RIOTS AND DISTURBANCES

How riots start and how order is secured

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Abstract


The aim of this report was to present the research on crowds conducted by the research group (Kjell Granström, Gunilla Guvå, Ingrid Hylander and Michael Rosander) up until 2006. It was originally written in Swedish (Granström, Guvå, Hylander, & Rosander, 2006) as a report to the Swedish Emergency Management Agency and was translated and published as a FOG report in 2009.

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Foreword

Large-scale popular, political, religious and idealistic manifestations take place in most societies. The news agencies report over and over again on violent conflicts between demonstrators and the police. Sweden has been relatively free from such violent altercations and recurrent riots. However, such an incident took place in connection with the EU ministerial summit, which took place in Gothenburg in 2001. The project team in Linköping monitored these events. Their scientific analysis of what happened resulted in an empirically founded theoretical model, which explains the conditions whereby encounters between the police and demonstrators can develop into ‘war’ or ‘peace’.

From both a social and a scientific perspective, it is as important to find out why things develop peacefully, as well as why riots occur. In this project, which is supported by the Swedish Emergency Management Agency, the focus has been on studies of activities of the police and demonstrators aimed at preserving peace. From a social perspective, such research is important as it pertains to how democratic freedoms and rights can be maintained. Societies are threatened to their very foundations when the police and other authorities are linked with and, far too often, involved in riots and violent conflicts with citizens. Therefore, knowledge of peace-preserving strategies is very important to prevent crisis-generating crowd incidents.

What factors are important to prevent a loss of trust between groups from leading to an escalation of the conflict? This can be said to be the starting point for the empirical studies made by the Linköping team in connection with a number of popular manifestations in Sweden over the past few years. In this context, it should be pointed out that world-leading riot research has been mainly conducted from the viewpoint of the demonstrators. Researchers have encountered obvious difficulties in finding out about the planning work and strategic deliberations of the police. In this respect, the Linköping team has succeeded in gaining access to the pilot work, main work and follow-up work of the police. Some researchers have taken part as observers in all phases of a number of major manifestations, and so the research team has acquired some unique and invaluable material. This dataset, which also includes corresponding data from the demonstrators (observations, interviews and documents), is extensive and is summarised in this report.

To start with, a number of theories will be presented which attempt to explain crowd incidents and disturbances. We will be emphasising shortcomings in various explanatory models and, finally, we will describe the theoretical foundation on which the present study is based.
An Overview of Research into Crowd Psychology

Introduction

Riots and public disturbances have been studied for more than a century and various researchers have attempted to find reasons for and explanations as to why a gathering of people changes and begins to act as a crowd in which social rules and norms appear to be reduced to varying extents. In the field of psychology, Gustave Le Bon (1896) is usually cited as the person who first noted this phenomenon. Even though his ideas about what controls the actions and reactions of crowds of people were published in the late 19th century, there are still traces of them in some of the more modern explanatory models. Explanations of revolts and riots during this past century or so have been based on individuals and various types of personality, or on viewing the crowd as a single unit, an organism. We will be looking at a few of these explanatory models in this section.

Early theories on riots and revolts

Le Bon – a collective perspective

Crowd psychology was a field in which the French physician Gustave Le Bon had an interest. He used the events of the French Revolution as his starting point to explain what may happen with people when they come together to form a crowd (Le Bon, 1896/1995).

A gathering of individuals is not the same as a crowd by Le Bon’s definition. A crowd, in the psychological sense, was not linked with a specific number of individuals in Le Bon’s view, and not even with these individuals gathering in one and the same place. What creates a crowd is the disappearance of a conscious personality (identity) and a similarity in feelings and thoughts. According to Le Bon, this can take place even if the individuals are isolated from one another, but in this instance some form of major national event is required to breed violent feelings. He emphasised the difference between a homogeneous crowd (participants from the same class or sect) and a heterogeneous crowd (participants with different backgrounds) and was of the opinion that they had certain typical characteristics that distinguished them, but
also that they had characteristics in common as a crowd in a psychological sense.

Le Bon described organisation within the crowd, not as a conscious organisation, but as a way of describing the fact that the change from a gathering of individuals to form a crowd is complete. In this phase applies what Le Bon called ‘The Psychological Law of the Mental Unity of Crowds’ (Le Bon, 1896/1995, p. 5). Above all, a tendency to follow is characteristic of crowds controlled by this law. According to this view, there is a collective consciousness in a crowd which makes the participants feel, think and act entirely differently to the ways in which they would feel, think and act if they were alone. Le Bon was of the opinion that this collective consciousness was not some kind of average based on the various participants, but that something entirely new is created when a psychological crowd is created.

Le Bon put forward a number of reasons as to why people in a crowd act so differently compared to isolated individuals. The first one states that people in a crowd may give in to their instincts. There is a feeling of possessing insuperable power, which makes the participants give in to their instincts. In the crowd, there is also anonymity, which leads to a complete disappearance of the sense of responsibility, which would otherwise control individuals. The second reason is infectiousness. In a crowd – according to Le Bon – every feeling and action is infectious. He was of the opinion that this is easy to observe, but considerably more difficult to explain. This infectiousness is passed on by means of something, which can be classified in terms of hypnosis. The third reason and, according to Le Bon, by far the most important one, is suggestion. When individuals in a crowd have entirely lost their conscious personalities, they all follow suggestions placed in their path in the same way that hypnotised individuals follow the hypnotist’s suggestions. ‘An individual in a crowd is a grain of sand amid other grains of sand, which the wind stirs up at will’ (Le Bon, 1896/1995, p. 13). Freud (1955/1921) criticised Le Bon and asked who was the hypnotist in the crowd – a question which Le Bon failed to answer.

Le Bon’s theories of crowd psychology are not considered to be valid explanatory models nowadays. However, there are traces of these ideas in more modern theories about what happens when people come together to form a crowd. The concept of the individual becoming depersonalised in the anonymity a crowd can offer and how this affects behaviour has been developed by, e.g. Festinger, Pepitone and Newcomb (1952), and later Zimbardo (1969), among others, in the form of the deindividuation theory.

Allport – an individualistic perspective

Allport (1924), unlike Le Bon, had an individualistic view of public disturbances and riots. Collective behaviour occurs, according to him, when individuals with similar temperaments, training or characteristic features end up in a shared situation. If collective behaviour includes civil disturbances and riots, the participating individuals would share such features as being criminals, being inclined to violence or having anti-social personalities. According
to this view, the group is merely a gathering of individuals. Group behaviour is *the sum of* the behaviour of the individuals taking part.

This view of public disturbances and riots has no prominent position in current research into collective behaviour. However, there is certainly often a layman’s view, which, in many instances, is close to Allport’s perspective, i.e. the fact that riots occur because the people who take part in them are violent individuals or troublemakers who are there just for a fight. These elements may certainly be involved in public disturbances and riots, but this does not explain why an entire crowd can be drawn into riots on the basis of the actions of this probably fairly limited number of violent individuals. Nor is there any particularly strong support in the reported research for this individualistic view, even though there are examples in which individual characteristics are put forward as the reason for public disturbances. One example is Murphy, Dunning and Williams (1988), who studied football hooligans. However, studies with this perspective are exceptions, and most contemporary researchers tackle this phenomenon with a group perspective and often in an inter-group context. Football hooliganism, for example, has been described by Stott, Hutchison and Drury (2001) on the basis of a social identity perspective.

**Frustration and aggression**

An interest in studying what lies behind aggressive expressions of prejudices was aroused at the time of the increase in anti-semitism in Europe, primarily Germany, in the 1930s. Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and Sears (1939) were of the opinion that the occurrence of aggression always presupposes the existence of frustration, and *vice versa*: that frustration always leads to aggression. This hypothesis, which they named the *frustration-aggression hypothesis*, is based on the assumption that all people have a certain amount of mental energy for executing various types of mental activity. When various goals are met, activated energy will be dispersed and the system will return to equilibrium. Anyone who is prevented from meeting goals will be frustrated and, according to this view, an imbalance is then created in that person’s mental system. This imbalance can be balanced out only if aggression is expressed. The fact that aggression should be the only way of reducing the imbalance has been criticised by many subsequent researchers (e.g. Berkowitz, 1962). Miller, who was one of the originators, did, however, refer to the initial formulation of the hypothesis (Dollard et al., 1939) as being ‘unfortunate’ and was of the opinion that it overshadowed later wordings in the text which do not have the same definitive view of the link between frustration and aggression (Miller, 1941). According to Miller, the frustration-aggression hypothesis should be understood in terms of the fact that frustration can lead to a number of different responses, one of which is aggression. There is a hierarchy of potential responses depending on which situation is being perceived as frustrating. If aggression is the strongest response in this hierarchy, it will be the first reaction. If other reactions take precedence (such as changing activity), these will be employed first and prevent aggressive reactions – at least temporarily. However, according to Miller, it is possible for these other reactions to frustration
to bring about equilibrium in the human mental system and for no aggression
to take place at all. However, should this equilibrium not be achieved, i.e. if
the frustration continues to prevail and a number of non-aggressive responses
have been employed, there is a greater likelihood of aggression being used.
One reason for this, according to Miller, is that aggression fails to be expressed
because people are afraid of being punished, primarily by society, as aggres-
sion is not viewed as an acceptable response to frustration.

Dollard et al. (1939) undertook to explain expressions of aggression at an
intergroup level, primarily in terms of social groups or categories. They were
of the opinion that if a large group of people feel that they are being prevented
from achieving their goals, i.e. if frustration occurs, because of another group,
and if this group is perceived as being too strong or too remote, the aggression
is exercised on a weaker or more local group. They used this reasoning to ex-
plain why the Jews were persecuted in Nazi Germany.

Research has shown that the assumption of the frustration-aggression hy-
pothesis stating that aggression presumes frustration is not true in all situ-
a-tions (Berkowitz, 1962). Aggression may arise without preceding frustration,
and frustration does not always lead to aggression. The latter is in line with
what Dollard et al. (1939) wrote, although they considered the claim that ag-
gression must be preceded by frustration defensible (Miller, 1941). Berkowitz
(1962) suggested three major changes to the hypothesis. The first relates to the
fact that the likelihood of aggression being the method used by the group to
vent their frustration increases if there are situational cues, which emphasise
aggression as a possibility. Previous or current views of other groups as spec-
ified scapegoats or of dislike have a part in this too. The other change con-
cerned clarification of the fact that frustration is not objective; it is a subjective
feeling. The third and final change suggested by Berkowitz involves reducing
the emphasis of Dollard et al. (1939) on frustration as a necessary criterion for
aggression. Berkowitz (1962) pointed out such factors as extreme temperatures
and physical pain as examples of other things that can precede aggression.
Therefore, in its reworded form, the frustration-aggression theory is based on
environmental factors and cognitive mediators as important aspects of the di-
rection and scope of aggression. Even though the frustration-aggression
theory can be used to explain individuals’ aggression, it has been used pri-
marily to explain collective behaviour and relative deprivation (Davis, 1959),
often linked with public disturbances and riots.

Relative deprivation

Relative deprivation is a term, which applies to groups who perceive that they
have fewer resources (money, food, support, work, housing) than they think
they ought to have. This expression was coined by Stouffer, Suchman, DeVin-
ney, Star and Williams (1949), but they failed to define it all that clearly. A
clearer definition was set forth by Davis (1959). He pointed out that compari-
sions within the group and comparisons between different groups lead to dif-
ferent emotional reactions. As regards riots and public disturbances, the latter
is of interest. A collective perception of not having something which people
feel they are entitled to can lead to them using various means to attempt to rectify the unfairness which they think exists. According to Olson and Hazlewood (1986), however, one aspect of deprivation is that people feel they cannot achieve this equalisation by means of hard work, for example, because the reason is deemed to be outside themselves and their own group. One way of equalising the situation, then, would be to use protests and actions against the group which they consider to be responsible for the unfair situation (cf. the violent riots in Parisian suburbs in the autumn of 2005).

When people compare themselves with others and come to the conclusion that they are lacking something, which they feel they are entitled to, they hark back to earlier experiences (Davies, 1969). Davies was of the opinion that people's expectations are guided by what they have got or achieved previously as a group and where they are now. In other words, groups in a society at large can, for instance, improve things for themselves, but if these improvements fail to meet their expectations, formed from experience, relative deprivation will be the result. Davies (1969) called this the J curve hypothesis. This means that a rise over a certain period (in the standard of living or living conditions of a social group, for example) leads to expectations that the improvement should continue. If this is followed by a period when the rise is not as apparent or is even reversed, there is a risk of collective anxiety, which can have explosive consequences in the form of protests and riots. Davies (1969) cited the French Revolution, the American Civil War and the rebellion of the blacks in the USA in the 1960s as examples, and pointed out improvements in living conditions, which turned into a decline immediately before and up to the time when the unrest broke out. Escalation of protests into violent riots is explained by the frustration-aggression theory as a chain of events in which aggression is the only way out (Berkowitz, 1972). If relative deprivation occurs within a group, this leads to frustration. If this coincides with negative environmental factors, such as a heatwave, this frustration is reinforced. This can lead to individual expressions of aggression, which can lead, for example, to the involvement of police in riot gear. This can be interpreted by the group as additional negative environmental factors, leading in turn to more widespread aggression arising from social influences within the group. Collective violence is a likely consequence of this. Berkowitz called this the 'long hot summer' explanation for public disturbances and riots.

Relative deprivation can be used as an explanation for why an initial spark may occur, but it is more restricted when it comes to explaining the ensuing processes when riots develop.

An emerging new norm

Sociologist R. H. Turner (not to be confused with psychologist J. C. Turner) was of the opinion that one characteristic feature of a crowd is the fact that it has no formal organisation and hence no established norms to provide participants with information on how they should behave (Turner & Killian, 1957; Turner, 1974). To explain behaviour in a crowd, you need, according to Turner, to study how norms arise within the crowd in the current situation.
Emergent norm theory emphasises a process in which participants in the normative vacuum, which Turner thought to be present in a crowd, focus on what is viewed as clear, distinct behaviour – often linked to certain individuals who stand apart from the rest. A clear behaviour among certain people indicates to the wider crowd, or is interpreted by them to mean, that there is a norm. Out of a normative vacuum, the crowd has found something to follow. Not everyone changes their behaviour directly on the basis of this developing norm, nor do they act in ways, which would run counter to the prevailing embryo of the norm. Inaction is interpreted as implicit confirmation that the norm exists. This gradually leads to a collective norm, which the crowd follows. According to this view, throwing stones at the police, for example, could be explained by the fact that the crowd initially has no norm, which controls how they should act in a new situation in which, say, the police are blocking their path. If a few individuals in the crowd start to prise up paving stones and throw them at the police and the rest of the crowd fails to act to prevent this, this is interpreted as meaning that this is a new norm, which people can follow. Hence more and more people start to throw stones.

Crowds gathered to demonstrate rarely find themselves, however, in the normative vacuum which Turner (1974) emphasised as being typical for a crowd. The participants often have some form of shared values and reason as to why they are there for the specific purpose of demonstrating. They may have, for example, political or ideological values as a shared foundation. Initial normlessness is a criterion for explaining collective behaviour on the basis of the emergent norm theory, so even though it may be valid in certain specific cases, this theory is in no way generally valid.

Lost identity

Festinger, Pepitone and Newcomb (1952) noted that people in a crowd often behave differently than they would have behaved if they had been alone in a social context. They were of the opinion that this different behaviour is due to a phenomenon which they called deindividuation, which arises when individuals behave as if they had been swallowed up by the group. Deindividuation was defined as a state within the group in which individuals are not viewed as and do not receive attention as individuals. No members feel that they stand out, and others in the group do not separate out individuals from the group as a whole. This is not entirely unlike Le Bon’s (1896/1995) description of a crowd in terms of individuals losing their conscious personal identity and of a shift from the individual to the crowd as a whole. Le Bon’s explanations as to why this happens do, however, differ from those put forward by Festinger et al. (1952). Nor is deindividuation a phenomenon arising only in crowds; instead, it can arise in any groups if the conditions are right.

The fact that people who are deindividuated behave differently was explained by the fact that their inner barriers are reduced or disappear in that state. Festinger et al. (1952) were of the opinion that this often involves a behaviour which the individual would like to implement, a need to please, but which their inner barriers otherwise would prevent. Being deindividuated in a
group – according to this view – means that members are given the opportunity to meet these needs and, in the long run, that the group becomes more attractive to its members. Festinger et al. emphasised the effects of deindividuation as one of a variety of aspects of increased attraction to the group. Other such aspects may include the group helping members to meet goals, creating opportunities for support for members’ opinions and behaviour, and the group facilitating individual needs for sympathy and status. The latter requires the group to be individuated, i.e. for the group’s members to be visible as individuals. Members of a group cannot be individuated and deindividuated at the same time. However, Festinger et al. were of the opinion that a group is most attractive if it can allow members to be in both states, but at different times. Any group, which only allows its members to be individuated probably will not be all that attractive to them. However, any group in which members are only deindividuated is not likely to be particularly stable. Festinger et al. cited the crowd as an example of the latter.

The term ‘deindividuation’ was later developed by Zimbardo (1969). He specified a number of criteria or variables, which may lead to deindividuation and also stated more clearly what this state can lead to. The most important criteria or variables that allow deindividuation to occur are anonymity, unclear or diffuse distribution of responsibilities and people finding themselves in a group whose size is of significance. If individuals find themselves in a large group, this can result in a feeling of them being anonymous, which can signify that they do not feel the same responsibility for their own actions or the actions of others, which they may have perhaps done if they had been alone. The context in which people find themselves also has a certain part to play, according to this theory. If, for example, the situation in which people find themselves is unknown or unclear and if there are a lot of new impressions, this can suppress the ability of individuals in the group to maintain their individuality, or make it more difficult for them to do so. All of this leads to deindividuated behaviour which, put simply, can be described as behaviour that is not controlled by established norms or appropriateness (Zimbardo, 1969): a behaviour which can be described as irrational, impulsive and regressive.

Studies on deindividuation do not always, however, produce consistent results (Diener, 1977). In some cases, the results were the complete opposite of what could be expected on the basis of the deindividuation theory, e.g. that people who were anonymous breached fewer norms than people who were individuated. Diener (1979) was of the opinion that this could be linked with the fact that the studies manipulated anonymity and the assumption that this manipulation actually created deindividuation was not tested. He suggested that emphasis must be placed on the internal, psychological changes involved in deindividuation. In other words, it is not enough to create conditions for deindividuation in order for it to arise, but the participating individuals must also view the condition as an internal perception of reduced self-awareness, which reduces individuals’ self-control and propensity to want to comply with norms. In addition, this means, according to Diener, that people are controlled more easily by external cues instead of basing their behaviour on rationally planned actions.
Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1982) differentiated between private and public self-awareness. They were of the opinion that anti-normative, uncontrolled behaviour can occur in two ways. One of them, linked with public self-awareness, is controlled by how the perception of responsibility in the situation is linked with anonymity. In other words, that individuals do not feel that they will be assessed and that they do not expect their actions to have any negative consequences for themselves personally. The other way in which individuals can act in an anti-normative and uncontrolled fashion is linked with private self-awareness. Strong group solidarity or psychological agitation can, for example, place individuals in situations in which their focus shifts from themselves and their own behaviour. This leads to a reduced ability to control one's actions and internalised norms for behaviour take on less importance. Prentice-Dunn and Rogers concluded that only reduced private self-awareness can be defined as deindividuation.

Working on the basis of Diener's (1977) research review of deindividuation and the conflicting results found, Postmes and Spears (1998) performed a meta-analysis of research on deindividuation. They included 60 independent studies conducted between 1965 and 1994. The results showed minimal support for the deindividuation theory, i.e. that deindividuation leads to increased anti-normative behaviour. For example, it was not at all possible to demonstrate any effect of Prentice-Dunn and Rogers’ (1982) private self-awareness. There was weak support for the claim that a perception of reduced responsibility leads to anti-normative behaviour. According to the analysis, the size of the group was of significance. The likelihood of deindividuation occurring increased as the group size became larger (Postmes & Spears, 1998). The only real effect of deindividuation, which was apparent was the fact that individuals band together to a greater extent behind local norms, group norms. On the other hand, a reduced tendency to comply with general social norms, as predicted by the deindividuation theory, received no support. Postmes and Spears (1998) concluded that a more appropriate understanding of what happens in large groups, where participants perceive a degree of anonymity, is that a shift takes place to a social identity and that behaviour is then controlled to a greater extent by the local norms linked with the specific context and social identity salient to the participants; instead of, as proposed by the deindividuation theory, people merely losing their own individual identity, which leads to an increase in anti-normative behaviour.

Social identity and self-categorisation

Many of the theories discussed above state that individuals lose their identity when they come together to form a crowd. An alternative way of understanding events in a crowd is to view it in terms of social identity (Tajfel, 1978). Based on this perspective, the issue is not a loss of identity, but a shift to a social identity. We all have a personal identity but also a set of different social identities. The personal identity is interpersonal and is developed in relation to important individuals in our environment and the various social identities we have are linked with the groups or social categories with which we identify.
Identifying ourselves with a specific group also means that the norms and values linked therewith are of relevance. Individuals can identify themselves as men, as vegans, as police officers, etc.

The very thought that our identities are affected by the groups to which we belong is nothing new; it has existed for a long time (e.g. Mead, 1934). However, the fact that group affiliation and social categorisation have a part to play in how we relate to other groups was not emphasised until much later. The realisation that something affects how we relate to others on the basis of how we categorise ourselves as belonging to a group, or are categorised as part of a group, originates in studies made with what is known as minimal groups. This means that the group in question exists only as a concept within the individual. Tajfel (1970) showed that it is sufficient to know that one belongs to a certain group in order to behave in a manner, which supports that group. Experiments have shown unequivocally that it is sufficient to be categorised as part of a group for the participants in the study to favour the individuals categorised in the same way (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971), despite the fact that the group as a physical unit has never existed or would never exist. The social categorisation involved with the minimal group was later described in terms of a social identity on the basis of which individuals acted (Turner, 1975). The concept was refined and eventually formed the foundation for the social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Social identity is that part of an individual’s self-perception which is based on affiliation with groups (Turner, 1999). This is a self-definition based on the social categories apparent to us – either via self-categorisation or by being categorised by others. Linked to these categories are also different values and emotional aspects. Being female or being Swedish or being a police officer or being a demonstrator means something to the individual as regards the values associated with the category, but it also has an emotional meaning for the individual. Without this link to emotions and values, the category is not as important as a basis for our self-image.

