INTEGRATION INTO VERTICAL MOSAIC –

REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY OF INTEGRATION POLICY,
IMER RESEARCH AND JOURNALISM IN SWEDEN SINCE THE 1960s

Keywords:
integration, discrimination, IMER research, integration policy

Norrköping, Wednesday, 15 October 2008
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Abstract

During the 1960s immigrants were normally called “foreigners” in the Swedish press, and were usually described in a way that would nowadays be considered not only as politically incorrect but also as flagrantly racist and xenophobic. This way of representing immigrants in the Swedish media changed radically at the beginning of 1970s. The word “foreigner” was replaced by “immigrant” in most newspaper articles, and the media started to represent immigrants in a manner that resembles current politically correct media discourse. This paper discusses, first, the reasons for this discursive shift, in the context of the evolution of the Swedish integration and integration policy that was initiated at the end of 1960s, and, second, the related development of international migration and ethnic relations (IMER) research in Sweden. Finally, the paper presents some reflections on the current state of relations between Swedish integration policy and Swedish IMER research.
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Perhaps the slogans of 1974\(^1\) were

nothing but slogans – empty declarations. (Westin, 1996)

In 2002 I took on the task of writing a short story about guest workers from Finland and former Yugoslavia who during the 1960s and 1970s lived and worked in the small industrial town of Finnspång, near Norrköping, in Sweden. Apart from a number of interviews, I had been systematically reading issues of a local newspaper, Folkbladet Östgöten (FÖ), from 1965–75. Two aspects of the newspaper’s coverage of guest workers attracted my attention. First, it employed discursive practices that would nowadays be considered not only as politically incorrect but also as flagrant examples of racism and xenophobia. Second, this discourse of social exclusion suddenly stopped around 1969–70, when FÖ started to represent immigrants in a manner that resembles current politically correct media discourses.

The aim of this chapter is, first, to provide a brief sketch of the prevailing image of guest workers mediated by FÖ during the 1960s, by citing selected quotations from the newspaper. Second, this image will be related to the earlier tradition of nation building in Sweden, as well as to the later evolution of integration and integration policy on the one hand and the related development of international migration and ethnic relations (IMER) research in Sweden on the other. Most of the quotations from FÖ are about Finnish and Yugoslav guest workers. This is partly because these were the largest immigrant groups at that time in

\(^1\) Freedom of choice, partnership, equality
the Norrköping / Finnspång region, and partly because my research was at the time focused on these two immigrant groups. I do not know whether, or to what extent, the image of immigrants from the 1960s presented and discussed in this article is typical of the general image of immigrants that was being presented in the Swedish media at that time. But it seems that my account of these medial discourses corresponds in many respects with the findings of other relevant studies in this field (Hultén, 2001; 2006; 2007; Brune, 2004).

Foreigners as ‘a danger to public security, order and morality’
during the 1960s

Although guest-worker immigration to Sweden was driven in the first place by the economic interests of Swedish big business, political and public life was dominated by the debate on whether any labour needed to be imported at all. Opponents of labour immigration argued that the existing national labour force should be more rationally used, in the first place by employing women to a greater extent, by re-educating unemployed workers, and so on. A significant number of passages in FÖ are part of this debate. The following quotation is an example of this:

‘Foreigners a threat to the wage standard’ – At the moment there are approximately 250 000 foreigners in the country, 150 000 of whom are employed, and industry constantly cries for more. At the same time 40 000–50 000 Swedish men are without a job. What is more, in Sweden we have hidden unemployment among approximately 150 000 women who, according to the Swedish Trade Union Confederation’s research department, do want to join the labour market. Since women ... appear to be as capable as men of handling any kind of job, we seem to have an unutilized labour-power reserve of approximately 200 000 persons. Why should we then import foreign labour-power at all? (FÖ, 660303)
Another important feature of the media’s image of immigrants was that immigrants posed a problem for, among others, the authorities. Typical headlines in FÖ were ‘Foreigners in Sweden – an adjustment problem’ (FÖ, 660117) and ‘Paragraphs meaningless – foreigners cannot understand Swedish’. Here is an illustrative quotation:

‘Legal clauses are meaningless. Foreigners can’t understand Swedish’ – The Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman quoted a statement by a senior enforcement officer, who answered something like: What is the point of letting foreigners be informed in those particular cases when our decision differs from what they stated in their income-tax returns? They do not understand Swedish and even less do they comprehend whether they have been taxed incorrectly. Formally it is always our duty to inform those concerned, even those who have not submitted any income-tax return. But the value of sending such information to foreign employees is open to discussion. (FÖ, 660118)

Immigrants were represented as a problem not only for the authorities but also for society as a whole, since they were depicted as morally problematic persons inclined to acts of deception and crime. The following quotation is illustrative of this:

‘Foreigner secured clothes for himself by trickery’ – A foreigner appeared last Wednesday in the district court, charged with gross fraud and forgery....

