophy in order to emphasize contextual bias of the aims of socially organized education. Referring on the history of Greeks he explains that philosophy as a social institution originates from a reflective faculty of mind at the point when society objectifies the need for transmission of knowledge from the old to the young. That genealogy of philosophy shows that education per se is a deliberate practice of philosophy within a social context. Therefore all educational aims are empirically bounded by the social context in which philosophy arises.

Prior to the inquiry in social aims of education we must understand the nature of an aim, Dewey suggests. In respect to the organic activities of the organism, the aim gives direction and order to an activity; the order consists of progressive completing of a process. “Given an activity having a time span and cumulative growth within the time succession, an aim means foresight in advance of the end or possible termination.”\textsuperscript{43} Thus, intelligent foresight of the temporal frame is the primary element of an aim. Natural spontaneous impulses and processes have no aim because they are not related to a time-frame. “If bees anticipated the consequences of their activities, if they perceived their end in imaginative foresight, they would have the primary element of an aim. Hence it is nonsense to talk about the aim of education - or any other undertaking – where conditions do not permit foresights of results, and do not stimulate a person to look ahead to see what the outcome of a given activity is to be.”\textsuperscript{44}

To see a process in its temporal sequences is to have a basis for observation, selection and ordering objects in relation to the natural impulsive activity of organism. This intelligent organization is called mind. Opposing to dualism, Dewey emphasizes that mind is not external to the organism “thing”. Mind is the capacity of organism to

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\item[42] Dewey 1916, p 39-40
\item[43] Dewey 1916, p 102
\item[44] Dewey 1916, p 102
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organize its life within a temporal frame. It generates aims and purposes in relation of present conditions to future consequences and vice versa; the mindful connections between these two supply meaning and direction to the conscious activity of organism. But, for the aims and purposes to be realistic (i.e. empirically grounded), the direction of activity must also account for the past which formed the organism.

Referring to these natural elements of an aim Dewey suggests three criteria of good educational aims: (1) The aim should be an outgrowth of the physically existing condition; thereby it should connect the intrinsic intelligence of the organism with the extrinsic normative demand. (2) The aim should be adaptable and flexible; i.e. it must be translated into a method which can meet circumstances which arise after the initial tentative sketch has been set. (3) The aim must have an \textit{end in view}, i.e. the aim must have targeted objects, but it must not be seen as terminated. Instead, the targets must be seen as an element of the larger process of hitting the target. The notion of “end in view” provides the incentives to educators to be on guard against the ultimate general ends which disconnect the intelligence of organism from its social context.

The original social context of the educational aims supplies meaning to the faculty of consciousness, but in reverse effect, it bounds the aims of education by specific physical sets of social contexts. As history shows, up till today human civilization accumulated plurality of the institutionalized philosophies formed by the local conditions; the local philosophies formed local educational practices, but there was never before a singular institutionalized context which provided a global philosophy of education.

This proposition points out the problems of the educational aims in the context of globalization. The globalizing social communication connects multiple contexts consisting of various values consisting in the social interests; thereby it influences the aims of the local educational practices. The values communicated in the global symbolic exchange may be very different; depending on the structural conditions of local social contexts, they may coincide, be partly in agreement, or be totally incommensurable. But the knowledge about plurality of values in the present stage of civilization has not formed the educational philosophy which would maintain the global educational structure. But the current formation of the global political structure
heavily relies on the globally accumulated communicative knowledge. In the discussed context it implies a new demand for institutionalizing the global philosophy of education in order to provide intergenerational transmission of communicative knowledge on the scale of whole humanity.

Referring to pluralism of social contexts, Dewey advocates for the universalistic educational philosophy which recognizes the difference between the national aims of social efficiency and the humanistic civilizing aims of education. While the intra-societal aim of education is based on national social interest bounded by industrial efficiency, the universal humanistic aim of education should be committed to balance the individual intrinsic social interest with the extrinsic social interest comprising in the philosophy of educative institutions. But at any rate, these two are not to exclude each other; the humanistic aim of education should be transcending the aim of social efficiency instead of separating individual from them.45

To demonstrate the relation between the internal social interest of national citizenship and the humanistic social interest committed to the individual, Dewey inquires in two opposite educational philosophies: of Plato and Rousseau. Both of them are contributed immensely to the meaning of education, says Dewey. However, their contribution must be reconsidered contextually. Plato’s idea of education as the social interest of good citizenship was generated from empirical observations within a limited and rather static social structure. But the ideal of citizenship based on a limited typology of Greek individuals of that time became outmoded with growing mobility and accumulation of new knowledge about other forms of social life. On the opposite pole, with accumulating knowledge about variety of social structures and types of individuals, Rousseau trusted individual nature too much. It led that his humanistic cosmopolitanism advocated for the idealistic education which should form the autonomous individual methodologically separated the individual self from its social context providing organic dispositions. The two extremes continued to interact throughout long line of the educational philosophies arising from different social contexts.

45 Dewey 1916, pp 93-96
This thesis holds that in the global context the two opposing poles of social interest must be reconciled for the sake of the globalizing social interest. In the context of globalization Dewey’s view on the national social interest transcended by the humanistic commitment to individual corresponds to the theories of reconciliation between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism by Kok-Chor Tan and Rawls (discussed in chapter 2.2). The theories of global justice may be extended by Dewey’s concept of the social interest consisting of values. There are two dimensions of social interest in his view: the individual and societal. The notion of the individual social interest grounded in psychological terms and derives from the individual Good; the societal social interest relies on sociological observations in the course of history and consists of the accumulated Good of a group. Dewey argues that the purpose of education is to make these two coincide. In order to facilitate the convergence of the two dimensions of social interest we must know how they interact. The values that constitute the social interest arise in the process of moral validation which at first occurs spontaneously as a habit of instinctive appraisal of something which is taken to be good. Then the moral validation proceeds a reverse moral reflection upon the moral worth of the instinctively appraised good. In this process the individual and the societal good expose the values that worth appraisal or condemnation.

