NATIONALISING CULTURE
THE REORGANISATION OF NATIONAL CULTURE IN SWEDISH CULTURAL POLICY 1970–2002

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Cover illustration: The front cover shows the National Museum of Fine Arts to the left. In the middle, alone on a hill, we see the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, once an annex to the National Museum of Fine Arts, now a part of the National Museums of World Culture. At the far right is the Skeppsholmen Church, a desacralised church, the future of which remains uncertain. The picture was taken in Stockholm in the spring of 2007. The photographer is turning his back to the Royal Palace (© Nils Harding). Back: A view of the industrial heritage area in central Norrköping. In the background one can glimpse the Museum of Work. The dam was once constructed to power textile industries but is currently there only to provide the right impression to observers. The building to the left houses the Linköping University Department of Culture Studies, and my office (© Linköping University).
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Preface

Working towards a Ph.D. is an odd experience. One is at once a student and an employee of a university. In my case I was also a teacher at that university. This situation is in itself an excellent condition for learning: to be faced with so many of the aspects of academic life at the same time. This is especially true at an interdisciplinary department such as the Department of Culture Studies at Linköping University. One not only meets people at different levels at the university or studying different topics, there is also a meeting of academic disciplines that reveals that what one might initially have taken for granted is only one way of looking at scholarly work. I have to say that this has helped me tremendously in finding my own perspective on things. This dissertation is one product of that process.

While interdisciplinary work gives a freedom that I have greatly appreciated, this freedom also comes with a price. If I had stayed entirely within the bounds of political science, it would perhaps have been enough to relate to works in that discipline. If one is to uphold quality in an interdisciplinary work this is far from enough. I hope, however, that the text in its current condition is at least readable to people from most relevant contexts and that it can contribute something to most of these, either theoretically or with empirical information. Ironically this does not mean that I expect a large audience for this work, academic publications seldom get large numbers of readers, and doctoral dissertations almost never do. At best this work will be read by experts in the areas that I discuss here. To at least reach experts in my own field in other countries, I have chosen to write in English. In addition to its theoretical values I thus hope that this volume may be of some use as the first major work on Swedish cultural policy available in any other language than
Swedish. It steps beyond the national borders to make Swedish examples available to the rest of the world.

Producing this work has been a rewarding experience and I will always remain grateful to the people who made it what it has been. First I would like to acknowledge the advice and guidance that I have received from my academic supervisor Professor Erling Bjurström as well as from my secondary academic supervisor Professor Svante Beckman. Both have a true gift for commenting on developing texts as well as a theoretical agility that I can only hope that I will one day achieve for myself. There is no person at my department with whom I have not had a meaningful discussion and thus no one who has not in some way contributed to this project. I do, however, wish to especially acknowledge the specific contributions of a number of people: Karin Becker, Roger Blomgren, Eltje Bos, Jens Cavallin, Helene Egeland, Johan Fornäs, Eva Haldén, Patrik Hall, Magdalena Hillström, Peo Hansen and Rune Johansson have all commented on this text, or on parts of it, and have thus been of great help in developing it. I would also like to thank Carl-Johan Kleberg, Kyrre Kverndokk, Ana-Maria Narti, Hans Rosenberg, Hanna Bertilsdotter Rosqvist, Micael Nilsson and my colleagues in the SweCult group for some unusually inspiring discussions on the subjects of this dissertation, Rogers Brubaker, Bengt Kristensson Uggla and Eva Haldén for the courses I have taken outside of Linköping University, those who let me interview them in spite of sometimes busy schedules, Rune Premfors (who supervised my MA thesis at the Department of Political Science at Stockholm University) for teaching me the first things about institutional analysis (which I hope that I have remembered), Staffan Klintborg for his help with the language, Lars Lagergren for giving me the opportunity to teach at Linköping University and the University College of Malmö and Mikael Hellström for giving me the same opportunity at the Kunskapsforum Foundation, something that has taught me a number of things that I could not have learned in any other way and, finally, my father for, among other things, the doubtful service of starting my interest in the practicalities of Swedish politics and administration and my mother for awakening the more joyful interest in history. These and many others have in various ways helped bring about this dissertation. The most important thing I have learnt during these years may, however, be that however important imagined cultural and political communities may be; they are not among the most important things in life. I hope that those among my family and friends who are know at least some of their importance to me.

Tobias Harding
Näsbypark 2007-08-20
CHAPTER I:
Introduction

Like most modern states Sweden has a cultural policy. Very few people seem to question that the Swedish state should continue to support such activities as opera, symphony orchestras, Swedish literature, museums and religious denominations, or that it should legally limit, for example, the export of the material cultural heritage or the freedom of owners to make changes in buildings included in this. On the other hand very few people suggest that the State should support rock concerts or the import of English literary classics to any comparable extent, neither do many question the general norms behind these rules. In 2006 even a rumour that the new Minister of Culture questioned State support for the cultural field was enough to provoke a storm of protest (ultimately she was forced to resign, because of unpaid TV licence fees). On the other hand many Swedish politicians, including her successor, seem to believe that cultural policy is of little importance in national politics and that its central norms are uncontroversial.¹ Yet, there are, as I will show, major differences between the various political positions, even on important points. The cultural landscape of Sweden is changing: “foreign” cultural expressions – from American films to books in Arabic – are becoming increasingly accessible. At the same time an increasing part of the population consists of immigrants. The State, somewhat paradoxically, simultaneously supports Swedish cultural production, protects it from foreign influences and promotes the concept of Sweden as a multicultural society. There are also signs that cultural policy is now becoming more explicitly – sometimes vio-

¹ Interviews with Lena Adelsohn Liljeroth, Gunilla Thorgren, Carl-Johan Kleberg and Ana-Maria Narti.
ently – controversial in Sweden as well as in many other countries. Examples of this international trend could include the murder of the Dutch film director Theo van Gogh in 2004 and the Berlin Opera’s decision in 2006 not to show a controversial staging of Mozart’s *Idomeneo*, for fear of violent reactions among Muslims. A Swedish example was when an artwork in the Holocaust exhibition in Stockholm 2004 provoked diplomatic protests from Israel.²

I will argue that this seemingly paradoxical belief in a consensus on these matters is connected with the idea that Sweden is a nation and that as a nation it has (or has at least once had) a homogenous culture. To understand conflicts, or the lack of conflicts, in cultural policy it is thus not enough to study the values that it promotes; one also has to study how these relate to the concept of a national community that is supposed to be homogenous in relation to them. There is little reason to believe that Sweden is unique in this respect. Yet, historical research shows that such nations, if they have ever existed, are relatively new phenomena and often the products of the states that now claim to represent them. This is what Benedict Anderson has described as the first paradox of nationalism. Upholding belief in the nation as a cultural community is an ongoing and continuous process. In the nineteenth century art and cultural heritage were important both as media and as symbols to the states and nationalists who promoted this concept. Anderson’s second paradox is that while most claims made by nationalists are particularistic, nationalism as a socio-cultural phenomenon appears to be universal.³ The success of the nation-state increased the legitimacy of states in an age characterised by social change. Today the nation is often taken for granted. As it appears in everyday life it can even be described as banal (in the sense that it is more about distinctions which we take for granted than about belligerent or even explicit nationalism).⁴

I argue that although modern Western nation-states seldom make belligerently nationalistic claims, their institutions not only build on nationalist assumptions, they also promote the concept of national culture, for example in their cultural policy. Nationalism is institutionalised in them, both in concepts promoted by them and in their very organisation as nation-states. I argue this by looking at the case of Swedish cultural policy, which is today

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² The first two examples are taken from Geir Vestheim’s (2007) discussion of this trend. The conflict in 2004 was caused by a work of art displayed in an exhibition at the Museum of National Antiquities in Stockholm in connection with an international Holocaust conference. The piece contained a picture of a female Palestinian suicide bomber floating on a raft in dam filled with red water. It was accused of picturing her in a too positive light, which provoked the Israeli ambassador to attempt to destroy the display during the opening ceremony (von Rosen 2004).
³ Anderson 2006: 5.
⁴ Billig 1995.
often explicitly anti-nationalist, yet organised as a part of a nation-state. The
claims to nationhood made by this state and its concepts of the meaning of
nationhood are, however, often paradoxical and even self-contradictory.
These inconsistencies may be explained by neoinstitutional theory. In order to
fully be able to look into all parts of cultural policy (which is necessary to gain
an overview of its complexity), I have had to limit myself to studying a single
actor: the Swedish state in recent decades. This is an old state – it predates
nationalism and the nation-state system – but has successfully managed to be-
come a nation-state (see Chapter IV). Sweden is thus a clear example of
Hobsbawm’s view that “[n]ations do not make states and nationalisms but the
other way around.”5 Combined with the fact that the processes and institu-
tions of Swedish national culture are less well studied than those of other
erly nation-states (e.g. France or the U.K.), this makes it an ideal case for a
study such as this.

The aim of this dissertation is thus to analyse how national culture is institu-
tionalised in the cultural policy of the Swedish state. An additional reason for this is
that this dissertation will provide an example of how to combine neoinstitutional
theory with the analysis of nationhood in a productive way. It is thus a
secondary aim to find such a combination of theories that can help us to
together understand how institutional processes within a state relate it to the
concept of the nation. I hope that this will benefit both neoinstitutional and
cultural policy research by relating them to new topics, as well as to scholar-
ship on nation-states, by developing the analysis of how national cultures are
institutionalised in states. Before doing this I will, however, have to explain
how I approach central phenomena such as cultural policy, nations and states.

Studies of topics related to culture are often complicated by the fact that
the term “culture” itself is ambiguous. Its Latin root, colere, originally meant
something like “to provide for” or “to care for”. It was used primarily with
reference to the farmer’s agricultural work of caring for his crops, but also to
religious responsibilities.6 Most scholars of culture, however, use the term in
at least two distinct meanings, often described as the anthropological and the
aesthetic definition. In 1871 Tylor defined culture in the anthropological
sense as “the complex entity, which encompasses knowledge, faith, art, morals,
laws, customs, use, and all other forms of skills and habits, which a person
acquires as a member of society”.7 About a hundred years later Raymond
Williams summarised this by saying that culture is “a particular way of life”.8
In the aesthetic sense a culture is, however, not just any activities that charac-

6 Benhabib 2002.
7 Tylor 1871 quoted in Duelund 2003: 424.
terise a particular society. Instead, it can be considered “the best that has been thought and said” in any society.\(^9\) In practice aesthetic culture has come to mean not just any activities that the user considers “the best” but instead a number of specific activities – e.g. dancing and literature – considered to represent higher values. In the first sense, culture has a plural form – cultures – it is a countable noun. Different nations may thus have different cultures. When the anthropological definition is used, religion is often included in the culture of a people. It is in many nations considered a national characteristic (but is only occasionally a part of cultural policy). While this is a particularistic interpretation of the word culture, the aesthetic definition lays claim to universal and normative relevance (much as religious people often do for their beliefs). It is a non-countable: either a nation is cultured or it is un-cultured; there is no such thing as different cultures. Sometimes there are limits to certain activities that are considered artistic; these activities are, however, not geographically or ethnically limited: a Gabonese orchestra would be expected to play Mozart in exactly the same way as an Austrian: if they do not, that just means that one of them is better than the other. Many forms of nationalism – especially German-style ethnic nationalism\(^10\) – instead postulate the existence of a number of particular cultures pursuing different values.\(^11\)

The Swedish cultural policy researcher Anders Frenander has suggested that the problem of cultural policy is culture.\(^12\) I have, however, chosen not to use “culture” as an analytical term but instead to study its use. From the perspective of this dissertation, the nation is instead a major focus. A polity is not only a state ruling a territory and its inhabitants. It is also a community of members, known as citizens. In the currently dominant form of state – the nation-state – these citizens constitute the imagined community of the nation. Following Anthony D. Smith I define nation-states as “states claiming to be nations”.\(^13\) Like Benedict Anderson I define nation as “an imagined political community [that is] imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”.\(^14\) With Hobsbawm and Gellner I define nationalism as “a principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent”.\(^15\)

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\(^9\) This is the nineteenth-century critic and poet Matthew Arnold’s (1865) vision of culture as described by Eagleton 2002: 32.

\(^10\) E.g. Herder 1816.

\(^11\) See Eagleton 2000 for a more thorough discussion of the meaning of the word culture throughout history.

\(^12\) Frenander 2005, see p. 102 of this dissertation for a discussion of his analysis.

\(^13\) Smith 1991: 143.


\(^15\) Hobsbawm 1990: 9, ref. to Gellner 1983: 1. Note that Hobsbawm is here misquoting Gellner who wrote that “Nationalism is primarily the political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent”, Gellner 1983: 1.
studies the properties of the nation as an actual community; Anderson postulates that it is an imagined one. That the nation exists in our imagination is, however, beyond question. Whether real or imagined, the nation is also, among other things, a cultural community (whatever that means). This implies that the cultural policy of a nation-state could be of special interest to those who wish to understand the State’s claim to nationhood (more on these definitions in Chapter II).

Nation-states do exist. The nation-state is today an institution that governs most of our planet. Its claim to be a nation is an institutionalised claim. No nation has ever had a cultural policy. States have cultural policies and this is a study of the cultural policy of the Swedish state. This state is, however, itself a complex organisation that can be analytically divided into smaller institutional actors. I limit this study to the process by which the cultural policy of the Swedish state is formulated. This is where the institutionalised authority of the State recognises actions and actors in cultural policy as its own. Although other areas could be equally interesting, this is where one has to start if one wishes to study how national culture is institutionalised in cultural policy by the nation-state. In other words, this is not a policy study in the sense of a study of how a policy is carried out. Instead it is a study of its formation as a result of actions made by institutional actors. Policy is thus not central to the explanations given here; I concentrate on the norms for appropriate action that guide its formulation (see Chapter III). To further limit the material I use an institutional definition of cultural policy focusing on how the term is used in these contexts. Following the national budget of 2002 (the final year of the final studied period), I have included the formulation of the State’s policy on “general cultural activities, theatre, dance and music, libraries, literature and cultural journals, architecture, picture and form, as well as arts and crafts, compensations and grants for artists, film, archives, cultural environments, museums and exhibitions, research and development in the cultural sphere, and religious communities”. These activities were defined as kulturpolitik, which is the Swedish equivalent of the English term “cultural policy”. Most of them have always, or almost always, been included in this. The only exception to this is religious communities. Church policy (concerning the relationship between the State and the Church of Sweden) has historically been a sector of its own. In the year 2000 it was, however, abolished as such to become a part of the heritage.
sector (and thus of cultural policy). I consider it an advantage that using this
definition includes it within the limits of this study. As I will argue in Chapter
IV, the relationship between the nation, the State and the state religion has
been of great importance to the development of a Swedish concept of the
nation, important enough to be rivalled only by state, language and belief in
our own modernity. I follow the various institutional actors and cultural act-
ivities that were, in 2002, considered parts of cultural policy by the govern-
ment and the Riksdag (the Swedish parliament) backwards in time to see how
they came to be institutionalised as such and how they developed the relevant
properties that they had at the end of this study. These actors are of course
not the only parts of the State that have had an influence on how it institu-
tionaises national culture. I could, for example, have studied government
policy on NGOs (non-governmental organisations) or immigration policy. I
have, however, chosen cultural policy, as it has never been studied from this
perspective before, being obviously related to culture, and has been so for the
entire history of the nation-state. Furthermore, I limit myself to focusing on
four periods (each consisting of the time between two national elections):
consists mainly of official texts published by the government, government
commissions and the Riksdag during these periods. The early seventies were
when Swedish cultural policy was institutionalised as an integrated field with
clear objectives. The latter periods cover the more important changes in re-
cent years (I will discuss these choices further in Chapter III).

While this is the first study of how cultural policy institutionalises na-
tional culture in Sweden, I am far from the first to study cultural policy. Many
have for example worked from T. H. Marshall’s assumption of three different
stages in the development of citizenship: legal, political, and social citizenship.
To these stages cultural policy researchers have added the fourth stage of
cultural citizenship. This concept is, as we shall see, close to the Swedish con-
cept of cultural welfare as the next stage in the development of the welfare
state, as well as to that of cultural democracy as a continuation of democra-
sation. Like so many other cultural policy theories these concepts suffer from
the problem that they take the nation for granted as the object of cultural
policy, rather than study how it is institutionalised as such. This is illustrated
by Benhabib’s criticism of Marshall. In today’s world there are an increasing
number of people who have the benefit of legal and social rights and, at the
same time, lack political rights. Marshall simply takes it for granted that the
subjects and citizens of a modern state are the same. This assumption is no
longer valid and has in fact never been fully so. At the same time a number of
new groups, defined by identity, emerge to demand recognition in society, not
only as citizens but also as ethnically, sexually, religiously and linguistically
(etc) defined groups. This recognition is often expressed in cultural terms. Thus, a politics of recognition emerges making the assumption of cultural homogeneity within nation-states less valid. Cultural politics is thus put centre stage again, much as it was when the present national identities were established. Marshall assumes a highly integrated nation-state, when the integration of the State and society are among the things that should be studied.

A more actor-centred approach to cultural policy is advocated by, among others, Li Bennich-Björkman. She uses a schematic model of the recipient, the artists, and the State as the three main actors of cultural policy. This model is similar to Roger Blomgren’s analysis of the arguments given for and against cultural policy in another tripartite model: arguments for Passivity, Perfectionalism and Neutrality. In this model, passivity gives the choice of culture to the recipients as individuals acting on a market, perfectionalist arguments reserve the choice to the State, while active neutrality hands this power to the artists, or more exactly to artist organisations recognised by the State. Hillmann-Chartrand and McCaughey classify cultural policy in the Patron, Facilitator, Architect and Engineer models. The United States acts according to a Facilitator model and supports culture by facilitating, for example, a system of tax reductions for donations to the arts and sciences. The United Kingdom, a Patron State, delegates its cultural policy to an independent Arts Council of Great Britain. France is a typical Architect State: it provides structures for the arts, steering them towards particular objectives. This is as much control as is possible in a modern democratic state. The Engineer model refers to the cultural policies of Communist Eastern Europe, which applied state control all over the cultural sector.

All of these models suffer from the central problem that they presuppose the boundaries of the nation-state. Some of them even tend to use a kind of black box approach to the State as an actor. I argue (and argue further in Chapter II) that the State, to a large extent, defines its own citizenry and, as I will conclude from this dissertation, its own culture. Processes that include the State furthermore define the groups of artists who are given authority in actively neutral models. In a neocorporative state, such as twentieth-century Sweden, artist organisations recognised by the State are among the actors that decide the cultural policy of the State. The State can thus not be separated from actors such as the Swedish Writers’ Association, or the Swedish Film

\[\text{Bennich-Björkman 1991. For a closer look at the study of Swedish literature policies for which this model was developed, see Chapter IV.}\]
\[\text{Bennich-Björkman 1991, Blomgren 1998. For a closer look at the study of Swedish film policies for which this model was developed, see Chapters IV, V and IV.}\]
\[\text{Hillmann-Chartrand & McCaughey 1989.}\]
Institute (SFI). Blomgren and Bennich-Björkman do not make this mistake in their analyses of the policy process.23 One may, however, question their choice of making such assumptions to categorise arguments. While these assumptions do not have significant negative consequences for their analyses, similar assumptions would arguably have worse consequences when applied to the issue of how national culture is institutionalised in cultural policy.

Instead of using these models I categorise the norms and actions of the various actors that determine Swedish cultural policy by using the following dichotomies and corresponding research questions. The end points of these dichotomies should be seen as ideal types in the Weberian sense.24

- What values have been considered appropriate for cultural policy to pursue: universalistic or particularistic?

  Partialistic  Universalistic

- What concepts have been considered appropriate for describing the nation in cultural policy: ethnic or state-framed?

  Ethnic  State-framed

- How strongly integrated has the organisation of cultural policy been?

  Integrated  Disintegrated

The first of these questions concerns the values said to guide cultural policy: indirectly this question covers the definitions of culture used by policy makers. Issues of values and definitions of culture are intertwined and this dichotomy thus concerns many of the issues that other researchers have approached as issues of how to define the culture that should be supported by the State. By concentrating on the values of cultural policy rather than on definitions of culture, I hope to keep the scope of the study separate from its result. It, furthermore, clarifies the difference between my analysis and the discussions on how to define culture making up much of the general discussion in some of the reports that I have studied. This choice also makes it

24 Weber used the term “ideal type” to describe an abstract type composed of certain properties relevant to the research. The best example of this use is perhaps that in The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism (Weber 2001) This concept is akin to what Wittgenstein (1976: §67) described as family resemblance: “I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than ‘family resemblances'; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gut temperament etc etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.” Wittgenstein considered e.g. art to be this kind of category, Haldén 2006.
possible to focus on the normative aspects of definitions of culture; they are
closer to the purpose and theory of this study and contribute to separate this
question from the distinction between ethnic and state-framed concepts of
the nation (further discussed in Chapter II).

To sort value references, I use a distinction between universalistic and
particularistic concepts of value. This distinction has the benefit of being
clearly relevant both to the relation between culture and the nation-state and
to the distinction between various types of national self-image. An actor that
argues from a universalist perspective refers to values relevant to all of human-
ity, regardless of the geographical, cultural and chronological context. Philo-
sophers such as Plato and Kant are examples of this: Kant’s categorical
imperative is relevant to all humanity and ideas represent, according to Plato, the
best that anyone can aspire to. A particularist perspective is the opposite of
universalism. In such a perspective values are relevant only in a particular
context. Values are thus considered situated and – on a meta-ethical level –
relativistic, which is not to say that they are relativistic to the individual: as
each individual exists in a particular position in time and space, a particular-
istically defined value may be just as normatively forceful as a universally
defined one.\footnote{This distinction is used by Fredrika Lagergren (1999: 30-41) and based on the works of Simon
Caney (1992). They, however, use the term “relativism”, which I consider somewhat misleading
as a situated value is not necessarily relative to the individual. They also use this dichotomy to
continue to define the distinction between individualism and communitarianism (or collectivism,
as Lagergren uses that term). That distinction is, however, less relevant to this study, as I study
references to universal and particularistic values in contexts in which the subject is often the State
or the nation, not the individual.} It should, furthermore, be held in mind that this is a meta-
ethical categorisation and that it is concerned with how values are referred to,
not an attempt to judge these values in themselves. Following Kwame Anth-
ony Appiah, one could for example differentiate between universalistic and
particularistic racism, based on whether a racial theory is concerned with recog-
ising supposedly higher or lower races or simply expects loyalty to one’s
own race.\footnote{Appiah 1992.} Answers to this research question are of course, like the answers
to all of them, more complex than can be explained by placing them on a
theoretical scale. The scales are used only as heuristic devices to clarify inter-
pretation and comparison.

While my first research question classifies the values that cultural policy
claims to uphold, the second classifies the limits of the nation as an imagined
community: Who are the people? In Germany the claim that the Germans
were a people that could demand a unified state existed before Bismarck
claimed to unify the German states into one unified Reich. The United King-
dom has on the other hand yet to succeed in convincing its people that they
are all British. In France loyalty to the Republic has often been considered the fundament of the French nation. It should thus be easier to become French than to become German. A brief look at the citizenship legislation of these countries justifies this claim. In France the State appears to be able to define its people through citizenship legislation, in Germany legislation had to be adapted to include an already imagined Volk. In both the French and the German cases cultural policy is central to the state’s claim to work for the benefit of the nation. In France cultural policy is the means to create a unified national community dedicated to the principles of laïcité and French culture. In Germany an important part of the claim that the Reich represented the Volk lay, at least before the end of World War II, in its support for authentic German culture. Nation-state theorists often distinguish between two ways of defining the nation. Depending on where the line is drawn, these have been known as for example civil and ethnic nationalism and the learned and the primordial definition. The distinction was originally proposed by Friedrich Meinecke when he separated the Kulturnation from the Staatsnation. Following Rogers Brubaker, I will, however, use the terms ethnic and state-framed to categorise concepts of the nation (see Chapter II).

The previous two questions concern the concepts of the values and the nation that actors in cultural policy consider appropriate to use and promote. The third question considers the organisation and institutions of cultural policy. Since different parts of the State may support different concepts a study of its organisation may thus help explain what may otherwise seem like paradoxes. At the same time the organisation of cultural policy is in itself an institutionalisation of the concept of national culture. A neo-institutional approach to nationhood could, as John W. Meyer has pointed out, be a “reaction to lines of thought analyzing the nation-state on its own terms as a bounded actor”. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen recognise that “in traditional treatments of democracy, citizenship is assumed to depend on unquestioned historical distinctions (e.g. between nations, age groups, castes, and sexes)”. These could, however, be studied as institutionalised norms that exist and are interpreted within the organisational context of the State (seen as an organisation which in turn exists in the context of a wider society from which it is not clearly separated). Although this has seldom been the main use of the neo-institutional perspective, it can thus be used to study the processes that institutionalise the borders of the State as an organisation claiming authority corresponding to the nation, and thereby institutionalising that comm-

28 Meyer 1999: 123.
unity as well.\textsuperscript{29} With such a perspective I can study how the State is integrated as an actor, instead of assuming that it is one. It is furthermore possible to study institutions, organisations, rules and concepts rather than for example only the discourses that take place within them (see Chapter III).

The last dichotomy thus focuses on this organisation by classifying how integrated and normatively homogenous the State’s cultural policy organisation is. The U.S. can for example be considered an extreme example of a country with a disintegrated organisation. It not only gives a low priority to integrating its citizens into a national culture, it also has an extremely disintegrated cultural policy organisation, where governments at various levels of the federal system are given a free hand to deal with cultural policy (or not to deal with it, as the case may be).\textsuperscript{30} An example of the other end of this scale could be Germany under the Third Reich, when all power derived from the \textit{Führer}; and Josef Goebbels, his Minister of Culture and Propaganda, thus held unlimited (if delegated) power within the borders of his ministry’s authority.\textsuperscript{31} Concerning countries less extreme than the Third Reich, the question of institutional integration grows more complex. These countries give room for a certain amount of power sharing. Power is divided within the limits of the national organisation of cultural policy. Cummings and Katz, for example, make a distinction between states in which national power is placed within a ministry of culture and those where it is delegated to a council for the arts or for cultural affairs (the Arm’s Length Principle).\textsuperscript{32} The models constructed by Hillmann-Chartrand and McCaughey can be arranged along this continuum, as can most other models for cultural policy organisation. These systems of organisation are, however, different from state to state, and the important thing in this dissertation is to relate organisation to the nation-state. This makes integration vs. disintegration the important scale along which to order organisational models here. In Chapter III I will discuss, among other things, the centralisation of power and authority, and the homogenisation of institutional norms as forms of institutional integration.

In Chapter II I take a closer look at theories of the development and properties of the nation-state and its relationship to values, culture, integration and the State as well as at how these relate to each other. In the following chapter I discuss the State as an organisation and the theory by which I ana-

\textsuperscript{29} March and Olsen 1989, quote from p. 143.
\textsuperscript{30} See Tilly 1996, on nation-state integration and Zimmer & Toepler 1999 on differences in how cultural policy is organised in U.S. and in Western Europe. That the level of strife, as well as heterogeneity, is still higher in the U.S. can also be seen in Vestheim’s (2007) examples of current conflicts in cultural policy, although he does not himself comment on this.
\textsuperscript{31} Steinweis 1993, see Gustavsson 2002: 196-205 for a comparison of German and Swedish art policies in the 1930s.
\textsuperscript{32} Cummings & Katz 1987.
lyse these matters. I furthermore present the methods of this study, as well as a more comprehensive discussion of its layout and the four periods that I focus on. These are then presented in Chapters V to VIII. They are internally organised according to the official sub-sectors of cultural policy (e.g. film and literature policy). The empirical chapters of this dissertation are thus organised in a kind of grid structure, which makes it possible to compare differences between periods as well as between different parts of cultural policy. The dissertation concludes with an analysis of the relationship between the organisation of Swedish cultural policy and the concepts of national culture and values that it recognises.
CHAPTER II:
Culture and the Nation

Scholarly interest in nationalism and nationhood has more or less exploded in the recent decades. Once nationalism seemed to belong to the past; even today many leading scholars proclaim its time to be drawing to its end. After the events in Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Iron Curtain few experts would, however, consider nationalism to belong exclusively to the past, although many would have preferred that it did. In this chapter I present an overview of some of the more prominent theories and theorists on nationalism, nationhood and nation-states. Then I discuss how I relate them to the research questions and aim of this dissertation. I begin by describing the ongoing discussion of the emergence of nation-states and nations and the socioeconomics that were given priority by the first generation of nationalism scholars (this I relate to the Swedish case in Chapter IV), then I discuss how the issues of nationalism and nationhood relate to culture, to the institutions of the State and to how nationality is defined.

The major schism in the ranks of nationalism scholars concerns the origin of nationalism and nationhood as well as the underlying causes. Older (that is, nationalist) theories on the subject are referred to as primordialist. Most primordialist worldviews can, however, be described as theories only in the loosest sense: most theorists that could be construed as belonging to this category are, in fact, not addressing this question at all. The primordialist view is, simply put, that nations have always existed, and that they will, presumably, always continue to exist. Without going to this kind of extremes primordialism can also be construed as appearing in more commonsensical forms and taken for granted by most people from the Enlightenment (or perhaps some time in the nineteenth century) up to the present. Even many social scientists
can be considered as having subscribed to this sort of thinking. While Durkheim pioneered much of today’s study of nationalism with his theory of society’s cult of itself as a civil religion, he is also a good example of this tendency as he remained content to leave the extent of these societies as an un-explained, and thus primordial, variable. Akin to this kind of theory is also the opinion that while nationality may not be a natural category, the feeling of belonging to a nation (or to something enough like a nation to function as a substitute) is the result of a need for cultural belonging and symbolism common to all or most human beings. This is the view sometimes described as cultural primordialism.

Neither form of primordialism is, however, a very common approach among today’s scholars of nationalism and nationhood. Today the once accepted primordialism has been dethroned (itself perhaps a sign of the waning of nationalism, at least in the academy). It has been succeeded by a now well-established modernism. I use the term Modernism for theories asserting that nationhood is of a specifically modern origin, that its appearance was caused by modern conditions and that it will, consequently, also diminish and disappear with these conditions. Modernism is today – in spite of its name – a relatively time-honoured view. It can trace its origins at least as far back as to the struggles of Marxist scholars to explain the persistence of nationalism in a world that should, according to their own theories, be more concerned with class struggle than with supposedly ancient national rivalries. One of the pioneers in this line of thought was none other than Joseph Stalin, who in Marxism and the National and Colonial Question started to make room for at least a temporary legitimacy for the nation-state in a Marxist analysis previously exclusively based on class.

Socio-Economic Construction of Nations: Modernist Theory

The central questions for classical Modernist nationalism research consist of solving three paradoxes. If Modernism is connected with a stage in the development of capitalism, then why does it linger on in a world in which capitalism is global? Another paradox lies in connecting the “subjective antiquity” of the nation in the eyes of nationalists with the “objective modernity of nations in the historians’ eye”. A third is the particularism of the nationalism of each

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35 Smith 2000: 20-25. Smith himself has been accused of belonging to this category (e.g. Hall 1998), even if he has argued that his is a theory of the golden mean, as it were.
37 Hobsbawm 1990: 2, Stalin 1936.
nation in contrast to the universality, at least in modern times, of nationalism and nationhood as socio-cultural phenomena.38

Many Modernists have also rejected the idea that nationhood ought to be studied or defined as a phenomenon a priori. No definition of “the nation” a priori is, according to for example E.J. Hobsbawm – an eminent historian of nationalism – able to include all the currently recognised nations, and at the same time exclude all groups and identities not generally perceived as actual, or even potential, nations. Instead, he advocates the approach of studying the nation as a concept a posteriori, beginning with the concept of “nation” and studying the changes it has gone through during its history. Such an approach would, in his view, be more rewarding as “[n]ations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way around.”39 Following Ernest Gellner, Hobsbawm later defined nationalism as “primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” but at the same time added that the principle also implied that obligation to one’s own nation “overrides all other public obligations, and in extreme cases (such as war) all other obligations of whatever kind”.40 Nationalism is thus not the result of the common acceptance of one remarkably successful ideology (as proposed e.g. by Kedurie) but rather an unavoidable stage in the socio-economic development of industrialist societies.41

The central issue for Modernists like Ernest Gellner, E.J. Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson is thus how the civil religion of nationalism can continue to convince. Following Anderson, I define the nation as “an imagined political community [that is] imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”. While the nation is, according to Anderson, a community in the sense of a Gemeinschaft, rather than an association (Gesellschaft), it can only be an imaginary one as “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them”. It is a political Community and is furthermore imagined as both “limited and sovereign”, in that while all nations seek to monopolise certain types of power in their own (imagined and ideal) territory, no nation wishes to encompass the entire world. This distinguishes the nation from previous forms of political systems, described by Anderson as religious communities and dynastic empires.42

42 Anderson 2006: 6-7, quotes from p. 6, Gesellschaft as defined by Tönnies (1955). Oddly, Anderson seems to believe that actual world domination was irrelevant to pre-modern rulers. He thus appears to ignore for example the actual attempt at world-empire made by Mohamed and the
Prior to the emergence of nations the world was, according to Gellner and Anderson, organised primarily after social stratification lines: large illiterate masses of peasants ruled by widely spread classes of literate clerics (e.g. the Medieval Christian priesthood, Islamic *Ulema* and Confucian *literati*) and sometimes literate warrior-nobles. Culture appeared in such societies in two general forms: (1) the highly localised verbally transmitted low culture of the peasants and (2) the literate high culture of the clerics, generally including literature and philosophy as well as theology, and universal in its aspirations, generally perceived as the word of God given to all men, rather than as the distinctive mark of a specific culture. Measures were often taken by more worldly powers to remove clerics from the particularistic concerns of a family by “depriving the budding warrior/bureaucrat/cleric either of ancestry, or of posterity, or of both.”\(^{43}\) Anderson also stresses the role of language as a difference between pre-modern and modern imagined communities. Systems like Christianity, the Middle Kingdom and the Islamic *Umma* were based on the use of “universal” literary languages such as Latin, classical Chinese and classical Arabic in an environment that remained largely illiterate. Nationalism, on the other hand, was based on universal (or at least national) literacy in national vernacular languages. It was the socio-economic factor of *printing capitalism* that from the sixteenth century and onwards forced their establishments to create a market for its written products when the limited markets of medieval literate classes were already satisfied.\(^{44}\)

Gellner explains the development of nationalities with the new organisation of labour demanded by the industrialisation of society. A sense of belonging to a localised community became insufficient in a time characterised by urbanisation. He describes this mechanism in the following (fictional) example:

The Ruritanians were a peasant population speaking a group of related and more or less mutually intelligible, dialects, and inhabiting a series of discontinuous, but not very much separated pockets within the lands of the Empire of Megalomania. The Ruritanian language, or rather the dialects which could be held to compose it, was

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\(^{43}\) Gellner 1983: 8-18, quote from p. 15. The second was sometimes accomplished by actual castration (many pre-modern empires were, at least partially, administered by eunuchs), but more often, as in the Christian West, by moral stigmatisation of clerical offspring through celibacy. The first was, for example, the case with the Janissary and Mamluk warrior classes of the Ottoman Empire, consisting of bought slaves or recruited as young boys among subject populations and brought up exclusively for the profession of loyal soldiers to the Empire. By both methods, these classes became devoid of family loyalties and in that way left without other loyalties than that to their state, or, more specifically (as their rulers would often realise too late), their regiments. See Goodwin 1998 for further discussion of the Janissary army.

\(^{44}\) Anderson 2006.
not really spoken by anyone other than these peasants. The aristocracy and official-
dom spoke the language of the Megalomanian court, which happened to belong to a
language group different from the one of which the Ruritanian dialects were an off-
shoot. [...] In the past the Ruritanian peasants had had many grieves, movingly and
beautifully recorded in their lament-songs (painstakingly collected by village school-
masters late in the nineteenth century, and made well known to the international
musical public by the compositions of the great Ruritanian composer L.). [...] In the
nineteenth century, a population explosion occurred at the same time as certain other
areas of the Empire of Megalomania – but not Ruritania – rapidly industrialized. The
Ruritanian peasants were drawn to seek work in the industrially more developed
areas, and some secured it, on the dreadful terms prevailing at the time. As back-
wards rustics speaking an obscure and seldom written or taught language, they had a
particularly rough deal in the towns to whose slums they had moved. At the same
time, some Ruritanian lads destined for the church, and educated in both the litur-
gical and court languages, became influenced by the new and liberal ideas in the
course of their secondary schooling, and shifted to a secular training at the university,
ending not as priests but as journalists, teachers and professors. They received
encouragement from a few foreign non-Ruritanian ethnographers, musicologists, and
historians who had come to explore Ruritania. The continuing labour migration, in-
creasingly widespread elementary education and conscription provided these Ruri-
tanian awakeners with a growing audience.\footnote{Gellner 1983: 58-60.}

The imagined community of the nation is thus the result of a removal from
actual local communities. The nationalist and the bourgeois individual are the
same. Nationality puts him closer to the pre-modern cleric than to the peasant
and thus opens the work market of the entire nation to him. In this context
culture is no longer taken for granted. Instead it becomes part of a con-
sciously expressed national identity with political implications.\footnote{Gellner 1983. The Islamic world of today provides an interesting contrast as it is entering its industrialist phase with a clerical class relatively suited to the adaptation to the new situation. Unlike the Western world, in which the clerics had been weakened by the Enlightenment, the Islamic Ulema still maintains significant positions of power, and much of the development in the Muslim world points to the succession of localised traditional cultures, not by national high cult-
ure but instead by something more close to the previous high culture of the literate universalist
Ulema. The relevant parallel to European nationalism in the Muslim world is, in other words, not
primarily Algerian or Iraqi nationalism, but rather Islamist fundamentalism, Gellner 1983: 75-81.

\footnote{Hobsbawm 1990.}}

According to Hobsbawm, the history of political nationalism starts with
the French Revolution – a bourgeois revolution. Quoting the Declaration of
Rights of 1795 he points to its emphasis on the fraternity and equality of
citizens as rulers rather than subjects of the State\footnote{Hobsbawm 1990.} (res publica, the rule of the
people, rather than monarchy, the rule of one):
Each people is independent and sovereign, whatever the number of individuals who compose it and the extent of the territory it occupies. This sovereignty is inalienable. Interestingly, no such passage was present in the earlier Declarations, that is, the ones presented before the outbreak of the Revolutionary War. The ideological foundations of French Republican nationalism, however, already existed in the form of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s theories on the public will as distinct from the will of the majority and originating from a pre-defined people. The members of this people were equal and free citizens. The battle cry of the French revolution, however, also describes them as brothers, which implies both a family relationship and male gender. The recognition of women as members of the nation would take much longer. As symbolic images women were, however, constantly present in the French revolution; the symbolic position of the King was now replaced (in the case of royal statues often quite literally) with symbolic goddesses of Liberty and France. At the height of revolution these goddess cults even replaced the Christian Church with the cult of the Fatherland. These images did not, however, imply the emancipation of actual women. It would be more correct to interpret them as symbols of what the male citizen armies of the Republic fought to protect.

Anderson also emphasises the break with tradition imagined by the revolutionaries and manifested for example in the new revolutionary calendar. He, however, points to the revolutions in which the Latin American states broke away from Spain and Portugal in the early nineteenth century as the origin of nationalism proper. While linguistic unity was present, linguistic differentiation from the dominant groups in their empire was apparently not a necessary requirement. Instead, he presents these revolutions as the results of the territorial boundedness of each region’s élite. The members of these Latin American élites had remained subjected to the central élite in Spain and Portugal, while at the same time being unable to join these, due to their transatlantic birth. This is, according to Anderson, what moved them to the final break with their European overlords. Nationalism in the already established monarchies of Europe then appeared as a second wave of nationalism, turning them – some more successfully than others – from dynastic realms into nation-states. In contrast to the revolutionary break with history in Latin America and France, this official nationalism was, however, backward-looking in nature; even French nationalists came to look back on the revolution as a contextualised part of the country’s history rather than as a break with it. Official nationalism, in turn, provoked one more wave: that of European sep-

49 Hobsbawm 1990.
arist nationalisms such as those of Ireland, Scotland and Serbia. While early republican patriotism had invited all inhabitants into the nation, the later version, however, based its categories on a purported ancientness of traditions and languages, often legitimised towards the end of the century by academics such as linguists, folklorists and racial biologists. With reference to both periods Hobsbawm stresses the central role of intellectuals and bourgeois class interests. It was also as a vehicle for bourgeois interests that nationalism would continue to influence history. With a somewhat more positive view of nationalism Anderson also reckons with a fourth wave consisting of anti-colonial Third World national movements. Much like their South American forbears these were not linguistically defined but instead limited by colonial borders. Within these boundaries new post-colonial élites would now have to create new nation-states.

End of Nations?
If the modern era is running towards its end, should not time then be running out for national identities, perhaps even for the nation-state? Anderson, Gellner and Hobsbawm all try to explain the re-emergence of nationalism in the late twentieth century without having to reject a theory that has, after all, predicted its disappearance. Gellner concludes that the status of national culture among the masses will remain unthreatened in the foreseeable future. It is thus more probable that existing economic needs of integration will be met by an increased similarity in the existing national cultures than by their disappearance. Ironically, it appears as if the intellectual classes, the same classes that originally instigated nationalism, will be the first to adapt to a higher mobility between national cultures.

In 1990 Hobsbawm, too, recognised that it may “seem wilful blindness to conclude […] with some reflections on the decline of nationalism” at a time when “more new nation-states have been formed, or are in the process of forming, than at any time in this century.” Hobsbawm’s distinction between patriotism and state-independent nationalism, however, allows him to do precisely that. The breaking up of European colonial empires some decades earlier was, according to him, not the result of increased nationalism but of anti-colonialism, and the separatism of the Soviet and Yugoslav successor states were not the result of newly emerged nationalisms but of nationalist conflicts inherited from the Czarist and Habsburg empires. The claims to nationhood

51 Anderson 2006.
54 Gellner 1983.
55 Hobsbawm 1990: 163, italics from the original.
made by Third World leaders today are typically claims made by states with territories inherited from colonialist treatises rather than representing actual nations. The threats against national stability are on the other hand generally either pre-national ethnic troubles or the result of religious fundamentalism, a decidedly non-nationalist force. As Gellner points out tribalism is, however, only tribalism when it fails and nationalism when nationhood is accomplished. Hobsbawm also looks hopefully to the settling of older properly national questions in the Western world, such as the Scots, Québécois and Fleming questions, problems presented by groups that now seem prepared to settle with regional institutions rather than with outright sovereignty.56

It is not impossible that nationalism will decline with the decline of the nation-state, without which being English or Irish or Jewish, or a combination of all these, is only one way in which people describe their identity among the many others which they use for this purpose, as occasion demands. It would be absurd to claim that this day is already near. However, I hope it can at least be envisaged. After all the very fact that historians are at least beginning to make some progress in the study and analysis of nations and nationalism suggests that, as often, the phenomenon is past its peak. The owl of Minerva which brings wisdom, said Hegel, flies out at dusk. It is a good sign that it is now circling round nations and nationalism.57

Many have thought so, both within and outside the academy. One of these58 is Manuel Castells, perhaps not the most original among them, but at least one who is comprehensive and not entirely untypical. According to Castells, we are rapidly moving into an informational new age, as well as into a new kind of society, one that he describes as a network society, a society marked by a network economy, and a network state. To start with the emerging network economy (emerging under the system of informational capitalism), it is characterised by the increasing irrelevance of geographical positions as well as of increasingly complex ownership structures in which ownership is diffused connecting companies in global networks. Employment is at the same time becoming more and more insecure as the economy increases in flexibility. Like the network economy, the network state is59

a state characterized by the sharing of authority (that is, in the last resort, the capacity to impose legitimised violence) along a network. A network, by definition, has nodes, not a center. Nodes may be of different sizes, and may be linked by asymmetrical

57 Hobsbawm 1990: 192, ref. to Breuilly 1985: 73 as one of “the rare theorists who seem to share my doubts about the strength and dominance of nationalism”.
relationships in the network, so that the network does not preclude the existence of political inequalities among its members.60

The premier example of such a networked system of government is today the European Union with its intertwined nation-states, its inter-national and supra-national agencies, its all the more independent regions and its non-governmental actors. Here nation-states are already giving up much of their sovereignty, not to each other but to a more diffuse state of things. The EU is not dominated by any single nation-state, although some, such as France and Germany, hold significantly more power than others. It is not a hegemonic system, but a networked one containing several nodes, some of which are more important than others but still without a centre. Neither do the nation-states hold a full monopoly of entering the system other than on certain levels. Regions are now becoming increasingly more common players in the network, as it is often more profitable for them to work directly with the EU, or with each other in trans-national networks, than through national governments. At the same time it becomes more potentially profitable for companies and people in each region to work together with their regional government for the good of the region than to work against it or below it. In regions such as Catalunya, Scotland and “Padania” these regional interests are linking on to identities. Sometimes they even include claims for political independence (from the nation-state). In these post-national days these claims, however, appear exchangeable for a more beneficial place in the network that already encloses the nation-state, as well as the proclaimed nation-to-be. To a traditional nationalist this would (and often does) seem hypocritical. In the network society nations are, however, increasingly independent of the State, preferring instead a more cultural (and possibly ethnic) existence. Above them flies the common European identity, far from a primary identity, but already with its own flag and anthem.61

The network society does, however, influence identity in other relevant ways. Older societal bases for identity are losing their once taken-for-granted stability. The omnipresent insecurity of individuals in a network society seems frightening to some and then may then be countered with the construction of a new singular identity. When this is done in the informational era it is, however, against rather than within the older identities that it takes place. The examples of such new identity movements are many and often violent: cases such as the IRA, the Zapatistas and Islamist fundamentalist groups are only the tip of the iceberg. When at their most extreme such groups are formed among those disadvantaged by the new order of things. These are both

60 Castells 1998: 332.
numerous and diverse: as prosperous companies, cities and regions connect into the evermore global networks of informational society, not only individuals and organisations, but entire cities and regions are being left behind. It is not only among the disadvantaged and the confused in the major cities, but also in the entire regions left out, that the new movements are growing. Religious fundamentalism is something of a case in point: it provides an entire new set of values as well as a whole new community, and it often does so in total and explicit rejection of the secularised world that will be the normal environment of any member of the informational society (like nationalism it, however, often does so based on a myth of being an older and more authentic version of its society).62

The strength of identity-based social movements is their autonomy vis à vis the institutions of the state, the logic of capital, and the seduction of technology. […] Yet the fundamental problem raised by processes of social change that are primarily external to the institutions and values of society, as it is, is that they may fragment rather than reconstitute society. Instead of transformed institutions, we would have communities of all sorts. Instead of social classes we would witness the rise of tribes. […] With no Winter Palace to be seized, outbursts of revolt may implode, transformed into everyday senseless violence.63

This fundamental problem stems from an equally fundamental fact of the Information Age: that it builds to a large extent on a diffusion of the distinction between fact and fiction. Political events become events only when they are projected in the media. Symbolic and cultural politics are now more real than the politics of what would once have appeared to be socio-economic reality. This is why cultural politics may be put centre stage again:64

The reconstruction of society’s institutions by cultural social movements, bringing technology under the control of people’s needs and desires, seems to require a long march from the communities built on resistance identity to the heights of new project identities, […] For this transition to be undertaken, from resistance identity to project identity, a new politics of identity will have to emerge. This will be a cultural politics that starts from the premise that informational politics is predominantly enacted in the space of media, and fights with symbols, yet connects to values and issues that spring from people’s life experience in the Information Age.65

62 Castells 1997, Castells 1998. In the network society, even the family is at question as the patriarchal structures and divisions of work that once provided its socio-economic base are rapidly falling under the attack of feminist ideologies and the new economic order. Even the family is today supplanted by network structures; more diverse personal contacts are providing more and more of the security once provided by the family and the marital situation becomes something that is supposed to change periodically during a lifetime rather than something that should supposedly last until death does the spouses part (Castells 1998).
63 Castells 1998: 352
64 Castells 1998.
65 Castells 1998: 352-353
Cultivating the Nation: Nationhood and Culture

Invented Traditions: Culture in the Modernist School

In the revised edition of *Imagined Communities* Anderson added other explanations to the newfound tendency to perceive order in a world of national communities. This time he emphasised the role of culture in the form of, among other things, museums and maps, in imagining the nation as a limited and distinct community, fixing and exhibiting its history, differentiating co-nationals from foes in its pre-nationalist history, and even making its geographical borders more real (e.g. on stylised maps) than natural geography itself. Another way of marking citizens as members of the nation was the introduction of national dress. In *The Invention of Tradition* Hobsbawm elaborates further on the inventedness of national culture. Supposedly ancient traditions, such as the clan-specific Scottish tartans and the Bardic contest of the Welsh, were invented during the nineteenth century efforts to “revive” them. This was in his opinion a typical feature of what Anderson described as second phase nationalism.

This change in nationalist ideology can also be seen in the new interest in national languages not as means of communication (as in republican French nationalism), but as symbols. The unification of Gaelic dialects into a unified language is one example of this, as is the emergence of Finnish and Norwegian as written languages in the nineteenth century as well as the choice of a rarely spoken language like Hebrew for the official tongue of the new state of Israel in the twentieth century (this is made especially clear by the fact that many proponents of these languages had to learn them as adults). In this context Hobsbawm also stresses the central role of intellectuals and the bourgeoisie and their class interests in the creation of nations and nationalism. Much like the earlier universalist literary cultures of pre-nationalist clerics, the new national high cultures could not be upheld without the special care and protection that would in their case have to be offered by a nation-state, rather

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66 Anderson 1991. This dress should at the same time be modern and traditional. In many parts of the world the Western male uniform and suits were combined with more traditional pieces of clothing. Anderson gives many examples of this from all around the world. One example from the periphery of Europe is the Scottish habit of wearing the kilt together with modern civil or uniform jackets and shirts. As feminist researchers have pointed out, traditional costumes in modern societies are often worn only by the women while privileged men instead wear Western suits. The present day Indian contrast between women wearing saris and men wearing suits is an example of this, that Icelandic folk costumes exists only for women is another. These are illuminating examples of the nationalistic construction of Women as the mothers of the nation and preservers of its heritage in contrast to its public sphere, instead dominated by the men. Anderson 2006, Blom 2000.

than by an imperial state or universalist church. While pre-nationalist high
culture had been the distinguishing mark of the selected few, national high
culture was, however, to be diffused to everyone in a society where everyone
was to be made literate and where the State could demand absolute, and
ultimately exclusive, loyalty of all its citizens. Cultural policy was an obvious
instrument for the State to achieve this legitimacy.

Not every theorist, however, thinks that national culture in the modern
days needs the protection of cultural policy. This is, according to Billig, far
from the case. Instead, nationalisms are constantly rehearsed and flagged in
more banal ways, such as by the literal national flags flown by citizens at
home and at government offices, but also by less literal “flags” such as post
stamps and coins. Another example is cheering for the nation itself at sports
events. In political language, nationality is flagged more subtly, hidden in
words such as “we”, “us”, and, sometimes, “them”. Politics is divided into
“interior” and “foreign” policy and news comes either from “home” or from
“abroad”. Elections are held “nationally” and representatives to international
and supranational forums are presented as “national” representatives – even
when this happens to be erroneous, as is the case at many levels in the Euro-
pean Union. Rather than having died out, nationalism has in many countries
entered a face of banality. Banal nationalism is, however, not banal in the sense
of being uninteresting or irrelevant, but rather in the sense of “the banality of
evil”, as used by Hannah Arendt.

While other identities are becoming more important in the western
world, they are generally formulated in terms that suggest that they are sec-
ondary to nationalism. Such terms are, for example, “African-American” and
“Japanese-American”. Like the workers of the nineteenth century, supposedly
global identities organise themselves nationally first, and globally second, if at
all. This is because identity politics are not only about identity but also about
politics, and politics is still mostly confined to the institutional framework of
nation-states. In fact globalisation itself may, according to Billig, be a pheno-
menon emerging from, and even to a large extent inside, a specific nation-
state: the United States of America. Globalisation is in other words not a
matter of de-nationalisation, but instead of Americanisation, and while it
makes the “patriotism” of Americans even more hidden, even more banal, it
does nothing to lessen its strength. One could of course argue that this per-
spective is, ironically, a narrowly American one. While America might remain
un-threatened; this is certainly not the case for the nation-states that are

70 Billig 1995, ref. at p. 7 to Arendt 1963.
71 Billig 1995.
threatened by its cultural imperialism. This is, however, a matter that needs to be answered empirically.

**Culture, Civilisation and Bildung**

When Gellner and Anderson worked out Modernist nationalism theory, the connection between the concepts of culture and the nation had already been thoroughly studied by the German sociologist Norbert Elias. In his monumental work *The Civilising Process* he describes, among other things, the views of culture and the nation developed by the rising industrial *bourgeoisie* in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Germany. It was among these that nationalism was developed as a system of thought by philosophers such as Herder, Hegel and Schelling. A distinction was made between *Kultur* and *Zivilisation* (culture and civilisation), a difference between on the one hand the superficial but learned *Zivilisation* of the western nations of France and Britain, and on the other hand the deep *Kultur* that was growing from the blood of the Germans and the soil of Germany. This distinction had its background in how the German intellectuals in the eighteenth century had viewed their own French-speaking and French-influenced aristocracy: i.e. as superficial, immoral, irreligious and culturally separated from the rest of the German people.⁷²

Intellectuals, as opposed to aristocrats, build their social standing on education, not on birthright. It was in this context that the notion of Bildung emerged. Although this term is unique to German (and to a few other languages – including Swedish – to which it has spread from the German), it originated in the verb *zu bilden*, used as a translation of the French word *former*, which in turn had developed from the Latin *formere*, “to form”. Bildung is, in other words, about education as a means to form the personality, to cultivate it. The German (and Swedish) word *Bild*, however, also means image, implying that Bildung is about forming a personality as an image of a higher idea (the Swedish terms *bildning* and *folkbildning* are further discussed in Chapter IV). The example for such a higher culture was in the nineteenth century

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⁷² Elias 1989. In a later version, the distinction between *Zivilisation* and *Kultur* was used by Oswald Spengler in his gargantuan work on *The Decline of the West*, where he described not only the decline of Western high culture in the terms of a process devaluing a high culture into a civilisation in the worst sense of the word, but also claimed that this had been the road of all high cultures since the days of Pharaonic Egypt. In this we can again recognise the connection between this way of thinking and the ethnicist tendency to place the soul of the nation in the distant past rather than in the present. Thus the Spenglerian argument would be that the German greatness lies in their stronger connection with their roots, as opposed to the British and the French – not to speak of the hated Americans – and their decadent focus on civilisation in the form of progress. Liberal democracy was according to Spengler among the worst signs of the current decadence as it turned the social structure upside down and removed spiritual distinctiveness from the State (Spengler 1996). Spengler’s world view is perhaps one of the most consistently particularistic perspectives ever created, even though its scope is wider than mere nationalism.
almost always that of classical, and most often Greek, antiquity. To both Herder and Hegel the ultimate goal of Bildung was for the knowledge of the individual to encompass the entirety of human culture. The micro-cosmos would thus coincide with the macro-cosmos. As this was an organic process it was, however, not a matter of separating the individual from his culture. Instead, it was a matter of elevating both the person and the German culture to the level set by the ancient Greeks. Much like traditional liberal education in Anglo-Saxon countries Bildung, was on the other hand, opposed to specialised education (Ausbildung), much like Kultur was opposed to Civilization. While specialist education may be superficially added to the personality, Bildung was a process that refined the personality from within. It is exemplified by the German intellectual class – the Bildungsbürgertum – a group that imagined itself as removed from society and immersed in the study of subjects such as philosophy and philology. In a sense this means that Bildung as a concept transcends the distinction between the particularist and universalist concepts of culture. Ideally, it was supposed to be both.73

A New Look at Perennialism: Anthony D. Smith

Even today the Modernist orthodoxy does not stand unopposed in nationalism theory. While not directly questioning the view of nationalism as a relatively recent phenomenon, Anthony D. Smith has proposed that successful nation-states build on pre-existing and much more ancient structures of a kind that he describes as ethnie. These ancient sources influence the structures of present-day nations. Each nation thus has a particular background and is not merely the result of a universal process. In spite of this, the study of nations and ethnie can, however, start from a common vantage point and has revealed a number of parallels between the developments of various nations.74 Nation-states can, according to Smith, be defined as “states claiming to be nations”,75 while a nation, can be defined as “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members”.76 An ethnie is in turn defined by sharing six attributes: “a collective proper name”, “a myth of common ancestry”, “shared historical memories”, “one or more differentiation elements of common culture”, “an association with a specific homeland” and “a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population.”77 It should be noted that the boundaries of an

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75 Smith 1991: 143
ethnie can be quite recognisable even when not all of its characteristics appear at the same time. It is, in other words, not a question of a smallest common denominator. The modern Croatian ethnicity would be such a case. Its distinction from its Serb and Bosnian Muslim neighbours is marked by religious difference (Catholic in contrast to Muslim or Orthodox). In the north it is, however, distinguished from Italians, Slovenians and Austrians mainly by language.78

Neither should the ethnie be interpreted as an essentialist concept; strong ethnic sense of belonging is neither universal, nor constant. Instead, well-defined ethnie have appeared on specific occasions in history and for specific reasons. Organised religion is one such reason (especially if it is distinct and specific). Another is the heightened solidarity often caused by war. Ethnie can be upheld by specific states and religious institutions diffusing myths and culture among “their” people. Lack of a state, leading to persecution can, however, also help to uphold the distinction between a particular ethnie and the surrounding populations. As opposed to a nation-state, an ethnic state (a state based on an ethnie) can, however, also be an empire ruling excluded larger or smaller subject populations (which may or may not be ethnie in their own right). This was, for example, the case in the Ottoman and Persian empires, both of which still made a significant impact on the establishment of clearly defined Persian and Turkish ethnie. Old Testament Hebrew and later Jewish groups also exemplify an ethnie established by the existence of an ethnic state and of religious distinction. Later their community was upheld by religious distinction coupled with persecution. In this case the sense of ethnic distinctiveness went far enough to prevent intermarriage with surrounding religious and cultural groups.79

In his later work Smith has come to take a closer look at the development not only of nations from ethnie, but also of nationalism from ethnicism. In Chosen Peoples he points to religious myths of chosenness, of promised lands and of golden ages as a shared characteristic of older ethnic mythologies and modern nationalist imagery. While this chosenness was often imagined in terms of sacralised kingship – as in the cases of the French Merovingian, Carolingian and Capetian dynasties as well as of the Russian Imperial tradition – there are also instances of chosen peoples (ethnie) far prior to nationalism. These would include the Ethiopian Aksumites and Amhara, the Armenians and the Japanese. It is interesting to note that in several cases this sense of chosenness builds upon the same origin: the Biblical myth of the Covenant between Israel and its God. Clear references to this myth can be found in the ethnic mythologies of ethnie as different as the English, British Celts, Scots,

Armenians, Aksumites and, of course, the Jewish diaspora, but also in several nationalism appearing during the last few centuries, such as the American imagery of America as a new Israel with a new promised land and a sacred duty to act as an example to the rest of the world.80

In spite of all this the ethnie is in some ways a much weaker community than the nation. The primary differences are that an ethnie does not demand a mass public culture, a common economy or common legal rights and duties for its members. The ethnie is in other words not by necessity either an economically or a politically active category. On the contrary, ethnie can be categorised into two major groups: lateral and vertical. Of these, only the second includes people from all, or most, social strata in its territory. The lateral ethnie instead includes only one social stratum and can be exemplified by aristocratic ethnie such as the Medieval Norman, Hungarian or pre-Muslim Spanish aristocracies tracing their roots to Norse, Magyar and Visigoth origins respectively, and generally trying to separate themselves from their subject populations in terms of language, culture, political activity and (in the last case) religion. Neither do ethnie normally strive to include all persons living in a given territory. In line with the non-essentialist nature of the concept an ethnie can also change these properties, which is of course a prerequisite for a transition from ethnie to nation. Hungarians and Turks have, for example, changed their mythical homeland, attaching themselves to the area of their present habitation, rather than to that of their mythical origins. As origin myths have often been religious in nature, such changes can also be the result of a change of the defining religion or secularisation. The Persian ethnie could again be taken as an example; while it was originally defined by its Zoroastrian religion, it is presently marked as a Shi’ite community. Many ethnie have, on the other hand, failed at making such transitions and have perished as distinct communities as a consequence of abandoning significant marks of identity.81 Yet, this serves to illustrate what could in the terms of this study be described as the values and limits of the national community that legitimises the State.

While proposing an ethnic origin of nations, Smith does not directly contradict the Modernist assertion of a modern origin of nationalism. Instead, he accepts the construction of nation-states as the basis of existing states and as an answer to the needs of these states and their emerging bourgeois and intellectual élites (referring to Charles Tilly, among others). The existence of both states and ethnie prior to the emergence of nationalism and nation-states helps, however, to explain the differences in the development of nationalism in various countries, especially the East-West difference between what he de-

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80 Smith 2003, the more literal forms of Israelising myths have been more comprehensively described by Tudor Parfitt in The Last Tribes of Israel (2002).
scribes as ethnic and territorial nationalism (the Andersonian second wave versus French and American republican nationalism). While these differences may not be as categorical as proposed by more Modernist theories, differences in the pre-national situation may help provide an explanation. France is, for example, built upon a mostly vertical ethnie with a close symbolic connection to an already established state. Pre-unification Germans could also be described as a mostly vertical ethnie, although lateral in its eastern periphery and without a strong established state. German nationalism was formed in the struggle to achieve statehood and at the same time include its eastern parts, now transformed into a kind of diaspora. Turks and Magyar were, on the other hand, forced by their laterality to adopt a territorially based nationalism in order to continue to lay claim to their symbolic homeland in the new era.

Like Hobsbawm, Smith proposes an appearance of nationalism at the outset of the French Revolution. This nationalism was clearly territorial and showed itself primarily in the Jacobin efforts to homogenise culture, for instance by spreading a standardised French language at the expense of local and regional dialects, an effort much like Bismarck’s later efforts to destroy a more Catholic (and thereby less Prussian) view of the emerging German nation in the Kulturkampf. When nationalism spread eastwards, the nationalisms of aristocratic, previously lateral, ethnie, such as the Poles and Magyars, clashed with subject populations, such as Slovaks, Romanians and Serbs in Polonisation and Magyarisation campaigns (not to speak of World War I). At the same time older empires had serious difficulties in adapting to the new situation. The Romanov Empire managed with relative success to turn itself into a Russian nation-state while the Ottoman Empire became a Turkish republic only after territorial decimation and severe persecutions of non-Turkish populations. In other cases the understanding of the nation has shifted within a single nation-state. Both in France and in Germany examples of both ethnic and state-framed concepts of the nation can be seen; it was in fact only after the Bismarck’s resignation that German Imperial policy properly turned from the older Prussian state-framed tradition to the more ethnic definitions of the late- and post-Hohenzollern German states.

83 This kind of conflict can be seen even more clearly in the Greek case, with a French-inspired territorial nationalism based on an equally French-inspired classical Greek imagery. Later in the nineteenth century however, Greek nationalists turned into a more ethnic interpretation, thereby opening up the nation more fully to the Ottoman Greek diaspora, as well as to a more Byzantine-Orthodox national imagery. These differences in imagery even influenced the creation of the national language, leading to the creation both of a written language based on the demotic dialects of the Greek homeland and on the simultaneously existing more Byzantine and archaic formal written language of the Phanariot diaspora. Smith 1986: 129-226.
None of these views contradicts the idea of a modern origin of nationalism. By depicting it as a new development based on earlier ethnicisms and religions and to this day retaining, sometimes even re-introducing, their sacred times and sacred spaces even if re-cast in a new context and infused with new meaning, they do, however, give reasons to consider its introduction a less radical change. In doing so, Smith could perhaps provide us with a theoretical framework for the interpretation of ethnic troubles currently plaguing nation-states, as well as for the origins of these states. Many originally territorially defined post-colonial nation-states are currently facing serious attempts to redefine them in ethnic terms. This is, for example, the case with Hindu Nationalism in India. It is, according to Smith, important to realise that while some states – such as Switzerland – may originate in several ethnic groups, successful nation-states are generally built around core ethnie. As an example, white Anglo-Saxon Protestants cannot today be considered the only Americans: they have, however, played a special role in the construction of an American identity. It would be odd to believe that this in no way influences the present national self-images.84

One should, however, notice that communities such as the Catalans and Scots, which with Smith’s definition can be considered not only ethnie but full nations, are today relatively satisfied with an existence as subjects and members of larger nation-states, while other ethnie and diasporas, however vigilant, are equally peaceful in pursuing ethnic minority rights. Such peaceful solutions are, however, only possible when compromises between them and the core ethnie of their nation-states are opened up. Like so many historical examples, these cases show that Marx was wrong in believing that the future lay solely with the great nations. In reality smaller nations and regions marked by the Kleinstateri, once so despised by nineteenth-century politicians and theorists, have often proven both more culturally creative and more successful than empires and large integrative nation-states. While peaceful solutions are reached in some parts of the world, other nation-states are, however, still pursuing the paths of integration or exclusion, and conflicts such as the Israeli–Palestinian and the Sri Lankan–Tamil conflicts are showing little signs of ending peacefully.85 On a global level Smith concludes that the presently acclaimed ideologies of globalisation lack the necessary strength to replace nationalism in its dominant position; they lack symbolic as well as historic and particularistic foundations, while nationalism, despite its failings, continues to possess precisely these strengths.86

86 Smith 1990.
INSTITUTIONS OF THE NATION-STATE

Regardless of the origin of the concept of the nation as an imagined political community, the State as an institution is much older, and so is its need to relate to its citizens and denizens institutionally. From this perspective the nation-state can be analysed as an institutional solution to the problems of the State and its spread across the globe as a case of isomorphism (see Chapter III).87 As an example of a now orthodox approach to the State in relation to its citizens and denizens, few works could be better suited than those of the historian Charles Tilly. According to him, a state is founded primarily on access to both capital and the means of cohesive violence. Generally, capital can be provided through coercion (through taxes, tariffs etc.). The means of coercion can, however, also be bought with capital (e.g. mercenaries). This has historically created two possible paths for state-building as based on either capital or coercion. As a middle road between these extremes, the State could choose a strategy of simultaneously building on both.88

Tilly can thus categorise states according to three major ideal types: states built on the concentration of coercion, states built on concentration of capital, and national states, defined as states built on a combination of both. The historical Republic of Venice could be given as an example of a state built on capital, using an extremely small public structure and instead relying on the private means of trade-based ruling noble families more interested in the access to trading routes than in conquest. Sweden in the early modern period is, on the other hand, a clear example of a state based on coercion, in the form of a concentration of military (and later administrative) power in the hands of the Crown. The interesting point is, however, that from the nineteenth century and onwards all states are national. There are still differences: European welfare states, for example, concentrate more capital to the State than the USA, and the Soviet Union built more on coercion than most current states. When compared to early examples of this type, such as early modern France, modern states are, however, extreme in their concentration of both capital and coercion. This change is, according to Tilly, driven primarily by war and by administrative inventions. These inventions (such as modern bureaucracy and taxation systems) have made it possible to finance larger armies, but have at the same time made the State more dependent on the economy, thus forcing all states closer to the national model and eradicating those farthest from it (such as the Ottoman Empire and the Venetian Republic).89

87 Meyer 1999.
88 Tilly 1990.
89 Tilly 1990. As an example of the difference between coercive and other states can be mention-ed how they deal with epidemics. Coercive measures include quarantines and other restrictions
A Tillyan ‘national state’ is, however, not by necessity a nation-state, as defined in this dissertation. The national state in its modern form, however, requires a new relationship to its inhabitants, namely that of citizenship, making them more accessible to direct taxation and participation in the national project, primarily in the armies of the national state. The appearance of national states is thus one of the causes for the appearance of nation-states (as the term is used in here). Citizenship is by nature a more direct relationship than earlier forms, such as the feudal subjection of a person to several different masters in various positions in a feudal hierarchy. Even in its modern form, however, citizenship can be constructed in several different ways.

The Modern State and the Institution of Citizenship
Limits to the right to citizenship have been studied by Rogers Brubaker. Much like this dissertation his studies are studies of institutions on the level of day-to-day politics and administration. Legally speaking, the automatic assignation of citizenship can generally be classified as according to one of two general principles: *jus soli* (the principle of soil) and *jus sanguinis* (the principle of blood). Under *jus soli* a person will automatically become a citizen if he or she is born within the territory of the State. Under *jus sanguinis* citizenship is instead assigned to those descending from other citizens. Comparing citizenship legislation and debates in France and Germany, Brubaker has illustrated how these principles have related to national identity during the construction of these two states.\(^90\) Later he has described this difference in terms of state-framed and counter-state nationalism, thereby making the distinction less ambiguous by anchoring it to the more easily definable entity of the State.\(^91\)

In France the concept of citizenship reached prominence in the midst of the Revolution. Turning the State upside-down did, however, not necessarily mean introducing new limits to its population: the subjects of the ancien régime simply became the citizens of the new Republic. Ironically, the real novelty instead became the exclusiveness of the citizenship rather than its cosmopolitan

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\(^90\) Brubaker 1992.
\(^91\) Brubaker 1999.
sides. Inspired as it was by the antique and contemporary city states celebrated by Rousseau, the Republic also came to incorporate the inherent exclusiveness of these often directly patrician communities. During the Revolutionary wars, the French Republic incorporated significant elements of *jus sanguinis* in its citizenship legislation in order to exclude potentially disloyal foreigners from its citizenry, thus fulfilling the creation of a French Republic — imagined as “owned” by its citizenry, as opposed to the previous monarchy of France (territorially defined) — by changing from a definition based on subjection to a state to one based on inherited membership. The legislation that was to form during the nineteenth century was essentially a compromise between these two principles.92

In Germany the concept of citizenship did not, in contrast, develop from one distinct point in history but was instead introduced successively and on the basis of earlier modes of categorisation such as the *Bürgertum* of a City or belongingness to a *Stand* (social stratum). These were in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries merged into one single concept of *Staatangehörigkeit* (State-belonging) in the various German states, and later in the unified German Empire. While generally exclusive, and as citizenship legislations decidedly *jus sanguinis*-oriented, these concepts were not consistently ethnic: the new German state included several ethnically and linguistically non-German populations (e.g. the Poles of eastern Prussia). The Empire was (like the Prussian state that preceded it) originally assimilationist in its attitude towards these groups. It was in fact as late as 1913 that a pure *jus sanguinis* law on citizenship was established in the German Empire. This law was, however, to remain in force until 1999 and still forms the basis of German citizenship legislation. According to this concept everyone descending from a German citizen (or citizen of a “German” state prior to the Hohenzollern Empire) has an automatic right to German citizenship, regardless of all other factors, while all such factors, as for example place of birth were made irrelevant to the automatic assignation of citizenship. The possibilities for naturalisation have since been significantly eased, especially for persons born in Germany, the rules for automatic assignation, however, remain.93

Comparing these two cases Brubaker concludes that citizenship legislation is not merely the result of legal convenience. Both France and Germany

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92 Brubaker 1992: 42, ref. to Rousseau 1914 and 1978. In its present version France does in fact assign citizenship automatically both to children of French citizens and to most persons born on French soil, even to the point of forcefully having assigned French nationality to persons born in Algeria before its independence, and even when their parents had later opted for Algerian citizenship rather than French. These principles have generally been defended from the perspective that anyone living in France, especially when born to parents living in or even born in France, would have been assimilated by French culture and French in identity, Brubaker 1992.

have retained their legislation through recent political arguments when German legislation was criticised from the left and French from the right. French citizenship legislation even survived the Vichy years (although the régime revoked thousands of naturalisation decisions made in the preceding years).94

The French understand their nation as the creation of their state, the Germans their nation as the basis of their state. There is a strong assimilationist strand in the French self-understanding that is lacking in the prevailing German self-understanding. France is not a classical country of immigration, but it is a classical country, perhaps the classical country, of assimilation. And schemes of self-understanding referring to the assimilation of the French periphery by the Parisian center have been easily and in a sense automatically and unconsciously transferred to the assimilation of immigrants.95

Citizenship and identification with the national collective should, however, not be regarded as cause and effect but rather as communicating vessels, the importance of which is illustrated by several recent Eastern European examples. Many Eastern European countries, notably the multi-national federations Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, established a practice of assigning not only citizenship but also formal ethnicity to their inhabitants and to note these in their passports. Some of these formal ethnicities – as, for example, Estonians and Croats – corresponded to Republics within the federations, others did not. When the federations disintegrated, formal ethnicity became the basis for newly relevant identities. In some cases, they even became the basis for the citizenship legislation of newly independent states. This is not to say that these identities had not existed previously, only that the borders between them were institutionalised by authoritative assignation.96

Based on the works of Rogers Brubaker and others, Tilly concludes that the collective of citizens and acceptable would-be citizens has been defined on the basis of either ethnicity or place of birth, which means that the basis of citizenship will be either primordial or learned (aside from ethnicity, Tilly also mentions gender as a basis for exclusion from citizenship that is both non-learnable and pre-existent to the State). The State’s stance towards its excluded non-citizen subjects can, according to Tilly, be either exclusive or inclusive. The exclusive turn is probably the one easiest to associate with the modern nation-state. Germany around World War I may be given as an example. France is, on the other hand, a republic that considers citizenship a learned quality expressed in political action, loyalty towards the State and the acceptance of French culture. This contrasts with the USA, in which the demands on would-be citizens are, according to Tilly, considerably less harsh, which


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makes the State significantly more inclusive. More importantly however, the USA is also significantly more generous in its acceptance of non-citizens living and working in its territory. How a community considering itself primordial could be inclusive is much harder to see, the Ottoman Empire, however, provides an example of a state which tolerated that many different cultural communities to co-existed in its territory, while at the same time considering all of these resident others to be primordial communities. It not only tolerated them, it also gave institutional recognition to their (ethno-religious) leaders and included them in the workings of the government. It is, however, also significant that Tilly’s example of a state in this category is neither a national state nor a nation-state, but a coercion-based Empire, later to be succeeded by a significantly less tolerant nation-state.97

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Fig. 1: The states’ relationship to its inhabitants.98

Even in nation-states that do tolerate direct representation of minorities in their government minorities may, however, be constructed around institutions. In his studies of the everyday construction of ethnicity in Transylvania, Rogers Brubaker has analysed how a minority community of Hungarians continues to exist in a city with an (ethnically) Romanian majority. One explanation is its institutionalisation. While the Hungarians do not have any political institutions of their own (with the exception of a political party that works within the framework of Romanian politics), they do have a number of institutions that can be described as cultural, in both the wide and the narrower sense, such as schools, newspapers, TV-channels, cinemas, theatres, associations, a university and churches (Roman Catholics and Calvinists tend to be Hungarian in this region, while ethnic Romanians are typically Orthodox). These serve as media for nationalism and for Hungarian culture. This is, however, not always the case and neither is it, according to Brubaker, the most important way in which they contribute to preserving the Hungarian minority as an imagined community. Hungarian cinemas may, for example, show American movies dubbed or subtitled in Hungarian. These institutions, however, give Hungarians the opportunity to speak Hungarian. More importantly, it

97 Tilly 1996, ref. among others to Brubaker 1992 on citizenship in France and Germany, Bodnar 1985 on immigration to the USA, Birnbaum 1993 on citizenship in France and Pelod 1992 on Arab citizens in Israel.
enables them to create a social world in which they predominantly meet other Hungarians, thus maintaining the minority as an imagined community partially framed by Hungarian institutions in civil society.99

In his 2004 article “Trust and Rule” Tilly discusses non-national communities in terms of trust-networks. These could, for example, be composed of pre-national trading diasporas or persecuted religious minorities such as the late-medieval and early modern Valdensians. Typical of these networks was an extremely high cost of leaving the network. This forces all members to continue to deal with each other, thus ensuring a high cost for untrustworthiness. Tilly furthermore claims that trust is a fundamental prerequisite for, among other things, trade. This could give an alternative explanation for the connection between Protestantism and capitalism described by Max Weber: people who are morally upstanding, especially within a religious framework that one accepts, are more likely to be trustworthy. In the strongly integrated national state these trust-networks are co-opted by the State, integrated with its institutions as more and more of each person’s life is affected by the State, which is much less the case with excluded minorities or the populations of non-national states.100

Concerning the end of the nationalist era implied by some Modernist theories, Tilly projects a vision not necessarily of the end of nation-states, but of an increase in the importance of the international state-system in relation to the states themselves. We no longer see changes in national borders to the extent once seen. Instead, we see an international system of nation-states punishing each nation that dares to attack another while at the same time respecting each other’s intra-national affairs. This is an era of inter-dependence in which the system is becoming at least as important as the states. This does not, however, pose a threat to the continuance of the existing nation-states, but actually helps to consolidate them and to protect them from external threats.101 On the other hand, the Internet and other new media have shown a tendency to lower the investment cost of joining a political cause or a business arrangement, which decreases commitment to trust-networks. Like Castells, Tilly also views the new media as decreasing the extent to which networks coincide with national communities. From a trust-network perspective, this would threaten the integration of networks with the State and through this the legitimacy of democracy itself.102

99 Brubaker 2006.
100 Tilly 2004.
102 Tilly 2004.
In his later work Brubaker has continued to concentrate on the categorisation of persons and phenomena into national, ethnic, and racial categories. While retaining this shift from studying groups to studying categorisation as a process he has, however, come to focus on informal micro-processes rather than on macro-processes of legal citizenship. For this purpose he has combined his earlier institutional approach with a cognitive one, based on influences from both sociology and cognitive psychology. As a result he is trying to understand ethnicity and nationality not as ontological categories or phenomena in the world, but rather as epistemological categories used to understand the world. These could, with inspiration from Paul DiMaggio and others, be studied as (perhaps institutionalised) schemas prescribing how to interpret the world in categories of ethnicity and nationality and what conclusions should be drawn from this description. This kind of categorisation not only concerns the understanding of other people but also the interpretation of objects and events.  

Approaching ethnicity and nationality as epistemological schemas of categorisation and interpretation means, in some degree, transcending both the dichotomy between primordialism and modernism and the distinction between state-framed and ethnic understandings of nationhood. In the former case, this is the result of a shift in interest from the actual origin of nations to the way in which national histories are imagined by interpreters. Interpreted in this way participants’ primordialism (that is, the primordialism believed in by participants rather than by the theorist) is, of course, not contradictory to what could be consequently described as “participants’ modernism”. National membership can be interpreted differently as well, not only by different interpreters, but also by the same interpreter in different contexts. Indeed, one of the chief benefits of studying grouping activities rather than groups is that such a model is far better equipped for the description of a more ambiguous and less consistent reality. Nationality or ethnicity is from this perspective not necessarily a constant feature of a person’s identity, but rather something that changes in importance from one context to another.  

Ethnicity and nationality are both composite categories and can be ascribed to a person due to a variety of factors. In his definition of nationality Smith enumerates a number of characteristics. A nation is thus “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical

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103 Brubaker et al 2004, an African American’s understanding of African Americanness could for example include the experience of “being stopped by the police for DWB [‘driving while black’]” as a racial schema, quote from p. 43.

104 A word borrowed by Brubaker from Smith 1998: 158.

memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal
rights and duties for its members". Other properties that are often used for
limiting the membership of a nation are language, religion, race and ethnicity.
Stephen Barbour and Cathie Carmichael have elaborated further on the role
of language formation in the development of European nationalism. As both
Anderson and Gellner have pointed out, the national languages have in no
way emerged independently of the nations that are now defined by them. In-
stead media, such as printed text, have continuously homogenised the langu-
ages within certain areas. European vernaculars obviously existed before the
nations. Many languages that are national today had, however, no distinct
borders in those days; they were separated by continuums of slightly different
dialects. Between the French of Île-de-France and the Castilian of Toledo there
was thus no distinct line, but a continuum passing via Langue d’oc, Catalan and
Aragonese. The same was even more recently the case in Sweden. The bord-
ers between Scandinavian languages are in no way empirically given; Swedish
includes a number of dialects that are much further removed from the
standard variety than standard Swedish is from standard Norwegian or Dan-
ish. Language can be important in both ethnic and state-framed national-
ism. The argument for its importance is, however, different: it is either im-
portant as part of ethnic heritage or to ensure communication between
citizens. In many cases these arguments may be interchangeable.

One reason for this is that ethnic belonging to a dominant group is
normally made invisible as such. It is “un-marked”, apparent as an ethnic
categorisation only by default as the absence of marked non-dominant ident-
ity. When Brubaker used this approach in his study of everyday ethnicity in
Romanian Transylvania he found, for example, that people were by default
categorised as Romanians and categorised otherwise only when recognised as
such (something which appears to be true of other dominant categories as
well, such as ‘male’ and ‘heterosexual’). The reference of words such as ‘Rom-
anian’ and ‘Hungarian’ could even change from a state-framed sense of
nation-belonging to referring to an ethnic or linguistic category, and back
again, during the same conversation, making all of these categories much
more ambiguous and fluent – but not in any way less real or forceful – than is
normally taken for granted. The consciousness of a difference between state-
framed and ethno-linguistic categorisation is, however, greater among the
(ethno-linguistic) Hungarians, the members of the marked minority category,
than among the Romanian-speaking majority. Hungarians were also more
likely than ethnic Romanians to use ethnic categorisation when interpreting

the reality around them. This appears to generally be the case for people who are identified as members of a minority.108

That a person’s own interpretation of his or her nationality need not be congruent with that of the law or of others was noted already by Max Weber: “Negroes of the United States, at least at present, consider themselves members of the American ‘nation’; but they will hardly be so considered by the Southern Whites.”109 Such ambiguity has unfortunately proved to be one of the central facets of nationhood. In this sense all categorisation of persons influences all other categorisation of those persons. This process is described from a somewhat different perspective in current work on intersectionality: that is as the cross-roads, or inter-sections, of various identity categories.110 Most of this research does not, however, directly concern the grouping activities worked by institutions. In spite of this the results of intersectional research exercise some influence on this study. Most importantly it underlines the Weberian point above, as well as the point that the same person might, by the same persons or institutions, in different situations be categorised differently, and that processes of categorisation are generally interconnected. Thus, a number of categories which are not normally used to define the nation may sometimes be at work to exclude persons that are normally included. In most Western societies race is such a category. Another category often discussed by intersectionalist researchers is gender.

Issues of gender can be seen as closely related to the distinction between ethnic and state-framed images of the nation. Ethnic images of the people as a family, often symbolised by the image of the nation as a mother, imply that gender-specific roles can be assigned to its members. The men are the sons of the nation, who go into battle in defence of its women, viewed as the children, wives and mothers of the nation. The same image may, however, be used to argue that the role of women is equal but different. The mothers who risk their lives in childbirth to procreate the nation have often been ascribed equal status to the men who risk their lives in battle. The mother who sends her sons into battle fearless of the fate that awaits them has been used as a supreme symbol of sacrifice. Consequently, nationalist movements have often centred on defending women in their roles as mothers and preservers of tradition and national culture. The state-framed nation was, on the other hand, originally an exclusively male affair. Since the equality of citizens was extended to women, gender inequality has, however, been seen as an abnormality from that perspective. The self-proclaimed representatives of imperial civilising projects have thus often argued for protecting the women in potential

110 Mulinari & de los Reyes 2005.
nations from the un-civilised and repressive traditions in which nationalists strive to lock them. Thus the Indian tradition of suttee (burning the widow) became a central issue for the British rulers of India as early as in the nineteenth century. Battles of this sort continue to be fought over women’s rights today, for example in relation to the European Muslim diaspora, where women’s clothing and marriage issues are once again given as the cause of a culture war.\footnote{Blom 2000, Schmidt-Linsenhoff 2000, Baron 2000, Hageman 2000, Benhabib 2004.}

Feminist research on national identities is often closely connected with post-colonial research on the relationship between the identities of the West and those connected with the world it colonised. Among the pioneers of this perspective was Edward Saïd. According to his research on Western literature, descriptions of the Other are an integral part of Western self-perception. This view has had a significant influence, for instance on the emerging academic field of museology, where it has inspired the study of representation in museum contexts. Later research has described Western (mis)representation of the Other in Freudian terms as a projection. The Western fascination with the Other thus becomes ambivalent (in the Freudian sense); the West is at the same time fascinated and revolted by the exoticism of the Other. Both of these feelings are, however, more related to the Western identity project than to the situation of the Other, who is thus denied representation. In reality, the West and the colonised world are, however, intertwined by the cultural presence of the West outside its traditional homelands as well as by the presence of Others in it. Thus cultural colonisation influences the self-perception of non-Westerners as well, forcing them to accept the categories ascribed to them by colonising powers.\footnote{Eriksson, Eriksson-Baaz & Thörn 1999, Hall 1990, Saïd 2002, Silvén 2006.}

Stuart Hall, among others, has used the term \textit{diaspora} to describe not only exile connected to an imagined home-land (as in Smith’s use of the word) but a situation in which identity depends both on a trans-national community and on the surrounding culture as well as on other even less place-related factors. Anderson has, on the other hand, argued that diasporas may develop in the opposite direction to become even more virulently nationalist than the homeland population. This tendency, which he describes as long-distance nationalism, is even more dangerous than the homeland variety, as exiles do not need to take the consequences of their own actions. Long-distance nationalism will thus not only be more driven by nostalgia, it will also be more violent and destructive.\footnote{Anderson 1992.}

While these theories will be highly relevant if I continue to study the reception or implementation of cultural policy, many of them are less relevant to the study of the processes that organise it, processes that
unfortunately do not appear to be much influenced by the self-perceptions of those who are excluded from its institutions. The tendency to deny self-representation to those perceived as foreign and to reduce them to representatives of categories that are chosen in institutional structures in which they are not represented is unfortunately highly relevant to this work, although I will concentrate on institutional processes of exclusion rather than on discourse.

POINTS OF DEPARTURE

Ethnicity and the State

This is a study of how national culture is institutionalised in the cultural policy of a state. An aspect of this is how it ascribes nationality to culture as well as to people. This is a matter of how the imagined community of the Swedish nation is imagined as limited by its sovereign state. Most theorists have concluded that nations can be categorised as building on either an “ethnic” or a “civil” foundation. The two sides of this distinction have however been described by many terms: “eastern” vs. “western” nationalism, “ethnic” vs. “civil”, “primordial” vs. “modern”, “primordial” vs. “learned”, “ethnic” vs. “territorial”, “state-framed” vs. “counter-state”, et cetera. A related categorisation exists in Anderson’s description of the four waves of nationalism. As indicated by the discussions on Charles Tilly, some of these categories intermingle with integrative dimensions. Others are more concerned with values than with how the nation is limited as a community. As Anthony D. Smith and Rogers Brubaker have both pointed out, an ethnicity may, furthermore, shape around a state or a legal category introduced by a state. Civil nationalism appears, by definition if nothing else, within the framework of a state, or at least an administrative unit. It has, however, often been mixed with ethnic feelings to a point where the difference has become one of degree rather than of an essential difference.

Issues concerning the integration of the members of the nation and how to define those members are also intertwined. There is a continuum of possible categories that are sometimes included and sometimes not. Inclusion may not be consistent. When a person or a phenomenon is always included identity can generally be expected to be un-marked. If no other borders are drawn the power of the State tends to be limited by default to people inhabiting the territory in which it is sovereign. In this dissertation I will study the institutional conceptualisation of a nation by using a scale ranging from state-framed to ethnic concepts of the nation. Large parts of this volume consist of detailed descriptions of which category-limits are institutionalised in which institutional contexts. Ethnic definitions of the nation are such that imagine it

as a primordial ethnic community. The *ethnic* as defined by Anthony D. Smith will here be considered an ideal-typical case of an *ethnic community*: a population sharing “a collective proper name”, “a myth of common ancestry”, “shared historical memories”, “one or more differing elements of common culture”, “an association with a specific ‘homeland’” and “a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population.”\(^{115}\) Primordialism and viewing co-nationals as an extended family, as blood relatives, are thus included in the concept, although one may consider a view of the nation as corresponding to the ideal type without explicitly subscribing to all criteria in this definition.\(^{116}\)

The term *state-framed* is used to refer to concepts of the nation as a community defined by its connection to the State. Nationality is thus dependent on being connected with the State, its institutions and its territory. As it focuses on the limits of the national community, this term makes the distinction clearer than one based on describing some communities as “civil” by definition would have. As Brubaker has pointed out, the description of some nationalisms as “civil” not only has normative tendencies, but these are furthermore related to a claim that the State works to uphold certain universal values.\(^{117}\) As I make a distinction between concepts of the nation and the values that the State works to uphold, the term state-framed is far more suitable for describing the first category while the term civil is better suited for the second.

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116 As a consequence of this, I agree with Brubaker et al (2004) that race can be considered a special case of ethnic categorisation. Anderson (2006), however, argued that nationalism and racism are opposing forces; racism is according to him a universalist aristocratic principle (even if it promotes the bourgeoisie of imperial states to aristocracy). While I can agree with him that the colonial empires of France and Britain were in many respects more imperial than national, I also accept the criticism that has been directed at his blindness towards the excluding sides of nationalism. Especially ethnic nationalism has close connections with racism, although neither presupposes the other (see for example Hall 2000 for such criticism). As we can see from Smith’s definition ethnicity is, however, in itself a composite category. As is implied by the existence of ethnic nationalism, it has much in common with the nation category. The key element not included in the general definition of a nation is, however, “a myth of common ancestry” (Smith 1991: 21, Smith 1986: 21-31). This is an element often claimed by ethnic nationalists for their national communities and can be considered a distinctive mark of the ethnic perception of the nation. There is thus no reason to separate ethnicity and race. “Race”, as used in American contexts, shares all of the characteristics that are here ascribed to ethnic communities, even though racial identity is commonly perceived as more connected with phenotypical features. For a comment on how ideal types are used in this dissertation, see note 24.

Particularism and Universalism

Modern liberal democratic nation-states tend to claim that the nation-state is dedicated to upholding universal values within its borders.\footnote{Benhabib 2004.} This claim may be especially common where state-framed concepts are dominant but is in no way unique to these. The borders of nations are, however, always particular, and sometimes ethnic. This dichotomy reflects, to some extent, the eighteenth-century distinction between *Zivilisation* and *Kultur*; a universal and a particular version of what could in a much broader sense be described as “culture”. In the religious sphere, this would correspond to the distinction between modern views of religions as a means to social coherence or personal identity as opposed to the (according to Modernist theory) pre-modern concept of religions as universal communities united by their connection with higher powers and legitimising political institutions (regardless of what heretics and infidels may have thought). This explains why religion has been such a problematic concept for nationalists in many countries, in spite of its role as a distinguishing feature of ethnic belonging.\footnote{Cf. Anderson 2006, Gellner 1983 and Greenfeld 1996.}

In the context of uses of history and cultural heritage, the distinction between universalist and particularist value concepts can be used to conceptualise the difference between an essentialist focus on the primordial identity of a particular people as the basic value of cultural heritage, as opposed to upholding it for universalistic purposes or focusing on the common heritage of humanity as a whole. For politics in general the distinction covers the claim of many states to promote civil values and universal rights, such as tolerance and democracy, as opposed to nationalist claims to promote the particular values of one’s own nation. In the arts, it could also correspond to a universal aesthetic view of art as an indefinable and indescribable activity or artefact that can, if used as art, by definition not be utilised in any instrumental way. This corresponds to the concepts of art in the Romantic tradition of *l’art pour l’art* and is opposed to instrumentalist views of art as a means to something else (be it national unity or the happiness of the people). It is also closely linked to how the Gellnerian distinction between high and low culture in a post-Romantic nation-state.\footnote{Gellner 1983, cf. Arendt 1968, Bjurström 2007 and Bourdieu 2000.} While it runs to some extent parallel to the dichotomy of ethnic vs. state-framed concepts of the nation, it is far from identical with this. Many representatives of the German Romantic movement, for example, went further in the aestheticist direction than their French counterparts, but did so by claiming a higher potential for reaching the heights of pure aesthetics from the vantage point of the German connectedness to
blood and soil than would be possible for the artists of decadent Western cities such as Paris or London.121

The State and the Nation
A nation-state is, as Smith has defined it, a state that claims to be a nation. According to Hobsbawn, nations do not make states. States make nations. According to Tilly, the creation of national states was a major cause of the emergence of nationalism. In the next chapter I will discuss the State as an organisation, an open system that sometimes includes and sometimes excludes a number of institutional actors, including government agencies, non-governmental and quasi-governmental organisations, political parties, and foundations. However, an important conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that the State and the nation are products of the same processes and that their limits remain interdependent. The integration of the State as an organisational actor is thus connected with the integration of the nation. As implied by Smith’s definition of the nation, the State lays claim to political, economic and cultural integration, as well as to political and administrative integration. These claims are central to the State’s claim to be a nation.

In this study I will, however, only be able to look at the integration of the State as an institutional actor (and even then only within its cultural policy) and not that of the nation. Yet, the integration of the State has implications for the integration of the nation. References to economic values are, as I will show, surprisingly absent in national Swedish cultural policy. References to political and cultural integration are much more common and studying institutions responsible for cultural values and activities is highly relevant to the study of cultural integration in the nation that the nation-state claims to represent. It is indeed so relevant that I doubt that the latter could be fully understood without first studying the former (which I hope to contribute to with this dissertation). As should be clear from Tilly’s work, the acceptance of minority institutions is, for example, an important feature of certain states. In a state that integrates large parts of society into its organisation, relations to minority cultures are thus closely connected with the organisation and integration of the State. The issue of who, and what, is to be integrated into the State’s cultural policy, is an important indicator of what values and what limits that define the State.