During June he tried to claim 651 crowns by falsifying a health insurance certificate. The dates were changed in order to prolong his period of sick leave by one month. ... After that he bought a suit in the one of the town’s clothes stores. By claiming to be a member of the men’s clothes club, he paid only 100 crowns for a suit worth 280 crowns. The fraud was revealed when the owner of the store attempted to collect the balance. (FÖ, 650127)
As well as a threat to public morality and citizens’ material security, immigrants were regarded even as a threat to public health:

‘Foreigners in Norrköping are mostly affected by venereal disease’ – As far as venereal disease is concerned, the town’s medical officer reported that the number of patients with infectious diseases of this kind increased compared with last year. Among teenagers gonorrhoea is relatively common. Like last year, the proportion of foreigners is significant. Many foreigners obviously still have not acclimatized to the country. Instead they lead a rootless way of life, loafing on street corners and in pubs, as their only source of pleasure and recreation. (FÖ, 671222)

An obvious detail that characterizes these long passages is that guest workers are called ‘foreigners’ rather than ‘immigrants’. To paraphrase a headline in FÖ from 1965\(^2\), their only fault was that they were not Swedes. Besides, a great number of articles in FÖ from that time adopt a sort of mocking, ironic tone towards these people, treating them as if they were not to be taken seriously. Here is an example:

‘A fiery foreigner arrested by police’ – In order to court a desirable but cold-hearted woman, he rushed in a taxicab through Norrköping and continued towards the goal of his dreams: the town of Söderköping. But when he arrived at his lady friend’s residence, he was refused admittance. He knocked at the door and he even broke one window. But he shouldn’t have done this, since his lady friend was being visited by her daughter accompanied by her fiancé, and it all ended with the fiery man being hit on the head with a chair. The police came and took care of the man, who had tried in vain to hide in a nearby ditch. He

\(^2\) ‘Invisible iron curtain in Hults factory. Trouble with Finns is: They are not Swedes’ (FÖ, Jan. 18 1965)
was taken to hospital, where his two minor cuts were treated, before police officers took a closer look at his papers. (FÖ, 660225)

This attitude, whereby immigrants are treated as immature, unreliable, unpredictable people who are not amenable to reason, had the consequence that even in those FÖ stories where immigrants were themselves exposed to violence and crime, they were rarely considered as victims but rather as part of the problem.

‘A Swede threatened foreigners with a knife’ – On Saturday afternoon two Yugoslavs were leaving a restaurant in downtown Norrköping when they encountered three Swedes who were on their way into the restaurant. At once one of the trio head-butted one of the foreigners, and when they rightfully protested, they were threatened by one of those three racists with knife. In such situations foreigners simply run away, while the situation in which the cocky trio wouldn’t feel so superior is still to come. (FÖ, 670527)

What is interesting in this passage is its general perspective on the event described. The first thing the reader learns is that certain Swedes threatened a couple of foreigners with a knife. From this fact it by no means follows that all Swedes necessarily tend to wield knives against foreigners, but at the same time it is not against the natural order of things either when Swedes sometimes threaten foreigners with knives. What is more, it is nothing unnatural for some Swedes to be racists; that is, Swedes normally do not wield knives and are not racists, except when they meet foreigners, in which case they might happen to wield knives and become racists. In other words, it is foreigners who by their mere presence sometimes provoke some Swedes to threaten them with knives and behave like racists. Another important thing we learn about the foreigners is that, when it came to the crunch, they just ran away. The reader is not given the opportunity to interpret this as a normal reaction on the part of peaceful citizens trying to avoid unnecessary conflict with problematic trouble-seekers in a
public place. Instead, their reaction is presented as an example of weak behaviour typical of people without character. A similar atmosphere is generated in the following passage:

