PERSPECTIVES OF MULTICULTURALISM - WESTERN AND TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES

editor
Milan Mesić

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Whither the social dimension?

Citizenship, multiculturalism and the enigma of social exclusion

Carl-Ulrik Schierup

The European Community took, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a principled stand stressing the urgency to defend and further develop the welfare state and its historically established rights of citizenship on the supranational level. This was, among other, explicitly expressed in the programmes on poverty and social exclusion (European Commission 1991, Room 1992). The analytical and normative-political framework for reform and renewal, which was here set up, was explicitly informed by the British sociologist T. H. Marshall’s now classical theory of citizenship, most well-known from the widely red and commented essay, *Citizenship and Social Class* from 1950 (Marshall, 1992 (1950)). Here Marshall laid out a threefold analytical and theoretical framework for depicting the development of rights of citizenship, implicating a complex interplay between, what he called, civil, political and social rights of citizenship. Alongside the work of John Maynard Keynes in political economy Marshall’s concept of citizenship belongs to the basic theoretical foundations of post-Second World War welfare state policies in Europe. While Keynes laid out the framework for those new strategies of state led intervention into western market economies that harvested great successes until the mid-1970s, Marshall’s conception of modern citizenship represent an integrated analytical and moral-political framework for the theoretical understanding of the relationship between market, welfare and democratic polities (Strobel 1996).

With a marked redirection of Union policy after the signing of the Maastricht-Treaty in 1992 a new state of affairs emerges. The quest for a strong ‘social dimension’ of the European community has, as argued by a number of critics, been partially forced into retreat in favour of more outright market-related strategies concerned with ‘flexibility’ and competitive expedience. Worries focusing on increasing social inequality and concerns for redistribution have been pushed into the background. Claims for the constitution of universal and unconditional ‘rights of welfare’ at the supra-national level, through combating a multifaceted poverty and safeguarding full democratic participation in the community on equal terms, have increasingly given way to more conservative discourses of ‘moral obligation’ and ‘social cohesion’.

Which direction the Union’s social dimension will actually take is still an open question. But presently dominant political and ideological currents appear closer to Milton Friedmans neo-liberal economics and Etzioni and Tony Giddens neo-conservative communitarianism than to Keanes and Marshall. At the same time, while deregulation and market exigency have, increasingly, come to dominate the Union’s political agenda, *social exclusion* has, in spite of the economic boom of the 1990s,
become exacerbated and taken a plethora of new forms in response to globalisation, new technology, economic restructuring and the emergence of new flexibility demands and regimes in working life (Burrows 1994, Rhodes 1998). One important common denominator for these changes is the current conspicuous racialisation or ethnification of social exclusion - that is the persistence of old and the emergence of a multiplicity of new forms of systematic exclusion from citizenship among immigrants and new ethnic minorities buttressed by stigmatising popular discourses on ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ or ‘culture’ and to varying degrees sanctioned by official institutional practice.

However, at the very historical junction where established social rights in national states appeared to become seriously challenged by forces of ‘globalisation’, by Reaganomics and Thatcherism, and by victorious neo-liberal ideology and politics (Peterson 1999), the issue of citizenship and social solidarity came again to occupy a central place in European intellectual and political discourse. A widespread belief that an extensive common ‘social dimension’ is not likely to emerge in the Union in the near future (Kosonen 1994:149) has been accompanied by a renewed social science interest in critical in-depth empirical scrutiny of the historically path dependent citizenship and welfare state regimes in different parts of the Community (Esping-Andersen 1996 and 1998, Burrows and Loader 1994, Rhodes and Mény 1998).

In this intellectual context the Marshallian Trinity of civil, political and social citizenship has experienced a spectacular renaissance among social scientists in Europe and in European political philosophy. Across the 1980s and 1990s, a growing number of studies have, through their creative redevelopment of T. H. Marshall’s work, continued to forge an integrated perspective on citizenship. Pertinent questions have been raised as to the limits to forms and practices of inclusion belonging to established political compacts, social policies and welfare institutions. So far mainstream social research on the welfare state is, unfortunately, most often void of qualified references to issues of international migration and ethnic relations. But on the other hand the critical theoretical debate on the Marshallian paradigm has been particularly lively and constructive among specialists focusing on migration and new ethnic minorities (e.g. Castles 1994, Jasyamuria 1992). At the same time an increasing number of researchers across Europe, engaged in the field of international migration and ethnic studies, have started to adopt perspectives from mainstream welfare state and social policy studies, and are carrying out cognisant studies of migration and citizenship with the social dimension in focus (e.g. Faist 1995, Geddes 1998, Bommes 1998).

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1 Lister (1990)...new appeal to citizenship .... Reaction against market liberalism.... Also quotation from Dahrendorf....
This is also where our own inquiry sets out. We discuss the impact of T.H. Marshall’s concept of social citizenship on early definitions of and discourse on social exclusion-inclusion within the European Community. We go on to relate to other of the more important among the plurality of discourses, which have informed European debates and policies, and express precautions concerning the use of exclusion/inclusion as concepts of social science inquiry. At the turn of the millennium a new manifest anti-racist orientation has been turned into mandatory directives and large scale transnational development programmes, which impose compelling demands for combating discrimination and social exclusion on the member states. The paper explores prospects of this new policy. At the centre of the discussion are possible implications of the sliding meaning of exclusion/inclusion and its articulation with a new discourse and institutional practices for the ‘mobilisation of civil society’ embraced by the current EU-policies to combat racism and discrimination. We go on to discuss a present tendency to estrange the meaning of social exclusion/inclusion from this association with a broad notion of substantial citizenship and a subsequent narrowing of the connotation to that of exclusion from or inclusion into paid work or self-employment. The general movement is from one type of European political coalition and discourse to another; that is from a conservative/social democratic coalition attempting to merge differential political concerns with ‘social order’ and ‘equality’, sliding towards a neo-communitarian/neo-liberal coalition concerned with reconciling ‘social cohesion’ with ‘efficiency’. The central issue is whether a sustainable policy targeted at equal opportunities can actually succeed without the precondition that some form of a broad social compact on citizenship and social welfare, in terms of normative political consensus and strong institutions beyond and complementary to the market, is still valid.

The Marshallian framework and its redevelopment

T. H. Marshall posed the problem of citizenship in relation to what he saw as the main contradiction of liberal democracy, that between formal political equality and the persistence of economic and social inequality in a class divided capitalist society. Members of the working class had become enfranchised in Britain, but impoverishment and insecurity could prevent the substantial utilization of civil or political rights and thereby full membership of the community. The Marshallian answer to the problem of capitalism versus democracy was the welfare state embodied in his notion of social citizenship. The establishment of universal social rights guaranteeing every citizen a certain modicum of welfare would complement the dimensions of civil and political citizenship established during previous centuries.

Thus, Marshall distinguished three types of citizenship rights, which he saw as having developed in historical progression. The first type was civil rights, which emerged in the 18th century as ‘negative rights’: individual freedom meant protection
from unlawful infringement of private property, personal liberty and justice by the state. These were joined in the course of the 19th century by positive political rights through which the active citizen could take part in opinion formation and political decision-making. In the 20th century, social rights developed, through which citizens were guaranteed a certain basic standard of economic and social well-being, through the right to work or through welfare provision. Together with the right to education, one of the fundamental social rights provided by the modern welfare state of the 20th century according to Marshall, these social rights were vital to permit members of the working class genuine participation in society as citizens (Marshall (1950) 1964; see also Turner, 1992, 34-40; Habermas, 1994: 30-1).2

Marshall’s work has been highly influential in US and British social theory, and is used in continental European debates too. The notion of the different types of citizenship rights is widely accepted. A key aspect of Marshall’s work is the idea of the interdependence of different types of right: that it is impossible to have full civil and political rights in a modern industrial democracy without a certain standard of social rights. Destitute people would be unable to fully take advantage of formal civil and political rights.3 A corollary of this is that social rights may be just as important as political rights as an indicator of citizenship, and that Marshall’s historical order could be reversed: social rights could precede or lead to political rights, which has also been the case historically, in a number of cases. These and other lines of constructive criticism has been the point of departure for a creative development of the original Marshallian paradigm.4

Paths of citizenship formation

Citizenship and Social Class was a reflection of the broadening of social rights through the emerging welfare state in post-war Britain. Marshall’s work has, on this background, been frequently criticised for its Anglocentrism combined with a lopsided evolutionary bias, making it difficult to accommodate it to an analysis of the particular experience of other countries (Mann 1987). In a seminal reception, of Citizenship and Social Class Michael Mann (1987) criticises Marshall’s allegedly anglophile and evolutionistic bias (Mann 1987: 340). While endorsing important premises of Marshall’s theory, Mann points to the contemporary importance of particular histories and conditions of formation belonging to several qualitatively different modes of

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2 A range of presentations and analyses of T.H. Marshall’s work have been published. See, for example, Castles and Davidson 2000, Roche 1992, Barbalet 1988, Close 1995, Turner 1990, Mann 1987).
3 For a discussion of the interconnection of social and political rights see Lister (1990: 41 ff.).
modern citizenship. A diacritical determinant for the formation and reproduction of these different modes is, according to Mann, the way in which local ruling classes, through repression, cooptation or concession, attempted to cope with and to integrate the demands of new ascending classes; first the rising bourgeoisie and second the working class during the period of capitalist industrialisation. A similar stress on historical ‘path dependence’, class conflict and class alliances is represented in Gösta Esping-Andersen’s (1990) influential work, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Here Esping-Andersen maintains that different historically established modes of governance and class relationships have given birth to, what he represents as, three ideal types of modern ‘welfare state regimes’, or ‘worlds of welfare’, in the ‘western’ Euro-Atlantic sphere:

