Disciplining Freedom

Treatment Dilemmas and Subjectivity at a Detention Home for Young Men

Anna Gradin Franzén
At the Faculty of Arts and Science at Linköping University, research and doctoral studies are carried out within broad problem areas. Research is organized in interdisciplinary research environments and doctoral studies mainly in graduate schools. Jointly, they publish the series Linköping Studies in Arts and Science. This thesis comes from the Division of Psychology at the Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning.

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When I started this journey of writing a dissertation I had absolutely no idea what I was getting into. I believe that might have been a good thing. The road to a PhD runs through valleys and mountains. From the valley floor all you can see are massive mountains surrounding you. But from the tops of mountains it feels like you are soaring. One thing that is absolutely clear is that it is impossible to make this kind of journey on your own. I am fortunate to have had many supporting people around to help me up the mountains and propelling me forward when I felt like I was flying.

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Anna Gradin Franzén
This is a study of treatment practices at a detention home for young men in Sweden. It investigates the complex and dilemmatic setting a youth detention home constitutes as it is an institution that provides treatment or care for young men, mainly with a prior criminal history or drug problems, but in the form of forced care. The focus is on social interaction, particularly between the young residents and staff members. But it is also a study about identity, about “who people are to each other” including related notions of morality and normality (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006, p. 6). However, drawing on social constructionist and poststructuralist notions, identity will be conceptualized as something performative, multiple, and dynamic rather than internal, essential, or static.

Identity today can be understood as something far from personal, private, or hidden deep within, but rather something that “penetrates us from every
angle” (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001, p. 2). Society is filled with institutions and practices aimed at self-change, not only institutions such as detention homes that attempt to force their subjects to self-change, but also in the form of, for instance, self-help books and magazines with “how-to” guides. This may be understood in terms of that the personal self is increasingly being deprivatized. Deprivatization happens in a complex “postmodern panorama of public sites of self-construction, whose venues diversely produce and manage personal identity […] where selves are regularly decentred from their inner recesses and recentered in institutional life” (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001, p. 2).

This dissertation focuses on identity and self-construction in a not very public place, more precisely a detention home, a forced-treatment institution for young men. Such a home is all about changing people; it is a type of people-changing institution—a total institution (Goffman, 1961). While self-construction is a topic that is formally public in this type institution, the everyday lives and practices of detention homes are generally less public to society. This is also mirrored in research as studies of youth detention homes in Sweden are relatively scarce and mainly focus on the development and evaluation of treatment methods (Gruber, 2013; for example, Andreassen, 2003; Holmqvist, 2008; Holmqvist, Hill, & Lang, 2007, 2009; Vinnerljung & Sallnäs, 2008; Westermark, Hansson, & Olsson, 2011). Few studies explore the everyday lives and practices of those working at or admitted to the detention homes (but see, for example, Andersson, 2008; Cromdal & Osvaldsson, 2012; Hill, 2005; Levin, 1998; Wästerfors, 2009b, 2011). This study can thus be understood as an attempt to open up “the black box” of the forced treatment of youths.

DETENTION HOMES AS INSTITUTIONS OF CARE AND CONTROL

Youth detention homes are particular social control institutions because of at least two interrelated aspects, namely, that they aim to provide forced treatment or care rather than punishment, and that they deal with children and youth rather than adults. Juvenile institutional care has a long history in Sweden. It may be said to, both historically and presently, be characterized
by conflicting ideologies as they separate groups of youths from the rest of society with the dual intent of rehabilitating the youths as well as controlling them and protecting society from them (Andreassen, 2003; Levin, 1998; Sallnäs, 2000). Even though the rehabilitation or care ideology is strongly emphasized, for example, in that various psychological treatment methods are enforced, it can be argued that these institutions still function in somewhat controlling and punitive ways (Sallnäs, 2000; Levin, 1998). This may be understood as an inherent dilemma of care-control for these types of institutions (Överlien, 2004).

The names of these institutions have varied over time and include, for example, “protective homes” (Sw: skyddshem), reformatories (Sw: uppfostingsanstalter), and reform schools (Sw: ungdomsvårdsstskolor). Terms also vary presently in public debate and scholarly literature, for instance, “residential treatment,” “homes,” and “juvenile centers” (Wästerfors, 2009b). Literally, the official Swedish term Särskilda ungdomshem can be translated as Special youth homes. In this study, however, these institutions will mainly be called detention homes, which is more in line with the terms used internationally. Still, it is difficult to find a term that reflects what type of institution it is, which in itself indicates the dilemmas surrounding these institutions and their practices.

Because detention homes intend to provide forced treatment rather than punishment, detained youth consequently do not receive a fixed sentence. By contrast, adult criminals, and Swedish youth between fifteen and seventeen who have committed serious crimes, are sentenced to fixed periods of incarceration, and released once they have served that sentence. The detention time for youth in forced treatment is instead determined in an ongoing manner in relation to the youth’s need for treatment and the deemed success (Levin, 1998).

This in turn relates to the second particular aspect of detention homes: it is an institution that admits youths, not adults. In Sweden, youths can be punished for crimes (Sw: straffmyndig) from the age of fifteen, but generally those under the age of eighteen are sentenced to compulsory youth treatment rather than prison. The emphasis on treatment/care rather than punishment
follows from a notion that children should not be punished, but rather raised and cared for in state-run institutions. Through indefinite detention, the state is to prevent the young person growing up from becoming a criminal. This involves the institution caring for and socializing the young person (when the parents have failed) into becoming a normal and law-abiding adult (Levin, 1998).

As a social category, the term “child” often invokes a notion of innocence, vulnerability, and an individual in need of protection (Pufall & Unsworth, 2004). In cases where children have committed a crime of violence, this may cause confusion since it clashes with the image of the innocent child and dissolves the traditional binary between child and adult as social categories (Jenks, 2005). Historically, one way of solving this conundrum has been to remove children who commit violent crimes from the child category and instead conceive of them as either evil or pathological, thus being able to retain the notion of true or real children as innately innocent (Jenks, 2005). Further, it has been pointed out that issues concerning children often become moral issues (Meyer, 2007). Adolescents, however, can be understood as being placed somewhere in between childhood and adulthood, or as some kind of “quasi-child or crypto-adult,” yet a clearly distinguishable group in society (Jenks, 2005, p. 55). Similar to the child category, issues concerning adolescents often also become moral issues. Foucault (1977) spells out what distinguishes the youth delinquent from the adult offender:

The delinquent is to be distinguished from the offender by the fact that it is not so much his act as his life that is relevant in characterizing him. The penitentiary operation, if it is to be a genuine re-education, must become the sum total existence of the delinquent, making of the prison a sort of artificial and coercive theatre in which his life will be examined from top to bottom. The legal punishment bears upon an act; the punitive technique on a life; it falls to this punitive technique, therefore, to reconstitute all the sordid detail of a life in the form of knowledge, to fill in the gaps of that knowledge and to act upon it by a practice of compulsion. It is a biographical knowledge and a technique for correcting individual lives. (Foucault, 1977, pp. 251–252)
Interventions targeted at correcting the youth delinquent, as opposed to the adult offender, are aimed at his/her whole life rather than at specific problematic or criminal acts. To be corrected, the causes of the crime are sought after in the individual’s whole life history, including his or her upbringing (or supposed lack thereof) and individual psychology (Foucault, 1977). Foucault’s distinction between the interventions for the youth delinquent and the adult offender may still be seen as quite relevant, and, if anything, the interventions for adults have become more like those for youth—concentrating on more aspects of the offender’s life history, and specifically involving an increased in-depth focus on the offender’s psychology or inner life (see, for example, Fox, 2001; Pettersson, 2003).

**FORCED TREATMENT OF YOUTH IN SWEDEN TODAY**

Every year, about 1,000 children and youths are placed in forced treatment in Sweden (Dahlström, 2013). The majority are boys or young men. For example, in 2012, 804 out of 1097 detained youths were male (Dahlström, 2013). There are twenty-five detention homes in Sweden at present. These are run by the Swedish National Board for Institutional Care (SiS; Sw: Statens institutionsstyrelse), a national board that organizes forced care and treatment for youth with serious psychosocial problems, drug abuse and criminal problems. Their treatment of youth is regulated under three laws: the Care of Young Persons Act (LVU; Sw: Lag med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga; Lag 1990[52]), which stipulates that youth with serious psychosocial problems can be detained for forced care; the Social Service Act (SoL; Sw: Socialtjänstlagen, 2001, p. 453), which involves voluntary care; and the Secure Youth Care Act (LSU; Sw: Lag om verkställighet av sluten ungdomsvård; Lag 1998[603]), which stipulates that youths aged between fifteen and seventeen who commit serious crimes can be sentenced in a court of law to closed treatment for youth in the form of a fixed sentence (maximum 4 years) (Statens institutionsstyrelse, 2013a). The detention home chosen as a research site only administered forced care under LVU rather than LSU.
This means that the dilemma of care vs. control is especially relevant as the duration of detention is not fixed, as opposed to that of LSU, where the detention period is based on the severity of the crime committed.

In accordance with LVU, a youth can be detained for various reasons that can be divided into two main categories: (i) for “living a destructive life with, for example, drug abuse or criminality,” or (ii) for cases where the youth’s guardians “cannot provide the support he or she needs to have a good upbringing” (Statens institutionsstyrelse, 2013b, my translation). Most cases involve the first of these two categories. SiS is responsible both for the assessment of the youth’s treatment needs and for providing the treatment for them. On its website, SiS emphasizes that it uses treatment methods based on scientific evidence, such as ART (Aggression Replacement Training) and CBT (Cognitive-Behavioral Theory). While there is some evidence that these methods might affect recidivism (see, for example, Andreassen, 2003), very little is known about what working with these methods actually entails in practice. This study, therefore, investigates the actual practices of staff members and youths in their everyday lives at a detention home, with a specific focus on issues concerning identity work in people-changing practices.
Chapter 2

TOTAL INSTITUTIONS AND SUBJECTIVITY

This study centers on identity and problematizes it in several ways. It builds on a notion of identity that could broadly be called social constructionist and is radically different from perspectives traditionally drawn upon within psychology. Many traditional essentialist theories of identity cast it as some type of quality or collection of qualities that make up an abstract core of the individual, which governs human action (e.g. Erikson, 1993; Marcia, 1993). This type of understanding of identity leads to questions such as which identity individuals possess, how they differ from one another or how identities correlate with different types of behavior (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006).

The notion of some kind of core self, or true self, found within individuals can be understood as a discourse in itself. It is through this notion that we understand our desires and life choices (Rose, 1998), and it is this

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notion that manifests itself, for example, through encouragements to be ourselves, to be “self-reliant,” or to build self-esteem (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001). In contrast, I have here adopted a discursive perspective on identity as exterior rather than interior, and as performative, dynamic, and constantly in flux. Following a discursive turn in the social sciences,

identity has been relocated: from the ‘private’ realms of cognition and experience, to the ‘public’ realms of discourse and other semiotic systems of meaning-making. Many commentators therefore argue that rather than being reflected in discourse, identity is actively, ongoingly and dynamically constituted in discourse (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006, p. 4).

One important aspect that needs highlighting here is that, with this perspective, there is no way of penetrating discourse to find a hidden, truer self or an inner core. There are several terms used for identity in this thesis (identity, subject position, and subjectivity), which stem from different theoretical traditions; these are used interchangeably, but identity is broadly here understood as “who people are to each other” (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006, p. 6). In this chapter, I will elaborate further on the specifics of discursive notions of identity (production), focusing on the emergent and changing nature of identity. However, I will begin by discussing total institutions as a specific site for identity construction.

**Total Institutions, Discipline, and Subjectivity**

Residential treatment for troublesome youth may be understood as something delivered in a type of total institution (Goffman, 1961). In the 1960s and 70s, both Foucault (1977) and Goffman (1961) published highly influential treatises on these types of institutions. However, their analyses take different starting points: Goffman’s (1961) in the interactions taking place inside the institution, whereas Foucault (1977) takes his starting point in an “archeological” investigation of the history of punishment. Both document broadly how individuals are constructed within total institutions.

In line with Hacking (2004) and others, for example, Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006; Kivett & Warren, 2002; Staples & Decker, 2010), I argue that the perspectives these two scholars can be seen to represent are
complementary starting points for an analysis of institutional practices and identities. After a brief introduction to Goffman’s notion of total institutions, I will discuss the work of Foucault and how it has influenced a critical psychology, and I will then return to explore what interaction-focused micro-sociological perspectives bring to an analysis of institutional practices and identities.

**Total institutions and discipline**

In *Asylums*, Goffman (1961) conducts an ethnographic exploration of total institutions, based primarily on fieldwork carried out at the mental hospital St. Elizabeths Hospital in Washington, D.C. Goffman specifically aimed to explore the world of the hospital inmates, searching to understand how their world was subjectively experienced by them and, in turn, how their lives became rational and meaningful to them. He, therefore, turned his gaze to the actual everyday lives and practices of people in the hospital.

In *Asylums*, he describes total institutions as those that separate categories of people and cut them off from wider society. They surround the inmates, subsuming their lives completely, implying that most, or all, aspects of the confined peoples’ lives are conducted in the same place, under one authority, and usually in the presence of many others. Further, the activities of the institutionalized are minutely scheduled and rationalized as part of a plan to fulfill the aims of the institution (Goffman, 1961, p. 6). Because all parts of inmates’ lives are so tightly regulated and controlled, there is always an imminent risk of sanctions or punishments for inmates.

In a total institution, minute segments of a person’s line of activity may be subjected to regulations and judgments by staff; the inmate’s life is penetrated by constant sanctioning interaction from above [. . . ] Each specification robs the individual of an opportunity to balance his needs and objectives in a personally efficient way and opens up his line of action to sanctions. The autonomy of the act itself is violated. (Goffman, 1961, p. 38)

Total institutions, with their restriction of freedom and privacy for inmates, are understood as dramatically impacting identity reconstruction. The total institution is a people-changing one in that through different kinds of
mortification processes, it strips away the inmates’ prior selves, their individuality, and their sense of personal agency by this strict monitoring and review of inmates’ daily activities, scheduling and controlling these thoroughly.

Total institutions also clearly delineate between staff and inmates. In his discussion of asylums, Goffman argued that the staff members bestow an overarching identity on the inmates that allows them to simultaneously control inmates and defend their own actions while cementing the institution and its purpose. The fact that the inmates have been admitted into the mental hospital means that normality has been redefined for them since from then on, abnormality is expected and virtually all inmate conduct can be seen as evidence of mental disorder. Mental hospitals are dedicated to provide care for those understood as unable to be responsible for their own actions, but at the same time the hospital staff demand that inmates assume moral responsibility for their actions: abnormal conduct is expected since that is what got them admitted in the first place; it is what is considered normal of inmates, yet they are penalized for abnormal conduct in the sense of breaking hospital rules (Burns, 1991). This leads to the staff’s authority becoming complete domination.

However, Goffman also discussed ways that inmates could defy the system by, for example, what he calls “make-do’s” (1961, p. 207), through which inmates could modify their life conditions by using artifacts in non-intended ways, for instance, using newspapers to construct pillows. Other acts of “working the system” (1961, p. 210) involve small acts of not complying with the order, for example, by finding ways of making food more enjoyable by sneaking in seasonings or combining foods in non-intended ways.

Goffman explicitly investigated how individuals were affected by the institution—he specifically discussed how institutions impose an identity on their subjects, how organizations generate assumptions about identity through the activities they expect inmates to engage in, and that “to engage in a particular activity in the prescribed spirit is to accept being a particular kind of person who dwells in a particular kind of world” (Goffman, 1961, p. 186).
However, it should be emphasized that his focus is on social action as making up the social world and identities rather than on the structure of the institution (Burns, 1991).

Foucault’s investigation of total institutions takes a different approach—a historical one. In his classic work *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1977), he examined disciplinary power and documented changes in the design of prisons and the Western penal system, from brutal physical torture to surveillance. While the abolishment of corporal punishment has been celebrated by humanists, Foucault paradoxically argued that in actual fact a more efficient disciplining power had been created. He outlined this disciplinary mode of power, which worked through surveillance and a calculated structuring of time and space. Eventually subjects come to internalize norms and discipline themselves.

Foucault specifies three processes involved in discipline: (i) hierarchical surveillance, which entails a scrutinizing gaze from the authority, and generates knowledge of humans; (ii) normalizing judgment, the principle of continuous assessment of conduct in relation to standards; and (iii) examination, which involves the combination of the previous two, applying a normalizing gaze in order to classify and punish (Foucault, 1977).

The goal of discipline is to create “docile bodies” (Foucault, 1977), obedient individuals who are both compliant and useful, and who have been molded and transformed into docility through disciplinary techniques such as identical uniforms, the separating and classifying of inmates, and even physical punishments and humiliations. Importantly, discipline concerns a type of control internalized by the individual—a control aimed at the soul rather than the body (Foucault, 1977). While disciplinary regimes were developed in a prison setting, they have spread throughout society and can be found in other institutions such as workplaces and schools.

In prisons, the internalization of norms is initially caused by the individuals knowing that they are always being watched. Foucault argues that the application of a series of micro-penalties when individuals overstep boundaries is one of the techniques used. Individuals regulate their behavior
as desired for fear of not living up to the norm rather than to avoid punishment (Mills, 2003).

As an illustrative example, Foucault draws on the prison structure developed by Jeremy Bentham—the Panopticon. In brief, the panopticon consisted of an observational tower in the middle of a circular building with small individual cells for prisoners. From the tower, a prison guard could observe prisoners at all times, but the prisoners could not see the guard and could therefore not know if and when they were being watched, only that they could be seen at all times. The effect was that the inmates would assume the prison guard’s gaze, thus becoming transformed into self-monitoring subjects. The example of the panopticon thereby illustrates disciplinary power, omnipresent but yet invisible, and how control here is aimed at the soul rather than the body. The soul becomes the body’s prison guard and the individual a self-monitoring subject (Foucault, 1977).

**Discourse, power, and subjectivity**

A radical notion presented by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* (1977), and further developed in his later writings, is thus that the “human subject is an effect of power” (Brinkman, 2005, p. 777). Power cannot be understood as something that can be intentionally and freely exercised by individuals for specific interests or purposes. Because individuals are always already intertwined in power relations, being a subject that has some kind of interest or agenda only exists through power relations.

In this Foucauldian perspective (1978, 1982), power is understood as diffused throughout social relations, rather than as imposed from the top down. Power is not strictly repressive of subjectivities, even in a total institution such as a detention home; rather, it is productive in that it produces new practices and subjectivities (Foucault, 1978). Moreover, power is inseparable from resistance, and although the setting of the detention home is one of great inequity and explicit hierarchical relations, these are not fixed but are instead under constant negotiation (Bosworth and Carrabine, 2001). Further, as Foucault has famously written: “Where there is power there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is
never in a position of exteriority in relation to power” (Foucault, 1978, p. 95).