‘A foreigner tried to flee a juvenile gang in Norrköping. He was knocked down at police station door.’ – It was a May 5th late night in King’s street. A foreigner was on his way home from a dance party, when suddenly a twenty-year-old man, together with his friend, who was annoyed after they had waited in vain for a couple of girls they were supposed to have date with, stumbled on him from some street door. When he faced the southern man, he started right away. ‘Nigger’, he yelled, and blocked his path. The foreigner, who could not understand any Swedish, said something and supposed that the encounter was over. But the twenty-year-old man attacked him and they ’whirled round’, as an eyewitness put it later. The foreigner ran away, but he was attacked again elsewhere in the same street, and in the end, when he ran all the way to the police station’s big front door, he was knocked down and remained lying unconscious. The gang around him had grown to six young men. – ‘All six were kicking him’, one eyewitness said. This person was also the one who rushed into the police station, asking for help. When police came around the corner, the sextet had of course already disappeared. …The foreigner was helped from the police station’s inhospitable front door to hospital, where he was treated for a couple of minor cuts on his face. His body, however, was black and blue all over. But he was so afraid of losing his job that he did not report sick, although he felt pain all over his body a couple of weeks. (FÖ, 681016)

Here we have an even better example. An innocent person was attacked and without any reason beaten up by six assailants. To be fair, this fact is clearly presented in the story. However, as in the previous example, the voice of the victim is not present. There is not even
a trace of empathy towards, or solidarity with, the victims of the violence in these stories, either in the way in which storytellers write about them or in the quoted testimonies of witnesses. Victims are implicitly treated as a part of the problem. If they had not been foreigners and if they had not found themselves at that time in that place, the problem would never have arisen. The fact that the victim in the second example did not report sick was not presented as an act of responsibility towards his job and loyalty towards his employer, but rather ironically as suggesting that he was slightly stupid, so as it is no wonder that he was beaten up.

Situations where immigrants have been exposed to ethnic discrimination are presented in a similar way. Their voices are usually absent, while at the same time the voices of those who are agents of discrimination are mediated without any restrictions or additional comment. Here is an example:

‘Why are foreigners used to being turned out of our pubs?’ – Five Yugoslavs enter a pub in Norrköping. There are already a handful of cheerful Swedish young people. The Yugoslavs sit around a table. The Swedish youth, for no obvious reason, start jeering at them: Bloody foreigners, go back to Yugoslavia! Then a waitress arrives and the Yugoslavs are being turned out of the pub. When they protest in surprise, she threatens to call the police. Finally they choose to leave the pub. At the same time the Swedish youth are undisturbed and allowed to remain where they were. This happened in one of Norrköping’s pubs some time during this year. And this is not a unique episode. The owner of the above-mentioned pub said that he was not particularly happy with Yugoslavs. We have had a trouble with Yugoslavs. They are noisy people, who give an impression of always trying to be superior. They want to sit in here without ordering anything, and do not listen to what they are
being told. I do not know about this particular case, but I understand the
waitress. They are so many that we are not at all happy about it. I wish they
would simply disappear. If only they were like ordinary people. But they seem
not to be able to adapt themselves. – The authorities should make sure that they
work, but as far as one can see now many of them are on sick leave. – I don’t
have anything against foreigners in general. But Yugoslavs in particular seem
to be especially troublesome. (FÖ, 660314)

To be sure, I have found a couple of passages in which immigrants had an opportunity
to express their opinions about their lives in Sweden. The following quotation concerns their
experience of discrimination:

‘No, the dreamland is not here – Young foreigners miss their homes and joy
where nobody is being disturbed’ – ... Yugoslavs are good workers – at least
most of them – Swedish industry needs us – but during time off work there is no
place for ‘bloody foreigners’, Zivorad said. Nowhere to be, nowhere to go,
nobody to talk to us. ... Foreigners are welcome, but not beyond Swedes’
doorsteps. And to work. During the rest of the time in between, however, we
should preferably not exist at all. ... As an example, a handful of us chaps were
standing in front of a shop window downtown. Then a policeman came and told
us to move on. We should always move a little bit up or a little bit down the
street. This is a free country and people can be wherever they want, except
where they are at any particular moment. (FÖ, 660113)

I shall now try to sum up this image of immigrants as mediated by FÖ during the
1960s. It is perhaps best to begin with a brief discussion about relevant notions that
systematically recur in the passages quoted. As mentioned, notions of immigration and
integration that came to be used in political and medial discourses a couple of years later
(1969/70) are almost completely absent. Instead, the dominant notions were ‘foreigner’ (utlänning) and ‘assimilation’ or ‘adaptation’ (anpassning). These semantic differences are actually quite illustrative not only of the political, medial and public attitudes towards immigrants that were dominant at that time, but primarily of the understanding of the main principles of nationhood, the issue of who has and who has not the right to be a member of the nation. So an immigrant may be defined as a person who does not originate in this country, but as a matter of fact now permanently lives here and is recognized as a member of the society. In contrast, a foreigner may be defined as a person who does not originate in this country but who happens to be here temporarily, and in no way can be regarded as a member of the society.