This view adds a dynamic perspective to the attempts of reconciliation between cosmopolitan and communitarian social interests. We should consider cosmopolitan and nationalist values as moral claims which may be justified in relation to the customary Good of civilization. In this perspective, the claims of either pole may be justified or not, depending on the content of a claim and the reverse reflection upon the moral worth of it. The social aims of education should be than focused not on establishing static values of either cosmopolitanism or nationalism, but on providing capacity to the reflective validation of the moral claims.

4.2. Character education

Reviewing the organic relation between the whole human civilization and its constitutive selves formed within human organisms, we are to be reminded that the character of civilization consists of the sum of characters of its atomic constituents. This makes the character, and accordingly, the individual character, a crucial function
in the circuit of civilization. As discussed earlier, the character of the organism is a moral feature of self which is constantly under construction. The character consists of the organic dispositions formed by series of choices. The choice is a consequence of the conscious deliberation among many spontaneous organic impulses objectified by the self. The organic impulses arise out of the physical interaction between the organism and its environment. The self chooses the impulses which connect his temporal continuity between the past and the future self. The capacity of self to conscious deliberation and formation of the future self is a matter of education; the connection between the past and the future self is heavily affected by aims of education. Furthermore, the connection between the past and the future of individual self is a microcircuit that reflects the past and the future of the human civilization in its wholeness.

This descriptive proposition has a normative component. It ascribes critical social function to the education of character, and regard character as the holistic purpose of education taken on the civilization scale. Since the individual character is organically/physically bounded with the character of civilization, changes in either of them causes changes in the other one. Therefore, the social aims of education ought to objectify the good of civilization in form of a subject matter.

In Dewey’s view, the subject matter of formal education has a property that transforms the organism. In a closer look the process of transformation consists of objectification of the facts and meanings of life by the inquiring self. In this subtle process the object and the subject of inquiry affect each other. The objects of inquiry which constitute a subject matter in reverse effect objectify the self by the acquired meaning of the subject matter. But, the transformation of self is not complete, or “real”, until it reaches down to the physical structure of the organism. In order for the educative transformation to have a practical meaning, not only the conscious faculty(self) but the physical structure of organism should be involved in the inquiry, i.e. the acquired meaning of the subject matter must be experienced through the organic physical activities. The way of the transformation of the subject matter into organic dispositions constitutes the method of education, according to Dewey. In order to facilitate the transformation, it is crucial to understand how the method and the subject matter are related to each other.
“When we reflect upon an experience instead of just having it, we inevitably distinguish between our own attitude and the object towards which we sustain the attitude[…] Such reflection upon experience gives rise to a distinction of what we experience (the experienced) and the experiencing. When we give names to this distinction we have subject matter and method as our terms. There is a thing seen, heard, loved, hated, imagined, and there is an act of seeing, hearing, loving, hating, imagining, etc.”

Dewey argues that the reality of experience brings the activity and the object into an organic unity. Separating the experience from the experienced into “the how” and “the what” is a method of controlling the course of educative direction which transmits the reality of the past to the reality of the future by the present living experience.

The subject matter of a school curriculum consists of the facts observed, recalled, read, talked about, and the ideas suggested in an educational directed activity having a social interest. Hence, the social interest directs the dispositions of organism that form its character. The educators equipped with a disciplined method furnish the environment for experiencing the subject matter by the active inquiring organisms. The school environment, therefore, is the medium of social interest. This uncontroversial fact is illustrated by history: the Hellenistic society formed Hellenistic character of the individuals living there, Medieval society forms medieval character of the individuals, the liberal society forms the liberal character and the fundamentalist society – the fundamentalist character. The structure of the institutionalized education of each time and society represents the current social interest and forms the character of the individuals who constitute that society.

The relation between the character of society and the character of individual leads to the question of the educational philosophy in the context of globalization: what kind of character does the global society form and what character should it form? The need for globalizing philosophy of education points out the problem of educational aims: what kind of the global educational aim could transcend the local social interest of

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46 Dewey 1916, p 166 -167
national efficiency and coincide with the social interest of every individual on the globe?

4.3. Education of democratic character

Social associations have two functional character traits, Dewey holds: (1) they are held together by the internal social interest consisting of values (2) they exchange social interests with other social associations. Social association can be of different kinds – private, profession, religious, criminal, political, national, international, etc. The values that constitute the social interest form the internal structure of an association and the way it interacts with other groups.47

By the inquiry in the properties of social associations Dewey puts forward a normative claim that not every value of a social structure has equal moral worth. His view on the moral judgment and genesis of moral validation standards (chapters 3.1, 3.2) supports the claim. He suggests that the two functional character traits provide a method of measuring the worth of values in any given social structure.48 In order to illustrate this functional standard for moral validation of the social interest Dewey inquires in the nature of dictatorship and slavery.