Social identity theory primarily attempts to explain how we create our own self-image on the basis of various social categories and how we relate to others on the basis of the active social identity. It does not focus on what membership of a working group, for example, involves or the processes arising within the group. Nor does this theory focus on the processes occurring between different groups. To understand these processes, Turner (1982) developed something, which he called the self-categorisation theory (SCT), taking social identity theory as its basis. The self-categorisation theory can be described as social identity theory for groups. Its starting point is the relationship between personal identity and social identity (Turner, 1999). When a social identity becomes more salient than the personal identity of the individuals who share membership in a social category or group, a number of processes occur within the group. These relate both to how people perceive themselves as group members and how they view the group, but also to how they perceive other groups. Self-categorisation on the basis of the salient social identity leads to self-stereotyping and depersonalisation of self-perception. Similarity on the basis of relevant dimensions within the group and differ-
ences compared with other groups are emphasised. The relevance of a dimension is determined by the salient social category. Within the group, the perception is that all group members are the same and that, as a member of this group, one is different to members of other similar groups. An example of this is a demonstration context in which two groups are set against one another, the police and the demonstrators. The police perceive themselves as being more similar, not just because of their uniforms, but also in respect of their values, for example, and they see themselves as clearly separate from the demonstrators as regards these values. Of course, the opposite is true too. However, these notions have not been tested in reality, which – if they were – would perhaps show that the police as a group do not share values at all to the extent, which the image created within the group would assert. It may well be the case that many police officers are closer to some of the demonstrators in terms of values than they are to others within the police group. Self-categorisation is based on a prototypical image of what members of a group are like. What becomes the salient self-category is also very dependent upon the context.

Social identity and deindividuation

The significance of context is emphasised by the social identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE; Spears & Lea, 1994). SIDE is a theory of situated self-categorisation. In situations in which there is a sense of anonymity or such a sense is created, this model can be used to understand the group processes occurring. As mentioned previously, earlier research has pointed out that anonymity leads to depersonalisation and disintegration of norms and inhibitions (see, e.g. Zimbardo, 1969). Postmes and Spears (1998) demonstrated, in a major meta-analysis of studies on deindividuation, that deindividuation theory was not a good or consistent explanation of the behaviour of individuals. Instead, they cited SIDE as a more appropriate explanatory model. In a state of anonymity, personal identity becomes unclear. If a social identity is readily available, it becomes more conspicuous. Thus anonymity in this perspective does not lead to normlessness, but instead leads to individuals following the norms applicable to the current social identity to a greater extent. A demonstrator in a situation in which he or she perceives a degree of anonymity thus does not lose his or her identity; instead, the most salient social identity forms the basis for self-categorisation. This includes the simplifications ensuing from the prototype for the relevant social category. The norms and values linked with the category are followed to a greater extent than if the situation had involved no state of anonymity (Spears & Lea, 1994). With anonymity, therefore, anti-normativity does not follow according to this view; instead, there is strong support for the local norms which are applicable or which are perceived to apply to the current situation.
A development of the self-categorisation theory

To provide a better understanding of the processes which may occur in connection with crowd incidents, a model was developed on the basis of social identity theory, primarily the self-categorisation theory: The Elaborated Social Identity Model of crowd behaviour (ESIM; Reicher, 1996; Drury & Reicher, 2000; Drury & Reicher, 2005). The self-categorisation theory emphasises the fact that collective behaviour is possible only if the participants share – or perceive that they share – a collective social identity (Veenstra & Haslam, 2000). The starting point for ESIM is the fact that crowd events are, to a great extent, intergroup phenomena. This model focuses on how the social identity within a group changes and develops as a function of the intergroup dynamic.

To understand the model and how a change to the social identity can take place, Reicher (1997) emphasised three aspects and studied them at the concept level: social identity, context and intention. Social identity, according to Reicher, should be viewed as being linked to events in the world. Social identity changes when events and social relations linked with it are changed. The other aspect emphasised was the context and what this involves. Context must not merely be seen as something external or static, which dictates identity and action. Instead, according to Reicher, the context should be viewed to a great extent as consisting in other groups and their actions. This is particularly apparent in the case of crowd events. Finally, the relationship between social identity, intention and consequence should be elaborated. In the case of crowd events in which two or more groups are pitted against one another, their intentions often are not apparent. Regardless of the intentions of one of the groups, their actions will be interpreted by the other group. This interpretation can often differ from the intentions of the first group. However, the other group reacts on the basis of their own interpretation of the incident and thereby creates a new context for the first group. Actions may be conscious, but the intention behind the action often is not perceived. The actions can have unintended consequences. ESIM clarifies how this spiral of intentions and actions of one group and reinterpretation of the actions and reaction to them by the other group can create a new context and a new social identity for the first group.

In our studies, we have found that this elaborated social identity model (ESIM) can be used to interpret and understand what may happen when different groups confront one another, such as police officers and demonstrators. From this point on, this report will discuss such encounters that have taken place in Sweden over the past few years.
Objective and Starting Points

The previous section described some of the research in the field of crowd incidents, demonstrations, riots and hooliganism. Internationally, such research has been carried out for many years, while Swedish research in the field has been restricted. However, the present report summarises experiences and conclusions from a series of studies relating to crowd incidents carried out at Linköping University.

Sweden has been relatively free from demonstrations that have developed into acts of violence. Since what is known as the ‘Gunshots in Ådalen’ in 1931, when conscripts shot and killed five people taking part in a demonstration, military intervention against demonstrators has been banned. Since then, it has been the function of the police to ensure that law and order is maintained in connection with crowd incidents in Sweden.

During the USA’s war in Vietnam, from 1965 to 1973, there were extensive demonstrations against the war all over the world, not least in Sweden. These manifestations were usually well organised (and even future Prime Minister Olof Palme took part). However, there were some conflicts between demonstrators and the police at that time. After that, there were hardly any violent crowd incidents in the 1980s and 1990s in Sweden. Incidents in connection with the EU summit in Gothenburg in 2001 did, however, develop into riots, police interventions, stone throwing and shooting. These incidents show that peaceful demonstrations under certain conditions can develop into violent conflicts between the police and demonstrators, resulting in injury and destruction of property. These criteria are just one of the areas discussed in this report.

Purpose of the project

The objective of the overall project has been to increase our knowledge of the collective processes, which can develop in encounters between demonstrators and activists, on the one hand, and the police, on the other. One fundamental purpose of the project has been to endeavour to disclose the interactive processes, which may lead to the preservation of order, security and the opportunity to express opinions, i.e. peace. Or, vice versa, to discern and name the reasons why chaos, riots and conflicts break out, i.e. war. In our work on charting peacekeeping and warmongering antecedents, we have documented and analysed both the activities and movements of the demonstrators and the actions as well as the strategies of the police.
The incidents forming the basis for the empirical studies are all characterised by encounters between demonstrators and police officers. Permission was granted for some of these demonstrations, while other activities took place without permission from the authorities.

Above all, there are three types of incident which form the basis for this report, namely:

1. A major political manifestation with elements of rioting (the EU summit in Gothenburg, 2001).

Project methods

A number of different methods have been used to gather data and information concerning the incidents listed above. A combination of different methods has been used in all studies. The strategies used in one or – in some cases, all – studies are as follows.

1. Monitoring of the activist groups’ websites prior to planned activities (authorised and unauthorised). These websites provide information on the purpose of the manifestations, rendezvous points, any governing principles and other criteria for the activity. Wherever responsible individuals have been named, it has been possible to ask questions and conduct interviews. The researchers have taken great pains to find responsible people to provide information on their presence as observers at the activities. The websites provide important information on the order and co-ordination to which the activities relate.

2. Information about the preparatory work of the police. The project has managed to obtain information about the police’s planning prior to the activities by means of discussions with responsible police officers and, in some cases, by means of participatory observations of the pre-activity work of the police. In connection with this, the police have always been informed of the presence of the researchers at these demonstrations. The police’s preparatory work provides, inter alia, information on the threats that the police deem to exist prior to the activity.

3. Participatory observations do not mean that the researchers took part as demonstrators, but as observers at the activities. However, this has not prevented them from holding discussions with and asking questions of activists and police officers while openly admitting to being researchers. These observations have been made as multipoint observations, which means that a number of observers have observed and noted the development of the course of action from various locations and with differing points of focus (for example, especially monitoring
the actions of the police or demonstrators). The times recorded for the observations allow us to describe and interpret incidents from a variety of starting points. These observations provide knowledge of the actual development of incidents in the event of crowd incidents.

4. **Interviews** have been conducted with various groups of activists and police officers after the observed incidents. This has taken place in the form of both individual interviews and focus group interviews. These interviews provide knowledge of the perceptions and views of the participants regarding the incidents, plus their views of their own group and of other groups.

5. **Questionnaires** have been handed out to demonstrators and police officers (before and after the incidents) on one occasion. The questionnaire dealt with questions relating to trust, threats and hopes. This questionnaire provides answers to the question of what the expectations of the informants were prior to the demonstrations and their perceptions and views afterwards.

6. Reports on experiences from the police. The project has gained access to the police’s *experience reports*, which are various officers’ written reports on what happened during a shift. These reports provide information about what police officers perceive as critical or dangerous incidents.

7. **Press monitoring.** The project has collected articles and press photos in connection with the crowd incidents studied and analysed how newspapers report such incidents. This type of analysis provides knowledge of how the press depicts crowd incidents, activists and police officers.

For each crowd incident, the researchers have ‘worked puzzles’, using different snippets of information provided by the various methods. In the present work, the intention is to combine the different pieces of the puzzle and work together with international research to create a greater whole and thereby enhance our knowledge of the mechanisms behind demonstrations and crowd incidents.
Incidents Studied

To provide an overview of the incidents forming the basis of this work, we will give a brief description of the various demonstrations and crowd incidents studied, as well as the actions of the police and the activists throughout the individual incidents. The various incidents have been described in more detail in other contexts (Granström, 2002; Polisförbundet, 2002; Wijk, 2001; Granström, Guvå, Hylander & Rosander, 2005a, 2005b). In this context, we will focus on what happened and on incidents pertaining to peacekeeping and warmongering processes.

EU summit in Gothenburg, 2001

During the first six months of 2001, Sweden held the chairmanship of the EU. In June that year, a summit took place in Gothenburg to which George W. Bush, President of the USA, was also invited. There was public opinion in opposition to Sweden’s membership of the EU at that time, which was why many people saw the Gothenburg summit as an appropriate occasion on which to express their opinions.

A large group of demonstrators from out of town intended to use peaceful means to demonstrate against the EU and its policies. Major demonstrations were also held, and seminars and popular festivals took place as well during the period 14–16 June. Police officers brought in from large parts of Sweden kept an eye on the demonstrations. A questionnaire and interviews show that the police officers viewed these demonstrations as part of the manifestations of a democratic society. Essentially, there was no antagonism between the police and the demonstrators.

On the morning of 14 June, the police got indications that individuals with violent tendencies had infiltrated the peaceful demonstrators. Someone asserted that they saw demonstrators carrying weapons into a school, which was being used to provide overnight accommodation for demonstrators. So the police stormed the school (Hvitfeldtska Upper Secondary School). The peaceful demonstrators involved in these incidents felt that they themselves were being wrongly perceived as violent by the police. They protested against this and invited resistance by failing to leave the school voluntarily. The police perceived this as a sign that they were admitting to collaboration with the weapon bearers (who proved not to exist). In the afternoon on the same day, an authorised anti-Bush demonstration took place. Some people attempted to persuade the demonstrators to march on to Hvitfeldtska Upper Secondary School instead of on to Järntorget (a square) as planned. However, the demon-
strators themselves managed to prevent this. However, after the dispersion of the demonstrators, activists went to the besieged school, where minor confrontations took place with the police, along with a certain amount of stone throwing. In the morning of the following day, a spontaneous action against police violence was organised. The demonstrators marched on to Götaplatsen (another square), where the police attempted to put a stop to the activity. To avoid violence, the police fell back. The encounter at Götaplatsen took place and ended with demonstrators being encouraged to go to the police station. The demonstrators set off and for about 10 minutes, a lot of damage was done on Avenyn (Main Street); shop windows were smashed; garden furniture and such like was set on fire. The police countered the action after a while and the violent demonstrators were dispersed. That same afternoon, a large and peaceful demonstration took place with 20–25,000 participants. This demonstration ended with speeches and appearances on Götaplatsen. That same evening, an unauthorised city festival took place in Vasa Park. The police attempted to break up the gathering. This action was also aimed at demonstrators who perceived themselves as peaceful, some of them getting involved and taking part in stone throwing and counterattacks. One demonstrator was shot.

On 16 June, another major authorised demonstration took place under the slogan ‘A Different Europe’. This demonstration took place as planned, peacefully. That same morning, the police surrounded another site where the demonstrators were located (Schillerska Upper Secondary School). In this case, too, weapons were suspected. The demonstrators were forced to remain on the school premises for several hours before the action was called off. In the evening, a spontaneous gathering took place at Järntorget. The police surrounded the square for a number of hours, but their monitoring was called off and the encounter ended peacefully.

The media reporting from Gothenburg was characterised by descriptions of the ‘war’, failing to clarify the boundary between peaceful demonstrators and the violent element. Pictures and headlines indicated a violent war. This reporting was important to the understanding of police officers, demonstrators and the general public of the incidents. Owing to the chaotic situation, the media proved to be an important source of information for both demonstrators and police officers. However, both police officers and demonstrators were of the opinion that the media gave misleading reports on the days. A more in-depth review of headlines and photographs also confirms this view. Therefore, it may be assumed that the attentions of the media helped to reinforce the image of the demonstrators as threatening and the situation as critical.

This very superficial description of the incidents shows that a number of activities took place with varying significance for both participants and police officers. A number of activists from out of town took part in the authorised demonstrations. These activities also took place as collaborative projects between the demonstrators and the police officers and could therefore take place in an orderly fashion. The demonstrators’ perceptions of these manifestations were also consistently positive, as demonstrated by the following report.

I took part in all the major planned demonstrations that took place over the EU summit. On the Thursday, I went with 10,000 other demonstrators on the ‘Bush
Not Welcome’ march. This was a powerful demonstration with a clear indicator aimed at the policies represented by Bush. I danced and laughed with thousands of other people throughout this march. They were playing samba music. ... On the Friday, I went on the mark against the EU and EMU, accompanied by about 16,000 other demonstrators. Here, thousands of people were shouting out slogans such as ‘No Violence’ and ‘Love’, as well as all the slogans critical of the EU. This was because of the violence that had taken place earlier in the day. The sense of community and unity, indicating that non-violence is the only right way to go about things, was very moving. I felt this massive strength within myself, telling me that what we were doing was right.... On the Saturday, the whole thing culminated in a demonstration under the slogan ‘For a Different Europe’. There were almost 25,000 of us on that march! Here, too, we listened to samba music, danced and sang. Jugglers, a walking shark with ten legs, orchestras and loads of other fun things took place as part of this demonstration. Concerts, plays, lectures, discussions and rendezvous filled the days of action in Gothenburg. ... This is true democracy, this is the parliament of the streets. This is where society’s citizens all meet up to discuss together how they want to organise their future society and how they should resolve the current problems we face on our planet. Here, there’s a willingness to change things, and a belief that things can be changed.

This report from one of the participants (and many similar reports) gives no indication of involvement in or willingness to participate in violence. This report merely described the peaceful demonstrations, which actually comprised the majority of the demonstrators. Other participants, including those with peaceful intentions who got involved in controversies with the police against their will or who were witnesses thereto, have submitted other descriptions similar to the one below.

The worst part of it all was that the police popped up and started attacking... popped up and started attacking, and we felt like hunted animals that whole afternoon until we got to this Forum area. Here, someone had managed to come up with this idea of amnesty for the area. It was just like you’d imagine an occupied country to be, where hordes of soldiers pop up and start attacking so that people just have to run for their lives ... We felt we were being hunted, even though we weren’t young or dressed in black or loudmouthed.

This report describes more of a war situation than images of a euphoric collective festival. It shows how the police, in their attempts to identify people with violent intent, had problems distinguishing them from ordinary demonstrators, as well as from peaceful young people who were dressed in black. The police are described as being under pressure, simplistic and abusive.

A massive infringement of the right to demonstrate. When without... people are all gathered in a square. Suddenly, police officers come running from every direction and surround us all. They bash anyone standing too close to them. Then we were all kept there for five hours, and people were being encouraged to hand themselves in to the police voluntarily. And the people who did that then got driven away in buses and locked up in – well, not even cells, but large steel cages... We were surrounded and then picked out, and people couldn’t even leave the area without being arrested.

The demonstrators describe the actions of the police as chaotic and hard to understand. This is an image which ties in quite well with individual police officers’ own perceptions of what happened in Gothenburg. In an interview in
Polistidningen (The Police Journal) (No. 8, 2001), a police officer described his orders as follows.

Many of my colleagues were scared and anxious. You could see it in the eyes of some of them. And I've never seen equipment like what some of them had, their helmets had turned yellow.

The police officer interviewed and his team avoided the direct violence.

But our radio communications were knocked out. Only afterwards did I realise that this was why everything then got so quiet. ... We were woken up after two hours and then we really had to move fast, because there was a rumour going round that a police station was to be set alight.

But this did not happen, and the police officer interviewed, along with his team, was sent instead to Järntorget (the square), where an unauthorised demonstration had been planned.

People were speculating that there would be individuals carrying weapons among the demonstrators. And after everything that had happened up to that point, it was not a nice feeling at all. It's not the same as when someone is carrying a weapon and you know who who it is. But the demonstrations went off pretty quietly for the most part. We had the odd tin can or stone thrown at us, but they didn’t come anywhere near hitting us.'

The police officer in question hopes never ever to have to be involved in anything like the EU demonstrations again.

These reports show that peaceful manifestations took place in which the police and demonstrators co-operated, but also that warlike situations occurred in which demonstrators and police officers viewed one another as dangerous, unpredictable and threatening enemies.

Reclaim-the-Streets activities

Reclaim-the-Streets began as a protest movement against motoring and the construction of motorways in the UK in the early 1990s. These protests took the form of occupation of roads or public places. Since then, the movement has spread within Europe, and on to Australia and the USA. Essentially, the movement is anti-car, but it is also focused these days on the political and financial interests behind the car culture. This phenomenon made its way to Sweden in the late 1990s. As a matter of fact, this is not really a movement, as it is not organised in the traditional manner with leaders and members. Rather, it is a postmodern phenomenon, which involves temporary street parties (with the emphasis on partying, rather than political messages) announced on the Internet or by means of flyers, stickers or the jungle telegraph.

People are normally invited to these street parties at a precise time (such as 18.37) and a specific location. However, the street parties do not always take place at these set locations. The young people gathered (normally in their 20s) might suddenly begin to move away to a section of the street, which is then
cordon off for their party. The events at two such happenings are described below in brief.

**Linköping, 1 May 2004**

All interested persons were invited to a party through an Internet website: ‘Leave your cares behind and live out your dreams of no-holds-barred partying!’ The police tried to use flyers to persuade students at the town’s schools not to take part in this unauthorised activity. But a couple of hundred youths gathered at the meeting place and after half an hour, they walked away and cordoned off a section of street between a bank and a department store. A vehicle carrying a hi-fi system was driven in and played loud music. A few young people danced, while most of them stood around chatting in groups. The police monitored events from a safe distance. The police officers were relaxed, wearing caps, and some of them had helmets hanging from their belts. During the party, the police had carried out searches of a few small groups. They searched bags and frisked a few people in a very undramatic way.

During the party, the police appeared in small groups, about fifty metres outside the cordons. They did not intervene in any way and they did not try to put a stop to the activities. Out of sight of the participants, in the surrounding area, patrol vehicles were stationed, carrying riot gear. There were also coaches on hand to transport away activists if necessary. However, the police did not ‘rattle their weapons’.

The party started off with performances, fireworks, flag burning, graffiti (on sheets of chipboard which the young people had brought with them) and beer drinking. There was a book fair there and sandwich stands. A few people went round collecting empty cans and rubbish in bin bags. Civilians needing to gain access to the area could do so with no problem. One of the observers was in the area, while the other one was not far from the police officers.

In spite of a number of unauthorised acts (drinking beer in a public place, letting off fireworks in a densely populated area, fires on the street, etc.), the police opted not to intervene. The party went off peacefully. The participants cleaned up the site, took down the cordons and left the site after about five hours, and then the street was opened to traffic. The actions of the activists and the police during the evening resulted in no conflicts, no damage and no rubbish left behind.

**Stockholm, 1 May 2004**

In Stockholm, for some weeks prior to the party, stickers had been put up all over the city bearing the words ‘Pirate Party, Karla Square, 1 May, 18:37’. This message led to a certain sense of unease among shop owners in the district. Prior to the party, the police decided to make themselves very visible (wearing yellow jackets), but not to wear helmets. When the young people arrived at the meeting place, all of those carrying rucksacks were searched. Representatives
of voluntary organisations (‘Parents in the Streets’, etc.) were seen in the crowds.

In other parts of the city, the police were monitoring groups that could have jeopardised the ‘Pirate Party’: a gang of militant football supporters and an extreme right-wing group. These groups were not permitted to go to Karla Square.

