GEXcel Work in Progress Report
Volume V

Proceedings from GEXcel Theme 2:
Deconstructing the Hegemony of
Men and Masculinities
Autumn 2008

Edited by
Jeff Hearn

Centre of Gender Excellence – GEXcel

Towards a European Centre of Excellence in
Transnational and Transdisciplinary Studies of

• Changing Gender Relations
• Intersectionalities
• Embodiment

Institute of Thematic Gender Studies:
Department of Gender Studies, Tema Institute,
Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Linköping University
Division of Gender and Medicine,
Faculty of Health Sciences, Linköping University

&
Centre for Feminist Social Studies (CFS), School of Humanities,
Education and Social Sciences (HumES), Örebro University

Gender Studies, School of Humanities,
Education and Social Sciences (HumES), Örebro University

January 2009

January 2009
The publication of this report has been funded with the support of the Swedish Research Council: Centres of Gender Excellence Programme

GEXcel Work in Progress Report Volume V: Proceedings GEXcel Theme 2: Deconstructing the Hegemony of Men and Masculinities, Autumn 2008

Copyright © GEXcel and the authors 2009

Print: LiU-tryck, Linköping University
Layout: Tomas Hägg

Tema Genus Report Series No. 9: 2009 – LiU
CFS Report Series No.11: 2009 – OU
ISBN 978-91-7393-663-7
ISSN 1650-9056
ISSN 1103-2618

Addresses:
www.genderexcel.org
Institute of Thematic Gender Studies, LiU-OU – an inter-university institute, located at:
Department of Gender Studies, Linköping University
SE 581 83 Linköping, Sweden
Division of Gender and Medicine
Department of Clinical and Experimental Medicine, Faculty of Health Sciences
SE 58183 Linköping, Sweden
&
Center for Feminist Social Sciences (CFS)
School of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (HumES)
Örebro University
SE 70182 Örebro, Sweden
Gender Studies
School of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences (HumES)
Örebro University
SE 70182 Örebro, Sweden
# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a book with a red cover" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person reading a book" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a group of people discussing a book" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a library with books" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a classroom with students" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a teacher with a book" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a student with a book" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a bookshelf" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a pen" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a laptop" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a smartphone" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a tablet" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a briefcase" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a backpack" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a hat" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a scarf" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a jacket" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a sweater" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a coat" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a cardigan" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a blazer" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a suit" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a tie" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a shirt" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a dress" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a skirt" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a pants" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a shorts" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a trousers" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a jeans" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a leggings" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a leggings" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a tights" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a socks" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a shoes" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a boots" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a sandals" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a flip-flops" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a slippers" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a sneakers" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a running shoes" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a joggers" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a running shoes" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a tennis shoes" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a hiking shoes" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a hiking boots" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a walking shoes" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a walking boots" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a hiking sandals" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a tennis sandals" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a running sandals" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a running sneakers" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a tennis sneakers" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a running tennis shoes" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a running tennis sandals" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a tennis sneakers" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a tennis sandals" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a tennis shoes" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a tennis boots" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a running tennis boots" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a tennis running shoes" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a running tennis running shoes" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a tennis running boots" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a tennis running sandals" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a tennis running shoes" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a running tennis running sandals" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a tennis running running shoes" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a tennis running running running shoes" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Image of a person with a tennis running running running running shoes" /></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 8
A Bedroom of His Own: Intersections of Webcams, Surveillance and Male Sexuality in the Transnational Context 101
Alp Biricik

Chapter 9
Outsourcing Women’s Subordination: Male Buyers in Business and Leisure Prostitution 111
Sheila Jeffreys

Chapter 10
Subversions of Techno-Masculinity in the Global Economy: Multi-Level Challenges by Indian Professionals to US ICT Hegemony 123
Winifred R. Poster

Chapter 11
Deconstructing Hegemonic Masculinity 137
Richard Howson

The Contributors 149
Centre of Gender Excellence
Gendering Excellence – GEXcel

Towards a European Centre of Excellence in Transnational and Transdisciplinary Studies of

- Changing Gender Relations
- Intersectionalities
- Embodiment

Nina Lykke
Linköping University, Director of GEXcel

In 2006, the Swedish Research Council granted 20 millions SEK to set up a Center of Gender Excellence at the inter-university Institute of Themeatic Gender Studies, Linköping University & Örebro University, for the period 2007-2011. Linköping University has added five million SEK as matching funds, while Örebro University has added three million SEK as matching funds.

The following is a short presentation of the excellence centre. For more info contact: Scientific Director of GEXcel, Prof. Nina Lykke (ninly@tema.liu.se), Secretary Berit Starkman (berst@tema.liu.se), or Research Coordinator: Katherine Harrison (katha@tema.liu.se).
Institutional basis of GEXcel

Institute of Thematic Gender Studies, Linköping University & Örebro University
The institute is a collaboration between:
Department of Gender Studies, Linköping University
Centre for Feminist Social Studies, Örebro University
Affiliated with the institute are:
Division of Gender and Medicine, Linköping University
Centre for Gender Studies, Linköping University

GEXcel board and lead-team
– a transdisciplinary team of Gender Studies professors:

• Professor Nina Lykke, Linköping University (Director) – Gender and Culture; background: Literary Studies
• Professor Anita Göransson, Linköping University – Gender, Organisation and Economic Change; background: Economic History
• Professor Jeff Hearn, Linköping University – Critical Studies of Men and Masculinities; background: Sociology and Organisation Studies
• Professor Anna G. Jónasdóttir, Örebro University – Gender Studies with a profile of Political Science
• Professor Barbro Wijma, Linköping University – Gender and Medicine

International advisory board

• Professor Karen Barad, University of California, St. Cruz, USA
• Professor Rosi Braidotti, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands
• Professor Raewyn Connell, University of Sydney, Australia
• Professor Emerita Leonore Davidoff, University of Essex, UK
• Professor Emerita Kathleen B. Jones, San Diego State University, USA
• Professor Elzbieta Oleksy, University of Lodz, Poland
• Professor Berit Schei, Norwegian University of Technology, Trondheim, Norway
• Professor Birte Siim, University of Aalborg, Denmark
Aims of GEXcel

1) to set up a temporary (5 year) Centre of Gender Excellence (Gendering Excellence: GEXcel) in order to develop innovative research on changing gender relations, intersectionalities and embodiment from transnational and transdisciplinary perspectives.

2) to become a pilot or developmental scheme for a more permanent Sweden-based European Collegium for Advanced Transnational and Transdisciplinary Gender Studies (CATSgender).

A core activity of GEXcel 2007-2011

A core activity will be a visiting fellows programme, organized to attract excellent senior researchers and promising younger scholars from Sweden and abroad and from many disciplinary backgrounds. The visiting fellows are taken in after application and a peer-reviewed evaluation process of the applications; a number of top scholars within the field are also invited to be part of GEXcel’s research teams. GEXcel’s visiting fellows receive grants from one week up to twelve months to stay at GEXcel to do research together with the permanent staff of the Gender Studies professors and other relevant local staff.

The Fellowship Programme is concentrated on annually shifting thematic foci. We select and construct shifting research groups, consisting of excellent researchers of different academic generations (professors, post-doctoral scholars, doctoral students) to carry out new research on specified research themes within the overall frame of changing gender relations, intersectionalities and embodiment.

Brief definition of overall research theme of GEXcel

The overall theme of GEXcel research is defined as transnational and transdisciplinary studies of changing gender relations, intersectionalities and embodiment. We have chosen a broad and inclusive frame in order to attract a diversity of excellent scholars from different disciplines, countries and academic generations, but specificity and focus are also given high priority and ensured via annually shifting thematic foci.

The overall keywords of the (long!) title are chosen in order to indicate currently pressing theoretical and methodological challenges of gender research to be addressed by GEXcel research:

- By the keyword “transnational” we underline that GEXcel research should contribute to a systematic transnationalizing of research on gender relations, intersectionalities and embodiment, and, in so doing, develop a reflexive stance vis-à-vis transnational travelling of ideas, theories
and concepts, and consciously try to overcome reductive one-country focused research as well as pseudo-universalizing research that unreflectedly takes, for example, “Western” or “Scandinavian” models as the norm.

– By the keyword “changing” we aim at underlining that it, in a world of rapidly changing social, cultural, economic and technical relations, is crucial to be able to theorize change, and that this is of particular importance for critical gender research due to its liberatory aims and inherent focus on macro, meso and micro level transformations.

– By the keyword “gender relations”, we aim at underlining that we define gender not as an essence, but as a relational, plural and shifting process, and that it is the aim of GEXcel research to contribute to a further understanding of this process.

– By the keyword “intersectionalities”, we stress that a continuous reflection on meanings of intersectionalities in gender research should be integrated in all GEXcel research. In particular, we will emphasise four different aspects: a) intersectionality as intersections of disciplines and main areas (humanities, social sciences and medical and natural sciences); b) intersectionality as intersections between macro, meso and micro level social analyses; c) intersectionality as intersections between social categories and power differentials organized around categories such as gender, ethnicity, race, class, sexuality, age, nationality, profession, dis/ablebodiedness etc); d) intersectionality as intersections between major different branches of feminist theorizing (for example, queer feminist theorising, Marxist feminist theorising, postcolonial feminist theorising).

Finally, by the keyword “embodiment”, we aim at emphasizing yet another kind of intersectionality, which has proved crucial in current gender research – to explore intersections between discourse and materiality and between sex and gender.

Specific research themes for first 2.5 year period of GEXcel

The research at GEXcel will focus on shifting themes. The research themes to be announced for the first 2.5 years are the following:

Theme 1) “Gender, Sexuality and Global Change” (on interactions of gender and sexuality in a global perspective), headed by Anna Jónasdóttir.

Theme 2) “Deconstructing the Hegemony of Men and Masculinities” (on ways to critically analyze constructions of the social category “men”), headed by Jeff Hearn.
Theme 3) “Distinctions and Authorization” (on meanings of gender, class, and ethnicity in constructions of elites), headed by Anita Góransson.

Theme 4 + 5) “Sexual Health, Embodiment and Empowerment” (on new synergies between different kinds of feminist researchers’ (eg. philosophers’ and medical doctors’) approaches to the sexed body), headed by Nina Lykke and Barbro Wijma.

The thematically organized research groups will be chaired by GEXcel’s core staff of Gender Studies professors, who make up a transdisciplinary team, covering humanities, social sciences and medicine. Seven more themes are under planning for the second 2.5 year period.

Ambitions and visions

The fellowship programme of GEXcel is created with the central purpose to create transnational and transdisciplinary research teams that will have the opportunity to work together for a certain time – long enough to do joint research, do joint publications, produce joint international research applications and do other joint activities such as organizing international conferences.

We will build on our extensive international networks to promote the idea of a permanent European institute for advanced and excellent gender research – and in collaboration with other actors try to make this idea become real, for example, organizations such as AOIFE, the SOCRATES-funded network Athena and WISE, who jointly are preparing for a professional Gender Studies organisation in Europe. We also hope that collaboration within Sweden will sustain the long-term goals of making a difference both in Sweden and abroad.

We consider GEXcel to be a pilot or developmental scheme for a more long-term European centre of gender excellence, i.e. for an institute- or collegium-like structure dedicated to advanced, transnational and transdisciplinary gender research, research training and education in advanced Gender Studies (CATSgender). Leading international institutes for advanced study such as the Centre for the Study of Democracy at the University of California Irvine, and in Sweden The Swedish Collegium for Advanced Studies (SCAS at Uppsala University) have proved to be attractive environments and creative meeting places where top scholars in various fields from all over the world, and from different generations, have found time for reflective work and for meeting and generating new, innovative research. We would like to explore how this kind of academic structures that have proved very productive in terms of advancing excellence and high level, internationally important and recognized research
within other areas of study, can unleash new potentials of gender re-
search and initiate a new level of excellence within the area. The idea is,
however not just to take an existing academic form for unfolding of ex-
cellence potentials and fill it with excellent gender research. Understood
as a developmental/pilot scheme for CATSgender, GEXcel should build
on inspirations from the mentioned units for advanced studies, but also
further explore and assess what feminist excellence means in terms of
both contents and form/structure.

We want to rework the advanced research collegium model on a fe-
munist basis and include thorough reflections on meanings of gender ex-
cellence. What does it mean to gender excellence? How can we do it in
even more excellent and feminist innovative ways?
Editor’s Foreword

The chapters of this volume are the result of the initial activities carried out within the frame of GEXcel’s second research theme, *Deconstructing the Hegemony of Men and Masculinities*. Most of the contributor authors were GEXcel visiting fellows and spent varying periods of time at Linköping University to work on their projects during November and December 2008. There are also two contributions from Tema Genus doctoral researchers who presented at the GEXcel events. Most contributors participated in the GEXcel conference on ‘Men and masculinities in transnational contexts: Power, hegemony and deconstruction’ and/or the symposium on ‘Men, age and embodiment: Power, hegemony and deconstruction’, which took place at Linköping University, Sweden, on 20th November and 2nd December 2008 respectively (see Appendix).

On 27th-29th April, 2009 some will gather in Linköping once more, at a conference aiming to develop the research activities they carried out during the autumn of 2008.

This volume is of a work-in-progress character, and thus the texts presented here are to be elaborated further. The reader should also be aware that due to the fact that this is a report of working papers, the language of the papers contributed by non-native speakers of English has not been specifically revised.

I would like to thank Kjerstin Andersson, Alp Biricik, Malena Gustavson, Katherine Harrison and Berit Starkman for all their assistance in the arrangements for Theme 2 and in the preparation of this volume, Raewyn Connell for invaluable advice on applicants for GEXcel and Nina Lykke for her support as GEXcel Director.
Chapter 1
Deconstructing the Hegemony of Men and Masculinities – Presentation of the Research Theme

Jeff Hearn
Linköping University, Sweden

The GEXcel project was launched in May 2007 with a conference arranged in Linköping (cf. Volume 1 of this Work in Progress Report Series). According to the work plan included in the application to VR (The Swedish Research Council), the first half of the first year was intended for preparations and detail planning. Since early February 2007 the Örebro team worked to prepare for the first theme on Gender, Sexuality and Global Change as the focus during the academic year 2007-2008 (Volume 2, 3 and 4). Collaboration has developed between the research themes, for example, with Theme 1 and the Conference on ‘The War Question for Feminism’, held in Örebro in September 2008. As Anna Jonasdóttir wrote in Work-in-Progress Volume 1

“... the kind of feminist social and political theory I wish to promote in this theme needs to take men (in their various relationships to women as well as with other men) theoretically more seriously than has been common among feminist theorists. Also, since Critical Studies on Men and Masculinities has developed into a field of its own, a dialogue between the two fields would be good for both.” (Jónasdóttir, 2008: 15)

Planning for the second theme, Deconstructing the Hegemony of Men and Masculinities, began during the life of the first theme. Since GEXcel is primarily a visiting scholars programme, gathering prominent senior as well as junior scholars from different countries to work with scholars based in GEXcel. These comprise invited scholars, selected from among many well qualified applicants from a wide range of countries, as well as self-funded Open Position Fellows. But first, I introduce Theme 2 in a little more detail.
What is the research theme *Deconstructing the Hegemony of Men and Masculinities* about?

This programme approaches theorising of gender and sexualities through a focus on the concept of hegemony in theorising men. The place of both force and consent of men in patriarchies is illuminated by such a concept that can assist engagement with both material and discursive gender power relations. Recent conceptual and empirical uses of hegemony, as in ‘hegemonic masculinity’ in the analysis of masculinities, have been subject to qualified critiques over the last ten years or more. This programme examines the shift from masculinity to men, to focus on ‘the hegemony of men’.

**Hegemony**

Hegemony addresses the relations of power and ideology, including the domination of what is ‘taken-for-granted’, and ‘commonsense’ definitions of the situation. It particularly highlights the importance of consent, even if that is provisional and contingent, and even if that consent is backed by force. In this sense, hegemony speaks more to complicity than to brutal enforcement. It refers to and reinforces what has been called the “fundamental outlook of society” (Bocock, 1986). In this sense, it is performative, but not simply a matter of performance. Hegemony encompasses the formation of social groupings, not just their operation and collective action. It is a structural concept, or at least invokes assumptions of structure, but is not structuralist.

Theorising on hegemony can be understood in terms of different theories of ideology within Marxian analysis. Nicholas Abercrombie and Bryan Turner (1978) showed how Marx presented two rather different theories of ideology. In the first, set out in the Preface (Marx, 1959/1975), “social being determines consciousness”: the particular social experience of particular social classes determines the ideas of the members of the class. Ideas follow immediate material relations, in terms of both general economic and social structural locations, and the conduct of everyday economic and social life. This approach lays the basis for the articulation of several class-based systems of ideas, even a relatively pluralist analysis. In the second, also set out in the Preface, but more famously in *The German Ideology*, “the economic structure, the real foundation” determines “a legal and political superstructure”, such that the ideas of “the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas.” (Marx and Engels, 1845/1970). This notion of ideology, like the first, embodies both material and intellectual force. It is, however, more deterministic, more
concerned with the social formation rather than activities of particular classes and class fractions.

The Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci (1971), took the latter mode one step further, rejecting economic determinism. He saw politics and economics, in his historical frame of 1920s Italian Marxism and communism, set within wars of position and manoeuvre. In his view of hegemony the cultural and intellectual realm was more important, with greater political impact than as an effect of economic structure and relations. Hegemony encompassed the range of social arenas – material, economic, political, cultural, discursive – rather than prioritising the economic or the cultural. Mike Donaldson (1993: 645) summarises some of the main features of hegemony as:

“... about the winning and holding of power and the formation (and destruction) of social groups in that process. It is about the ways in which the ruling class establishes and maintains its domination. The ability to impose a definition of the situation, to set the terms in which events are understood and issues discussed, to formulate ideals and define morality is an essential part of the process. Hegemony involves persuasion of the greater part of the population, particularly through the media, and the organization of social institutions in ways that appear “natural,” “ordinary,” “normal”. The state, through punishment for non-conformity, is crucially involved in this negotiation and enforcement."

Applications to men and masculinity

As noted, the notion of hegemony has been a key focus of recent research and debates on men and masculinities. There have been a number of ways in which the notion of hegemony has been used in studying men, as, for example, in ‘hegemonic heterosexual masculinity’ (Frank, 1987), ‘male hegemony’ (Cockburn, 1991), ‘the hegemonic male’ (Vale De Almeida, 1996), ‘hegemonic men’ (Dominelli and Gollins, 1997; Lorber, 2002), ‘hegemonic male sexuality’ (Mooney-Somers, 2005), and ‘hegemony masculinity’. Of these, this last use, that of hegemonic masculinity, has been by far the most popular and influential over the last twenty years of more.