In a dictatorial social association there is no common social interest for the governed and the governors. This trivial proposition implies that the structure of a dictatorial association is held together by something else than the exchange of values among all its members. In order to hold a dictatorial society together and call out the activities of the governed the governors appeal to the human capacity for fear. This capacity should not to be neglected; it is in itself a necessary element of life which equips us with caution, circumspection, and desire to foresee the future consequences in order to avoid bad outcomes. The core of dictatorship is that it appeals to the isolated faculty of fear and operates in the behaviorist mode of stimulus-response: evoking dread and promising a tangible reward of comfort and ease. This mode of social association

47 Dewey 1916, pp 81-82
48 Dewey 1916, p 83
debilitates and perverts all other human capacities into serving pleasure of comfort and avoiding pain.49

“Plato defined a slave as one who accepts from another the purposes which control his conduct. This condition obtains even where there is no slavery in the legal sense. It is found wherever men are engaged in activity which is socially serviceable, but whose service they do not understand and have no personal interest in. […] The tendency to reduce such things as efficiency of activity and scientific management to purely technical externals is evidence of the one-sided stimulation of thought given to those in control of industry – those who supply its aims. Because of their lack of all-round and well-balanced social interest, there is not sufficient stimulus for attention to the human factors and relationships in industry. Intelligence is narrowed to the factors concerned with technical production and marketing of goods. No doubt, a very acute and intense intelligence in these narrow lines can be developed, but the failure to take in account the significant social factors means none the less an absence of mind, and a corresponding distortion of emotional life”.50

The internal structure of dictatorship generates traits of xenophobia in the external relations with other groups. “The essential point is that isolation [of social interest of any given group] makes for rigidity and formal institutionalizing of life, for static and selfish ideals within the group. That savage tribes regard aliens and enemies as synonymous is not accidental. It springs from the fact that they have identified their experience with rigid adherence to their past customs. On such a basis it is wholly logical to fear intercourse with others, for such contact might dissolve custom.”51

The inquiry in dictatorship and slavery appeals to the intuitions that the two functional traits (1) and (2) are a measurement to evaluate democracy in social associations. Fulfillment of the two criteria implies something which is morally good. But, considering the distinction between customary and reflective morality, in order to morally validate character traits of social associations, we should extend the validation further. The customary Western morality suggests that the traits are morally

49 Dewey 1916, p 84
50 Dewey 1916, p 85
51 Dewey 1916, p 86
worthy because they are democratic measurements. But, according to Dewey’s theory, we should reverse the causal chain and engage in the reflection which validates why our intuitive habitual appraisal of the democratic traits are worth moral approval. Dewey emphasizes that the ideal of democracy is not an abstract unit or a form of government which we should defend as a custom; it has a practical moral worth as a mode of associated living.

The value of democracy on which we intuitively rely as an immediate customary standard of moral approbation is the first trait of the common recognition of mutual interest within a democratic society. The following second trait of the free interaction between social groups generates change in habitual behavior of the democratic group and adjustment of their social interest by new situations of the interaction. The second trait secures renewal of the democratic values in the relation with other than democratic societies, which reevaluate the moral worth of democracy. We are customary familiar with the relation between education and democracy – education widens the individual horizon of social meanings and the social space for realizing individual potential in social communication. But there is a deeper relation which Dewey suggests to explore.

If we extend the notion of democracy from a mode of governance to a mode of associated living in conjoint communicated experience, we must consider the extended number of individuals who partake in a social interest. The extended number of participants who have to relate their own values constituting a particular social interest to other’s values of plural social interests ultimately breaks the barriers of the isolated social associations. One of the effects of the increased global value exchange is educational, that is liberation of the variety of individual powers which are otherwise restricted in an isolated social interest accumulates knowledge about multiplicity of human life forms. “The widening of the area of shared concern, and the liberation of a greater diversity of personal capacities which characterize a democracy, are not of course the product of deliberation and conscious effort. On the contrary, they were caused by the development of modes of manufacture and commerce, travel, migration and intercommunication which flowed from the command of science over natural energy. But after greater individualization on one hand, and a broader community of interests on the other have come into existence, it
is a matter of deliberate effort to sustain and extend them.”52 The inquiry in slavery and dictatorship has shown that, in order to avoid blind obedience to impulses and external dictations of other’s activities within the globalizing society with multiplicity of values and social interests, the meanings and connections of the symbolic exchanges ought to be educated. This implies that there is a difference in educating democracy as a self-evident customary value or as a conscious reflection upon directions and contents of the social interests. The former ultimately leads to a dogmatic and rigid democracy; the latter progressively renew the meaning of democracy in every new social context.

The very idea of education is the opposite of trust in the natural contingencies. Contingencies of nature imply chance, character implies choice. Democracy per se is not a chance. It is a free individual choice which resulted from engaging many individual powers liberated in the exchange of values among individuals. Since it is not up to chance, but up to the deliberate efforts, the development of consistent democratic character requires an institution for its realization. Throughout history democracy has been intimately connected with education as an activity empowering individual capacities to deliberate; the civic demand for democracy led to the establishment of public education.

However, the dependence of public education on the material/physical support of a national state caused the humanistic social interest to be replaced by nationalistic one. The idea of educating a good human in the context of a local social interest turned into the idea of educating a good citizen.53 Since the aims of education were defined by the state, they were interpreted in terms of social efficiency which implied subordination of the individual interests to the interests of the state. It formed education as disciplinary training which served the state by training individual for the patriotic citizenship.