The party got off to a rather tentative start; the youths wandered round and chatted to one another, a few bangers went off. Bongos were played, young people in fancy dress danced. The hi-fi gradually got going, and fire-eaters appeared. The police wandered round and searched the young people respectfully while chatting to them. Some fights broke out between participants. The police quickly moved on the young people involved. Various activities took place, like ‘islands’ in the crowds of young people. A number of ‘rushes’, as they are called, took place over the course of the evening. Suddenly, a small group of people started running, and a large number of young people joined in. The police reacted to this as a threat: they put on their helmets and formed small groups. However, these ‘rushes’ came to nothing. The police did not permit the ‘rushes’ to leave the area, and this helped to restrict the street party to the occupied area. There were no interventions against the crowd, although individual youths were dealt with discreetly, such as when a window was broken.

At about 10 p.m., the music stopped playing and the young people drifted away, and the party site was cleared of beer cans and rubbish. A limited number of shop windows were broken in an adjacent street in connection with a ‘rush’ outside the party site. This damage was not linked to the party, but occurred afterwards. The ringleader was arrested and authorised action was instigated.

Like in Linköping, the police adopted a permissive attitude to the actual ‘party’ and allowed the young people to hold it. In this case, too, the result was very limited damage, no littering and no confrontations between the police and activists at the party site.

The Salem Manifestations, 2004

The incidents that played out in Salem (a suburb to Stockholm) and central Stockholm on 11 December 2004 are rooted in a tale of abuse dating back to 2000. In December of that year, a Swedish boy was injured so badly by another boy with an immigrant background that he died on the way to hospital. Since then, right-wing extremists (organised into what is known as the Salem Foundation) have held annual manifestations to honour the memory of the boy who was killed. These manifestations have also become an annual event for the mobilisation of right-wing extremists in Sweden and its neighbouring countries. In previous years, anti-fascist groups have held ‘counter-demonstrations’ to mark their dissociation from the statements of the right-wing extremists. In 2003, the police ended up between the two groups of dem-
onstrators and a scuffle ensued, mainly between police officers and anti-fascist participants.

Prior to November 2004, preparations were implemented for various types of manifestation in Salem or in the central part of Stockholm. Negotiations between the police and various interest groups ensured that each of the groups’ manifestations took place in different places and at different times, without risking the groups confronting one another locally. The major manifestation of the right-wing groups was to follow the route marched in previous years, i.e. from a commuter station to Salem at about 4 p.m. A smaller demonstration in which ‘People of Salem against Racism’ wanted to demonstrate their dissociation from the manifestation of the right-wing groups took place on the morning of the same day, starting in Salem and ending with a roll call close to the commuter station. At the same time as the right-wing groups were demonstrating in Salem, a celebrity gala against racism was taking place in Stockholm (the square, Medborgarplatsen). Thus the ‘opposing groups’ were gathered, but in separate locations. In addition, activities were run by autonomous groups in the central parts of Stockholm, partly with the intention of preventing right-wing supporters from getting to Salem. All activities were monitored by the police. In brief, the planned incidents can be described as follows.

‘People of Salem against Racism’ held a traditional demonstration march through Salem at about 10 a.m., using the slogan ‘Salem, a Nazi-free Zone’. The police escorted the march, with 25 or so participants, along the designated route. The march ended with a roll call where people were encouraged to dissociate themselves from racist and neo-Nazi undercurrents in society. There were no disruptions, and no counter-demonstrators were present. The number of police officers and ‘volunteers’ (e.g. ‘Parents in the Streets’) exceeded the number of demonstrators.

The Salem Foundation, which professes to adhere to nationalistic, anti-immigrant views, was due to start their gathering at 4 p.m. at the commuter station. At about 4 p.m., supporters turned up by road and rail. The police were present, clearly visible in yellow jackets and without helmets on. Participants were searched while chatting with police officers. A few weapons were seized and dealt with discreetly. The police officers patrolled the area in pairs, while the people who had come to the demonstration chatted, smoked and waited. After about an hour, the participants – who by this time numbered about 1,600 – were encouraged to get into groups of four. In a very short time, the entire gathered crowd had formed a long line of people to march on the memorial site, with drums, flaming torches, wreaths and flowers. This torchlight procession took place in silence, there was no alcohol, and special demonstration guards maintained order and space within the procession. The police monitored the areas around the march route and meeting place. The meeting place was cordoned off and the surrounding areas were illuminated with powerful spotlights. The police officers on duty were faced away from the crowd, i.e. facing the surrounding area. The aim of this monitoring was to protect the assembled masses from attacks from outside. The demonstrators held a memorial ceremony, laying wreaths before a kind of cross made of crutches. A roll call with a very nationalistic message then took place. Free tea was pro-
vided during the meeting, and stalls brought in sold sausages, T-shirts and literature. The meeting ended and the participants went back peacefully to their cars or trains. The meeting place was cleaned by the participants.

At the same time as the Salem Foundation was implementing its activities, the ‘Network against Racism’ held a major manifestation at a large square (Medborgarplatsen) in the heart of Stockholm. There were between two and three thousand participants present. When the meeting started, people stood around in groups and chatted. Most of them were young people, although middle-aged people were also present. Various banners were on display, bearing slogans such as ‘Now fuck it, we’ve had enough’, ‘For a school free of Nazis’ or ‘Against Racism and Discrimination’. Few police officers were visible in or near the area. The ones who were there were clearly visible in yellow jackets, and they were normally patrolling in twos. The arrangers were constantly in touch with police communications officers in civilian clothes, called ‘dialogue polices’, who were near the scene.

A total of six artists were performing, and top of the bill was Michael Wiehe (a famous protest singer). He was perceived as a national symbol of the left-wing movement. The entertainment continued for two hours. Over this period, the police carried out body searches on a large number of participants. When a number of them had been searched two or three times, the arrangers contacted the ‘dialogue policemen’ and asked them to make sure the searches stopped. This also resulted in the police easing off on the searches. On one occasion, the police put on their helmets and intervened against a person whom they thought was wandering around with iron bars. However, he turned out to be selling torches. According to an agreement with the arrangers, the arrangers actually should have been responsible for making initial contact with people suspected of having violent intent.

Communication via the police communications officers worked relatively well. This, coupled with the fact that the event and entertainment were arranged well, and the fact that this manifestation took place at the same time as that of the antagonists a long way away, meant that the activity went off peacefully.

*Stop Train* at Central Station had been advertised on the Internet. The aim was to prevent the nationalists from getting to Salem by train. The message posted on the Internet was similar in nature to the one below.

Dress normally – leave the black hoodies at home. Then you’ll be able to melt into the crowds at Central Station and the Christmas shopping. The police will be out looking for left-wing youths dressed in black so they can send them straight home.

There was a strategy regarding how the activists intended to stop the Nazis with respect to how they were going to position themselves in relation to the police, the general public and one another.

If the police advance, we’ll withdraw. So we have to be flexible and swarm around the cordons instead of bunching together.
It’ll be difficult for the police to shut off all of Central Station, they’ll have a lot of annoyed motorists on their hands and there’s a risk that, in the crowds, they’ll get the wrong people.

If there’s a risk of anyone creating chaos at the station, it’s the police.

Here, numbers are a lot more important than militancy, so the more people who get out there and protest, the more peaceful the entire action will be.

As the police had intelligence in advance that this action was about to take place, Central Station was patrolled by police officers wearing yellow jackets. The police deployed officers at the entrance to the platform for trains to and from Salem, thereby preventing the activists from getting to the platform. One girl yelled ‘everyone this way’ and ran to the entrance before the one for Salem. Two or three individuals repeated her admonition, and about 20 young people managed to get up the steps before the police blocked them off. The young people were ordered to go back outside the glass doors into the large hall on the lower floor. A police officer spoke into a megaphone. ‘This is the police. Move back.’ Part of the crowd started to move back. In the other part, most people did not move, but then someone told them all to move and go back behind the glass doors. The police stopped a few young people who were offering passive resistance. They allowed themselves to be stopped, but they did not leave voluntarily. The police moved slowly, pushing them in front of them.

Whistles could be heard loudly most of the time. Applause gave way to slow handclaps. One girl shouted, ‘What shall we do?’, and everyone replied, ‘Crush racism’, followed by drums and singing. Suddenly, everyone started to move over to the underground. A few people started to move, everyone followed. It was possible that they now understood that the train that the nationalists took to Salem would not be stopping at Central Station, but that it had already passed. The young people gathered at the steps to the street outside. The girl led slogans and shouted, ‘Let’s go!’ Everyone moved to the turnstiles to the underground. Plain-clothes policemen in police jackets let the young people pass through the gates to the underground.

While the activists were blocking Central Station, the police had persuaded the nationalists not to try to take the train from Central Station, but to travel from another station instead. They then got on the train there, and the train passed through Central Station without stopping. This was how the police managed to keep the antagonistic groups apart, while at the same time allowing the ‘train stoppers’ to express their opinions loudly.

Reclaim-the-Streets activity. The militant fraction of AFA (Anti-fascistic Action) gave notice of an anti-racist action, meeting up at Slussen (the ‘Sluice’, a central meeting point) at 6:37 p.m. A fairly large crowd of young people had gathered at the designated time in order to march to an unknown party site. Some of them were wearing masks, but most of them were not. Among other things, they were shouting, ‘What shall we do? Stop fascism!’ There were a lot of them, but they were marching in neat rows. The police monitored the march by following in vehicles. It turned out that the activists intended to go back to the Central Station to meet the right-wing demonstrators from Salem.
on their way home. The activists were offered three alternative march routes, thanks to efforts by the ‘dialogue policemen’, primarily by talking to the people who wanted to talk to the police. It was also made clear to the activists that the police would not stand for people going to Central Station. The activists then accepted a march route heading for Mariatorget (a square), although they did not stop there; instead, they opted to continue on to Medborgarplatsen (another square), where they held their street party. This soon broke up (the weather was cold). The police monitored the activists’ march and party by being nearby. Contact and discussions with the activists took place via the ‘dialogue policemen’.

_to summarise_, it may be stated that a number of parallel activities took place on that day; some authorised, some not. The police monitored all activities and ensured that order was upheld in connection with them. The measures against and removal of individuals who were carrying weapons or behaving threateningly were one-off actions, not crowd actions. In all instances, the activists demonstrated responsibility for their own participants. The discipline at the Salem Foundation’s manifestation was almost military by nature. ‘The Network against Racism’, as well as the militant AFA, maintained open contact with the ‘dialogue policemen’. The train stopping action failed to result in confrontation with the police when the participants noticed a clear boundary for how far they were permitted to go. All in all, it may be stated that all groups managed to implement their manifestations successfully in that they all had the opportunity to put forward their opinions. The right to demonstrate could be upheld, even for groups that had not requested permission for their actions.

The orders of the police involved avoiding confrontations between demonstrators and counter-demonstrators, and the police worked in a peacekeeping capacity in order to avoid this. This occurred mainly because the ‘dialogue policemen’ were able to establish contact with members of the various groups, and this took place in a variety of ways depending on how the different groups worked and were organised.
How Riots Occur and How Order Is Secured

How riots start, escalate or de-escalate

The analysis of questionnaires and focus group interviews with demonstrators and police officers from the Gothenburg incidents showed a wide variation of descriptions regarding the events that took place in Gothenburg. They were described completely differently, depending on who was describing the situation. Two processes, different but taking place at the same time, could be distinguished on the basis of the statements of the various informants – an aggravation process and a peace process. An analysis of such processes has provided data for a model, which has then been used and further developed on the basis of the analyses of the reclaim actions and the incidents in connection with the Salem manifestations. Examples of aggravation – processes are taken mainly from the Gothenburg manifestations, as this was where they materialised; while examples of peace processes are taken mainly from the other manifestations we have observed.

Thus, our studies have resulted in a theoretical model, which explains both the criteria for peaceful demonstrations and the occurrence of confrontations, which may lead to riots. Further development of this model, which is presented in the next section, also allows us to explain why certain critical situations sometimes develop into a dialogue between the parties, while other ones turn into confrontations, which in turn may develop into riots but do not always do so. In this section, we will be focusing on the directly peace-making and war-making processes.

Peace-making and aggravation processes

The first model presented here shows different processes, which may constitute peace-making or aggravation processes during a demonstration. Combinations of these factors within the demonstrator group or police group, or between them, influence the course of events. The outbreak of riots has been demonstrated to be not only an interaction between the various groups, but also an interaction between intra-group processes as well as inter-group processes. One move leads to another, both within the group and between the groups.

The following processes have proved to be crucial to the occurrence of riots:
• How the police and demonstrators categorise themselves (the ‘in-group’) and the others (the ‘out-group’).

• How the activities are actually organised.

• How the police and demonstrators treat one another.

Categorising, organising and treatment can be viewed as variables, which can be either aggravating or peace-making and which have proved to be applicable to both police and demonstrators. The table below shows how aggravation and peace-making are expressed in the three types of process.

Table 1
Wa-making processes and peace-making processes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF PROCESS</th>
<th>AGGRAVATION</th>
<th>PEACE-MAKING</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Categorising</td>
<td>Negative stereotyping</td>
<td>Differentiating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organising</td>
<td>Creating chaos</td>
<td>Orderly organising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>Provoking</td>
<td>Disarming</td>
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Below is a description of categorising, organising and treatment, and how war-making and peace-making can be understood by means of these three types of process.

Aggravation processes

Categorisation as aggravation (stereotyping)

A war-making categorisation mainly involves stereotypical categorising of the other group. While one’s own group is humanised (‘We are only human’) and heterogenised (‘We are all different within our own group’), the other group is de-individuated (‘them’) and perceived as an anonymous crowd. Demonstrators become a trouble hotspot, a black flock in the eyes of the police. The police are described as inhuman stonefaces by the demonstrators. We have opted to use the term negative stereotyping for this phenomenon.

In our description of stereotype categorisation, we have social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1978) and self-categorisation theory (SCT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) as points of departure. One group (the ‘in-group’) expresses their collective perception of another group (the ‘out-group’) by describing each member of the out-group in a stereotypical way. At the same time, differences within the in-group are reduced in a way that makes differences between the in-group and the out-group distinct. Thus, the maintenance of asocial identity, separate from that of the out-group, is facilitated. The in-group is upgraded, while the out-group is downgraded. The term negative stereotyping, as used in this study, refers to a categorisation with negative loading. In accordance
with SCT, a categorisation of members of the in-group takes place, not on the basis of stereotypical notions, but on the basis of positive self-categorisation. However, there may be a tolerance for differences within the in-group. Differentiation may be used, which means viewing the group members not only as group members but as individuals. The fact that nuances can be tolerated in one’s own group can be explained by, for example, the ultimate attribution error (Pettigrew, 1979), which involves, inter alia, a tendency to explain what is perceived as positive in-group behaviour at the individual level. Negative in-group behaviour is explained instead with reference to the situation or factors in the surroundings. On the basis of their shared social identity, police officers may create an image of themselves as a unified group. Individual police officers’ norm-breaking is explained as being outside the control of the individual police officer and as being dictated by the situation. Corresponding behaviour among individual demonstrators would, instead, be viewed by the police as being caused by the demonstrators themselves and, in the long run, as an expression of the way in which the entire group of demonstrators acts and relates to the police.

Many examples of stereotyping processes were given both by police officers about demonstrators and by demonstrators about police officers in Gothenburg. Police officers as well as demonstrators made stereotypical categorisations on the basis of the other group’s clothing or equipment. The uniforms and safety equipment of the police made the demonstrators view them as a de-individuated crowd. The police officers were described as an armed force, which it was impossible to reach and communicate with.

Like Tengil’s soldiers (laugh), they were, yep! That’s what they looked like marching around in Gothenburg – impersonal. I think their equipment – or when they beat with their batons on their shields, I think that’s really... I think it’s provocative in itself, and it’s really scary. (Demonstrator)

While older demonstrators felt that they were considered by the police to be peaceful, many young people – particularly if they were dressed in any kind of an extreme outfit – felt that they were regarded by both the police and the general public as would-be troublemakers. Thus, clothing and age appear to be important codes for negative stereotyping.

Well, after what happened there on the Friday morning, all of Gothenburg looked... looked different. People moved to one side when you walked down the street, that kind of thing/ .../Because we looked like we did, I think we were wearing jeans, big scarves... and I think we went walking round with a Lenin flag. (Demonstrator)

The clothing of demonstrators forms the basis for police stereotypical categorisation into two categories: those who are there to demonstrate and those who have other things in mind and are categorised as a trouble hotspot. Masks, but also pulled-down scarves, which can be used as masks and black clothes, thus constitute a kind of uniform, feeding negative stereotyping.

However, the police do not tar everyone with the same brush, but divide demonstrators into two stereotypical groupings, ‘demonstrators with peaceful intentions’ and ‘troublemakers with evil intentions’. ‘Don’t call them demon-
strators’, the police said in reference to the latter group. The police also spoke of a ‘tail’ of criminals, who just turn up whenever anything is happening.

Yes, of course. It’s obvious – they just come here for one reason. They want to make trouble and fight and misbehave. And then you can always discuss what on earth they get out of all this. (Police officer)

The opposing side is organised, clever, well trained and can handle these kinds of things. They train themselves in order to get naïve people on their side... They hide in amongst the demonstrators as well. (Police officer)

The police also categorise demonstrators on the basis of how they follow the rules of the game, as interpreted by the police, and thus evaluate the demonstrators on this basis. According to this categorisation, ‘demonstrators’ are those who participate in regular protest marches, where permission has been applied for and granted. Demonstrators who act more spontaneously are regarded as anarchists (autonomous) and can easily end up on the list of would-be troublemakers, as the demonstration itself is deemed to constitute a breach of order as it falls outside of the rules of the game, as interpreted by the police.

However, the police do not tar all these demonstrators with the same brush, either. Instead, they divide them up according to how they follow the rules of the game. The police are authorised to shut off streets, order crowds to disperse, etc. and then expect demonstrators to behave as law-abiding citizens, i.e. to do as the police say. Anyone failing to do so is guilty of disobeying police orders, which is against the law. Police officers serving in connection with the Gothenburg riots described, for example, the difficulties involved in differentiating the demonstrators with peaceful intentions but who were ‘dragged along’ by the ones with evil intentions. By offering demonstrators the opportunity to leave after having been searched, which the police considered to have taken place when Hvitfeldtska Upper Secondary School was cordoned off, for example, the people who stayed were considered to have made a personal choice. They were then treated by the police as if they belonged to the category of people with evil intentions.

To summarise, there are various examples of negative stereotyping processes during demonstrations, which may lead to riots, from both the police in respect to the demonstrators and from the demonstrators with respect to the police.

Organisation as aggravation (creating chaos)

The acts of the police and demonstrators have great significance for the outcome of a demonstration, particularly in respect of how these actions may contribute to chaos. We have seen various examples of activities, which have created chaos and hence aggravation, and also activities which have been orderly organised, and hence contributed to peace-making.

Chaos-creating processes are anything police officers and demonstrators do to contribute to the creation of disorder, such as rumours, sudden unexplained or inexplicable actions caused by altered rules from the police or the demon-
strators, lack of information, etc. With regard to the police, the aim of an intervention may be to create order (to counteract or prevent a breach of order), but the consequence is the opposite, i.e. creation of disorder and chaos.

Uncertainty, fear and a lack of information may lead to rumours gaining ground and spreading around, which in turn results in further uncertainty and chaos. Mobile phones among demonstrators had great significance regarding how rumours were spread; likewise, it was important how the police scouts interpreted and communicated their observations in order not to convey a sense of unnecessary threat. One such example was a rumour that iron bars were being handed out at the square Medborgarplatsen in connection with the Salem demonstrations. Another example was when a demonstrator was seriously injured in connection with the shooting at Vasa Park in Gothenburg; many different rumours flourished regarding who had been shot. Journalists, police officers and a number of demonstrators were named as victims. One demonstrator who asked a police officer what had happened at Vasa Square was told that a police officer had been shot.

We’re just not used to this incredible dynamic when the crowd really gets going, you know. That’s – that’s when things really happen. And something new that I’ve never understood, is what mobiles can do in society, to suddenly create a rumour and get people moving. And all that stuff, you know? And people just talk about all kinds of stuff. That lad, in the evening, you know? Suddenly everybody knew he was dead. And that created a kind of atmosphere, like, now what should we do? (Demonstrator)

Rumours spread among the police as well, including one stating that there were foreign demonstrators, armed, at Schillerska Upper Secondary School. Uncertainty among the police and demonstrators led to a small number of people almost managing to assemble large groups of people, such as at the anti-capitalist demonstration, when the rules suddenly changed and a few people wanted to lead the march down to Hvitfeldtska instead of following the set march route.

This anti-Bush demonstration... Suddenly a bloke came rushing past with a megaphone. And there was a real sense of uncertainty in the air. So we didn’t really know whether we were taking part in a demonstration or not. This bloke shouted come on you lot, the rules have changed. We’re off to Hvitfeldtska instead. ... A few people ran and led the demonstration, and then things just went the way they went, that kind of thing. You could see how crowds work, you know. (Demonstrator)

Demonstrators were of the opinion that the situation would not have been as chaotic if the police had provided better information, if they had told them where they were not allowed to go, where they should have gone instead, and why.

Instead, there were loads of rumours flying around. And yeah, somebody mentioned that the police were letting us go one way so as to get out of there. That was the impression we got, but when we started heading in that direction, there was a raid all of a sudden, with cops rushing that way and forcing people back. And then you’ve got complete uncertainty on all sides, you know. And that completely wrecks the atmosphere. (Demonstrator)
A lack of information led to uncertainty, which in turn led to chaos. There were many tales of the police failing to answer questions and failing to provide information, in a manner, which made demonstrators believe that this was a deliberate strategy.

They had really rigid tactics and wouldn’t tell us anything. ... they’d just suddenly cordon off things without telling people anything. They did this the whole time, and it was really unpleasant. (Démonstrateur)

The police were of the opinion that they were unable to provide information on many occasions on account of confidentiality concerns. But even the police described anxiety and fear, and they even wondered whether they would come home alive. The demonstrators also felt this uncertainty and insecurity.

We were really unsure what would happen, like, there were so many people and the police were really keyed up. (Démonstrateur)

The police described how the organisation they had built up and planned rapidly descended into disorganisation. The officers designated to relieve the usual officers in difficult situations had to go in almost straight away.