The notion of hegemonic masculinity has been develop as an outcome – one might say more accurately an offshoot - of R.W. (now Raewyn) Connell and colleagues’ work on gendered social processes within patriarchy. In various publications Connell and colleagues have emphasised
processes of hegemony, dominance/subordination, complicity, marginalisation (for example, by class or by ethnicity), as well as other processes of resistance, protest and ambivalence (Connell, 1995). This process usage of hegemony has been by no means as popular or influential as another usage employed by Connell and colleagues, namely in terms of linking hegemony to masculinity. In this, ‘hegemony’ as one key social process mutates to ‘hegemonic’ as a descriptor of certain (multiple) masculinities. In this latter and very powerful scheme, forms of masculinity that have been recognised principally:

- hegemonic masculinity, legitimating “patriarchy”;
- complicit masculinity, bringing benefit without effort;
- subordinated masculinity, by gender-related relations, for example, gay;
- marginalised masculinity, by, for example, class or ethnicity.

Sometimes there are also references to resistant, protest or ambivalent masculinities. However, as suggested above, seeing hegemony as a process is rather different from seeing hegemony in terms of forms of masculinity.

Interestingly, the first published use of the term, hegemonic masculinity, was by Connell in 1979 in the paper, “Men’s bodies”, and republished in Which Way Is Up? (Connell, 1983). Its background was debates on patriarchy. The paper was published alongside two others on theories of patriarchy and empirical research on boys and girls in schools. In a further paper on the theory of social reproduction, he critiqued functionalist take-over of the term “hegemony” (Connell, 1983: 156). From this first use, the hegemony at issue in relation to masculinities was the hegemony involved in the patriarchal system of gender relations. In a personal communication Connell in 2000 reported that:

“I was trying to direct attention onto the patterns of conduct and emotion involved in men’s activity in a patriarchal system, including some of the complexities, division and contradictions – as I was also at the time trying to get a theoretical handle on the process of historical change in patriarchy.”

The “Men’s bodies” paper is very interesting in a number of respects. It considers the social construction of the body in boys’ and adult men’s practices. In discussing “the physical sense of maleness”, Connell marks out the social importance of sport as ‘the central experience of the school years for many boys’ (1983: 18), emphasising the practices and experiences of taking and occupying space, holding the body tense and skill,
as well as size, power, force, strength, physical development and sexuality. In addressing the bodies of adult men, he highlights the importance of physicality within three realms: work, sexuality, fatherhood. Above all, Connell stresses that:

“the embedding of masculinity in the body is very much a social process, full of tensions and contradiction; that even physical masculinity is historical, rather than a biological fact. … constantly in process, constantly being constituted in actions and relations, constantly implicated in historical change.” (p. 30)

The use of hegemony is developed in the much more well-known paper published in 1985. Here, Carrigan, Connell and Lee write that hegemony

“always refers to an historical situation, a set of circumstances in which power is won and held. The construction of hegemony is not a matter of pushing and pulling of ready-formed groupings but is partly a matter of the formation of these groupings. To understand the different kinds of masculinity demands an examination of the practices in which hegemony is constituted and contested – in short, the political techniques of the patriarchal social order.” (Carrigan et al., 1985: 594)

One might argue that there is a slippage from the formation of these groupings to the understanding of the different kinds of masculinity. At this point one might conclude that hegemony can mean many different things, but more significantly this shows the importance of being clear whether it is the formation of groupings or the different kinds of masculinity within them that is addressed. These seem to be different foci. In the book, Masculinities (Connell, 1995), hegemonic is defined by Connell as: “… the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women.” (Connell, 1995: 77). This is again a different emphasis to the social process usage of hegemony.

Some critiques of hegemonic masculinity

It is perhaps not so surprising that these (and other) various conceptual and empirical uses of hegemony, as in ‘hegemonic masculinity’ in the analysis of masculinities, have been subject to a variety of qualified critiques over the last ten years or more (for example, Donaldson, 1993; Hearn, 1996, 2004; Wetherell and Edley, 1999; Whitehead, 1999, 2002; Demetriou, 2001; Howson, 2006). These critiques have highlighted: lack
of clarity in the concept; lack of evidence or inconsistency or insufficient complexity in terms of detailed empirical studies; as well as theoretical and political inadequacies, for example, in relation to postcolonial theory and queer theory (also see Butler, 1990; Halberstam, 1998; Ouzgane and Coleman, 1998). More specifically, a range of questions can be put that are yet to be clearly answered:

• Is hegemonic masculinity a matter of cultural representations, everyday practices or institutional structures, or all three?
• Can hegemonic masculinity be reduced to fixed set of practices?
• Should one talk of hegemonic masculinities in the plural?
• How do various dominant and dominating forms, such as violence and control of resources, interconnect with each other?
• Why use the term, “masculinity”? What does it mean, include or exclude? (Hearn, 1996)
• Does hegemonic masculinity fit detailed empirical studies, for example, how men talk about themselves?
• How does hegemonic masculinity relate to postcolonial critiques?
• Where is the counter-hegemonic? (Donaldson, 1993).

A recent review of the concept by Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) addressed some but not all of these and other critiques.

The hegemony of men

Most importantly, the concept of hegemony has generally been employed in too restricted a way. The focus on masculinity is too narrow. If we are interested in what is hegemonic about gender relation to men and masculinity, then it is ‘men’ who or which are far more hegemonic than masculinity. Thus, instead, it is time to go back from masculinity to men, to examine the hegemony of men and about men. This involves addressing the hegemony of men – in both senses. The hegemony of men seeks to address the double complexity that men are both a social category formed by the gender system and dominant collective and individual agents of social practices. The hegemony of men instead raises these key social processes:

• social processes by which there is hegemonic acceptance of the category of men.
• the system of distinctions and categorisations between different forms of men and men’s practices to women, children and other men (“ masculinities”).

• which men and which men’s practices – in the media, the state, religion, etc - are most powerful in setting those agendas of those systems of differentiations.

• the most widespread, repeated forms of men’s practices.

• description and analysis of men’s various and variable everyday, “natural(ised)”, “ordinary”, “normal” and most taken-for-granted practices to women, children and other men, and their contradictory, even paradoxical, meanings.

• how women may differentially support certain practices of men, and subordinate other practices of men or ways of being men.

• interrelations between these elements above, that is the relations between ‘men’s’ formation within hegemonic gender order, that also forms ‘women’, other genders and boys, and men’s activity in different ways in (re-)forming hegemonic differentiations among men (Hearn, 2004).

The programme

This programme examines shifts from masculinity to men, to focus on ‘the hegemony of men’. It addresses the double complexity that men are both a social category formed by the gender system and collective and individual agents, often dominant agents. It examines how the category “men” is used in national and transnational gender systems. These uses are both intersectional and embodied in specific ways.

Dominant uses of the social category of men have often been restricted by, for example, class, ethnicity/racialisation and (hetero)sexuality; these issues have been explored in, for example, postcolonial theory and queer theory. Less examined is the construction of the category of men in terms of assumptions about: age, ageing and (dis)ability; nationality/national context; and bodily presence.

Indeed, despite the explicitness of some of the statements of Connell and colleagues, there have been a number of neglected or missing elements in some recent debates on and applications of hegemony to men and masculinities, including: relations of hegemony to “patriarchy”; relations of hegemony to” bodies” (note: the first formulations in the late 1970s); relations of hegemony to the (changing) “form” of the social, cultural, and indeed the virtual (note: despite anti-functionalist critiques of social change); and relations of hegemony to moves away from no-
tion of fundamental outlook of ‘society’ (Bocock, 1986), nation and the nation-state to the growing importance of the "transnational" (note: increasing attention to globalisation, for example, Connell, 1993, 1998).

Thus this programme examines how the hegemony of men is being (re)defined in relation to three intersectional, embodied arenas: in terms of problematising hegemony in practice, by way of these neglected arenas: (older) ageing, bodies, (dis)abilities; transnationalisations; and virtuality. In each case these are arenas that can be seen as forms of absent presence, by marginalisation by age/death, disembodiment, and disconnection from nation, respectively. Each presents reinforcements, challenges and contradictions, to hegemonic categorisations of men. These three aspects and ‘exclusions’ are problematised as the focus of this programme over the five years of GEXcel. In each case these are arenas that can be seen as forms of absent presence (Hearn, 1998), by marginalisation by age/disability/death, disembodiment, and disconnection from nation, respectively. Each of these presents reinforcements, challenges and contradictions, to hegemonic categorisations of men.

Moreover, the theme of ‘contradictions of absence’ refers to these three arenas in which absence of some men (or aspects of some men) may both, and contradictorily, reinforce hegemony of men and potentially at least subvert that hegemony; absence acts as both a source of power and a way of undermining power.

Three sub-themes in the programme

The three sub-themes briefly described below have already evolved a little during the development of GEXcel. The first sub-theme in Theme 2, though centrally based in the interrogation of age, ageing, gender relations and older men, has developed somewhat towards a more general engagement with questions of embodiment, and thus is slightly renamed. This is fitting as this is one GEXcel’s central cross-cutting themes. The second sub-theme has been renamed to be more precise and clear in its broad attention to transnationalisations and transnational men. The third sub-theme keeps the same title.

(i) Embodiment, Ageing and Older Men

Debates, dominant constructions and media and other representations and images of men and masculinities are dominated by younger men and men “of middle years”, as if men and masculinities “end” pre-old age. When images of older men are presented in the media they are generally very partial, very limited. Age, ageing, men, maleness and masculinities intersect in many different, complex ways. An under-explored area is the
frequent exclusion of older men, men with certain disabilities and dying (though not dead) men from the category of “men”. (Older) Age is a contradictory source of power and disempowerment for men; the social category of older men is contradictory (Hearn, 1995). In many societies age and ageing has been a ‘traditional’ source of patriarchal power, and of (some) men’s power in relation to women, older women, younger men. This relation of men’s age and men’s gender power has become more complex and problematic. In many contemporary societies, age and ageing can be a source of some men’s lack of power, in relation to loss of power of the body, loss of and changing relations to work, and significant extension of the ‘age of weakness’.

Men’s generational power in families and communities has been widely overtaken by major national and international institutions, most obviously in the state and business. These latter institutions have their own patterns of domination by particular groupings or segments of men. Contemporary contradictions of men’s ageing stem partly from inter-relations of sexism and ageism. Put simply, older men benefit through sexism, while, at the same time, older men are disadvantaged by ageism. Older men and older masculinities can be understood as an “absent presence” (Hearn, 1998). Indeed (some) older men may even become a contradictory, another Other - to younger men, even women. On the other hand, age and ageing do not necessarily reduce men’s power. Age and ageing are a source of financial power for some men, so that age also brings greater economic divergence. Men’s labour-power may be extended, through information technology and ‘cyborg-ageing’, pacemakers, disability aids and so on.

(ii) Transnationalisation and Transnational Men

Transnationalisation takes many forms and has many implications for men and gender relations (Zalewski and Palpart, 1998; Hearn and Parkin, 2001; Hearn and Pringle, 2006). It is perhaps the most acutely contradictory of processes, with multiple forms of absence for both men in power and those dispossessed through, for example, forced migration. Different transnationalisations problematise taken-for-granted national and organisational contexts, and men therein in many ways. The project builds on the earlier project: ‘Men, Gender Relations and Transnational Organising, Organisations and Management’ on: gender relations in the large business companies; and men’s gendered organisational practices in European countries, and differential relations of (supra)national policy to “men” and men’s organising “as men”.

21
One example of the impact of transnationalisation is the importance of managers in transnational organisations for the formation and reproduction of gender orders in organisations and societies. In light of the globalisation of business life and the expansion of transnational organisations, the concept of “transnational business masculinity” describes a new form of masculinity among globally mobile managers. Connell (1998) sees this form of masculinity as marked by “increasing egocentrism, very conditional loyalties (even to the corporation), and a declining sense of responsibility for others (except for purposes of image-making).” (Connell, 1998: 16). It differs from “traditional bourgeois masculinity by its increasingly libertarian sexuality, with a growing tendency to commodify relations with women.” Studies focusing on senior managers, still overwhelmingly men, are necessary to understand how the hegemony of men is reproduced and changed globally. This involves international research and multiple methods.

(iii) Virtualisation and Virtual Men

Virtualisation processes present sites for contestations of hegemony in terms of bodily presence/absence of men. The focus here is the positive, negative and contradictory effects of certain uses of information and communication technologies (ICTs) upon men’s, and women’s, sexuality and sexual violences, as men act as producers and consumers of virtuality, represent women in virtual media, and are themselves being represented, even made dispensible (Hearn, 2006). These structural and agentic differentiations, with and without force, may suggest multiply differentiated (trans)patriarchies that are stable and changing, fixed and flexible. Charting the particular, changing forms of these rigidities and movements of and around the taken-for-granted social category of men may be a means of interrogating the possibility of the abolition of ‘men’ as a significant social category of power. The implications of ICTs for the reformulation of social space and public (sexual) domains are examined.

Cross-cutting connections

Importantly, there are key connections between these three sub-themes, and the different men and masculinities thereby implicated: social processes across and between arenas, for example, men’s violences; forms of re-engagements with “absent” bodies; diverse links across the economic, the political, and the cultural; possibilities for both extensions and subversions of men’s power. In all, the concept of transpatriarchies may be a relevant theme. The persistence, and usefulness, of the concept of patriarchy, despite obvious critiques, remains. Following earlier debates on
historical shifts to, first, public patriarchies, analysis of transnational patriarchies or transpatriarchies is now needed. These contradictory social processes may also further the possibility of the abolition of the social category of “men, as a category of power”, an approach and prospect bringing together materialist theory/politics and queer theory/politics.

The Visiting Fellows and the following chapters

I introduce these in the order of the chapters of this volume. The next and first main chapter is by Professor Toni Calasanti, Professor of Sociology at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and an invited GEXcel Senior Scholar. She is working on the first sub-theme by an examination of the anti-ageing industry and what that tells about both age and gender relations. The next contribution is from Anna Boden, a doctoral student from the Department of Geography, University of Lancaster, UK, a competitive GEXcel Scholar, on the constructions of older men as grandfathers. The next two chapters continue the concern with ageing. First, Dr Neal King, Associate Professor in Interdisciplinary Studies, also at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and a GEXcel Open Position Scholar, writes on social processes of adjustment, or “slackening off”, amongst older men; then Linn Sandberg, a doctoral student in Tema Genus, Linköping University, addresses the questions of intimacy, old age, masculinity and heterosexual morphologies.

Questions of embodiment remain a focus in the subsequent chapters, but with a shift to and overlap with the two other sub-themes around virtualisation and transnationalisation processes. Chapter 6 is a more historically-orientated chapter by Benedict Carton and Robert Morrell, addressing martial sport, warrior bodies and Zulu manhood in South Africa, 1800-1930. Robert is Professor of Education, University of KwaZulu Natal, South Africa, and was a GEXcel Open Position Scholar in Autumn 2008. Then, Nils Ulrik Sørensen, a postdoctoral researcher at Aarhus University, Denmark, and a competitive GEXcel Scholar, discusses young boys viewing male bodies in pornography, as detours for young men’s heterosexuality. Alp Biricik, another doctoral student at Tema Genus, Linköping University, continues the debate on relations on embodiment, the virtual and the transnational, through analysis of the intersections of webcams, surveillance and male sexuality in the transnational context. The following chapter by Sheila Jeffreys, Professor of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, Australia, and invited senior GEXcel Scholar, addresses the outsourcing of women’s subordination in the form of male buyers in business and leisure prostitution. As such, it brings together question of embodiment and transnationalisation, and even to an extent virtualisation. Some further inter-
connections are drawn by Dr Winifred Poster is a Lecturer in Women's Studies, University of Washington in St. Louis, USA, and competitive GEXcel Scholar, in her chapter on subversions of techno-masculinity in the global economy, through multi-level challenges by Indian professionals to US ICT hegemony. The final chapter is on the overall theme of deconstructing hegemonic masculinity by Dr Richard Howson, a GEXcel Open Position Scholar who visited in May 2008 from Wollongong, Australia.

Two invited senior GEXcel scholars have accepted to come during Spring 2009 and stay for different periods of time. These are and Dr Christine Beasley, who is Reader in Politics, University of Adelaide, Australia, and Dr David Bell, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Geography at the University of Leeds, UK. Dr Marina Blagojevic, Dr Fataneh Farahani, Dr Karen Gabriel, Nil Mutluer and PK Viyajan have been selected as competitive GEXcel Scholars, and Niels Ulrik Sorensen returns for another research visit. These were selected from over 40 applications. In all these processes Professor Raewyn Connell, University of Sydney, has been a great support in Theme 2 advising Nina Lykke and myself on the competitive applications.

Finally, we have announced the 27th – 29th April 2009 conference related to this second theme, and received many excellent paper proposals.

References


Chapter 2
Aging bodies, constructions of masculinities, and the anti-aging industry

Toni Calasanti
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, USA

Introduction
A variety of competing masculinities, shaped by intersecting social locations, co-exist, only one of which achieves dominance in a particular time and place and serves the interests of elite men. While most men aspire to and measure themselves against this dominant masculinity, the majority do not achieve it, often as a result of discrimination based on their positions in other systems of inequality. Further, hegemonic masculinity “allows elite males to extend their influence and control over lesser-status males ...” (Sabo and Gordon, 1995: 8), subordinating not only femininities but other masculinities as well (Courtenay, 2000a). The resulting “contradictory meanings and experiences of manhood” (Coletrane, 1994: 42) means that many men feel powerless, which indeed they are—not in relation to women, but in their relationships with other men. These two hierarchical systems—domination over women and over most men—express and reproduce one another. Thus, for example, the single-sex organization and violence advocated in many competitive sports allows men to dominate other men, on the sporting field and in social settings, and also encourages the use of violence in relationships with women (Pappas et al., 2004).

In terms of the ways that social locations shape masculinities, more than a decade ago, Hearn noted that manhood is constructed “through and by reference to ‘age’” (Hearn, 1995: 97). But gender scholars have little explored how manhood changes with age beyond this insight and none has theorized this system of inequality.