- an Anglo-American liberal regime focusing strongly on the market, a liberal work ethic and, which favours private welfare solutions combined with a system of public welfare transfers targeted at low income groups and based on a universalism of minimal needs;
- a conservative continental European corporate regime highly influenced by Christian values, which focuses on the conservation of the traditional family, a morally sanctioned social order, and which reproduces a particularistic and hierarchic edifice of citizenship;
- a social democratic regime, most typical for Scandinavia, focusing on values of equality and individuality, and which is occupied with safeguarding a high degree of universalism in a huge and ramified public welfare system, catering even for differentiated needs of the middle classes;

The three welfare state regimes differ in terms of historical formation, political foundation, institutional set-up and functional logic. Each of them elaborates the dimension of social citizenship on the basis of its own distinct political rationale, embedded in specific institutional frameworks, and carried up by different forms of class alliances and modes of consensus making. Within the European Union, in spite of ongoing supranational integration and gradual erosion of the powers of the national states these ‘three worlds of welfare’ still tend to function as rough dividing lines between the essential principles of governance in clusters of member states and in particular concerning their legislation and practice in the realms of welfare policy and labour market regulation. As any ideal type classification the model of the three worlds of welfare is vulnerable to critique, based on detailed empirical evidence of individual variation. In practice individual countries, to varying degrees at different points in time, tend to blend elements from different models, and rapid change across Europe as a whole has distanced reality increasingly from the ideal types

Like Marshall, Mann has, however, been criticised for neglecting issues of ethnic and national minorities (e.g. Turner 1990).
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synthesising the variable character of the mature national welfare state at its peak. Yet the theory contains important explanatory value. Each world of welfare tends to produce and sanction different specific forms of social exclusion and inclusion among immigrants and ethnic minorities, and in spite of their presently rapid transformation (Esping-Andersen 1996, Pierson 1998), continues to operate as alternative moral-political frameworks competing for the definition and delineation of an overall EU-European social dimension. They represent major interpretations and concrete materialisations of what the central political terms of social exclusion and inclusion actually signify and what they tend to implicate in terms of the overall quality of citizenship and social welfare.

The claim for diversity: ‘formal’ and ‘substantial’ rights

Another line of critique problematises a conspicuous lack of a perspective on cultural and social diversity in the Marshallian framework. In this vein, a need to accommodate new plural forms of social movements and democratic agency has been stressed (Turner 1990). It has been pointed out that Marshall departed, from the assumption of a unitary national state making no reference to the existence or specific problems accounted by women, or by ethnic minorities and migrants, with respect to rights to citizenship and the substantial utilization of formal rights when granted.

Feminist scholars have criticised the theory’s inherently male bias and extended and reformulated the Marshallian paradigm in order to accommodate a complex gender-perspective (e.g. Anthias and Yuval-Davies 1993, Yuval-Davies 1996). Everywhere women have become entitled to rights of citizenship later than men, and when eventually included their actual opportunities for substantially enjoying these rights have been blocked by institutional practice, organisational set-ups and informal power relationships inherently biased on male homo-social premises, neglecting the particular social preconditions and needs of women.

Other critics have drawn attention to the lack of any perspective on ethnic or cultural diversity in the Marshallian framework and stressed the importance of integrating theories of culture, identity and ethnic minority rights into a remodelled concept of citizenship (e.g. Turner 1990, Bottomore 1996, Castles 1994, Favell 1998). As in the feminist discourse, a central issue of dispute has been that of formal versus substantial rights. Most European debates on migration and citizenship have focused on formal citizenship – that is on the rules for access to citizenship for migrants, or for (becoming a citizen). Less attention has been paid to substantial citizenship (being a citizen) – that is the actual capacity to exercise the rights and obligations, as embodied in the Marshallian trinity of rights, connected with being a

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*As discussed in detail by Schierup (2003c)*
‘full member’ of society. Formal and substantial citizenship often do not correspond. Some may not be formal citizens and yet have rights and obligations in a state. But members of ethnically or racially distinguished minorities may also formally be citizens, and yet be excluded from enjoying their rights due to discrimination, racism or poverty. Formal equality as citizens does not in itself overcome economic disadvantage or social marginalisation, nor does it give a share in power in major economic and political institutions. Being a citizen is also no guarantee of protection from racist discrimination or violence, which may block minority members from exercising their formal civil, political and social rights (see Castles and Davidson 2000). The experience of migrants and ethnic minorities is that established institutions will not be able to tackle a range of practices that block their full membership and actual participation in society. They may even be instrumental in upholding such practices, due to discriminatory rules, stigmatising institutional ideologies (Grillo 1985) or their habitual administrative routines; routines that may not be intentionally discriminatory, yet discriminatory in their effects (e.g. Feuchtwang 1982). This raises the issue of pervasive and complex institutional change aimed at bridging the gap between a universalist discourse of rights and the actual reality of a ‘truncated citizenship’ (Cross 1998) for many ethnic minority members.

This issue of formal versus substantial citizenship is, in turn, closely interconnected with the intricate problem of universality and difference; one of the central issues for citizenship (Castles 1994:10-15). The basic assumption of the concept of universal citizenship shared by most liberal political philosophers and political ideologies is that people are equal and homogeneous in their role as citizens, and should therefore be treated equally by the state. But the relationship between formal equality as citizens and a reality of difference between various members of society is a political issue of central importance for contemporary problems of social exclusion.

Not least feminist theory has persuasively argued how strict adherence to the principle of equal treatment may help maintain existing forms of group privilege and power. Thus, Iris Marion Young (1989), has insisted that full citizenship can only be achieved through recognition of group differences and the consequent allocation of group rights. This is seen as the only effective strategy to overcome barriers constructed on the basis of social markers like gender, race and ethnicity, which effectively exclude members of the group concerned from certain positions, or discriminate, against them in the allocation of social resources. One implication of this position would, be however to accept that people’s primary social identity might not be as individual members of society but as members of a specific community. Yet, this notion of differentiated citizenship is quite problematic, as argued by Castles (1994:15),

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7 I.e. the so-called *denizens* according to Hammar’s (1990) terminology.

8 See also, the discussion on Young’s position in Castles (1994).
due to the obvious tensions it creates between individual rights and group rights. Fixed group membership may be experienced as repressive especially if it means binding people to groups with rigid values on gender, religion or social behaviour. A political system based on group rights runs the risk of undermining the equality of political rights, which has been an historical demand of democratic movements.

**Multiculturalism and the welfare state**

A critical perspective on ethnic minorities and an ethnocentrically structured mode of citizenship was, in fact, anticipated by the, by now, ‘classical’ local level studies on the social exclusion of ethnic minorities in British cities conducted by John Rex and associates during the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Rex and Moore 1967, Rex and Tomlinson 1979). These empirical studies demonstrate how immigrant minorities, contingent on unevenly and racially structured power relationships in society, are alienated from the welfare state and, thereby, the benefits of social citizenship that the British working class struggled for. This perspective on the racialised alienation from citizenship is the background for Rex’s (1996 (1985)) much published essay from 1985, ‘The concept of a multicultural society’, where he attempts to sketch the framework for a more inclusive welfare society. Here Rex describes, in the reformist spirit of Marshall, the welfare state as the historical outcome, in the western European context, of the characteristic range of social conflicts in a predominantly industrial society; that is of a class struggle, which has produced institutions to deal with the injustices of capitalism. The formation of a multicultural society he sees, in an analogous way, as a struggle and a process leading to the formation of institutions to deal with conflicts between majorities and minorities; that is, to develop institutions that will be able to deal with the injustices produced by racism. The presupposition is that of a further processing of the welfare state compromise in a society that in its “main structures” is committed to “equality of opportunity”. A multicultural society - being thus already a developed welfare state - represents, Rex concludes, a society, which in its main structures “must find a place for both diversity and equality of opportunity”.

Rex’ ‘concept of a multicultural society’ suffers, however, from essentialist assumptions akin to Young’s communitarian feminism, when depicting society as basically composed of corporate self-contained ‘cultural communities’. He contrasts a supposed ‘majority community’ versus supposed ‘minority communities’ without any effort at modulation (as critically observed by Ljungberg 2000: 11), and states that ‘the new social order of the multicultural society is an emergent one which will result from the dialogue and the conflict between cultures’ (Rex, 1996 (1985):29). But in contrast to Young, who advocates a wholesale settlement with liberal universalism through a break up of the national political community, Rex, on the contrary, rather hypostatises it by setting up an arbitrary dividing line between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ spheres of society. Here the space for ‘minority culture’ seems to be largely
confined to the latter, while the former remains unproblematised and basically non-negotiable. With the ‘public’ sphere representing the basic political and overall institutional set-up of society, this makes in fact, as observed by Hoffman-Nowotny (19xx), for a highly domesticated and toothless ‘multiculturalism’.