The situation is similar with regard to the relationship between the notions of integration and assimilation. Integration is defined as ‘melting together dissimilar parts into a whole, often with the focus on levelling out the differences’ (Norsteds Swedish Dictionary (Svensk ordbok), 1990: 432), while assimilation is ‘transformation in order to become more similar to the surroundings, normally through incorporation into something larger’ (Ibid:37).

From this way of using language it is possible to draw conclusions on two discursive levels. First, at the institutional level immigrants are implicitly defined as ‘collective non-Swedes’ (Demker and Malmström, 1999:102), as unfamiliar space invaders within the Swedish national body that usually only cause problems both for other members of the society and for the authorities. A successfully implemented adaptation process would of course be the best solution for these problems. But, as can be seen in the above-presented quotations, there is a sort of doubt whether such a process can actually be successful, because immigrants are either unable or unwilling to adapt to Swedish society.

The second discursive level that we discuss here may be called the discourses of everyday life. Ylva Brune (2004) argues in her dissertation that news journalism in its daily
practices often proceeds from some sort of preconceived readers’ common sense, that is, the established way in which they understand certain social phenomena. In this respect, and based on the above-presented quotations, we may conclude that FÖ’s representation of immigrants during the 1960s is not very different from the image of ‘Lapps, Finns, gypsies [and tattare], Jews, and idiots...\(^3\), which dominated the Swedish press during the period between the two world wars\(^4\). For example, the newspaper *Skonska Dagbladet* in 1923 depicted ‘tattare’ as ‘godless, thievish … individuals … who are not amenable to reason, who … constantly were a source of fright, annoyance and disgust for all law-abiding citizens” (quoted in Hazell, 2002: 124). In our case, even though guest workers in Sweden during the 1960s had on average a higher level of employment than native Swedes, they were often represented in FÖ as a vagrants who (to continue our associative comparison with discourses from the 1930s) ‘hang around without any intention of looking for some sort of decent job, and moreover have a way of life that necessarily constitutes a danger to public security, order and morality’ (Ibid:77). This way of treating these people without any compassion, even in those situations when they are victims of crime, and the fact that there is almost no place where they are welcome define them systematically and exclusively as a ‘socially inferior element in society’ (Ibid:125), which in fact needs to be removed from the Swedish national body as soon as possible.

This has been a brief description of the time when both Swedish immigrant politics and IMER research came into being. In this context, we should also take into account the influence of the Swedish National Institute for Race Biology in Uppsala\(^5\) not only on academic, political and medial discourses but also on public opinion. At the same time it was not easy to establish new ideas on these issues. The first serious debate on Swedish immigrant

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\(^3\) Paraphrase of the title in Rogers and Nelson (2003).

\(^4\) On the similarities between these two press discourses, see Hultén (2001) and Molina (2001).

\(^5\) This institute existed between 1922 and 1959 (Broberg, 1995), which means that it was closed down only a couple of years before the FÖ articles that are analysed in this paper were written.
and minority policy was initiated by David Schwarz in the newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* in 1964, where he critically scrutinized traditional Swedish assimilatory policy and pleaded for cultural pluralism. The following passage is illustrative of how this debate looked in FÖ:

‘There is only one race. People are only a sort of collection of bastards’ – *Humankind is and has always been a sort of collection of bastards*, Associate Professor Joachim Israel said in his introductory speech at the Counties Educational Association’s international course on race issues, which took place at Marieborgs public high school over the weekend. Associate Professor Israel was responsible for the theoretical lecture ‘The Race Problem in the Light of Science’, while the Dean, Gunnar Helander, concluded the course with a lecture on the social, economic as well as political consequences of racial prejudice... People from all over the County attended the course, including guests and speakers from a number of African countries, USA and India. (FÖ, 660912)

There are two things that we learn from this quotation. The first is the way in which Joachim Israel tries to call into question the existing popular understanding of race and race relations. He tries to be provocative in order to draw popular attention to his ideas and thereby spark the necessary public debate about them. The second important feature of the quotation, however, is the manner in which the author of the article writes about his theory, especially as it is articulated in the headline. The ’new’ view on race is represented as something that is in opposition not only to actual popular understanding of the matter but also to common sense. This example is also illustrative of the general atmosphere in which the new Swedish integration policy started to take shape.