1 This is a modified and updated version of the following article: Calasanti, Toni and Neal King, 2007. “‘Beware of the Estrogen Assault’: Ideals of Old Manhood in Anti-aging Advertisements.” Journal of Aging Studies, 21:357-368.
Below, then, I briefly discuss age relations—the system of inequality that privileges younger adults at the expense of old people (for a lengthier discussion, see Calasanti, 2003). I relate this to the ways in which people embody age and gender, and I explore anti-aging industry advertisements concerning bodily changes to discern some of the cultural constructions of masculinity in later life.

Age relations, bodies, and the anti-aging industry

Age relations operate similarly to other relations of inequality, such that, first, age serves a social organizing principle. Societies differentiate life stages and organize tasks, responsibilities, and behaviors based on age. Second, different age groups gain identities and power in relation to one another. People recognize their own placement, and that of others, into different age categories; and these categories matter for access to resources. These relations of privilege and oppression influence inequalities in distributions of authority, status, and wealth. In concrete terms, this means that those age groups who can be seen as “not old” benefit from ageism at the expense of those designated as “old”. For instance, age relations structure the labor market and are enforced by the state by means of its age-graded labor and retirement policies; those who are not old thus face less competition for such valuable resources as wealth. Thus age relations influence everyone’s life chances, and not just old people’s.

As with other power relations, those who are advantaged by this system view their position as “natural” and beyond dispute. They stigmatize the oppressed group and entitle themselves to own or manage resources that might otherwise go to the latter. By contrast, people designated as “old” lose power, even if they are advantaged in terms of their position in other hierarchies. Old people lose autonomy and authority, for example, in relation to their ability to be heard and exert control over personal decisions concerning their bodies. Research finds that doctors treat old patients differently than younger clients, more often withholding information, services, and treatment of medical problems (Robb et al., 2002). Doctors often take the complaints of old people less seriously than younger clients, attributing them to “old age” (Quadagno, 1999). At the same time, old age has been biomedicalized such that the outcomes of social factors are defined as medical or personal problems. The outcome of both situations is that old people lose their ability to make decisions about their bodies and undergo drug therapies rather than other curative treatments (Wilson, 2000; Estes and Binney, 1996).
Old people are marginalized in the labor market and in the workplace, losing both status and money. Attitudes and beliefs of employers matter, but often ageism is more subtly incorporated into staffing and recruitment policies, career structures, and retirement policies (Bytheway, 1995). The inability to earn money in later life means that most old people must rely on others—families or the state; they become “dependent.” Further, because participation in waged labor “is a crucial element of citizenship, in the definition of social worthiness” (Laws, 1995: 115), the lack of labour market participation encourages a view of old people as less than full citizens (Wilson, 2000: 161).

Finally, old people are stigmatized and culturally devalued. Negative depictions can accrue to other age categories, such as the dependence of infants or the immaturity of children. But, as Molly Andrews (1999: 302) astutely notes, we only seek to eliminate old age. The equation of old age with disease and physical and mental decline is such that visible signs of aging serve to justify limitation of the rights and authority of old people. Many view old age as a “natural” part of life with unavoidable decrements; equating aging with a natural order justifies ageism.

Old age does not just exacerbate other inequalities, but is a social location in its own right, conferring a loss of power for all those designated as “old” regardless of their advantages in other hierarchies. Even the most privileged lose power once they are labeled “old”—including privileged men. By the same token, age relations also intersect with other power relations. Gender, class, and other systems of inequality influence both when “old” occurs, and how individuals experience this—what it means to be old.

Although age relations are similar to other power relations in many ways, one critical difference obtains: age is fluid such that group membership shifts over time. People can experience both advantage and disadvantage in terms of age relations, if they live long enough. Among the many implications of this statement is the fact that, when advantaged by their age category earlier in life, people learn and internalize the cultural devaluation of old age. Thus, when they themselves become elders, many old people may accept their chronological age but will avoid identifying themselves as “old” (Minichiello et al., 2000; Townsend et al., 2006).

Age relations shape and are maintained by the ways in which people try to live up to ideals of age and other social categories in their daily lives. Age is something people do in daily interaction with others; we are held accountable for “acting our ages.” One way in which we do age is through our bodies (Laz, 2003). Bodies serve as markers of age and can thus serve as bases of exclusion, or inclusion. At the same time, they also serve as markers of gender and other social inequalities; we see not
just young or old people, but young or old men or women of particular races, ethnicities, sexualities, and classes.

The focus on bodies is particularly interesting in light of the cultural beliefs in many Western societies that one expresses oneself through one’s body, that one has the ability to shape it in many different ways, and that science and technology can help us control our bodies. In combination with a strong belief in personal responsibility and control, people thus look down on others who “look old” because we see them as “letting themselves go.” We think they can and should exert control over their aging; it is a moral issue. That is, “empowerment” is now possible; the implication is that to deny oneself “agelessness” is immoral, deserving of the label “dependent” that attaches to those who have “given in” to growing old. People are thus motivated to try to present their bodies in ways that help them avoid this exclusion, and researchers have begun to explore these cooperative efforts between consumers and those that market anti-aging products and services to them.

Precisely what should be included under the rubric of the anti-aging industry is not entirely clear; Mehlman et al. (2004: 305) use a broad definition that includes five categories of products and services geared at altering aging: “cosmetic treatments and surgery; exercise and therapy; food and beverages; vitamins, minerals, and supplements; and cosmetics and cosmeceuticals”. However defined, the anti-aging industry is both lucrative and expanding, with the profit estimates of $43 billion in 2002 expected to rise to $64 billion in 2007 (Mehlman et al., 2004). As a profit-seeking industry, advertisements for the anti-aging industry will draw upon cultural constructions thought to resonate with the most potential customers; they can thus be seen as both reflecting and reshaping cultural constructs about aging, bodies, and gender.

Thus, the anti-aging industry serves as an example of broader practices of ageism that operate in the context of intersecting inequalities to marginalize old people in clearly gendered ways. It is a useful source of information about how we view aging as it makes clear what things we associate with aging bodies and thus want to avoid. It also makes clear how aging bodies are gendered, and in this sense, what it is we think would make for an appropriate old age: what it is we should strive for as we get older as old men and women.

I focus here on what anti-aging ads tell us about old manhood. I argue that both ageism—the domination of younger men over old men—and sexism are embedded in these ads such that both are reinforced. That is to say, the ads tell us, first, that men cannot be both men and old; and second, that maintaining manhood also means maintaining gender inequality.
Anti-aging websites and old manhood

My discussion draws from content analysis of 96 anti-aging websites. I analyzed these websites and relevant links, and examined both pictures and text advertising of anti-aging products and services. Throughout these web pages, the presentation of race was limited such that whiteness served as the implicit or explicit standard; I found very few pictures of people of colour. Likewise, little class variation emerged. The consumer sites assume at least a middle class standing as their products are often costly and they often depict potential consumers engaged in relatively expensive activities, such as travel and golf. Finally, both text and pictures suggested that consumers’ sexual orientation was assumed to be heterosexual. Thus, the view of manhood presented is very specific; all masculinities are to approximate this hegemonic vision.

Most typically, products sold on anti-aging websites are related to hormones, especially human growth hormone (hGH). The standard pitch to consumers is that taking an hGH formulation will help them to: gain muscle mass, bone density, and endurance; lose wrinkles and physical pain; and improve their mental outlook, energy, libido, sleep, skin, internal organs, and blood pressure. Other hormones that come up frequently include testosterone and estrogen. Finally, a variety of dietary supplements, skin care products, and similar products also appear on the websites; services provided include clinical services and cosmetic surgery.

Websites differentiate by gender in a variety of ways. Some sites directed only to men or to women, or have separate pages and products for women and men. Others include products for both sexes on the same pages but sell them in gender-differentiated ways. For instance, “HGH-pro” sells iterations of hGH, ostensibly derived from pituitary extracts and “velvet antler formula,” in different “combos” specifically for women (along with “Female Balance” and “Female Plus”, http://www.healthandfitnesstv.com/womens-anti-aging.htm) and for men (with “Male Balance” and “Male Plus”; http://www.healthandfitnesstv.com/mens-anti-aging.htm).

Manhood as biological opposition to womanhood

“Testosterone… makes you a MAN” (http://www.lifespringmen.com/ Antiaging). Ads such as this, from the LifeSpring Medical Group, are common and suggest that masculinity (like femininity) is biologically based, rooted in hormones whose levels decline with age. Most websites explicate the link, some doing so with scientific-sounding neologisms: “As a steroid and androgen [testosterone] functions in three categories:
masculinization, anabolism (tissue building) and sexual arousal” (www.renewman.com/testosterone03.htm).

Despite the lack of scientific evidence that the slight decrease in testosterone that accompanies aging has any clinical significance (Marshall and Katz, 2006), these sites depict manhood under siege, threatened by “male menopause” “andropause,” “male hypo-gonadism” and, on one website, “manopause”—all of which can make men “less than men.” These sites argue that diminishment in testosterone robs men of characteristics of manhood that are at least partly social. One site states that, with andropause, “Men slowly experience a decline or loss of sexual vigor and performance, lack of direction, poor self confidence, loss of purpose, decisiveness, courage and motivation.” (http://www.antiaging.com/andropause.html). Another site argues that, “Low Testosterone Wreaks Havoc on Your Ability to Feel Alive and Be All the Man You Can Be” (http://www.lifespringmen.com/AntiAging.htm). The social aspects of manhood are presented as rooted in biology—in testosterone.

Further, manhood is depicted as under siege from the biological forces of femininity. Ads tell men that, with age, not only do they lose testosterone but they gain estrogen—a “female hormone” that degrades manhood: “Men need to be Aware of the Estrogen Assault. … Mother nature and father time are not only depleting your testosterone reserves but are also trying to overload you with estrogen.” http://www.lifespringmen.com/HormoneHealth.htm One site warns that the combination of male socialization and the feminizing effect of biological aging conspire against men:

“The whole idea of men going through menopause, or andropause and needing hormone replacement therapy is ‘de-masculinizing’. Virility is a man’s second nature … and to seek help for this ‘condition’ is itself ‘de-masculinizing’… Men do not talk or complain since it is not the ‘manly thing to do’.” (http://www.renewman.com/Andropause0319.htm).

And for men to be (in chemical terms) more like women is to face debilitation, to be come sick and unhealthy:

Along with [a] decline in testosterone with age and lifestyle, many men also experience increases in the levels of estrogen. The result is a testosterone/estrogen imbalance that directly causes many of the debilitating health problems associated with normal aging…. In fact, studies have shown that the estrogen levels of the average 54-year-old man is higher than those of the

This chemical feminization results not only in status loss but also in concrete threat to life. Arguing for the importance of recreating the previous hormonal balance, one site tells men (counter to much scientific evidence) that “…[R]eplacing testosterone does not increase but rather decreases the chances of developing prostate cancer. One of the primary causes of prostate cancer is excess estrogen” (http://renew.sonstone.com/Testosterone/Tabid/779/default.aspx).

Masculinity as biological opposition to aging

Advertisements promote the notion that loss of testosterone is not only “de-masculinizing,” but also underlies the aging process. Sometimes, this plays on the depiction of old age as a disease; ads tell men that, “low Testosterone [is] a modern-day male epidemic” (http://www.lifespringmen.com/HormoneHealth.htm) and more than one site implies that low levels of testosterone indicate a medical disorder, a “Testosterone Syndrome” (www.renewman.com), or “Testosterone Deficiency Hypogonadism.” The list of symptoms widely associated on these sites with andropause matches those linked to aging: loss of muscle tone, bone density, memory, and patterns of sound sleep. Still other symptoms overlap with constructs of masculinity, physically and socially: “low levels of … testosterone [is] followed by one or more of the following conditions: drop in sexual desire and performance; diminished muscle size; diminished muscle strength; depression; fatigue; weakness; loss of motivation; osteoporosis; sparse body hair; reduced libido” (http://www.lifespan-dynamics.com); decreased competitiveness (http://www.lifespringmen.com/AntiAging.htm); a decreased “Zest for life—the old attack the day attitude;” feeling “sad and/or grumpy”; “a deterioration in your work performance” (http://www.renewman.com/Home/Questionnaire/tabid/805/Default.aspx); and even a “loss of eagerness and enthusiasm (www.renewman/testosterone03.htm).

Further promoting the belief that hegemonic masculine characteristics are biologically based (like “competitiveness”) and intimately tied to aging, some sites use scientific-sounding discourse to warn men that any changes in their manhood signals aging. Turning around the medical logic usually cited, sites tell men that:
Until the early 1990’s medical science believed certain key hormones declined because we age. We now know the opposite is true. We age because those hormone levels decline (http://www.renewyouth.com/why_we_age.htm).

Testosterone may in fact be the single factor that links all age-related degenerative diseases. It is certainly intimately tied to the male cycle of aging ... Many age-related chronic and even acute diseases are associated with a decrease in production of testosterone ... (http://www.newportantiaging.com/docs/testosterone.html).

And LifeSpring Medical Group proclaims that “we have now discovered the secrets of the Fountain of Youth!”--which is testosterone: “Testosterone is ... essential for providing you with a youthful sex drive, high mental and physical energy, muscle size and strength, focus and concentration and slowing down the aging clock” (http://www.lifespringmen.com/AntiAging.htm). Reversing losses in one is equivalent to reversing the other. Maintaining masculinity means avoiding old age, and both depend on performance-enhancing products that operate at the biological level. This opens the door to claims that aging and masculinity can be controlled through hormone supplementation: “Replacing hormones to younger healthier level ... can give significant control over the aging process. ... This is medical science at its best.” (http://www.renewyouth.com/why_we_age.htm)

Manhood as domination: Reinforcing gender inequality

Anti-aging websites convey not only that men and women are opposites, but that remaining so is necessary to fight aging. Further, this opposition promotes gender inequality through the construction of manhood as power and domination. Based on scholars’ arguments that often the most significant struggle for domination occurs between men, I judged advertisements to be reinforcing gender inequality to the extent that they offered constructions of masculinity based on athletic or work competition among (youthful) men or domination over women. These ads offer visions of men victorious at work, in sports, and with women.

Several sites promoted images of masculinity involving physical performance through athletic competition. The site “Age Force” promises that hGH can “Increase Energy and Endurance—And That Translates Into Improved Athletic Performance!” (http://www.age-force.com). Sites also make the importance of competitive ability—and the relation to images of aging—clear: “Is there anything worse than being an obsolete old

Ads tell men that anti-aging products and services will empower them to triumph at work as well. From a cosmetic surgery site, we hear that:

thousands of forty-something men have been undergoing surgery … [to] boost their success in the boardroom … Executive plastic surgery allows the active businessman to plan and prepare for procedures that will allow for excellent rejuvenating procedures with a minimum of downtime and quick return to a busy schedule …[M]en say that their cosmetic surgery procedures often provide that jump start for success in a new job position, a competitive edge… (http://www.jromano.com/text/mlprocedures.html).

One web site testimonial tells consumers that anti-aging supplements can help aging men dominate in the work place and thus avoid becoming old:

I’m the oldest salesperson (62 years old) on a sales force of 52 people. I physically work hard … for 12 to 14 hours a day, six days a week. … [With this product] … I outwork salespeople one-third to one-half my age… And I’ve attained “salesman of the month” many times. (http://www.fromthepines.com/testimonials.html)

Gender inequality in terms of men’s dominance over women is especially clear in discussions of sex, which assumes high priority on men’s pages. Men are told that they should be concerned predominantly with sex; and that the sexual performance typical of young men is central to masculinity, as this dramatic discussion of “Testosterone Syndrome” reveals:

Without hormonal input, the muscles gradually wither and sustained fullness of erection becomes impossible. Even more catastrophically, a decrease in the tension of the ischio cavernosa prevents blood from being maintained in the chambers of the penis, with results as “deflating to the ego as a flat tire in the Indianapolis 500” (http://www.renewman.com/SexualFunction0319.htm).
Men are presented as active and women as receptive, their own desires stimulated by the men who initiate. Some men’s products begin by stimulating their libido, to initiate “action;” “Think of it as priming the pump – the body has to want to do it.” (http://www.renewman.com/SexualFunction0319.htm), while others also work to enhance women’s receptivity. One product promises that it “will not only help men perform better, but it will put her in a more ‘receptive’ mood …” (http://anti-aging-ghr-15-hormone-shop.com/tunnel.html). The ad for the supplement Super Testron makes the link between strength (power) and sex clear. With its suggestive ingredients, “Trillium Erectum and Potency Wood”, the product promises to restore strength and thus youth as demonstrated through sex: “Originally created for sports enthusiasts, body builders and power lifters, Super Testron has also proven to ‘revive’ male libido. … This supplement increases sexual drive, frequency and duration, especially in middle-aged and older men” (http://www.tidesoflife.com/supertestron.htm).

This quote also evinces age relations by promoting youth-based ideals in old age. Sexual functioning is important not just for pleasure, but for forestalling aging itself (see also Katz and Marshall, 2003). Thus, Dr. Karl Ullis proclaims on his website that,“Good, ethical sex is the best anti-aging medicine we have” (http://www.agingprevent.com/flaash/index.html). The “good, ethical sex,” anti-aging ads promise to restore is that which is based on youthful standards: “Feel alive again, feel positive about yourself, and have the same sex drive you had when were younger.” (www.feel21.com/cgi-bin/feel21/09282) Tides of Life proclaims: “RxErect: ‘You’ve heard many promises. Get ready. Have fun! Be fulfilled! Do it again! And again! And again!’ “ (http://www.tidesoflife.com/rxerect.htm). Hegemonic masculinity is youthful.

That such sex involves domination of women is sometimes discussed in blatantly forceful terms. Vasoderm Male Enhancement Gel, which is sold on many sites, is advertised with a bottle of the gel positioned next to a model of a cannon, underscored with the caption: “Get Your Cannon Firing Again!” (http://www.tidesoflife.com/vasoderm.htm). And herbs such as “Maca” are found in products for men that promise total conquest:

“Legend has it that Inca warriors would consume Maca before entering into battle. This would make them extremely strong. But after conquering a city, the Incan soldiers were forbidden from using Maca to protect the conquered women from the warrior’s powerful sexual impulses!”(www.vitamins2health.com/sex/Vimaca_sex_drive.html)
While this example presents an extreme in terms of power, it makes clear that the ideal form of masculinity is both youthful and not feminine—powerful and dominant in all realms.

Discussion and conclusion

Although popular culture does not cause ageism or change self-identity in a unilateral fashion, it can certainly inform these. First, these websites make clear that manhood is rooted in biology (hormones), and is the opposite of womanhood. Loss of these hormones means a loss of gender. You cannot be a “real man” unless you have lots of testosterone; and to the extent that you have lots of testosterone, you increase your distance from women.