Foucault’s notion of discourse is intimately connected to his analysis of power and resistance, and, furthermore, to knowledge and truth. Discourse is understood as a system of representations—a system that provides a language for speaking about some particular topic at a specific moment in time. Discourse produces knowledge through the use of language since: “it governs the way a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about. It also influences how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate the conduct of others” (Hall, 1997, p. 44). Furthermore, all social practices can be understood as having a discursive aspect since all practices require meaning, and meaning is what guides our conduct. This crucially involves a notion of discourse that not only encompasses language but also practices, in an attempt to overcome the language—practice dichotomy (Hall, 1997).

This discursive perspective involves an interest in the production of knowledge and meaning. In Foucault’s view, objects can only have meaning within discourse (Foucault, 1972). This means that it is discourse that produces knowledge. This also involves truth and knowledge being bound to historical context, and thus varying with time and space. One of Foucault’s famous examples is that of how “the homosexual” as a kind of social subject was produced through discourse in the nineteenth century. Even though homosexual actions may have existed before then, those acts were not meaningful in the sense of implying a homosexual identity until after then (Foucault, 1978).

Discourses, however, are always in conflict with other discourses, which is why power is a key element in discussions of discourses—how discourses relate to power and authority to reveal how certain discourses come to dominate over others (Mills, 2004). The relationship between discourse and power is, nevertheless, not a simple one. Foucault wrote:

[Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are. We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of
resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines it and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes possible to thwart it. (Foucault, 1978, p. 100–101)

**Neoliberal rationalities and the ethical subject**

The early work of Foucault (1977) on discipline in correctional institutions, which highlights the production of obedient individuals, transformed and improved through the application of social control, has been criticized for under-analyzing the individual. His later works (1982, 1991) emphasized strategic uses of language as a means of self-governing and also how individuals can be conceptualized as active and rational agents who partake in their own governing rather than as passive victims or objects of power (Foucault, 1982). Rather than acting on the individuals’ bodies, this power incites introspection and self-monitoring (Garland, 1997), that is, it aims at self-control rather than obedience.

This could be understood as an instance of neoliberal (or “advanced liberal”; Rose, 1999b) rationalities, where governing involves the shaping of subjectivities aligned with governmental aims, using freedom as a resource. Individuals are not forced into conformity; rather, they are expected to willingly work on their own selves, internalize societal norms, and behave accordingly, in brief, to become ethical human beings (Foucault, 1991, 1997). Becoming ethical is largely about acting ethically. To do this, individuals are offered self-technologies (a historical example being confession) that can be used to work on and improve their bodies and souls in order to transform themselves into ethical subjects (Foucault, 1997). But what is seen as ethical varies across cultures and time, as do the self-technologies.

Within correctional institutions, the ethical subject has largely become someone responsible and enterprising, that is, involved in his or her own rehabilitation through self-governing (Garland, 1997; Rose, 2000). These institutions are designed to produce not compliant but self-monitoring subjects who willingly engage in introspection (Garland, 1997).
A crucial point is that this self-monitoring subject is constituted through social scientific disciplines, for example, psychology, specifically through a strategic use of (often scientific) language (Brinkman, 2005; Fox, 1999). It is the expert status of disciplines such as psychology that makes individuals want to engage in introspection and treat themselves as subjects to be reformed (Garland, 1997).

This means that people are constituted and reconstituted, or transformed, through language (Fox, 1999). This can happen through, for example, the act of confessing, which is required as part of certain rehabilitative programs, and has been highlighted by Foucault (1978), and further investigated by, for instance, Rose (1998, 1999a, 1999b). Rose (1999a) has documented how psychology as a discipline has become part of Western governmental practices in that it emphasizes ethics as involving self-reflection and self-regulation, and specifically that introspection must be combined with confession using specific vocabularies and drawing on certain explanatory codes from authority sources.

The expert status of psychology has become infused into existing systems of authority. Through the use of psychology and psychological terminology, staff with some authority in various settings (for example, army officers, prison guards, or staff administering forced treatment) can “accumulate a kind of ethical basis”—authority can be exercised through the authority’s psychological knowledge of its subjects (Rose, 1998, p. 63). But here authority is played out, not in the form of demands and control, but through “improving the capacity of individuals to exercise authority over themselves [. . .] to understand their own actions and to regulate their own conduct” (Rose, 1998, p. 63).

“Soft power” in penal practices and forced treatment

Within forced treatment for youth, this can be seen, for example, in the application of rehabilitation programs that stress self-care and self-regulation. At present, many such programs are based on cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT; cf. Gray, 2009; Kemshall, 2002; Muncie, 2006). In these types of programs, coercive methods are avoided; instead, they aim to influence the
offenders’ thought patterns by draping the offenders in a particular psychological language, and, thereby, transforming the offenders into active, responsible citizens (Cox, 2011; Fox, 1999).

There are, however, also challenges to neoliberal governing, for example, that of creating a sense of autonomy without abandoning societal control of social life (Muncie, 2006). Within the forced treatment of youth, this problem has, for instance, been observed by Cox (2011) as a dilemma of producing free and responsible individuals in a highly controlled environment. In her study of behavior modification programs for young people in secure residential facilities in the United States, she found that they were simultaneously urged to exercise self-regulation and enact responsibility as well as total submissiveness to authority.

Crewe (2011), drawing on interview data from two extensive prison studies, discusses neoliberal governing through the notion of “soft power.” One aspect of this type of power, he argues, is seen in the increased use of indefinite sentences, something employed within the forced rehabilitation of delinquent youth, and among adult prisoners as well. The softening of penal power does not mean that the pains of imprisonment have been reduced. Crewe documents the pains of uncertainty and indeterminacy, involving stress and anxiety caused by the uncertain future for individual prisoners (for similar observations in a Swedish context, namely, youth homes, see Levin, 1998). He highlights the difficulty for prisoners to know when the “prison’s coercive potential,” which is always “coiled in the background,” might be activated (Crewe, 2011, p. 514).

The pains of self-government follow from that control is relocated from the authorities to the inmates. The prisoner is given greater autonomy but also increased responsibility for his own rehabilitation, leading to the prisoner being unable to submit to authority (Crewe, 2011). Crewe (2011, p. 522) argues that while today’s prisons are generally less authoritarian, power is “all-encompassing and invasive, in that it promotes the self-regulation of all aspects of conduct, addressing both the psyche and the body” (Crewe, 2011, p. 522). For the prisoners, participating in rehabilitative programs is voluntary, but not participating has significant consequences in that the
prisoner’s release date may be postponed indefinitely, that is, if the prisoners do not submit to institutional demands, for example, by not recognizing that the prescribed rehabilitation is in their own “best interests,” then the prison will resort to punishment and constraint (Crewe, 2009).

Rethinking the Subject in Psychology

The linguistic turn in psychology has gained inspiration from several disciplines, building, for example, on Wittgenstein’s philosophy, Austin’s speech act theory, and Foucault’s historical studies of discursive practice, leading to a change of focus from the individual and his or her inner life to language as performance and its productive potential (cf. Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1984; Wetherell, Taylor, & Yates, 2001). In the 1970s and 80s, social psychologists began to formulate a critique of cognitivism and humanism. Discussing these in depth is outside the scope of this dissertation, but in simplified terms, the critique regarded, for example, cognitivist notions of the individual as a unitary, rational, intentional human being (see, for example, Henriques et al., 1984; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Humanism is critiqued, for instance, for placing the human being as the origin of meaning. This involves a rejection of methodologies that attempt to document meanings that exist inside individuals’ minds, such as cognitions or emotions (Parker, 2013). Further assumptions that are critiqued include the notion of a real world that is discoverable and describable through language, and the notion that language can be used for expressing an essential inner-self (Hepburn, 2003). Instead, a new understanding of subjectivity is formulated, one that dissolves the individual–society dichotomy, a traditional psychological notion of the individual as a rational being that is clearly separated from the surrounding society (Henriques et al., 1984).

Foucault’s notions on discourse, power, and knowledge have been very influential (along with other poststructuralist concepts, which fall outside the scope of this dissertation to discuss), including that language is productive rather than reflective. This involves the radical notion of decentralized subjectivity: the individual is not understood as unitary, rational, and
separated from the surroundings, but intrinsically tied to them and made up of them in the sense that discourses construct the individual in different ways. Discursive practices provide subject positions: “[...] in this view, the subject is composed of, or exists as, a set of multiple and contradictory positionings or subjectivities” (Henriques et al., 1984, p. 204). Psychology and other discursive practices make positions available for subjects to take up. It is through these positionings that the subject is constructed and what causes subjectivity to be dynamic and multiple (Henriques et al., 1984, p. 3).

Drawing on the Foucauldian notion that power and knowledge are interconnected, and that knowledge causes transformation, scholars have problematized the profound impact psychology as a discipline has had on humans and more specifically on how individuals think and feel, that is, it has impacted human subjectivity itself (Brinkman, 2005; Rose, 1998). Psychology and other human sciences have provided society with technologies for subjectivity construction, i.e., concepts and categories provided by psychology have gradually been adopted in humans’ thinking about themselves. They have become part of our self-reflexivity. Furthermore, humans have become increasingly dependent on psychological technologies, for example, psychotherapy or psychological tests (Brinkman, 2005, p. 769).

The core issue is that these ways of thinking about oneself that psychology has provided are not simply “passive representations of human subjects,” but they also have an effect on those very subjects; for this reason, psychology can be understood as “the business of ‘making up people’” (Brinkman, 2005, p. 770). Further, the objects studied within psychology, for example, cognition, emotions, or anxiety, cannot be understood as “naturally existing” since they are only meaningful in discourse, that is, through certain descriptions in specific discursive contexts (Brinkman, 2005). It is because people interact with their descriptions and categories that we have what can be called the “looping effect of human kinds” (Hacking, 1995).

Hacking has problematized the looping effect of classifying human beings, which implies that social categorizations are constantly undergoing transformation since humans change their behavior when having gained
knowledge of them—when people are classified, they change, and this in turn, causes the classifications themselves to have to be altered. Therefore, the classification, or categorization, of people has real effects on people in that it changes them, and these changes in people tangibly affect the classifications or categorizations themselves (Hacking, 2004). This also indicates that when new social categorizations (or descriptions) arise, new options for comportment become opened up (and other closed), and new descriptions lead to new actions (Hacking, 1995). This further highlights that the understanding of (social-) psychological concepts must always be placed within the practices and cultures where they are found, that is, they are only intelligible within a discursive context (Hacking, 1995). For instance, the specifics of youth delinquency are only understandable in certain contemporary Western contexts.

Crewe (2011) has shed light on how psychological practices and language have powerful effects on prison inmates serving indefinite sentences. The psychological assessments and categorizations applied have a real influence in determining both the prisoners’ future and their present lives in confinement, depriving them of control over their personal identity. The assessment systems require that prisoners fit their life stories into the categories which are useful and manageable for psychological assessments. This means that complex identities are molded into abstract units required by the system. The prisoners’ previous identities are overwritten in the process as the categories provided do not capture the ambiguities of identities, or take social context into consideration. Instead, personal histories and actions are given a “master-label” that provides an explanation, for example, “impulsivity problems” or “anti-social personality” (Crewe, 2011, p. 515).

Further (see, for example, Fox, 1999, 2001), psychological discourse is particularly powerful for constructing truth, perhaps especially within total institutions such as prisons. This is because those prisoners who do not adopt the discourse, including their given identities as individuals with psychological problems (which explain their problematic actions), can be categorized as being “in denial,” which, in turn, confirms the “fact” that they have psychological problems. However, adopting the discourse can also be
dilemmatic—if a prisoner adopts the discourse too enthusiastically, he or she may risk being suspected of not being genuine, but rather trying to please others (Crewe, 2011; Lacombe, 2008).

MICRO PERSPECTIVES ON IDENTITY: IDENTITY AS ACTION AND ACCOMPLISHMENT

In a study of subjectivity and total institutions, Foucault’s theories thus have much to offer, especially to illuminate how individuals are constituted as subjects through discourse in relation to power and knowledge. However, his theories imparted little information on how subjectification and power happen in practice (Hacking, 2004), even if his later writings explored a related issue on his reasoning about technologies of the self (Foucault, 1997). Insights into this can instead be gained from other research traditions focusing on the study of social interaction. Hacking (2004) proposes a synthesis of Foucault and Goffman. Both their works are of special importance to this study since both authors have written seminal work on prisons and other total institutions. As in much of Foucault’s work, Goffman was also interested in deviation and deviance (Goffman, 1963). Furthermore, Goffman’s interactional perspective reveals how discourse becomes a part of people’s everyday lives; it involved a study of people’s face-to-face interactions in institutional settings, and specifically how norms both affect, and are affected by, those interactions (Goffman, 1961). He made early and important contributions to the study of social interaction by treating it as social organization in its own right, and as something connected to personal identity (or in Goffmanian terms: face) as well as to social institutions on a macro level (Heritage, 2001).

However, in this study, Goffman is, from this perspective, mainly relevant for his contributions to conversation analysis (CA) and, consequentially, discursive psychology (see, for instance, Goodwin and Heritage, 1990; for a critical discussion of Goffman’s contribution to CA and for a critique of his perspective, see Schegloff, 1988). These are perspectives that study social reality from the “bottom up,” starting in everyday interaction (Miller & Fox, 2004, p. 36).
Discursive psychology: identity in interaction

Discursive psychology (DP; Edwards & Potter, 1992) has its roots in several traditions, but draws largely on ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967) and CA (Sacks, 1992) in its challenging of mainstream psychology. DP rejects the notion of language as a gateway to peoples’ inner lives, or mental processes, and generally understands psychological states, such as emotions, feelings, identity, as performed through language, rather than as something that happens inside people, and which we could gain an understanding of through language alone. Therefore, DP “studies how common-sense psychological concepts are deployed in, oriented to and handled in the talk and texts that make up social life” (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006, p. 40). This involves a study of how reality is constructed through discourse, rather than represented by it (Potter, 1996). Here discourse is understood as action oriented in that it accomplishes things in interaction. Rather than understanding, for example, people’s descriptions of the world as either true or false accounts of it, discursive psychologists analyze descriptions as social action, pointing out that all accounts construct versions of reality, and the task of analysts is to shed light on what people accomplish with their accounts (Wetherell, 2001). DP also points to discourse being situated: it must be analyzed in its situated context (Aronsson, 1998). Meaning is constructed in its immediate context in interaction, and, further, it is a joint production between participants in the interaction (Wetherell, 2001).

Another basic premise of DP is that discourse is simultaneously constructed and constructive (Billig, 1991). This implies that when people talk, they use already existing categories and common-sense ideas available to them (cf. Hacking, 2004) while constructing the social world by using descriptions and accounts of it (Wetherell, 2001). To the study of identities, DP (often drawing on membership categorization analysis; Sacks, 1992) brings the possibility of exploring identities in interaction (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998a; Aronsson, 1998). Such work concerns how identities are “claimed, resisted and otherwise put to use in interaction” (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006, p. 40).
In this study, I especially draw on insights from a specific strand of DP that is relevant to the study of identity, a strand sometimes called critical discourse psychology (Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Edley, 1999), but which could broadly be said to advocate a combination of Foucauldian/poststructuralist and micro-sociological work on social interaction. This approach espouses both a “CA-inspired attention to conversational detail [and] wider macrostructures and cultural-historical contexts” (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006, p. 41). One way of achieving this combination is through positioning theory.

**Subject positioning and ideological dilemmas**

One way of conceptualizing “the discursive production of a diversity of selves” is through the notion of subject position or positioning (Davies & Harré, 1990, p. 47). Discursive practices are productive in the sense that they make subject positions available for individuals to take up. Subject positions are constantly under negotiation, which implies that who an individual is, is constantly constituted and reconstituted through the different discursive practices he/she participates in (Davies & Harré, 1990, p. 46). Positioning is here understood as

the discursive process whereby selves are located in conversations as observably and subjectively coherent participants in jointly produced story lines. There can be interactive positioning in which what one person says positions another. And there can be reflexive positioning in which one positions oneself. However, it would be a mistake to assume that, in either case, positioning is necessarily intentional. (Davies & Harré, 1990, p. 48)

Positioning theory may therefore be understood as illuminating how social interaction is crucial to identity work. It is in language that people both construct themselves in particular ways and are constructed by others, and it is in language that they negotiate these subject positions (Phoenix, Frosh, & Pattman, 2003). Further, positioning theory is useful in that it connects wider discourses or ideologies with the occasioned and situated nature of identities in interaction, and acknowledges that people are both products of, as well as producers of, discourse (Edley, 2001; Wetherell, 1998).
The subject is understood as decentered and as someone who often assumes contradictory subject positions (Wetherell, 1998). To make sense of our actions, however, we must either resolve or ignore contradictions we are aware of. Producing a coherent story of ourselves is necessary, and will be insisted on by others if we do not (Davies & Harré, 1990). Society demands a non-contradictory subject. The assumption that “people are unique, self-contained motivational and cognitive universes” may be understood as an “Enlightenment myth” building on a tradition that Western people are largely invested in, one where they like to be understood as “someone in particular,” something which may lead to discomfort if contradictions in their identity are exposed (Edley, 2001, p. 195). The notion of the decentered subject made up of varying and sometimes contradictory subject positions may be further elaborated through the concept of ideological dilemmas, which was first introduced by Michel Billig and colleagues, and involves a critical perspective on ideology and thinking (Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton, & Radley, 1988).

Here the notion of ideology as a coherent, unified system of thought is problematized as well as the tendency to understand social actors as passive recipients of ideology. The problematization of ideology highlights the fact that ideology is necessarily made up of contrary themes, and it emphasizes the interconnectedness between formal and common-sensical ideologies. In particular, it highlights how ideology is reproduced in common discourse, pointing to the fact that: “[. . .] ideology is not reproduced as a closed system for talking about the world. Instead it is reproduced as an incomplete set of contrary themes, which continually give rise to discussion, argumentation and dilemmas” (Billig et al., 1988, p. 6). Thus, formal ideology does not exist independently of social interaction among people but can be found in commonsensical discourse where dilemmas are used by people in interaction to build arguments. This means that ideology may rather be conceptualized as “the common-sense of the society” (Billig, 1997, p. 48); it is what makes certain habits or beliefs appear natural and others unnatural.

Ideology, or common-sense reasoning, necessarily consists of contrary themes, and it is that which allows thinking to happen in the first place since
thinking is a dialectic process (Billig, 1997). The themes are sometimes, but not always, explicitly contradictory or paradoxical and thus dilemmatic; it is only when a choice has to be made that the conflicting themes might develop into a full-scale dilemma (Billig et al., 1988).

Billig and colleagues exemplified this in their case studies, which explored tensions within liberal ideology and how these could be found in everyday interaction. For example, dilemmatic values of equality versus authority, which was identified in interaction between a nurse and her colleague of a lower institutional rank. The nurse had been speaking from within a democratic ideology, and the dilemma was exposed when the lower-ranked colleague did not interpret a question from the nurse as a demand. In the following interaction, it became clear that the production of explicit authoritative demands was problematic as the nurse attempted to neutralize her authority while keeping her position as someone in command (Billig et al., 1988). As Billig and colleagues point out, there is no way to solve dilemmas once and for all since they make up the foundation of thinking in the first place. Individuals may attempt to, and succeed in, finding solutions to dilemmas, or at least to “everyday reproduction” of underlying dilemmas, but this will only lead to dilemmas taking another form of expression (Billig et al., 1988, p. 6).