121 Elias 1996.
CHAPTER III:
Studying the State as an Institutional Actor

In the previous chapter the State was mostly treated as an actor that categorises people and partakes in processes that create imagined communities. On the other hand I have also described how Brubaker and Tilly point out the need to see the State as something more complex than an actor if one wishes to understand these processes. The State is a composite actor and its organisational borders are not by far as clear as its geographical borders. Its actions are not the actions of a rational strategist but instead the results of organisational processes. I will analyse these with the help of a perspective often known as neo-institutional theory. In this chapter I discuss how I use this. I then return to the outlay of this study, how I approach the State what material I study, why, and how I interpret it.

NEO-INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES

The word *institution* derives from Latin *institution*, meaning establishment or arrangement, but also education, or teaching.\(^{122}\) As we shall see, this original double meaning is fitting for the neo-institutional use of the term. The foundations of institutional approaches can however be traced as far back as Aristotle’s categorisations of constitutions in the Greek city states\(^{123}\) (in contrast to Plato’s earlier prescriptive sketches of an ideal state\(^{124}\)). They could also be considered to include, among others, thinkers such as Hobbes, Montesquieu

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\(^{122}\) Sundström 2003: 4.
\(^{124}\) Primarily in Plato 1968.
and Locke. Later, when the foundation for the modern social sciences was laid down by Weber and Durkheim, the study of institutions became an integral part of these, \(^{125}\) so integral in fact that Durkheim defined sociology as the “science of institutions.”\(^{126}\) Applying institutional analysis to the problems of the nation-state is in other words a far from new idea. According to many of the founding fathers of the “new” institutionalism these perspectives had, however, lost the attention of social scientists during the post-war years. In political science it was to take until the late 1980s before James G. March, Johan P. Olsen and others criticised the present state of the discipline for being too emerged in behaviourism and rational choice theory. In her groundbreaking article “Bringing the State Back in” the political scientist Theda Skocpol argued for a return to the study of the administrative structure of the State as an explanation of government policies.\(^{127}\) More or less simultaneously institutionalism was reawakened in sociology.\(^{128}\)

In the social sciences of today neo-institutional approaches exist in several versions, and the word has been used to describe a great variety of perspectives, several of which do not fall within the definitions of institutionalism, or neo-institutionalism, provided by many of the others.\(^{129}\) The American political scientist B.G. Peters groups these perspectives into seven categories (beginning with those most commonly used in political science):\(^{130}\)

1) **Normative institutionalism**: neo-institutionalism as presented by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, concentrating on the rules and routines of institutions, building on the conception of *logics of appropriateness* (a concept that I discuss more at length later in this chapter).\(^{131}\)

2) **Rational choice institutionalism**: neo-institutionalism based on the central conceptions of rational choice theory, considering institutions to be “systems of

\(^{125}\) Peters 1999.


\(^{128}\) Powell & DiMaggio 1991a.

\(^{129}\) E.g. Pierson & Skocpol 2002. In Sweden the establishment of neo-institutional perspectives was, on the other hand, marked by a significant emphasis on empirical research, single cases and practical contexts, rather than on the advancement of theory (as had, arguably, been the case among the mostly American pioneers). Consequently, the early Swedish researchers tended to utilise the new theories only when they considered them needed for the purposes of their practical studies. One should also notice the important role that business administration organisation experts, such as Nils Brunsson, played together with political scientists and sociologists in the introduction of new institutionalism to Sweden, Roine Johansson 2002.

\(^{130}\) Peters 1999: 19-22. Neo-institutional theories can of course be grouped in other ways as well. Sundström (2003: 9), for example, uses three categories: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. In this case the differences between normative institutionalism and perspectives are, however, important to discuss.

rules and inducements to behaviour in which individuals attempt to maximise their own utilities.”

3) Historical institutionalism, for which path dependency, the dependency on historical choices, is central.

4) Empirical institutionalism: a version of neo-institutionalism closer to the older versions than many of the other, concentrating on the comparative study of differences between political systems, as well as on their consequences. A principal goal of empirical institutionalism, defined in this way, is to guide policy makers in the construction of good institutions.

5) International institutionalism: the study of institutions appearing on the international arena.

6) Societal institutionalism: the study of institutions and institutionalism outside of the State, in civil society.

After the versions of new institutionalism commonly found in political science, Peters describes the neo-institutionalisms of other social sciences. One finds that most of these can be placed in the above categories. In the end we are left with only one extra category:

7) Sociological institutionalism: new institutionalism as it has been developed by sociologists, primarily within the sociology of organisations, with Walter W. Powell, and Paul J. DiMaggio as two of its central figures, and concentrating on institutions and institutionalising processes in organisations.

Between these perspectives there are several differences, even regarding theoretically central issues. To start with, there are wide differences between their approaches to the preferences of actors, indicating a difference in the assumed nature of actors. March and Olsen made a central point of considering the preferences of actors to be shaped by the context in which they act. In this respect they were followed by Powell and DiMaggio and by other leading sociologists. Working in a sociological tradition of organisational theory they, however, put more emphasise on the ontological and epistemological importance of structures for the formation of actors’ preferences. Proponents of historical institutionalism tend on the other hand to consider preferences highly dependent on the institutionalised results of important choices of paths.

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made at the creation of institutions.\textsuperscript{140} In rational choice institutionalism and empirical institutionalism, it is instead a central premise that preferences can be considered to be stable during the studied processes and thus, that they arise externally to the context of these processes. This premise is in rational choice theory necessary for the study of political arenas as fields in which pre-defined actors with pre-decided goals meet to determine policy through game-like or reciprocal processes.\textsuperscript{141} Empirical institutionalists instead consider the institutions as themselves constructed by actors in order to achieve certain consequences, presumably determined by pre-defined preferences. In societal institutionalism, finally, preferences are studied as existing in institutionalised interest organisations, political parties and policy networks crossing the border between the State and these societal organisations. In this approach preferences are considered to be determined in context and established in these groups, primarily during their formation.\textsuperscript{142}

These differences bring with them a number of other consequential differences. One of March and Olsen’s a major points is that their views of rationality differ significantly from that of rational choice theory. These views are shared primarily by neo-institutionalists in sociology. Rational choice institutionalists can on the other hand be seen as trying to include institutions and institutionalisation in their theories while at the same time retaining the concept of the individual as a rational actor.\textsuperscript{143} Other types of neo-institutionalism tend to fall in between these two extreme points, generally closer to the former than to the latter, something many institutionalists would actually consider a requirement to deserve the title of “institutionalist”.\textsuperscript{144} Consequently, views of functionalism, too, constitute a major point of difference between the various neo-institutionalist schools of thought. Historical institutionalists are, according to Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, generally suspicious of functionalist explanations and understandings of social phenomena. As a consequence of their reliance on design by more or less rational actors, empirical and rational choice institutionalists, however, tend to rely heavily on reasoning based on the concept of function.\textsuperscript{145} As the theories of normative and sociological institutionalists are founded on assumptions of limited or absent consequential rationality, they have to be interpreted as theoretically biased against all teleological and functional reasoning. This is especially true of normative institu-

\textsuperscript{140} Peters 1999: 63, ref. to among others Skocpol 1992, King 1995 and Krasner 1984, see also Skowronek 1997 for an example of such a study.
\textsuperscript{142} Peters 1999.
\textsuperscript{143} Peters 1999, see also Ostrom 1997 for a theory of institutions based on actors acting in accordance with bounded rationality.
\textsuperscript{144} E.g. Pierson & Skocpol 2002.
\textsuperscript{145} Pierson & Skocpol 2002.
tionalism with its strong emphasis on logics of appropriateness before logics of consequentiality as a general basis for action. Societal institutionalism would, again, fall in the middle of this scale.

A final difference between the various approaches within neo-institutional theory is their respective attitudes towards the theories of “old” institutionalisms, behaviourism and rational choice. On these issues it is noticeable that empiric institutionalists, historical institutionalists and normative institutionalists to a higher extent than the other schools of neo-institutionalist thought tend to look at earlier institutionalist research as their chief parent tradition. Sociological institutionalists, such as Powell and DiMaggio, emphasise instead the differences between their own neo-institutional approach and earlier forms of institutionalism. A similar difference is how neo-institutionalists in political science relate to behaviourism and rational choice, with normative institutionalism and rational choice institutionalisms as the two extremes. Thus, while the normative institutionalists March and Olsen regard their whole approach as a direct attack on these traditions, rational choice institutionalists tend to base their analysis on earlier theories on rational choice. Their theories can thus be regarded as a way of answering institutional questions with an approach based on rational choice theory.¹⁴⁶

A “NORMATIVE” APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONS

Of these approaches I have chosen to base my analysis on normative institutionalism, although I have also incorporated features from historical and sociological institutionalism. These features (described below) have, however, been reinterpreted to fit within the framework of the normative approach. Institutions are defined as by March and Olsen:

> Institutions are] collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations. The process involves determining what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what obligation of that role in that situation is.¹⁴⁷

Institutionalisation is taken to be a process in which such rules and routines are strengthened and become more stable. They are the focus of normative institutionalism. “Normative” institutionalism should thus not be interpreted as normative in the same sense as Plato’s Republic or other normative works of political philosophy are normative but can instead be defined as the study of institutions that are, by definition, normative. Indeed, as Peters has pointed out, it is difficult (perhaps even impossible) to judge institutions normatively by using this perspective, since it does not provide any rules by which to

make such judgments. The basic assumption of normative institutionalism is instead that actors (individuals as well as organisations) act primarily on logics of appropriateness, as opposed to logics of consequentiality.

A logic of appropriateness can be contrasted with a logic of consequentiality. In a logic of consequentiality, behaviours are driven by preferences and expectations about consequences. Behaviour is wilful, reflecting an attempt to make outcomes fulfil subjective desires, to the extent possible. Within such a logic, a sane person is one who is “in touch with reality” in the sense of maintaining consistency between behaviour and realistic expectations of its consequences. The sacred texts are Bentham and classical decision theory.

In a logic of appropriateness, on the other hand, behaviours (beliefs as well as actions) are intentional but not wilful. They involve fulfilling the obligations of a role in a situation, and so of trying to determine the imperatives of holding a position. Action stems from a conception of necessity, rather than preference. Within a logic of appropriateness, a sane person is one who is “in touch with identity” in the sense of maintaining consistency between behaviour and a conception of self in a social role. Ambiguity or conflict in rules is typically resolved not by shifting to a logic of consequentiality and rational calculation, but by trying to clarify the rules, make distinctions, determine what the situation is and what definition “fits.” The sacred texts are Homer and classical jurisprudence.

The rules of normative institutionalism can are thus connected both with the situation and the role of the individual and can be seen as “standard operating procedures” for appropriate behaviour in a given situation. If both of these variables (the situation and the individual’s position in it) are clear to the individual it should also be clear to him or her what the proper way of acting ought to be:

Rules are learned by experts as catechisms: Physicists learn what physicists do; lawyers learn what lawyers do. The rules are enforced by the standards of professions and the expectations of patrons. As a result, within political institutions, physicists do what physicists do (and are expected to do); and lawyers do what lawyers do.

The dichotomy between logics of consequentiality and logics of appropriateness should, however, not be over-emphasised. Sometimes consequentiality may be appropriate. That bureaucrats pursue certain consequences because

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148 Peters 1999: 39-40. To consider this a peculiarity of Normative Institutionalism would, however, be a grave exaggeration; it is integral to all empirical studies that normative conclusions can never be drawn from empirical facts without the addition of normative premises. That the study of the norms and values held in society should be no different is hardly surprising. With the addition of such premises (for example through the acceptance of those present in the popular ethos) it, however, becomes a task within the scope of the social sciences and the humanities to discern how these premises relate to each other and to society as it is described empirically, cf. Weber 1989 and March & Olsen 1989 (especially pp. 129-134) for a discussion of the role of the social sciences in the normative discussions of society.


they consider this appropriate may, on the other hand, explain why they pursue consequences favourable to the goals of their agencies rather than to themselves. This way of justifying policy is in most cases the norm today. This is also what enables me to talk about institutional actors. Such actors exist because individuals consider it appropriate to act as their agents. This is true on several levels, both institutional and cultural. Civil servants at the National Heritage Board, for example, consider it appropriate to act according to the norms and rules of that government agency (this willingness is, however, enforced by power, something that I will return to). At the same time they – and thus the agency that they work for – act as agents of the State, which can thus be seen as an actor. Furthermore, as Brubaker has pointed out, they identify themselves as citizens and representatives of the nation. On all three levels this can be understood as a matter of how people interpret their role in the world and of the normative implications this has for their actions in a logic of appropriateness. This makes normative institutionalism relevant both for studying the values that the institutional actors of this study consider it appropriate to pursue and the limits of the nation that they, as representatives of the State, are both responsible to and responsible for.

In this dissertation I will, among other things, analyse bureaucratic and political discussions of, for example, the definition of culture or the nature of the Church of Sweden as a Folk Church (see p. 96), discussions which concern the role of cultural policy and the Church in relation to the State, to values, to society and to the people. The concepts concerned by my first and second research questions can be understood in terms of appropriate ways to relate to values and the nation, for example in discussions about culture or the Folk Church. These norms can be considered a part of the legitimising activities of the cultural policy field, and thus to reflect its views of the roles that make its activities appropriate. The prevalence and centrality of such discussions is one reason why I consider normative institutionalism so suited to this study. Like any other norms, those concerning the appropriateness of using value concepts and concepts of the nation may be institutionalised, for example in cultural policy.

This is not to say that the norms and rules of normative institutionalism are the same as those of culture at large. Following sociologists Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann one could view these norms as less internalised than the rules and norms of the wider culture. This is hardly surprising when we are talking about such things as the appropriate way of report-

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writing at the office, rules that are “learned as catechisms”\textsuperscript{154} during one’s time as an employee, in contrast to, for example, the appropriate way of celebrating Christmas. The relationship is, however, not quite so simple. Laws, one of the most obvious examples of institutionalised rules, are often used to assure that behaviour in society follows the norms of the dominant culture (as illustrated, for example, by the marital laws of most countries). This, however, still works to illustrate the point: while the laws and other rules and norms of the State can hold immense power (at least as long as those norms and rules are followed by civil servants and stand unopposed by the majority of society), they are not self-evident, as commonly held traditions can be. Otherwise they would not have to be laws.

Contrary to some of the other forms of neo-institutionalism, normative institutionalism has been criticised for not ascribing enough weight to the cognitive side of institutions.\textsuperscript{155} In my view, however, the differences between the epistemological and normative sides of different neo-institutionalisms do not necessarily mean that the object of one has to be overlooked by the other. Institutionalised norms are, to begin with, clearly dependent on cognitive processes, as they require that the individual recognises a possible action for a logic of appropriateness to work. It is, however, when the relationship works, the other way around – that is when the sense of appropriateness comes to influence epistemology – that things become more complex.\textsuperscript{156} Understanding or interpreting reality may or may not be an action. It is, however, clear that describing it is an action. When made in public in a political context it is in fact a political action and often quite an important one at that.\textsuperscript{157} With this in mind I will consider these forms of actions as subjected to logics of appropriateness like all other actions. Descriptions of reality that an author subscribes to in, for example, an official report can thus be considered products of a logic of appropriateness and not necessarily descriptions of actual cognitive processes. This is what I assume in this study. By doing so I am able to avoid the need for a distinction between epistemological discussions used for understanding reality and descriptions used to legitimise decisions made for different reasons. In this context all explanations will be considered parts of the activity of the actors, rather than preparations for activity, a distinction that would have been dubious at best.

How bound should we then consider individuals to be by the norms and procedures of institutions within a logic of appropriateness? Let me first state

\textsuperscript{154} March & Olsen 1989: 30.
\textsuperscript{155} Peters 1999: 33-34.
\textsuperscript{156} Berger & Luckmann 1967, Wenneberg 2001. This is according to March & Olsen (1989:40-46) generally the case.
\textsuperscript{157} Brubaker et al 2004.
that there is no reason to consider a choice made according to a logic of appropriateness more or less free or rational than one made under a logic of consequentiality (the kind of choice presumed in the self-styled “rational choice” theories).\textsuperscript{158} Many institutionalist researchers also emphasise the window of opportunity for action that opens up for an individual working in within a logic of appropriateness, but in a position that enables him or her to choose between different rules, norms or procedures, depending on how the situation is defined.\textsuperscript{159} Counter-institutional acts, furthermore, do occur from time to time, even according to the most ardent proponents of normative institutionalism. All acts are not in accordance with institutional procedures and all preferences are not endogenous, even in the most institutionalised of environments. It is, in other words, quite possible to escape the Weberian iron cage of bureaucratic norms and rules, at least momentarily. I simply do not consider it to be either easy or common. When this happens on a larger scale a crucial junction is reached and a new path chosen.

CHANGE, FIELDS AND PATH DEPENDENCY

Normative institutionalism has been criticised for lacking in the ability to explain change, especially in the form of how new institutions are created, a problem that would be fundamental if true.\textsuperscript{160} In answer to this, models for the explanation of change have been developed, often building on earlier research by March and Olsen (in this case especially by March). In order to better understand how such an approach can be built, I will now take a closer look at one such model: the concept of isomorphism (homogenisation of form) as presented by Powell and DiMaggio.\textsuperscript{161} Conformity to the nation-state model is as an extreme example of isomorphism on the macro level of state structure and legitimacy in the state system, a case in which isomorphism could be considered universal, if not always deep.\textsuperscript{162} On a lower level isomorphism within nation-states may create differences between them. In model Powell and DiMaggio’s model the following three (combinable) forms of isomorphism are presented as a typology:

(1) coercive isomorphism that stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy; (2) mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty; and (3) normative isomorphism, associated with professionalization.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{158} Olsen 1992 on the non-automatic character of logics of appropriateness.
\textsuperscript{160} Peters 1999: 33-34.
\textsuperscript{161} Powell & DiMaggio 1991b.
\textsuperscript{162} Meyer 1999.
\textsuperscript{163} Powell & DiMaggio 1991b: 67, italics from the original.
The Swedish researchers Lindberg and Erlingsdóttir complement the concept of isomorphism with those of isopraxism (homogenisation of practices) and isonymism (homogenisation of names, or terminology). A distinction between form and practice, however, hardly benefits a study that is focused on organisation as a process guided by a logic of appropriateness, in which the form of an organisation or institution is constituted by the norms guiding activities of actors and where institutions are considered objectifications of praxis. The awareness that isonymism is not the same as isomorphism is important, however. There is also much research to the effect that new concepts are translated rather than transferred unchanged when they are implemented in new organisations. Powell and DiMaggio’s model of isomorphism can, furthermore, be considered problematic to combine with the normative and (relatively) actor-centred approach of this study. I thus do not use it in its original form here. Instead, I will use approaches more compatible with normative institutionalism to explain these three forms of change. However, at the centre of these differences lie I believe, power, authority and the search for legitimacy as driving, and sometimes limiting, forces in change. These are issues that become much more central to an actor-centred approach than to a more structure-oriented one.

Coercion and Power, Authority and Legitimacy

Coercive isomorphism is described by Powell and DiMaggio as resulting “from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organisations by other organisations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society in which the organisations function.” State influence is cited as an example, both in the form of direct government action and through the legal environment in which organisations find themselves. It has, however, been argued that it is doubtful whether coercive isomorphism can be justifiably considered an institutional factor at all. I personally agree that this is indeed somewhat doubtful, as we are dealing with a force that often works against institutions through the means of raw power and resource dependence. In a theoretical approach such as this, where actors, and especially their values and norms for how to appropriately describe the world, are given a central role, power-related relations between actors cannot possibly be ignored, either as force promoting change or as one that favours stability. In order to deal with this vital aspect of politics I will employ the distinction between power and

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164 Erlingsdóttir & Lindberg 2005.
In his study of the politics of American presidents the American historical institutionalist and political scientist Stephen Skowronek defined the difference as follows:

*Power*, as I will use the term here, refers to the resources, formal and informal, that presidents in a given period have at their disposal to get things done. Presidents exercise power by husbanding these resources and deploying them strategically to effect change. *Authority*, on the other hand, reaches to the expectations that surround the exercise of power at a particular moment, to perceptions of what is appropriate for a given president to do. A president’s authority hinges on the warrants that can be drawn from the moment at hand to justify action and secure the *legitimacy* of the changes effected.\(^{169}\)

*Power* can, in other words, be described as emanating from the control of (scarce) resources.\(^{170}\) “Control” is, however, just another word for “having power over”. In the end this kind of power can, in other words, be seen as reducible to power in the old Hobbesian sense of being able to defend by force. In practice, however, this kind of power need not be reducible to the possession of means for violence, as these means are in themselves institutionalised in the State’s defence of the laws through the monopoly on violence.\(^{171}\) In practice this kind of power will be considered as working as an agent of change in accordance with Powell and DiMaggio’s model of coercive isomorphism (see above), as this model is specifically developed to deal with the process of change through coercion. In a modern bureaucratic institutional setting coercion tends to take the form of legal and financial means rather than direct talk of violence. This is also why the independence of institutions is dependent on their control of resources as a base of power.\(^{172}\) The chief holders of such power in national cultural policy are of course the government and the Riksdag with their financial, rule-setting and appointment powers. The use of such power ranges from the annual routines of the budgetary process to the creation or termination of institutional actors and activities.

The other significant way of looking at status relations between actors is as personal or institutionalised *authority*. Power needs authority. The main reason for politicians to take the advice of experts may, for example, not be that they intend to follow it (they may in fact see to it that they find an expert willing to support the path they have already chosen), but to have their decisions legitimised by the (academic, professional or other) authority of experts.\(^{173}\) While this aspect is usually more subtle than the more obvious uses of

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169 Skowronek 1997: 18, italics inserted by this author. This distinction has a long history. Among the first to use it was Cicero (1999) in *De Legibus*.
171 Weber 1958: 82.
power, it can nonetheless be fatal to ignore, something that became unusually obvious during the “velvet revolutions” in Communist Eastern Europe when the authority of independent intellectuals (many of whom originated in the cultural sector) was pitted against the raw power of regimes increasingly deprived of methods to legitimise it.\textsuperscript{174} Authority is what makes power legitimate in the eyes of those who respect it. It builds on the beliefs and notions of appropriateness of those outside the organisation, rather than on its own powers (although its legitimacy in the eyes of the people who make up the organisation is also of vital importance).\textsuperscript{175} A prime example of this is how nations imagined as political communities legitimise nation-states, both in the eyes of their citizens and in the eyes of those who exercise their powers.

Working according to the norms taken for granted by the rest of society can be a powerful way to legitimacy. These norms tend, however, to be inconsequential, so that an actor may need to follow several sets of rules in order to achieve legitimacy. It has, for example, never been possible to achieve legitimacy only by fulfilling the demands of the techno-economical paradigm, although many organisation experts tended to believe so when it was at the height of its authority.\textsuperscript{176} It should also be pointed out that legitimacy cannot be separated from the context in which it has arisen. It can be institutionalised to some extent within that context, but it can never be transferred to another context which does not share the notions of appropriateness prevalent in the original one.\textsuperscript{177} A nation-state’s claim to authority only works in a context where the basic tenets of nationalism are accepted, and vis-à-vis persons who identify themselves, or at least their context, with the nation in question. Viewing legitimacy as a transferable commodity also brings the risk of ignoring that it tends to be lost if bargained with in a way that (perceivably) defies the rules from which it derives. I will thus consider legitimacy a property of (some) institutions, and from certain perspectives, not as an automatically transferable commodity.

By differentiating power and authority it is also possible to differentiate norms and rules, or “norms” and “instructions”, to use the terminology of Swedish researchers Jacobsson and Brunsson: instructions, such as laws, are written down and formally accepted by the authority of the legislative process and enforced by coercive power; norms are not, which is not to say that norms cannot become instructions or that we do not need norms to know

\textsuperscript{174} Danjoux 2002. It is illustrative, I think, at this point to look back at Weber’s (1965) distinction between personal and transferred charisma. In the terminology of normative institutionalism it is, of course, the latter part that can be identified as institutionalised. In Skowronek’s terminology charisma is more related to authority than to power.
\textsuperscript{175} Røvik 2000: 46, referring to Parsons 1956.
\textsuperscript{176} Røvik 2000: 46, referring to Parsons 1956.
\textsuperscript{177} Powel & DiMaggio 1991b on the endogeneity of legitimacy.
which instruction to follow. According to Jacobsson and Brunsson there is also an intermediary form, which they term standards. Standards are written down and generally followed, but they lack a formal penalty for those who do not follow them.\textsuperscript{178} They are in other words supported by authority but not by legislative power (more of this later, on the issue of super-standards). In modern democratic polities, rules are the results of a democratic institutional and institutionalising process. This makes them accepted as the legitimate actions of the State as an actor.\textsuperscript{179} I have chosen to limit this study to this process. While other actors than those formally involved may influence it, I will thus analyse their influence when it reaches the formal process rather than before.

Coercive isomorphism is to a large extent dependent on factors such as the coercive powers of the legislature and on, for example, financial resources. Arguably, these means are, in turn, partially dependent on following institutional rules and procedures. Thus, power will be considered dependent on the institutions by which it is defined. Consequently, it will also be considered to be (normally) limited by the logics of appropriateness inherent in the relevant institutions. Both power and authority will figure in this study. It is, however, important to remember that they should be considered as something like opposite sides of the same coin, rather than as distinct phenomena: most of the raw power that appears in a modern society is clearly dependent on institutions (such as the systems of norms institutionalised in, for example, the police, the military or organised crime). Most choices that appear to be the result of a logic of appropriateness could, on the other hand, also be considered as the results of a knowledge of a more material structure of incitements inherent in the institutions. The power and authority held by institutions are, in other words, intertwined in a complex web of processes in which they often tend to strengthen each other.

\textit{Mimesis and Travelling Concepts}

Unlike coercive isomorphism, the mimetic version, that is accepting rules as a way of dealing with difficult or unclear situations, is a process much like those already described by March and Olsen, and is indeed described by Powell and DiMaggio with reference to earlier work by March and Olsen.\textsuperscript{180} It is also very much related to authority and legitimacy. Authority, as the term is used here, is the property of an actor that makes other actors follow its example: “Actors tend to imitate those they want to resemble”.\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{179} March & Olsen 1989.
\textsuperscript{180} Powell & DiMaggio 1991b.
\textsuperscript{181} Hedmo, Sahlin-Andersson & Wedlin 2005: 194.
A somewhat broader perspective on change in organisations can be built by looking at normative ideas as institutionalised concepts with the ability to ‘travel’ between organisations and institutional contexts. One of the models created for that purpose is the one presented by the Norwegian political scientist Kjell Arne Røvik as the *virus theory*. In his model such travels are made possible by strong and in some degree norm-setting (or at least norm-spreading) inter- and trans-organisational networks, such as conferences, professional networks and the networks of organisational consultants vested with high authority. This is something that Røvik observed during his studies of change in rhetoric and praxis in Norwegian local government during the 1990s. Comparing travelling organisational concepts to virus, he concludes that concepts arguing for marketisation “infected” these local governments during this period. As with biological virus infections, infected subjects are altered in order to reproduce the viral element. In practice this theory can be seen as a special, if a somewhat critically formulated, case of the general phenomenon of mimetic isomorphism. However, this virulent spread of new organisational concepts is according to Røvik, not only a special case but a new mode: organisational concepts are nowadays not, as they once were, different from sector to sector or from region to region. Instead, concepts are spreading rapidly across all sectors. In some cases they also disappear as rapidly as they came. All this is a part of a global isomorphism.\(^{182}\)

![Diagram: Røvik orders institutionalised concepts into four groups on the basis of spread and longevity.\(^{183}\)](image)

The concepts studied by Røvik are norms regarding organisational practices. In the context studied here travelling institutional concepts will be used to analyse both such norms and norms regarding the activities of the organisation, such as how to relate to multiculturalism in cultural policy. Many other ways of relating to the nation and to core values may be considered institu-

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\(^{183}\) Røvik 2000: 22, simplified model.
tional mega-standards. Whether or not new solutions in cultural policy include themselves and create new paths in the norm system or fade away like the viral norms of organisational consultants remains to be seen. Despite its name Røvik’s viral theory also leaves room for individual agency; its explanations centre on the role of individual gatekeepers with the relative power to choose whether or not to adopt new concepts.\textsuperscript{184} There are in other words borders that are harder to cross for travelling concepts than the general terrain. Such borders include both the borders of organisations and the borders between organisational fields.

\textit{Organisational Fields}

Models and analyses based on the \textit{field} metaphor have been used in the social sciences since when Kurt Levin in 1936 presented a social psychology field model based on concepts combined from gestalt theory and theoretical physics. In 1967 Roland L. Warren used a concept of inter-organisational fields which is much closer to later neo-institutional approaches. Powell and DiMaggio define organisational fields as “those organisations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognised area of institutional life”.\textsuperscript{185} The recognition of a field’s existence by its participants is, in other words, a requirement. Another important and related concept is Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of the artistic field. Such spheres of artists, academics and others, however, have the additional characteristic of being relatively independent and striving for independence, something that may not be possible for all organisational fields.\textsuperscript{186} As organisational fields do not necessarily strive for independence there is no problem in considering an institutional sphere a field and at the same time a part of a larger field, which I do in this dissertation. Common to all of these approaches is, however, the following assumption:

\begin{quote}
Individual actions should thus be understood to be dependent on the characteristics of the field and on the positions that individual actors occupy \textit{vis-à-vis} others rather than caused by individual mechanisms.\textsuperscript{187}
\end{quote}

In this study I will try to integrate the concept of organisational fields in my otherwise normative institutional approach. An \textit{organisational field} is thus an institutionalised and institutionalising environment in which norms are relatively homogenous. I agree, however, with Powell and DiMaggio that

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{184} Røvik 2000.
\textsuperscript{185} Powell & DiMaggio 1991b, quote from p. 64.
\textsuperscript{187} Hedmo, Sahlin-Andersson & Wedlin 2005: 193.
\end{footnotes}
Once disparate organizations in the same line of business are structured into an actual field (as we argue, by competition, the state or the professions), powerful forces emerge that lead them to become more similar to one another.\textsuperscript{188} Such fields are often not only inter-organisational, but trans-organisational as well; they transgress the boundaries of formal organisations. Yet, many fields are organised nationally and thus contribute to the institutional integration of nation-states. Studying isomorphism within the framework of fields and not only national institutions has the advantage of not assuming such correspondence. It furthermore makes it possible to study integration in which power and authority are held by several actors. This does not, however, contradict the study of national cultural policy as a field bound together by power and authority. It is in fact an argument for such a study.

The concept of a field is furthermore connected with that of \textit{professionalisation}, as described by Powell and DiMaggio in connection to their third form of isomorphism: the \textit{normative} form. In normative isomorphism the professions act as norm-givers, not necessarily on the organisational level, but instead on the individual; targeting individuals with the same educational background (and preferably also with similar tasks in their current organisations) in order to create a mass of basically similar professionals and posts for them to occupy. Thereby enabling these professionals to move unhindered from organisation to organisation and, in some cases, even from sector to sector. There is thus a possible contradiction between strong (employing) organisations and strong professions.\textsuperscript{189} In a neocorporative state such as Sweden professional organisations are especially relevant as representatives of their professions. This is one way in which the trust networks of society are bound up with the State. Typical of professional organisations is that they limit the number of recognised members in order to make membership in the profession more exclusive. Demanding a specific education is one way of doing so. Such organisations in Sweden are, for example, the associations of lawyers and civil economists (the former of which is legally regulated and thus institutionally recognised by the State). Li Bennich-Björkman has, however, seen strong elements of professionalisation in the Writers’ Association, even though it does not require a specific education (see p. 99). Such recognition is institutionalised, among other things, in the policy process, as these organisations are regularly involved in the development of government policy.\textsuperscript{190} However, it is

\textsuperscript{188} Powell & DiMaggio 1991b: 65.
\textsuperscript{189} Powell & DiMaggio 1991b.
\textsuperscript{190} See Bennich-Björkman 1991 on the Swedish Writers’ Association as a professional organisation and Rothstein 1996 for an analysis of the Swedish political model as a neocorporative arrangement. It should be noted that in the Swedish neocorporative system a number of organisations are also recognised as representatives of interest groups, regardless of exclusivity.
not only the State that legitimises a profession. The profession gives authority to the processes of the State at the same time as the State enforces the institutional rules of the profession with its legislative power. By involving themselves in government policy the professions are integrated into the State. This creates a need to conform to its organisational principles, such as for example its territorial organisation. Neocorporatism thus results in mimesis and national integration.

Path Dependency, Formative Moments and Historical Institutionalism
Normative institutionalism makes change rather than stability a matter to be explained. Within an institutional field actors accept ruling norms and tend to change them only with reference to the authority of other norms. When an institution is established it will thus often remain for some time. This makes the notion of path dependency relevant. According to Paul Pierson, path dependency is the tendency for certain choices to result in a series of events that are especially hard to depart from. Such choices take place in what can be described as formative moments (although these moments can occasionally be long enough to be defined as “moments” only in the face of history). Fredrika Lagergren makes a distinction between formative moments and crucial junctures, by which the latter term describes a situation in society which makes the existing institutions unworkable. The former term, on the other hand, signifies the moment at which new institutional forms are established. At these points ideas and concepts may have strong influence on the new institutions, as they are used as a sort of road map by the actors that create new institutions.

In her studies of Swedish literature policy Bennich-Björkman wrote that “[i]t is primarily in an initiation and construction face, when it is decided according to what principles an organisation shall work, that an interest group has the opportunity to work to get included in political decision-making.” When this point is passed, the norms, rules, and standards guiding the new actor are more set. Pierson has on the other hand observed that formative moments are rarely recognised as such by participants. Instead, a consequence of path dependency is that some actions have far-reaching results that are not known to those who make them. The previous chapter includes several examples of this: the Communist leaders of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union hardly anticipated the role that formally assigned ethnicity would have at the

break-up of their states. The role they have played has instead often been both unforeseen and unwanted. After a certain point these categorisations have become unchangeable. The results of an event may also be influenced more by its context than by the intentions of actors, and chance events may have at least as much influence as intended steering. The order in which a sequence of events takes place may, for example, be of a very great importance, as it means that the first events may become important parts of the context in which the later ones take place.\textsuperscript{195} Procedural rules and norms may remain in place long after the thought systems that led to their construction have lost their relevance:

\begin{quote}
Efforts at change are often resisted because they threaten individuals’ sense of security, increase the cost of information processing, and disrupt routines. Moreover, established conceptions of “the way things are done” can be very beneficial; members of an organizational field can use these stable expectations as a guide to action and a way to predict the behaviour of others.\textsuperscript{196}
\end{quote}

Organisations and organisational fields may also survive by adapting to new situations when the normative contexts of their origin have changed significantly. The political parties of many established democracies are examples of this. The Swedish political party system, for example, did not change between the twenties and the eighties.\textsuperscript{197} In a classic article Paul DiMaggio uses the organisation of art museums in the first half of the twentieth century as an example of an institution that has passed the need for active elite support and that can (in the terminology of this dissertation) survive on its own authority.\textsuperscript{198} The relevance of path dependency to studies of how the national community is institutionalised in nation-states has already been shown by Brubaker in his analysis of how citizenship in France and Germany has remained dependent on paths taken at formative moments during the Revolutionary Wars and the German unification, respectively (see p. 40).

The history of cultural policy is, however, also rich in examples of path dependency. A number of European states are still marked by the consequences of cultural policy decisions made by eighteenth-century monarchs. Thus the Habsburg family interest in music and the fondness for theatre at the

\begin{flushright}
195 Pierson 2000. In line with rational choice theory (bounded rationality) one can argue that the costs of changing a system may increase when it is in place, even when another alternative might have given more beneficial results to a lesser cost, if the comparison had been made at an earlier point. Political actors are even more prone to path dependence than private actors. The need for immediate results increases path dependency as well as the need to produce results before the next election, Pierson 2000, Powell 1991.


197 The “frozen” party systems of Western democracies were described in this way by Rokkan and Lipset (1967), although they did not use the language of normative institutionalism.

\end{flushright}
French court at Versailles led to the establishment of many still dominant cultural institutions in Central Europe and France. It also influenced the relative strength of these institutions in relation to other arts and policies in these countries, as well as their institutional structure as established institutions in national cultural policy.\textsuperscript{199} For similar reasons cultural establishments are often concentrated at old imperial capitals, regardless of where modern politicians would want them to be. Dependency on a chosen path may thus remain long after the original reason for following the path has been abandoned.\textsuperscript{200}

*Integration of the State as an Actor and as an Arena*

It should be clear by now that I do not intend to consider the State a unified actor. Instead I conclude, with Peterson, and from the theories of March and Olsen, that the State should be viewed “both as a structured ensemble of values, norms, rules and institutions, and as an arena of competing interests”\textsuperscript{201}. Analysing certain institutions, rules, norms, concepts and values that exist in this field is the focus of this dissertation, as it is of all neo-institutional research on the State. In this dissertation the aim and research questions, however, focus on the State as a whole and not on its parts (although it is limited to its cultural policy and focuses on the specific concepts and values relevant to my research questions). Analysing its parts is thus a means to explain the actions of the State. By viewing the State as an organisation, I can resolve what could otherwise seem to be a paradox: at the same time as the State can be seen as an arena, it is an institution that acts, and can thus be considered an institutional actor. It follows from the discussions in this chapter that (like all institutions and institutional actors) the State is the product of organising processes that continuously produce the organisation known as the State and the actions ascribed to it. Thus, the State is both an actor and an arena. As an arena the State is, however, not a clear field, but instead a highly institutionalised environment in which institutional actors (parts of Pedersen’s “complex set of institutions”) both meet and are constituted. The aim of this dissertation requires an analysis of how certain norms guide the State in its actions within the sphere of cultural policy. I reach this aim by studying the institutional processes through which its actions are formed and in which these norms are expressed. Like all institutional systems it is also considered the subject of institutional change, change that is considered to be dependent on the factors of power, authority and legitimacy. When

\textsuperscript{199} Cummings & Katz 1987, Zimmer & Toepler 1999.

\textsuperscript{200} Lagergren 1999, Pierson 2000.

\textsuperscript{201} Pedersen (1991: 127), who considers this opinion to be a consequence of all neo-institutional thinking.
they are directly related to the changes sought for in my research questions, these changes are a major object of study in this dissertation.

Because of these processes, the State appears as a cohesive acting organisation with certain boundaries. Isomorphism is an important aspect of how national cultural policy is integrated as a field. Centralisation and decentralisation of the power and authority vested in various actors are also important. While the extreme point of centralisation would mean that all power and authority would be collected into the hands of one institution (something like the German *Führerprinzip*), a less centralised organisation makes room for an increased degree of complexity. Increases in centralisation of power and authority to specific actors can thus occur at the same time as power in the organisational field as a whole is decentralised. Decentralisation can be horizontal as well as vertical: i.e. power and authority can be spread out both between various institutional actors (such as government agencies) at the same organisational level and between actors at different levels (as defined by the State’s institutionalised view of its own organisation). At the other end of the spectrum from the *Führerprinzip*, we have the situation described as pluralism: a highly diffuse State with power and authority held by a number of actors in a complex arena covered by norms and rules that without a central authority are likely to be highly inconsistent. At the one end of the spectrum power and authority can be highly centralised and thus the State will be a highly integrated and unified actor. Placing a change on a line between integration and disintegration is thus not enough. The scales are simply heuristic tools for a qualitative description. Much like the State’s boundaries are the results of institutional processes so are its various institutional parts.

Not only government agencies take part in the government of Sweden. Especially in decentralised processes NGOs and other actors take part as well. Bennich-Björkman’s study of the professionalisation of the Swedish Writers’ Association is an excellent example of how organisations are invited to share the resources of the State at the cost of lending their authority to its purposes. Actions of the State, as for example declaring a change in its cultural policy, are thus often the result of a process that includes several actors that may or may not officially be legally parts of the State. This is a consequence of viewing the State as a composite and sometimes diffuse actor.

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203 Mintzberg 1978.
204 Bennich-Björkman 1991
THE CULTURAL SECTOR, CULTURAL POLICY
AND THE LIMITS AND PERIODS OF THIS STUDY

This is thus not a study of how the State carries out its cultural policy, but of how this policy is created through a process institutionalised in praxis and law. While a wide variety of institutional actors may influence this process, most of them are only invited to do so (an invitation that may, however, be institutionalised), and only a few are included as institutional stages in the process (described in the Appendix). These are the government, the relevant government commissions and the Riksdag (in which I include the parties as institutional actors). These actors are the primary focus of this study. Other actors are studied only when they are included in their decisions. As this is a study of the State, I accept that only actions authorised constitutionally should be considered actions of the State, as opposed to actions of other actors (such as NGOs or private persons). This authorisation is itself the institutionalised result of the long and, as I argue, ongoing process which has formed the Swedish state into a nation-state. What influences the actions of the State within its cultural policy is an empirical question that can to some extent be answered within the limits of this study. This is an important part of the answer to the research question of how integrated the State is as an actor. This is, in other words, not to say that the government, government commissions and Riksdag parties are the only actors that I study here; only that other actors are studied when they influence these in certain ways and as they appear in the material.

In Sweden, State and society are traditionally divided into “sectors” (sektorer) such as education, industry and culture. This term will be used, as it is defined institutionally, as the limit of this study. The State’s kulturpolitik consists of those of its activities that relate to the cultural sector. Kulturpolitik is in itself an institution and it exists in a fairly standard way in most countries in the world. The English term for this part of the State’s activity is cultural policy. I will thus use “cultural policy” as an English translation for kulturpolitik (this is paralleled by translating konstpolitik as “art policy”, filmpolitik as “film policy” and so on). While changes in the definition of the cultural sector are an object of this study, my neo-institutional assumptions make it more interesting to follow activities and actors over time than to change the scope of the study to follow the changing definition of a sector. The study is instead limited by how cultural policy was defined institutionally at the end of the last studied period. More specifically I have chosen to follow the limit set to cultural policy as a policy area in the national budget for 2002: “general cultural activi-

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205 Kulturpolitik could also have been translated literally as “cultural politics”; this term is, however, commonly used in a way that implies a wider and less institutional meaning of both culture and politics.

206 The term “policy” should thus not be interpreted in the strict sense given to it in policy theory.
ties, theatre, dance and music, libraries, literature and cultural journals, architecture, picture and form, as well as arts and crafts, compensations and grants for artists, film, archives, cultural environments, museums and exhibitions, research and development in the cultural sphere, and religious communities”.207

A number of sectors and sub-sectors that have sometimes been included in official cultural policy but that have later been excluded from it are thus also excluded from this study. Such an area is, for example, adult education (including the folkbildning associations), which in this study will be discussed only to the extent that it is related to in material concerned with included activities. The same goes for media policy, a sector that has quite often been included in discussions of cultural policy, but has never been fully integrated in the field. When Sweden has had a Ministry of Culture, the media have always been included in its responsibilities, being, however, at the same time administered by a special Media Division, never included in the responsibilities of its Cultural Affairs Division, or the short-lived Cultural Heritage Division. Thus the choice of the national budget for 2002 as the basis for setting a limit to this study creates a concentration on a number of core fields that have generally been included in cultural policy, regardless of how it has been defined. The one exception to this is the inclusion of religious denominations (previously been known as Church policy), a sector that was included only recently (in 2000). Given the focus on national identity and the dichotomy between universalist and particularist value concepts, the inclusion of religion, however, provides an interesting contrast, and sometimes a parallel, to the analysis of art and heritage policies that composes the rest of this study. The inclusion of Church policy is thus an additional argument for choosing this definition.

To clarify institutional change I have chosen to organise this dissertation in four (primarily) chronologically defined chapters:


In the following I will discuss the choice of periods, the choice of material and what I have chosen to focus on in my reading. Like the organisational limits, these chronological limits are defined institutionally and are limited by the dates of Riksdag elections. The empirical chapters concentrate on certain official documents produced by government commissions during this time. In order to properly cover decision-making processes, chapters have, however, been extended to also include the government decisions that instigated the

more relevant commissions of the period, as well as the government bills and Riksdag debates that were the direct results of their reports. The first chapter thus extends into 1974, in some cases even into 1976. It is defined more by the decision-making processes (connected with the commissions that were active in the period) than by the period’s chronological limits. This means that most of the important cultural policy changes and discussions during Olof Palme’s first government (1969–1976) are covered by this chapter. Corresponding extensions have been made in other cases to cover all instructions to government commissions reporting 1991–1994, as well as bills that have been made after 2002 as the results of commissions reporting earlier. In the latter case, this extension covers all such bills delivered before the publication of this dissertation.

The period of 1970–1973 is chosen to cover the Committee known as the Culture Council (Kulturrådet) and what is generally considered the formative moment of Swedish cultural policy as a general field. The period between 1975 and 1990 was, on the other hand, relatively calm in matters of cultural policy and, according to Anders Frenander’s studies of Swedish cultural policy discourse, included virtually no new directions in (what he analyses as) the discourse about it. Neither did the period include any major institutional change, except for a reform of the Church’s election system, which can be considered, at least partially, as a result of the investigations included in the first empirical chapter. A summary look at this reform will, however, be included in the 1991–1994 chapter as an introduction to an analysis of its later results. That chapter also covers Swedish reactions to the break-up of the Soviet block, the beginning of the separation of Church and State, as well as the first efforts to integrate Sweden into the European Community. It furthermore covers a centre-right government that, as I will show, worked in a somewhat different direction than the previous Social Democratic governments. The chapter on 1994–1998 covers the most comprehensive commission enquiry in the history of the field, as well as the reformulation of cultural policy following the evaluation of the 1974 reforms. It also includes the introduction of World Culture as a major new approach to cultural policy as well as the creation of a number of new agencies to deal with World Culture and the fight against xenophobia. The last empirical chapter covers the consolidation of the new ideas of the third period and a notable increase in direct gov-

208 As Swedish governments do not resign at an election unless the majority situation of the Riksdag has changed, governments are considered to sit from the election of the Prime Minister until his resignation, Larsson 2003.
ernment involvement in cultural policy. By this choice of periods I can cover most of the formative moments of cultural policy during the last four decades. At the same time it allows me to focus on the more recent developments of the nineties and around the millennium. It also covers one of the larger commission enquiries into the possibilities for a separation of Church and State, as well as the separation itself.

SOURCES AND METHODS FOR THEIR INTERPRETATION

The main sources for this study are the official documents produced during various stages in the policy process (within the limits set above). These texts are not first and foremost seen as descriptions of historical actions. As I have noted above, publishing these texts is interpreted as actions made by institutional actors, rather than as mere descriptions of action. In this dissertation I analyse the logics of appropriateness guiding what values and concepts of the nation are expressed in cultural policy. If one assumes that the writers of these documents have written what they consider appropriate, it follows that the result will be a direct remnant of that choice. I argue that there is good reason to assume this. The rejection of any inappropriate actions would also be evident in the sources included here (even if only as the non-action of ignoring a recommendation or changing the way it is described). Also included in this study are the legal actions made by the government and the Riksdag in legislation, budgeting and other normative decision-making. Even more than the choices made in writing, these actions leave remnants in the material of this study.

According to the Swedish historian Göran B. Nilsson, a remnant (as distinct from a descriptive source) is a source that fulfils the nearness criterion to a 100 per cent. Whether a source should be considered a remnant is thus a result of its relationship to the research questions.211 The texts that I analyse as remnants here are the reports of government commissions, Ministry Reports, government bills, and proceedings of the Riksdag and its relevant Committees. Thanks to Swedish Fundamental Law all of these documents are public and published by the State.212 All such documents published within the limits set above have been examined for this dissertation (with the one exception that my studies of Riksdag material have focused on actions of the government and parties). The main actors behind these documents (government, commissions and parties) are composite institutional actors. Official texts produced by them will, however, be considered as the products and textual actions of them as singular actors rather than as arenas.

212 Holmberg & Stjernquist 2003.
Although the Riksdag Committees do not always accept the propositions made by the government, the Riksdag almost always accepts the propositions made by its Committees. Thus, the focus of that part of this study will be on the proceedings of the Committees, rather than of the Riksdag in plenum. In that context it will be possible to analyse the responses of Riksdag parties to government bills together with the bills made on behalf of the parties by their party leaders and representatives to the Committee on Cultural Affairs, or other relevant Committees. Private bills presented by other members of the Riksdag will be given less attention in this study, the actors that I study being the parties as institutional actors rather than the individual members of the Riksdag. Analysing the actions of individual members of the Riksdag who do not hold any (other) authority to represent their party would thus not be relevant enough to be worth the significant amount of time that it would take examine their bills. The same restriction will guide my studies of budgetary decisions. For these the sources are, however, less extensive (budgetary decisions are not preceded by government commissions but instead prepared within the Ministry of Finance). Just as the official material discussed here, the official written parts of the dialogue between the ministries and government agencies are public (in contrast to the no less relevant dialogues between ministries), although not published. As this study is primarily concerned with longer perspectives, this will, however, not be a part of the material. The National Budget will for the same reason be considered supplementary information and used to discern the actual proportion of the government’s financial investments in the various projects and institutions that are included in its cultural policy. The answers given to these bills by the Riksdag parties will be of primary interest only to the extent that they concern the long-term organisation and direction of cultural policy.

As the discussions contained in this material generally concern possible reforms, a consequence of this choice of material is a focus on institutional change. This is a clear advantage. It is change that needs to be explained in normative institutionalism, not stability. Furthermore, this material has a special legal status. The official documents of the process leading to a law or other legal or governmental directive are under the Swedish legal system to be taken into account in legal interpretation of that law or directive. By choosing the material in this way, all of the sources relevant to legal interpretation are included in the study. What can be observed here are thus not only descriptions of institutional reality but also the production of policy and institutions. Not only do laws, ordinances and government directives have a legal coercive eff-

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213 In legal interpretation the actual text of the law is of course the most important factor, followed by the text of the (private or government) bill, in turn followed by the texts of preceding government commissions, Hellner 1996.
ect. Both these documents and the commission reports that have preceded them often have strong normative effects as standards for working within the sector and act as inspiration, as a source for concepts and mimetic isomorphism. As a consequence, these sources only include remnants of the part of the policy process that holds legal authority.

In addition to analysing these documents as remnants of actions, I have also used them as the main descriptive sources of this study. As such they have the advantage of being authentic and close to events relevant to this study. When the latter is not the case (as, for example, when they include long historical narratives), I have instead used other sources. While outright lying in these contexts could be considered unlikely, there is often a certain risk for bias, generally in favour of the political and administrative recommendations and basic norms advocated by the institutional actor that has authorised the text (although this is not necessarily the case; especially when the actual writer is not the person in charge, other norms may be relevant as well). My study of norms is thus helpful to my evaluation of the texts as descriptive sources. To complement these documents, I have, however, also used other sources, as well as the studies of other scholars. There are, in other words, three kinds of literature that have provided facts for the empirical chapters of this study: the documents listed as material, descriptive sources and the works of other scholars. Only the first category holds the status of remnants relevant to this study. All of these text categories, however, provide relevant descriptions.

My other sources include a number of interviews made with people who have been involved in the processes that I study, as well as some published descriptions written by such people (e.g. Ekström 2003 and Kleberg 1987a). The people I have interviewed have been involved in some of the major processes in the creation of Swedish cultural policy. The interviews have been qualitative and semi-structural. I have, in other words, not had a fixed questionnaire but still steered interviews to cover topics relevant to my research questions. Sometimes I added new topics during an interview when I realised that it was possible to cover more or other aspects than initially expected.214 These interviews have in some cases been very helpful in putting the statements of the studied texts more in context and to understand the situations in which they where written. These descriptions, however, run at least the same risk of bias as the documents. They are also further from the events in time, in some cases over thirty years. Such information has to be taken with some scepticism. It has also to be kept in mind that these are only the opinions of some of the people involved and consequently coloured by their personal perspective. Human memory can change over time and a narrative is more

214 Kvale1997 and Bjurström 2004 on interviews and their interpretation.
often than not reconstructed in view of later events. I have applied basic historical source criticism to the interviews and the written descriptive material. I have thus tried to compare the various sources to other descriptions and value information against what is known of human behaviour in bureaucracies and politics of this kind. Some sources are luckily better than others. The proceedings of Riksdag committees can, when used as descriptions of party actions, for example, be considered highly reliable (due to rigorous control), even if they may be biased in favour of the majority. Even in these cases I have, however, given greater credence to stated differences of opinions, as these are given by the members themselves and thus have the status of textual remnants of the statements made by these.

Interpreting texts and interviews can be seen as a hermeneutic circle. I have thus tried to interpret the reasoning behind the actions of each actor by placing them in relation to the whole of each text, the activities of the actor behind it, its worldview and the norms expressed in it. The field in which each report places itself is considered the primary organisational context in relation to which the text is interpreted. The norms of the field are at the same time reinterpreted from the norms expressed in each text. Interpretation thus continues in a circle. Five years of working with these texts has hopefully made it possible for me to come closer to understanding how these norms have been interpreted by the writers and intended readers of these texts, and thus to the norms expressed in them. At the same time categorising norms to answer the research questions of this study has often meant that I have interpreted them in a different context than the one intended by their writers and intended readers. Only very few of these texts have in fact been intended to have implications on how the national community is imagined as limited. This is the major benefit of reading these texts from the perspective of the theories described in this chapter and the previous one: it makes it possible to interpret the implications and consequences of these events in a new context relevant to my research questions instead of to the original context as imagined by the original writers. The interpretation is thus a product of the meeting between my own research questions, other pre-understanding and the material, rather than any claim to an objective understanding of the meanings of the texts. This is of course the case with any reading and the work I have done here could in fact have been considered quite pointless if my interpretation had not added anything to the interpretations of the sources’ original writers.

By applying my research questions to the actions of institutional actors in this way I follow the logics of appropriateness expressed in their writing and

216 See e.g. Ödman 2007 or Bjurström 2004 on hermeneutics.
guiding their actions. This analysis is described in the following four chapters. These chapters are organised in a matrix structure. Each chapter is divided along the lines of the sub-sectors of cultural policy. These divisions are kept constant through all chapters with only a few exceptions. In this way the four period descriptions can be further divided into partial cases through which the norms guiding cultural policy development can be compared in order to answer questions on both changes over time and differences between various parts of the cultural sector. While a thematic structure could have made the text easier to read, I hope that this way of organising it places the various reports in their original context. This should make it easier to analyse how normative changes relate to each other.

217 “Film Policy” is a different heading from “Theatre, Music and Dance Policy” in the two first chapters since there was little connection between these fields at that time; in national budgets film policy was even considered a part of media policy rather than of cultural policy. In the later chapters these are grouped together with additional sub-sectors under the heading “Art Policies”. Artist Policies is furthermore added only in the 1994-1998 chapter as there was at that time, and no other, a number of government commissions working in this field in a way that was relatively unconnected with other fields. Language policy, finally, does not appear as a sector until the mid-nineties.
CHAPTER IV:
Cultural Policy and the Swedish Nation-State

After the previous chapters, the subject of this chapter may appear somewhat paradoxical: a discussion of Swedish cultural policy from the Renaissance and until the present, when I have already concluded that the State and the nation as well as cultural policy are social, cultural, and institutional constructions that change over time. It is safe to say that Sweden as a State and a nation (as those words are interpreted today) did not exist five hundred years ago. It is in fact likely that there have been significant changes in how the State and the nation have been organised during the few decades covered by this dissertation. Neither is cultural policy a stable subject. While the term is in international use today, it has had its present meaning only since the early post-war years. Yet, this study assumes that the institutions of cultural policy are still formed by formative moments much earlier in “its” history. I thus have to follow the actors and activities that were included in cultural policy in 2002 backwards in time to periods when the term “cultural policy” would not even have been understood. This chapter will be a (pre)history of the State’s relationship to a number of specific actors and activities and not of Swedish cultural, artistic or religious life in general. It will thus not include other actors that were once important to Swedish cultural life, other than as parts of the original context of the actors that I focus on here. This is, in other words, a rather narrow history. It is, however, complicated by the fact that many of these actors have been represented by a number of very active historians. Their written history is thus often partial and the writing of it could be seen as

a series of actions made by proponents of various actors and activities working to increase the legitimacy of these. As I will show in the later chapters, these actions can be analysed as made within a logic of appropriateness. While I will analyse similar actions in those chapters, I have had no other choice in this chapter than to rely on the work of other scholars. Luckily the awareness of this kind of problem is increasing in current historiographical studies. As cultural policy becomes a subject of increased discussion, the legitimising history of its actors is thus under increased scrutiny as well. As a result of the fact that scholarship on these matters consists primarily of legitimising history and the criticism of this, the history of the surviving institutions tends to be better covered than the cultural history of Sweden in general.

As this is not only a study of cultural policy but of cultural policy as a way in which the State organises national culture I will also have to look at the values and concepts of the nation that were dominant in the formative moments when the institutions of what would become cultural policy were established. The purpose of this chapter is thus to describe the institutional development of what would become cultural policy, what values were used to legitimise these activities and the development of concepts of the Swedish nation in the same periods (with an emphasis on cultural policy). The chapter ends with a discussion of prior academic studies of the Swedish cultural policy of the period that I study in this dissertation. Although it may appear that most parts of the history of Swedish cultural policy have been studied already, much of the following concerns events that are mentioned in many general works but that remains to be studied in detail.

GOTHS, LUTHERANS AND FRANCOPHILES: PROTO-NATIONAL SWEDISH CULTURAL POLICY

Belief in a Swedish nation has a long history. A central role in this story is played by the proto-nationalist theory known as göticism (“Gothicism”), accor-

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219 See Hillström 2006 for an analysis of the written history of Swedish museums and other institutional actors in cultural heritage policy as a legitimization of the presently dominant actors and of cultural heritage as an ancient responsibility of the State. As Per Sundgren (2007: 23-24) has pointed out it becomes clear that the history of Swedish cultural policy is less than thoroughly studied if one compares the situation to the amount of scholarship that exists on its history in Norway and Denmark, see e.g. Hans Fredrik Dahl’s and Tore Hellstedt’s (eds. 2002-2006) series Norsk kulturpolitikk 1814-2014 and Duelund 1995.

220 Sweden also has a long history as an independent national state in the Tillyan sense. From the perspective of this study it hardly matters when in the Middle Ages the first state emerged. What matters more is the establishment of an independent Swedish national state under the sixteenth-century kings of the Vasa dynasty. This development began with the brake-up of the Kalmar Union with Denmark and Norway in 1523 and later became connected with the reformation and the establishment of a national Lutheran Church with the King as its highest protector.
ding to which the “Goths” mentioned by the Roman writer Tacitus were also the forefathers not only of the Goths that would later plunder Rome, but also of the modern Swedes and that Sweden was in fact their original homeland. The Ostrogothic historian Jordanes had claimed that the Goths had once lived on the Island of Scandza “in the north” together with their women, the Amazons. According to Swedish göticist theory the Gothic tribes (and sometimes the Amazons) were the ancestors of the Swedish people, or more specifically of its kings and nobles. The earliest known example of this theory dates from 1434 when the Swedish Bishop Ragvaldi took part in the Consistory of Basel and argued for a better seat by claiming that the Swedes as descendants of the nation that defeated the Romans were the pre-eminent people of Europe. From these statements one can, however, deduce that the göticist theory was at that time relatively well established, at least in Sweden. The real zenith of göticist theory was, however, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when Sweden under Gustavus Adolphus achieved the status of a major European power, a status that could be legitimised by reference to an even greater Gothic past. The most well-known example of göticist theory in its prime is the Atlantica published by Olof Rudbeck in 1672. Rudbeck used the established method of comparing national history with dates from ancient Greco-Roman and biblical history to argue for an enhanced göticist theory. Sweden was, according to him, not only among the oldest nations in the world. It was the original civilisation, which he identified with both the Hyperboreans of Greek legend and with Plato’s Atlantis. Swedish was furthermore the original language and the Latin and Greek alphabets could be traced back to its runic alphabet.

As with many other projects that could increase the status of a European monarchy, the search for historical remnants of Sweden’s Gothic past was supported by the Crown. A major example of this is that Gustavus Adolphus in 1630 charged the göticist scholar Johannes Bureus to collect what was described as “old monuments and things with which the Fatherland can be illuminated”. Among his various responsibilities was also to write down what runic inscriptions he could find. In 1666 the regency of the infant Charles XI

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221 Göticism was not a uniquely Swedish phenomenon. The original Goths had establish post-Roman Ostrogothic and Visigothic kingdoms in Italy and Spain and was claimed as ancestors of Spanish dynasties. The Gothic Christian kingdom in Spain before the Muslim conquest was also used to legitimise the recompuesta. Hall 1998: 13, 42-46 and 151-169, Grundberg 2000: 47-52.

222 Rudbeck was an accomplished physician and botanist using modern scientific methods to support his theories empirically, for example by comparing Swedish place names with names mentioned in the Bible and in Classical texts and by reference to archaeological evidence. In this respect he was a rather typical representative of the century of Newton, Hobbes and Agrippa, a time when some of the modern concepts of academia were slowly emerging from an earlier scholastic tradition. Eriksson 1994, Hall 1998: 156-169.
continued this policy with a legislation for the protection of “ancient antiqui-
ties and remnants” that commemorated the achievements of the “Kings of
Sweden and Götha and their august Men and Subjects”. The following year
the regency charged Johan Hadorph to take care of these activities and award-
ed him the title of riksantikvarie, Antiquarian of the Realm. The actual authori-
ty and responsibilities of early Antiquarians of the Realm remain unclear, as
does the extent of their accomplishments. The institution, however, remains
important to the study: although the continuity between these institutions can
be doubted, the office was later revived and has continued to this day and
grown into riksantikvarieämbetet (RAÄ), the Office of the Antiquarian of the
Realm, or the National Heritage Board as it is currently, but less literally,
translated into English. The idea that the Board had originated in the age of
Gustav Adolphus would later become an important source for legitimacy and
may have influenced its development by defining its legitimate role at an early
stage.

Was göticism a proto-national ideology that united the Swedish people in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? Were the Swedes an ethnie and seven-
teenth-century Sweden an ethnic state in Smith’s sense as well as a national
state in the sense that Tilly uses the word? The political scientist Patrik Hall
and many others argue that primarily the aristocracy and upper clergy were
concerned with göticism and that it did not even claim a common descent for
the entire people of the kingdom but only for its upper strata. The historian
Jonas Nordin has on the other hand made an extensive study of the concepts
of the nation that were common in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
and concluded that göticist rhetoric was at least somewhat more widely spread.
There are, for example, cases of göticist rhetoric used by priests in recruitment
campaigns for the Thirty Years’ War. This speaks for a wider inclusion of
Swedes in an ethnic concept, although in no way for nationalism in the mod-
ern sense. While the ethnic minorities of the realm were all integrated parts of
a privilege-based society the Crown’s approach towards them differed signifi-
cantly. Germans had been an established group in Sweden since the Middle
Ages, when they had dominated trade in the Baltic sea. Although the position
of German as a language of business had declined in Sweden at this time, the

223 Beckman 1999, Grundberg 2000 Hillström 2006: 43-50, quotes according to Grundberg 2000:
48. Much like Rudbeck, Bureus was a Renaissance man accomplished in a number of fields, such
as Oriental languages, chemistry, mathematics, astronomy and astrology. Even more than Rud-
beck, he was a product of a time when what would today be considered science was not yet
separated from the occult. Many of his theories concerned the mystic aspects of Swedish as the
True Language and the mystical aspects of Runes. Tomas Karlsson (2005) has studied Bureus’
Gothic Cabbala and its importance to the development of European occultism from a compara-
tive religion perspective.

Germans remained an important group in many of the conquered provinces (in what are now Germany and the Baltic States). Germans also became an integral part of the Swedish aristocracy.225

The Crown did even less to integrate the larger Finno-Ugric minorities speaking the Finnish, Estonian and Sami languages. These languages had been used in Swedish Churches (in the relevant areas) from the time of the Reformation, and officials of both Church and State were expected to know Finnish when working in Finnish-speaking areas. Swedish, however, remained the official language of both Church and State throughout the entire realm. A stronger division than these ethnic distinctions was the separation of Sweden proper and its submissive provinces. Representation in the Swedish Riksdag was the privilege of subjects of the Swedish Crown within the Realm (including Finland). The provinces south and south-east of the Baltic were denied this privilege. The Danish-speaking population of the southern provinces conquered in 1658 was an exception to these rules. According to the official view, these were re-conquered Swedish provinces and their population was forcefully integrated into the Swedish ethno-linguistic community. Nordin considers this a means to ensure their loyalty towards the Swedish Crown.226 His study thus points towards an ethno-linguistic proto-nationalism in the seventeenth century. Although the general acceptance of this concept remains controversial, it implies that the Swedish monarchy could be described in Smith’s terminology as an ethnic state with the Swedes as a mostly vertical ethnie acting as a lateral aristocratic ethnie in some of its conquered provinces. Ethnicity appears to have been conceived as linguistic and genealogic as well as closely connected to the State, united by a common loyalty to the King.

There was, however, also a close connection between Church and State, at least after the Protestant Reformation, when the King effectively took control over the Church. The clergy, however, retained the privilege of being one of the four estates of the Swedish Riksdag. While canon law was integrated into the national law, the clergy was thus at the same time a fourth of the legislative assembly. The Church was furthermore an important part of the administration. It was the Church that carried out many of the policies mentioned above. Church officials, as well as secular ones, were charged with cataloguing Gothic remnants and reporting them to the Antiquarian of the Realm, just as they were charged with recruiting soldiers. It was a change in the language of the priests that became the most obvious sign of the new language policy in the conquered southern provinces. This was considered natural since Church officials were highly integrated in the State. Bishops

225 Nordin 2000.
were appointed by the King and parish priests acted as representatives of the
Crown, as well as of the Church. An interesting example of how the Church
was used as a medium was the annual Royal Proclamation read in all Swedish
churches. These have recently been studied by the historian Joachim Östlund,
who finds that their ways of legitimating the King’s power included both refe-
rences to the ethno-religious community and to the King’s role as protector
of the people, a somewhat different version of what would later become a
state-framed concept of the nation.227

Religion was, however, important not only as an institution but also as a
common faith. While the influence of göticism may be doubted it is hard to
doubt that the Thirty Years’ War was legitimised as a religious war (which
Sweden entered to protect its fellow Lutheran states in Northern Germany
from the Catholic forces of the Habsburg Emperor and the Holy League).
The priority becomes clear if one looks at the treatment of minorities. Reli-
gious minorities were as a rule both persecuted and executed for treason in
seventeenth-century Sweden. Even the few exceptions that existed (concern-
ing, for example, the Catholic and Calvinist Walloons that immigrated to
Sweden to work as craftsmen) were temporary privileges eventually revoked.
Linguistic minorities were, on the other hand, generally tolerated and some-
times privileged. The Church of Sweden used at least four languages in its ser-
mons: Swedish, German, Finnish, and Sami.228 The perceived connection be-
tween Lutheranism and loyalty to the King outweighed any beliefs in com-
on ethnicity as a fundamental bond between King and people. Universal reli-
gious legitimacy outweighed ethnic particularistic legitimacy.

Like most European monarchies in the seventeenth and eighteenth cent-
uries Sweden was, however, not satisfied with proclaiming its unique status. It
also had to define itself in the context of the larger European state system and
aristocratic culture. During the eighteenth century this culture became in-
creasingly Francophile and Francophone. In these times the arts remained a
matter for the court, even when power was seized by the Riksdag during what
was known as the Age of Liberty. During this time the most important deci-
dion in this area was Queen Louisa Ulrika’s decision to found a Royal Aca-
demy of Letters. She led the academy personally. With this in mind it is hardly
surprising that cultural policy would become more important when her
artistically inclined son Gustav III restored the political powers of the Crown
by a coup d’état in 1772. The King was a great benefactor of the arts. At the
same time he was, however, dissatisfied with his mother’s academy. In 1786
he thus instituted a new academy – the Swedish Academy – modelled after
the Académie française. Much like its French model it was to publish a diction-

228 Nordin 2000.
ary and award literary prizes. Its aim would be to improve the Swedish language and literature. This was much the same as the aim of the already existing Royal Academy of Letters. Gustav III thus reformed the Academy of Letters to becoming an Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities. He even decided that the Antiquarian of the Realm should be its permanent secretary 	extit{ex officio}. This merger changed the Academy’s focus to history.\footnote{Svensén 1998: 1-12, Jonsson 2003: 15-48.} An 	extit{ad hoc} choice provided a path that would prove permanent.

It has often been said that the purpose of cultural policy in this era was to enhance the status of the monarchy in the eyes of both the European aristocracy and the Swedish people.\footnote{Beckman 1999, Larsson 2003: 185-186.} This status was measured in the context of a trans-national aristocratic and largely Francophone European culture. Its members travelled Europe as part of their education and adult life. They identified with French culture to an extent that would be impossible in the more nationalised Europe of later days. France was to a large extent what the Germans would call the \textit{Wahlheimat} of the European aristocracy.\footnote{Wolff 2005.} It should, however, be noticed that the operas and dramas that Gustav III funded, wrote and in some cases participated in often consisted of heroic tales from Swedish history and often even \textit{göticist} motifs. This was no paradox. The King was at the same time a member of the European family of hereditary monarchs by the Grace of God and successor to great Swedish Kings. A grand national history enhanced his status in Europe, just as a command of French culture did. His status as something apart from the Swedish people could strengthen his position in the country at the same time as his relation to the heroes of the people. It was still possible to be both a Swede and a Francophone aristocrat at the same time.

\section*{Cultural Policy and the Nation in the Long Nineteenth Century}

Sweden did not experience a revolution in the 1790s. The Swedish state did, however, undergo a number of thorough changes from the murder of Gustav III in 1792 to the adoption of a new constitution in 1809 and a new royal dynasty (through the adoption of the French Marshal Jean Baptise Bernadotte as heir to the throne in 1810 under the name of Karl XIV Johan, or Charles XIV John in English). The new constitution, or Fundamental Law, re-established Freedom of the Press as a fundamental (albeit limited) right. It also established a balance of power in which executive power was entrusted to the King and his Council of State (later known as the government), while legislative power was shared between the King in Council and the Riksdag.
The Riksdag would, however, continue to consist of the four Estates – Nobility, Clergy, Burghers and Peasants – until the reform of 1866, when it was replaced by a bicameral Riksdag in which the Second Chamber was elected by limited suffrage and the First was appointed by the county councils and cities. Even more important than the new constitution was perhaps the Russian conquest of Finland in 1809. With the Peace of Fredrikshamn (Hamina) Sweden lost about a third of its territory and a fourth of its population, including the major non-Swedish-speaking group, the Finns. Within a few years the map, however, changed again: thanks to the involvement of Sweden and its new Crown Prince on the winning side of the Napoleonic Wars (as well as to successful diplomacy during the Vienna Conference), the Swedish King gained the Crown of Norway, which thus became joined with Sweden in a personal union. Due to a compromise with the less than satisfied Norwegians, however, Norway would be managed as a separate state, although with a shared King with executive powers, especially over foreign policy (which remained in Swedish hands).

In the following decades Sweden saw a rise in national sentiments, partially as a way of dealing with the loss of Finland, a trauma perhaps comparable to the French invasions that may have provoked the rise of German nationalism a few years earlier. Among the more significant representatives of this movement were the Uppsala academics that founded Götiska Förbundet (“the Gothic Association”) in 1811. As the name suggests the Association had the ambition to reinvigorate the göticist ideology of the pre-Enlightenment era. Unlike the göticism of Rudbeck and Bureus the ideology of the Gothic Association was, however, a variety of ethnic nationalism that paralleled, or mimicked, the German ethno-nationalism of writers such as Herder and Schlegel. Like their German contemporaries the members of the Gothic Association focused on a heroic past, primarily on pre-Christian times, but to some extent also on the Middle Ages. Their göticist predecessors and their royal protectors were also among the heroes of the Gothic Association. The memory of these heroic eras was to be preserved by the protection of remnants and monuments but also through poetry and song. While their gatherings had the trappings of a ritualistic order, inspired by their own romanticised versions of pre-Christian tradition, the activities of the Gothic Association quickly became more public than secret. Many of its members, Erik Gustav Geijer and Esaias Tegnér among them, became important national poets in the Romantic tradition. Tegnér is, for example, famous for poems which he idealised Vikings and heroes, but also the independent and rustic virtues of Swedish yeoman farmers. To him this national revival was equivalent to “within the

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borders of Sweden re-conquer Finland”, that is to regain the honour and spirit of the nation.234

In more practical matters the members of the Gothic Association opposed what they perceived as the passivity of the Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities. The antiquity statutes now became an important legitimising argument connecting heritage preservation with the time was a major power. While the Gothic Association originally appears to have opposed the Academy as such, this changed when they eventually came to dominate it and instead became proponents of a reformed Academy. In 1828 they reached many of their goals on heritage issues with the establishment of a new heritage statute. The power of the Antiquarian of the Realm and the Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities was now institutionalised in a statute that required their permission for anyone to be allowed to damage or move an object registered as an ancient monument (neither of these actors had been mentioned in any earlier statutes). The statutes also re-established the State’s authority over the national heritage, despite the fact that it had originally built on a pre-modern conception of ownership, according to which commoners could not own land, only the right to use it. The idea of an older legislation created under the heroic Gustavus Adolphus appears to have been crucial as a source of authority for those who considered heritage preservation a responsibility of the State, something that was in no way taken for granted at the time.235

While the neo-gòticist movement was a clear example of ethno-nationalism, the borders of the ethnic nation appear to have been less than clear. This is evident when one looks at the Pan-Scandinavian movement among nineteenth-century intellectuals. The goal of the Pan-Scandinavians was not only to unite all of the Scandinavian countries in a political union (which would include Denmark as well as Sweden and Norway). They also strove to unite the Scandinavian languages into one unified written language. Pan-Scandinavism was at the height of its authority in the 1840s. It was supported both by a growing student movement in the Swedish and Danish universities and by the Swedish King Oscar I, who was eager to use it in a growing mobilisation to legitimise a more active foreign policy. As was shown at student meetings, like the one in Copenhagen in 1848, Pan-Scandinavism was mostly an intellectual, liberal and bourgeois endeavour.236 Intellectual movements, such as neo-gòticism and Pan-Scandinavism, thus paralleled the German movement for union that culminated in the revolutions of 1848. Both movements were based on liberal bourgeois classes and both supported a nationalism that was at the same time

ethnic and linguistic in its concept of the nation and class integrative, liberal and democratic in its implications, in the same way as the German Bildungs-
bürgertum their Swedish contemporaries espoused Bildung – or bildning in Swedish – as represented by poets and writers such as Geijer and Tegnér.237

In spite of these parallels Tor Larsson and others have doubted the influence of the bourgeoisie on Swedish culture and cultural policy, arguing instead that Swedish cultural policy remained based on an aristocratic concept of culture, while Swedish culture at large remained more or less separate from this, being based instead on the cultures of the working classes and peasants. As the abolition of the four estates occurred before the industrial revolution, this exclusion was to have political aspects as well. The Swedish bourgeoisie would have developed inside the already existing political and cultural system rather than in opposition to it.238 Although it is true that the Swedish upper bourgeoisie of the late nineteenth century was dominated by upper civil servants, rather than by capitalists, I would consider Larsson’s view somewhat exaggerated. It ignores the extent to which a bourgeois public sphere actually did develop in Sweden as well as the cultural establishments to which it contributed. City theatres such as Södra Teatern (“The Southern Theatre”) in Stockholm and the theatres of Norrköping, Linköping, Umeå and Luleå are examples of this. Many of them started as privately owned companies. Later in the century concert orchestras and public libraries followed suit, often as a result of non-profit work in civil society. As in so many other European countries the rise of the middle classes in industrialised society also created markets for art and literature. In Sweden these markets provided the basis for writers and painters, such as Strindberg, Heidenstam, Zorn and Larsson who would put lasting marks on the self-image of future Swedes.239

Among the more monumental national reminders of nineteenth century civil society is Nordiska Museet (“the Nordic Museum”) and the Skansen open air museum, both located in Stockholm and both largely the work of Arthur Hazelius around the turn of the century. Stockholm already had a national museum at this time. Nationalmuseum (“the National Museum”) had been created in 1866. Its bases were the royal collections of art and antiquities and the Royal Armoury. Officially these were three establishments that shared one and the same building: the Royal Armoury and the art collections both had their own administrators, while the collection of antiquities was entrusted to the Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities (and to its permanent secretary, the Antiquarian of the Realm). This conglomerate would later spawn a

237 For a discussion of Geijer’s philosophy as related to German and British personalism and Bildung-philosophy, see Bengtsson 2006.
238 Larsson 2003.
number of separate museums. The Royal Armoury would later move out and
become its own museum and the antiquities collection would in 1965 become
the Museum of National Antiquities. At the beginning of my study, this muse-
num was, however, still entrusted to the Academy and its secretary was still
the Antiquarian of the Realm, head of the National Heritage Board (RAÄ).240

To many people these establishments were not enough. The nineteenth
century saw a lasting interest in historical remnants and the culture and cultural artefacts of a country culture that was believed to perish in the face of
industrialisation. Arthur Hazelius became one of the most well known and
controversial proponents of this movement. Perhaps characteristically, he
started his career as a public intellectual as a proponent of Pan-Scandinavian
spelling reforms.241 Later he continued by collecting artefacts of peasant cul-
ture. This work, both fundraising and personally collecting artefacts, in the end
resulted in the opening of the Nordic Museum in a monumental neo-Gothic
cathedral-like building in the former royal hunting reservation of Djurgården,
with Skansen close by. These establishments were of course decidedly nation-
alist in character and Skansen was quickly made a centre for the celebration of
June 6 as the Day of the Swedish Flag. Hazelius’s personal concept of the
nation appears, however, to have remained larger than the Swedish state. His
collections included items from the whole of Scandinavia. A special taste for
the internally exotic could be seen in a bias for the picturesque costumes of
Dalecarlia and the Lapps (or Sami) of Northern Sweden. Both Dalecarlians
and Sami were in fact purposefully hired to lend authenticity to his installa-
tions in Stockholm. Sometimes Hazelius even appears to have been more
interested in the exotic than in any concept of Swedishness: the Nordic Muse-
um included German collections which he had received from a friend and
Skansen displayed living crocodiles in its menagerie. This appears to have done
little to prevent his establishments from becoming foci of Swedish identity.
After Hazelius’s death, his heirs would have to deal with this eccentricity
when they reformed the foundations for the Nordic Museum and Skansen
into becoming more integral parts of the Swedish cultural heritage establish-
ment. This integration was successful, however, and in 1919 a formal separa-
tion of responsibilities was established between the Nordic Museum and the
State museums. The Nordic Museum became responsible for artefacts newer
than 1523, while the Museum of National Antiquities took care of older arte-
facts. In time the two museums would also be connected with different aca-
demic disciplines: ethnology and archaeology, respectively.242

242 Hillström 2006.
One should remember, however, that ethno-nationalist liberals, such as neo-Gothicists and Pan-Scandinavians, neither represented the whole of the political spectrum, nor necessarily the official self-image of the Swedish state. The latter could perhaps be better understood by studying the works of the Platonic philosopher Christopher Jacob Boström. According to him, the State was an ideal person that was put between God and man. The official hierarchies of the State, from the King to the common people, represented the ideal hierarchies of creation. The Church was the spiritual arm of the State. This philosophy was successful enough to dominate the philosophy department of the University of Uppsala, and later that of the new Gothenburg University, for several decades in the late nineteenth century (much as Hegelian philosophies dominated at many other universities). Through these it influenced the education of public officials. Boström had also been a private teacher to King Oscar II, his influence thus reaching the highest top of Swedish society, as imagined by itself, and becoming a kind of official philosophy of the State.\textsuperscript{243} Far from any kind of ethnic nationalism, this was a kind of pre-nationalist monarchist state-framed patriotism with decidedly universalistic legitimation.

It was natural from this perspective that the Church remained an integral part of the State. The first steps to make the Church a separate entity were, however, taken in the 1860s. First the parish organisation of rural Sweden was changed. Previously rural Parish Councils had taken care of both spiritual and secular matters. From 1862 secular matters were, however, transferred to secular municipal councils. When the Riksdag was reorganised the Clergy lost its direct representation in the legislative assembly. The compromise that made them accept this created the National Synod (with both clerical and lay members) as a constitutional body with the right to veto Riksdag decisions that directly concerned the internal affairs of the Church. The second half of the nineteenth century was also the time when the Church of Sweden was challenged as the dominant religious and ideological force in the country. As freedom of belief was strengthened, Nonconformist churches, such as Methodists and Pentecostals, began to establish themselves as dominant forces in many parts of Sweden. These revivalist groups are recognised among the popular movements (folkrörelser) that are commonly considered to have laid the foundation for modern democratic Sweden.\textsuperscript{244}

The concept of \textit{bildning} took root in these popular movements and developed a following within the young Social Democratic Party. In this version the concept of \textit{folkbildning} (people’s \textit{bildning}) developed. \textit{Folkbildning} was


\textsuperscript{244} Ekström 2003: 16-19.
supported among bourgeois intellectuals as well as within the workers’ movement and several organisations promoting it developed during the latter part of the century. Among the more influential organisations was the Workers’ Educational Association (ABF), from the start in close cooperation with the Social Democratic Party and the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO). In this context, folkbildning was seen as an activity in which the people educated itself and thereby conquered the high culture that had previously been the privilege of the ruling classes. Ideologists of the movement spoke of this in terms of making the working classes ready to take over power as a ruling class. Parallel with this revolutionary project was a discussion of to what extent the working classes should mimic the culture of the bourgeoisie and to what extent they should create a culture of their own. By the mid twentieth century a traditional reformist perspective had carried the victory: the Social Democratic Party should take power by democratic elections and transform society from the top. At the same time the people were supposed to cultivate themselves by folkbildning. When in 1947 Tage Lindbom re-opened the debate on cultural policy by publishing a programme for the relationship between the workers’ movement and culture, he described the idea of a separate worker’s culture as “pure nonsense”.245

If Pan-Scandinavism received its first major blow when Sweden failed to help Denmark against a Prussian invasion, it was worn down by the prolonged – if peaceful – separation of Norway and Sweden. To Swedish politicians this conflict was also heavily intertwined with Swedish constitutional politics. The two states were held together by a common monarch (much like Austria-Hungary). Secession and parliamentarianism became one and the same issue. Very few supported a full merger of the two kingdoms. In this sense the separate institutions and administrative traditions of the two kingdoms remained stronger than any linguistic similarities or imagined ethnic community. They remained what Oscar II described as “the Brother Peoples” and their relationship became all the more quarrelsome. When Christian Lundeberg, as a member of the Riksdag’s bicameral Special Committee in 1905, spoke for a forceful integration of Norway into Sweden, he argued for it as a new course

245 Lindbom 1947: 9, Gustavsson 1991, Sundgren 2007. The cultural and folkbildning activities of the workers’ movement and other popular movements are among the parts of cultural policy history that have been the subject of the most academic research. Gustavsson (1991) argues that folkbildning represented a specific new concept of culture while Sundgren (2007) argues that this was only a variation of the idealistic view of culture that dominated in the surrounding bourgeois society. Both Sundgren and Frenander (2005) discuss the possibility of a separate worker’s culture and a cultural policy in the style of the Soviet Proletkult (see Read 2006 on Proletkult). Both, however, agree that if such a concept was ever presented in Sweden it remained marginal even in the worker’s movement. This research, however, concerns activities outside of the State in civil society and it would thus be going beyond the limits of this dissertation to describe it in detail.
of action and assumed that it could only be achieved if Norway was re-conquered in a new war. He was also alone in this opinion and the Riksdag accepted dissolution of the Union without a vote.\textsuperscript{246} In cultural policy, the failure of Pan-Scandinavianism was symbolically manifested by the new Nordic Museum. A new era was signalled when its new building was to be shared with the Royal Armoury. The main hall, once designed as a temple of the ethnic nation, was used for displaying the conquered standards of enemy states. In its centre resided a huge enthroned statue of Gustav Vasa by Carl Milles. The only reminder of the people was the imperative inscribed on its fundament: “Be Swedish!”\textsuperscript{247}

Even among the Swedish royalist Right matters were more complex. Nils Elvander has, for example, compared the outlook of Harald Hjärne and Rudolf Kjellén, both professors and public intellectuals, one a moderate and the other a radical conservative. To Hjärne Sweden was primarily a state that existed within a larger European civilisation which it should ideally uphold. To him any policy on the Norwegian question should strive for a compromise. When this failed, he accepted the dissolution of the Union.\textsuperscript{248} Kjellén went further in the construction of a philosophy of nationalism, which I will dwell somewhat more on. In sharp contrast to Hjärne’s universalist view of civilisation Kjellén argued for particularism and nationalism. To him each nation was an organic entity that could strive, live and die. The nation was, however, not only an ethnicity and ethno-politics was only one side of the nation’s life: constitutional politics, economic politics, social politics and geo-politics being other sides. As a political scientist he rejected the distinction between \textit{Staat} (state) and \textit{Gesellschaft} (society), not because it was analytically invalid, but because it was inappropriate to apply when the modern states were forced by history to encompass society. From this organic point of view Kjellén denounced liberalism as a parenthetic episode in history that would be surpassed by what he described as “national socialism”, a system in which the social strata could act together under a corporative constitution. The State would become a people’s home – a \textit{folkhem}. In this he never included the Norwegians. The nation appears to Kjellén to have been defined more by the State than by any ethnic community. Within these borders the nation should be strongly integrative. Norway was on the other hand neither a part of Sweden

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{246}] Elvander 1961: 185-256. The discussions in the Riksdag and in the bicameral Special Committee were published by the Riksdag in 2005 together with other relevant material edited by Evert Vedung and Margareta Brundin.
\item[\textsuperscript{247}] See Bohman 1997: 118-121 for an analysis of Milles’ statue of Gustav Vasa at the Nordic Museum.
\item[\textsuperscript{248}] Elvander 1961.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
nor an equal partner, but a land conquered by Sweden and should be used by Sweden to survive in the geopolitical game played by the European powers.249

Politically Kjellén probably had a larger influence on German conservatives and geopolitical thinkers than on any group in Sweden. State-centred royalist conservatives played out their role in Swedish politics during World War I. The parliamentarian government and Gustav V clashed in 1913 over issues concerning the defence budget, which the Liberal Prime Minister saw no reason to increase. This resulted in a massive campaign organised by, among others, the explorer and writer Sven Hedin. The campaign culminated with a march of protesting peasants and landholders that met with the King in the yard of the Royal Palace, a last manifestation of the image of the Swedish yeoman class, once idealised by Geijer and Tegné, gathering around their King in a time of war. This time these powerful national symbols were used in order to confront a less belligerent Liberal government. The confrontation went no further at the time, nor did it so in 1917, when many again feared a confrontation. Sweden was instead democratised peacefully with the suffrage reform of 1921.250 The association of royalist state-framed nationalism with anti-democratic forces friendly to Germany may, however, help explain why these symbols have become so difficult to use for later generations.

CULTURAL POLICY, NATIONALISM AND THE BIRTH OF THE FOLKHEM STATE

The inter-war years became a time of confrontation in Swedish politics, although that confrontation with very few exceptions stayed within the boundaries of the political system. It was also a time when Social Democracy redefined its views of itself and its relationship to the nation. In a speech in 1928 future party leader and prime minister Per Albin Hansson voiced that re-interpretation by presenting a vision of Sweden as a folkhem – a people’s home – that would transcend the conflict between classes. Social Democracy changed from a workers’ party into a people’s party, from a potentially revolutionary party first into a potentially governing party and soon into the governing party.251

249 Elvander 1961: 257-325, Lagergren 1999, Kjellén 1916. On the demise of liberalism Kjellén believed, much as Plato, that political systems naturally changed during the course of history. Democracy would turn into a more oligarchic republic, which would in turn change into a principate, which would evolve into Caesarianism, monocracy, autocracy, constitutionalism, parliamentarianism and then back to democracy, a cyclic view of history that somewhat resembles Spengler’s larger cyclical view of high cultures. See also Tunander 2005 for a discussion of Kjellén’s geopolitical analysis.


Traditionally this change has been analysed as an internal process in the workers’ movement. Later research has, however, worked for a more contextualised interpretation. The political scientist Fredrika Lagergren, for example, argues that the *folkhem* concept (as it developed in the inter- and post-war periods) was heavily influenced by earlier concepts, such as Kjellén’s idea of the nation as a *folkhem*. She furthermore compares it to the visions of the feminist pioneer Ellen Key. Her ideas of the contribution women could make to the nation if they were recognised as political citizens fit well both in an organic view of a nation and in a view of women as separate from, but ideally equal to, men. These ideas could be seen as determining concepts when the ruling Social Democracy later formulated a policy for a more caring state.\(^{252}\)

The writer Elin Wägner could also be given as an example of a view of the nation as something that was at its most authentic among the working people, such as women and waged workers.\(^{253}\) This concept of the nation could be described as organic and ethnic, even though it professed universal civil values, such as equality, justice and peace.

While authentic Swedishness could be searched for among the simple people – much as Hazelius and others had searched for it among the peasants of Dalecarlia – the new concept of Swedishness was at the same time essentially modern. The Danish ethnologist Linde-Laursen has even argued that being Swedish for many people in post-war Sweden has been the same as being modern, a nationalism symbolised not only by the Welfare State but also by national TV and industries such as Volvo, IKEA and Ericsson.\(^{254}\) A universal modernity was manifested in the Swedish nation. An interesting example of the relationship between the new Swedishness and modernity is given in Åsa Linderborg’s study of how the ruling party has related to history. According to her, there are two major ways in which the Social Democratic Party has done this: history can either be good or bad. In the positive version, the modern *folkhem* State is the result of a long historical development in which distinctly Swedish institutions such as the early medieval and Viking Age *tings* (local meetings or assemblies) and later on Parish Assemblies preceded the development of democracy. From this perspective Social Democratic leaders and prime ministers are described as national father figures in the patriarchal tradition of Swedish kings. In the negative version, Swedish

\(^{252}\) Lagergren 1999.
\(^{254}\) Linde-Laursen 1995.
history is, on the other hand, depicted as one of repression and misery, which ended with the formation of Social Democracy and the *folkhem*.\textsuperscript{255}

In this homogenised ethnic and modern vision of Sweden, only one ethnic minority remained recognised: the Sami aboriginal people of northernmost Sweden. The Sami were, however, considered defined by their traditional lives as nomad reindeer herders. The special rights that were recognised 1883 were thus intended only to protect their rights as reindeer herders. The official policy toward other people of Sami origin, on the other hand, became increasingly assimilationist. While the explicitly racist overtones in official policy disappeared in the post-war years, the focus on the reindeer herders (now a minority among the people who considered themselves Sami) remained until the eighties and nineties when the government began to recognise the cultural rights of non-reindeer-herding Sami.\textsuperscript{256} Until then it had, however, been impossible to recognise the Sami both as modern and separate from the Swedish majority culture, which was considered modern almost by definition. Other minorities were subjected to harsh assimilation policies as well. Minority languages were especially targeted by the State.\textsuperscript{257}

Among less tolerant proponents of the new form of nationalism was the future Social Democratic Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs (including culture) Arthur Engberg. The historian Håkan Blomquist uses him as an example of the anti-Semitic tendencies that existed within the workers’ movement in the inter-war years. He argues that Engberg viewed the nation as a not only ethnic, but also racial, concept. While he was always influenced by the established ideologies of *bildning*, he was generally seen as belonging to the more radical Marxist anticlerical and antiroyalist flank of Social Democracy. He argued, for example, that the Church was the instrument of the ruling classes and should be separated from the State. At the same time he was one of the proponents of the Swedish Institute for Racial Biology that a broad Riksdag majority initiated in 1921. Even racial thinking could form part of the Swedish modernisation project. When he became a more established politician Engberg, however, toned down his radicalism – his anti-Semitism as well as his Marxism, antiroyalism and anticlericalism – in favour of a more conservative outlook. His views of *folkbildning* have on the other hand had an influence on Swedish cultural policy.\textsuperscript{258}

\textsuperscript{255} Linderborg 2001. Roger Johansson’s (2002) studies of how history is used point to the shootings of protest marchers in Ådalen 1931 as a last act of violence that marks the border between the historical and the essentially peaceful modern Sweden.

\textsuperscript{256} Mörkenstam 1999.

\textsuperscript{257} Hyltenstam 1999.

\textsuperscript{258} Blomqvist 2001, Blomqvist 2006.
When he became Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs Engberg had changed his views on the Church as well. According to Church historian Urban Claesson, the main reason for this seems, however, to have been a fear that a more independent Church could turn against the modernisation of Sweden planned by the Social Democrats, or that, alternatively, the collapse of the National Church would leave a clear field for the Nonconformist churches, with much the same consequences. Engberg’s alternative was a Church that functioned as a government agency. Church properties should be considered State property and Church influence over schools and universities should be removed. At the same time the State should continue to appoint Church officials. The issue of a separation of Church and State would be a recurring problem in Swedish twentieth-century politics. While the Church had once considered itself the spiritual side of the State, a new perspective had developed in the early nineteenth century: that of the People’s Church, or Folk Church (as Claesson translates the Swedish term folkkyrka). The Folk Church should be open to the entire people regardless of class. Like the Jacobine conception of the French nation, Folk Church ideologists imagined their community not in relation to a state, but in relation to the ethnic concept of a historically defined people. The additional religiously universalist requirement that membership should be acquired by Swedes by baptism was, however, already common within the Church and was indeed the majority opinion of the National Synod as early as 1952.