A corporatist (Schierup 1991) and essentialist concept of a multicultural welfare society as proposed by Rex appears indeed boldly programmatic seen in relation to the social context in which it was put forward. Rex’ essay was first made public in 1985, during the heyday of Thatcherism, in a period reputed for this regime’s successful dismantling of crucial features of the British welfare state and for the adept political decomposition of the social coalition upon which it had traditionally rested. While the ‘concept of a multicultural society’ may have looked anachronistic when related to the British context, the model’s basic assumptions appear, however, comparable to propositions, which continued to inform Australian, Canadian, Dutch and Swedish officially designated ‘multicultural’ policies from the early 1970s and well into the 1980s. Here ‘multiculturalism’ was conceived as an alternative to the alleged inflexibility and inherently discriminatory character of previous assimilatory concepts and practices of incorporation of immigrants.

But a corporatist and essentialist definition of ‘culture’ and ‘ethnicity’ generated new problems and tended to block the substantial exercise of rights of citizenship (Ålund and Schierup 1991, Castles 1994 and 1997, Bel-Habib and xxx 1996). In advanced Swedish and Dutch welfare states with multiculturalist programs unemployment among immigrants and new ethnic minorities grew disproportionately high and debates on welfare dependence became a burning political issue. At the same time globalisation and the urge for market based solutions of social problems put pressure on efforts to develop multiculturalism on the basis of established welfare state policies.

In Australia the general political development has taken a neo-liberal cum neo-conservative course. This has implicated a remoulding of the Australian welfare state and, at the same time, a loosening of the programmatic and factual tie between, on the one hand, policies directed towards immigrants and ethnic minorities and, on the other hand, general social policy. It has, moreover, in the Australian case, meant an incipient distancing from the ideology of multiculturalism as a whole and a creeping nostalgia for a past mono-cultural (Anglo) ideal of the nation (Castles 1997: 135). Increasingly, issues of ‘diversity’ and of immigrant incorporation have come to be thought of as matters best being catered for through the opportunities and self-regulating powers of a free market with as little state interference and special services as possible.

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9 See, for example, descriptions and analyses in Ålund and Schierup (1991) and Castles 1997
10 In fact, as described by Castles (1997), this retreat from active institutional policies of multiculturalism had already been commenced earlier.
In Sweden, on the contrary, multicultural policies have rather been exposed to profound critical re-evaluation and remoulding than to dismantlement. Under the heading of ‘diversity-policies’ such revised conceptions of multicultural citizenship are increasingly backed by institutional change and innovation (e.g. Södergran 2000). Contemporary discourses of ‘diversity’ and ‘multiculturalism’ in these countries endeavour to venture beyond the predicaments of the corporatist approach to culture by devising different approaches to the universalism-particularism dichotomy. Their premises come, in fact, close to an alternative proposition for a multicultural citizenship defined as ‘a system of rights and obligations which protects the integrity of the individual while recognising that individuality is formed in a variety of social and cultural contexts’ (Castles 1997: 114). This definition rests on suggestions for solving basic contradictions between individual rights and the protection of collective identities put forward by Jürgen Habermas (1994) in his critical reception of Charles Taylor’s influential essay on The Politics of Recognition (Taylor 1992). It is based on a conception of democracy as the autonomy citizens enshrined in their collective exercise of their political rights. Hence, citizens are the carriers of individual rights, but they develop their individuality within the framework of different social contexts. Therefore a multicultural democracy needs to guarantee social and cultural rights for all citizens according to their individual preconditions, not only for some (minority) groups. This necessitates a whole range of institutional changes, designed to empower citizens, who are exposed to different social conditions, who have different cultural prerequisites and particular needs. Moreover, the model presupposes an open-ended non-static conception of the public realm and the institutional set-up, where the overarching political culture is itself subject to continuous renegotiation and redefinition.

But, the Swedish trajectory from “multiculturalism” to “diversity” is circumscribed by profound changes in the existing welfare regime and the formation of new fragmented ethnic divisions of labour, which forces its moral-political objectives to manoeuvre uncertainly within a profoundly changed terrain. Since the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) the overall policy configuration at the supra-national level of the Union has, increasingly come to look like this Swedish scenario: that is the strong rhetorical commitment to the formation of an inclusive community marked by ‘diversity and equal ‘treatment’ and commitment to dynamic anti-racist policies, on the one hand and, on the other hand, a floating social policy agenda concerning the conception of and strategies to combat social exclusion, which appears to leave in its wake a number of unsettled questions.

**A hegemonic notion**

The notion of social exclusion originates from the French political scene. Here it has even since the mid 1970s been an important political concept for the defi-
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nition of the moral-political rationale of the *republique* and French citizenship. It has in France a particular meaning attached to social Catholicism as well as to Durkheimian sociology. It is, as discussed by Silver (1994), concerned with moral integration and social solidarity. *Exclusion* is understood ‘as the breakdown of the structural, cultural and moral ties which bind the individual to society’ (Levitas 1998).

In the French context the notion of *exclusion* has, moreover, traditionally been and still is a contested one, exposed to competing Catholic and Socialist/Social democratic understandings (Chamberlayne 1997).

A similar situation came to prevail when, fifteen years after the term’s first adoption as a key concept in French social policy, the discourse of *social exclusion* came to penetrate the wider EU political scene and was elevated to a hegemonic notion guiding political strategy as well as scientific enquiry.\(^\text{11}\) Its powerful status can be seen to emerge from the fact of its inclusiveness as a concept providing a common language of ‘solidarity’ for a wider spectrum of political directions in the Union.

The language of ‘exclusion-inclusion’ came, like in France, from the beginning, to merge the concerns of two main broad political traditions. One was a Christian Democratic concept of citizenship associated with the conservative-corporatist type of welfare regime, traditionally prevailing in central and southern Europe. The other approached a social democratic orientation conforming to an egalitarian interpretation of citizenship and social justice, similar to the well-known theory of T.H. Marshall (1992 (1950)). This is a tradition dominant in Scandinavia and, partially, in Pre-Thatcherist Britain (e.g. Mann 1987), but, in fact, influential among much of the traditional social democratic left across the European Union. While the former, the ‘conservative’ Christian democratic tradition, stresses moral integration and social order the latter, the social democratic, has traditionally been deeply concerned with poverty and broad issues of social participation with a focus on ‘equality’. The strategic advantage of the concept of ‘social exclusion’ was thus that it could draw from the two main, traditionally dominant, welfare regimes and traditions of social policy of the Union, even though they would attach substantially variable meaning to the concept.

This potentially hegemonic concept of social exclusion and thereby even its antonym of *social inclusion*, merging conservative concerns centred on *social order* with socialist concerns centred on *social equality*, was succinctly articulated by Ralph Dahrendorf (1985), who, by the mid-1980s, stood forth as a pioneer for the adoption of social exclusion as a basic European policy concept. Dahrendorf formulates the question of social exclusion in terms of the moral-political premises of citizenship

\(^\text{11}\) Chamberlayne (1997: 3 ff) provides an illuminating review of the ways in which ‘social exclusion’ was adopted and debated by social science in different member states. This is indeed a matter, as argued by Chamberlayne (1989: 3 ff), depending on national traditions and current directions of social science analysis. But given ‘social exclusion’s inherent character of a moral-political term any preference for analytical premises and definitions will indeed be forced to state its value premises.
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on which the 20th Century welfare states were constituted. He presents a range of new forms of marginalisation and poverty, developing in the economically advanced welfare states from the mid 1970s, as an ongoing process expressed in the exclusion from established rights, encoded in national charters on social citizenship (Dahrendorf 1985, 1987, Schmitter-Heisler 1992). The new odd miscellany of socially marginalised and poor categories of the population - among them an incongruously high proportion of immigrants and ethnic minorities - make up a deviant, restless but disorganised new ‘underclass’, excluded from the social compact of the welfare state. Thus, citizenship was becoming an exclusive rather than inclusive status, Dahrendorf sustained (see also Lister 1990: 24), and this to a degree that would threaten the social stability (i.e. ‘cohesion’), which for decades marked the post-Second World War Western European welfare states.

Social exclusion as the denial of rights of citizenship

Thus Dahrendorf analysed the problem of social exclusion in terms of a major contraction of the welfare state, which has created a ‘crucial boundary … between the majority class and those who are being defined out of the edifice of citizenship’ (Dahrendorf 1985 98). That is, as he sees it, a social cleft, which threatens to fundamentally undermine the legitimacy of the central political institutions of the liberal democratic state. The essence of the term ‘social exclusion’ is, as used here, its denotation of the denial of citizenship: that is, citizenship largely understood in the sense as the concept was theorised by the British sociologist T.H. Marshall (Marshall 1992 (1950)) in his influential work Citizenship and Social Class. Consequently the precondition for combating social exclusion and social unrest would be to uphold an ideal of citizenship as a universal entitlement. This would, among other, implicate a distinctly redistributive welfare policy, unconditionally guaranteeing every citizen a certain socially acceptable standard of living; a solid floor to build on.

This was, sheltered by the President of the commission, Jaques Delors’ stress on forging a powerful social dimension of the Community, also to become the dominant connotation of social exclusion, when – from the beginning of the 1990s - the term became one of key importance in the political vocabulary of European Union parlance. A focus on tackling a broad range of social disadvantages, connected with poverty and inequality, is strongly articulated in the Background Report to the European Poverty Programme in 1991. Here the poor are defined as ‘persons whose resources (material, cultural and social) are so limited as to exclude them from the minimum acceptable way of life in the Member State in which they live’ (European Commission 1991: 1).