In this study, there are several dilemmas that become relevant in the everyday life and talk at the detention home. For example, that of care vs. control, which may be seen as inherent in the detention home as an institution (as it administers forced care, in many cases, for conduct that slightly older individuals would receive a fixed sentence/punishment for). Several of the dilemmas or paradoxical themes that emerge in this study may be related to neoliberal ideology, these include coercion vs. freedom and authority vs. equality.
Chapter 3

IDENTITIES IN INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS
OF FORCED TREATMENT

As has been highlighted by, for example, Wästerfors (2009a), research that complicates traditional folk notions of “the problem of (youth) criminality” residing primarily inside the young delinquent is much needed. He points out that what is constant in institutions that detain youth delinquents may rather be the recurring practices than the individuals.

Below I will present a selection of studies that have attempted to get closer to the participants in context, that is, in their daily lives in forced-treatment institutions, and primarily work on young men or boys in such institutions. Subsequently, I will introduce two broad (and somewhat overlapping) research perspectives on identity in institutions: subjectivity research and research on identity in interaction. Since there is very little research on identity and detention homes from the chosen theoretical and methodological perspective, I will also present research from related
institutional settings. While there is much relevant work on, for example, young masculinities, ethnicity, and violence (Frosh, Phoenix, & Pattman, 2002; Messerschmith, 1993) and the role of language, style, and performativity for these categories (Jonsson, 2007; Milani & Jonsson, 2011), in this study I have not taken gender or ethnicity as a theoretical starting point. Instead, I discuss these categories if and when they explicitly have become relevant in the recordings or observations, and I have accordingly chosen to limit the literary review on ethnicity and gender.

**ETHNOGRAPHIES OF YOUTH DETENTION HOMES**

Ethnographic studies of youth detention centers (and similar institutions) have shed light on these institutions’ complex and at times dilemmatic practices. In a study of an open-custody facility for delinquent boys in Canada, Gray and Salole (2006) found that despite a general aim of mainly rehabilitation, when investigated at the micro-level, these open-custody facilities proved to also engage in “discipline, punishment, enterprising and reintegrative functions.” Thus, approaches that could broadly be classified as neoliberal were combined with neoconservative ones, and the authors maintain that at the level of situated practices, open custody involves contradictory social control sanctions (2006, p. 677).

From a different perspective, ethnographers like Kivett and Warren (2002) and Wästerfors (2009b, 2011) further complicate the picture of detention homes as total institutions with monolithic control over their inmates, illuminating how power or social control is not fully pervasive, but rather how it emerges as a micro-political and bidirectional phenomenon. Kivett and Warren (2002) document “the micro-politics of trouble” at a detention home in the United States that appears to embody the disciplinary gaze of a total institution, specifically through the use of a behavior modification program: token economy (TE). However, they find that the disciplinary gaze is also averted. Power can thus be seen to be bidirectional as staff members at times decide to look the other way in instances where they
otherwise could have used TE or other institutional rules to enforce compliance. Social control is thereby micro-political and constructed in “the minute-by-minute decision making of individual staff members” (2002, p. 31).

Wästerfors (2009b, 2011) similarly takes an interactional and micro-political approach to “trouble” or disputes in detention homes for young men in Sweden. By illuminating how interpersonal trouble is neither static nor random, he challenges notions of youth in detention as “programmed troublemakers” (2009b, p. 33): as youths with individual problems that cause them to engage in troublesome actions. Actions are instead understood as contextual rather than individual, and interwoven with the daily affairs of the institution. Trouble, or the reason for it, can thus not be seen as stemming from inside some individuals, but must be viewed as social and contextual.

Youth identities
Several ethnographic studies examine how institutions affect or attempt to alter youth identities in various ways. In her analysis of a secure residential facility for young people in the United States, Cox (2011) explicates how the contradictory setting simultaneously attempt to rehabilitate youth using CBT, and punish or discipline them. This involves paradoxical aims for the detained young people in that they are urged to take responsibility for their lives in a setting that gives them virtually no possibility of enacting such responsibility (in Cox’s words, express “self-control”, 2011, p. 604).

In another study of young men in correctional institutions in the United States, Abrams and Hyun (2009) found that the young men struggled to retain a positive self-view in response to the stigmatization of their prior identities caused by the rehabilitation discourses at the institution. Through rehabilitative discourses, the young men were urged to “reexamine their prior selves and envision alternative future identity possibilities” (2009, p. 26). The authors delineate strategies used by the youths in response to these discourses, including negotiation strategies, for example, manipulating rules
or selectively accepting parts of the program. This enabled the young inmates to maintain some positive aspects of their prior lives to counter the pains of the involuntary punitive setting (2009).

In a third American study of young men in correctional facilities, Inderbitzin (2007b) highlights how staff members attempt to alter the young men’s aspirations for the future by lowering their expectations and “aiming low.” This involves an attempt to redefine what success may entail: while the young men had dreamt of wealth and “masculine prestige” in the form of being the breadwinner and providing for a family, perceiving themselves as competent men, the staff try to redefine masculinity and success as implying hard work (rather than financial success) (2007b, p. 235).

Several studies specifically investigate gendered identity constructions, arguing, for example, that the “juvenile correctional practices reify a hegemonic masculinity” that, for instance, involves competition, stoicism, and sexism, and can also be seen to reinforce criminality (Abrams, Anderson-Nathe, & Aguilar, 2008, p. 38). In their study of young men in detention, Abrams and colleagues argue that various therapies offered alternative gendered identities, but these were “largely suppressed.” Reification of hegemonic masculinities occurred through institutional practices such as rules and activities, and through social interaction: how the staff and youth interacted and sanctioned ways for the latter to interact with each other.

Performing masculinity has also been understood as a way for young males to do resistance. In a study of a Danish secure care unit for young people, Bengtsson (2012, p. 534) similarly describes a culture “praising not only physical strength and toughness but also male superiority” and was maintained by the young men and partly also by the staff. Bengtsson further found that the young men engaged in “hyper-masculine” acts as a form of resistance to institutional rules but also to an “almost omnipresent boredom” both inside and outside the institution (2012, p. 542).

In a Canadian study of incarcerated young men, Cesaroni and Alvi (2010) discuss how norms related to masculinities and specific subcultures combine and provide resources for the young men to resist staff members and the correctional environment. Acts of resistance included acting tough and
unemotional and using specific street language or cultural signs and symbols such as teeth sucking (2010).

Taking a social constructionist and interactional perspective highlighting how identities are constructed and negotiated in interaction, Andersson (2007, 2008) has similarly documented, for example, how an ART class, and particularly talk of violence, constitutes an arena for doing masculinity among young men in a Swedish detention home setting. She explicates how gendered categories are constructed in interaction and used discursively for different purposes, for example, for the young men to construct themselves and their actions as morally justifiable in relation to masculinity discourses (2007). It was also found that both staff members and young men used masculinity discourses as interactional resources in the class, and, further, that such an institutional setting provided opportunities for the participants to draw on a convict code (see also Wieder, 1975). ART was thereby found to allow participants to “position [themselves] as knowledgeable within a field of criminality” (Andersson, 2008, p. 153), a somewhat ironic finding since the institutional goal of these specific ART classes was to develop the youths’ moral rationale away from a criminal discourse.

A few more studies have taken related perspectives on identity in interaction. Cromdal and Osvaldsson (2012), for example, show how identity (membership) categories linked to age can be exploited in interaction among young men in a detention home in order to instigate –“pick fights”. The study highlights that issues of age and maturity are high-stake phenomena among adolescent boys who have been detained because of breeches of cultural norms for behavior. The study also illuminates “some of [the young men’s] social and argumentative skills, which involved making relevant, ascribing and managing local identities through category implicative descriptions of behaviors and practices” (2012, p. 159).

In a study of a detention home for young women in Sweden, Överlien (2003) also found age and maturity to be of discursive relevance. She analyzed discourse about sexuality and discovered that the staff members talked about the young women as if they were still children (like 4- or 5-year-olds) and asexual. The young women themselves contested this and claimed
sexual agency. The staff members’ positioning of the women as children constructed sex as a non-issue and simultaneously handled the potential problematic of male staff and their “potentially harmful sexuality,” protecting both the young women and the male staff members from potential problems. Another reason for positioning them as children could be that the staff might have wanted to give the (purportedly overly sexualized) women a chance to start over and restore their innocence. But positioning them as children simultaneously constructs them merely as victims or objects rather than as agents, that is, as agentless.

In another study of young women in detention, Osvaldsson (2004) adopts an interactional approach to interviews with the detained women, investigating the research interview as a site for “the joint production of social identities,” specifically explicating how the participants construct “normality” and “deviance” in a setting where the starting point is that the young women are categorized as deviant for being in detention.

**Staff identities**

Although not much research in these settings take staff identities as a subject of study, there is research which indicates that the professional position of a staff member in total institutions in general, and youth detention homes in particular, is a delicate one, marked by dilemmas that involve a balancing of, at times, uncomplimentary duties.

As previously pointed out, detention homes and similar institutions are discursively highly complex settings. A few studies illuminate that policies (or treatment ideologies) are linked to staff identities. For example, in a study of Swedish staff members at a detention home, Åkerström (2006, p. 58) documents how “policy imposed ‘from above’ influenced staff members at the same time as they expressed resistance to it.” Since policy innovation intends to alter the current organization and its practices, it includes the staff members being required to change too, their duties as well as their identities. However, by studying staff rhetoric, Åkerström found that staff members could take up a new position of “doing ambivalence,” where they could simultaneously “embrace and distance themselves from policy innovations.”
This highlights that staff attitudes to policy innovation are multifaceted and nuanced, and cannot be about simply either accepting or rejecting the proposed change (2006, p. 57).

Several studies touch upon the subject of discretion in staff members’ work. Rules for, for example, behavior guidelines cannot always be followed minutely, sometimes staff must look the other way to preserve order or maintain a good relationship with the inmates (Kivett & Warren, 2002; cf. Wästerfors, 2011). Highlighting the intricacies of social control work, Wästerfors (2011) found that staff responses to “interpersonal troubles” or disputes with detained boys at a Swedish detention home were quite varied (thus, not only in line with, for example, the token economy that was in use). Staff members attempted to protect the activity at hand (for example, a music lesson) and prevent a dispute from interrupting it, but also used the activity as a means of ending the dispute. Also, staff members would use activities as a way of deflecting or preventing disputes that were about to happen. Kivett and Warren (2002), in their study of an American residential treatment center for delinquent boys, highlight that staff members at times turned a blind eye to actions that otherwise could have been sanctioned in line with the behavior modification system so as to preserve the order at the home. This also involved interpretations of behavioral rules and inmates’ intentions behind their actions.

A rare example of a study that specifically explores staff identities in youth detention is Inderbitzin’s ethnographic study (2007a) at a maximum-security training school for violent young male offenders in the United States. Staff members were found to juggle the opposing roles as correction officers, counselors, and surrogate parents. The author points out that there is a difference between rhetoric and practice, arguing that the staff members have to “find ways to balance the rhetoric of rehabilitation with the punitive reality of daily life in the institution” (Inderbitzin, 2007a, p. 348).

While not explicitly discussing how it may tie into identities or perceptions of selves, Hill (2005) explicates staff members’ varying ways of perceiving their positions in the youths’ rehabilitation, and how these relate to dilemmas stemming from the detention home’s ambivalent tasks of both
controlling youths and rehabilitating them, including establishing and maintaining trusting relationships. Dilemmas revolve around how to uphold a position as an authority figure without being too stern and how to construct a good and trusting relationship without becoming overly private or distant while maintaining control. Another similar dilemma briefly discussed (and which relates to treatment ideology) is that of trying to get students to want to participate in treatment (rather than forcing them) (Abrams, Kim, & Anderson-Nathe, 2005; Hill, 2005).

Yet another treatment challenge touched upon in a few studies is the risk of staff members being manipulated by inmates (Abrams et al., 2005; Hill, 2005). Such a risk has also been mentioned in related research on staff in prisons at large (Crawley, 2004; Hicks, 2012). Prison officers have been found to use emotional detachment as a strategy to avoid manipulation by prisoners; however, in practice, this strategy is not always easy or possible to use (Crawley, 2004). Hicks (2012) studied how prison chaplains were being socialized into, and managed, a “working personality” tied to institutional norms of risk management, including that “[c]haplains were encouraged to distrust inmates at all times, and to be vigilant for signs they were at risk of being manipulated” (Hicks, 2012, p. 13).

**TREATMENT METHODS AND SUBJECT POSITIONING**

This section introduces some studies in institutional settings that document how treatment discourses construct subjectivity. A branch of research building on Foucault’s later writings on governmentality (1982, 1991) has highlighted how, for example, treatment discourses in punitive settings construct subjectivity, and how, in general, neoliberal governing has been on the rise and is realized through, for instance, the use of CBT in different institutional settings (for example, Fox, 2001; Gray, 2009; Kemshall, 2002). Such programs are being used in a number of arenas, including schools, prisons, and juvenile institutions. While many studies within this branch of research involve policy studies (for example, Gray, 2009; Kemshall, 2002; Muncie, 2006), I will exemplify a few that have also explored how such discursively constituted subjectivities are taken up in practice. These studies

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draw on the notion of the decentered subject, which is constructed in particular ways through diverse discursive practices (Foucault, 1978), and they are targeted at investigating “the technologies and techniques that make certain subjectivities emerge” rather than the subjects themselves (as agents). Further, they are designed for analyzing what subjectivities are constructed as desirable (Dahlstedt, Fejes, & Schönning, 2011, p. 401).

In studies of prisons, researchers have explicited how CBT programs, rather than deploying coercive methods, attempt to transform offenders into active, law-abiding, responsible citizens partly by changing the offenders’ thought patterns. Inmates are supposed to transform themselves by accepting the truth about themselves and their actions, admitting guilt, and learning to avoid thinking errors (Fox, 1999, 2001; Ugelvik, 2012). Studies have also shown that inmates, however, do not remain submissive to these institutional transformation attempts, but engage in resistance in various ways. For example, by engaging in rhetorical struggles about what a criminal is with CBT program facilitators and thereby resisting self-examination and change (Fox, 1999). Another example is resistance by engaging in practices that contribute to a more positive identity construction, for instance, by using neutralizations when constructing narratives about their crimes (Ugelvik, 2012). These studies illuminate that subjectivities cannot be completely determined institutionally. Even though the institution is at a discursive advantage (as it dictates the rules and motivations for inmates to engage in the discourse of rehabilitation), there are always possibilities of resistance, and as inmates resist institutional power, alternative self-constructions are produced (Fox, 2001).

In a study of CBT programs for preventing aggression and other troublesome behavior (ART and Social and Emotional Training) in Swedish schools, Dahlstedt and colleagues (2011) studied how different neoliberal technologies of governing shape specific subjectivities through certain techniques (such as confession). They found three pedagogical techniques that were being used to shape the desired subject into being active, democratic, and responsible: the art of motivating, acknowledging, and calculating. Through encouraging the students to look inward, reflecting on
their selves, and changing their insides, thoughts, attitudes, and so on, they will alter their outward behavior. This was found to be a way of developing a “democratic mentality” through constant dialogue.

Although not specifically a study of treatment methods, Phoenix’s study (2004) of young masculinities and neoliberalism in school contexts is of relevance here. In this interview study of young men, eleven to fourteen years old, the neoliberal notion of individuals being free and able to make rational choices is challenged. It was found that masculine subjectivities, including, for example, irreverence toward schoolwork and being confrontational toward teacher, were at odds with those produced as desirable from within a neoliberal discourse, for example, taking individual responsibility for schoolwork. The young men struggled with the contradictory positions that arose when they attempted to both do well academically and position themselves as properly masculine. Many of them tried to solve the dilemma by balancing both positions: doing schoolwork sometimes, and acting irreverent or confrontational at other times. Further, the study showed that masculinities were racialized, for example, in that Black, White, and Asian boys were positioned differently in relation to hegemonic masculinity (Phoenix, 2004).

IDENTITIES IN INTERACTION IN INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS

In this section, I present empirical research on identity in institutional settings where identity is primarily understood as an interactional achievement and as action or a tool to make things happen. These studies build on an array of theoretical and methodological approaches, such as ethnomethodology, conversation analysis (CA), membership categorization analysis, and discursive psychology (DP), often in combinations. What they have in common is that identity is (primarily) seen as a product of interaction, rather than that of macro discourses or ideologies. It should, however, be pointed out that these two theoretical perspectives on identity outlined here are more complex than what can be represented in this brief presentation.

The focus is on “how identity is something that is used in talk: something that is part and parcel of the routines of everyday life, brought off in the fine
detail of everyday interaction” (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998b, p. 1; italics in original). Such studies with micro-analytic perspectives, among other things, highlight that socialization, including the construction of social identities, is not a unidirectional process where knowledge flows from active experts such as adults or staff members to passive recipients or novices. Rather, socialization is understood as dynamic and dialectic, and as a process that involves negotiation concerning expert status (Cekaite, 2006). These studies can exemplify that all participants, even those with less explicit power, such as young schoolchildren, may participate in defining and redefining the social situation, including, for example, resisting teachers’ socialization attempts (Cekaite, 2006).

Juhila (2003) has studied interaction between Finnish social workers and their (adult) clients at a crisis center, particularly investigating what happens when participants’ expected institutional positions or identities are misaligned. Building on an ethnomethodological perspective on identity as co-constructed and situated, she examined what kind of institutional identity categories and tasks that the participants orient to, focusing on disagreements about institutional identities and responsibilities. By investigating a so-called “deviant case” (see, for instance, Potter, 1996), implicit, taken-for-granted cultural expectations are revealed. Juhila (2003) explicates how the client does not meet the expectations of his ascribed identity and is constructed as a “bad client” in interaction with the social workers, as well as how the client responds to this accusation by constructing different expectations of the social workers’ institutional duties. During this conversational disagreement, the social workers construct criteria for both “good” and “bad” clienthood. Being a good client and taking on a client’s identity involve constructing oneself as in need of the assistance social workers provide, being motivated to be helped, as well as treating “social workers’ suggestions as competent ones and not questioning them with his own knowledge” (2003, p. 93). Subsequently, being a bad client involves the reverse.

Hitzler (2011) has studied social work professionals’ identity work in interaction, specifically in three-party care planning conferences, where professionals from different institutions meet with a client. This specific
context demands that the social workers invoke disparate identities, both those that will correspond to their professional relationship with each other and the client. The study illuminates the relational nature of institutional identities. When the social workers have several identity positions to choose from, they opt for the ones that construct a complementary identity for the client as well (rather than the positions that do not)—one of being a “client” in need of help and accepting the professional’s authority. These identity positions clarify the relationship between all parties. But it also leads to “the structural triad of the care planning conference [collapsing] into an interactional dyad,” which has interactional implications, for example, in that it becomes more difficult for the client to form alliances (Hitzler, 2011, p. 306). The social workers gain increased control over the interaction as they position themselves based on their professional commonalities rather than their differences as they represent various institutions with different duties and aims. The care planning conference can thus be seen to “[reproduce] conventional professional–client interactions and leaving the client to deal with one powerful professional counterpart rather than profiting from possibly productive professional disagreement” (Hitzler, 2011, p. 307).