The concept of the Folk Church was wedded to the new organisational structure of the Church that was introduced in 1930 and 1932. The fundamental unit in this structure was the parish, which was from 1930 led by a vestry elected by the parishioners. As they were elected in the same way as municipal assemblies they became dominated by parties that soon were the same as the national political parties. In a second reform, the Church lands were transferred from the State to the parishes in spite of loud protests from Engberg, who became Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs in a Social Democratic minority government less than three weeks after the promulgation of the new law. During the following decades laymen appointed by elected assemblies became an increasingly powerful group in the Church. In 1949 they became the majority in the National Synod. Thus the Church could be said to be ruled democratically by the people, a Folk Church to parallel the folkhem State. This church was open to all citizens and denizens of the Swedish nation regardless of belief and saw its mission as a matter of offering the Holy Communion and the Word of God freely to all of Swedish society and in particular to ethnic Swedes. This concept has remained dominant in the

Church of Sweden, even after the separation of Church and State. The vast majority of the population has also remained members even after 1952 when it became legal for anyone to leave the Church without its permission.261

Neither was it clear how cultural policy would fit into the new *folkhem* state. A formative moment may have been in 1933, when Arthur Engberg founded the National Touring Theatre (*Riksteatern, NTT*), an organisation that would provide high-quality theatre to larger parts of the country. This decision was, however, criticised for degrading local scenes and workers’ movement establishments to the status of ticket sellers and providers of the physical scene for a form of culture that was delivered to them from the capital.262 This also meant that at least in the field of theatre the non-governmental culture organisations of the workers’ movement were integrated into the cultural policy of the State, rather than the other way around. This is an important difference between the cultural policy that I study in this dissertation and the more thoroughly studied *folkbildning* policy (in the narrow sense of adult education), which remained the province of the independent associations for *folkbildning*.263 That this would be the result could, however, not have been obvious at the time: as late as in 1935 Social Democratic Prime Minister Per Albin Hanson could state publicly that culture in the *folkhem* would be a private matter and that the ideal would be a state in which everyone could afford leisure but in which the State had nothing to do with how they spent it:

> If one wants to use his free time for car driving, another to grow roses, a third for collecting stamps, a fourth for music, a fifth to dwell in the world of books, a sixth to watch races or play soccer, that is not our concern.264

In the post-war years, the concept of *folkbildning* would, however, set the scene for Swedish cultural policy within the framework of the established institutions of the State. There were many reasons for this. Some institutions had as early as in the inter-war years already been established for a cultural policy for the *folkhem*. In that sense the path was already chosen, even though the Prime Minister may not have realised where it was going.

The National Touring Theatre was one of these. Martin Gustavsson has described the establishment of another, the National Public Arts Council created in 1937. The Public Arts Council was (and is) a small government agency responsible for buying art objects for the decoration of public buildings and similar tasks. Two other reasons for its founding were, however, to

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262 Larsson 2003: 199.
263 For descriptions and analysis of the development of *folkbildning* associations and of cultural policy discussions in the workers’ movement at this time, see Gustavsson 1991 and Sundgren 2007.
support the producers of high-quality art and at the same time support *folkbildning* by making high quality art accessible in public spaces. The definition of high quality was, however, unclear, although it was concluded that the artists were the ones who could recognise it (which would prove an important choice of path). There was, however, no obvious counterpart for the State to form a neocorporative relationship with. Yet, most participants in the debate considered this the appropriate way to recruit artist representatives. Working from the theories of Pierre Bourdieu, Gustavsson distinguishes two major types of art at this time: the modernist art of the non-commercial art field and the nostalgic art of commercial art dealers, associated with radical and *bourgeois* forces respectively. With the establishment of the Public Arts Council, that struggle was — at least as far as the State was concerned — won by the progressives: the Council and the new national union of artists were composed of artists connected with progressive art clubs and galleries. Although Engberg was a supporter of what Gustavsson considers nostalgic art, his term of office thus marked the beginning of an alliance between Social Democracy and progressive art.

Art policy thus became aestheticist, neo-corporative and state-framed. It should also be noticed that the national union of artists, much like the NTT, was founded as a result of governmental decisions and did not develop as an NGO before it became a part of a neo-corporative arrangement with the State. This appears to be a recurring phenomenon in cultural policy that further separates it from the field of *folkbildning*. This supports the distinction between these fields and thus the limits of this dissertation. It should also be noticed that narratives that emphasize the *folkbildning* movement, rather than the institutions of earlier national cultural policy, as the basis for later national cultural policy may have helped legitimise the latter as a part of the *folkhem* state, rather than of the pre-democratic Sweden. Historiographically this history and the equally legitimising history of the RAÄ’s seventeenth-century origins are thus similar to the positive and negative versions of pre-democratic Sweden noted by Linderborg in the historical writings of the Social Democratic Party. An example of such a narrative will be given in the following chapter.

In her dissertation of 1991, Li Bennich-Björkman described twentieth-century debates on public support for literature, especially the establishment of the system of Library Compensation. The central actor in her analysis is the Swedish Writers’ Association (founded in 1893). While this NGO originally took its inspiration from labour unions, it also decided only to organise writers of recognised literature, a requirement that was upheld by an internal

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265 Gustavsson 2002, who analyses the situation in the art market in the same study.
admission procedure. A central goal was to provide a more stable economic situation for writers and to establish a system in which writers could “be their own patrons.” Although the Writers’ Association had a network of contacts in both the Liberal and the Social Democratic parties, the claim for State support for this kind of grants was originally opposed in the Riksdag by a (mostly rightwing) majority that preferred the existing system of stipends granted by the Swedish Academy (which was considered more impartial). During the inter-war years the Writers’ Association, however, managed to establish both the opinion that writers of quality literature (i.e. the members of the Writers’ Association) were entitled to public grants and that they were themselves the most qualified to judge which writers should be supported in this way. This view followed the path taken concerning public art funding in that it both considered artists the best judges of quality and funding of that quality the responsibility of the government. Another side of this discussion had concerned the right of writers to compensation when their books were lent out by public libraries. In the interwar years this claim had led to a conflict between the Writers’ Association and the *folkbildning* movement (more concerned with the economy of public libraries). In 1954 a compromise had, however, been reached and a system for compensation had been created: it was not the lenders who should pay but the government. In this system the money would be awarded through a combination of quality assessment and consideration of lending frequency and the grants giving bodies would include both representatives of the Writers’ Association and of the government.266 While public libraries had often originated in civil society, often as parts of popular movements, the reform helped integrating them into the cultural policy of the State.267

This change had been made possible by a rising interest in cultural policy in the ranks of the Social Democratic Party during the early post-war years. Bennich-Björkman points to a number of people more or less connected with the party but acting more like public intellectuals. Such a person was Tage Lindbom, who argued convincingly for a development of *folkbildning* into bringing cultural as well as material wealth to the people. Bennich-Björkman also argues that Erlander, the new Prime Minister, took a personal interest in these matters and constantly took the advice of public intellectuals and writers. On a more tactical level she also makes a connection between this struggle for the loyalty of the intellectuals and the rise of the Swedish Communist Party. It would thus not be a coincidence that the Book Commission (whose recommendations would lead to the establishment of Library Compensation)

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266 Bennich-Björkman 1991, quoting an editorial by Ivar Harrie in *Dagens Nyheter* 1941 on p. 91.
267 See Björk 2002, Hansson 1999 and Sundgren 2007: 67-80, on public libraries in the early twentieth century and as a part of the workers’ movement.
was appointed early in the election year of 1948, when the Communists reached the record result of 6.3%. According to her analysis, this was part of a conscious policy directed at winning intellectuals for Social Democracy and at including them in the *folkhem* project.\(^{268}\) This is supported by Per Sundgren’s conclusion that the Communist cultural policy programme of 1948 had been formulated in order to win over the support of intellectuals from the Social Democrats. As a result this programme had been reformist rather than revolutionary in its approach to politics and to the State.\(^ {269}\) Throughout these debates public intellectuals who were loyal (if sometimes critical) members of the Social Democratic Party continued, however, to play an important role.

In spite of its early development cultural policy has often been considered a latecomer to the expanding welfare system. This was, as I will show, the view of the Culture Council\(^ {270}\) when it summarised the development of national cultural policy and cultural policy debate in 1972. It is also the view of Anders Frenander, who has studied Swedish cultural policy discourse in the twentieth century. Bennich-Björkman, on the other hand, points to the lively debate of the late forties. Tage Lindbom, for example, developed his opinions in his book *Arbetarrörelsen och kulturen* (“The Workers’ Movement and the Culture”, 1952) as well as in the more concrete “Cultural Post-War Programme” published in 1946. In the fifties and sixties there were, however, a number of other Social Democratic public intellectuals writing on what a cultural policy for the *folkhem* should be like. Bengt Nerman’s *Demokratins kultursyn* (“The Democracy’s View of Culture”) from 1962 and Roland Pålsson’s *Det möjliga samhället* (“The Possible Society”) from 1967 are important examples of this. It was also around 1960 that representatives of the Social Democratic government started to show a greater interest in cultural policy. Ragnar Edenman, who served as Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs in 1957-1967, presented the first general government bill on cultural policy in 1961. There he defined the sector as including the arts and cultural heritage. Many of the participants in these debates – including Edenman himself – also often used the term culture in a much broader sense, however, including both education and Church policy.\(^ {271}\)

\(^{268}\) Bennich-Björkman 1991.

\(^{269}\) Sundgren 2007.

\(^{270}\) *Kulturrådet*, the Culture Council, was a government commission at work 1968-1971. By using the direct translation of its name, I hope to separate it from the government agency *Statens Kulturråd*, for which I use its official English name, the National Council for Cultural Affairs and the Swedish abbreviation, KUR.

\(^{271}\) Government bill 1961:56, Frenander 2005 referring to Nerman 1962 and Pålsson 1967, Bennich-Björkman 1991, especially note 2 on p. 133, where she comments on Kleberg 1987b. It is perhaps significant that Lindbom, who was among the most convinced proponents of *folkbildning* as the foundation for social change, would later turn against Social Democracy to become
Like many other politicians at the time, Edenman’s views were often based on the concept of *folkbildning*. Even his perspective, however, signified a change from the earlier view of culture as part of the private sphere. This change was in a large degree the fruit of disappointment: it had been believed that the tastes of the general population would improve with their financial situation. Following the path chosen with the establishment of policies on public art and literature, the State now declared its ambition to “support, not steer” culture.\textsuperscript{272} What culture should be supported was considered an aesthetic decision and thus left to the artists, or at least to their representatives in committees and associations. The power to define their areas of responsibility – and thus the supported *forms* of art – remained with the government and the Riksdag. In this way the people could receive qualitative culture from the State. More radical leftwing socialists also used the term culture in a broader sense. To them cultural policy should be concerned with the overall environment of human life in society. Much of these debates were summed up by Sven Nilsson in *Idéer i kulturpolitiken* (“Ideas in Cultural Policy”).\textsuperscript{273} Nilsson would continue to write on cultural policy and become one the more noticeable participants in these debates as well as the perhaps most important writer of overviews on the subject.

Another Social Democratic intellectual who was to play a significant role in forming Swedish cultural policy was Harry Schein, who would play a central role in the establishment of film as a sub-sector within the cultural sector. When film technology reached Sweden, it had been considered a threat to public moral and good culture. In 1911 Sweden became the first country in the world to introduce film censorship, an example that was soon to be followed by several other nations. It was not until the late thirties that the political establishment took a more positive interest in the film industry. Following the lead of more powerful European states, the Riksdag started to take initiatives in the direction of supporting film production. This was, however, not for artistic reasons, but rather for explicitly nationalist ones. In times of danger the Riksdag wanted to raise national spirit in the population and film was a proven way of doing so. When government funding of films was discussed arguments, however, arose in the Riksdag that un-qualitative films would be sponsored. Thus, the matter of aesthetic quality entered the official discussion of film policy. The first government support of film production came in the form of tax cuts and the quality issue remained marginal. The

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modern institutions of film policy developed in the sixties, largely as a result of the efforts of the culture journalist Harry Schein who acted as an advocate of artistic freedom in the film business, arguing from the apolitical status of film as art. The result of the debate provoked by Schein and others was what he described as the largest cultural investment ever made by the Swedish state: the creation of the Swedish Film Institute (SFI), a foundation largely controlled by the film business, but with a contract with the State that would grant it money that the film business would otherwise have paid the State as entertainment tax. This was a unique construction in the Swedish cultural sector. It would, however, be the structure of film policy that was to remain.  

SWEDISH CULTURAL POLICY AFTER 1970, ACCORDING TO CULTURAL POLICY RESEARCH

In 1967 Edenman resigned from his post as Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs and was replaced by much younger Olof Palme. He did not stay at this post more than two years. During that time, however, he appointed many of the government commissions that were to change cultural policy. This process, as well as the rest of the period that I study here, has to some extent been studied before. In the following I will discuss this previous research beginning with existing studies of general cultural policy and then proceeding with studies of particular sub-sectors.

The perhaps most thorough analysis of Swedish cultural policy at the time of writing is Anders Frenander’s study of cultural policy discourse in twentieth-century Sweden. In this study he characterises culture by using three notions derived from a class-based analysis. Culture can thus be either worker culture, peasant culture or bourgeois culture. He generally considers the already established art forms regardless of content to be bourgeois by definition. He thus agrees with the many cultural scholars who reduce the universal values claimed by traditional aesthetic ideology to particularistic values of specific social and cultural groups, in this case of socio-economic classes. From this perspective he concludes that although the notions of peasant and worker culture were present in the discourse of the inter-war period, demands for worker culture silenced at the time, while the notion of peasant culture lost any significance in the fifties. Despite a brief return of workers’ culture in the form of radical culture in the sixties, it was largely left out of the cultural policy reforms of the early seventies. It is instead bourgeois culture that has become dominant. Frenander’s analysis is structured in four periods: up to 1945, 1945–1958, 1959–74 and 1975–1996. To some extent he has studied the same documents as I have and I will thus have reason to return to his inter-

274 Blomgren 1998.
pretations. His studies of the opinions of political parties are, however, based on a different material. His main sources are political journals more or less connected with the parties. As Leftist, Communist and other leftwing socialist journals have been more numerous than centre-right journals, this discourse is somewhat over-represented in his study. Much of the debate he covers is thus a debate between Social Democratic proponents of *folkbildning* (considered *bourgeois* by Frenander) and leftwing socialist proponents of radical or workers’ culture.275

According to Frenander, Swedish cultural policy discourse reached its peak in the early seventies. Much cultural policy discourse up to that date had been a matter of demands. In 1974 the State established a general cultural policy, and from that point the discourse has ebbed out. Post-1974 cultural policy, however, has included an important change within the category of *bourgeois* culture: while the cultural policy of 1974 had been based on a welfare state combination of a bureaucratic logic and a social-humanist perspective, later policies combine economic logic with a social-humanist perspective on the arts. Frenander considers this to be part of a much greater change in Swedish welfare society in which the *folkhem* is deconstructed and politics have lost the initiative to the representatives of the market (a process that would have parallels in most Western European states). Cultural policy is according to him not a counterweight to this tendency. To the extent that it constitutes an exception, this is instead because it is stagnant and at the same time marginal enough to be left alone by the rest of society.276

This view parallels the perspective that Sven Nilsson currently argues: that the culture of cultural policy has been left behind the cultural development of society in general. In a sense he has, however, also come to consider 1974 as something of a high point in Swedish cultural policy, a time when it caught up with the demands of the day. In his later writings he has concentrated on the ongoing changes in society, especially on current trends relating to the Internet and new media, trends which he does not consider cultural policy to have caught up with.277 Frenander, on the other hand, also sees some more hopeful tendencies. A wider concept of culture is now used in cultural policy to include previously excluded cultural activities such as jazz music. In spite of his negative attitude towards the increasing influence of the market, Frenander sees some possible openings, primarily that the differentiation between established high culture and excluded low culture may become

275 Frenander 2005.
threatened by a freer use of culture in society. As Lars Göran Karlsson has pointed out, a conservative tendency in cultural policy is no certain sign of weakness. It may just as well imply that cultural policy is among the strong conservative forces in society counteracting the radical critique that Frenander criticises it for lacking.

Rolf Hugosson has compared the general government bills on the cultural policy of 1974 and 1996 and analysed them from a rhetorical perspective. He concludes that definitions of cultural policy fulfil different purposes in these documents. In the first, cultural policy has to be established and explained as a sector. It was also important for legitimacy reasons to point out that the cultural sector was not the same as Swedish culture and that government policy was directed at the sector and not at culture as such. In the second bill there was no need to make this point: cultural policy was already established and did not have to be defended in this way. In neither of the cases should the general policy objectives of cultural policy, however, be interpreted in a way that makes it possible to evaluate them. Their main importance was instead one of inspiration and rhetoric. In Chapter VII I will explain why I do not agree unconditionally with this proposition, at least not in relation to the second bill. I do, on the other hand, agree with both Hugosson and Frenander that the main consequence of the cultural bills of the early seventies was that cultural policy was consolidated. This was, so to speak, not the beginning, but rather the end of the beginning. Whether Nilsson is right to consider the later developments the beginning of the end is a much more complicated issue. It may, however, be highly relevant that Frenander ended his study with 1996. While it is possible that a formative moment already had begun at the time, my study points to a number of changes that became apparent only after 1996 but that may be highly relevant to future developments of the Swedish nation-state and its cultural policy.

Theatre Policy
The impact of the cultural policy reform of 1974 in the field of theatre has been studied by Rikard Hoogland in his dissertation, in which he concentrates on the creation of regional theatres and their subsequent fates. According to him, many of these theatres had a background in the radical free theatre groups of the sixties and seventies and could be considered representatives of a cultural policy more involved in society, as envisioned by the Culture Council and implied by the reform itself. When these groups were established as regional theatres, their radicalism clashed with the more conservative ex-

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278 Frenander 2005.
279 Karlsson 2006.
280 Hugosson 2000.
pectations of provincial theatre critics and regional politicians. This forced the theatres to adapt to the views of culture that were dominant in the theatre field in the provinces. Swedish theatre policy 1974–2002 has also been studied by Anna-Maria and Roger Blomgren. In their study they analyse the theatre sector with a network approach inspired by the neo-institutional concept of advocacy coalitions. In their view, Swedish theatre policy in the latter half of the twentieth century has been dominated by the struggle between four networks: the Popular Movement Network (consisting of primarily the NTT and trade unions), the National Finance Network (the Ministry of Finance and related government agencies), the Regionalisation Network (the forces working towards a regional organisation) and the Professional Network. Of these, the last has been the most dominant and government policy has thus been dictated by to what extent the other networks have been able to gain influence at its side.

**Film Policy**

Roger Blomgren has also studied arguments used in debates on Swedish film policy between 1909 and 1993. He categorised possible government attitudes towards cultural policy as either passively neutral, actively neutral or perfectionist. The first was the liberal (sometimes neo-liberal) standpoint described by, for example, Prime Minister Hansson, the second the social-liberal ideal that the State should support culture but not take a stand on issues of taste, the third that the State should plan cultural activities in detail. Blomgren also categorises arguments on cultural policy as arguments for either passivity, perfectionalism or active neutrality. The first category includes arguments against State involvement in cultural policy, the second argues for a system where the State steers national culture, and the third for one in which it supports certain forms of culture but abstains from steering their content (see p. 14 on how I relate to these). He concludes that Swedish film policy has been pending between perfectionalism and passive neutrality since the fifties. While the early arguments against film had been moral in nature, debate in the post-war years mostly concerned artistic freedom and whether this was best protected through support or non-intervention. An active neutral support via the Film Institute has since become the norm, although that norm was heavily criticised by the political left in the sixties and seventies. Their arguments were perfectionalist. It should be noted, however, that while Blomgren describes nationalism as a bias when it is included in the explicit message of a film, he considers it neutral when the State taxes the distribution of foreign film for

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281 Hoogland 2005.
the benefit of Swedish film production, something that in the context of this dissertation can be considered a clear case of state-framed nationalism.

*Museum and Heritage Policy*

At first glance Swedish heritage policy would seem to be a well researched area. The study of the uses of history is a growing interest among Swedish historians and archaeologists, while museology has already been established as a separate subject in several Swedish universities and university colleges. I have referred to some of this recent work on public uses of history in Sweden in this chapter and briefly mentioned some of the international work in previous chapters. Much of this work is in fact concerned with the role of museums and historical research in the development of nineteenth-century nationalism. The emerging discipline of museology is also influenced by postcolonial theory in that it focuses on how significant Others are constructed when depicted by museums.284 Only very little of this work is, however, concerned with the organisational forms of cultural policy or the values and concepts of the nation currently or recently represented by its overall institutions. While this research often touches on subjects related to this dissertation, its focus is thus on a different subject than cultural policy and I will abstain from making an overview of it here. I do, however, hope that this study should contribute to related studies of heritage and museums not by adding to its details but by complementing the dominant view of a move away from nationalism by providing an analysis of the contrasting tendency to preserve a national framework in the institutions of an organisational field that is becoming increasingly anti-nationalistic in its self-image.

While most current academic work on the heritage and museum sector tends to deal with cultural policy only normatively, there are some studies of the history and development of heritage policy as well. Stefan Bohman can be mentioned as a researcher who occasionally touches on cultural policy in his studies of nationalism in Swedish museums.285 Jonas Grundberg has, furthermore, described a number of the lines of conflict in current Swedish heritage policy, focusing on the RAÅ. His perspective is largely that of the heritage field and this is pictured as being in the centre of a number of conflicting and often new influences. Old paternalist and nationalist views of heritage clash with modern democratic and pluralist views. Demands for economic efficiency are increasing. Notions of heritage as specific objects and areas clash with more holistic views of heritage as a living part of society. At the same time Swedish heritage has to a larger extent become a part of a global context and

283 Blomgren 1998.
these clashes are all global in character. Sometimes the heritage preservers have also allied with environmentalists in public agitation for the preservation of natural and cultural objects and sights. For Grundberg the RAÄ stands in the middle of these conflicts. For them these clashes are sometimes resolved by increased differentiation between, on the one hand, the scientific and legal work of the heritage sector and, on the other hand, the RAÄ’s role as provider of a heritage that can be used as symbols, as identity and for economical purposes. In this he considers scientific and legal activities to be politically neutral, although influenced by external factors.286

Church Policy
Despite the fact that the separation of Church and State has been the subject of sometimes intense political conflict throughout the twentieth century, these conflicts remain relatively unstudied by academic scholars. Lennart Ahlbäck has, however, (in his dissertation in theology) studied the development of a new ideological perspective on the Church, within the Social Democratic Party between the reforms of 1979 and 1996. As I will show this was an important period in Church history. During this period the Social Democratic Party came, according to Ahlbäck, to look at the Church as a democratic power in society. The democracy of the Church had, from this perspective, several aspects. Most importantly, Church organisation should build on the principle of representative democracy. As a democratic structure, the Church thus derived its legitimacy from the fact that its leadership was guided by the elected representatives of its members. The Church should, furthermore, be democratic in its doctrine and activities. The Party thus developed a perspective on Christianity that was congruent with its own ideology. Both were considered to be based on the principles of Freedom, Equality and Solidarity. Ahlbäck himself does not believe that his studies of Social Democratic policy documents and minutes can answer whether this meant that Social Democratic Church politicians believed that their perspective on Christianity was guided by their belief in Social Democracy or that their perspective on Social Democracy was guided by their Christian beliefs.287 In both cases their arguments have, however, to be considered to be founded on universal principles.

Previous Research on Cultural Diversity Discourse in Cultural Policy
So far no research has been conducted on the national limits of Swedish cultural policy in the latter part of the twentieth century. Some research has,
however, been done on the multicultural aspects of that policy. Helene Egeland is currently writing a dissertation on how multiculturalism is performed at Södra Teatern ("the Southern Theatre"), a government-funded theatre in Stockholm. It is an interesting example of how multiculturalism is performed in current Swedish cultural policy. In her view, three kinds of diversity discourse can be seen there: authentic, good and cool, supporting, respectively, authentic ethnic culture, the enlightenment of the people in the currently universalised values and a government sponsored culture that is more up to date than the more established institutions. She has also described the use of terms such as "mångfald" ("diversity") and "kulturell mångfald" ("cultural diversity") in Swedish cultural policy discourse. She concludes that these terms often denote the same activities and categories as the older term "eftersatta grupper" ("disadvantaged groups"). This points at what is in this dissertation described as a path dependency in the organisation of this part of cultural policy. A similar point is made by Lundberg, Malm and Ronström in the cultural policy chapter of their study of multiculturalism in Swedish music.

Relevant to this study is also Karin Borevi’s dissertation on official discourse concerning the relationship between the state and its minorities. She does not, however, study cultural policy but instead takes her examples from the State’s policy on immigration, housing, school and NGOs, which she relates to the ideal types of ethnos and demos, as well as to integration. Her perspective is thus close to the one applied in this dissertation, although she concentrates on discourse, while I concentrate on institutions. She furthermore works from a Marshallian view of integration. Her study has, however, been very useful to me as a source for comparable information on how the State has related to immigrants in other policy sectors.

Points of Departure

A number of researchers have studied Swedish cultural policy. Some of them are political scientists, some historians or historians of ideas whereas others belong to academic disciplines that study the various fields touched by cultural policy. There is also a tendency, especially in museology and in the heritage field, to focus on cultural diversity and the construction of national iden-

tity. Thus, it comes as no surprise that much of the existing research discusses the cultural sector rather than the policy process behind the State’s relationship to it. When this kind of research relates to governmental cultural policy, it is often when researchers act as public intellectuals trying to influence it. Although a number of researchers have studied policy processes and government cultural policy this research is less extensive. While many studies of the sector focus on nationalism and nationhood, especially when dealing with the nineteenth century, cultural policy research, on the other hand, focuses on institutional processes. A combined study has never been made. This is not surprising: as could be seen in the previous chapters, combining a focus on nationhood with neo-institutionalism or studies of institutions is rare and remains to be done in cultural policy research.

While some parts of Swedish cultural policy have been described, large parts of it furthermore remain entirely unstudied. General cultural policy discourse between the war and 1996 has been studied (although not Riksdag and Committee discussions), as have modern film, theatre, Church and heritage policy. Many of these studies, however, end at various points in the nineties. Bennich-Björkman’s study of literature policy ends even earlier, although it does cover the seventies. This study is thus not only the first analysis of Swedish cultural policy as a (re)organisation of national culture. It is also in many cases the first academic analysis of much of its material. I thus hope to contribute both with a detailed study of this, and with an analysis from a perspective not previously applied to it.
CHAPTER V:
1970–1973:
A New Cultural Policy?

In many studies of this subject, the early seventies have been considered the years when the Swedish state for the first time achieved an articulated and integrated cultural policy. How much of an exaggeration this may be, the government at this time attempted to take a more conscious and goal-oriented approach to its cultural policy. When Olof Palme became Prime Minister in 1969, he formed the last in a long line of dominant Social Democratic governments. Before that he had been the head of what had previously been known as the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs. When he left it to Bertil Zachrisson in 1969, he had renamed it the Ministry of Education. Included in this Ministry was – apart from the various divisions dealing with schools and universities – a Division for Culture and a Division for Church Affairs. During his time as the minister responsible for culture Palme started a major reform by appointing a number of government commissions, especially the Culture Council. These were charged with preparing a new cultural policy for Sweden. For Church policy (for which he was responsible but did not consider a part of cultural policy), he appointed the State and Church Commission. He also appointed commissions to reform higher education. The proposed reform of Swedish university education in the humanities was in fact

293 Unlike many of his colleagues Zachrisson was a Christian he was, however, a member of the Nonconformist Swedish Missionary Society, and thus not a member of the Church of Sweden. He was thus constitutionally prohibited from being responsible for Church Affairs, which were instead entrusted to Alva Myrdal (who was not the head of any ministry but who at the same time led the State and Church Commission), Ekström 2003: 125, 242-243.
among the causes that triggered the student revolt in Stockholm in 1968. Although Palme’s commissions on cultural policy did not provoke reactions of that magnitude – or even any major opposition – they did establish cultural policy as an organisational field in Sweden.

Judging from previous research, the fields that met the Culture Council and the other commissions at the time were in a high degree the results of the formative moments of their core organisations. The Church of Sweden was (at least) as old as the State and had a state-wide organisation established during the early modern period. This organisation was also highly interconnected with that of the State, and the border between them remained ambiguous (disturbingly so to the State and Church Commission). In the heritage field the National Heritage Board (RAÄ) had been smaller from the beginning but had grown over the years. Much like the central offices of the Church its central organisation had become complex and intertwined with the corporative bodies of the early modern state. This was also true of the regional organisation of heritage and museum policy: County Museums were organised as foundations and associations, and yet the Regional Antiquarians – officials entrusted with legal authority – worked there. Other museums were as varied as the County Museums, their responsibilities and organisation being largely the result of their formative moments: the Nordic Museum was the foundation left by Arthur Hazelius, the Museum for National Antiquities was a collection entrusted to the Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities and so on. The norms of organisation were thus far from homogenous and often not even in line with those of the Weberian bureaucracy, the accepted source of legitimate concepts for organisation within the State.

The artistic fields were also in an uncoordinated state. Literature policy had been established as a compromise between the State and the Writers’ Association. A committee appointed by the government but dominated by the Association distributed library compensation to writers it considered qualitative. Film policy was on the other hand based on an agreement between the State and the movie business and centred on a foundation (the Swedish Film Institute, SFI) that distributed money collected as fees but resulting from a tax reduction in exchange for which the State could expect the foundation to support quality. These organisations were national. Theatres and music establishments were, on the other hand, specific localised establishments and thus spread out over the country, with as much difference in organisation as the County Museums. Like them their founding moments in the previous century had often been dominated by civil society. Although the responsibility had

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294 Johansson 1996. Prior to this, humanities education at the Swedish universities had had a more open organisation. Now they were re-organised as a nationally integrated system of programmes (or “lines”), see Trow 1993 on Swedish university organisation.
later passed to the State, this fact still formed their organisations. Their status as parts of artistic fields corresponded to this. The entire organisation was thus constructed from the premises of drawing a clear line between the influence of its benefactors and the internal affairs that were controlled by representatives of the artistic professions. These were legitimised by the norms of artistic independence, not by those of Weberian bureaucracy. The Royal Theatres were exceptions only in the status of their original benefactor, the Royal Court. These localised institutions had, however, been complemented with the National Touring Concerts (NTC), Travelling Exhibitions (NTE) and Touring Theatre (NTT), organisations that were the products of Arthur Engberg’s version of Social Democratic folkbildning and organised nationally, in close connection to the State. It was in this heterogeneous collection of actors that the Culture Council – itself a collection of mostly Social Democratic public intellectuals closely connected with the government – should bring order. The result was presented in a report ambitiously named Ny Kulturpolitik, “New Cultural Policy”.

**GENERAL CULTURAL POLICY**

*The Culture Council*

The main instrument of the early seventies governments, in their intended reformation of cultural policy was the Culture Council. This government commission (proposed by Palme) had been created in 1968 to formulate a new cultural policy for the State. 295 Despite later belief in the Council as the creator of Swedish cultural policy, it appears to have considered its work a continuation of a continuous process to expand cultural policy. This is perhaps in part the result of the curious construction of the Culture Council’s secretariat. Usually commission secretariat consisted of full time employees recruited by the commission or appointed by the government. In this case, the secretariat consisted of people who simultaneously worked in the Division of Culture at the Ministry of Education. Many of them were even involved in drafting national budgets for culture at the same time as they worked for the Council. According to Carl-Johan Kleberg (who was himself both an employee of the Division of Culture and a member of the secretariat), many of his colleagues in the secretariat had previously been members of the advisory group on cultural policy that had existed when Ragnar Edenman was the minister responsible for cultural policy. This group had included several prominent Social Democratic public intellectuals, such as Harry Schein (of the SFI). It had been headed by Roland Pålsson, who was also the head of the

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295 His Royal Majesty’s Decision of 29 November 1968, as proposed to His Royal Majesty by Palme.
Division of Culture, and who had himself played a role in the public debate with a book named *Det möjliga samhället* (“The Possible Society”). In contrast to their secretariat, most of the members of the Culture Council were new to this kind of work. Some were representatives of artist organisations, trade unions and NGOs, some were artists, some were bureaucrats and others – such as Ragnar Thoursie: a poet turned bureaucrat – belonged to several of these groups. No one, however, represented the political opposition.296

When it described earlier Swedish cultural policy in its report *Ny Kulturpolitik* (“New Cultural Policy”) the Council began as far back as in the eighteenth century with a summary description of the creation of the Royal Academies and the National Museum. The motives for their creation had, according to the Council, merely been to increase the prestige of their royal protectors. Other reasons for the State’s involvement in culture arose, according to the Council, for the first time in the nineteenth century, but did not gain their current importance until universal suffrage was introduced. The importance of the electoral reforms after World War I were also emphasised as having opened the Riksdag to working-class interests. For cultural policy this meant, according to the Council, that the principles of justice and equality could finally replace the older prestige-centred cultural policy. The Council did, however, not only present this as a purely causal result of legal changes. It was instead described as the product of the creative work of Social Democratic ministers in the tradition of *folkbildning* in the workers’ movement.297

Only Social Democratic ministers were in fact mentioned in the Council’s descriptions of the twenties and thirties (a time when centre-right and coalition governments were still common). Social Democratic party programs were cited as authorities next to the reports of government commissions and regarded more or less as parts of the cultural policy of the Swedish state. In this way, the policies of the Social Democratic Ministers of Ecclesiastical Aff-

296 The Commission was headed by Paul Lindblom, who was also the chairman of the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation as well as of the National Touring Concerts and an active Social Democrat. It also included Bo Lagercrantz (director of the Stockholm City Museum), Bengt Andersson (one of the men behind the new theatre of Norrbotten County, a Social Democrat), Henry Björinder (of the Association of Local Authorities), Rune Blomkvist (a Social Democrat working at the LO), Per Olov Enquist (a writer and a Social Democrat), Hans-Erland Heineman (a city architect from Skövde), Elisabet Hermodsson (artist and writer), Bengt Häger (head of the Museum of Dance and was according to Blomgren & Blomgren considered a Social Democrat), Bertil Jansson (formerly of the LO, ABF, National Touring Concerts and the National Union of People’s Parks), Gunilla Palmstierna-Weiss (an artist considered to belong in the political left), Rolf Rembe (of the Swedish Theatre Union), and Professor Bo Wallner (director of Swedish Touring Concerts). The Commission secretary Ragnar Thoursie was both a poet and a civil servant at the Labour Market Board. SOU 1972:66, Blomgren & Blomgren 2002: 43 (partially referring to an interview with Kleberg), Kleberg 1987a, Pålsson 1967, interview with Kleberg.

airs Arthur Engberg and Ragnar Edenman were given as legitimising examples of the *folkbildning* tradition. The narrative became not only a history of the integration of the people into the state-framed nation and its aesthetic culture, but also part of the institutionalisation of the identification of the Social Democratic Party with the civil state-framed nation. Arthur Engberg’s brochure *Demokratisk kulturpolitik* (“Democratic Cultural Policy”) from 1938 was mentioned as an example of early plans for a more democratic cultural policy. It was thus implied that cultural policy was part of an original – and thus legitimate – vision of the *Folkhem* state. This project was halted by the outbreak of the World War II but taken up again in the late forties when several commissions were created by Engberg. These commissions led to the formulation of a plan of action presented in a bill in 1961. This plan, however, concentrated on the improvement of working conditions for artists and other “cultural workers” (as they were consistently termed by the Council), while the larger perspectives (such as *folkbildning*) were left to the future, now represented by the Culture Council.  

This brings us to the final period in the Culture Council’s historical narrative: the sixties. During this decade, several reforms were initiated. Although confined to the traditional aesthetic fields all of the new institutions had, according to the Council, been created as means for a democratisation of culture through the distribution of qualitative culture to larger parts of the population. They could also be seen as counterweights to the less qualitative cultural products distributed on the market. In describing this era (the era of its own creation) the Council included more opposition and other non-Social Democratic material than in describing earlier epochs. Its description in fact includes an overview of demands made on cultural policy by, for example, trade unions in the cultural field, political youth organisations (the Social Democratic and Liberal ones in particular) and Riksdag bills on cultural policy from all parties. Despite their differences, all of these groups were described as demanding better conditions for cultural workers and a cultural policy not only – as previously – concentrated to the capital and the major cities but intended for all parts of the people (as demanded especially by the Centre Party). The Council, in other words, emphasised the normative homogeneity concerning cultural policy issues in the various parties and laid down the ground for presenting its own recommendations as a compromise between different legitimate and legitimising interests, with Social Democratic programmes as the chief authority. A reformed, united and democratic, cult-

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ural policy was inscribed as the next logical step in the national narrative of the *Folkhem* state. This reformatory process was to be conducted according to the norms and standards established in the reforms of other sectors in the recent past. Cultural policy had, furthermore, been intended to be reformed in this way from the very start of Social Democratic government.  

The Council summarised its task – as given by the government and by Palme – as formulating a policy for these points:

1. the long-term direction of State involvement in the cultural area.
2. the interplay between State, county, municipal and other measures in the cultural field, and the need for coordination of these.
3. State measures for the benefit of various groups of cultural workers.

The Council’s instructions were thus unusually loosely stated, which can be considered one of the oddities of its organisation. It seems reasonable to conclude that the Minister considered the need for instruction minimal when the Council was in such close contact with the Ministry.

To fulfil its purpose the Council had to start from the very beginning by defining the cultural sector. It took into consideration the “sociological and ethnographical” definition of culture as “a term for the total set of behaviours, habits, roles, and norms that a group, or a society, has in common.” This definition was, however, deemed to be of little use in defining culture as a public policy sector. For this purpose the Council instead recommended the concept of cultural policy as

> part of society’s environmental policy undertakings at large, to which, among other things, have been referred physical planning, societal planning, landscape architecture and education, as well as issues concerning the working and leisure environment.

Hugosson points out that the Council explicitly refrained from defining *culture*, preferring instead to settle with a definition of *cultural policy*. A distinction was thus still considered necessary. Cultural policy was considered an instrument for the improvement of the environment and life conditions of the people. In practice cultural policy was, however, in the Council’s recommendations still considered to consist of the traditional aesthetic fields of theatre, dance, music, literature and film, together with museums, archives, arts, cultural heritage, the more recent addition of the media (including TV and radio) and the “cultural” – but not the educational – activities of the

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300 SOU 1972:66, interview with Kleberg.
301 SOU 1972:66: 19
302 Interview with Kleberg.
303 SOU 1972:66: 168
304 SOU 1972:66: 168
305 Hugosson 2000.
folkbildning associations (a distinction that was never fully explained). For example, formal education and religion were, on the other hand, excluded. This only added financial support to the press to the responsibilities already coordinated by the Division for Culture (press support had previously been administered by a Commission reporting to the Ministry of Finance). While this definition in no way contradicted the norms of the Council’s institutional environment, it served to further institutionalise the cultural sector as distinct from other activities of the Ministry of Education.

Another way in which the recommendations of the Culture Council served to further institutionalise cultural policy as a sector was by proposing common objectives for it. According to Kleberg, including objectives in the recommendations was inspired by practices in Swedish social policy. This was a sector that at the time enjoyed high legitimacy as a core area of the Folkhem State. The dominant trend in Swedish public administration at the time was, furthermore, so-called Programme Budgeting, a steering concept based on the evaluation of efficiency in achieving objectives set for each administrative activity as part of a major programme for social change. Typical of these objectives were in other words that they would encompass large areas of public policy, that they would relate to social change and that this change should be possible to evaluate. Central to this planning and evaluating organisation were the Agency for Administrative Development, the National Audit Office (RRV), and the Budget Division of the Ministry of Finance, which were also its major proponents. As we shall see, the Council followed all of these characteristics in what has to be seen as a clear example of mimetic isomorphism, a measure directed in a way that would increase the legitimacy of cultural policy as a sector by conforming to more general norms and authorities on what a sector should look like (as opposed to previous cultural policy, which, judging from the Council’s descriptions of it, could only be considered an archaic relic from an earlier stage in its development). In this sense the Council really was trying to present its New Cultural Policy as a re-creation of its sector. Looking beyond of its pronouncements on cultural policy in general, there are, however, few signs that the norms of Programme Budgeting influenced the activities, the details and particularities of cultural policy. Neither did the Council give any suggestion of how its objectives could be evaluated. As pointed out by Hugosson, steering by objectives, when translated into the context of cultural policy, did not mean chang-

ing it by setting new objectives, but rather strengthening its old norms by formulating them as objectives.\textsuperscript{309}

These objectives could furthermore be placed in the context of the ongoing revision of the Swedish constitution, which in its finished form in 1975 included a statement of purpose unusual for constitutional documents:

The personal, economic and cultural welfare of the private person shall be fundamental aims of public activity. In particular, it shall be incumbent upon the public institutions to secure the right to health, employment, housing and education, and to promote social care and social security.\textsuperscript{310}

In formulating the objectives the Council, however, followed the established procedures of gathering the opinions of all concerned parties, including the parties of the Riksdag, the trade unions and the institutions and organisations within the sector concerned. Also included in this collection of opinions were those of the other government commissions working within the cultural sector. Of these the Culture Council referred extensively to the Literature Commission and the Museum and Exhibition Expert Commission of 1965 (MUS’65). As the Council considered itself to have the overall responsibility, it made the recommendations and suggestions of these other commissions’ part of its own programme.

The objectives proposed by the Culture Council were presented in the form of one general objective and five “requisites”, or secondary objectives which should be fulfilled for cultural policy to fulfil its function in society. This function was, in accordance with the super-standards of Programme Budgeting, concerned with general social change and not with cultural policy:

The general objective for cultural policy is to contribute to the creation of a better social environment and to contribute to equality.

For this objective to be possible to achieve it is required
- that the activities and decision-making functions of the cultural area are decentralised to a higher degree (the Decentralisation Objective),
- that cultural policy measures are coordinated with society’s involvement in other fields and are differentiated with consideration to the conditions and needs of various groups (The Coordination and Differentiation Objective),
- that cultural policy measures are formulated in such a way as to improve communication between various groups in society and to give more people the opportunity to cultural activity (The Community and Activity Objective),
- that cultural policy contributes to the protection of freedom of speech and to create real opportunities for this freedom to be exercised (The Freedom of Speech Objective),
- that artistic and cultural renewal are made possible (the Renewal objective),

\textsuperscript{309} Hugosson 2000.

\textsuperscript{310} Instrument of Government Ch. 1 Art. 2. From the English translation in Holmberg & Stjernquist 2003: .63, see also the introduction to Holmberg & Stjernquist for a short commentary.
that historical [äldre tider] culture is preserved and reinvigorated [levandegörs] (The Preservation Objective), and
- that society has an overall responsibility for promoting pluralism [mångsidighet] and distributing the supply of culture and to decrease or prevent the negative consequences that the market economy can bring (The Responsibility Objective).311

The Council’s general objective for cultural policy has to be interpreted in the light of its own statements on culture as part of society’s responsibilities for the environment of its citizens. The word “Society” (samhälle) was used here as a synonym for “the State, county council and municipality”.312 “Society” used in this way denotes the institutional side of the nation-state. It is clear that “Society” was to be coordinated by the national government in cooperation mainly with artist representatives who achieved at least part of their legitimacy by being included in associations approved by the State, and delegated power by it. Various groups and interests such as trade unions, academies and foundations, as well as regional and local governments were included both as proposed parts of the new system as well as in the Council’s own working procedures. There is, however, no indication that the Council expected any of these groups, not even the regions or ethnic minorities, to possess a culture significantly different from the one already existing within the established institutions of professional culture (or at least not that such a difference could be considered as either a problem or an asset). One of the keywords here is “coordination”, centred on by several of the Council’s proposals. A new government agency – the National Council for Cultural Affairs (Statens Kulturråd, KUR) – was to take the overall responsibility for the sector falling under the report’s definition of cultural policy. To some extent this agency would work with the evaluations prescribed by the super-standards of Programme Budgeting. The Council of Theatre and Music and the Bureau for Folkbildning at the National School Board were both to be merged into this new government agency, while other sections would have to be filled with new personnel. The Culture Council furthermore recommended that the government should create a Ministry of Culture to take over the responsibilities of the Ministry of Education’s Division for Culture, as well as the supervision of the Press Support Commission.313

Perhaps the key to the Council’s concept of the nation lay in its third objective, the Community and Activity Objective. In this context this has to be interpreted as an integrative ambition. All parts of the nation had to become active partners in its culture, and this culture was to be the culture

311 SOU 1972:66: 171
approved by Society. This culture would, by necessity, be the one that already existed in Society’s institutions, something that would be logical in a society that was also a culturally homogenous nation manifested by a highly integrative and centralist state. What the Decentralisation and the Diversity Objectives referred to was not a decentralisation of decision-making, although significant freedom would continue to be delegated to cultural establishments, as well as to individual artists. Instead, this was a question of a geographical and social distribution of (expected) new resources, so that cultural policy would no longer remain a privilege of an élite but a benefit to all inhabitants of Sweden. It was, in other words, not a question of regionalisation, but of geographical and social integration. Vertical centralisation was not only compatible with horizontal decentralisation; it was a condition for it. To make the cultural sector an integrated field the Council would have to rely on its authority to increase isomorphism among a multitude of actors. For municipalities, this isomorphism would mainly have to be mimetic. In other cases, it could be coerced.

The Decentralisation Objective, as well as the Coordination and Differentiation Objective, the Freedom of Speech Objective and – perhaps most clearly – the Responsibility Objective are reflections of the main objective: they emphasise Society’s responsibility for upholding universal civil values, such as freedom of speech and diversity. Availability in the whole of the country was, however, the main problem in the Council’s approach to the media sector as well. Emphasising the connection between culture and the press, the Council proposed coordinating them under the proposed new Ministry of Culture. With an uncharacteristic respect for the integrity of a mostly privately owned sector the Council did, however, not say very much about re-organising the press (although it did recommend that KUR should take responsibility for the support of cultural journals granted by the Riksdag). Neither did it propose any changes in the organisation of Swedish Radio (Sveriges Radio AB), which would continue to produce TV and radio programmes as an NGO-owned company financed by compulsory TV-licences in exchange for following an agreement with the government. This agreement, however, stressed the need for channels for public information more than the need to use these media to spread culture.314 In spite of its nominal inclusion in the cultural sector, media policy was thus not integrated into the emerging field, or even consistently considered cultural.

What were then the kinds of culture that should be delivered to the people by the other parts of the cultural sector? On the one hand, the Council obviously continued in the Engbergian tradition of distributing qualitative culture to the people. On the other hand, it also stated the right of every citizen to express him- (or her-)self culturally, as well as the need for the government to make this kind of freedom of speech a reality. The expressed need for better education for cultural workers, as well as the proposed expansion of professional culture in the provinces gives credibility to the first interpretation, while the proposed expansion of support for amateur culture works in the other direction. Access was, in other words, not simply a matter of access to passive consumption. The Council argued that these two forms of cultural expression should not be considered contradictory, but complementary to each other, and that they should both be allowed to flourish (with State grants). Not only amateur culture was, however, to gain more support, but also independent artist groups (whose incomes and social standards were to be made more equal to the incomes and social standards of other fulltime employees). What the Council did not give its readers was, however, a definition of this qualitative difference. The power of definition was thus left to the actors in the cultural fields. As the artists were already (or were, as in some cases, recommended by the Council to become) represented in the decision-making bodies via their organisations, this delegation of defining power was in line with the already established norms of cultural policy. The arts were thus quasi-governmental corporations in the neocorporative Folkhem state, at the same time as they were recognised as artistic fields. This close relationship between artists and the State is related to the traditions described by, for example, Bennich-Björkman and Gustavsson.315

Freedom of speech was thus a central objective for the Council, both as a positive and as a negative right. Concerning freedom of speech as a negative right it expectedly endorsed the idea of a more explicit protection in the Fundamental Law (such a protection would finally be established with the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression in 1991).316 Freedom of speech as a positive right was on the other hand a major objective of the New Cultural Policy:

The fundamental democratic influence over cultural policy can under no circumstances mean that the contents of culture are controlled. If this influence is extended to including the contents of culture this will mean that the cultural activities can not

fulfil their abovementioned purpose of exercising criticism of society and exploring reality.317

Freedom of speech, in other words, exists because it has a role to fill in society (and to Society). The paradox lay, however, in the fact that freedom of speech had to be protected as a positive right at the same time as the institutions that ensured (and financed) this right were used to fulfil governmental objectives for the benefit of Society (as co-ordinated by the government). This is a variation of the apparent paradox of freedom of speech protected by the government even when (and especially when) it works to protect opinions opposed to those held by the government or by society at large. As a positive freedom in the context of the proposed new cultural policy freedom of speech was, however, not an absolute right, but an “objective” and a “requisite”, something that would be used “to contribute to the creation of a better social environment and to equality” and that thus had to be subordinated to what Society considered this to be. The positive right to freedom of speech that was granted to the inhabitants of artistic fields and, albeit to a lesser extent, even to amateur artists was thus considered secondary to the more general aims of Society, i.e. the state-framed Folkhem nation. The priorities of the Culture Council remained those of a centralising, civil, integrating State within the framework of the state-framed national community for the benefit of the general happiness of its citizens.318

This leaves us with the Preservation Objective, the one objective relating to a specific sub-sector: the heritage sector. Obviously, this sector was to be subjected to all of the other objectives, as well as to its own; still, it seems hard not to consider the existence of such an extra objective to be a recognition of a special status for this field. One could add that the Council’s overview of the cultural policy debate hardly included any mention of heritage policy. Heritage had in other words only a very small role to play in the cultural policy field envisioned by the Council. This impression is reinforced by the unique way in which the Council relied on MUS’65, when concerned with the heritage sector.319 That this sector could have its own objective included among the objectives of cultural policy can thus be seen as an example of the tendency, noticed by March and Olsen, of interest coalitions to include “members who are mutually indifferent about the demands of their part-

318 March & Olsen (1989) comments on the tendency to subject free speech to the norm of arguing from instrumental concerns, a tendency with the consequence that it “loses its essential character as an entitlement when justified in terms of its contribution to values other than itself” (p. 125).
ners." In this case the Council appears to have accepted the norms supported by MUS'65, not because they followed from the norms of the Council (which they did not), but because they seemed too irrelevant to warrant a conflict. I shall later in this chapter return to MUS'65, and to its relationship with the rest of cultural policy. The Council's treatment of the heritage sector has, however, something to say of its general view of the objectives as well. It was not creating a new set of objectives as a fundament for any thorough reform of the cultural sector, it was merely clarifying and expressing aims of an already existing cultural policy in which heritage was at most a peripheral part guided by its own norms and rules.

A Government Bill on Culture

In preparing its own actions, the government was nearly as thorough as the Council itself had been. The government bill based on the Council's report was thus even more extensive than the report had been. In the two years that had passed between these two documents (submitted in 1972 and 1974, respectively) the report had been referred for consideration not only to all of the organisations and agencies it mentioned, or included in the cultural sector, but also to several other groups and organisations that the government thought concerned. Such a procedure was in total accord with the established norms of Swedish consensus democracy. The extent of referral on this occasion was, however, unusual in its thoroughness. The one major exception was the exclusion of all commercial actors from the procedure, an exclusion that was never commented on by any of its participants, and which we must therefore assume was taken for granted by all those included.321

Included in the resulting proposition was, however, not only the suggestions and information originating in the Culture Council's report and investigations, but also those of the other major government commissions, i.e. the Literature Commission, the Film Commission and MUS'65, as well as some recommendations regarding culture from commissions in other fields (such as the Immigrant Commission).322 As the government described the situation in its bill (based on a summary by Sven Nilsson323), nearly all of the institutions were in general agreement with the recommendations and values expressed in

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322 The discussions of these are, however, referred to here only in relation to the general principles of cultural policy, while those parts dealing with specific sub-sectors will be discussed under their respective headlines later on in this chapter.
323 According to Frenander (2005: 158), Nilsson had been in charge of summarising the answers to these reports.
the reports. Despite this there are, however, a few negative opinions in the summary that are both general and relevant in this context. 324

Although most respondents were positive (or silent) on the issue of defining culture as a sector of public policy, some responses, however, concluded that it did not sufficiently stress the integration of culture into the rest of society. *Folkbildning* associations, such as the ABF and The People’s University (*Folkuniversitetet*) were of this opinion, as were the LO, KLYS (The Joint Committee for Artistic and Literary Professionals), the Council for Theatre and Music and The Swedish Association of Local Authorities. Many emphasised the importance of the connections between culture and their specific areas of activity. Such central actors as Swedish Radio and the National Board of Schools are examples of this response. The importance of religion and Church activities in the cultural sector was also stressed; both by organisations close to the Church of Sweden and by the Municipality of Gothenburg. The proposed definition was on the other hand explicitly defended by such important agencies and organisations as the RAA, the Agency for Administrative Development and several County Administrative Boards and Municipalities. 325

Almost mirroring this grouping of answers was the clearly more central division on the issue of how to handle commercial interests within the cultural sector. Several respondents considered the recommendations of the Culture Council too lenient. It would, in the words of the Swedish Theatre Union (*Svenska Teaterförbundet*), be “serious if the objective of Society’s activities [in the cultural sector] was only to clean up after the ravages of commercialism.” 326 The Swedish Writers’ Association, KLYS, the LO, the ABF and the SSU (the Social Democratic youth organisation), among others, agreed with this. Many wanted a more thorough analysis of the negative consequences of the market economy. The ABF suggested a somewhat different objective stating that “Society has the overall responsibility to stop the negative consequences which the market economy leads to”. 327 On the other side of the battlements stood mainly organisations directly associated with the Moderate party, together with the SFI and the Swedish Publishers’ Association, the closest thing there was to a representation of commercial interests in this process. These were, largely, the same respondents as those who questioned the relevance of equality in society as a fundamental objective for cultural policy. 328

325 His Royal Majesty’s Bill 1974:28: 29-34.
Definitely more above the divisions of right-and-left politics was the criticism against the absence of a discussion of quality in the recommendations, a criticism that was supported by a wide variety of in-sector actors, which more or less explicitly questioned the sufficiency of the Renewal Objective. None of these groups was, however, close to producing a recommendation on how to define such a problematic word as “quality.” Other actors – from the Royal Opera to the *folkbildning* associations – appear primarily to have been annoyed with the Council’s perceived inability to appreciate the quality and novelty of the work that they were already doing. Most of the criticism concerned, however, groups in society that would, one way or another, benefit less from the new policy than the majority or the privileged. Among others, the Immigration Board (*Invandrarverket*) criticised the lack of concern for immigrants in the Council’s recommendations (the result of which will be discussed more in depth further down). Others, such as the municipalities (through their national association, as well as individually) and the Local Heritage movement (*Hembygdsrörelsen*), considered the proposed policy not to recognise the importance of local and regional culture sufficiently. Among others the ABF, the Swedish Institute and the Publishers’ Association proposed international contacts as a new and separate objective.329

Criticism against the Council’s recommendations (as perceived by the Ministry of Education and described in the government bill) could thus be grouped into two major categories: on the one hand, answers arguing for a more radical integrative approach with both the State and the nation, and agreeing with the Council’s instrumentalism (among them the answers of the LO, the ABF and several artists’ organisations) and, on the other hand, answers arguing for a more aestheticist approach and emphasising freedom of speech (the SFI, the Publishers’ Association and the political right). Between these, some of the more established actors argued for limited centralisation. A number of arguments were also raised concerning various specific issues that I will discuss further later in this chapter.

Adjacent to the consideration procedure for the Council’s report were also those of the recommendations of the Immigrant Commission330 that related to cultural policy. These would not be included in a Culture bill until 1975, 331 but they still deserve some attention, as they came to be integrated both in the formulation of cultural policy and in the various sub-fields. Fundamental to this integration was the agreement between the Culture Council and the Immigrant Commission that cultural policy for immigrants ought to

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330 SOU 1974:69
331 His Royal Majesty’s Bill 1975:20: 137-144.
be an integral part of general cultural policy. The Immigrant Commission, however, had some specific views on how this was to be accomplished:

The [Immigrant] Commission states four partial objectives within the framework of cultural policy, for the benefit of immigrants and linguistic minorities: increased possibilities for participation in the general Swedish supply of culture, for contact with the country of origin, for cultural activity of their own, and for cultural interactivity between the minorities and the majority population.332

In practice this was, among other things, to mean that culture had to be made available in immigrant and minority languages through broadcasting on TV and the radio and support for theatre groups and literature. This integration of immigrant policy with cultural policy was a part of a general move away from a more exclusive policy concerning immigrants. Yet, cultural policy towards immigrants remained specific, as did other policies aimed at them. Reactions to these recommendations were mostly positive; both the National Association of Finnish Organisations (Riksförbundet finska föreningar) and the Culture Council are examples of actors sharing this view. An exception was that the National School Board, the Culture Council and the Immigration Board considered the Commission to have underestimated the importance of NGOs. The LO, furthermore, considered the recommended measures to be too centred on the Finnish-speaking minority (then, by far, the largest one). What was more controversial was that the Commission recommended the creation of a new government commission to investigate the possibilities for collecting the museum and archive material on immigration and immigrants. This was, according to the Nordic Museum and the National Archives, completely unnecessary and, furthermore, totally at odds with the organisational structure of the heritage field. Unlike the rest of the Immigrant Commission’s recommendations, this was never realised. The recommendations were thus followed when they supported integrating immigrants and minorities into the national culture but ignored when they advocated for the disintegration of the cultural policy field.333

When the main Culture Bill was presented, the official statement of the Minister of Education (the crucial part of the text) started by expressing general agreement with the values that had guided the Culture Council. The Bill, however, also emphasised the importance of taking into account the comments given by all other parties involved.334 With this in mind, the government proposed the following reformulated points as general objectives for future cultural policy:

332 His Royal Majesty’s Bill 1975:20: 137.
333 His Royal Majesty’s Bill 1975:20, see Borevi 2002: 77-133 for a discussion of Swedish immigrant policy at this time.
- Cultural policy should contribute to the protection of the freedom of speech and to create real opportunities for that freedom to be exercised.
- Cultural policy should give people opportunities for creativity of their own and contribute to contact between people.
- Cultural policy should counteract the negative consequences of commercialism within the cultural area.
- Cultural policy should promote decentralisation of activity and decision-making functions within the cultural area.
- Cultural policy should to an increased extent be formed with consideration to the needs and experiences of disadvantaged groups.
- Cultural policy should enable artistic and cultural renewal.
- Cultural policy should guarantee that historical [älдре tidern] culture is taken care of and reinvigorated [levandegörs].
- Cultural policy should promote an exchange of experiences and ideas within the cultural area across language and national borders.335

These reformulated objectives should be considered a compromise between various interests in the field, not only considering the norm of consensus on major reforms (both between Riksdag parties and between the different bodies in the public sector), but also in view of the new parliamentary situation that appeared in the 1973 elections. The Riksdag now had 175 Socialist members and 175 from the centre-right. This so-called Lottery Riksdag (aptly named after the Constitutional rule that a stand-off vote should be decided by lot) forced the government back into an even more consensual leadership; support had now to be constantly sought on the other side of the political divide.336

What can be seen in the phrasing of the objectives, in the rest of the text and in the more practical recommendations is a more liberal approach to culture than that of the Council: contact should be promoted between “people”, not between “groups”. Artistic freedom was still to be protected, as well as freedom of speech.337 The Preservation Objective was also still there. Indications of a cultural policy aiming to influence other sectors of society were, on the other hand, less explicit, if still present. It should also be noted that international exchange had been added as a new and separate objective, as suggested by the ABF. Cross-language contacts, which could in the Council recommendations have been taken as included as a contact between “groups in society”, was now linked to the international arena. On the issue of counteracting commercialism the government again went on the ABF line and specified that it was “the negative consequences of commercialism within

335 His Royal Majesty’s Bill 1974:28: 295
337 The bill is considered liberal in the social liberal sense that it advocates a welfare state and other political actions to defend the liberty, rights or happiness of the individual (cf. Barry 2001), see also note 588 for a comment on the further liberalisation of cultural policy.
the cultural area” that should be counteracted. With this formula they could meet the criticism from the right as well: it was only negative consequences within the cultural area that should be counteracted, not the market economy as such. The objective thus moved closer to a protection of aesthetic quality and further away from an instrumentalist use of culture to change society for civil ends. All in all, what can be seen is a weakened and compromised set of objectives, but certainly not a different norm system. The same concept of national culture as mainly civil and integrative within a framework of the State remained, together with a strong bias towards an instrumentalist view of the arts implying that they should be used in favour of civil goals rather than seen only as values in themselves.

If instrumentalism was slightly weakened, the integrative ambition was even more so, especially in the case of institutional centralism. This also holds true regarding the organisation of government involvement in the cultural fields. Issues relating to cultural policy were still to be gathered in one single division at ministerial level; not in a new Ministry of Culture, however, but in a division within in the Ministry of Education. A permanent KUR was also to be created for coordination, information and funding purposes, but its power would be limited to the sector. Most prominently, film and the media (except cultural media in the narrow sense) were left outside its power. The museums were, on the other hand, placed under the responsibility of KUR. KUR would thus (as proposed by the old Council) adopt the role of the new coordinating body that the MUS’65 had advocated). This compromise indicated that the Minister was supporting the Council’s work to integrate the cultural sector organisationally under a common set of norms directing work towards civil values within the framework of the state-framed nation. Yet, it is symptomatic of how the Ministry of Education under Bertil Zachrisson’s leadership composed the Bill: the tendency to compromise was now much stronger than it had been in the Council (composed by Palme and with a secretariat recruited from his and Edenman’s staff). KUR was given authority over most of the sector, although not all of it and not much power over fields that already had strong actors with which the Ministry now wished to establish consensus by compromise.

Looking at the economy, it has on the other hand to be stated that governmental budgetary priorities were already in line with the new cultural policy. An increasing amount of money was spent on the creation and expansion of the National Touring Theatre (NTT), the National Travelling Exhibitions (NTE) and the National Touring Concerts (NTC) while budgetary demands from older actors, such as the National Museum of Fine Arts, the

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Opera and the Museum of National Antiquities were harder to get through (often with reference to the need to wait for the commissions). Even after the Culture Bill, grants to the latter institutions continued to increase primarily when concerned with enlarging their audiences, and less when concerned with, for example, expanding collections for scientific purposes. The budgetary consequences of the Culture Bill were also ensured by the amendments to the national budget made in the Bill itself and, albeit to a lesser extent, followed up in later national budgets during the following years.339

**Discussions in the Riksdag**

When placed before the Riksdag the general principles of the Culture Bill were recognised and approved by a clear majority. Each of the four parties outside the government, however, reacted differently on several specific points.340 The VPK (Communists) professed to agree more with the original report of the Culture Council than with the government bill it had resulted in. It agreed even more with the opinions of certain respondents that had recommended an even harder line in relation to commercial culture. The bourgeoisie had, according to the VPK, lost its role as the primary culture-bearing class when capitalism entered its monopolist fase. The working class was, on the other hand, still prevented from taking its rightful place. A socialist cultural policy had thus to build on the powers of a radicalised group of cultural workers. At the same time the party, however, remained suspicious of the government’s talk about decentralisation. According to them, many of the government’s propositions worked in a centralist direction. Neither were they satisfied with the government’s prioritising of professional culture over that of amateurs.341 The VPK also remained concerned about the concentrations of private ownership of the media and specifically moved for the enlargement of State subsidies to journals.342

The Liberals, like the VPK, expressed significant concern for the situation of cultural workers. They, however, remained more concerned about the monopolistic power of government than about the powers of commercial forces. Between these two problems the party had to create a solution, and thus turned to models designed to ensure both government funding for artists and their artistic freedom. While agreeing with the proposed objectives they proposed, among other things, an independent Culture Fund for the support of artists.343 The Centre Party, on the other hand, agreed largely with the gov-

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341 Motion 1974:1721.
343 Motion 1974:1709.
ernment, but stressed the importance of distributing resources more evenly across the country. They also demanded the recognition of countryside culture and argued for a more holistic and, to some extent, primordialist view of cultural heritage. On organisational issues they underlined the need for parliamentary representation in the new National Council for Cultural Affairs, as an alternative to the Ministry of Culture that the Culture Council had recommended. They thus agreed to further integration of cultural policy, but not necessarily under government control.344

The Moderates were perhaps the party with the most divergent opinions on cultural policy. Gösta Bohman, Moderate leader and future Budget Minister, seemed in fact quite bemused when he complimented the Minister of Education on the “cultural conservatism [he] expresses in his argumentation on several occasions in the government bill.”345 Little of this view could, however, according to the Moderates be seen in the actual proposed reforms in that same bill. Since Moderate priorities were significantly more centred than those of the other parties on what they considered qualitative culture Moderate views were at this time generally much more positive to the culture of establishments such as the Royal Opera and the Royal Dramatic Theatre. Consequently, they proposed as an alternative main objective for cultural policy that it should “aim at giving people the possibility to participate in a cultural life marked by quality, freedom and pluralism.”346 Like the Centre party they were more interested than the government in the preservation and invigoration of historical culture as a link between the past, the present and the future, although they were at the same time the only party to state that “our culture” should not be taken to mean only “Swedish culture”, but instead “Western culture” at large. Together with the Liberals they supported the existing structure of County Antiquarians (Länsantikvarier), while at the same time trying to ensure that the future KUR would be composed of representatives of the Riksdag parties. Finally, they were also generally more positive to commercial actors than any of the other parties, while at the same time remaining more suspicious of the influence of large national NGOs.347 In the end of course none of these bills became law. The differences between centre-right parties led to constant majority for the government and thus to the acceptance of His Majesty’s Bill 1974:28 with its general objectives for cultural policy. Especially the Moderates would, however, stay true to their own norms of how to approach culture, norms which would become much more influential in the early nineties.

344 Motion 1974:1706.
345 Motion 1974:1701: 5
346 Motion 1974:1701: 2
A Belated Art-Funding Reform

The major reform planned by the Culture Council for the benefit of individual artists was to wait until 1976, when a new scheme for art grants was proposed. In its special report on this matter the Council continued to promote the idea that the solution to the artists’ problematic situation would be to employ them in work for Society. In this line it suggested greater funding for the National Arts Council (responsible for buying art for State buildings), underlining at the same time the importance of municipal responsibility for public art. This followed the norms established for public arts funding in the inter-war years. The Council, however, also recommended increased State support for artists through individual grants and grants for specific projects. For these purposes it recommended the creation of three new Art Grant Committees: one for “picture and form artists”, one for “film and scene artists” and one for “tone artists”, all filled with representatives of the artists themselves. These followed the standard set by the committee for Library Compensation rather than the established system for art grants. Isomorphism was thus increased in art funding. The only major difference was entirely in line with the norms established by the Council: funding was not to be seen as a right, but as support provided by the government. With a few changes (one Commission in three departments rather than three Commissions etc) this proposition was accepted, first by the government and later by the Riksdag, thereby finishing the reform work started at the planning stage with the inauguration of the Culture Council some eight years earlier.348

In spite of the criticism it had met in defence of the freedoms of the artistic fields and non-instrumentalist aestheticist views of culture these reforms remained relatively close to the culturally and institutionally integrative centrally planned state-framed civil nationalism of the Culture Council and its directives. Even when its institutional centralism had been somewhat toned down by the Ministry under Zachrisson the general impact of the reforms of the 1970s remained a consolidation of the institutionalised borders of the cultural sector. In practice the reforms, however, also worked in favour of the aesthetic culture of the artistic fields, at least in their institutionalised forms: this was the culture that the people should be given access to.

THEATRE, DANCE AND MUSIC POLICY

With the Royal Opera, its dance and concert ensembles, the Royal Dramatic Theatre, concert halls in several major cities and a long tradition of church music and choirs, the theatre, dance and music sectors included some of the oldest cultural establishments in the country. All three fields – but especially

the music field – included major amateur activities, mainly organised by the *folkbildning* associations. Music ranked the most popular cultural activity, both in terms of visitors and in terms of amateur participants. In terms of funding, State-funded professional theatre, on the other hand, remained limited to a rare few establishments in major cities. Funding for music and dance establishments was even more limited; the Museum of Dance (in Stockholm) was in fact the only major establishment for dance.\(^{349}\) In addition, the military music organisation (previously under the regiments) had in 1970 been reorganised as Regional Music Assemblies. There were, furthermore, national actors involved in these sectors: the NTT and the NTC. The first was a government-funded association (primarily made up of municipalities and smaller associations) aiming at organising touring performances of the National Theatres and others. While acting for a similar objective in the musical field, the NTC was a foundation. This difference could, however, be seen as a superficial one. Not only were both organisations financially dependent on the State, but their chairmen were appointed by the government and board members by various interests (such as municipalities, county councils, *folkbildning* associations and the government). Other forms of organisation existed as well: the two Royal Theatres were both privately owned limited companies, while government-funded city theatres and orchestras included both limited companies as well as profit and non-profit associations.\(^ {350}\) As can be seen from the first two examples, the difference between legal forms could, however, be deceptive, and relations to the State could be treated as at least comparable.

*Commissions in the Fields of Music, Theatre and Dance*

The Culture Council’s account of these fields was delivered in several parts. Sometimes all three categories were treated as one sector. More often, however, music was singled out as a separate sector, while dance remained tied to the larger theatre sector. The Council, furthermore – and to a higher degree – kept the professional and amateur spheres separate. There was even a clear distinction made within the professional fields, distinguishing (without exception State-financed) “establishments” from the “free”, if professional, activi-

\(^{349}\) According to SOU 1972:66: 234 the following theatres were owned or at least partially funded by the State in 1974: The Royal Opera (*Kungliga teatern*, Stockholm), The Royal Dramatic Theatre (*Kungliga dramatiska teatern*, Stockholm), The NTT (*Riksteatern*), The Norrbotten Theatre, Stockholm City Theatre, The *Stora teatern* (opera, Gothenburg), Gothenburg City Theatre, *Folke teatern* (The People’s Theatre, Gothenburg), Malmö City Theatre, Helsingborg City Theatre, Borås City Theatre, The Norrköping and Linköping Theatre and Uppsala City Theatre. The State also funded the symphony orchestras of Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmö, Norrköping, Helsingborg and Gävle, and smaller orchestras in Västerås and Örebro, SOU 1972:66: 260.

\(^{350}\) SOU 1972:66.
ties outside of them, which were considered closer to amateur activities. Music, however, remained dominant in the amateur category and – albeit to a lesser extent – the free professional category. Amateur dancing remained, on the other hand, a relatively rare activity, at least if, as the Council indeed did without even stating it, one only takes into account publicly funded and formally organised activities. As this is the way the Council approached its task, it is hardly surprising that the folkbildning associations turned out to be the clearly most important organisers and financers of amateur activities in these fields, closely followed by the choir organisations, a movement already spread all over the country. Neither did the Council consider this a problem. Although it was concerned about funding systems being created for the benefit of teaching activities rather than artistic activities, its recommendations for adapting the structure never proposed changing the major actors. Instead, it remained concerned with such things as the education and professionalisation of activity leaders.351

In its account of the institutions in these sectors the Council’s primary concern remained the Decentralisation Objective. The audiences of these art forms could still be considered very limited, in geographical terms as well as in terms of social stratum and age (the Council remained particularly concerned for the supply of theatre and music directed to children). In order to deal with these problems the Council recommended closer cooperation with Swedish Radio and the NTT, as well as that greater efforts should be invested in touring activities. Special problems were noted in the decentralisation of opera performances: the Royal Opera, Stora Teatern in Gothenburg and Malmö City Theatre were the only theatres in the country that were equipped for opera performances. To tackle this the Council recommended adjustments in the repertoire.352 At the same time, the concentration of dramatic theatre to larger cities (although significantly smaller than those endowed with an opera house) was seen as a problem, which made the Council propose a reorganisation of city theatres into county theatres connected to the county councils rather than to city municipalities. This organisation would demand significant government support for the successive expansion of the County Theatre system to cover all, or nearly all, Swedish counties. At the same time, the system would however still be based mostly on already existing theatres. The Council also proposed some changes in the organisation of the Royal Opera

351 SOU 1972:66. See Hoogland 2005 for a more extensive discussion of the Council’s attitudes towards free theatre groups. Hoogland also stresses the apparent paradox between on the one hand the Council’s stated support for radical and new forms of culture and, on the other hand, the emphasis on institutional theatre in the later Government bill. In my view, this contradiction is, however, present even in the Council report between the more visionary statements and the more practical policy recommendations.
and the Royal Dramatic Theatre to the effect that they would be reorganised into one united and government-owned limited company. This would, as we will see, become the topic of a major discussion, as well as for a new commission with a more detailed assignment, a commission that would later result in a Ministry Report basically agreeing with the Council.353

The Council’s recommendations on music policy remained quite close to those concerning theatre. Consequently, city symphony orchestras were to be re-organised as County Orchestras while the NTC was to be given a more coordinating role.354 Another study of the musical field was made by the Concert Bureau Commission. In its report on phonograms it opened its presentation with narrating the whole story of technical development in music recording, much as the Film Commission did with film technology. Unlike the Film Commission the Concert Bureau Commission did, however, not consider these advances to have made artistic advancement possible. Instead it considered listening to recorded music a poor substitute for the fuller experience of live performances. Such recordings could, however, prove an important tool for the purposes of education and as a means to promote an interest in music. Unfortunately private production and distribution did not live up to these expectations. It concluded that there was a need for the State to act, primarily as a supplementary distributor of qualitative music – and especially, of qualitative Swedish music – an objective that could be reached by using public libraries, TV, radio and schools.355

Theatre, Music and Dance in the Government Bills

The responses to these Commissions’ recommendations, when they were referred by the government to various institutions for consideration, proved to be mainly positive, nearly totally so, in fact, when regarding the recommendations to strengthen the position of performance dance and the decentralisation of cultural activities. In spite of this, there was some criticism, however.356 Practicalities of County Theatres were, for example, discussed by several County Councils and other actors concerned. The recommendation of such a system led to a new situation in which the NTT was forced to defend

353 SOU 1972:66.
355 SOU 1971:73.
356 His Royal Majesty’s Bill 1974:28:77-129. Interestingly the Royal Dramatic Theatre was the only major actor to criticise the Council of Cultural Affairs for its purported failure to provide recommendations for the strengthening of the connection between amateur and institutional performances. The Swedish Theatre Association (Svenska teaterförbundet) also pointed to “the unsatisfied need for culture” that remained in the suburbs of the larger cities. While the Association had the same geographical and integrative outlook it prioritised, in other words, a different marginalised category than the Council did, with its traditional perspective based on the city versus country dichotomy (ibid.).

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its position. It was also defended by the LO and several other leading NGOs, including the ABF (the leading folkbildning association connected with the Social Democratic Party). The recommendation to use TV as a means for theatre distribution proved to be one of the more controversial of the Council’s recommendations and was opposed by both the SFI and by representatives of theatre professionals, but also by Swedish Radio. Many of these considered TV an inferior medium. Responses regarding the Council’s recommendations on music remained close to those on theatre and dance, although the Theatre Union (Teaterförbundet) considered the Council to have overestimated the similarities between these fields. Several respondents were, furthermore, critical of the Council’s purported over-concentration on classical and instrumental music. Not only did the Swedish National Jazz Association (Svenska Jazzriksförbundet) criticise this kind of narrow-mindedness, but also more central actors, such as the Swedish Performing Rights Society (STIM) and the Swedish Choir Association filed likeminded criticism, particularly concerning the Council’s lack of discussion of vocal music. Representatives of the orchestras were, on the other hand, concerned that massive decentralisation could lead to decreasing quality unless due attention was paid to the special competence for playing in smaller groups than the symphony orchestra.\(^{357}\) It is safe to say that most critics were actors arguing in their own interest, generally supporting their claims with aesthetic values.

In spite of this criticism the Culture Bill did not diverge far from the Council’s recommendations. It did, however, emphasise the importance of integrating different systems, such as Regional Music Assemblies, City Orchestras, even when the Culture Council had not proposed any model for coordination. The Ministry, however, also stated that further investigations and circulations of reports among the actors concerned had to be made before a possible reorganisation of theatres and orchestras from city to county level, and that the solutions in terms of organisational form etc. would probably have to vary between different regions, depending on the existing circumstances. Neither did it agree with the Council that a consistent distinction could be made between professional and amateur music practitioners, although such a distinction was considered generally desirable. Not surprisingly, the Bill also emphasised the importance of NGOs and the vital role of the NTT as a coordinator of Swedish theatre life, and essentially preferable to all possible alternatives in that role, thanks to its “direct contact” with the audiences (through its close association with NGOs).\(^{358}\) The government bill could, in other words, be considered to have been less ardent than the Council in prio-


ritising the homogenisation and integration of the periphery into national culture, as well as the various independent actors of the field into a more integrated organisation. It did not, however, replace this priority with any other, or even question the aestheticist assumption of national cultural homogeneity with only differences in the level of quality and professionalism. Neither did it try to change the organisational structure of music as one sector and theatre and dance as another, nor on the desirability of professionalisation that was implied by a continued respect for aesthetic quality founded in the artistic fields.

Debates in the Riksdag
When the Culture Bill of 1974 was debated in the Riksdag, the debate centred on other issues, although the Riksdag parties generally supported the Bill. Among the few comments in the procedures of the Committee on Cultural Affairs was the joint bill of centre-right members in support of higher funding for the Royal Opera and the Royal Dramatic Theatre in order to support high quality culture somewhere in the country. There was also a VPK bill for higher financial support of free theatre groups, arguing that these were both more independent and more progressive than State establishments (a civil argument).\(^{359}\) Although private bills on theatre, music and dance were extremely rare, almost non-existent actually, during the period of this investigation, a bill by a Social Democratic member could also be mentioned – one concerning the importance of extending the supply of music and theatre to the countryside – as well as one written by a group of Moderates moving against the increased funding for the NTC proposed in the National Budget for 1973.\(^{360}\) The centre-right thus continued to defend institutionally recognised aesthetic quality, Social Democrats worked for cultural integration and civil work within the state-framed nation and the VPK for different civil values which could only be supported by artists if the field became more disintegrated.

FILM POLICY

The Film Commission and the Film Institute
Swedish film policy is a field that was different from other fields of cultural policy, if nothing else, by structure. At its centre stood the Swedish Film Institute (SFI), established by the Film Agreement of 1963, undoubtedly a greater reform of this field than anything it faced in the seventies. Yet, some


reforms were made at this time as well. These were drafted by The Film Commission. Appointed by Minister Palme in 1968 it was charged with mapping the situation in areas such as the economy of the film sector, the situation for amateur film studios, children’s films, film in the schools and film workers, as well as with investigating the possibilities for “improving the distribution of film, especially the dissemination of quality film in the countryside, and in that context to investigate possible new ways of distribution, such as non-commercial cinemas supported by society”. The members of the Commission were primarily experts recruited within the field itself, but also representatives of various sectors of society, although mostly from the public sector.

More than any other government commission of its time the Film Commission emphasised the status of its subject as art, a status that, according to the Commission, had been clear and unquestionable at least since the early sixties. Again quite uniquely, the Film Commission continued by narrating the whole history of this art form both in Sweden and the world at large. In this respect it included everything from the early productions of the late nineteenth century, and including all of the major Swedish directors. It is, however, quite clear that all movies were not included in the concept of “film as art”; on the contrary, “commercial film” was contrasted to “quality film”. Through its reports the Commission remained concerned with the independence of its artistic field. It was this concern that lay behind many, if not all of its recommendations. Unlike the proponents of older art forms, the Film Commission in other words saw a need to legitimise the status of their subject by conforming to what they perceived to be the institutionalised norms of other artistic fields.

Furthermore, it was, according to the Film Commission, not enough to protect the supply of quality film in Sweden. Instead it saw its assignment as protecting the supply and distribution both of qualitative foreign film and of Swedish film in general (both already being responsibilities of the SFI):

> It is the opinion of the Commission that there is Swedish film, film that depicts the people, the environment, the culture, the uniqueness of one’s own country. A film that makes both Swedish society of today and the Swedish culture of earlier times alive.

The production of genuinely Swedish film should, according to the Commission, be a concern for the whole of society and thus deserved to be supported by the State. In its retelling of film history it continued to establish the existence of a specifically Swedish way of making film. Swedish film was, in other

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words, not only a reflection of Swedish culture but also an essential part of it. Although the Commission did show some concern for the importance of a film production reflecting all parts of society, it remained clear that only film in the Swedish language could be considered to be an integral part of Swedish culture (the existence of other productions was never even mentioned). The Film Commission thus presented a more particularistic argument than other actors dealing with other art forms.

TV was considered both a threat and an opportunity. That film as an art form could have anything to learn from TV appears to have been inconceivable to the Film Commission. Instead (presumably licence-financed) TV was viewed primarily as an opportunity in its role as a potential workplace for unemployed film-workers. Film made for TV could enrich not only TV but also the film sector, but then only by financing films that would otherwise not have been made. Such productions, however, called for rigorous quality control, but could still work as a temporary solution for the financial problems of the film field. Swedish Television (SVT) should thus be instructed to buy and show more film for the benefit of the Swedish film industry. TV was, however, not seen as an ideal way of watching film. Instead, a network of public sector cinemas should be created across country to secure proper distribution of high quality film to the entire population of the state-framed nation. Such institutions could also be used for other related purposes, for example, as part of school curricula. In these ways the Commission agreed with the general norms of cultural policy reform, at the same time as it enforced the border towards media policy and thereby the inclusion of film in the cultural sector rather than the media sector. On the subject of institutional organisation the Commission, however, stressed the importance of the connection between film and the media, especially TV. Although the Commission had nothing against film being incorporated in the area of responsibility of the new KUR as suggested by the Culture Council, it did not, however, recommend this if TV, radio and other audio-visual media were not be included as well. It also specifically emphasised that such inclusion could never be a matter only of specifically “cultural” media (such as journals on culture or culture TV) but of all media.

The SFI strongly supported the Film Commission’s recommendations. At the same time, it was also one of the most active respondents to the recommendations of the Culture Council. In contrast to most of the other culture agencies, it did not simply concentrate on its own field within cultural policy, but instead put forward a relatively consistent view of what cultural

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365 SOU 1970:73
policy as a whole ought to be. In this view it differed from the Culture Council (and from other actors in the sector) in that it openly questioned the need for a strong involvement of outside actors. It was, furthermore, one of the few respondents to criticise the absence of a discussion of quality in the Council’s report and of suggestions for general objectives for the national cultural policy. It also considered the Council to be overly critical of the established cultural institutions and mentioned the work of the Royal Dramatic Theatre as an example of genuinely progressive work within these. On the other hand, it argued against the Council’s proposal for the composition of the new KUR, on the grounds that a council in which half of the members were appointed by the government would weaken parliamentary influence. In other words, they did not consider culture to be a part of regular State policy, which was the province of the government, but something that should be more independent and above day-to-day politics.

**Government Bills and Riksdag Activity**

The Culture Bill of 1974 said little of film policy, a subject that instead had to wait for the finishing consideration procedure, and which was not addressed in a government bill until 1975. Neither were there any major private bills in the Riksdag concerning film during the entire period of 1970–1973, or any written comments on it in the debates on the bill of 1975. State respondents, including KUR and several other State actors and NGOs, however, criticised the Commission’s proposals heavily for being too friendly to the private interests in the film industry and not radical enough in its suggestions for a stronger government involvement in the production and distribution of film. Other actors, such as MUF (the Moderate youth organisation) and SAF (Swedish Employers’ Federation), on the other hand, agreed with the Commission’s more accepting view of private film production and proposed that the problems with distribution should be solved through State subsidies for private cinemas rather than by the creation of a whole new system of public ones.

The government in the end chose the more moderate road of near status quo. Their propositions continued in the already established tradition of supporting the SFI and clearly envisioned that future financial support of film production should continue to follow this norm. On the institutional home of

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367 His Royal Majesty’s Bill 1974:28 e.g. on pp. 34 and pp. 46. According to Kleberg (interview), the SFI’s response was written by Harry Schein personally.
the film sector in the State, the Minister was even more status quo-oriented. In 1974, he postponed connecting it with KUR and simply reminded the readers of the Culture Bill that as a Cultural matter film fell under the Council’s general responsibility, but stated at the same time that film subsidies would remain a matter for the SFI, which was thereby established through delegation as something close to the government authority of the sector. On the issue of public cinemas he finally referred to already existing activities stating that it would be wrong for the government to create an activity that should properly grow spontaneously from the initiatives of NGOs.\textsuperscript{374} The film sector was thus left without significant changes as a field dominated by commercial actors, accepted by the State as qualitative, together with the semi-governmental SFI. The Commission and the SFI had thus failed in their mission to fully include the media sector in the consolidated field of cultural policy. On the other hand, they had succeeded in including themselves in that field as an independent and recognised art form. It is also interesting to note that their combination of explicit aestheticism and Swedish particularism based on the uniqueness of Swedish society and language had not only been met with no official response, but had on the contrary been accepted as a valuable argument in the discussion on the future of the field.\textsuperscript{374}

\textbf{LITERATURE AND LIBRARY POLICY}

\textit{The Literature Commission}

As was the case in several of the other sectors in Swedish cultural policy the leading norm-producing actor concerned with literature policy was a government commission appointed by Palme during his time as Minister of Education. In this case, the Commission in question was the Literature Commission of 1968, responsible for literature and library policy (two sectors that were at the time considered separate in the National Budget). The Commission was composed predominantly of authors, academics and public employees from the library field. Among its members were also a number of Riksdag members, including several who were elected during their work in the Commission. Among the experts used by the Commission there was a relatively high degree not only of library personnel, but also of literary sociologists. There were, however, no literary scholars from the humanities among them. Due to the empirical nature of most of its work, these experts were the ones writing most of the Commission’s intermediary reports, as well as collecting the background material for its recommendations. This work should according to the directives deal with the growing threat posed to good literature by the new

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{373} Government Bill 1975:20: 221-234.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{374} Cf. Blomgren 1998: 80-99.}
media and mass-produced commercial books. Palme expressed serious concerns that the high prices of Swedish original literary work had, according to recent studies, become high enough to discourage large groups of people from buying them. In such a situation it was quite necessary to create a government commission “[t]o consider how far ‘extending conditions for the production and dissemination of books meet people’s need for qualified information and literary experience.’” The Commission was especially instructed to conduct experimental studies on methods to improve the work of public libraries. 375 Six years later the Commission summarised its own fundamental values:

Cultural policy in the literary field should give more people the opportunities and impulses to read good books, participate in protecting freedom of speech, contribute to a greater possibility for the voicing of opinions, and, in doing so, make artistic and cultural renewal possible, preserve and reinvigorate historical and foreign literature, and in doing so safeguard the future development of Swedish literature.376

One of the keywords in this statement, as well as in the original directives, was “good books”. Both the Commission and the Minister implied that there was literature that was at the same time objectively and obviously good, and for those reasons was worthy of State support. The Minister never elaborated on these implications and the Commission did so only to some extent, and then only in order to make the distinction operationally useful for its statistical and administrative purposes. For these purposes it (and its experts), however, used several definitions, all of which were based on the judgement of one or several groups. In its studies on availability the experts tended towards definitions based on scholarly standard works on Swedish and foreign literature. As only Swedish works were used, this handed the power of definition to literary scholars in Swedish universities.377 Other experts tended towards definitions based on publishers and forms of publishing. In the discussion of literature for the “mass market” in the Commission’s expert report of 1972, such literature was defined mainly on the basis of mass-published book series, especially when such series were published by non-established publishers or not sold via specialised booksellers (using supermarkets or newsstands instead). All of these definitions of “pulp fiction” were in turn based on assuming that there were two separate “systems” of literary production and retail.

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377 Definitions used by Associate Professor Lars Furuland of the Institute for the Sociology of Literature at Uppsala University in SOU 1972:80 in pp. 369-404.
This assumption was never questioned or considered problematic. In its own concluding report the Commission (like some of the experts) used a definition based on the classifications of the Royal Library, thus putting the power of defining “good” literature (i.e. literature worthy of support) in the hands of State-employed library professionals. The result of these investigations was the conclusion that mass-marked literature was in no way the province of the uneducated. The problem was instead that qualitative literature remained the province of the educated few, even if these read mass-market literature as well.

The Commission’s views on publishers were somewhat complicated. The emerging power concentrations within the Swedish publishing sector were clearly the cause of some concern, a concern that was already expressed in the Commission directives. At the same time the Commission continued to consider some publishers distinctly “better” than others, in the sense that these commonly known firms could be expected to be more responsible concerning the quality of the literature they put to print. Unfortunately, these “serious” publishers were already included – and in fact central – in the power concentrations considered so problematical. In the end no recommendations were made on this issue and the distinction between “serious” and “un-serious” publishers remained a tool used only by some of the Commission’s experts in order to study how large a part of the total literary production was made up of serious literature. The same principle was also followed regarding booksellers. Despite its concerns that “serious” booksellers were losing in the competition against supermarkets and newsstands, the Commission had no recommendations on how to attend to this problem either.

When it came to the issue of improving the reading habits of the Swedish people, the Commission did, however, not turn to the publishers for a solution, nor to the booksellers, but instead to publicly owned intermediaries, primarily public libraries and (regarding children’s literature) schools and school libraries. It was also in these areas that its major recommendations were to be found: the Swedish library system was to be improved and reorganised. Teachers should furthermore receive better literary education. Interestingly, the institutional centralism in the cultural sector came in this context to mean a stronger separation of these areas: public libraries had up to this time been under the supervision of the National Board of Schools. According to

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379 SOU 1974:5.
the Commission’s recommendations, this responsibility was to be transferred to KUR, thus contributing to the general formation of a more clearly limited cultural policy field. Regional Libraries should furthermore receive increased funding to supplement municipal libraries in satisfying specialised demands.\textsuperscript{381} Various methods for libraries to reach out to non-readers had now been tested and were presented in a separate report.\textsuperscript{382}

At the other end of the production chain, the Commission was also concerned with the situation of writers. Once again a new set of distinctions was used. This time the major distinction was not between good and bad literature or between serious and un-serious publishers, but instead between established and un-established writers. An “un-established” writer could very well be published both more times and in larger editions than an “established” one. The distinction was instead based on membership in the Swedish Writers’ Association or the Swedish Writers’ Association of Finland.\textsuperscript{383} Through this definition, the power over who was to be regarded as an established writer was to be delegated to the professional organisations of the linguistic nation. In recommending solutions for the economic situation of writers, the Commission remained careful not to use methods that would favour writers of books that were already favoured by the market, but instead writers of qualitative literature. The Commission thus took the opposition between aesthetic and economic values for granted. It also specifically pointed out that the State’s support of writers was an answer to a need in society, as was its support of public libraries. The latter was, however, not considered to oppose the interests of writers, or even of publishers, but instead to increase public interest in reading. As the Commission itself put it in its final report; “demands for Library Compensation [biblioteksersättning] appears, from certain perspectives, to imply that Society would be in debt economically to the publishers. This seems doubtful, to say the least.” Instead, such support for the writers should be placed where it was to the best use for the production of good literature. This judgement should, however, be delegated to a board composed of established writers. This was mainly a change in motive, and does not represent a major institutional change. In practice, it was an enforcement of existing aestheticist standards for funding granted by committees dominated by established writers.\textsuperscript{384}

Apart from this, the Commission also proposed several forms of financial support for publication to be distributed by KUR. For translated litera-
ture for adults the Commission recommended a selective financial support given after publication and a selective support given in advance for classic literature, as well as for non-fiction specialist books and children’s literature. For Swedish original prose and lyrics the Commission, on the other hand, proposed a general financial support for all books, requiring that the publishers should produce a fixed number of books for the State (primarily to be distributed to public libraries). It should also be noted that not only was literature in the Swedish language the only literature directed to Swedes that was discussed in any of the Commission’s reports; translations from foreign languages into Swedish were, despite several statements of their importance, not given any priority in comparison to production of new literature in Swedish. Swedish culture was certainly considered to benefit from the influence of foreign literature, but this influence was obviously not, when it came to making financial recommendations, to be considered as important as that of Swedish literature. This was to some degree justified by the importance of such literature in the depiction of contemporary Sweden as part of Swedish culture and public discourse, something that has, however, still to be considered a statement of (and for) the distinctiveness of Swedish culture.385 The experts Furuland and Johansson (unopposed, but seemingly in contradiction to the Commission’s discussion of translations) thought that Swedish literature had to be regarded as being of greater value than translated foreign literature, as the quality of foreign literature translated into Swedish was generally lower than that of Swedish original literature.386

For immigrants, and especially for second generation immigrants (children of immigrants) there could, however, be some need for literature in other languages than Swedish. Referring to “American research” the Commission thought that immigrants benefited from continued contacts with their land of origin and that this was thus needed for their integration into Swedish society and culture.387 The primary objective of this was, in other words, adjustment on the part of the immigrant. To be able to do this, however, the immigrant also needed a stable identity grounded in his or her original homeland and might to this end need literature to keep the connection alive. At the same time the Commission was also of the opinion that a good knowledge of one’s mother tongue may be needed to learn a new language. Immigrants were, in other words, considered to have a connection with an original (ethnic particularistic) culture that had to be considered if they were to be integrated as

385 SOU 1974:5, SOU 1972:80: 405-448 (the chapter on “Availability of Literature on Some Specialist Subjects” by Anne-Marie Bratt).
386 SOU 1972:80: 226 Both experts were from the Institute for Sociology of Literature at the Uppsala University.
members of the (linguistically and state-framed civil) Swedish culture. Literature from the countries of their birth would not be enough for the needs of immigrants when they were established in Sweden. This argument was perhaps more in line with a view of immigrants as citizens with a right to personal (and specialised) public service, a view that existed simultaneously in the Commission. Regardless of which perspective was dominant, it remained a problem that immigrants read fewer and less qualitative books than any other population category. In response to these needs the Commission did, however, not recommend any permanent activities. Instead, it proposed that a specified sum should be granted to public libraries to support the creation of book collections in immigrant languages.388

The Riksdag Parties and the Government on Literature and Library Policy

The Literature Commission was never alone in any of its views. There were, however, some issues on which the consensus was less than total. One of the best examples of such differences was actually made by one of the Commission’s own members. Per Ahlmark, the future leader of the Liberal Party (and, from 1970, a member of the Riksdag Committee on Cultural Affairs) objected both in a reservation to the Commission’s recommendations and in several Riksdag motions during its active period. Quite alone in this opinion (in the Commission), Ahlmark protested against its inability to comprehend the importance and the problems of translators of foreign literature into Swedish. He also opposed the Commission’s disapproval of lowering the taxes on books as a means to support the market (which had been rejected by the Commission on the grounds that such a measure would only benefit works already benefited by the market). More representative of the centre-right parties were, however, his opinions on the Commission’s recommendations on Library Compensation, which were by Ahlmark and other Liberals considered something of a legal right claimed by the writers from the State.389

In the Government Bill on Culture of 1974 very little was said on the subject of literature. This was due mainly to the fact that the Literature Commission’s recommendations had not yet been duly referred for consideration.390 These issues would instead have to wait until 1975 and Government Bill 1975:20. Certainly, there were several critical responses among the referees when these answers arrived but mainly on issues related to library organisation.391 There was also some criticism on details in the recommendations

388 SOU 1974:5.
389 SOU 1974:5: 378-385 and e.g. Motion 1971:827. See Bennich-Björkman 1991 for the history of this opinion.
but not on their main outlay. If anything, the writers’ organisations would have wanted a more radical solution to the problems of power concentration among publishers.392 Little such radicalism was, however, to be seen in the propositions in the government bill. This remained close to the original recommendations of the Commission with the major exceptions of not adopting its controversial recommendations on Regional Libraries and of proposing a slightly different organisation of literary grants. On this latter issue, the Ministry’s main disagreement with the Commission concerned generality of financial support for original Swedish literary work, preferring instead the more restrictive approach of post-publicational selective support, a model that was considered more consistent with the rest of cultural policy.393 Later the same year these bills were, however, followed by a new government bill in which it was proposed that a new government-owned publishing house for mass-produced affordable quality literature should be created.394 This was in line with the wishes of the writer organisations, but nowhere near as radical as many of their answers suggest that they would have wanted.