This is, in effect, an approach to poverty that echoes the so-called relative deprivation theory of poverty, widely publicised through the influential writings of the sociologist Peter Townsend (e.g. Townsend 1987).

12 This echoes T.H. Marshalls (1992 (1950)) conception of so-
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Social inclusiveness in *Citizenship and Social Class*, when he describes social citizenship as that ‘whole range of rights of citizenship’ from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society. Del Castillo (1994: 616) observes that the general orientation here is on social exclusion as ‘it relates directly to the contemporary challenge to one of the cornerstones of justice, and addresses the system of “social contract” associated with democracies since the Second World War, namely, the equality of opportunity which should be guaranteed by law’.

In the subsequent work of the Commission, ‘social exclusion’ was widely adopted as a theoretically based concept for identifying, analysing, and forming policy in respect to groups exposed to conditions of enduring and multiple deprivation. Marshall’s concept of social citizenship was explicitly adopted as the basis for the work of the *Observatory on National Policies to Combat Social Exclusion*, which was founded by the Commission of the European Communities in 1990 (Room 1992). Seeking what they describe as a precise and theoretical content of the notion of exclusion, the Observatory defines social exclusion ‘first and foremost in relation to the social rights of citizens’. Social exclusion can, accordingly, ‘be analysed in terms of the denial - or non-realisation - of social rights’ (Room 1992:13 15)). On the basis of this definition, the Commission went on to produce evidence of a significant degree of widespread and growing poverty throughout Europe, which, at the same time, was seen as being variable in extent and forms. The Observatory includes other types of rights of citizenship in its analyses, such as Marshall’s civil and political dimensions, insofar as they appear important in concrete cases for analysing exclusion from or realisation of social rights (Room 1992:16 ff.)). It investigates the various social rights (to employment, housing, health care, child care, etc.) individuals have in the individual Member States. It makes use of studies of multiple, persistent, and cumulative disadvantage (in terms of education, training, employment, housing, and financial resources), and it addresses the question ‘whether those who suffer such disadvantages have substantially lower chances than the rest of the population of gaining access to the major social institutions’ (Room 1992:16 ff.).

**Combating racialised exclusion: The ‘post-Amsterdam’ social agenda**

The work of the Observatory suffered, from the beginning, from what critics have identified as one of the soft spots so often present among protagonists of the citizenship paradigm derived from T.H. Marshall. That is an apparent blindness to matters of ethnic diversity and the social position of immigrants (e.g. Turner 1990). A

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13 See Close (1995: 30ff), Strobel (1996), and del Castillo (1994) for examples of seminal discussions concerning the European Commission’s perspective on poverty and social exclusion.
number of important national surveys, studies and academic discussions on social exclusion and poverty from the 1980s and early 1990s contain, with notable exceptions, quite inadequate material, or lack data altogether, concerning the situation of immigrants and ethnic minorities; and they, too often as well, lack a discussion as to this apparent scarcity.

This state was, in the course of the 1990s, gradually redressed, as the Commission sponsored important comparative studies concerned with discrimination and racism and with the situation of immigrants in irregular labour markets. It was, however, only the Amsterdam accord in 1997 that gave the Commission genuine leeway for developing social policy initiatives, including policies on combating racism and discrimination (e.g. Kostakopoulou 1999). Here, in the context of the new post-Amsterdam policy agenda in general, we see an increasing confluence of social policy with labour market and employment policies taking place. This is, among other, currently being implemented through large-scale community programmes supposedly pushing in the direction of integrated EU practices and institutional frameworks formulated top down. But they are envisaged to be implemented in the form of processes of transnational integration from below. This is supposed to take place through the transborder dissemination of ‘best practices’ produced by development partnerships focused on regions, branches or local communities in different member states.

Although the process may, in several ways, appear spurious and contradictory (Kostakopoulou 1999) the EU now also came in the position to, and actually started to, take concrete and determined action in terms of policies of inclusion addressing racism and discrimination as central issues. This policy-agenda, emphasising ‘Fundamental social rights and civil society’ is, among other, being implemented through the ‘Community Action Programme to combat discrimination’ (2001-2006). But a particularly noteworthy milestone was The Council Directive, which was adopted in June 2000, Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin (European Commission 2000). The directive aims to put into action the Article 13 of the EC Treaty as regards the struggle against racism and xenophobia. Here the Council strongly expresses the need to promote ‘a socially inclusive labour market’ for the EU to be able to achieve the objectives of the

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14 The most notable exception is that of Britain, which is the by far best researched western European country in this respect.
15 E.g. the important anthology on deprivation and poverty, edited by Ferge and Miller (1987)
16 E.g. the study Preventing Racism at the Workplace (Wrench 1996), based on 16 detailed country reports from across the Community, and Migrants’ Insertion in the Informal Economy (Reyneri et al. 1999) a detailed TSER report on migration and the informal economy in Southern Europe, including a comparison with parts of Northern Europe.
EC Treaty, ‘in particular the attainment of a high level of employment and of social protection’.

Currently, the new large scale and transnational so-called Equal-programme 2000-06,18 managed by the European Social Fund, ties together these two parallel developments in policy formation, mentioned above - the new social policy cum employment agenda and the anti-discrimination agenda – within the overall framework of an integrated transnational development strategy. The programme echoes the ‘Third Way’ (as theorised by Giddens 1998) and stakeholder capitalism with an emphasis on social inclusion of disadvantaged groups through employment (cf., the discussion by Levitas 1998). This is supposed to take place through the collaboration of the ‘different worlds of public administration, non-governmental organisations, social partners and the business sector’ within the framework of, mostly local, development partnerships, which are supposed to pool ‘their different types of expertise and experience’. The programme has become a privileged testing ground for trying out new ways of dealing with problems of discrimination targeted on a range of disadvantaged groups in the name of ‘diversity’, but with a marked emphasis on the inclusion of refugees, immigrants and ethnic minorities and on combating racism and xenophobia in the labour market. It stresses, in particular, the need to analyse and to combat structurally and institutionally embedded discrimination. It also emphasises the urgency of intercultural training and the training of social workers or mediators of immigrant origin as well as the need to take positive action in order to improve the opportunities of migrants and ethnic minorities.

The implementation of the programme is in accordance with the general decentralising principle of subsidiarity of the Union, which has gradually been developed within the context of its practices belonging to the Employment and Social Policy agenda (Geddes 2001, in passim). In this context so-called ‘development partnerships’, including partners in ‘civil society’ together with business and public sector, which cooperate on specific local or regional objectives, are privileged instruments. Development partnerships are expected to build on and to produce ‘empowerment from below’, which is in line with a general stress on regionalism, localism and ‘civil society’ in a range of contemporary programmes for enhancing social participation and equal opportunities across the Union. While each member state develops its own particular priorities within the general framework and orientation of the Equal-programme, the implementation of each single (regional, local or branch-oriented) development partnership must include close cooperation with similar development partnerships in other EU-member states for the purpose of joint development and dissemination of ‘good practices’ in the form of inventive strategies for employment inclusion. Mainstreaming and progressing integration of practices are strived at

through development, communication and exchange of transformative practices, vertically, horizontally and traversing the boundaries of member states across the Union.

*Equal* and other large-scale EU programmes for combating racialised exclusion are yet in progress and will be studied and evaluated in due time. But there is a good deal of experience to share already, from other programmes and local partnerships for social inclusion from different parts of Europe, albeit they were not so ambitiously targeted on the specific aim of combating ethnic/racial (and other forms of) discrimination.

Among other, a number of analytic country-reports were collected in the edited volume *Local Partnerships and Social Exclusion in the European Union* (Geddes and Benington 2001), which provides a critical appraisal of partnerships as new forms of local governance. The experience reviewed is not unanimous. Some report a potentially genuine increase in a broad influence for social movements on a new and more attentive social policy agenda, like in the case of Portugal (Rodrigues and Stoer 2001), while, for example, the Finnish report (Kautto and Heikkilä 2001), gives the impression of an overall state-bureaucratic grip on the whole process. The British report (Geddes 2001), in turn, observes that the form of ‘partnership’, belonging to the ‘new social agenda’, looks like a sales offer for the people to buy shares in the overall neo-liberal project, but wholly on terms set by business, the much propagated ‘corporate responsibility’ of which cannot, however, make up for any overall social solidarity.

Obviously experience appears to vary greatly, not only from locality to locality, but systematically between member states, according to their still highly different path-dependent economic policies, welfare and labour market regimes, systems of governance, and the factual constitution of civil society. But it is necessary to discuss the changing norms of social citizenship and social welfare on which the new social policy agenda and the antiracist programmes are, in general, contingent. This has to do with a currently strengthened role of the European level in setting the rules of the game for policy formation on social and employment issues, together with an increasing emphasis at transnational mainstreaming of best practices, which – among other - the new programmes targeted at combating racialised exclusion give evidence to. Seen in this perspective, there is a particular need for a critical scrutiny of important changes in the wider European discourse and agenda on social exclusion/inclusion, within the framework of which the new programmes are conceived and implemented.