Some studies have also illuminated how morality and identity (positionings) are related, and how morality should be understood as an action rather than an individual internal quality (Adelswärd, 1998; Evaldsson, 2005a; Tholander, 2002; Tholander & Aronsson, 2003). For example, in a study of students in junior high school, Tholander and Aronsson (2003) analyzed subteaching practices among youth in informal group work sessions. They show how traditional pedagogical routines were reproduced as some students took on a “subteacher” position through which they drew on discursive practices commonly used by the teacher. In this way, they often managed to get the other students to comply, but they also encountered resistance, which showed that the position “subteacher” was a moral position that could be challenged. The study thus highlights how identity, or positionings, in interaction are infused with morality—they can be played up or toned down; they can be criticized, challenged, and resisted. Furthermore, the study exemplifies how positioning is a collaborative
phenomenon. Together the students would position one as a subteacher and the others as mere students. This was also true for resistance toward the subteacher, whom students would at times collaboratively challenge (Tholander & Aronsson, 2003).

In her study of evaluative interviews with conscientious objectors in Sweden, Adelswärd (1998) explores a specific institutional practice that aims at determining and evaluating individuals’ “essential” morals standpoints. The aim of the interviews is to determine whether the applicant’s convictions in regard to his moral standpoint on military service are strong enough that he should be excused from the otherwise obligatory military service. The interview is partly built on an assumption that there is a direct connection between the “rhetoric level” and the applicant’s inner morals that could be exposed when applicants are asked to discuss a hypothetical moral dilemma. The study explicates some inherent problems with these interviews and the project of locating the applicants’ true moral selves, for instance, the problem of localizing the applicants’ true selves when the interviewer is an active participant and in the conversation and the discussion of the hypothetical dilemmas. The study further highlights that morality is an important aspect of self-presentation—for the applicants, the issue was to present not only a correct and coherent moral argumentation but also a believable/trustworthy authentic self (Adelswärd, 1998).

**Aims**

As has been suggested in previous research on forced care, detention homes can be understood as particularly complex and dilemmatic discursive settings. Drawing on both macro and micro perspectives on discourse and subjectivity, this study investigates treatment practices at a detention home for young men as well as how these are tied to issues of subjectivity. I would argue that a study of treatment practices should include both what discourses are available and how these are taken up and negotiated in interaction (see also Gubrium & Holstein, 2001). Therefore, this study documents and analyzes the available
discourses and discursive practices that may be understood to produce the
social organization of the detention home as well as how these are drawn
upon in social interaction.

A related aim is to record how discursive practices generate subject
positions for participants to either take up or resist in interaction. This also
includes a study of how staff and residents construct social order through
different discursive practices (e.g., TE) and discursive resources, such as
humor, and how this involves, or is tied to, subject positioning and identity
construction.
This study draws on ethnographic fieldwork at a youth detention home in Sweden. In this chapter, I introduce the research setting and describe the methods used. As is common in qualitative research, the process has evolved successively (Taylor, 2001). Of significance is that the project started with a rather open focus on the interplay between staff members and young people with a particular focus on identity work, and was gradually specified as the study developed. As the study progressed, the focus, alongside that of identity construction, shifted to what could broadly be described as “[t]he interplay of available discourses and discursive practices [that] produces the social organization of the settings – both its patterns and its tensions” (Spencer, 2001, p. 159). The analyses draw on data generated by participant observations (conducted over a period of three semesters), video recordings, and interviews with residents and staff at a youth detention home for young
The data consist of videotaped interaction (thirty hours), field notes from participant observations, and semi-structured interviews (twenty-five) with the staff members and residents (the young men).

**The setting: Stillbrook**

The detention home, here called Stillbrook, was chosen as a research site for several reasons. First, it uses so-called *manualized treatment models*. Second, it is a home that administers forced care under LVU rather than LSU (that is, the law that regulates society’s treatment of youth between the ages of fifteen and seventeen who have committed serious crimes). This means that the dilemma of care vs. control becomes extra pertinent as the detention period is non-fixed as opposed to that of LSU, where the detention period is based on the severity of the crime.

Stillbrook is part of a larger institution located on the outskirts of a medium-sized Swedish town. It consists of several cottages, surrounded by beautiful nature, with creeks, lakes, and forests on its doorstep. The beauty of the scenery contrasts with the gravity of the institution’s purpose. This is one of twenty-five institutions in Sweden responsible for the coercive treatment of young people, which constitutes the most severe consequence for youth delinquents under the age of 15 in Sweden (at the same time not everyone admitted is a delinquent).

Stillbrook admits young men/boys between the ages of about thirteen and sixteen; it houses up to eight residents at a time; and it has about as many treatment assistants that work in shifts. The detention home can be locked (Sw: *låsbar*), meaning that the doors usually are open during the day, but locked at night, and the unit has the capacity and legal right to isolate residents in locked areas. The doors used when the residents are supposed to be in their rooms are alarmed, even when the doors are not locked. This means, for example, that the alarm notifies staff members if/when a resident leaves his room at night.

Stillbrook has its own school that offers education for the residents. At times, however, residents take part in after-school activities, such as playing sports with the local teams. Nevertheless, most residents spend all, or at least
most of, their time on the detention home’s premises, where they sleep, eat, go to school, take part in treatment programs, and engage in leisure activities. The residents have their own bedrooms but share bathrooms. There is one large living room, where residents and staff often watch TV together; this area also houses the dining table, where most of the meals are consumed. Stillbrook also has a separate cottage where residents whose treatment is seen to have progressed and who are coming toward the end of their stay are allowed to room. Here they have slightly more freedom in the form of a living room of their own with a TV and a PlayStation, somewhat later bedtimes, and although their doors are alarmed as well, there is usually no staff member staying in that cottage overnight. In that same cottage, there is a separate small “apartment” where visiting families can stay; this is also where I spent my nights during my fieldwork.

The treatment models

Stillbrook has a history of working with milieu therapy (Sw: miljöterapi), but at the time of my fieldwork, it featured several treatment methods, including Aggression Replacement Training (ART; Goldstein, Glick, & Gibbs, 1998) and two versions of TE. The detention home also worked with relational treatment via a contact person system (cf. Holmqvist et al., 2009); every resident was assigned a contact person who had particular responsibility for his rehabilitation, and who would engage in regular individual talks with the resident. The contact person would also in meetings act as a kind of spokesman for the resident and would sometimes mediate between him and his family.

This thesis mainly concerns the two TE systems described below. I will also briefly introduce ART since it is relevant to the general treatment context at the home, and was part of a (or an intended) shift of treatment perspective from milieu therapy to CBT. At the time of the study, all young men were on a TE program and the majority on an ART program too.
Aggression Replacement Training

ART (Goldstein et al., 1998; cf. Holmqvist et al., 2009) is a manualized method used for both the prevention and treatment of antisocial, aggressive, and criminal youth. It was developed by the American Arnold Goldstein in the 1980s, and is a so-called multimodal treatment model, based on cognitive-behavioral therapy, in which people’s behaviors are understood as a result of repetitions and reinforcements. The ART program is designed to alter undesired behaviors in aggressive and antisocial youth and replace those with desirable, socially acceptable behaviors. The youth are understood to be deficient in "social-cognitive skills," unable to sufficiently detect and control their anger, and suffering from a low level of moral reasoning (based on Kohlberg’s theory of moral development; Kohlberg, 1969). The ART program consists of three areas: (i) skillstreaming (the manual details fifty interpersonal skills, such as asking a question, saying thank you, avoiding fights, and delivering criticism); (ii) anger control training (including identification of triggers and cues of anger as well as techniques for staying calm); and (iii) moral reasoning training (which involves engaging the youth in discussions about hypothetical moral dilemmas). It is also recommended to complement the training with a structured reinforcement program, such as a TE (Goldstein et al., 1998).

ART has been introduced and used in Sweden since the 1990s. It is employed both within residential care for delinquent youth, and preventatively in, for example, schools (see, for instance, Dahlstedt et al., 2011). It has increasingly become one of the most popular methods for both the prevention and treatment of aggressive and criminal youth in Sweden (Kaunitz & Strandberg, 2009; cf. Andersson, 2008). A 2009 report by the National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen) showed that it was the most frequently used program within the social services’ open services for early interventions for children and youth; 30 percent of the municipalities reported using this method (Socialstyrelsen, 2009).

At Stillbrook, ART was introduced approximately four years before the fieldwork began; however, not all staff members believed in this model, which appeared to lead to slight frustration among the staff group. About half
of the staff had been formally trained in ART and were involved in the training of residents. ART was administered in different ways during the course of my fieldwork, but most often the residents would have one “ART day” per week, during which the entire day was dedicated to ART classes. Despite staff disagreements on the potentiality of ART, all staff members appeared to agree upon the usefulness of the TE systems (although they also frequently discussed the challenges of and necessary alterations to the system).

*Token economy*

TE is a behavioral reinforcement system in which tokens are allotted on the basis of clients’ adherence to specific rules of comportment. It has a long history as a treatment and motivational tool in rehabilitative and educational settings as well as in psychiatric institutions (Kazdin, 1978, 1982) and prison settings (e.g., Liebling, 2008). Presently, behavioral reinforcement programs are common in the residential treatment of “disruptive” youth, in many, if not most, residential programs in the United States (Schwab, 2008, p. 17). TE generally builds on principles of operant conditioning, where positive reinforcement is given for compliant behavior with the goal of increasing desired behavior and decreasing undesired behavior (Schwab, 2008). At Stillbrook, two versions of TE were developed and implemented: a general TE system and an individualized TE system, here called self-assessment training. Both were continuously discussed and updated by the staff.

The general TE system concerned all residents in the home and consisted of an intricate reward system that covered virtually all aspects of resident conduct at all hours of the day. Desired behaviors were specified in a staff-compiled TE manual, and the system involved staff members using this document to continuously assess and evaluate the residents’ behavior throughout the day in order to determine how many points each resident should receive. The TE manual was written in some detail, specifying desired behavior at certain times of the day, for example, the first time slot of the day included brushing teeth, making the bed, being at the breakfast table at X-o’clock, and displaying good table manners. The manual also specified some
social actions that were not allowed, for example, hanging out in each other’s rooms, lending each other things, fighting, or threatening others. The manual further specified how many points could be received for each time slot.

The points would then translate into rewards, for example, how much pocket money each resident should receive at the end of the week, but also other privileges, such as being allowed to play video games, staying up an extra half hour at night, or leaving the premises at the weekend to, for instance, visit parents.

The second TE system at Stillbrook, the self-assessment training program, encouraged more active involvement on the resident’s part. The resident and his contact persons were to jointly discuss and decide which “problem behaviors” the resident should work on altering, and how this training should proceed and be evaluated and rewarded. The staff members would subsequently compile an individual manual for the resident, generally with up to three assignments that the resident should practice, as well as grading criteria for each. Examples of assignments during the fieldwork included getting up in time in the morning, not speaking too loudly, practicing leaving the premises, and being polite to others.

Each resident then jointly engaged in self-assessment training with a staff member during the individual bedtime conversations in the evenings. The goal is for the resident to practice assessing his own behavior using the manual. The first step is for the resident to contemplate on his behavior during the past day and to record the grade he believes that he deserves. Then the staff member is to assess the resident’s behavior and record the grade he or she believes to be the correct one, and finally they jointly discuss the reasoning behind the grades and decide on the final grade.

FIELDWORK

The fieldwork consisted of participant observations, video recordings, and interviews with staff and residents. In all, I spent about one month in the field (but over a period of three semesters; one to five days at a time). In between the visits, I would transcribe the recordings and go through my field notes.
Participants

The focus of this study is on discourse and discursive practices, rather than on the individual persons. Therefore, I have not collected detailed information about the individual participants, but in this section, I will present some basic information that will be of importance to understanding the treatment context. Another reason for not giving extensive details about the participants is to preserve their anonymity. All names, including that of the detention home, have been fictionalized.

In all, ten staff members and fourteen young men were included in the study.7 The young men (the residents) were detained for different reasons, but they all had some history of violence or criminal behavior. Other complementing “risk factors” included low academic performance and abusive or otherwise troublesome home settings where parents could not take care of them properly. For this specific group, the length of confinement8 varied from a couple of months to over two years (which is somewhat uncommon but in this case, it involved a resident who left the home and came back soon thereafter). All were admitted in accordance with LVU. Although the detention home’s official policy was to only admit young men between thirteen and sixteen years old, there were two that were older at the time of the fieldwork. The ages of the residents varied from thirteen to eighteen.

The young men, here often referred to as residents,9 appear in the analyses to varying degrees. This is due to several reasons: (i) The video recordings were conducted on different occasions. When I stayed at the home over several nights in a row, coincidences led to not all residents being present on all occasions. For example, during the first and longest period of video recordings, two residents were in their hometowns and another was in “isolation” and not allowed to interact with the other residents. (ii) Because of ethical considerations, I did not follow individual residents around, and some chose to spend more time (or just naturally did) in the social areas where I was filming. (iii) Moreover, some residents happened to provide clearer examples than others of the particular discursive practices of interest.
Table 1. Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resident's namei and ageii</th>
<th>Staff member's namei</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adam, 13</td>
<td>Britta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali, 17</td>
<td>Lotta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felix, 14</td>
<td>Mona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fredrik, 14</td>
<td>Nilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janek, 15</td>
<td>Åke</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jesper, 15</td>
<td>Henke</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joel, 15</td>
<td>Jens</td>
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<tr>
<td>Markus, 15</td>
<td>Kalle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micke, 16</td>
<td>Lennart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orkan, 18</td>
<td>Per</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oskar, 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadek, 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas, 15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaki, 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(i) All names are fictionalized. (ii) The age specification is based on the age at the end of the year when the video recordings were made.

Participant observations in forced institutions

This study draws on ethnographic traditions in that I have chosen to carry out an in-depth study of everyday treatment practices at one detention home, Stillbrook, rather than documenting such practices in several homes. I have attempted to get close to, and gain, a deeper understanding of one treatment culture through many observations across different activities and over an extended period of time at the home (cf. Agar, 1996; Duranti, 1997; Duranti, Ochs, & Schieffelin, 2012; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007; Wästerlors, 2009a). An important aspect of this line of research is recognizing, describing, and analyzing patterns, and that which falls outside of those patterns, in specific social settings and contexts. To be able to
recognize and describe interactional patterns, placing oneself as the researcher in the “repetitiveness of everyday life” is a crucial element of fieldwork research (Duranti, 1997, p. 92).

Several ethnographic methods were used to document the local treatment culture at Stillbrook, including participant observation and semi-structured interviews. The primary method, however, was participant observation using a video camera. This also means that, with the exception of the interviews, the data were not staged (nor elicited by the researcher) but could be considered “naturally occurring” (see also Duranti et al., 2012; Potter, 1996). One advantage of video-ethnographic methods is that they allow detailed analyses of interaction because they enable researchers to capture and review again and again the detailed complexity of social interaction (cf. Duranti et al., 2012); documenting and analyzing participation frameworks with respect to talk, prosody, laughter, pauses, posture, gestures, and ways of appropriating and inhabiting space (see, for example, Goodwin, 2000, 2007).

In Sweden, research on SIS institutions has in recent years increased (see, for instance, Holmqvist, 2008; Holmqvist et al., 2007, 2009; Osvaldsson, 2002); however, ethnographically inspired studies are rare (but see Överlien, 2003; Wästerfors, 2009b, 2011). The use of video cameras in ethnographic studies of everyday life at detention homes or other forced settings appears to be quite rare (see Cromdal & Osvaldsson, 2012; for a video-based study of ART, see Andersson, 2007, 2008).

**Entering the field: gaining access and establishing a researcher role**

Gaining access to the research field entails securing the trust of gatekeepers who, formally or informally, are in control of the researcher being allowed into the field (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). This process began with a meeting with the head of the major institution as well as the head of Stillbrook during which the project was introduced. These two persons functioned as the first gatekeepers, and after their approval and interest in taking part in the study, a meeting was set up with the treatment staff, during which they were informed further and consented to participation.
The next step was to inform and gain consent from the residents and their parents, which was done by talking to the former. Moreover, I sent information and consent forms to the parents or legal guardians. Once this was completed, I had technically gained entry to the field. However, access is not only about gaining physical entry (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). It is also about gaining trust and finding a way to position oneself as a researcher within the particular style of social interaction in the setting.

For the most part, I felt welcome at Stillbrook. However, some staff members appeared to be initially suspicious of what I was really doing there. This coincided with my initial uneasiness in finding an appropriate "researcher’s role" where I, at the beginning of the fieldwork, for example, struggled with finding a place to physically position myself, or when to ask questions.

When conducting observations there are different roles a researcher may assume. These can often be placed on a scale between less and more participation (Hammersley & Atkinsons, 2007). For example, Duranti (1997) describes the different modes of participant observations on a scale from passive participation to complete participation, in which the passive participant attempts to be as nonintrusive on the interaction as possible, and the complete participant interacts intensely with the participants and engages in the activities studied. However, assuming the role of a complete participant may be problematic as it can be difficult to both participate and be active and simultaneously be attentive and observant of what is going on (Duranti, 1997). A more useful status is that of an "accepted bystander" or "professional overhearer," putting oneself in an unobtrusive place to observe, as well as assuming an acceptable demeanor (Duranti, 1997, p. 101).

I decided to alternate between assuming a more and a less participatory mode of observation. I often helped out with things, such as setting the table, and I would chitchat with both staff members and residents. I would also sometimes participate in activities, such as playing cards with the residents. This was both a way of gaining trust and acceptance and a means of staying close to where the staff-youth interaction was taking place.
The residents were less or more talkative depending on the occasion and the context. A few approached me on their own, sharing stories or asking me questions. Some eventually treated me like an intern or an extra staff member. Most of them simply carried on with their own business when I was around and did not appear to take much notice of me.

It took a little more time to gain acceptance from the staff members. However, the initial uneasiness about my presence at the home that some appeared to have eventually subsided, and most of the time during the fieldwork I felt accepted and included. The staff members and I would chitchat, and often I would be let in on the jokes, which appeared to be a sign of approval and acceptance. This acceptance was not completely unproblematic, however, since I was more interested in how they interacted with each other than with me, and, further, it was difficult to keep track of what was going on around me when I was pulled into a conversation. At times, I, therefore, tried to place myself in something of a “blind spot” (Duranti, 1997, p. 101), for example, by sitting in a corner chair by the couch in front of the TV (which almost always was on during the residents’ free time), a space where it was acceptable to be quiet, and from where I had a good view of almost the entire bottom floor and living area of the home.

During the observations, I took field notes throughout, and mostly openly. Sometimes I left the group when I had a lot to write down. At times, residents asked what I was writing and I would answer that I wrote down what was happening, occasionally showing them or reading what I had just written. In the beginning, I wrote down most activities and conversations (cf. Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). I moved around all areas of the home, attempting to be where most interaction was going on. Eventually, I focused the observations and video recording on some recurring practices in the daily life where staff and residents were interacting: bedtime conversations, meals at the dinner table, and “hang-out time” on the couch in the evenings. Once I began videotaping, I took fewer field notes, and more in a complementary way in order to add information the camera could not capture, such as how people outside of the camera’s view were moving around, or adding information I heard about relevant things that had happened, for example, in
school that day, and also to help me to easily find interactions of interest on the videotape later on.