Second, they affirm the ideal body as a young male body. Any change from that is a decline, and something men should aspire to recapture. The age relations made apparent in these images make it clear that manhood is something that only young men can achieve.

Third, the ads tell us that moving away from masculinity is both feminizing and a sign of aging; one cannot be old and a man. Any movement away from a more dominant form of masculinity serves as a sign of aging, and anything that approximates femininity, such as increased estrogen, is both emasculating and a sign of incipient decay.

There are a number of implications of these messages, aside from the obvious. Not only do these constructions of masculinity reinforce gender and age relations, but they remain unachievable, no matter how privileged men are. Ultimately, aging men cannot live up to the ideals of successful aging depicted on these sites. Bodies do age. Instead of providing the empowerment promised on many pages, including a re-definition of manhood away from such things as competition and dominance, these constructions of manhood stigmatize aged forms of it, again reinforcing age relations.

I do not claim that old men follow the dictates on these anti-aging sites—though some may. Instead, I am pointing to the ageist and sexist messages on these sites that reflect and influence cultural messages about deservingness and equality which affects all old people’s experiences. These sites promise that “Baby Boomers can age differently,” but deliver only the heavier burden of trying to live up to unachievable ideals for more years than previous generations had been expected to try. Telling men that they “no longer have to grow old” does not challenge ageism so much as reinforce it, driving home the idea that to age is to be “not a man.” Further, it is likely that those who are presently middle-aged (and following generations), who have been strongly influenced by the cultural dictates about personal responsibility on the one hand and “active”
or “successful aging” on the other, who will be more receptive to these products.

Generally, scholarly discussions of masculinities have been aware of the varying inequalities that shape ideals. But they have not taken into account age-based inequalities, and how this shapes masculinities. The exclusion of age relations is critical as it means that even the most privileged men—those few who can fit the hegemonic ideal—will lose privilege as they grow old. The implications of this for masculinity, for movements toward equality, for studies of oppression and privilege, among others are, I think, enormous, but they have yet to be explored.

References


Chapter 3
Deconstructing the hegemony of men and masculinity (?): A focus on old(er) men as grandfathers and intergenerational relations

Anna Boden
Lancaster University, UK

Introduction

Whilst gerontologists are increasingly focusing on the gendered nature of older age, and it has become more widely accepted that masculinities are socially constructed, in flux and multiply experienced as a result of power laden gender relations that exist both between men and women and between groups of men (Connell, 1995), the study of older men remains relatively undeveloped. Drawing these literatures together and developing an intergenerational perspective of men and men’s identities can highlight the sometimes contradictory intersections of gender, age and generation that are negotiated between men on an individual level and interpersonally. An intersectional approach to understanding men’s identities will result in a useful attempt to critically deconstruct the hegemony of men and masculinities.

In this vein, this paper particularly seeks to recommend a focus on the identities and practices of grandfathers to explore the intersectionalities of age(ing) and masculinities in a familial context. This emerges from my own engagement with the newly reconceptualised concept of intergenerationality in human geography, defined not only as the interrelationships between groups of people of different generations, but also as ‘an aspect of social identity [which] suggests that individuals’ and groups’ sense of themselves and others is partly on the basis of generational difference or sameness’ (Hopkins and Pain, 2007). Adopting a feminist perspective on this, I suggest that this approach presents an un-missable opportunity to attempt to deconstruct the hegemony of men and masculinities through an examination of the seemingly contradictory discourses of ageism and sexism that are negotiated in grandfathering activities such as play, care and discipline.
Integrating the literatures

An important critique of the ageing literatures is that whilst older men are sometimes considered, their masculinities are rarely theorized (Calasanti and King, 2005) or understood. Similarly in the subfield of men and masculinities, older age is rarely discussed. Thus, the age relations that are often contradictory and may act to subordinate older men are reproduced in academic research which further marginalizes this group of men. Integrating the literatures of men and masculinities, ageing and intergenerationality can make explicit the complexity of older men’s lives and their own articulations of their experiences, practices and identities. It is important at this point to make clear that this approach does not wish to re-enforce male dominance in society as this could result in a damaging step-back and would be an anti-feminist development. Instead I wish to examine men and masculinities critically from a feminist perspective (Calasanti, 2004) that shows that men’s relations to power are not merely masculine but also negotiated intersectionally and relationally so that in some instances dominance may not be upheld in later life (Sandberg, 2007). Age and generational relations therefore are an interesting way to examine how men relate to, or resist masculinity in their everyday lives and how they relate to other men.

When discussing masculinity, I refer to Connell’s configurations of practice, which describe the varying levels of power men might try to aspire to (Connell, 1995). This has highlighted that there are multiple masculinities in existence which are performed or enacted not just as gendered but in intersection with other axes of social difference, including sexuality, ethnicity, race and (dis)ability to name a few. Thus, although many men do aspire to the hegemonic ideal of masculinity, many do not accomplish it, especially not in all arenas of their lives in which their identities might be constructed differently and some social locations may be considered more powerful than others at different times. The most dominant position of power a man might adopt is hegemonic masculinity, a concept that has been increasingly critiqued in recent years (Demetriou, 2004; Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005; Coles, 2007) but has been extremely influential in ‘recent thinking about men, gender and social hierarchy’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 829). The hegemonic position of masculinity is increasingly problematic when considered in intersection with other social positions of inequality (Calasanti, 2004), which in this case take account of old(er) age and generation. The dominant constructions of old age which include expectations of physical and mental decline, withdrawal from everyday life and perceptions of economic dependency and loneliness (Pain et al., 2001), compete with, and often contradict understandings of a hegemonic masculinity which
reverses physical ability, competitiveness, lack of emotion and strength. Thus older men and men representing older generations such as grandfathers or even great-grandfathers, cannot often achieve a hegemonic position in the family for example as a result of the negative connotations that age carries. Should intergenerationality be considered in relation to these constructions of age, which are intrinsically linked, it might be possible to understand how generational relations also shape masculinities and men’s relation to power at all stages of the lifecourse. Adopting Hopkins and Pain’s (2007) definition of generation as an aspect of social identity has implications for the ways in which men relate to each other and how they are positioned in social hierarchies in the family. This position of power is complicated by the competing stereotypes of a hegemonic masculinity and older age that men will try to comply with through their familial roles.

An integration of the literatures of men and masculinities, age and generation then, show how some men might have more power than others in certain social arenas. In the family, a generational perspective might reveal how certain men are either empowered or disempowered on the basis of their age and familial position. From a critical feminist perspective, it is important to expose the power relations that exist between men as well as between men and women, something that an intersectional approach makes explicit.

Why grandfathers?
The focus on grandfathers is a consequence of my PhD aims and interests. In trying to integrate the literatures of men and masculinities with the newly reconceptualised notion of intergenerationality in a familial context, men defined as grandfathers both socially and biologically, have become one of the key social groups that I am researching. I have chosen to explore intergenerationality in the family because this is where the majority of men have intergenerational relationships and this research has remained significantly underdeveloped as a result of a more detailed focus on generational power in institutions (Hearn, 2007). The family also presents an interesting contrast for the study of older men because according to traditional sociological discourse, familial relationships are considered to develop equity and empowerment (Davidson et al., 2003). How this intersects with the discourses of ageism and sexism that older men negotiate everyday is unknown. By focusing on a British context, where family structures are becoming increasingly diverse and generational networks are verticalising (Putney and Bengtson, 2003; or are extending as a result of people living to an older age) it is clear that grandfathering has become a much more common practice for older men.
Thus grandfathering is a masculinity issue. The multi-generational aspect of intergenerational research is rarely explored, never reaching beyond the young and middle generations and focusing almost exclusively on parents and young children (Constanzo and Hoy, 2007). This acts to marginalize older men in academic analysis and theory even further. It is these men in my research therefore that represent the intersections of older age, gender and generation most effectively. Accordingly I suggest that introducing intergenerationality to research of older men might act to complicate and therefore strengthen understandings of what men do when they are older and how they experience old age in relation to men of different generations, all of whom experience varying levels of power or patriarchal relations in diverse social arenas. This follows the traditions of Critical Studies of Men and Masculinities which seek to highlight the complexities of men’s power.

**Grandfatherhood, geography and intergenerationality**

Upon exploration of the literatures of older men and in particular of grandfathers, it is clear that very few exist that explicitly acknowledge the voices of men as grandfathers; instead theoretical assumptions are made that oppose the experiences of grandmothers (Mann, 2007). This is worrying considering that grandmothers are not a homogenous social grouping upon which generalizations can be made. Neither are grandfathers. It is also surprising considering that the theorizing of age suggests that like masculinity, it is also socially constructed and that ‘the meaning and experience[s] of age, and the process[s] of ageing, [are] subject to historical and cultural processes’ (Wyn and White, 1997: 10). For Davidson et al. (2003) the role of grandfather is new, yet paradoxical. They suggest that on the one hand their relationship with their grandchildren is more nurturing and gentle but on the other they may also be viewed in the patriarchal role of ‘sage’ or ‘wise man’. These are clearly culturally variable. Taiwan for example, a country in which there is a strong patriarchal lineage and older age is respected (Yi et al., 2006) differs greatly from the British context, impacting significantly on the role of grandfathering and intergenerational relations. Interestingly, the discourses of grandfathering that Davidson et al. (2003) suggest, refer explicitly to the grandfather role in relation to grandchildren, but do not discuss these as intergenerational relations. Nor do they suggest that intergenerationality plays an important role in the construction of grandfatherhood.

Ross et al. (2005), in their study of intergenerational relationships between grandparents and their teenage grandchildren, found that although grandfathers were more difficult to recruit than grandmothers, these relationships were an extremely important aspect of their lives. Is-
sues of recruitment may in fact be one of the reasons for the lack of engagement with men who are grandfathers, although this was not true for my own study. Many of the men described how important their relationships with their grandchildren were, and the interest gained from both my pilot and subsequent recruitment have shown that grandfathering is an important issue to older men.

Geographies of grandfatherhood are non-existent, despite the development of subdisciplines in the 1970’s of geographical gerontology and geographies of ageing. As a result of the dominance of the quantitative nature of geographies past in which people sought to map ageing societies (Pain et al, 2001), little awareness has been raised about how older age (and grandfatherhood) is actually experienced and given meaning by men. Similarly there has been little engagement with the spaces that grandfathers use with their grandchildren, and in particular their grandsons. The spaces that men use might prove useful for understanding how masculinities are performed in relation to

Some brief findings

The pilot data I collected between June 2008 and October 2008 questioned specifically the activities and practices that grandfathers in the UK carried out with their grandchildren. I interviewed 3 grandfathers from the UK, from the Lancaster District in this time period, with an age range of 66 to 81. Questioning the practices and activities of grandfatherhood had implications for the types of spaces in which the men related and interacted. It was through the men’s narratives that issues of the negotiation of intersecting identities emerged. Of particular interest to me was how aspects of discipline, play and care in relation to their grandsons involved a complex negotiation of intergenerational power based on masculinity and age relations. These were commonly articulated through their descriptive use of space and the body. Many of the men interestingly described how discipline of their grandchildren reflected a relationship based more on age relations than masculinity. It emerged in my data that the father seemed to have a much more powerful, symbolic role in relation to discipline. In one instance one of the grandsons threatened to involve the father if his grandfather told him off again. This was interesting in that it represented how the negative construction of older age and the power relations involved in this impacted upon the grandfather’s ability to discipline and a loss in his relation to a more masculine self. When disciplining grandchildren, this was often done when the grandfather was in a caring capacity. Grandfathers as carers, was relatively rare in the narratives of the grandfathers as all had wives who they described as having a more involved and caring role for
the grandchildren. This highlighted the gendered nature of grandparent roles and practices. The grandfather who lived closer to his grandchildren however had a more caring role than his wife as he was more able bodied than her and could still drive the car. He also had a very involved role in his grandchildren’s lives as a result of living geographically close to his children. He took them to school and gave them dinner in the evenings. This was an interesting case in that care work is often equated more to women (Calasanti, 2003) and if theorized as unpaid work might reflect women’s role as a housewife, which from a feminist perspective is unpaid labour in the home. In this respect, the grandfather’s intergenerational practices of care that are structured and enabled by his older age, distanced him from constructions of hegemonic masculinity.

The body space and the embodiment of grandfathering activities that emerged from the narratives was something that also interested me. The interaction of the youthful and older bodies that was narrated represented to me how age and masculinity relations were negotiated and intersecting as a result of their intergenerational relationships. Many of the men interviewed were able bodied and described their interest in playing with their grandsons. I am wondering what impact the intersection of disability might have had on the grandfathers identity as one of the grandfathers even suggested that the grandfather’s role is to play. Should disability as a result of age be a factor in this would it disempower the grandfather as a man? Play is also an interesting concept in itself. In one respect it reflects a compliance with the masculine ideal of youthful masculinity, often equated as the hegemonic masculinity in which physical ability and competitiveness are revered (although this is problematic). This might represent the way in which older men attempt to maintain a masculine self. On the other hand, some of the men felt that their ageing body was slowing them down. In relation to the young bodies of their grandsons the men felt disempowered as they were not ageing successfully in relation to their grandchildren.

What my pilot data is beginning to reveal in this respect is that familial inter- and multi-generational relationships between men such as grandfathers and their grandsons do not always reflect the development of empowerment and equity that the traditional family was considered too. From a Critical Men’s Studies perspective these intergenerational relations highlight the often contradictory and complex power relations older men negotiate in relation to their grandchildren. As a result of the complexities of the intersecting identities of age, generation and masculinity, it is clear that the grandfather identity is a useful mechanism for exploring ways of deconstructing the hegemony of men and masculinities in the future.
Future research and questions

Upon further collection of qualitative data that allows the voices of grandfathers to be heard in different ways, I suggest that there is great value in attempting to deconstruct the hegemony of men and masculinities by focusing on the intersectionality’s of older men’s identities from an intergenerational perspective. Future questions might include:

1. How important is the grandfather label to older men?
2. How can an understanding of grandfather identities help to deconstruct the hegemony of men and masculinities?
3. Is intergenerationality a useful concept for deconstructing the hegemony of men and masculinities?

Further, as a geographer, I would like to explore the notion of space more explicitly. Very little geographical research to date, has engaged critically with intergenerationality as an aspect of neither social identity nor its spatial specificity as a result of its relative immaturity (for an exception see Kraftl and Horton, 2008). I suggest that there are several interesting arenas in which intergenerational research with men and masculinities might prove fruitful. Geographical debates surrounding space have often engaged with varying scales, from the micro space of the body to the international and transnational. Vanderbeck (2007) in particular has advocated the development of geographical approaches to intergenerationality suggesting that spaces can either facilitate or limit intergenerational contact, and that relationships vary between different social groups and contexts, resulting in variations of social cohesion and discontinuity and degrees of ageist behaviour. Interestingly he does not refer to the body space, something the geographies of men have been criticized for (Robertson, 2006) and which has emerged specifically in my own interviews. The relationship between the older bodies of grandfathers and the youthful bodies of their grandchildren in interaction can say important things about how their identities are intersectional, particularly in relation to ability and (dis)ability. Similarly as a result of the complexity of the concept of space, it is clear that it is used in very different ways. Grandfathers for example that live at a physical distance from their grandsons might find alternate social spaces to interact with and influence them, such as cyber space. Some questions that might be considered here include:

1. What is the role of the body in intergenerational relationships between men in families?
2. What does this reveal about the intersectionality of the discourses of sexism and ageism that grandfathers negotiate in the performance of their identities?

3. What spaces facilitate intergenerational contact between generations of men in families?

Conclusion

What I have tried to argue in this paper is that grandfathering has become a contemporary masculinity issue in which the intersections of age, masculinity and generation can be explored. From a geographical perspective the intersections of space and place are also made explicit and have implications for intergenerational relations and the power relations between groups of men of different ages and generations. Acknowledging that the meanings and associations of grandfatherhood that older men attach to this aspect of their identity will inevitably differ as a result of the intersections of age, gender and generation, but also of space, both social and physical, provides the basis upon which a study of grandfathering might develop. This I suggest is something that requires further critical engagement.

Note

I have not included any new empirical data in this paper. This will be published in my thesis and explains better how the theory and the practice relate. I can be contacted for more information.

References


Chapter 4
The Slackening Self:
Concepts of agency in old manhood

Neal King
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, USA

Agenda
This brief report considers the relation between institutional hegemony and aging manhood. Under what conditions do men seek assistance and to whom do they turn? Can men enjoy ceding agency by seeking aid? And in what ways might that bolster institutional hegemony or work against it? By way of introduction, I summarize two existing studies of gerontologists’ imputations of agency and empowerment to groups (King and Calasanti, 2006, 2009) and then present data on aging men’s imputations to their selves, (in interviews on the topic of their transitions from middle- to old-age).

Principal arguments
Imputations of agency do little to refine testable theory but instead demand respect and attention to, call attention to the efficacy of, and affirm a speaker’s role as agent for those to whom one imputes agency. At least one consequence, intentional or otherwise, is to make the putative agents accountable —obliged to be ready to justify their behavior to others, and thus take the concerns of others into account. Imputations of agency can thus impose burdens. Admitting a decline in causal efficacy can lighten that burden of accountability in favor of a more diffuse sense of shared agency. Acknowledging interdependence moves away from one form of hegemonic masculinity, and moves one into markets for institutional help. Thus, a move away from hegemonic masculinity, with its code of strong personal agency, can move one into the position of consumer of institutional help for old people, and thus into a position of affirming another kind of (ageist) hegemony.
Part I: Scholarly imputations of agency

Old people often feel, or are treated as if they suffer, a lack of efficacy. Critical gerontologists often approach the oppression of old people as a problem in which they can intervene. A desire to intervene raises two questions of agency—of the other and of the self who imputes it. That is, professional agency such as that of a social gerontologist implicates not only the agency of the professional but that of the oppressed party represented.

Many gerontologists employ on a realist theory of agency as they write about the party whom they wish to represent—old people. That theory owes mostly to the influential writings, in Sociology, of Anthony Giddens, who defines the agent as one who “could have done otherwise” (1981, 53) in his theory of “structuration” (1984). Giddens invokes this concept of agency in order to explain social change as the intervention of choice into the constraining and conservative force of institutionalized group behavior (1976: 95-96; see Loyal and Barnes [2000] for a discussion). In this realist theory, agency appears as a human attribute.