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6 For a more detailed account on Schwarz’s more than 30-year-long engagement in the debate on Swedish immigrant and minority policy, see Román (1994).
Foreigners become immigrants – birth of the new integration policy
and IMER research

Before we consider the development of Swedish integration policy, something needs to be said about its guest-worker policy. In fact, Sweden had never had a formal policy dealing with guest-worker immigration (Castles, 1987). The recruitment and ‘import’ of labour was almost exclusively planned, organized and carried out by employers themselves. According to Hammar (1999), this was a sort of market system of labour import, which was controlled by trade unions, while at the same time the government used not to interfere in these matters. This system was formally changed in 1972, when the active recruitment of foreign labour was suddenly stopped after a short recession in February 1972. Interestingly, this radical policy turn was based not on a formal decision of either parliament or government, but simply on the Swedish Trade Union Confederation’s veto on the further import of labour (Ibid.) The period that followed this event was characterized by an increasingly restrictive immigration policy on the one hand, and, on the other hand, growing efforts to develop a new integration policy oriented towards those immigrants who were already living in the country.

This shift in policy was, in my opinion, set in motion by three contradictions that increasingly characterized Swedish political reality at that time. First, it became obvious that guest workers had come to stay7. In this respect the generally negative attitude towards immigrants described above, together with actual policies of assimilation that increasingly appeared to be inappropriate, tended to seriously damage social order in the long run. The second contradiction was between existing practices of marginalization of immigrants on the one hand and, on the other hand, inclusive political principles that integrated those citizens who were perceived as ‘really’ members of the Swedish nation. The third important challenge was related to the fact that at that time Sweden was trying to establish a new political profile

7 This fact was recognized not only in Sweden but in other European receiving countries (see Castles, 1987).
at the international level. Indeed, Sweden tried to conduct an active international policy that not only was based on principles of national self-determination, democracy and human rights, but also adopted a clear stance against the international hegemony of the great powers (Demker and Malmström, 1999:13). Such an active international policy had the effect that Sweden’s actual political influence at the international level far exceeded its real political, economic and demographic capacity. However, this international policy of ‘bridge building’ and ‘example setting’ (Ibid: 24) was in sharp contradiction with the treatment of immigrants at the national level. These three challenges pressured the authorities to do something in order to develop a new, more inclusive integration policy.

And so the new integration policy began to take shape. In fact, these processes had started as early as in the mid-1960s. In their historic overview of Swedish integration policy, Thomas Hammar and Charles Westin (2002) call the period between 1964 and 1975 the ‘policymaking’ period. An important event during this period happened in 1969, when the Swedish Immigration Authority (SIV) was established. Its role was related not only to the control the immigration, but also to citizenship issues and immigrants’ ‘adaptation’ (as it was still called at that time) to Swedish society (Demker and Malmström, 1999). The new integration measures included language education, measures aimed at helping children’s integration into the Swedish school system, home language education for children, local immigrant councils, financial support for immigrant associations, and so on. The way in which immigrants were represented in the media changed radically, becoming more nuanced, while at the same time xenophobic and hostile voices against these people were toned down. The more liberal political discourse as well as the humanistic scientific argument related to these issues also obtained more coverage in the media. This was true even of FÖ. The word ‘foreigner’ (utlänning) almost disappeared from the columns of this newspaper, while at the same time stories about immigrants covered the activities of immigrant associations, the
culture of different immigrants groups, as well as policy measures that had been taken to make it easier for immigrants to become integrated into Swedish society. Typical headlines in FÖ from this period were ‘Language education during the working time’ (700212); ‘Yugoslav children’s books exhibition in Finspång. Immigrant children have to have the opportunity to read fairy tales in their own language’ (741109); ‘Female immigrants are offered language education’ (710306); ‘Trade unions’ information for immigrants should be better’ (710224).