**Video recordings**

In all, the video recordings cover about thirty hours of everyday life: particularly mealtime conversations, talk in the living room/dining room, and bedtime conversations with various groups of boys and staff members.

Being able to use recording devices has increased the number of phenomena possible to study as well as refined the analytical potential. It makes viewing and reviewing events feasible, as well as making very detailed and (more) accurate transcriptions than is ever possible without recording devices. Also, it allows the researcher to study interaction in detail, and focus on sequential and other interactional details. Further, it enables collaborative viewing among research colleagues, which may strengthen the analysis (Duranti, 1997). However, along with the many analytical advantages of using recording devices comes a whole range of new choices and possible problems that must be considered, and they all can potentially affect analyses (Duranti, 1997; Heikkilä & Sahlström, 2003). These issues range from purely technical to ethical, and I will begin by describing the more technical choices in this study.

The video camera was introduced after I had spent some time at the detention home. This was because I initially expected the participants, especially the residents, to be uncomfortable with the video recordings and I wanted to build a rapport with them first. It turned out that by the time I introduced the video camera, most of the residents appeared to be excited about it, wanting to try filming, making faces at the camera, or performing in front of it (cf. Sparrman, 2005). However, the attention the residents paid to the camera soon waned, only to return every now and then. Some of the staff members initially appeared nervous and self-conscious around the camera, sometimes giggling and exchanging glances. This subsided rather soon.

To simultaneously videotape, be observant of the surrounding interaction, and maintain being a participant observer, I varied between holding the camera in my hand and using a tripod. The goal was to capture
the participant’s faces as much as possible, increase audibility for transcription, as well as make facial expressions available for analysis when relevant. When using the tripod, I mainly tried to place myself outside of the camera view, but, at the same time, not right behind the camera. I attempted to carry on making observations and relations the way I had before introducing the camera, that is, I would sometimes switch on the camera, set it up in a corner of the living room, and then go grab a cup of coffee, chat with someone in the kitchen briefly, before returning to the camera. Mealtimes were an exception. Since the staff and the youths always had their meals together and I was invited to eat with them from the start, I decided to continue this also when I was video recording. In brief, I never fully assumed the role of “cameraman” (in contrast to, for example, Forsberg, 2009) but rather a participant observer who was also video recording. When filming activities such as nighttime conversations, or when most of the residents moved to the upper floor or a different room that I could not see or hear from where I had the tripod set up, then I would instead hold the camera and follow the interaction. At those times, trying to place myself close enough for the microphone to pick up the conversation and the camera to capture facial expressions, but at some distance to disturb the interaction as little as possible.

Because of the quite sensitive setting, including the fact that the young men were under forced care, I was extra careful to not be intrusive with my video recordings, and all of the techno-methodological choices were foremost based on ethical considerations. To make transcription work easier, sometimes researchers will use individual microphones that participants will wear so that even whispers and other unclear communication can be captured. However, the use of microphones could be discussed ethically, and I decided such a method would be too intrusive in this particular research setting. As a consequence, the sound quality in some instances limited what I was able to transcribe, and this, in combination with the number of people that would engage in, sometimes multiple, conversations at the dinner table, meant that transcribing was an immensely challenging experience.
I also decided not to use “target” participants (for an example of the use of target participants, see Forsberg, 2009) who could have been followed for a whole day or several days; again, this was out of consideration for the individuals at the home who were already isolated, under surveillance, and stripped of privacy. I wanted to ensure that the participants could move away from the camera if they wanted to. As a consequence, certain residents and staff members are more prevalent in the transcripts than others since some would stand in front of the camera more often than others would.

I decided to videotape bedtime conversations and meals. In the beginning, I also attempted to follow “the action,” accompanying the residents and staff as they moved around but I soon gave up as it was difficult to get an overview of what was happening and capture conversations. I opted to mainly stay in the areas where I learned that most staff-resident interaction happened, which was the living room/dining room, and instead wait for it to come to me.

**Interviews**

Individual interviews were conducted with both staff members and residents. All interviews were thematized and semi-structured. I used an interview guide with themes and example questions, but strived to use a conversational style. The interview guide was updated as the study evolved. The staff interviews focused on staff perspectives on working with different treatment models, using structured rules in conflict situations, and the staff members’ professional roles as treatment assistants, as well as their experiences of important or difficult conversations with residents, and the importance of physical space and spatial arrangements for these conversations.

The interviews with the residents began by encouraging them to tell me about their view on why they were admitted to the detention home, and then went on to focus on their experiences of being at the home, taking part in the different treatment models, and their relationships with their contact persons. In total, the interview material consists of fourteen staff interviews and eleven resident interviews, all of them were either video- or audiotaped. I also took notes during the interviews. However, the fieldwork also consisted of many informal interviews/conversations that took place.
whenever the opportunity arose, for example, when I was “hanging out” in the living room with the residents, or when helping with preparing food or cleaning up in the kitchen with staff members.

In line with the view of scholars with an interest in discourse and interaction who maintain that meaning is socially constituted (for example, Adelswärd, 1998; Holstein & Gubrium, 2004; Phoenix et al., 2003; Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Silverman, 2006), interviews and other conversations are here understood as instances of social action. Since meaning is understood as socially constituted, and a research interview cannot be seen as an exception with regard to meaning-making, during the interview meaning is understood as co-constructed: a collaborative process (Garfinkel, 1967) involving both interviewer and interviewee. This implies that these interview approaches (including, for example, social constructionist, ethnomethodologist, and poststructuralist) to varying extents emphasize how meaning-making happens as well as what meaning is produced (Holstein & Gubrium, 2004) or, for instance, how talk is organized and what it achieves in interaction (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

In this study, this means that I am not striving to understand what the staff members or youths actually think or feel about, for example, the treatment at Stillbrook. By understanding the interview as an instance of social action and an arena for meaning-making rather than potentially true or false accounts of “reality,” the focus is shifted to how participants produce “morally adequate” accounts in the interview (Silverman, 2006, p. 139), constructing themselves as moral beings.

Further, what within other fields of traditional qualitative interview research is understood as the “debris” of data, the inconsistencies, the pauses, false stops, and so on, are the very matters that are of interest to the discourse analyst (Wetherell & Potter, 1992).
Methodological reflections

While this study, along with many others (for example, Antaki & Kent, 2012; Aronsson & Gottzén, 2011; Evaldsson, 2005b; Cromdal & Osvaldsson, 2012; Goodwin, 1990; Hepburn & Potter, 2011), upholds the value of using video recordings as data, specifically of so-called “naturally occurring” events (those that would most likely have happened even without the researcher’s presence), this does not imply that video-recorded interaction here is assumed to be more “real” or “natural” than other data, at least not in the sense that it is somehow unaffected by my presence and the video camera’s.

Duranti (1997) has discussed “the participant-observer paradox,” that is, the fact that the researcher must observe the interaction he or she wants to study, and that through observing interaction, the researcher will inevitably affect it (unless the researcher uses covert observation, which is ethically questionable) (1997, p. 118). However, we can become aware of how we, as researchers with our equipment, affect the activity we are studying (Duranti, 1997), and the researcher effect can also be reduced through thoughtful techno-methodological choices (Ochs, Graesch, Mittman, Bradbury, & Repetti, 2006). Further, Duranti (1997) highlights that social behavior and language are always part of a cultural repertoire, and even if participants may or may not adjust their behavior in front of a camera, they are still drawing on that repertoire of available social actions. An advantage with video recordings is also that they allow the analyst to study his or her effect on the interaction in retrospect (Sjöblom, 2011). Ultimately, however, there is no escaping the fact that the researcher and the camera will always have some type of effect on the social activity, and they should therefore be assumed to be co-participants (Forsberg, 2009).

In the video recordings, there are occasional instances of “camera behaviors” (Duranti, 1997, p. 118): staff members would sometimes giggle when they used a bad word or, similarly, residents would every so often stick out their tongues or make provocative gestures at the camera, both in my presence and absence. On other occasions, they would make comments at the camera, narrating what was going on, or performing in front of the
camera. However, this happened quite rarely, and mostly in the initial phase of the video recordings.

On the rare occasions I left the camera running while I left the room to do something else, it occasionally happened that residents reminded each other in front of the camera that the recording was only for research purposes and not for the staff, and they could be safe in the knowledge that they could go about their business (in one case, playing with the food in a seemingly innocent way, but, nevertheless, something that they apparently suspected the staff would not deem appropriate behavior).

On a few occasions, staff members would use my camera or my presence when teasing or making semi-serious threats by saying to residents that I would report something I had seen, or that they would examine my videos afterward. These instances were somewhat uncomfortable as I was being asked to take sides; I was being invited into the staff group to take part in the teasing. I had the option of either contributing to something that I did not ethically believe in or could do professionally, or risk damaging my rapport with the staff members (being invited to join in the teasing/mocking can be seen as “being part of the gang”). I always chose the latter, however, even if uncomfortably so, and awkwardly attempting to do so lightheartedly. Often I attempted to bring up the subject again afterward. For instance, I would remind the boys that the staff members would not be allowed to see the videos, and all research findings would be anonymized. This highlights the ethical dilemmas of leaving the room when recording (cf. Duranti, 1997) as well as the fact that not only the researcher but also the camera has an effect on the social interaction.

**Analysis**

The analytical process in the three papers presented in this thesis could be said to be positioned somewhere in the middle of a scale ranging from deduction to induction (sometimes referred to as an iterative approach; Taylor, 2001). In this study, the iterative approach has entailed that while the analyses in all papers have been informed by the study’s research questions and theoretical perspectives, they have also been specified and reworked
during the course of the study. The analytic process also involves strong elements of induction as I have focused on recurring institutional and discursive practices that I gained knowledge of during the fieldwork. The analyses focus on both what is achieved through interaction and how this is done (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001; Miller & Fox, 2004).

Selection of cases
In study I, based on the interviews with staff members, all interviews concerning treatment methods were transcribed in their entirety. The transcriptions were then read and reread in order to identify recurring patterns, specifically related to institutional discourses of treatment/punishment and how staff members positioned themselves and the residents in relation to these. In this analysis, the theoretical concepts of ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988) and subject positions (Davies & Harré, 1990; Wetherell, 1998) were of relevance and guided the analytical process. It should also be pointed out that the cases in the individual studies have been chosen because they represent the data at large.

The analysis of the video recordings began with a viewing and documenting of episodes to acquire a general overview of the contents of the videos. I primarily focused on interaction between the staff members and residents. Clips where, for instance, participants would sit alone or together in complete silence watching TV were merely tagged as “watching TV.” I created a preliminary data catalog, documenting the activities that took place and who were participating, in order to obtain an initial overview of the data corpus (cf. Heath et al., 2010). As I reviewed the videos over time, I would add more information to the catalog, and sometimes “rough” transcriptions of interaction where I would focus especially on clips of special interest that I had gained knowledge of from the fieldwork. Typically, the analytic process then followed with repeatedly watching the videos of particular interest, except in study I, where the interviews first were transcribed and I then read and reread the transcriptions.

In studies II and III, I narrowed down the viewing to focus on certain practices that had caught my interest during the fieldwork and which I had
learned were recurring practices (bedtime conversations, meals, and “hang-out time” in front of the TV). Once I had narrowed down the instances of interest for a particular study, I would transcribe all of those. In some cases, such as in study II (which focused on humor), it was difficult to transcribe all instances of disciplinary humor since there were very many.

In study II, the focus was on humor, and I began by searching through the data for instances of humor; I would then study theories of humor and previous research, and continued to narrow down the instances of humor that were of interest to those that could be categorized as containing disciplinary elements (cf. Billig, 2005). Switching between theory and empirical data is a common strategy of analysis within qualitative research (Taylor, 2001).

In study III, focusing on self-assessment training (which as a treatment practice was part of my early focus during the fieldwork, as well as a recurring practice), it was relatively easy to locate all instances since work on self-assessment training normally took place during the daily nighttime conversation between (typically one) staff member and one resident. After switching between empirical data, theory, and previous research, the concept of responsibilization (Kemshall, 2002; Phoenix & Kelly, 2013) became the focus, and cases for transcription, and later in-depth analysis, were chosen in relation to instances where issues of responsibilization became relevant. In the study, however, two excerpts are also included that relate to self-assessment training that took place at dinner time rather than during the actual self-assessment talk in the evening. This case was one of particular interest that I became aware of during the fieldwork because it clearly exemplified a dilemma related to responsibilization (that I later explored in this study).

**Transcription**

Transcription should be understood as an essential aspect of the analytical process, rather than as a preparatory stage. Transcripts alone cannot be viewed as data as they “cannot be autonomized from the recordings,” but rather as secondary products of the representations that the recordings make up (Mondada, 2007, p. 810). The transcription can never completely
represent the recording in all its interactional details; therefore, the researcher must always decide what features to preserve and how to represent them (Bucholtz, 2000; Ochs, 1979). Transcription is thus not to be understood as a passive reflection of recordings, but rather as a necessarily selective process guided by analytical interests and theoretical perspectives as well as by the technology used and issues such as readability in relation to the presumed reader (cf. Bucholtz, 2007). Transcription may thereby be understood as “theory”: the choices the researcher makes during transcriptions affect possibilities for analysis, and are therefore also guided by the researcher’s theoretical and analytical interests (Ochs, 1979).

Mondada (2007, p. 810) highlights that transcribing should be understood as a situated practice and the transcript as an “evolving flexible object” as it changes as the researcher revisits the original recordings (adding to and subtracting from the transcripts). The researcher should strive for reflexivity by becoming aware of the choices made and their consequences in terms of representation and possibilities for analysis (Bucholtz, 2000).

The interviews analyzed in study I were transcribed by me in their entirety. Both interviews and the interactional sequences selected for analysis were transcribed with inspiration from Jefferson’s transcription conventions (2004), often used in CA (see Appendix A). This means that I have transcribed the interviews and interactions at some level of detail, including documenting, for example, pauses, sighs, and intonation. I have also included some embodied action in the transcriptions, using parenthesis and only in cases where it has appeared as relevant to the interaction or where it was necessary for understanding the interaction (that is, to improve readability). I have used standard orthography to improve readability. The detailed transcriptions allow for secondary analyses and offer some level of transparency (cf. Have, 2002).

A particular challenge of this study was transcribing multiparty interaction. At times, there could be as many as fifteen participants together. Often there would be multiple conversations going on at one time, and these would frequently flow in and out of each other. Transcribing such conversations is a particularly challenging and time-consuming job. For
ethical reasons, I did not want to use external microphones, which could have increased sound quality and made transcription easier.

All analyses have been conducted while viewing the original videos and reading the Swedish transcripts. Selected excerpts have later been translated by me and revised by a native English speaker. I have strived for a balance between a more literal and a colloquial translation to preserve the original meaning while still presenting an understandable transcript to non-Swedish speakers (on potential difficulties when translating transcripts, see Bucholtz, 2007). The Swedish originals are attached in Appendix B.

Analytical approach: Ethnographies of institutional discourses

My analytical approach is partly inspired by what has sometimes been called institutional ethnographies, or ethnographies of institutional discourses (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001; Miller & Fox, 2004; Miller, 1994). This approach involves a study of how the discursive environments of institutions construct selves, and combines an ethnographic approach that considers the institutional context with a discourse analytic focus on talk-in-interaction (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001).

Procedurally, [ethnographies of institutional discourses] require attending both to what is locally available by way of identity resources in these discursive environments and to how the complex processes of self-construction unfolds in relation to these resources. The former task highlights the descriptive contours of available identities, while the latter underscores the work of self-construction. (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001, p. 16)

Further, following scholars such as Wetherell (1998, 2007), Edley (2001), Miller (1994; Miller & Fox, 2004), and Fox (1999, 2001), I have attempted to combine analytical insights from different discursive perspectives. The field(s) of discourse analysis and interactional analysis is a broad and multifaceted one, stemming from different theoretical and disciplinary traditions. Within the field of DP at least two approaches have crystallized: one rooted primarily in micro-sociological perspectives, including ethnomethodology and CA, and one in Foucault and poststructuralism. It has
been much debated whether and how these approaches are compatible and whether it is fruitful to combine insights from both (see, for example, Billig, 1999; Schegloff, 1997; Wetherell, 1998). Issues of concern include, for example, the role of context in analysis.

A traditional CA stance is that the only context needed for analysis is found in the actual piece of interaction studied (since the aim is to show how the participants make certain things relevant). Since a large number of variables could potentially be relevant to exactly what is being said in a conversation, the CA method is to only include what is being made relevant by the participants themselves as this is displayed in their interaction on a moment-by-moment basis. This means that the focus is on the proximate context—the immediate interactional context (Aronsson, 1998). A different perspective on this context issue, stemming from poststructuralist-inspired discourse analysis, is that in order to gain a broader answer to why participants say certain things in interaction, it is necessary to involve some wider context in the analysis, for example, social, cultural, or historical contexts (Wetherell, 2001). Wetherell (1998), for instance, has argued for this stance in combination with a sensitivity for the proximal context.

In this study, I align with those who believe the benefits of combining insights exceed the problems, and I have thus chosen a more synthetic, and eclectic, approach to analyses. Inspired by ethnographies of institutional discourses, I draw on ethnography in an attempt to bridge these methodological challenges of the different discursive perspectives. The metaphor of bridging is used to highlight that the goal is not to reach a totalizing synthesis between different perspectives, but rather to allow perspectives to be mutually informative in analysis and to keep their distinctive features (Miller & Fox, 2004). This approach takes into account that people are both producers and products of discourse (Billig, 1991). Further, it involves an attempt to analyze both the “whats” and the “hows” of institutional discourse, that is, to both investigate discourses and practices associated with the setting and how members use them and the discursive resources they provide (cf. Gubrium & Holstein, 2001).
Drawing on a Foucauldian perspective on discourse, I have strived to highlight the link between language and power (Foucault, 1982), which includes situating discourse in a societal context. This involves adopting a more “inclusive” notion of discourse than that often used within, for example, DP (see Wetherell, 1998). In the present study, this means that I take an interest in the relationship between discourse, discursive practices, and subjectivity. This entails my analytical interests having gone beyond interpersonal interaction and also involving, for example, treatment practices at the detention home.

Further inspiration from a Foucauldian discursive perspective has involved understanding the data collected as “expressions of culturally standardized discourses” that are associated with a particular research setting (Miller & Fox, 2004, p. 44). Analyses from this perspective have entailed scrutinizing data in search of the constitutive elements of these standardized discourses, common-sense reasoning, categories, and assumptions, including paying attention to different or competing discourses (which could also be conceptualized through the concept of ideological dilemmas; Billig et al., 1988) present in the same social setting (Miller & Fox, 2004).