In contrast to this approach, constructivist analysis looks at agency as an imputation made within social networks, which construct agency as a social role. Study of patterns in imputations of agency shows that they tend to demand respect and express ideological approval for the putative agents, and result from social closeness to the putative agents, or be inspired by novel behaviors of short duration. For example, scholars apply such terms as “resistance” to mark behavior that they regard as agentic. Scholars impute agency to groups whom they regard as oppressed but able to resist, just as people impute it when they feel close and thus sense inner lives. “One can verstehen, but not that many people” observes Fuchs (2001: 32)².

The rise of property ownership and individual rights to enter contracts focused popular attention on personal choice as an expression of inner self (Birken, 1988; Foucault 1978). Capitalist organizations arose to meet and nurture rising demands for consumer products, health, and other forms of moral adjustment, such that consumerism expanded the sense of personal agency. That attribute became an ideal of behaviour to which people and groups are increasingly held accountable. It serves as an element of social control, pinning responsibility for behaviours onto individual or collective agents. Active agency is thus a role, the adoption of which is observable by social scientists even if the attribute itself is not (Meyer and Jepperson, 2000).

---

² See King and Calasanti (2009) for fuller discussions of these patterns in imputations of agency by social gerontologists.
Theorists, as professional agents, impute agency to those to whom they feel close and for whom they wish to advocate (even at the expense of imputations of agency to (oppressive) institutions). Likewise, anti-aging merchants use the language of “empowerment” to stress the agency of consumers. The likeness of these two discourses—those of critical gerontologists and those of anti-aging merchants—suggests, whatever their differences, they share a Global North origin in the professions that constitute advanced capitalism. Members of both groups can expand their professional turf by advocating on behalf of oppressed old people. And where critical gerontologists informed by a Marxist tradition encourage collective action toward liberation, anti-aging merchants encourage individual empowerment through purchase of the means (anti-aging products) to avoid the appearance of membership in that oppressed group (King and Calasanti, 2006).

A study of scholarly imputations of agency to old people revealed that, over the last decade of publication in such journals as *Ageing & Society, The Gerontologist, Journal of Aging Studies*, and the *Journal of Gerontology: Social Sciences*, scholars chose realist imputations to old people over critical constructivism by a proportion of 8 to 1, and that the realist imputations were never made to oppressive, hegemonic institutions but always to members of the oppressed group (King and Calasanti 2009). These findings lend support to the theory that imputations of agency serve hegemonic purposes of professional positioning more often than they serve to theorize the nature of institutional age relations.

Consider, as a scholarly claim of old people’s efficacy: “changes do not come about spontaneously; people acting individually, collectively, or through existing institutions are the agents of change” (Dannefer, Uhlenberg, Foner, & Abeles, 2005). Another author focuses more obviously on old people themselves in a study of aging bodies: “By locating agency also in the body and not just in the mind as distinct and separate from the body … the body itself can be understood as a source of creativity” (Kontos, 2003: 166).

The purpose of focusing on the agency of old people rather than on the agents of institutions that regulate old lives, is to keep the focus on helping professions such as social gerontology. Consider, as a sample offer of agency on behalf of the oppressed: “Gerontology would similarly benefit from greater debate around the rights and statuses of old people ... and how they build or have collective agency as a group. Attention to these matters can reinforce the need to watch and advocate for the welfare of elders and link their concerns to those of other social groups.” (Settersten, 2005). Thus do social gerontologists, like advocates of empowerment through anti-aging, urge views of old people as agents, the
better that professionals may seem to play significant social roles by serving their needs. In order for this relationship to seem productive, old people must be seen to deserve advocacy on their behalf, which requires that they be held to standards of empowerment. For instance, Moody (1988: 27) urges models of old-age development that foster “self-criticism, self-interpretation, and critical consciousness,” as vital features of emancipation. Minkler and Estes (1996) likewise posits “empowerment” in humanist terms as “the process by which individuals and communities are enabled to take such power and act effectively to transform their lives and their communities” (p. 472).

In his consideration of such calls to empowerment, Katz notes that, “all dependent non-laboring populations — unemployed, disabled, retired — have become targets of state polices to ‘empower’ and ‘activate’ them” (2000: 147). Both of these approaches to this task — the anti-aging industry and critical gerontology — define themselves as counter-discourses in opposition to some mainstream view. Each offers to the old an exciting new way to define themselves and improve their lives. They each involve, in the words of Phillipson and Walker (1987:12) in their discussion of critical gerontology, “a commitment not just to understand the social construction of ageing but to change it.” Such realist theory as these quotes represent is neither empirical nor refutable. Scholars expand professional turf by imputing agency to those on whose behalves they wish to advocate. The imputations hold groups accountable and aid a service-oriented professional hegemony. With the second half of this essay I review personal imputations of agency to see the extent to which they fit within this professional framework.

Part II: Imputations to Selves

Imputations of agency to selves also demand more or less attention to and respect, suggest relative efficacy, present selves as more or less accountable (able and obligated to explain choices). The study of self-imputation allows us to see the extent to which they might serve the purposes of the institutions just reviewed and thus aid a hegemonic project.

I generate evidence of middle-aged men’s imputations to themselves by discourse analysis of interviews with men aged 40-61, on the topic of their experiences of aging and masculinity. Analysis proceeded with location in transcripts of uses of “I can(‘t)” and identification of objects of imputed agency and lack thereof.

The larger finding reviewed below is that men at this age discuss aging primarily in terms of physical capacity. They are agents and thus accountable to ideals of manly behavior to the extent that they retain the physical capacities of their youthful selves.
Efficacy

Interviewees establish that, though aging, they remain mostly in control:

- “Physically, I can do just about anything that these younger people can do and probably better on a lot of aspects. And I don’t just think that, I know that.”

- “What I try to show is when you are my age, it doesn’t mean you are ready to put yourself on a shelf. You just have to work a little bit harder and do a few things to allow you to continue having good quality of life and doing the things that you enjoy doing you know. To me that’s the whole idea of exercise.”

- Aware if the constraints that aging can impose on physical activity, such men establish that they represent their own best interests in pursuit of self control. Nevertheless, aging has incurred and altered the sense of efficacy that agency involves:

  - “I quit playing softball. I am too old for this kind of thing. It’s all, it would be all sports relevant. I don’t play basketball anymore. … It’s a performance issue, ability issue.”

  - “As you get older, you really try to reduce the number of things you do because you … appreciate that you need downtime. You can’t work 12-hour days anymore. You physically can’t do that.”

Some of these comments move from the tight focus on physical activities, of working and playing hard, to the larger issue of hard work as a means to self control. Such men link aging to the maturation process in which they cede certain ideals of hegemonic masculinity:

- “Maybe you work to be happy … because as a man I was raised to prove that I can do things and to work hard at them. You are only as good as the last time you have proven yourself. So, I was raised to just keep aspiring, keep aspiring, keep aspiring …”

- “… and then I recognized it doesn’t mean that happiness comes, that I can’t work harder to stop a physical decline. Working harder doesn’t solve everything. It just doesn’t happen. And that started middle 40’s.”

- As maturity brings the wisdom to back off of youthful standards of physical effort, men allow themselves losses of status—in this case networking with a relatively low-status athletic group defined by their relative incapacity:

  - “I have given up trying to compete at a level at which I have been competing for a long time, and accepting that I am a pick-up basketball player with aging men. So, yeah, that’s definitely a difference. It’s
something going on, and I can’t stop it. However, I can find happiness within it.”

This is a minor concession made by a man at the pinnacle of his career (as most of these men claim to be). But such concession fits a larger pattern in which men move from claims of self control to a sense that some aspects of their lives are under a more widely shared control.

**Wider Imputation of Agency**

In their discussions of what it is to be middle aged and ageing, some of the men discussed life-lessons taught by adult strife, in order to suggest ways in which aging alters imputations of control:

- “All nine men [in my family] became engineers and all the women became either teachers or nurses. That’s when I first realized, ‘Oh, I am not choosing this myself. Shit—I am a man.’”
- “Divorce forced me to recognize that almost everything in this world is outside of my control; and working hard may not fix things.” Thus identifying ways in which others participate in the control of one’s own fortunes, aging men thus identify themselves as potentially in need of help.

**Seeking Assistance**

Diminishment of efficacy can inspire search for help, which in turn can lead in two directions, the first being toward institutions—enduring patterns of behavior that sustain these men as their bodies begin to fail them. Some men set up their own habits, to help them get through their days once they have less focus and energy available to drive them.

- “I want more organization, I want more routine in my life, less spontaneity because I want to think about things other than just staying alive and feeding myself and things. ... That’s another thing that happens when you get older is this desire for routinization. ... I want to exercise because my acupuncturist says you have to exercise everyday or else you are not going to sleep.”
- “Happiness is the big deal. I am getting older; I want to simplify my life by throwing some things out and get these routines in, right? And you know having routinization is a part of the equation to make life so I can focus on things I want to focus on, and put more of my energies into that.” Other men look to products, mostly those sold by the anti-aging industry that promises to prop up their masculine functionality. To lean on help from others in order to convey the sense of inner strength and drive is, of course, paradoxical. But so goes
manhood in general. This is merely a more explicitly acknowledged version of the interdependency that underlies manly performance:

- “There’s a whole (raft) of things out there that tell you they are gonna help increase muscle mass. I think if there’s clear evidence that those products will allow you to do things that you enjoy … I think that would be a fine thing.”

- “If I started experiencing sexual dysfunction, I’ll be all over Viagra, No problem, and even if they may have some health effects, because I love sexuality. That’s something you don’t want to give up.” Other comments from these men reveal a small trend away from such bolstering and toward a backing out of obligations, as if to slough off some of their sense of accountability. I do not mean to exaggerate such diminishment of accountability because even one who refuses to live up to formerly binding expectations may explain why he does that, as these men mostly do, which satisfies the definition of accountability. But these men are slacking off all the same, happily admitting that they can no longer do some things, and finding some comfort in that refusal to perform.

- “I am more comfortable revealing a vulnerability where before I might hide it because it scared me. I am not as exceptional as I thought I was. Becoming 50 has been a liberating experience- Not until the 50’s did I feel physical decline, but I am very happy, and I feel that kind of liberation from anxieties at age 50.”

- “The idea of retiring and having significantly active years without a job, that sounds really fun. Maybe not being expected to do certain things, like helping someone move—that’s not bad, to get off the hook for that.”

Accountability is itself a performance; and these men allude to a station in life in which they may no longer have to explain their inactivity, which would count as an actual reduction of accountability. This is far from the sense of empowerment in which disciplined individuals manifest their inner drives by choosing from among options, whether as consumers, citizens, lovers, etc.. Such empowerment is a kind of freedom in the sense of its opposition to duress. But a lack of accountability is another kind of freedom, one from having to choose at all. One withdraws into a state of low demand; one slacks off, at the cost of an important aspect of hegemonic masculinity.

Middle-age imputations of agency, by men at the heights of their careers, demand attention to and respect for selves; but they also note declining efficacy, suggest happiness found in relaxation of accountability, and pose the external forces of routines and other parties as agents on men’s behalves. Those others include agencies of the anti-aging industry
just as they do loved ones and other networks. Wider imputations of agency look like statements of lack of power, of mutual dependency, and thus unlike hegemonic masculinity. They also bring men (who can afford it) into the purview of merchants of hypermasculinity, who are pleased to serve as agents for aging men. The aging industry is anxious to help to restore to a semblance of hegemonic ideals men who retreat from them. Many of those men will take up the offers, in some ways, as they can afford to do so. But the more genuine withdrawals of slacking off will be of little help to professional agents who hope to expand their domains by nurturing the agency of ageing men. Sometimes, men are just slacking off. Slackening men offend the ideals of the hypermasculine anti-aging industry, perhaps most because slackers spend so little on their own sense of agency.

References


Chapter 5
Getting intimate:
Old age, masculinity and new (?) heterosexual morphologies

Linn Sandberg
Linköping University, Sweden

The photo shows a suntanned and smiling man looking into the camera. He is greyed and got a double chin and he is seemingly in his seventies. Behind the man stands a blond woman, leaning over and hugging him. She looks like she is a few years younger and she too is smiling. The photo is shot by a shimmering lake with blue skies above, it seems like a perfect summer day. Obviously there is no sex in the photo but it illustrates an article with the headline “Mona helps me with the sext”3. The article, which was published in the Swedish tabloid Aftonbladet in a series of articles on prostate cancer, tells the experiences of Sven Tumba, 75 years old, and a former Swedish hockey player4. Sven is in the article described as a national hero in the fifties and sixties, and the article asserts that he, with his physique and charisma, became a role model for many men. Sticking with the sports metaphors the article tells how Sven’s body at the beginning of 2003 was put up against “a totally different match” when he was diagnosed with prostate cancer. His greatest fear was then according to the article to be forced to stop having sex. However, despite some initial problems, Sven eventually after his treatment regains the capacity to be sexually active. He refuses to “throw in the towel and become an old geezer” but keep up with the sex thanks to nature-cure medicine and a “loving wife”5.

This article is in many ways telling and illustrative for a prevailing discourse on older men’s sexuality as lifelong; in which sexuality is reinforced and constructed as something that despite ageing persists. Literature on sexuality and later life often point to the obfuscation of older people’s sexuality and how the neglect of sexuality in later life (in research and elsewhere) render older asexual (Calasanti and Slevin, 3 Mona hjälper mig med sext
4 http://www.aftonbladet.se/kropphalsa/cancer/article441801.ab (2008-12-15)
5 “Kasta in handduken och bli en gubbe” “kärleksfull fru”.
A shift in discourse can however be identified in which older people’s sexuality, from being an unthinkable issue, increasingly is regarded as lifelong and part of a healthy and positive ageing (Marshall, 2008). What the article on Sven Tumba conveys is, however, how sexuality is by and large equated with erection and heterosexual penetrative sex, something which is in line with how discourses of lifelong and healthy ageing are often constructed (Gross and Blundo, 2003; Marshall and Katz, 2002; Calasanti and King, 2005). Impotence is posited as the major threat to continued sexual activity in later life, and sexuality is hence conceptualised in a narrow way and largely rooted in male experience.

In the example of Sven Tumba above, text and photo are mutually saturating a picture of hegemonic masculinity, stressing elements such as sport’s achievements, being a role model and ideal for other men, and the importance of sex. What is interesting is how maintaining this hegemonic masculinity entails avoiding and resisting becoming an “old geezer”. The old geezer is implicitly made sense of as somebody who is impotent and thus has to cease being sexually active, and Sven is when interviewed stating that sex makes him stay healthy and happy. Becoming old is thus a process occurring as one gives in and stops being sexually active (cf. Marshall and Katz, 2002; Katz, 2000). While it can be said to be positive that older people are not stigmatised for wanting to have sex and maintaining an active sex life, it has also been discussed how these discourses of continued sexuality (notably also co-existing with Viagra-discourses on the maintenance of the erect penis) re-establish pressures on men to stay virile and willing also while older (Gross and Blundo, 2003; Marshall and Katz, 2002). Sven’s story is one of success where he recovers from his ailment and can keep on enjoying life, but not all men are able to overcome and regain their erections.

Another aspect in this discourse of the older man’s sexuality is how it is a very specific sexuality of the older man that is made desirable. Sexuality, in the article on Sven Tumba and more generally in discourses of ageing well, is not only narrow in the sense that it solely implies heterosexual coital sex, but also how sexuality is confined within the realms of a long term monogamous relationship. Sven’s younger wife Mona, the woman who is portrayed with him in the photo, is recurring in the headline as well as in the article, her thoughts and view on her husband’s illness are represented too. The reader learns that Sven and Mona have been married for 46 years and that her understanding and considerate approach towards his erectile problems after the treatment for prostate cancer has been of vital importance for the successful outcome. As Calasanti and King (2005) note, alongside with the healthy older man
who engages in good ethical sex is the stereotype of the “dirty old man”. Stressing sexuality as something healthy and as something taking place within a stable relationship is hence necessary to avoid being castigated as a dirty old man.

I have so far used the article on Sven Tumba to illustrate what can be understood as an increasingly dominant discourse of older men’s sexuality, in which hegemonic masculinity as well as a very specific kind of ageing, as positive or successful ageing is entwined. A lesson well learnt from post-structuralism is however that a dominant discourse seldom, if ever, walk alone or to use the by now almost cliché like Foucauldian assertion; where there is power there is resistance. I am accordingly convinced that changes taking place in men’s bodies and sexualities following ageing may propose different and sometimes challenging modes of masculine sexuality outside the dominant and hegemonic realm within which erection and intercourse is what sex is all about. Drawing on 11 interviews with men aged 66-84, which were conducted as a part of my work in progress doctoral dissertation on intersections of masculinity, (hetero)sexuality and old age, I will onwards focus on “alternative” or “other” discourses on older men’s sexuality, which resist and negotiate erectile and coital imperative. What interest me is how these narratives may propose a radical “rethinking of male sexual morphology” (Grosz, 1994: 201). I am using the words of “alternative”, “new” and “other” with a caveat, knowing that it is never fully possible to know what is new, challenging or subversive and what is not. To follow Judith Butler: “how will we know the difference between the power we promote and the power we oppose? (Butler, 1993: 241). I am not saying that older men ultimately destabilise and challenge male power and dominance, and would answer Jeff Hearn’s tentative question of whether men’s ageing can challenge patriarchy (Hearn, 2007) with a definite no. However, I think that the narratives presented in this paper offer ways of thinking male heterosexuality differently and deconstruct some of the dominant modes of male sexuality.

The paper focuses on three themes emerging from the interviews: becoming a less selfish man; on the importance of reciprocity and mutual satisfaction, stressing increased intimacy in later life, and finally variations and negotiations of sexual practices. The impression from this presentation might be that changes occurring from ageing and/or illnesses and ailments such as impotence are not perceived as problems and disruptions to men’s sexual subjectivities, and that all men are able to de-centre and negotiate the importance of the erect penis and coital sex. This is, however, not the whole picture, in my study of older men’s sexuality, shame, guilt, disappointment and feelings of lack were also surfac-
ing when narrating experiences of impotence and lack of libido. I have chosen in this paper to focus on narratives which in some ways break out of the erection/penetration territory of sexuality, but this does not mean that erection and penetration are not important for older men’s sexuality. Many seem to agree with Axel, aged 83 who says: “Well after all it is the actual insertion (of the penis into the vagina) that is the cream of the crop”.