The context of global exchange objectifies the fact that many kinds of societies across the globe practice the institutionalized philosophies sustaining the education for many types of citizenship. Since the democratic citizenship is not the only mode

52 Dewey 1916, p 87
53 Dewey 1916, p 93
of living experience in the world, in the global context democracy should not be taken as a self-evident moral value. Should it be left up to the contingencies of chance within the global symbolic exchange? The peoples whose organic dispositions are formed by the democratic social associations have inclinations to the democratic character but it can not be sustained without serial conscious choices which renew the value of democracy in the actual living experience again and again. A self-evident democracy chosen once and for all makes a rigid custom which deteriorates its original worth. Therefore, the customary democratic morality of Western national states should be transcended by the humanistic moral reflection which renews the democratic values in the new context of the globalizing citizenship. From the discussion above it follows that in order for the moral value of democracy to sustain we should be able to justify democratic moral claims in relation to the good of civilization.

4.4. Summary

In accordance with Dewey’s view, education is the practice of philosophy which transmits the socially accumulated knowledge between generations. Democratic education is the practice of philosophy which liberates the organic individual capacities and facilitates conscious deliberation about the values constituting the social interest. The social interest directs the aims of institutional practices of education. The democratic aims of education make the intrinsic individual interest to coincide with the extrinsic social interest.

In the globalizing exchange of communication between multiple societies, the values that constitute social interests pose many alternatives for the individual deliberation. Democratic social interest consists of a value of the individual freedom of choice and a value of the liberation of individual capacities in the enterprise of public education. In order to form the democratic character of society by forming the democratic character of the individual these values must be morally validated in conscious reflection instead of defending them as rigid principles of a democratic custom.

The moral approbation of democratic values has a starting point in the customary democratic intuitions which has to be tested against the knowledge about the good of
human civilization. Dewey suggests two specific functional character traits of social association: (1) social associations are held together by the internal social interest consisting of values (2) they exchange social interests with other social associations. These traits constitute a measure of moral approbation of the competing values in the globalizing society. The moral worth of democracy appears in the reflection upon these traits applied to a particular social association.

However, the character of social association consists of the character of its individual members. In order for a democratic social association to perpetuate in time, the social interest to democratic values must coincide with the natural organic disposition of every member of the association. A truly democratic association defines the aim of education through a conjunction of the intrinsic individual interest with the imposed extrinsic social interest. Thereby the association renews and procreates its core values through the living experience of its members.

The contextually borne democratic character is challenged by the globalizing context since the intrinsic democratic interest grants a social space for the plural values claimed by individuals from the different kinds of societies. The moral claims which are contrary to the initial democratic disposition may erode the democratic character by non-democratic choice (e.g. the democratic dispositions of character of many Western societies choose to justify claims of the hierarchical social associations). This paper suggests considering Dewey’s theory of democratic education as a possible remedy to the erosion of democratic character in the globalizing world of today. Rethinking the social meaning and aims of education on the global scale ultimately globalizes educational philosophy and exposes the need for its institutionalization on the transnational scale. In reverse effect, educational philosophy on the local national level may be able to revitalize the meaning of democracy in the individual living experience and thereby procreate democracy in the course of civilization.
5. Implications of progressive democratic education to the process of globalization

This chapter contemplates possible contribution of Dewey's theory to the solutions of the moral problems of globalization. The philosophy of progressive democratic education applied to the process of globalization outlines the prospects and issues of institutionalizing the global educational structure.

According to the theory discussed in this thesis, character is the serial choices of intelligent self which organize human life within a time-frame. Democratic character is the character which recognizes the interdependent nature of human associations and the necessity for all human beings to consciously participate in the association of human civilization. The theory reminds us that a determined life-span of a single human is an atomic component of the undetermined span of the entire human race. Every single human being dies, but the wholeness of human civilization remains. Its continuity sustains by transmission of the knowledge about human experiences accumulated throughout multiple life-sequences of the individual human beings. Therefore, in reverse effect, conscious individual participation in the accumulation of knowledge of human civilization provides the meaningful continuity for the individual life.

Awareness about the interdependence of human beings in the span of civilization implies the importance of involving all members of human race in the participation in the accumulative communicated knowledge, believes Dewey. The knowledge about plurality of social associations on the scale of civilization expands the initial relations within a single primary association to the members of other associations and to those who lived in the past and who will live in the future.

However, even though the interdependence of all human beings is a natural condition, the immature human beings primarily have no knowledge but impulses. Humans are born as bare organic bodies and physical impulses which transform the individual self in every new encounter with surroundings. In addition to the individual spontaneous natural learning society provides the intelligent educational environment which deliberately mediates knowledge shaping the individual self. In order to sustain
the continuous wholeness of human association, society ought to put efforts to educate the democratic character traits of the individual self. In order to maintain the genuine ideal of democracy, the education is to be institutionalized in accordance with the aims of a social interest, pedagogical method and moral standards. The question of this inquiry is how Dewey’s educational theory contributes to the solution of the moral problems of globalization.

The discussion about global justice (chapters 2.2, 2.3.) points out the tension between communitarian (as local) and cosmopolitan (as global) social interests. The tension imposes three major problems: (1) justificatory basis of the moral responsibility to distanced individuals and social associations in relation to the responsibilities to the nearest and dearest, (2) choice of the individual ontological commitments to the moral values in the situation of the global variety of values offered by the social interests of plural societies, (3) risk of the dictatorship of democracy in the global political structure.