Things went wrong right from the outset. So we had to go in right from the beginning. But why things turned out the way they did – well, that’s something you can talk about ’til the cows come home. (Police officer)

The demonstrators were perceived to be unpredictable, and the police were afraid of what would happen, and above all of how the ‘black flock’, i.e. the people categorised by the police as would-be troublemakers, would act.

The technique of the black flock is to infiltrate the general public and then to emerge and attack the police and banks and then to ‘disappear’ again and blend in with the crowds. That’s how they protect themselves. (Police officer)

The police officers also stated that different organisations were responsible for different kinds of order. The agreement entered with the organisation leaders prior to the demonstrations was based on the fact that the organisations themselves would be responsible for order within their own organisation but, according to the police, this did not appear to work.

Chaos appears to be created primarily in connection with the unauthorised manifestations, such as Reclaim parties. These manifestations are also characterised by another type of organisation than in the authorised demonstrations. They are perceived as anarchistic and hence also as chaotic since there is no clear leadership structure and decision-making organisation. This has consequences for the work of the police, as there is no one with whom to communicate and negotiate and who can act as a spokesman for the group. For the police, it may be difficult to understand that there is no one behind a planned action. This may increase suspicions of a hidden agenda, and of activists ‘hiding’ among ordinary demonstrators.
To summarise, in riot situations there are many examples of chaos creation, i.e. processes, which prevent or impede order. A lack of information or conflicting information which gives rise to rumours, uncertainty and fear contributes to this chaos.

**Provocative treatment as an aggravation process**

By provocative treatment, we mean not only the way in which demonstrators and police officers negatively treat one another, but also a more general form of ‘treatment’ such as police helicopters, containers, fences, formation, behaviour, etc. The same is true of demonstrators’ actions: weapons they bring along, masks or a preparedness to cover their faces – hoods pulled down, scarves, an unwillingness to talk to the police. The opposite – i.e. normal uniform or clothing, patrolling in pairs, normal behaviour, chatting, etc. – is instead disarming.

In Gothenburg, the police officers’ batons, shields and weapons entailed that the demonstrators perceived the police officers as being provocative and armed for war. Transport containers used to shut off streets, dogs and horses also helped to make demonstrators feel afraid, threatened and powerless.

On this street after the library, there was a big car park, and there we found the police were loading up and, you know, filling the entire car park with dog handlers and barking dogs and... there was such an incredible echo in there. (Demonstrator)

This organisation by the police officers was described as entirely unexpected. The demonstrators were unprepared for what would happen and they themselves did not understand why they were subjected to provocation.

By the way police officers as well as demonstrators behave, dress, etc., they consciously or unconsciously provoke the other group. For police officers, masked demonstrators constitute a provocation, while they themselves are not always aware that their uniforms with helmets, visors, shields, etc. constitute a provocation for the demonstrators which they themselves consider to be just part of their working clothes. Few police officers realised that the containers set up around Hvitfeldtska Upper Secondary School would constitute a provocation for the demonstrators. Coaches, helicopters, dogs and horses are other examples that may be provocative to demonstrators, just as demonstrators who show up in groups and refuse to talk to the police constitute a provocation for the police. Furthermore, not all police officers realise that the police *per se* can constitute a provocation; but rather they believe that their presence represents security for the people who ‘have nothing to hide’.

Other examples of more direct and often more conscious provocation is when demonstrators attempt to provoke the police by means of various invectives, such as ‘Nazi swine’, etc. in order to, in the eyes of the police, force them to use their batons. Correspondingly, there are examples of police talking to demonstrators in offensive ways.
To summarise, there are many examples of behaviour and events perceived to be provocative by the other party. This was true of incidents or behaviours, which destroyed the other group’s chances of doing what they were there to do or were perceived to be disruptive or offensive by the other group. Provocation of the other group is not always intentional or even a conscious act. The police had trouble understanding that their clothing, helmets, visors and shields are *per se* provocative, just as demonstrators have trouble understanding that hoodies and big scarves can be provocative to the police.

**Peace-making processes**

Above, we have described war-making processes, which have contributed to the start of riots. In this section, we will describe those processes and situations that help to preserve peace and prevent riots. During the same demonstration, it is possible for both war-making and peace-making processes to take place.

Some demonstrators in Gothenburg stated that they were emotionally affected and proud of being present in a context where so many people joined in a common action. No masked individuals appeared in the large ‘No to the EU’ demonstration: it was entirely peaceful. The whole thing was perceived to be a happy carnival with lots of music, a meaningful message and a range of interesting lectures. Young and old got together, participated and intermingled with one another. The same is true of a number of the Reclaim parties and anti-racist demonstrations we studied. Below is a description of how categorising, organising and treatment can result in peaceful activities.

**Peace-making categorisation (differentiation)**

Peace-making categorisation signifies that police officers as well as demonstrators differentiate and view each other not according to a group stereotype but as individual persons with good and bad sides. In certain circumstances, anyone can turn into a stone-throwing police officer or demonstrator. Differentiation applies to the view of members of one’s own group as well as the members of the other group. Destructive or bad elements or processes are seen not only in the ‘out-group’ but also in the ‘in-group’.

Differentiation is the opposite of stereotyping and it implies that one’s own group (the ‘in-group’) is able to distinguish differences between the participants in the other group (the ‘out-group’) and assess part or aspects of the other group positively. Thus categorisation of the other group takes place, but not in terms of negative stereotyping; but rather, there is positive categorisation in which positive aspects are emphasised and assigned to the entire ‘out-group’. Demonstrators expressed understanding of individual police officers. One reason was that they realised that chaos creation was a fundamental reason why the riots started, and the police chiefs had to be accountable for that, not the individual police officers.
Most of the blame rests with the police chiefs, because I reckon they subjected these police officers to so much pressure, so I’m not really surprised…. I think they should place responsibility one hell of a long way up, I reckon. I know I was standing and chatting to cops, they were totally confused, they were absolutely terrified. I can really empathise with individual officers who were called in from the countryside and who couldn’t ever imagine this kind of thing happening. (Demonstrator)

A lot of demonstrators also understood that individual police officers felt threatened and expected trouble, because before the demonstration, some groups had put out posters and made announcements on the Internet promising stone throwing and disruption. They also expressed an understanding of the feelings of individual police officers and what they may lead to.

But then I suppose the police were really scared – well, it’s obvious they’d be scared, I suppose… they probably felt bloody exposed and threatened, and I can really see why they felt that way. (Demonstrator)

The police also believed that innocent young people were dragged into the riots, and that this was attributable to crowd psychology.

This is a massive threat to democracy, and of course precisely this kind of crowd psychology. Loads of people could end up getting involved. You couldn’t really say who, but anyway loads of people. We’ve seen examples of this a number of times, both in Sweden and abroad, of course. (Police officer)

As far as police officers are concerned, categorisation is part of their work. They have to be able to identify quickly who is guilty or not guilty and what issues can result in authorised action, i.e. what is to be regarded as a criminal act. As mentioned above, the police do not tar everyone with the same brush. They make a selection in connection with demonstrations. They attempt to separate the wheat from the chaff, i.e. the agitators from the ‘crowd’, as they seem to work on the basis of a theory based on specific individuals leading an unidentified crowd.

Even though the police have not changed their theories about crowds, they are currently working in accordance with a new national tactics project. Walking in pairs among demonstrators, wearing ordinary uniforms and chatting with them also makes it possible for the police to see the demonstrators as individuals and not as an undifferentiated crowd. And vice versa: demonstrators have the opportunity to see police officers as individual professionals and not as an attack force, thereby facilitating identification of mutual variations.

Searches also allow the police to differentiate the people who turn up with dangerous stuff and are deemed to be spoiling for a fight. Instead of tarring all demonstrators with the same brush, the police show that they have a varied view of them. The police use different uniforms and only wear helmets when they are expecting something to happen. Helmets being put on and taken off signal that these are working tools designed for different situations or contexts and not a uniform designed to give people the impression of the police as a united front.
There were also a large number of varied statements along the lines of ‘The police are here to make sure we can hold our demonstration’, which helped ensure peaceful relations.

To summarise, there were many examples of differentiation by both demonstrators and police officers during the Gothenburg incidents, as well as during later Reclaim actions and demonstrations. Demonstrators and police officers have demonstrated understanding of the reactions of individual participants in the opposing group and regarded the ‘out-group’ as being made up of individuals who are all very different.

**Peace-making organisation (‘order creation’)**

By ‘order creation’, we mean everything which one group does to counter ‘chaos creation’ within both one’s own group and the other group. For example, the police view demonstrators following the prevailing rules as exemplifying order creation. For example, requesting permission for a demonstration is order creation in many ways. On the one hand, the police receive information on the demonstration and, on the other, there is an arranger with whom they can negotiate, who claims to be responsible for the demonstration and undertakes to be responsible for order via their own guards. As far as the police are concerned, they have to acquire information on the demonstrators’ plans so that, among other things, they themselves can plan their own organisation. Through information, both parties ‘lay their cards on the table’ so as to counter notions of hidden agendas and rumour mongering.

Demonstrators also pointed out similar factors as being methods of order creation for demonstrations: (a) permission to demonstrate, (b) a prearranged route for the demonstration, (c) a clear arranger and checking of slogans, (d) demonstration guards and (e) a ban on masks. These six criteria were applicable to the three major demonstrations in Gothenburg, which also went off peacefully.

Nothing happened at the demonstration we took part in, there was no violence at all, no provocation. I think there were six cops walking with the demonstration, and then we had our own guards, you might say. And if things are like that, if the demonstration is like that, you don’t need to be worried because nothing’s going to happen. (Demonstrator)

When provocative action takes place against a demonstration, individual demonstrators may undertake roles as guards so as to avoid chaos. At the anti-capitalist demonstration in Gothenburg, demonstrators were encouraged to abandon the march route and head for Hvitfeldtska Upper Secondary School instead, but individual demonstrators then intervened.

So I ran into the street there and started stopping people and told them there was no demonstration there. We’ve got to... we’re going... we’re going this way because we have to... And it was all okay because I was standing there like some
kind of voluntary demonstration guard and made sure the demonstration followed the right route. (Demonstrator)

The police described how they are organised in order to counter the risks within their own group with regard to individual actions, for example, in connection with provocative actions.

Then it’s very much down to the group to keep away… sure, we were extremely provocative and wandering head first into the trap, and then you help each other out, because once you’ve got angry enough, it’s difficult to… then you might go along for the ride, they try to get you to emerge out of the group, out of the chain, but then you have to help each other out and hold back. (Police officer)

Both activists and the police at the Reclaim party in Linköping demonstrated clear organisation in their activities, which translated into order creation. The activists maintained order within their captured area. The police guaranteed order in surrounding districts. The police officers’ ‘buffer zone’ acted as a kind of access area where ordinary citizens could decide themselves whether they wanted to continue and where people suspected of being there to cause trouble could be sent away by the police.

In Stockholm, such Reclaim phenomena as music vehicles, drums, fire extinguishing, etc. were all examples of order creation. Music and dancing were strong attractions for young people who went round expecting something to happen, which reduced the risk of, for example, ‘rushes’ which could cause chaos. The police worked in pairs, wearing ordinary uniforms among the young people, which created order partly on account of the chats they had with them. There was co-operation between the police and partygoers with regard to the music vehicle, for example. When it came to the positioning of the vehicle and the time for shutting off the music, the activists complied with the requests of the police and the police helped out when their loudspeakers failed to work. The cordoned area turned into a party site, which probably helped to ensure that activists who were on looking for something other than a party headed out to the periphery and left the area unnoticed, although they then went on to create chaos by breaking windows outside the party site. The ability of police officers to cope with the rushes that took place in Stockholm by not getting dragged in, but by rapidly returning to their recommended working method and immediately removing any helmets they had put on, was in itself order creation. In one of the rushes, the police followed the ‘crowd’ and thus managed to talk the young people into going back to the party site.

The early searches carried out at the various events in Linköping and Stockholm can be viewed as order creation activities as they were carried out before anything had happened. Objects which could have been used for provocation or creating chaos were confiscated, while at the same time the searches took place respectfully and thus made it possible to initiate communication between demonstrators and the police.

With constant communication between the police and partygoers, the risk of chaos-creating rumours was reduced among both participants and the police. On one occasion, there were rumours among the police that autonomous
troublemakers were hiding amongst the partygoers. Among the partygoers, there were also rumours that Nazis were on their way. A functioning information operation allowed the police to protect the party site by dealing with racist youths on the way to the site.

The partygoers themselves maintained order by going round and collecting rubbish in both Stockholm and Linköping, which probably also helped to normalise the image of the party among residents and the general public.

To summarise, we may state that the planning of activities, clear objectives and a preparedness to intervene when general rules were not followed were important components in the peaceful demonstrations. Another conclusion is that when demonstrators and the police work together to create order, this leads to peaceful demonstrations. On the other hand, it is not enough for the police to be well organised; the demonstrators have to be too.

Peace-making treatment (disarming)

Disarming involves the police and demonstrators treating one another in a way, which is not perceived as provocative by the other group. Some examples are the police turning up in ordinary uniforms and caps instead of helmets, working in pairs instead of forming a troop, chatting with the demonstrators and even cracking a joke or two instead of behaving formally and ‘being on duty’.

The same is true of demonstrators, who behaved in a disarming fashion vis-à-vis the police at the peaceful demonstrations in Gothenburg by avoiding provocative clothing such as hoodies, hats and scarves. They also behaved in this way with other demonstrators so that they would not be perceived by the police to be provocative, e.g. by removing their masks.

I pulled down his mask and took his stone and then I said shit, is that your only fucking argument. I yelled at him, and he couldn’t really take that. (Demonstrator)

On the police officers’ side, there were many initiatives to enter into communication with the demonstrators so as to form the basis for a disarming and peaceful progression. This worked with regard to the groups of demonstrators who were so well organised that they could appoint people to represent them, but it was considerably more difficult with regard to groups who advocated individual responsibility and didn’t allow themselves to be represented by anyone.

At the Reclaim activities in Linköping, the police behaved in a disarming fashion in two senses. On the one hand, they searched some activists and then allowed them to return to the crowd. This message was probably viewed as meaning that the police accepted peaceful activities but did not allow weapons. The other disarming factor was the fact that the police did not ‘rattle their weapons’ by using visible riot gear. The disarming activity of the activ-
ists was manifested mainly in the form of larking about, practical jokes, dancing and singing.

In Stockholm, the police carried out their searches in a slightly different way to in Linköping. In Stockholm, searches took place within the activists’ own area, unlike in Linköping, where the police did not operate in amongst the young people, but remained outside the cordons set up by the activists. Purely theoretically, the police officers’ searches could have been interpreted as both disarming and provocative, depending on when, where and why the searches were carried out. In Stockholm, it was the intention of the police to carry out early searches so that they would not lead to trouble in the same way that searches in a more confrontational situation may have done. For this reason, the searches were done while things were still quiet, in the same way as in Linköping. These searches were disarming in both literal and figurative terms, as anything, which could have been used for provocation was confiscated.

Searches, which take place in a friendly manner have proved to lead potentially to actual disarming, but also to opportunities for contact and communication. The people who asked questions of the police received answers. Disarming also took place in that the police and participants ‘openly’ showed their weapons. For example, boys aged 12-14 stood around and chatted with the police, who showed them their helmets and shields. The young people got to touch them and ask questions.

To summarise, in the case of all crowd incidents studied, there were examples of both the police and demonstrators managing to avoid violence by initiating communication and by not appearing to be provocative, but by being ‘disarming’ instead.

Summary of war-making and peace-making processes

Experiences from Gothenburg allowed us to determine that when manifestations degenerated into riots, all war-making processes were present, i.e. stereotyping, chaos creation and provocation. Stereotypical categorisation, chaos creation and provocative actions by both the police and demonstrators all took place during the confrontation at Vasa Park, during the police raid on Hvitfeldtska, and at the spontaneous demonstration against police violence and the rush on the ‘Avenue’. It seemed as if it were precisely the combination of these processes which was characteristic of escalation and riots while, on the other hand, peace-making processes such as differentiation, order creation and disarming led to calm, peaceful demonstrations.

Summary of conclusions

• War-making processes of significance for explaining the occurrence of confrontations between demonstrators and the police are stereotyping, chaos creation and provocation.
• Peace-making processes of significance for explaining the occurrence of peaceful demonstrations are differentiation, order creation and disarming.

Consequences for police work

• These studies show that when the police fail to differentiate different types of demonstrator or activist and treat all of them as if they were would-be rioters, the actual risk of riots increases. When the police manage to establish contact and bring about negotiation with individual activists or groups, there is a greater likelihood of peaceful developments.

• If the police have malfunctioning internal communication or an unclear type of internal order-giving process, this can lead to the creation of chaos. Chaos can be created by failing to do certain things or by delaying such actions on account of hierarchical order-giving. A lack of information or the spread of rumours about infiltrators or weapons among demonstrators can lead to provocative, chaos-creating actions which in turn increase the risk of riots. On the other hand, well-functioning internal communication and opportunities for fast, local decisions, whereby the activists are kept informed and given explanations of police officers’ actions, increase the likelihood of order creation and peace.

• When the police face up to the activists in a manner similar to a military formation, when they approach as a troop, with helmets, visors and shields or setting up fences, this can be perceived as a provocation and increases the risk of aggression or riots. If, on the other hand, the police patrol in pairs, without helmets but very visibly (wearing yellow jackets, for example) and move among the activists, initiate conversation, provide information and answer questions, there is more likelihood of peace. Areas cordoned off with plastic tape can be more effective than fences if the police provide information and explanations as to why the areas are being cordoned off.

Consequences for demonstrators

• As long as demonstrators regard the police as individual police officers tasked with maintaining order and assisting demonstrators, there is every chance of maintaining peace. If, on the other hand, the demonstrators regard the police as an undifferentiated group of emotionless soldiers and not as individuals, stereotyping has taken place and this increases the risk of belligerent incidents.

• When demonstrators apply for permission to demonstrate, follow specific march routes, have their own demonstration guards and do not wear masks, the risk of riots is minimal. If the demonstrations are unauthorised, if the demonstrators head for streets and areas counter to police officers’ instructions or collective agreements, if the demonstrators wear masks, appear disordered or run (‘rushes’), there is a greater risk of conflicts.
• When demonstrators behave in a disarming fashion by maintaining informative communication with police officers in a way which counters chaos-creating rumours, when they dance, sing, play instruments and demonstrate their peaceful intentions, there is little risk of a riot. If, on the other hand, the demonstrators wear masks, turn up in uniform-like clothing and with weapons (cudgels or similar items), there is an obvious risk of rioting.

Interaction between two parties

As is apparent from the above review, war-making processes (riots) assume that both the police and the demonstrators contribute towards stereotyping, chaos creation and provocation. Just as the demonstrators can contribute to this, the actions of the police can provide the spark that will give rise to riots. Maintaining the peace and orderly demonstrations is based on both the police and demonstrators behaving in ways, which are varied, order-creating and disarming. Thus there is an interaction between the parties, which facilitates the maintenance of peaceful conditions.
What Contributes to De-escalation and Escalation in Critical Situations

Given the model described above, it is possible to understand and explain why demonstrations sometimes lead to confrontations, while at other times they result in peaceful manifestations. Other research has also shown that riots are not a ‘within-group’ phenomenon, i.e. something which occurs on account of factors within a group of demonstrators, as was previously asserted (e.g. Turner, 1974; Zimbardo, 1969). Instead, riots are viewed as an inter-group phenomenon, i.e. something which occurs in conjunction with an ‘in-group’ and an ‘out-group’ where the police as a group are also of importance to the development of events. Our studies show that this is not even wrong when two people have a row, just as it is not down to one person to make sure that no row takes place. It is even more complex than that, as both police officers and demonstrators can behave in both a peace-making and a war-making fashion, and there can also be differences within the respective groups in these respects. This creates different kinds of situations in which there are sometimes discrepancies between police officers and demonstrators, when one group behaves in a peace-making manner and the other in a war-making fashion. We have opted to define these situations as critical incidents. In the table below, they are described as boxes B and C. In the previous section, we described boxes A (mutual peace-making) and D (mutual war-making, i.e. riots). This section starts with a brief recap of the mutual conditions, and then goes on to describe potential results when there is no reciprocity.

Table 2

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<tr>
<th>Demonstrators behave in a peace-making fashion</th>
<th>Demonstrators behave in an aggravating fashion</th>
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<td>The police behave in a peace-making fashion</td>
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<td>Mutual peace-making</td>
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<td>The police behave in an aggravating fashion</td>
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<td>Mutual aggravation</td>
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Mutual peace-making (box A)

If there is mutual peace-making between demonstrators and police officers, the criteria for peaceful demonstrations are met, i.e. mutual differentiation, mutual disarming and mutual order creation. In turn, this creates the conditions for co-operation and communication between the police and demonstrators, under which the police allow the arrangers to assume responsibility for certain activities, for example. (This was the case in the authorised demonstrations in Gothenburg.)

When the police developed new tactics, i.e. the mobile action concept (Police Academy, 2005), criteria were created for peaceful manifestations in connection with traditional demonstrations, i.e. demonstrations duly reported and authorised. In Gothenburg, the police managed to secure meeting rights for the EU summit and the freedom to demonstrate for the authorised demonstrations, while spontaneously arranged protest actions and street parties were not handled as ordinary public gatherings, but as would-be breaches of the peace, which resulted in confrontations between the police and the demonstrators.

At later, spontaneously arranged demonstrations in Stockholm and Linköping (among others, Salem, Reclaim), the police behaved in a peace-making fashion, even with regard to demonstrators who had previously – in Gothenburg, Malmö and elsewhere – been categorised as non-demonstrators, who behaved in a more anarchistic fashion by, for example, failing to apply for permission for their gatherings. By also defining non-reported meetings as public gatherings (and hence as protected by constitutional legislation as authorised demonstrations), the police have handled these demonstrators in the same peace-making manner as at the traditional gatherings, and not as if they were would-be troublemakers.