To sum up, the Commission had been successful in its project to create a more integrated field of literature policy and public libraries, independent from both the educational sector and commercial influences. Negative responses to its recommendations had primarily consisted of library and writer associations arguing for more radical anti-commercialism but still in agreement with the general ideas of institutional centralism and, on the other hand, a much less vocal Liberal proposition to increase literary production and consumption via tax benefits. In its concept of national culture the Commission had consequently defined Swedish literature (in the normative sense of literature that should be supported by the Swedish State) as literature in the Swedish language written for Swedes (in the linguistic sense, i.e. including the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland) and dealing with subjects relevant in a Swedish context from a (culturally) Swedish perspective. To some extent, books in immigrant languages could also be supported but only in the interest of integrating immigrants into Swedish society. With the exception of the Liberals no officially recognised opposition to this position was voiced.

392 Government Bill 1975:20: 41-57, SOU 1974:5. The Writers’ Union and the LO, among others, proposed that Pressbyrån – the major owner of newsstands – should be taken over and administered by the State and NGOs. The Swedish Library Association and others agreed with Commission member Stellan Arvidsson that municipalities should take control over newsstands (in order to enable stronger co-ordination with local Cultural Policies).
MUSEUM AND HERITAGE POLICY

Museum and heritage policy were perhaps the most diverse sub-field of Swedish cultural policy. Although the responsibilities of the museum and heritage sector were remarkably stable it had, however, expanded significantly during the centuries as new museums were constantly added. As may be expected this expansion had been neither consistently planned nor consistent in its results.

The Museum and Exhibitions expert Commission of 1965

In museum and heritage policy, the dominant commission was the Museum and Exhibitions expert Commission of 1965 (MUS'65). This was not a product of the Palme era. Instead, it dated back to Ragnar Edenman, his predecessor as Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs. In accordance with the established norms, the Commission’s members were collected from the main actors of the field and it was led by Lennart Holm, the Director General of the National Board of Physical Planning and Building (Statens planverk).

The directives stated by the government in 1965 gave it the authority to investigate the status of museums and exhibitions. In 1967 Palme added heritage policy to the Commission’s responsibilities. None of these instructions, however, included any requests for a further discussion of the long-term objectives of government policies. Edenman had instead been content with requesting only instrumental suggestions on how to reach the goal he himself had supplied:

395 The following museums were mentioned in the national budget of 1971: Riksantikvarieämbetet och statens historiska museum (RAÄ with the Museum of National Antiquities, Stockholm), Nationalmuseum (the National Museum of Fine Arts, Stockholm), Livrustkammaren (the Royal Armoury, Stockholm), Naturhistoriska riksmuseet (the Swedish Museum of Natural History, Stockholm), Statens sjöhistoriska museum (the National Maritime Museum, Stockholm), Etnografiska museet (the Museum of Ethnography, Stockholm), Medelhairomuseet (the Museum of Mediterranean and Near Eastern Antiquities, Stockholm), Skoklosters slott (Skokloster Castle, Skokloster), Nordiska museet (the Nordic Museum, Stockholm), Tekniska museet (the Museum of Science and Technology, Stockholm), Skansen (Skansen Open-Air Museum, Stockholm), Föreningen Sveriges pressarkiv och presstmuseum (The Association of the Swedish Press Archive and Press Museum, Stockholm), Varbergs museum (Varberg Museum, Varberg), Hålbylska museet (the Halwyl Museum, Stockholm), Kulturhistoriska föreningen för södra Sverige (The Cultural Historical Association of Southern Sweden, Lund), Stiftelsen Dansmaskinsfonden (the Dance Museum Foundation, Stockholm), Stiftelsen Drottningholms teaterns museer (the Drottningholm Theater Museum Foundation, Stockholm), Stiftelsen Carl och Olga Milles Lidingöhem (the Carl and Olga Milles Foundation on Lidingö, near Stockholm), Stiftelsen Musikhistoriska museet (the Museum of Musical History Foundation) and Stiftelsen Thieliska galeriet (the Thid Gallery Foundation, Stockholm). The same budget included the following archives: Riksarkivet (the National Archives), Landsarkiven (Regional State Archives), dialek- och ortnamnarkivet (the Dialect and Place Name Archives), Stiftelsen Arbetarrörelsens arkiv (the Workers’ Movement Archive Foundation), Föreningen Sveriges pressarkiv och presstmuseum (the Association of the Swedish Press Archive and Press Museum), His Royal Majesty’s Bill 1971:1, Appendix 10.

396 SOU 1973:5: 3-4.
educating the people.\textsuperscript{397} The Commission itself reinterpreted its task by distinguishing two main functions for museums and exhibitions: (1) showing items to the public (either for the benefit of their education, or to produce aesthetic experiences) and (2) collecting and maintaining items for scientific purposes. Connecting these two functions was their mutual reliance on the collections of items held by the museums. The Commission concluded that by fulfilling these functions museums became “society’s memory”.\textsuperscript{398}

The Commission’s recommendations, however, remained true to its instructions. Few reforms were suggested regarding the established Swedish museums, and none relating to the structure of the sector as a whole. In the few cases when the Commission proposed changes, these were without exception to the benefit of professional autonomy. It proposed, for example, separating the Museum of National Antiquities from the RAÄ, as well as the National Museum of Modern Art from the National Museum of Fine Arts, the latter on account of the differences in assigned tasks between the two museums (at the time administratively one museum, although located in different buildings in Stockholm). The assumption of such a difference underlines the Commission’s assumption of a historical or archival role for museums, which makes the exhibition of modern art an exception. In this case the Commission, characteristically, also chose to respect the wishes of the personnel of the Museum of Modern Art and separated the differing parts from the ones that shared its opinions. The Museum of Eastern Asian Antiquities would, on the other hand, remain a part of the National Museum of Fine Arts, although it too was located in its own building. This was, however, a museum of mainly historical, albeit Eastern Asian, art and was thus more compatible with the Commission’s views of what a National Museum of Fine Arts should be. On the organisation of museums in general the Commission continued to emphasise autonomy. In line with its professionalising norms, the Commission proposed, furthermore, that museum staff should be represented on museum executive boards. In the cases mentioned of establishing

\textsuperscript{397} Minutes of the Council of State 26 of March 1965 and 17 March 1967 respectively, SOU 1972:45. Grundberg (2000) argues that heritage policy was added to the Commission’s responsibility because of the failure of the previous Antiquarian Commission (SOU 1965:10) to produce recommendations acceptable to the sector or the government. Grundberg suggests that its recommendations had been rejected because of their anachronistic conservatism and nationalism, which was, in his view, very different from the progressive approach to heritage environments taken by the Expert Commission. This seems, however, an exaggeration, especially as organisation was a central matter to the Antiquarian Commission and the Expert Commission’s suggestions for a new museum organisation had its centralism in common with its predecessor. From an institutionalist point of view, it seems much more reasonable to view the dispute as one of whether the Central Museums or a central heritage board (as proposed by the Antiquarian Commission) should be given authority over Swedish museums.

\textsuperscript{398} SOU 1973:5: 16.
new boards the museum directors were proposed to act as their chairmen. The Commission also proposed establishing a National Museums’ Board, to coordinate the activities of all State museums. This board should consist primarily of representatives of the Central Museums399 and could thus be expected to further strengthen the institutionalisation, integration and independence of the field, as well as the centralisation of power and authority within it.

The most detailed work of the Commission concerned exhibitions and geographical distribution. As the Commission itself took over the experimental activities of the National Travelling Exhibitions, the number of details supplied in the report is hardly surprising. This was also the work most in line with the general norms of the Culture Council. In 1967 these test activities were merged with the Association for Art in the School (Föreningen Konst i skolan) and The National Association for Educational Art (Riksförbundet för bildande konst) to create a new organisation: Swedish National Travelling Exhibitions (Riksutställningar, NTE), a separate association (and thus a legal person) organising touring exhibitions of both art and historical items. The Commission unsurprisingly concluded that its activities had been successful and that it should be allowed to continue its activities as an independent but government funded body. Its function appears to follow the standard set by the NTT and the NTC and it would later often be treated together with these. The activities of the NTE were, however, to be supervised by the Central Museums (The National Museums of National Antiquities, of Fine Arts etc.) and not be considered an alternative to the touring exhibition activities already conducted by these museums. Thus the Commission created “Central Museums” as a category to which it recommended a centralisation of research functions and authority. However, it did so without proposing any actual changes in their structure, possibly because it considered competence already located in these museums.400 “This solution would have strengthened museums and exhibitions as an integrated and separate professionalised field with its institutional centre in the Central Museums. By granting access to exhibitions controlled by the Central Museums to the whole of the country it would also have furthered the cultural integration of Sweden as a national community.

On the subject of regional distribution of cultural policy resources the Commission took up the question of the role of Counties Museums. Such museums already existed in different forms in most counties. The Commission proposed that they should be re-organised isomorphically and placed under the supervision of the Central Museums.401 It is thus clear that even –

399 SOU 1973:5.
400 SOU 1974:43.
401 SOU 1973:5: 204-220.
or perhaps especially – when proposing a broader geographical distribution of resources the Commission made it clear that the knowledge resources originated at the centre, and should be distributed outwards, never flowing in the other direction. It should also be held in mind that the monetary resources that were to be distributed were proposed as new funding, not funding taken from the Central Museums. The only exception from this tendency in the Commission’s recommendations was its agreement with the museum professionals in Gothenburg that the (at the time city-funded) museums of that city filled a similar role on the West Coast as did the Stockholm museums in the East, and that they should therefore be allowed state funding, thus indicating a less place-bound, and perhaps more urban-centred, distinction between centre and periphery.

The last of the Commission’s assignments – and the first one to be finished – was the one concerning the preservation of the cultural heritage or, to put it more precisely, of culturally relevant buildings and antiquities. The main reason for Minister Edenman to add this new field to the Commission’s area of responsibility appears to have been that the recommendations of the previous Antiquarian Commission had been rejected by the field when they were circulated for consideration. Authority in this field lay with the RAÄ. On the regional level, it remained, however, with the institution of provincial antiquarians tied to provincial museums, regardless of whether these were NGOs, foundations or publicly managed. At the same time both the Commission and the Minister had observed that public interest in these issues was growing and could be expected to continue to grow with the increased interest in environmental issues. This observation is interesting as it is contradicted the overviews of cultural debate made by the Culture Council.

Heritage preservation would, according to the Commission, have to be more integrated into public planning. This required a new and more consistent organisation. The regional agents of the State were at the time the Regional Antiquarians (Landsantikvarier). These were, however, the employees of County Museums (even when these were organised as foundations or associations) and delegated this authority by the RAÄ. To integrate them within the Weberian norm the Commission proposed that they should be transferred to the County Administrative Boards (responsible for regional planning) to become the heads of cultural heritage divisions in these. The RAÄ would at the same time become responsible for coordinating heritage policy in the entire country. Heritage protection could thus be integrated with planning without the creation of any new agencies. This would also strengthen both professional and central authority, although it would do so at the expense of the

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county museums. It did, however, clarify the separate responsibilities of the Central Museums and the RAÄ. It would thus contribute to separating the heritage filed from the museums and be a step towards the establishment of heritage and museums as more strongly integrated separate fields.404

In its arguments for a continued heritage policy (never requested in the directives) the Commission tried to legitimise it by integrating it with the norm system that was expressed by the Culture Council. Heritage was thus included in a more holistic view of cultural environments which was described as important to human wellbeing. It is, however, revealing that it did so not only by stating that cultural heritage preservation had to be seen as a part of the planning of the human environment, but that it continued by emphasising the importance of stable points of reference and collective memory to identity and quality of life.405 This indicates a more primordial view of identity than that of the Culture Council’s. This norm system was alone in cultural policy to use a concept of identity, both local and national, that only looked backwards. To this Commission, identity could only come from history.

Treatment by the Government

Although a few years older than the Culture Council, the MUS’65 found its reports placed in the same context as those of the Council and its contemporary commissions, i.e. in a much broader context than it could have originally expected. In spite of this, the Ministry found it best to coordinate the circulation of the Commission’s reports with those of the other Commissions and to include, in 1974, the results of these procedures in the same general government bill on cultural policy. Most of the Museum and Exhibition Experts Commission’s proposals met with a positive response, with a few more or less significant exceptions. Among the more significant of these was the Culture Council itself, which along with the Office of the Chancellor of the Swedish Universities (Universitetskanslersämbetet) and others (all sector-external actors) considered the recommendations of the Commission not integrated enough with the rest of cultural policy (as envisioned by the Council).406

Several in-sector actors, such as the RAÄ (with the Museum of National Antiquities), and the Nordic Museum, on the other hand, criticised the Council’s own Preservation Objective for assigning too passive a role to the museums. Instead, they proposed altered formulations stressing the importance of making historical culture come to life. The RAÄ even proposed that this objective should be replaced with a similar objective described as “the Identification Objective” (identifikationsmålet) in order to emphasise the importance

404 SOU 1972:45.
405 SOU 1972:45.
of identifying with history. In this context the LO stressed the importance of preserving not only the culture of the upper classes but of the people as a whole.407 Finally, representatives of the artistic field agreed with the opinions of the responding museums: both the MUS’65 and the Council had underestimated their connection with the rest of society. Here the gaze was, however, fixed on artistic and societal renewal – not on history.408

The consensus around the propositions of the Commission in the heritage field, as well as in the museum field was according to the government, significant. No one seems to have considered disagreement with its views of preservation as built on environmental concerns and identity to be an important issue. What proved controversial to the referee opinion was instead the Commission’s proposed reorganisation of the power structure of Swedish heritage policy. With the exception of the RAÄ (with the Museum of National Antiquities) and a few of the other referees, consensus supported what was described as a decentralisation of decision-making power from the RAÄ to the County Administrative Boards. The RAÄ, however, did not agree with this opinion, protesting that the County Administrative Boards did not have the necessary expertise. It also claimed that heritage law existed for the protection of national interests and that such interests were best served by a national agency. Other in-sector respondents worried that the new system would damage the close relationship between the various branches of regional heritage expertise currently embodied in Regional Antiquarians working within County Museums but at the same time acting as regional agents of the RAÄ.409

On the subject of museum decentralisation, consensus was again with the Commission. Most, if not all, referees agreed with the need for more financial resources to museums and exhibitions outside the capital.410 Among the few negative voices was the National Museum of Fine Arts, which doubted that the Central Museums had the financial resources necessary for their new role in relation to the County Museums and the NTE. On the subject of the organisation of Central Museums, the SAFAD (the Swedish Agency for Administrative Development), however, criticised the tendency in the Commission’s recommendations to needlessly separate museums into different government agencies and thereby risking cost increases due to needlessly doubled administration. Instead, and to cut costs, it proposed that all or most Central Museums should be merged into one single government agency, retaining their independence only when regarding the substance of their

operations. For this reason, and with reference to other synergetic effects, the RAÄ also opposed its separation from the Museum of National Antiquities.411

In his comments in the Culture Bill the Minister, as usual, tried to argue his points as though he was voicing a consensus. Thus he agreed with the Commission’s and the referee opinion’s general wishes regarding such issues as the importance of decentralism under the leadership of Central Museums, of the maintenance of the activities of the NTE and of strengthening County Museums, as well as with the general ideologies of the reports. Nearly all of the reforms proposed by the Commission were included in the government bill. He integrated the Commission’s view of cultural environments with the more general norms of the Council. At the same time he maintained, however, the Commission’s and the in-sector referees’ statements on the importance of identity and heritage. The Bill remained relatively close to the recommendations of the Commission on administrative issues as well. On many issues it did not, however, go as far as the Commission had recommended. Although the Minister professed agreement with the SAFAD on the general principle that a museum could remain independent in relation to the contents of its activities even within the framework of a larger government agency, he did not make any indications of a need for any major reform of the public museum organisation. Instead, he used this as a reason for not approving of the National Museum of Modern Art as a separate government agency. It is interesting to note that such considerations never came into his argument concerning the Museum of National Antiquities and that he instead agreed with the Commission on that the differences between this museum and the Heritage Board being great enough to warrant a separation between them.412

Neither did he agree with the Heritage Board in its concern for the problems that could result from the re-organisation of regional heritage administration. Instead, he considered corporatism (in the sense of including association-owned County Museums as instruments of government policy) inappropriate in this sector, while at the same time strengthening it in the exhibition field (through the role given to NTE). In spite of this the County Museums would continue to exist in their present form headed by Regional Antiquarians. These would, however, lose their function as regional representatives of the RAÄ. As suggested by the Commission the authority that they had enjoyed as such would be transferred to the County Administrative Boards. There would be no new divisions, but each County Administrative Boards would receive funding to employ at least one new official who would take up these responsibilities. This official would be termed the County Antiquarian (länsantikvarie). The Minister had thus not only nationalised a pre-

viously corporative authority but also strengthened the institutional border between the museum sector and the heritage sector. Finally, he agreed with the Commission that a central supervising Museum Authority (not to be confused with the administrating authority recommended by the SAFAD) had to be created. Minister Zachrisson, however, did not go in line with their suggestions on this issue but proposed instead, following the Council, that this role should be taken up by KUR. Thus the Commission’s ambitions for the independence of its own field were somewhat thwarted for the benefit of the Culture Council’s ambitions for the centralisation of power and authority in the cultural policy field as a whole. The museum field remained, however, in most ways independent of this larger field.

Reception in the Riksdag

When the Culture Bill was accepted by the Riksdag, the parties of the opposition were in general agreement with it on museum and heritage issues as on so many other issues. Criticism issued during the period was also often responded to with references to measures already taken or planned in the suggested direction. One example of this is the Liberal bill that argued for considering the museums of Gothenburg a national responsibility, a suggestion that the government was already working on. Many opposition bills – as well as most of the private bills delivered by Social Democratic members of the Riksdag – concerned activities in their home districts. Examples of this tendency are the Liberal bills to the benefit of renovating the early medieval environment at Eketorp (on Öland) and the bill submitted by a Centrist and a Social Democrat in favour of special funding for heritage activities on Gotland. Many of these issues transcended party lines, although they seldom found broader support in the Riksdag.

Even in this sector there was, however, some disagreement. The least supported heritage proposition in the Bill of 1974 was reforming the system of Regional Antiquarians, which was opposed as being too centralistic by all three centre-right parties. They argued instead for retaining the existing system; the Moderates even argued for a decentralisation of cultural heritage deci-

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413 His Royal Majesty’s Bill 1974:28: 339-356. The issue of the organisation of the Central Museums of history and art was to get its final solution in 1976 when the Riksdag by approving Government Bill 1975/76:135 collected the National Museum of Fine Arts, the Modern Art Museum and the Eastern Asian Museum as separately led museum-units under one board in the new government agency of the National Museums of Art, and at the same time the RAA, the National Museum of History, the Mediterranean Museum and the Royal Coin Collection as separately led museum-units within another government agency. This proposal was the result of continued investigation within the Museum and Exhibition experts Commission and within SAFAD, Ds U 1975:16, Government Bill 1975/76:135.

sions to the county councils. The Moderate and Liberal parties argued furthermore for a support system for County Museums based on the same lines as those proposed for theatre, dance, and music establishments. Both parties had supported the heritage sector in budget negotiations during the period as well. Moderates, for example, argued for increased acquisition funding for the National Archives. Moderates, Liberals and representatives of the VPK all supported the National Museum of Ethnography and pointed to its need of a new building. Concerning national exhibition activities the Moderates and Liberals took the side of the artists as a group whose independence (as a group) ought to be strengthened. The VPK also expressed concern for their economic and social situation.\textsuperscript{415} All other parties, especially the centre-right, thus opposed the centralism argued for by the government. Especially the Moderates, but to some extent the entire centre-right opposition, were also more favourable to prioritising museums and heritage values above other cultural policy.

**Church and Religion Policy**

In the early 1970s the Church was still ruled according to the compromises that had been institutionalised in the mid and early twentieth century. The Church of Sweden was thus a rather odd combination of a government agency, an association based on (passive) voluntary membership and the status of parishes as clerical municipalities.\textsuperscript{416} The Church thus remained institutionally entangled with the State at the same time as its self-conception proved contrary to the secularist Social Democratic vision of that state. Around 1970 Engberg’s old convictions regained actuality with Alva Myrdal.


\textsuperscript{416} A National Synod consisting of the 13 bishops, 26 representatives of the clergy and 57 representatives of the laity furthermore retained its share of the legislative power, while the Government retained the age-old Royal right to appoint bishops (including the Archbishop), members of Cathedral Chapters (the ruling councils of the dioceses) and several other high offices of the Church. Parish priests were in turn appointed by the bishops. The Church Fund (a central fund used to equalise parish economies) was administered by SAFAD, while the parishes, as clerical municipalities, retained the right to tax all persons within their territories, including legal judicial persons and non-members. Parishioners (Church members living in the parish), on the other hand, had the right to elect the vestry (\textit{kyrkofullmäktige}), which in turn elected the Church Council (\textit{kyrkorådet}, the ruling council of a parish). This council together with the clergy in some dioceses appointed a Diocese Assembly (\textit{stiftning}) and through this a Diocese Council (a coordinating body within each diocese). Vestry elections were (and still are) conducted according to the same procedure as municipal elections, with the result that vestries largely consisted (and still consists) of representatives of the national political parties, SOU 1972:36:201-203, in the English summary.
In position A the Commission has included reforms that do not change the fundamental relationship between the State and the Church. [...] This means, among other things, that the Church's religious activities will be regulated in a way similar to the present, and that taxation rights will be maintained and that access to Church lands will be left untouched. [...] In position D the Commission has presumed that the Church should be free, organisationally, as well as in other ways, without taxation rights and without access to Church lands. [...] In the C and B positions the Church is presumed, in principle, to be organisationally released from the State. The positions are initially separated with regard to economic matters. This may, however, have consequences in other areas, like government supervision and control. In position B the Church is presumed to retain some rights to taxation, or at least a simplified form of collection of membership fees with the help of government agencies. The Church is, furthermore, presumed to retain the right to Church lands and other Church property. For the C position the Commission presumes that the Church, as in the B position, retains the right to Church property. It is, on the other hand, presumed here, contrary to in the B position, that government cooperation in collection of membership fees is not retained.419

Of these alternatives Palme (as the Minister responsible) expressed a clear preference for the A and C positions, as the inclusion of a “rights to taxation of its members” and “access to Church lands” in the B position would make the Church too dependent on the State, and, at the same time, privileged in relation to other denominations. The D position would, on the other hand, be contrary to the “spirit of tolerance and generosity” that should mark the separation of Church and State.419 The remaining alternatives meant a choice between independence without much resources or continued subservience to the State together with continued access to its economic resources. This implied a resurrection of the Engbergian view of Church property and lands (see p. 96). The importance assigned to this Commission by the government was emphasised by the appointment of Alva Myrdal to lead it. She was at this time both a consultative member of the government (responsible for Church aff-

417 Minutes of the Council of State 28 June 1968.
418 SOU 1968:11:22.
airs among other things), and a major figure in the Social Democratic Party. Bertil Zachrisson was also later appointed member of this Commission. Other commissioners were members of the Riksdag from the Liberal, Centre and Social Democratic parties (including future Minister Lena Hjelm-Wallén). Among the experts employed by the Commission were representatives from the Church of Sweden and other denominations as well as academic experts on Law and the Sociology of Religion. The academic disciplines of Comparative Religion and Theology, on the other hand, remained unrepresented, as did the non-Christian denominations. The Commission considered a further separation of Church and State a necessary consequence of the freedom of religion established in 1952: the Church of Sweden should be a denomination like and its connection to the State severed.420

Consequently, the Commission recommended a total separation of Church and State, close to alternative C, and continued by elaborating a detailed timetable culminating in a final separation, recommended to take place in 1983. Until that time a system of provisional regulations was to be issued. The Church was, for example, to receive help from public authorities in levying membership fees. As this timeline was never to be approved, the most interesting feature of the Commission’s report was, however, its proposed boundaries between the secular and religious parts of society. These two spheres were considered obviously, essentially and conceptually distinct from each other. The views of Boström (and the later Engberg) on the Church as part of the State were thus thoroughly rejected in favour of a purely secular view of the State. Secondly, it considered religious freedom – both positive and negative – as well as a clear separation of Church and State to be fundamental features of a modern society. From the Commission’s perspective a system designed to privilege one denomination before others would thus be a clear break with the modern society that Sweden had become in the last decades. The existing compromise was, in other words, rejected as un- or pre-modern. On the other hand, it did not consider the present arrangement to be for the good of the Church either; the heavy legal regulation that was put on the Church by the State Church system was a restriction of its freedom of religion. Matters of faith were clearly not matters for the State but for the various denominations and ultimately for the individual citizens.421 The Commission was, in other words, firmly convinced not only that Sweden was a state-framed, secular, and modern nation, but also that it had become so as recently as

420 SOU 1972:36:3-6, Ekström 2003: 107-110, where he notes that all members of the Commission had experience of working with or inside either the Church of Sweden or a non-conformist church. The one exception was Lena Hjelm-Wallén, who had, according to Palme, been appointed to represent the indifferent, Ekström 2003: 108, ref. to interview with Hjelm-Wallén.
in the early post-war years. It is thus a clear continuation of the discontinuous tradition of history-writing within the Social Democratic Party.422

According to the Commission, the organisational border between Church and State should follow its conception of a natural divide between secular and religious matters. Most of the secular duties of the Church had been removed in the late nineteenth century. Of the few remaining ones, only two were seen as essentially in need of transference to the State: national registration and the responsibility for burials and burial grounds. In the first case the registration and keeping of records was to be transferred to the local tax offices. The same solution was recommended for the authority of approval connected with the Name Law, as well as the investigation of impediments required by marriage legislation. In the case of burials and of burial grounds, this responsibility should be transferred to the municipalities. These would also be expected to provide for secular burials for persons not wanting the religious ones, a practice that was suggested as analogous to the civil marriage ceremonies already provided by public officials. Apart from this, the Commission, however, abstained from giving any reason for considering the provision of burial services and grounds to be a matter for the secular authorities rather than for the Church. We are simply left to conclude that the State’s responsibility to provide for the needs of every citizen from cradle to grave was to be taken quite literally. Such an interpretation is also strengthened by the Commission’s discussion of the social care services provided by the Church – such as helping the poor and offering marriage counselling – activities that could be handled by the Church, but only as long as the secular authorities fulfilled their responsibilities by providing religiously neutral alternatives.423

The need for the removal of religious duties from the State appears to have been considered much smaller than the need to remove secular duties from the Church. A few changes on the symbolic level were, however, recommended:

422 Matters concerning the Church of Sweden were to some extent also dealt with by the Culture Council and the MUS’65. It is clear, however, that neither of these two commissions considered church policy a part of cultural policy. Instead, the Church of Sweden was discussed mainly when relating to its extensive musical activities and its ownership of a large number of historically important buildings. In both of these matters the commissions seems to have been determined to treat the Church as any other independent organisation. Apart from that, matters of religion were never mentioned by these two commissions, or, for that matter, by any other of the government commissions working within the cultural sector. Although the issue of the relationship between the Church and the State was never mentioned by these commissions (SOU 1972:66, for example p. 333 on choirs, SOU 1972:45), this was an indication as good as any of a decidedly secularist view of the nation, something that would also go well in hand with the generally civil and secular perspective of the Culture Council.
We endorse the proposal of the Drafting Committee on the Constitution not to retain regulations on the Parliamentary sermon. The stipulations on divine services for judicial procedures should also be revoked, and the regulations on affirmation as an alternative to the oath reworded to indicate clearly that the two alternatives carry equal weight.\textsuperscript{424}

Also mentioned was the requirement in the Act of Succession that the monarch should be of the Pure Evangelical Faith. No recommendations were, however, made on this point, and the matter was consequently left for the Drafting Committee.\textsuperscript{425} The State would continue to give economic grants to denominations, but only on an ecumenical foundation. Existing subsidies for the Church would thus be added to a general pot. The Commission explicitly considered equalising all denominations to be a primary goal. This goal would not only require a reorganisation of the Church of Sweden (at the time including about 98\%\textsuperscript{426} of the Swedish population), but also a reformation of the State’s relationship to Immigrant Churches (a relationship handled by the Immigrant Division at the Ministry of Employment rather than by the Church Division at the Ministry of Education). However, this was apparently not an issue it considered within its responsibility to elaborate upon any further. Neither did it even mention any denominations outside of the Judeo-Christian group.\textsuperscript{427} Despite its choice of name for the final report (“Society and Denominations” rather than “State and Church”) the Commission thus ironically accepted, at least in practice, the prevalent view of Sweden as a Christian country, even if it should be made a secular Christian country.

\textit{The Separation of Church and State is Rejected}

The response finally received by the State and Church Commission when its final report was referred to various instances for consideration has been described as a storm of protest. Some answers, including those of several of the larger Nonconformist churches, the Swedish Association of Municipalities and organisations connected with the Moderate and Centre parties, as well as to the Church of Sweden, declared themselves to be basically in favour of a


\textsuperscript{426} SOU: 1970:2: 19. The Commission lists the membership of “other religious communities” in 1969 as follows: Svenska Alliansmissionen 13 800, Evangeliska Fosterlands-Stiftelsen 28 600, Svenska Missionsförbundet 87 900, Fri baptistförrbundet (Baptists) 1 300, Helgelseförbundet 4 800, Sjundaydays-Adventistförrbundet (Seventh Day Adventists) 3 300, Svenska Baptistsamfundet (Baptists) 26 700, Pingströrelsen (Pentecostals) 90 000, Örebromissionen 19 500, Frälsningsarmén (Salvation Army) 37 700, Svenska Frälsningsarmén (Salvation Army) 1 900, Metodistkyrkan i Sverige (Methodists) 8 900, Catholic Church 53 800, Orthodox parishes 15 000, Mosaic congregations 15 000 (Finnish-language Protestant parish-work, within the Church of Sweden 45 000), SOU 1972:38: 9.

\textsuperscript{427} SOU: 1972:36.
separation of Church and State. Nonetheless, they found the terms recommended by the Commission too unfavourable for the Church. The Centrist representative in the Commission had already stated his difference of opinion. In the final report he had argued that the reform endangered the financial means for the Church to continue its work in the whole of the country. At the same time he wanted this to remain its legal responsibility. As can be noted from many of the answers from Moderate and Centrist organisations, there was in fact little support for a separation of Church and State in these parties. They were supported in this by the Christian Democrats (then a small party that still had a long way to reach a seat in the Riksdag). There was even a protest meeting of Church politicians in Malmö under the leadership of a Social Democrat. In most cases, the criticism was related to the financial problems expected by the Church, often arguing for a permanent help from public authorities in collecting Church taxes or fees. The Commission separated these negative answers into two categories: one entirely opposed to a separation of Church and State, and one opposed merely to the present proposal. The first group included such significant institutions as the Archbishop, the priests’ trade union, the National Committee of Diocese Assemblies and Diocese Councils and the Christian Democratic Party. The second group included, among others, the national association for church musicians and the Cathedral Chapter of the Archdiocese of Uppsala. Both groups included a large number of parishes and Nonconformist congregations. Finally, most government agencies and commissions (including the RAÄ and the MUS’65) declined giving an opinion on the Church and State issue itself.428

Behind the economic concerns in many of these answers lay a very specific view of the Church as an institution of a different kind than the other denominations. A great number of answers from within the Church – but also from several government agencies – referred to the Church of Sweden as a Folk Church. The Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency (kammarkollegiet) defined a Folk Church as a church which does not make “requirements on the religious positions of those who in various ways seek the services of the church.” As such the national Church distinguished itself from other religious denominations by not being an association of believers but instead an institution based on belief offering its services openly to “everyone”, i.e. to the inhabitants of the state-framed nation, although only membership in the ethnic nation would grant automatic membership (which followed with citizenship). It has to be stated that this description of the Church of Sweden was shared not only by the Commission’s critics, but also by the Commission itself. It did, however, not consider this status as threaten-

ed as its critics did, and perhaps neither as important in relation to the freedom of religion. No one, however, openly opposed the principle of a Church for the national folk.429

Among the few respondents to support the recommendations of the Commission were several Nonconformist and Immigrant Churches, as well as the Immigrant Commission, the National Immigrant Authority and organisations related to the Liberal Party. Significantly more space was in fact spent on issues relating to immigrants and the so-called Immigrant Churches in the report dealing with answers to the proposal, than on the proposal itself. The arguments relating to immigrants are also of special concern to this study. In March 1973 the distinction between Immigrant Churches and other denominations had been thoroughly rejected by a conference of Immigrant Churches. They stressed the place of non-Christian denominations in the country and that any denomination that began as an Immigrant Church could be expected to become more and more Swedish over time (as its members were integrated into Swedish society which would thus not necessarily mean a change of religion). The Immigrant Commission, on the other hand (albeit in another context), used religious denominations as a good example of an identity-based organisation, when it argued for permanent support of immigrant associations focusing on cultural activities rather than on common interests as immigrants, something that it believed would become typical when immigrants had been integrated into Swedish society.430 It was thus expected that immigrants would continue to exist as ethno-cultural groups (in this case ethno-religious, in a particularistic sense) even after their integration into the Swedish state-framed nation.

Worth mentioning are also those of the respondents who opposed the reform as a threat to Christian values. No major actor belonged to this group, although several municipalities and parishes did, as did a few of the dioceses, as is illustrated by the response from the Parish of Linköping:431

The two entities The Church of Sweden and Society […] have been tied to each other for centuries with very strong bonds. It would be highly unfortunate if these, soon to be millennium-old, ties were to be severed.432

The protesters generally argued that freedom of religion had been achieved in 1951 (i.e. that negative freedom was enough). Only seldom were arguments

429 SOU 1974:9, quote from p. 32.
430 SOU 1974:9, p. 29-30 on the expected development of Immigrant Churches. The distinction between Immigrant and other Nonconformist churches was also used in regulations for state subsidies for religious communities, and in connection with Immigrant Churches receiving significantly less subsidies per member than their counterparts, Gärde 1999: 83-88, Borevi 2002: 145.
presented for why the problems the Church would face, if it was further separated from the State, were the State’s problem. When arguments were given, they were generally ethnic in nature, referring to the bonds between the Church and the State, but primarily to those between the Church and the people. In this the folk of the Folk Church was manifestly not reducible to the body of citizens. It is not surprising, in this context, that the government at this point considered it impossible to reach a consensus among all the parties involved about a programme for the separation of Church and State. Not only consensus politics demanded a wide support for such a reform, but also the Synod’s privilege of veto, still guaranteed by the Constitution. In 1973 the government decided to postpone all plans in this direction. Answers to the Commission’s recommendations were, however, published in the form of SOU 1974:9, in order to help prepare for partial reforms.433

**Biblical Policy**

The complexity of the State’s view of secularisation is illustrated by the fact that while the State and Church debate was going strong, it ordered a new Swedish translation of the Bible. This was apparently considered an obvious responsibility of the government. The latest translation had been presented to the King in 1917 and it was thus, according to all sources, high time to start discussing a new one. After looking into the matter the government decided to create a Bible Commission to translate the New Testament. After further investigation by the Bible Committee of 1971 its assignment was amended to include the translation of the entire Bible, including the Apocrypha. This translation would not only be for the benefit of the Church however; instead a vide variety of other groups were mentioned in the instruction, as, for example, Nonconformist congregations, schools and private readers. The government also stated that434

> the language of the new translation is to be formed in such a manner as to make available the contents of the text for a contemporary normally schooled adult reader, possessing stylistic properties that that answer to this primary demand, the stylistic properties of the original [etc.] A translation according to the principles I have recommended should be possible to make in a manner that can be accepted by the Christian denominations and other groups in need of a translation. In this way the translation can achieve the status of main text within the Swedish language area.435

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433 SOU 1975:9: 3, Ekström 2003: 116-121, referring to the press release made by the government on Mars 21, 1973. Based on interviews with Thage G. Peterson, he also suggests that the forthcoming election of 1976 was a reason for Palme to avoid controversial changes in the relationship between the Church and the State.


435 Minutes of the Council of State 1 December 1972.
To achieve this widely usable translations a great variety of experts were included in, or at least engaged by, the Bible Commission. This meant that representatives of the Riksdag parties, of schools and of various Swedish denominations were included in the Commission, together with writers and theological scholars, to ensure that all relevant voices were heard. This was in other words a project not only for the Church of Sweden, or even for believing Christians, but instead a matter for the whole nation, as defined by its common language and cultural history. Immigrant Churches were, however, excluded without comment, as were Jews and Muslims. This gives an interesting example of an ethnic concept of the nation that combined religious and linguistic markers with a particularistic view of religion.

Religion in the Riksdag

Opinions in the Riksdag on religious matters were at this time at a near constant consensus, at least on the matters that actually reached the Riksdag. A few bills from single members in the Moderate group indicate a slightly more traditional outlook than the general, which confirms the impression that it would have defended the State Church, had the matter reached the Riksdag. Bills were submitted for, among other things, government action to promote the celebration of “traditional holidays”. The one major cause of disagreement was the State’s relationship to the Nonconformist Christian churches. Several private bills relating to this were submitted every year by various – mostly centre-right – members. Such bills might concern everything from spiritual care for Nonconformist patients in public hospitals to the education of church musicians for Nonconformist congregations. Another series of bills proposed that priests in the Church of Sweden should be allowed to celebrate Mass together with Nonconformists. All of these bills were voted down by a Riksdag referring to the need to wait for the recommendations of the State and Church Commission. In 1973, however, a rare alliance consisting of the centre-right parties and a few Social Democrats managed to get an increase in State grants for the Nonconformist Christian denominations. Interestingly, the top name on the relevant Social Democratic bill (like most of the members behind the single-member bills mentioned above) was one of the members of the official Christian group of the Riksdag, a trans-party semi-formal group that appears to have been very active – if only seldom successful – in this sector of politics.

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437 Motion 1973:84.
439 Motion 1971:825.
440 Motion 1973:1256.
Several views of the relationship and identity of the Swedish Church, nation and State can thus be found in the Church politics of this period. First, the modern secularist views of the State were represented in the State and Church Commission. Secondly, one can note the ethno-linguistic opinion present in the instructions given to the Bible Commission, in which the Bible was considered part of a Swedish cultural heritage from which Immigrant Churches and non-Christians were excluded, while Swedish atheists were included (which was presumably the reason why it was possible to combine this view with a belief in the secular state). Thirdly, the idea of a Folk Church based both on common history and common faith was commonly retained as a parallel to the conception of a secular state. Thus the nation could exist simultaneously as a modern secular community represented by the State and as a Church based on belief but with “no requirements […] on the religious positions” institutionalising the cultural religion of an ethnically defined nation.442

CONCLUSION: UNIVERSALISTIC STATE-FRAMED INTEGRATION

Institutional Integration

The story of Swedish cultural policy does not start with the Culture Council. Sweden not only had a cultural policy before its time, but most of the institutions and actors of the cultural sector already existed as well. Even the sub-fields existed. The Council, however, made important contributions to institutionalising cultural policy as such as a field. Many of the sub-fields were also investigated by smaller and more specialised government commissions. The Culture Council, however, took an overall responsibility to formulate objectives for all of them (with the exception of Church policy). As a result all these fields were integrated into one general field of cultural policy. It appears that this integration was supported by the more general standard of sector organisation in the Swedish public sector. Sectors were supposed to include both State and municipal activities under the coordination of a government agency and a ministry (which the Council proposed without success). The result was, however, integration in a degree that was both limited and varied. It was the artistic fields that became the core of the new cultural policy field. Even the integration of the various arts, however, came with recognition of their already established organisations, as well as of the general norm of differentiating between form and content, according to which politicians or bureaucrats could never influence content directly. The choice of what art and what artists that should be subsidised would thus continue to be left to the representatives of recognised artist organisations and artistic leaders of establishments such as theatres and orchestras.

442 Demerath 2000.
The main instrument for integrating cultural policy to create a unified organisational field was the new government agency that would supervise it: the National Council for Cultural Affairs (KUR). This agency, however, followed the already legitimised organisational concepts used for literary subsidies. Its new subsidies for “picture and form artists”, “film and scene artists” and “tone artists” all followed this model with only a few changes. Compared to literature subsidies these were, however, formulated in a way that made it clear that this was a matter of subsidies, not of compensation. This was actually the Council’s opinion of literature subsidies as well, and these were consequently now submitted to the integrating bureaucratic power of KUR. Increased isomorphism could thus be achieved as well as a compromise between the authority-based autonomy of the artistic fields and the demands for bureaucratic and political coordination.

Outside of art policy KUR authority was even less clear, which was perhaps why the Culture Council had proposed a Ministry of Culture as well. This was an authority the government did not award. Heritage, media, and folkbildning policy were all included in cultural policy. All of these, however, had central actors (the RAÄ, Swedish Radio and the folkbildning associations respectively) and these remained outside of KUR’s control. Its authority thus came with very limited power. This is, however, not to say that heritage policy remained unchanged at this time or that isomorphism with the general cultural policy field did not increase. Although it did not always conform to the general outlook of the Culture Council, MUS’65 shared its aim to conform its field to Weberian organisational norms. Thus it recommended the integration of the Regional Antiquarians into the County Administrative Boards and the homogenisation of the County Museum organisation. Although its success with regard to these issues was only partial isomorphism was increased and the borders of the field further institutionalised as coinciding with those of the State was. Other changes implied the clarification of sectoral borders between heritage and art.

Throughout this process the government and its commissions generally managed to achieve consensus with the political parties of the opposition. Moderates to some extent argued for increasing the support of the heritage sector and against worker movement-related organisations such as the NTT. Liberals and VPK representatives, on the other hand, argued for increased support for artists. Most oppositional bills originated, however, from single members or trans-party coalitions representing regions or cities. These motions were generally rejected. They were also marginal in relation to the consensus that existed about the general organisation of cultural policy. To a large extent this was a consensus around existing institutions. This is not to say that it did not result in change. Although the Culture Council presented
most of its arguments with reference to already established authorities, seemingly from all relevant sides, it did institutionalise both the organisational field of cultural policy and the sub-field of general cultural policy. Its main goal, apart from preserving existing cultural institutions, was to increase public access to them. Its main means to that end was increasing isomorphism between the geographical parts of Sweden by using both the authority and the economic resources of the State. While its success outside of the cultural policy of the State is not studied here, it is clear that it both expanded and integrated the organisation of Swedish cultural policy.

In strong contrast to this stood Church policy, yet the need for political consensus on Church policy was even higher. The State and Church Commission was thus, unlike the Culture Council, composed of representatives of the Riksdag parties. Yet, it failed to achieve consensus. The problem appears to have been that Alva Myrdal and the government aimed to separate Church and State. These were, however, heavily intertwined and the Commission chose to hold on to the conceptual border it had inherited from Arthur Engberg and that was strongly to the State’s advantage. At the same time the Church and its political allies worried that it would not have the financial resources that would be needed for it to remain national. Consensus could thus not be achieved, and the Church remained a part of the State. Like most commissions active in cultural policy at the time the State and Church Commission had been created by Olof Palme. This is not to say that its opinions were only a product of his initiative, nor were those of the other com. The work of the State and Church Commission instead continued where the earlier commissions had ended and the Culture Council was both closely connected to the Ministry and aided by a secretariat largely com of Edenman’s advisors. Both could thus be expected to follow already established norms.

Yet, the number of reforms that were started in all sectors under the authority of the Ministry of Education during Palme’s brief period as its head indicates a personal accomplishment. In all of these sectors these commissions worked for the increased integration of the State as a field with clearer internal and external borders and a more centralised organisation. The willingness to use coercion to create isomorphism was, however, much lower under Zachrisson than it had been under Palme. This may be a main reason why the programmes presented in his time did not change cultural policy more thoroughly. If the Film Commission’s idea of creating a network of public cinemas had been realised, the film field would, for example, have been re-organised to follow culturally integrative civil state-framed norms in a public organisation instead of remaining in the hands of an aestheticist somewhat ethno-linguistically motivated quasi-governmental foundation. It could be argued
that the sector of higher education was changed in this way.\textsuperscript{443} The government, however, chose not to use, for example, economic power to create new institutions in the cultural sector with the help of an increased budget to the extent advocated by the commissions. Thus much cultural policy remained relatively unchanged. This was a period when most organisational changes in cultural policy were initiated by the government.

\textit{The Concept of the Nation}

It is easy to conclude that both the government and the Culture Council used their institutionally integrative cultural policy to continue to integrate the Swedes into a nation that was defined by the State as a geographical and institutional entity. It was thus not only this entity that should be integrated; it was the cultural community of its citizens as well. This integration was, however, seldom explicitly connected with any concept of the Swedes as an ethnic community. Instead it was formulated as granting access to culture to disadvantaged groups. These groups were defined primarily in terms of class, education, and residence (although considerations for residence were formulated as a separate objective). It is within this given institutional context that this policy is revealed as national integration: the culture that the people were encouraged to take part of was defined by national organisations, such as the SFI, the NTT, the NTE, the NTC, and the Authors’ Fund and so on.

Looking at Church policy reveals that this state-framed concept of the nation implied that the State should be secular in the sense of having no ties to a specific Church. The State was legitimised by providing aesthetic values to its inhabitants, supporting them in civic activities and protecting their religious freedom. That the separation of Church and State failed at this point was not the consequence of any opposition to the concept of a secular State (such opposition existed but was very weak) but rather of an organisational argument on where to draw the line between the Church and the State, an argument in which Olof Palme and Alva Myrdal stood for a large State and a Church with a relatively marginal role in society. This opinion was in no way opposed to the view of the State represented by the Culture Council: a centralistic view of the public sector and a belief that the State had a central responsibility for the cultural life of society. Society (as the word was used by the Culture Council) is in fact close to synonymous with the state-framed nation. From this perspective the State could have used the Church (as once envisioned by Engberg), or it would have to consider it a competitor as a centre of cultural life. This competition would, however, have been one of values, rather than of the limits of the national community.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{443} Trow 1993}
Looking closer at various parts of cultural policy reveals other concepts of the nation. Language is evident as a defining factor for several of the art grants systems. It was sometimes mentioned that cultural policy should protect the Swedish language. Its importance becomes even more evident when one looks at the institutional arrangements of literature and film policy; both using the Swedish language as a main criterion for subsidies. In the case of literature, it was in fact taken for granted that Finland-Swedish literature should be supported by the Swedish state. Yet, the arguments that were occasionally given for protecting the Swedish language were not ethnical but related instead to the need for a common language in a society, especially for high and qualitative political participation. These arguments followed state-framed – not ethnic – concepts of the nation and the consequence for minorities was thus assimilation, rather than exclusion. These combinations of norms of how to describe the nation appear to have been defined in the formative moments of these organisations and fields.

Heritage and museum policy was guided by a different concept of the nation than the Council; one that allowed the collection of items which could show the history of the Swedish people hundreds or even thousands of years back. In the Central Museums there was in fact a dominance of the history of the people over that of the State, and often even before its establishment as exemplified by a museum of history – or “national antiquities” – that displays Swedish history before 1523. Such a concept is decidedly ethnic. This concept was also present in Church policy in arguments in favour of the Church based on the view that responsibility for heritage was its legitimate role and that this role was legitimate for the State to support. Although it was different from the dominant state-framed concepts, this ethnic definition of the nation shared its emphasis on the people and on equality. Just like the rest of cultural policy, heritage and museum policy strove strongly for integration: equal access to the history of the people was to be granted to “everyone”, again with an emphasis on residence and to some extent on class and education. The Church of Sweden followed these norms as well, considering them to be integral parts of its role as a Folk Church.

While the centre-right parties did not express any distinct concepts of the nation, it should be noted that their (and especially the Moderates’) support for the heritage field and the Church indicates that they considered these more important than the government and the Council did, much like Moderate dislike for the NTT, the NTC and the NTE was motivated both by a different view of geographic centralism and by a rejection of their political

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444 “Historiska museet” literally means “the museum of history” although its official English translation – the Museum of National Antiquities – is more accurate as a description of its activities than the Swedish name.
views. In Church policy discussions ethnic concepts of the nation were even expressed explicitly by Moderates and Centrists, although rejected by Liberals.

The Values of Cultural Policy

The dominant values at this time were quite explicitly civil. The government strove to establish a modern secularised State which gave everyone equal access to culture. This culture would help the State to reach goals such as equality and equal participation in the political life of society. This priority was presented as sympathy for a broader anthropological definition of culture. In practice this definition was used as an argument to support the interest in amateur art. To promote participation, the State also needed a common language in which thought could be expressed and understood by all. At the same time the State recognised the institutions of the artistic fields as well as those of the museum and heritage field. The norms of art policy acknowledged aesthetic values as supreme. The government thus simultaneously created a general cultural policy in which aesthetic activities were instrumental for reaching civil goals and supported artistic fields with policies that recognised aesthetic values as non-instrumental. This paradox was managed by an organisation in which quality assessment was made by the corporative appointment of artist representatives, while the overall objectives were upheld by politicians, bureaucrats and government commissions. Ultimately, the politicians represented the citizenry of the state-framed nation, while the artists could be expected to be loyal to their art as such. Quality and contents were in fact hardly ever discussed by the various commissions studied here. The Literature Commission is a good example of how deeply institutionalised this norm was: even when it tried to safeguard quality, it studied aspects of the distribution cycle with the help of sociologists of literature. Any scholars from the humanities would have been redundant, as they would have been experts on contents, an area that government commissions avoided meticulously.

Both civil and aesthetic values were considered universal. The one exception was cultural heritage, which was the heritage of a particular ethnic culture – the Swedes – for which the State had a special responsibility. State support for these values can be interpreted in terms of legitimising State authority. The State had once recognised the artistic fields in order to increase its legitimacy, just as it had earlier started to supported heritage preservation for much the same reason. That some of these values were particularistic and others universalistic were a manageable contradiction. That the Church was perceived by some to represent universally defined values, contradicting those of the State was much more of a problem. In this context the mega-standard of the secular state implied that the State should hold a monopoly not only on violence but also on the universal values that could be expressed in the public
arena. Christianity thus had to be confined to a non-public arena of private belief and associations. All relevant actors thus agreed that a separation of Church and State was appropriate. Only practical problems and concerns for the consequences to the particular values of cultural heritage delayed this reform.
CHAPTER VI:
1991–1994:
Sweden in the New Europe

Swedish cultural policy on the national level did not change much between 1974 and 1991. The only major exception to this rule is the political power structure within the Church, which was changed drastically in 1982 (more on that later in this chapter). The leadership structure of the Swedish state changed as well, both on the organisational and the political level. At the time when this chapter begins, the surrounding world had changed even more: the Soviet block had collapsed and Sweden no more stood between two opposing political blocks. Instead it would enter Europe by joining the EU. The application was signed before the election of 1991. The centre-right government that came into power that year thus found itself in an entirely new context, not the least in its own opinion.445

War in the former Yugoslavia brought increasing numbers of refugees to Sweden. The nature of immigration had, however, begun to change as early as in the early seventies. Labour immigration had become less important and had already been succeeded by an immigration of refugees and relatives of earlier immigrants. In the past employment rates among immigrants had been higher than among the general population. The number of immigrants received by Sweden had had been limited by the economic and housing situation. The new immigration was, however, dependent on the rights of individual immigrants. Social and economic problems among them increased. From the mid-seventies onwards immigrant policy became more and more focused on integrating immigrants into the state-framed nation. While the Immigrant

Commission of the early seventies had assumed that immigrants would be assimilated into Swedish society and yet keep parts of their (ethnic) cultures (as, for example, their religion, see p. 161), later immigrant policy tended to consider the relationship between particular ethnic and civil state-famed culture more problematic.446

The State thus emphasised that the civil values held by the state-framed nation were not negotiable. Neither could it be assumed that all immigrant groups would be large or organised enough (in Sweden) to perpetuate their own cultures (here). These views point towards a state-centred civil concept of the State in which particularistic ethnic minority cultures were tolerated, at least to some extent. As early as 1975 only the Centre and the VPK argued for a permanent minority policy to complement the more transitory immigrant policy. In the late eighties immigrant policy was increasingly viewed as part of general welfare policy (including cultural policy). Immigrants had the same rights as all others. Their socio-economic situation was weaker, however, and special political actions could thus be needed.447 Much like in the seventies, cultural policy would thus have to treat immigrants as a disadvantaged (not different) group.448

The State that carried out these policies had changed as well. Like in most Western countries the Swedish state was reorganised in the eighties: detailed central steering was to be replaced by objective and result-oriented steering. In his study of this process, the political scientist Göran Sundström has, however, concluded that the new system had in practice a great deal in common with the older system of “process steering”, although it was now coated in the international language of New Public Management (NPM). The authority of the economic profession, however, had increased significantly. Among the more important actors were the Ministry of Public Administration, the Budget Office at the Ministry of Finance (responsible for the National Budget), the National Audit Office (RRV) and the Agency for Administrative Development (SAFAD). In the new centre-right government of 1991 there was, however, no Ministry of Public Administration and although the Budget Office had become increasingly powerful, the new system of three-year budgets would not, as expected, strengthen the budget as an instrument of steering. Instead reporting results was the central focus of the working system of objective and result-oriented steering.449 The extent to

446 Borevi 2002: 98-133. Borevi discusses these matters with the help of a distinction between civil and ethnic culture as a part of her discourse analysis of Swedish immigrant policy.
448 Egeland 2002.
449 Sundström 2003: 207-286, who works from historical institutionalism, see also Pollitt & Buckaert 2000 on the influence of NPM internationally and in Sweden.
which these reforms were the result of international influence or a continuation of the process steering model lies far beyond the subject of this study. Suffice to say that power and authority relations within the State changed and that central actors within it worked to increase its internal isomorphism by using both coercion and authority.

Not only public administration had changed. Riksdag politics had changed as well. In 1976 the government of Olof Palme had lost the election and a centre-right government had been formed for the first time over forty years. During the following six years Sweden would see no less than four different centre-right coalitions before Palme and the Social Democrats were returned to power in 1982. This was however no return to the previous stability. Around 1990 three new parties entered the Riksdag: the Greens, who entered in 1988 only to be voted out again in 1991 (and return in 1994), the Christian Democrats and New Democracy, both elected in 1991. The two latter parties were both outsiders to the Swedish system and products of public dissatisfaction, but at the same time very different. The Christian Democrats, which had existed since the sixties, emphasised Christian values. New Democracy had existed less than a year and was an anti-establishment party based on the charisma of its two leaders: the businessman Ian Wachtmeister and the music producer Bert Carlsson. The government that took office in 1991 under the leadership of Carl Bildt included the Moderate, Centre, Liberal and Christian Democrat parties. It was, however, dependent on New Democracy. While cultural policy had become increasingly stable during the last twenty years it thus not only found itself in a new environment. Its actors were now also responsible to a new government.450

GENERAL CULTURAL POLICY

More than any other government studied here, this government had a clear concept of Sweden as a nation and of the role of cultural policy in placing that nation in a new Europe:

The support of a free cultural life is an important undertaking necessary for a society to remain open and dynamic, and for human beings to grow and develop. Cultural heritage should be protected. The Swedish culture increases in importance when we, in the coming years, take the step into the European cooperation. Our culture should be brought out to the rest of Europe at the same time as we strengthen our own cultural identity. […] churches and free denominations play an invaluable role in a good society.451

450 Hadenius 2000.
This is a statement in favour of a strong and historically founded concept of national identity. It is however also in favour of seeing this identity as a harmonious part of a larger European identity. Cultural policy was thus given a higher symbolical value, but not much more funding.

The most obvious practical change in cultural policy was the creation of a Ministry of Culture under the leadership of the Liberal Birgit Friggbo. In the governments of 1976–1982 she had been Minister of Housing (bostadsminister). Now she became Sweden’s first Minister of Culture. In spite of this title her duties were however not limited to cultural policy in the established sense. Instead, they consisted of the already institutionalised sectors of immigration, (gender) equality, media, and cultural policy. The corresponding Government Office divisions were now brought together from the Ministries of Education, Employment, and Public Administration (utbildnings-, arbetsmarknads- and civildepartementet) to form the Ministry of Culture. Church policy was, on the other hand, left with the Ministry of Public Administration. It should also be noted that not even literature and film policy were counted among cultural expenses in the National Budget, but instead included under the heading of media policy, an old arrangement.452

The limited stream of new funding of the cultural sector in this time of economic moderation was directed towards the high cultural establishments traditionally supported by Moderates and Liberals (e.g. Central Museums and the Royal Opera) and the regional institutions supported by the Centre Party (such as regional symphony orchestras and County Museums). The government’s attitude towards direct support for artists was, on the other hand, more guarded: while these did receive some slight increases in funding, the government also decided to limit the influence of their organisations in the funding boards, arguing that such influence on a procedure of quality assessment would lead to bias. A clear influence of liberal and NPM anti-corporatism could be noted in this view. This meant a new orientation in institutional isomorphism, but in no way a decrease: cultural policy was now included in a general reform of public administration. Governmental attitudes towards amateur culture were, on the other hand, even more guarded and although no direct budget cuts were made, neither were there any increases. An aestheticist concept of the arts dominated, in other words, as did a less corporative approach to artists.453

There were, on the other hand, some increases in government support for Sami culture as well as in new measures against xenophobia. The first had started as a demand from the Municipality of Kiruna and received support

from KUR.454 Defence against xenophobia was on the other hand seen as a counterattack against “recent attacks on immigrants, the violence and damage against refugee facilities in Sweden [which] show that measures against xenophobia, racism and anti-Semitism have to be strengthened.”455 Even though it remained a seemingly marginal measure at the time, this measure was the beginning of a new path in Swedish cultural policy. It was highly in line with the norm of using cultural policy for civil aims. Making this activity a part of cultural policy rather than of immigrant policy was also in line with the norms of an immigrant policy that primarily concerned itself with immigrants and not with ethnic Swedes. Only the topic was in other words new to cultural policy. Separate support systems for Sami culture were, on the other hand, in line with the norms of earlier Sami policy, if not with those of the now established fields of immigrant and minority policy.

A more visible reform of the cultural sector was creating a Foundation for the Culture of the Future. This was part of a larger reform with much greater consequences for the field of university research than for cultural policy. This story goes back to the early eighties when the new Social Democratic government created Wage Earners’ Investment Funds, which were to buy shares in Swedish companies in order to increase the influence of workers’ representatives. These caused an outcry from the centre-right and their removal was a central issue on the agenda of the new government. It just had to solve the question of what to do with the money. The government chose to separate it from future government influence by creating a number of foundations for the benefit of science and culture. This also fits well into its general belief in independent research and art. Most of these foundations were, however, to concentrate on strategic research. Although Cultural Policy Research gained an important new supporter in the enforced Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, the Foundation for the Culture of the Future was the only one that focused on cultural production. With this foundation, the sector had however gained a new independent funding organisation:456

The purpose of the Foundation shall be to award funding to long-term and regenerative cultural projects for a period of at least ten years. The funding shall stimulate

456 Hadenius 2000. The influence of these foundations on the Swedish scientific community has been studied in a research project under the leadership of Professor Sverker Sörlin. Its results were published in an anthology; Sörlin (ed.) 2005. On the reorganisation of the University College of Jönköping and Chalmers Technical University from government agencies to foundation-owned companies, my own MA thesis (Harding 2001), where I compare Chalmers’ relationship to the State with that of The Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) is, as far as I know, the only study made so far.
This indicates a leaning in the direction of economic development in a changing society rather than in the more aestheticist direction that cultural policy tended towards at the time. Its support for regional development would become an important tendency further into the nineties. It was also a parallel to the other foundations’ emphasis on strategic research.

A more subtle change in the planning system was the new importance ascribed to evaluations. Adherence to the new super-standard of public policy evaluation may in fact help explain the many evaluative government commissions that were created during this period. Their role was both to deliver recommendations for further reform and to serve as vehicles for increased government control via evaluation, a measure that strengthened government power, if not approval. These measures could be expected to increase isomorphism, as evaluations impose a new set of norms and standards (see Chapter III). The power element in this isomorphism is especially evident at a time when government-funded actors faced a serious risk of budget cuts. Isomorphism might, however, stop at isonymism, especially when it is coerced: it might not necessarily go deeper than the methods for evaluating it. Typical of this period was also the increased involvement of the Riksdag with government commissions. This can be seen as a consequence of an alliance between New Democracy and the Socialist parties to gain direct influence over government policy via representation in government commissions. Although they appear to have believed in the importance of the evaluative commissions almost as much as the government, these parties thus had the power to ignore the parts of NPM that contradicted parliamentary involvement in the implementation of government policy.

**Evaluating the Cultural Policy of 1974**

The chief example of such an evaluation is the commission appointed in 1993 to evaluate the entire cultural policy of 1974. In its first year, the new Riksdag unanimously voted for the appointment of such a commission. The Riksdag Committee on Cultural Affairs also stated that “[t]here is still consensus in principle on cultural policy objectives” but that a commission of parliamentary representatives should be appointed to evaluate cultural policy in the view of these objectives. The Riksdag Committee had in fact stated this as early as in 1989 and now pointed it out again to the new government.\footnote{Statutes of the Foundation Culture of the Future, Appendix to the Government decision of 23 June, 1994, No 65.}

\footnote{1991/92:KrU 18.}
1. The main assignment of the Commission should […] be to evaluate to what degree the cultural policy objectives of 1974 have been achieved. In this, special attention should be given to the Decentralisation Objective. […]
2. The Commission should furthermore – on the grounds of the result of the evaluation – take a stand on the issue of whether there are reasons to recommend an adjustment of the contents of the existing cultural policy objectives.
3. The need and appropriateness of adding new cultural policy objectives […]
4. The Commission should present its views, in principle, on with what resources the objectives proposed for the future should be achieved.459

After having been criticised again for being too slow with the appointment of a new culture commission, the government in late February 1993 finally appointed one. All Riksdag parties were represented in this new commission which would initially be headed by former minister Ingemar Mundebo. It received a large budget and would employ a great number of experts in its secretariat. In its instructions Minister Friggebo pointed out a number of especially important themes for its investigations:460
1. The possibility of creating “cultural centres” outside the capital.
2. “Culture in the multi-cultural Sweden.”
3. The internationalisation of culture.
4. “Media development and cultural policy.”
5. “Defending the cultural heritage.”
6. Culture for children and young people.
7. Adult education (Folkbildning).
8. Financing culture.
9. The efficiency of cultural policy in reaching its objectives.461

To create cultural centres outside the capital was a new take on the issue of decentralisation. It could perhaps be seen as a compromise between decentralisation and quality, as well as a generalisation of the arguments delivered in the previous decades from the cultural establishments of Gothenburg (and, to some extent, those of Malmö) for a more equal distribution of the cultural budget between the major cities of Sweden.

Several of the themes were in fact unsolved paradoxes and goal conflicts. Immigrants and minorities should be enabled to develop their own cultural

460 1991/92:KrU 18. The members of the Commission were, apart from Mundebo, Charlotte Branting (Lib.), Kia Ericson (SAP), Elisabeth Fleetwood (M), Thomas Ginner (SAP), Stina Gustavsson (C), Åke Gustavsson (SAP), Bertil Norbelie (M), Elisabeth Persson-Grip (Left), Anne Rhenman (NyD) and Alva Wennerlund-Larsson (KDS), SOU 1995:84: 3. Attached to the secretariat was also a group of expert advisors that included Carl-Johan Kleberg (who had worked in a similar capacity for the Culture Council), Göran Nylöf (academic expert at KUR) and Dag Hallberg (the Director of the Gothenburg Opera). The research report written under the leadership of Margareta Cronholm, SOU 1995:85: 22.
461 Dir. 1993:24.
heritage, a development which was seen as a positive contribution to Swedish culture. At the same time they ought to be integrated into that same Swedish culture. Internationalisation was seen as a positive force, although entirely distinct from that of multiculturalism, if not from those of media development and the development of a new international market for cultural products. The government also believed that Swedish identity had to be strengthened to enable it to meet the new impulses in a constructive way. The European and the Nordic identities had to be strengthened as well (but not, for example, trans-Atlantic Occidental identity or global solidarity). Current developments in the heritage and media sectors were considered unreservedly positive. New media would create new possibilities. New developments in the heritage sector meant that the older and “narrower” view of the cultural heritage as merely material should be revised, as would, in view of the changes in the last twenty years, the objectives of cultural policy in general. Neither was it seen as a contradiction to quality to emphasise the need to increase the importance of culture sponsoring. Finally, the Minister of Culture also stressed the issue of language, that the consequences “of Sweden being a small language area with a geographic fringe position in Europe” should be given special concern. She thus added a linguistic component to her concept of the nation and stated a belief that the Swedish territory and the Swedish-speaking area was (or should be) identical.462

The Riksdag was, however, not fully satisfied with this directive, but instead criticised the government again, this time for separating theatre policy and museum policy (discussed under these headings) from the general inquiry and assigning them to separate government commissioners. The Social Democrats, Leftists, Greens and New Democrats thus joined again and forced the government to appoint representatives of the Riksdag parties as members of these commissions as well an entirely new commission to deal with issues relating to the internationalisation of culture.463

The International Culture Commission

The International Culture Commission was designed to investigate the international aspects of Swedish cultural policy. Its chairmanship was entrusted to Professor Stig Strömholm who was joined by a group of representatives of the Riksdag parties.464 The Commission’s view of its own assignment appears to have been somewhat mixed. It considered both the international element of culture within the Swedish borders (indicating a foreign quality ascribed to immigrant culture) and the international cooperation of the Swedish cultural

464 Dir. 1993:52.
sector. The Commission noticed with disapproval that despite the fact that immigration had significantly changed the demography of Sweden hardly any changes had been made in the supply of public culture. On the other hand, it complimented the actors of the sector to have increased their cooperation with Eastern European and Developing countries since the mid-seventies. It also noted; however, that cooperation with Western European countries had been left behind, an oversight that should be remedied. It proposed new cooperative ventures, primarily with Germany, France and the United Kingdom, as well as full membership in the developing cultural cooperation of the European Community. The Commission, furthermore, considered increased access to cable television a major opportunity as it increased access to European culture. All contacts with foreign culture were, on the other hand, not considered positive. The Commission was particularly worried that most literature translated into Swedish was originally written in English. Increased cultural exchange with the UK was seen as a good thing. We have thus to assume that the real problem was the influx of American culture. The remedy was in any case that the government should intervene in the flow of translated literature by sponsoring translations from other languages than English.\footnote{465 SOU 1994:35.}

Apart from its specific recommendations, the report is also worth noticing for the lecture by Professor Strömholm that was included as its introduction. This is perhaps the clearest presentation of the dominating concept of the nation at this time, and perhaps the most explicit formulation of such a concept in the entire material of this study. The lecture was entitled “Nordic Cultural Identity” but its subject was primarily the Swedish relation to the rest of Europe throughout the ages. The core of Europe – we learn – is identical to the territories of the Roman Empire (its European territories we have to presume), while European identity is the result of the meeting of Roman identity and Christianity. During the Middle Ages this Latin culture spread with Christianity to enter the Germanic and Slavic lands of Northern and Eastern Europe, thereby creating the Europe of latter days. Rather than as a Dark Age, the Catholic Middle Ages were described as a period of cultural intermixing and of a true pan-European culture. Not even pre-Christian Scandinavia was depicted as truly isolationist. The Vikings, we learn, were both traders and travellers: “once only barbarism was patriotic”. Luckily, however, the Swedes, according to Strömholm, have always been willing to import culture from abroad.\footnote{466 SOU 1994:35: 19-34, quote from the commission’s comment on p. 17.}

In spite of this Professor Strömholm still tried to pinpoint the characteristics that differentiate Swedes from other Europeans. As can be expected most of these characteristics can be considered positive ones, some were,
however, at least ambivalent. He mentioned the stability of the Swedish state, the spiritual simplicity of the Swedish mind (contrasted to the gaudiness sometimes seen in continental art), the Swedish love for nature and the high esteem in which folk culture is still held in Sweden (in contrast to, for example, in France). A less fortunate characteristic was the Swedish admiration for America and American culture. All of these characteristics have a long history in the development of Swedish nationalism. Strömholm’s views on the nation have to be considered as having a clear tendency towards essentialism and primordialism, or at least towards a pre-modernist theory of the nation. At the same time, the argument was, however, not in favour of isolationism but instead of turning Swedish identity towards a wider European identity, rather than towards America. His views were in fact quite close to those once held by the conservative historian Harald Hjärne nearly a hundred years earlier (see p. 92). In spite of the parallels “nationalism” was, however, not a positive concept for Strömholm. Instead, the “nationalist wave” of the nineteenth-century Sweden was depicted as an ersatz movement characteristic of a former great power forced to adopt a defeatist and neutral foreign policy. Nationalism was thus constructed as pathological and Swedish identity as non-nationalist.467 As we shall see, there are elements of these views in much of this government’s cultural policy.

General Cultural Policy of New Democracy
The government was not the only force in Swedish politics. It even had to rely on another party for its majority in the Riksdag. The concept of the nation that can be seen in statements made by New Democracy was even more explicit than that of the government. It was also more central to their cultural policy. As can be seen from the following quotes, the cultural policy of New Democracy could be described as standing on two pillars: one was the principle of marketisation (in the sense that the production of cultural products and services needed to be put to the test of the market). The other was the protection of the Swedish cultural heritage, something that was considered especially important now that a New Europe could be seen to appear outside the Swedish borders, following the fall of Communism:

[Opening] Summary
Freedom and diversity in cultural life are some of the prerequisites of democratic society. Freedom in cultural life is freedom from political steering. [...] The attitude to culture has to change as well. If we are to strengthen our cultural profile in the new Europe, we should start to view culture as an investment and as a growth factor, both in quality of life and in the public treasury.

467 SOU 1994:35: 19-34.
**Strong Cultural Identity**

In large parts of Europe one has realised that the 90s belong to culture and make large national and regional investments. The Swedish culture also increases in importance when we move closer to Europe. We have thus to protect our cultural heritage and strengthen our sense of Swedish culture. But also taking advantage of the possibilities created in the cultural sphere throughout the new Europe. This is a challenge, but we have the fundamental prerequisites needed for success. Art will, however, have to be given a greater role, increased resources invested and attitudes changed.\(^{468}\)

In New Democratic texts little contradiction was seen between the freedom of culture and private financing. Although the opening sentences of this private bill (signed, among others, by Wachtmeister) mentioned freedom from political influence, the party, however, only seldom argued that public finance could risk compromising artistic freedom. Neither did it seem to see any contradiction between its stated support for quality in the arts and an artistic scene guided by market or market-like mechanisms. Instead, their expressed belief was that “everybody benefits from culture”. They believed that investments in culture would increase economic growth on the local and regional levels as well as on the national level. Although the concentration of public spending in Stockholm was considered a problem, increased spending on other regions would have to remain the responsibility of the counties and municipalities. At the same time national identity would have to be strengthened in order to become an asset when Sweden “entered the new Europe”, something New Democracy considered both necessary and urgent (much as the government thought). The unity of national identity was never questioned, neither was the idea that it could remain unthreatened within a more integrated European cooperation. The only characteristics of this identity mentioned in this or any other New Democratic party bill were that it was to be based on Swedish history and Swedish culture.\(^{469}\) It is also apparent that it was considered to exist already as a primordial ethnic identity.

Despite all talk of the importance of culture it was, however, also clear to New Democracy that no increased spending on cultural policy could be allowed in the national budget, something that was, on the other hand, the case with most other sectors and entirely in agreement with government policy. Later procedural concerns took precedence and the party’s policy on culture became centred on the idea that no major policy changes could be allowed until the government commissions working with the sector had finished their reports. Towards amateur culture, however, party policy was even

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\(^{468}\) Motion 1991/92:Kr272: 1.

\(^{469}\) Motion 1991/92:Kr272: quote from p. 3.
harsher, suggesting severe cuts. In many ways the cultural policy of New Democracy could thus be described as a harsher version of the government’s.

**General Cultural Policy of the Social Democrats**

In opposition the Social Democrats remained explicitly close to the objectives set for cultural policy in the seventies. In their answer to the national budget of 1991/92, the Social Democrats of the Riksdag Committee on Cultural implicitly accused the Liberals and the Centre Party of abandoning the long-standing consensus around this programme in favour of a neo-liberal ideology centred on adaptation to the market. During the following two years, Ingvar Carlsson – the Party Chairman and Leader of the Opposition – presented the party’s cultural policy himself in private bills. In his bill of 1993/93, he summarised Social Democratic cultural policy in five distinct headings:

1. “Make an effort for children and young people”
2. “Fight against xenophobia”
3. “Without artists no art”
4. “Broaden participation, create equality”
5. “Culture in the whole country”

The last three are a repetition of the older objectives of 1974. The first is a strengthening of an already existing theme. Under the heading “Without artists no art” we find the old concerns about artists as a professional group with unacceptable working conditions, now combined with the image of the coalition government’s economically restrictive policy as a grave danger to their situation. “Broadened participation” refers to a concern for those groups in society that remained culturally disadvantaged, groups that were still primarily defined in terms of economical and educational resources.

The fight against xenophobia was a new objective, at least as an explicit objective in its own right. It did in fact not appear in official answers to the

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471 Motion 1991/92 Kr271.
472 Motion 1992/93 Kr335 and Motion 1993/94 Kr307. Carlsson’s answer to the national budget of 1992/93, however, remained partially identical (word by word) to bills formulated the previous year by Åke Gustavsson.
473 Motion 1993/94 Kr307.
474 1992/93 KrU19, Motion 1992/93 Kr321, Motion 1993/94 Kr307. It is interesting to note the ambivalent Social Democratic attitude towards popular culture. The most extreme example of this ambivalence was perhaps their attitudes towards computer gaming, revealed in passing comments in one of Carlsson’s bills. In the opening paragraphs computer gaming was mentioned as a threat – when cultural activities are cut down by the government young people risk to end up gaming in front of their computers – but later as an opportunity; cultural centres were complemented for supporting computer gaming as a way to activate young people and meet them at their own level. Although it is clear that the main object was still bringing culture to the youth, these methods also indicated that the main objective was sometimes seen in the civil goal of activating the whole of the people, Motion 1993/94 Kr307.
coalition budgets until 1994. It was, however, well within the established norms of battling social problems through the means of cultural policy. Although still undeveloped the methods were also connected with the old tradition of *folkbildning*. This is, however, the first example in the material of a Social Democratic statement in which a problem relating to immigrants does not give rise to measures directed specifically at them, but instead to specify measures directed against a group within the general population. 475 Although this was not a party line, it is also worth mentioning that it was Bruno Poro- 

maa, a Social Democrat who submitted yearly bills in favour of recognising the Tornedalian Finns as a national minority. He demanded that they should be given the same status as the Sami as well as increased government support to their culture and their national organisation. It was, perhaps, unsurprising that a unanimous Committee on Cultural Affairs, including its Social Demo- 
crat members, turned these recommendations down. In the last year of the period, when the bill had gained the support of a bill from a Liberal repres- 

sentative, the Committee decided, however, to support the Tornedalian orga-

nisation as the legitimate representatives of a “cultural minority”, while at the same time turning down all suggestions for increased funding.476

*General Cultural Policy of the Left Party*

Leftist cultural policy remained in many ways close to its Social Democrat counterpart, especially in criticising the government’s budget cuts and referring to the objectives of 1974. The only truly positive comment in their answer to the 1991/92 National Budget was their agreement with increasing govern- 

ment funding of Sami culture. The Left was also more positive towards popular culture than the Social Democrats:

> If the State had been interested in the cultural and artistic choices of the youth themselves it should, for example, be just as self-evident that rock concerts receive government support as that the Opera or the symphony orchestras do!477

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475 Motion 1993/94 Kr307.
476 1991/92 KrU8, 1992/93 KrU3, 1993/94 KrU6, Motion 1990/91 Kr319, Motion 1991/92 Kr236, Motion 1992/93 Kr235. Sami issues had been discussed by the same Commission. In its final report – submitted as SOU 1990:91 *Samerätt och samiskt språk* (“Sami Right and Sami Language”) – the Commission argued from the internationally protected rights of indigenous peoples that the Sami language should be protected as a part of the Swedish cultural heritage and that the Sami were a minority in their own home country.
477 The Tornedalian minority was described in the bill as the result of the peace treaty of 1809 (when a new border had been drawn after the Russian annexation of Finland). During the nineteenth century the State had increased measures for their assimilation into the homogeneity of the Swedish nation. Since the 1980s their culture and organisation had, however, received increased government support (via the Norrbotten County Administrative Board and other public authorities). The Sami minority – once subjected to the same oppression – had in 1990 seen their
Although the Left agreed that differences existed and that some segments of society were denied their due part of culture – primarily because of age, sex, and class – this should not be taken as proof of the existence of an objective high cultural good that the people could or should be taught. Instead, the ruling coalition was heavily criticised by the Left for a cultural policy that was restrictive towards popular and participatory culture, centring instead on high cultural establishments, such as the Royal Opera and Dramatic Theatre.\footnote{Motion 1991/92 Kr274. When Anders Frenander studied the internal cultural policy discourses in the Leftist party he described a turn away from the radical programmes of the seventies and towards an increased individualism in the early nineties (Frenander 2005: 188-191). In practical policy debates this could explain the increased acceptance of an older version of Social Democratic cultural policy. It is perhaps also the same tendency that can be noticed in the acceptance of youth culture displayed in the quote. If there was any “liberalism” in the Leftist policies of these days it did, however, not show in any positive feelings towards government policy, but that was, on the other hand, more neo-liberal and conservative than liberal in any way friendly to the artistic field.}

\textit{A Comment on General Cultural Policy under the Bildt Government}

To sum up, the institutional isomorphism pursued by the Bildt government was of a different kind than that of the seventies. The government placed its authority behind de-corporatisation and evaluation. Once more the government put its faith in a government commission that would investigate the entire cultural sector, this time the focus was, however, on evaluation and efficiency rather than on recommendations for further expansion. In spite of their differences, both the new policy and the vision still defended by Social Democrats and Leftists concerned the centralisation of authority. It is thus not surprising that both the government and the opposition agreed to form a new government commission on culture. Unlike New Democracy, the government was a strong proponent of the establishments of high culture. Its policy thus became a defence of aesthetic universalism, a defence that was opposed primarily by the Leftists. This was on the whole a continuation of older centre-right and Leftist policy. In its more explicit concepts of the nation both the government and New Democracy, however, represented a dual vision, one that included both the old cultural conservative concept of an ethnically defined nation and a newer positioning of this Swedish identity as part of a larger European Community. This concept has perhaps more in common with the ones usually put forward by Moderates, Christian Democrats and Centrists than with those of Liberals. Together with the organisational policy supported by New Democracy these government policies resulted in a continued emphasis on integration. In the Liberal, Centrist and Social Democratic perspectives we can, however, also see another concept appear-

language accepted as a legally protected second official language in some areas. Motion 1991/92 Kr274: p. 13.
ing in cultural policy during this period: the fight against xenophobia and an increased concern with the interests of national minorities. These lines of thought did, however, not gain any noticeable influence on the institutions of cultural policy at the time. That was still to come.

**THEATRE, DANCE AND MUSIC POLICY**

The interest in questions related to theatre, music and dance was relatively great in the Riksdag during this period. The general structure of the field had changed little since the early seventies. The only major difference was – thanks to the cultural policy established in those days – that regional establishments now existed in almost every county. The lack of a national institution for dance had also been remedied by the establishment of the House of Dance (Dansens hus) in Stockholm early in 1991. The most debated issue in the Riksdag was now that of budget priorities. The battle stood between the advocates of, on the one hand, the Royal Opera, the Royal Dramatic Theatre and, on the other hand, the National Touring Theatre (NTT) and the National Touring Concerts (NTC). The government, its participating parties and the Theatre Commission argued for stable funding of the two former, while the Social Democrats and Leftists were in favour of the latter. Social Democrats and Leftists could also be seen as active supporters of free theatre, music and dance groups. The governing coalition, on the other hand, acted in support for regional and local establishments (often with the same arguments that the Theatre Commission would later present). Both groups wanted access all over country (cultural integration within the state-framed nation), but while the one supported institutionalised establishments of aesthetic quality, whether national or regional, while the other stood for organisational centralism as well as for renewal. At least as important as the differences between the political blocks were, however, the constellations that transcended them. As in the early seventies regional blocks sometimes emerged to advocate regional issues. The most important such alliance during this period was for increased funding of the Gothenburg Symphony Orchestra and Opera.

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479 Hoogland 2005.
480 This new establishment was organised as a foundation. Its principals were the Royal Opera, the National Touring Theatre, the Gothenburg Musical Theatre, the County Theatre of Östergötland, the Malmö City Theatre, the Museum of Dance Foundation and the Dance Centre (Danscentrum). 1991/92 KrU18: 20.
An aspect of the increased competition between proponents of the Royal Theatres and those of the NTT that would prove important in the future was the issue of the *Södra Teatern* ("the Southern Theatre" in Stockholm). Prior to this period it had been run for several decades by the NTT and had also been used by the Royal Theatres and the Opera College. In 1992 KUR recommended that it should instead be administered as a joint venture between these and the Theatre Centre (*Teatercentrum*) which all agreed to this. The NTT stated, however, that continued activity at the Södra Teatern on their part would require substantially increased funding. Despite this consensus the government was against any changes. This provoked a debate in the Riksdag Committee on Cultural Affairs. Coalition and New Democracy representatives voted for the government bill, while the Leftists and Social Democrats argued that a continued NTT administration of the building without any increased resources would heavily strain the possibilities for the NTT to fulfil its important responsibilities in the rest of the country.483 This conflict would continue and the Södra Teatern issue would produce some unpredicted consequences. These would, however, not appear until a few years later.

New Democracy did not always follow the government in their voting. It is in fact very clear that in theatre and music policy that they had created a new and volatile situation in the Riksdag. The clearest example of this was the severe criticism that the government met for its appointment of one man commissions on theatre and museum policy in apparent opposition to the Riksdag’s policy of parliament representative commissions. This led to an open protest from the Riksdag and its Committee on Cultural Affairs and to the subsequent reformation of the Theatre Commission and the Museum Commission.484 It was also due to New Democracy that budget frames could be enforced in the face of significant demands from both members of the governing coalition and the Socialist opposition. Finally, it was also thanks to the choices of New Democratic members of the Riksdag that the Socialist block could walk victorious through most of their disputes with the government on this sector. This was particularly obvious in the cases concerning the NTT and the NTC, where New Democracy clearly followed a more user-oriented – and thus more traditional – concept of culture, in sharp contrast to the more high-art oriented and universalist approach of the government.485

The Theatre Commission

Only one government commission was instituted by the Bildt Government concerning theatre, dance and music policy: the Theatre Commission of 1993.

Looking at its original instructions it is easy to get the impression that it had a rather limited field of inquiry concerning primarily the relationship between the NTT and the various County Theatres. Following the now established general norm for minor commissions, the government created the Theatre Commission as a one man commission, although at the same time it also appointed several experts to assist the investigator in his work. When the Commission’s report was published the following year it presented, however, a somewhat different view of its role. Not only did it connect this role closely with the two contemporary commissions on museum policy and of the international aspects of cultural policy, but it also took a much broader grip on theatre policy, including, at least to some extent, both music and theatre performance, and motivated by a desire to put the role of the NTT into a wider context. The Commission thus worked towards increased field integration within the wider field of theatre, music and dance policy. This new scope may have been a result of the Riksdag forcing the government to change the commission from a one man commission into a more traditional parliament representative one. The inquiry was also broadened by additional instructions. The government, however, also added that all recommendations that could be expected to increase public spending should be accompanied by other recommendations for balancing cuts so that the sum of public spending on theatre would remain the same.

The report itself has some interesting properties. One was that its historical narrative starts with 1972 as the year when Sweden was first given a cultural policy worth the name. Before that date, no relevant history seems to exist at all. After that several important commissions and some minor changes of policy were mentioned but always in relation to the Council’s report of 1972. Despite the fact that the commission was obviously aware of differences between the policy objectives set by the Riksdag and those originally proposed by the Council, the motivations and discussions of the Council were now treated as the proper context and source of the Bill. The Commission considered its own purpose primarily to be evaluating and reformulating that programme. The Culture Council was in other words used both as authority and as a model.

On the geographical aspect, the Commission agreed with the Culture Council’s support of spatial decentralisation. It did, however, consider the situation to have changed since then, to some extent because of its success, for example, in the creation of several new County and City Theatres. There

were now theatres in every region in the country. This development together with the new economic situation put the NTT in a new light: money given to this organisation could now be perceived as taken from the County and City Theatres. This would, “ironically”, mean that the position of the NTT had developed into a centralising force rather than a decentralising one. This should, according to the Commission, be dealt with by clarifying the roles of the NTT, the State and the counties. The NTT should in the long perspective return to a clearer role as an NGO, while the counties should take responsibility for the economy in their regions and the government support national and artistic qualities. Thus, the Commission managed to reconcile the centre-right dislike for the NTT with the Decentralisation Objective which was defended at least by the Centre. The Commission was also very eager to point out the economic importance of theatre for the development of regions. While regional development had been important in 1974 as well, the relevant development had then primarily been non-economic now there was no hint of an incompatibility between economical, cultural and democratic development.\textsuperscript{490} In this reformulating capacity, the Commission’s conclusions can be summed up in the following new objectives for theatre policy:

\begin{quote}
The objectives of national theatre policy should be seen as a combination of cultural policy objectives and objectives for the artistic field. This policy should create the foundation for good theatre in the country as a whole. This means among other things that the national theatre policy should:
- guarantee diversity, quality and professionalism,
- protect freedom of speech,
- widen participation,
- make cultural renewal possible,
- protect the cultural heritage,
- guarantee efforts for children and young people.\textsuperscript{491}
\end{quote}

It should be noted that when it presented these objectives the Commission perceived a difference between the possible goals of the government and those of the artistic field. Although this did not lead to any recommendations for radical change this dichotomy was recognised all through the Commission’s report and was also mentioned as one of the major problems with the centralising results of the NTT’s position. This, however, also influenced the Commission’s view of the relationship between the NTT and the government, leading to the conclusion that the NTT in the long perspective had to be freed from its functions as an agent of the State and cultivated as the NGO it was originally meant to be.\textsuperscript{492}

\textsuperscript{492} SOU 1994:52, especially 232-235.
The objectives proposed for theatre policy in 1993, however, entailed no strong deviation from those of 1974: the protection of freedom of speech was still there, as was the ambitions to widen participation, make cultural renewal possible and defend the cultural heritage. Support for children’s culture was hardly new, although a slight increase is noticeable. The idea of countering commercialism was, on the other hand, suspiciously absent, while quality and professionalism had been added. Although this was never stated, there is reason to suspect that the latter was considered a legitimate goal of the artistic field rather than of the government. Cultural diversity was, finally, included in the official objectives again. It was even placed among the artistic objectives, rather than with the political ones. This can, however, not be seen to have had any significant consequences for the actual recommendations. Despite perceptively sharing the objectives of 1972, the Commission of 1993, acting as a primarily evaluative commission, considered the theatre policy of 1974 to have failed to reach many of its objectives: not only had costs increased (which was after all to be expected), but attendance at theatre, music theatre and dance events had decreased significantly and the social and geographical homogeneity of attendants remained as significant as twenty years earlier. This criticism was also supported by earlier work of such important actors as KUR, the National Audit Office, the Riksdag Audit Office, and even the Council of Europe. The Commission’s recommendations to counter this was, to sum up, characterised by a willingness to clarify and differentiate the responsibilities of the various agents of government policy so that national aesthetic and integrative concerns could be kept apart from regional economic ones.

**FILM POLICY**

In 1991 the film sector still was still structured according to the same basic institutions as in the seventies. A few changes had, however, been made with the Film Agreement of 1982. Among these was a change from post-production to pre-production funding of films by the Swedish Film Institute (SFI). Taking in the construction of funding committees, this meant a transfer of power to film professionals, film business and distributing organisations.

*Film Production and Film Cultural Activities*

In April 1991 Bengt Göransson (then Social Democratic Minister of Education) had appointed a commission to evaluate the film support system. Typi-
cal of its time it consisted of only one person, County Governor Jan Rydh, who together with a secretary and an expert, conducted the entire enquiry. Their work was finished in December the same year with a final report on film production and film-related cultural activities. The Film Agreement was to be renewed, activities had to be evaluated and the terms of the agreement possibly changed.\textsuperscript{495}

[The Commission should] shed light on the need for the State’s responsibility in the film field, and to present alternative models for future cultural policy measures. Included in the assignment is also to analyse the present film support, and to shed light on the conditions for a new film and video agreement.\textsuperscript{496}

Included in the assignment was not, however, as the commissioner himself stated, to evaluate or recommend changes in the current structure of ownership in the film business. Instead, he concentrated on the economic problems of the sector. Although he argued that these problems were implicitly artistic problems, as they indicated a lack of audience, his main conclusion was to propose a new funding system based on a combination pre- and post-release support, where the latter would be dependent on ticket sales and the first on assessed quality. Interestingly, documentary films would, however, be excepted from the dependence on sales, a difference justified by the fact that documentaries received less public interest. This indicates that quality was more central than sales quantity. Another suggested method was to isolate the core activities of the SFI: financial support (1) to film and (2) to cultural activities connected with film. The economic responsibility for the latter should be transferred to the State and financed through a new agreement, according to which the State could pay the SFI to perform and support these activities. To further isolate the core activities of the SFI the Commissioner argued for abolishing its import of foreign quality film which could be replaced with a system for financial support of such import by other actors (including commercial ones).\textsuperscript{497} The Commissioner did, however, also see problems on the

\textsuperscript{495} SOU 1991:105, Dir. 1991:19. \hfill \textsuperscript{496} SOU 1991:105: 9. \hfill \textsuperscript{497} SOU 1991:105. The financial resources available for the film field could also be increased through the involvement of SVT and Nordic Television (TV4) as partners in the Film Agreement. Nordic Television was a private television company that had been contracted to broadcast commercial television via the national ground network used by the SVT. The new television channel, later named TV4, was bound by an agreement similar to the one that bound SVT, forcing it, among other things, to broadcast a certain amount of culture programs, news and programmes produced in Sweden (Harding 2006b). SVT and Nordic Television would, however, not be included in the Film Agreement for their experience or as producers of film, but as financial contributors, in their role as distributors of film. SVT and Nordic Television were in other words considered dependent on the film field, and at least morally indebted to it. The Commissioner also recommended that a new fee should be introduced on “empty” video tapes sold on the
quality side, indicating that the SFI had not been able to keep up quality in the
highest possible degree. According to him, this problem could be traced back
to the control exercised over the SFI by its principals. The solution to this
problem would be to change the structure of its board (and of other important
groups within it) so that it consisted entirely of experts, artists, or represen-
tatives of the field.498 In this way the recommendations of the commissioner
enforced the dominant aestheticism of the field at the same time as he only
proposed limited changes in the existing compromise between the State and
commercial actors. He also prioritised the national focus of upholding quality
in Swedish film over the universalist objective of providing the public with
qualitative foreign film. In this sense, the particular won over the universal in
a struggle held within the frames of an aestheticist concept of film as art.499

Proceedings of the Government and the Riksdag
When the recommendations for a new film policy were finished, they were
referred for consideration to 52 actors, including the SFI, and a number of
government agencies and NGOs (including, among others, organisations for
cinema owners and the film-interested public). The reception was generally
positive but far from without objections. Among others, the SFI itself object-
ed to the isolation of Film Support from Film Cultural Activities, arguing that
State support was needed and justified in both of these fields. Many organi-
sations receiving support from the SFI, however, expected such a re-organisa-
tion to facilitate a more working cooperation with the grants-handling institu-
tions. All of these actors (the SFI included), however, tended to be positive
towards the inclusion of artistic consultants in the grants procedures of the
SFI, while at the same time they defended the SFI’s active involvement in
quality film import. Interestingly, however, the SFI did not accept the propos-
ed reorganisation of its board. Most actors involved – the SFI still included –
also argued for significant increases in government support for the sector in
general, arguing among other things that the grants for theatre were much
higher and that the construction of the present system created a problematic
dependence on fluctuations in the public interest as expressed on the market.
This could be remedied if the State would assume a more direct responsibility
in financing the field instead of making it rely on fees dependent on the
market.500

500 Government bill 1992/93:10 appendix 2. In some contrast to most of these opinions, the
National Taxation Board considered the alternative of introducing a value added tax on cinema
tickets preferable to the present system with cinema companies contributing directly to the SFI.
Based on these answers the government prepared a new government bill on film policy:

The Swedish film policy aims at, within our limited language area, upholding a film production of such a volume that we can maintain a separate film identity. The existence of a broad supply of Swedish film has in latter years become more important as a complement to the massive supply of foreign film that is offered to the public through the increasing number of TV channels and through the expanded distribution of video tapes. Film policy measures also aim to promote an active film culture as well as to preserve and reinvigorate [levandegöra] the Swedish film cultural heritage.501

This justification of film policy was hardly different from the one offered in the early seventies. One should, however, note the pairing of a living culture and preserving (and invigorating) an older heritage. In its propositions the government remained close to those of the Commission. In spite of protests, a partition between pre-and post-production film support was to be introduced, according to the recommendations. Support for Film Cultural Activities was also to remain with the SFI but to be paid for by the State. Unlike the commissioner the government, however, proposed that the sum involved should be specified in the Film Agreement, increased according to an index to avoid being dependent on the fluctuations of the film market. On the other hand, several of the more peripheral Film Cultural Activities (such as the publication of journals) should be taken over by the State and coordinated with similar activities in other parts of the cultural sector. Finally, the SFI’s status as a foundation was to be secured in the context of the new Foundation Law. To permanent this system a capital had to be assigned to it. At the same time a new charter should be written for it with the parties of the former Film Agreement and the TV companies as founding principals.502 This was a continuation along the same paths before, not a new path choice.