As mentioned earlier there are well-established ethical theories of reconciliation between the global and the local justice. Rawls’s theory implies that in the global context the first principle of justice expressing the core democratic ideal should be realistically considered in relation to the factual global inequalities in material and political conditions. But his theory falls short in providing incentives for the ideal of justice within the global context. The suggestion of reconciliation by Kok-Chor Tan does not appear to be more prospective. He offers an account of patriotism as a necessary emotional basis for the sense of moral responsibility to others and a justification for the restricted nationalism on a basis of the cosmopolitan concern about the individual as the ultimate moral unit. Tan’s theory accords with Dewey’s, but the appeal to cosmopolitanism heavily relies on intuitions; the cosmopolitan ideal appears to be very desirable but insufficient to make a substantial claim of practical implementation.

Dewey’s theory, suggested in this thesis, has more substance in claiming the democratic ideal to be educated as a progressive trait of the individual character. The margins of this theory stretch wider in being more realistic and more idealistic than Rawls’s. The account of the formation of human self throughout a life-span is much
more real and solid than Rawls’s. While Rawls holds thin psychological and epistemological assumptions, Dewey relies on the “logos” that connect all human beings in time and space. Although Dewey does not speak of justice, his theory discusses the very substance of democratic ideal which constitutes the core of justice. But, being idealistic, his perspective does not distinguish the economic justice separately in the way that Rawls does. Instead, the economic justice appears to be a natural consequence of democracy as a mode of communicated living transmitted through education. Is it a strength or a weakness of his view? On the strong side, Dewey’s view implies that everybody’s participation in the continuity of civilization is an intrinsic value of civilization. But the faith in the good of civilization in the same way as faith in anything else may turn into the weaknesses of subjectivism, idolatry or elitism.

In my interpretation, Dewey systematizes the good of human civilization, which provides solid philosophical grounds for his normative pedagogical claims. Therefore this thesis suggests his theory to be useful in the global policy-making by shaping the global institution of education. I believe that, if (and only if) consistently implemented in the global educational structure, the philosophy of progressive democratic character education may immensely contribute to solution of the moral problems of globalization which are: (1) justificatory basis of the moral responsibility towards distanced individuals and social associations in relation to the nearest and dearest, (2) choice of the ontological commitments to the moral values in the situation of the global variety of values of the plural social interests, (3) risk of the dictatorship of democracy in the global political structure.

In order for the theory to be implemented effectively and to minimize risks of the mentioned problems of idealism (subjectivism, idolatry and elitism), a systematic structure of implementation is necessary. For realization of the ideal of progressive democratic character education through the global regulatory structure there must be well-defined aims, values, standards, method and the subject matter.
5.1. Measures and measurement of educational intervention

As suggested, Dewey’s theory may be useful as a theoretical basis for implementing the global institution of education. In accordance with the theory, the very nature of public education derives from the genuine ideal of democracy. In order for the ideal of democracy to perpetuate in time the global institution of education should aim at the progressive democratic character of the individual. The democratic character education builds a capacity to renew the value of democracy through space and time by experiencing the natural physical interdependence of all human beings and deliberating about the value of participation of every human being in the continuity of human civilization.

Public education facilitates formation of the individual self by socializing new members into the existing structure of a social association. Thereby school, its environment and teachers become a crucial element of the social association. What does school teach and how does it teach? The implicit and explicit aims of public education derive from the social interest of the social association providing education. The aims define curricula which consist of the subject matter, the method of educational intervention and the standard measurement of the educational effects. The set of subject matters which constitute a school curriculum represents the knowledge accumulated in a given social association. The method of educational intervention represents the way of integrating the subject matter into the actual living experience of the individual self.

Dewey points out that the conventional pedagogical instrumental attitude to the method and the subject matter holds them as a societal possession instead of being a resource to accomplish the humanistic purpose. Modern critiques of Dewey’s philosophy suggest that this problem remains in today’s schools across the world in the same extension as in the time Democracy and Education was written. In difference to Dewey’s view on the subject matter as “advanced, refined and logically organized forms of knowledge that had their genesis in ordinary experiences of the human race” which ought to be connected with the primitive but immediately vital

54 Kliebard in Hansen, p 121
experience of the individual, the conventional pedagogical philosophy sees the subject matter as the artificial content of a synthetic world which has to be learned for the purposes of this strange world.\(^{55}\)

The remoteness of the crystallized subject matter from the actual living experience separates the extrinsic social interest from the intrinsic interest deriving from the genuine activity of an organism. The empirical consequences if it are to observe in many contemporary sociological surveys: adolescents and young adults demonstrate “abysmal” ignorance to politics, science, history and other societal functions.\(^{56}\) In accordance with Dewey’s theory, it happens because the interest of the living organism rejected the abstract facts of knowledge taught during a limited time of schooling. Even if the results of the courses are high at the time of schooling, later they tend to become unnecessary intellectual constructs without any bearing on the real life situations if the educational intervention does not aim at transformation of the entire organism down to the level of physical experience.

But, as suggested earlier, the opposite extreme of the Platonian kind of formal synthetic training is the Rousseauan immense trust in the individual nature. On the opposite pole of the synthetic training there are social associations setting radically humanistic aims of education towards liberation of all natural powers of the individual. The major problem of this kind of educational aims is the view on the individual as an autonomous self isolated from its social context. Among many problems, one consequence of this type of education is that it restraints the measurement of the results of formal education. This tends to annihilate the original social meaning of education deriving from the Greeks. The character trait of such social associations is the youths acquiring the attitude “anything goes” due to the radically restricted authority of the old. The educational aim which is set to liberate all primary impulses and immediate interests of the organism obscures the subject matter, the method and the standard of measurement of the educational results. Thereby the formal education glides into the state of informal spontaneous learning and, ultimately, it undermines the civilizing social purpose of the enterprise of public education.