This shows that the police officers’ actions in connection with demonstrations have great significance for the outcome. If they deal with a gathering of demonstrators as if they actually are demonstrators, i.e. are there to demonstrate and not just to cause trouble, there is less risk of confrontations. If, on the other hand, peaceful demonstrators are treated as if they were troublemakers, this can lead to protests by them against the police, which is perceived by the police as confirmation of their categorisation of them as troublemakers (self-fulfilling prophecy).

Mutual aggavation (box D)

When demonstrators are regarded as troublemakers, even peaceful demonstrators will end up on the same side as the war-making demonstrators, and hence mutual aggravation will occur between demonstrators and police officers, with mutual stereotyping, mutual provocation and mutual creation of chaos. In this situation, everything but co-operation and communication prevails. Demonstrators and police officers stereotype one another as a threatening ‘them’ against whom they have to protect and defend themselves. Mutual provoca-
tion takes place if both sides adopt a formation; the police as a troop and the
demonstrators as a massive collective, wearing uniforms/masks and protec-
tive gear and even bearing weapons in some situations. Mutual chaos creation
takes place when both sides act without talking to one another, with a risk of
ensuing chaos-creating rumours (non-informative, hidden agendas, unex-
pected actions). In this situation, it will suffice for a single police officer or
demonstrator to allow him or herself to be provoked into setting things off,
creating a confrontation between police officers and demonstrators (Guvå,
2005b). However, the question is when a confrontation leads to escalation of
the conflict or is restricted to a conflict between war-making demonstrators
and war-making police officers.

Critical situations and their escalation or de-escalation

Our studies have shown that an igniting spark that sets off a fire risks starting
an escalating process, which – if we are unlucky – may lead to the train of
events that took place in Gothenburg. There, even peace-making police offi-
cers and demonstrators got involved in the collective actions, which resulted
from the escalation of the conflict on both sides. Examples of escalation among
the police are the reinforcements deployed in Gothenburg (Guvå, 2005b), for
instance, but which also took place on other occasions when the situation esca-
lated, such as in Salem in 2003. In Gothenburg, one thing led to another, as
even traditional peace-making demonstrators reacted against the police acting
improperly against other, in their eyes, innocent demonstrators. This in turn
led to the police losing the confidence of even traditional demonstrators.

Table 2 shows two types of situation where there is neither mutual peace-
making nor mutual war-making, but a discrepancy (boxes B and C) between
the actions of police officers and of demonstrators. In one case, the police be-
have in a war-making fashion against peaceful demonstrators and, in the
other, the demonstrators behave in a war-making fashion against peaceful pol-
ce officers. War-making and peace-making behaviours are defined on the
basis of how demonstrators and police officers actually behave vis-à-vis one
another, i.e. how they as a group or collective categorise one another, relate to
one another and act during the demonstration, not on the basis of the purpose
or intent they have. For example, the actions of police officers can be defined
as chaos-creating even though their aim is to create order.

Situations in which a discrepancy prevails have been defined as critical
situations to which we have been able to attribute a range of incidents, which
turned out to have the potential to lead to escalation or de-escalation of con-
licts depending on various factors, such as how the police and demonstrators
deal with a war-making opposing party.
War-making police officers meet peaceful demonstrators (box C)

The police may constitute a war risk and thereby create a critical situation when they work from the beginning on the basis of a stereotypical categorisation as in Gothenburg, where unreported and hence unauthorised gatherings are handled as if they were unlawful. Demonstrators are viewed as an unidentified, impersonal ‘crowd’, which is dealt with by means of collective chaos-creating measures (raids, breaking into demonstrations, surrounding demonstrators, etc.). The police behave provocatively as a rigidly ordered troop wearing protective gear in response to a perceived threat. There is a great risk of escalation, but depending on how the demonstrators respond to the actions of the police, this can lead to escalation or de-escalation of the conflict.

Risk of escalation

If the police act in a war-making fashion and the demonstrators respond by behaving in a war-making fashion themselves, there is a great risk of escalation of the conflict. This risk further increases if the police in turn respond by strengthening their position with more officers (reinforcements). This will probably lead to the demonstrators also escalating the conflict: there were many examples of this in Gothenburg and at the Salem demonstration in 2003.

Even if the police work according to the premise that at a demonstration, there are both demonstrators who want to demonstrate and demonstrators who have ‘other plans’, they, the police – in their protective gear and troop formation – are making war against all demonstrators, which is justified by stereotypically defining everyone who, for example, fails to leave a location when an order to do so is given as non-law-abiding. They have thus made themselves guilty of disobeying police orders, for which reason lawful action can be instigated.

Chance of de-escalation

If the police act in a war-making fashion and the demonstrators respond by, for example, ‘obeying’ the police, there will be no escalation of the conflict. This is the case when demonstrators do as the police say and, for instance, obey an order to leave a place. This is based on the demonstrators’ acceptance of the police as an authority exercising its power and their accepting the rules of the game as interpreted by the police. Opinions differ as to the rules of the game in connection with the raid on Hvitfeldtska Upper Secondary School in Gothenburg. According to the police, everyone who wished to leave the premises did so. There was probably a lot of confusion as to whether people were allowed to leave and how they should do so, but the police treated everyone who was left behind as if they had opted to stay and hence had also chosen sides.
If, among the demonstrators, there are people who do not wish to accept the rules of the game which the police are applying and who allow themselves to be provoked by the actions of the police, the risk of escalation is, in turn, dependent on how this situation is handled within one’s own group. In the studies, there are examples of how demonstrators themselves dealt with fellow participants who ‘reacted irritably’, and thus probably prevented a conflict with a risk of escalation, or how, by interceding in a conflict between individual police officers and individual participants, they were able to resolve it with no further involvement of the police. This then had the effect of an order-creating action, which probably prevented chaos-creating intervention by the police.

There are also examples of how individual demonstrators, in connection with interventions by the police, which led to demonstrators being surrounded (Gothenburg), entered into negotiation with the police, so as to prevent escalation of the conflict.

Peace-making police officers meet war-making demonstrators (box B)

Since the Gothenburg riots, the actions of police officers in connection with major popular gatherings have been the subject of investigation (the Gothenburg Committee), which has resulted in the development of new working methods for both basic tactics and special police tactics for dealing with breaches of the peace in connection with major popular gatherings. The objective is to introduce a new mobile tactics concept within the police force.

Essentially, this new concept means that the police will have to work in a peace-making fashion by not provoking trouble themselves on account of their clothing or attitudes.

Nor should they themselves cause or contribute to breaches of the peace with a view to creating order by deploying collective interventions against demonstrators during a meeting or demonstration, breaking into demonstrations, etc.

Nor should the police categorise demonstrators stereotypically as a homogeneous ‘crowd’, but rather differentiate between demonstrators and – as far as possible – intervene in individual cases where lawful action is possible.

Instead of employing the public order tactics as in Gothenburg, the police will have to apply what are known as task tactics on the basis of a general main order. At demonstrations since Gothenburg, it has been clearly stated in this main order that the primary task of police officers is to secure demonstration and meeting rights and prevent breaches of the peace in connection with them.

This has meant that the police have acted mainly in a peace-making role at a number of the demonstrations on which this study focuses, by being clearly visible in ‘ordinary uniforms’, wearing caps and not carrying helmets, visors or shields. To enhance their visibility at later demonstrations, the police wore
yellow jackets and sometimes also carried protective gear inside their visible uniforms. They patrolled in pairs and moved among demonstrators with a view to carrying out searches, but also in order to create contact instead of forming a troop around a demonstration (see previous reports). By looking and behaving ‘like people’, the police counteracted the risk of being stereotypically categorised by the demonstrators. Nor did they provoke anyone or help to create chaos.

Although neither police officers nor demonstrators set out to create conflicts leading to strife, both police officers and demonstrators who behave in a war-making fashion will create critical situations, which may constitute a risk of strife or ‘war’. At the demonstrations where the police acted in a peace-making role, situations occurred in which they encountered demonstrators who acted in a war-making fashion by turning up as a collective, with the risk of being stereotypically categorised as a ‘crowd’ by the police, sometimes wearing masks or hoodies and scarves an, in some cases, also carrying ‘weapons’ – sticks or other weapons. Just like the police, the demonstrators themselves may regard these weapons and uniforms as merely protective gear and do not intend to use it to attack.

The risk of confrontation is great if war-making demonstrators meet police officers who correspondingly constitute a war risk (mutual war-making). If, instead, such demonstrators meet police officers who behave in a peace-making fashion, the outcome is dependent on how the police manage to cope with these demonstrators. Our studies indicate two possible developments: a risk of escalation or a chance for de-escalation.

**Risk of escalation**

If the police allow themselves to be provoked and recategorise the demonstrators as a crowd, there is an increased risk of escalation as the situation then constitutes a chaos-creating threat for the police. If Le Bon’s notions (see previous section) are applicable within the police with regard to crowd psychology, the risk of it being derailed is perceived to be great. On the basis of this logic, the interventions taking place at demonstrations and which led to chaos-creating breaches of the peace were intended to prevent the breaches of the peace, which they thereby created. With this approach, a popular gathering – as a crowd *per se* – constitutes a would-be trouble hotspot, and the job of the police is to stop it spreading. This was probably the case in Gothenburg, where the police viewed the unauthorised demonstrations as breaches of the peace against the EU summit, which it was their job to secure. If the same approach had applied in connection with the Salem demonstrations in 2004, the so-called train-stopping action could have also been defined as a trouble hotspot, the objective of which was to disrupt the nationalists’ meeting and which therefore should be stopped. Instead, the police opted also to define the train-stopping action as a general gathering, which meant that these activists were treated as demonstrators in a disarming, non-stereotyping and hence order-creating manner.
As mentioned previously, it is sufficient for a police officer to allow himself to be provoked, with a risk of other police officers also attacking the group of demonstrators, which in itself can lead to an escalating course of events.

**Chance for de-escalation**

If the police, both individually and collectively, do not allow themselves to be provoked, but can deal with demonstrators who are being provocative in terms of their clothing and behaving in a chaos-creating manner in the form of ‘rushes’ caused by rumours, there is instead a chance of preventing an escalating course of events. There are a number of examples of this in our studies.

During the *train-stopping action* that took place in connection with the Salem demonstrations in 2004, a large number of young people gathered to stop the train that the nationalists were going to take from Stockholm Central Station to Salem (Rönninge). Permission for this demonstration was not sought and hence it was unauthorised, and it was advertised on the Internet just a day or so in advance.

The demonstrators who gathered in the tunnel leading to the train went up to the entrance of the platform where the train was to stop. The police cordoned off this entrance, but a small number of demonstrators managed to get past this cordon and up onto the platform. The police did not opt to pursue them (instead, police communications officers dealt with these this group), but held their position and came face to face with a large group of demonstrators. The police were not wearing their protective gear, but their ordinary uniform, with caps and yellow jackets. Nor were they in chain formation in front of the demonstrators. In this position, one of the police officers began to speak, while at the same time moving towards the demonstrators and ordering them loudly to go back. When they – albeit unwillingly – did as he said, he asked them to go further back and stand behind the glass doors that separated the entrance from the tunnel. The large group of demonstrators, some of whom were wearing masks, constituted a collective provocation, but the police did not allow themselves to be provoked.

By not running after the ones who went up onto the platform, they did not allow themselves to be forced to take chaos-creating measures by individual demonstrators either. In this case, the demonstrators also responded by ‘obeying’ this particular police officer and doing as he said, i.e. going back. Blocking them could be interpreted to constitute a provocation of the demonstrators, as it prevented them from fulfilling their plans. However, the police permitted the demonstrators to continue their demonstration and thus succeeded in stopping the breach of the peace, which could have arisen if they had attempted to stop the demonstration by ordering the demonstrators to leave.

Another critical situation at the same demonstration (Salem, 2004) arose in connection with a group of militant anti-fascists arranging a meeting for which no permission was sought. However, the police opted to define this as a general meeting. Problems occurred when the participants were about to go and take the train to Central Station, where the police felt there was a risk of con-
conflict with returning nationalists (whom the demonstrators had previously attempted to stop on the way to their demonstration in Salem). With the aid of police communications officers, the police negotiated with the demonstrators who chose to enter into communication concerning the route with these police officers. They succeeded in agreeing on a different route, but a new critical situation occurred when the demonstrators did not stop at the agreed location, but kept on going. The police then opted not to stop the train, with a risk of conflict. Thus they did not allow themselves to be provoked into a chaos-creating intervention, but rather attempted to control the train in a different way, which was both disarming and order-creating.

In connection with Sweden’s National Day in 2005, a demonstration was arranged in Stockholm where the police managed – thanks to communication with the arrangers – to arrange for a demonstration permit, which was presented on the morning of the same day. Apart from demonstrators in ordinary clothing, a large number of masked AFA activists also took part, wearing uniforms consisting of grey hooded jackets and hoods and carrying shields bearing the abbreviation AFA in large letters. Instead of Swedish flags, they carried black standards. The police decided not to disarm them when they gathered. The train stopped at a square outside the Royal Castle, where these uniformed and masked AFA demonstrators stepped into formation alongside the train. The police did not allow themselves to be provoked, but stood at one side, wearing their ordinary uniforms and yellow jackets. However, a critical situation arose when some participants burned a Swedish flag. Burning the Swedish flag probably constituted optimum provocation in connection with the National Day, which was previously named the Day of the Swedish Flag. The police did not intervene in the flag burning, but they did intervene to stop an individual demonstration, although this did not lead to chaos creation. Even though some police officers allowed themselves to be provoked in this situation, people within the group succeeded in making sure that these particular people did not act, which action could have otherwise triggered a conflict, with a risk of escalation.

Summary

Critical situations in connection with demonstrations may arise due to the actions of police officers or demonstrators. In the former case, the police can deal with this by being aware of what it is for themselves that constitutes a risk of confrontation, for example:

- When police officers themselves do things and act on the basis of a stereotypical categorisation of the demonstrators as non-demonstrators, i.e. when they start to regard the non-demonstrators as a crowd against which action must be taken and/or which turns up in uniform and/or in formation, with a risk of themselves being stereotypically categorised as an unidentified, anonymous police ‘crowd’ by the demonstrators;
• When the police constitute a provocation for the demonstrators, for instance, on account of their uniforms, strict formation and behaviour, deployment of dogs, horses, helicopters;

• When the police contribute to chaos creation by means of collective, unexpected, inexplicable interventions or a lack of information which provides a breeding ground for chaos-creating rumours.

As mentioned above, the new tactics have been mindful of this and hence minimise the actions of the police as a ‘war’ risk. However, the police may still constitute a risk in cases where they define the participants as non-demonstrators who are regarded as posing a risk of breach of the peace and thus justify other war-making tactics.

Our research shows that what has a part to play is how the police respond to demonstrators’ provocative and chaos-creating actions, whether and how they invite stereotypical categorisation of themselves (depersonification), and whether this takes place collectively or individually. This also applies to the demonstrators’ way of dealing with what is interpreted by them as war-making processes.

Our research also shows, like other prior research, that riots do not constitute a ‘within-group’ phenomenon, but are a process dependent on interactive developments of events between groups. What also proves to be of crucial significance to the escalation of a conflict, however, is how the conflict between members of ‘in-groups’ and ‘out-groups’ is handled within the respective groups. If the police respond by ‘coming to the rescue’ in the event of a provocation instead of ‘looking after their own’, there is a risk of escalation of the conflict into a situation where everyone is against everyone else, i.e. chaos arises and people categorise one another in a stereotypical manner. On the other hand, in instances where both the police and demonstrators create order within their own ranks (self-policing), the likelihood of de-escalation of a conflict is increased. This shows that for war to occur, all processes have to take place simultaneously. War can break out when participants feel they are being provoked, chaos prevails and people regard one another in a simplified and stereotypical manner. This means that the police themselves can contribute to the creation of chaos, be provocative and categorise in a stereotypical manner just as the demonstrators can. When both groups are ensnared in such processes, a warlike situation has probably already broken out.

Consequences for police work and for demonstrators

Although crowd incidents such as riots have nothing to do with irrational crowd behaviour caused by one group of demonstrators, but rather are collective actions occurring between two groups, such as the police as one group and demonstrators as another, the police have a professional responsibility to ensure order in connection with demonstrations. Above all, they must ensure that they do not deal with gatherings of people in such a manner that they themselves cause breaches of the peace and damage to democratic freedoms
and rights: it is their job to prevent the occurrence of such breaches and damage. In the event of a confrontation arising, they must be aware of how to avoid escalation of the conflict and instead bring about de-escalation by not becoming an adversary.

To avoid becoming involved in confrontations which may lead to riots, corresponding rules apply to demonstrators. Although demonstrators do not have professional responsibility for ensuring order, demonstrators as a group can of course help to ensure that demonstrations take place in orderly, peaceful ways.

*To summarise,* it can be stated that the police and demonstrators should:

- Avoid stereotypical categorisation of the other group or allowing themselves to be stereotyped by the other group
- Avoid contributing to chaos-creating measures or allowing themselves to be so influenced by the actions of the other group
- Avoid provoking the other group or allowing themselves to be provoked by the other group
Intention, Trust and Mistrust

In the previous section, we described the events that take place when there are incongruities in peace-making and war-making between the police and demonstrators. In that section, we approached the matter on the basis of the police and demonstrators actually playing war-making or peace-making roles. This does not mean that the police or demonstrators viewed themselves as war-making. Rather, it is the case that when war-making processes take over in a critical situation, both parties will be of the opinion that it was the other side that started these processes and hence created the critical situation. This was the case with the confrontation at Vasa Bridge in connection with the Salem manifestations in 2004, and it was the case at a number of the confrontations that took place in Gothenburg in 2001.

Although one’s intentions are peaceful, they can be misconstrued by the other party. Drury and Reicher (2000) reflected on the link between intention, consequence and social identity with respect to the occurrence of riots. They voiced the opinion that a lot of things are taken for granted in the literature regarding a direct relationship between peaceful social identity, peaceful intentions and peaceful consequences, which need to be problemised. One question this gives rise to is whether trust is required in the ‘out-group’s peaceful intentions for the consequences of the intentions also to be deemed peaceful. In other words, it is necessary for the police to believe that the demonstrators have peaceful intentions for them to regard a crowd action as varied, ordered and non-provocative.

The crowd incidents, which we studied after Gothenburg, and in which critical incidents were observed but no riots took place, have one feature in common. All were preceded by expressed peace-making intentions by both the demonstrators and the police. These peace-making intentions were expressed by the demonstrators in general information on the Internet, among other things, and in the directives issued to the police when they received their orders. This can be viewed as peace-making strategies involving both active and passive peace-making and by means of communication between the parties.

Trust and mistrust in the other group’s peace-making intentions

The police do not base their actions primarily on their own intentions, but on the perception they have of the intentions of the demonstrators, i.e. on whether they believe that the demonstrators are war-makers or peace-makers. Demonstrators also act on the basis of whether they feel that the police have peaceful in-
tentions, and will then be prepared to enter into communication with them. Perception of the other group as peace-makers or having peace-making intentions can be characterised as trust, and perception of them as war-makers or having war-making intentions can be described as mistrust. This gives rise to four different scenarios in which congruity or incongruity may prevail in the trust between the police and demonstrators (Figure 1). Where incongruity prevails (boxes B and C), mistrust can turn into trust or trust can turn into mistrust, depending on whether war processes or peace processes develop. Mistrust and trust are based on previous experience of war processes or peace processes. At an anti-racist demonstration taking place on 1 May 2005, a demonstrator expressed the opinion that the demonstrators who had not been at Gothenburg trusted the police differently:

The relationship with the police is a generation issue. The younger people who hadn’t been in Gothenburg go up to the police and talk to them. There’s always a crowd of kids surrounding the police, chatting with them. Personally, I was scared of the police after Gothenburg. I used to jump when I saw a policeman or police car, and it took about six months for that feeling to pass. (Demonstrator)

Just like the demonstrators, the police expressed the view that their ideas about what could happen in Gothenburg had been influenced by previous incidents in connection with demonstrations, both nationally and internationally.

Then you try to keep things calm, but that’s not really the case. These gatherings aren’t calm any more, not since the Amsterdam gathering. After that, the nature of all gatherings changed completely. People went around with blinkers on, in political Sweden, and told everyone this’ll be a calm gathering. (Police officer)

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<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Demonstration trust police officers’ good intentions</th>
<th>Demonstration mistrust the police</th>
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<td>A</td>
<td>Mutual trust</td>
<td>B</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td>Stereotyping of the police, casting suspicion</td>
<td>C</td>
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<td>C</td>
<td>Stereotyping of demonstrators, casting suspicion</td>
<td>D</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>Mutual mistrust</td>
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Table 3
Four scenarios taking into account the perceptions of police officers and demonstrators of the intentions of the opposite party
A. Mutual trust

Demonstrators came to Gothenburg with peaceful intentions and trust in the police officers’ willingness to protect their right to demonstrate and prepared to communicate if any problems occurred. The police came with trust in the peaceful demonstrators, as which the three major demonstrations were categorised by the police. These demonstrations were in fact characterised by peace-making processes and went off peacefully according to statements made by both demonstrators and police officers.

While this research has been in progress, it has been possible to observe to an ever increasing extent peace-making processes whereby both the police and demonstrators trust in one another’s peaceful intentions; and this was very clear in Salem in 2005, at the Reclaim activities in Stockholm and Linköping in 2004 and in Stockholm in 2005. Thus this could indicate that a collective experience of previous peace-making processes increases trust by the time of the next activity.

B. Demonstrators who mistrust the police meet police officers who trust demonstrators

This scenario can lead to either war-making processes or peace-making processes. If war-making processes occur, the police may lose trust in the demonstrators and hence the demonstrators’ mistrust also increases. There were examples of this in Gothenburg, where the police trusted the traditional demonstrators running the major demonstrations, but when these demonstrators lost trust in the police and came down on the side of the demonstrators who ended up in confrontation with the police, the police officers lost trust in these demonstrators as well. If, on the other hand, there is clear peace-making, the mistrust of the demonstrators can change to trust. This happened in Salem in 2004 when the anti-racist demonstrators in Salem wanted police protection but were unsure of whether the police would provide it. Some demonstrators were also anxious that the police communications officers would spy on them instead of just communicating. When the demonstrations took place with evidence of clear peace-making by the police, the demonstrators’ mistrust disappeared. This could be expressed as follows.