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19 The Swedish *interim* evaluation for *Equal* (PLS/IPM 2002) presents a similar (provisionary) judgement, concerning the way in which the first round of the national *Equal*-projekt has been set up in the country.
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Changing configurations of ‘exclusion/inclusion’: From ‘social order’ and ‘equality’ to ‘social cohesion’ and ‘efficiency’

In the beginning of the 1990s a belief in the Community’s role as a successor to the national welfare state, guarding a forceful ‘social dimension’, was still alive among major representatives of its institutions (e.g. Delors 1992). But after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the abortive negotiations for reaching an overall accord concerning ‘the social dimension’, which preceded it, alternative traditions in European social policy and politics of citizenship have gained in influence concerning the major issue of what ‘a European Creed’ should actually be. This has decidedly modified the scope of the social dimension as well as the critical analytical range of the notion of ‘social exclusion’.

The stress has been increasingly placed on labour market integration as a precondition for ‘social cohesion’ with the wider implications of poverty and inequality moving into the background (e.g. Levitas 1998). If the initial focus had been on efforts to reconcile the conservative primacy on ‘social order’ with socialist worries concerning ‘equality’, the core concern now becomes to reconcile ‘social cohesion’ with ‘economic efficiency’. An economic discussion is phrased in terms of efficiency, deregulation and the demand for economic growth, while a parallel social concern counterpoises ‘solidarity, integration and cohesion’ to ‘unemployment, poverty and social exclusion’. But in spite of a language of solidarity the emphasis is here one-sidedly on exclusion from paid work, or on the issue of ‘unemployment’. The cure is, universally, inclusion through paid work. Here: ‘solidarity’ is a device reducing the costs of social provision, not for redistribution. The forms of solidarity invoked are manifold: between those who have jobs and those who do not; between generations; between regions; between ‘those who earn their income from work and those who earn their income from investments’; and between men and women ‘making it easier to reconcile family life and working life’ (Levitas 1998: 25).

This is not about any unequivocal enthusiasm with the market, which is seen to be in need of regulation or ‘management’ through collective solidarity mechanisms. But the type of ‘solidarity’ in question is not synonymous with that of a redistributive welfare state, argues Levitas (1998) in her analysis of central EU-documents on social exclusion/inclusion. Welfare state expenditures are deemed too costly to uphold. Instead solidarity is called upon as a form of restraint for the purpose of reducing the costs of social provision. What is at stake is no longer the duty of the whole community to face up to universal rights of citizenship, but rather, under the

\[20\] Quoting from (European Commission 1994b).

\[21\] In particular two reports from the European Commission in 1994: European Social Policy (European Commission 1994a) and Growth, Competitiveness, Employment (European Commission 1994b).
banner of civil society and corporate responsibility, a moral commitment of the indi-
vidual citizen, corporations, individual counties and social groups to safeguard 'so-
cial cohesion'.

This social integrationist discourse (Levitas 1998), becoming dominant in the
Community after Maastricht, could indeed be described as a revamped version of a
conservative-corporatist moral ‘creed’ focused on maintaining social order through
social solidarity measures. However, merging with an Anglo-American liberal dis-
course preoccupied with economic expediency, a retreat of the state from the
economy and with the minimalisation of welfare expenditures, the Commission’s
conception of social exclusion/inclusion has become increasingly similar to the neo-
communitarianism of ‘The Third Way’, which – apart from Tony Blair’s Britain -
profoundly influences social democratic regimes like, for example, Sweden’s or Ger-
many’s. This turn away from redistribution became ‘endemic’ in the financial and
legal framework of the Union as its member states started to employ austerity meas-
ures in order to qualify for the single currency. It is ingrained in the practices of the
whole range of projects initiated by the structural funds, designed to integrate mar-
ginal groups into the labour market or to promote equal opportunities. They exclu-
vatively finance project targeted directly on the labour market, and their rules are
designed so as to reinforce the understanding of social participation as labour mar-

Right to welfare or duty to work?

Reserving ‘social exclusion’ as a term for describing the ‘exclusion from paid
work’, as is the tendency in the EU social policy agenda since Maastricht, may
have the advantage of simplicity and precision. But this shift occurs - as analysed in
detail by, among other, Peo Hansen (2002)22 - together with a general disassociation
from more ambitious visions of the European Union’s ‘social dimension’ and the
adoption of practices that withdraw attention from the wider issue of poverty and
inequality. It is important to raise, as argued by Ruth Levitas (1998), a discussion of
the consequences of this choice in terms of an estrangement from the broader fo-
cus on ‘full membership of the community’, as implicated a the broad citizenship
maxim and an initial redistributive discourse on social exclusion and inclusion.

Between racialised welfare dependency and the new working immigrant poor

An imminent consequence is that of de-legitimising non-participation in paid
work,23 and by, directly or indirectly, discrediting traditional redistributive meas-

22 Preparatory work for book on ethnic minorities and the decline of social solidarity in Europe (Schierup
et al. 2004 (in preparation)).

23 For a detailed argument on this point, see Levitas (Levitas 1998).
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ures, doing away with any welfare guarantee. It carries with it an innate propensity for endorsing stigmatisation of immigrants and ethnic minority members out of work, often excluded due to exposure to racism or systematic institutional discrimination. Putting one-sided emphasis on work and economic expediency, and branding welfare spending, also limits the political latitude for leading a generous refugee policy. We see currently such tendencies all across the European Union, but particularly in the ‘old’ immigration countries of North-Western Europe. Here unemployment and welfare dependency among immigrants and new ethnic minorities is consistently high, widely overstep rates among national majorities, and is the object of negative and stigmatising attention in media and popular discourse (e.g. EUMC 2001). Hence, as argued by Ruth Lister (1990), where ‘poverty’ becomes ‘social exclusion’ and where the bearings of social exclusion become, in the next instance, constricted to ‘exclusion from paid work’ - there is an immanent risk that the result may turn out to be the sifting out and stigmatisation of one particular subgroup among the poor, the ‘welfare clients’. A most adverse, but quite typical result is that the issue of poverty and social exclusion becomes subsumed by an understanding that locates the cause of misery in a moral deficiency of the excluded themselves (e.g. Lister 1990, c.f. Katz 1989).

Different varieties of this kind of moral underclass discourse (Levitas 1998) have indeed won extension in political struggles over the causes and meaning of social exclusion among immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities all across Europe (e.g. the analysis by Schierup 1993). It is in the United States that this kind of discourse has been most influential, however, and forcefully adopted as a recipe for ‘social integration through work’. Converted into actual policy measures and processed, through tough disciplinary strategies of workfare, this has proved to lead to the transformation of poor ‘welfare clients’ into different categories of ‘working poor’, permanently trapped in enforced low-status, deregulated and under-remunerated work’. Morally induced work enforcement of this disciplinary character, of which a huge American ‘prison-industrial complex’ (Parenti 2000) is the ultimate expression, has deprived poor African Americans of their political power and their civil right to withhold their labour from the new service economy’s sub-standard jobs. The implication is, in effect, a substantial deterioration in terms of exclusion from citizenship; not only social citizenship, but civil and political (King 1999, Fox Piven and Cloward 1993).

24 See, for example, John Myles’ (1996) revealing analysis of the development from welfare to workfare in the United States.

25 Arguments focusing on the impoverishment and deprivation of poor urban African-Americans during the past three decades do, of course, not in any way reject the fact that, during the same time, a substantial African-American professional elite has consolidated its positions in the US. But in a situation marked by economic and labour market deregulation and the deterioration of general welfare state policies this has, as argued by Wilson (e.g. 1987, 1993, 1999, 1997), become part of a convoluted social problem of race, class and deprivation, rather than a solution to poverty, social exclusion and urban segregation. This is an issue that we discuss at length ourselves in another paper (Schierup 2003b).
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Seen in this perspective, the ongoing ‘war on welfare’ (Katz 1989) in the US is, as argued by Fox Piven and Cloward, nothing but part of a wider ‘war against (organised) labour’. It forms, contingent on The Breaking of the American Social Compact (Fox Piven and Cloward 1997), part of a consistent low wage strategy of employers. The defeat of organised labour and, with it, the struggle of radical race and class conscious black urban ‘ghetto’ communities have, together with the moral condemnation and institutional embargo on ‘welfare’, opened the gates for the formation of today’s extended deregulated low wage sector, mainly staffed by new immigrants from Asia and Latin American, but increasingly also by poor African Americans.26 Similar tendencies can be observed all over the ‘old’ immigration countries of the European Union, with Britain as the most outspoken example of this incremental Americanisation of regimes of welfare and work.27

Here, what Fox Piven and Cloward have called ‘regulating the poor’ (Fox Piven and Cloward 1993), is about regulating the poor, not for their own benefit, ‘but for the benefit of protecting work and family values and the corresponding modes of economic allocation and political entitlement’ (Schram 2000: 87).28 There is a growing political pressure to device new authoritarian forms of workfare and, among employers in particular, to extend the range of a deregulated low wage service sector, drawing labour from racialised internal labour reserves as well as from the global labour market. As observed by Chris Jones and Tony Novak (1999: ) in a comparative study of welfare-to-workfare strategies in the US and New Labour’s Britain, ‘work is promoted as the solution to a range of social issues and ‘problems’, but ‘with an apparent total amnesia of the damage that work has done to many people’. This may well be on its way to become a maxim for social- and employment policies all across the European Union.