Another important topic that frequently recurred in FÖ from the beginning of the 1970s was gestures of friendship between Swedes and immigrants. The following quotation is about such gestures among youth:

‘International Evening at the Social Democrat’s Youth Association’ – In the spirit of friendship, in a pleasant atmosphere and with the hope of more parties of this kind in the future, approximately 50 young people met each other last Wednesday at SSU’s office in Norrköping. They got together under the theme ‘International Evening’, they sang together, they played different kinds of ethnic music and they talked to each other in an atmosphere of genuine familiarity. ... Finns, Greeks, Yugoslavs, Lebanese and Czechs as well as Swedes of course. The initiator of this get-together was SSU, and there is an expectation of more such parties in the future. (FÖ, 701217)

The passage witnesses a radical U-turn in FÖ’s discursive practices concerning immigrants. Expressions such as ‘international get-togethers’, ‘brotherhood of people from different cultures’, ‘conversation in an atmosphere of friendship and familiarity’ were all in sharp opposition to the vocabulary used only a couple of years before, when immigrants were described as a people who have a ‘rootless way of life, loafing on street corners and pubs, as their only source of pleasure and recreation’.
Work on immigration policy reform and on new integration policy was complete by 1974/75. In 1974 the government commission on immigration (Invandrarutredningen) presented recommendations for new immigrant policies (SOU, 1974:69), which were officially adopted by parliament in 1975 (Prop. 1975:26). The new policy was based on principles of freedom of choice, partnership and equality, and was essentially multiculturalist. IMER research was requested by politicians and included in this reform process from the beginning (Hammar and Westin, 2002). At the same time, relations between researchers and policymakers have not been problem-free. During the ‘policymaking’ period (1964–75) IMER research was important for policymakers, who desperately needed new scientific knowledge not only as a basis for policy reforms but also as a means to make the radical break from ‘the traditional unreflected policy of assimilation’ (Westin, 1996).

However, since this period research and policy have taken different paths. According to Thomas Hammar (2006), the reason for this was partly the changing nature of immigration (refugees had replaced guest workers), and partly the fact that immigration and integration policy became increasingly politicized. But an even more important reason seems to have been the fact that during the period from the mid-1960s, when the new immigrant policy was initiated, until the present time only political rhetoric has been changing, while political practices have remained the same as before (Borevi, 2002; Dahlström, 2004). In this context Karin Borevi (2002:308) makes the important point that the proclaimed ideal of Swedish multicultural society cannot be achieved before the resolution of the contradiction between the *ethnos* and the *demos*, that is, between the ethnic principles that still shape both popular perception and sentiments related to nationhood, national identity and national belonging on the one hand, and, on the other hand, principles that include all citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin, in the *demos*, that is to say, in a political community grounded in civil rather than ethnic principles.
In light of these findings it is important to draw attention to similar research results related to changes in medial discourses during the same period. Ylva Bruné (2004:357) claims that Swedish journalism as a profession has changed in a number of respects since the 1970s, but it has not changed at all in its inclination to play the role of standard-bearer of the Swedish nation and Sw弟弟ishness. Gunilla Hultén (2006) comes to a similar conclusion:

*But journalism has never questioned its bases, namely, that Sweden is supposed to have regulated immigration in order to protect Swedish well-being. Both migration policy and journalism have uninterruptedly continued with ideas about an ethnically homogeneous Sweden. Even those ideas about a multicultural Sweden consist of a national way of thinking. The idea of a sort of secure peoples-home-Sweden is still alive. Nation building within journalism is not finished.* (Hultén, 2006:218)

The discrepancy between political rhetoric and political practices is, however, not the only thing that is problematic in this context. During the whole of this period a significant discrepancy has existed between (multicultural) political rhetoric on the one hand and social reality on the other. Multicultural rhetoric in Sweden, as well as in other Western countries, has tried to provide popular support for the multicultural concept that defines society as a mosaic of different subcultures and subgroups (Crispino, 1980; cf. Ålund and Schierup, 1991). The problem was that this political rhetoric disguised the harsh social reality, where, according to Ålund and Schierup (1991), immigrants were systematically exposed not only to economic inequality (overrepresented in manual, monotonous and dirty jobs, characterized by long working hours, poor working conditions and increased risk of occupational injuries) but also to political and social marginalization. The multicultural mosaic of political rhetoric thereby became a ‘Swedish vertical mosaic’, as Aleksandra Ålund (1987, paraphrasing John
Porter, 1968) described the economic and political stratification of Swedish society based on the ethnic principle.