Despite criticism the reception of the government’s film policy in the Riksdag has to be considered positive, at least in comparison with the discussion of other fields. Only in one case was official opposition to the government line voiced by New Democracy and even the Social Democrats expressed general agreement with the Government Bill on Film Policy. Among the few points of disagreement was the Social Democratic concern for govern-

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502 Government bill 1992/93:10. Quite like the Film Commission of the seventies – but unlike the more recent Film Commission – the bill also described much of the history of the Swedish film sector in order to legitimise the need for government involvement. This time history was, however, only narrated back to the fifties when the introduction of television left the field in need of government support. This was in other words the history of film policy and not of film as such.
A Limit to Film Censorship

Film policy was, however, not only about supporting film. Censorship still existed in Sweden, mainly in relation to violent and pornographic material. In June 1990 a government commission was appointed to further investigate and work against the circulation of films depicting violence in a destructive fashion. The Commission was instructed to coordinate the various measures used by the State and other actors for the prevention of such circulation – including censorship – and to cooperate with scholars and other experts to collect information on the matter. Three years later the Commission published the report *En gräns för filmcensuren* ("A Limit to Film Censorship"). Their main objective was to protect children and young people from hard-core pornography and from destructive depictions of violence. In order not to limit the possibilities for news, documentaries and pedagogical depictions of historical and present atrocities, the emphasis was on destructive depictions of violence. “Hard-core pornography” was defined as "close [närgångna] depictions of sexual organs, group sex and homosexuality”, indicating that a traditional concept of protecting children from the abnormal was the Commission’s major ambition.

These views were hardly original; instead the Commission considered them to be the same as the ones that had led Sweden to use film censorship and age limits on films for decades. The Commission was also under the impression that watching of violence on TV and films regularly was a contributing cause for the development of a violent character. These motives were, however, also considered practically identical with the ones already present in the guidelines for public television. The reason for re-formulating the censorship rules were, in other words, not a change in values but a change in access to film violence and pornography, due to the increased spread of video tapes and access to cable and satellite TV. It was a matter of defending Sweden

504 Dir. 1990:40.
from dangerous foreign threats to civil and moral values. Nordic homogenisation and cooperation on the prevention of this kind of circulation was thus considered highly desirable. In spite of its professed agreement with the earlier state of things, the Commission did, however, not consider continued adult censorship a desirable policy in the future. The main problem appears thus to have been to combine freedom of speech with protection for the young. This was further complicated by the insight that the normal way of watching film for children and teenagers was on TV and not in cinemas. In the end the Commission failed in agreeing on a recommended policy. Instead, it pointed to two contradictory paths for further action. In both alternatives age limits were to continue to exist and it would also remain possible to forbid films for adults. The main difference concerned instead whether the new 18-years age limit should be recommended or legally binding.506 As no censorship was enforced on other forms of expression one has to conclude that the more established artistic fields still held too much authority to be censored.

LITERATURE AND LIBRARY POLICY

Ideologically little had changed in the organisation of government policy on the literary field between 1972 and 1991. General literature policy had been institutionalised along the path already taken (e.g. in the Government Literature Subsidies Ordinance 1978:490). When these subsidies were increased in 1991/92 the support for this was unanimous among the parties, except for the Social Democrats, who instead argued for special increases to the benefit of immigrant, minority and children’s literature. As a support for the printing of literature, grants were also given to the production of the literary pocket book series *En bok för alla* (“A Book for Everyone”), intended to produce quality books at affordable prices. Neither did this activity raised any debate, although Moderates in the Riksdag Committee on Cultural Affairs commented that only books for children and young people actually required such support: sufficient quantities of quality literature for adults were already provided by the market. No changes were, however, proposed in that direction. Support was, furthermore, given for the first time to bookstores to enable them to keep a larger selection, something that the Riksdag Committee for Culture considered especially important outside the major cities.507 None of

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these events points to any major changes in the structure of the field or in the concept of its relation to the nation. Neither did much change in governmental library policy. The main reason for this may, however, have been that very little was decided on the national level, as it was mostly regarded as a municipal activity.508

MUSEUM AND HERITAGE POLICY

If literature and library policy remained unchanged and uncontroversial during the time of the Bildt Government, museum policy, which had been so much outside the mainstream of cultural policy in the seventies, now began to come into focus again. The main event in this field in the early nineties was the report of the Museum Commission. Apart from this, many other issues were debated. Heritage policy provoked both recurring debates in the Riksdag and several government commissions. Yet, no changes were made in the purposes or orientation of these activities. Since the seventies the integration of cultural heritage (not including museums) as a field had come to a conclusion in 1988, when legislation on the field was collected in a new law on cultural environments. Even though its portal paragraph expressed a holistic view of cultural heritage general legislation, however, continued to centre on the protection of specific objects.509 Most of the changes that were made during the Bildt Government were intended to make them more efficient through marketisation and other NPM standard solutions. The following discussions on material heritage preservation, archives and museums will thus mainly illustrate the rise of NPM and the continued path dependency of heritage and museum policy, in spite of these changes. Museum policy was as we shall see a different issue entirely.

When the new government took office it showed a relatively positive attitude towards heritage and museums, at least in general. In its first National Budget it even increased the grants – especially for heritage preservation – in spite of a strained budgetary situation. Later on the government, however, became more and more restrictive, and although it never attempted to decrease public spending on this sector, debates in the Riksdag grew more and more inflamed. The Socialist parties argued for continued increases in public spending, especially concerning the preservation of industrial heritage, for heritage

economic, social or cultural debate, or that primarily provides space for analysis and presentation within the various forms of art”, 1992/93 KrU:26: 9, quoting ordinance 1977:393, a definition in line with the norms established in the seventies.


projects that could help decrease unemployment and for the role of museums in promoting multiculturalism. New Democracy, on the other hand, declared as their general opinion that no increases in spending on cultural policy should take place before the final report of the Culture Commission. Yet, in 1994 they supported increased spending on museums.510

While some general differences of opinion existed between the various parties, most private bills on these policies still originated with single members. These were generally voted down by a unanimous Riksdag Committee referring to the strained budget situation, to its intent to wait for the recommendations of the Culture Commission or to the fact that minor grants should be granted by the National Heritage Board (RAÄ), KUR or the County Museums, not by the Riksdag. These bills typically concerned a single museum or a demand for the preservation of a single building. The old silver mine at Sala (in the province of Västmanland) was the object of much concern of this kind, as were the walls of Vadstena Castle and the City of Visby, as well as several museums in Gothenburg and Malmö. These bills tending to defy party lines originated in all parties, but with clear over representation of Social Democrats, Centrists, Liberals and, to some extent, Moderates. The two new parties – Christian Democrats and New Democrats – were more passive, and the Leftists engaged in this sort of bill-writing primarily when the objects could be linked with unemployment or industrial heritage.511

More interesting than these minor bills were perhaps the motions on museum funding that caused more general disagreement in the Riksdag. One major recurring debate concerned government grants to the Museum of Work (in Norrköping). The museum had been founded in 1983, as a foundation by the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), the Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO), the Swedish Cooperative Union (KF) and folkbildning associations connected with them. It had opened in 1991 as one of the rare new government funded museums. However, it did not receive the same positive treatment by the new centre-right government: its grants were cut by two million in the government’s first year and (unlike other major museums) it received no increases in the following budgets. This became the cause of noted differences of opinion from the representatives of the Social Democrats and the Leftists.512 To them, industrial heritage and the Museum of Work were a matter of including the working classes in the preserved mat-

eral heritage. To their opponents it was a case of the organisations of the workers’ movement trying to institutionalise their own version of history in a way that would threaten the political neutrality of heritage policy. Both sides thus referred to neutrality as a source of legitimacy.513 Inclusion of group heritage in the national heritage was now on the agenda as a political issue.

The government, too, worked to protect industrial heritage. They chose, however, to do so by making it easier for private persons to create foundations for preserving cultural heritage, primarily for industrial heritage and manor houses. The background to this decision was a report submitted in 1991. That commission had started its work in 1988 as the result of a private bill in the Riksdag. The authors of this motion – former ministers Karin Ahrland and Jan-Erik Wikström (both Liberals) – had wanted a commission appointed to investigate the possibilities for an increased protection of privately owned cultural heritage, such as manor houses, pointing to the British National Trust as a positive example. The Riksdag accepted the motion; Bill Fransson was appointed commissioner and was to be advised by among others Keith Wijkander of the RAÄ. In its final report the Commission recommended reducing taxation on manor buildings as well as the possibility for their owners to reorganise them as foundations (providing that these foundations also included enough property to ensure their independence). The government accepted this but added industrial heritage as an example of an interesting field for further support. Furthermore, the Commission recommended that a national heritage foundation should be created by the State.514 Although this was never done, it is an example of how the government tried to decentralise cultural policy. A National Heritage Foundation would have paralleled the research foundations as an alternative source of funding for a field.

A less extensive, but still interesting, debate concerned the export of cultural heritage. The private bills that precluded this debate were few and were in the end turned down unanimously by a Riksdag Committee which, however, agreed that the issue merited further investigation (an investigation they considered already ongoing within the responsible authorities). Kjell Nordström and a group of other Social Democrats motioned for increased actions against the export of culturally valuable horse wagons. Per Gahrton and other members of the Green Party on the contrary demanded a more generous policy of returning foreign cultural heritage, especially when concerning items that had originally come into Swedish hands as spoils of war.

513 I develop this argument more thoroughly in Harding 2006a, as well as in later chapters on heritage policy in this volume.
The Committee’s answer to this was quite lengthy and included several discussions of significant precedents. In the end it strongly supported the status quo, involving that the return of valuable items could take place in some cases, as the free actions of the Swedish authorities, while the law demanded special authorisation for the export of culturally valuable items,\textsuperscript{515}

As Swedish cultural items [kulturföremål] are considered items that are or can be presumed to have been made in Sweden or in another country by a Swede. As foreign cultural items are considered items that have been made in another country by someone other than a Swede.\textsuperscript{516}

This is among the clearest definitions of any part of the material cultural heritage and is especially interesting given the implication that these items are, in a sense, the property of the nation, as represented by the government. The definition is quite wide and it includes all items connected both with the Swedish territory and with the Swedish ethnicity. The list of objects that could be considered “cultural items” (kulturföremål) included in the Heritage Law emphasises objects connected to Swedish folk culture as well as to the Sami minority and thus suggests that Sweden consists of one territory and two ethnicities.\textsuperscript{517}

While limiting exports remained uncontroversial, industrial heritage remained politically relevant and could thus be accused of political bias. It was, however, not controversial enough to warrant any radical measures against the museums that the government considered biased. The “bias” was, on the

\textsuperscript{516} 1991/92:KrU2 referring to SFS 1988:950, 5 chapter 2§.
\textsuperscript{517} The heritage law listed cultural items as follows: “Swedish cultural items: 1. Items that has been produced before the year 1600 regardless of value: a) printed texts, maps and pictures as well as b) hand-written scriptures on parchment or paper. 2. More than 100-year-old items regardless of value: a) drinking vessels, harnesses and textile tools, if they are wooden and have painted or carved décor, b) folk costumes and embroidered or pattern-woven folk textile, c) painted wallpapers, d) furniture, mirrors and boxes, e) floor clocks, table clocks and wall clocks, f) signed faience, g) musical instruments and h) guns, melee weapons [blankvapen] and protective weapons. 3. More than 100-year-old items with a value of more then 50 000 kronor, to the extent that the item can not be regarded under point 2: a) paintings, drawings and sculptures, b) items in ceramics, glass or porphyry, c) items in gold, silver and bronze other then coins and medals, and d) chandeliers and woven tapestry. 4. More then 50-year-old items at a value of more then 2000 kronor, to the extent that the item cannot be considered under point 1 or 2: a) Sami items, b) non-printed minutes, letters, diaries, manuscripts, notes and account books, c) hand drawn maps and plans and d) technological models and prototypes as well as scientific instruments.” 1991/92:KrU2 quoting SFS 1988:950 chapter 5, §4).

“Foreign cultural items that can be presumed to have arrived in Sweden before 1840 and that have a value of more then 50 000 kronor: a) furniture, mirrors and boxes, b) floor clocks, table clocks and wall clocks, c) musical instruments, d) guns, melee weapons and protective weapons, e) paintings, drawings and sculptures, f) items in ceramics, glass and ivory, g) items in gold, silver or bronze other then coins and medals, and h) chandeliers and weaved tapestry.” 1991/92:KrU2 quoting SFS 1988:950 chapter 5, §5.
other hand, never defended as such. Instead, its adherents referred to the legitimising values of democracy and equality.\textsuperscript{518} In the government’s last year, fortunes changed for several projects and museums (including the Museum of Work, the Roseum in Malmö and the Museum of Ethnography in Stockholm). This was not the result of any change in policy on the part of the government, but instead the result of an alliance among the extra-governmental parties. Social Democrats and Leftists remained moved by regionalism and by their concerns for industrial heritage and the fight against unemployment. New Democracy, on the other hand, argued against what it perceived as the government’s prioritising of minor museums over museums with national responsibilities. These minor museums ironically included some that the government had supported because of Social Democratic bills, such as the Immigrant Museum in Botkyrka.\textsuperscript{519}

\textit{Commissions on Material Cultural Heritage Support}

In June 1992 the Minister of Culture assigned Christina von Arbin of the RAÄ to investigate and present recommendations for the government support of heritage preservation in connection with re-building and restoring culturally significant buildings. Experts were recruited from the RAÄ (such as Keith Wijkander) and from government agencies and public companies connected with housing policy. Among the reasons for this, were changes in the governmental support system for housing. The commission came to suggest mostly technical changes in these systems. More importantly, however, the responsibility for these support systems was to be transferred from the National Board of Housing, Building and Planning to the RAÄ. While the report included little discussion on the nature of cultural heritage it was, in other words, made quite clear who had the competence to recognise it.\textsuperscript{520} Another commissioner was assigned to investigating and presenting recommendations on the handling of the mandatory archaeological excavations connected with land exploitation. At this point, they were under the responsibility of the County Administrative Boards in consultation with the RAÄ and the County Museums. This system was according to the Minister unsatisfactory and the commissioner was charged with presenting recommendations in the following directions:\textsuperscript{521}

\textsuperscript{518} The democratic aspects and objectives of preserving the industrial heritage have been the subject of much discussion among academics concerned with the heritage sector. The anthologies of Alzén & Burell (2005) and Aronsson & Alzén (2006) include a number of good examples of this discussion.

\textsuperscript{519} 1993/94:KrU26, Motion 1993/94: Kr309.


\textsuperscript{521} Dir. 1991:112.
- The scientific – including popular scientific – surplus of archaeological exploitation investigations should increase.
- Investigation costs are increasing. Increases should be limited.
- To reach these objectives, it is important that there are several actors in the field and that the assignments are distributed among them.522

Commissioner Birgitta Isaksson Péres (with the help of among others Professors Hans Andersson and Åke Hyenstrand, Gustav Trotzig of the RAÄ and Keith Wijkander, now of the Ministry of Culture) submitted a report in December 1992. This Commission recommended what was to be the only marketisation reform of the cultural sector at this time: County Administrative Boards should purchase excavation services from entrepreneurs under the supervision of the RAÄ and with the County Museums as responsible for taking care of the findings. This would also mean that the Excavation Unit (UV) at the RAÄ would be separated from that agency, reorganised as a government-owned company competing with other possible archaeological companies for excavation contracts. This conclusion was, however, not uncontroversial: Hyenstrand and Trotzig both noted differences of opinion, noting among other things the need to protect the system established during the previous 300 years and based on mutual trust in a spirit of cooperation. It has to be noted, on the other hand, that the whole difference was a matter of means; there were no differences of opinions on the value of excavations or on the need for a legal requirement.523

The actors in the field, such as the RAÄ, the universities and the County Administrative Boards, agreed more with the disagreements noted in the report than with the recommendations of the Commissioner herself: a marketised model would not only break up a cooperation that had evolved during centuries, it would also fragment the process of analysis taking place between archaeological findings and adding them to the collections of the museums. In spite of this negative expert opinion, the government decided to go through with the recommendations and included the model in the National Budget of 1993/94. At the same time it proposed increased funding for the relevant bureaus in the County Administrative Boards (in order to make it possible for them to obtain the necessary expertise for buying archaeological services). The separation of the UV from the RAÄ was, on the other hand, shelved until the submission of the final report of the Museum Commission. The reception in the Riksdag was as cold as among the acting authorities and the reorganisation (but not the increases in funding) was thoroughly rejected. New Democracy accused the government of having misunderstood the entire

archaeological process as “primarily digging”\textsuperscript{524} One has to conclude that the norms of the heritage field had more authority than the supporters of public management reform.

\textit{Debates and Commissions on Archive Policy}

While the structure of most sub-sectors within cultural policy had remained unchanged since the early seventies, the archive system had been slightly changed as a consequence of the Archive Commission that had worked between 1985 and 1988 and led to a new Archive Law (SFS 1990:782). In this context the most important feature of these enquiries and reforms were the general objectives for archive policy proposed by the Archive Commission:

The first responsibility is the providing of knowledge. \textsuperscript{525}
The second responsibility is the cultural. \textsuperscript{525}
The third responsibility is that of increased efficiency. \textsuperscript{525}

The first purpose was related to democracy and the rights granted by the Fundamental Laws, the second to the objectives of cultural policy. \textsuperscript{526} These objectives become clearer in view of their legal and political background in the Freedom of the Press Act, national cultural policy and the current economic debate. The “knowledge” of the first responsibility was in other words the specific knowledge of procedures and decisions made by specific government agencies. Cultural purposes, on the other hand, would seem to include most other possible (and existing) uses, but especially those connected with historical and heritage interest. It is also significant that the Commission considered both the civic responsibility of archives and the demand for efficiency to be relatively well provided for by the present structure, while an acceptable fulfilment of the cultural purpose would require a significant expansion of archive facilities. This historical aspect of their work would require a greater support for private archives, primarily those of major NGOs. New regional archives would, furthermore, have to be established, both in order to increase availability and to provide space for new material. \textsuperscript{527} In its following bill, the government agreed with these recommendations, as had the general consensus among the relevant authorities when the report was circulated for comments. It was, however, decided that the new archive law should concentrate on the first of the three responsibilities, not on the second responsibility, which is the main concern of this study. \textsuperscript{528} During the period discussed here, little debate erupted on archive policy in general. The expansion of the

\textsuperscript{525} SOU 1988:11: 10-11.
\textsuperscript{526} SOU 1988:11, 1992/93:KrU22.
\textsuperscript{527} SOU 1988:11.
\textsuperscript{528} Government bill 1989/90:72, SFS 1990:782.
archive sector was, however, continuously investigated. A government commission report was submitted in 1991, before the change of government, but since the question remained unanswered further investigation was entrusted to the National Archives. Debates in the Riksdag came during the same period to concentrate on the locations of the proposed new regional archives, something that became the subject of several private bills from regional members of all parties.  

Although some dissatisfaction existed in the Riksdag with the (according to the opposition) slow management of the expansion of the archive sector, no differences of opinion were formally noted in the Riksdag Committee, except for New Democracy’s disagreement with the Riksdag’s decision to allow increased spending.

The responsibilities of the Dialect and Place Name Archives and the Swedish Folksong Archive (DOVA) were, on the other hand, the subject of several private bills. These were submitted primarily by Liberal and Centrist representatives but also by Social Democrats. All of these bills were in favour of increased legislation in order to preserve the cultural heritage under its responsibility. It was, however, more for efficiency reasons that DOVA was reorganised. This was a government agency that had been created in 1970 through the collection of several smaller organisations, some of which dated from the turn of the century. Its duties included such various activities as documenting dialects, folksongs, place names, folktales and jazz music. SAFAD had now proposed to reorganise it again, primarily because it was too small to be efficient as an agency.

Minister Friggebo appointed Professor Åke Hyenstrand commissioner for investigating this and recommending changes in its organisation. A year later he submitted his final report and recommended that the leadership structure of the agency should be made more focused by being concentrated in the hands of an executive director assisted by a board composed of representatives of society. This would bring the organisation of

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529 Especially high interest was enjoyed by the proposed project of expanding the facilities of Vadstena Regional Archive in Vadstena Castle through the reconstruction of the castle walls as new archive buildings, something reputedly argued for by regional representatives of all parties, as well as by Lars Werner and Gudrun Schyman, the present and future leaders of the Left Party. Arguments, however, remained whether technical or referring to the creation of local jobs, 1991/92: KrU22, 1992/93: KrU22, 1993/94: KrU23.

530 1991/92: KrU22, 1992/93: KrU22, 1993/94: KrU23 This was also the year that the Riksdag informed the government that it expected that it have other aspects than the need for archive facilities in mind when taking a decision on expanding Vadstena Castle, 1993/94: KrU23.


532 In 1989 SAFAD made an investigation of government agencies with fewer than a hundred employees, DOVA among them, SOU 1992:142.

533 SOU 1992:142. Hyenstrand also presented some arguments for continuing the work of this agency. While he consciously contrasted the collecting of the remnants of a distant past characteristic of heritage discourse in previous years to the more modern view of recording current
the agency more in line with general isomorphic norms. It was soon accepted by the Riksdag and a unanimous Riksdag Committee. The agency was renamed The Institute for Dialectology, Onomastics and Folklore Research (Språk och folkminnesinstitutet) and charged with the general responsibility to work towards the objective that “the knowledge of the cultural heritage of the whole country in the form of place names, dialects and folk memories are kept alive and spread in society”, an objective that combined a primordial view of heritage with common access within the state-framed nation.

It is interesting to note that this growth in the archive sector took place with almost universal political consensus. Within the university sector the Duty Copy Commission (Pliktleveransutredningen) used the following argument for a parallel increase in archiving, which could be relevant to understanding the corresponding developments in the cultural sector as well:

Products of Swedish life, Swedish society and Swedish culture that are saved for posterity show our distinctiveness and provide identity in the European community. In the end this is about cooperation over the borders emphasising the human heritage in our world and its importance today and in the future. This is fully in line with the normative system of cultural policy at this point. The Riksdag Committee on Culture, however, made no attempt to explicit justification beyond the assumption that the cultural uses of archives were of increasing importance. There was apparently no need for further justification.

Memory and Bildning: a Commission on the Purposes and Organisations of Museums

While the heritage field was slowly strengthening its positions, norms started to change more quickly in the museum field. Central to this was the commission led by Ambassador Bengt Säve-Söderberg, assigned the broad investigation of the field of museum policy in 1993:

The museum structure of today has evolved successively during a long time. As new museums have been added alongside older ones, the number of State-owned and State-subsidised museums have increased. At the same time the whole has become

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change in the subjects of the agency, he also stressed the importance of what he described as the “hidden” or immaterial cultural heritage. Without this the material and legally protected heritage would become incomprehensible and meaningless. It was therefore of great importance to protect, or at least record, such things as ancient names of places and persons. He also argued that the changes in Swedish folk memory could be of special international interest as greater changes in the wider word could become clearer when seen through the eyes of a peripheral nation such as Sweden. Apart from emphasising the importance of his subject to both research and identity, he continued to stress the increased possibilities for raising the population’s awareness of their immaterial heritage (SOU 1992:142). It has to be presumed that the government and the Riksdag agreed with these opinions.

more difficult to survey. [--] In its fundamental properties the museum structure is
[...] the same as before the cultural policy decisions of the 1970s.536

Now was, however, the time to make a new and more comprehensive overview of the entire museum field. Such an overview should include the connections between government-funded museums, universities, the heritage sector, the art sector and the NTE, as well as with non-governmental or municipal museums and with society at large. It should include a discussion of the organisation of the RAÅ and the Museum of National Antiquities (still organised as one government agency) as well as of the function of KUR as a coordinator of the museum sector. All of this should be done by the end of Mars 1994.537 Later in 1993 the Riksdag, however, decided that this investigation merited the involvement of representatives of all the Riksdag parties as well as by experts. The commission was therefore re-formed into a commission headed by Säve-Söderbergh but also including representatives of the four largest parties: Björn Kaaling of the Social Democrats, Göran Åstrand of the Moderates, Karin Perers of the Centre Party and Harriet Colliander of the New Democracy.538

To collect information the Commission used several different methods, such as questionnaires, interviews, visits to museums and a conference. With very few exceptions these served to collect the opinions and observations of museum employees. The view of reality that was to be represented in the material gathered by the Commission was, in other words, that of museum employees and experts as a profession. The few exceptions consisted of information from academic experts. No research was done on the opinions of the public, or the visitors. The result fit well with the Minister’s assumption of a complex and diverse museum structure. The commission observed that there were at least 210 museums in the country (including 15 national museums, 23 County Museums, 63 municipal museums as well as several other groups). In addition to these the commission suspected that there might also be at least 500 more museums in the country which were not connected with the public sector. To obtain an acceptable overview of things a new definition of a museum was needed, one that was more comprehensive than the one in use. A “museum” was, according to the Commission, the dwelling place of the Muses. The Muses are, according to Greek mythology, daughters of the goddess of memory. A definition could, however, not be based on a purely linguistic analysis, just as it could not be based on “the ordinary man’s understanding”, especially not when the definition concerned was one that would become the

536 Dir. 1993:26; 2.
basis for allocating public funds. Instead the commission concluded that it would have to form its opinion on the basis of discussions among museum professionals:\textsuperscript{539}

A museum is a part of society’s collective memory. A museum acquires, documents, preserves and communicates objects and other evidence of human culture and environment. It develops and promotes knowledge and offers experiences appealing to all our senses. It is open to the public and contributes to the development of society. The purpose of the museum is knowledge for the citizens.\textsuperscript{540}

This was not a descriptive definition but rather a mix between an ideal and a highly idealised self-image, originating in the material collected from the museum professionals questioned in the Commission’s research. It was, furthermore, based on that of international organisations within the field (primarily ICOM) as well as on its own investigation and the objectives of 1974. This is, in other words, the normative self-image of an increasingly international professional community. The Commission also noted that the majority of museum professionals at this point often used these objectives as guidelines in their everyday work (something the commissionaires themselves did not seem to have considered anything but natural).\textsuperscript{541}

Their professional identity was thus a mixture of that ascribed to them by the cultural policy of the early seventies and of the one they and their colleagues ascribed to themselves in the context of an international professional community. Normative concepts had now started to leak directly across the national border within the framework of a trans-national field that was now seen as an authority parallel to that of the national ideologists of 1972. A keyword in this self-image would seem to be “memory:

Systems in evolution need a memory, and societies are evolving systems. The museums are part of the collective memory of human beings; they are not the collective memory, but they may well be the leading element in societies’ collective memory. […] Human societies have possessed collective memories at least since we started telling tales and stories around campfires thousands of years ago. In the first civilizations between the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, memory became institutionalized in museums.

The definition of memory holds the key to the museums’ objectives. Memory is not a building, it is not a structure. It is first and foremost a process whereby information is gathered, processed, communicated and used. […] Consequently museums need not only acquire and preserve evidence of human and natural life, it is equally important to communicate the information contained in this evidence. […] We argue that museums are in the service of society and consequently must offer both learning

\textsuperscript{539} SOU 1994:51: 9-18.
\textsuperscript{540} SOU 1994:51: 218, in the English summary. It should be noted that the word translated as “communicates” is “levandegör”, more literary meaning “making come alive”, the same word as the one used in the cultural policy objectives, and that “knowledge” is a translation of “bildning”.
\textsuperscript{541} SOU 1994:51.
and entertainment, but the single most important objective of memory is to help us learn, as individuals and in society.\footnote{542}{SOU 1994:51: 216-217.}

These general views on the functions of museums in society were also elaborated on in the historical appendix written by Per-Uno Ågren, a museologist. He approached his subject by starting with the first museums founded in Sweden. These had been legitimising projects of kings like Gustavus Adolphus. Today museums were facing a time of change and challenge: a time in which they would have to take a new and more active role in a changing society. French museologists such as Georges Henri Riviéri and Hugues de Varine were referred to as authorities to promote a more open view of the museum as part of society and in close connection to the people. The international museum organisation – ICOM – could be seen as working in the same direction. From these sources new super-standards could be imported for the reformation of Swedish museums. Luckily for the Swedes, the traditional Swedish view of museums could, however, be considered closer to this vision, as the role of the local heritage movement in the evolution of the museum institution in Sweden made the popular connection a part of their history.\footnote{543}{SOU 1994:51:5-28 in the appendix.}

The new concept could thus be legitimised by history as well as by new authority.

According to these views, the museums were lacking in one major aspect: communication, especially communication with certain groups in society. Museum visitors unfortunately still typically came from high-income and highly educated backgrounds while the less educated and those with lower incomes remained significantly underrepresented. The attendance of immigrants had been decreasing for several years. The most frequent visitors were children between the ages of ten and twelve. The quality of these visits could, however, be questioned as the visits frequency decreased as the children entered their teens. The Commission’s own view of the people is perhaps best illustrated by the second appendix developed by “three young women” engaged via the Fryshuset project (a municipal project in Stockholm directed at young people with problems). It had in other words not chosen to look at the statistics or tried to get in touch with “the ordinary man” but instead tried to reach out to those perceived as being furthest away from museums and their traditional public, perhaps trying to regain their historical connection with the true soul of the people. This approach appears to be well in line with the 1972 norms of Swedish cultural policy, but also with the trends of international professional debate. Ironically, the “three young women” agreed almost entirely with the expertise and concluded that an increased contact with “ord-
inary” – or in their case: “young” – people was what the museums needed most. If anything, this appendix, when compared to the rest of the report, included a more pronounced demand for seeing things in their proper context and to have them explained.544

The commission, however, did not stop at the problems for museums to reach the public with their message. Instead, it also addressed the question of how this message should be decided:

The museums shall of course conduct their public activities in ways that do not compromise the freedom of expression, but that does not mean that the museums in all their responsibilities can be equaled with free artists, writers and other leaders of public opinion [opinionsbildare]. The Museums have e.g. the responsibility to care for, preserve and document a significant part of our cultural heritage in the form of objects or other testimonies, a central responsibility that has more the character of public trust [förvaltningsuppdrag].545

In spite of its ideological inspiration from organisations such as ICOM, the Commission thus continued to take it for granted that museums were part of the State and had to work within the framework of its bureaucratic norms. This is one example of how the Swedish concept of the museum met with international influence. In this case the Commission solved the conflict by giving precedence to the Swedish model.

Both efficiency and governance problems in the museum sector were considered the result primarily of the complexity of the sector and its resulting lack of coordination and cooperation. To overcome these problems the Commission recommended increased cooperation both within and outside the sector. The existing cooperation with schools was deemed extremely important to the communicative aspects of museum responsibilities. Increased cooperation with universities was also important. Cooperation like this should preferably cross discipline borders and could benefit the museums both in their role as research institutions and by developing the competence of their personnel. This was also the time for a reorganisation of the national museums as public agencies; the commission recommended that government-owned museums should be organised in four national units: (1) the creative arts, (2) natural sciences and ecology, (3) the history of human civilizations and (4) humanity in the world today. This would have several benefits, since the new units would be in a better position to reallocate resources for national purpos-

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545 SOU 1994:51: 200-201. It is interesting to note that this quotation, taken from the report’s Swedish summary, did not have any direct parallel in the English version where the closest statement is this: “A large system such as the museums needs a purpose and a mission. Without objectives management may become an haphazard affair, and the task of selecting what to do and setting priorities would be left to chance.”, SOU 1994:51: 216

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es and at the same time include museums all over the country, something the commission seemed almost painfully aware that the present organisation, based on central museums, did not. That it would mean severing the Museum of National Antiquities from the Heritage Board was considered only positive, as it was obvious that the activities of the Museum would benefit more from co-organisation with other museums than with a completely different kind of organisation.  

The new organisational system would, furthermore, have to include increased possibilities for governance. Its roles or functions were defined as acquisition, preservation, communication and research. The performance of the museums in their four roles would have to be monitored and regulated. Measures based on economic incentives were especially recommended, as was governance through ideals and norms, which was presumably exactly what the Commission was trying to provide through its extensive ideological reasoning. While the appropriate way to organise the museum sector was under discussion at this time, it was quite clear that to the Museum Commission museums were developing into a field separate from heritage: it had its own professional opinions, its own academic discipline (museology) and would get its own government agencies. That the Museum of National Antiquities should be co-organised with other museums rather than with other heritage authorities was an obvious consequence of this way of defining its field. However, this field also had its own ideological conflict. Its purpose was in no way clear. Unlike the situation in the heritage field this was not a conflict between the general cultural policy objectives and a separate set of bureaucratic norms for heritage, but instead it was a conflict between, on the one hand, a combination of these two and, on the other hand, a trans-national professional norm system that put the independent role of the museum before its loyalty to the State. While this does not directly influence the ruling concept of the nation, it most certainly weakened the tendency towards institutional integration into State authority.

The Riksdag, on the other hand, continued to treat museums and heritage primarily from other perspectives, such as employment and regional policy. At the same time museums and heritage appear to have continued to be important to most Riksdag parties, with the possible exception of the Left. Much like the other commissions working with heritage they continued to view it from the same perspective as the commissions of the early seventies (i.e. not in line with the general cultural policy of 1972, but as a fixed primordial entity that was in need of being reinvigorated). The focus was, in other words, on heritage as passive memory, even when some of the actors were

547 SOU 1994:51, the discussions on the role of museums are summarised in pp. 222-224.
striving to include the memory of the whole of Swedish society in a more objective way (a way that their opponents, however, criticised as less objective). As a middle ground between the Museum Commission and the rest of the heritage policy makers, archive policy focused on preservation, but both for civil and primordialist purposes. It was, however, the latter that legitimised the expansion of the sector. NPM made its mark in both museum policy and in the expanding archive sector. It was, however, in the more conservative heritage sector that it made its major breakthroughs. Where purposes remained unchanged – and thus clear – efficiency could apparently be increased.

**CHURCH AND RELIGION POLICY**

If museum policy had remained constant for a long time and began to change in the early nineties, the Church had begun to change as early as the beginning of the eighties and was now continuing to change. In the new Instrument of Government the regulations of Church Law had been placed among the transitory regulations to indicate that the relationship between Church and State was expected to change within the foreseeable future. The Synod’s constitutional right to veto decisions concerning the Church’s internal affairs thus ceased to be a permanent feature of the constitution. This was seen as a direct consequence of the parliamentarian principle at the heart of the new Instrument of Government: only the Riksdag could legislate. The Church was now open to the threat of direct use of power from the government and the Riksdag. Yet, the centre-right governments of the late seventies failed to reach an agreement on the separation of Church and State, efforts that ended up in a bill supported only by a Liberal government.\(^548\) The only change made by these centre-right governments was in fact that of permanently transferring Church policy to the ministry responsible for municipal policies had been made permanent in 1976. In 1991 Inger Davidson, the Christian Democratic Minister of Public Administration was thus responsible for Church policy.\(^549\)

In 1982 the Liberals, Centrists, Moderates and Social Democrats had, however, managed to agree on a new Church organisation, which was implemented in 1983 after having been accepted by the National Synod and after a successful change of the Fundamental Law. The clergy now lost their representatives in the Synod, which would thus consist only of indirectly elected political representatives. The Synod would, on the other hand, be given increased responsibilities by delegation from the Riksdag. The Church was also given a Central Board appointed by the government and headed by the Archbishop. Together with a General Secretary this Board would lead the Church

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548 See Ekström 2003: 122-148, for an overview of these developments.  
on the national level. During the following years an integrated organisation emerged for the Church on the national and diocese levels. It was clearly separated from the State, although the government continued to appoint most of its senior officials. Equally important was the Riksdag’s decision in 1991 to transfer responsibility for the national register to the tax authorities (as once suggested by Myrdal). Although the Moderates and the Centrists opposed this change, one more obstacle to the separation of Church and State had now been removed.550

Another change was soon to come. Until early 1992 large parts of the Church Law of 1686 had still been in force, regulating matters concerning the Church of Sweden in great detail, together with an increasing number of other laws and government acts of various ages, some of which were even older and many of which were obsolete. To bring order in this complex legal field, Minister Davidson appointed Judge Carl Axel Petri to investigate this and make recommendations for a reformed Church legislation. He was already a recognised expert in Church Law and had been secretary to the commission of 1958 (see p. 156).551 In 1987 he submitted his recommendations. It was, however, to take until February 1992 before these recommendations reached the Riksdag in the form of a government bill. At that stage, they had been circulated to a large number of groups and actors for consideration, as well as being submitted to, and accepted by, the Synod. There was now a general consensus among the more relevant actors. The result was a bill proposing that the lion part of legislation concerning the Church of Sweden should be rewritten in the form of one single Law on the Church of Sweden. This act would be significantly less detailed than the previous legislation. It enabled the Synod to act more independently and increased the power of elected bodies. Bishops should now be elected by the cathedral chapter together with the (indirectly elected) diocese assembly, instead of, as previously, by the cathedral chapter alone. The increased independence of the Church and its consistent bodies also included the authority to decide its own liturgy. Churches could now legally be used for activities not conducted according to the Liturgy of the Church of Sweden and thus became open for ecumenical use. The liturgical homogeneity of the Church decreased while power was centralised within it as it became a more integrated and distinct organisation, more in line with the democracy of the rest of society.552

550 Ekström 2003: 148-182, 243, for an overview of these developments.
552 Government bill 1991/92:85. Not included in the work of this Commission was, however, one of the most problematic questions of the field: the question of automatic membership in the Church. It was now, according to the government, generally accepted that the automatic membership of new citizens and children born to Church members was in conflict with the freedom of religion guaranteed to every citizen by the Instrument of Government (although it was allowed
Church Issues in the Riksdag

When it reached the Riksdag the bill was generally accepted and what little debate there was concerned the Church and State issue rather than the details of the new law itself. The only party not to vote in favour of the bill was the Left Party. Lars Werner, the Leftist leader, together with other representatives of his party, stated that no special regulations differentiating the Church of Sweden from other religious denominations should exist, but that the Riksdag should instead take a principle decision that the Church should be separated from the State from the January 1, 1993. Any problems resulting from such a swift decision could be solved through transitional legislation. Representatives of the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party also argued the importance of a decision on the future relationship between Church and State. Jerzy Einhorn of the Christian Democrats, as well, stressed the importance of equality in all issues between the denominations in case of a separation of Church and State. Representatives of the Centre Party, on the other hand, questioned the need for such a change. Arguments in favour of a general division between Church and State and the equality of religious denominations were based on references to universal values, while arguments against were particularistic, either with reference to the good of civil society or to Swedish culture.

Discussions on Church budgets in the Riksdag remained, on the other hand, even more consensual than debates on other Church matters. Among the few bills in the field was the one submitted in 1993/94 by Leftist representative Eva Zetterberg concerning the ongoing translation of the Bible. Zetterberg was concerned about the reactionary view of women that was expressed in the text. She therefore demanded that the Riksdag should instruct the Bible Commission to add an introduction to the text explaining the questionability of these opinions. The Committee on Cultural Affairs, however, considered the involvement of the Riksdag in these matters and at this stage unnecessary, but at the same time also commented that not only did it expect official Bible comments to deal with the views of women expressed by the Bible, but also with other un-modern opinions that could be found there.

The overwhelming consensus on Church issues was partially due to tradition and to the fact that government bills were generally the results not only of government deliberation but also of the involvement – and often the initiative – of the Synod of the Church of Sweden. The few disagreements

under its transitory regulations). A conclusion to this problem could however, according to the government, not be reached until a new model for the membership had been accepted by the Synod, and the possibility of such a solution was still under investigation by the Church as well as by the state (ibid.).


that occurred thus concerned financial support for other denominations. A number of Social Democratic private bills demanded increased support for these, not the least because immigration had increased their importance.\footnote{1991/92:KU32, 1991/92:K13, 1993/94:KU14, 1992/93:K11, 1993/94:KU07, 1993/94:K14. As these concerned the funding for other denominations rather than the Church of Sweden they were treated in the Committee on Cultural Affairs, rather than in the Committee on the Constitution. Among the few other details that were debated were the few non-territorial congregations of the Church of Sweden, which were the subject of a number of private bills. Liisa Rulander of the Christian Democrats, for example, in several bills tried to make the Finnish Congregation more separate, while Göran Åstrand and Bertil Danielsson of the Moderates were concerned with proposed limitations of the Congregation of the Royal Court and the German Congregations of Stockholm and Gothenburg to people living, in Stockholm and Gothenburg, respectively, 1991/92:KU32, 1991/92:K18, 1991/92:K19.}

However, when the Church of St. Katarina in Stockholm was burned down by arson in 1990, all parties supported a one-time grant of several million kronor for its reconstruction. The reasons given for this had, however, more to do with material heritage than with faith.\footnote{Motion 1991/92:K427.}

The Commission on Economics and Law in the Church (the ERK Commission)

In 1989, the government had appointed Judge Carl Axel Petri commissioner to describe the legal and economic situation of the Church of Sweden. Reasons given for this were the massive changes that had taken place since the earlier investigations, both through the reforms of the early decade and because of value changes in Church property. At the same time the commissioner was also charged with presenting different models for the future relationship between Church and State. Despite the fact that he was instructed not to make any specific recommendation for the future of this relationship, his report would become the breakthrough on this issue. When Petri submitted his final report in January 1992, he presented a picture of a Church that was already becoming increasingly separated from the State. Unlike his predecessors in the Myrdal Commission he included the involvement of the State in religion: While the Monarch could after 1974 no longer be considered the head of the Church, he (or she) was still required by the Order of Succession to belong to it. Many of the formerly royal powers over the Church had now been taken over by the government and the transitory regulations required that the ministers responsible were members of the Church of Sweden (this concerned the Ministers of Education and Public Administration, and possibly of Culture). Likewise, several government agencies, such as the National Audit Office, the National Tax Board and SAFAD remained involved in Church affairs.\footnote{SOU 1992:9:27-29, quoting the Government Minutes of 1989-02-16 and pp. 95-118 on the involvement of agents of the State in Church affairs and religious matters.}
The Church also retained some government responsibilities. Maintaining important parts of the nation’s cultural heritage in the form of churches was such a responsibility, as was maintaining burial grounds. The Commissioner noted that all of the previous commissions regarding the relationship between the Church and the State since the 1930s had considered these secular responsibilities. While most had in principle been in favour of transferring the responsibility for burial grounds to, for example, the municipalities, all plans in that direction had been discarded, mainly for practical reasons. One problem was that the vast majority of burial grounds were churchyards in direct connection to churches, belonging to the Church of Sweden and important to the appearance of these buildings, something that often concerned the heritage authorities as well. Involving three different interests in the maintenance of churchyards would doubtlessly be inefficient and unnecessarily complicated. The commissioner noted that the Church had always been exemplary in carrying out its duties in the centuries in which it had been executing them and that many of its members had a strong wish to be buried on hallowed ground. On the other hand, he also noted that many had pointed out that Sweden was no longer a homogenous Christian society and that this issue still remained unsolved.558

Another serious issue that remained was that of compatibility between freedom of religion and a State Church. Here the Myrdal Commission was used as an example of one extreme among the possibilities of interpretation: the position in which freedom of religion meant that the State ought to be strictly neutral in religious matters and that the privileged position of the Church of Sweden would therefore be incompatible with this central principle in modern society. On the other hand the commissioner pointed to a more literal interpretation of religious freedom as interpreted by the Freedom of Religion Act of 1951, in which it was interpreted as the negative freedom for any citizen to freely express their religion and maintain organisations for this purpose without government interference. Clearly there was no conflict between this principle and the freedom of those not belonging to the Church. Unfortunately, the influence of the State in Church affairs could be seen as an infringement on the freedom of the Church of Sweden. On the other hand such close connections with the government were traditional in Lutheran national churches and could well be considered a part of their preferred way of organisation.559

Even more problematic was, however, the issue of Church membership. This was, according to the commissioner, in conflict with the provision in the Law on Freedom of Religion that no one would be included in a religious

559 SOU 1992:9: 258-266.
denomination against his or her will. As this interpretation already existed in a law, the commissioner considered it to be the most appropriate way to interpret the freedom of religion guaranteed as a constitutional right by the Instrument of Government. To gain new perspectives on how to bridge this problem, the commissioner studied the Church and State relationship in a number of other comparable countries including Denmark, Norway, Finland, Germany, the USA and Italy. Among these the commissioner was especially inspired by the close relationship that Finland and the German Bundesländer enjoyed with their churches. More specifically he liked the fact that these institutions allowed both for independence of the churches and for a mutual rights to initiate changes in the relationship.560

Of special interest is also the expert report on the members of the Church of Sweden. This report included statistical material and conclusions based on this concerning the possible consequences for the Church in case of a separation of Church and State. Both “subjective” and “practical” connections were considered important. The experts concluded that while the membership of the Church of Sweden had been slowly declining as long as leaving had been a legal option, the corresponding development in the traditional Nonconformist denominations was even worse. The so called “Immigrant Churches” (now written with quotation marks), on the other hand, continued to increase (in percentage of the population as well as in absolute numbers).

As the non-Christian denominations were not included in the statistics it was assumed that this development also included the Muslim faith.561 The con-

560 SOU 1992:9: 205-230, 276-291. The commissioner considered Denmark and Norway to have a Church even more controlled by the State than in the Swedish system (they were among other things financially dependent on the State), while churches in the USA were at the other end of the spectrum. This situation was considered a result of the USA’s history as a country peopled primarily through immigration from a number of countries with different religious denominations. The USA was thus not comparable to Sweden. Finland, like Sweden, had a national Lutheran church and both this and the Russian Orthodox Church (of Finland) were considered public bodies. While the national church was regulated in law it also had the right to initiate legislation concerning its own internal affairs. While this was considered a good arrangement, its re-introduction into Sweden would conflict with newly established position of the Riksdag as sole legislator. In the case of Germany the churches were also public bodies. This was due to an arrangement in which the relationship between the Catholic Church, the Lutheran churches and the Reformed Landeskirche was regulated in the form of agreements between the church (or churches) and Bundesland governments. In these agreements change could be initiated by both parties but had also to be accepted mutually, SOU 1992:9: 205-230.

561 Among the categories used to group individual background were sex, place of residence and age, while the connection between religious affiliation, ethnicity and country of origin were never made. Expert study by Jonas Atwall from the research secretariat of the Church of Sweden, Göran Gustavsson, Professor of Sociology of Religions at Lund University and Thorleif Pettersson, Professor of Sociology of Religions at Uppsala University, published by the commission as SOU 1991:102, especially p. 26 on Nonconformist and Immigrant Churches.
tinued decline of the membership of the Churches that the Commission considered ethnically Swedish (non-immigrant) was, however, caused by immigration (the increasing numbers of people of non-Swedish ethnic origins), not secularisation, as in the seventies. It is also interesting to note that this state of affairs was expected to become permanent: i.e. the ethnic distinction between Swedes and immigrants was not expected to disappear when the immigrants were integrated into Swedish society.

While decreasing membership in the Church of Sweden remained a relatively minor problem, participation in Church activities was also low for most of its members, and although the attendances at Communion, Confirmations and Church weddings were actually increasing, the general trend remained decreasing. Despite the low attendance a vast majority of the polled Church members did not plan to leave the Church in case of a separation of Church and State. Neither was there any majority in favour of such a separation. Interestingly, 74% agreed that “[i]t is important that we have the Church of Sweden as a symbol of that the Swedish people is a Christian people” while 89% considered it “important that the Church of Sweden is responsible for ceremonies on important occasions in people’s lives” and 72% considered it “important that the Church of Sweden preaches the gospel so that people are brought to faith”. Identity issues were thus placed before the more universal faith-related issue of evangelisation. Although no majority in favour of a separation of the Church and State existed among the members of the Church, the experts believed this to be a result of the significant worry expressed by the members that Church economy would suffer and that this would make it impossible, or at least harder, for the Church to continue its work to the present extent (nearly all of the Church’s work was considered important by most of its members). These worries were, however, stronger among the non-active majority of the members and less expressed by the active minority. The experts also pointed out that active members had more to gain than both (politically appointed) parish representatives and non-active members. The wisest thing to do to pave the way for a separation of Church and State would be to ease the fears of the majority. They also pointed out that the poll result indicating a possible membership decline was probably exaggerated. Polls prior to previous Church reforms (such as the abolishment of compulsive membership in denominations in 1951) had been similarly exaggerated.

Other investigations were also made on the possible consequences of a separation of Church and State. Among these was the investigation made by SAFAD on behalf of the Commission concerning the costs and possibilities

for maintaining the material cultural heritage owned or maintained by the Church. At this point a significant part of the Church holdings was protected by heritage law. All churches built before 1940 were, for example, under legal protection and supervised by the RAA. The Church also owned a significant amount of land in need of protection as part of the cultural and natural landscapes, often in connection with buildings owned or maintained by the Church. The importance of parishes to local communities could also be considered a valuable part of the cultural heritage. All of these values were the responsibility of the State and the State could therefore be expected to contribute to cover the costs (this could preferably be arranged in the popular form of a purchaser–provider system).564 Thus the particularistic interests of identity and civil values – as opposed to universalist faith-based interests – were considered public matters.

With these perspectives and facts in mind the commissioner finished his work by presenting three main alternatives for a future changed relationship between the Church and the State. In Model 1 the Church would continue to be a part of the State but could still be given significant freedom through delegation from the Riksdag. In Model 2 the Church would become a separate entity from the State, but some legal regulation would still be maintained. The Church would lose its rights of taxation but government tax authorities could still be responsible for collecting its membership fees. The Church would, on the other hand, obtain government support for maintaining property of cultural heritage value. In Model 3 the Church would become entirely independent of the State in all matters, including in the collection of its fees. It could, however, still receive support for its role in heritage preservation. Regardless of how the relationship between Church and State would be resolved there were also several ways in which the burial grounds could be maintained. For the State or municipalities to take over the management of the churchyards was not recommendable. The responsibility could, however, be shared by the Church and municipalities and the State or municipalities could also take financial responsibility in case of a separation between Church and State.565

Unchanged in all of these models were a few central points. Among these were that the organisation of the Church was to retain a clerical hierarchy at all levels as well as elected representatives of the laity. While this arrangement on regional and national level was only a decade old (the role of the King as a layman at the head of the Church was left un-mentioned), the arrangement as such was, however, considered to be deeply rooted in a parish organisation dating back to the Middle Ages. Secondly, it was also considered beyond question that the Church was to be the same legal entity if separated

564 SOU 1991:9, Appendix 1.
from the State (with continued property rights). The Church’s right to tax non-members would, on the other hand, have to be abolished, as would all automatic forms of obtaining membership, since these could be considered to be in conflict with the basic freedoms guaranteed by the Instrument of Government. All three models could be considered more favourable for the Church than the one presented by Alva Myrdal.

The Church Commission
In 1992, the government decided to appoint a Commission composed of representatives of the Riksdag parties and headed by Petri to further discuss the state of the Church. This time the experts included, among others, Sören Ekström (then the Secretary General of the Church of Sweden) and Keith Wijkander (as an expert in cultural heritage). It was supposed to evaluate the Church reforms of the 1980s, reforms that were considered to have decreased government influence on the Church. It was also to make recommendations on possible reforms of Church membership, an issue that had not been included in the Church Bill presented earlier that year on account on the need for further deliberation. It would do much more than that. Interestingly, all of the commissioners were also members of the Church of Sweden.566

When the Commission delivered its final report (in March 1994), this included, among other things, the comments collected at the circulation of the report of the previous commission collected with a clear concentration on its second model. The response to that report had been positive, at least in general. In an extensive comment, the Central Board of the Church of Sweden together with all of its bishops had their own suggestions on how to organise the Church in the future. They agreed that the Church of Sweden should be enabled to become a separate legal entity but not at the cost of infringing on the independence of its parishes and dioceses. Neither the Central Board nor the bishops agreed with the relatively small amount of legal regulation proposed in Model 2. They argued instead that there was a special need for constitutional protection of the liturgy, teaching and faith of the Church of Sweden. Separation should, furthermore, be achieved without using the established legal forms, such as foundation, non-profit organisation and so on. The established opinion within the Church had long been that it was more than the sum of its members; it was a community based on faith. As an alternative, the Central Board and the bishops suggested that “registered denomination” should become a new category of legal persons. This was the solution that would be recommended by the Church Commission as well.567

The Association of Parishes and Congregations of the Church of Sweden, on the other hand, supported the maintenance of the parishes as legal entities under the Municipality Law, while the trade union (Svenska kyrkans personalförbund) considered the present regulations of the Church as a public entity preferable. The RAÅ stated the need for retained legal regulation of the Church’s management of the material cultural heritage. Several important commentators such as SAFAD, the Association of Nonconformist Churches, the Jewish Congregation of Stockholm and the office of the Catholic bishop were, furthermore, critical of the notion of continued separate legislation on the Church of Sweden. On the subject of the Church Tax the Central Board of the Church of Sweden agreed with the other denominations that the system could not be maintained and that it should be replaced with a system in which the State offered the service of collecting fees to the various denominations. SAFAD and the National Tax Board agreed that this option was feasible while the RRV and the board of the Church Fund considered the Commission’s views on the economy of the Church, in case of abolishment of its taxation rights, to be over-optimistic and thus called for further investigations. The Parish and Benefice Association of the Church of Sweden and the Church’s trade union, on the other hand, commented in favour of continued rights to taxation for the Church. On the more specific issue of responsibility for the burial grounds all of the commentators within the Church agreed that this should remain a Church responsibility, while the other denominations supported a transfer of this responsibility to the secular municipalities. The Swedish Association of Municipalities, however, objected to such a transfer, apparently un-tempted by this new responsibility.568

On the subject of Church membership, finally, the Stockholm Administrative Court of Appeal recommended further investigation into the constitutional matters involved, while SAFAD stated the need for retained legal regulation if the parishes remained public entities. The Nonconformist congregations, the office of the Catholic bishop and the Swedish National Council of Jewish Congregations all objected to all forms of automatic membership in the Church of Sweden, as well as to the requirement that the King should be a member of that church. The trade union, on the other hand, stated that everyone should be able to feel at home in the Church of Sweden, as long as they had not specifically stated anything else. The Central Board of the Church of Sweden, finally, recommended that any decision should wait until the Church’s own investigative commission had finished its work. Its was, however, submitted during the circulation. It concluded that membership in the Church of Sweden, in the future, ought to be based on the principle of

568 SOU 1994:42.
membership through baptism, a Christian universal faith based criterion to replace the earlier ethno-national connection with the *jus sanguinis* of citizenship legislation. Those who would want to join the Church in the future without being baptised by it should be able to obtain membership through application. The internal commission did, however, recommend that the Synod should prohibit all un-baptised persons from holding elected offices within the Church.\(^{569}\)

While the Church Commission made it very clear that its recommendations were closely based on these comments, it started by making the following statement:

Church activities over the centuries have played a very important part in the development of Swedish society. Society has been profoundly influenced by Christianity. From the viewpoint of the State today, in our opinion, there is still reason for taking a positive view of religious activities, partly in view of their important societal functions. This, however, should be combined with respect for those citizens who, for their own part, dissociate themselves from religious activities. In a modern society, the State has no reason for showing special favour to a certain denomination.\(^{570}\)

Although the phrase “separation of Church and State” remained curiously absent from the Commission’s vocabulary, it was recommended that the Church of Sweden, as a consequence of the desirability of state neutrality, should be given the status of a legal person separate from the State. To facilitate this and at the same time be able to offer legal protection to both the Church of Sweden and to other denominations, it was also proposed that “registered denomination” should become a new form of legal entity in which the Church of Sweden as well as any other denomination desiring this could organise itself. In this new form their independence could be protected in the Instrument of Government. The affairs of the Church of Sweden should, however, also be regulated in a special Law on the Church of Sweden including regulations for its identity, the duty of its members to pay membership fees (which would make it illegal for members to abstain) and its general decision-making procedures (that should be kept generally democratic).\(^{571}\)

Church economy would be secured as the Church would retain all its property (either as the property of the registered denomination or in the form of Church-controlled foundations) and at the same time receive payment from the State for taking care of buildings of historical interest. While the Commission recommended that the Church should lose its rights of taxation, it also recommended, however, that the Church of Sweden as well as all other registered denominations should receive the right to have their membership

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charges collected by the national tax authorities, a somewhat more generous solution than the one proposed in the seventies to the same problem. The Commission, furthermore, recommended that responsibility for burial grounds should remain with the Church of Sweden and that the costs of this would be covered by a special burial charge collected annually from both members and non-members by the tax authorities. Finally, it recommended that the issue of membership should be decided by the Church, but that negative freedom of religion for all citizens should be constitutionally guaranteed.\footnote{SOU 1994:42: 69-84, 119-124.} In order to realise this, the commission proposed a time plan:

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
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Year & Events \tabularnewline \hline
1994 & April Final report from the Church Commission. The report is circulated for consideration. December Deadline for comments. \tabularnewline
1995 & May Letter of principle [principskrivelse] from the government to the National Synod. August Consideration of the letter of principle by the National Synod. October Government bill on the principles. December Principle decision by the Riksdag. \tabularnewline
1996 & Certain governmental and Church internal investigations carried out. \tabularnewline
1997 & April Investigative work is finished. The reports are circulated for consideration. November Deadline for comments. December Government bill with propositions on Fundamental Law decisions. \tabularnewline
1998 & Spring First decision on Fundamental Law issues by the Riksdag. May Letter from the government to the National Synod on new legislation etc. August Decision by the National Synod on the government letter. October Government bill on new legislation. December Second decision on Fundamental Law issues by the Riksdag. Riksdag decision concerning the government bill. \tabularnewline
1999 & May Letter from the Central Board of the Church of Sweden to the National Synod on Church internal regulation. August Decision by the National Synod on the letter of the Central Board. \tabularnewline
2000 & 1 January Decisions come into force.\footnote{SOU 1994:42: 148-149.} \tabularnewline
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The Commission, however, never reached full consensus on its recommendations. The Liberal and Leftist representatives Bertil Hansson and Eva Zetterberg noted their disagreement with the Commission’s recommendation to retain special legislation on the Church of Sweden, a choice they considered to be in direct contradiction to the Commission’s stated goal that the State should treat all denominations equally. Bertil Hansson was the Liberal minis-
Institutional Integration

Institutional integration remained a major tendency throughout this period. Its contents were, however, distinctly different from in the seventies. Cultural policy was finally recognised enough as a policy field to be given its own separate Ministry of Culture. Most of the continued institutional integration, however, concerned management by objectives and results and other management reforms, rather than older versions of Weberian bureaucracy. Much as when Palme was Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, a number of government commissions were appointed. When trans-national management reform super-standards had been combined with the Swedish commission system, the latter had been interpreted as a primarily evaluative instrument. The cultural policy objectives of 1974 were thus interpreted not only as directions or explications of general norms, but also as objectives that should be attained and form the basis for evaluation. In this sense, management by objectives

574 SOU 1994:42: 175-221, quotation from p. 175.
and results was implemented in cultural policy with a higher degree of isomorphism than Programme Budgeting had ever been.

These commissions often consisted of one expert only and were generally charged with the evaluation of a sector. Others, however, consisted of representatives of the Riksdag parties. Although the time when governments issued large programmes for expanding the public sector was now past, the government did not use the budget situation or NPM to make major changes in the structure of cultural policy. Instead it accepted the existing institutions. Although some organisations were less well treated, no agencies or organisations were, however, or even subjected to major downsizing. The Museum Commission lay behind some of the few changes in the institutional structure of cultural policy proposed in these years. It recommended a thorough reorganisation of the museum field. Many of its recommendations were based on the authority of international museum organisations, thus implying that the museums were now parts of a trans-national professional field and not merely parts of a national policy. Another important new institution was introduced with the Foundation for the Culture of the Future, an innovation that also conformed to the mega-standard of artistic freedom, albeit in an organisational frame that was more accepted abroad than at home.

Freedom was also an important norm in Church policy. It was during this period that a changed relationship between Church and State was achieved. There was now a consensus on changing the relationship to make it closer to established standards for the relationship between the State and other organisations, closer to the protected and supported autonomy that already existed in the neo-corporative arrangements of cultural policy. Thanks to decisions made in the early eighties the Church of Sweden had become more distinct and integrated as an organisation. Its central organisation had become increasingly separate from the State but had at the same time mimicked the public sector in its new organisation. This new organisation gave more power to (internally elected) political representatives. With the new Fundamental Law, the Church had, furthermore, lost its permanent legislative veto and its unique involvement in the legislative process. When the issue of a separation was re-actualised, the major conflict was thus already solved and a major obstacle had been removed. Much like its predecessor in the seventies the new Church Commission was composed of party representatives. A high degree of consensus existed, however (both in the Riksdag and in the National Synod) on the timetable that it presented in its final report, a timetable that on all major points would be fulfilled during the following years. The changes were, however, not only the result of a change in the power structure. There were also changes that influenced the legitimacy of the project.
The Concept of the Nation

The view of the nation that dominated cultural policy in this period contrasts strongly with that of the seventies, at least if one concentrates on the view presented by the government. Prime Minister Bildt and his colleagues were among the few Swedish governments that have explicitly presented a concept of the Swedish nation. This concept was decidedly ethnic, but at the same time placed the Swedish people as a part of a larger European civilisation. This perspective was directly connected with the government’s foreign policy and to Sweden’s application for membership in the EEC (resulting in a Swedish membership of the EU in 1994). It should, however, also be understood in the context of a Swedish search for a new identity after the murder of Olof Palme, the collapse of the Soviet Block (recasting Swedish neutrality) and the economic and political crisis of the folkhem state (which had been the focus of Swedish national pride). Even though the government had a remarkably coherent view of the Swedish nation, this did not, however, change the normative concepts that were common in cultural policy (although the newer concepts could be recognised in the views of a number of government commissions). The one indication of these views in the organisation of cultural policy was that it was now prioritised enough to be given its own Ministry of Culture and that this ministry not only included cultural and media policy but immigration policy as well. This indicates that immigration was at least partially understood as a cultural issue, rather than a social one. This points towards an ethnic concept of immigrants corresponding to the government’s ethnic concept of the Swedish nation. This view may also be connected with the mentioning of the fight against xenophobia in the National Budget for cultural policy, a peripheral measure at the time, but a first step in a new direction.

It is also interesting that it was under the leadership of a government with that worked with this concept of the nation that consensus was reached on the separation of Church and State. A large part of the Riksdag (Moderates, Christian Democrats, Centre, and New Democracy) not only considered the Church an important part of the Swedish cultural heritage, but also considered that heritage central to Swedish national and local identity. They concluded, furthermore, that it was the State’s responsibility to preserve this heritage. Although the Liberals and Leftists worked for a complete separation, a compromise could be reached in which the State treated the Church of Sweden as equal to other denominations but in which denominations were privileged in relation other association. There were other signs as well that the State was beginning to accept the mega-standard of equal treatment as the norm for its relationship to organised religion. The State had now ceased to make a difference between Immigrant Churches and Swedish Nonconformists. It had thus accepted a role that would include both the preservation of
ethnic heritage and the equal treatment of religious denominations — a civil responsibility of the State in a state-framed nation.

Most of the cultural policy field, however, remained unchanged in the norms of how to relate to the nation. Although the notions that had dominated heritage and museum policy were closest to the government’s views of the nation, museum policy in fact moved away from these. The establishment of museum policy as a separate and trans-national organisational field was marked by a changed view of the nation. Its new self-conception as a group of actors in the public debate was a move towards a less ethnic self-conception and implied civil responsibilities within the framework of the State and the state-framed nation. This change is hardly connected with the government, but perhaps more with an international trend in the humanities and in the museum field related to the birth of museology as an academic discipline and to new conceptions of the role of the museum.

The Values of Cultural Policy

In terms of values this period offered few novelties. The particularistic values of the ethnic Swedish nation were, however, considered more important to cultural policy in general when the ethnic definition of the nation become more influential. Yet, it was at this time that the Church and State issue was resolved. When analysed from a value perspective it becomes evident that not only organisational aspects of this conflict had now been resolved: the animosity between State and Church had been one between two universalistic value systems: modernity versus Christian tradition. From a particularistic point of view, both the Church and the State were caretakers of Swedish identity and the heritage of the Swedish people. A separation could thus be achieved that recognised continued support for both the Church of Sweden and other denominations as protectors of particularistic values which it was the State’s responsibility to preserve as well (as opposed to universal religious values towards which the State had a duty to remain neutral). This combination of liberalism and the recognition of particularistic values corresponded to a decreasing focus on integrating the national community. In this sense, the ethnic particularism of the government’s general cultural policy defused the conflict between the universalist values of secularism and Christianity. When the Church became a particularistic value, the institutional obstacles could be overcome by practical compromising.
CHAPTER VII:
1994–1998:
Consolidation and New Paths

After the elections of 1994 Ingvar Carlsson could return to the office of Prime Minister with the support of the Leftists and the Greens. Margot Wallström became the new Minister of Culture, Marita Ulvskog Minister of Public Administration (including Church policy) and Göran Persson Minister of Finance. New Democracy had collapsed a few months earlier after the resignation of Ian Wachtmeister. Other changes would be made as well. Due to changes in the constitution, the next election would be held in 1998. Sweden, furthermore, became a member of the EU as of January 1 of 1995 after a slight victory for the proponents in a national referendum. In 1995 the Prime Minister made public that he would retire the next year. After an unusually tumultuous process Göran Persson was elected chairman of the Social Democrat Party and became Prime Minister in March 1996. He immediately made a number of changes in the government. Marita Ulvskog was now appointed Minister of Culture. She, however, retained responsibility for Church

575 The severity of New Democracy’s internal problems became clear with Wachtmeister’s resignation as party leader in 1994 and with the following declaration from Bert Karlsson that he had no desire to become his successor. This led to a pitched battle for the post among some of the less known members of the party executive and its representatives in the Riksdag. Wachtmeister and Karlsson for a time endorsed different candidates. The conflict of the following months included several different party conventions, and was in the end to move into the courtroom, following a lawsuit over party funds. As all of this took place during the election campaign of 1991– and since most of the party’s funds were seized for the duration of the lawsuit (Holck-Bergman 1995) – it is hardly surprising that the party’s votes dropped from the 6.7% of the previous election to 1.2%, well below the 4% limit, thereby ending its time in the Riksdag, Andersen & Bjorklund 2000, Ignazi 2003: 157-159.
affairs, which now became part of the Ministry of Culture.\textsuperscript{576} Both Wallström and Ulvskog had to deal with several reform processes set in motion by the previous government. These included both the Culture Commission and the separation of Church and State which gave the period the highest activity of government commissions on cultural policy ever. In some cases the new government appointed additional commissions on sub-sectors already under the investigation of commissions appointed by previous governments. It also added new directives, such as the general instruction to describe how recommendations would influence gender equality,\textsuperscript{577} a sign not only of an increased emphasis on gender, but also of a new way of using power to coerce isomorphism among commissions and, in the longer perspective, the State and the nation at large.

**GENERAL CULTURAL POLICY**

Evaluating cultural policy had become a major issue in the early nineties. After lengthy discussions, the government had appointed a commission, the Culture Commission (see p. 176). Its report would become the chief document on cultural policy in this period. It still remains the largest work ever written on Swedish cultural policy. Before the Commission was allowed to finish its work, the new government, however, made some changes in its instructions. The first of these was changing its composition. The Chairman was replaced by the Social Democratic County Governor Gerd Engman. The representative of New Democracy left her place and was replaced by Ewa Larsson of the Green Party and the Social Democrat Annika Nilsson (thus making the majority of the Commission follow that of the Riksdag).\textsuperscript{578} The new instruction was, however, not intended to radically change the task of the Commission. Still, it was given a new list of focuses:

- Equality and participation in the cultural life,
- The role of folkbildning and popular movements in the diffusion of culture,
- The participation of children and youth in culture.
- Bettering the conditions of artists,
- The influence of mass media on cultural development
- The importance of the cultural heritage and the Swedish language,
- The design of the physical environment.\textsuperscript{579}

Most of this was, quite naturally, a change in a traditional Social Democratic direction. There are, however, some elements that I wish to point out. The

\textsuperscript{577} Dir. 1994:124.
\textsuperscript{578} SOU 1995:84: 3.
new emphasise on the physical environment could be connected to the 1970s view of cultural policy as a part of environmental policy. On the issue of equality, the government mentioned the aspect of differences between women and men in “cultural habits”. As I will show, this is only one example of the increased interest in gender as an excluding factor in cultural policy at this time. The government, on the other hand, also suggested culture in working life (an old Social Democratic theme) as a possible way to deal with cultural inequalities. It also stressed the importance of cultural heritage, and of the Swedish language as part of it. This was much in line with the previous instruction and also continued to place heritage in the context of the new international situation:

The Swedish membership in the European Union and the rest of our international commitment receives a greater value for ourselves as well as for the surrounding world if we are safely anchored in our own culture. The cultural heritage as it has been developed until this day, in the language and the arts and in our physical environment is of a fundamental importance in this. […] Schools, folkbildning, libraries, museums and other cultural establishments are together with mass media important tools for the diffusion of knowledge. It is the task of the Commission to put these issues in a larger context of cultural policy.

The Commission should pay attention to the role of the Swedish language as a common frame of reference for everyone who lives in our country.580

The Commission

Much like the Culture Council of the early seventies the Culture Commission professed to take a broad perspective on culture and society. Like the Council it also put a great deal of work into defining culture. Much like the same predecessor it also decided to refrain from using an “anthropological” definition, but preferred instead to use the term in a more narrow sense. It did not, however, equal “culture” with the cultural sector, but decided instead to use it as referring to “art forms, media, educational aspirations and cultural heritage”. This may sound much like a definition of the sector but also touches on several other sectors, primarily education policy. The layout of the report itself is in fact even narrower and mostly confined to the sector itself.581 Continuity between the Culture Council and the Culture Commission can also be seen in the definition of artistic quality presented by the Commission when its discussions turned to the situation of artists. Quality – according to the Commission – had primarily two dimensions: experienced quality and professional

581 SOU 1995:84, quoting p. 603 in the English summary. “Educational aspirations” is the Commission’s own translation of bildningssträvanden (strivings for bildning), which I will use when referring to their documents. It should be noted that this translation implies a narrow definition in which bildningssträvanden is confined to a specific sector of adult education rather than considered a more encompassing perspective.
quality. Experienced quality was what appeared in the meeting between the viewer and the work of art: 582

It is particular to good art that it possesses the ability to provoke thoughts and feelings, and thereby start a mental process in the recipient [mottagaren]. It is a matter of experiences that touches and benefits the recipient with the joy of recognition or with the challenge of the unknown. 583

Professional quality was, on the other hand, artistry seen as knowledge, a knowledge that was best judged by experts. In this context the commission tied knowledge to the ability to uphold two sub-types of quality: renewal and the conservation of traditions. 584 The experts who could judge professional quality in art were artists, not, for example, academics or critics.

The expressions of renewal could however also be strange, unfamiliar and therefore challenging, questioning and questioned. Paradoxically, the issue of quality may therefore in this context in some degree be expressed as the measure of real renewal being that it can initially only be understood and appreciated by a small circle of recipients. 585

For cultural policy in this sense the Commission proposed a set of objectives that differed slightly form those of the early seventies:

Culture gives people joy, insights, many different opportunities for expressing themselves and a richer life.

Cultural policy must thus:
- safeguard the freedom of expression and provide real opportunities for its exercise,
- work for participation and stimulate personal creativity,
- promote artistic and cultural renewal and quality,
- take responsibility for cultural heritage and promote its positive use,
- give culture the possibility to be a dynamic, challenging and independent force in society. 586

The first abjectvivecame directly from the old list, although it was no longer followed by a statement on the “negative consequences of the market economy”. Neither were there any statements on cultural diversity (of any form), but instead a possibly more universalistic concept of “culture” as a “dynamic, challenging and independent force in society”. A more general statement on “participation and personal creativity” has replaced earlier objectives of decentralisation, disadvantaged groups and border transgressions. Of these the

Commission only proposed increased funding for children’s culture and culture outside of the population centres. The distinction between artistic culture and participation in amateur culture was now even more pronounced than in the seventies: quality and participation were now different objectives. Cultural heritage was still taken to be a fixed entity but was no longer to be “reinvigorated”. Instead it should be “used”, a terminology by which the Commission emphasised the instrumental value of heritage. In the traditional *folkhem* manner the Commission also stressed the importance of agents of the State working together with NGOs, such as the *folkbildning* associations.587

On the whole, the new set of objectives, however, makes a more liberal impression, seen as civil values, than those of the early seventies. This is underlined by an opening paragraph that emphasises gain for the individual, in sharp contrast to the general objective centred on “society” once proposed by the Culture Council. This increase in individualism was also apparent when the Commission discussed the legitimacy of cultural policy as such. This discussion was written from a decidedly social-liberal perspective, using the language of collective goods and limited rationality that was at the time more and more used to legitimate the welfare state at large. This perspective can be traced to the government instruction that the Commission should discuss how its recommendations benefited citizens. That the citizens (the state-framed nation) were now discussed as individuals rather than as a collective (society) was thus a norm that had been authorised by the previous government. The norm was, however, supported by other authorities as well, including the inter-national governance trend. Much of the actual argument, on the other hand, also rested on the fact that the existing institutions of the cultural sector would be impossible to uphold without government funding. The legitimacy of these institutions was in other words still taken for granted and the Commission’s acceptance of social-liberal individualism as legitimising authority was marginal in comparison with its continued acceptance of older more authoritative norms.588 Neither did the Commission present a historical

587 SOU 1995:84. See Hugosson 2000 and Johannisson 1999 for comparisons of how “culture” is defined in the goals of 1995 and 1972. In my chapter on nationality and cultural heritage (Harding 2006a) in Aronsson’s and Alzén’s anthology *Demokratikt kulturarv* I deal with the issue of “uses of cultural heritage” as opposed to “invigorating” it, and of “cultural heritage” (sing.) as opposed to “cultural heritages” (plur.). One conclusion is that this formula point forward towards later “uses” of “World Culture” and Holocaust memories to promote democracy and integration (see Chapter VIII).

588 Dir. 1993:24, SOU 1995:84: 93-116, interview with Kleberg. Social liberalism refers to a liberalism that advocates a welfare state and other political actions to defend the liberty, rights or happiness of the individual, even against the outcomes of the market economy. Thinkers such as Dworkin, Keynes and Rawls could thus be considered social liberals in this sense (Barry 2001). See Rothstein 1994 for a discussion on the legitimacy of the Swedish welfare state with similar arguments.
narrative to legitimise their role in the *Folkhem* state (as the Council once did). Referring to the objectives and consensus of 1974 apparently provided enough historical legitimacy. Consensus within the state-framed nation did not need to be proved. As social-liberal individualism was allowed to supersede some of the civil values that had dominated in the seventies, it may, however, be that the legitimacy taken for granted was not that of the *Folkhem* project, but even older claims to legitimacy for the cultural field, based on aestheticism or ethnic particularism.

When concerned with amateur culture the Commission seems to have been closer to its seventies predecessor in considering the activation of the people an objective in itself. Even on this issue there was however a trend towards increased individualism: “The design of rules for supporting organisational life has to be made in a way that stimulates individuals [enskilda] to take responsibility for cultural life on their own or together.” The Commission pointed to the many alternatives and different forms of organisations, from traditional *folkbildning* associations to culture clubs and churches. Even privately owned businesses were now considered a natural part of the citizens’ sound cultural activity. “The diversity of cultural programmes and other cultural activities” was now an institutionalised norm in cultural policy on the amateur level. The aim of activating the people was thus combined with a social-liberal view of individual choice. The only thing required was that organisations were open, so that anyone could join (which was taken for granted). As before professionals were assumed to work as “leaders or resource persons in the amateur activities” rather than as partners. That the amateurs could do something essentially different than the professionals was not even considered. Neither was the possibility that amateurs could work outside recognised organisations.

When looking at the Commission’s general view of society one finds that it shared the previous government’s belief that Sweden was entering a new type of society. Although less visionary in its language, it assumes the importance of such forces as internationalisation and the new media. The major difference between the Commission and the Bildt Government was instead that the Commission was not unreservedly positive to these changes. New ways of organising production and the labour market were, for example, primarily seen to threaten communities instead of liberating individuals. The international entertainment industry was especially feared and the Commission believed that it seduced (especially young) people into losing touch with reality and turning their interest and creativity to the fantasy worlds of popular literature, movies, and computer games. The Commission, however,

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still emphasised that culture and the organisations which dealt with it had to make use of new technology and international contacts. The Commission did not expect that cultural policy could change general trends in society. It could, however, be used to balance them. In contrast to the report of 1972 there were also very few references to cultural policy in other countries while the opinions of international NGOs were, on the other hand, often treated as authorities. In this context, the new interpretation of “cultural heritage” came into focus. While heritage to the Culture Council had been a peripheral field in a changing world and in a progressive sector, the Commission treated heritage as a central factor to the whole of its sector. Inspired by the Museum Commission, the Culture Commission used the term “heritage” in a broader sense and in the hope that it would provide a basis for integration of both immigrants and minorities into Swedish society and of Sweden as a whole into the larger international community. All parts of the cultural sector should be involved in the preservation of cultural heritage in this sense. Instead of a sectoral difference between heritage and the arts, the Commission considered all culture a balance between heritage and creativity.590

Although “disadvantaged groups” were not mentioned at all, concern about the groups once considered such takes up a large part of the Commission’s report. In the instructions of 1994 the chief “disadvantaged group” had been women. Gender issues had also been mentioned in the Statement of Government Policy that year. The Commission did indeed discuss this dimension of exclusion and emphasised its importance. It did not, however, devote any particular chapter in the report to the subject, or, for that matter, treat it recurrently in the general chapters. If anything, the report pointed to an under-representation of (especially older) men among cultural consumers. No major measures were, however, proposed to equalise this situation. The aspect of exclusion given most space was instead age, especially in relation to children and young people. Here the importance of the widened definition of “culture” and the individualised outlook of the Commission is significantly more noticeable than in general. While children and young people were still viewed as in need of protection (especially from the entertainment industry), significant importance was also given to their own opinions and choices. That is, youth culture was accepted as culture as well as an important way for its participants to find their own identity and place in society. It was even recognised that “youth culture” was not always a transitory state. Municipalities and folkbildning associations were praised for their important contributions to making a living and organised youth culture economically and practically possible, as well as for more traditional measures, like investments in music

and culture schools and *folkbildning*. This was also taken to mean that these sub-cultures were best served by the municipalities (since these had closer contact with local communities than the State had). They would in other words not be integrated with the field of qualitative art, which is entirely in line with differences in authoritative value concepts: while qualitative art remained dominated by a universalistic aestheticism, youth culture was a matter of identity, and thus of particularism. About the elderly, very little was said, although the issue could perhaps be read into discussions on disabilities. When concerned with disabilities the discussion was, however, one of access, and thus of integration, not of diversity or contribution.\(^{591}\)

The issues of multiculturalism, immigrants and linguistic minorities were seen largely as a kind of balancing-act: a full command of the Swedish language and culture was considered a necessary prerequisite for integration into Swedish society. At the same time the Commission accepted the institutionalised opinion that minorities needed to retain their own culture and identity, now, however, with the added condition that this was only to the extent that it was acceptable to Swedish society and to Swedish values. The norms that had led the previous government to place integration policy in the Ministry of Culture thus remained influential. The Commission also recognised that these cultures could add to Swedish culture, in terms of artistic and cultural expressions. No new agencies or budgetary posts were, on the other hand, proposed to cover these activities, neither were they much discussed when the Commission dealt with particular parts of the sector. Of the minorities only the Sami were given a privileged position. They had now been given an elected assembly of their own, with its own cultural budget. Finnish speakers, especially those of the Tornedalen area, were, on the other hand, given an intermediary position as a “linguistic”, but not an “ethnic”, minority. The Commission merely repeated the Riksdag’s refusal (see p. 183) to recognise any Tornedalian organisation.\(^{592}\)


\(^{592}\) SOU 1995:84. Carin Norén (2004) notes in her MA thesis that there was a dualism in the Commission’s view of society in so far as it was sometimes described as “multicultural” while the minorities were at other times ignored. In my view, only the parts of the report that explicitly deals with multiculturalism take any kind of multicultural view. I, however, agree with her that the discourses (as she terms them) are entirely separated. She also enumerates nine words used to denote immigrants and other minorities: immigrants, extra-Nordic groups (*utomnordiska grupper*), new citizens, new Swedes, people with different cultural identities, cultural minorities, people of different ethnic origin, artists with different ethnic and cultural background and artists with immigrant background. This implies that the norms for how to discuss and term these groups had yet to settle. One could add that the borders of these categories thus remained varying and that as a consequence the focus of policy changed as well. Egeland (2002), on the other hand, describes a continuity from the “disadvantaged groups” of 1974 to the “multiculturalism” of 1995.
The Culture Commission was, in other words, relatively untouched by the ongoing changes in immigrant policy that occurred when that sector was redefined by the Immigrant Policy Committee. The new integration policy that was presented in 1997 was in its practical consequences a continuation of already existing institutions. In its explicit conclusions the Immigrant Policy Committee, however, emphasised integration within the state-framed nation in the sense that not only immigrants but Swedes as well would have to change in order to create a broadened concept of Swedish identity based on democratic civil values. This change of perspective was marked by the creation of integration policy as a new sector under the responsibility of the new Integration Agency. Even the word “multiculturalism” (mångkulturalism) was abandoned in the following government bill in favour of “diversity” (mångfald), in order not to point out immigrants as a group. The concept of the nation that the government attempted to institutionalise with these measures had more in common with the forward-looking civil nationalism of New Cultural Policy than with the social-liberal and heritage-oriented cultural policy of its own time. It is perhaps a sign of how little influence these texts had on cultural policy that “multiculturalism” became an established term there.593

Like the previous government the Commission, however, recognised that EU membership and other internationalising developments had changed Sweden’s situation in an international context. The extent of international co-operation had, for example, increased. International cooperation below government level had previously been coordinated by the Swedish Institute. Now the Commission recommended that this responsibility should be transferred to the agencies and other organisations responsible for the corresponding activities in Sweden. This was in fact what was already happening within most parts of the Swedish public sector. Several other changes in organisation were also recommended. Chief among these was perhaps that significant resources (in the name of de-centralisation and following the recommendations of the Theatre Commission), should be transferred from the National Touring Theatre (NTT) to county theatres (that now existed in every county). Parallel changes were already going on, and endorsed by the Commission, concerning the National Touring Exhibitions (NTE) and National Travelling Concerts (NTC). All of this followed traditional Liberal and Moderate demands. In other areas centralisation was instead the order of the day: The Commission recommended that the National Council for Cultural Affairs (KUR) should be charged with supervising adherence to the cultural policy objectives within the media sector and that academic resources should be concentrated on creating culture studies (kulturvetenskap) as a new academic discipline dealing

with the cultural sector. Finally, the sector itself was expanding to include the new art forms architecture and design. The government should thus initiate a national plan for architecture as an art form. Discussions on this matter much resembled the 1970s view of culture as a matter of everyday environment. Now the layout of cities and towns themselves were to be added to cultural policy.594

Taken together, the Commission’s individualised approach to culture, its emphasis on quality, its relatively little interest in minorities and its much higher interest in international professional cooperation point to a noticeable trend towards an increasing focus on universal values as well as a slightly less integrativistic approach to the sector. The increased emphasis of heritage, on the other hand, stresses the importance of identity and of an identity that (with the exception of the Sami) was perceived as relatively homogenous in the entire nation, a community that was, in other words, now more often perceived as primordial. At the same time de-centralisation coexisted with professionalisation in the Commission’s approach to cultural policy and the State.

Reactions to the Commission Report

When finished, the reports of the Culture Commission were circulated for consideration among the organisations and agencies that the government considered concerned by it. 427 organisations and agencies had been asked to comment, 386 of which answered, as had 277 others. Most answers were positive to the report in general. Most of them were also satisfied with the Commission’s definition of “culture” as its subject. The National Museums of Defence History (Statens försvarshistoriska muséer, recently transferred from the Ministry of Defence) would, however, have preferred a more normative and less descriptive definition. The HSFR (a research council for the humanities and social sciences), on the other hand, considered the proposed definition too far from ordinary academic use, resulting among other things in an easily misunderstood view of the extent of “cultural” research done in universities. The Swedish Museum of Natural History considered that the Commission ignored the connections between nature and culture. Other answers opposed the exclusion of sports. Finally, the Central Board of the Church of Sweden and others, including Uppsala University (with a large theological faculty), considered religion and the Church unduly excluded from the discussion. This was considered “surprising, considering the role of the churches and denominations as custodians of a religious/literary heritage […] music, singing, pictorial art and architecture”.595

595 Ds 1996:23: 3-8, quote from p. 8.
KUR generally agreed with the Commission. Its criticism of some proposals however revealed a more centralistic position. It thus pointed out the need for a greater coordination of national cultural policy, especially in dealings with the EU. Furthermore, it suggested that the national objectives would be much more efficient if they were made binding on the local and regional levels as well as on the national one. It wanted, in other words, to be able to put power behind its authority and coerce isomorphism in the parts of the public sector that was not part of the State. The National Heritage Board (RAÄ) also emphasised the need for greater control and auditing possibilities in their case within the context of heritage policy. Both agencies adopted NPM arguments in emphasising the importance of auditable and clear objectives with measurable results. For the same reasons KUR argued for additional objectives for different parts of the cultural sector. SAFAD (the agency that was actually responsible for implementing NPM), on the other hand, argued that this added little of value but brought the risk of creating unnecessary difficulties for border-transgressing forms of art. In line with norms established in the seventies, KUR, furthermore, considered it “surprising that the economical situation in society is not touched upon”, especially considering “the increasing power of the international experience industry and the increasing social differences.” They also suggested two additional objectives: an internationalisation objective and an objective for bildning, in order to recognise the central importance of the folkbildning associations.596

Comments on the “positive use of the cultural heritages” were largely an exercise in the political importance (or imagined importance) of what might appear to be a matter of semantics. The College of Arts, Crafts and Design discussed the possible contradictions involved in promoting only uses of cultural heritage considered “positive” (by whom?) and the objectives of freedom of expression and quality. KLYS, on the other hand, supported the choice of the plural form while a number of institutions, primarily County Museums, considered that that same use threatened the view of the cultural heritage as a unity. Few seemed to have questioned the broadened use of heritage terminology as such. Neither were there any negative comments about the protection of the Swedish language. The Swedish Language Committee and the universities of Lund and Uppsala, however, stressed the need for a further discussion of the future of the language in the EU.597

Not only the objectives recommended by the Commission were given space in the Ministerial Report where the answers were published. Due to the heavy demands for retaining them, the objectives of 1974 were discussed as well. The LO had even gone as far as opposing the recommended objectives

in favour of the old list. The objective of counteracting “the negative consequences of the market economy” was defended by a large number of respondents, including the LO, the TCO, the NTT KLYS, and a great number of folkbildning associations, NGOs and cultural establishments. The objective of “consideration for the needs of disadvantaged groups” was also defended by a number of groups. KLYS, for example, argued that the disadvantaged groups had grown since 1974 due to migration and other reasons. KUR, on the other hand, argued that this objective could be fulfilled within the framework of the broader objective of participation. The LO, SAFAD and number of County Administrative Boards, county councils, municipalities, NGOs and cultural establishments defended the old Decentralisation Objective. Finally, the objective to “promote exchange of experiences and ideas within the cultural field and across language and national borders” was defended by among others the LO, SAFAD and KUR. The SAFAD argued that the objective of international cooperation was especially important now that Sweden was a member of the EU, and KUR proposed a new objective concerning “artistic exchange to further international contacts, and the importance of an international objective to counteract ethnic conflicts in Sweden” (which they, in other words, considered connected phenomena) KLYS, KUR and the SFI, among others, however, agreed with the need to decentralise international contacts, while for instance, the Swedish Institute and the National Museums of Art opposed this recommendation.598

Very few answers concerned themselves with the issue of gender, and then only in connection with age issues. These were however the concern of a large number of answers. The Commission’s recommendations on children’s culture were generally agreed upon and KUR suggested the creation of a “national idea and resource centre” for children’s culture. The National School Board and the Union of Swedish Municipalities however considered the demands on children’s culture already sufficiently satisfied within the existing system of schools and pre-school activities. KUR for its part considered the whole youth section insufficiently specified and suggested that it should recommend specifications together with the SFI and the Dramatic Institute.599

**The Government Bill on Culture**

Based on the results of the many government commissions during the previous years, the government could in 1996 present a new cultural policy bill to the Riksdag, the most comprehensive since 1974. During these years cultural policy had, according to the Bill been a history of overwhelming success. Cultural establishments and events were now more available to the whole of

598 Ds 1996:23, 19-23, quote from p. 23.
the country than at any time before. There were regional theatres and museums in every county. Music and dance events were made available through national tours. The production of phonograms was ten times as big as in 1974. Cultural activities were no longer as bound to establishments as they once had been. Access to cultural activities was now more spread out in Sweden than in most other countries. There was, furthermore, a strongly increased interest in history and heritage, something that was especially true when it came to local or “close” history, as manifested in a number of projects and new establishments, from the local heritage movement to museums of working life. Descriptions of the development outside the cultural sector were, on the other hand, much more ambivalent. Social differences had increased and “the negative effects of the market economy” were now more present than ever. Women had finally joined the work force, Sweden had joined the EU, and unemployment was increasing, as were single person households and the immigrant population. Culture could however still help to counteract social problems, in this new society as well as in the seventies. Technological progress provided new methods for access, as well as for progress and preservation. This should be utilised in the cultural sector.600

The government clearly considered the policies of their predecessors a great success. From an evaluative perspective this was of course the ultimate source of legitimacy to continue. For the future they proposed, however, a new list of objectives, adjusted to the new times, and following some of the collected comments:

The objectives of cultural policy should be to:
- safeguard freedom of speech and create real opportunities for everyone to exercise it,
- work for participation and stimulate personal creativity,
- counteract the negative consequences of commercialism and promote cultural diversity, artistic renewal and quality,
- preserve and use the cultural heritage,
- promote international cultural exchange and encounters between different cultures within the country.601

If anything this list was closer to that of 1972 than were the objectives of 1974. The changes and additions to the recommendations of the Commission mark a greater concern for equality and extra-sectorial issues. The government especially stressed culture as a way to integrate and employ women, young people and people living outside the major population centres. More attention should thus be directed at children’s culture and the government stressed that children, unlike youth, do not have clear preferences and should

be stimulated to increase their interest in culture. For the disabled an action programme should be established and KUR was to conduct an investigation about the access of the disabled to culture. Increased cooperation with their organisations was also required in line with established neo-corporative norms. Among the art forms, literature should be the focus for increased attention, a new library law forbidding municipal libraries from taking fees was, for example, included in the bill, as was the economic situation of artists in general. On these issues, as on most others, the government closely followed the recommendations of the Culture Commission.\textsuperscript{602} Elaborating on the Diversity Objective the government stated that culture should be used to fight racism and proposed that increased attention should be called to how immigrant culture could become better represented.\textsuperscript{603}

\begin{quote}
It is an obvious task for cultural policy to contribute to that people with various ethnic and cultural backgrounds can meet and give impulses to each other. Integration should be stimulated, xenophobia and racism fought. It is also an important task to create space for the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural generation that does not fit into traditional categorisation of cultural and ethnic identity. In the mix of different cultural backgrounds and forms of expression the preconditions for new creativity and new quality are to be found.\textsuperscript{604}
\end{quote}

Much as its predecessors, the government subscribed to a belief in a massive change in society. In this case society was not only described as multicultural, this multiculturalism is, furthermore, described as a difference between generations. It is interesting to note this vision of multiculturalism as change in the whole of society. What the Immigrant Policy Committee considered desirable, the Culture Commission apparently considered an already emerging future. The actual measures taken regarding this change were, however, very specific and in fact concentrated to the foundation of two new separate establishments: a House of World Culture in Stockholm and a new museum of ethnography in Gothenburg (which would later be called “the Museum of World Culture”). Now the government was not talking, however, of a new indefinable generation, or even of society as a whole, instead the holistic perspective is gone and the talk is instead of immigrants as some of Sweden’s

\textsuperscript{602} Government Bill 1996/97:3.
\textsuperscript{603} Government Bill 1996/97:3. Egeland (2002) concludes that cultural policy had changed its focus from the integration of “groups” to individuals and thus runs a risk of abdicating from its social responsibilities to instead consider cultural differences mere differences of individual preference. According to Carin Norén’s MA thesis (2004) the discourse around the proposed House of World Culture, however, implies that its primary goal was integration and work against xenophobia, not the production of art, and that its activities were in fact treated as distinct from the artistic sphere.
\textsuperscript{604} Government Bill 1996/97:3: 30.
“inhabitants”, not of the people or of society ("Sveriges befolkning" as opposed to folket or samhället):

To broaden the borders and offer a cultural arena for all of Sweden’s inhabitants, regardless of ethnic and cultural background and to give status to all the cultures that do not have a place in the cultural life today, the government intends to create a House of World Culture.605

By creating these new institutions the government chose a path that did not point towards a change in the entire cultural policy field, but instead towards organising World Culture as a separate field: what was discussed as cultural integration would in practice mean institutional disintegration, at least in a short perspective. Both projects would be developed by government commissions. The House of World Culture would be situated in Stockholm, in the Södra teatern ("the Southern Theatre") and provide new space for the various cultural activities that the government considered previously excluded. Unlike in the seventies the government now considered disadvantaged groups to have cultures of their own. The government also proposed that the National Museums of Ethnography, Far Eastern Antiquities and Mediterranean and Near Eastern Antiquities should be merged with the Gothenburg Museum of Ethnography to create a new Museum of World Culture, centred in Gothenburg.606 As we shall see, the House of World Culture was opposed by the very commission that should have prepared its construction, while the new museum in Gothenburg became the most controversial idea in the entire bill. This new and controversial idea will be discussed further under the heading of Heritage Policy.