The substantial erosion of the ideological foundations for social citizenship, which the redefinition of social exclusion/inclusion opens up for, may thus – seen in the perspective of the ongoing deregulation and recommodification of labour all over Europe - pave the way for a deterioration of the actual quality of employment and conditions of work. Given their systematic concentration in low pay and de- or non-regulated sections of the labour market, exacerbated through racialising stigmatisation

26 Black racial pride and class consciousness - embedded in a wider ongoing class struggle concerning the terms on which labour can be bought and sold – have often been conspicuously articulated in a submerged conflicts between racial and ethnic minority groups in the ‘ghetto’. This is vividly illustrated in Spike Lee’s film *Doing the Right Thing* and it formed one of the components of the Los Angeles uprising in 1992.

27 See, in particular, the work by Chris Jones and Tony Novak (1999) on Britain. Detailed discussion also in Schierup Schierup (2003c, Schierup 2003b). For a comparison of dimensions of the US and the British experience, see e.g. Sassen (1991) and King (1999).

28 See also the illuminating discussion of US debates on ‘welfare’ by Roche (1992)
and prevalent hiring practices, this affects, in particular, immigrants and new ethnic minorities. A one-dimensional emphasis on paid work in conjunction with a currently growing stigmatisation of welfare recipients may reinforce the pressure on immigrants and ethnic minorities to accept any working conditions, and thus deepen current tendencies towards a new type of racialised divisions of labour and welfare in Europe. To this comes important gender aspects. A one-sided emphasis on paid work and self-employment may exacerbate a predominant blindness to ‘unpaid work and its gendered distribution’ (Levitas 1998: 26 ff), which carries with it also particular predicaments of racialisation (e.g. Sassen 1991). It pertains not least to the conditions in the expanding sector of so-called ‘ethnic business’, where ‘invisible’ and ‘unpaid’ female and family work often plays an essential role as cheap labour under irregular and hazardous working conditions.29

‘Guest workers’, ‘welfare scroungers’, ‘illegals’

Certainly, the racialisation of European labour markets and welfare regimes is, as such, nothing new. But historical reality, and with it dominant political discourse, has gone through several phases of change since the commencement of post Second World War international migration to Western Europe.

The labour migrants in north-western and Central Europe of the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s were, in general, exploited as a second grade, racialised labour force (e.g. Nikolinakos 1973, Castles and Kosack 1973 and 1985, Castles 1984). They were handled as an opportune Konjunkturpuffer - to use a striking German term for their function as a convenient reserve army of labour - which could absorb the brunt of the booms and slumps of shifting economic cycles and who were slotted into the most unpleasant and non-rewarding jobs, niches and branches in, among other, the traditional manufacturing industries, in building and in municipal services. In major parts of Europe these socially stigmatised, so-called, ‘foreign workers’ or ‘guest workers’ were expected to remain temporary ‘birds of passage’ (Piore 1979), who would, in due time, return to their so-called ‘home-countries’. They would work and pay taxes in the industrial metropolises of Western Europe, but not make long term claims on their educational systems or welfare institutions and services.

Yet, the very universalism of most Western European citizenship regimes meant that immigrants could not, in the long run, be excluded from substantial rights of

29 E.g. Panayiotopoulos (1996), Lund (2000), Mitter (1986), Morokvasic (1993). A particularly penetrating analysis was made by Swasti Mitter (1986), who studied the intersection of class, race and gender in constituting a heavily exploited female labour force in new ‘ethnic’ sweatshops produced through restructuring of the English clothing industry during the 1980s (on this, see also Schierup 2003d).

30 I.e.: Britain, France, Germany, the Benelux countries, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway.
social citizenship (e.g. Ryner 2000, Guiraudon 2000), but were gradually incorporated as *de facto* denizens or as citizens with *de jure* as well as *de facto* social rights. This development was reinforced by employers’ actual needs for the stabilisation of large parts of the migrant sections of the labour force (e.g. Castles 1984); indispensable in particularly those least privileged parts of the labour market, which were most unattractive to national majorities seeking alternative paths of professional mobility and social status advance. But, notwithstanding the reality of a solidifying ethnic socio-professional hierarchy, many migrant workers also advanced into more qualified jobs and strategic process-monitoring or lower management positions. Although the, often protectionist and racialist, practices of established trade unions had a substantial responsibility for the ways in which a racial-ethnic hierarchy and an unequal ethnic division of labour was constituted and reproduced, and although their degree of solidarity with foreign workers can be questioned, they would in general, as a matter of enlightened self-interest, back up trends concerning the incorporation of ethnic minorities into established welfare regimes’ schemes of basic social rights and standards (e.g. Penninx and Roosblad 2000).

While, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the classical Fordist base industries went through restructuring, downsizing and internationalisation (e.g. Schierup 1985), a major part of the immigrant population were thus, during that same period, turning into ‘new ethnic minorities’ and factual citizens who were to be *Here for Good* (Castles 1984); a development substantiated trough a growing amount of family unifications and the gradual emergence of a ‘second generation’ of children of immigrants. This happened even in Germany, although the country only recently acknowledged this, not so new, reality in terms of changes in its official political rhetoric and formal laws on citizenship.

The new ethnic minorities belonged indeed to the most exposed and vulnerable part of the working class and the population. Migrant workers had been, initially, concentrated in those parts of the labour market that were subsequently, from the mid 1970s and during the 1980s, most severely hit by restructuring and that ensuing mass-unemployment,\(^{31}\) which has come to figure as the advanced European welfare states’ Achilles’ heel right into the present. The rate of unemployment and welfare dependency among immigrants and new ethnic minorities, until then everywhere marked by a higher rate of employment than among national majorities, became with the advent of the crisis of the 1970s everywhere disproportionately high (continuously two to three times higher than for ethnic majority citizens, even with the same labour market and class segments) and their rate of participation in the labour force decreased to exceedingly low levels.

\(^{31}\) For example, the detailed case study by Stephan Raes (Raes 2000) on migrant labour in the restructuring clothing industry of the Netherlands.
Dependent on place, a continued relatively high standard of unemployment compensation and social welfare transfers to those excluded from the workforce altogether was, obviously, matched by high thresholds of entry into the labour market. This was contingent on the practices of institutionalised regulation embedded in still powerful welfare regimes and upheld by the dominant wage and employment policiesfavoured by the labour unions. This, among other factors, acted, and still works, to block ready access to the labour market for unemployed and racialised immigrants, refugees and ethnic minority youth; a trend most apparent in countries like Germany and in Scandinavia with their strong labour movements and highly regulative welfare states (e.g. Schierup 1993). Incorporated into a factual state of social citizenship, a still relatively intact welfare system has been, however - as long as it has lasted - a ‘safe haven’ for the new ethnic minorities, just as ‘welfare’ was still for ‘redundant’ African Americans in the 1960s’ US ‘Great Society’.

The backside of this relative state of social security was, however, that - also similar to African Americans in the US - the new ethnic minorities of Europe, with their background in labour migration, should become the victims of the kind of reshuffled racialisation discourses taking sway in the 1980s. Together with new groups of asylum seekers and refugees they were, collectively (whether unemployed or not), to be routinely associated with inflated welfare dependency, the weighting down of municipal budgets, producing, by inference, destitute racial ‘underclass ghettos’, urban unrest and high rates of criminality. Welfare dependency and the ‘clientilisation of immigrants’ should, like in the US, become a favourite theme for neo-liberal neo-conservative critique directed against a supposedly authoritarian and pacifying welfare state, seen to be killing off the initiative and achievement of individuals and ethnic communities (e.g. Gür 1996). But it became also, within most of the old, economically advanced, immigration countries across north-western and central Europe, the basic raw material from which increasingly influential nationalist-populist movements have forged the racialising political discourses through which they speak in the name of the nation’s supposedly threatened ‘moral majority’ (e.g. Schierup 1993). Yet, the politics and raison d’être of these neo-racist and nationalist-populist movements are truly paradoxical, as they definitely act to legitimise the further dismantlement of the national welfare state, which they, generally, lament that ‘the foreigners’ are preying on and destroying (e.g. the critical arguments of Faist 1995, Martin 1997, Ryner 2000).

Governments, striving to contain populism, but in the same instance to meet employers’ demands for cheap and ‘flexible’ labour, open up the doors for new discriminatory employment practices, supposedly immune to a repetition of those ‘imperfections’ of earlier periods and policies that allowed immigrants’ settlement and their gradual incorporation into a status of denizen- or citizenship: short-term contract workers systems, elaborate international sub-contracting relationships, and an increasingly important non-documentated, or so-called ‘illegal’, labour immigra-
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tion, welcomed by certain employers and tacitly tolerated by public authorities (e.g. Hunger 2000, Martin 1997). Conceived of as measures to fence off social welfare institutions from the incremental incorporation of non members of the ‘club’, such revamped migrant labour regimes exacerbate, in conjunction with a general dismantlement of the universalist character of existing social policy arrangements, the uneven but nevertheless ongoing ‘Americanisation’ (Pierson 1998, Freeman 1986) – i.e. deregulation cum recommodification (e.g. Ryner 2000) - of European labour markets and welfare regimes; and thus they undercut the bargaining power of wide sections of the least privileged part of the population, even among the national majorities (e.g., the arguments of Faist 1995, Ryner 2000).