The inspiration from micro perspectives (EM, CA, and DP) has been particularly useful to shed light on how participants use the discursive resources, including subject positions, in interaction. These perspectives offer methods for analyzing interaction in detail, including video-recorded everyday interaction, and involve a careful examination of the participants’ own methods for collaboratively accomplishing, and making sense of, social action and activities in interaction (Heath, 2004). DP is useful as it provides methods of analyzing how participants produce versions of reality, for example, events or inner psychological worlds, in discourse, and, further, how these versions, or descriptions, of events perform actions in interaction (Potter, 2004). This includes paying attention to how identity constructs or positionings are used to perform social action (Widdicombe, 1998), and it illuminates the interactional recourses used by participants to which ends (Potter, 2004).
Since my main interest is in studying identity work, the combination of these perspectives is fruitful as it allows for a detailed analysis of the participants’ interactional positioning of themselves and each other. Positioning theory (Davies & Harré, 1990) is useful because an analysis of subject positioning highlights both that discursive practices construct certain subject positions and participants can use these practices as resources with which to negotiate new positions (Davies & Harré, 1990). Therefore, positioning analysis may be understood as offering a way to analyze power and resistance in practice. This involves studying which subject positions are constructed as desirable in the setting as well as conducting a fine-grained investigation of how residents both comply with and resist these.

**Data analysis**

The process of analysis has involved a close reading and rereading of the transcripts of video-recorded interaction and the interview transcriptions, and with a particular focus guided by the different studies’ research questions.

In study I, the focus was on the identification of recurring patterns of: (1) institutional discourses that were drawn upon by staff members when talking about the treatment method TE, and (2) how staff members positioned themselves and the boys in relation to these. The analysis also concentrated on the emerging ideological dilemmas and how the staff members manage them.

In study II, the focus was on humor; particularly drawing on Billig’s notion (2005) of disciplinary humor, the analytical focus was on joking events between staff members and residents that involved both disciplinary features and laughing/teasing. The analysis focused on how humor was performed and how institutional culture “both impinge[s] upon and [is] transformed by those performances” (Edley, 2001). This entailed paying close attention to how institutional positions were invoked and negotiated in humor events in ways that both drew on and transgressed institutional discourses. In line with DP (Billig, 1991; Wetherell, 2007), the analyses primarily explored the participants’ own perspectives as revealed through talk and social interaction.
In study III, a specific analytical focus was on the participants' interactional positioning of themselves and each other, related to responsibilization strategies that involve attempts to produce certain types of subjectivities (cf. Rose, 1999b) during the specific institutional practice of self-assessment involving both a staff member and a resident. The analysis aimed to explicate how responsibilization was both attempted and resisted. All self-assessment practices were coded in order to understand what these involved, tagging, for example, silences, resistance, or compliance, that is, discursive phenomena that have a bearing on the participants' positionings in relation to responsibilization. The detailed analysis of selected examples has been informed by DP and positioning theory, paying close attention to interactional details, such as word choices, silences, and overlapping speech, and investigating what subject positions were made available and how these were taken up or resisted in interaction.

**Ethical considerations**

This study has been approved by a local ethical committee, EPN 53-08, and follows the guidelines developed by the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet, 2002). For instance, all participants were informed of the aim of the study; the staff members were verbally notified, while residents were informed both verbally and by written information sent to their parents or legal guardians. Informed consent was obtained from both the residents and the staff members. The residents, as well as one of their parents or legal guardians, signed an informed consent form. The information included the purpose of the study as well as their right to withdraw consent to participate in the study at any point, how the data would be handled, and that participants would always be anonymized in the presentation of results. The data have been handled with great care; all video recordings have been kept in a locked cabinet, along with my field notes and raw transcriptions.
Research ethics as a process

Ethical guidelines tend to focus on the work before and after data collection. They are often formulated as a code consisting of lists of principles, demands, or rules, and less consideration has been given to the ethical aspects and choices the researcher has to deal with during the fieldwork (Aarsand & Forsberg, 2010a; Hollway & Jeffersson, 2000). Within ethnographic work, and perhaps especially video-ethnographic studies, a more reflexive approach to ethics is required as ethics are intrinsically tied to each research context (Pink, 2001) (and, just like other social phenomena, always in flux). This implies that many ethical decisions cannot be made until the researcher is actually in field, and the notion of one ethical code being superior to others must be reconsidered (Pink, 2001). Within constructionist research, such as this study, ethical guidelines should rather be treated as a starting point for critical reflection since issues of morals/ethics must be understood as an ongoing negotiation involving the researcher and the informants, as well as being informed not only by the ethical guidelines but also discourses about private and public (Aarsand & Forsberg, 2010a, 2010b). In brief, I would argue that many important aspects of research ethics take place during as well as after the fieldwork. During my fieldwork I made several adjustments for the ethical consideration of residents as well as staff members.

The methodological and ethical particularities and challenges of conducting (video-based) research in private homes have previously been discussed (Aarsand & Forsberg, 2010b). But little has been written on the subject of the research of closed institutions (most likely because using a video camera in these settings is still uncommon). Conducting any research in a forced institution requires extra ethical sensitivity, perhaps especially that which involves the use of video recordings. However, video-ethnographic methods in these types of institutional settings serve an important role since they give an insight into an otherwise closed-off world, and by revealing the everyday lives of members of those settings, these types of studies can, in a sense, give voice to members of society that are otherwise rarely heard. This study considers several ethical issues related to the particular setting where young men are forcefully detained for an unspecified period of time.
Conducting research at a total institution involves particular challenges. As discussed by Goffman (1961) in his study of inmates in a mental institution, the residents at Stillbrook have been stripped of much privacy, leading to dissolutions of private-public boundaries. There is a striking power imbalance between the participants in the present study (the residents and the staff) as well as the researcher. This imbalance of power and the continuous negotiations of morals and ethics between staff members and residents were also parts of my research interests. Stillbrook, as an institution, explicitly focuses on morals in that staff members aim to alter residents’ morality as well as behavior (working, for example, from notions of youth delinquency and aggression in the ART treatment program that stipulates that these types of youth typically have a lower moral development than others; see Goldstein et al., 1998). When I entered the home with my camera, my presence became something that could be negotiated about, something both out of the ordinary and yet, at the same time, just another thing. Where the dividing line goes between my influence and my responsibility and what is the participants’, and simply their doing “ordinary life,” is complicated, and something that I was considering during the data collection. My attempts to, in a sense, help residents regain some privacy by being careful to ask whether it was okay to film them on different occasions did stand out in the context somewhat and sometimes appeared to take them by surprise.

Further, the detention home is both a home (private) and a workplace (public). Sometimes in ethnographic research, it is highlighted that researching private and public spaces involves different dilemmas. Aarsand and Forsberg (2010a, 2010b), for example, discuss how they used doors as a medium for negotiation about private/public in their research in middle-class homes. They encouraged participants to use the doors in the house as a way of creating a private space and shutting the researcher out if they so desired. In the detention home environment, this method did not appear legitimate as the participants’ freedom and privacy are already vastly limited; asking the residents to virtually lock themselves up in their rooms to get away from me did not seem reasonable. Instead, I mainly strived to be attentive to signals that participants may not want to be filmed at any moment and took it upon
myself to adjust the angle of the camera or move to a different room if needed. I informed all participants, and took extra care with the residents, that they could ask me to turn the camera off at any time, or just move away from the camera if they preferred. I also mainly stayed in the more public areas and only filmed in the residents’ personal rooms when I was invited or it appeared that everyone was willing to let me follow them.

To minimize the risk of recording individuals who were not part of the study and had not given their consent to be filmed, I mainly video recorded inside Stillbrook’s buildings. On a few occasions, however, I followed a group of participants walking between buildings on the premises and then I would aim the camera at the ground, using it rather as an audio-recording device. This was also the way I handled the situation on the few times I ventured outside the premises with participants, going into town to run errands, and on one occasion going to a youth club (Sw: ungdomsgård) nearby. When it proved difficult to even audio record without capturing “passers-by,” like much of the time at the youth club, I simply turned the camera off for that duration.

**Ethics during the writing process**

In the writing process, I have strived to portray the rationality of the participants. Within such “morally imbued” settings, and with such explicit power imbalance, authors risk resorting to critique or “taking sides.” Silverman writes that his “preference is not to criticize professionals but to understand the logic of their work” (Silverman, 1997, p. 35). In a similar way, I have attempted to make this clear in the writing process. Further, in the selection of cases for articles, there have been deliberate ethical considerations to be mindful of not picking examples that could be understood as especially sensitive for those who participated. All names of people and places have been fictionalized in order to anonymize the data. However, to enable secondary analyses, I have mainly preserved the gender and nationality of the names. For instance, someone named Emre would be given the name Basir rather than Mats or Lena.
Chapter 5

SUMMARIES OF STUDIES

STUDY I: FROM PUNISHMENT TO REWARDS? TREATMENT DILEMMAS AT A YOUTH DETENTION HOME

Anna Gradin Franzén and Rolf Holmqvist (submitted for publication).

Residential treatment for troublesome youth may be understood as taking place in a type of total institution (Goffman, 1961) where activities are targeted to minutely control bodies in space and time, to shape “docile bodies,” useful and compliant subjects (Foucault, 1977, p. 211). Contemporary penology, however, is largely influenced by what Rose (1999b, 2000) calls the new “advanced” liberal rationalities in which technologies of control “operate through instrumentalizing a different kind of freedom” (Rose, 1999b, p. 237). This includes an emphasis on active individuals who are free to make their own choices but who are also responsible for their own lives and futures as well as their own security. The goal of social control organizations within this rationality is to produce not
only compliant subjects, but subjects who willingly engage in introspection and self-monitoring (Garland, 1997).

The combination of rigorous control and monitoring of activities within this type of total institution, and the aim of the responsible, self-monitoring subject of the "advanced" liberal rationalities, may, in practice, lead to ideological dilemmas. This study focuses on such dilemmas by examining how the local treatment culture is talked into being by the staff members as they discuss the implementation of the treatment method TE.

The study mainly draws on participant observations at the detention home as well as individual interviews with the full-time staff members. Specifically, using DP, the analysis focuses on paradoxes and ideological dilemmas that emerge in the staff members’ talk about how TE has been implemented at the detention home and how they handle working with the TE manual.

Two main paradoxes were found: (i) paradox of transparency and interpretation: this involved TE being constructed as objective and transparent, but also as something that requires continuous interpretive work, and (ii) paradox of rewards and punishments: this entailed paradoxical notions of the tokens used in the system as they were primarily conceptualized as rewards for desirable behavior, but these very rewards (tokens) could also actually be withdrawn in order to control undesirable behavior.

These paradoxes further provided rhetorical resources that were recurrently drawn upon by the staff members: “The clean slate metaphor” is repeatedly used as a resource that foregrounds the transparency and fairness of the TE system and how tokens are to be understood as rewards rather than punishments. The metaphor involves a description of the system through the image of residents waking up each morning with no tokens, and then earning tokens throughout the day through correct behavior. The metaphor illustrates a transparent and fair system that motivates, rather than coerces, good behavior. This also foregrounds a focus on the residents’ individual responsibility—since the system is transparent, the residents are free to make informed and responsible decisions.

Another recurrent rhetorical resource was the use of rules and numbers as externalizing devices (Potter, 1996). By writing down the rules in a TE
document, the staff members construct them as objective, stable entities that exist separately from the individual staff member. In practice, this way of using rules can limit discussions about specific behaviors and whether they are desirable or not. Further, numbers may function as *inscription devices*, which construct things as stable, durable, and comparable (Rose, 1999b; Latour, 1986). At Stillbrook, numbers were important elements in the production of "objective" rewards and consequences, which allowed staff to talk about the boys' behavior and compare and project progress or stagnation (cf. Rose, 1999b).

As Billig et al. (1988) argue, ideology, in the way of common-sense reasoning, necessarily consists of contrary themes, and in this study, we argue that the paradoxes that emerged in the staff members' talk are a product of a principal ideological dilemma of coercion vs. freedom. In line with "advanced liberal rationalities," the local treatment culture involves an emphasis on the young men enacting "normal" behaviors but that they do this on their own free will. For the staff members, this dilemma can be seen to produce "troubled subject positions" (Wetherell, 1998). Their job involves that the residents are to be controlled or steered toward the correct behaviors as they are specified in the TE manual, while the goal is that the residents freely choose these behaviors—without the staff members controlling them. A good staff member, then, is one who is non-disciplinarian and does not force or punish the residents into conforming behavior. To avoid positioning themselves as disciplinarian, the staff members struggle to position the residents as responsible for their own actions and free to make decisions about their own conduct. Achieving this is hard work for the staff members, and it involves learning to understand that the system is about rewards and not punishments. In brief, there is substantial rhetorical "work" involved in "constructing an objective system of rewards."
Humor can be used both to disrupt and impose order. Prior work has at times highlighted this and other paradoxical aspects of humor. For instance, joking can be both aggressive and strengthen relationships (Norrick, 2003). Humor can be deployed both as a means for superordinates to maintain control, and a way for subordinates to challenge or subvert authority (Holmes, 2000). One crucial aspect is that humor can render criticism in a socially acceptable form (Holmes, 2000). Furthermore, as criticism, humor is powerful in that it is difficult to resist since it is not to be taken seriously (Watts, 2007). Billig (2005) has argued that humor, and especially ridicule, is essential for social life and it is profoundly connected to social order. He argues that (i) laughter is rhetorical in the sense that it does not foremostly stem from an internal state, but rather performs action in interaction, and (ii) that there is an under-analyzed relationship between humor and embarrassment, pointing out that people take pleasure in breaches of social order, and not only laugh with others, but also at them. This involves humor having a corrective function in social life because the fear of ridicule ensures that people conform to social norms. Humor can be both disciplinary in that it maintains social order, and rebellious in that it can be seen to challenge or disrupt social order (2005).

While many scholars have illuminated disciplinary aspects of humor in other institutional settings (such as humorous teasing as a form of norm control among students in junior high school: Tholander and Aronsson, 2002), few studies have been conducted on humor in penal settings, and those that exist have primarily focused on humor as a coping mechanism (for example, Crawley, 2004; Geer, 2002; Nylander, Lindberg, & Bruhn, 2001). However, total institutions, such as detention homes, are interesting sites for a study of disciplinary humor since they are designed to work on their subjects’ selves (Goffman, 1961; Foucault, 1977), and, furthermore, because
in these settings, staff members and residents tend to have strict behavioral
guidelines to orient to (cf. Kivett & Warren, 2002; Price, 2005). This means
that there are clear authoritative norms that might be resisted, ridiculed, or
dealt with in different ways.

This study explores how disciplinary humor, and particularly teasing, is
employed for creating, and challenging, social order, specifically related to
the shaping and reshaping of age, gender, and generational positionings
among staff and youth at Stillbrook detention home. The data are drawn from
videotaped interaction between staff and youth, focusing on instances of
disciplinary humor, that is, events that involve both laughing/teasing and
disciplinary features.

The study showed that while previous research has found that staff in
detention homes can use humor as a way to avoid disciplining certain
behaviors by looking the other way (Kivett & Warren, 2002), at Stillbrook,
the staff used humor as a skillful way of “getting things done,” a refined way
of making the residents abide by the local rules of conduct without explicitly
forcing them. Humor might thus be understood as a way to manage the
inherent dilemma of coercion vs. freedom by sidestepping explicit demands
on resident behavior.

In line with previous research which has suggested that humorous teasing
is an important aspect of male identity construction (Evaldsson, 2005b;
Haugh & Bousfield, 2012; Schnurr & Holmes, 2009), the staff members and
youths were found to orient toward teasing and the importance of being able
to “take it”; responding to a tease without being overly aggressive. But the
study also suggested that some instances could be conceptualized as rebellious
humor in that some youths were successful in teasing or mocking the staff
members.

Overall, the study illuminates how humor is used skillfully by both staff
members and youths in negotiations of local hierarchies related to authority,
generation, and age. In most cases, these were primarily evoked through the
participants’ ways of playfully exaggerating or playing with generational
divides. The staff members employed a number of interactional resources for
developing playful teases (Buttny, 2001), such as metaphorical exaggerations
and hypothetical quotes. In addition, these data document the use of playful physical action and gestures, as well as hypothetical threats as resources for developing playful criticism.

Furthermore, the study confirms that disciplinary and rebellious humor are not easily distinguished (Billig, 2005) since both build on the present social order. Even in the cases of rebellious humor employed by residents to mock authority, it can ultimately be seen to remind the participants of the very hierarchies that separate staff members from residents, and men from boys, or adults from children, and it thereby consolidates the very boundaries it apparently transgresses.

**STUDY III: RESPONSIBILIZATION AND DISCIPLINE: SUBJECT POSITIONING AT A YOUTH DETENTION HOME**


This study explores practices regarding a behavior modification program at Stillbrook, specifically how self-assessment practices can be conceptualized as responsibilization strategies. Within correctional institutions, such as detention homes, the ethical subject (Foucault, 1991, 1997) has largely become one who is not compliant, but responsible and enterprising, that is, involved in his or her own rehabilitation through introspection and self-governing (Garland, 1997; Rose, 2000). This implies that governing largely happens by *responsibilization*: the process through which the inmates are to be transformed and reconstructed into responsible, self-governing individuals (Phoenix & Kelly, 2013). Within the forced treatment for youth, responsibilization strategies can be found in various rehabilitation programs emphasizing self-care and self-regulation. Rather than employing coercive methods, these particular rehabilitation programs focus on a transformation of the offenders into active, responsible citizens by influencing their thought patterns (Cox, 2011; Fox, 1999, 2001).

Inmates in institutions do not, however, simply remain submissive to this type of control, but engage in different forms of resistance. While resistance
sometimes takes dramatic forms, such as riots, it can also be seen in small acts in everyday life during which staff and inmates continuously negotiate power-resistance relationships (Crewe, 2007; Bosworth & Carrabine, 2001). Research on resistance in youth detention is sparse, but a few studies have illuminated youth resistance, for example, in the form of using rules to their advantage (Cesaroni & Alvi, 2010), or, by strategically complying or adopting a stance of “faking it” vis-à-vis their participation in rehabilitation (Cox, 2011).

Previous criminological research has investigated the rationality behind policy and practice reforms in terms of responsibilization strategies of governance that produce particular subjectivities (e.g., Kemshall, 2002; Gray, 2009; Muncie, 2006). Yet, few previous studies have examined the actual everyday practices. Therefore, this study takes an interactional approach and focuses on responsibilization in practice. Specifically, it concentrates on the particular and detailed behavior modification practices: self-assessment training, where the residents are asked to identify problem behaviors that should be altered, and then, on a daily basis, to scrutinize, evaluate, grade, and reward their own behavior.

The empirical data analyzed consist primarily of videotaped interaction between staff and youth. The analysis draws on a Foucauldian perspective on discourse (1982) and combines an ethnographic approach with fine-grained analyses of social interaction (cf. Duranti, et al., 2012; Miller & Fox, 2004; Wetherell, 2007) as well as DP (Billig, 1991; Wetherell, 1998, 2007). The analyses illuminate the ways that responsibilization is attempted and resisted in practice, as well as how responsibilization is intrinsically tied to issues of subjectivity.

The study explicates the detention home setting, which is highly complex as the institution engages in both rehabilitation and control, and could be understood as simultaneously attempting to produce both obedient and docile subjects and free and self-governing subjects who do not simply submit to authority (cf. Rose, 2000). The study shows that this dilemma largely centers on relations with the rules and manuals of the rehabilitation programs. The rules are constructed as helpful and the residents are subsequently being
positioned as individuals who need assistance or rehabilitation rather than control and punishment, a position that the residents at times resist.