Apart from these internal issues the government also addressed the national image on the international arena. In 1998 Stockholm was to become the European Culture Capital and the government argued expansively for the possible importance of this, not only as an image factor but also to attract future investments and tourism. At the same time the city would also host a cultural ministerial conference within UNESCO focusing on the issues presented in the report Our Creative Diversity. Now the government proposed, however, that the projects connected with that year should be spread out over the whole of the country for the benefit of everybody. Many of the new focus areas discussed in the bill would be attended to via time-limited projects focused on the upcoming years to boost the already planned projects. Among these projects and focus areas the government especially mentioned projects on “language and writing as the basis for a humanistic and democratic social development”, on “the encounter with the surrounding world”, and “the

young city”. Apart from these, it proposed that six more major projects and institutions outside the capital should be funded by the government for an initial phase of three years: Malmö Konsthall (an art museum in Malmö), Backa barn- och ungdomsteater i Göteborg (a children’s theatre in Gothenburg), Film i väst (a film project in western Sweden), Stiftelsen Falun Folkmusikfestival (a folk music festival in Dalecarlia) and the Museum of Work in Norrköping. Finally, a permanent House of World Culture would be established in Stockholm.607

The UNESCO conference was part of a major international trend that was now beginning to influence Sweden. The background included Our Creative Diversity, the 1995 report of the World Commission for Culture and Development, a report that was mentioned as highly influential by some of the people I interviewed. Its influence is also apparent in the importance given to the following conference in the government bill. The main perspective in this report was that every nation is the host of a number of distinct cultures. While this was never explicit, these were described as assuming distinctiveness and authenticity in a way that in the terminology of this dissertation should be labelled ethnic and particularistic. At the same time the World Commission – like UNESCO and the whole UN system – strove to establish a “global ethics” that could regulate the relationship between these cultures. This should be based on universal human rights including a cultural right to self-fulfilment. Cultural rights were, however, collective, although it is clear that the Commission expected them to be limited by the all-embracing system of human rights. Civil universalism was thus placed above ethnic particularism. At the same time it was the states that were responsible for upholding this universalism within their respective limited territories. While the World Commission stated its support for a wider anthropological notion of culture, the activities and institutions that it was concerned with generally belonged to the cultural sector in a narrower sense. It was a matter of broadening the sector outside of traditional Western high culture, rather than of discussing something else than the sector. In this the World Commission’s approach to culture was similar to that of the Swedish Culture Council in the seventies. The World Commission had complemented Swedish cultural policy on several occasions. Now it was time to live up to that positive image. This may explain some of the urgency displayed by the government in matters related to diversity and World Culture.608 It is also clear that these norms had not yet had time to influence the Culture Commission, or the Riksdag.

608 UNESCO 1995, interviews with Kleberg and Cavallin. It should perhaps also be added that I myself have been a witness to the importance ascribed to this report, as an evaluator of the programme of the Stockholm Conference in connection with the expert conference organised in Stockholm in 2003, Cavallin & Harding 2003.
Reactions in the Riksdag

When the government bill finally reached the Riksdag, it did so nearly simultaneously with the National Budget in a fiscal year that was elongated to 18 months (due to the ongoing changes in national budgetary procedures). As a result the Riksdag Committee on Cultural Affairs had to deal with the bill in only five weeks. In spite of this they managed to arrive at a consensus on the cultural objectives that included all of the Riksdag parties except for the Moderates and the Greens. When they were finished, there were obviously still some differences of opinions, even between these parties. Most important of these differences was the issue of what was now described as a “collected central museum of ethnography in Gothenburg”.

The Leftists stressed that the cultural policy of the previous twenty years had failed to achieve the “cultural equality” envisaged in the early seventies. Women, children, young people, immigrants and the disabled were all still left out, as were those with a low income or little education. To reach these groups, the government would have to turn its resources to expanding support for culture in schools and working places. While it was a good thing that the term “disadvantaged groups” had been left out (the Leftists considered the term much too passive), these measures could still be directed at further cultural integration of these groups in the name of equality. They especially emphasised the need for directed measures for culture in the schools to be integrated in curricula and school plans, rather than be left to the individual choice of pupils or parents. The measures proposed by the government on multiculturalism were also considered too narrow and too little integrated into the different parts of cultural policy. Neither did the Leftists agree that these measures recognised that immigrants could contribute to the general culture of Sweden. There were, furthermore, too few people with an immigrant background in leading positions in the cultural sector. 17% of the Swedish population had, after all, an immigrant background. Support for international cultural projects should be expanded from 500,000 to 3 million kronor and an action programme for multiculturalism created. The Leftists, furthermore, supported the creation of a women’s museum to stress women’s situation and “invisible” history.

Within various academic disciplines research has increasingly taken note of the differences between the situations of men and women. In historical research the history of women has been called the ‘hidden’ or ‘invisible’ history. […] There is thus a need...

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609 1996/97:KrU1, the new museum ethnography is discussed on pp. 123-127.

for a museum that in the future will take on the task of collecting and systematically treating and working with objects and information on the situation of women.611

With the election of 1994 the Greens entered the Riksdag for the second time, a party which was in many ways the opposite of New Democracy, but without the powerful position that the latter party had enjoyed as the one support needed by the government. Much like New Democracy policy, however, the cultural policy presented by Birger Schlaug and his colleagues in response to the Cultural Bill had an odd note of nationalism to it: this time of an older more primordial variety based on localism and rootedness in the soil:

Culture is the human way of confirming one’s identity and self-respect, developing one’s imagination and innovative capability. Through culture a sense of belonging to a local community [hembygd], a nation, humanity and nature are created.612

The Greens generally stayed close to the norms institutionalised in 1974, defending such things as Nordic cooperation (as opposed to the EU, which they rejected), the NTT and a perpetually growing cultural budget. The Greens also stressed the importance of protecting the Swedish language and the Swedish culture. They wanted an addition to the cultural objectives, one that would mirror and spread their concept of the individual as connected to nature. They, furthermore, voted for a new film museum, a women’s museum and a new National Museum of Ethnography in Gothenburg, thus joining the Leftists in a politics of recognition. They rejected, however, the government’s proposition to move the Museums of Ethnography, Mediterranean Antiquities and Far Eastern Antiquities to Gothenburg as being too expensive.613

The Centre Party remained relatively close to the policies of 1974, expressing a feeling of disappointment with the Culture Bill, which they considered lacked support for culture in the whole of the country, as well as failing to recognise the importance of NGOs, especially the bildning associations. Instead of the proposed list of objectives they proposed an extended one, adding both the 1974 Internationalisation Objective and the objective of bildning suggested by KUR:

- [cultural policy should] promote international cultural exchange and encounters between different cultures within the country.
- cultural policy should promote strivings for bildning.614

Apart from bildning (emphasised as a corner stone of cultural policy) and “culture in the whole of the country”, the Centre Party underlined the need

611 Motion 1996/97: Kr20: 15.
613 Motion 1996/97: Kr4.
for internationalisation and cultural diversity. It was important to support the ethnic minorities, but also to defend the Swedish language and to cooperate closely with the neighbouring countries. They stressed the important role of schools in children’s culture and commended the government on its now initiated major national projects. They, finally, stressed the need to emphasise “the women’s perspective” in the form of “women’s history and cultural achievements”. They considered it a great shame that one could still get the impression that there “had hardly been any women that had been important enough to merit them or their achievements being depicted, described or shown.”615 All of these changes should be considered as a defence of the already established integrative cultural policy.

The Christian Democrats supported the idea of a cultural policy centred on “the whole of the person”, including both the spiritual and the material side. This view appears to be rooted in (or at least related to) a Personalistic view of culture. In practice the Christian Democrat answering to the Culture Bill was, however, very close to the views of the Culture Commission which in turn rooted in the philosophy of *bildning*. As the concept of *bildning* has a common origin with modern Personalistic philosophy this similarity is, however, not surprising. The Christian Democrats thus shared the Commission’s view of cultural heritage as a perspective that should be present in all parts of cultural policy. The Christian Democrats however interpreted the cultural heritage in a more primordialist manner than the Culture Commission did, for example by emphasising the need for keeping the heritage alive in the major theatres. Nothing in their motion points toward a support for the concept of cultural heritage as something to be “used”. Instead, they appear to have been more inclined to the older vision of reinvigorating it. Unsurprisingly they also stressed the importance of the geographic diffusion of resources, if not to the point of supporting moving the Museum of Ethnography.616

The Liberals chose to stress the importance of artistic freedom in their answer. They also repeatedly emphasised the importance of the Liberal Party itself in creating Swedish cultural policy, pointing out that both of the centre-right “Ministers of Culture” since the War had been Liberals. Liberal cultural policy was also, according to Lars Leijonborg and his co-writers, distinct from Social Democratic cultural policy in that it not only supported the artists’ right to popular funding but also their right to artistic freedom. The Foundation

615 Motion 1996/97: Kr283, quotes from pp. 5-7.
616 Motion 1996/97: Kr13. Personalism is a philosophical school which stresses the person as a contextualised subject, as opposed to atomistic views of the individual. Personalism has a background in Catholic philosophy and has also had a strong influence on continental Christian Democracy. For a history and a discussion of personalistic philosophy with a special emphasis on the origin of modern personalism in the nineteenth century, see Bengtsson 2006.
for the Culture of the Future (see p. 175) had been an excellent example of a
decentralist view opposed to the Social Democratic desire to control (a desire
that had admittedly been enforced on the Foundation when the new Foundation
Law enabled the government to take control of Foundations initiated by
the State). The proposed Library Law was described as an affront to municipal freedom. The Liberals, furthermore, opposed the proposed new system
for government funding of regional establishments, arguing that the proposed
guidelines on prioritising “for example work to reach new audiences and
support for museum activities with themes such as class, sex, cultural background and generation” were too restrictive. Even when the government
sought to hear the views of the artists, the Liberals disagreed with their
methods. KLYS should not have been re-invited to be represented in the
official committees. The members these should instead be appointed by the
government. In order to ensure that all were represented, including non-orga-
nised artists, representation had to be achieved in a non-corporative way. On
the whole the Liberals supported, however, the prevalent cultural policy, with
one exception: the objective to “counteract the negative consequences of
commercialism”. The reason was artistic freedom, not economic freedom.
Neither did the Liberals disagree with the new emphasis on cultural heritage,
nor with the government’s promise to “use” it: 617

Interest in the Swedish cultural heritage is not an example of narrow-minded nation-
alism. Our cultural heritage has been formed both by international and internal
impulses. In this melting pot what is now called Swedish culture has emerged.618

Perhaps the lack of knowledge of “the Swedish” is one of the explanations for the
xenophobia that exists […I]t proves profitable to emphasis our own cultural
heritage.619

As they placed themselves in a position of individualist anti-centralist univers-
alism, the Liberals, in other words also took history as their witness that this
was the true origin of Swedish culture. Ironically this points to a more prim-
ordial concept of the nation, closer to the pro-European primordialism of the
previous government, the position of Stig Strömholm and Harald Hjärne.

Moderate cultural policy was quite similar to that of the Liberals. It was
however even more outspoken against the ruling Social Democrats and the
objectives of 1974:

Culture has a value in itself. It is wrong to use tax money to try to steer people’s parti-
cipation in the cultural life. The contents of the culture supply [kuluttatiuido] and the
choice of the individual should be decisive. The United Moderate Party promotes a

618 Motion 1996/97: Kr17:14.
cultural policy that makes possible a rich supply of culture of a high quality.

With increasing international contacts the Swedish culture and cultural heritage obtains a new importance as a fundament for our identity. But culture is not static; new impulses are added and habitual patterns are reinterpreted. Everyone should be able to express their culture, as long as it is not in conflict with fundamental values of our society.620

In the opinion of Carl Bildt and his colleagues both the current cultural policy and the proposed one were a Social Democratic construction largely used to benefit organisations close to the Social Democratic party at the expense of both freedom and quality. Times were however changing and cultural policy should conform to a more open society. Due to integration into the EU, current developments in IT and other media, as well as increased immigration, international influence was more forceful in Sweden than ever before. All of this was positive to the Moderates, who noted that, for example, a greater number of TV channels had been allowed in Sweden only because the Social Democratic government had been unable to stop it. This new situation demanded a new cultural policy in which the resources of the State (resources that would have to be limited due to the restrained economic situation) should be concentrated on the most qualitative projects and establishments. These should be chosen by expert panels without other political guidelines than to support quality. The cultural policy objectives proposed by the government were rejected. The Moderates especially attacked the objective with regard to “the negative consequences of commercialism” and pointed out that the word “commercialism” itself was negative and that it implied a contradiction between “qualitative” and “commercially viable”. In practice however, Moderate policies remained exactly that: moderate, distinguished primarily by their proposed financial restraints against the forms of culture they considered “politicised”, or to close to the Social Democratic party, that is primarily too such organisations as the NTT.621

The consensus that emerged from these debates was largely formed around the propositions in the bill. There were however some changes even in the objectives themselves:

The objectives of cultural policy should be:
1. to safeguard freedom of speech and create real opportunities for its exercise.
2. to work to give everyone the opportunity to participate in cultural life, to cultural experiences and to personal creativity.
3. to promote cultural diversity, artistic renewal and quality, and thereby counteract the negative consequences of commercialism.
4. to give culture the prerequisites to be a dynamic, challenging and independent force in society.

620 Motion 1996/97: Kr207:11.
621 Motion 1996/97: Kr207.
5. to protect and use the cultural heritage.
6. to promote the strivings for bildning.
7. to promote international cultural exchange and encounters between different cultures within the country.\textsuperscript{622}

The first objective was defended against the Moderate criticism with explicit references to the norms established in 1974. The second objective was, on the other hand, reformulated to clarify that it was within the cultural sector that cultural policy should work for equality. The Committee majority also supported the continued struggle against the “negative consequences of commercialism”, as well as retaining the International Objective of 1974 (as proposed by the government). However, they also supported the Culture Commission’s recommendation for cultural independence as an objective in its own right, rather than as a means, thus not distancing themselves further from the Moderate and Liberal criticism. The sixth objective was a direct acceptance of the recommendations of KUR and the Centre Party.\textsuperscript{623}

\textit{Bildning} can, according to the National Council for Cultural Affairs, be defined as a set of knowledge, values, norms and ideals. The National Council for Cultural Affairs says that while the goal of education is often a specific and limited professional competence, \textit{bildning} is assumed to provide orientation in our existence. The National Council for Cultural Affairs, furthermore, states that, among other things, the objective of \textit{bildning} has its background in people’s personal development and in their need for community and identity (the individual perspective). An objective of \textit{bildning} could also have its point of departure in a fundamental view of democracy [\textit{en demokratisk grundsyn}]. \textit{Bildning} is a collective concern and the level of \textit{bildning}, through its contribution to societal development at large, has a competence and symbolic value to the nation or region (the societal perspective).\textsuperscript{624}

Thus formulated the concept of \textit{bildning} seems to have included all of the basic values included in the dominant concept of the nation. In a word deeply connected with the \textit{Folkhem} tradition KUR had thus combined the values of both individualism and collectivism in a way acceptable to all parties – except to the old Conservatives. The recommendations of the Committee were passed by the Riksdag with the usual overwhelming majority.\textsuperscript{625}

\textbf{On the role of IT in Cultural Policy}

An interesting example of the belief that society was changing in the mid-nineties was the general view of IT and the belief in an emerging IT society.

\textsuperscript{622} 1996/97:KrU1: 41. Unlike the government and the Culture Commission, the Culture Committee numbered its recommended goals. The first, third and fourth objectives are translated as in SOU 1995:84: 606 in the English summary.

\textsuperscript{623} 1996/97:KrU1:40-41.

\textsuperscript{624} 1996/97:KrU1:41.

\textsuperscript{625} RD 49, 1996-12-19.
Carl Bildt had been one of the proponents of this idea and it was shared to some extent by the new government. To take a deeper look at what this development would mean for cultural policy the government appointed Bi Puranen of the Institute for Future Studies to lead what would be known as the Swedish Culture Net Commission. Its instruction started in a typically visionary tone: “Infrastructure, working conditions and patterns of life” were expected to “change fundamentally”. “Informational society” was described as “the new trend after farming and industrial societies”. This visionary attitude could also be extended to the cultural sector: “IT can give new possibilities for artistic creativity and for the exchange of thoughts, ideas and experiences.” The main task of the Commission was, however, to see to the development of common standards for digitalisation in the cultural sector and to provide guidelines for that. It was also stated as a condition that the State had an important role to ensure that information would reach all citizens and to prevent the emergence of an “A” and a “B team” of information technology.

Thus we can see a direct line from the integrative outlook of Culture Council to the instruction of this IT Commission.

In her final report Puranen primarily dealt with two issues: the digitalisation of working procedures and registers and the creation of a Swedish Cultural (electronic) Network. It was important to the Commission to increase efficiency within the cultural establishments, as was the utilisation of IT in artistic creativity. More important was, however, that the public would get easier access to cultural production and heritage. In this sense IT gave new possibilities for reaching the objectives of cultural policy, especially access. The result of these discussions was a proposal to create the cultural network as a new network within the Internet for the benefit of the cultural field. This would grant access, much like the Internet, but it would at the same time remain national and guarantee quality. It was thus a matter of utilising new technology for the benefit of an old vision. This new network would initially during a test period of a few years, be financed by the foundations that had already involved themselves in the experiment. It would be administered by an editorial staff responsible for quality checks and for helping and educating participants.

626 Under the Bildt government IT and the informational society had been something a symbol for the new era that Sweden was now supposedly entering. An IT Commission was appointed to analyse and plan the transition to an informational society. Almost alone among government commissions in Swedish history it was headed by the Prime Minister in person. It believed that IT would change society fundamentally and worked to make Sweden a spearhead in this development (SOU 1994:118). Predictably, the Social Democrats changed the leadership of this commission and replaced it in 1995 with a new IT Commission of their own making headed by Jan Nygren, a senior Social Democrat. The programmes and reports of this commission, however, maintained much of the visionary zeal of the former government, SOU 1995:68.

The editorial staff would in turn be supervised by the Royal Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities and by the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences, as well as by a special steering group with representatives of cultural establishments and of the artists.628

The Commission’s primary concern was with the more practical difficulties of how to use IT to spread culture to the people and at the same time avoid the creation of a “B team” in the information society. Several aspects of this problem were considered, primarily those of gender, age, geography, functional disabilities and “multicultural aspects”. While the majority of those who used computers in their work were women, men were highly overrepresented among Internet users, as well as among users of e-mail and other typical features of the information society. The Commission however believed that women’s interest in the Net would increase if subjects more interesting to women (as for example culture) were made more available there. The elderly were also seriously underrepresented among the users of these devices, as were people living outside the major cities. Special care would have to be taken for the new Network to be as easily accessible as possible for disabled people, especially those with impaired sight. Among the ethnic and linguistic minorities only the Sami were discussed as having a culture in need of a separate part of the Network. Other minorities were instead considered from the perspective of how to make their access to the general Network as easy as possible. For their special benefit as much of it as possible should be accessible in English, easy-to-read Swedish and, possibly, also in the major immigrant tongues. Internet access and advice could, furthermore, be offered in the libraries and in the schools. Old institutions could thus still be utilised to further the established objectives of cultural policy in the new informational society.629 The expectation was not that the Net would challenge the integrative project of the Swedish nation-state, but rather that it would provide the modern nation-state with more efficient means to reach its goals.

At the same time as the Culture Net Commission was working on the expansion of the use of information technology in the cultural sector the government also presented a general bill on information technology, the State and society. When it was presented to the Riksdag it included an action programme for the State, but no actual propositions for the Riksdag.630 In the

630 Government bill 1995/96:125, discussed in the Riksdag Committee on Traffic, but referred to the Committee on Culture for consideration (its answer is registered as KrU7y to the TU). While the work of the Culture Net Commission was still ongoing, some of its suggestions were included in the recommendations of the Culture Commission and thus included when it was circulated for consideration in the cultural sector. KUR was prepared to take responsibility for a Culture Net, provided that it was given the necessary resources. The Nordic Museum and the Swedish Writers'
Committee on Cultural Affairs this bill was heavily criticised by the Moderates. Bildt argued in a private bill that it illustrated not only the new government’s failure to lead the development, but also a larger inability to grasp the ongoing changes in society. When compared to his own IT policies, those of the new government seemed weak. The government believed too much in its ability to control development. This is illustrated by Bildt’s comment on the role of libraries:

> In the long term, we hardly believe that normal libraries will play any significant role as a result of a broadened use of information technology. Telephones exist today not only at the post office or in the phone shop. […] The citizens’ access to information via IT will not be benefited by giving public libraries any special role as ‘screen providers’ for those who do not have access to computers at home or at work.

In a bill signed by Mats Odell (the former Minister of Communication), among others, the Christian Democrats agreed in general with the Moderates that the new Social Democratic IT policy was significantly weaker and less visionary than that of their government. As regards culture, however, they stressed, together with the Leftists, the importance of using information technology to grant the general public increased access to the Swedish cultural heritage. This could be done, for example, through increased access to original material via the Internet. They, furthermore, argued for the need of ethics in the new society. On the practical level this would mean, for example, an immediate ban on child pornography.

Like the Christian Democrats the Leftists pointed to the importance of public access to the cultural heritage resources held by the public sector. Like the Greens they demanded that these reforms should receive extra funding so that the agencies and organisations of the sector would not be forced to carry the costs themselves, as they had had to do in so many previous reforms. The main theme in Leftist IT policy was however that of putting IT to use in the fight against class differences in Swedish society. They, furthermore, emph-
ised the threat posed by international flows of information to the Swedish language and culture, as well as the great importance of State intervention and leadership in a changing society:634

[...] Just as it once was political decisions on public schools that, after 400 years, made Gutenberg's invention of the art of print at last available to the entire people, political decisions will have to lay the foundation for public access to the new technology.635

Like the Social Democrats the Leftists believed in a continued important role for libraries and folkbildning in this work. They also pressed for the need of a coordinating role assigned to KUR. The economy issue, however, remained the principal difference.636 In many ways the interpretation of IT in all parties corresponded to their interpretations of already existing technology: the Left focused on ownership, Social Democrats and Moderates on planning Christian Democrats on morality and Liberals on artistic freedom. While all parties talked of a new society, they interpreted it, in other worlds, by metaphors founded in the old. The oldest of all institutional modes of speech was perhaps the concept that the ideal nation could be realised by imminent developments in technology.637

*A House for World Culture*

Another major symbol of change in Swedish society was the emergence of a multi-cultural society. In February 1997 the government appointed the senior Social Democrat Lars Engqvist commissioner to present recommendations on founding a House of World Culture in the facilities of Södra teatern ("The Southern Theatre", in Stockholm). This should be "a stage for international music, dance, film, theatre, poetry and literature, as well as for debates on culture and society. The repertory should be broad and include everything from popular culture to experimental cultural events." Engqvist's first task was to define what "World Culture" should mean. This is also among the more interesting features of his report. He noted that the term "world" was used with different meanings in the similar terms "world literature" and "world music". In the first case the term referred to "literature that has been internationally successful, of good quality and that has been published in many countries", thus focusing on a universal value. In the latter case the implication was "internationally and commercially successful music that weave

634 Motion 1995/96 T56, Motion 1995/96 T 59.
635 Motion 1995/96 T56: 3.
636 Motion 1995/96 T56.
637 See Harding 2006 for a more comprehensive discussion on the interpretation of new technology in the Swedish cultural policies of the nineties. See also Santesson-Wilsson 2003 for an analysis of the introduction of broad band technology as an example of symbolic politics.
together musical traditions and styles from different countries and cultures. In other contexts, the term world music has become a general term for various kinds of music that stand on the fundament of folk music” – a concept that is based on particular cultures, although it defines “world culture” as a hybrid between these. A hybrid is, however, only a hybrid if one assumes the existence of pure forms. The implied differences between high and low art, or the reference to (universal) “quality” in one case and to commercial success in the other were never problematised by Enqvist. The definition of “World Culture” that he chose would however be one much closer to the particularist latter case.638

Enqvist argued for the importance of World Culture with reference to internationalisation, increased travel and trans-border communication, as well as to the shift from work-related to refugee immigration. He agreed with the government that this created a need to “broaden society’s cultural horizon to include non-European cultural expressions as well.” He seems however to have considered the objective mainly to be one of broadening the horizon of the non-immigrant majority. World Culture could in other words be understood as a term for non-European culture, although this understanding was not consistently followed. Neither was there much room for the government’s objective of “providing space for the young and new trans-ethnic and trans-cultural generation.”640

His conclusions were somewhat more surprising when concerning the House of World Culture itself. After evaluating the possibilities for a localisation to the Southern Theatre, he concluded that the building was too inflexible to house such a diverse number of activities. On the other hand, he also noted that many other establishments were already involved in World Cultural activities. With this in mind he recommended that the Southern Theatre should continue its work under its present administration (the NTT) with a special profile towards World Culture, and that the government, instead of financing a House of World Culture, should invest in a Forum for

[638] SOU 1997:95: quotes from pp. 9 and 13. For a study of Swedish world music see Lundberg, Malm & Ronström 2003. It should be noted that world music in ordinary use includes Swedish folk music, at least when mixed with folk music from other parts of the world, or with rock, jazz or techno, or other modern popular music, and that Swedish folk music is marketed internationally as world music (pp. 148-150).


World Culture with representatives of various cultural organisations and with the task of coordinating World Cultural activities in Sweden. In this way the money could be used for the good of the whole of country and would not have to be concentrated to Stockholm or to one physical location.\textsuperscript{641} Engqvist thus rejected the idea of creating a specific cultural establishment for World Culture. Instead he proposed integrating these concerns with the already existing actors, something that would be much more in line with the institutionalised standards of cultural policy. This implementation would however require a new institutional actor that would coordinate the integration of these new standards of approach to culture in the field as a whole. This new actor would be the Forum for World Culture. Although the Forum itself would never become a permanent feature of the sector, this model would also be used in the Forum for Living History (see p. 347), which the Prime Minister initiated only six days after the publication of this report.

A Forum for World Culture, following these recommendations, was included in the National Budget for 1998. The government argued that “[d]ifferent cultures often live side by side without ever meeting. The majority of people in Sweden seldom or never come in contact with the cultural richness that immigration has added to our society”. The Forum would adjust this by coordinating public measures. These would include both “giving information of World Cultural events” and supporting “trans-ethnic and trans-cultural expressions”. The idea was however rejected by both the Moderates and Centrists, both of which stated that such activities were the responsibility of the existing establishments and not a reason for creating new ones. The Liberals, on the other hand, proposed co-location with the new Museum of World Culture in Gothenburg, something that the majority rejected by referring to the involvement of the City of Stockholm in the project and its funding. The Greens proposed that the Forum should be led by artists and the Leftists criticised the general idea as being insufficiently concerned with not marginalising the culture it was supposed to support. The Left also proposed a Library of World Culture situated at the already existing Culture House in central Stockholm, rather than on its “margins”. These ideas were, however, rejected in favour of the government’s programme.\textsuperscript{642}

\textsuperscript{641} SOU 1997:95. It is interesting to note that although the Södra Teatern remained with the NTT, it also developed along the lines of a house of world culture, in spite of the fact that the Riksdag chose to follow Engqvist’s recommendations. See Egeland 2007 for an analysis of the construction of “multiculturalism” in the Södra Teatern.

\textsuperscript{642} 1997/98:KrU1: pp. 49-54, summarising the bill at p. 49.
Although many activities already related to language, or more precisely to protecting the Swedish language, the term language policy was not in use before this time. A Swedish language policy would in fact not be officially established until 2006. The commission behind that project would however start its work in 2000. Legislation on minority languages was then already an integral part of cultural policy. As this study concerns the sub-sectors included in the cultural sector in 2002 I will discuss the work of the Minority Language Commission here, in spite of its status as part of the government's minority policies (and thus reporting to the Ministry of Agriculture). That is not to say that its location in a different field is irrelevant. I believe, on the contrary, that it was precisely because the issue was handled outside the field of cultural policy that the norms of representation and minority policy could supersede those of linguistic unity.

The Minority Language Commission was formed in 1995 and consisted of representatives of the established organisations for Tornevalians, Sami, Swedish Finns and Roma, under the chairmanship of Carin Lundberg (Social Democratic member of the Riksdag) and responsible for investigating the consequences of signing the European Charter for Minority Languages. Later on a new section of the Commission was added to deal with the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. This time the members were representatives of the Riksdag parties. In 1997 a representative of the Jewish community was added to the first section. Many of these organisations were themselves the results of an immigrant and minority policy that had since the eighties financially supported cultural (ethnically defined) NGOs as representatives of these communities and as ways of activating them socially. Ironically this policy was now giving way to an objective and result oriented preference for explicit integration projects that could be more easily evaluated as such.

The two sections of the Minority Language Commission presented two separate reports, one on the minority languages and one on national minorities. Among the most significant sentences in both reports of this Commission was the motivation given by the politicians in their comment on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities:

This would demonstrate that Sweden, in line with its previous policy, supports the work of enhancing the protection of human rights and freedoms. In the last few years issues connected with the protection of national minorities in Europe have...
once again been highlighted as a result of the upheavals in Eastern Europe. It is therefore important that Sweden, which has traditionally promoted the protection of human rights and freedoms, should ratify the Framework Convention, thus underlining its decision to protect the rights of its national minorities.

Ratification would also imply the recognition of Sweden’s multicultural history, of which the national minorities have long been part.646

This is enlightening, especially given that the Commission did not at this point think that Sweden actually fulfilled the requirements of the Framework Convention. These requirements should, in other words, not be fulfilled to give minorities their due, but in order to prove the superiority of the Swedish nation in following universal rules and to make the nation identifiable as “multicultural”. The interpretation that the minorities were recognised primarily because of the implications for changes in the self-perception of the majority is strengthened on a more practical level by the fact that the changes recommended in Swedish cultural policy in order to “recognise” the national minorities were characterised as “measures to disseminate information among the majority population about the national minorities, their culture, language, religion and traditions, and their history in Sweden.” It is, furthermore, interesting to note that the present situation of the minorities was not included in the descriptions were to should be distributed to the majority population.647

This is symptomatic of a report that looked on the minorities primarily in terms of their cultural history and only secondarily, and in relation to decisions that concerned them specifically, as functioning polities or parts of the present day polity of the state-framed nation.

The major parts of both reports relate to which languages could be considered national minority languages, which groups could be considered national minorities and which ones of the languages should be connected to special rights for their speakers in specified parts of the country. These categories were defined in the Convention as follows:

a “regional or minority languages” means languages that are:
   i traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State's population; and
   ii different from the official language(s) of that State;
   It does not include either dialects of the official language(s) of the State or the languages of migrants
b “territory in which the regional or minority language is used” means the geographical area in which the said language is the mode of expression of a number of people justifying the adoption of the various protective and promotional measures provided for in this Charter;

“non-territorial languages” means languages used by the nationals of the State which differ from the language or languages used by the rest of the State’s population but which, although traditionally used within the territory of the State, cannot be identified with a particular area thereof.\(^{648}\)

The Commission recommended only three minority languages: Finnish, Sami and Romani Chib, and – somewhat later – five national minorities: Finns, Tornedalians, Sami, Roma and Jews. The earlier report on languages did, however, discuss the languages of all five (Finnish, Meänkieli, Sami, Romani Chib and Yiddish). After consulting with linguistic expertise they, however, concluded that all five were possible to consider as separate languages and had a significant history in Sweden. Yiddish (but never Hebrew) was discussed as a possible language connected with the Jewish minority, but the Commission concluded that the language had very few speakers and no continuity in the country. Neither was Finnish considered to have continuity in any part of the country except for the Tornedalen area. It was in order not to deprive the larger Finnish-speaking population of the possibility to gain status as a regional minority that the Commission decided not to consider the regional variation a separate language. What is noteworthy is also that the Finnish-speaking population of Sweden was approximated by adding the number of Finnish immigrants and people descending from Finnish immigrants in later generations to the approximated Finnish-speaking population of Tornedalen, thus assuming them to be mostly an immigrant category. This must be considered somewhat strange given that it not only contradicts the very purpose of the investigation but also ignores the fact that Finland is bilingual. Also considered at this point were sign language and various dialects and regional variations of Swedish. Sign language was rejected with the argument that the Framework Convention had been created to protect minority languages as part of minority cultures and although sign language had been established in Sweden for some time, it did not play this part but functioned in a merely communicative role. While certain dialects, such as the old Gotland dialect, were in fact different enough from standard Swedish to qualify as separate languages, those who spoke them were few and often elderly. The Commission did not believe that a new legal status would contribute in any considerable way to the survival of these languages.\(^{649}\)

To these recommendations all of the minority representatives noted their differences of opinion: the Tornedalian representative against the exclusion of his Meänkieli, Yiddish, and the Sami varieties, and the Sami representative against the exclusion of South Sami as a separate language, as well as the

\(^{648}\) European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages Part I Article 1, pp. 312-313 in SOU 1997:192.

limited responsibilities that would accompany recognition. The Finnish representative noted that the recognition of the national status of the Finnish language in Sweden came at the same time as budget cuts that would in fact diminish public service in their own language for the Finnish-speaking minority. The Jewish representative contributed with an overview of the history of the Yiddish language in Sweden and elsewhere to point out its long presence in Sweden. The Moderate party representative also noted a difference of opinion stating the importance of a free choice of services in the fields of schooling and care for the elderly, as a way to give more people access to these services in the minority languages.\textsuperscript{650} The later report on the Framework Convention, written by the political representatives was, on the other hand, considerably less restrictive and immediately recognised five minorities – Jews, Tornedalians, Roma, Swedish Finns and Sami – considered to live up to four criteria for national minorities in Sweden:

- it should be distinguished by a marked degree of cohesion and not have a dominant position in relation to the rest of the population;
- it should have a distinctive character in terms of religion, language, traditions and/or culture;
- it should have historical or longstanding ties with Sweden;
- self-identification: both the individual members and the group as a whole must be prepared to preserve its identity.\textsuperscript{651}

That other groups in Sweden might have this status was never discussed. This definition has, however, to be considered as a fairly standard definition of ethnicity, and it is interesting to note that as the Commission went on to discuss what a Swedish minority policy should look like, minority issues were restricted to issues concerning traditions, culture, the traditional Sami way of life and – to some extent – language use, and that the proposed new influence of the minorities was restricted to these areas. The Commission also discussed possible measures in the area of language preservation.\textsuperscript{652} The Government Bill on the National Minorities that was presented the following years largely institutionalised these norms (see p. 320).

**POLICY ON THE FORMS OF ART**

*The Culture Commission and the Forms of Art*

With the exception of the Culture Commission, the art forms were subjected to few commissions during this period. Apart from literature – which I have

\textsuperscript{650} SOU 1997:192: 283-301.
\textsuperscript{652} SOU 1997:193.
chosen to treat separately – these art forms were “theatre”, “dance”, “music”, “film”, “visual and form art”, “architecture and community planning” and “design”. In order to increase the possibilities for the evaluation of objective fulfilment the Commission recommended separate objectives for each of these sectors. Both dance and architecture were relatively new as such and design was similar to them in this. It was now to become a prioritised part of the policy on visual and form art, if not yet a sector of its own.653

While theatre policy had not been the subject of any government commission serving under the Persson governments, it had been the subject of the Theatre Commission which had finished its work in the final days of the Bildt government. The Culture Commission now largely agreed with the Theatre Commission. Their recommendations thus favoured a decentralisation of theatre funding from the NTT to regional establishments and a defence of the qualitative and heritage preserving work of the Royal Opera and Dramatic Theatre.654 The Commission’s discussions of dance policy, however, differ somewhat from this. By way of introduction, it comments on the universality of dance as an art form including not only high art but also both folk dance and the dances of youth sub-cultures such as rave and hip hop. The Commission also stressed that “[i]n the multi-cultural society, dance can contribute to increasing understanding and decreasing prejudice between groups. Dance has, like all non-verbal art forms, advantages for developed international cultural exchange”. Much like the Culture Council had, the Commission in practice, however, dealt primarily with professional and dance which had already been accepted as artistic. TV, dance education and dance training as part of school curricula were, on the other hand, treated as ways of increasing public interest in that art form. Other forms of dancing – from jazz to folk dance – were treated only in the context of amateur activities, even if education was recommended to increase public interest in these pastimes as well. On the more practical level, the Commission recommended that the NTT should be given a special responsibility for dance and that the government should increase its contribution to dance culture documentation facilities and to creating new dance establishments out in the provinces.655 In spite of its multiculturalist rhetoric the Commission’s dance policy in other words stayed with the institutionalised combination of high art universalism and geographic

653 SOU 1995:84. Dance had previously been treated together with theatre, while architecture had not been treated as cultural policy at all; the State did have a well-developed policy on building, but did not take credit for having prioritised the aesthetic aspects of this.


integration within the borders of the state-framed nation. Theatre policy, too, remained aestheticist, but its funding would in turn be regionalised.

The Commission’s description of the musical sector could be considered a combination of the previous two. Music was without competition the largest of the cultural sectors and an obvious success story in that both public interest and government commitment in all parts of it had either increased or remained high. There were, however, areas that the Commission considered neglected: the sector supported by the government did not correspond to the plurality of public interest but instead concentrated heavily on Western musical high culture. While the Commission did not recommend (or even discuss) any drastic measures to remedy this situation, it did recommend certain transfers of funding from modern artistic music to more popular forms, such as jazz and folk music, the latter of which was described as enjoying a continued public relevance in local societies as well as being an important part of “our cultural heritage” (together with folk dance, folk music was the only genre that was described with references only to the cultural heritage and none to artistic significance, renewal or aesthetic quality). To achieve this move towards an increasingly particularistic view of music, the funding of County Music should be cut by half and the released funding spent on genre profiling. Chamber music should also be included among these genres, but then chamber and symphony orchestras would, together with County Music, see their funding recreated as a generalised regional funding. The role of the National Touring Concerts (NTC) should also be changed for the benefit of a more regionalised organisation. On the more separate issue of technical developments, the Commission also recommended that its support funding should be taken over by KUR. It is also interesting to note that the Commission was positive and without reservations with regard to technical developments, including the new technologies that could enable the unimpeded spread of music in electronic form, something that was apparently seen only as a benefit for public interest in, and access to, music – not yet as a threat to more legitimate channels of distribution.656

Even more diverse was the sector described as “visual and form art”. In practice it consisted of a core composed of the established high artistic expressions of painting, sculpture and (now) conceptual art and, on the other hand, some more peripheral art forms such as photography and, even further from the centre, design and handicraft, i.e. art forms that had not been established as parts of the artistic field occupied by the art museums.657 In the artistic core, the Culture Commission was in the company of the Commission for Art in the Public Environment, established by Friggebo in late June 1994,

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in creating a more coordinated organisation for administrating and financing works of art such as monuments and artwork placed in public buildings.\textsuperscript{658} While the commissioner – Gunilla Lagerbielke – stressed the importance of the aesthetic aspect of public places in public life, her report centred, in practice, almost exclusively on places where publicly owned works of art were displayed: that is government offices and other major public buildings. The often less than public access too many of these buildings was thus not discussed. It was however recommended that the National Art Council should be given increased authority and that this authority should be used to spread information about these works of art in order to increase the appreciation of them, and also to make it possible to prioritise new buildings in which the works of art could be coordinated with the architectonic context in order to create a more qualitative whole. It should, however, also be a priority not to decorate buildings that could not be expected to stay in government use for a long and foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{659} These opinions were in general supported by the Culture Commission.\textsuperscript{660}

On the subject of the established art forms the Culture Commission itself based its views on a clear renewal and quality perspective coupled with the values of culture in the whole of the country and with internationalisation. A display compensation for artists was discussed briefly (see below under Artist Politics), and it was recommended that the counties should be made responsible for regional surveys. It was also noted that County Museums continued to focus on cultural heritage. The Commission thus recommended that their government funding should be made dependent on their support for visual quality art. The County Museums should thus be further integrated into the artistic side of cultural policy by the use of economic incitements (steering by objectives and results). The informational work of NGOs for the benefit of the interested public should also gain increased funding in order to make the public interested in the visual arts continue to grow. With much the same arguments photography was also pointed out as an art form of growing importance that needed more support to reach out to larger audiences. Design was also pointed to as a field of growing importance and the government ought thus to create a design council to stimulate this development. If design was a progressive subject of renewal, handicraft was “an important part of the cultural heritage” and supported through the funding of an NGO. The new and the old art forms should, however, be housed under the same

\textsuperscript{658} Dir. 1994:63.
\textsuperscript{659} SOU 1995:18.
roof: it was recommended that the Röhska Museum of Applied Arts should be made responsible for both of them.661

The chapter on architecture is more of an argument for architecture as part of cultural policy than an actual plan for it. Arguing from the ancient Roman architect Vitruvius the Commission considered architecture a matter of firmitas, commoditas and venustas – durability, comfort and beauty. Modern, and especially Swedish, architecture had, however, overemphasised a narrow conception of efficiency at the cost of other values. To create a better environment architecture had to be seen as more of a cultural than a technical activity. Such an effort could be coordinated within national cultural policy. The Commission recommended that The National Board of Housing, Building and Planning, the National Museum of Architecture, the National Art Council and the architect organisations should create a national plan for architectural policy, and that the National Museum of Architecture should be considered the museum responsible for the documentation of the architectonic art form.662 Much as with design, the institutionalisation of a new art form thus followed an already existing pattern in that an established art form should have a museum and an autonomous support system working from aesthetic quality assessment. According to the Commission each sub-sector within cultural policy should also have a set of objectives. Architecture was thus ordered into the established norms of art policy organisation.

Film was now established as a part of art policy rather than of media policy. In the National Budget the transfer had, however, occurred as late as in 1994. Apparently the Commission still felt a need to legitimise this by arguing that film was a form of art. It also noted several differences between the organisation of film policy and the policies concerning other art forms. One difference was the position of the SFI – a foundation – as the main public actor of the field. Another was that most production remained within the private sector. Neither of these facts did, however, lead to any recommendations for change. The recommendations of the Commission were instead presented as responses to changes that had occurred in the field since the seventies. TV had become more important as a way of watching film. TV companies ought thus to make a larger contribution to the activities of the SFI. The Commission, however, also pointed to the importance of TV as the main outlet for documentaries and short film. More worrying was the decline of cinemas in smaller towns and the Commission stressed that municipalities ought to recognise the cultural status of these institutions. Culture in the whole of the country was also approached from a production-perspective and

661 SOU 1995:84:413-434. Handicraft was also subjected to another commission, in which the protection of master titles in various crafts were discussed and supported (SOU 1994:53).
the Commission recommended that the SFI should support film production in new regions. The increased possibilities for private production created by new technology were also hailed as a positive development. Increased amateur activities should be supported through the funding of media workshops. Film policy thus remained as it had been since the sixties: civil and integrative within the limits of the linguistic nation, but at the same time highly aestheticist in its defence of film as high art.

The Government Bill on Culture

The Culture Bill followed the recommendations of the Commission with only a few significant deviations. One was that the NTT and the NTC would retain all their responsibilities unchanged, and that the Royal Dramatic Theatre and the Royal Opera were treated more benefliciarily. This was maybe the result of a number of actors, including the Theatre Union, intervening in favour of the NTT and of several other respondents defending the Royal Theatres. The government, however, also argued for the national responsibilities of the Royal Theatres as guardians of the cultural heritage (referring to their responsibilities for touring and TV-production and to their special responsibilities). Another change was the several new projects and responsibilities directed at supporting cultural activities for children and young people, which the government added on its own. The inclusion of the young and the geographical periphery were now top priorities for cultural policy. Among the projects that the government did not consider fundable for the moment was, however, the Commission’s recommendation of a Sami theatre. On this matter the government pointed to the funding and responsibilities of the Sameting. The government, on the other hand, created “architecture and design” as a new unified sector. Although its suggestions for it closely followed the recommendations of the Cultural Commission and the Commission on Art in Public Spaces, the definition of it is still of interest. Aesthetic quality and the preservation of cultural heritage were now the main arguments and in a very high degree considered one and the same, as well as highly beneficial to the quality of life that the government wished to deliver to its citizens and opposed to the short term interests of commercialism and a materialistic view of society.

Discussions in the Riksdag

It is interesting to note the relative consensus that still existed on these matters, even in the Riksdag. Moderate representatives argued for decreased funding of the NTT and the NTC and for increased support for the Royal

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Representatives of all parties, however, cooperated to achieve a transfer of funding from the Royal Opera to the Gothenburg Opera. Representatives of all parties also argued for a permanent Sami theatre, a proposal that was rejected by the Riksdag. Liberals, Centrists, Christian Democrats and Greens argued for an even more regionalised music policy while the Moderates would rather support the municipalities (with funds transferred from the NTC) and, somewhat surprisingly, jazz music. Various Centrists, Liberals and Social Democrats, on the other hand, argued for a new national centre for folk music, and for proclaiming the keyed fiddle the Swedish national instrument. This attempt at strengthening Swedish particularist culture failed, the allied representatives of Gothenburg managed, however, to have the Gothenburg Symphony Orchestra proclaimed a “national orchestra”, which did not, on the other hand, lead to any practical benefits.666

The following year Liberals, Greens and Leftists joined forces to try to stop cuts in regional music funding. The Liberals also continued their policy of advocating support for independent groups. In the film field Centrists argued for making distribution a priority in the next Film Agreement and for handing over the responsibility for this to regional establishments rather than to the SFI. Christian Democrats, on the other hand, argued for making the production of children’s movies a higher priority. Regarding architecture a Green representative argued for an aesthetic clause in the building legislation that would enable municipalities to stop aesthetically objectionable buildings. Arguments concerning the visual arts were even more varied. The Moderates argued for a clearer definition of Konstnämnden as the institution responsible for buying art for public purposes. Most arguments, however, were more concerned with the situation of the artists than with the general state of the field.

It is interesting however to note that during this period representatives of all parties at one point or another opposed the institutional integration of the territory proposed by the government in favour of more regionalist models.667

To sum up: aestheticism remained relatively unchallenged in art policy, despite certain support especially from the Centre and the Greens for a particularist prioritising of folk culture in various forms. This is clear both in the established fields and in government arguments for the recognition of new sectors. Despite the dominant universalist perspective the nation remained the limit of artistic fields as supported by the State. The government continued to defend institutional integration of all cultural policy within it, even when regionalisation was argued for by both the Culture Commission and the opposition.

THE SITUATION OF ARTISTS

To improve the economic situation of the artists was among the central issues of this period, as well as one of the main tasks of the Culture Commission. The art grants system was still much like what it had become through the reform of 1976 (see p. 131). It consisted of various compensations and subsidies. One such was Literature Compensation, but similar systems existed for pictorial and musical artists, as well as for music copyright holders. All of these systems were based on auditable quality rather than on sales or demand, much like the grants systems (which consisted of short- and long-term stipends as well as guaranteed income).668

The Culture Commission on the Situation of Artists

The Culture Commission connected the situation of artists primarily with the objectives of Renewal and Internationalisation. The economic situation of professional artists was, however, described as both changing and problematic. Their number had increased significantly in the previous decades. A positive development was that much of this growth consisted of an increase in the number of female artists. Everything also pointed to a continued interest in the artistic professions as well as in artistic education at lower levels. Unfortunately, the demand for artists had not increased to a comparable level. Many artists were thus dependent on unemployment aid, often for regular periods. Aid-funded artistic projects were, however, selected on the basis of need, not quality. That a large portion of the artistic projects were funded in this way thus created a counter-productive bias. In the end both cultural and employment policy were, however, to aim at increased job opportunities for artists. Their aims should thus not contradict each other.669

Solutions to the problem had, according to the Culture Commission, to be found in an increased demand for art. This could be accomplished in several ways, including an increased public employment of artists, as well as an increased interest in art in the public sector and among the people. Such a change would be more feasible if artists became more oriented towards new sectors (for example in the emerging information society). Solutions could also be found in the coordination of various sectors, such as the cultural, the legal and the fiscal. Educating already active artists was recommended as a method to increase their attractiveness. Funding should, furthermore, be transferred from employment policy to cultural policy in order to fund further education for artists. What was also important was the legal field of copyright law, which would have to be changed as a result of both technical developments and the ongoing harmonisation of law in the EU. Copyright was now

668 SOU 1997:84: 229-270.
considered a central point in financing creative artists. A basic rule should thus be that exceptions from copyright should be avoided, and not made at all if the reasons were only economic. The Commission, furthermore, considered the possibility of a droit de suit (see below). Performing artists (to use the distinction that the Commission made between copyright holders and other artists) would, however, have to rely on other means. In this context the Commission also discussed the possibility of setting up a fund (as suggested by a commission lead by Carl Tham in SOU 1990:39). To be able to equally benefit both artists with a regular employment and those running their own businesses, the Commission, however, recommended improving the existing systems rather than investing in any of possible new alternatives.670

In the Culture Bill the government chose to follow the Culture Commission on all of these recommendations, except for that of transferring money from employment policy, something that had been opposed by a number of important actors. KLYS, the National Labour Market Board (AMS) and the Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO) did not, for example, agree that funding for employment policies directed at artists could be decreased at this point. The National Audit Office (RRV) and SAFAD had argued against transferring the funding of unemployment measures in one sector from general employment policy, as this would in long run risk to disintegrate the entire sector of employment policy.671 The government now decided to create three government commissions to submit recommendations for a future artist policy.

The Artist Compensation Commission
One of these was the commission appointed to investigate the possibilities of complementing existing copyright legislation with a droit de suit, a kind of fee that is paid whenever a work of art is sold by a person who is not the original artist. Such a rule had been discussed before, not the least in connection to the reworking of Swedish copyright legislation in the early nineties. The Commission, which was also charged with presenting recommendations on how to include phonograms in the Library Compensation system, was equipped by

671 Government bill 1996/97:3, Ds 1996:23: 102-128. The reception of these recommendations, when they were circulated for consideration, had been positive in general. KLYS and some other representatives of the artists had, however, pointed out that increased selective grant forms (which they supported as such) could not be considered a substitute for creating a general support system, as the one once recommended by Carl Tham. Others considered some of the recommendations centralistic. The Authors’ Fund disagreed with the idea of strengthening the Artists’ Fund, which would risk weakening the representatives of traditionally independent fields. Transferring funding from employment policy for educational purposes proved, however, more controversial than any of the other recommendations concerning artists.
the government with a number of experts connected with the government itself. It interpreted its assignments in rather technical terms but reasoned that while the government prohibited increased spending on any sector, artists were in need of increased grants. A droit de suit would solve this. This was especially true within the fields of pictorial art, as the works of these artists, unlike, for example, literature and music, would otherwise only benefit their creators economically on the sale of the original (to include craft artists was taken for granted even when the Commission noted that this was not necessarily the case abroad). Looking at the systems of the other Nordic countries and that of the EU the Commission found that those of Denmark, Finland and the EU were based on compensation for copyright owners, while those of Iceland and Norway instead worked with compensation for artist organisations. Without much of an argument the Commission recommended the second system, which was more in line with Swedish institutions. Collecting fees could be managed by existing tax authorities and the grants handed out by KUR and the Artists’ Council. This funding should, furthermore, be directed to benefit young or otherwise unestablished artists (such as immigrants), the ones that needed it most.

Interestingly, the Artist Compensation Commission argued quite differently on their second subject: compensations for phonogram use in public libraries. On this issue their argument was not only based on the needs of the artists, but also on fairness, as they argued that it would be reasonable to treat the libraries’ lending policies for music in the same way as those concerning books. In line with the methods used by earlier investigations of book lending, the Commission’s limited studies of phonogram lending built on a traditional categorisation of genres and quality that would indicate that the fields were indeed comparable. In line with these arguments it recommended a grants system following the standard institutionalised on book lending (although distributed by the organisations STIM and SAMI, instead of by the Authors’ Fund). The Commission in other words chose isomorphism within the library field. As they did not have the authority to propose increased public spending, the Authors’ Fund was also where the money would have to

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672 Dir. 1996:81.
673 SOU 1997:106. During its work the Commission was in contact not only with representatives of foreign countries, but also with the public agencies concerned and the organisations representing copyright holders. Unsurprisingly, the latter, being the traditional Swedish artists’ organisations agreed with the Commissions’ argument. Some dissent existed, however, among the museums, where it was believed that the large parts of the art market would now be forced abroad, and that it would take important works of art with it. The Commission agreed that such a development ought to be stopped, but not that abstaining from a droit de suit was a proper way to respond.
taken. This could be taken to imply that their tendency to conceptualise rights from a legal perspective was relatively weak and in fact secondary to their desire for cost cuts as well as to neo-corporative aesthetic priorities. This priority was supported by some of the artists’ organisations – as, for example, the Swedish Union of Professional Musicians – which did not consider copyright compensations related enough to quality to be desirable as a standard.

Art Grants

As it had promised in the Culture Bill, the government also created a Commission to present recommendations for a future system for art grants. In answer to demands from the artists’ organisations and to Carl Tham’s report of 1990 (SOU 1990:39) the government decided that the new system should be concentrated on benefiting artist who owned their own businesses but it should also in all fairness include employed artists with low incomes. The Commission should, furthermore, take special care that the system benefited only those who were “artistically or literarily active in the true sense”, something that could be ensured only by “objective demands” on quality. They should, however, also consider that artistic creativity could demand non-constant work intensity and actually benefit from limited work in another relevant field. It was, however, more of a problem than a benefit that artists were dependent on their day jobs for their livelihood.

The Commission started its work by ordering a major study of the economic situation for artists from the National Statistics Office (SCB). This study was carried out in connection with both this commission and the one concerned with the work conditions of artists. In order to avoid bias in defining the population studied, the commissions and the SCB decided to limit it to persons that had applied for artistic stipends and grants. The result was a detailed mapping of the current economic conditions of active artists, based on categories built on the institutions of cultural policy (pop, rock and folk music were, for example, grouped together, while more established art forms remained separated). The result pointed to artists as a group with significant internal differences, but a generally very low standard of living, especially

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674 SOU 1997:140
676 Dir 1996:80, quotes from p. 105 in the SOU 1997:184 reprint of the directive. Tham had suggested that a fund should be established to which active artists could make payments and from which they could later receive funds when they were in need. Such a system would however, according to the Commission, unduly privilege artists owning their own business. Including employed artists would, however, make them “pay twice”, as they, or at least their employers, were already paying social fees and taxes, SOU 1990:39.
when taking their generally high level of education into account. After comparing the Swedish situation to that in Ireland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Norway and Denmark (countries that were, for unknown reasons, considered comparable after a more general study), the Commission concluded that something would have to be done. It did not, however, agree with Tham’s earlier recommendations. A new grants system would have to be more general, or at least beneficial to everyone that could be recognised as being active within the arts (as defined in a normative sense). In spite of this, the Commission recommended a series of separate grants systems, set up for the various forms of art, as these were unequally benefited by the already existing systems. After discussions with the artists’ organisations, it also recommended that increased public funding should be granted to projects designed to increase the demand for works of art within the various art forms.

The Artistic Work Market Commission

The third Commission appointed to investigate the situation of Swedish artists was the Artistic Work Market Commission, entrusted to Anders Forsman, Ph.D., assisted by experts from the Federation of Swedish County Councils, the Theatre Union, KLYS, the Ministry of Culture, the Artists’ Council, KUR and the Ministry of Work. Two months later the government decided to add additional experts from the National Theatre Association, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and the unemployment authorities. This group was charged not only with investigating the situation for artists in the work market. It was also to submit recommendations to amend a situation characterised by chronic unemployment and imbalance between supply and demand, as well as between the work market for artists and the output of artistic education. The Commission was instructed not to depart from the objectives of either employment policy or cultural policy and yet to bear in mind that it was a central point of Swedish employment policy that the unemployed should stay available to the whole of the job market, and that this meant that those who were not likely to regain work within the sector they were already educated to work in should be re-educated in order to enable them to take up

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677 SOU 1997:184, SOU 1997:190. An alternative definition of artists that was discussed would have been to use KLYS membership as a criterion (which would have meant including press photographers among other groups that were considered non-artistic), or people reporting “artist” as their employment in the previous census (which would have excluded those unable to support themselves as artists).

678 SOU 1997:184. Among other things, five million kronor should be granted to the Writers Forum (Författarforum) for distribution and the promotion of reading, three million to financing new drama performances, ten million kronor to independent theatres and dancers and five million kronor in increased support for film production.
work in an other sector.\textsuperscript{679} Perhaps symptomatically, the Commission made the cultural section of the Employment Market Authority the focus of its report. These significant funds were administered by the cultural section of the Labour Market Board (AMS), making it the largest source of funding for artists in Sweden. Unfortunately, the objectives of employment policy and cultural policy did not meet.\textsuperscript{680}

To promote adjustment of the work force to the demand of art and artists on the regular employment market, which is the responsibility of employment policy, easily conflicts with cultural policy demands of diversity, artistic renewal and quality. Cultural policy should adjust the art market while employment policy should contribute to adjustment to this market. The heart of cultural policy is quality, while employment policy remains neutral to the quality of art. It aims to find jobs. But, before all, to prevent long-term un-employment.\textsuperscript{681}

The Commission agreed with the other commissions that the heart of the problem was that the number of artists had increased since the seventies, while the demand for their work had ceased to increase in the mid eighties. The excess artists were however kept within the art sector by an unemployment system that did not focus on re-education. The structure of the intersection between employment policy and cultural policy was however also more complicated than that, mostly as a consequence of the fact that both active and non-active artists were generally paid through various sorts of government support. The system itself was in fact based on having a number of artists kept available and supported through employment policy measures. Freelancing theatre groups, for example, tended to finance their training with unemployment aid, while the authorities (still as a part of employment policy) concentrated on acting as an intermediary for contracts. This was also where the objectives of employment and cultural policy came into open conflict. Artists working for unemployment money formed a significant part of the field and in reality a cheap alternative that it was hard for self-supporting artists to compete with. A solution to these problems would require a normative definition of “artists”. This concerned the cultural section of the AMS, as this definition was the determining factor for who would receive their com-

\textsuperscript{679} SOU 1997:183, Dir. 1997:58.
\textsuperscript{680} SOU 1997:183. Funding via employment policy was around 1.3 billion kronor to be compared to the approximately 4 billion channelled though the Ministry of Culture and its subordinate agencies. Of this money around 970 million went to so-called passive support and only 325 million to subsidies that required the receiving artists to be active.
\textsuperscript{681} SOU 1997:183: 9.
parably beneficial treatment. In most of its own work the Commission chose to define artists as persons holding membership in a KLYS organisation.682

For the future the Commission argued for even more limiting definitions; it considered about a third of the beneficiaries of aids given by the cultural section of the AMS as not being established artists. Everyone with an artistic education could not be considered an artist; neither could everyone who had once been employed in the art field. Instead the line had to be drawn with the help of regular evaluations in order to guarantee that the beneficiaries had recently been able to make a living on their artistic creativity. In order to guarantee that such a line would be upheld in practice as well as in theory the Cultural Section should be put in more regular contact with other parts of the AMS and be given more influence on who was transferred to it. Finally, councils of artists, representatives of artists’ organisations and critics should be created to watch over the evaluation of artists within the Agency. At the same time 50 million kronor should be transferred from the yearly budget of employment policy to that of cultural policy in order to include what were actually permanent activities in that sector. Government-financed theatres should employ freelance actors to enable these to be active within the cultural sector between jobs rather than work on unemployment aid. Through these measures the Commission believed it possible to create a more balanced employment market for artists in Sweden.683

Government Bills on the Situation of Artists
The government agreed that what was now termed “un-qualified artists” should be channelled out of the artistic sector and instructed the AMV (the Labour Market Administration) to do so (something it could do without the approval of the Riksdag). While it agreed that unemployment aid should not be used to help new artists to become established, the government did not, however, believe that decreasing the number of places in artistic education would solve the problem. It also concluded that a general grant for artists could not be financed at this point. The bill on the situation of artists that was submitted to the Riksdag in the spring of 1998, however, presented a number of measures that could be expected to increase the employment rate of artists within the various art forms (excluding literature, which was the subject of a separate bill):

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682 SOU 1997:183. Other proposed limitations were to use qualitative requirements, making the artists define themselves individually, or to include those with artistic education above a certain level, those (professionally) active within a field or a combination of these, ibid.51-53.

1. *New subsidies for exhibitions*, as recommended by the Art Grants Commission and agreed to by most answers when that report was circulated for consideration.

2. *Increased government funding for the Art Grants Committee*, as recommended by the Art Grants Commission. Differences of opinion existed on this measure, but mostly of a practical nature.

3. *Phonogram Compensations*, as recommended by the Art Compensation Commission. Most actors were positive to this measure with the exception of the Writers’ Fund, which protested against the idea that the necessary means should be taken from its funding.

4. *Increased subsidies to independent music groups and events, to regional and local theatre, music and dance establishments, to STIM, to phonogram production and to NTC*. The Arts Grants Commission had also recommended increased funding of County Orchestras, but this had been rejected, among others, by KUR, which argued that the NTC was better suited to handle these subsidies.

5. *Employment for freelancers in the theatre*, as recommended by the Commission for the Artistic Employment Market. On the recommendation of the University College of Dance this would, however, not include the dancers.

6. *Increased funding for independent dance and theatre troupes*, as well as for the Art Grants Committee’s film grants, as recommended by the Art Grants Commission.

7. *A new grant system for new Swedish drama*, much as recommended by the Art Grants Commission, although following the National Theatre Union’s suggestion not to limit these grants to independent troupes. The new system should be administered by the Authors’ Fund.

8. *A transfer of funding from employment policy agencies to Artistic Centres* supported by KUR to enable them to take over its responsibilities as an intermediary, as recommended by the Commission for the Artistic Employment Market and the Art Grants Commission.

9. *Increased funding for international cultural exchange* organised by KUR, the Art Grants Commission, the NTC and STIM, as recommended by the Art Grants Commission.

In executing all of these measures the actors responsible should take care to use them to equalise the uneven proportion of men and women in the cultural sector.684

**Reactions in the Riksdag**

The party most critical of these propositions was the Moderates. In their responding bill Elisabeth Fleetwood and her colleagues argued that the government had not presented satisfactory methods to amend the overpopula-

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tion in the artistic employment market. While anyone had the right to try to become an artist, they most certainly did not have the right to be provided for by the State while trying. As a way of increasing work opportunities for artists they pointed to the tax system. Artists were often self-employed and the Moderates argued for better tax conditions for small businesses. Furthermore, they argued that expenses on art should become tax deductible. Private firms should be allowed to act as (government-subsidised) agents for artists on the same terms as the public intermediary centres. The funding of these could, however, as proposed by the government, be transferred from the employment policy budget to that of cultural policy. While positive to a stronger copyright legislation the Moderates were very critical of the government’s propositions. Compensations should not be administered by corporative organisations like the Writers’ Fund, STIM or SAMI, which would endanger the rights of unaligned artists. Regardless of administration, rights should be owned by the creator of a work of art, not by organisations. The creator should, furthermore, be allowed to sell such rights, or to concede the right to droit de suit, to, for example, a gallery.685

Leftist representatives, unsurprisingly, had very different opinions. While they agreed that demand had to increase to provide work for artists, they argued that this increase should be accomplished by the public sector, for example, by creating new systems for the support of culture in the schools and for art exhibitions in public libraries. The latter could even be linked to the new Library Law, as could the proposed phonogram compensation. While they supported many of the measures proposed by the government, they considered their support for independent groups biased in favour of projects (as opposed to more long-term support systems). Independent groups should be funded, but primarily in ways that supported continuous work. Neither did the Leftists agree with the Government’s perceived lack of interest in cooperation between professional and amateur artists. Finally, they agreed with the government that the proportions of women and men in the artistic sector needed to be dealt with. They did not, however, consider the consequences of the proposed financial matters sufficiently analysed by the government on this issue. Neither did they consider the government’s support for the cultural activities of immigrants sufficient. Persons with an immigrant background constituted 17% of the population and the government should thus increase the support for their organisations to enable them to participate more in cultural life. This would also help enrich “Swedish culture.”686

The Greens agreed with the Leftists on the need for general support systems, a need not satisfied by the particular systems proposed by the gov-

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ernment. Neither did they consider the government’s concern for the connection between professional and amateur culture sufficiently mirrored in their actual propositions. The Greens also agreed with the Leftists on transferring funds from employment policy to cultural policy. They considered the present bill a step in the right direction, albeit a small one. They, however, also agreed with the centre-right on the need for better representation of non-unionised artists on the various consultative boards and committees, and with the Centre Party on the importance of giving recognition to folk music. The other centre-right parties stood somewhere between the extremes of the Moderates and Leftists. Together with both Greens and Leftists they submitted a bill on the issue of representation of non-unionised artists to the various consultative boards and committees. The Christian Democrats also agreed with the Left on the need to employ artists within the public sector. To the Christian Democrats this was a call for transferring cultural policy money to specific projects. The Liberals remained oddly silent in the Committee on Cultural Affairs and the Centre stressed the issues of culture in the whole of the country, equal representation of men and women and the importance of amateur and folk culture, as well as of multiculturalism:687

We miss a clearer emphasis of important cultural activities such as folk music, folk dance and multicultural music in the bill. […] These areas are of great importance to preserving the cultural heritage as well as to developing future cultural life. Folk culture also contributes to a greater exchange between amateurs and professionals. Greater importance should be given to folk music, folk dance and multicultural music in the distribution of production grants as well as in the make-up of consultative bodies.688

With only a few changes the Riksdag voted in favour of the government bill. The changes that were included in the final decision were all in favour of the bildning associations (connected with amateur culture) and the creation of a national centre for folk music.689

A Weakening but Un-Changed Field
To sum up, discussions on the situation of artists were held from a decidedly aestheticist point of view, from which the existence of universal aesthetic values remained unquestioned. Only the Moderates differed somewhat on this issue, as they offered a more juridical and ownership-based view of the artist’s right to funding. The general debate was however more of a result of the clash between the institutionalised objectives of employment policy and
of cultural policy. Although professional organisations were recognised as legitimate (and legitimating) representatives of the artistic field, their membership was not taken for granted as a definition of artists. As professional organisations in a neo-corporative system they have thus to be considered relatively weak. At the same time gender integration was presented as an issue particularly by the government and the Left. Representation of ethnic minorities was also becoming an issue. It is significant that the definitions institutionalised in employment policy were decidedly stronger than those of cultural policy. The development where this normative contradiction had to be solved – and where it was solved in favour of the norms of employment policy – can be seen as a new normative and mimetic isomorphism in the State. The fact is that these issues and the commissions dealing with them were not much integrated into the field of cultural policy as such. This is signalled by their high regard for the norms and actors of employment policy and by the fact that the Culture Commission treated these issues separately from those of the art sectors. The result was, however, that the cultural policy field proved weaker than the organisational field of employment policy, something that would prove important in the future.

LITERATURE AND LIBRARY POLICY

The Culture Commission on Literature Policy

During this period two different Commissions were working within the field of literature and library policies: the Culture Commission, and the Book and Cultural Journal Commission, the latter created on the recommendation of the former. Both emphasised language:

> The language is incredibly important as a carrier of identity and culture. It is crucial to the individual’s ability to understand what happens in life and to the exchange of thoughts and ideas. A rich and vital language presupposes a connection with the linguistic heritage and a continuous and careful renewal.\(^{690}\)

As on so many other issues, and perhaps more so, the Commission approached literature policy by comparing it to the situation twenty years earlier. On the whole, the policy of the early seventies was considered a general success. The use of public libraries had increased early, even though this increase had levelled over time. A larger percent of the population were now reading books and Swedish printing could, when compared internationally, be considered relatively broad and diverse (a statement made with no references). Nearly half of the literary production consisted of Swedish originals, although English titles were in the majority among the translated titles (which

\(^{690}\) SOU 1995:84: 461.
was considered a problem). On the other hand, the ownership of bookstores and publishing houses became more and more concentrated, leaving most of both production and distribution in the control of a handful of owners.691

On the issue of English dominance among translated titles the Commission did, however, not agree with the International Culture Commission’s earlier recommendation for a quota system. It instead preferred only to recommend KUR to take note of the problem when awarding translation and printing subsidies. Although the Commission considered the Swedish situation one of the most commercial book markets in Europe, it decided not to recommend any major changes, concluding instead that no negative consequences could be found of the de-regulation made in the early seventies. They also noticed, with some interest, the Danish system of not allowing new books to be sold outside specialised bookstores until six months after the publication date, a measure that they recommended that Swedish publishers should consider by their own free will. In the future however, the situation would have to be evaluated again, and legal measures might be needed in order to protect diversity on the book market.692

The focus of literature policy was, however, not the bookstores but the public libraries, now by far the most visited of all Swedish cultural establishments. Public libraries were declared an astounding success. Sweden had also signed the UNESCO manifesto on public libraries, stating the centrality of public libraries, “the gateway to knowledge” and “a fundament of lifelong learning, independent decision-making and cultural development.” In spite of their importance, public libraries were however threatened by cuts in municipal budgets. The Commission considered the problems of government interference in municipal matters; it took note of the paragraphs of Municipal Independence in the Swedish Instrument of Government and the European Convention on Municipal Self-Government, but still recommended legally binding municipalities to provide public library services free of charge. This was important, especially as a fee on library loans would make them subject to immaterial property rules on renting out copyrighted material, requiring that libraries should seek the permission of the writer. The Commission also, like the (still working) IT Commission, pointed to the need for a nationally organised and publicly available catalogue of the books held by Swedish libraries.693 The Commission, in other words, favoured coercive isomorphism and organisational integration in general.

Literature, Language and Libraries in the Culture Bill and Following Riksdag Debate

Although the Commission’s recommendation of a Library Law had received general support by the respondents, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities had rejected it considering the recommended legislation an offence against Municipal Freedom. There was also a difference of opinion noted in the report itself where the expert Ants Viirman (a representative of that organisation) had stated the same opinion. KUR and the Authors’ Association had, on the other hand, demanded a more specific legislation.⁶⁹⁴ In spite of these protests the law was presented to the Riksdag. A number of objectives were proposed for literature and library policy:

- stimulating wide publication of quality literature.
- increasing access to and interest in literature in the whole of the country.
- contributing to giving children and young people access to the literature.
- supporting information technology in the area of culture in the service of the public.
- protecting the cultural journal.
- protecting the Swedish language.⁶⁹⁵

The Swedish language was considered in need of protection, as was the reading of good literature (in Swedish). What was most alarming was that reading was decreasing among children and youth, at the same time as many municipalities made major cuts in their budgets for public libraries. The answer to these problems was increasing the integration of the sector as a field. The Royal Library was to continue the development of a national electronic library catalogue (in spite of the fact that KUR had recommended that this project should be coordinated with the Culture Net) and municipalities all over the country should be legally coerced to finance free libraries for the citizens. The government thus chose to use its legal powers when municipalities failed to heed the authority of its cultural policy.⁶⁹⁶

In the Riksdag this centralism was opposed by the centre-right parties. Moderates, Liberals and Christian Democrats united against the new Library Law. The Liberals argued that writers already had the right to stop their books from being lent out for a fee. In their view this was in other words a matter of the rights of the writers and not of the lenders as protected by the State. These centre-right parties also agreed with Viirman that the new legislation was contradictory to Municipal Freedom. The Left Party, on the other hand,

⁶⁹⁶ Government Bill 1996/97:3:43-56, economic measures were, however, suggested as well: government grants were to be given to public libraries for investments in children’s and youth literature, but only if their respective municipalities also took part in funding these. NGOs would, furthermore, be given new grants for literature-related activities with these age groups.
argued for additional legislation in order to force county councils and municipalities to present plans for library policy. The Centre and Christian Democrats argued for government support for municipal activities to stimulate reading, as opposed to the activities that were proposed to be organised centrally by KUR. The Moderates instead continued their campaign against the government-funded *En bok för alla* series. The Liberals demanded that the possibilities for tax reductions on cultural goods and services should be investigated. Another Liberal bill argued against the idea that KUR should protect diversity of opinions in their grants to cultural journals. The Greens proposed nationally fixed book prices. They also argued that the Swedish language should be protected as an integral part of the nation’s cultural heritage. The Moderate response to the Culture Bill stated as follows:

> The most important tool for a culture is the language around which the people can gather. [...] The peoples who have been so assimilated as to lose their language have ceased to exist, while those who have defended the mother tongue have survived occupations as well as exile even when these have continued for centuries.

There was in fact general support for the protection of the Swedish language. In the end the government got the bill through. It should be noted that while institutional centralism was controversial, the values of aesthetic and linguistic integration remained unanimously supported.

*The Commission on the Book and the Cultural Journal*

Partially as a result of the recommendations and studies made by the Culture Commission, the government appointed a Commission on the Book and the Cultural Journal. In its instructions, the government noted that several comprehensive investigations had been made on Swedish literature and production of cultural journals (the Literature Commission among them). None had, however, been made recently. Now both the book market and the situation in general had changed significantly. To investigate the need for further measures a new evaluation was needed. The Commission was instructed to look into the matters of binding book prizes, of regulating distribution channels and of possible tax changes. The general view it was instructed to take, however, followed the objectives decided by the Riksdag almost verbatim:699

> Measures taken by the State should stimulate a broad publishing of quality literature and contribute to the access to, and interest in, literature in the whole of the country.

The State should, furthermore, contribute to that children and young people have

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698 Motion 1996/97:Kr260: 5.
access to the literature and, in the field of culture, support information technology in the service of the public. The cultural journals and the Swedish language should be protected.700

To conduct this investigation the Minister of Culture appointed the former Minister of Justice Anna-Greta Leijon sole commissioner: She was assisted by experts representing the Ministry, KUR and the leading NGOs of libraries, publishers, cultural journals, bookstores and writers.701

They followed quite closely in the footsteps of the Literature Commission (see p. 140), although they lacked its resources for research and experimentation. Despite this, they were able to conclude that the situation had changed significantly. Apart from the changes already noted by the Culture Commission, the two circulation systems of the literary market had now merged. Pulp circulation had disappeared; quality pocket books and bestsellers now both occupied the shelves of department stores and newsstands, as well as those of well-established bookstores. Book-reading was in no way lower than in 1974, but the book still had to be protected from new competitors. The Leijon Commission worried that books would not be able to stand competition against the “noise” of the new media. Book-reading was now decreasing among the computer gaming youth. Political measures would have to be taken to prevent them from becoming a “lost generation” in the struggle between literature and the low culture promoted by the new technology and the gaming industry. Government funds should be committed to the purchase of children’s literature to public libraries and a national catalogue of children’s literature created to grant them better access. Librarians should co-operate more with school personnel and children’s hospitals. School libraries were already under evaluation by KUR and further measures would have to await its report. There was, however, no question of the need.702

The bookstores, too, were facing a new threat, primarily from bookstores on the Internet, a phenomenon that could not, however, be considered either entirely good or bad:

In Sweden several literary classics are available on the Internet, for example via Project Runeberg. The Complete Works of Carl Jonas Love Almqvist are under digital publishing […].

One can publish, order, buy and read literature via the Net. […] Through the Internet all the literature of the world is going to be accessible to both the scholar and the individual citizen. Theoretically there are virtually no limits [or borders]. The physical access, the encounter between the book and the reader could, on the contrary, decrease as a consequence of increased use of the Internet.

701 SOU 1997:141: 3.
702 SOU 1997:141.
Even today there is price competition between Internet bookstores and regular bookstores.\textsuperscript{703}

The Internet also faced the authorities with the challenge of untaxed foreign books shipped into the country, privately ordered by citizens and thus posing an illegal and unfair competition to regular bookstores. To defend existing Swedish bookstores in the whole of the country was a concern of both national and local cultural policy. Nationally a re-created support system for bookstores was proposed. The Commissioner also stated that the municipalities as well as the State had a responsibility in this matter.\textsuperscript{704} Competition concerned Leijon from other perspectives as well and she pointed out that limits to competition instituted for cultural purposes were permitted under the 128\textsuperscript{th} article of the Treaty of Rome. The international case studies made by the Commission – all of them Western European – suggested that price regulation on literature was quite common and the Commission recommended an amendment to the Competition Law in order to at least allow the business to self-regulate for such purposes.\textsuperscript{705}

The existing book subsidies were also discussed and Leijon recommended, among other things, that two million kronor should be added for the purposes of grants for special projects. She also recommended changes to prevent that government grants were given to works that sold in large editions. Journal grants, too, were to be changed in order to make them available for special projects (printing was now easier and resources could thus be freed from printing grants). Literary classics were another subject for increased grants. Literature in minority and immigrant languages was, on the other hand, considered a special problem: that of evaluating its quality. One is tempted to conclude that the quality of Swedish books was now not imagined as universal, but rather particularistic, as literary quality was recognisable only to the members of the right linguistic and cultural community. It is, however, possible that the problem was merely one of a lack of linguistic knowledge in deciding committees. The funding of subsidies for minority literature in min-

\textsuperscript{703} SOU 1997:141: 261.
\textsuperscript{704} SOU 1997:141. Another technology-related concern for the Commission was the creation of national catalogues. Catalogues were to be constructed for a number of purposes including children's literature. It was also important to grant the public easy access to for example LIBRIS, the catalogue of the Swedish research libraries. The Commission thus agreed with the Culture Net Commission on the need for using electronic resources to further integrate national informational resources. See Harding 2006b for further discussion of the relationship between Swedish IT policy at this time and the dominant concepts of the nation.
\textsuperscript{705} SOU 1997:141. The following paragraph was proposed: “The prohibition of §6 does not concern such deals between companies that satisfy important cultural purposes and that promote the creation, distribution and selling of books. Such deals are designated in executive regulations by the government.” SOU 1997:141: 277.
ority languages was in any case to remain at the present level of two million a year. A new system was, on the other hand, proposed for grants for the translation of immigrant and minority literature into Swedish in order to increase understanding for minority culture among Swedes. This has something to say of who constituted the prioritised target group.

The Riksdag and the Government Bill on Literature and Reading

Less than half a year before the upcoming election the government submitted a Bill on Literature and Reading. This was in spite of the fact that central agencies (such as the RRV, the Competition Agency and SAFAD) had criticised the Commission for its unsatisfactory research work. Even representatives of the bookstores had in fact questioned the efficiency of the proposed support systems. The NGOs of the sector – from the associations for bildning and the trade unions to the bookstores’ association – had, on the other hand, expressed their support for the recommended legislation. The response to the Culture Commission’s recommendations on libraries and books had, on the other hand, been generally positive. Even though most respondents had agreed that translations from smaller languages should be supported, there had, however, been a strong opinion against the need for a quota restraining translations from English. KUR and the Swedish Publishers’ Association even suggested that such a policy would “discriminate the dominant written language in the world, and affect books written by writers from several parts of the world”.

In its bill the government shared the general views of the Leijon Commission. It noted that reading was still an activity less common in certain classes and age groups and that access to books might differ between different parts of the country. It also linked the emergence of public libraries to the history of idealistic work with folkbildning and stressed work with language and literature as a priority of the ruling government:

Literature opens new worlds to its readers and transmits experiences of thrill, humour, tragedy and joy. It provides insight into the different living conditions of people, and helps us understand the world and ourselves. As a source of knowledge literature is hard to surpass.
The cultural journal is faster and more flexible than the book. […]
The book and the cultural journal are transmitters of the Swedish language; here it is developed and kept alive. Through reading people’s ability to use the language increases. The right to a language is fundamentally about the freedom of expression.

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706 SOU 1997:141. Samples was now to be translated, chosen on the basis of synopses submitted in Swedish, English, or another major language in order to make it possible to allow equal competition and evaluation to literature in these languages as in Swedish (ibid.).
and about democracy. Language is power and access to the language provides the ability to take part in forming the society of tomorrow.\textsuperscript{710}

The government, in other words, authorised its own commitment to the importance of language by connecting it with civil values. It also, at the same time, acted in line with the Commission’s recommendations on minority literature, thus continuing the use of a more particularistic and ethnic border around the nation. In practice, however, the reforms proposed in the bill were limited to an addition of 30 million kronor. The more controversial issue of changing the Competition Law was left out, awaiting further investigation.\textsuperscript{711}

Opposition against the Government Bill on Literature and Reading was a little more organised than it had been against the Culture Bill. Relative consensus still prevailed, however, in the language and literature sector. Again it was the Moderates who were most firmly set against the bill. Accepting the propositions would, according to them, be much too expensive and at the same time risk that the choice of which bookstores to support would become arbitrary. Producing catalogues of journals was something that should be left to the free market, not a responsibility of the State.\textsuperscript{712}

[R]esponsibility for the awakening of an interest in books should rest in the home, pre-school and school, and book production and book distribution should work without State interference in the market.\textsuperscript{713}

No major changes in literature policies were, however, proposed. The Christian Democrats agreed that it was not proper for the State to decide what books should be available in public libraries. However, they wanted even more grants for reading activities. The Greens proposed that libraries should make their purchases from local bookstores as in Norway, and the Left wanted more government support for public libraries and for the distribution of cultural journals. Christian Democrats and Greens argued for a tax reduction on books (a suggestion already turned down by the Tax Committee). Surprisingly, not only the Moderates but the Leftists as well argued for an investigation of the possible consequences on reading habits that such a measure

\textsuperscript{710} Government bill 1997/98:5.
\textsuperscript{711} Government bill 1997/98:86. This money was split between a few different measures: 1. Retaining the existing support systems for publishing and distributing books. 2. A new grant for measures in support of reading. KUR should, among other things, be funded to produce a catalogue of children’s books in order to increase access and make pedagogic projects easier. 3. Increased government support for bookstores. 4. Increased government support for libraries to buy cultural journals. 5. Broadening the responsibility of KUR to include auditing the development in the literature and cultural journal market, entirely in accordance with the recommendations of the Commission.
\textsuperscript{712} 1997/98:KrU15.
\textsuperscript{713} 1997/98:KrU15: 17, difference of opinion noted by Fleetwood et al.
would have. In this case coordination was lacking, however, and the only change actually accepted by the Culture Committee was instead the Liberal proposition to make all cultural journals acceptable for grants, and not only those which were not making a profit.714

No party held a different opinion on the democratic need to support the Swedish language and neither did any of them question the belief in the desirability of increasing the number of readers in the country.715 Literature policy thus continued combining the norms of a linguistically defined nation and an aestheticist view of literature. The main threat to aesthetically qualitative literature had, however, ceased to be mass-market literature. In the view of the Leijon Commission the main threat was instead other more modern pastimes such as computer games. On the other hand, this aestheticist policy remained concerned primarily with Swedish literature, as opposed to imported books. Unlike earlier commissions Leijon was, however, also concerned with the quality of minority language literature, something that might be a sign of a more multi-linguistic – but still aestheticist – definition of the State’s responsibility. This is illustrated by the problem of solving the assessment issue with the help of Swedish experts rather than by viewing immigrant minorities as parts of larger trans-national diasporas. The same problem also related to a more particularistic view of art and a multicultural (not to say ethno-pluralist) view of society.

**MUSEUM AND HERITAGE POLICY**

*Heritage and the Culture Commission*

To the Culture Commission cultural heritage was simultaneously a perspective on the entirety of the cultural sector (sometimes on society as a whole) and a specific part of it, consisting of the protection of cultural environments and, to some extent, of museums. As a general perspective, cultural heritage was needed to provide a steady fundament for identity in a time of change. At the same time, cultural heritage could also remind people that Sweden had always been open to cultural influence from the rest of Europe. Knowing oneself was to be able to understand others. Consequently, the Commission also inscribed the Cultural Bill of 1974 in a European context. It had been delivered in the European Year of Building Conservation and had been inspired by the then powerful perspective of “integrated conservation”. Now an even more integrated view of cultural heritage had been established and

could be integrated in Swedish cultural policy. The Commission also emphasised the heritage objectives set by the government in 1987/88:

Cultural heritage preservation should
- preserve and reinvigorate the cultural heritage,
- aim at continuity in the development of the external environment,
- promote local identity,
- face the threats against the cultural environment,
- contribute to increasing the awareness of aesthetic values and historical contexts.

The Commission agreed to these objectives to the extent that it did not propose any changes in them and apparently considered them consistent with both the new and the old objectives of cultural policy.

Cultural heritage was also described as a contemporary popular movement. As the economy was declining identity was sought in history, especially in the countryside and in the old industrial cities. Idealist and non-profit work was praised, but also the role of the heritage sector as a provider of new jobs, both in the sector itself and in the form of a tourism industry. Cultural heritage also provided a fundament for people’s identity when industry declined. The ongoing work with the protection of the industrial heritage was given as an example of a new way of working with cultural heritage. Now preservation was not only a matter of the material remnants of a period. Instead, it included whole environments and work processes. It was a matter of “documenting and explaining” the emergence of the industrial society which was now leaving room for a new kind of society based on information technology. Naturally such a project demanded the participation of several different institutional actors including the RAÄ, as well as the Nordic Museum, the Museum of Work, the Museum of Science and Technology, the National Archives, County Museums, the Department of Industrial Heritage at KTH (the Royal Institute of Technology) and representatives of the local heritage movement. Another important task was the preservation of the countryside, a task that would now increasingly involve the institutions and funds of the European Union. To deal with a situation where historical identity, and thus cultural heritage, became more important, the Commission recommended some changes in the organisation of the heritage sector. The primary argument was the need to streamline activities and to clarify the responsibilities of the various institutions. The RAÄ was to take a general responsibility on the national level for the preservation of cultural environments; County Museums would be responsible for “documenting and invigorating the exter-

716 SOU 1995:84.
nal cultural environment” on the regional level; while the County Administrative Boards would concentrate on the role of regional government agencies in the protection of the physical cultural heritage. This would create a more integrated heritage field.

In relation to museums the Culture Commission relied almost entirely on the Museum Commission and on the authority it had been given by other actors in the cultural policy field. This is evident from the objectives that it recommended as well as from these being separate from those of heritage policy:

Museum policy should, from the assumption that the main responsibilities of the museums are memory and **bildning**:
- promote national, regional and local cultural identity,
- increase the possibilities for people to encounter the cultural history, art, science and technology contexts and holistic perspectives,
- promote the active participation of people in the activities of the museums,
- develop and strengthen cooperation in the preservation of the cultural environment,
- promote that the museums develop in a close connection to the ongoing change in society,
- work towards the knowledge contents gaining breadth and balance.719

The Commission especially emphasised the need to integrate museums more, both in the rest of society and with other sectors, such as academia. A closer contact with the sciences was an important part of this. It was, however, also important to integrate museums as a field. The present system for educating museum personnel was, however, not satisfying, and a separate education in museology concentrating on communication with audiences was needed as well as resources for research in connection with this.720

The Museum Commission’s recommendations for restructuring the museum sector were less well received. Creating one or more new government agencies brought the fear of creating a new and extensive bureaucracy – an anathema in the age of NPM. The Culture Commission thus discussed other alternatives. An organisation under the leadership of the Ministry itself was against Swedish administrative tradition, which left only two major alterna-

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718 SOU 1995:84, Harding 2006, see also Alzén & Burell (eds.) 2005 on industrial heritage.
719 SOU 1995:84: 489. As Stefan Bohman (1997:131-134) points out there had been no mention of the nation or of identity in neither in the objectives of 1974 nor in the general objectives proposed by the Culture Commission. This was unique to the museum sector and although national identity was not mentioned in the objectives later proposed by the government the concept continued to be present in the text.
720 SOU 1995:84: 485-510. The Commission had some difficulty when these two goals intersected on the issues of university and military museums (still administered by the universities and the defence respectively). It concluded, however, that a closer connection to other museums could be achieved without severing the bond to their respective sectors.
atives: giving the RAÄ authority over the entire museum sector, or endowing KUR with the same authority. The RAÄ as an alternative was discussed at some length, but the Commission finally opted for KUR. Its primary argument was the need for continued integration of the museums in the cultural policy field, by close cooperation with its other actors. To increase KUR’s resources, an advisory museum council consisting of museum representatives should be created (somewhat along the lines suggested in the seventies, see p. 149). The RAÄ would continue as the national authority on heritage preservation in close cooperation with the museums. It would, however, be separated from the Museum of National Antiquities, which would instead form the basis for a separate government agency: the National Museums of History. Neither would the National Touring Exhibitions (NTE) retain its position, especially not as regards producing exhibitions, a service for which it, in the interest of separating the spheres of responsibility, would have to rely more on the museums themselves (a parallel to the recommendations on the NTT and NTC).721

The Cultural Heritage Commission

At the same time as the Culture Commission a special Cultural Heritage Commission appointed by Minister Friggebo was also investigating the field. Its instruction had been much more specific than those of the Culture Commission and primarily concerned reforming the legislation on heritage preservation. In the instruction the government assumed that the general objectives of heritage policy were already decided. It ordered the Commission to focus on the following:

1. “Place names”, on which the Commission recommended a non-mandatory cautionary paragraph in the Cultural Heritage Law, for use in the public sector.
2. “Buildings and built environments valuable to cultural history”.
3. “Vicarages”, which would have to be protected in case of a separation of Church and State.
4. “Church towns in Northern Sweden”.
5. “Export of cultural items”, the prevention of which had to be updated, not in the least in relation to EU trade legislation.
7. “Certain legal issues”.

On none of these matters did the Commission differ significantly from the institutionalised view of cultural heritage as a set of material tangible entities. The subjects themselves were chosen to cover the field of already protected

items, buildings and environments. This Commission does not appear to have produced any changes in the norm system of the heritage field. It is simply an example of bureaucratic clarification of rules within the already institutionalised system of norms.

Knowledge as Power: Museums of History in the Fight against Xenophobia and Racism

More important in the long run would be the national action programme on how museums would contribute to the fight against “xenophobia and the questioning of fundamental democratic values”, which the government had commissioned from the Museum of National Antiquities in 1995 and which was presented to them in the summer of 1996. Although much more brief than the report of the Heritage Commission, this report managed to outline a significantly new way of writing about heritage in Swedish official text. According to its instruction the Commission could include, among other things, illustrations on “how anti-democratic movements in the twentieth century have used ancient culture and symbols for propagandistic purposes.” The resulting report was, however, inspiring beyond the expectations of the government, which decided to publish it in its Ministerial Report series under the title *Kunskap som kraft* (“Knowledge as Power”). In her introduction, Marita Ulvskog described the booklet in terms best described as hyperbolic:

[I]n the report that is now made public through this publication, such important issues are discussed as how we interpret history, how we can create perspectives on our present by critically analysing our past and how we can make cultural heritage into the democratic tool that it should justly be.

I am convinced that this discussion is fundamental to how we will now and in the future look on for example the communication of the cultural heritage made by the museums.

The report itself was in fact rather original, at least when seen in the context of Swedish official reports, if nothing else because it problematised not only cultural heritage (which the Minister, in the quote above, failed to question), but also the nationalism and ethnocentrism of Swedish society. In the historical part of the report, its writers – Inga Lundström and Marja-Leena Pilvesmaa – tracked the Swedish integrative project back to the unitary state established in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and its insistence on Lutheran orthodoxy as a requisite for being considered a loyal citizen. In this view, immigration had, however, been accepted as long as the immigrants could be

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Even older than this religious demand for sovereignty for Church and State was, however, the belief in an age-old bond between the people and the land. This claim had been introduced for the first time as early as the fifteenth century by the gothicist Bishop Ragvaldi, a claim that had from early on been combined with the claim that the Swedish people had inhabited the same region from the dawn of time.