This works also to further jeopardise ethnic minorities’ inherently ambivalent relation to the welfare state (e.g. Ryner 2000). Stabilised sections of the migrant and ethnic minority population have – exposed to racism and discrimination and given their particularly vulnerable position on the labour market – had strong reasons to look towards the welfare state as a safety net. But as social citizenship deteriorates, due to the dismantlement of universalist social policy schemes, and as far as disciplinary workfare across Europe increasingly replaces compensatory social allowances or upgrading industrial retraining schemes, they and many of their children find themselves a situation, which is, in certain aspects, increasingly similar to that of temporary contract workers, the clandestine migrant workers, ganz unten (Wallraff 1985), or to that of the marginalised new refugee groups.

This is so, at least in the sense that they can no longer safely rely on relatively newly acquired rights of social citizenship, and are thus induced or forced to see their opportunities in the decreasing thresholds of entry effected by deregulation and informalisation of the labour market (e.g. Slavnic 2002). They become enrolled in the echelons of the new working poor helots (Cohen 1987), as – at one and the same time – chief victims of the welfare state crisis, and agents for that informalisation of the labour market and the economy, which represents one of the main dynamic economic strategies and social forces propelling the crisis in the first place. An increasing sense of ambivalence is not, however, reserved for immigrants and new ethnic minorities alone. The formal image and legally stipulated targets of a, would be and on paper, still generous welfare state may, as Zoran Slavnić (Slavnic 2000: 173-202) demonstrates in a persuasive analysis of the dilemmas of Scandinavian welfare bureaucracies in crisis, be upheld by, among other, actively encouraging and supporting immigrants’ and refugees’ inventive coping strategies, which combine sources of sustenance from shrinking public welfare budgets with those offered by a burgeoning underground economy.

The variation across the European Union is, however, huge. The Scandinavian social democratic welfare states represent one extreme, with their still - in spite of rapid change and differentiation of the reality of immigrants and ethnic minorities - rather one-sided public focus on welfare dependency as the supposed core of a so-
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called ‘immigrant problem’ (Schierup 1993). At the other extreme we may locate the southern European member states of Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, where ‘immigrants on welfare’ has never, so far, been a noteworthy social fact nor the kind of ‘immigrant problem’ at the centre of public attention. Here the focus is on those working poor others, who belong to a so-called - seen in the perspective of European post Second World War migratory history - ‘new immigration’ (e.g. Baldwin-Edwards 1999), publicly connected with clandestine migrant workers, a booming underground economy and - particularly in the racialising lore of ascending nationalist-populist movements - with a supposedly galloping criminalisation of society (e.g. Zincone 1999). These southern European ‘late-comers’ to the European migratory system and an emerging so-called ‘Fortress Europe’ may indeed – seen in the light of major contemporary trends in the political economy of racialised exclusion - be its most advanced members of club (Schierup 2003a); an augury to be taken particular notice of, when we discuss what contemporary post-Fordist configurations and reconfigurations of racialised exclusion in Europe are essentially about.

The complexity of ‘advanced marginality’

What Dahrendorf, and others with him, focused on during the early 1980s was, in particular, the social and political repercussions of the mass unemployment and subsequent welfare dependency resulting from crisis and restructuring in North-Atlantic economies setting off from the mid 1970s (Schierup 1985). However, during the 1980s and 1990s, the actual multiplicity of contemporary forms of social exclusion has become increasingly evident. The unemployed and welfare dependent among Europe’s new ethnic minorities have come to enjoy the company of a number of categories among the new working poor, to an increasing degree stigmatised and kept apart as ethnic or racial ‘others’.

These count everything from the undocumented workers on southern Europe’s large building sites to the ‘exotic’ women in Amsterdam’s iniquitous red light district. They include Western Europe’s so-called ‘new proletariat’ (Habib 2001), small self-employed ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ in subcontracted ‘sweatshops, the new ‘contract workers’ substituting a defamed Guest worker’s system, the Black housemaids tending middle class homes in Italy (Andall 2000) and the new asylum seekers forced into clandestine jobs due to deteriorating terms of protection and reception in presumptive ‘host-countries’.

These and other categories of working poor are all found to various extent in different member states of the European Union, depending on their particular political configuration and policies on migration and integration, their type of welfare regime, and the structure of their economies and labour markets.

32 An innovative theoretical perspective on the new working poor, international migration and ethnic relations was raised by Saskia Sassen (e.g. 1991, 1998) in a number of important works. Schierup (2003b) discusses strengths and weaknesses of the Sassenian approach.
Immigrants and ethnic minorities, and especially immigrant and ethnic minority women, are – across the Union - heavily overrepresented in new service jobs marked by odd working times, non-regulated working conditions, and lack of social security benefits. In southern Europe, in particular, public attention, and that of researchers as well, is on the contingencies and consequences of undocumented migration and the extensive employment of immigrants in the irregular economy. This is, however, since long an extended practice also in countries like Germany, France and Holland, and rapidly growing phenomenon in Britain and Scandinavia, where the irregular economy draws labour, partly from among racialised populations squeezed by a deteriorating welfare system (e.g. Slavnic 2002) and partly through a growing undocumented immigration. With their exposed position, these and a range of other categories among the new working poor are excluded from essential dimensions of citizenship.

These new working poor European others share with their North American contemporaries, what the French sociologist, Loïc Wacquant (1996b) has called advanced marginality. This signifies that their lives and their exclusion are formed by conditions that belong to the novel and most advanced political and economic configurations rather than representing the imperfections of a passing order. But in this respect they are no different from the contemporary poor on welfare.

In other papers (Schierup 2003b, 2003c, 2003d) we have analysed the actual complexity of this development. We argue there that any analysis, focusing on poverty or social exclusion as an issue, which pertains to a single social category in isolation - like, for example, the ‘welfare dependent’ so-called ‘ghetto poor’ or, alternatively the new migrant ‘working poor’ - does, not merely, simplify the matter. It eschews or distorts the dynamics of different, but mutually interdependent, processes of racialised exclusion, which should be analysed together in their contingency on wider globalising ‘political economies of exclusion’, deregulated labour markets and refractory welfare regimes on the wane. In this perspective the matter of social inclusion becomes much wider than simply one of employment or entrepreneurship. It emerges as part and parcel of the more comprehensive issue of citizenship in a situation where, as brought forward by Dahrendorf (1985), Fox Piven and Cloward

33 See, for example, the edited volumes on immigration in southern Europe by Anthias et al. (1999) King et al (2000) and Marin Baldwin-Edwards(1999).

34 For example, the study, Migrants’ Insertion in the Informal Economy (Reyneri et al. 1999), which is a detailed TSER report on migration and the informal economy in Southern Europe, including a comparison with parts of Northern Europe.

35 Representing preparatory work to be included in a more comprehensive analysis of a contemporary European Dilemma (Schierup et al. 2004 (in preparation)).

36 Criticising and contextualising the arguments of, respectively, Wilson (e.g. 1987), Sassen (e.g.1991) and Waldinger (1996).
(1997) and others, the social compacts that carried up the established national welfare states are dwindling or collapsing.

The US example, referred to above, is particularly illustrative of this complexity and interdependency (Schierup 2003b). Studies like that of Fox Piven and Cloward (1993) or Desmond King (1999), bring out clearly that the old Marxist thesis embodied in the theory of the ‘reserve army of labour’ in capitalism, telling that unemployment is always a relative phenomenon, is still not obsolete. Their analyses demonstrate that the welfare poor are hardly superfluous in any absolute sense. That ‘work disappears’ (paraphrasing Wilson 1997) and jobs continue to remain unavailable, as contended in well known US discourses on the so-called (black) ‘urban underclass’ or the welfare dependent ‘ghetto poor’ (e.g. Wilson 1978, 1987, 1993), is indeed the expression of a state in a struggle for rights of citizenship and for the terms on which labour may be sold and bought on the market, rather than the manifestation of any absolute surplus of (low skilled) labour.

The character and function of the black, so-called urban ‘ghetto’ depends largely on the relationship of forces in that struggle. When racialised minority groups hold a strong political position they may be able to withhold their labour from unfavourable sections of a racially divided, discriminatory labour market. The ‘ghetto’ may function as a political resource and a stronghold of social and political citizenship as often started to become the case under the terms of the ‘Great Society’ in the big cities of the US during the 1960s (e.g. Fox Piven and Cloward 1993). But, when minorities, and African Americans in particular, became weak and dispersed, when new political constellations became in a position to exploit ever present potentials of racialisation, and when new exceedingly unfavourable terms of negotiation were set by economic restructuring, spatial relocation and globalisation, in terms of internationalising the labour market through increasing capital mobility as well as large scale and continuous immigration of low wage labour, the ghetto became an increasingly stigmatised hell-hole with the disciplinary function of deterring anybody attempting to withhold her labour from the sub-standard jobs on a labour market, where employers hold the upper hand.