The staff will do a great deal of work to coax residents into behaving correctly without directly telling them how to conduct themselves. Further, the residents at Stillbrook are very skillful at navigating the rehabilitation system and using the rules strategically. The study explicates several ways in which the residents use rules to their own advantage. For example, Markus employs a particularly skillful exploitation of the system’s flaws as he manages to simultaneously comply by participating in self-assessment and resist responsibilization by following the rules too closely (and too rigidly).

Another resident, Jesper, successfully uses the rules of the system in constructing himself as a responsible young man. He uses the rules to explicitly discipline himself, much in the same way as staff members otherwise do, and he manages to construct himself as someone who is responsible and dedicated to self-improvement. He may be seen to exemplify the way self-assessment practices may be successfully used as a technology of the self (Foucault, 1997).

Further, the study highlights how both staff members and youths recurrently strategically position the young men as little boys to achieve specific practical ends. This is performed by both the residents themselves, seemingly without irony, and the staff members as a mocking “threat”: a way of disciplining the residents. It is intriguing that the young men are often positioned as mischievous little boys when they might otherwise be positioned as disobedient delinquents. For example, in an interaction between Britta, a staff member, and Jesper, a resident, Britta constructs a prior incident where Jesper had broken the rules concerning how long residents may play video games and had not followed staff members’ instructions to finish playing as a type of behavior normal of preschool-aged children rather than that of delinquent youth.

The study concludes that these types of positionings of the young men as little boys can be understood as a type of joint resistance where staff members and youths at times collaboratively resist or handle the contradictory aims of the institution. The hierarchical difference between child and parent is, in this
context, less problematic than that between delinquent and staff member. In instances when the residents are not compliant, it may be “safer” to position them as mischievous children (who should submit to adult authority). This positioning reconstructs the disciplinary action as something much like parents socializing children, rather than prison guards enforcing discipline or punishing delinquents.
Papers

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The articles associated with this thesis have been removed for copyright reasons. For more details about these see: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-106936
This dissertation explores staff-resident interaction in a youth detention home setting, a particularly dilemmatic context, where ideological dilemmas may have a profound impact on the residents. It is argued that morality and normality issues, which are integral parts of identity, are of high relevance in such a setting of forced treatment on an indeterminate basis where the treatment periods are not specified. The resident youths have breached societal norms in different ways (usually petty criminal acts). The stakes are high in such a place where the residents are not released upon having served a specific time for a crime, but, ultimately, only when they have proved to be sufficiently rehabilitated to be released or transferred to other less-secure treatment facilities. In order to be released, they should be seen to be able to self-govern themselves (but perhaps with some institutional support). Behaving in accordance with norms within the walls of the institution may
thus be understood as something of great importance to the residents, and, further, proper conduct hopefully instills a belief in the staff that the residents “have truly changed,” having reinvented themselves as it were, and that they will also behave appropriately outside those walls when they are no longer under surveillance.

Furthermore, detention homes comprise a setting that is often isolated from the rest of society. Few people have actual insights into, or firsthand experiences of, these institutions. By conducting an in-depth study of one such detention home, this dissertation contributes by localizing and revealing some of the social interactional resources that both staff members and residents draw upon in their everyday lives. An important argument here is that rehabilitation should not be understood as merely consisting of treatment programs and manuals, but treatment happens through language and specifically through the intricate interaction between staff members and youths on a moment-to-moment basis. As the studies have revealed, treatment is very much about making the other party say the right things. It is therefore, to a great extent, about rhetoric. When interaction in this setting is explored in depth, a multitude of resources are laid bare.

In this dissertation, I have argued that a study of treatment practices and subjectivity in a total institution benefits from a combination of a Foucauldian perspective on discourse, power, and subjectivity, and a more Goffmanian-inspired method of ethnography, studying situated identity work and the participants’ own interpretations and ways of doing things. Through an ethnographic immersion in the treatment culture, and a detailed analysis of interaction, this dissertation investigates subjectivity, power, and resistance in interaction. The three studies illuminate how subject positions are not only produced through discourse, but how they also can be used as resources by the participants in everyday interaction. This perspective thus highlights both how discourse constructs what can be talked about and in what ways and how subject positions are highly situated and essentially co-constructed. For instance, a resident using a “little boy” position may make relevant a staff member’s position as a “parental caretaker” (rather than “disciplinarian”).
To sum up the contributions of this dissertation: it advances prior research by investigating the actual everyday practices that go on in a detention home. There is very little previous research about this, and this study is almost unique in the sense that videotaped everyday life interaction has rarely been analyzed (but see Cromdal & Osvaldsson, 2012). It further contributes by providing a detailed and situated analysis of so-called neoliberal technologies of governing in practice. By combining macro and micro perspectives on discourse, this dissertation documents how power and resistance are played out in social interaction, mainly through specific (dilemmatic) types of subject positioning but also through detailed documentations and analyses of the participants’ own reflections on what is going on in social interactions. This highlights that subject positions are produced through discourse, but also explicates that identity positions are highly situated and are co-constructed and put to use in interaction.

In the following section, I will discuss some of the discursive resources found in each study and the specificities of these resources in this particular discursive setting. First, I will briefly examine treatment dilemmas that can be seen as inherent in detention home treatment.

**Disciplining Free Individuals in Forced Treatment**

This dissertation has illuminated several dilemmas in the detention home treatment of youth. First, the care-control dilemma may be understood as intrinsic to institutions that provide forced care, and it touches upon issues of whether this type of institution delivers—treatment/rehabilitation or punishment/control. One of the major dilemmas of neoliberal governing within locked institutions might be that these institutions can be seen to attempt to construct free and responsible individuals, inviting the participants to reinvent themselves as it were in an environment where the individual actually has very little freedom to enact the desired responsibility (see also Cox, 2011). Within the modes of control that Rose (1999b, 2000) calls advanced liberal rationalities, subjects are encouraged to work on themselves in order to become free agents rather than merely conformists. As opposed to disciplinary regimes, the goal is personal autonomy rather than submission
to authority. But at the same time, the detention home administers strict control, applying very specific rules of conduct and using a token system that may also be understood as one that delivers micro-penalties to those who do not abide by the local rules. This dilemma of coercion vs. freedom thus involves producing subjects (the residents) who behave in line with a large number of very detailed and specific rules of conduct, but not for the sake of following rules, but because they themselves believe that this is the right conduct and therefore voluntarily chose to behave so.

In this way, institutional discourses construct subject positions to be taken up or refused in interaction. In short, within a treatment discourse, the detention home is inhabited by individuals in need of help and care, along with other individuals (staff members) who provide that care. Conversely, within a discourse of punishment, the detention home would be made up of individuals guilty of crimes, who, therefore, should be punished, and of staff members who would merely deliver systematic punishments, making sure that the residents would not escape.

**Resisting Resident Subjectivities**

Previous research has shown that despite the explicit power imbalance in detention homes and other forced-treatment (or incarceration) institutions, such as prisons, inmates do not simply submit to the power being imposed on them, but engage in more or less dramatic forms of resistance (see, for example, Bengtsson, 2012; Bosworth & Carrabine, 2001; Cesaroni & Alvi, 2010; Fox, 1999; Ugelvik, 2012). This dissertation confirms these previous findings, but contributes by specifically illuminating resistance through particular subject positionings. The studies show that the residents use several resources to resist rehabilitation and subjectivities constructed in detention home discourse, for example, by refusing to assume the position of being someone in need of help, and instead constructing the detention home and the practices that take place within it as punishment (Tadek, study III).

Paradoxically, in this setting, following rules too vigilantly may similarly be understood as an act of resistance. The social context of the detention home is made up of a large number of complex rules and consequences that
are constantly changing as the staff members refine, specify, increase, and
decrease them. The boys become very skillful at relating to these rules and
using them strategically to their own advantage, for example, to position
themselves as responsible, or the reverse, to complicate things by positioning
themselves as “rule-followers” and, in a sense, as “docile” (e.g., Markus in
Study III). Being docile may in a way be understood as the opposite of the
self-governing, responsible subject who actively makes his or her own choices
(but the right and responsible ones in line with governmental aims), someone
who, for instance, engages in self-critical thinking. Rule following can
become problematic since the goal is that the residents behave correctly not
for the sake of following rules, but because it is ethically correct behavior and
good in its own right.

Residents also used humor (study II), at times, as a way to tease or
criticize staff members. For example, Markus and Jesper exemplify this when
they collaboratively engage in a playful reversing of positions, positioning the
staff member Per as a resident and criticizing his playful complaint of wanting
to go home (study II, ex. 6). Through the use of humor, residents could also
build ridicule sequences together with staff members, collaborating over
generational boundaries.

THE DISCIPLINARIAN STAFF MEMBER AS A TROUBLED SUBJECT POSITION

Authorities have a distinct role in liberal societies. This particularly concerns
total institutions such as prisons or detention homes. Liberal rule is tied to
the practices of authorities in the form of experts, for example, doctors,
psychologists, and social workers, who shape individuals’ selves and conduct
by the use of expert knowledge (Rose, 1999b). Psychology has been singled
out as an especially influential discipline in shaping subjetivities (Brinkman,
are understood as experts—are the ones who are seen as speaking the truth
(Mills, 2003, p. 58). Within total institutions such as mental hospitals,
prisons, or, as in the present case, detention homes, the lines of separation
between experts and non-experts—between those who can speak the truth
and those whose accounts can be ignored—are especially distinct (Goffman,
1961). Even if the institution is designed to reconstruct inmate identities, this dissertation clearly illustrates that it also involves much identity work from the staff members as well. Their identities and those of the residents are always in flux.

Moreover, ideological dilemmas (in particular, that of coercion vs. freedom) inherent in the detention home setting can be seen to produce dilemmatic and paradoxical subject positions for the staff members with regard to enforcing authority in action. While the staff members at Stillbrook are given authority and power, they are repeatedly attempting, in several ways, to downplay or escape their use of coercion, avoiding a position of disciplinarian, something which is challenging in a coercive treatment setting.

In the staff members’ talk about token economy (TE), a highly disciplinary rehabilitative program in the sense that it sets strict and detailed guidelines for correct conduct by the residents, they employed a number of rhetorical measures in attempting to avoid positioning themselves as disciplinarians (study I). For this matter, staff members draw on several rhetorical resources, including the “clean slate metaphor,” which constructs the TE system as transparent and objective. They also used rules and numbers as externalizing devices (Potter, 1996). These are interactional procedures that draw attention away from the identity of the speaker and conceal the fact that the speaker could have a stake in—something to gain or lose from—what is being said. More specifically, the staff members used rules and numbers (in the form of tokens in the TE system) as resources to construct “out-there-ness,” constructing what is being said as objective facts (Potter, 1996), and simultaneously positioning themselves as merely following the rules of the TE system, rather than disciplinarians with “punitive thinking” (as described by a staff member in study I).

Furthermore, ambiguity could be seen as an important resource for this matter, and it relates to the issues of authenticity that may be understood as always present in interaction, in the sense that people treat each other’s talk as being motivated by self-interest and therefore they must take measures to construct their accounts or versions of events as factual. Within DP, this is conceptualized as the dilemma of stake (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter,
1996). Here authenticity is understood as a discursive accomplishment. At Stillbrook, the participants could be seen to use paradoxical aspects and ambiguities in order to handle some issues of stake or authenticity. In study I, the staff members draw on both paradoxical aspects of the TE system (that it can be understood as a form of both punishment and reward/rehabilitation) to construct themselves as non-disciplinarian and credible in this matter. This finding has some similarity to Åkerström’s (2006) study of detention home staff members’ “doing ambivalence” as a rhetorical activity that handles stake when discussing a new treatment ideology.

Ambiguity as a staff resource was further explicated in study II, where humor, in particular disciplinary humor (Billig, 2005), was shown to handle the troublesome dilemmas for staff members. This type of, often ironic, humor may be understood as yet another way for staff members to deal with dilemmas that occur in the intersection between neoliberal governing and disciplinary control (coercion vs. freedom), and relating to identity construction where staff members might avoid the position of disciplinarian. First, through the use of humor, in particular ridicule or teasing, staff members can make the residents behave in a desired way without specifically ordering them to do so. This can thus result in residents (seemingly) freely choosing to behave in desired ways. Second, (self-)ironic humor by staff members may have a similar effect. By enacting parodic, exaggerated authoritative staff behavior, they can actually position themselves as the opposite, as someone who is not authoritative. Simultaneously, this is, however, an artful way of reminding the residents of who ultimately has the authority.

**Generational positionings**

One of the findings of this study is that the young men in the detention home are often positioned or position themselves as little boys—as children. This may be seen as paradoxical in several ways, for example, in that they are residents in an institution that is designed to produce responsible young adults who can take care of themselves in society. But this is also an example
of how discourses are productive in that they construct novel subject positions.

Furthermore, the child position makes practices possible that might otherwise seldom take place in these semi-delinquent young men’s lives. While the detention home setting can at times be rough at Stillbrook (for example, the residents can be forced to follow local rules of conduct with an impending threat of isolation), there is also, for instance, a lot of hugging and cuddling up together on the couch, something that the child position allows for. The residents sometimes actually discuss crimes or drugs, however, instances such as when they watch children’s programs on TV together appear more common.

In most Western societies, age and “maturity” are highly value-laden social categories (cf. Jenks, 2005). It might be considered demeaning to address someone as either much older or younger than he or she is. Acting too childish or too mature is problematic and might be considered inauthentic, as when someone tries to assume a position that he or she is not entitled to (Aronsson & Gottzén, 2011; Cromdal & Osvaldsson, 2012; Tholander, 2002; Tholander & Aronsson, 2002, 2003, touch upon these issues to some extent). This further highlights that age, like other social categories, for example, gender, is heavily infused with morality. This is also why individuals who position themselves as markedly older or younger may draw laughter, something which was illustrated in study II.

However, the age-related social categories are also powerful, and drawn upon by both staff members and youths in interaction to accomplish local goals. Staff members, for example, may ironically and humorously position themselves as older than they are. For instance, when Britta in Study II temporarily and ironically positioned herself as an elder person, an old lady (Sw: tante), when carrying a young man to the stairs when he refused to walk up to his room on his own: taking up the position of an elder relative or parental figure, rather than a staff member, making the act less threatening and aggressive. Through the same action, she manages to humorously position the resident as a small child who needs to be carried to his room for a nap. The action draws laughter while still getting the message across—that
the boys have to go to their rooms and the staff members are there to make sure that it actually happens. This analysis of temporarily subverted age positions extends prior work on (strategic) generational positions (Aarsand, 2007; Aronsson & Gottzén, 2011; Hepburn & Potter, 2011) in analyzing more in depth the complementary nature of the staff member’s generational positionings on the one hand, and the young man’s positionings on the other.

It is possible that issues of age and maturity are of particular relevance to teenage youths, who are in between childhood and adulthood, and even more so to youth in forced treatment since they are often admitted for having breached societal behavioral norms. Therefore, accusations of childishness may be understood as particularly spiteful in this setting (Cromdal & Osvaldsson, 2012). There are examples in this dissertation (study II) and other works (Aronsson & Gottzén, 2011; Cromdal & Osvaldsson, 2012; Hepburn & Potter, 2011) that child positionings, that is, positioning someone as younger than they should be, can be used as a way of teasing, reprimanding, or disciplining children or youths. In the present analyses of social interaction at Stillbrook, it can, however, also be noted that the child position proved to be a useful and powerful one for the residents themselves (especially illustrated in study III). This is yet another paradoxical aspect of the child position since in many ways “the child” as a social category may be understood as a powerless one. As pointed out by Jenks, the “dominant modern discourse of childhood continues to mark out “the child” as innately innocent, confirming its cultural identity as a passive and unknowing dependant, and therefore as a member of a social group utterly disempowered – but for good, altruistic reasons” (2005, p. 125).

The child is therefore discursively “naturally subordinate” to adults, or at least subordinate in a less problematic way than youth delinquents are to staff members in a forced-treatment facility. Positioning oneself as a child may allow residents to avoid acting responsible or in expected normative ways since it is thought likely that children are unknowing, dependent, and in need of help. This, in turn, means that they position themselves, the staff, and the detention home in terms of a treatment ideology or an ideology of care rather than punishment.
In many instances, residents and staff members jointly position the (teenage) residents as children, seemingly without irony. This phenomenon can thus be understood in relation to the dilemmatic setting of the detention home, specifically vis-à-vis both the care-control and coercion-freedom dilemmas. By reconstructing the young (semi-delinquent) men into little boys in need of parental guidance and care, these dilemmas might temporarily be circumvented as the disciplinary actions are re-conceptualized into something like parents socializing children, rather than prison guards enforcing discipline or punishing delinquents.

Similarly, for the residents themselves, subordination might be problematic since there is the issue that they must prove an “authentic will” to act according to rules of conduct other than following the actual rules. For them, through the non-ironic uptake of a child position, subordination might possibly work as a less problematic way of temporarily subordinating themselves. For example, Jesper (study III), who was accused of not following rules about playing videogames nor staff instructions, subordinated himself in assuming a child position, thereby also avoiding a position of submission to authority. The staff member Britta and the resident Jesper could both be seen to collaboratively position themselves and each other in ways that circumvented the more troublesome positions of disobedient delinquent and disciplinarian staff member. Therefore, these instances of child positioning might be comprehended as a type of joint resistance that staff members and residents at times enact together as a way of circumventing dilemmas inherent in the detention home setting.

In brief, as the impact of a total institution extends to all the individuals inside its walls, it has disciplinary effects on the selves not only of inmates but also of staff members (Fox, 1999; Hicks, 2012). This illuminates the possibility that staff members—and not only residents—might engage in resistance in response to the dilemmatic discursive setting. I believe that this, what I here call joint resistance, can be seen in the instances where (i) staff and youth engage in mutual positioning of young men as little children, and (ii) when they jointly engage in ironic humor about their positions at the detention home and the detention home context.
CONSTRUCTING AN AUTHENTIC SELF IN FORCED TREATMENT

At the detention home, issues of authenticity may also be understood as an explicit topic to be handled. Whether the residents actually have changed, or are just pretending to change, is crucial. In the same way, study III shows that it is critical whether they voluntarily abide by rules of conduct or not. As discussed in that study, it is important that the residents themselves freely choose to behave correctly. In studies of prison, similar issues have been documented. For example, Fox’s study (1999, 2001) of adult men in a CBT program in prison illuminates dilemmatic aspects of the prison discourse and prisoner subjectivities. The prisoner “self is at the same time rational, capable of change, and yet one that is essentially cognitively distorted and in some ways innately criminal” (Fox, 2001, p. 177). Staff members expected inmates to initially resist treatment; if there is no resistance whatsoever, or if the treatment discourse is adopted too enthusiastically, staff members doubt whether inmates’ self-change is authentic (Fox, 1999; see also Crewe, 2011; Lacombe, 2008). I would argue that it appears that to construct themselves as authentic in their self-change in rehabilitation, these prisoners must draw on paradoxical aspects of their institutional identity as prisoners. Achieving authenticity is therefore an interactional matter—it is negotiated in interaction. Moreover, as I have attempted to show in this dissertation, it might involve paradoxical combinations of subject positionings.