At the same time the three basic principles of the new, multicultural policy – freedom of choice, partnership and equality – appeared to become something completely different when they were implemented in actual political practices (Ålund and Schierup, 1991). Immigrants could express freedom of choice only through their state-sponsored and state-controlled associations, which in addition were organized exclusively on cultural and ethnic lines. An important consequence of this was the absence of any real opportunities for communication and/or cooperation between different immigrant associations, which would have possibly provided grounds for articulating common political initiatives. So the engagement of immigrants in their cultural associations was the way to their definitive political marginalization rather than their integration in Swedish society.

This was partly the reason why the second principle of the new integration policy, that is, partnership, has never become a part of Swedish social and political reality, since immigrants have never become ‘partners’ within the realm of politics. What has been developed instead is some sort of mentorship between the authorities and immigrant associations in which the latter always play a subordinate role of learner or novice (Ibid:149).

Not even the third multicultural principle – namely, equality – has ever been really achieved, since the necessary legal preconditions for the realization of equality between the majority population and immigrants have never been established. The reason for this has been a lack of political will among the relevant political actors (trade unions, employers’ central organizations and relevant state agencies) to initiate and adopt effective anti-discrimination legislation (Ibid.:128).

In sum, political rhetoric, during the whole of this period, was created and re-created under the influence of a public debate that predominantly focused on moral values (equality,
rights, freedom of choice) (Dahlström, 2004). On the other hand, political practice was compelled to obey partly its own immanent rules related to political/bureaucratic procedure, and partly the principle of efficiency (Ibid.:165). But, as we may grasp from preceding passages in this chapter, an even more important role of political practice has been to integrate principles that were adopted by political rhetoric into the traditional mode of nation-building, which was (and still is) based on an ethnically homogeneous Sweden.

And finally, we have the social reality that has been increasingly characterized by discrimination, ethnic segmentation within the labour market, and ethnic segregation in spatial terms. At this point we should recall our previous discussion about the relationship between Swedish IMER research and Swedish immigration and integration policy. According to Thomas Hammar (2006), the main reasons for the ‘divorce’ between policy and research in middle of 1980s were the politicization of the policy on the one hand and, on the other, the changing nature of immigration, whereby refugees had replaced guest workers. In my opinion, however, there is at least one additional more important cause, which has to do with an essential difference in views on, and definition of, the problem. While political rhetoric was proclaiming multiculturalism, and political practice was busily trying to integrate multiculturalism into the traditional idea of an ethnically homogeneous Sweden, IMER research increasingly focused on the inconsistency between the rhetoric of multiculturalism and the real conditions of immigrants in Sweden. This in my view has been the most significant point of confrontation between politics and IMER research since the 1970s. This was an important factor that helped IMER to establish itself as an academic discipline. At the same time, as mentioned above, it removed it from politics. True, governments and other

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8 Another important factor, according to Hammar (2006) and Hammar & Westin (2002), was the establishment of a number of new universities and university colleges in Sweden since the beginning of the 1990s (Norrköping-Linköping, Malmö University College, University of Växjö, South Stockholm University College). These new academic centres were more ready to accept the multidisciplinary character of IMER research than the old universities, which were limited by the traditional mono-disciplinary structure of their departments.
political actors (local governments, political parties and various interest groups) have continued to support IMER research and to commission policy-relevant investigations, but in general IMER research has lost its previous influence (Hammar, 2006).

**Ethnic discrimination in the labour market as a catalyst for re-commodification**

At the beginning of the 2000s, however, some sort of rapprochement occurred between these actors, and this time the initiative came from the politicians. One possible explanation for this renewed political interest in IMER research is that the protracted widening of the gap between political rhetoric, political practice and social reality has increasingly troubled politicians, partly out of concern for long-run political stability and partly because of the problem of the coherence of actual political discourse. Indeed, it is not possible for ever to describe one’s own society as a realm of equality, justice and democracy while at the same time almost 20 percent of population live on the cultural, economic and political margins of the society.\(^9\)

In any case, at the beginning of the 2000s the government appointed not one but two commissions (Dir. 2003:118; and Dir. 2004:54) charged with investigating the phenomenon of structural discrimination on grounds of ethnicity and/or religion and proposing measures to prevent it. These projects, which involved a number of IMER scholars, resulted in two reports, one directed by Paul Lappalainen (‘The Blue and Yellow Glasshouse – Structural Discrimination in Sweden’\(^{10}\) (SOU 2005:56) and the other directed by Masoud Kamalli (‘The Black Book of the Integration’\(^{11}\) (SOU 2006:79). The mere fact that the government appointed two commissions on discrimination is viewed by Stefan Jonsson (2007) as a real