It exceeded our expectations. What the police did exceeded our expectations. They ensured our safety rigorously, with helicopters and dogs trained to sniff out bombs, and yet they still stayed in the background. (Arranger)

I’ve got a bit more of a positive attitude towards the police. They’ve given clear signals that they’re thinking along different lines now. A more positive view of the leaders and police communications officers. They were professional. The people who were there weren’t the ones who were in Rönninge the year before. The police communications officers have been given better training. Their job, which was based on avoiding conflict, worked out relatively well. (Demonstrator)

This experience meant that the Salem demonstrations the next year were characterised by trust between the police and demonstrators.
C. Demonstrators with trust and police officers with mistrust

If demonstrators with trust encounter police officers with mistrust, there is a great risk of the demonstrators losing their trust as well. Many demonstrators who trusted the police officers’ peace-making intentions came to Gothenburg, but they lost this trust after the confrontations, even if they themselves had no part to play in them. They expressed this as follows.

Before I went there, I still trusted the police. ... It was as if, beforehand, I always thought the police were at least a bit on my side. There were a few rotten eggs who freaked out and all that, but not like this, that they should so systematically use confrontational tactics that just added constantly to the vicious circle and increased the violence. (Demonstrator)

Demonstrators who trusted the police to protect their right to demonstrate had gathered at Hvitfeldtska Upper Secondary School. However, the police were mistrustful towards some of them, and when the police automatically categorised the ones who stayed at the school or in the schoolyard as demonstrators with evil intentions who could therefore be attacked, all demonstrators lost trust in the police. Riots occurred. This situation probably could have been resolved differently if peace-making processes had been allowed to prevail. If, instead, the result of the negotiation which police communications officers and demonstrators began had been the guiding principle, there would have been opportunities for greater trust and peaceful manifestations. Many demonstrators believed that negotiation with the intended communication group would lead to a result.

The deceitful bit was the fact that they surrounded the school early in the morning. And the fact that negotiations took place all day between those of us inside the school and that they then broke everything off when we’d arrived at a solution. And that they went in completely heavy-handedly and then tried to blame it all on us. I was incredibly disappointed then, frustrated. If they wanted to go in, they could have just done it straight away. (Demonstrator)

The peaceful solution was impossible because the mistrust of the police, based on the threat of the potential presence of weapons hidden in the school, was so strong.

D. Mutual mistrust

When both demonstrators and the police mistrust one another’s intentions, the risk of war-making processes is imminent. The demonstrators with prior experience of confrontations with the police may mistrust the police from the outset. A demonstrator who had been one of those surrounded at a Reclaim party at Götgatsbacken in Stockholm in 2000 had this to say after Gothenburg.

We’re still expecting PC Plod to be a nice constable who helps people, but those aren’t the police you see out on the streets, they’re not the police activists encounter. (Demonstrator)
Demonstrators who mistrusted the police and encountered police officers experiencing a high degree of threat, i.e. who mistrusted the demonstrators and hence categorised them as troublemakers, came to Vasa Park in Gothenburg. The police regarded the gathering as unlawful and wanted to disperse all demonstrators. They encountered stone throwing, so the police went on the attack and even more people started throwing stones. An ‘us’ and ‘them’ situation developed. The demonstrators changed, from peaceful partygoers into violent demonstrators. Demonstrators interviewed have stated clearly how the ‘us’ and ‘them’ feeling developed. In the case of demonstrators who were mistrustful right from the outset, these incidents increased their mistrust.

Things have escalated a bit, but the basics are the same. The reaction from the police is the same, although they did go a step further. (Demonstrator)

To summarise, police officers’ peaceful intentions focused on demonstrators with peaceful intentions had peaceful consequences, while police officers’ actions based on the perception that demonstrators had war-making intentions had war-making consequences.

Mistrust and social identity

The incidents at Vasa Square are an example where it is easy to apply the developed social identity model (ESIM), as we can assume that the demonstrators changed their social identity from being peaceful demonstrators to being demonstrators in opposition to the police. However, we have no evidence from the interviews that demonstrators underwent such a change in social identity. On the other hand, there is plenty of evidence of demonstrators maintaining their social identity as peaceful demonstrators but losing their trust in the police when they were attacked by them. Demonstrators who took part in the major demonstrations seem to maintain their social identity as peaceful demonstrators, but when they see young demonstrators in confrontation with the police, they side with the demonstrators and lose trust in the police. There are older individuals who did not throw paving stones themselves but who defend the young people who did.

I’m not one for violence, but I reckon if I were about 20 I’d probably have gone along with it. I don’t think those people were hired hooligans egging each other on. I just think this was a normal, healthy reaction from the kids... I’d have thrown my handbag because people would’ve thrown anything, because people are entitled to defend themselves when they’re attacked without doing anything... I don’t know how you prise up paving stones, so I wouldn’t have thrown them. (Demonstrator)

A young person who was in the gathering outside Hvitfeldtska when the police stormed into the crowd expressed his understanding that they could have been provoked. He described the fear and powerlessness, as well as the impulse to get away from there as quickly as possible. Thus he maintained his social identity as a peaceful demonstrator and chose to run away from the site instead of switching to a new social identity.
I’ve got a mate who kind of tripped, and they just ran right over him and stood and gave him a pasting. I got a smack on the head from a baton, I stopped when I saw a lad falling over and they kind of ran over him, so I stood and yelled “what do you think you’re doing?” and then a policeman gave me a smack on the head. Then I ran away. It was terrible! (Demonstrator)

I felt a number of times as though I’d like to have chucked stones at the police there at Hvitfeldtska, but you have to... it was all cordoned off, like. [I: So what was it that made you hold back?] Nooo! You can’t go round doing things like that (laugh), it’s just not what you do... I was there to demonstrate peacefully, after all. (Demonstrator)

This does of course beg the question: what makes some people change their social identity, while others do not? Furthermore, we can state that there is no direct link between social identity and trust/mistrust in the other group’s peace-making intentions. Thus demonstrators can maintain their social identity as peaceful demonstrators even though they mistrust the intentions of police officers.

Individual and collective trust/mistrust

When demonstrators express their mistrust of police officers’ intentions, this alludes to an individual perception in many people. They described feeling afraid, shocked, feeling that they need to keep out of the way. As far as the police are concerned, they refer instead to a collective threat. The police do not feel that they have changed their trust in the demonstrators after Gothenburg. They trusted the peaceful demonstrators and mistrusted the troublemakers even beforehand. They have only lost trust in individual demonstrators who they thought belonged to the peaceful category but who they now realise belong to the non-peaceful category. As far as the police are concerned, trust and mistrust involves placing people in the ‘right’ category. The threat determines the degree of risk, i.e. the extent to which demonstrators with war-making intentions are present. Threat can thus be viewed as a collective mistrust which is expressed by various types of strategy against demonstrators who are perceived to have war-making intentions. The job of the police is also to identify individuals, or groups of individuals, early on who can be defined as troublemakers or hotspots, i.e. people who have plans to do things other than demonstrating. They do this to prevent trouble, breaches of the peace and damage, which would risk involving other people regarded as a ‘tail’. This mistrust is based on crowd psychology theories, which are based on certain individuals playing the part of agitators who can encourage other people to join in and on it being possible to get involved anyone who is part of a group, even ordinary people. As we showed previously, this is far too simple an explanation.

This must never happen again!

Given the Gothenburg riots, the Salem riots in 2003 and the derailed Reclaim party on 1 May 2003, it could be expected that both demonstrators and the
police would have lost their trust in the peaceful intentions of the other party, which would have increased the risk of continuing escalating riots. However, this did not happen. Both the demonstrations in connection with the Salem manifestations in 2004 and 2005 and the Reclaim actions on 1 May 2004 and 2005 went off peacefully for the most part. Our explanation of this phenomenon is based on the social identity theory described previously. Unlike the crowd incidents described in the literature, where demonstrators after the riots in St. Pauls in 1980, for example, felt proud of their new social identity, Swedish demonstrators and the police were annoyed and ashamed regarding the specified categorisation. They refused to acknowledge the social identity developed in certain crowd incidents in Gothenburg in 2001 and in Salem in 2003. The reported behaviour of demonstrators and the police in the media did not tally with their own view of themselves. Peaceful demonstrators felt that they were described as violent terrorists. Even the police felt that they had been painted black, and what happened in Gothenburg was something that they wanted to avoid repeating. Thus this can be interpreted to mean that both groups were categorised by the media – and hence also by the general public – as belonging to a group other than the one to which they themselves felt they belong. The categorisation by others does not tally with their self-categorisation. The demonstrators do not recognise themselves when they are labelled as a group of hooligans, and the police do not recognise themselves when they are described as a horde of soldiers attacking innocent demonstrators. To recreate or reinforce their social identity as belonging to a group of peaceful and democratic demonstrators, demonstrators are prepared to lie low so that nothing happens that could ruin their reputations. The arrangers of NMR (Nätverket Mot Rasism) had the following to say prior to the demonstrations in connection with Salem in 2004.

Nätverket mot Rasism has got a terrible reputation after what happened in Salem last year. People think we’re nasty, violent and all dressed in black. We’re planning to stay out of the way – our demonstrations are going to take place at different times and in different places, but we want to make our political mark. (Arranger)

The police officers wished to maintain their social identity as professionals who do what the job demands of them, i.e. being tough on demonstrators who they feel are provocative, but ready to co-operate with demonstrators with peaceful intentions.

In both the police group and the demonstrator group, ‘norm work’ was taking place on the basis of the notion that what happened must not be allowed to happen again. New peace-making strategies were prepared. We have previously described the new police tactics, which are taking shape, the primary elements of which are in line with the peace-making processes in the model we described. Discussions are in progress within NMR with regard to peace-making measures, which will lead to the making of clear decisions in this area. These mutual peace-making intentions were being expressed ever more clearly between 2001 and 2006, i.e. over the period in which we observed crowd incidents.
Intention and consequence

Even though intentions are peaceful, this does not automatically mean that the consequences will be peaceful, as we were able to see from the incidents in Gothenburg where there were two simultaneous parallel directions. On the one hand, there were peace-making intentions, which were reflected in, *inter alia*, communication, police communications officers, the letting of lodgings to demonstrators and a rhetoric stating that things would be quiet in Gothenburg. On the other hand, there were threats based on information that was not available to the public. Somewhat incisively, it is possible to interpret what then happened in Gothenburg as meaning that the early plans were based on the peaceful intentions, while the consequences were derived from the threats. In other words, when planning, the police worked on the assumption that demonstrators were coming with peaceful intentions, but in their actions the police then worked on the assumption that certain groups of demonstrators were out to create warlike situations. Furthermore, there were no clear peace-making strategies on the part of the police, but there were clear strategies linked with the threats and hence these prevailed.

When there are *mutual* peace-making intentions from both the police and demonstrators, reflected not only in peace-making information but also in collective and clear peace-making strategies, the results have proved to be peaceful. This can take place even when there are individual provocative, chaos-creating or stereotyping elements, or if there is *individual* mistrust in another group. We have seen examples of this from the demonstrations in connection with the Salem manifestations in 2004 and 2005 and the Reclaim actions in Stockholm and Linköping in 2004 and 2005.

**Intention and consequence: 1 May 2004 in Linköping and Stockholm**

Prior to 1 May 2004, not a lot of information was issued by either the police or the participants. The information issued by the police was not clearly peace-making. In Linköping, the police issued flyers in order to prevent young people from coming to the advertised street party and to warn them that participation was unlawful. On the Internet, activists stated clearly that precisely this issuing of permission was a critical point and wrote that the action was not unlawful even though no permission had been sought. This meant that as the police declared the activity unlawful, antagonism was created between party-goers and the police which itself could lead to war-making processes. Despite the earlier warning, the police in Linköping then decided that the unauthorised party did not need to be banned. The overall impression on site was that both the police and the activists viewed one another as keen to maintain peaceful relations, even though both groups appeared to be aware that any ‘war-making actions’ could come from the other group. One criterion for this peace-making action was probably the fact that the police did not define the manifestations as gatherings that could constitute a breach of the peace. In this way, the police demonstrated their trust in the peace-making intentions of the demonstrators. If, on the other hand, the party had been categorised as disrup-
tive, the demonstrators could have been regarded as criminals, which would have risked starting a warlike process. Here, the actions of the police are not a consistent consequence of the original perception, which was expressed in the warning. Nor is it certain that individual police officers would have expressed trust in the activists prior to the action. But during the party, the police behaved as if they trusted the activists to behave peacefully, which consequently resulted in peaceful behaviour. The fact that the manifestations were regarded as lawful gatherings can be interpreted as collective trust from the police that the parties would turn out well, i.e. there was little threat. It is not possible to state whether there was a corresponding collective trust among demonstrators in the police safeguarding the gathering.

In Stockholm, very little information was provided by the activists on the Internet, and nothing was stated other than the fact that the planned activity was a joint party. The police, in accordance with their new tactics, had been encouraged to patrol in pairs in ordinary uniforms and caps and ‘mingle’ with the participants. Situations occurred which could have developed into revolts and strife at the party site. At the end of the party, a ‘rush’ took place outside the party side, which resulted in broken windows, but this action did not escalate. As we interpret it, the actions of both the police and the partygoers throughout the manifestation promoted peace-making processes. However, during the planning stage, there were tendencies to mistrust the intentions of the arrangers among police officers in Stockholm. For example, a need for cages in connection with any crowd arrests was discussed. However, this came to nothing: the police behaved here, too, as if they trusted the peace-making intentions of the participants and hence avoided stereotypical categorisation and de-identification of the participants, which could have led to escalated war-making processes. Here, therefore, it appears that the peace-making strategies are of significance and signal trust in the peace-making intentions of the one group, as far as the other group is concerned.

**Intention and consequence in connection with the Salem demonstration in 2004**

At the Salem demonstrations, the mutual peace-making between demonstrators and the police appeared to be brought about by peaceful intentions which were also mutual. The four different groups of parties involved – the police, anti-racists, anti-fascists and nationalists – had laid plans in advance for peace-making measures, and these plans were implemented. Thus this was a conscious strategy, which was advertised clearly and unequivocally in advance.

NMR, the arrangers of the anti-racist demonstrations, pointed out prior to the demonstration that they had to improve their brand in order to reach more people with their message. The anti-racists felt that the newspapers had painted them as troublemakers on the basis of previous demonstrations in Salem and hence that the message of the demonstration had been overshadowed. Now they had a well-thought-out strategy to bring about peaceful demonstrations, based partly on ensuring that demonstrators and counter-demonstrators did not meet (their demonstrations took place in different
places and at different times), and information about this was presented on the Internet and in the press.

The main order, which was issued to the police prior to the Salem demonstration, was strongly influenced by the new national tactics project, which involved, among other things, thinking in terms of peace-making and avoiding actions by police officers in connection with demonstrations that triggered escalating war-making processes.

The anti-fascist demonstrators stated clearly and unequivocally prior to the action at Central Station that this would be a peaceful action and encouraged demonstrators not to behave provocatively towards the police, as the police were not the enemy.

The nationalists had requested permission and issued clear rules of order, which excluded drunken participants and led to strict discipline and order within the demonstration. These demonstrators had also encouraged participants in advance not to view the police as the enemy.

Thus all parties involved had peaceful intentions in respect of the police. However, this does not automatically mean the absences of war-making actions. These war-making actions did not lead to riots, however, but merely to critical incidents. When there are mutual peaceful intentions, situations do not develop such that all three war-making processes occur (i.e. chaos creation, provocation and categorisation). The critical situations, which were de-escalated because of the way in which demonstrators and the police reacted to one another’s actions were characterised by the fact that only one or two of the war-making processes were involved. Critical situations, which did not lead to an interaction process between the groups in which all three war-making processes ended up interacting and reinforcing one another did not lead to riots. Thus individual provocative elements, where order otherwise prevails and provocative actions are only taken by individuals, do not end in riots. If there are mutual peace-making intentions, an individual war-making process can be countered with a peace-making one. Among the incidents analysed where there was war-making activity by one group but where this did not lead to the stating of riots, it is possible to discern three different combinations of war-making and peace-making processes:

1. **War-making processes in one group are met with active peace-making by the other**

   The unauthorised demonstrations involving the train-stopping action at Central Station and the demo party at Slussplan (the ‘Sluice’), which constituted provocation of the police as no permission had been sought, are one example of this. The police regarded both these and the subsequent demonstrations as public gatherings and hence opted to regard the demonstrators as if they had peace-making intentions. Agreements were made by means of communication, and the police thus reacted to provocative actions with a peace-making approach.
2. War-making processes in one group are combined with peace-making processes within the same group

When a demonstrator behaved provocatively in respect of the police, the arrangers went in and communicated with the police so that de-escalation took place, i.e. both the war-making and the peace-making efforts took place within the same group.

3. War-making processes are met with passive peace-making, i.e. individuals not allowing themselves to be provoked, not allowing themselves to be stereotyped, and avoiding being drawn into chaos creation

How passive peace-making can be manifested is described below.

Passive peace-making

When there are peaceful intentions, there appears to be an awareness of the interaction between the groups. At the manifestations in connection with the Salem demonstrations, the parties involved expressed a conscious desire to avoid anything, which could be perceived by the other group as war-making processes. This passive peace-making, when a party involved avoids actions which may be perceived as provocative, stereotypical or chaotic, has a peace-making function in the same way as active peace-making. Thus passive peace-making involves avoiding war processes by taking into account what the other group can be expected to perceive as war-making processes. But it also involves the parties concerned making an effort not to be drawn into the war-making processes of the other party. They avoid being provoked, behave in a way, which will not result in their stereotypical categorisation and make every effort not to get involved in chaos.

They take responsibility not only to ensure that their own group behaves in a peace-making fashion, but also to behave in such a manner that critical incidents are not escalated, irrespective of whether they feel that ‘the others started it’. This means that each group has to acquaint itself with what group behaviour the other group perceives to be provocative and chaos-creating, and which facilitates stereotyping. This process is promoted by communication, which we will come back to. Below is a description of passive peace-making.

Avoidance of stereotyping categorisation

To be able to retain their own social identity as idealistic, peaceful demonstrators who are very anxious about the spread of neo-Nazism, NMR worked actively to include many different groupings within this collective objective. The demonstrators avoided being stereotypically categorised themselves as black-clad, violent activists by encouraging other demonstrators to wear ordinary clothes and by encouraging people of all categories and ages to take part in the demonstrations. On the Internet, the anti-fascists encouraged participants in the train-stopping action to wear clothes that would allow them to blend into
the crowds. The demonstrators were at pains not to express themselves provocatively in connection with categorisation of the police. The anti-fascists wrote that the police were not the enemy.

By patrolling in pairs and wearing ordinary uniforms, and by not standing in formation or wearing visible protective gear, the police avoided being stereotyped by the demonstrators. The police also showed in different ways that they were avoiding stereotyping groups of demonstrators. According to their main order, interventions were to be aimed as far as possible at individual cases where lawful action was possible. They made active choices of when to intervene and not to intervene and avoided ‘surrounding’ demonstrators. By implementing what are known as ‘kilo interventions’ (where plain-clothes police officers arrest and remove individuals suspected of crimes), the police avoided disrupting the event for other demonstrators who were able to continue with their gathering in peace and quiet.

A change in categorisation and assessment of the police communications officers as a group seems to have taken place. The anti-racists interviewed prior to the demonstration were sceptical of the police communications officers, who were viewed with mistrust. After the demonstrations, they were more positive and thought that the officers were different to the ones who were deployed before. ‘They were better trained and the ones who did all the snooping weren’t there’. Obviously, whether this represents a marked change in the actual behaviour of all police communications officers or whether the treatment meted out by the demonstrators led to a change in interaction and hence a change in treatment by the officers is impossible to say.

The police have also altered their categorisation. They seemed to talk less about a ‘hardcore element’ or a ‘black flock’ than they did before. After the Reclaim activities on 1 May, where no major violence took place, the police were of the opinion that the hardcore demonstrators were not present. We interpret this as meaning that the police therefore minimised their own role in the interaction. When mistrust prevails between the groups or when both groups behave in a war-making manner, perhaps both the ‘hardcore element’ and ‘snooping police communications officers’ put in an appearance.

Avoiding chaos

Avoiding chaos frequently involves some kind of order creation (i.e. active peace-making), but not all organisations involves avoiding chaos. Quite the opposite: organisation can be provocative if the ideas for organisation differ too widely between groups. Instead, adaptation of the own group’s organisation to that of the other group becomes a peace-making measure (more about this in the next section on postmodern and modern organisation).

In Gothenburg, demonstrators did not allow themselves to be forced into chaos-creating behaviour and avoided following demonstrators who attempted to persuade the demonstration to take a route different to the set one.

In the unauthorised activities, which took place on 1 May, there were various kinds of strong attractions which brought people together and which
meant that the ‘rushes’ probably involved fewer people than they would have otherwise done.

Organisation in connection with the Salem manifestations had a peace-making function by virtue of creating order, which prevented chaos. Within all groups there seemed to be an awareness of the importance of clear information in order to avoid chaos. Arrangers and speakers provided clear information. Anti-racist demonstrators provided information from the stage and repeated their peaceful message. Even the anti-fascist demonstrators provided information on the Internet on the train-stopping activity and encouraged participants to behave peacefully. The police constantly provided the general public with information and had also printed up information sheets in the event that trains would not stop at Rönninge Station – all with a view to avoiding chaos.

Avoiding provocative actions and not allowing oneself to be provoked

Among all demonstrator groups connected with the Salem manifestation, there seemed to be an intention not to provoke the police while, on the other hand, a number of demonstrator groups intended to provoke the demonstrator group which they opposed. Even the police acted deliberately not to provoke demonstrators by de-emphasising their uniforms, by patrolling in pairs and by behaving in a manner, which allowed communication with them.