The notion of ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988) might shed light on this issue. Similar to how the staff in Fox’s study (1999) expected the inmates to show ambivalence, to both enact resistance (positioning themselves as criminal offenders) and participate in rehabilitation (adopting the discourse of CBT and positioning themselves as responsible, self-governing individuals), the residents and staff at Stillbrook might be seen to engage in a balancing of identity positions in order to position themselves as authentic. Study III, for example, shows some instances of residents alternating between divergent positions (Markus: resisting the system vs. child position; Jesper: child position vs. responsible young man position). The participants can therefore be seen to draw on dilemmatic or paradoxical...
identity constructions to create a more authentic, or credible, self, which highlights how paradoxical positions provide resources for participants in interaction.
The detention home could also administer care under Sol., that is, voluntary care. However, these cases are few under the SiS’s care generally (SiS, 2013b), and in this study, all of the young men were admitted under LVU.

Neutralizations are techniques used by offenders to account for criminal acts in ways that neutralize the deviant behavior by, for example, using justifications or excuses. Within CBT-based treatment for criminals, neutralizations are understood as a kind of thinking error that needs to be corrected. Ugelvik (2012), however, shows in his study that neutralizations can be viewed in a different light, namely, as a way for inmates to reconstruct themselves as moral subjects in a context where they are otherwise positioned as morally inferior.

It has been pointed out that confession through dialogue is an important aspect of these programs in their goals to produce normal, free, responsible individuals (Dahlstedt et al., 2011).

Other treatment practices included MI (motivating interviews; Sw: motiverande intervjuer) and Komet (a parental training program), but these had less significance as fewer staff members were trained in them and they were rarely mentioned.

This practice changed somewhat during the fieldwork. The residents always had at least one main contact person. Often they also had a secondary contact person and at one time the home used teams of contact persons where staff would work together with a group of residents but each resident would also have a main contact person assigned to him or her.
It should be noted that in connection with a critical investigation of TE conducted by the National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen, 2012), SiS updated its guidelines on how to use TE in its detention homes, including that TE must be employed in an individualized manner. This update took place after the fieldwork for this study.

There were also a few temporary staff members present at times during the fieldwork, but only the regular staff members are included in the specified number and they were the only ones interviewed.

The average length of male juvenile confinement in 2012 was 141 days (Sonefors and Knudsdotter Vanström, 2013).

The average age of the residents in the study is about fifteen. While the term “boys” might be common in traditional psychological research for this age, I believe that, for the purposes of this dissertation, the term constructs them as younger than they actually are. Therefore, I prefer the more age-neutral term residents or young men in order to emphasize that they are adolescents and may be understood as somewhere in between childhood and adulthood (Jenks, 2005).

All names, including that of the detention home itself have been anonymized.

The high staff-resident ratio was probably one of several features that made the home into a somewhat homelike environment.

Staff members were interviewed in two rounds. This article focuses on the first staff interview, which concerned the treatment methods at the home and staff roles.

All personal names, including that of the detention home itself have been anonymized.

See transcript notations in appendix A

All personal names, including that of the detention home, have been changed to maintain anonymity.

Since this study involves an analysis of language, and in particular of generational positioning, it is also important to reflect on the way my language positions the residents. I refer to the residents as young men, for lack of a better term. Boys, for example, constructs them as younger than they are.

The study received ethical approval from the regional ethical committee (EPN 53-08).


Ages are specified according to each young man’s birthday in the year of the video recording, whether or not the birthday had passed.

Each resident at the detention home had a small “team” of contact people. Usually only one staff member participated in the bedtime conversation.
The grading scale varied with the assignments, often three levels were used: unsatisfactory (Sw: icke godkänd), satisfactory (Sw: godkänd), and highly satisfactory (Sw: väl godkänd). Sometimes a fourth level was used as well: excellent (Sw: Mycket väl godkänd).

For example, the staff had previously pinned a photograph above Markus’ desk that showed his desk organized in a manner that they found to be neat; Markus was to tidy his desk accordingly.

Eftermiddagsfika, or just fika, is a Swedish tradition similar to a coffee break or snack time. At the detention home, fika happens three times per day. Residents and staff have coffee, tea, lemonade, and open sandwiches or cookies.

In the individual, empirical studies of this dissertation, this dilemma has also been called a dilemma of control vs. freedom, and of discipline vs. self-government.
REFERENCES


masculinities in juvenile corrections. *Men and Masculinities, 11*(1), 22-41.


*Socialtjänstlagen [SoL: 2001:453] [The Social Service Act].*


   In C. Antaki & S. Widdicombe (Eds.), *Identities in talk* (pp. 192–207).

APPENDIX A: TRANSCRIPTION NOTATIONS

Transcription notations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>:</td>
<td>prolonged syllable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>overlapping utterances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.)</td>
<td>micropause (i.e., shorter than 0.5 seconds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>pauses in seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(xxx)</td>
<td>inaudible word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(word)</td>
<td>uncertain transcription</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_ _ _</td>
<td>speech at low volume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORD</td>
<td>relatively high amplitude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(( ))</td>
<td>transcriber’s comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>rising terminal intonation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≡</td>
<td>latching between utterances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>word</td>
<td>sounds marked by emphatic stress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hehe</td>
<td>laughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w(h)ord</td>
<td>laugh particles within word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>abrupt cut-off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“word”</td>
<td>reported speech</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B: TRANSCRIPTS IN SWEDISH

STUDY II

Excerpt 1.

1* Jesper Hallå (kan) ja få gå? Ah men asså ja vet- ja kan
ty- asså nå- ah allvarligt en portion efter eh
första portionen så får man gå ifrån?
5 Henke De kan vi ta upp om ni ha de men ta de på
elevkonferensen
7 Markus Hehehe
8 Jesper Klockan e tio över fem ((tittar på sin
armbandsklocka)) å ja ska prata me dig ((pekar på
Henke)) å ja ska (((Tittar på klockan igen och
"räknar demonstrativt med hjälp av fingrarna")\)

11 **Per**  
((härmar överdriver Jespers sätt att gestikulera))\)

12 Jesper  
Ja:hoe\)

13 Tadek  
Ja ska duscha\)

14 Jesper  
Å ja ska\)

15 **Per**  
Kolla en gång till vänta ((tar tag i Jespers arm och vrider på den så Jesper kan se sin klocka)) 
nu- a bra\)

16 Jesper  
Va ska ja hinna göra?\)

17 Per  
Amen för de tar ju en stund å fixa till 
{(Klappar/stryker lätt över Jespers kortsnaggade här}) lägga de rätt\)

18 Jesper  
"Ah" {(ler lite}) de brukar vara (svårt) {(ler mot Per)}\)

21 Jesper  
Hehehe raka bort {(rör vid Jespers hakspets)} 
pling pling pling {(animerad röst)}\)

22 Per  
Ah de måste ja också göra {(rör sin haka liknande Per, ler, tittar mot Henke)}

*Numbers are matched to those in the English transcripts in the studies*

**Excerpt 2.**

1 **Nilla**  
Så: mina vänner (.)\)

2 Thomas  
Nä:j de e tre minuter {{kvar}}\)

3 **Nilla**  
[Uppe] me dig nu\)

4 Thomas  
Tre- Nåde (. ni säger (uppe) när vi e f=  
...  
{{Argumentation om tid mellan Thomas, Joel och Nilla}}\)

22 **Britta**  
((Går fram emot Joel i soffan))\)

23 Britta  
Nu kommer {xxx} tant bära upp dig\)

24 Thomas  
{{För varje gång ni kommer tidigare] så  
[är ni ingenting]}\)

25 **Britta**  
{{Tar tag i Joel under ben och rygg}}\)

26 **Britta**
Excerpt 3.

Jesper: Har inte- har inte X-landskap nånting i speedway?
Åke: Nå de e inte mycke X-landskap har
Nilla: ((ler))
Jesper: Åh ja, nä, okej vi säger väl de, vi säger väl de, vad har lilla Y-staden? ((bitande ton))
Åke: Ja vi har Jesper här på Stillbrook hehe (xxx)
Jesper: De måste va stort för Stillbrook
Åke: De e [stort] ((leende röst))
Nilla: [mm]
Jesper: ((xxx))
Åke: [Ja tror du kommer] hamna hehe de:: (. ) ja ja tror dom ska byta ut hästen på: torget
Jesper: "Vilken häst"
Åke: Hästen på (xxx)
Jesper: Ah den där han sitter på
Åke: [Mm så e de- så e de du som sitter]
Jesper: [Ja kan ta ner honom så kan ja sitta där hela dagen]
Excerpt 4.

1 Markus Visst ser han gammal ut me skägget ((pekar mot Tor))
2 Per Hur gammal tror du han e?
3 Markus E du asså du va väl tjugosex, tjugosju
4 Tor Tack
5 Per Ah precis ((ler mot Tor))
6 Tor Tack {tack}
7 Markus [Nå] men allvarligt
8 Tor Trettitre år ja
9 Markus Jaha (..) m å han ser ut som fyrtio femtio
10 Per ((Ler och tittar runt bordet, slutar demonstrativt le når han tittar i riktning mot Lotta/Jesper))
11 Lotta Men de va inte hyggligt sagt ju eh Markus
12 Per ((Gör en överdrivet sur min i riktning mot Lotta))
13 Markus Nå me(heh)n de e ju sa(heh)nt hehe
14 Lotta Nå: tänk va ledsen du skulle bli säg- du ser ut som du bara e sju år
15 Tor Hehe[hehe]
16 Lotta [Ah:::] va! femton år å få- moppeåldern
17 Jesper Ah eller [hur]=
18 Tor [På söndag!] (1.0)
19 Jesper Kan du ens köra moppe?
20 Tor (1.0)
21 Markus Ja:
22 Jesper Kör inte å krocka nu ja vill se dig på söndag för
23 vi ska ha tårta å {då vill inte ja att du ska dö}
Excerpt 5.

1 Jesper Lotta Lotta har du hört ja har gjort en låt om Per?
2 Per ((Sänker telefonen han håller i och vänder sig mot Jesper))
3 Jesper “Per du har så lite hår på skallen” ((sjunger))
4 hehehe
5 Per Hur e de å slå elever? (°de får man inte göra°)
6 ((leende röst; mot Lotta))
7 Lotta Så får man göra
8 Per Så får man göra ja ja skulle [aldrig kunna tänka mig å slå elever]

Excerpt 6.

107 Markus Du ((knackar Per på axeln)) va har du för önskemål ikväll?
108 Per Åka hem så tidigt som möjligt
109 Jesper Ah men asså ja fattar inte [hur kan du sitta å]
110 Per [åh göra nått kul me er]
111 Jesper =Hur kan du sitta å gnälla på oss å så ändå så har du valt å jobba här
112 Per "Va sa du?*
113 Jesper Du har ändå valt å jobba här sitter du ändå här å gnäller ibland på oss
114 Per "Näh de (gör ja inte)*
115 Jesper Va!
116 Jesper Lär dig å respektera att vi e dampbarn
117 Per A ja de vet ja att ni e ((litet leende))
118 Jesper Eh ja!: då får du lär dig å respektera de
119 Per ["Ja respekterar de nu°] ((vänder bort huvudet utan att le))
120 Tor [Hehehehe]
STUDY III

Excerpt 1.

34  Per  Nu är det [så här]
35  Åke  [Nu är det] följande som gäller (.). eh eftersom att du har så svårt att få klar din tvätt (1)
36  Per  För [det har du]
37  Åke  [Så gör vi] en mall här åt dig (.). som du kan använda dig av (.). eh nu står det onsdagar här men jag kommer lägga fram en ny till dig som det står torsdagar (1) 'Första maskinen startar jag direkt efter fikat på eftermiddagen' de e ju klockan tre de e ju då vi får börja starta tvätten (.). eller hur?
38  Åke  (2)
39  Åke  "Direkt efter middagen (.). så hänger du första maskinen och startar maskin nummer två"
40  Åke  (2)
41  Åke  "Klockan ärton (.). så gör du likadant"
42  Tadek  Ska ni göra så hela tiden medans ja e här?  
43  Åke  ((Irriterad röst))
44  Åke  Tills du: (.). klarar av utan lapp
45  Tadek  ((Suckar och vänder bort ansiktet från Åke))
Excerpt 2.

111 Åke  
Förstod du texten då? Om du läser igenom den [utan å (xxx)] 
({försöker räcka manualen till Tadek})

114 Tadek  
[Ja 

115 jag förstår ((irriterad röst, tar inte emot 
manualen))]

116 (2) ({Tadek och Åke tittar på varandra})

117 Åke  
[Ja du förstår mm]

118 Tadek  
[Jag kan det utantill ja]

119 Åke  
Kan du den utantill?

120 Tadek  
"Ja: jag vet allt"

Excerpt 3.

50 Lotta  
Ah jag kan hålla med dig om att det är IG (.) för 
här ser det ut som ett bombnedslag ((pekar på 
skrivbordet))

53 Markus  
Ja men DE:: står inte med på mina manualer ((pekar 
på manualerna som hänger ovanför skrivbordet))

55 Lotta  
Att du får ha det lite [o-] stökigt så där=

57 Markus  
[mm]

58 Markus  
=Ja

59 Lotta  
Det står att du får ha det så?

60 Markus  
Det står inte att jag får ha det så men det står 
inte heller att jag inte får ha det

63 Lotta  
Men de e stökigt?

64 Markus  
Ja, men det är inte därför jag har satt ett IG

66 Lotta  
Vad sa du?

67 Markus  
Men det är inte därför jag sätter ett IG

68 Lotta  
Är det inte det?

69 Markus  
Nä det är för sängen
Lotta: Mhm: (.) för jag tycker att du har det stökigt där.

Markus: Nja men de kan inte ja få ett IG för egentligen

Excerpt 4.

Lotta: För ibland tror jag inte du är medveten om att du gör så

Markus: (4)((Skakar på huvudet))

Lotta: mm

Markus: (*jag vill) nanna*

Lotta: Vill du nanna? ((smiley voice))

Markus: "Ja (xxx)"

Lotta: Förstod du vad jag menade nu?

Markus: Ja:

Lotta: Vad menade jag?

Markus: Det du sa

Lotta: Vad sa jag då?

Markus: D(h)e d(h)u sa

Lotta: Berätta för mig vad du- vad jag sa

Markus: Att du ska göra s- 'ajajajaj' ((rör munnen)) akta munnen ((uttråkat tonläge))

Lotta: M åh då- när ja gör så ['ahajajaj']

Markus: [Ska jag knipa käften!]

Lotta: Stänger du munnen (.) eller 'nu stänger du din lilla söta mun'

Markus: 'Fast så så jag kanske inte men eh' Du=

Lotta: =Du ska- du behöver inte säga det till mig men jag kan säga det till dig

Markus: Ah men du, den e störande ((visar en del av foten för Lotta))
Excerpt 5.

31 Åke Har farbror Janek [(xxx)]?
32 Janek [Ja! Jag] vill gymma med Jens,
33 om de, om de går
34 Åke (eh du säga nått mer va?)
35 Nilla Det är nått mer som vi pratade om igår [kväll]
37 Janek [Jag ska]
flytta
38 Nilla Ja, men vi har nått mer också som du brukar-
40 (2)
41 Nilla Som ingår i vissa [saker]
42 Janek [Cykla!]
((Lines omitted))
83 Janek Men jag tänkte flytta, cykla
84 Nilla Nej vi, cykla gör vi först
85 Janek Nä, de bestämmer inte du
86 Nilla Jo: innan det blir mörkt
87 Janek (Jag) cyklar inte
88 Nilla Får du ingen godkänd self-assessment training idag
89 heller?
90 Janek ((Skakar på huvudet, ler lite och formar ord med
läpparna mot Nilla))

Excerpt 6.

1 Åke Ska du inte sätta på dig kläder så du kan cykla
2 iväg
3 Janek JA HAR INGA! Det är därför jag väntar (på)
4 (aggressiv ton))
5 Britta Åh stackars Janek [inga] klåder= {(överdriven min,
6 putar med underläppen, smiley voice})
7 Janek [mm]
8 Janek =stack för att du (xxx)
9 Britta Åh ((putar med underläppen))
10 (2)
11 Britta Det är inte många som kan se så sur ut som du kan
{eller} ((leende röst)) INTE LE! {1} bra (.) MER
(.) rynka ihop ögonbrynen {((rynkar ögonbrynen och
gör en arg min))} Bra: Janek! Har du tur kanske man
kan bli lite rädd för dig nån gå(h)ng ibland (.)
hehehe

Excerpt 7.

16 Jesper E:h "träna å hålla playstationontiderna, sluta spela
17 vid tillsägelse, klarat av att sluta spela
18 självmant utan tillsägelse från personal"
20 {3}
21 Jesper Ja: jag har slutat spela vid tillsägelse
22 {1}
23 Jesper "Dom sa till mig" {((lägger ner pennan, sträcker på
24 sig och dunkar Henke lätt i ryggen))} {de e bra}
26 {2}
27 Jesper [{xxx}]
28 Henke [{xxx}] gjorde du det?
29 Jesper Ni sa ju till och så slutade jag {ju}
30 Henke {[(Visa igen)]}
31 Jesper Det finns ändå inget IG
32 Henke Nå det ska du väl inte ha
{((rader borttagna))}
61 Henke Du får ett G (.) men jag undrar om vi inte ska, vi
62 ska inte ha IG mer, men jag undrar om vi inte ska
63 nått annat där vi {kan}
64
65 Jesper {Ah vi borde ha] IG med tycker
66 jag
67 Henke Vill du ha de?
68 Jesper Ja eh ja
69 Henke Du vill ha de?
70 Jesper JA!: De e för fan Self-Assessment-punkter de e
71 klart man ska kunna misslyckas också, eller hur,
misslyckas man inte-] misslyckas man inte så lär
man sig ingenting

Excerpt 8.

57 Britta M eh m:: m bra jag hörde att dom hade fått säga
till dig och=
59 Jesper =mm=
60 Britta Och du hade gått in i ett Alfons Åbergs tillstånd
61 Jesper (Vaddå) 'ska bara, [ska bara,] ska bara' hehe ah
62 ((smiley voice))=
63 Britta [°Hehehe°]
64 Britta =Var har du din [Molgan?]
65 Jesper [Du!] jag e kapten krok {(håller
66 upp en knuten nåve med en nyckel som sticker ut
67 mellan fingrarna})
68 Britta Var har du din [Molgan?]
69 Jesper [Ja vet inte] Molgan?
{(rader borttagna})
70 Britta [Hur tå(h)nker] du att du sku(h)lle ku(h)nnna
72 min(h)ska Alfon Åberg lite då?
70 (1)
72 Jesper [(Asså)]
73 Britta [Du e] makalös på 'jag ska bara, jag ska bara'
75 Jesper °Ah°
76 Britta Många barn har ju de liksom: °hehe° nä(h)r do(h)m
77 är sm(h)å
78 Jesper Mm:: aieh ((ler)) ta den också, man får inte ha
79 den här {(ger Britta något})
80 Britta Tack (l) tack för en bra dag {{kramar Jesper och
82 dunkar honom i ryggen}} god natt


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