To get an idea of how the themes discussed in this paper emerged I will say a few things on my methodology and material. The 11 interviews I am basing my discussion on were semi-structured interviews focusing the body and sexuality. I centred the interviews on some themes of everyday life such as health, personal hygiene, clothes, food and diet and care. Sexuality was accordingly only one of many topics discussed. Thinking of how sexuality might be considered a very private and sensitive topic I approached it rather late in the interview, usually after an hour of interviewing, and after having established some rapport with the interviewee. I also opened the discussion on sexuality by asking about attraction, what they found attractive in others, and what they thought others found attractive in them. These questions I thought of as a bit more relaxed questions on sexuality, and as a way of “warming up” the interviewees instead of going straight into sexual practices. I also asked for their understanding and what they put in the words sex and sexuality to start out with the interviewees own conceptions of the topic. People who hear about my study often ask me: “do they (my informants) really tell me anything about sex and sexuality?” and many are often surprised to hear that the men in my study are able to articulate things on this matter. The lack of research on older people’s sexuality is sometimes motivated by the sensitivity of the topic and how it may cause aggravation to the older informants (Gott and Hinchcliff, 2003). I do however believe that this is largely rooted in an ageist attitude towards older people as conservative and asexual. Some men in my study were even keen to talk about sexuality in order to challenge the assumption that sex was nothing for old people.

**Becoming a less selfish man:**
**narratives of sexual reciprocity**

In the interviews I asked the men about their understandings of sexuality, what the concept of sexuality meant to them, and what they thought of as “sex”. While there were many diverse answers to these questions,
ranging from reproduction (even as in a more demographic sense) to coital sex and touch more widely, the importance of reciprocity to be able to satisfy the partner was a central element in the discourse of what sexuality involved. Reciprocity has been discussed as central in discourses of heterosexual sex generally and the meaning of reciprocity is then a giving and taking, essentially involving mutual satisfaction and orgasm (Braun et al., 2003). The issue of orgasm is not explicitly addressed in my interview guide, but was brought up by some interviewees, the ability to satisfy their partners and giving them orgasms is talked of as a priority. For a man to be able to “knock off the socks” of his female partner in sex has been discussed as a central feature or “key plot” in the shaping of male sexuality (Plummer, 2005: 185) and it seems as if the narratives of reciprocity in my interviews also evolve greatly around this plot and becomes an important way of constructing a desirable male heterosexuality. What is interesting is, however, how age is made use of and plays a crucial role for how an older man’s sexuality is constructed. I will focus on the narrative of Nore, 76, which is the one who most clearly develops a narrative around how age and masculinity intersects and how he is transformed from a sexually selfish person to one who engages in sex which is satisfying also for the partner.

Age and masculinity are evoked from an early point when discussing the meaning of sexuality in the interview with Nore.

Linn: If you should, what does sexuality mean to you? (.) What do you put in that?

Nore: Well (.) in the beginning as a teenager it was to sleep with somebody, (mm) yes it was, hugging and kissing and eventually intercourse (..) I think it was like that a good bit into adulthood, and eh (..) I don’t think I was a (..) very good at it (.) in the beginning but eventually you have learned that (..) I did like, I like more to socialize with women than men (.) I still do, I feel much more untroubled around women and I understand them better and especially masculine men I have a hard time with (..) or this attitude

Linn: What is it that you have problems with?

Nore: Well I have problems with this (..) eh this backslapping, and (xxxx) like that, one should be cocky and superior, I don’t know it’s difficult to talk, I don’t have a male friend that I can talk to the same way I talk to female friends (..)
Linn: When you say you weren’t good at this sexualities bit, what is it that you’re thinking of?

Nore: No, I was more focused on myself, (.) and eh (..) not really attentive to the wishes of my partner, and that is typically the kind of thing I dislike in men (laughing) I was probably like that.7

Nore begins with telling about what sexuality meant for him when younger and from this turns to a discussion about his friendships with women and men. He clearly disassociates with features of masculinity such as being “cocky” and “superior” and engaging in “back-slapping” and instead emphasises how he can talk to women. The turn to discussions of masculinity when asked about sexuality is motivated in the narrative from how Nore links his former sexual behaviours, which he regards as “not very good”, to masculinity. The selfish and inattentive sexual self that Nore depicts comes to an end or is significantly altered from what Nore narrates as an important event. When Nore is in his mid-fifties his wife leaves him for a younger man, which he relates to her dissatisfaction with him as a sexual partner.

Nore: She didn’t think I could give her, she didn’t think, well it had a lot to do with my behaviour in bed, my inability to-, lack of responsiveness to her and those things.8

---

7 L: Om du skulle, vad innebär sexualitet för dig? (.) Vad lägger du i det?
N: Ja (.) i början som tonåring så var det ju att ligga med nån, (mm) det var det ju, kramas kysas och så småningom samlag, (...) så var det nog rätt långt upp i åren tror jag, (...) och eh (...) jag tror nog inte jag var nån (...) bra på det (...) i början men så småningom har man lärt sig det att (...) jag tyckte ju om jag tycker mer om att umgås med kvinnor än män (...) det tycker jag fortfarande, jag känner mig mycket mer(...) obesvärd tillsammans med kvinnor och jag förstår dom bättre och speciellt manliga män har jag väldigt svårt för (...) eller som har den attityden
L: Vad är det du har svårt för?
Ja jag har svårt för det här (...) åh det där ja ryggedunkandet och xxxxx så där och man ska va så där kaxiga och överlägsna och jag vet inte, det är svårt att prata, jag har ingen manlig bekant som jag kan prata med på samma sätt som jag oratar med kvinnliga bekanta (..)
L: När du säger att du inte var så bra på det här med sexualitet vad är det du tänker på då?
N: Nå jag var nog mer inriktat på mig själv (.) och eh, (...) som inte så lyhörd för partenrens önskemål och är typiskt sånt som jag inte gillar hos karlar (skratt) så var jag nog
8 hon tyckte inte jag kunde ge henne, hon tyckte inte ja, det hade till stor del att göra med mitt uppträdande i sängen, (ja) och min oförmåga att kunna, brist på lyhördhet och sånt
They eventually get back together, their sex life improves and importantly for Nore the event becomes a lesson learnt and a shift in attitude towards sexuality and sex. Where sex was before a matter of intercourse he now values the foreplay, “getting in the mood” and uses words such as “intimacy”, “feeling the body” “softness” to describe what he appreciates in sex. To Nore the former investment in selfish sex, focusing intercourse and his own orgasm rather than the partner is made sense of as a lack of knowledge or information, and the misinformation is partly related to other men.

Nore: I simply thought it should be that way, because the male friends I had, had described how it should be like that, and that was the thing

Also since he relates his behaviour in bed to a certain kind of masculinity, one which he disassociates with and does not attribute to himself, he expresses confusion with how he could have been that man which was not paying attention to his partners wishes. He narrates himself as a “soft person” but misinformed. Noteworthy in Nore’s story is how it is a story of success, how he improves and is enlightened by an important event, and the positive connotations of becoming less sexually selfish and considerate is also visible in how Jakob, 83 talks about his changing attitudes to sexuality in life.

Linn: But has your attitude towards your own sexuality what intimate relationships should be has that changed throughout life or has it been quite the same all the time?

Jakob: (..) No I think it has become more considerate (.) as time goes by

Linn: What do you mean by this?

Jakob: Less egoistic (..) can I give you some more? (gives me a piece of cake)

Linn: But when you say less egoistic, do you think about pleasure or that kind of thing or what do you mean by less egoistic?

Jakob: Yes (.) less egoistic in terms of my own pleasure yes (.)

9 Komma i stämning, närheten, känna kroppen, mjukheten
10 Jag trodde helt enkelt att det skulle va så, för dom manliga bekanta som jag hade som (.) beskrev hur det va så var det på det viset och det var det som gällde
11 mjuk person.
Linn: Why do you think that is? That you’ve become more (. ) considerate?

Jakob: Maturity

Linn: (laughs briefly)12 Tell me what does maturity involve?

Jakob: (laughs) Insight

Linn: Mm, about what?

Jakob: That one shouldn’t simply think about oneself13

As I have been arguing elsewhere “maturity” is a central component in discourses of positive and successful ageing (Sandberg, 2007) and in this case maturity also involves sexual maturity through becoming less egoistic and more considerate. Gullette (1998) discusses this as a “progress narrative” in which one improves sexually as one ages, which Potts and colleagues attribute to a pre-viagra discourse. How Nore and Jakob focus on a more partner-centred sexuality also has strong resonance with the work of Potts and colleagues (2006) on men’s counter –narratives on erectile dysfunction. Similar to Nore and Jakob the men in their study recognized adolescent sexuality as focused on the personal pleasure whereas they now focused more on satisfaction of their partners. In Nore and Jakob’s narratives, however this is not done as a countering of a Viagra-discourse but I understand it as a way of shaping a masculine mature sexuality in later life more broadly.

---

12 So my half-muffled laugh is caused by how I hear arguments I have made on masculinity and ageing being expressed by my interviewee.

13 L: (..) Men har din syn på just din egen sexualitet vad samliv ska va har det förändrats under livets gång eller har det vart ungefär liknande syn hela tiden, (borrning i bakgrund)
J: (..) Nej (.) jag tror att det har blitt mer hänsynsfullt (.) med tiden
L: Hur tänker du då?
J: Mindre egoistisk (..) får jag peta till dig en bit till (ger mig lite kaka)
L: Men när du säger mindre egoistisk då tänker du till exempel på njutning och så eller hur tänker du när du menar egoistisk
J: Ja (.) mindre egoist-, mindre tanke på egen njutning ja (.)
L: Hur tror du att, vad kommer det sig av? Att du har blivit mera (.) hänsynstagande
J: Mognad
L: (skrattar till) Berätta, vad innebär mognad då
J: (skratt) Insikt
L: Mm, om vad då?
J: (..) att man inte bara ska tänka på sig själv(....)
This way of narrating a transformation into a less egoistic sexuality uses both youth as an egoistic and self-centred phase but also a perceived macho masculinity as identities to position oneself against. As Wetherell and Edley argue the macho-man as a recognized social ideal can both be used to identify with and disassociate from and puzzling enough they state that “men may be most involved in reproducing the hegemonic when they position themselves against the hegemonic masculine ideal” (Wetherell and Edley, 2001: 351). I think this is an important observation not least in this Swedish context, where a desirable masculinity often involves distancing from macho- or hyper-masculinity which is perceived as stereotypic and orienting towards a more authentic personhood, where one is an individual rather than a gender. (Sandberg, 2005) Importantly the emphasis on a more considerate and less selfish attitude to sexuality is done in dialogue with me as a woman and gender scholar in the interview, but also a wider societal realm of gender equality as widespread ideal in Swedish society and heterosexual discourses on reciprocity and equality in sexual relations. Positioning oneself against a youthful egoistic masculinity is thus not necessarily a flight from masculinity but a coming together of age, masculinity and sexuality in the shaping of a desirable subjectivity.

**Hold me!: narratives of increasing intimacy in later life**

A narrative on a less selfish sexual self is closely discursively linked with another central theme of the interview: intimacy\(^{14}\). Intimacy is far from having a given and unified meaning and here I will focus on two aspects of intimacy emerging in the interviews. The first aspect I will discuss is to do with the role and meaning of sexuality as a part of life more widely, whereas the latter relates more to sexual practices. Both aspects relate closely to the above theme of a less selfish sexuality and emphasis on reciprocity turning towards intimacy involves turning to a more partner-centred sexuality, mutual pleasure in sex etcetera. The focus on increased intimacy in these interviews does not exist as a narrative “on an island” but are in dialogue with a pre- Viagra psychological discourse where the time after 70 is talked of in terms of “snuggling sex” (Sheehy, 1999, in Potts et al., 2006: 310) stressing touching and tenderness.

Taking my outset in the narrative of Edvard aged 68, he links sexuality in later life strongly to a life course perspective. I ask him if he thinks that a 70 year old person is attractive the same way as earlier in life and

---

\(^{14}\) In Swedish the word “närhet” was frequently used and though intimacy may have slightly different meanings I regard the word intimacy as a suitable term covering what several of the interviewees were approaching.
he says that “no, things change” and asks me if he can read a poem he has written, which goes:

To be young and in love, oh passionate desire affecting your mind,
to be newly-wed in love listening to a belly the biggest to find,
to be adult in love to buy a house you might not afford,
to be unhappily in love to scream in pain when you are deserted,
to once more fall in love with someone whose interests you share,
to be old in love to see the wee red when carried by a dance,
to unnoticed touch a nose just nearby,
to press a cheek against yours,

enjoying unconditional intimacy here and now\textsuperscript{15}

In this translated poem the love and sexuality of youth is characterised by passion and drive, whereas love and sexuality of later life are characterised by the sensual pleasures of dancing, just touch and sight but as in an “unconditional” way\textsuperscript{16}. This idea of the passionate and uncontrollable sexuality of youth reverberates in other interviews and with a wider societal discourse altogether (Potts et al., 2006) and from this sexuality in later life emerges as more focused on sensuality and intimacy. The way Edvard makes sense of sexuality in later life seems part of an overarching narrative he presents in the interview. He talks of old age and later life as being “finished”, which can be understood as a “decline narrative” on ageing (Gullette, 1998). To be “finished” means that one has been through the key phases of the life course, which are also reflected in the poem, forming a relationship, getting children, settling down, etc. When it comes to sexuality reproduction is narrated as central within the life course and being outside reproduction consequently makes possible a different form of sexuality\textsuperscript{17}.

\textsuperscript{15} “att vara ung och kär, oh eldiga drift på förståndet tär, att vara nygift kär att få lyssna på en mage som stor är, att vara vuxen kär att köpa ett hus fast ekonomin knappast bör, att vara olyckligt kär, att skrika av smärta när man övergiven är, att få bli en gång till kär, att ålska med nån som med ens intressen bör, att vara gammal kär att se dom små röda när det när en dans oss bör, att omärkt snudda vid en näsa som så nära är, att trycka en kind mot din, att kravlöset få njuta av närhet nu och här.”

\textsuperscript{16} There is of course a problem of imploding love and sexuality and this needs some further discussion

\textsuperscript{17} It is worth thinking of how lack of knowledge and contraception for earlier generations and the shame of illegitimate children have influenced relations to sexuality – presumably a great deal. For example, Gösta answers the question
Edvard: In the end it does not work to have children anymore and so on, physiological laws makes it happen it doesn’t work anymore, you can’t become pregnant, and by this maybe communion and warmth and love may deepen.

Not only does Edvard narrate a life outside reproduction as deepening a relationship and the meaning of sex, it also involves a much more unconditional sexuality, nothing is at stake the same way as in young years.

Edvard: Well there are much less demands /.../ if you think that when you were young, now I don’t know your age but you’re not that young but still, it was embarrassing and you blushed easily and all those kinds of things, there were so many, now one has been around all life and maybe had several relationships so we joke and laugh openly about things you know, and no one is offended if - It is much simpler, much less demands because we are in the future, the future is past and we can tell each other and joke about how things were when we were twenty and all that, and (laughs) well it’s easier.

Talking of oneself as in the future or even as how the “future is past” is part of Edvard’s almost teleological narrative of the life course as set within the realms of reproduction. Spector Mersel (2006) discusses the lack of scripts of gendered identities in later life and this can be related to Edvard’s narrative. Even though men can father children well into old age this is not something Edvard remarks on; instead he is drawing on an understanding of heterosexuality as ultimately linked to reproduction and which in essence has consequences for how sexuality in earlier life is determined as more instrumental and with more demands. Being outside this reproductive script may provide a less normative and freer position to follow Edvard. (cf. Silver, 2003)
Though not all makes these links between life outside reproduction and intimacy, old age plays a role. Many of the interviewees put intimacy as what is central and most important to sex. Intimacy is linked like in the above examples to warmth love and mental communion but also to physical intimacy as bodily contact. Lennart, 78, talks about how he regards intimacy including physical contact as a priority and highly valued aspect of sexuality, and he links this to being in a certain stage in life.

Lennart: Both Lena /wife/ and I are of an age where one thinks about what will happen next, who will pass away first and how will it feel not to have somebody to crawl over to during the night. Sometimes Lena says hold me and then I hold Lena and then I say hold me and it could be you have troubles sleeping or, that’s a part of sexuality which almost never leads to intercourse but which I think is a part of (.) the bodily contact20

With illness and death being parts of everyday life the focus on intimacy increases and becomes more important in how Lennart makes sense of sexuality.

Touching and feeling, the whole of the body!: narratives of changing sexual practices

As the quote by Lennart reveals and which was also visible in Nore’s narrative on more mutual sex, sex does not necessarily equate intercourse within the discourses of intimacy. An important element in this discourse is thus variations and negotiations of sexual practices, what I will discuss as the final aspect of alternative and different narratives of older men’s sexuality and sexuality in later life. The variations and changes in sexual practices is very much linked to the theme of intimacy but also to the theme of reciprocity. In Nore’s narrative of an unselfish attitude to sex that emerges in later late relates closely both to an increased intimacy and to different sexual practices, he says:

I’m more interested in touching and feeling and like that (.) now than /before/ she thinks that is really nice21

---

20 Båda Lena och jag är i den åldern nu då man funderar över vad händer härnäst, vem ska gå bort först och hur kommer det att kännas att inte ha nån att krypa över till, att eh, under natten, ibland säger Lena Håll om mig, då håller jag om Lena å så säger jag håll om mig och eh det kan vara när man har svårt att sova, det är en del av sexualiteten som nästan aldrig utmynnar i ett samtal som men som också tycker jag är en del av av (.) kroppsskontakten.

21 jag är mer intresserad av att ta i och känna och så där (.) nu mot, hon tycker det är vädligt trevligt

72
Axel similarly talks about caressing, taking showers together as things one can do, but for him the variations in sex are more conditioned by problems to get an erection than an entire shift to intimacy and different sexual practices. Similarly Nore expresses how changes in the body lead to different sexual practices where touching each other becomes more central:

Nore: Well it changes, it’s probably like that for all older couples, it gets dryer and the man has more difficulties to get an erection so it isn’t just like the old days, and maybe that’s a good thing in some ways (laughs) (How?) cause then there is a different /…/ technique sort of, it’s not just to, you have to touch each other in a different way and like that (..) I add lubricant and so that is a part of this and if I can’t get an erection that is also a way of getting, it becomes part of a foreplay, so in a sense that is good

The shift to different sexual practices which involves things such as touching, feeling caressing the whole body and which is less centred on intercourse and the penis, seems to exist in a continuum with increased intimacy, less selfish sex and changes in bodies in old age. Nore expresses satisfaction with how bodily changes opens up for variations in sexual practices which comes close to intimacy and what for him characterises more reciprocal and less selfish sex. So it is not necessarily that bodily changes lead to increased intimacy and less selfish sex. Nor is it so that increased intimacy is the onset of different sexual practices, instead increased intimacy, bodily changes and different sexual practices are intertwined in how sexuality is narrated in later life.