\(^9\) On the dynamics between democracy, nationalism and ethnic exclusion in Sweden, see Dahlstedt (2005; 2008)

\(^{10}\) “Det blågula glashuset – strukturell diskriminering i Sverige”

\(^{11}\) “Integrationens svarta boken”
and definitive breakthrough for IMER research, since, apart from its academic competence, it has appeared to have social relevance and to be in political demand. But what is paradoxical about the whole thing, according to Jonsson (Ibid.), is that, since the reports were submitted, their results have been politically marginalized and repudiated. ‘Like water off a duck’s back, Lappalainen’s and Kamali’s conclusions ebbed away from the political and opinion-building class in Sweden’, concluded Jonsson (Ibid).

Obviously the ‘political and opinion-building class’ is not ready to face scientific conclusions about the nature and causes of ethnic discrimination in Sweden, such as, for example, the conclusion that discrimination cannot be combated by further demands on immigrants to integrate (adapt, assimilate, [ZS]) into Swedish society, but only by demanding that Swedes stop discriminating against immigrants. At the same time, if discrimination can be defined as deprivation of access to social/political power and/or material resources, then it follows that the surplus of the power and material resources that normally should belong to the victims of discrimination has been expropriated by somebody else. This is the point where discrimination and exploitation meet, both as concepts and as social/political practices. That was why both commissions propose, among the other things, new and more efficient legislation, and new policy measures against discrimination.

In sum, these and most of the other conclusions and recommendations in the reports discussed have been rejected by the state authorities and, by and large, even by the media. Instead of an ‘anti-discrimination line’ the media have adopted a political line that today is called a ‘jobs line’ (Jonsson, ibid.) with a focus on providing such conditions in the labour market whereby it would be ‘more profitable’ for labour to be employed than unemployed. This in fact means the worsening of welfare protection and security during unemployment. Another aspect of the ‘jobs line’ is providing new regulation that makes it possible for employers to employ certain categories of job seekers who are especially vulnerable in the
labour market, such as immigrants, under more ‘flexible’ conditions, which in fact means more forms of atypical employment, worsened working conditions and lower wages.

Here again, discrimination and exploitation meet. To be able to understand this relationship, it is Nevertheless necessary to go beyond the perception of discrimination as a result of everyday xenophobia and ‘unintentional’ discrimination carried out by ordinary people, based on ‘us and them’ sentiments. Discrimination obviously has an additional ‘function’ related to ongoing processes of neoliberal reconstruction of so-called advanced societies and their economies. According to Schierup (2007:162; see also Lazaridis and Psimmones, 2000), big business today has two vital aims in employing immigrants. The first is to reduce production costs (discrimination/exploitation) and the other is to ruin the collective identity of labour so as to provide new opportunities for surveillance over it. So both actual ethnic discrimination in the labour market and those ‘anti-discrimination measures’ offered by the ‘jobs line’ are becoming catalysts for ongoing processes of recommodification (Holden 2003; Papadopoulos, 2005; Slavnic 2007), which in the long run tend to redefine the historical compromises between labour, capital and state at the expense of labour. Capital has taken advantage of the fact that capital tends to be globally integrated while labour tends to be locally fragmented (Castells, 2000). As it seems today, the state increasingly takes a stand in favour of capital, while trade unions are increasingly disoriented, lacking both an appropriate strategy for the everyday handling of these problems and political visions for the future. This is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that, instead of turning the cutting edge of their political action against their real opponent, that is, capital, trade unions are on a daily basis increasingly preoccupied with uncomfortable activities such as hounding so-called irregular immigrants, who work without permits and in the cheapest, dirtiest and least protected occupations in Sweden. The only real effect of these actions is to contribute
further to the production and reproduction of ethnic discrimination and the stigmatization of immigrants.

To conclude the discussion, we may return to the words of Charles Westin with which this chapter began. Were the slogans from 1974 really nothing but slogans – empty declarations? Is it possible to set the balance right in the future? In trying to find the answer to these questions it is perhaps best to conclude this chapter with another quotation: ‘Capitalism has no final telos. Its future remains open in the face of structural changes and social struggles’ (Jessop, 2002). The only thing that is evident, however, is that the future political and territorial arena for these structural changes and social struggles will no longer be the nation state. If we take seriously Castells’ diagnosis presented above, then the only way for labour to become an equal partner again in a possible future new historical compromise is to become globally organized. This means that the new historical compromise is possible only at the global level.

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