\(^{55}\) Kliebard in Hansen, p 121
\(^{56}\) Kliebard in Hansen, p 121
In my interpretation, the Platonian tendency to possess the subject matters of the curriculum as separated from the individual interest is the key pedagogical issue in the context of globalizing world. In order to educate involvement of all human beings in the life of human race their intrinsic social interest should be objectified in relation to the social interest of the global social association. But this objectification should not be left up to natural chances or the Rousseuan humanism. If the global institution of education is to be established, there still should be a global curriculum of subject matters, global aims of education, global method and global standards of measurement. Dewey’s theory brings awareness about the two undesirable extremes of formalism and naturalism. But trying to avoid the radical formalism of over-doing education should not lead us to abandonment of the measures and measurement. Instead, we should review and renew the measures and measurement of the formal education in accordance with every new arising context.

5.2. Conditions of global democratic character education

In the context of globalization the plural social association come into contact which leads that the values of their social interests affect each other. Most of the worlds’ societies incorporate institution of the formal education with the curricula, method and standards of measurement deriving from the locally borne philosophies. The plural educational institutions participate in symbolic exchange of knowledge through the global communication. According to the discussed democratic ideal of formal education, the accumulated global knowledge should be renewed in the context of every individual life across the planes and thereby enrich and empower the intrinsic value of human being. It poses a high demand on the global educational structure in order to live up to the democratic ideal globally. First, in general, the global educational structure should account for the living experience of every single life of human beings across the globe. Second, the global educational institution should be able to crystallize and organize very large volumes of knowledge from the local sciences and philosophies accumulating living experience of individuals. Third, the crystallized knowledge and philosophy should be educated to the every individual member of the global community via the local educational institutions. Fourth, the process of accumulation of knowledge about the individual life experiences should proceed upwards to the global educational body and downwards to the individual.
should be continuous. These demands means that the global educational body must have a complex architecture of the globally constructed aims, methods, time-frames, processes, functions, materials, values, standards, facts, rules and exceptions.

Is such an institution possible? The overview of the advances of human race supports the possibility of building the global institution of education. Humans constructed The World Bank, European Union, United Nations, World Trade Organization, International Criminal Court, International Monetary Found and many other international bodies.

Taking the democratic ideal realistically, there are economic, political and cultural contexts on the global and local scale. The global education requires a unified context of knowledge, which would incorporate plurality of the locally biased contexts. In the current situation, one of the largest institutions of international government is UN. It incorporates constitutive bodies one of which is United Nations Development Program. Among other targets, UNDP focuses on the global primary education and education for gender equality. The millennium target of the global primary education program is “to achieve universal primary education” ensuring that all boys and girls complete primary school.\(^57\) At the first sight the educational target of UNDP appears to be utterly democratic, but, in the light of the theory discussed in this thesis the philosophy, the pedagogical measures to achieve the goal and the measurement of the results seem to be far from clear.

First, the global structure of primary education takes a form of a political campaign, or “a mission of charity”. UNDP’s aims to help the local contextually biased social associations to help themselves. They offer “an access to a high quality education for hard-to-reach groups” and general “strengthening of the educational opportunities”.\(^58\) From this follows that very little attention is paid to the content of education, to the curriculum, method and measurement; knowledge appears to be taken as a currency possessed by the well-educated social associations which is to be generously handed out to the illiterate. The notion of the high-quality education stated in the UNDP project reports without support of the standards of measurement in the light of the

\(^{57}\) http://www.undp.org/mdg/goal2.shtml

\(^{58}\) http://www.millenniumcampaign.org/site/pp.asp?c=grKVL2NLE&b=185519
discussed theory indicates undermining the democratic core of education as a mode of communicated shared living experience of all human beings.

In the framework of Dewey’s theory the campaign of UNDP is a representative of the Platonian philosophy of education: some parts of the global social association possess the synthetic knowledge which has to be educated for the purposes of the strange and artificial world of knowledge and the knowing. Thus, UNDP runs all the risks associated with this kind of educational philosophy. In the best scenario democracy is still left up to chance: if the local curricula happen to coincide with the intrinsic social interest of the pupils, democracy may work; if not, then the pupils may eventually reject the artificial subject matter and have no practical use of the education. In the worst scenario, the local dictatorial politics may use the UNDP resources to advance its dictatorial social interest through a dogmatically-behaviorist mode of teaching.

The reference to the activities of UNDP illustrates a point that the global institution of education should rely on another educational philosophy and focus on the content, method and measurement apart from the access to education. The UNDP’s educational philosophy today is that the developed world should spare resources to educate the illiterate third world. Inevitably it begs the question: who should educate the well-educated and what is the content of that education?

Another UN’s division is United Nation’s Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Its structure consists of a complex of strategies, aims, methods, measurement and function. The strategic mission of the educational sector of this organization is to[^59]:

- Provide international leadership for creating learning societies with educational opportunities for all populations
- Provide expertise and foster partnership to strengthen national educational leadership and the capacity of countries to offer quality education for all

UNESCO is committed to the UN’s millennium development goals MDG 2 (primary education for all boys and girls by 2015) and MDG 3 (gender equality). The division of education in UNESCO has a key coordinative role in a global movement “Education For All” (EFA) which incorporates 192 countries and multiple educational institutions and organizations. Five of the goals of EFA dedicated to promote the educational opportunities for the illiterate and underprivileged, and the last sixth one is “To improve quality of education”.