I was arguing above that the emphasis of reciprocity and distancing from young and macho-masculinities may be one way shaping a desirable sexual self in old age and which may in essence be a way of creating a new hegemonic heterosexual sexuality with the outset in old age; and this discussion is certainly done in a critical mode. I would however also like to attempt a more creative and generative mode, focusing of
possibilities of change involved in narratives on older men’s sexualities. Annie Potts uses the Deleuzian question of “what a body can become?” to explore the shaping of Viagra-bodies, and I find her approach interesting also to think of what bodies can become in intersections of age and masculinity. (Potts, 2004) Central to the Deleuzian body is the notion of “assemblage” which refers to how bodies are not coherent organic entities but temporary assemblages between the organic and inorganic. As Potts puts it:

Deleuzian bodies come into being in a kind of chaotic network of habitual and non-habitual connections, always in flux, always reassembling in different ways. Importantly, instead of seeking to define and constrain the ‘habits’ of a body Deleuze and Guattari are concerned with what bodies can become. (2004, 20)

Accordingly, Deleuze (sometimes with Guattari) is not primarily occupied with the regulatory schemas of bodies, most notably bio-medicine defining and restricting bodies, but rather interested in thinking in a generative mode beyond the conventions of biomedicine. Desire is to Deleuze organized by three modes, the molar line, the molecular line and the “line of flight”. Molar lines could be conceptualised as a hegemonic discourse of sexuality, a macro-force which organizes and categorizes through creation of binaries, codes, rules and regulations, and Potts links this to authoritative discourses such as capitalism, marriage and the nuclear family “and in respect to sexuality, normative domains such as medicine, sexology and psycho-analysis” (ibid., 21). In relation to this exists molecular line which operates more on a micro-level, are less structured but still informed by the molar. In contrast to these lines, Deleuze introduces the “line of flight” which involves possibilities of proliferating desires outside the domains of the molar and molecular lines, the line of flight “de-territorializes” new domains of desire and as such, according to Potts, may present “radically different experiences of ‘becoming’”. (ibid.)

How does this then relate to the narratives of intimacy and varied sexual practices and to narratives of the becoming of an unselfish sexual self and increased reciprocity? In Potts, the Viagra body as an assemblage is discussed in relation to how it re- or de-territorializes bodies and desires along molar lines or lines of flight. I am interested in thinking how the above narratives which exist in a continuum of bodies and practices may propose a “line of flight”, a new direction and orientation which de-territorialises new sexual grounds for heterosexual male sexuality. The line of flight has strong parallels with Elisabeth Grosz’s call for a “radi-
cal rethinking of male sexual morphology” (Grosz, 1994: 201). Feminists have discussed how the imaginary anatomy of male and female heterosexual bodies signifies male bodies as hard, sealed and impermeable and female bodies as soft, mushy and permeable (Grosz, 1994; Waldby, 1995). The sexual practices enacted in heterosexual sex, the morphology of the body is intrinsically linked to the psychic investment of the subject according to Waldby (ibid.). The primary role in the ideology of heterosexual sex is played by the phallus which involves a detachment from and disassociation with other erotic sensations and pleasures of the body. Obviously what Waldby and other feminist theorists are presenting is a symbolic relationship of male and female bodies in heterosexual sex. Just as I have been arguing for how sexuality and masculinity follow certain scripts, and what Waldby is presenting are “bodily choreographies”. These may not entirely resonate with how men and women engage in sex but surely structures what is considered real sex and sexual practice. The dominant bodily choreography of male sexuality does then neither allow for intimacy and reciprocity nor for sexuality that de-centres the penis. However the narratives I have presented above essentially involve a de-centring of the penis, penetration and a sexual morphology which entails bodily sensual pleasures beyond coital sex. As such they may in fact present another orientation and direction of male sexuality and the sexual bodies of men. If reproduction is one of the molar lines of sexuality and which has rendered sexuality outside reproduction perverse or unintelligible (see, for example, Edelman, 2004) Edvard’s narrative of how sexuality in old age outside reproduction as more free may propose a Deleuzian line of flight. Life outside the life course is more un-scripted and the reciprocity, intimacy and sexual practices beyond penetrative sex may thus be enabled. While there is a tendency to see young as representing change and old as stable, conservative and stagnating (Connidis, 2006), the interviewees’ narratives to some extent suggest something different. Men’s sexualities in later life provide us with other and changing ways of understanding men’s sexual practices, a non-teleological trajectory of older bodies and sexualities

Some concluding remarks

Returning now at the end to the Aftonbladet article initially discussed on Sven Tumba’s recovery from prostate cancer and the ominous threat of impotence, it is clear that the construction of masculinity and sexuality in relation to old (age) differ in significant ways in the representation of Sven Tumba and in the narratives by some my interviewees. The article on Sven reinforces links between masculinity and a specific kind of sex centred around erection, and additionally distances from old age as ir-
reconcilable with a masculine sexual subjectivity. When my interviewees however discuss their erectile problems old age is made use of as a resource bringing maturity and consideration to their sexual relationships. This may in turn, like in the case of Nore, involve complicating and challenging a traditional or stereotypical notion of masculinity, often connected to youth and youthful masculinities.

Accordingly, discourses on older men’s sexuality do not necessarily always require the story of the erect penis and a distancing from old age as equating asexuality. Instead age can be used as a strategic resource and negotiations around what counts as good and satisfying sex is possible when men formulate narratives on sexuality in later life. The themes of intimacy, mutual satisfaction and variations in sexual practices are not only occurring in my interviews but echoes also in other places such as in an article in the same series on prostate cancer with the head line “Problems with potency- not with the sex life”. This article features Gert Ove another man who suffers from prostate cancer and his partner Anita, but they in comparison with Sven Tumba and Mona cannot keep on with sex like before but are faced with a different sex life. This new sex life is described with very similar terms as those my interviewees above used. Stressing the positive aspects of their new sex life the article goes:

But sexuality is much more than just having intercourse. It is just as much about seeking love and acknowledgment from your partner, intimacy, contact and warmth. -We’ve found several new ways of being intimate with each other. Primarily through communication. To touch and caress each other have also become more important aspects of our relationship, says Anita23.

What is noteworthy is how this article on Gert Ove and Anita as well as the above stories very much focuses the couple and sexuality within a stable relationship and it thus seems that this kind of articulation of sexuality is possible foremost in relation to monogamy and coupledom.

Still the article on Gert Ove and Anita and the interviews discussed point to how new narratives may emerge when regaining an erection is not possible (or sometimes not even sought), narratives where notions

23 Men sexualitet är mycket mer än bara att ha samlag med varandra. Det handlar lika mycket om att söka kärlek och få bekräftelse av sin partner, närhet, kontakt och värme.

such as intimacy, warmth and other sexual practices than intercourse are stressed. This may be a way of reconstructing a desirable male sexual subjectivity which allows older men to be sexual albeit differently from in their young and virile years. Or it is perhaps even possible to think of it as a de-territorialisation of male sexuality outside the realm of erection and penetration at this intersecting point. However, thinking of intersections of old age, masculinity and heterosexuality may open up for different ways of thinking and conceptualising male sexualities.

References


Chapter 6
Recreating warrior masculinities: Zulu martial sport and male socialization in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-century South Africa

Benedict Carton
George Mason University, Virginia, USA, and
Robert Morrell
University of KwaZuluNatal, South Africa

For at least two centuries, some Zulu boys and young men have reinforced their gender identity through non-lethal stick fighting (ukudlalisa induku), a sport that tested their male prowess. In the context of patriarchal hierarchies, stick fighting offered a means to confront masculine fears of failure (Alegi, 2004; Mchunu, 2008). Winners of one-on-one bouts enhanced their status in a peer pecking order. They were hailed as champions (amaqhawe) and ‘bulls’ in body and spirit. The losers, however, could face scorn as ‘rejects’ (izigwadi). This article traces stick fighting from the beginning of the 1800s to the mid-1900s, examining its influence in military regiments of the paramount chief Shaka kaSenzangakhona and subsequent evolution after British troops destroyed the Zulu kingdom in 1879. Many coming of age rituals died in this imperialist conquest but some managed to survive. In the late nineteenth century white rulers increasingly restricted Zulu martial socialization while they also expanded migrant labour, opening other avenues for rural youths to engage in competitive combat. By the early 1900s, stick fighting had inspired Zulu men to meld influences of modernity and tradition into hybrid expressions of ‘leisure’ that resisted white domination.

Our theoretical approach draws on R.W. Connell’s (1983, 1987, 1995) pioneering critique of homosocial sports that bolster ‘hegemonic’ masculinities. Writing in this vein, other scholars who inform our analysis have probed how exaggerated gender divisions in ‘macho’ school games teach boys to be aggressors, especially in relation to girls. Recently, scholars of South Africa have engaged critically with this literature, initiating other lines of inquiry that examine male-dominated sporting
events in colonized black societies. Mager (1998) and Morrell (1998) have demonstrated that while male recreation entrenched traditional patriarchal prerogatives it also set the scene for courtship, which produced an array of outcomes from romantic love to sexual violence. New studies of ‘leisure time’ and ‘masculinity’ in Africa also provide valuable historical frameworks through which to interpret Zulu stick fighting. In a 2002 review article, Emmanuel Akyeampong and Charles Ambler (2002) survey the emerging research and scrutinize prevailing explanations of leisure that concentrate on individual recreation outside work. In contrast, they describe African leisure as more deeply embedded in shared experiences such as generational obligations in kinship-based societies. Indeed, atomized notions of play would not capture the motivations of Zulu stick fighters who learned to spar with fellow herd boys and later entered migrant labour in age-sets.

Over several years, we have ourselves each conducted interviews (sometimes aided by an interpreter). Our Zulu-speaking informants represented different generations (old to young and some in between); and they came from a variety of rural, peri-urban and township communities. Finally, the questions we posed covered a range of topics pertinent to stick fighting such as the changing views of sporting men.

‘It would be a fighting bull, pitch black in colour’

The cultural idioms associated with stick fighting (*ukudlalisa indunku*) are rooted in oral histories that are difficult to verify. While fragmentary details of stick fighting in the Zulu kingdom appear in European travelers’ accounts, these sources are larded with ethnocentric fabrications. On the other hand, studies conducted by archaeologists offer a good sketch of the life of stick fighters in pre-colonial homesteads bound by marriage, birth, and allegiance to a chief. Since at least the sixteenth century, the homestead (*umuzi*) served as a focal point of everyday activities, with one patriarch controlling rights to labour in a domestic hierarchy subordinating women to men, and juniors to seniors. Livestock husbandry was largely the domain of males, while crop cultivation was the responsibility of females. In hills and valleys surrounding their familial homestead (*umuzi*) herd boys passed some of their time sparring (*ukungcweka*). The skills they honed with switches and sticks were employed to guard cattle, a preeminent source of bridewealth that enabled children eventually to marry and create their own families.

The nascent Zulu state tapped into these conventions of social organization. In fact, Shaka’s military system probably derived some of its structure from a rite of passage conducted by eighteenth-century chiefs. They enrolled male ‘age-sets’ that were commanded by young men ex-
pert in stick combat (izingqwele) who led bands of herd boys in defense of their grazing territory. By the end of the eighteenth century, when European merchants in Delagoa Bay (now called Maputo, Mozambique) increased ivory trafficking, chiefs in what is now KwaZulu-Natal dispatched age-sets to kill elephants for coastal traders. Hunting on this scale molded young men into disciplined, fleet-footed soldiers. As ambitious chiefs sought to control the profitable sale of tusks, they clashed violently. In ensuing wars that facilitated the rise of Shaka, age-sets transformed into military regiments (amabutho).

Some historical evidence indicates Shaka promoted stick fighting as a training exercise for the Zulu army, subduing the king’s rivals and raiding their livestock. In the mid-to-late nineteenth century subsequent kings Mpande and Cetshwayo limited campaigns because their political territory was hemmed in by the English colony of Natal to the south and Boer Transvaal republic to the west. Thus, regiments (amabutho) turned to more national concerns such as patrolling the Zulu state. Occasionally, they battled one another when civil strife racked the royal house, but more often they maintained their preparedness in grand ceremonies, performing martial anthems and warrior dances (ukugyiya) before colliding in stick bouts. During the king’s annual ‘first fruits’ celebration (umkhosi), young soldiers were rewarded for their service by being allowed to consume a ritually slaughtered and roasted bull’s body (umzimba wenkunzi). An aged patriarch named Mshanyankomo, whose father was Mpande’s court praiser, recalled in 1922 that ‘umkosi ceremonies in the Zulu country’ entailed sending conscripted youths to capture ‘a fighting bull, pitch black in colour [inkunzemnyama], a big one, old one, that would rip out people’s innards’. This beast was driven back to the king’s enclosure, killed and eaten by the young warriors.

A well-drilled and highly motivated force, the Zulu army represented a formidable danger to colonial power in South Africa, particularly to white authorities in Natal, a territory on the flank of Zululand that the British annexed in 1842. By the 1870s, imperialist policymakers in London were demonizing Zulu regiments as a grave threat to Anglo-Saxon ‘civilization’ in Africa. Some of these officials conspired to erode the sovereignty of king Cetshwayo (the nephew of deceased Shaka) and convert his soldiers into cheap labour for white capitalist farmers and diamond mine owners profiting from the mineral revolution. English-speaking settlers in Natal, for their part, vented fears that the ‘man-slaying’ Zulu would wipe them out; their voices joined a chorus clamoring for a British confederation in spanning all of southern Africa. In 1878 the British High Commissioner Bartle Frere promised to fulfill these demands. He was fascinated by the ‘fine fitness’ of ‘Kaffir tribes’, but regarded king Ce-
tshwayo’s regiments as blindly driven since boyhood, when they learned to play violently with sticks, to engage in ‘bloodthirsty’ conquest. In January 1879 Frere was instrumental in launching a British invasion of the Zulu kingdom. Early in the campaign, several columns under the command of Lord Chelmsford were annihilated after Cetshwayo’s regiments, racing into rifle fire, stormed an encampment of imperial soldiers at a place called Isandlwana. In that battle Zulu soldiers used their weapons in hand-to-hand combat—a crucial skill probably acquired in stick fighting—to deliver one of the most devastating defeats suffered by the British in Africa. But by mid-year, Queen Victoria’s troops had overrun the kingdom, killing thousands of civilians, deposing king Cetshwayo, and pulverizing his regiments.

“I won’t let so-and-so throw dust in my eyes”

With popular memory of the battle of Isandlwana receding, white authorities from the 1880s onward accelerated their appropriation of land and imposition of taxes. Yet, even with these intrusions herding practices that instilled customary norms of male ‘toughness’ persisted well into the twentieth century. Meanwhile an industrial boom around the First World War hastened the flow of migrant labour to growing towns like Durban, where officials enforced draconian measures to safeguard whites-only leisure facilities and residential areas, thus laying a legal foundation for the apartheid system. The tightening of racial segregation prompted some black elites like African National Congress (ANC) founder Pixley Seme to press for preservation of the ‘tribal’ vestiges of male socialization like competitive combat. Indeed, as white rulers proscribed large-scale military exercises associated with the training of Zulu regiments, stick fighting grew in importance as a symbol of ‘black’ resistance to emasculating modern colonialism. Rural-born Zulu workers, for their part, sought more intensely to assert their masculine presence in the city by creating autonomous urban spectacles animated, in part, by warrior codes of stick fighting. They attracted crowds to neighbourhoods around their municipal compounds by organizing ngoma (dance-song) competitions, with teams of performers adorned in insignia recalling the late-19th century battle Isandlwana and mimicking the routines of stick fighting. Labour migrants also formed street gangs known as amalaita, which marched abreast on sidewalks, armed with sticks and the confidence of champion combatants.

Not surprisingly, from the end of the nineteenth century, colonial authorities expressed acute uneasiness with the trajectories of stick fighting, which they considered a bellwether of gathering ‘tribal’ violence. They closely monitored social turbulence, noting in files what their local
interpreters—the paid colonial conduit to Zulu orality—reported about the machinations of young men who brandished sticks before wooing girls. To be sure, this documentation is impaired by the racist views of white officials and rosy testimony of triumphant stick fighters who romanticized their exploits. It also contains muted references to sexual assaults triggered by stick bouts. Winning could imbue some stick fighters with a sense that a girl they liked would accede perforce to their advances. Defeat too could bring feelings of emasculation and incitement to rape. Colonial officials were aware of the broader violence kindled by stick fighting and by the start of the twentieth century, magistrates had regulated the number of sticks that men could carry in public (to not more than one) and outlawed the mobilization of military regiments and ‘first fruits’ ceremonies. Through mounting prosecutions, courts tried to clamp down on feuds between young men using sticks and more deadly weapons like clubs.

Yet colonial authorities never banned stick fighting. In fact the most illustrative evidence (from archives and corroborating testimony of Zulu-speaking men we interviewed) suggests that white rule was only one of many influences that marked, if not fundamentally altered, stick fighting over several centuries. Moreover, there are compelling indications that stick fighting also retained remarkable continuities from the nineteenth century through the twentieth century. For one, the sport consistently took place on communal grounds away from homesteads and reflected the instructions imparted by ‘coaches’ (izingqwele) who trained stick fighters stoically to give and receive punishment. Sparring (ukungcweka) also remained a favorite way to prime muscle groups for the clench and backpedal, whirling hits and fast footwork. Finally, in some historical accounts an aesthetic portrait emerges that illuminates the form and function of the model fighter’s body. He was supposed to be dexterous with a bull-like torso, though a lithe, lightning-quick competitor was equally admired for the swift damage he could inflict. In some rural Zulu communities these ideals of physical fitness are as coveted today as they apparently were during the nineteenth century.

The written and oral sources divulge much more about the specific customs and outlets of contemporary stick fighting. During the twentieth century, this combat was refereed by a headman or a ‘war captain’, who drilled fighters from a cluster of homesteads. He could preside over a contest and intervene after a decisive collision or one of the opponents crumpled to the ground. Each fighter typically carried a long blocking stick, (ubhoko); a short stick (umsila) to slide through the back of their shield, and grasp as a handle; and the striking weapon (umshiza). Sometimes stick fighting served broader community needs, especially in over-
populated reserves around which white settlers already claimed the most productive soil. In these chiefdoms vendetta-driven conflicts over land were rife and the threat of youths ambushing one another hung heavily over homesteads. Consequently, as early as the turn of the twentieth century, patriarchal elders scheduled inter-district stick fights (*umgangela*) for a pre-arranged spot and time, thus affording a sanctioned space for young men’s aggression and release valve for tensions caused by material scarcity.