Later these claims had been combined with the pseudoscience of racism. In the early twentieth century it had been common to claim that the Swedish people had taken possession of the country as the first humans to walk its virgin lands in the tracks of the retreating inland ice 15,000 years ago. Sweden had swiftly become leading in the academic part of the pseudoscience of racism with an Institute of Race Biology established by the Riksdag in 1921 and active until 1975. Neither did the report writers forget the concern about declining birth rates, expressed in the thirties by the Social Democratic economists Alva and Gunnar Myrdal. All of this was, according to the report, connected with the close relationship that existed between Swedish and German culture until the end of World War II. This heavy cultural influence had, together with open racism in socially acceptable contexts, been suppressed at the end of the war. According to the report writers, it had however, not been properly dealt with, but was in fact still lurking under the surface of Swedish society. This is where the action programme would come in. The one representation of the nation that was left un-questioned in the report was the present, civil state-framed one. In spite of referring to Modernist analyses of nationalism, the report in practice worked on the assumption that nationalism and racism were parts of a pre- (or early-)modern ideology. It was this ideology that should be dealt with by *folkbildning*. Racism and xenophobia could thus not be considered youth problems but were instead something pushed onto the younger generation by their elders. All generations, however, needed to be educated in the falsehood of this ideology. The report, in other words, followed one of the two types of Social Democratic history-writing described by Linderborg: that of rejecting history as foreign to the present social and political system (see p. 94). It is interesting to note that from this perspective racism became a cultural rather than social problem, which was of course entirely in line with the already institutionalised norms of approaching it by cultural policy and *folkbildning*.

The museums in their current state were, however, not fit for the task of battling racism and xenophobia. Museum personnel were not ready to take a

726 Ds. 1996:74.
stand on important issues. Historical awareness was not established enough for everyone to realise that the cultural heritage can only be said to exist in the here and now, as it is something created in the present rather than something inherited from the past. Yet, it is clear that the report considered the approach of the museum field to be precisely that. The writers mentioned the exhibition the Vikingar (“Vikings”) exhibition produced by the Museum of National Antiquities as a negative example, perpetuating the traditional picture of “the Viking” by, for example, only showing males in active roles. The same could be said of Jamtli, the County Museum of Jämtland, and its presentations of the Sami people as passive, natural, and entirely separate from the farming population and the developing Swedish (ethnic) nation. On a short time scale, the report writers recommended a travelling exhibition designed to enlighten the people on how history was used by racist and xenophobic groups and ideologies. This exhibition would have to be accompanied by teaching material and other texts, as well as by material distributed via the media and IT. A special marketing campaign directed primarily at public employees and people in the schools would also be necessary. In the long run the active participation of the museums would demand changes in the education of museum personnel. A stronger professional identity had to be established, as only those who have the benefit of an established identity have the ability to take a stand in public debate.728 In spite of the apparent radicalism of the report its practical recommendations thus remained fully in line with those of the Museum Commission in support of the professionalisation of museum personnel. The battle against racism and nationalism would be fought within the established norms and standards of the field. It is thus not surprising that the preferred way of enabling the field to take on this task would be increasing its integration.

The Government and the Culture Bill
The chapter on cultural heritage in the Cultural Bill was in some respects much more radical than some of the preceding commission reports and much less close to the recommendations of the Museum Commission. This is especially interesting given that the RAÅ had argued for stressing the importance of heritage itself in the objectives of the sector. While there were very few differences between the government and the Commission on the subjects of archives and cultural environment most of the main discussion was in fact spent on stressing the importance of diversity. Like the centre-right government before them, the new Social Democratic government emphasised that Swedishness was composed of elements of many different origins. The policy presented was in fact even more inclusive. There was not only one cultural

728 Ds. 1996:74.
heritage in Sweden, but several. Industrial heritage was used as a positive and important example of what cultural policies should be (and in fact more money was granted to this objective than proposed by the Commission). The cultural heritage of women, immigrant and ethnic minorities, youth groups and others would also now have to be prioritised, as would projects regarding “class, sex, cultural background, and generation”. This was even included in the new general objectives for national heritage policies, as was the “awareness” of the importance of heritage, which had been emphasised by the RAÄ as well:

The State’s activities should aim at
- levelling out the differences that exist between various groups of people, when it concerns the preservation of and the access to the cultural heritage.
- strengthening interest in the cultural heritage and the awareness of its importance to society.

To improve the understanding of the industrial heritage the Museum of Work would be granted 1 million a year during the 1997–1999 period to help the museum continue its work with the presentation of the roles of men and women in working life. The role of cultural heritage in a multi-cultural society was, on the other hand, not only that of affirming identities and strengthening the groups once labelled as “disadvantaged”, but also to prevent xenophobia and racism. To this purpose the government would grant 1 million to work in line with the recommendation of the action programme Knowledge as Power, which thus gained even further authorisation. The government’s interest in museum policy was at an all time high. 235 million kronor had in 1995 been granted by the Riksdag for the SESAM project, a comprehensive overview, registration and systematisation of the collections held by Swedish museums. This project also aimed to evaluate the representation of under-represented groups in the material cultural heritage of the collections. Over time this could become the necessary preparatory work to sorting out overrepresented categories and make room for the less represented. Through the Culture Net, these new catalogues could also be used to increase public access.

On the organisational level the National Museums of History were finally separated from the RAÄ, while its archaeological unit (UV) would remain within the Board (as the Board itself had wished). The National Museums of Defence History would, on the other hand, be transferred from the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of Culture and the NTE would be restructured from a foundation to a government agency with the support of

729 Government bill 1996/97:3, quote from p. 132
travelling exhibitions as its main objective. One more neocorporative relic was thus removed. Organisational changes thus aimed both at clarifying the borders of the museum field and increasing isomorphism in the organisational structures of the State as a whole. The government also proposed a set of objectives relatively different from those recommended by the Commission, objectives more in line with the policy discussed above and still separate from those of heritage policy:

- Future activities of the State should aim at
  - strengthening the anchoring of museums in social life,
  - directing the internal work of the museums at improving the care and registration of the collections of items,
  - directing the external work of the museums at increased diffusion and participation,
  - concentrating activity reports on quality and surround effects.

On the suggestion of the City of Gothenburg the government proposed, furthermore, to merge the Gothenburg Museum of Ethnography (which would be taken over by the State from that City), the National Museum of Ethnography, the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities and the Museum of Mediterranean and Near Eastern Antiquities, thus creating a new national ethnographic museum that should be placed in Gothenburg. The Commission had planned none of this, nor had it passed through the procedure of referring proposals for consideration. The idea had instead been born in the Ministry of Culture itself as a cultural policy measure against the perceived xenophobia of Swedish society and bias in cultural policy. The project was also inspired by examples abroad. No arguments were given in the bill for merging these particular museums, two ethnographic museums concentrating on pre-Columbian America and Africa, a part of the Museum of National Antiquities dealing with ancient Greece and Egypt and a Far Eastern art collection administered by the Museum of Fine Arts (all of them, however, located in separate buildings, most of them in Stockholm). One has only to

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734 Government Bill 1996/97:3: 142-143, interview with Thorgren. The National Museum of Ethnography was organised as a separate agency and housed at Djurgården in Stockholm. Until 1966 it had been a part of the Swedish Museum of Natural History. The Museum of Mediterranean and Near Eastern Antiquities was, on the other hand, a part of the National Museums of History and the result of a merger in 1954 between the Museum of Egyptology (founded from a private collection in 1928) and the Cyprus Collection (which was originally the result of Swedish digs on Cyprus around 1930). This museum was now housed in a building in central Stockholm and included, in addition to its Egyptian and Cypriot parts, some other collections of predominantly Ancient Greek, Etruscan and Roman archaeological findings. The Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities originated in specialised collections within the National Museum of Fine Arts, and
assume that the Ministry hastily collected everything it perceived as foreign. The arguments actually given in the bill primarily referred to the need to support culture and society in Gothenburg and outside Stockholm. Another reason was, however, the ambition to add World Culture to the culture presented at Swedish museums and to show it to the Swedish people.

This was a fairly new problem for cultural policy (hardly dealt with by the Commission) and so was the conclusion. This is typical when new concepts are introduced into organisations. As Røvik has described, viral concepts have a tendency to provide both their own problems and their solutions. Neither is it surprising that this change happened at this point. Change in line with the norms of an authority is a common response to uncertainty (see pp. 59 and 64). In this case the concept implied an entirely new norm for how to describe Sweden’s place in the world. The established norm was to view it in a European context (described both as a state-system and as a cultural community) with the USA as its significant other. In this version of World Culture, Sweden was instead a part of an Occidental community (mostly cultural) with the rest of the world as significant other. In this case the West was even more narrowly defined than by Huntington, even classical Greco-Roman culture was now considered foreign. This was an important step in choosing the path of a separate organisation for World Culture. It would be given a separate government agency, quite contrary to the trend of increased institutional integration. Much as in the case with the House of World Culture the aim was to show World Culture to a public that was expected not to have encountered it.

This was also an initiative taken by the Ministry of Culture itself, which explains why the context in which this change moved towards isomorphism was international and not that of Swedish museums. When I interviewed her for this dissertation, Gunilla Thorgren (the then State Secretary of the Ministry of Culture) described how she and Ozan Sunar (then a representative of the Ministry of Integration) travelled around Europe in a very short time to visit a number of museums to get inspiration for the plan. Both Thorgren and Sunar are examples of Social Democratic political intellectuals who have served as civil servants and advisors within the context of Swedish cultural policy; she was a well known feminist debater and he would later become a public figure as a high-profile director of Södra teatern (“the Southern Theatre”).

was organisationally still a part of that museum, albeit located in a separate building. The Gothenburg Museum of Ethnography, finally, had started of in the late nineteenth century as a separate collection within the Museum of Gothenburg, had later been transformed into a foundation, and was presently administered by the Committee on Cultural Affairs of the City of Gothenburg, SOU 1998:125.

735 Cf. Huntington 1996, this in fact means defining the West in a way much more similar to the way Spengler (1996) defined it.
Among other things she described the corresponding museums of Berlin and Paris as examples of what not to do. The exoticism of these museums was exactly what they wanted to avoid. In spite of this conclusion their search for international inspiration implies that the concept of World Culture was a response to an international development, a way of conceptualising the Swedish situation with the help of internationally diffused norms and super-standards. Ironically much of the conflict that surrounded this idea was about moving the collections of the Stockholm museums to Gothenburg, something that was not actually proposed in the bill, although it was hinted at by the Minister of Culture.736

Heritage and Museum Politics in the Riksdag

The Museum of World Culture now became the hottest topic in Riksdag debates on cultural heritage. Several parties noted that the government had made no inquiries about the opinions of the museums involved; these had in fact not even known of the reform until the publication of the bill itself. Several parties also expressed concern for the (still un-investigated) possible consequences of moving the Stockholm collections to Gothenburg, both in terms of material damage to the collections and for the research departments in Stockholm that needed the collections in their work. The Riksdag Committee on Cultural Affairs noted that the government had not only refrained from circulating their propositions for consideration among the parties concerned, they had even authorised an application to an EU programme for projects within the Museum of Ethnography. This was interpreted by a Liberal member of the Committee as implying that the government had not decided upon this course of action until the final weeks before the submission of the bill. The Committee also listened directly to negative reactions from invited representatives of the concerned museums in Stockholm. With this in mind it is hardly surprising that this became one of the few issues on which a proposition in the bill was voted down in the Riksdag. It is quite clear that the government had failed to achieve legitimacy for this policy; in the field as well as in the Riksdag and that the authority of the field in the eyes of the members of the Riksdag (including those of the parties supporting the government) was much higher than that of the government and its ministerial officials.737

736 Interview with Gunilla Thorgren, Egeland 2007. Thorgren denies that there was any plan to move museums to Gothenburg when the bill was written, only that the new museum organisation should be centred in Gothenburg. It was, however, generally taken to suggest a move, something that the government did not successfully deny (ibid.). When I interviewed Ana-Maria Narti of the Liberal Party, who opposed the idea of moving these museums, she had no doubt that this had been the original intention of the government.

The Committee however reached a compromise advocating that the museums should form a new agency with its headquarters in Gothenburg and that an entirely new museum should be constructed there, but that the museums already situated in Stockholm should remain there, although organisationally included in the new agency. If the government had not, as Thorgren suggests, intended this in the first place, a new museum was created when the government had wanted fewer. The centre-right opposition, on the other hand, was prepared to accept only a merger of the two ethnographical museums and saw no need to break up the working organisations of historical and art museums. This was an object that they failed to reach. The new museum in Gothenburg was instructed to work interdisciplinarily and to cooperate with schools, universities, cultural institutions and NGOs, an approach that was clearly in line with the established government preference for interdisciplinary research.738

As always cultural heritage was also the subject of a number of private bills in the Riksdag. Most of these were not even endorsed by their own parties. Many of them were, on the other hand, co-written by Riksdag members of different parties. Such bills did not, however, concern issues of national interest, but instead particular objects, museums, monuments and remnants of the past that particular members of the Riksdag wanted to preserve. Centre-right members were more productive in this respect than their Socialist and Green colleagues. Leftist members were perhaps somewhat more interested in industrial heritage, but so were some of the Moderates. To answer these, the Riksdag Committee on Cultural Affairs typically pointed out that particular cases of heritage preservation were the responsibility of the agencies concerned, and that investigations should be carried out by them. The Committee could also point to government commissions already investigating these issues.739

Although a consensus on general heritage policies still existed, there were also some interesting points of difference between the political blocks even in this field. On organisational issues Moderate representative Elisabeth Fleetwood considered the still existing 1974 system of cultural policy to place far too much power in the hands of KUR, not the least when concerning museum policies. She also considered increased grants to the Museum of Work an undue expense in difficult economic times. The Moderates also wanted to cut back costs in general and considered the grants for KUR a reasonable target.

738 1996/97:KrU1:123-127. Interdisciplinary research has often been considered more practical, a line of thought that seems to build more on a belief that academic borderlines foster research relevant only to academia, than on any belief in cutting edge science – tactical rather than strategic research, to use the language of the previous government, Sandström & Harding 2002.
Together with the Liberals, they advocated better opportunities for private entrepreneurs to take care of the excavations sometimes required in connection with construction work. To avoid undue conflicts of interest, the Liberals also proposed that the RAÄ should be separated not only from the Museum of History, but also from its own archaeological section (UV). This was a clear continuation of the NPM policies of the previous government. The Centre Party, on the other hand, attacked the centralism in the form of cuts affecting County Museums which had been proposed in the bill. The Leftists for their part attacked the proposed archive policy, which they considered too unradical, advocating instead the extensive use of IT in archives in order to maximise accessibility for as large groups in society as possible.740

A National Museum for World Culture

The Riksdag’s decision on a Museum of World Culture was swiftly followed up by the government, and an organisational commission was created. This commission was instructed by to present not only an investigation of the possibilities for creating the museum but also to present a general plan for its establishment, a preliminary budget, guidelines for its work and recommendations for future ways of evaluating its activities. The National Museums of World Culture was to be established as a government agency in 1998. The collections of the museums situated in Stockholm would not be moved and the new building in Gothenburg would thus house an entirely new national museum. The Commission was, furthermore, instructed to use international experiences of multicultural museums and to take special notice of the possibilities for coordination with the NTE and the County Museums.741

Despite the title of their report the Commission followed the new norms of integration policy in not using the term “World Culture” very frequently, but writing instead about diversity (mångfald). They emphasised general accessibility to the museum they envisioned, especially for young people, and through the use of IT and multi-media. Their vision was also less centred on museum collections than the established museums, and more oriented towards integrating the museum into the surrounding society. This is evident, not the least, in their suggestions for evaluative instruments, including among other things work oriented towards children, young people and immigrants, thus changing the focus from “educating” the general population to creating a forum for expression for “those not generally represented”, as they were called in the Commission’s terminology. This is also evident in a shifting focus towards artistic expressions, and thus from an anthropological concept of culture to an aesthetic one. It should also be noticed that immigrants were

741 Dir. 1996:110.
mentioned as an additional target group for inclusion among the audience. They were considered culturally connected with the subjects of the museum’s exhibition, i.e. with non-Western culture. The expectation appears, furthermore, to have been that the main audience would be the usual groups of museum goers, i.e. primarily middle-aged ethnic Swedes. They were, in other words, the ones who should be shown the diversity of World Culture. Others should be activated and integrated among them. The museum could be considered the primary Swedish example of a new type of museum that would follow the standards sketched by, for example, the Museum Commission. This is evident in the objective for the activities of this new agency that was now presented:

> [T]o show and reinvigorate the cultures of the world. From e.g. ethnographical, archaeological and artistic perspectives, the agency should promote the interdisciplinary production of knowledge and public activities in new forms. The agency should document and illuminate the expressions and conditions of various cultures, as well as cultural encounters, historically and in the society of today.743

The new museum would, however, have to take over not only the buildings and collections of its consistent parts but also their personnel, of whom only the employees of the two ethnographical museums could be expected to complement each other in any obvious way. With regard to the collections, the Commission stressed the need for a comprehensive electronic registration to increase both public access and the possibilities for coordination. Integration within the agency was the cure for its heterogeneity.

The new museum in Gothenburg would also need a new building. This building would have to provide an exhibition area of about 9000 m². The Commission recommended an expenditure frame of 200 million kronor.744 The fact that this was granted has something to say of how prioritised this project was for the government. Although its target group remained ambiguous, the tendency was toward non-immigrants: ethnic Swedes, in other words. Yet, the museum should work as a stage for underrepresented culture, which was thus framed in a specialised organisation. No suggestions were, however, made for how to give these groups an influence on the agency as such. If anything, the actor that had more power in this case than in already established museums was the government – it was after all a government appointed commission that planned it.

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**Other Commissions Discussing Museums**

The ongoing reorganisation of the maritime museums was considerably less controversial, or thorough, for that matter. In 1996 a Commission was called to submit recommendations regarding the merger of civil and (formerly) military maritime museums, as well as on the possibility of localising the central offices of this new government agency to the city of Karlskrona, a city that was already preparing to place itself on UNESCO’s World Heritage List for its well preserved naval installations (from Sweden’s time as a European power). The considerations of the Commission were largely practical and organisational and it presented its final report within a year, recommending the location as suggested by the government. This Commission largely avoided most of the ideological discussions of the Culture Commission and the Culture Bill by concentrating on practical matters. In fact, the geographical issues and the objective of increasing the number of women in museum staffs to above 40% were the only references ever made to the general objectives of cultural policy. This is especially interesting given that the new agency also included the most popular museum in the entire country, the Wasa Museum.\(^{745}\) In the case of such a popular symbol of national greatness the ambition for a more representative cultural heritage apparently seemed of less importance.

Another museum issue was the Nobel Centre which the Nobel Foundation was urging the government to found and help pay for. In 1997 the government appointed Bengt Göransson, a former Minister of Education, to cooperate with the Nobel Foundation to investigate the possibilities for such a centre as well as a possible location in the capital. In his report Göransson argued from the great need to increase public interest in the sciences (especially among young people) as a major national interest, but also from the possibilities for the new centre to become a major tourist attraction. He recommended constructing a new building in central Stockholm and concluded that significant parts of the funding could be expected to be covered by private sponsors. The museum should be planned for a capacity of 300,000 to 400,000 visitors a year (to be compared with the 750,000 of the Wasa Museum and the 200,000 of the National Museum of Fine Arts).\(^{746}\) The government, apparently, did not agree and the project never reached any further.

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\(^{745}\) SOU 1997:100, Dir. 1996:79, Dir 1997:22. When this recommendation was circulated for consideration the RAÄ, the City and County Administrative Board of Stockholm, the National Museums of Defence History, the military, the Museum of Science and Technology and the Nordic Museum all considered such localisation unnecessarily problematic, while KUR among others agreed with the government and the Commission. This was, however, the main point of difference.

Old and New Heritage

Most of the norms guiding heritage policy during this period predated the Culture Council. The Cultural Heritage Commission, for example, presented few novelties. The Culture Commission, on the other hand, continued to integrate the heritage and museum fields into the larger cultural policy field at the same time as it established the museum field as fully independent from heritage. NPM was now also relatively institutionalised as an approach, if not institutionalised enough for the government to oppose the RAÄ over its organisation. At the same time the issue of multiculturalism entered the heritage agenda. The Museum of World Culture was founded on a hasty and criticised government initiative. The Knowledge as Power report had, however, been the surprising result of the work of experts from within the field although inspired primarily by academic developments. Neither were these developments incompatible with the seventies concept of cultural integration of disadvantaged groups. The culture of the working classes was, for example, already the object of government support. This recognition of separate cultures in the particularist sense – even when made within a sector that had always been particularistic in its view of culture – meant, however, a move away from the established belief in the cultural homogeneity of the nation. Even though the aim remained to integrate all its inhabitants into the state-framed nation, that aim was somewhat contradicted by the establishment of a separate museum agency and a new national museum for these “foreign” cultures.

Church and Religion Policy

The issue of separating the Church from the State had reached its formative moment with the Church Commission. Unlike the 1970s the terminology of separating Church and State was however meticulously avoided. Instead all government and committee material discussed proposed reforms in terms of an unspecified “change of relations” (relationsförändring), rather than a “separation” or “divorce”. One of the most fundamental changes had been achieved in 1994 when the government submitted a bill that changed membership criteria fundamentally. The basis for membership would from the 1 January 1996 be baptism according to the rites of the Church of Sweden, instead of Swedish citizenship. Thus the Church moved from a membership based on the jus sanguinis to one based on Christian doctrine and choice (even if that choice was carried out by the parents of infants, rather than by prospective members themselves). Membership would, however, still be available only to those who lived in Sweden or who were Swedish citizens. The Synod of 1995 considered even this an offence against the Church’s status as an institution built on the voluntary offering of Grace. The same Synod also stressed that the bishops of the Church of Sweden had advocated voluntary membership
since 1920. While this was a step in the direction of a more religious definition of the Church, it was thus no separation of the Church and the nation. This reform was backed by almost all relevant parties. The interpretation of what was meant by a Folk Church had changed dramatically since the Myrdal Commission.

As the government discussed changes in Church membership, the recommendations of the Church Commission were circulated for consideration. As with previous reports proposing major changes, this circulation involved a great number of actors, including church institutions, relevant public authorities, Nonconformist churches, NGOs, the Roman Catholic diocese and the Jewish Central Council. Unlike the seventies the major trade unions declined to comment on the reform, but as in the seventies, the Jewish community remained the only non-Christian denomination invited, despite the significant increase in primarily Muslim adherents in the country. Just like in the seventies the government also made a special point of presenting a summary of the collected answers in a special report (this time in the Ministry Report series). This indicates a special interest in stressing consensus around the proposed changes.

Unlike the seventies the general opinion was decidedly in favour of the proposal, although some respondents – including legal authorities – considered it too unclear on important points. The reasons for this acceptance were several. The most important seems to have been a desire to permanently solve an issue that had been hanging over the Church of Sweden for more than half a century. Many of its representatives – including several dioceses – did however not consider the privileged position of the Church of Sweden in relation to other denominations problematic. They emphasised instead the need for the State to have a moral fundament for its decisions. In general, Church representatives appear to have been most concerned with keeping the situation of the Church as it was, in terms of internal organisation, creed and finances. The general objection against the proposal was in fact, much like the seventies, that the independence of parishes would have to be protected in a new way if Church organisation was no longer regulated by national law. The Church itself was also often perceived as having an identity that needed protection. Ironically many representatives of the Church advocated legal defence for the Church’s self-identity as an Evangelical-Lutheran Folk Church organised along the dual lines of an episcopal-clerical as well as democratic-congregational organisation. The key element of being a Folk Church was ex-

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\textsuperscript{747} Proceedings of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Church Law Committee (of the Synod of the Church of Sweden, \textit{Andra kyrkolagsutskottets betänkande}) 1995:1, reprinted as Government Bill 1995/96:80, Appendix 3.


\textsuperscript{749} Ds 1995:34.
plained (when it was explained) as building on the idea of offering the Gospel and Church life to the entire Swedish people regardless of their own faith and not exclusively to the already firmly convinced.\textsuperscript{750} Given the apparent consensus on the membership issue, one has to assume that the Swedish people should be taken to include everyone living in Sweden (regardless of faith and citizenship) as well as Swedish citizens living abroad.

Authorities such as the Svea Court of Appeal, on the other hand, disagreed with the Commission’s idea of retaining legal powers in the Church Synod after making this the ruling body in a separate legal person. No one seems, on the other hand, to have been much concerned with the once symbolically charged issue of the denomination of the monarch. Only three answers were in fact concerned enough to mention it, and of these the Central Board of Church of Sweden approved of removing this regulation from Fundamental Law while Riksmarskalsämbetet (a central office in the Royal Court) defended it, but only with the argument that it need not be concerned by the proposed changes. The general trend seems, in other words, to have been for the conservatives to abandon their beliefs in influencing the State, in favour of joining the liberals in establishing an independent Church, and only then to defend the religious character of that Church.\textsuperscript{751}

Outside of the essentially religious issues that constituted its core activities, the Church was also engaged in two major activities that, according to consensus, were responsibilities of the State, but that were still too intertwined with the Church’s heritage to be separated from it: the preservation of cultural heritage and the running of burial grounds. Cultural heritage was in this context considered wholly a matter of physical artefacts and buildings that were presently used by the Church but that also belonged to the national heritage. The general opinion appears to have favoured the proposed fixed government grant to the Church for this matter, although many considered this grant too small. Some, like the diocese of Visby, however, advocated maintaining the Church tax to cover these expenses. On the issue of burial grounds most answers were clearly positive, although many considered the financial issues in need of further investigation. The negative answers, however, included those of the Jewish Central Council, the Catholic Diocese, the representatives of Nonconformist churches and the National Council for Government Grants to Denominations, all of which continued to advocate a municipal administration.\textsuperscript{752}

\textsuperscript{750} Ds 1995:34.
\textsuperscript{751} Ds 1995:34.
\textsuperscript{752} Ds 1995:34.
The Government Bill on Changed Relations between the State and the Church of Sweden

A special Law on the Church of Sweden should include what is principally important and of a fundamental character for the Church of Sweden. It should be stated e.g. that the Church should be an Evangelical-Lutheran Church with an Episcopalian structure, an open Folk Church, democratically organised and nation-wide. The role and self-determination of parishes and dioceses [should be stated, as well as] the duty for those belonging to the Church of Sweden to pay locally and regionally decided Church fees.753

The Church would be given all the protection it had wished for. Rules on the Church of Sweden and other denominations should be protected by the Instrument of Government as well as by a Law on the Church of Sweden. By this legislation “registered denomination” would become a new form of legal person protected by special legislation. The Church’s new status as registered denomination would, however, in no way interfere with existing rights, such as that of performing legally binding marriages. Church fees as well as the fees of other registered denominations should be collected by the State. Fees collected in this way would however be obligatory for members of the Church of Sweden and voluntary for those of other communities. The Church was guaranteed continued administration of most burial activities and finances for this should be provided locally. Its independence would be achieved within a legal framework, but without any delegated legislative powers. The government would, on the other hand, provide finances for the preservation of the (physical) cultural heritage owned and cared for by the Church. The special provisions for Church buildings made in Heritage Law should also remain in force. Many of these legal and financial issues were, however, still in need of further commission investigation754 and four new government commissions were to be appointed later that year.

Riksdag Discussions on the Changed Relationship between State and Denominations

Sören Ekström has suggested that the high speed with which this law was drafted and passed was achieved on purpose by Marita Ulvskog, who was then Minister of Public Administration. During the process, Ingvar Carlsson had made public his intention to resign as Prime Minister. One of his possible successors – Göran Persson – was known for his opposition to the proposed separation of Church and State. When the decision was taken, he and Thage G. Peterson were in fact alone in voting against the bill at the Government Meeting. As Persson did in fact succeed Ingvar Carlsson, the success of the bill was a matter of weeks. Another development in the last few months was that the Centre Party changed its opinion between the decisions of the

Church Commission and the discussion of the bill at the National Synod. When the bill was written, the government had already discussed it with all of the party leaders. During these negotiations Olof Johansson, the Centre leader, had decided to support the bill, apparently without consulting the rest of his party leadership. Bengt Kindbom, the Centrist member of the Commission, never changed his mind, but Johansson managed to convince the party representatives to both the National Synod and the Riksdag of the benefits of an immediate separation of Church and State in spite of this.755

In the Riksdag there was now an established consensus in favour of a change of relations. That does not mean that the bill was universally accepted however. The Moderates and Liberals protested against the government’s restrictive opinions on compensation for the Church’s care for national heritage. The Liberals also protested against the continued special regulation of the Church of Sweden through a special law. The Left, on the other hand, went even further in this direction and rejected the bill entirely, arguing that it not only failed to stop the special treatment of the Church of Sweden, but even included the other registered denominations in increased national regulation.756 At the same time Moderates and Christian Democrats were urging the Riksdag to demand that baptism should be a criterion for holding elected offices in the Church of Sweden. This idea had originated in an internal commission within the Church and achieved general support in the parishes but had then been rejected by the Synod and a number of government agencies (including the Legal, Financial and Administrative Service Agency, Kammarkollegiet), as this would introduce two classes of Church members. In the Riksdag the majority also used the parallel with election criteria in the municipalities and counties as an argument against this differentiation of the right to vote and to stand for election. They apparently considered these norms more authoritative, as well as relevant for the Church, and rejected the idea.757

Further Investigations and Commissions
As a result of the principles laid down in the bill and accepted by both the Riksdag and the Synod, the government commissioned four new independent investigations as well as special reports from the Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency and the National Tax Board, all finished in 1997. Of these commissions only the ones dealing with burials and cultural heritage had more than one member. At the same time the Bible Commission con-

755 Ekström 2003: 222-226, referring to Peterson 1999 and to interviews with Thage G. Peterson, Bengt Kindbom and Anders Svärd (a Centrist representative and advisor to Olof Johansson.
756 1995/96:KU12, especially the differences of opinions noted by Kenneth Kvist, Birgit Friggebo, Håkan Holmberg, Birger Hagård, Jerry Martinger, Nils Fredrik Aurelius and Ola Karlsson.
tinued its work. The general instruction of the administrative commissions included the principles now decided on by the Riksdag arguing that the old relationship between Church and State had been made obsolete by the changes that had occurred in society. These commissions submitted their reports in time and came up with all of the practical solutions demanded by the government.

Reports were submitted in 1997 on the issues of material cultural heritage owned by the Church, legislative regulations, Church property, burial organisation, Church personnel, financial issues and government participation in the collection of fees. The Church’s work with preserving the cultural heritage would be financed by a special tax paid by all citizens and related to their income. Church fees and the fees of denominations so desiring would be collected by government tax offices. Burial grounds would be organised in a separate system by which the country was divided into territories and the government appointed a responsible organisation for each of these. These administrative borders would, however, follow the existing parish borders and the parishes would be appointed to be responsible for burials in all areas except for Stockholm and Tranås (where the municipalities were already responsible for the major burial grounds).

The Legal, Financial, and Administrative Services Agency analysed Church property and suggested that many of the more antiquated forms of ownership should be terminated and that property to be transferred to parishes and dioceses. On the issue of Church lands they made three suggestions. Two of these suggested that it would not become the property of the Church when it became a separate legal person. Instead it would be either government property or the property of a new foundation administered by the Church under government surveillance (a model once suggested by the Myr dal Commission). It was also suggested that the constitutional paragraph on the faith of the monarch had nothing to do with the relationship between Church and State; it was a matter between the Head of State and the Riksdag. One more symbolically loaded issue was thus out of the way.

758 Dir 1995:162.
759 In all areas the organisation responsible (be it a parish or a municipality) would be responsible for supplying burial space for both Church members and non-members, something they could do both by supplying space centrally and by making deals with other maintainers of burial grounds in the area, such as parishes (in the case of Stockholm), municipalities (in other areas) and other denominations.
Finalising Bills on the Change of Relations

The number of comments requested by the government this time was even greater than in the earlier stages of the procedure, and this time answers from Eastern Christian and Muslim congregations were invited as well. This was also the first time that the government described the changes as a permanent solution.\footnote{Government Bill 1997/98: 49, Government Bill 1997/98:116.}

From the mid 19th century a development began which meant that the social responsibilities of the Church were successively taken over by agencies of the government and the secular municipalities. At the same time the opinion that religion and morals are private matters that can naturally take different forms in society reached prominence. The development has resulted in the break-up of the old unitary society, replacing it with increasing diversity in matters of culture and values. The consequences have been a society with greater vitality and faster changes but at the same time a society with increasing insecurity of the meaning of the existing norm system.\footnote{Government Bill 1997/98:116: 17.}

In the end the government followed the recommendations of the commissions in all matters concerning the general relationship between the State and the Church of Sweden. The problematic parts of Church property would remain the property of the State. Some of these decisions went against the protests of the Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency that a special Law on the Church of Sweden would go against constitutional prohibitions against laws directed at single cases. Neither did the government consider itself having time to consult the Council on Legislation (lagrådet) on the necessary changes in the Fundamental Law. Several other denominations protested against the continued special legal status of the Church of Sweden, among them were Nonconformist, Islamic and Jewish congregations and the Roman Catholic Diocese. The Church of Sweden Synod of 1997 was on the other hand quite satisfied with most of the proposals. They were, for example, very pleased that the new description of denominations no longer implied that the Church was some kind of association made up of individual citizens. While it would not own the traditional Church property it had at least avoided the less tempting alternative of foundation ownership. The government, for its part, could not see that the new construction was in any way contrary to religious freedom as what was said about the Church of Sweden was only mirroring its own self-image. The age-old close relationship between the State and the Church of Sweden was also used as an argument. Whether the law was supposed to change this view, or aimed to preserve the Church, remained unclear.\footnote{Government Bill 1997/98: 49, Government Bill 1997/98:116.}
Riksdag Discussions on the Finalising Bill

In the Riksdag the main protests came from the Leftists, Liberals and Greens, who continued to oppose both the special regulations regarding the Church of Sweden and the remaining legislation on the religious affiliation of the Head of State. The Leftists and Greens went even further by recommending that the regulations made in the Law on the Church of Sweden should be of a transitory nature and that the help given to the Church with the collection of fees should be included in these rather than extended to other denominations (something that according to these parties would unduly favour religious organisations before secular ones). Christian Democrats, on the other hand, moved for the maintenance of the Church’s veto on legislation concerning itself. The Committee on the Constitution considered this unnecessary and would continue to include the Church when circulating propositions for consideration. None of these differing opinions did in fact gain majority, as there was already a majority gathered in support for the model now presented by the government.764 With few remaining details this sealed the decision of a new relationship between the Church of Sweden and the State.

Although most decisions in Church policy at this time were mere specifications and practical solutions to decisions already made in the previous period, this may have been a formative moment for the organisational details of religious institutions in Sweden. The current organisation of the Church of Sweden had in a high degree been decided on in the early eighties. Yet, this was the time when institutions were drafted, as for example the new structure for Church heritage and burial administration, not to speak of the new legal figure of registered denomination, which is now the normal form for religious organisation in an increasingly multi-religious Sweden. It should, furthermore, be noted that while the government (with the exception of the new Prime Minister) now looked at the Church as a relic of a past in relation to a secular state, the Church itself started to accept a more religious identity, although it still also identified itself with the nation.

CONCLUSION: CONSOLIDATION AND NEW PATHS

Institutional Integration and New Paths

Much as the previous period the mid-nineties did not include many new institutions. The Culture Commission continued with the concepts of management by objectives and results that had surrounded its origin. Cultural policy thus became increasingly isomorphic to the rest of the public sector. It should, however, be noted that this did not lead to any deep reorganisation of the cultural policy field. Neither was the agency that was the main authority

764 1997/98:KU20, including noted differences of opinions.
on NPM (SAFAD) convinced of the efficiency of these measures. This implies a relatively superficial isonymism intended to increase the legitimacy of the field as a sector, rather than an acceptance of NPM norms and standards. At the same time the government continued to reject Liberal, Moderate and Christian Democrat demands for a less centralised cultural sector. This conflict became explicit in the library field: when the government began to fail to achieve adherence to its norms with authority, it resorted to coercion by legal powers.

The Commission also continued to respect the older institutions of the cultural policy field. It proposed no major new agencies, organisations or changes of institutions. It supported, however, the recognition of two new art forms. These facts support the conclusion that the institutional growth of cultural policy had ended in the early seventies. Neither did the Commission support the changes proposed by the Museum Commission. It is, on the other hand, also clear that it did nothing to stop the emergence of museum policy as a distinct field. It supported it. The National Museum of Historical Antiquities and the RAÅ were finally separated and the border between their respective fields thus strengthened. The strengthening of the museum field can also be seen in its front position in the IT development of the cultural policy field, as well as in the increased professionalisation of its employees. At the same time the Culture Commission’s interest in museum and heritage issues marks that these fields were now more integrated into cultural policy as a policy field than they had been twenty years earlier.

A comparison between the Culture Council and the Culture Commission not only shows that the later was even less prone than its predecessor to change the cultural policy field. The changes it proposed held, furthermore, less legitimacy in the field itself. This is evident from the changes that its proposed objectives for cultural policy underwent before they were accepted by the Riksdag. The involvement of members of the Riksdag in the Commission this time worked more to increase their continued involvement in changing the objectives when they reached its Committee on Cultural Affairs, than to make it acceptable there. This opened a way for alliances between dissatisfied actors. The united effort of KUR and the Centre Party to make the formerly implicit objective of bildning explicit is an example of this. Other additions were contributed by the Ministry of Culture in the form of a new Museum of World Culture, a measure that proved to have little legitimacy in the field or among the Riksdag parties. While cultural policy was now a more integrated policy field than it had been twenty years earlier, the Commission was less of a part of it than its predecessor had been.

As cultural policy was further institutionalised its borders became clearer. It was, for example, clarified once more that while the Church of Sweden was
not part of cultural policy, some of its activities were parts of heritage policy (and thus of cultural policy) being responsibilities of the State, whereas most of its other activities were not. Such clarification was also evident in how both the government and several of its commissions prioritised border controls against “un-qualified artists” when they prepared to reform the art subsidies system. Yet, this process also shows signs of the weakness of cultural policy as a field: it failed to take control over its borderlands towards employment policy. This failure foreshadows the major cuts that were made a decade later on the special treatment of unemployed artists. Another example of the weakened position of cultural policy was that when new artistic sub-sectors were established they became institutionalised in relatively small new government agencies rather than in nation-wide new institutions. There is little doubt that the government’s programmes for architecture and design will never reach the same size as the older fields. Yet, they follow their institutional standards.

If this study had ended with 1996 it would, however, still have been reasonable to view it as a story of the successful integration of the cultural policy field, a successful story of how the government and its commissions forged a field from a set of highly heterogeneous institutions, fields and actors. At the beginning of this dissertation I proposed that national cultural policy does not need to be nationalist to help create a national culture. Although the reports of the Culture Commission gives a better view of its success than anything that could have been included in this study, I have shown that the Swedish cultural policy field in 1996 was a highly integrated organisation working to grant the entire nation access to culture guided by the same national professions. Nationalism appears, however, to have been far from the professionals and politicians who produced this cultural policy. After 1996, new organisational elements have however entered some parts of the field and given it a less integrated structure. Some of them even appeared with the Culture Bill. The decision to form the Museums of World Culture as a new government agency would, for example, prove formative for the foundation of later organisations, such as the forums for World Culture and Living History. This increase in government involvement with the field was also in itself a major change. Its implications for field integration should be seen in the contexts of the government’s decreased authority in the field, which explains why new actors were added, instead of new norms imposed on the existing actors. This is to some extent a parallel to the project policy sometimes seen in other sectors765 (and later in cultural policy as well) when politicians involve themselves personally by creating specific projects rather than by setting down strategies for entire fields. In this case, the new actors

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765 See e.g. Hall et al 2005.
were, however, permanent and would have permanent consequences on cultural policy. Nonetheless, it appears that the reason did not lie within the field itself but that acting with changes in cultural policy was a mimetic response from the government to a specific challenge to it. I will argue that the reasons for the creation of these new actors related to entirely new ways of conceptualising the nation that became increasingly thought of as appropriate at this time.

The Concept of the Nation
Despite the fact that the Social Democrats had regained power in 1994, the ethnic perspective of the previous government was still recognisable in the reports of the Culture Commission. The major difference in how this commission and the Culture Council approached the nation are that as a result of the integration of the heritage field into this general field, heritage could now be applied as a perspective on the entire cultural policy field. This tendency is, however, most evident in the general chapters of the main report of the Commission and less evident in chapters concerning specific art forms. To speak of a general success for an ethnic concept of the nation would thus be a major overstatement. The distance between norms in general cultural policy and in the sub-fields remained. Much as in earlier days, integration in the form of equal access remained central to cultural policy. Yet, the focus on cultural integration was much weaker than it had been and, for that matter, than it would become.

Another important development was the emergence of multiculturalism and World Culture as new super-standards for the relationship between State and culture. During this and the previous period a number of private bills had moved for increased support of the specific cultures of various groups. Several motions had concerned the culture of women, some concerned youth culture, but most concerned the cultures of ethnically defined groups, sometimes immigrants, but more often specific ethnicities. Other motions expressed concern for the growing xenophobia in Swedish society. These motions were, however, less novel; motions directed at improving the democratic values of the population were perfectly in line with general approaches to Swedish politics. The Culture Commission expressed sympathy for these perspectives, but did little to accommodate them.

It was instead by later government initiatives that these concepts would influence cultural policy. The first response that the government made was to propose a new Museum for World Culture and a new agency to administrate it (the museum was to be located in Gothenburg, as a result of previously

766 For a discussion of modernity and technology as vehicles for the integration of Sweden as a national cultural community see. Harding 2006a.
established norms on geographic equality). This was received poorly by the other parties of the Riksdag. These did not however make this argument in ways that are easily related to their approach to the nation, but related instead to field autonomy. The experts who had introduced these new perspectives did, however, themselves come from the museum field. The normative integration of the Swedish museum field with the trans-national museum field was now directly influencing the concepts of the nation that were expressed in Swedish cultural policy. At the same time politically appointed representatives took direct part in the translation of trans-national super-standards for the creation of the Museum of World Culture. The government's new approach was clearly expressed in the new museum agency, especially when compared to the statements of certain government commissions. World Culture should be taken to simultaneously mean culture that was not represented in established (State-supported) Swedish cultural production and culture that was perceived to have a non-Western origin. With this concept the taken for granted context of the Swedish nation had thus changed from Europe to the West in general; its significant other became the rest of the world rather than the USA. In the case of the new agency this non-Western world even included Greco-Roman and Ancient Egyptian cultures, which were hardly underrepresented in Swedish museums. It is in fact very likely that these were included precisely because collections of that kind already existed institutionally as separate organisations and thus were easily movable to the responsibility of the new agency, if not actually movable to Gothenburg. These actions indicate that the government considered itself responsible for immediately expressing World Culture in its cultural policy and that this was the crucial juncture that motivated the choice of a new path.

Yet it does not appear as if these displays were directed primarily towards immigrants or other minorities. The main recipient appears instead to have been the ethnically Swedish public. This would also explain why these measures were sometimes discussed together with (other) measures to fight xenophobia, something that also became a prioritised goal for cultural policy, one that rose to prominence after the establishment of the official objectives for cultural policy. If one is to construct a concept of the nation from the new messages of cultural policy at this time it would thus be what was described as “a multi-cultural society” in the sense of many (ethnic) cultures in one society, and thus implicitly (at least with the Swedish use of the term society) one (civil) State responsible for upholding all of them. Integration thus, perhaps ironically, continued to be a major part in the cultural policy approach to the nation. It was now necessary for the State to integrate the population in the new multiculturalism of Swedish society. It should be noted that gender issues were treated differently. Both gender and World Culture were approached by
integration, yet gender was integrated into the already established organisation, while World Culture was organised separately. This leads to the conclusion that the inclusion of women in the nation were more taken for granted than that of ethnic minorities.

World Culture policy was at the same time occasionally described as separate measures directed at the separate culture of immigrants or ethnic non-Swedes. These descriptions vanished, however, in time, possibly because they contradict the norms legitimised by research in fields such as post-colonial and ethnic studies. In spite of the fact that the norms of explicit argumentation had turned against ethnic essentialism, a path had already been chosen; government agencies and organisations had been created to deal with World Culture separately from other cultural policy. These were primarily concerned with how non-Swedes were regarded by a public presumably consisting of ethnic Swedes, who were thus recognised as a dominant and separate group in the multi-cultural society, a group that could tolerate other groups, which were separate and subordinate. While this may not have been a desired result (which it probably was not), it became the unintended output when separately organised measures promoted tolerance and the main part of cultural policy continued to concentrate on Swedish ethnic culture and a purportedly neutral aesthetic culture that the non-Swedes were, by implication, less concerned with. The role of the State was to protect these subordinate groups within its state-framed nation. The Swedish recognition of national minorities and minority languages follows a similar organisational logic but with somewhat different norms for how to legitimise it. It recognises separate groups with separate cultures that were not to be assimilated. Although some differences exist between minorities that were defined by language, by religion (Jewish) or by nation of origin (Finland), all were ethnic categories for which the State assumed special responsibilities. It should be noted that neither these minorities nor the immigrant minorities were dealt with as trans-national diasporas. They were instead recognised as (sub)cultures existing within the framework of the surrounding state-framed Swedish nation.

The Values of Cultural Policy
Much like its predecessor the Culture Commission discussed the values of cultural policy explicitly. This time the result was however more of a compromise in which both ethnic particularistic and universal aesthetic and civil values were recognised. The focus on civil values was thus considerably less than in the seventies. This made for a more liberal individualistic approach to the issue of the individuals’ right to the universalistic aesthetic and ethnic particularistic cultural values, for which the State was now considered responsible because of their importance to individual identity. This was a uni-
versal value from a liberal individualist perspective rather than from a collectivist one, something that was not contradicted by any other commission or actor. This trend was in fact even more pronounced in Church policy, where the individual right to both negative and positive religious freedom was the main concern of all actors, with the exception of those few who instead emphasised the same importance of particularistic values to individual identity as the Culture Commission emphasised on cultural heritage. Universal (human) rights were thus the dominant values of the day. It was also when the nation was not perceived to live up to universal values such as tolerance, and its legitimacy was thus implicitly weakened, that the government was motivated to take action on World Culture.
CHAPTER VIII:
1998–2002:
Nationalising World Culture

We have now come to the last period that I have studied in the context of this dissertation. The objectives that are still in force for cultural policy had by then already been established. No other general reform of cultural policy has been made since then. It would be easy to assume that the field has not changed since the consolidation of the mid-nineties. The fact is, however, that major changes have occurred and that these are highly relevant to the topic of this dissertation. Part of the relevant context of these changes may be the increased discussion of issues related to democracy and integration in the state-framed nation which is evident not the least in some of the major government commissions of this period. Integration policy continued to focus on the state-framed nation by emphasising the need to broaden Swedish identity to include immigrants.767 In 1997 the government also appointed a Democracy Commission to find new ways to strengthen democracy in Sweden. Between 1997 and 2000 this Commission published an unprecedented number of reports. Its concept of democracy was mostly deliberative and participatory within the framework of the nation-state. Its recommendations thus centred on increasing the identification felt by the inhabitants of the nation and their involvement with the processes of Swedish democracy.768

A parallel to this new focus on civic virtues can be seen in the Public Administration Commission (förvaltningsutredningen) and its focus on the virtues of public officials and their responsibility towards the people and its demo-

767 Borevi 2002: 119-133.
768 SOU 2000:1.
ocratic institutions, as opposed to the focus on pre-set objectives and evaluable results represented by the Ministry of Finance, among others. Whether this focus on civil values and the state-framed nation was accepted by the State is an empirical question that is outside the scope of this study. There is, however, according to Sundström, reason to doubt this.\textsuperscript{769} The cultural policy decisions of 1996 were, however, taken before the field was influenced by these trends. Cultural policy has also changed after these decisions, which may mark the end of an era, rather than the beginning of a new period. Cultural policy was now becoming important to Sweden’s international image, as, for example, in the UNESCO conference on cultural diversity held in Stockholm in 1998 and the Holocaust conference of 2000. Not only the Ministry of Culture was involved in this; at least in the latter case Prime Minister Persson took a leading role in making a cultural policy measure – the Forum for Living History – a central point in a project intended to strengthen democracy by changing the nation’s view of the past. This is highly typical of the period.

GENERAL CULTURAL POLICY

It was in the year 2000 that cultural policy was given the boundaries that limit this study. 1998–2002 was also the time when religious denominations (including the Church of Sweden) were for the first time treated as an integrated part of cultural policy and subjected to its general objectives. Cultural policy was at the same time established as a policy area in the new budgetary system, corresponding to the responsibilities of the Ministry of Culture within the framework of the larger budget area of Culture, Media, Religious Denominations and Leisure. In spite of these changes 1998–2002 was however a time of consolidation of sector-wide policy. No new Commissions were created and no major reports submitted on cultural policy in general. Policy ran according to and with reference to the plans laid down in the cultural policy decisions made in 1996. This was especially true in the first two years, when the government explicitly prioritised the situation of artists, the democratic aspects of cultural heritage and the promotion of reading, design and architecture and Swedish film. Later on the focus shifted back to cultural heritage and the national museums. The most prioritised of these agencies and organisations were the ones associated with “democratic aspects”, such as the new Museum of World Culture and the Forum for Living History. Another on-
going project was the promotion of informational technology within the cultural sector, and the Culture Net Sweden was, after a brief and praise-filled review by the Ministry, made permanent as a fully government-financed office within KUR.\textsuperscript{770}

The cultural policy decisions of 1996 were also visible in the new evaluative chapters of the National Budget. In these each policy area was evaluated in relation to its objectives. The super-standard of management by objectives and results thus became even more institutionalised as the official function of the objectives. Of respect for the established norms of the cultural policy field it was, however, noted that evaluation would not concern the contents of cultural activities, a norm that was already inscribed in the objectives. Special emphasis was given to including the whole of the country in the benefits of national cultural policy, and to some extent also to including ethnic minorities and the disabled, and promoting gender equality. The different norms for approaching the latter are interesting. Gender equality concerned primarily the people within the sector; the disabled were primarily to be granted access to the sector as an audience.\textsuperscript{771}

Multicultural aspects, on the other hand, concerned minority representation among both artists and audience, but also the contents of the culture in which they were included. A strong emphasis on multiculturalism could be noted in many areas of cultural policy. This term also supplanted the term “World Culture” in most contexts during this period. The activities begun as “World Culture” were, however, continued. Two Commissions specifically dealing with multicultural and minority policy as areas of cultural policy will be discussed here. Multicultural concerns are, however, a recurring theme in many parts of cultural policy at this time. All recognised National Minorities were developing cultural institutions of their own. The Sweden-Finnish Language Committee could be mentioned, as well as the Tornedalian Theatre, the Sami Theatre, the cultural support system administered by the Sami Parliament (Sametinget) and the Jewish and Roma Museums. In the National Budget of 2001/02 these activities were also given an increased budget of seven million kronor. In some cases the Sami were even treated more as equal to the regions than as anything else, the major example of this was the existence of a Sameland County Artist, following the same standard as those of the actual counties. Just like these, Sami cultural policy, as well as those of the other minorities, also remained within the framework of the Swedish state instead of becoming a trans-national organisation by joining with its counter-

\textsuperscript{770} Government bill 1998/99-2001/02:1, budget area 17, entrusting KUR with the Culture Net is discussed in Government bill 1998/99-2001/02:1, budget area 17: 40-41, the decision was based on Ds 1999:20.

parts in the neighbouring nation-states. Immigrants, on the other hand, had to be satisfied with the various activities concerned with multiculturalism and World Culture, activities that were generally more concerned with integration and giving Swedes access to World Culture than with developing the cultural heritage of the various diasporas.\textsuperscript{772}

\textit{Debates in the Riksdag}

In the Riksdag polarisation continued to increase. The main topics of cultural policy debate during this period proved to be regional and multicultural issues, i.e. issues of national integration. This was also the context of some of its few trans-alliance blocks as the Leftists, Centrists and Liberals of the Committee on Cultural Affairs allied behind the counties of Kalmar, Gotland and Scania to entrust these with the responsibility of cultural heritage preservation within their borders (presently cared for by the National Heritage Board, RÅ) for the duration of a test period lasting several years. These parties were also in general the most regionalist, while the Social Democratic government appeared to be the most centralist actor in the Riksdag. Only the Christian Democrats voted for increased support to the Stockholm region.

This was however in the context of their continued work with establishing a county music ensemble in Stockholm, the last county to have one. All of the centre-right parties, however, moved for reconsidering the earlier decision of merging the Museums of Eastern Asian Antiques, Mediterranean and Near Eastern Antiques and Ethnography to create a new government agency for the Museums of World Culture. This would, according to them, risk the exist-

\textsuperscript{772} Government bill 1998/99-2001/02:1, budget area 17. Also working during this period was the Commission on the ILO Convention no. 169 (concerning “indigenous and tribal peoples in independent countries”), which delivered its final report to the Ministry of Agriculture in 1999. The government appointed County Governor Sven Heurgren commissioner to investigate whether Sweden should sign the convention and what the consequences of that would be (Dir. 1997:103). The Commissioner concluded that the major problem with Sweden signing the Convention would be that the Swedish state did not grant the Sami significant enough rights to use their traditional lands (if the lands traditionally used for reindeer husbandry would be considered “traditional lands” in the sense of the Convention). Enforcing their rights to use the land (as opposed to granting rights of ownership) would, however, be enough. This would require that the government created a system in which it would be easier for the Sami to defend their legal rights in case of conflict. It would also require that the Sameting should be granted a legal right to state its opinions on public decisions regarding the traditional Sami land. In spite of these problems, the Commissioner recommended that Sweden should sign the Convention. He argued that “Sweden has a long tradition of commitment to weak, disadvantaged groups and has acceded to all the key conventions which seek to protect minority groups etc” (SOU 1999:25: 29). Once again minorities would be protected with reference not to inherent rights, but to the status of Sweden as a tolerant nation. It is hardly surprising that the Sami members of the Commission were unsatisfied with the measures it recommended, SOU 1999:25.
ing close cooperation of the two former with the other museums included in the National Museum of Fine Arts and National Museums of History.773

Moderate policy at the same time became more radically market liberal and the Liberals generally followed suit. Both parties stressed that the State should finance only part of national cultural life. Especially the Moderates also emphasised the strained economic situation and the need for cutbacks even in the cultural sector. At the same time they praised the expansion of cultural life at the county level that had taken place in the last twenty years and concluded that the National Touring Theatre (NTT), Travelling Exhibitions (NTE) and Touring Concerts (NTC) were no longer needed to provide culture for all of the country, at least not to the same extent as before. Another old target for their suggested cutbacks was KUR, which to them represented both bureaucracy and central political planning. Instead, governmental involvement in the cultural field should concentrate on the following three areas, all of which seems to have been considered fundamental for the long-term sustainability of Swedish culture:774

- Promoting children and youth culture.
- Protecting our common cultural heritage.
- Giving the artists [kulturakapare] of the country real opportunities [förutsättningar] for their artistic work.775

Both Moderates and Liberals also pointed to the need of increased work with expanding the use of information technology, something they considered especially useful in giving people all over the country access to the productions of, for example, the musical and theatrical establishments of the capital. As a further demand for a less government-controlled cultural sector, the Liberals protested against the government’s decision to appoint the board of the Culture for the Future Foundation and to give guidelines for its activities. They even presented a new set of objectives for cultural policy, based on “freedom, diversity and quality”.776

To reach the objective of freedom the ideals of humanism, tolerance and democracy have to be strengthened. Freedom of speech and the possibility for everyone to use it should be protected. [---]

To reach the objective of diversity cultural life has to be in constant change and marked by many different opinions, ways of expression and actors. Cultural Heritage is preserved and used. Cultural life is accessible to all, regardless of age, education, economy, place of habitation, disabilities et cetera. For the objective to be reached, it is required that international cultural exchange is supported and that various cultural

773 1998/99-2001/02:KrU1, especially the stated differences of opinion.
774 1998/99-2001/02:KrU1, especially the stated differences of opinion.
775 2001/02:KrU1: 133, in the stated differences of opinion.
776 1998/99-2001/02:KrU1, especially the stated differences of opinion.
expressions are available in the whole of the country. [---]  

[Quality] The objective means that cultural quality and professionalism becomes guiding for cultural policy without regard for what is commercially valuable. The Liberal Party wishes to support renewal in cultural life. This means that artistic quality becomes decisive, without that employment market, regional policy or other purposes are prioritised above the quality aspects.777

It is interesting to note that they mentioned cultural heritage as their second point together with diversity as a particularistic ideal, while the two other points were distinctly universal. It is also interesting to note that neither ethnicity nor gender was mentioned.

The Centrists and Greens stressed the importance of prioritising the culture concerned with women, children and cultural diversity. The Greens, for example, moved for special National Assignments (nationella uppdrag) responsible for World Culture (in 2001/02, the previous year it had been restricted to World Music) and “the role of women”, while the Centrists had a proposed new museum in mind for an Assignment targeting the latter issue. Both parties also moved in defence of culture for children and young people and the Greens especially stressed the importance of musical education. The Leftists, on the other hand, moved for increased support for cultural diversity (especially on the regional level) and for information to immigrants on how to apply for cultural grants and support. They also continued to argue for the integration of cultural policy with other sectors such as school policy and for increased support for film and libraries.778 A Green Party bill at the same time pointed out the need for a Sami cultural centre in Stockholm, a city that had after all the largest concentration of Sami people in the entire country. Such projects could however, according to the majority, be supported by the normal means of culture support, as well as by the culture budget granted to the Sami Parliament (Sametinget).779 This budget was at the time just above nine million kronor, while KUR had a budget of seven million marked for the special support of the cultures of national minorities. The special literary grants for literature in the national minority languages were 750,000 kronor.780 The only instance in which a specific institution for a non-national immigrated minority culture was discussed followed on the Leftist bill on the foundation of a Greek cultural centre in Stockholm. This, too, was voted down with reference to the normal channels of grant-money.781 In spite of these differen-

777 Motion 2000/01:Kr346: 7-8.
778 1998/99-2001/02:KrU1, especially the stated differences of opinion.
779 2001/02:KrU15: 28-29, Motion 2000/01:K378.
780 2001/02:KrU13: 12.
781 2001/02:KrU15: 47-48, Motion 2001/02:Kr347.
ces the Greens and Leftists continued to support most of the government’s cultural policy.782

**A Forum for World Culture**

As Lars Engqvist had suggested, the government created a new commission to act as a Forum for World Culture and organise experimental activities for a limited amount of time. It was also instructed to report to the government at the end of the project two years later. Like the suggested House of World Culture, the Forum would be a cooperative operation under shared management by the State and the County and City of Stockholm and would consequently consist of representatives of these. Its objective should be to

> support the artistic and cultural diversity in Sweden by providing space for cultural expressions from countries and environments, the culture of which are not normally made available through established commercial and institutional channels. The experimental activities should be primarily directed at scenic production and contact activities stimulating new ideas.783

Like the defunct House of World Culture and the new Museum of World Culture, the Forum would have to take a stand on the meaning of “World Culture” as a defining term for its activities. The instructions given by the government seemed to imply that “World Culture” was to be interpreted as “cultural expressions from countries and environments, the culture of which is not normally made available through established commercial and institutional channels”. In the more detailed instructions the Forum was, however, also ordered to “initiate, stimulate and coordinate activities in existing institutions concerning other cultures than the traditional Western one”,784 implying that the intended beneficiary was “other cultures than the traditional Western”. The Forum’s actual activities came to include a number of major music events but also a touring exhibition on the six world religions under the title *Gud har 99 namn* (“God has 99 names”).785 The Forum in this case took the role normally performed by the NTE in the integration of Swedish culture.

These events primarily concerned cultural expressions and sometimes people originating outside of the West (as normally interpreted). This would

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785 SOU 2000:15, SOU 2000:118. According to the Forum, Christendom, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Sikhism are world religions. The title is presumably from the Koran. That there are five world religions is something of a proverb. The exact list tends, however, to vary as there are more than five religions in the world, nearly regardless of how one counts. This list for example ignores Taoism, Confucianism, Shinto and a number of other more or less organised faiths, which add up to more than a billion people. This was never explained in the exhibition.
imply an ethnically based distinction between the Occident and the rest of the world. In the Forum’s report there was, however, also a great deal of talk of the importance of different cultural expressions meeting and generating new expressions. The Commission, furthermore, emphasised the positive and creative influence of this new input into Swedish culture. The Forum considered globalisation to be an unavoidable phenomenon. What was not unavoidable was that its influence on Swedish culture had so far primarily consisted of the influx of a homogenous commercial Anglo-Saxon culture, rather than the creation of new hybrid expressions. It should be noted that this Anglo-Saxon influence appears to be much the same expressions as those that in the seventies were described as pulp culture, negative effects of commercialism and American influences. The old dichotomy of Europe as opposed to the USA thus remained an appropriate approach in spite of the institutionalisation of World Culture. It was to this influence that the Forum would provide a counterweight. This implies that World Culture was culture “not normally made available through established commercial and institutional channels”, as, for example, Hip Hop culture, which the Commission considered an interesting World Cultural response to the negative effects of globalisation.\footnote{SOU 2000:15, SOU 2000:118.}

As the objective of these measures would seem to be creating new cultural expressions by combining the Swedish experience with cultures in some way considered different, as well as with Swedish culture inspired by these other cultures. Although recruiting many of its artists from abroad, this approach has to be considered primarily a matter of integrating culture within the state-framed nation. Recruiting artists from abroad, however, also implies a view of immigrant culture as parts of larger trans-national ethnic diasporas. The result was a project aiming to transform both ethnic immigrants and ethnic Swedes into World Culture-inspired Swedes embracing new civil values. This aim was also visible in the Forum’s practical recommendations to the government. They did not suggest a Forum for World Culture as a permanent entity, but instead as a temporary project for three more years. After this World Culture as a perspective ought to be fully integrated into Swedish cultural policy. The project should, furthermore, be an integrated part of KUR, an agency that had the authority to enforce World Cultural standards on the cultural policy field. To make this possible, the Council was to take over all responsibility for international cultural cooperation, including those that were at the time administered by other agencies and organisations, such as the Swedish Institute.\footnote{SOU 2000:118.}

The government agreed to integrate the Forum’s activities with those of KUR. It even granted 1.3 million kronor to KUR to continue these activities.
At the same time it created a separate system of Regional Multicultural Consultants (regionala konsulenter för mångkultur) in order to grant the Swedish people access to the cultural diversity that was now part of its cultural life. “This is, in a high degree, about increasing the knowledge of cultural expressions that are today invisible, and inspiring further engagement in both the producers of culture and the audience.” This time the government did, in other words, not include this diversity in “the people”.788 Neither was it, as we have seen, enough to convince the centre-right parties of the need for increased funding of KUR. The Centre, however, demanded a permanent new government agency to continue the work of the Forum and to prevent these issues from getting lost among all others in KUR’s care. Leftists and Greens, on the other hand, wanted more sizable investments in Multicultural Consultants. The Greens, furthermore, demanded the establishment of larger agencies to deal with these issues in other major cities than Stockholm.789

Apparently the Leftists, Greens and Centrists were more eager than the government to create new agencies for World Culture. There is, however, no reason to doubt that the government would have created an agency if the Commission had not advised against it. This was, in other words, the second time that a commission argued for integrating World Culture more with the general field than what was preferred by politicians. It is interesting to note that the agency that actually had been established – the National Museums for World Culture – was initiated directly by the Ministry without consulting any commission and against the explicit wishes of the agencies concerned. One has, in other words, to conclude that there was, among politicians, great willingness to create agencies for World Culture but that this was discouraged by experts and agents of the cultural policy field.

**LANGUAGE POLICY**

During this period Riksdag debates explicitly concerned with the status of the Swedish language became more common than ever. First the Christian Democrats proposed that the status of the Swedish language should be guaranteed explicitly by law. Later, a government commission argued that a shared language is a necessity for the internal civic communication of a democracy. All parties agreed that there was a genuine need to protect the Swedish language both as an official language of the European Union and in the face of an increasing Anglo-Saxon influence.790

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788 Government bill 2001/02:1, budgetary area 17, quote from p. 35.
789 2001/02:KrU1.
Among the first bills of the re-elected government was the Government Bill on National Minorities, in much a result of the work of the Minority Language Commission (see p. 253).\(^791\) As one may expect when a Commission is this divided, there had been no consensus among the commenting actors either. A number of answers – including the National Association of Finns in Sweden (Sverigefinska riksförbundet), the National Agency for Higher Education and the Universities of Stockholm and Uppsala – pointed out that Stockholm had been the residence of a Finnish-speaking minority since the mid sixteenth century. The capital could thus be considered the residence of a national minority. A number of answers also expressed worries that an asymmetrical relation might appear between standard Finnish and Meänkieli, and that the latter should thus be recognised as a separate language. This concern was expressed by, among others, the County Council of Norrbotten (the concerned region), the Torndalen National Union and the Universities of Stockholm, Uppsala and Luleå. Others including Stockholm University, the Jewish Central Council and the Jewish congregations of Stockholm and Gothenburg pointed out that the Convention demanded that the wishes of the groups concerned were taken into account, and that the Jewish groups clearly considered the preservation of Yiddish an important issue. The Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination considered the declining state of Yiddish an argument in favour of protection rather than against it. Others considered the sources used by the Commission biased. On the issue if Sign Language only the national union of the deaf and Stockholm University stated their support for its status as an official national minority language. No other languages were even discussed.\(^792\)

In spite of this criticism the government in its bill stayed close to the recommendations of the Commission, although with some very interesting exceptions: Yiddish and Meänkieli were now both accepted as separate minority

have been presented at the 4th International Conference for Cultural Policy Research, in Vienna 2006, Harding 2006c.


\(^792\) Government bill 1998/99:143. On more administrative issues several courts, Government agencies and municipalities concerned protested against their proposed duties of servicing minority members in their own languages. This was largely framed as an economic problem but, by some courts; also as a judicial one due to the problems inherent in the use of interpreters, a practice that these courts believed ought to be used only at a bare minimum. The Sami Parliament, on the other hand, argued that municipal and administrative borders ought to be redrawn in order to favour the minorities. KUR, on the other hand, did not agree with prioritising national minority cultures, which would be contrary to the freedoms of the art forms. Affirmative action would, however, be an acceptable alternative. Both the Sweden-Finnish National Union and the National Archives were, on the other hand, prepared to take responsibility for an increased documentation of minority issues and culture – provided that they received increased funding for this purpose, ibid.
languages, and both Finnish and Meänkieli were considered regional languages of the Tornedalen area, as well as in some other northern municipalities. It is also interesting to note that the government even more than the Commission considered dealing with the minority issue primarily to be part of the preservation of a national cultural heritage (of which they were an integral part). At the same time the government, paradoxically, considered minority issues to be a new international concern and described their development as if they had appeared primarily as a result of the creation of new nation states in Europe after World War II. Of the current national minorities in Sweden only the Jews had so far been defined religiously. Now the government also included a religious aspect in its description of Tornedalians, as it pointed out the importance of the Lestadian Church in the history of the region. All minorities except the Jews were, however, primarily defined by language and culture, while the Jews were defined by religion and culture. Only the regional minorities would gain the right to deal with public authorities in their own language, but all five minorities would, on the other hand, gain prioritising support for their cultures in government cultural and education policy. In practice, annual government support for minority cultures would, however, only increase by one million kronor. Actual support for Jewish and Roma culture would in other words remain limited, while the forms for increased study of minority cultures would have to be further investigated, as would the forms for minority influence on public policy.793

Reactions in the Riksdag
The bill was treated in the Riksdag Committee on the Constitution, but was also considered by various other Committees such as the Committee on Cultural Affairs.794 With the notable exceptions of the ruling Social Democrats, the Leftists and the Moderates, several Riksdag parties disagreed with the bill on one point or another in favour of even stronger protection for the national minorities. The Greens were especially concerned with the Sami and argued

794 1999/2000:KrU2y. The bill was also referred to the Committees on Health and Welfare and Foreign Affairs. The Committee on Foreign Affairs treated the matter as an issue of human rights in the context of international law. They furthermore concentrated exclusively on the Sami as a trans-national indigenous people. This was, according to the Committee, regardless of whether the Sami or the Swedes were the first inhabitants of the region. No reason was, however, given for not considering the trans-nationality of Jews, Roma or Tornedalians. The Riksdag Committee on Health and Welfare, on the other hand, placed the bill in the context of previous immigrant policies, but still stated that while many of the national minorities had already benefited from immigrant policies they would be well served by this new protection. The Committee on the Constitution, like the majorities of all the Riksdag Committees concerned accepted the bill in its entirety. 1999/2000:KU6, 1999/2000:SfU2y, 1999/2000:SoU3y, 1999/2000:UbU3y, 1999/2000:UU3y.
for a strengthened legal support for them. Together with the Liberals they also proposed speeding up the ratification process. Christian Democrats and Liberals joined forces to support the inclusion of Southern Sami areas in the new Sami region. Christian Democrats, Greens, Centrists and Liberals all supported more far-ranging rights to deal with government agencies in minority languages. Especially interesting is perhaps the Christian Democratic demand that the right to use minority languages in contact with government agencies should not be regionally restricted but should instead include contacts with the national offices of government agencies (which they argued were becoming more common now that contact by e-mail was a possibility). Centrists, on the other hand, focused on territorial issues and supported including Stockholm in the Finnish minority region as well as the inclusion of Swedish-speaking immigrants from Finland and of Finland-Swedish culture in the Sweden-Finnish minority. This, too, was rejected by the Committee when it clarified a point that the government had so far ignored. In spite of this general support for national minorities, only a few private bills on this subject were submitted to the Committee on Cultural Affairs. Among these could be mentioned the Leftist support for minority literature and the Tornedalen Theatre, which were rejected as unnecessary.\textsuperscript{795}

\textit{A Swedish Language Policy}

Whereas recognition of minority languages was a new concept in cultural policy the Swedish language had been considered a legitimate object of government support at least since the eighteenth century. In 1998 the Swedish Language Committee (\textit{Svenska Språknämnden}) submitted one more plan to defend it, arguing that “Swedish should continue to be the fundamental language without exceptions in Sweden as well as an official language of the EU. Swedish should be a complete language in Sweden.”\textsuperscript{796} In spite of this plan nothing much happened (according to the Committee on Cultural Affairs) until the Left Party proposed that the government should be instructed to form a commission composed of representatives of the Riksdag parties to make further enquiries and recommendations on how to protect the language. Unlike so many other private bills this one found unanimous support. In the proceedings of the Committee the Swedish language was given great prominence. Immigrants were described as having less access to a proper language than other groups in society. New class distinctions were seen to emerge based on differences in linguistic competence. In relation to immigrants, the discussion was, in other words, dominated by an integrative civil state-framed

\textsuperscript{795} 1999/2000:KU6, noted difference of opinions.
view of the nation and the appropriate values of cultural policy. The language, however, also had to be defended in the EU. Schools, media and IT should be used to guarantee that everyone had the opportunity to learn to command it. The commission would thus have to be given authority to make recommendations on all policy areas. Legal measures would have to be applied and the middle way between central regulation of language and linguistic laissez-faire policies might have to be abandoned.797

This had been the second time the Riksdag made such a demand on the government. This time, however, it worked. In its instruction the government shared most of the views expressed by the Committee on Cultural Affairs, although it added that no measures taken in defence of the Swedish language should be at the expense of recognised minorities. It was not that Sweden had lacked a linguistic policy in the past. The problem was instead the lack of central coordination and explicit legal support. The new Commission for the Swedish Language was composed of representatives of the Riksdag parties assisted by a number of academic experts and bureaucrats, and was instructed to cooperate closely with all the agencies concerned.798

The Commission took the unusual measure of ordering an attitude survey from Swedish Gallup. From the survey and other sources they were able to conclude that the Swedish language was generally considered important by the people, but that the younger generation tended to consider the command of English more important. In spite of this the tone of their report was significantly less alarmed than that of KUR had been. Although Swedish was not a world language, neither was it a very small one. With nearly ten million speakers and a majority position in a united territory controlled by the Swedish nation-state, Swedish was in a relatively good position, especially as the Scandinavian languages together formed a unique linguistic community of mutually understandable languages. This community ought to be further strengthened by an increased exchange of, for example, TV programmes. The Commission also stressed the importance of national minority languages, sign language and immigrant languages for the identity of their users. The discussion of Swedish, on the other hand, showed significantly less emphasis on its importance to identity and virtually no emphasis on its role as part of the cultural heritage. The focus was instead on the importance of communication within a state-framed nation that was now recognised as multilingual but also, and precisely for that reason, in the need of a common language understood by all its inhabitants. This language should be Swedish and it was of uttermost importance that all of its inhabitants had equal access to their common language and equal command of it. At the same time differences within the

language, such as differences of style, dialects and accents should not be threatened. Everyone should, however, have as equal access as possible to the national standard language. The greatest danger was, however, not decreasing language control, but the loss of linguistic domains: that Swedish would no longer be used in such areas as science, IT and the EU and that the proper terminology for discussing these matters would not even exist in Swedish. Such a state would weaken democratic access to these fields and at the same time contribute to the creation of new class distinctions.\footnote{SOU 2002:27.} A threat to the homogeneity of the state-framed nation was a threat to democracy.

To counteract these tendencies the government needed to gather its strengths and coordinate its resources. Thus the Commission proposed a law stating that Swedish was the official language of Sweden which would open with the following paragraphs:\footnote{SOU 2002:27:470.}

1§ The Swedish language is the main language in Sweden and the official language of the country in international contexts.

2§ Those who fulfil functions in public administration should in their work use clear and understandable Swedish.\footnote{SOU 2002:27:470.}

Language policy should also become a separate trans-sectoral policy sphere with its own objectives, which should in turn be considered subordinate to the objectives of cultural policy:

The objectives of language policy should be
- that everyone should have a right to language: Swedish, mother tongue and foreign languages
- that Swedish should be a complete language and fundamental to society [\textit{samhällsbärande}]
- that official Swedish should be correct and well functioning.\footnote{SOU 2002:27:411.}

To fulfil these objectives the Commission proposed an 80-paragraph-long action plan to defend the status of the Swedish language through work in the schools, integration policy and administration. Stronger measures should be taken to create and conform terminologies in specialist areas and to see to it that legal and administrative terminology were used by all officials of all public authorities, as well as by public TV and radio, as part of a correct and understandable language. To coordinate these measures the government should create a new agency.\footnote{SOU 2002:27.}
It was to take until 2005 before the report of the Language Commission resulted in a Language Bill. The policies of this bill would, however, create language policy as a new policy sphere (but not a separate sub-sector) with a new government agency to implement it in all sectors of government policy. As the government summarised the perspective of the Commission it also laid the foundation for future policy:804

The fundamental perspective of the Commission is that Sweden needs a common language, Swedish, to be able to enjoy the benefits of the richness that a multilingual and multicultural society provides. Thus, all have to be given the opportunity to learn Swedish and at the same time develop their mother tongue and acquire enough knowledge of English and other foreign languages. Society’s increased demands on proficiency in the use of both written and spoken language lead to an increasing importance of everyone – regardless of linguistic and social background – being given the opportunity of learning a rich and functional language […] The Commission also takes an interest in that there are linguistic variations between women and men, girls and boys, and thinks that research should be encouraged on the role of language from a perspective of sexual difference and on the position of men and women in the public sphere.805

Swedish was thus still considered the common language and the government intended to continue fighting domain losses, especially the ones threatening in the EU and in academia. It also stressed the importance of language education and of working to increase access to literature. This is made clear in the proposed objectives for language policy:

- The Swedish language should be the main language in Sweden
- Swedish should be a complete language fundamental to society.
- Public Swedish should be cultivated, simple and understandable.
- Everyone should have a right to language: to develop and learn the Swedish language, to develop and use their own mother tongue and national minority language and get the opportunity to learn foreign languages.

These objectives should be considered in all areas of society. […]806

More important from the perspective of this dissertation was, however, the new view of an intelligible official (or public) Swedish. The idea that official Swedish should be easily understandable was however an old one. Easy contact between the people and official representatives of the State was considered a matter of democracy. The accessibility of official documents is a Swedish tradition often considered an integral part of making public policies open to public criticism. In earlier versions the linguistic aspect of this had

804 Government Bill 2005/06:2.
806 Government Bill 2005/06:2: 2.
simply been one of integration, legitimised by civil values. One language made one national public sphere possible. Now the government, however, argued for a greater adaptation of the official language to the different needs of different segments of the people. Through the new minority policy the government had already endorsed the rights of national minorities to use their own language in contact with public officials. Now the government also discussed gender (or “sex”) differences, age groups, sociolects and sign language in this context and proposed that government officials on all levels should receive education in these aspects of communication. A politics of language recognition was emerging and the government proposed a number of new policies in this direction:

1. Increased measures for language guidance.
2. Measures to safeguard the status of Swedish in the EU.
3. Language education including education in the mother tongue for children with a foreign background or from the national minorities.
4. Increased education in foreign languages.
5. Stressing the importance of education in the Swedish language in foreign countries.
6. Support for literature and reading, including government grants to increase access to children’s books in immigrant and minority languages.

Some of these measures were new. Neither the teaching of Swedish in foreign countries nor access to literature in immigrant languages in Sweden had been prioritised areas in Swedish cultural policy. It is, however, important to notice that language policy was not simply a part of cultural policy, although the bill was signed by Leif Pagrotsky, the Minister of Education and Culture. Sweden was apparently taking a greater interest in both Swedish culture abroad and in communicating with its linguistically non-Swedish residents (or at least in making it possible for them to communicate vertically with the State). It is, however, also important to notice that immigrant languages were not included to the same extent as Swedish, sign language or the national minority languages when public officials were to increase their communication skills. One is in fact left with the impression that the government expected that contacts with immigrants could be better served by taking sociolects into account than by increasing the knowledge of immigrant languages in the public sector. This implies an increased emphasis on integrating the immigrants (as opposed to national minorities) of the state-framed nation into its culture. It also implies a tendency to consider them national sub-cultures rather than transnational diasporas.

807 Government Bill 2005/06:2.
808 Government Bill 2005/06:2.
The government did not, on the other hand, follow the Commission’s recommendation to legislate on the status of Swedish as the national language in Sweden. The proposed Language Law had already been rejected by, among others, the Centre for Multi-Ethnic Research at Uppsala University, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and the Chancellor of Justice. The main argument had been that it would have been discriminatory towards speakers of other languages. It had also been suggested that it would be damaging to legislate on the use of Swedish in contacts with other countries. In spite of this the government – as we have seen – continued the older policy of strengthening the Swedish language. The main difference was that more than the Commission did, it saw a need to use English in Swedish institutions; economic and academic competitive benefits were prioritised above the protection of the language.809

Another interesting change was that the institution of public language guidance was reorganised. The Swedish Language Council had previously been a relatively independent association issuing recommendations on the official use of Swedish. Now it would be reorganised as a government agency with a somewhat increased authority. At the same time government funding was withdrawn from the Swedish-Finnish Language Council (an NGO), and its responsibilities were transferred to the new agency. This agency would also be responsible for guiding the development of Yiddish, Romani Chib and Meänkieli, including the development of the last-mentioned into a more comprehensive written language. Only the Sami language would remain the responsibility of another organisation: the semi-governmental Sameting. Guiding the development of official EU Swedish (including the translation of official documents) would, on the other hand, remain with the Offices of Government. The semi-private Swedish Centre of Terminology would also retain its responsibilities for scientific terminology. The government had thus moved all linguistic authority closer to itself with the exception of the Swedish Academy, scientific language and the responsibilities already held within the Offices of Government.810 Linguistic integration within the state-framed nation was thus accompanied by institutional integration of the State.

Reactions in the Riksdag
Looking at Swedish public debate in the months between the presentation of the government bill and the following debates in the Riksdag makes it easy to conclude that the single most controversial issue in the Bill was a proposition that was not made: the issue of legal institutionalisation of the status of the Swedish language. Ironically a clear majority of the Riksdag parties supported

809 Government Bill 2005/06:2.
810 Government Bill 2005/06:2.
this measure, but no law was passed. The main reason for this was that the Left Party chose neither to propose a law nor to support any propositions of the centre-right. Instead they stated that this issue should be taken up again and dealt with in the context of the present revision of the Swedish Constitution. In spite of this relatively controversial issue, most of the private bills presented in the Riksdag during this debate did not relate directly to any changes in language policy. Instead they continued to stress older party policy on library policy and literature grants. The centre-right also continued to stress old points. A different view of the status of the Swedish language is however more noticeable with these parties. All of them moved for the immediate enactment of a legal statement of the status of the Swedish language. The Moderate Party especially, but to some extent also the other centre-right parties, argued for a strengthened defence of the language in such contexts as the EU, science and technology. They, furthermore, pointed out that the Swedish Academy was in dire need of funding as its original sources of money had dried out due to recent reforms. The Liberal and Centre parties stressed the need for the continued support of dialects. The Centre Party also argued for a strengthened Nordic dimension in the sense that the Scandinavian languages could strengthen each other while Sweden and Finland could cooperate to strengthen Swedish and Finnish in both countries.811

POLICY ON THE FORMS OF ART

The most obvious new feature in government art policy during this period was the continued establishment of Form and Design as a recognised art form. While architecture could now be considered integrated into cultural policy, not even the government itself appears to have been satisfied with the measures taken to include form and design. At the same time the government continued its measures to improve the economic situation of Swedish artists. The major measures taken in this area were, however, those that had already been decided during the previous period with the addition of the costs of the new Film Agreement which had been negotiated in 1998. This would increase the government’s contribution to the Swedish Film Institute (SFI) by about 65 million a year. Other major increases benefited the Royal Opera and to some extent the Royal Dramatic Theatre, both of which were described in the National Budget as very successful enterprises, although more could be done for their activities outside Stockholm. Another organisation that benefited from the changes was the NTT, which was applauded mainly for its activities in Södra Teatern in Stockholm. The County of Stockholm also finally received a regional musical establishment of its own. A more typically Social Demo-

811 2005/06:KrU4.
ocratic investment was the increased funding of NGOs organising artistic events.\textsuperscript{812}

Several of the government’s actions were heavily debated in the Riksdag Committee on Cultural Affairs. Among these were the continued subsidies for the NTT. Both Moderates and Liberals continued to question the value of its continued productions for adult audiences now that regional theatres had expanded and IT had increased access by other means. Neither did these parties agree with the majority’s expansion of cultural policy into the fields of architecture, form and design, but demanded instead that the State’s responsibility for the physical environment should be limited to its own buildings and activities. Physical planning was, as the Liberals pointed out, a Municipal responsibility and the financial situation was demanding. Both parties, however, argued for more resources to independent theatre groups. The Moderates had in other words accepted the Liberal penchant for free artistic groups as part of their anti-centralist perspective, at the same time as the Social Democrats moved further from their culture-radical approval of these.\textsuperscript{813}

Centrists also argued for budget cuts in the film, theatre, dance, and music budgets. Centrists, Liberals and Christian Democrats, however, at the same time argued for increased grants for regional establishments, although the Liberals primarily supported the Gothenburg Opera. Christian Democrats supported regional music establishments and especially the creation of such in Stockholm, while Centrists concentrated on demands for increased grants for the NTT. The centre-right opposition was, in other words, less than united on issues relating to theatre and the other art forms. They remained divided between, on the one hand, two parties that prioritised the minimisation of government involvement and, on the other, two parties that prioritised cultural integration within the territory of the state-framed nation. Both sides, however, advocated budget cuts. On the leftward side of the political spectrum unity was at least somewhat higher, although the Greens continued to support the Royal Dramatic Theatre, while the Leftists questioned the government’s restrictive funding of culture and demanded independent enquiries made on the general status of culture and the results of cultural policy in Sweden.\textsuperscript{814}

\textit{Film Policy}

In 1998 it was time to renew the Film Agreement once more, and the government appointed a Commission to present recommendations on possible changes that could be included this time. Some of the criticism against the ex-

\textsuperscript{813} 1998/99-2001/02: KrU1.
\textsuperscript{814} 1998/99-2001/02: KrU1.
isting agreement was noted even in its instructions. Among other things it was mentioned as a problem that the system for post-showing grants did not take any notice of quality. The Commissioner should therefore make recommendations for a new, or revised, grants system, for new measures to develop cinemas as a cultural meeting place, to increase production cooperation with Europe in general and the Nordic countries in particular and, finally, to analyse the motives for continued State support of Swedish film production.815

This enquiry was entrusted to Per Olov Enquist, who would be assisted by experts from the field and work from material already presented in SFI reports. While the Commission in its report spent very little space on trying to explain the motives for continued cinema and film support, it made clear that it supported the established norms and concepts of the field:816

The production of Swedish film first. The existence of a national Swedish film production is dependent on State support. This is true in Sweden as in all other European countries. Sweden, with its long history as a film country, has a good potential to have its own successful film production even in the intense media landscape of the future. Here is an artistic potential to be used. It is of great importance to the national identity to create a vital Swedish film production, to give especially young people pictures of the present that they can identify with, and to counteract the one-sided American influence that is taking place in the film industry.817

This is a concept of film as a fundament to strengthen national identity and especially to anchor young people in a Swedish identity in order to prevent them from drifting off in an American commercial tidal wave. As in the already existing Film Agreement there was also a ready definition of Swedish film:818

A film is considered to be Swedish providing that the film has a Swedish producer and that the Swedish contribution of artistic participants is of significant importance. A film that does not have a Swedish producer is still to be considered Swedish providing that the Swedish economic contribution amounts to twenty per cent of the production costs and that the Swedish contribution of artistic participants is of significant importance.819

In spite of all arguments relating to contents, the definition of Swedishness in films was, in other words, based on the origin of the resources with which it was produced. Quality was, on the other hand, left un-defined and free for the SFI and their consultants to judge for themselves.820 Most of the report

815 Dir. 1998:36.
was, however, very practical about how to fulfil these aims and a number of measures were recommended both on the production and the distribution side of the film industry:

1. A development fund was to be instituted with 15 million kronor to act as a “greenhouse” for young filmmakers.
2. Two funds for pre-production support provided with 55 million kronor each to support quality films independently of each other.
3. A film and TV fund financed by SVT and the Film Agreement and under the collective leadership of representatives of SVT and the SFI. The cooperation between film and TV was, judging from the experience of film production in other countries, now considered an important source of renewal that should be supported.
4. Funding for short films, documentaries, children’s films and animations should be granted 25 million kronor.
6. Support for film creators (upphovsmannastöd) in support of producers, directors and scriptwriters.

The existing post-production support was to cease entirely—again. At the same time, distribution grants were to be reorganised and the differentiation between cultural policy support for Film Culture and other kinds of distribution support was to cease. In constructing the new system the commissioner primarily considered the geographical aspect of giving the whole of the country access to as broad a choice of films as possible: all tax payers had the right to access all of the films they helped finance, not only the population of the major cities. The commissioner also discussed the gender dimension to some extent but did not appear to have been directly influenced by this, at least not so as to take any specific measures in this respect. The film that was to be distributed was thus primarily Swedish but to some extent also included European quality productions. The proposed support system consisted of the following measures:

1. Promotion support: a support of up to 500,000 kronor (of a total of 14 million) for the promotion of Swedish films in Sweden in order to strengthen them against primarily American competition.
2. Cinema support: stimulation grants for cinemas, especially in towns with less than 50,000 inhabitants.
3. Video support: the commissioner described the opportunity to view films on video tape as “democratic alternative” and recommended six million kronor to grants directed to making Swedish and European quality films available on video. This way each lending place or public library should get

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821 SOU 1998:142
822 SOU 1998:142
one free copy of every such film. Promotion grants for imported quality film were also included under this post.

4. Film in the school: the SFI should continue to be responsible for buying property rights for showing films in the schools to the extent that they are a required medium.

5. Regions and film: The three already existing regional film centres (in the North, the South and the West) should continue their activities concerning both the production and promotion of film in their respective regions.

6. Showing organisations and quality import: Support for promoting organisations such as film festivals, 11 million kronor.

7. International organisation fees and promotion through international co-operation.

8. Film cultural activities such as lending, libraries, archives, promotion events etc at a value of 25 million kronor and administered by the Film Institute.

In addition to the already ongoing measures to subtitling Swedish film for videos to the advantage of the hearing-disabled was now to be added.823 About a month after its decision to appoint Enquist commissioner for the Film Commission, the government also appointed Bengt Nyström to make enquiries on the state of the organisations responsible for archiving non-fiction film material. He was also to investigate the possibilities for founding a centre for film restoration and repair at Grängesberg (in Ludvika).824 What the Culture Commission had described as the heritage aspect of art policy was thus taken quite seriously, at least when connected with the IT-intensive archive sector.

What the commissioner referred to as “documentary film” (in order not to make it a purely negative category) was at this time archived in a number of different locations, archives, and organisations both within and outside the public sector. The main archives were, however, the SVT archive, the Archive for Sound and Picture and the archive of the SFI. To these, the commissioner proposed to add a Centre for Documentary Film with a unit responsible for maintenance and restoration, located at Grängesberg and under the responsibility of the SFI in cooperation with the Archive for Sound and Picture and the Municipality of Ludvika. The national measures taken to collect documentary films for archiving should, furthermore, increase. More important in this context is perhaps that the motive given for increasing these measures was neither artistic nor directly linked to identity Nyström and his experts instead pointed to the enormous amount of information on the development of Sweden during the 20th century that was stored in these films. It was this informa-

823 SOU 1998:142
824 Dir. 1998:42.
tion that was now to be archived and made available for researchers as well as, directly and through the institutions of *folkbildning*, for the public.\footnote{825 SOU 1999:41.}

The government agreed with the Film Commission on nearly all issues, as did most of the referees when the suggestions were circulated for consideration. The government’s justification for this position included most of the classical justifications for Swedish cultural policy: the protection of the Swedish language, upholding quality, providing the citizenry with art relating to Swedish society and counteracting the forces of commercialism, although in this case, as in literary policies, these forces were not considered wholly negative. Instead, the government described the film sector as a unique node where the interests of market investors and artists of various kinds met with the State to produce artistic work. The concerns of the government were primarily the institutionalised concern for the equality of access between geographical regions, genders and age groups. It is thus interesting to note that the opinion that support for Swedish and European film would lead to further under-representation of African and Asian film was met with silence by the government.\footnote{826 Government Bill 1998/99:131.}

In the Riksdag it was primarily the centre-right parties that criticised the government’s film policy. While the Christian Democrats argued that the terms of the Film Agreement should have been negotiated according to guidelines given by the Riksdag, no party actively opposed the general objectives of film policy or its general structure as based on an agreement. On some issues disagreement was obviously unavoidable. The Centre, as always, demanded more investments in the regions and more money for regional film production and centres. The Moderates, on the other hand, argued for greater coordination of measures aiming to preserve film cultural heritage (a demand that was rejected by the Committee with reference to the ongoing work of the special commission described above). The Liberals were, on the other hand, worried that the expansion of broadband technology might threaten cinemas in smaller towns (to which the majority answered by referring to ongoing projects of establishing broadband connections for all, and to the competence of the SFI to utilise this technology in the distribution and presentation of quality film). Most active was, for once, the Christian Democrats. They argued not only for a more direct Riksdag influence, but also for clearer definitions of quality, for stating the ethical responsibility of the State in film policy as well as for more active measures directed at children and young people. Many of these suggestions were rejected with reference to the statutes of the Film Agreement as a binding agreement for the State as well as for its other
participants. It is interesting, however, to note that this non-governmental foundation was now questioned by the centre-right parties. They favoured isolating film policy from the rest of cultural policy in order to place it directly under the province of the Riksdag, a measure that was also discussed concerning SVT. In these cases the opposition went even further in supporting free speech from government involvement than they did in general art policy. The only other agencies placed directly under the Riksdag were at this time the Riksdag Audit Office and the Bank of Sweden.

*Design as an Art Form*

As early as 1996 the government had appointed an inter-ministerial working group in the Offices of Government to coordinate and plan government measures on form and design. Later on this had – as we have seen – resulted, among other things, in an action plan for architecture and design. In 1999 this was followed up by appointing State Secretary Claes Ljungh to commissioner to make further enquiries and recommendations on government measures concerning form and design. In its instruction to the commissioner the government pointed to both economic and environmental motives for the importance of this field. Well-designed products could be an advantage in international trade and, in the tradition of Swedish cultural policy, good design could also be considered a welfare issue, a matter of creating a better and more pleasing environment for the Swedish people.

The commissioner shared the government’s allegiance to these dual motives for highlighting design. Generally he just pointed to the decisions of the Riksdag and the government for justification. When his justifications became explicit they, however, related to either cultural policy as an environmental issue (referring to the norms set by the Culture Council in the early seventies) or to the business of marketing Sweden and Swedish products internationally. He also pointed to earlier government decisions in line with recommendations from the Swedish Institute stating that design was one of the features that should be used in profiling Sweden in the context of international public relations. On the other hand, the commissioner also added what he described as a “democratic” aspect. This, too, was much in line with the seventies view of cultural policy as a move away from an elitist separation of a cultural élite and an uncultivated people. Design was – and was considered to have been since the early post-war decades – a way of making the people part of what was now described as a subjective aesthetic experience rather than a matter of objective aesthetic values. Unlike the cultural policy ideologists of

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827 1999/2000:KrU5, especially the noted differences of opinion.
828 Harding 2006.
829 Dir. 1999:9.
the early seventies Ljungh considered the market and its commercial actors an integral part of this democratisation. Businesses such as IKEA and Hennes & Mauritz were now “not only clothing and furnishing Sweden, but the entire world”.