To evaluate the quality of education achieved by EFA, UNESCO identifies six criteria:

- Good teaching: qualified teachers who are well-paid and focused on the learners’ needs
- Well-equipped schools: books and learning materials at disposal
- Safe schools: environment free of harassment (especially for girls)
- Enough instruction in the right language: appropriate usage of native and other languages
- Relevant and useful curriculum: learning based on what they find in the local environment and focused on broader knowledge and competences
- Well-managed schools: local boards and committees where parents and community leaders ensure good service of schools

But, surprisingly, in the action UNESCO reserves itself the role of an adviser. The mission of UNESCO consists of suggesting policy options for the local governments and the funding bodies. What does UNESCO actually do? “It supports the promotion of quality education by emphasizing the values that underpin it.” The promotion occurs through:

- A Decade of Education for Sustainable Development which aims to make sure that education presents the ideas that build sustainable future – one in which communities and individuals can develop in full respect to each other, of the world we live and to the future generations
- The Associated Schools Project Network which gives the schoolchildren chance to learn about the wider world and how the UN works

- Education for Human Rights and peace to make sure that education is a force of solidarity
- The cultural and linguistic program for diversity of cultures and languages

UNESCO’s actual coordinating activity within EFA movement consists of a multi-level coordination, monitoring and reporting. The role of UNESCO is to provide a forum for all the activities and connect the associations and individuals participating in EFA.

Does UNESCO qualify as the global educational institution which may provide the progressive democratic education? In the context of this thesis it is hardly so. First of all, the strategy of UNESCO is correlated with UNDP; since UN runs the risk of enforcement of a dictatorial democracy, UNESCO as its subordinated body risks the same problem. Apart from the general problem of UN’s democracy, the educative role that UNESCO ascribes to itself shows the traits of Roussean kind of educational philosophy which trusts too much in the nature of individual. In my interpretation the major problem of UNESCO’s activity in EFA is that it does not execute a normative authority on the subject matter, method and measurement, but leaves it up to the local conditions and occasional research.

My critique of UNESCO and UNDP is to point out the need of the global educational institution which would have more pedagogic expertise than UNDP and more normative authority than UNESCO. According to the theory discussed in this paper, such an institution should aim at the progressive democratic character education as the capacity of consequent moral deliberation about interdependence of human beings and the ability to act upon the moral choice. This aim of education should serve the good of civilization by incorporating the living experience of individual human beings and in reverse effect enriching their lives by the accumulated communicative knowledge of human race.
5.3. Critical issues of global democratic character education

To emphasize the genuineness of the democratic ideal is to point out its unattainable nature. The ideal of democracy in the same way as any other ideal (justice, love, humanity, courage) is not to possess but to strive for. It is never to be achieved since every newborn member of human race becomes a new unit of human experience to incorporate in the accumulative communicated knowledge of civilization. Therefore, the current political situation of possession of democracy by the well-ordered countries and the “handing out” education from democratic world to the illiterate and poor runs risk of dictatorship. The dictatorship is not to be confused with the educational paternalistic enforcement of social interest. There is a clear difference between the education by seeking intrinsic unity of the social interests in every new context of individual lives and the education by evoking fear to be left “outside” and promising comfort in exchange for conformance to the interest of others’. If the latter takes place, democracy turns into its very opposite.

Thus, I suggest that Dewey’s theory provides a possible solution to the dictatorship of democracy by inquiring in the nature of democracy. Thorough consideration of its idealistic nature dissolves possibility of any nation’s possession of it; consequently it dissolves many “democratic campaigns” and “missions” which “hand out” democracy on a basis of charity. Charity per se implies sympathetic immediate response of help to those in need. As discussed earlier (chapter 3.2) Dewey suggests that sympathy is a core component of moral deliberation which derives from the instinctive recognition of the interdependence of all human beings. But, being habitual instinctive response of all human beings sympathy alone is not enough to qualify as the conscious moral conduct. If sympathetic response does not use in practice the intelligence of accumulative communicated knowledge of human race but instead discriminates those in need in relation to the others, it may perverse democracy by developing the debilitating attitude of ignorance in those who is being helped. Ultimately, charity as an immediate help without seeking the intrinsic unity of individual interest and civilization in return has adverse effects. In the today’s global political structure instead of promoting active participation of all human beings in the life of civilization, democracy turned into the charity which discriminated the third world as a social association to be helped, fed, medicated, and sheltered. The result is a large mass of
slaves blindly accepting the purposes of democratic campaigns and missions for the sake of immediate comfort of being fed, sheltered and medicated.

This observation leads to consideration of justification of moral responsibility to the distanced peoples. What is the basis for our responsibility to them? Inevitably, the organic impulsive basis is sympathy. But, in accordance with the discussed theory sympathy is not enough. The disposition of sympathy which we all acquire in the early years close relations should be extended to the distanced peoples by conscious deliberation and physical action based on the moral choice. Dewey’s theory as a theoretical basis for such justification is to be distinguished from utilitarian. While the ideal of democracy appeals to the greatest good for the greatest number of people, the theory provides a method for clarifying the numbers of peoples and the functional meaning of good. The method consists of the philosophy of formal education with well-formulated aims, subject matter and measurement of educational intervention. The theory of good provides an account of the accumulated through history good which crystallizes values in particular historical, physical and political contexts and have a transcending property in the context of civilization. In sum, the basis for responsibility towards the distanced peoples is the capacity of thinking which must be educated. The thinking that we ought to educate is a dramatic rehearsal of mind which relates multiple bits of information to the larger context of the existential interdependence of human beings. It is neither artificial computing nor debilitating pitying, but an artful performance of imagination which binds the impulses of sympathy to knowledge about experience of human civilization and aesthetic appreciation of the wholeness of human life.