Both the police and demonstrators emphasise the importance of not allowing themselves to be provoked in the event of any provocative actions. There are many examples of this. For example, the intervention at Vasa Bridge led to a number of demonstrators running through the police chain that was set up, resulting in a rush on Vasa Street, which constituted a provocation against the police. Initially, the police had allowed themselves to be provoked by the demonstrators, but in this situation they asked police communications officers to go in, instead of calling for even more reinforcements from the regular police ranks. By dealing with and making contact with the demonstrators, the police communications officers were able to calm down these demonstrators who had been provoked and become involved in chaotic actions. The whole thing ended with these individuals being searched by the regular police and released at Central Station. The chaos-creating rush constituted a provocation, but the police communications officers did not allow themselves to be provoked or create chaos: instead, they went in and created order by means of information and contacts. Demonstrators simply shrugged off searches, which could have been perceived as provocative: they did not allow themselves to be provoked.

To summarise, we can state that passive peace-making – i.e. avoiding chaos or anything which could provoke the other group and stereotypical categorisation of the other group, as well as not allowing oneself to be provoked to create chaos, stereotyped and categorised – will have peaceful consequences in the same way as active peace-making. Passive peace-making is based on an
interest in and awareness of how the other group will react and perceive the actions of the own group. Communication creates such awareness, and so communication is a contributory factor in peace-making.

**Peace-making communication between groups**

Communication *per se* can be regarded as an integration of the peace-making processes, i.e. both a criterion for and a result of them. With proper communication, both parties will be willing to listen to the arguments of the other party and are prepared to relinquish a standpoint in order to resolve a problem, which is preventing the other group from doing its job. Thus communication is always mutual. Communication is a *prerequisite* for peace-making processes when it provides a foundation for understanding of the reactions of the other group. To avoid provoking members of the other group, it is necessary to know what things will provoke them. Communication is also a *result* of mutual peace-making processes between the groups when there are explicit peaceful intentions applicable to the groups as a whole. The demonstration then becomes a joint task to be completed.

Communication provides a ‘win-win’ situation. Both parties are prepared to relinquish something for the good of everybody. An example of this is the resolution of the train-stopping action at Central Station. The police made it possible for nationalists to travel out to Salem for their authorised demonstration by using communication and negotiations to ensure that these people did not gather at Central Station. Thus anti-fascists managed to prevent the nationalists from gathering at Central Station by means of their demonstration. On the other hand, they did not manage to stop the nationalists from getting to Salem, nor could they prevent the police from implementing this, but the anti-fascists thought they had won even so, as they had demonstrated their strength and loudly expressed their protests so that a lot of people got to hear all about them.

Communication *per se* is *disarming* and non-provocative, and it has been the most effective means of de-escalating critical incidents. Communication has taken place either with representatives of various groups and hence been an expression of *order creation*, or it has taken place with individuals where no obvious representatives have been available, and then it has been *differentiating*.

It has been possible to resolve a number of critical situations by means of a *chain of communication*. When an incident took place in which a demonstrator behaved provocatively, demonstration guards established contact with the demonstrator in question. The guards then held discussions with the police communications officers, who in turn held discussions with other police officers. When problems occurred with the police because some demonstrators felt that the searches had gone too far, the arrangers were able to enter into communication with the police communications officers, who in turn entered into communication with the police officer who was in a position to make a decision, thus leading to disarming on the part of the police by means of de-escalation of the searches. As far as the demonstrators were concerned, it was
important that situations were resolved by means of this kind of organised chain of communication and not by means of parallel decision paths, as was the case in Gothenburg.

Inclusion and communication. Yet another type of peace-making communication was the communication held within the respective groups. A large number of organisations and individuals who discussed policy at joint general meetings took part in NMR activities. AFA implemented its own actions in connection with the Salem manifestation, but it acted in accordance with the principles established by NMR, i.e. with a view to not provoking violence. Thus this inclusion seems to have functioned as a peace-making measure. We can assume that a lot of communication creation took place within the network in respect of, for example, the small local demonstration in Salem which was the result of a compromise between the people who thought it was important to indicate that the streets should not be handed over to the Nazis and the people who did not want Salem to attract a large crowd of anti-fascists.

As a result of the communication work in connection with the Salem manifestations in 2004, the police got not only an overview of the situation, but also the opportunity to influence it. This also allowed the threat to be altered, and it was no longer perceived to be uncontrollable. The demonstrators felt that the police listened to them and treated them with respect – and also that they had provided clear signals of a new way of thinking compared with previous years. The police were perceived as being more professional and more competent in respect of conflict resolution.

Summing up

When there are mutual peace-making intentions on the part of both the police and demonstrators, as reflected in collective and clear peace-making strategies, the results have proved to be peaceful. This can also take place when there are individual provocative, chaos-creating or stereotyping elements. For riots to occur, all war-making processes must be involved. When mutual peaceful intentions are reflected in peace-making strategies, individual war-making processes fail to gain a foothold.

It is the collective trust or mistrust, as expressed in intentions and strategies, which is of importance as regards whether war or peace results. The intentions and strategies of demonstrators are in turn of importance for whether the police regard a gathering as peaceful, and the intentions and strategies of police officers are of importance for whether the demonstrators feel threatened. In other words, individual demonstrators’ mistrust of the police or individual police officers’ mistrust of demonstrators is not of significance.

When the police behave, by using peace-making strategies, as if they trust the peace-making intentions of demonstrators and hence categorise their gatherings as lawful, there is less of a risk of demonstrators feeling threatened and hence less of a risk of riots.
Once demonstrators and the police have been categorised as violent in a way, which does not tally with their own self-categorisation, a social identity change may take place in the manner demonstrated by Reicher via ESIM (Reicher, 2001). However, it is also possible that the groups may make the effort to retain their original social identity. This is facilitated by clearly expressing collective peaceful intention and preparing peace-making strategies, which constitute both active and passive peace-making.

Passive peace-making assumes awareness of how the other group perceives and categorises one’s own group. Such awareness facilitates communication but is also a result of communication.

Communication is the primary instrument required to ensure peaceful crowd incidents. Communication is most successful when it takes the form of a chain of communication with arrangers who are able to make decisions at one end of the chain and police officers who are able to make decisions at the other.

**Consequences for demonstrators**

- If demonstrators wish to appear peaceful, collectively expressed peaceful intentions and strategies are of great significance.
- Communication with the police can be crucial to the results of a demonstration.
- Communication facilitates passive peace-making, i.e. people avoiding being provoked, getting involved in chaotic situations and being stereotypically categorised.

**Consequences for the police**

- The police must have a good knowledge of what democratic rules of the game apply in order to act as the ‘guardians of democracy’.
- As long as one works on the basis of classic theories of crowd psychology, according to which individual agitators can persuade an entire crowd of people to ‘derail’, each meeting or demonstration constitutes a threat in and of itself. Police officers’ intention to create order by removing the individuals defined as would-be offenders can in itself create the disorder, which the measure was intended to prevent. The police should therefore not just pay attention to their practice, but also to their theories (assumptions) with regard to crowd incidents.
- Suspications that demonstrators have hidden agendas risk undermining trust in the peaceful intentions of the demonstrators and constitute an obstacle to one’s own peace-making, both active and passive.
- Communication entered into with demonstrators must be based on trust in the peaceful intentions of the demonstrators and be distinguished from
intervention against individual troublemakers (i.e. do not cast suspicion on everyone).

Communication-promoting principles should not apply only to special police communications officers, but to all police officers.
The Significance of Context

Reicher and his colleagues (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996; Stott & Drury, 2000) emphasised the importance of context as regards interaction between large groups and were at the same time of the opinion that it is the *interaction itself* which changes the context by means of the actions implemented in the interaction between the groups and which in turn is of significance for social identity. A new social identity in one group, according to Reicher, provides a new *social context* for the other group, which thereby reacts differently; and hence a new inter-group context is created for both groups. There are many examples of this in Gothenburg, e.g. when the lawful occupation of Hvitfeldtska Upper Secondary School was redefined as a forbidden area and the demonstrators therefore found themselves in a criminal situation, or when the police – who thought that they were being deployed to guard a demonstration – were subjected to stone-throwing. In previous sections, we have shown that both demonstrators and the police can influence the context by means of their collective intentions, how these are expressed and the strategies, which are a consequence of the said intentions. Collective peaceful intentions which are reflected in peace-making strategies between the police and demonstrators create a peaceful context for both groups.

So far, we have looked at the group interactions solely as interactions between demonstrators as a group and the police as a group. Both the police and demonstrators consist of a number of different categories, which means that the interaction between them, and hence the context, is extremely complex. In this section, we will be looking at the link between different contexts and war-making and peace-making processes. Two different contextual factors will be reviewed and analysed more closely. These are *categories of demonstrators* and *type of demonstration*. Another significant contextual factor is the granting of *permission*, which is of significance for whether the police will regard a manifestation as a lawful gathering. This factor will be discussed in connection with the other issues.

Four categories of demonstrator

We discovered fairly early on during our analysis of the Gothenburg incidents that there were different categories of demonstrator who behaved differently and, above all, were perceived completely differently by the police and hence constituted completely different contexts for them.

Both demonstrators and police officers make both stereotypical categorisations and differentiations of the other group. The demonstrators do not view
themselves as a unified group, but distinguish between groupings with different objectives. The police categorise demonstrators into ‘demonstrators’ and ‘agents provocateurs’. Many demonstrators agree with the police that there is a small group of agents provocateurs who have objectives other than demonstrating their views. However, opinions are divided as to how large this group is and who belongs to it. It is difficult to get a clear idea of what the police base their assessment on when categorising demonstrators and ‘troublemakers’. We have also been able to note a change in the police officers’ categorisation in that participants in unauthorised actions have not automatically been deemed to be troublemakers. The demonstrators believe that the police work on the basis of age and clothing when categorising demonstrators as troublemakers and then arrest people. There is a certain amount of evidence of this from the police too.

We have been able to distinguish four different categories of demonstrator in terms of their intentions and organisation on the basis of the descriptions given by demonstrators and the police, as well as our own observations. These categories are not groups with clear boundaries. The boundaries occur in a dynamic interaction of categorisation. The demonstrators interviewed agree that these categories exist, but they have widely varying views on the sizes of the groups. These groups – as we have described them – seem to exist before, during and after the demonstrations. On the other hand, the extent to which specific individuals will identify with or be identified with a group is dependent on the course of events and the mutual categorisation between demonstrators and the police. The four categories are: (a) modern organised demonstrators with peaceful intentions, (b) postmodern organised demonstrators with (primarily) peaceful intentions, (c) agents provocateurs, i.e. demonstrators with warlike intentions (organisation may vary) and (d) premodern organised demonstrators with peaceful intentions in respect of the police. In this group, attitudes towards counter-demonstrators can be expressed in warlike terms, but as long as the leader negotiates with the police and maintains control over the group, there will not be warlike consequences.

**Modern organised demonstrators**

This category consists of traditional groups of demonstrators organised in accordance with the modern project. Their objective is specifically peaceful. They often belong to established groups such as political parties or voluntary organisations with plenty of experience of arranging demonstrations and public gatherings. At political manifestations, they may also take part in network arrangements of a generic nature, their organisation helping to support or lead the network organisation. Their arrangements are characterised by peace-making processes (differentiating, order-creating and disarming). As the police perceive these arrangements to be lawful, with a low threat, they will also treat them with peace-making intentions. Trust is high. This group has a fairly clear social identity. They categorise themselves as demonstrators with peaceful intentions but with a legal right to make their views known.
Postmodern organised demonstrators

This category consists of individuals and groups who organise themselves into networks with no clear leadership. Individuals may be included in many different groupings. These groupings are on a scale from more established (Syndikalister, SULF) to entirely unestablished groupings, which arise, for example, as festival committees for an arrangement. As individuals, they join in with arrangements organised by umbrella networks, e.g. NMR. Members of this category may describe themselves as follows:

I am active, take part in some actions, turn up at some demonstrations. On the other hand, I am not part of any groups or associations, or even networks. (Demonstrator)

This type of self-categorisation means that postmodern demonstrators have a more ‘unclear’ social identity than the modern ones. This is particularly true before and after demonstrations. However, in crowd incidents, a collective social identity is readily developed for this category. The postmodern groupings have a more or less anarchistic ideology. Each and every individual speaks for him/herself, and not on behalf of any group. Their attitude towards violence is characterised by leaving it to each individual to decide what violence that individual considers to be necessary. This means that there is a wide variation in views: (a) people who never want to use violence themselves, (b) people who are of the opinion that they are right to defend themselves, and (c) people who are of the opinion that, in some cases, violence can be justified in political struggles. Below is an example of an argument in favour of violence being potentially necessary in some cases.

I don’t think violence is the way to go, not the way things are at the moment. It feels as though it might be justified in some cases. I can also understand part of the reason why people say we arm ourselves with /../ People in Sweden die because of attacks by Nazis and fascists, and then people say we arm ourselves because we’re defending people who can’t defend themselves. We make sure we use violence to create Nazi-free zones, because doing that also protects handicapped people, gays, foreigners and immigrants. (Demonstrator)

Postmodern organised demonstrators do not believe that they need to request permission for public arrangements and invite everyone to take part without restrictions, which means that even individuals belonging to the agents provocateurs category may take part. As no permissions are requested, the police may regard the arrangements from this category as illegal and breaches of the peace. Although in the case of later demonstrations, it was expressly stated by the police leaders that even such meetings and demonstrations are legal, they are perceived by the police as being more risky than the traditional authorised demonstrations. These actions risk being perceived as chaotic and provocative, which can lead to the police stereotypically categorising all postmodern demonstrators as belonging to the group agents provocateurs. They express their social identity primarily as a state of opposition to counter-demonstrators by calling themselves anti-fascists.
Agents provocateurs

This category is least defined and most dependent on how others categorise demonstrators. It is very dubious as to whether any of them actually categorise themselves as an agent provocateur. During the Gothenburg incidents, the police were of the opinion that this group was fairly large, while views from the demonstrators varied from believing that it was fairly small to believing that it barely existed (Granström, 2002). The police seem to expect it to exist and be present at major manifestations. When things have gone calmly and peacefully, the police may draw the conclusion that “the hardcore weren’t there” (Granström, Guvå, Hylander & Rosander, 2005a). This means that the police regard these groups as set groups, and do not think that they may arise in interaction with themselves as a group. The police are aware of the difficulty of distinguishing the real troublemakers from the people who have allowed themselves to be dragged into things, but they feel that the risk is not so great – perhaps a hundred to one – that they would assess someone incorrectly. Demonstrators, on the other hand, see that it is precisely this interaction, which breeds the group of agents provocateurs; at least if it includes more than just single individuals. There are some quite divided opinions among demonstrators as to whether some people attend demonstrations with the intention of using violence. However, everyone interviewed agrees that there is a small group of people who can be thought of as agents provocateurs and whom even demonstrators deem to be disruptive of the implementation of their demonstrations.

They come from tough backgrounds, have lousy relationships, have all the things they need to either turn to crime or end up as part of an extreme subculture. That’s probably it. Finding a culture they can identify with, a group they can identify with, where they can also exclude the rest of society that they’ve never felt any affinity with. I think that’s true – but for very few people. (Demonstrator)

Many demonstrators agree entirely with the police that there are agents provocateurs who infiltrate various groups and force the pace. One demonstrator from Gothenburg had this to say.

So I ended up at the back end of the demonstration and soon discovered that there was a “tail” of people there who were following the demonstration in various ways and provoking the demonstrators from behind. … they tried to join us and provoke us and get us to leave the place, and then gradually there were more and more of them wearing masks, you know, and they had stones in their hands, you know, and they turned up in such a way that you just didn’t know what was going to happen, whether they were going to start throwing stones from behind at something or other. (Demonstrator)

Premodern organised national demonstrators

It has been possible to distinguish a further group of demonstrators in connection with the Salem manifestations. They have a lot in common with the modern demonstrators in their attitudes towards the police. The police have also stated that it is easier to cooperate with nationalists than it is to co-operate with anti-fascists (postmodern demonstrators) because their organisation still
bears major resemblances to the police officers’ own hierarchy-based leadership organisation. The nationalists have a formal leader with whom it is possible to negotiate and who is authorised to negotiate on behalf of the organisation. By co-operating with the leaders, the police also feel that they have control over the members of the organisation. Order is maintained with the aid of guards with armbands. Here, too, order is maintained within their own group. Service functioned as an assembling and order-creating activity. They did not behave in a provocative manner towards the police. They complied with the requests of the police and had their own bans on alcohol and smoking as part of the demonstration march.

This is where the similarities end, however. There are clear dividing lines in their organisation compared to the modern demonstrators. It is not clear, for example, which organisations are part of the Salem Foundation. One leader took it upon himself to submit an application for the demonstration, but it is unclear what mandate he had to do so. The question is whether the nationalists have any functioning delegation or organised distribution of roles, or whether they are an organisation controlled from above with a self-selected leader. If so, then this is more of a premodern organisation, which is not based on democratic principles. This theory is borne out by the fact that this is a gathering of people around an emotionally charged message, and that the ceremony was characterised by an almost military-styled discipline. Few conflicts arise with the police as long as there is a leader who makes decisions and who is obeyed by his followers. Problems arise if the leader disappears or if individuals or groupings fail to comply with the discipline.

To summarise, four different categories of demonstrator have been identified, with varying focus on organisation: modern organised, postmodern organised, agents provocateurs and premodern organised. These categories constitute different contexts and hence are treated in different ways by the police, thereby leading to different outcomes. The treatment by the police is in turn of vital importance for how social identity develops in crowd incidents. For example, modern demonstrators will constitute a peace-making context, which will probably give rise to peaceful demonstrators and peaceful police officers as they also exclude agents provocateurs, while postmodern demonstrators will constitute a different context, with scope for the development of different social identities. The postmodern group may also include agents provocateurs, or – rather – not exclude them. In other words, this is a war-making context, which can cause matters to get out of hand.

Organisation of demonstrators versus organisation of the police

Our hypothesis has been that differences in the type of organisation have contributed to misunderstanding between groups and increased the risk of riots. Above all, differences prevail between the hierarchically organised police and the postmodern anti-fascists, who are not hierarchically organised. Difficulties arise when, for example, the police want to negotiate and the postmodern demonstrators are not organised such that they are able to delegate a negotia-
tion mandate to anyone. However, we have seen a change in organisation from both demonstrators and the police, which we believe has facilitated communication between the groups. This change reflects an understanding of the other group and involves adapted organisation, which constitutes an important peace-making measure.

The police organisation is traditionally hierarchical in structure, but according to the new police tactics (special police tactics, SPT), features are included which could be stated to be more postmodern in nature. This means that police officers must be mobile and flexible so that they can rapidly change their plans on the basis of new criteria. The job means that subordinate managers at various levels are responsible for their own tasks and hence decide on how tasks are to be implemented. This means that the police can make decisions at a lower level, which also facilitates faster feedback for the demonstrators. The new police tactics thus mean changes, which counter chaos creation. They are based on an awareness of group processes and pave the way for organisation adapted to suit the group with which the police are interacting at that particular point in time. SPT involves, among other things:

- Intervention against suspect individuals, not groups
- Searching for wanted persons and monitoring in the local area before and during demonstrations in order to protect the demonstration
- Contact and communication with demonstrators before and during demonstrations
- Selective searches

What adapted organisation as a peace-making process involves as far as demonstrators are concerned is looked at below.

Different types of demonstration

We have studied three different types of demonstration, (a) major political manifestation with riot elements, (b) street parties not reported/unauthorised, and (c) all demonstrations and counter-demonstrations. These three types of demonstration differ as regards organisation, participants and objectives, and hence form different types of context for all parties involved.

Major political manifestations

The major political manifestations which we have studied are the EU protests in Gothenburg in 2001, where there were demonstrations arranged by both modern and postmodern demonstrators. It should also be pointed out that postmodern groups of demonstrators also took part in the demonstrations arranged by modern demonstrators. The modern organised demonstrations were characterised by peace processes and took place calmly and peacefully.
On the other hand, riots occurred in connection with unauthorised actions. Postmodern organised demonstrators were categorised as *agents provocateurs* on a number of occasions and were treated as such. All parties interviewed were of the opinion that *agents provocateurs* were present, but many demonstrators felt that this category was created by the police, either mainly or in part. The police, on the other hand, categorised everyone who failed to obey their directions as troublemakers.

As we have been able to state previously, there is concordance between the organisation of the police and that of the modern demonstrators, which means that the same type of order is expected. This applies to both the modern demonstrators in Gothenburg and the modern demonstrators in connection with the Salem action. It also applies to the premodern demonstrators. They had their own guards who were in contact with the police. In their turn, they entered into communication with the people who were provocative within their own group. Thus they maintained order within their own ranks. In connection with Salem, the modern demonstrators had requested permission and entered into communication with the police during the planning stage. The arranger was a spokesman for a network consisting of a number of different organisations. Strong attractions in the form of food, music and other appearances also made it easier to maintain order. The arrangers themselves stated that a broad range of ages among participants was the most peace-making factor. For the activities arranged by the modern group, the average age was higher than for the postmodern arrangements.

**Reclaim parties**

Chaos, provocative actions and stereotypical categorisation between the police and demonstrators – i.e. war processes linked with the unreported or unauthorised actions – were connected with the Gothenburg incidents. There were also actions where the participants belonged to a greater extent to the category of postmodern demonstrators and where *agents provocateurs* acted in some cases. One of these was the party in Vasa Park, where confrontations between the police and participants ended with shots being fired. One question we asked ourselves in this regard was whether it is possible for peace processes to develop even in the case of unauthorised actions.

In the light of our studies of five different Reclaim parties, we can state that peace-making processes were in fact developed and dominated. How the police categorised the action seemed to be crucial. The unauthorised gatherings were eventually regarded by the police as legal public gatherings. In this way, the demonstrators were also perceived as if they were implementing authorised activities.