Thus, subjected to the terms of the particular low wage strategy, backed by the new immigration, that came to mark wide sections of the US labour market during the 1980s, the black urban ghetto became increasingly a depressed and haunted labour reserve. Here the disciplinary function of ‘workfare’ has become effectively boosted by that of the prison. With the mass-incarceration of the poor – hitting on poor Black Americans to an extremely disproportionate degree37 - the former ghetto’s ‘ethnoracial prison’ is, as argued and documented by Wacquant (e.g. 2000, 2002),

37 The lifelong cumulative probability of doing time in a state or federal prison is, as estimated on the basis of the imprisonment rates of the early 1990s, 4% for whites, 16% for Latinos and 29% for blacks (according to Wacquant 2002: 43, quoting, Bonczar and Beck 1997:1).
Christian Parenti (Parenti 2000) and others, being systematically transformed into the prison’s surrogate ‘judicial ghetto’ (Wacquant 2000). With the privatisation of prisons and the introduction of the privatised prisons into the stock-market and with the increasingly commercialised character of forced prison labour, a new post-Fordist mode of the slave economy became de facto reintroduced in the United States less than 150 years after its formal abolishment under the auspices of humanism and mass industrialism. An important difference is, however, that it is now no longer restricted to the Southeast, but is as present in the North and the West. Institutionalised within the framework of the so-called prison-industrial complex the private prison corporations operate under ‘ideal business conditions’ (Parenti 1996: 232). They are guaranteed a labour supply at absurdly low wages, receive direct government subsidies and have a guaranteed market.

The rising demands and political movements of the Black American ghetto and African Americans’ rejection of the new ‘slave jobs’, belonging to the post-Fordist service economy, has been curbed. In the same fell swoop, American employers have, through workfare and the prison’s new slave economy, managed to exploit the gradual conversion of poor African Americans from welfare recipients to labour reserve for cutting the prise of labour even more, and thus indirectly to impair the bargaining power of wider groups of working poor (African Americans, Asians, Latin American and white alike); workers, who already before the 1990s’ rapid expansion of the wage depressing prison-industrial economy’s ‘bloody Taylorism’ had a weak position on a changing US labour market.

Thus, by the turn of the millennium, the relationship between the ‘restructured’ black ghetto and the ‘new economy’s’ low wage pole, run by cheap immigrant labour, had, in a somewhat ironical way, become reversed. State subventioned workfare programmes and the prison economy, replacing the ‘welfare refuge’, have become additional levers for wage-dumping in a dualised post-Fordist economy.

Like in the contemporary United States the European situation is marked by multiple modes of racialised exclusion and different categories among the excluded cannot be seen in isolation. They are mutually interdependent, embedded in complex ethnic divisions of labour. Extended areas of chronic social disadvantage and

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38 See, in particular, the edited volume by Marc Mauer (2002)
39 In, for example, California subject to the so-called Prison Industry Authority (PIA) (Parenti 1999:232).
40 As commonly labelled by ghetto inhabitants (Wacquant 2002: 54).
41 Term originally coined by Liepitz (1987) for describing the particularly rude character of industrial relations marking the Taylorist production processes ‘exported’ to low wage ‘newly industrialising countries’ after the great leap in Western industrial restructuring processes from the mid 1970s onwards.
42 See, for example, Waldinger (1996), Fox Piven and Cloward (1993) and Carnoy(1994). Contemporary ethnic divisions of labour and the political economy of racialised exclusion in the USA and different member states of the EU are analysed in a comparative perspective by Schierup (2003b, 2003c)
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welfare dependency are ever-potential ‘incubators’ for working activities that are ‘precarious and underpaid and systematically performed by women, immigrants and disadvantaged minorities’ (Mingione 1996a: 382). The extension of areas of low pay, casual, and precarious jobs, performed by exposed minorities and other groups excluded from substantive rights of citizenship, is, in turn, apt to put pressure on welfare institutions and to support political programmes for dismantling the function of social citizenship as a sanctuary and defence of the exposed against market forces.\(^{43}\)

This kind of development and interdependency is everywhere contingent on labour market deregulation, new flexibility regimes, the growth of an informal economic sector and the irregular sector of the labour market. Similar processes of economic restructuring and labour market deregulation have racialising effects and shape unequal ethnic divisions of labour all across the European Union. Yet, particular modes of racialised exclusion are forged depending upon the dynamics of the political economy and social struggles in local and national institutional settings, exposed to global pressures. The concrete forms of intersection of different faces of marginality vary, depending on the character of the welfare regime in each single country or groups of countries, and on their policies of migration and incorporation.

**Towards a new social compact?**

Social citizenship and the welfare state are, like any dimension of citizenship, the result of social struggles and based on particular political, institutional and structural assumptions and preconditions (Bottomore 1996, Giddens 1982). Like any achievement in citizenship, attempts to develop an inclusive multiethnic welfare society is vulnerable to radical social and economic change and, in the last instance, contingent on the sustainability of established or the renewed formation of powerful political compromises and coalitions (e.g. Carnoy 1994).

We see, currently, under headings like ‘social cohesion’, ‘social inclusion’, ‘transnational partnerships’, the ‘mobilisation of civil society’, ‘empowerment from below’, ‘combating racism and discrimination through structural and institutional changes’, the emerging contours of a *new European social project*; beyond the homogenizing class organisations belonging to industrial Fordism and beyond the centralised national welfare state. New EU policy-frameworks and methods and grand transnational anti-discriminatory development programmes are designed and

\(^{43}\) A number of important case studies from different countries and local settings in Europe and in North America was collected by Mingione (1996b) in the volume *Urban Poverty and the Underclass*. See also the complex analysis of US politics on work deregulation, welfare, and workfare by Fox Piven and Cloward (1993).
launched top down. They appeal for the bottom up mobilisation of a long range of movements and networks of ‘civil society’. This still, like in the traditional ‘social partnership’ of the established welfare state, include the trade unions, but without, any more, conceding these their, once, self-evidently privileged position. New policy-frameworks endeavour to merge ‘civil society’ and voluntary associations into ‘development partnerships’ with local and regional government, business, centres of learning and science. This overall process is supposed to embrace ‘diversity’, in terms of gender, ethnic background, etc., as a central conceptual hub and as a target for practice.

We could see all of these currently emerging anti-racist programmes, institutions and declarations of intent from the European Commission, and their increasingly regular embeddedness within major treaties and transnational framework agreements, as one important new feature of processes of renegotiation of the overall social compacts of citizenship and welfare which, in all their national variation, have dominated the member states of the European Union since the Second World War. We may further see this as signifying emerging elements of a more inclusive ‘European Creed’ and process of identity formation, professing a qualified and differentiated liberal approach through its stress on ‘diversity’ and the need to combat discrimination – racial and other – in particular local situations and with a professed will to address the conditions of disadvantaged groups in their institutional and structural embeddedness. This is accompanied, moreover, by a multitude of actual day-to-day practices for ‘diversity’ and directed against racial and other forms of discrimination.

A truly promising and encouraging development. The stress on local commitment and civil involvement addresses key problems, which emerged as constraints for the realisation of a substantive community of citizens during the heyday of heavily bureaucratised and often inflexible welfare states, not so well equipped for accommodating increasing cultural diversity, complex identities and differentiating social needs. Yet, seen in a wider perspective, the question and innate dilemma is whether the baby may not in the end risk to be lost with the bathwater. That is if the wider sense of the ‘social dimension’, closely connected with a universalistic liberal-democratic conception of citizenship as an inseparable complex of unconditional rights, will vanish in the mist in favour of fragmented, localised and parochial projects and partnerships targeted at a narrowly conceived inclusion into employment or the engagement in small business. In a possible negative scenario, with no overall social vision or broad democratic representation guiding the process, these ‘partnerships’ may become just the vehicles for transforming the right to welfare into the (unconditional) duty to work; the end of the ‘social dimension’ rather than its reaffirmation.

Seen in this perspective, the contemporary European dilemma of racialisation is centred between an incipient contemporary ‘creed’, manifest in an emerging EU supra-national policy agenda for combating racialised exclusion, and a current politi-
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cal discourse and *realpolitik*, which may potentially disconnect the important link between the issue of social exclusion/inclusion and the more general question of citizenship and social welfare.

In North-Western Europe, even the *Gastarbeiter* or the *travailleur emigré* of post Second World War Western Europe lacked often fundamental rights of citizenship in the countries where they worked, but their mode of employment and social trajectory differed in general from what has become typical for substantial parts of a multifarious *new immigration* of the 1980s and 1990s. Our times’ racialised working poor are socially marginal, but essential cogwheels serving the much hailed *flexibility* of the production and labour regimes and the new service economies characteristic of current processes of restructuring. As the broad class based organisations characteristic for the established European welfare states increasingly loose their integrative power for economy and society, ‘multiculturalism’ or ‘diversity’, which have become important idioms for the self-understanding of contemporary North Atlantic societies, emerged from the early 1970s as a coded language obscuring new fragmented divisions of labour and a so-called ‘network economy’ harbouring multiple new forms of racialised exclusion.

But this does not necessarily mean that the particularism of equally fragmented and multifarious social and employment programmes, beyond any socially grounded universalism, must or can be the overall answer. We should scrutinise the long-sighted prospects of the European employment and social policy agenda, together with its new strongly voiced anti-racist/anti-discrimination dimension, as vehicles for ‘empowerment’ in the perspective of today’s more general problems of the erosion of frameworks for substantial citizenship. Without, so far, any broader alternative in sight, which may effectively confront the challenges of economic globalisation and the prevalent ‘deregulation’ strategies, the issue of citizenship, and in particular that of social citizenship, must in turn be dealt with in its contingency with new economic regimes, structurally bounded ethnic divisions of labour, and the crumbling of the established compacts on social welfare between capital and labour. Here a cross-Atlantic analytical perspective is as important as ever.

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