The plural values of multiple social interests communicated globally challenge the individual commitments to particular sets of values. Dewey’s theory of the moral life suggest a dynamic account of values in difference to a static view on values as fixed abstract entities; he inquires in the process of moral valuing and validation. Understanding of this process dissolves the problem of individual commitment to a particular set of values. Values as an intelligent perception of something very dear for the physical existence of organism derive from the intuitive impulsive dispositions supplied by the immediate surroundings. The intuitive appraisal hardens values into intelligible standards, principles and rules. In order for these hardened values to
perpetuate in time they should be re-valued and re-validated in new contexts relating to new experiences of human beings. Therefore, Dewey advocates for educating individual capacity to reflect upon the worth of values and to make moral choices of commitments in a continuous manner called character. In order for individuals to keep re-valuation and re-validation of the value of human interdependence, the education of democratic character ought to provide the context of human civilization which perpetuates in time.

Thus, the theory provides a philosophical ground for reconciliation between communitarian and cosmopolitan claims of justice; thereby it dissolves three major moral problems of globalization. Dewey’s view implies that the progressive education of democratic character is a way to strive for the cosmopolitan humanistic ideal of justice while having the point of departure in the communitarian local justice of direct physical context. The educative intervention should not proceed in empty artificial context: character is to be build from the blocks of the physical organic interactions with the direct environment. Thereby communitarian justice or injustice conditions precede the cosmopolitan moral deliberation, which is a matter of education. But neither communitarian nor cosmopolitan claim should be justified once and for all; character implies series of choices which re-validate values in every new situation. The very notion of progressive democratic character implies continuous intelligent appreciation of the value of interdependence of every human being which extends the scope of justice from the local through the global towards the scope of civilization.

However, the theory has a weakness which may severely affect implementation of the global institution of education. Although the theory relies on a solid philosophical background, it invests too much trust in the intrinsic good of human civilization and human nature. Without spelling out more of its content, it leaves the theory open for abuse by the vice dispositions accumulated in the character of civilization and the nature of its constitutive members: aggression, fear, greed, vengeance. There should be caution where the theory advocates for deconstruction of the existing educational structures; without constructive substantive propositions to reformation it may cause adverse effects on the meaning of education.
On the other hand, the theory is too constructive in relation to the real world corrupted by ignorance, wars, poverty and cruelty. The possibility of global institution of education requires much heavier deconstruction of the existing social structures before we may be able to construct the universal humanistic educational structure. At any rate, prior to constructing the global institution of education we should seriously consider the source of its authority.
6. Conclusion

The wide purpose of this thesis is to outline a theoretical basis for possible justification of democracy in the context of globalization by inquiring in Dewey’s theory of moral life. The narrow purpose is to review the natural relation between democracy and public education in the process of globalization. In reverse effect it supplies new contextual meaning to the core ideas of democracy and education which Dewey suggests.

In sum, the thesis focuses on the process of globalization as
(1) processes and relations (social, economic, political, cultural, etc) that are
(2) transcending national borders that
(3) link distanced people and that are
(4) spontaneous rather than result of political decisions

In the moral perspective globalization actualizes the tension between the local and the global justice. Thereby it poses three major moral problems: (1) justificatory basis of the moral responsibility towards distanced individuals and social associations, (2) choice of the ontological commitments to the moral values in the situation of the global overload of values by the plural social interests, (3) risk of the dictatorship of democracy in the global political structure.

Dewey’s theory dissolves the problems by inquiry in the evolutionary processes of moral life. His perspective exposes the moral evolution through the organic interaction of human beings. Evolution of knowledge about the value of human interdependence which ought to be continued necessitates the institution of philosophy. The social practice of philosophy through the formal education for active individual participation in the life of human association constitutes democracy as a mode of communicated living in a particular scope of human association. The theory implies that the scope of human association in which the individual learns to participate is expandable in space and time.

In accordance with the discussed theory, in order to perpetuate the intrinsic value of human interdependency in the globalizing world we should focus on the characteristic
traits of social associations: (1) exchange of values within a local social association
and (2) relation of the values of social association which supplies organism with
physical experience to the multiple social associations.

To educate democratic character as a consistent capacity to deliberate about human
interdependence and act upon choices there should be a formal institution with such
aims, subject matters standards and measurement which incorporate the accumulative
communicated experience of the entire human race. Only through well-defined
method and measurement of educational intervention the progressive democratic
character education transcends the participation in local social contexts to the
participation in the humanistic cosmopolitan context. Thereby it enriches the
experience of individual human being and supplies the meaning of human life by the
accumulative communicated knowledge of civilization.

Thus, the thesis concludes that there is a necessity of the global institution of
progressive democratic character education which should:

- account for the living experience of every single life of human beings across
  the globe
- be able to crystallize and organize very large volumes of knowledge from the
  local sciences and philosophies accumulating living experience of individuals
- execute a normative authority to educate the crystallized knowledge and
  philosophy to the every individual member of the global community via the
  local educational institutions
- continuously perpetuate the process of accumulation of knowledge about
  individual life experiences upwards to the global educational body
- have well-formulated aims, measures and measurements of the education
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