In the analysis of these incidents, we have been able to note that the anti-fascist demonstrators with postmodern organisation seem to have adapted their organisation to tie in with that of other groups, with peace-making in mind. When the police communicated on site with the people who got in touch themselves, instead of insisting on formally appointed representatives, it was possible to bring about negotiation between the postmodern demon-
AFA activists and the police. They did not allow themselves to be provoked by the requests of the police; instead, they complied with them, sometimes with passive resistance but only by violating the bans in exceptional cases. When situations occurred in which demonstrators and the police had different perceptions, such as when choosing the demonstration route, individual demonstrators negotiated with police officers and managed to come to a collective agreement. There was order in the ranks, which was created along with yelling, music and whistles. Permission was requested for the AFA demonstration on National Day in 2005. Thus this can be interpreted as though both the police and the demonstrators changed their organisation with peace-making in mind. Anti-fascists have no visible guards and have an express ideology stating that each and every individual is entitled to carry on the political struggle in a way to the best advantage of the issue. But here there was collective order, which made the participants follow the march, take part in speech choirs and dance together. There was one example of how a social identity was rapidly formed, and in this case this social identity was characterised by peace-making.

The police officers’ interpretation of the peaceful outcome of 1 May 2004 in Stockholm was that ‘the hardcore weren’t there’. Of course, we can neither confirm nor deny whether certain individuals who had previously acted as agents provocateurs had abstained from taking part. But we can state that in a critical situation, the police can be turned in the eyes of demonstrators from ordinary police officers into riot-equipped ‘monsters’, and participants can be turned in the eyes of the police into a masked ‘black flock’. The police made a differentiation by distinguishing between the ‘hardcore’, as they are known, who wanted to use the party as an arena in which they could hide with a view to creating ‘war’, and the peaceful demonstrators who just wanted to have a party. According to the police, the ‘hardcore’ consists of a certain number of agents provocateurs. Our interpretation is that irrespective of whether or not there are agents provocateurs initially, the size of the ‘hardcore’ will depend on the inter-group processes occurring between the police and the demonstrators.

**Antagonistic groups**

In Salem, confrontations have occurred over a number of years between – in the main – anti-fascists and the police in connection with the former wanting to stop nationalistic demonstrations. From these earlier demonstrations, we know something about what can happen when antagonistic groups lay claim to the same public space at the same time. In Salem in 2003, violent confrontations occurred between the police and the anti-fascists and anti-racists. These incidents provided examples of how riots can develop as a result of chaos creation owing to contradictory information from the police leaders leading to the spread of rumours, unconscious provocation by buses being driven up and police officers dressed in protective gear (whom the demonstrators perceived as threatening), as well as stereotypical categorisation by both the police and the demonstrators. The police, who prevented the demonstrators from passing through a tunnel to the train, did this in the belief that they were dealing with a crowd on their way up to the platform with a view to having a showdown
with the nationalists. The demonstrators in turn perceived the police as a hostile opponent attacking them when they were on their way from the demonstration to the train. The context created was thus that of two groups of antagonistic demonstrators and a group of police officers whose objective was to prevent the different groups from meeting. The final result can be described most appropriately as a row between the police and counter-demonstrators. The image, which the mass media gave was of black-clad violent activists who were out to cause trouble. The message was overshadowed.

Peace-making measures from all groups made Salem in 2004 an example of the complete opposite to this. All five main activities took place calmly and were characterised by peace-making processes; and this was true of both authorised and unauthorised actions. A number of critical incidents have been identified which could have led to confrontations, but which passed off peacefully.

As the primary objective of the antagonistic groups is to combat the ideology of the other group, and as certain subgroups also want to fight physically with one another, this means that all forms of contact between the groups are provocative. There are no peaceful intentions. The only possible peace-making process, therefore, is the absence of contact. The principle eventually embraced by most people concerned therefore involved manifestations by the antagonistic groups of demonstrators taking place in different places and at different times. Both the anti-racists and the nationalists changed their original demonstration plans after talking to the police in order to avoid all contact with the other group of demonstrators.

Anti-racists planned the major anti-racist demonstration for Medborgar Square. They also took care to encourage demonstrators travelling to the action to head for Medborgar Square instead of Salem.

The anti-fascist groups attempted to make contact with the nationalists by means of provocative actions, which in turn could have led to confrontations. When it was obvious that they intended to prevent the nationalists from getting to Salem by means of a train-stopping action, there was a risk of provocative contact. At this point, the police negotiated with the nationalists and persuaded them not to go to Central Station. The gathering of nationalists moved on to Karlberg Station and the train to Salem subsequently never stopped at Central Station. This allowed the principle of ‘manifestations taking place in different places and at different times’ to be upheld successfully. However, the anti-fascists seemed to be happy with this and felt that they had forced the nationalists to change their plans and thus demonstrated their strength.

According to the police, the nationalists attempted to get to Stockholm in order to come into contact with the anti-racists, but this too was prevented. To ensure that the different groups did not meet on the train, the police stopped anti-racists on their way home and sent them to take buses and the underground instead. The police also prevented anti-fascists from getting back to Central Station from Slussen by negotiating a different march route with a view to avoiding an encounter with returning nationalists.
In only one instance do we have an example of a situation leading to confrontation (Vasa Bridge) and which can be interpreted on the basis of the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM). Stereotypical categorisations by both sides, with the police regarding the demonstrators as constituting a trouble hotspot, helped to ensure that the demonstrators developed the social identity of demonstrators opposing the police. During the subsequent searches, the police said that they made contact with the individual demonstrators. It was possible to talk to them when they ‘left their grouping’ and thus peace-making communication took place. On the other hand, we have many examples of peaceful events, which can also be understood on the basis of ESIM. A social identity as a peaceful demonstrator or as a peace-making police officer develops in the interaction between the groups when one group behaves as though the other group is peacefully disposed and the other group thus acts in a manner which is both actively and passively peace-making by nature.

Salem in 2004 thus demonstrated that even complex demonstrations, where antagonistic groups lay claim to the public space at the same time, can result in peaceful manifestations without confrontation between the different groups or between groups of demonstrators and the police. What was primarily considered to be crucial to the peaceful development of events was the fact that the peace-making effort was mutual, that it was intentional and that there was an agreement shared by most of the parties concerned to separate the manifestations of the antagonistic groups, making them happen at different times and in different places.

Context and social identity

The type of action and the categories of demonstrators taking part in an action create the context, which is of crucial significance to which social identity develops within a group in connection with a crowd incident. During a number of confrontations between the police and demonstrators, subgroups have participated on different terms, and different social identities have obviously developed within the major group of demonstrators (Granström, 2002). This had to do with the police categorising the demonstrators in different ways, among other things, but also with how they categorised themselves both before and during the crowd incident. The modern demonstrators take part in demonstrations primarily belonging to the category of major demonstrations with a political objective. They avoid any context consisting of antagonistic groups. Their communication with the police allows them to maintain order and uphold their peaceful social identity. They are happy to include the postmodern demonstrators in their demonstrations. They have strategies to allow them to achieve peaceful demonstrations and avoid violent confrontations, and they have been able to retain their social identity as peaceful demonstrators as the police have also regarded them as such. Postmodern extra-parliamentary demonstrators, consisting mainly of youths united by overall objectives such as ‘no fascists on our streets’ have been regarded – to a greater extent than traditional demonstrators – as a group of troublemakers, which has led to peaceful post-
modern demonstrators finding themselves in opposition to the police through no fault of their own.

The Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) (Reicher, 1996; 1997; Drury & Reicher, 1999; Drury & Reicher, 2000) provides significant explanations regarding how riots occur and develop but, on the other hand, other theoretical perspectives may be required in order to understand what happens when crowd incidents fail to develop into revolts. Here, too, an analysis is required of what happens between minority groups within larger groups and between a minority group and the majority. Hogg & Turner (in Abrams & Hogg, 1990) demonstrate the significance of the context with regard to polarisation of attitudes within groups. For example, a group of conservatives in a right-wing party to the right of centre will move their voting nearer to the centre if an ultra-conservative group appears. This is done because they wish to avoid being categorised as belonging to the ultra-conservative group. If the object of comparison is changed, the evaluation of the same object will shift. Abrams and Hogg (1990) are of the opinion that the acceptance of norms by group members should rather be regarded as internalisation of group norms via their own categorisation and social identification, rather than as a result of group pressure. Group pressure leads to obedience, while social identification would sooner lead to a ‘reason to agree’, i.e. conviction regarding the legitimacy of the norm.

When a movement is established and accepted by society, a minority perceiving itself to be in opposition to the established society and wishing to continue setting its own rules and using its own interpretation of democracy will break away from the majority. This was what happened when, for example, AFA withdrew from Nätverket mot Rasism prior to the Salem demonstrations in 2005. This can be interpreted as meaning that close co-operation with the police had become far too well established, and when peaceful intentions became more important that countering fascists, a different social identity developed outside the network. But it is possible to question whether there is a collective social identity within this minority group. There are varying values and views within this group regarding the other organisations with which they should co-operate, as well as the extent to which violence should be used in the fight against fascists and extreme nationalists (AFA Malmö, 2005; AFA Stockholm, 2006). The discussion about peacemaking and war-making processes thus seems to be in constant progress, but to be moving in such a way that the main arena for these negotiations is sometimes between the police and the entire group of demonstrators and sometimes between traditional demonstrators and postmodern demonstrators and sometimes between groupings within the postmodern group or between the postmodern group and the agents provocateurs.

To extend the theoretical perspective, social identity theory can be combined with other perspectives of identity (Stryker, Owens & White, 2000). Stryker (2000), who bases the concept of identity on an extension of symbolic interactionism, is of the opinion that it is not only group affiliation, but the actual interactions within the group that are crucial to the type of social identity developed. Furthermore, it is stated that identities may vary in prominence.
For the players involved who, for example, belong to a movement with an expressly non-violent profile and with great commitment to the movement, identities as stone-throwers or brawlers are not particularly prominent. Considerably more is required with regard to war-making processes between the groups to develop such an identity than for individuals who belong to a ‘looser’ network with an unclear attitude towards violence (Hylander, 2004). Both solidarity and norm development within majorities and minority groups are therefore of importance to the social identity and to the interaction both within and between groups.

**Summing up**

In this section, we have shown that in the encounters between two groups, the groups provide one another’s contexts. As the context influences how individuals and groups act, how the context is perceived is of great significance. If, for example, a group of skaters perceive the ice to be thin and unsafe, they will not skate out onto it, even though the ice would actually bear their weight. On the other hand, they could assume that the ice would hold and skate out on ice which is too thin. Both demonstrators’ and police officers’ actions are influenced in the same way by how they perceive one another. In the first instance, their perceptions of one another are the controlling factor, not always the actual conditions. The police attempt to figure out the ‘strength of the ice’ by assessing potential threats. Sometimes their assessments are correct, and sometimes they are not. However, what the police and demonstrators do forms a basis for the actions of the other group. Knowledge of these processes could have, *inter alia*, the following consequences for demonstrators and the police.

**Consequences for demonstrators**

- The ways in which manifestations are organised have significance for how the interaction develops between the police and demonstrators.
- When groups with antagonistic messages demonstrate, peace can be maintained if all groups officially state that they intend to take part in peaceful manifestations, if the groups are kept separate by ensuring they meet up with their fellows in different places and at different times and if the police and demonstrators behave in a peace-making fashion towards one another, maintaining communication, i.e. maintaining a peace-making context.
- Modern organised demonstrations pass off peacefully when the interaction is characterised by peace-making processes.
- Postmodern organised actions can be perceived stereotypically by the police as chaotic and provocative and are therefore treated with war-making intent by the police, which in turn may lead to the demonstrators also reacting with war-making intent: this is how riots occur. Postmodern organised actions treated with peace-making intent lead to peaceful demonstrations.
• Premodern organised actions may pass off peacefully if the police negotiate with the leader and if the leader has a mandate from the group.

• *Agents provocateurs* use war-making processes to bring about stereotyping, chaos and provocative actions, i.e. they consciously aim to create a warlike context.

**Consequences for the police**

• The police constitute a context for the demonstrators. Different uniforms, formations, attitudes and body language give varying signals to the demonstrators, who then act on the basis of their perceptions of the police.

• It is important to ensure that the police work consciously in order to constitute a peace-making context themselves for the demonstrators.

• What is known as the situation-specific tactics as part of the new police tactics is one way of attempting to bring about appropriate ‘here-and-now’ treatment of demonstrators based on the actual situation.

• Differentiation allows the police to distinguish and separate not only post-modern demonstrators from *agents provocateurs* on site, but also to carry out more nuanced context analyses (analyses of the surroundings) as a complement to the analysis made of the threat. (To check for themselves whether the ice will hold up, and not be afraid of threats or warnings of thin ice.)
What Can Be Learned from the Project

The research presented in this report and based on data from both police officers and demonstrators, as well as the interaction between the two, has resulted in an interpretation model which illustrates the complexity of demonstrations and crowd incidents. What happens between the groups cannot be explained in simple terms of cause and effect, but rather it must be understood on the basis of what peace-making and war-making processes occur between them. This study confirms previous research into riots as an inter-group phenomenon between groups of demonstrators and the police, but it also shows how processes within a group interrelate with processes involving other groups in dynamic interaction. Some of these processes help to create peace, while others help to create war between the police and demonstrators. Both the police and demonstrators act in both peace-making and war-making ways.

War or peace

Peace-making processes

- **Differentiation** involves assigning both good and bad sides to the members of a groups. This *also* means realising that individuals within a group do differ. Differentiation is peace-making in that it contributes towards a nuanced view, not only of one’s own group but primarily of other groups.

- **Disarming** involves persuading others – either in one’s own group or the other group – to lay down their arms, either literally or figuratively. In other words, to liberate others from war-making attributes or persuade others to give up their provocative behaviour.

- **Order creation** involves strategies, which help to create structure, pass on information and hence create a sense of security within both one’s own group and other groups.

War-making processes

- **Stereotyping** involves, on the one hand, categorising individuals into groups so that all members of the group, irrespective of their individual differences, are regarded in the same way and, on the other, assigning negative values to the collective traits of other groups. Stereotyping is war-making in that it helps to create a stereotypical view of the other group and its members. Processes, which facilitate stereotyping of one’s own group are also war-making.
• *Provocation* involves conscious or unconscious actions, which are perceived by the other group as a means of expressing war-making intentions.

• *Chaos creation* involves processes, which lead to disorder and insecurity owing to a lack of information or the provision of conflicting information, unforeseen events and a lack of planning.

**Confrontation or communication**

Both demonstrators and police officers can act in a peace-making manner (differentiating, disarming, order-creating) or a war-making manner (stereotyping, provocative, chaos-creating).

When *mutual peace-making* prevails between demonstrators and the police, the foundations are laid for *co-operation* and peaceful demonstrations, while *confrontation* will arise between them in the case of *mutual war-making*. When confrontations arise, all three war-making processes are present.

**Escalation or de-escalation of a conflict**

When there is dissonance between the groups in respect of their war-making and peace-making actions, critical situations are created which can lead to escalation or de-escalation of the situation and are dependent on how the respective groups deal with the conflict arising. This is the case when:

1. Peace-making demonstrators encounter war-making police officers who treat them as if they were war-making, i.e. in a stereotyping fashion (tarring everyone with the same brush), provocatively (as if they were troublemakers and not demonstrators) and in a chaos-creating manner (non-informative, inexplicable actions). In such cases, there is a risk that the police will create demonstrators who feel violated and hence rebel against the police, which in turn may persuade the police to justify their own actions. If other police officers then come to the rescue, there is a risk of escalation of the situation.

   If the demonstrators in this situation do not allow themselves to be provoked, maintain their composure and do not act in a manner, which would facilitate stereotyping, i.e. engage in passive peace-making, there is a chance of de-escalation. However, in this situation, it is not sufficient for most demonstrators to behave in a peace-making fashion: individuals who allow themselves to be provoked by the police may be taken as justification of the perception of the demonstrators as warmongers and lead to escalation.

2. When peace-making police officers encounter war-making demonstrators, there is a risk of escalation if the police allow themselves to be provoked by the demonstrators and start to categorise them stereotypically as non-demonstrators and resort to *chaos-creating* measures such as collective surrounding actions, etc. The police then switch from a peace-making situation to a war-making situation. If, instead, the police ensure both *active peace-making*, by creating order and implementing nuanced interventions and searches, and
passive peace-making by not allowing themselves to be provoked, create chaos or act in such a manner that would allow them to be stereotyped, de-escalation may take place.

Communication

Communication is crucial between demonstrators and the police in order to resolve critical situations. If a chain of communication is successfully established and maintained from postmodern demonstrators to modern demonstrators to police communications officers to police officers with authority to make decisions, or vice versa, the degree of trust between the groups increases. This is the case, for example, when police communications officers manage to bring about direct communication with postmodern demonstrators, whom the police sometimes consider to be unpredictable. When there is a constant exchange of information on what is happening, this creates predictability, which reduces the risk of chaos-creating rumours and incorrect interpretations of the intentions and actions of the other group. In addition, greater trust is engendered in the opportunities for influencing the actions of the other group by its own members.

Intentions – consequence

What appears to be crucial to how war-making or peace-making police officers and demonstrators relate to one another is the image they create of the intentions of the other group. Police officers’ assessment of the intentions of demonstrators is crucial to how they will act. Demonstrators who are perceived to have peace-making intentions are regarded with trust, while those who are thought to have ‘other plans’ are regarded with mistrust. But even though the groups may have been mistrustful of one another to some extent (suspecting hidden agendas), consistent peace-making action by demonstrators and police officers alike has proved to be capable of resulting in peace-making processes. Here our results can be said to support the new police tactics to a great extent. When the police behave by means of peace-making strategies as if they trusted the demonstrators and hence categorise gatherings as lawful, even if they are not authorised, there is less of a risk of demonstrators feeling threatened and therefore less of a risk of riots. It is not the mistrust of individuals that is significant: the collective trust/mistrust as expressed in intentions and strategies is the crucial factor.

In our research, there are few examples of demonstrators or police officers with peaceful intentions who ended up in confrontations and abandoned their peaceful social identity in favour of a social identity associated with conflict between the groups. On the other hand, there is a strong indication that demonstrators and policemen who feel that the media has described them stereotypically as violent troublemakers wish to eradicate the blot on their character by clearly expressing peaceful intentions and acting in a peace-making fashion. The police and the demonstrators do the same thing on account of this. The groups or subgroups who are of the opinion that conflict is a way of dem-
onstrating the unfair aspects of society then no longer wish to remain in contexts in which demonstrators draw up plans together with the police.

Social contextualisation

Demonstrators and police officers constitute one another’s social context. They act on the basis of how that context is perceived. Different categories of demonstrators also constitute different contexts for the police. Traditional demonstrators and reported, authorised actions constitute a peaceful context, while postmodern demonstrators and unreported actions may constitute a more risky context. Counter-demonstrations aimed at another group of demonstrators constitute a further context which cannot be handled by means of peace-making processes between the police and demonstrators alone: instead, these demonstrations must take place in separate locations and at different times in order to avoid confrontations between the demonstrators. The context is not merely a ‘here-and-now’ phenomenon: it is also dependent on previous incidents. International demonstrations, which degenerated into riots have, for example, led to the police viewing current Swedish demonstrators and demonstrations differently to the way they used to. The fear of terrorism all over the world has also reached Sweden and the Swedish police.

Unlike international demonstrations, which can be viewed as a chain of events with gradual escalation, the Gothenburg incidents seem to have been a turning point for Swedish demonstrators and the Swedish police. Our research shows that both police officers and demonstrators are working to create a new image for themselves with a view to (re-)creating an image of themselves as peaceful and as the defenders of democratic rights and freedoms. Both sides appear to be striving to create a different view of themselves to the one created in Gothenburg. Instead of police officers in troop formation, wearing helmets and visors and carrying batons and shields, the police turn up in ordinary uniforms, yellow jackets and caps, and they walk round chatting with demonstrators and the general public. This creates a different context for the demonstrators, whose clothing and organisation also constitute a context for the police. But in both groups, this peaceful context can change into a war zone as if by magic if the police go in equipped with helmets, batons and shields and the demonstrators wear hoods and scarves and use violence to protect themselves from what they perceive to be the attacks of the other party. And the spark which ignites the whole situation could easily be an individual police officer or demonstrator allowing him- or herself to be provoked, and instead of these non-conforming individuals being dealt with within their own groups, their respective groups come to their rescue and go on the counterattack against the other group. Thus the threat to security comes not only from the other group, but may also arise within one’s own group.
Safeguarding the rules of the game in a democracy

At a review of incidents in connection with international meetings in Europe (the Gothenburg Committee, 2002), it is clearly apparent that the role of the police was to safeguard parliamentary democracy for politicians. Demonstrations against these meetings have been perceived as a risk factor in terms of breaches of the peace, and not as part of a democratic society. Quite the opposite: new protest movements, with elements of civil disobedience actions, were perceived to constitute a threat to democracy (on a par with terrorism). In Sweden, freedom of assembly and freedom of speech are protected by the constitution. Even unreported and hence unauthorised meetings are lawful. As far as the actions of the police are concerned, it is a matter of differentiating between lawful and unlawful actions so as not to be guilty themselves of unlawful actions in respect of demonstrators. The job of the police is to safeguard all lawful demonstrations and meetings in the same way as meetings among politicians are safeguarded. The threat against peaceful demonstrations does not relate to the demonstrations per se, but to the ways in which both the police and peaceful demonstrators deal with the minority who do not act in accordance with the democratic rules of the game or who do not accept, in the event of civil disobedience actions, the applicable laws and are prepared to take their punishment.

How both the police and peaceful demonstrators deal with this minority, without ending up themselves in confrontations with one another, is an issue which requires further research, primarily in connection with the demonstrations which will be taking place after a ban on covering one’s face is introduced in Sweden. The question is, inter alia, whether this ban will be used by postmodern demonstrators as a civil disobedience action and, if so, whether this will be dealt with by the police as such and distinguished from a situation in which agents provocateurs, under the cover of masks, will attempt to create confrontation and cause damage.
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