While commercial companies could be “democratic” in this sense, this did not mean that everything was. In its international comparisons, the Commission noted, for example, that French and other Southern European design culture were not democratic in this sense. The Commission appears to have viewed other countries mostly as competitors (albeit sometimes as competitors from whom a lot could be learned). Examples were thus chosen by excellence rather than by, for example, cultural or geographical proximity (the obvious exception from this rule being the other Nordic countries). There were, however, some identity-related features to the Commission’s view of Swedish design. It was characterised by its simplicity and functionality, which together with its democratic implications made it unique. In this way, Swedish design was connected with the modernistic side of Swedish identity and part of its status as a frontier nation in international modernisation. It is at the same time also possible, however, to hear an echo of Strömholm’s idea of a Swedish culture marked by its simplicity (see p. 180).

In practice design was, however, not such a prioritised area in the Swedish public sector as the government’s newly found interest might imply. Design issues were split between several ministries and agencies. Most important of these ministries were the Ministry of Industries, Employment and Communication, the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Education. Among the most active agencies were the Swedish Business Development Agency for Economic and Regional Growth (NUTEK), the National Swedish Handicraft Council (Nämnden för hemslöjdsfågor) and KUR. More or less independently, albeit under the theoretical supervision of KUR, a number of publicly financed museums were also active in design. A number of government-sponsored NGOs did important work, as did the Swedish Institute. Most of the recommendations were directed at creating a better and more coordinated structure for these measures. Not the least the archive situation had to be better organised, both for identity-related reasons and in order to work as a source of information and experience for design in the emerging knowledge society.

The primary method for increasing the awareness of the importance of form and design in Swedish society should be for the State to act as a good example. In line with Swedish tradition educational efforts targeting responsi-

830 SOU 2000:75: 23
831 SOU 2000:75
832 SOU 2000:75.
ble personnel in the public sector would be the main method to change the behaviour of those responsible for public spending. Further coordination was, however, needed in the design sector. The commissioner thus proposed that a design council should act in an advisory capacity under the leadership of the Minister of Culture but also including about 15 representatives of design organisations. In the more narrowly defined cultural sector the necessary coordination would be provided by a Meeting Place for Form and Design, which would also produce exhibitions and other events as well as information and promotion material for the benefit of the general awareness of the importance of good design. Neither of these new agencies would, however, be vested with any real authority. Regionally, activities would be coordinated by a new set of Regional Design Centres. All of this would, furthermore, be financed mostly by the relocation of existing resources, primarily from the Ministry of Industries, Employment and Communication budget. The Meeting Place was approved by the government in the following National Budget.833

*Unchanged Art Policy*

No major changes were thus made in the direction of the government’s art policy during this period. The differences between the Riksdag parties also remained the same with the possible exception that the Moderates may have moved away from cultural conservatism to favouring instead a more liberal aesthetic universalism. The new Film Agreement remained based on the assumptions of cooperation between the State and the film business, the protection of a film production under Swedish control and the view of film as an art form. The proposed investments in the preservation of documentary films, however, stressed the non-aesthetic aspects more than the aesthetic. In establishing form and design as a new artistic sector the government and the commissions stressed both the positive role of commercial actors and the uniqueness of Swedish culture more than in relation to other more established art forms. It is possible that this new concept of an art form was more in line with the views of the present government than the concepts presented with the more firmly institutionalised concepts used in texts regarding the more established artistic sectors. The government and the commissions, however, also stressed the aesthetic contribution of form and design to the environments in which people lived. These arguments constituted an interesting new fusion of the state-framed and the ethnic nations.

LITERATURE AND LIBRARY POLICY

Apart from language, the Literature policy in Persson’s second term included several other hotly debated topics. In many ways politics related to the literary field resembled that concerned with other art forms. Leftists, Greens and Liberals continued to motion for more monetary support for literature in immigrant and national minority languages as well as for translations of literature from “minor language areas” into Swedish. At the same time the old issues of library policy and literature grants continued to provoke dissention. These issues attracted Moderates and Leftists in particular. The Leftists argued for more government support for municipal and work place libraries, for legislation that would prevent municipalities from cutting their budgets and for increased support to cultural journals that should be made available in these libraries. The Moderates, on the other hand, stressed the importance of municipal self-government and thus argued against these unnecessary legislative measures on the national level. Moderates, furthermore, believed that the introduction of new IT into the library sector would increase efficiency and thus enable it to make further budget cuts. The En bok för alla series (“A Book for Everyone”), should also be terminated as a government funded project. Even the Christian Democrats argued for a re-evaluation of the outcome of continued support for this project driven by a firm owned by NGOs in close connection with the Social Democratic party and the political left. The Centre Party, on the other hand, questioned the relevance of continuing to prioritise the support for literature aimed at adults. On all of these issues centre-right representatives clashed with Leftists, Greens and Social Democrats. On one issue the government, however, changed its mind in the National Budget of 2001/02 and accepted something that had long been on the centre-right agenda: reducing the value added tax on books.834

Books and Value-Added Tax

To get the people to read books had been a goal for the Swedish government for at least half a century. Early in 2002 it tried a new, and in the Swedish context original, method by lowering value-added taxes on books and cultural journals. According to Gunilla Thorgren (who was State Secretary of the Ministry of Culture at the time), the Ministry considered this contrary to the established norms of Swedish cultural policy. This was a policy that did not encourage new readers but that only served to make books cheaper for those who already read and enrich the publishers. The government accepted it as a part of its budget deals with the Green Party. The Ministry of Culture did not even have much influence on these negotiations, which were instead domi-

nated by representatives of the Ministry of Finance. One might add that the proposal was not only supported by the Greens but in fact had a Riksdag majority behind it in any case, as the centre-right parties had argued in favour of it for some time. It also had an unusually high profile for a cultural policy issue; it had been preceded by a major lobbying campaign headed by, among others, the major publishers and student unions.835 At the same time the government invested more and more resources in measures and grants to increase reading among children and youth. In addition, it appointed a commission to evaluate these measures, both to determine whether book prices were lowered as a result of lower taxes and to determine if there were any effects on reading habits among the people. The Commission should also, simultaneously, take part in the work to increase reading among the population. This Commission included politicians, journalists and librarians. A week after its creation the Minister also included a book publisher and a representative of the national student union (SFS).836

To its help the Commission had several experts, yet it relied for its empirical information on the SCB and Nordicom Sweden (a Gothenburg University research institute). As a result the information that was gathered was primarily statistical and, like all previous Commissions in this field, relied more on quantitative data than on qualitative analysis. In the final report one chapter was, however, written by a Literature Ph.D. Ironically, that chapter was not on books, but on hypertexts and narratives in electronic media. Other chapters on the future and present of the book as medium and commodity were written by business economists, a book publisher and a senior bureaucrat. Most of the report, however, contained statistics, and the goal was very clearly that of spreading the habit of reading to the entire population. While the research of the Book Price Commission was never as extensive as that of its predecessors, it was still deeper than that of most contemporary commissions. Unlike prior book commissions it did not, however, use quality distinctions but instead concentrated on reading habits in general regardless of quality, only distinguishing between forms (such as non-fiction, fiction, children’s books, and poetry). This belief in homogeneity also meant that almost only books in the Swedish language and printed in Sweden were discussed; literature for immigrants in their mother tongues was commented on briefly in one of the preliminary reports but never in the final document. The

835 SOU 2005:12, interview with Thorgren. For an analysis of the Swedish budget process, see Premfors et al 2003. In the interest of a self-critical approach to one’s research subject it should perhaps be added that I myself was active in the periphery of this campaign, as a member of the board of the Stockholm University Student Union, an organisation that favoured the idea as it would lessen student expenses on course literature.

import of English literature was mentioned in the context of university course literature and the growing book trade on the Internet. It turned out, however, that the existing statistics had nothing to say on how large this market really was. In general, the Commission remained uninterested in the prospect of Swedish-speaking people reading literature in foreign languages.837

On the basis of its statistics the Commission concluded that book prices had indeed been lowered to a reasonable extent. While prices on journals were not sinking, the journal business was already in a crisis and the extra profit provided by these tax cuts might have had the equally desired result that journals that might otherwise have been laid down were still in print. On reading the Commission concluded that while more books were now sold and read in the country, the buyers remained the same. Neither was there any increase in the sales of non-fiction books. This could possibly be explained by concluding that people now found the information on the Internet. If that was the case, it was not necessarily a problem. The only truly problematic area was instead that of university course literature in the Swedish language, a genre that had become increasingly expensive. For the moment student economies were partially saved due to sinking prices on foreign literature. This was, however, considered to be mainly the result of price wars on the Internet, and was thus not necessarily a permanent feature of the market. This argument is interesting both as a reaction to the Internet and as one more exception to the general view of foreign literature. Apparently the academy was now partially not considered a necessarily Swedish-speaking sector.838

As its main conclusion the Book Price Commission recommended further study, especially concerning the possibility of changing reading habits, possible connections between reading habits and book prices, as well as the state of the university course literature market. The representatives of the book business never even agreed on its methods. They believed that the differences that it had noted between tax cuts and lowered book prices were caused by the methods used by the Commission and the SCB to compare the book market to the economy in general, methods that, according to the book business, overlooked major structural differences. Neither did the student representatives agree with the rest of the commission. They disagreed, however, with the conclusion that book prices had been lowered to an acceptable level.839 The major change during this period was that quality had ceased to be a political matter. With the new system that was implemented against the will of the Ministry of Culture it was in fact institutionally excluded from a system whose aim was to support book sales and that was legitimised by the value of

838 SOU 2005:12.
839 SOU 2005:12.
reading as an activity, regardless of what was read. Further legitimacy was provided by the increasing importance to the state-framed nation that was now ascribed to its language.

**Heritage and Museum Policy**

A number of interesting developments characterised the heritage sector during this last period covered by this dissertation. The struggles surrounding the National Museums of World Culture imply that the government and the opposition were now beginning to develop different views of the relationship between State and nation. In spite of their stated intentions many heritage agencies and organisations at the same time continued to work from old concepts of the national heritage and of the heritage as an existing entity. Recognising the value of various groups by recognising their heritage had, however, also become an established norm, as can be seen, for instance, in the many demands for special museums for a number of under-represented categories of people. At the end of the period this double perspective was considered paradoxical to many within the heritage field, a field that at the same time included the most conservative and the most progressive parts of cultural policy. To the government heritage had a vital connection with current events. In the transition from industrial to informational society Swedish identity should be preserved by preserving the heritage of the previous stage, much as the heritage of the agricultural society had been preserved at the beginning of the industrial era that had given birth to modern Sweden. At the same time political and moral threats against the central civil values of the Swedish nation and its moral standing in the world could be fought by using the cultural heritage. The hope of the Prime Minister seems in fact to have been to use heritage in this way to further his nation’s international position as a centre in the struggle to uphold universal values. Much as with the Museum of World Culture this new perspective would be taken up by a new agency, the Forum for Living History. However, in my view these norms governed distinct spheres of policy. The role conflicts perceived by the inhabitants of the field could thus be theoretical long-term problems but did not have to slow down the developments required by the new norms.

*The Government Bill on the Cultural Heritage*

In a bill on heritage policy the government proposed explicit changes in the official view of heritage policy in general. Among these were the brand new objectives for heritage policy:

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The general objectives of activities in Cultural Environment should be:
A defended and preserved cultural heritage
A sustainable society with good and stimulating environments and the work with cultural environments as a driving force in the change
The understanding, participation and responsibility of everyone for their own cultural environment
National and international solidarity and respect for the cultural heritage of various groups.842

On the whole these objectives appear closer to the cultural policy of the 1970s than to that of the 1990s: even the word “cultural environment” was central to the 1970s and was now again used to signify the focus on whole environments and their direct influence on the people that moved in them on a daily basis. In the nineties this was, however, also an implicit move back to the older dominance of the physical heritage that remained the focus of the bill. Noticeable in this case was, however, also the new emphasis on cultural heritage as a concern of all government activities. The heritage bill now included descriptions of cultural heritage work in such areas as environment, agriculture, transport, foreign and regional policy. The last section is especially interesting as it is the only paragraph in the entire bill to explicitly mention identity. Even in that case identity was, however, included in a discussion of regions as positive environments and economically attractive locations. The international connection is also interesting and specifically emphasised in this bill. This is hardly surprising, given that Stockholm had in 1998 hosted a UNESCO conference on culture and development (see p. 239). This conference was described as a success while its results were only alluded at, as much like the typical Swedish model for heritage policy. It is also noticeable that this is the only context in which “other groups” were mentioned. Multicultural concepts are hardly visible at all in the Heritage Bill.843

On a more concrete level the bill followed the recommendations of the Heritage Commission on most issues. Its main issues was the protection of buildings, place names and church towns, expert regulations on cultural heritage, increasing the possibilities for appeal in heritage cases and the abolition of entailed estates (fideikommiss). On the first issue the government stated the need for further enquiries but also supported some of the Heritage Commission’s recommendations, all of which had already been accepted almost unanimously when they were circulated for consideration. On the issue of place name protection it simply followed the recommendations of the Commission, in spite of the fact that both the Local Heritage Movement and several County Museums had requested a more forceful legislation. The same goes

for the recommended appeal system, despite the protests of landowner representatives. On the issue of church towns, however, the government neither followed the Commission nor the official responses to its report. It proposed no special regulations and stated that the existing protection under general regulations was enough. More interesting in this context is perhaps the export regulations on antiquities. These were somewhat extended when compared to previous regulations. Archaeological artefacts from before 1650 were, for example, not to be exported regardless of their particular value. All changes were in favour of a more restrictive position and some changes also extended protection to non-Swedish objects that had been in Sweden for a long period of time (usually a hundred years). The connection with the country of origin was in other words weakened in favour of unilateral concerns for what had taken place in Swedish history. These changes were to some extent in line with what the Commission had proposed but also followed the even more restrictive arguments presented in the official answers of the RAÄ and a number of museums, including the National Museum of Fine Arts and the Museum for Nordic Antiquities, both of which had large collections, including an unknown number of such objects.

**Industrial Heritage**

The interest in industrial heritage had increased in government circles in the mid nineties. In 1998 the government commissioned Professor Erik Hofrén to present a programme on how heritage institutions could further the preservation of the “cultural heritage of industrial history”, especially the breakthrough of industrialism in Sweden. The government stressed from the start that this should be a broad activity and that it should emphasise the democratic aspects of heritage activities. Hofrén’s report is one of the better examples of the concept of class representation in Swedish cultural heritage. His idea was that a preservation of the heritage of industrial society would mean including the environments and memories of the ordinary people who had made up this society. This implied an important place not only for the working classes as such, but, if measures were taken, also for women and, although this was discussed to a much lesser extent, minorities and outsiders (such as the unemployed). Government involvement in preserving industrial heritage would, furthermore, be a counter measure to the privatisation of history in company archives in private and privatised companies.

Hofrén also tried to strengthen the links to current issues more than the government had originally intended. This seems, however, to have been a

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845 Dir. 1998:43.
consequence of his unwillingness to consider industrialism a finished period in Swedish history. Industrialism was, in his view, a period that stretched from the early nineteenth century to the present. In spite of this belief in the continuation of industrial society he also emphasised the urgency of collecting the memories and artefacts of the period before its living representatives died out. In this respect his views much resembled those of a nineteenth-century ethnographer trying to capture the culture of a pre-industrial society before it disappeared into the mists of history. Now it was an industrial past that needed to be captured. Professor Hofrén’s vision was for the heritage authorities to choose and preserve representative objects before time and coincidence made the choice for them. These projects would demand a coordinating authority. For this purpose he proposed the creation of a Commission for the Cultural Heritage of Industrial Society.847

The government did apparently take his warnings seriously and appointed a Commission, not only to make enquiries but also to continuously present suggested research and projects for funding. These projects and the Commission itself was to work for the increased centralisation of relevant public agencies but also for integrating these with the many amateurs and NGOs working with industrial heritage, as well as for increasing public interest, activity and understanding. Cooperation on these issues should preferably also transgress borders, especially academic ones. These projects were to coincide with the Swedish chairmanship in the EU and at the same time be the Swedish contribution to a Council of Europe cooperation on cultural heritage. The main difference between the Professor’s views and those of the government lay in their description of reality and in their justification of these measures, a justification in which identity plays a much more central role:848

Swedish society of today has been formed by a more than a century long development of industrialism. Industrial society is now changing drastically and a new phase, often known as the knowledge society or the information society, is taking shape. The heritage of industrial history is, however, still an important part of our identity—a locally, regionally and nationally.849

The Commission, however, stayed closer to Hofrén’s preliminary enquiries and considered the ongoing changes more as a threat to its own activities than as the main reason for their existence. This is perhaps not surprising, considering that the Professor himself was included in the Commission, together with a number of other experts from the heritage sector, Kristian Berg of the

848 Dir. 1999:60.
Museum of National Antiquities among them, as well as representatives of labour market NGOs.850

At the centre of its activities were the projects it suggested to the government, a mixed number of both academic and non-academic projects. According to the Commission itself, these had been chosen in order to increase inclusion, coordination, and activity within the heritage sector as well as to spread light on a number of important aspects of industrial society. In its own report the Commission tried to do the same by including a number of essays by Commission members and other experts – heritage professionals, ethnologists and journalists, among others – and concentrating on the particulars of industrial society rather than on generalisations. Much like the projects they tried to give representation to the heritage of previously under-represented groups, as categorised primarily by class, gender and region (not ethnicity). The main recommendation of the Commission was that its activities should be continued, which was much needed, because of both social change and the under-representation of the cultural heritage of certain groups in society. As the heritage sector in its current state was unable to live up to these demands the Commission also suggested further deliberation on the possibility of a thorough reorganisation.851

Not everyone in the Commission agreed, however, with these conclusions or on the working procedures of its activities. Both Erik Wegræus (formerly director of the RAÅ), and Kristian Berg, the controversial director of the Museum of National Antiquities, had differences of opinion noted in the final report of the Commission, a measure that was relatively rare in a Commission composed of experts. Neither of them considered the enquiries thorough enough to justify the recommendations. According to Wegræus, the Commission had not considered other possibilities to organise possible future measures. Thus its conclusion that the projects it had recommended had been successful far from proved that its work should be continued in a form similar to its own. Berg, on the other hand, criticised the rest of the Commission for neglecting to evaluate its projects properly and thus basing its recommendations on speculation. He himself would later be criticised for focusing too much on contemporary issues in his work at the Museum of National Antiquities. Characteristically, he criticised the Commission for its lack of competence in dealing with such issues or with democracy issues.852

850 SOU 2002:67
851 SOU 2002:67
Riksdag Procedures on Cultural Heritage

On heritage issues the Moderates were undoubtedly the most active of the opposition parties. They were not particularly positive to the idea of a Museum for World Culture. Neither could they accept the methods with which the government increased the support for protecting industrial heritage. Especially the Museum of Work became the focus of their criticism and the party several times moved for putting a stop to all public grants to it. These critical points were parts of a larger criticism of the structure of the entire museum sector. The Moderates wanted a restructuring aimed at appointing specific museums responsible for all areas. Contrary to the current system these should, however, be appointed regardless of whether they were owned by the government or not. All of the centre-right parties demanded to some extent a general evaluation of the sector’s structure. True to their liberal principles the Moderates, however, also wanted the new system to be more open to sponsoring, and possibly even to selling archaeological material on the open market, at least when the material was not unique and existed in large quantities. Less liberal was perhaps the Moderate support for the continuance of entailed estates in the form of foundations. On this issue Moderates and Christian Democrats argued from the heritage value of preserving these historical estates undivided while the government and the Committee majority argued that entailed estates had their roots in a privilege-based society and thus were inconsistent with the modern values. Thus a conservative approach to preservation clashed with a Weberian wish for more consistent property legislation argued according to more leftist norms.

With the exception of the Museum of World Culture, disagreements on the museum and heritage sectors cannot, however, be considered very great among the members of the Committee on Cultural Affairs. From the perspective of this dissertation, some disagreements were however of certain relevance. As regards organisation Moderates argued the importance of reorganising the RAÄ as a purely supervisory organisation, rather than one dealing with both practical activities (such as field archaeology) and the supervision of such activities. Centre-right representatives also argued for government subsidies of legally required archaeological investigations in connection with construction work (which the owner was required to pay for). Moderates, furthermore, championed the idea that the government should buy, and support continued activities in, culturally relevant industrial facilities. Liberals and Moderates argued for the importance of IT in the sector. The Liberals, how-

ever, professed not to see the need for increased government subsidies in this area when the Culture Net was not publicly financed.855

More relevant in this context was perhaps the criticism delivered by Centrists, Leftists and Greens directed at the Stockholm-centred perspective of Swedish museum policy. According to these parties, the institution of Central Museums still referred primarily to museums that happened to be situated in Stockholm, thus creating a bias in favour not only of that region but also of the more or less arbitrary subjects that these museums happened to concentrate on. Instead, they argued for the establishment of various new National Museums in various parts of the country, e.g. a Women's Museums and a Museum of Forestry. A Liberal member of the Committee also motioned for a National Museum of Migration. The Greens, on the other hand, argued that Sweden should sign the international conventions that protected the heritage of developing countries against commercial exploitation.856 A number of bills were also submitted demanding the return of Sami objects from various museums to “the Sami themselves” by transferring them to the Sami museum Ájtte in Jokkmokk. In 2002 Leftist, Green, Centrist and Liberal representatives had differences of opinion on this issue noted in the report of the Committee on Cultural Affairs. The Committee, however, referred to an earlier comment by the Minister of Culture stating the need for Sami heritage to be represented in the national museum collections, and thus accessible to the entire population.857

The most non-territorial argument was, however, delivered by the Moderates when they suggested that Sweden should give financial support to the preservation of the Cape Coast Castle in Ghana, formerly the Swedish slave trade fortress Carolusborg and now added to the World Heritage List. It was, according to the Moderate bill, important to “shed light on dark chapters in our history as well”, especially now that the government of Ghana had invited Sweden to take a special responsibility for this particular object. The Committee majority however pointed to its earlier statement that the Swedish State was responsible only for objects situated within the Swedish territory and recommended that the Riksdag should vote the bill down, the same recommendation that in fact followed all of these bills, a recommendation that the Riksdag followed consistently.858

857 2001/02:Kr8, 2001/02:KrU15. The aforementioned report refers to a statement made by the Minister of Culture in the Riksdag at its meeting on 8 of June 2000.
858 2001/02:Kr8, 2001/02:KrU19.
A Forum for Living History

In sharp contrast to this general lack of interest in the physical remnants of the Swedish slave trade stood the government’s interest in Holocaust remembrance, an interest that had been stated by the Prime Minister himself only a few years earlier:

During the Swedish party leaders’ parliamentary debate in June 1997, Prime Minister Göran Persson promised to initiate an information campaign focusing on “what happened in the Second World War, the attitudes and human perspectives that led to the Holocaust”.

At a meeting in Stockholm in May 1998, Sweden, the UK and the US took the initiative in launching an international project – the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research. [...]

What came to be termed the Living History project in Sweden was launched in the autumn of 1997. The aim was to spread awareness and information about the Holocaust and to use it as a starting point for a wide-ranging discussion of such issues as democracy, tolerance, compassion and the equal worth of all people.859

This first note of the English summary included in the official report of the Government Commission on the Living History Forum is interesting in many ways. One is its emphasis on the international context of the project and the central role of the Prime Minister emphasised, for example, in the quote above.860 In these sentences the tone was set for the Living History Forum, both as a Commission-headed project and as the permanent agency that was later to be set up on the initiative of the Commission: the history of the Holocaust was to be used to create a discussion of the core values of society and through discussion strengthen these values in Swedish society. Much of its work would be directed at young people in schools. Reports on the National Minorities and the sterilisations that Swedish authorities had once forced on people with disabilities and other categories of people discriminated against were also mentioned. The latter case was the only one that concerned the Swedish government and not merely extremists or historical foreign governments. It is interesting to note that the Commission in this case thought it wisest to state, quoting a previous government commission, that “the ethical principles of today can only be discussed in relation to the past, not applied to the past”861 Ethical principles were thus understood as particularistic in this case. In practice the Commission, however, tended to use history as a

859 SOU 2001:5: 17 in the English summary. This comment has, however, no parallel in the Swedish text, it is instead a translation of the introductory lines of the government’s instruction to the Commission (Dir 1999:75). The speech is available at the Forum’s webpage, http://forintelsen.levandehistoria.se/om/tal/goran_01.html, 2006-11-17.

860 When I asked her who had been the driving force behind this project, Gunilla Thorgren also described it as “the Prime Minister’s baby”, interview with Thorgren.

861 SOU 2001:5, quote from page 62, italics from the original.
pedagogical example in teaching ethics rather than as the proper context for understanding ethics. Applying ethics to the past was in many ways the central idea of the Living History Project. Although initiated by the Prime Minister, the Living History Project had been a realisation of the programme presented in *Knowledge as Power*. The government now considered it a great success. Books and other material had been distributed in schools and exhibitions had been created. The government, however, considered this success a sign that perhaps something more permanent was needed and appointed a Commission to draft a proposal for a permanent Forum for Living History. This Commission included, among others, the director of the Museum of National Antiquities, a schoolteacher and representatives of the Swedish youth organisations as well as of the Jews and Roma. More specifically, the government wanted the Forum to be a centre for building new networks and opening for cooperation between relevant organisations and agencies such as “the educational system, children’s and youth organisations, voluntary associations, NGOs, religious communities, cultural institutions and other networks with a view to ensuring optimal nationwide accessibility”. Academic institutions could also be involved but these should preferably be interdisciplinary. New technology should be used in the suggested projects. The Commission should also continue the activities of the Living History Project. The directives, in other words, emphasised that the forum would transcend existing institutions as new and radical measure.862

Despite being a unique new institution in the cultural policy field, the Commission did not regard itself as standing alone. Instead it wrote itself into a context of a large number of different commissions, projects, and legal measures initiated in recent years to fight racism, xenophobia and right-wing extremism, measures usually performed in the contexts of integration policy and the legal dealing with organised crime. Another important context was that of the schools and the current discussion of a set of fundamental values (värdegrund) for the education of Swedish children.863 The Commission thus legitimised itself by referring to norms institutionalised outside the cultural policy field. The name Forum for Living History (or Living History Forum as it was termed in the English summary) was supposed to imply that history is not a fixed object, but something that lives and changes with our interpreta-

862 Dir 1999:75, with quotes from the translation in the English summary on p. 18 in SOU 2001:5. The idea of government-initiated interdisciplinary research as a way to cut through institutional barriers in the academy was, however, an established argument in research policy, Sandström & Harding 2002.

863 The discussion on the fundamental values of the schools was summarised by Christer Matsson in an appendix (SOU 2001:5: 191-207). It clearly had an inspirational value to the Commission’s view of its own work.
tions. Following Professor Birgitta Odén, the Commission described this as “history consciousness” (historiemedvetande) and stressed that there are several histories (or “stories” – the Swedish word “historic” is ambiguous). While each person or group may have their own story, this should not be confused with the falsification of history made by right-wing extremists (whose stories, one has to assume, are wrong). As a result, the word “forum”, an ancient term for a square serving as a meeting place, was, according to the Commission, well chosen to describe the kind of discussions that they hoped the informational programmes of Living History would lead to. This view was also mirrored in the overview written by Christer Matsson on the work with the fundamental values of Swedish schools. This kind of work should in his view be an open discussion between pupils and teachers on the fundamental values of Swedish democracy.864

In order to make a more lasting impression school events sponsored by the Forum for Living History had to be different from ordinary schoolwork. In practice this could be encompassed in a number of ways. The whole discussion built, however, on the premise that the Forum should through special training of teachers and other methods take stronger control over the events to be able to guide these to better results.865 From the ways in which the Living History Project was evaluated for the benefit of the Commission (by a private evaluation firm) one has to conclude, however, that the results were not measured by the openness of discussions but by their ability to imprint in the minds of the recipients the values and facts already stated in the instruction and in other authoritative documents. This was also the case with the assessments made by the Commission of the result of regular teaching in the schools. It concluded that while Swedish youth generally possessed a reasonable amount of knowledge of the Second World War, they tended to lack the ability to apply this knowledge to interpreting present issues in a democratic and ethic way. No differentiation between ability and willingness was made. Neither was the important thing to know the facts of the Nazi atrocities but using the Nazis as significant others as a contrast reinforcing the values of modern democracy. More emphasis should therefore be put on the connection between the Holocaust and modern Swedish reality as well as on helping pupils and other recipients of the message to reach insights into the phenomenon rather than mere facts about it.866

864 SOU 2001:5
865 SOU 2001:5. The same difference between Holocaust remembrance and ordinary schoolwork is noted by Kverndokk (2007) in his Norwegian study.
866 SOU 2001:5. The tendency to use Nazism as Significant Other in relationship to modern Western democracy is quite common in popular culture and has been studied extensively in that context (see for example Kingssepp 2005). In his ongoing studies of Norwegian school tours to
The function of the Forum was to act as an authority that would create conformity within the State and the public sector concerning values that were considered fundamental to society. It should also coordinate practical activities and create concepts for further activities that could be carried out by other organisations. Typically, its approach was integrative, civil and state-framed in its relationship to the people as a national community as well as to the State. The main exception to this was that it primarily targeted the ethnic majority rather than the minorities. This civil value-oriented integration was also emphasised by the high priority given to education, possibly a result of a wish to influence a future generation. As a further consequence of this long-term perspective the organisational form chosen by the Commission was the government agency. All in all, this institution was to continue the activities of the Living History Project and at the same time be responsible for organising the oncoming international Holocaust conference as well as, among other things, collecting material, mostly stories, from survivors of the concentration camps before it was too late. The Commission also recommended a number of interdisciplinary research programmes and academic institutions all over the country that the new agency could cooperate with. The Museum of National Antiquities was mentioned as a future partner in this context, as was the planned Museum of World Culture.867

The recommendations of the Commission were however not entirely uncontroversial. While they were supported by the government as well as by the Leftists and Greens (and were thus realised) the centre-right parties as well as several government agencies and other in-sector actors disliked both the Forum's organisation as a separate government agency (and not, for example, as an integrated part of an existing museum) as well as its narrow focus on the Nazi Holocaust. The centre-right parties stated to the Riksdag Committee on Cultural Affairs that other cases of ethnocide and persecution should have been included as well in order to provide a more balanced picture. Moderates pointed to the Soviet tyranny and Liberals emphasised religious persecution. One Moderate even suggested a “Museum of Evil”. The government proceeded, however, to appoint an organisation commission to prepare for the creation of the new agency. This commission was also to take note of the points of views that the government had collected in answer to the previous Commission.868 The Forum for Living History would be instituted, as a new govern-

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867 SOU 2001:5.
ment agency, and the government’s international work would continue. It culminated in the international Holocaust conference in Stockholm in 2000.

CHURCH AND RELIGION POLICY

Last Acts of a Changed Relationship

In the autumn of 1998 the last touches were put to the change of relations between the State and the Church of Sweden. Among the issues still to be dealt with were those of the burial organisation and the Church’s cultural heritage. The answers gathered when the commission reports were circulated for consideration had been varied. Nonconformist, Islamic, Jewish and Roman Catholic answers all agreed that burial grounds for people who were not members of the Church of Sweden should ideally not be organised by it and that “burial fees” should be gathered as municipal taxes, rather than be paid to Church of Sweden parishes. No new special regulations on cultural heritage owned by the Church of Sweden were, on the other hand, deemed necessary. The government, however, stressed the special status of the Church of Sweden in Swedish history, but also practical issues concerning the administration of the existing heritage.869

The ecclesiastical cultural heritage has been built during nearly a thousand years and been formed in continuous interchange with other parts of society. Through the historical standing of the Church it has come to both mirror and make up an important part of Swedish history. This is living a cultural heritage that through the centuries has been used continuously and that is still used for the same purpose. It is also a cultural heritage that is accessible to everyone regardless of, for example, church affiliation, age, sex and citizenship. Each and everyone can experience the church buildings and their inventories as historical and antiquarian memories and take part of art and architecture, listen to church music or seek a moment of stillness and peace.870

The government must, however, have considered the special status of the Church of Sweden to be historical rather than present, as it proposed to change Heritage Law so that its special protection regarded all churches that had belonged to the Church of Sweden before January 1, 2000.871

The government’s practical concern was, on the other hand, more related to the economical costs of heritage preservation and it was certainly not interested in committing itself to paying the expenses. Instead, it proposed financing through the National Budget and drafted a ten-year plan for this. It forecasted costs significantly less than those recommended by the Commission, motivating this by referring to the significant projects that were already

taking place and that would be made before the actual change of relations. On matters of principle, however, the government agreed with the Church Commission (see Chapter VII) on every point. Church heritage was essential to the nation and deserved to be protected – by the State and not only by the Church – Church fees should be collected by the State while burial grounds should be administered by parishes.872

When these proposals reached the Riksdag Committee on the Constitution their implications for the burial organisation proved controversial. Christian Democrats, Liberals and Leftists all considered the Church of Sweden’s continuing responsibility for burying non-Christians contrary to religious freedom. It was also problematic from a democratic perspective as those who were not members of the Church of Sweden would be subjected to decisions made by bodies elected by Church members alone. Both Leftists and Greens wanted this entire area of responsibility transferred to the municipalities, while the Liberals and Christian Democrats wanted municipal responsibility only for burying non-Christians (an interesting contrast to their own democracy argument: many Christians were not members of the Church of Sweden and the Catholic Church was in fact the second largest denomination in the country). The Committee on the Constitution also raised the issue of the constitutionality of a law that would delegate general rule-making power to a private organisation such as the Church of Sweden. The Committee proposed instead to give the Legal, Financial, and Administrative Services Agency the final decision on the size of burial fees in each district. On the subject of Church heritage several parties were also critical. The Moderates and Christian Democrats considered the proposed government funding much too small and protested especially against the proposed limitations in the first years (on account of the many renovation projects). A Centrist bill demanded a decision regarding funding after 2010. Leftists and Liberals, on the other hand, protested against the special treatment of the Church of Sweden and proposed that heritage law should be formulated in neutral words and protect religious buildings regardless of denomination. The majorities of both the Committee on Cultural Affairs and the Committee on the Constitution, however, supported the government bill and at the same time stressed the importance of the Church of Sweden to Swedish history and heritage.873

872 Government bill 1998/99:38. The Church was in fact far from pleased with the notion that its investments in heritage preservation would give such costly result. Sören Ekström (2003: 252-253) has described the hectic and quite antagonistic discussions between himself as Secretary General of the Church of Sweden and the Minister of Culture in the days before the presentation of the bill. In this case the Church failed miserably.
Budgetary Grants to Denominations

In spite of the new situation the National Budget for denominations continued relatively unchanged throughout the period. From 2000 they had the right to government aid in collecting their fees. By September 2001 seven registered denominations, the Church of Sweden not included, used this service. All of these, except for the Roman Catholic Church, were Protestant and had deep roots in the country. At the same time 19 religious organisations shared the government grants for religious denominations (including, among others, the Orthodox and Eastern Christian national cooperation, as well as those mentioned above). Those receiving the fee collection service obtained lower government grants, however, and the Church of Sweden received no funding at all under this budgetary heading (which did not include such things as the grants for maintaining Church heritage). In the National Budget these grants were justified by the positive influence that the religious denominations had on upholding the (presumably civil) values of society. From the 2000/01 budget onwards this description started, however, by stating that the denominations added to the diversity of Swedish society, before saying anything on the unity of their values. Diversity in particularistic values thus took precedence before both religious and civil universalism.

In the Riksdag Christian Democrats, Liberals and Centrists moved for increased funding for religious denominations. A Social Democratic private bill, on the other hand, moved for rethinking government funding for the Catholic Church, because of the alleged fact that the Opus Dei was conducting activities including “physical and spiritual degradation”. Another Social Democrat motioned against the special treatment of religious organisations under the new grants system. These bills were, however, voted down, the two last mentioned on the recommendation of a unanimous Committee on Cultural Affairs. Granting State support for religious denominations had now become the province of a committee composed of their own representatives. In a sense this meant that they became integrated into the neo-corporative governance organisation at the same time as the Church of Sweden and the State were finally freed from the bounds of a pre-modern corporative arrangement. That the denominations formed a neo-corporative relationship to the State within the framework of cultural policy also meant that they were integrated into this field and subjected to its institutionalised objectives. Whether, or to what extent, the State will use power or authority to make them follow these standards remains to be seen.

The Bible as a Government Commission Report

The Bible is now available in a new Swedish translation. It is the third of an official character since the Reformation. The two earlier were published in 1541 and 1917 after being liked and established by the King. The new translation has been made on the mandate of the Swedish people by being decided by the Riksdag. This decision has been executed by the government, which has appointed a Bible Commission to do the work in accordance with clearly stated instructions. When the work is now done it is presented to the principals [uppdragsgivarna], but will not be determined by a special State decision. It is by being in public use by the Swedish people that the translation fulfils the purpose stated in the instruction: to be the main text for the Bible in the Swedish language area.876

In December 2000 the Bible Commission delivered its new translation of the Bible,877 nearly a year after the formal separation of Church and State. Although this “divorce” was not mentioned, the introduction to the new edition (the opening paragraph of which is quoted above) could hardly have been more democratic. It even added the democratic touch of placing the people above the government, the Riksdag and the King, the Swedish people, the demos that had supposedly ordered and would now approve the new translation was defined by language, not by religious denomination or citizenship.

In practice the work had, however, been organised by the government as a standard government commission. This commission had included representatives of the Liberal, Social Democratic, Moderate and Centre parties (with former Liberal minister Bertil Hansson as Chairman of the Commission), the Church of Sweden and the Nonconformist Churches (Harry Lindsröm, also vice chairman), as well as professors of Nordic Languages and of New Testament Exegesis and an expert in liturgy. Representatives of the Catholic Church, the Orthodox churches and the former Supreme Rabbi of Sweden, Morton H. Narrow, were added later; the Catholic, Associate Professor Anders Ekenberg, initially as a liturgical expert. Although the commission itself was actually involved in the translation process, most of the work was made by its hundreds of experts, including a large number of academic experts in the various relevant theological and linguistic disciplines, as well as writers, poets, singers, musicians, composers, school teachers, priests, reverends, bishops and others. The long list of experts with various titles does not,
however, include any imams or mullahs, and only the one rabbi that the govern-
ment had appointed.878

The translators had striven to combine a number of different demands, such as readability and faithfulness to the original. Less self-evident was the inclusion of the Apocrypha.879 The treatment of these can in fact be used as an example of how the Commission tried to achieve a consensus on its translation. The Apocrypha – or “Amendments to the Old Testament” as the Commission resolved to call them – were, in its view, considered integral parts of the Bible by Catholics and Orthodox Christians, but not by Jews and Protestants. Earlier Swedish editions had followed Martin Luther’s own German translation in including them stating but at the same time that they were not parts of the Holy Scripture. Luther himself had noted in his edition that “they are books that are not counted as equal to the Holy Scripture, but still sound and good to read”. The Commission had obtained the government’s approval of including them in 1977 after making a survey among the Swedish congregations on the subject. In this way the Commission had concluded that it would be acceptable if it was clearly stated that they were presented separately, but that the mistrust of the Apocrypha that had previously existed among some Nonconformist Churches had now largely disappeared. The problems did not, however, end there; the Apocrypha are themselves not a clearly defined group of texts. This was solved by including as much as possible and on occasion more than one version of the same text. The choice of describing them as “Amendments to the Old Testament” (rather than “Apocrypha”) was also motivated by the more neutral tone of this heading.880

The Comments published in 2000881 could also be considered neutral rather than doctrinal or radical from any perspective. Neither do they seem directed primarily at an academic or clerical circle of readers (with the exception of the detailed comments to the translations provided in the Appendix). The explanations provided in the short Bible lexicon are mostly concerned with placing the texts in the historical context of the times when they were written. The general implication seems to be that they should properly be interpreted in relation to that context (rather than as universally applicable

878 SOU 2000:100:3495-3507.
879 In practice the original had been the Stuttgart edition of the Medieval Hebrew manuscript Codex Leningradensis for the Old Testament, the Greek text of the Göttingen Septuagint for the Apocrypha and the United Bible Society's Greek New Testament for the New Testament, none of which were considered controversial choices and all of which were amended by comparisons with older texts and fragments such as the Dead Sea Scrolls, SOU 1986:45, SOU 2000:100.
880 SOU 1986:45, SOU 2000:100, Martin Luther quoted on p. 3 in the introduction to SOU 1986:45.
881 SOU 2000:100.
dogma). However, these comments cannot be considered an analysis of the text from the feminist standpoint demanded by certain members of the Riksdag, nor from any other critical standpoint, just as little as they can be considered an exegesis.

The Swedish people had now received a Bible from the hands of its government, just as their forbears had received one from their King. It seems clear that the government aimed to use its influence to create a Holy Scripture accessible to the majority of the people and at least acceptable to minorities that it recognised as legitimate – from feminists to Nonconformists – a kind of consensus Bible, in other words. Towards the end of the project this consensus was even intended to include non-Christian immigrants, even if these groups were the ones most often left out. This created a consensus that was not necessarily religious and that was only in a varying degree open to the entire state-framed nation: most often included were the ethnic Swedes, defined by their connection with the Church of Sweden, by the established Nonconformist churches of Sweden and by the literary field. Most often excluded were the non-Christian immigrants, closely followed by Orthodox Christians and Catholics. One must thus draw the conclusion that it was the ethnos (excluding immigrants) that was to receive their Bible from the hands of their government. Unlike Myrdal and Engberg Persson could, furthermore, treat the Bible as a part of the State’s responsibility for cultural heritage and present it to the people with an ease that would have been impossible if its value had been perceived as universal. When the State had recognised the Church as a bearer of universal truth, there could not be more than one Church. When denominations were bearers of identity the State could become the bearer of truth.

CONCLUSION: DISINTEGRATION AND COERCIVE RE-INTEGRATION

Institutional Integration
When compared to the other three periods, the organisational state of cultural policy in this period had distinct similarities with those of the Bildt period in that it lacks the isomorphic influence of a government commission responsible for the whole field. At the same time as the sources of legitimacy were changing new institutions were introduced into the field of cultural policy, mostly on the initiative of the government or even prompted by international settlements. One such was the institution of recognised National Minorities. New agencies were the Museum of World Culture and the Forum for Living History, the latter in fact an entirely new type of agency which did not follow the norm of political non-involvement in the contents of culture. The government had also contemplated a permanent Forum for World Culture. This idea
had, however, been rejected by the very commission appointed to prepare for its creation. This rejection appears to have been in line with the now more academically informed norms of the professional field which was now less inclined to organise these activities separately. Neither had the field approved of the Museums of World Culture. This approach implies that the field was now protecting these issues rather than rejecting them as foreign. These agencies had instead been created by the powers of the government and the Riksdag. The idea of agencies for World Culture originated in the Ministry of Culture and the Forum for Living History had been initiated personally by the Prime Minister. Such a struggle for this responsibility suggests that it had a legitimising effect.

Other changes were made in the field of literature and libraries. With the Library Law the government ignored the oppositional view that this was against Municipal Freedom. When municipal cultural policy had been discussed in the earlier periods it had been expected to follow national policy. When municipalities started to consider different solutions for their municipal libraries the Left Party and the government answered with a Library Law that limited their freedom. Contrary to the established norm of leading by the authority of objectives the government now used its legal powers to coerce isomorphism among municipalities. These changes were imposed not by the professions or by the field of cultural policy but by the government and its Ministry of Culture. Other Ministries, however, also increased their involvement the field of cultural policy. In the field of literature the government broke with existing institutions to take the route argued by the centre-right. Subsidising books by reducing value added tax means that subsidies follow the market instead of being decided through neocorporative quality assessment. This measure was introduced in budget negotiations with the Green Party (with little opportunity for the Ministry of Culture to influence). This tendency appears to continue to this day: The still ongoing discussion on copyright legislation is of immense importance to cultural production (especially in the wider sense)\textsuperscript{882} but has not only remained the province of the Ministry of Justice; it is hardly even commented on in the material of this study. While cultural policy tries to solve problems previously – and simultaneously – handled by other policy fields, other ministries now had policies in the cultural policy field.

This dissertation describes a cultural policy of and for a nation-state. Other studies, however, show that the EU and municipal cultural policies, as well as commercial and trans-national culture, are becoming more and more

\textsuperscript{882} For a discussion of the implications immaterial law on culture see for example Hemmungs Wirtén 2004.
important to the cultural life of Sweden. Yet, national cultural policy shows little concern for this. At the same time the policy field moved towards decreased integration even at the national level. While the study of the first three periods have been a story of integration based on adherence to the norms of established fields (legitimising the authority assumed by the government and KUR), the last (and to some extent the previous) period has shown examples of new institutions added to the old ones and of the use of power to coerce both municipalities and the field to isomorphism. Although it may be important to the outcome it does not appear as if the changes that have been imposed on cultural policy as a field during the last period of this study can be explained by looking at how cultural policy had been organised previously, at least not if one considers organisation and the goals for which it works to be two different things.

The Concept of the Nation

No new concepts of the nation appeared during this period. This was instead a time when concepts that had appeared in cultural policy during the previous period were established. This explains the government’s new policy of establishing new agencies in cultural policy: It was a matter of introducing new norms in a situation where its general authority was weakening. There was perhaps a somewhat increased belief in Sweden being a society in transition, something that was far from remarkable or unique around the turn of the Millennium. The Culture Commission had written about a new multi-ethnic generation of Swedes. This was a new kind of cultural modernity. Instead of realising that they were Europeans (like the Bildt government), Swedes should now become multicultural. World Culture should be transmitted to the Swedes. Church policy was disbanded as a separate sector of government policy in a timely stroke that came to signify that Sweden was now a multi-religious as well as a multi-cultural society. It is significant, however, that the religious communities were placed within the heritage sector. At the same time heritage policy was dealing with Sweden’s passing from an industrial society into a new information society. Among the few exceptions from this increasingly state-framed concept of the nation were the ones used to legitimise the new art form of design, which was presented as both modern and characterised by a specific Swedish aesthetic, an argument that might remind the reader both of Professor Strömholm’s definitions in the early nineties and of the Herderian view of culture, more than two centuries before. While there were also motions for supporting the culture of various categories of the population – mostly the negative ethnic category of immigrants – these were not primary target for the dominant form of multicultural-

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ism. The Forum for World Culture hinted that its primary audience was those who remained ignorant of World Culture, i.e. the ethnic Swedes. Paradoxically, the representatives of the State who tried to recreate the Swedish nation as a multi-cultural society ethnified its own public with the very efforts it had designed to de-ethnify them with: they institutionalised the distinction between ethnic Swedes and ethnic non-Swedes in the organisation of national cultural policy.

That the ambiguity was not solved is clear from the emerging field of language policy. Heritage-oriented ethnic arguments were mixed with state-framed integrative ones. Protecting the Swedish language was, however, a path already chosen, and so embedded in existing policies that the government was surprised that it could be important to anyone. It was. Another sign of remaining ambiguity was that the only denomination given special attention in the post-separation policy on religion was the Church of Sweden, which on its own request was not granted full freedom. Instead, the State would guarantee that it remained tolerant and democratic as well as Evangelical. The state-framed nation-state as a protector of civil values was the emphasised perspective. The remnants of an ethnic view of the nation remained, however. Immigrants and national minorities were treated as ethnic cultures that the Swedes could tolerate at the same time as ethnic Swedes were to be integrated into a multi-cultural society.

The Values of Cultural Policy

While both new institutions and new concepts of the nation were introduced into cultural policy after 1996, at least artist policy remained unchanged in terms of values. In general cultural policy, as well as in heritage and museum policy, civil values remained dominant. If anything, the reference to particularistically defined values reached its zenith in the early and mid nineties and then decreased (as did the focus on Swedish particularism in heritage and museum policies). Both the separation of Church and State and the early motions in favour of recognising the cultures of specific groups (between 1994 and 1998) had been marked by this particularism. World Culture and later multiculturalism were instead institutionalised in terms of civil values, such as equality, tolerance and hybridity. Multiculturalism, on the other hand implied that aesthetic values were particular to their cultural context. The civil values that the nation-state was supposed to uphold were, on the other hand, universal, an interpretation that was perhaps clearest expressed by Göran Persson when he initiated the Forum for Living History. Being instrumental to universal values legitimised particular values. It was thus reasonable for the same Prime Minister to provide the Swedish people with a Bible as a part of their cultural heritage. In spite of, for example feminist, concerns the Bible
was now above ideological arguments in defence of civil values. This was, however, because its message belonged to the past. Consequently, it did not concern the non-Christian immigrants. In this case, the people was the ethno-linguistically defined people to which the Christian heritage of the Swedish nation belonged. The rest were immigrants, “New Swedes”, not to be confused with old Swedes.

The problem of legitimacy that had appeared in the mid nineties when the State’s ability to lead a multicultural society had been at least implicitly questioned should, however, not only be analysed by looking at the limits of the relevant imagined communities. Legitimacy is achieved by adhering to the norms that are dominant in a particular context. Society was now described as multicultural. Integration, however, focused on values. The State was now simultaneously countering xenophobia and legitimising the role of the nation-state in a world characterised by globalisation. It had taken up the responsibility for integrating the many cultures recognised by multiculturalism into a society based on the universal values of democracy and tolerance. The particularistic values of heritage, the arts, and religious heritage, all had parts to play in this new project. The past could be used to prove the leading position of Sweden on the road to a new universal (post)modernity.
CHAPTER IX:  
Concluding Discussion

In the introduction to this dissertation I argued that states have to legitimise their power in the eyes of their subjects and that cultural policy has always suggested itself as a tool for this. Plato, for example, sketched what could be anachronistically described as a cultural policy for his ideal state: art and myths should be used to make everyone accept the same universal values. In modern nation-states cultural policy is, however, especially relevant to the legitimacy of the state. Following Anthony D. Smith I defined nation-states as “states claiming to be nations” and a nation (following Benedict Anderson) as “an imagined political community [that is] imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”. The way that such communities are limited differs between both nations and situations. While the limits of the State as an organisation tend to be institutional, the limits within which the nation is imagined are largely cultural. This is why cultural policy is even more central to nation-states than before them. While this is an argument for studying the cultural aspects of nation-state policy in general, I have for practical purposes chosen to limit this study to the areas that were institutionalised in the Swedish state as “cultural policy”.

The study was also limited to what was considered cultural policy at the end of the studied period, in 2002, and I have thus followed the activities then included in cultural policy backwards in time to analyse how they became institutionalised as such. The study, furthermore, focused on the official policy-making process and more specifically on processes that resulted in government commission reports (published in the SOU series) during four

884 Smith 1991: 143.
periods limited by Riksdag elections: 1970–1973, 1991–1994, 1994–1998 and 1998–2002. The aim was to analyse how national culture has been institutionalised in the cultural policy of the Swedish state. I have worked from an institutional perspective based on the theories of James March and Johan P. Olsen, thus assuming that actions in the administrative organisation of the State (including its cultural policy) are legitimised to those who carry them out with reference to institutionalised norms that guide their work. To reach my aim I concentrated on three aspects, categorising norms and concepts according to three dichotomies in answer to three research questions:

- What values have been considered appropriate for cultural policy to pursue: universalistic or particularistic?

- What concepts have been considered appropriate for describing the nation in cultural policy: ethnic or state-framed?

- How strongly integrated has the organisation of cultural policy been?

The first of these questions does not relate specifically to the function of cultural policy to the nation-state, but instead to how cultural policy helps legitimise any state. Historically Swedish cultural policy has been both particularistic and universalistic in its claims to legitimacy. In pre-national times universalism was, however, dominant, especially in the form of the institutionalised recognition of the State Church and its corresponding recognition of the monarchy. While the State was once legitimised with reference to the universal values of religion the early nationalism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries legitimised it by reference to the particularistic value of the nation. The Church remained, however, as a complementary source of legitimacy. The Swedish *Folkhem* State was, on the other hand, legitimised primarily by services granted to citizens and denizens but recognised as universal rights. Religious claims to universal relevance were now rejected as something that could not be supported by the State. The Swedish nation thus continued to be marked by a commonly shared relation to religion. Its religious alignment had, however, changed from Lutheranism to a secularism from which the State Church remained a problematic exception. Aesthetic claims to universal
relevance were, on the other hand, accepted, and access to them became a service offered by the State and interpreted in the tradition of *farkbildning*, a tradition now legitimising the State as responsible for making universal values accessible for the people.

Although the first versions of Swedish nationalist cultural policy was distinctly particularistic in the German fashion the Swedish nation-state has thus later (re-)adopted a more universalistic self-image. In the institutions of cultural policy this has been expressed in recurring references to universal aesthetic values which have remained the dominant way of legitimising art policy throughout the studied period. At the same time, and especially until the late nineties, heritage policy has been legitimised by references to particularistic historical values. The New Cultural Policy of the early seventies overlaid these values with a general cultural policy legitimised by universal civil values that the nation-state claimed to uphold within its limited sovereignty:

The general objective for cultural policy is to contribute to the creation of a better social environment and to contribute to equality.886

These values were weakened in the early and mid nineties. In spite of this these periods were, however, marked not only by strengthened historical ethnic particularism, but also by a universalistic social liberalism that emphasised the individual’s right to choose cultural products and activities, as well as the importance of culture (including particularistic historical culture) to individual identity. That this view also become dominant in Church policy undoubtedly helped to legitimise the separation of Church and State in terms beneficial for the Church. The State could now be considered responsible for preserving the Church as heritage, but also for upholding religious freedom as a matter of individual choice. What had been a seemingly unsolvable conflict of values when both State and Church were legitimised by upholding (conflicting) universal values was defused when the Church was viewed merely as the representative of particular values, however important to the individual.

Ironically, the increased strength of civil universalism in cultural policy in the mid and late nineties also legitimised an increasingly particularistic concept of art from the multicultural perspective of considering it as an expression of a particular culture rather than of universal aesthetic values. In literature policy there were even indications that aestheticism itself was weakened: the latest government commission on literature policy abstained from any opinions on what books the people should read to instead concentrate on encouraging people to read Swedish books in general. Whether this is part of a larger trend (as the one suggested by Bjurström887) remains to be seen. Multi-

886 This was the general objective recommended by the Culture Council, SOU 1972:66: 171
887 Bjurström 2007.
culturalism was, on the other hand, legitimised as an instrument to uphold universal civil values. The State thus increasingly considered both religion and art particular values that could be used instrumentally to uphold the civil values that it now recognised as universal. Prime Minister Persson’s Living History Project is the clearest example of how cultural heritage and historical memory as well was now not to be reinvigorated for their own sake, but used to uphold other values:

The aim was to spread awareness and information about the Holocaust and to use it as a starting point for a wide-ranging discussion of such issues as democracy, tolerance, compassion and the equal worth of all people.

Cultural policy thus helped to legitimise the State by emphasising its responsibility for defending the civil rights and liberties of its citizens and denizens. When the particularistic values of the era of nationalism was becoming less recognised the Swedish state thus turned to universal civil values to legitimise its power. If this is part of a larger trend we might already be post-national. Yet, the nation-state remains.

The second research question concerns which concepts of the national community were institutionalised in cultural policy. A first conclusion from the empirical study is, from this perspective, that in spite of the dominance of universal values in legitimising Swedish cultural policy, the same cultural policy displays clear signs of being the cultural policy of a nation-state. It helped institutionalise Sweden as a national community (and consequently the State’s claim to be a nation). This community could, however, be imagined as limited in different ways. In answer to the second research question, I have categorised norms on how to describe the limits of the national community. On the basis of previous research I have assumed that it is defined as either ethnic or state-framed. Values are both distinct from, and connected with, concepts of the community that upholds them. The nineteenth-century concept of Bildung (or bildning), for example, implies reaching for universal values from the vantage point of one’s own ethnic culture. The use of one framework in one case does, furthermore, not exclude the use of another to limit the same imagined community in a different situation. This is a practical consequence of not assuming that nations have an essential existence. Imagining the nation is an ongoing project and nation-states remain constant because they are institutionalised, not because of any primordial essence. While institutions can be stable over long periods of time, they rely on people who carry out the activities that perpetuate them. These activities may change as a result of changes in authority, power or legitimising norms. Both the nation and the State are the results of ongoing processes rather than independently existing entities.

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Differentiating the values and the limits of the community also makes it possible to note that the borders of a nation may be defended for different reasons, some of which are entirely unrelated to nationalism.

Looking at Swedish cultural policy I have found examples of both state-framed and ethnic concepts of the nation, as well as both explicit nationalism and actions that support the institutional strength of these frameworks for other reasons. In the early seventies dominant norms favoured state-framed institutions and descriptions of the nation together with civil values. These descriptions never referred to the nation explicitly. The State, however, expressed strong claims to integrating its citizens and denizens into a common culture (supporting universal and historical particularistic values). The clearest example of this is the high authority enjoyed throughout all the periods of this study by the objective of providing access to culture for “the whole of the country”. From the perspective of this dissertation this equals a high acceptance of the territory of the state-framed nation as the primary responsibility of the State as well as the equality of all its parts in relation to that State. This is true of Church policy as well, although it should be noted that Church membership was, and is, based on citizenship legislation and thus on the jus sanguinis (an ethnic framework). In heritage policy the ethnic concept was considered more legitimate: norms based on a historical definition of the cultural community that should be represented by the field were taken for granted.

With the Bildt Government in the early nineties at least in its general statements on cultural policy followed a different norm and accepted an ethnic definition of the Swedish nation and culture at the general level, although one in which this culture was at the same time inscribed in a larger European civilisation. Strengthening Swedish (ethnic particular) culture was considered strength when integrating Sweden further into this larger community:

The Swedish culture increases in importance when, in the coming years, we take the step into the European cooperation. Our culture should be brought out to the rest of Europe at the same time as we strengthen our own cultural identity.889

Most cultural policy, however, remained unchanged by these statements. Museum policy even presented changes in the opposite direction. In the 1994 report of the Museum Commission it was no longer taken for granted that historical museums should deal primarily with the past. Their function was instead defined in relation to current problems in Sweden (rather than to the ancestors of ethnic Swedes). In the mid nineties this development continued to parallel a seemingly contradictory development in general cultural policy, where cultural heritage was now recognised as a normatively important per-

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spective on all cultural policy. This did not only imply particularistic values but also a more primordial view of national culture, and thus also a more ethnic definition of the nation. It is, on the other hand, hard to see any influences of these changes on the government’s art policy. Nevertheless, they are visible in arguments for supporting the Swedish language (which has always been considered important): in the seventies the language was considered an important medium for integrating the state-framed nation; in the early and mid nineties, it was important as a heritage; around the year 2000 only minority languages were considered important as heritage, while the importance of Swedish was again primarily thought of as a medium for the state-framed nation. The last period of this study, however, also displays new norms on how to define the nation in other parts of cultural policy. The main new development was that of World Culture as a central concept (later succeeded by multiculturalism).

Much like Living History, World Culture was a concept introduced in the mid nineties and institutionalised in the late nineties. Both were introduced as Swedish versions of internationally recognised standard answers to social and political problems. Measures motivated by these concepts emphasised universal values, such as tolerance, compassion and democracy, and were often explicitly anti-racist and anti-ethnicist. At the same time they did, however, also represent a strong increase in the State’s efforts to homogenise the values of the state-framed nation. There were, on the other hand, indications that the main object of these efforts was not all citizens and denizens of Sweden (the state-framed nation) but, at least primarily, the unmarked category of ethnic Swedes. These were the ones who had not previously had access to World Culture (i.e. non-Western culture) and who should now be enlightened by it. The culture on display as World Culture became a tool for this integrative ambition to change the values of the nation, but not necessarily its object. At the same time World Culture was institutionally separated from the culture it was supposed to change. This marks its relationship both to the high culture of art policy and to the democratic values of the nation. It remained foreign and particularistic, belonging to a negative ethnicity: the marked category of ethnic non-Swedes within the state-framed nation.

In this sense these norms worked to homogenise the values of the ethnic nation at the price of further institutionalising the distinction between ethnic Swedes and ethnic non-Swedes in Sweden, in spite of being legitimised as an effort to include precisely these groups. This distinction is paralleled by the changed concept of the surrounding world implied by the concept of World Culture: the concept of Sweden as a part of a larger European culture opposed to American culture (in English) was now complemented with the concept of Swedish culture as a part of Western culture, implying a special responsi-
bility for the State to recognise marked non-Western cultures in a politics of recognition. What lies ahead in this direction seems to be something like the recognition of other ethnicities than the core *ethnic* proposed by A.D. Smith, although without any separate institutional recognition of the various immigrant minorities.

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890 Interestingly Södra Teatern in Stockholm appears to have developed into something of a microcosm of these aspects of cultural policy: a place intended to present World Culture to the general Swedish population, as well as events dominated by immigrants, but where these have been separated from each other (despite the good intentions of the establishment). For further analysis of Södra Teatern, see Egeland 2007 as well as p. 108 in this dissertation.
My third research question concerns the institutional integration of the State as an actor, as this can be seen within the area of this study. Institutional integration has been studied as isomorphism and concentration of power and authority within organisational fields. The field of cultural policy as such has moved towards increased institutional integration, at least until 1996. Its constituent sub-fields (such as theatre, music, and heritage) were, however, fully institutionalised even before cultural policy was established as a field with the New Cultural Policy presented by the Culture Council and in the Culture Bill of 1974. When the new cultural policy field was established they were not equally integrated in it. Instead, the field was built around the artistic fields, which were now placed under the authority and coordination of the new National Council for Cultural Affairs (KUR). So was, officially, the heritage and museum field. That field, however, remained under the authority of the National Heritage Board (RAÄ), while the authority over it given to KUR was limited. Even the Culture Council and the government accepted the stronger independence of this field in that they recognised its already existing norms by institutionalising them among their objectives for cultural policy, for example, as a separate Preservation Objective. They also sought to include the media and folkbildning sector in cultural policy. The inclusion of these was, however, even vaguer. Church policy was not at all included, although it was recognised that some Church activities, as well as some media and folkbildning activities, were cultural and important to cultural policy (such as church choirs, art study groups and cultural programmes). This recognition, however, also underlined the exclusion of their other activities.

These institutional changes can be of great value in explaining why certain changes in the values and concepts of the nation occurred in cultural policy. Organisational fields have by definition certain homogeneity of norms. One conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that norms on how to describe the values of cultural policy and the limits of the national community have been relatively homogenous within each of the sub-fields of cultural policy. Another conclusion is that they were in the early seventies quite different from sub-field to sub-field. This explains why and how cultural policy actively supported contradictory norms on these issues: that the government proclaimed in effect that cultural policy should support the civil values of the state-framed nation at the same time as it supported artistic independence with reference to the universalistic aesthetic norm of l'art pour l'art as well as ethnic particularist values in the heritage sector. The borders between these fields were simply too strongly institutionalised for this to be seen as a problem, and the government did not at this point force its new norms upon them but continued instead to depend on the same paths as before, paths that they in some cases had been following for centuries.
It is clear, however, that it was the government that initiated the establishment of the new unified cultural policy field. More specifically, the project was initiated by a small group of Social Democratic bureaucrats, intellectuals and politicians that had been formed in the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs under the support of the future Prime Minister Olof Palme. This group continued to some extent to dominate KUR in its formative years. While important as individuals, these people did not, however, work against any of the major norms of the *Folkhem* State. On the contrary: their project was legitimised with reference to the existing norms on how a sector should be organised as well as to norms and concepts from the *folkbildning* tradition of what the aim of cultural policy should be. Including the *folkbildning* activities of adult education in the new cultural sector increased its legitimacy in the eyes of those who adhered to this tradition, making it a part of the *Folkhem* State with a background in the workers’ movement, rather than a relic from the old dynastic Swedish state. Ideas – or concepts – are important to give form to action and organisation and may, if institutionalised, continue to do so decades or even centuries after public support for them has ceased. This is, however, not to say that actors do not matter. Even when actors follow institutionalised norms (as they usually do), their relative positions, power and authority may determine which norms and concepts will shape the formative moments of new institutions. In this sense, the position of Palme and a few others at the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs at a crucial juncture would, for example, determine much of the future development of cultural policy.

At that moment the formulation of cultural policy was dominated by people connected with Social Democracy. It is thus not surprising that the future norms of cultural policy in that party would remain close to those institutionalised in the State in the early seventies. The norms guiding the cultural policy of other parties have, however, also remained stable at least since that time. Centrists in particular emphasised the access to culture in the whole of the country. The party most likely to refer to decentralisation was thus also the party that most favoured territorial integration. Liberals and Leftists instead emphasised artistic autonomy. For the Liberals this was, however, legitimised mostly by referring to aesthetic values while the VPK (and later the Left Party) instead tended to refer to civil values. Both parties stressed the integration of the state-framed nation. These were also the parties that emphasised the values of secularisation the most on the issue of Church and State. Like all centre-right parties the Liberal Party, however, also defended the heritage field as well as heritage in the Church of Sweden with arguments that could be considered ethnic and particularistic. This was especially clear in the Moderate Party (both in heritage and Church policy), for which the defence of the artistic fields also took the form of a struggle against the NTT,
the NTC and the NTE. However, it should be noticed that, although the Moderates remained somewhat more distanced from the general consensus, to the other parties all of these differences are matters of nuances and that they do not indicate any hostility towards any sub-sectors (with the exception of the Moderate animosity just mentioned). These differences can instead be seen from which sectors the parties have argued in favour of. It should also be noticed that while the power relationships between Riksdag parties fluctuate, the norms guiding their cultural policy have been relatively stable during the periods studied here. Their influence should thus not be considered only in the short term. To the extent that specific parties have been influential it has instead been a matter of who has been in power at a formative moment.

The field of Church policy exemplifies that commonly expressed norms do not necessarily lead to immediate organisational consequences. To express support for a separation of Church and State was already considered appropriate in the mid twentieth century. Yet, it took until the turn of the Millennium for this concept to be fully implemented. At the beginning of this process the two organisations had been highly integrated. There was also strong resistance to separation within the Church and, judging from the responses to Alva Myrdal’s State and Church Commission, such a reform contradicted the norms then institutionalised in the Church. Still, disintegration and re-integration as two distinct actors became the result. The separatist norm was implemented, although it took more than half a century and the process has yet to reach its final point. During all this time governments continued to place both power and authority behind this mega-standard supported by other authorities and norms both in Sweden and globally. Few standards of cultural policy have, however, been as long-lived as that of the secular civil nation. Of the guiding standards on the relationship between culture, cultural policy and the nation only two other organisational concepts have had comparable implications: the nation-state as the main level for integration and the separation of art and politics, both fundamental to the New Cultural Policy presented in the early seventies:

The fundamental democratic influence over cultural policy can under no circumstances mean that the contents of culture are controlled. If this influence is extended to include the contents of culture this will mean that the cultural activities can not fulfil their abovementioned purpose of exercising criticism of society and exploring reality.891

Clear institutional borders between organisational fields have continued to exist, although the borders, both between the sub-fields of cultural policy and those between cultural policy and the rest of the State, were somewhat weak-

891 SOU 1972:66:173
ened in the early and mid nineties. The main reason behind this was not any initiatives of the central actors in the field of cultural policy. Nor was it the introduction of new actors or sub-fields into cultural policy; the field having in fact remained almost entirely the same in these respects since its consolidation in the early seventies. Some new art forms (primarily design and architecture) were added in the mid-nineties. While these follow the institutional rules of earlier fields, their recognition has only been followed by the creation of minor agencies. No national or otherwise major action has been taken to establish them as organisational fields. The main reason for field integration in the early and mid nineties was instead the authority of NPM super-standards such as management by objectives and results (with the power and authority of the government and the ministries behind it). NPM brought normative integration of the entire State by coercive isomorphism and the encouragement of mimesis. It legitimised, for example, a number of new evaluative government commissions, including the monumental Culture Commission appointed by the Bildt Government.

The introduction of a new status for the objectives of cultural policy (due to new management concepts), together with the growing official discussion of the central values and concepts of cultural policy led to increased isomorphism in the field. Combined with this homogenising process the values and concepts of the nation already dominant within the centre-right parties of the Bildt Government may explain the increase in particularistic and ethnic values and concepts that can be noticed in the general cultural policy of that government and of the commissions appointed by it. Mimetic isomorphism does, however, seem a better description of the implementation of NPM in cultural policy than coercive isomorphism; the agencies responsible for NPM implementation in the State as a whole did in fact not even support these changes or believed that they would be particularly efficient. There was, in other words, no specific external actor behind this change, only a will to conform to perceived authority. Neither did NPM lead to any thorough reorganisation of any part of the field (with the exception of the excavation unit of the RAÄ). Mimetic isonymism may thus be an even better description for most parts of this field.

Nor do the particularistic and ethnic values and concepts of the Bildt Government appear to have influenced cultural policy permanently. The implications of these latter norms were however stronger in Church policy than in the cultural policy field. Only for Church policy is it reasonable to consider the early nineties to be part of a formative moment. This was in fact the beginning of the end for Church policy as the organisation of a special relation-

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ship between the State and the Church of Sweden, and thus the formative period of a more equal policy on religious denominations (which will not necessarily constitute a specific organisational field in the State). It can be concluded that while differences between parties and governments have generally influenced cultural policy only superficially, their influence may become more important in formative moments such as the early nineties for Church policy and the late sixties and early seventies for general cultural policy.

Beyond the authority of NPM standards and norms lay an increased contact between the Swedish state and the international field of administration. NPM was, in other words, a result of the increased trans-nationalism of organisational fields.893 Management was, however, not the only field that became more trans-national, since this was true of the fields of cultural policy as well, particularly of the museum field, which was now simultaneously trans-nationalised, (re-)academised and (re-)professionalized: the academic discipline of museology was institutionalised both as a strengthened research field (New Museology) and as a new professional education, new norms and standards spreading both through academic and professional publications, organisations and conferences. In the material of this study this trend is first exemplified in the 1994 report of the Museum Commission. It displays a new view of museums as actors in a public sphere, instead of only as institutions responsible for the preservation of memories and objects. The establishment of a trans-national museum field thus explains why civil values and state-centred concepts of the nation now became dominant in activities previously dominated by ethnic particularistic views of national culture.

The new concept of the nation that became dominant after 1996 was thus partially the result of normative isomorphism in the museum field. There were, however, other actors and developments behind it as well. The establishment of the National Museums of World Culture, the Forum for Living History and the new institutions of National Minorities and National Minority Languages are examples of direct government involvement on a level that had not been seen in cultural policy since its institutionalisation as a sector in the early seventies, and perhaps not even then. When the Forum for Living History was established by Prime Minister Persson it was placed in the context of international Holocaust remembrance:

During the Swedish party leaders’ parliamentary debate in June 1997, Prime Minister Göran Persson promised to initiate an information campaign focusing on “what happened in the Second World War, the attitudes and human perspectives that led to the Holocaust”.

At a meeting in Stockholm in May 1998, Sweden, the UK and the US took the

initiative in launching an international project – the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research.\textsuperscript{894}

The same norms were displayed in the Swedish recognition of National Minorities and Minority Languages, which was also the result of an international process, in this case the ratification of international agreements and work with human rights motivated by a wish to uphold Sweden’s international standing:

This would demonstrate that Sweden, in line with its previous policy, supports the work of enhancing protection of human rights and freedoms. In the last few years issues connected with the protection of national minorities in Europe have once again been highlighted as a result of the upheavals in Eastern Europe. It is therefore important that Sweden, which has traditionally promoted the protection of human rights and freedoms, should ratify the Framework Convention, thus underlining its decision to protect the rights of its national minorities.\textsuperscript{895}

The path taken by recognising national minority languages has, however, also provoked arguments for recognising Swedish as the national language of Sweden, as well as for establishing language policy as a new area of cultural policy, an unintended consequence certainly, but still a sign of an established path dependency. The field of language policy is still minimal at the time of writing and may not be institutionalised as a field at all. If it is, this will, however, be its formative moment.

Much like the Forum for Living History and the institution of recognised National Minorities, the new Museum of World Culture and the new agency that it was a part of, were results of direct government involvement, in this case by the Ministry of Culture under the leadership of its Minister and State Secretary. This initiative was evidently inspired by the new international trends concerning the role of cultural policy and may be described as an influx of new international super-standards. It should be remembered that mimetic isomorphism is a common response to insecurity in matters of roles and legitimacy. The sense of urgency that marked the creation of the Museum of World Culture supports the conclusion that this was a mimetic response to problems in Swedish society that seemed similar to problems which other states had responded to in similar fashions. To the fields of cultural policy this mimetic isomorphism was, however, in some cases, coercive (when the government took direct action). In comparison with the coercive isomorphism of the early seventies this new isomorphism was, furthermore, disintegrative to the State in that it spread unequally. It is possible that this could be counteracted by a new general cultural policy (which is what a government


commission is working on at the time of writing\textsuperscript{896}). There is, however, reason to believe that the disintegration will continue: the Culture Bill of 1996 was much less powerful than that of 1974, and yet there is research indicating that its authority was much weaker than that of its predecessor.\textsuperscript{897}

This is not to say that the new concepts or ideas do not matter. Only with new concepts of what a museum should be was it possible to present a new museum as a part of the government’s response to xenophobia and the multi-cultural society. Whether they will become permanent features of cultural policy remains to be seen, as does their success at influencing the norms and standards of other parts of the nation. If these norms are institutionalised more permanently this may, however, become formative to a new path dependency developing from a crucial juncture when the cultural landscape of Sweden changed into a more multi-cultural society. As a result of being initiated outside of the established field of cultural policy, language policy, Holocaust remembrance, World Culture and measures against xenophobia have, however, been institutionalised in new actors outside the established organisations (thus disintegrative to the field but still framed by the nation-state). This organisational model is already connected with a concept of the nation. Activities concerning other ethnicities than ethnic Swedes institutionalise them as different, both from ethnic Swedes and from (other members of) trans-national ethnic communities. As the concern of government agencies responsible for re-educating Swedes in civil values these Others are used as resources for an integration that they are not always a part of. Not only the ethnic national communality is strengthened by these trends, the limits of the state-framed nation are strengthened institutionally at the same time and by the same processes. In the case of the national minorities this is explicitly so: each minority could have been defined trans-nationally, but is in fact institutionalised nationally (one Sameting or other organisation for each nation-state, Meänkieli as a uniquely Swedish language etc).

In the case of World Culture this has been less explicit. What is now institutionalised is however a multi-cultural society in the sense of one nation-state that includes several ethnicities, with the Swedes as the dominant one. State activities directed at the Swedish ethnic nation are civil and nominally state-framed (un-marked). The ethnic concept of the nation is instead institutionalised when different policies are used towards different ethnically defined groups, in this case Swedes, National Minorities and Others (of which the two latter are marked). This new outlook also includes government policy on religious communities, although in a slightly different form: the State has special control over the Church of Sweden at the same time as the policy on

\textsuperscript{896} Dir. 2007:99.
\textsuperscript{897} Cf. e.g. Johannisson’s (2006) studies of municipal cultural policy in Gothenburg.
other religious communities builds on the norms of equality and separation of the State from the religious denominations. While most cultural policy is universalistic and nominally state-framed when directed at ethnic Swedes and yet ethnic and particularistic in its concept of other ethnicities, the policy vis-à-vis religious communities is ethnic and particularistic when directed at ethnic Swedes and civil state-framed when directed at other religious communities.

Explicit nationalism was extremely rare in official discussions on cultural policy around the turn of the Millennium. Yet, it was taken for granted that even anti-nationalist values should be defended primarily by the nation-state. The State was thus more important as an institutional actor and arena than as the object of nationalism. It was defended because it existed as a powerful institution that could be used for various purposes and that could not be avoided, not because anyone claimed loyalty to it. Yet, its role is taken for granted in all of the material of this study. Perhaps we should not hope with Hobsbawm “that nationalism will decline with the decline of the nation-state” but ask instead whether the nation-state will decline with explicit official nationalism. Cultural policy certainly moves in the direction predicted by Gellner for culture (see p. 25): it remains national, but international isomorphism makes national cultural policies ever more alike. If the government is successful in recreating Swedish culture in this way, Gellner will be proven right: national culture will remain; it will just not remain as different from other national cultures as it once was. This certainly describes the position of cultural policy in the current state-system as this was described by Tilly (see p. 42)

On a more minor level one may also ask if national cultural policy will survive as an integrated field. At the end of this study it appears to be disintegrating. That new concepts of values and the nation have motivated the creation of new institutions in cultural policy helps explain this. Studying values and concepts of the nation is thus important to cultural policy research. That culture is becoming increasingly important in politics does, however, not mean that cultural policy as a sector will become more important or that the Ministry of Culture – or any of its other actors – will either gain or become the subject of increasing conflict. New actors are moving in on the field and may become more important than the old ones. These new actors include other ministries as well as foundations, municipalities, counties, the EU and others. Their involvement supports the claim that culture is becoming more important in society. They, however, often follow other norms than the cultural policy field. The institutions of cultural policy appear, on the other hand, to be far more long-lived than the values that originally legi-

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timised them. Institutions and cultural establishments are thus often more long-lived than philosophical and political opinions of what culture is or should be. It is therefore likely that actors now under attack will find new ways to define a legitimate relationship to the nation, the nation-state and whatever actors and identities may compete with these in the future. Many of the actors of cultural policy have after all done so several times in the past. This is one way to interpret the increased authority of civil values in Swedish national cultural policy (as well as of economic values to many other actors in the cultural field\footnote{See Johannisson 2006 for a study of the values guiding the City of Gothenburg, where this highly evident, and Frenander 2005 on Swedish cultural policy discourse.}): as a new way to legitimise actors and institutions. March and Olsen, however, point to a problem that may become serious both for the institutions of cultural policy and for the nation-state itself:

\begin{quote}
[T]here is some chance that a powerful institution will become dependent on its capability to enact its own environment and consequently be unable to cope with a world in which it does not have arbitrary control.\footnote{March & Olsen 1989: 47.}
\end{quote}

Cultural policy has been a major part of the nation-state’s work to control national identity among its citizens and denizens for a long time. Is cultural policy now losing the authority necessary for this role? Is the current interest in cultural policy research a sign that the legitimacy of national cultural policy is not as evident as it once was, as Hobsbawm claimed of nationalism studies and the nation-state\footnote{Hobsbawm 1990: 192.}? Is the wisdom-bringing owl of Minerva flying because dusk is approaching for national cultural policy? The quantitative investigations made by the Culture Commission indicated that cultural policy between 1974 and 1994 had failed to reach the aim of making the citizens and denizens of Sweden take part of the culture made available to them by it. It did, however, appear to have succeeded in upholding the authority of high culture. At least no political party has in practical politics questioned its right to State support.

This authority – and thus the legitimacy of the cultural policy field – rests, however, on what the citizens of Sweden consider appropriate. Whether the Swedish policy of cultural integration in favour of common civil values will be successful or whether the future holds a more disintegrated society, as the one envisioned by Tilly or Castells (see Chapter II), is obviously a question that cannot be answered by a study of how the Swedish state responds to the situation. The State does, however, appear to refer more to universal civil values now than it did before. This stands in clear contrast to the particularism considered to have characterised state legitimation in the era of national-
ism, and perhaps less so to the universalism of pre-nationalist times. What is institutionally known as cultural policy is, however, not the only activity by which the State influences the culture and self-image of its citizens and denizens. This study shows that while Swedish cultural policy is not a nationalist stratagem, it has played, and continues to play, a role in legitimising the State by continuing to institutionalise Sweden as a both political and cultural imagined community that is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. What can also be concluded is that it is now disintegrating.

Furthermore, it can be concluded that studying norm-development in the organisation of the cultural policy field can help explain why the State supports certain values and concepts of the nation. Values and concepts of the national community are institutionalised in policy fields and differ between them. It can also be concluded that the limits of the nation as institutionalised by the State are, at least in cultural policy, the results of path dependencies within organisational fields, many of which have occurred as unforeseen choices made for different reasons and in different contexts, rather than as the results of explicit nationalism. For those who wish to understand how the State legitimises itself as a nation-state, it thus becomes important to study the norms and organisation of the State. To try to understand how a State or a cultural institution relates to matters such as nationhood or ethnicity by merely studying its explicit statements or those contained in the contents of the activities that they support is not enough. It has also proved fruitful not only to differentiate between ethnic and state-framed understandings of the nation, but also to separate these from the values upheld by the State in that it has helped to reveal the shift from particular to universal values legitimising the State’s actions in cultural policy, a change that may be relevant to its values in general.

This dissertation is an example of how studies of policy-making procedures, institutions and organisations may help explain how institutional processes within their organisations constantly reconstruct the ways in which institutional actors relate to matters such as culture, ethnicity, nationhood and values, a combination which has been used all too seldom. This dissertation is, furthermore, an illustration of the relevance of cultural policy research to the larger issues of nation-state legitimacy and democracy. Its approach should, however, be useful in other areas than cultural policy research, as well as on other actors than nation-states, actors that are now becoming increasingly important in cultural policy, as well as in other areas.
References

Government reports (Ds), government bills (prop.), Riksdag motions (Kr, when they are treated by the Committee on Cultural Affairs), proceedings of the Riksdag Committees (KrU for reports by the Committee on Cultural Affairs) and of the Riksdag (RD), Swedish laws and ordinances (SFS) and the reports of government commissions (SOU) are all referred to by the numbers under which they have been officially published. The Ds series and the SOU series are both published by Fritzes (Stockholm) while the other official documents are published by the Riksdag. Instructions to government commissions (Dir.) are referred to by numbers while page references to them refer to the versions printed in the resulting commission reports.

LITERATURE


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Kverndokk, Kyrre 2007, forthcoming dissertation at the Linköping University Department of Culture Studies.


INTERVIEWS


Interview with Kristian Berg (member of the Commissions for the Forum for Living History and for the Cultural Heritage of Industrial Society, head curator of the National Museums of History etc.), Stockholm 2005-10-21.

Interview with Jens Cavallin (civil servant at the Culture Division in the seventies and nineties), Stockholm 2006-12-22.

Interview with Carl-Johan Kleberg (member of the Culture Council’s secretariat and later a leading civil servant at the KUR), Stockholm 2005-10-13.


Interview with Gunilla Thorgren (State Secretary for Culture 1996-2004), Stockholm 2006-03-03.
APPENDIX:

A Short Guide to Swedish Politics and Administration

Sweden is a constitutional monarchy ruled by a parliamentary system. In spite of this fairly typical Western European system there are a few oddities in the Swedish government that may have to be explained. First of all, Swedish ministries (with the exception of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) are comparatively small and responsible – at least formally – only for preparing decisions for the government. Most of the implementation is instead handled by government agencies responsible not to a minister but to the government as a whole (they do, however, report to a specific ministry). Secondly, although Sweden has a relatively large public sector; most of its employees are employed by counties and municipalities, which have their own taxation rights and elected assemblies. As Sweden is not a federal state, these entities are, however, subjected to national law and government decisions.902

The Swedish constitution consists of four Fundamental Laws: The Instrument of Government, The Act of Succession, The Freedom of the Press Act and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression.903 The first of these includes most of the regulations normally contained in a constitution. Most of the regulations on the proceedings of the parliament – the Riksdag –

902 For a more comprehensive presentation of the Swedish Fundamental Laws see Holmberg & Stjernquist 2003 and Congleton 2003 for a discussion of constitutional reform in Sweden.
903 The Act of Succession dates from 1810 and regulates the succession to the Swedish throne. It was last changed in 1980 to make succession equal for men and women. The Freedom of the Press Act dates from 1766 and regulates freedom of expression in printed media. The Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression, on the other hand, regulates other media and did not exist until 1991.
are, however, stated in the Riksdag Act, which does not have the status of a Fundamental Law. Both of these laws have been changed during the period covered by this study. The first election under the current Riksdag Act was in 1970 when the previous bicameral system was replaced by a unicameral Riksdag (which originally had 350 members but currently 349). Like the Second Chamber of the bicameral Riksdag the new Riksdag is elected proportionally, although with regional constituencies. The term was also shortened from four years to three years and coordinated with regional and local elections. At the same time the committees of the Riksdag were reorganised and the old bicameral committees were succeeded by a number of committees responsible for specific sector of society, among them the Committee on Cultural Affairs. While this committee was responsible for nearly all of the activities studied here (as well as media policy), Church issues, because such issues were regulated by the Fundamental Law, tended to be discussed primarily in the Committee on the Constitution.

A new Instrument of Government went in force 1 January 1975. This is often considered a primarily formal change. Like the constitutions of many constitutional monarchies the prior Instrument of Government had granted large formal powers to the King. These powers had in practice been the province of either the government (as royal advisors) or the Riksdag. Legislative power was, for example, shared between the King and the Riksdag; laws did not come in force until they were signed by the King. As the King always did sign them, the Riksdag was, however, in effect the only legislative power. While the King had the right to appoint ministers, the appointment of a Prime Minister in practice depended on the current majority of the Riksdag and the appointment of other ministers on the recommendations of the Prime Minister. Sweden thus had a de facto parliamentarianism. The King also held formal power over the government agencies, which were formally responsible to him. It was also he who held the power of submitting bills to the Riksdag. These powers were, however, exercised by the King in Council, i.e. by the King advised by his ministers. The most visible consequence this has for this study is purely formal: government decisions before 1975 were formally termed “His Majesty’s Decision” (Kungl. Maj:ts beslut) and the government “the Council of State”. Government bills were written in the form of presentations made by the responsible minister to the King in Council and was thus written in the first person.

Under the new Instrument of Government, the Decisions of His Majesty were succeeded by formal Government Decisions made by the government collectively (a unique construction). Ministers, in other words, still do not have any formal power to submit bills to the Riksdag or giving instructions to the government agencies reporting to them. Only some ministers are, further-
more, heads of ministries. Other ministers may be junior ministers at a ministry led by someone else or consultative members of the government. They are, however, still part of the collective decisions made by the government. While the formal power of ministers is limited and the ministries have virtually no formal power, their influence may yet be considerable as it is the ministries that prepare government bills and other government decisions. The power of a minister is thus to a large extent dependent on control of his or her ministry, as well as on his or her authority in the government.

**THE LEGAL DECISION MAKING PROCESS**

The typical procedure for legal decisions in Sweden starts with the creation of a government commission, a decision taken by the government, although sometimes on the instructions of the Riksdag. The position of such a commission is formally the same as that of any other Swedish government agency, i.e. it is not the part of any Ministry, but instead an independent institutional actor formally subjected only to general legal instruction and to collective decisions from the government. At its creation (and sometimes later) each commission is, however, given a special task by the government, and often a timeframe in which to fulfil it. To this purpose it gathers the facts and opinions that it considers relevant (based on its members professional views and the instructions it has received from the government). When finished, it presents an official report to the government. This report is also published in the SOU-series (*Statens offentliga utredningar*). Most of the material of this study consists of such reports delivered to ministers responsible for culture.

Reports are circulated among relevant (as determined by the ministry) government agencies, NGOs and other concerned organisations. The comments gathered from these respondents are then gathered by the ministry and is together with the report itself used as background material in the production of government bills. These collections of answers are also part of the material in this study. As I limit myself to study this part of the procedure from the official perspective of the government, its official presentations of the answers are more relevant to this study than the answers themselves. After being accepted by other concerned ministries (always including the Ministry of Finance) and the government, the government bill is presented to the Riksdag by the relevant minister. The bill is then referred to a Riksdag...
Committee together with the private bills that the Committee deems to be connected to it. Because of the discipline of Swedish parties the Riksdag generally follows the recommendations of its Committees. The National Budget is taken annually according to a similar procedure. Dates for budgetary decisions and the start of new fiscal years have, however, changed during the period of study.

**Legal decision making procedure**
(under the Instrument of Government of 1975)

1. The Riksdag demands the creation of a government commission (not a necessary stage).
2. The government authorises a minister to appoint a Commission and decides on its instructions (not a necessary stage).
3. The minister appoints a government commission (not a necessary stage).
4. The government commission delivers a report (not a necessary stage).
5. The report is circulated for consideration and comments are collected and summarised by the ministry (not a necessary stage).
6. The ministry writes a government bill
7. The bill is circulated for consideration among the ministries and (informally) concerned authorities and others.
8. The bill is decided upon by the government and presented to the Riksdag
9. The members of Riksdag are allowed to present private bills in answer to the government bill
10. The bills are discussed in a Riksdag committee
11. The committee's propositions are presented to the Riksdag in plenum
12. The Riksdag creates or changes law.

**Political Parties Represented in the Riksdag**

*The Swedish Social Democratic Workers Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti, SAP)* was founded in 1889 and has headed nearly all Swedish governments since 1932. Most of these have been single party minority governments supported by the Leftists and lately by the Greens. In the inter-war period, Social Democrats also occasionally governed together with the Liberals and, in the fifties, with the Agrarians. The Social Democratic Party is a member of the European Socialist Group.

*The United Moderate Party (moderata samlingspartiet)* originated in the political Right of the early twentieth century. Previously named the Right Party (*högerpartiet*), it was renamed the United Moderate Party in 1969. Since the eighties, it is the largest of the centre-right parties. It is a member of the European People's Party.

*The Left Party (vänsterpartiet)* originates in the Communist party that broke away from the Social Democrats after the Russian revolution. That party has

2004-2006 this Ministry was re-united with the Ministry of Education in a Ministry of Education and Culture, but is now again a separate Ministry of Culture.
been succeeded by a number of successor parties, most recently the Left Party, the Communists (vänsterpartiet kommunisterna, VPK) which has now dropped the reference to Communism entirely. The Left Party is a member of the Confederated Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left.

The Centre Party (centerpartiet) originates in the Agrarian Party (bondeförbundet) founded in 1921 and changed its name to the Centre Party in 1957. The party has belonged to coalition governments with the Social Democrats, as well as with the Liberals, Moderates, and Christian Democrats. The Centre Party is a member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe.

The Liberal People’s Party (folkpartiet liberaterna) originated in the liberal opposition in the Riksdag of the late nineteenth century. In its present form, it was, however, founded through the merger of two older liberal parties in 1934. The Liberal Party now is a member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe.

The Christian Democrats (kristdemokraterna) was founded in 1964 by active members of the Pentecostal Church. In 1991, it entered both the Riksdag and Carl Bildt’s coalition government. The Christian Democrats is a member of the European People’s Party.

The Green Party (miljöpartiet de gröna, literally “the Environment Party, the Greens”) was founded in 1981 and entered the Riksdag in 1988. It, however, lost its seats in 1991 but regained them in 1994. Its organisation differs from the norm in that it lacks a single chairperson. The party instead divides this position between two spokespersons, one male, and one female. On the European level, the Greens is a member of the Group of the Greens /European Free Alliance.

New Democracy (Ny Demokrati) was a populist party founded shortly before the elections of 1991. It was immediately elected to the Riksdag and achieved a hold on the balance of power which it used to support Bildt’s centre-right coalition (of which it was not a part). The party collapsed at the end of the term because of internal struggles.
ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS OF SWEDISH TERMS

I have tried to use the official English names used by the Swedish state as translations of the names of Swedish institutions. To shorten these names official English or Swedish abbreviations are used when possible. When no established Swedish abbreviation exists, I have however abbreviated the English terms and when no official English names have been found (which is common for agencies that no longer exists) I have translated the Swedish names literally.

The Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities
Kungl. vitterhets historie- och Antikvitets akademien
Agency
(statlig) myndighet
The Association of the Swedish Press Archive and Press Museum
Föreningen Sveriges pressarkiv och pressmuseum
The Broadcasting Commission
Radionämnden
Church Council
Kyrkoråd
The College of Arts, Crafts and Design
Konstfack
The Council for Theatre and Music
Teater och musikrådet
The Council on Legislation
Lagrådet
County Administrative Board
Länstyrelse (agencies representing the government on the regional level).
County Antiquarian
Länsantikvarie
County Council
Landsting (regional government).
County Governor
Landshövding
County Museum
Länsmuseum
The Cultural Historical Association of Southern Sweden
Kulturmuseifonden
Södra Sverige
Cultural policy
Kulturpolitik
The Culture Council
Kulturrådet (the government commission)
The Dance Museum Foundation
Stiftelsen Dansmuseifonden
The Dialect and Place Name Archives and the Swedish Folksong Archives
Dialekt- och ortnamnsarkiven samt Svenskt visarkiv (DOVA)
Diocese Assembly
Stiftning
Division (in a Ministry)
Enhet (vid ett department)
The Drottningholm Theater Museum
Stiftelsen Drottningholms teatermuseum
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Swedish</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Federation of Swedish County Councils</td>
<td>Landstingsförbundet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum for Living History</td>
<td>Forum för levande historia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Freedom of the Press Act</td>
<td>Tryckfrihetsförordningen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government bill</td>
<td>Regerings proposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Commission Reports</td>
<td>Statens offentliga utredningar (SOU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government commission</td>
<td>statlig utredning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government decision</td>
<td>Regeringsbeslut</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government meeting</td>
<td>Regeringssammanträde</td>
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<td>Government Minutes</td>
<td>Regeringsprotokoll</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Halwyl House Museum</td>
<td>Halwylska museet</td>
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<tr>
<td>His Royal Majesty’s Decision</td>
<td>Kungl. Maj:ts beslut.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>His Royal Majesty’s Proposition</td>
<td>Kungl. Maj:ts proposition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigrant Churches</td>
<td>Invandrarkyrkor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Immigration Board</td>
<td>Invandrarverket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Instrument of Government</td>
<td>Regeringsformen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The King in Council</td>
<td>Kungl. Maj:ts (in the Constitution of 1809)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Institute for Dialectology, Onomastics and Folklore Research</td>
<td>Språk och folkminnesinstitutet (SOFI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency</td>
<td>Kammarkollegiet</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs</td>
<td>Ecklesiastikminister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>(regerings)department</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry Reports</td>
<td>Departementsserien (Ds)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Minutes of the Council of State</td>
<td>Statsrådsprotokollet</td>
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