Of course, stick fighting was not without its unpredictable hazards. Once two fighters faced each other, they normally tapped sticks or one another’s shield; then they launched into feints and charges, wheeling to deliver chopping blows. A sport of this kind led to serious and sometimes crippling injuries: a blinded eye, punctured eardrum, smashed wrist, and broken ribs. A crushing hit to the crown or temple could produce a fatal brain injury. Lasting marks from fighting sticks—dented brows and other permanent signs of harm to elbows and ankles—were seen as badges of honour, especially the scar (*ingozi*) on the head, which was named idiomatically, *inkamb’ beyibuza*, ‘where you go people ask, What’s that from?’ A homicidal competitor could flout rules of engagement and pummel his fallen foe, despite the umpire’s cries of ‘Maluju-wethu!’ and shouts from the crowd of ‘Khumu!’ conveying ‘Enough! and ‘That’s It!’.

In addition when a group of stick fighters (*iviyo*) from a particular district vented a grudge, a territorial rivalry could erupt into a ‘faction fight’ involving knobbed club and short-stabbing spear.
It was also common for a stick fighter to express his zeal verbally, for example, in regimental anthems (*amahubo*) that warned competitors against winning at all costs. When such restrictions were ignored the consequences could be fatal, not just to the combatants, but also to the larger society. In 1920 the male elder Mangati recited verses of one bal-

---

24 Photos by James Hersov. These images appeared in the 2005 documentary film, “Heaven’s Herds: Nguni Cattle, Nguni People”; Benedict Carton and Dingani Mthethwa were the historical consultants for this film and worked closely with the director James Hersov.
lad describing a tragic battle between two Zulu princes and stick fighters, Cetshwayo and Mbuyazi, who claimed their father’s mantle. Their row ignited a civil war that killed thousands in 1856. Other ‘faction fight’ lyrics recorded by ‘Country Zulu’ bands like Inkumba Emfece narrated the bitter antagonisms between young men that brought heaven-sent destruction. One of Inkumba Emfece’s melodies, ‘Sokushaya Isangquma’, cried: ‘Imikhombe iyenana. Sokushaka isangquma. Lezonduku zonanana [A bad turn deserves another. You will be struck by hailstones. These sticks of yours will meet ours stroke for stroke]’. Inkumba Emfece’s ‘Sokushaya Isangquma’ was recorded in Durban on gramophone technology by Eric Gallo (Tracey, 1948).

A stick fighter could initiate a contest by loudly praising his heroic (igbawe) virtues or issue a ‘polite’ challenge (inselelo) that lightly cloaked his belligerence. His opponent might retort, ‘I won’t let so-and-so throw dust in my eyes’. As further barbs were traded, one of the competitors might break into a solo war dance (ukugiya) that climaxed in stomping. His pounding feet could evoke a bull’s fury, and also the sheer force a young man displayed when with his bare hand he chopped the hardest bone of a slaughtered cow, its jaw (elifuphi). Today at rural weddings in KwaZulu-Natal older boys and young men from the groom’s clan arrive at the ceremony in call-and-response mode. Their headman (induna yezinsizwa) may ask ‘Where are the bulls?’, to which they respond lustily, ‘Here are the bulls!’ ‘Nanzi izinkunzi!’ This word play could lead to a stick bout in a field far from the nuptials, pitting the young men in the groom’s party against their counterparts in the bride’s contingent.

Onlookers such as the male guests at a wedding could observe a bout and spur on the action, but rarely did they bay for blood. There was etiquette to follow, regulating the audience and combatants. ‘When one got in a blow’, an isiZulu-speaking colonist who witnessed stick bouts remarked, ‘he would shout to his opponent “Yivume”’, meaning “admit that the stick has reached you”; and the one successfully warding off a blow would shout out Hlala, meaning, literally, “sit down”, but actually meaning you are foiled’. Many fighters valued a fair triumph, which left a beaten, if not maimed loser (Samuelson, 1929; Coetzee, 2002).
Stick fighting and Zulu masculinity in the age of modernity

In the 1920s ANC leader Pixley Seme extolled the valor of young stick fighters in the hopes of renewing indigenous opposition to the depredations of industrial-strength white supremacy. To this end, Seme spoke about the need to imbue future generations of Africans with the fortitude of Zulu herd boys. The latter were, in his estimation, the opposite of white children enfeebled by bourgeois leisure and economics:

He [the Zulu boy with a switch] does not need to be taken visiting all the time, like the child of a white person, which is always having balls and carts bought for it. For this came with the white people; it is their equivalent of looking after cattle. The beast of the white people is money. For money brings all the knowledge of the things which children of the white people have to learn about as they grow up. It prepares them for their

25 Photo by Zev Greenfield.
kind of manhood. This kind of manhood, we see, is also ruled by money. Among black people it is ruled by cattle

While western parents coddled their offspring, Seme asserted, boys in Zululand traversed rugged pastures and forged esprit de corps: ‘For in the Zulu country looking after cattle was the great school for boys. Boys had their own izinduna [headmen] the izingqwele [the leaders of stick fighters and herd boys] who gave them orders, like soldiers, and who were obeyed by all the other boys’. Stick bouts solidified their brotherhood: ‘If boys fought with one another, if they disputed over the grazing-grounds of the cattle, these matters were not interfered with by older people. For boys did not fight at their homes; they fought out in the countryside (endhle) [emphasis in original], where they were in charge’. 

Seme longed for his vanguard of Zulu males to reflect proudly on their ‘country’ values wherever they went, which during his lifetime (1881-1951) and beyond meant entering the urban world of capitalist production. By the middle twentieth century the number of able-bodied Zulu patriarchs living year-round with their family was fast diminishing. The more typical male ‘provider’ was a phantom figure in the reserves that spent months in town seeking employment or toiling in a menial job (Maylam, 1996; Hunter, 2006). However, by leaving home, these migrants were not necessarily abandoning ‘tradition’. Customary pursuits such as stick fighting were imported and adapted to the city setting, where along with other related (and evolving) cultural performances, they would leave profound marks on urban life. Labour migrants incorporated stick fighting into their town pursuits like warrior team-dancing (ngoma), which they rehearsed in and around labour compounds. During set routines on a Saturday or work holiday they donned pre-colonial combat regalia. On center stage, typically a patch of field, they brandished sticks in response to cues from their ‘war captain’ (igosos) and stepped to syncophated regimental anthems (amahubo). More dramatic movements imitated a stick fighter’s dance (ukugiya) before a bout. In the wake of the First World War, ngoma performances became popular entertainment for Africans in Durban employed as domestic servants and stevedores. They turned their ‘Native Recreation Grounds’ into leisure sites for weekend ngoma competitions. Such exhibitions electrified black crowds and stirred martial feeling that triggered clashes between stick-wielding migrants and municipal policemen. These contests came to be a fixture in African social life not only for migrants but even for some ‘enlightened Bantu’, the educated Christian African elite, who

could be quite critical of public displays of ‘raw tribalism’. There was also a degree of direct white control over dance competitions, with police supervising teams at recreational sites and the Native Affairs Department as well as municipal welfare officers organizing ngoma events.

Needless to say, warrior team-dancing alarmed white South African authorities. It was closely linked with gangs known as amalaita, which reportedly specialised in theft, robbery and attacks on white residents. Yet this categorization of criminality overlooks the organization of amalaita groups and its ‘obvious resonance with the stick-fighting of rural youth’, one of the strongest ‘cultural continuities between town and countryside’ (La Hausse, 1990). Gang membership involved obeying ‘captains and officers’, adopting group identities like the ‘black bulls’, Nkunzemnyama, as well as patrolling turf ‘with sticks at night’. These activities, even if anti-social, gave migrants a sense of their masculine worth ‘in a racially-oppressive colonial town’ and channeled their frustrations, exacerbated by daily indignities like being ‘[d]riven violently off Durban’s pavement by white males and frequently fired without notice by employers’ (Ibid.). In this regard, by the early twentieth century stick fighting had transformed from a form of combat preparation in defense of Zulu sovereignty to a proving ground for labour migrants confronting the exigencies of modern South Africa.

**Past as prologue?**

Today, stick fighting is no longer vital to the arsenals of gun-toting gangs in South Africa’s cities, but it still is part of traditional Zulu life, especially in communities where the martial sport reinforces male pecking orders and primes boys entering migrant labour for challenges of the urban street, hostel, factory and shop. Yet with high unemployment (near 40% nationally and endemic now for a decade), stick fighting may no longer be preparing many rural young men the rigorous world of salaried work. One might ask, then, with South Africa continuing to shed thousands of jobs in industrial and manufacturing sectors, what unfolding processes are likely to transform some of the future purposes of stick fighting? Such a question might focus on global forces buffeting the fledgling post-apartheid democracy as it seeks to lure overseas investors and tourists. The fastest growing segment of the South Africa’s neo-liberal economy is the hospitality industry, which not only receives injections of foreign capital, but also packages the country’s top ‘brands’, wildlife safaris and ‘tribal’ adventures. Besides game parks, one of the popular destinations is the cultural village resort, offering visitors from across the world a chance to participate in ethnographic dramas of the ‘real Africa’. For example, at Simunye Zulu Lodge, a designated Natural Heritage Site and
premier tourist attraction near king Cetshwayo’s grave, daily entertainment includes stick fights. After watching a simulated bout, guests are invited to try combat with ‘padded’ wooden weapons under the command of a Zulu-speaking lodge employee playing ‘war captain’ (Carton, 2005). If Simunye is any indication, a sport enjoyed by Zulu male youths might be shifting to an arena of greater commodification. Indeed, a boy growing up in the shadow of a ‘cultural village’ who tests his prowess against peers might, if he is lucky, secure employment as a mock ‘warrior’ in the hospitality industry.

Note and acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was published as “Kampfsport, stählerne Körper und Mannhaftigkeit in der südafrikanischen Zulukultur, 1800–1930” [Martial sport, warrior bodies and Zulu manhood in South Africa, 1800-1930], WerkstattGeschichte, 44, 2007, 65-78. We thank P. Alegi, J. Clegg, J. Hersov, M. Hunter, D. Mthethwa, B. Platt and L. Vis for their insights.

Bibliography


Chapter 7
Detours for heterosexuality
– Young boys viewing male bodies in pornography

Niels Ulrik Sørensen
Aarhus University, Denmark

This paper analyses young boys’ descriptions of their meetings with male bodies in pornography. It is based on qualitative interviews with 15 and 16 year old boys performed in the NIKK-project “Youth, gender and pornography in the Nordic countries”, which took place in 2005 and 2006.

The paper explores the tension between the masculine and the feminine, the homosexual and the heterosexual generated during these meetings. Especially it focuses on the tension related to the young boys’ attempts to assume masculine and heterosexual positions and the feminisation and homosexualisation inherent in their looking at male bodies in pornography. The paper shows that the young boys pursue various strategies to reinterpret gender and sexuality in pornography in order to avoid this feminisation and homosexualisation.

However this reinterpretation sometimes creates friction between the masculine and the heterosexual, and the boys feel that they cannot position themselves as both – they have to choose between masculinity or heterosexuality. The paper explores how and what they choose.

Background

Though pornography consumption among young people in Scandinavia generally has increased, still more young boys than young girls use it, and more young boys than young girls use it on a daily basis (Sørensen and Kjørholt, 2007). As much pornography revolves around female characters, this has caused some public debate about the conceptions of female bodies and sexualities that young boys construe in their use of pornography (Sørensen, 2003). Far less has been said about their conceptions of male bodies and sexualities.

However, media studies have drawn attention to a remarkable proliferation of objectified male bodies and sexualities in non-pornographic visual mass media products in recent decades (Bordo 2000, Gill et al.)
And scholars who have studied masculinity have argued that young boys increasingly identify with these bodies and sexualities and use them as standards of reference for modelling their own bodies and sexualities (Mort, 1996; Edwards, 1997; Johansson, 1997, 2005; Sørensen, 2005, 2006).

In the same way that images of male bodies and sexualities outside pornography contribute to young boys’ construction of bodies and sexualities, male bodies and sexualities in pornography may contribute to this construction too. There has not been much research about this particular issue, though it was taken up in a recent American study in relation to a group of adult heterosexual men (Eck, 2003). They distanced themselves unambiguously from nude male images – to relate to them even remotely seemed incompatible with their positions as male heterosexuals.

However, young boys in Scandinavia who have grown up in a time, where images of male bodies and sexualities have become part of mainstream culture, may relate differently to such images. This paper explores if and how that is the case among 10 Danish middleclass boys from the Copenhagen area, who were interviewed individually about their use of pornography. More precisely the paper explores how they interpret and give meaning to male bodies in pornography, and how they through these interpretation and meaning construction processes construct their own gender and sexuality. But it also explores some of the methodological challenges I faced to make them talk about this issue at all.

The general picture
Initially, the young boys tend to talk about the organisation of gender and sexuality in pornography in generalised terms. By using all-encompassing and de-personalised pronouns like “women”, “men”, “people”, “you” etc. they make clear that men view pornography to view women, and women are in pornography to be viewed by men. The pornographic spectator, in other words, is male, whereas the pornographic spectacle is female, and the relationship between the two of course is heterosexual.

Though not talking directly about themselves, by using these generalised terms, the young boys of course indirectly position themselves as male heterosexual spectators who view pornography to view female spectacles. But they also make other kinds of pornographic spectators, different kinds of spectacles etc. irrelevant and unimportant to mention. They become unspoken and silenced deviances which the young boys don’t have to relate to or be associated with.
Among these unspoken and silenced deviances, of course, are the male bodies in pornography, which is non-existent in the young boys’ generalised talking about the organisation of gender and sexuality in pornography. As one of my aims during the interviews was to make them reflect on these bodies, I had to encourage them to talk about pornography in a less generalised terms and make them talk in more concrete manners: in which situations do they view pornography, what they see on the screen, and of course what role the male body plays in the seen – if any.

Deconstructing male bodies

Having done that, the boys did start to talk about male bodies in pornography. To begin with, however, this talk mostly consisted of prefatory remarks about them being “ugly”, looking like “bulldogs” etc. followed by reassurances that it didn’t really matter, as the male bodies in pornography are not of any sexual interest in themselves. They are only there to contribute to the sexual action where the female bodies play the main role.

As it is primarily via the penis that the male bodies contribute to this action, the penis overshadows the rest of the male body in pornography in the boys’ talk about the male body. But, interestingly, by putting a delimited focus on the penis, the young boys not only separate it from the rest of the male body. They also separate it from the sexuality of the male body. Though an epitomization of male sexuality, separated from its male body-context, the penis in other words become deprived of the sexuality that it epitomizes.

The boys mostly talk about it as an empty object (for example, “organ”, “equipment”, “knob”) with well-defined outer features (for example, “long and thick”, “25 or 30 centimetres”, “colossal”), which is used by the woman to specific sexual purposes, but which is deprived of any sexual sensibilities, desires, orientations etc. in itself. What is left is a well-designed dildo of flesh and blood – but without any of the characteristics normally associated with a penis of flesh and blood. It becomes strictly a means by which to satisfy the female body.

When the young boys reduce the male body to a penis, and reduce that penis to a dildo, they not only deprive the male characters of their sexuality. They also seem to deprive them of their subjectivity. In the boys’ descriptions of the relationships between the male and female characters, the female characters seem to be the only driving forces – the ones who create the action and thus the ones who shape the dynamics of pornography. The male characters on the other hand go passively with the flow created by the female characters.
The women are displayed as “horny” and seeking “sex all the time in all places and in all possible ways”. And in order to get this sex, they make use of all sorts of means, which will make them end up having sex “with their boss or the mailman”. Deprived of their own sexuality, the male characters do not have similar needs to fulfil, and therefore do not attempt to get anything apart from what is given to them. “Men are just objects used to create the movie”, one boy says. And, it could be added, they are also objects for the female characters which use them to get what they want. The women in pornography may be the primary objects for the male viewers, including the young boys in this paper, but according to the very same boys they seem to objectify the men in pornography, who are reduced to mere dildos of flesh and blood.

This deconstructive approach to male bodies in pornography makes it possible for the young boys to talk about these bodies and maintain their position as male heterosexual viewers of pornography at the same time. When the young boys move beyond the generalised notion of the organisation of gender and sexuality in pornography, which only involves female spectacles, and they acknowledge that there in fact are male spectacles too, they tend to strip these bodies of any sexual, subjective etc. qualities in order to make sure that their own qualities as male heterosexual viewers of pornography are not put into question.

A hypothetical female perspective

Interestingly, there is a way that the young boys briefly can describe the male bodies in pornography without stripping them of any sexual, subjective etc. qualities. And they can even do it without compromising their status as heterosexuals. However, it requires that they momentarily give up their male talking position in the interviews and instead assume a female talking position. Some of the young boys briefly do that during the interviews.

Mostly it is done when they are asked to comment on non-pornographic pictures of male bodies from various youth-sites during the interviews. Then they’d say things like: “This is not the kind of picture that you are turned on by as a girl”, “That’s not the first thing a girl would think of when looking at an upper-body” etc. And after having done that they would be able to elaborate on various aspects of the boys’ looks, sexualities, personalities etc. (E.g. Whether they had “good upper-upper-bodies” or not, or whether they were “horny” or not).

But even though a female perspective is adopted mostly in passages when the young boys are asked to comment on pictures presented to them in the interview situation, these comments sometimes spill over into direct talk about male bodies in pornography, which opens up a
communicative space where the potentially homosexualised relationship between the young boys as male viewers and the male body in pornography is replaced by a female-male relationship which makes it possible for them to elaborate on the male body in ways they would otherwise be unlikely to do.

On the one hand, this “gender-change” shows how important gender is in the viewing situation. What can be seen, and how it can be seen, depend very much on the gender associated with the seer as well as the seen. But it also shows some of the regulatory power that heterosexuality has over gender. In order to maintain their heterosexuality, the young boys position themselves contrary to their normal gender position. Momentarily, heterosexuality so to speak drives them out of their maleness and into femaleness.

However, it must be emphasised that the gender-change is not only momentary – it is also somehow hypothetical. When talking from various male perspectives during the interviews, the young boys talk with a considerable conviction: they merge into these perspectives, become them. The female perspective is kept at a considerable distance. When talking from a female perspective, they constantly mention that they do so – as if they have to convince themselves that this can be done.

Conclusion

The young boys continuously attempt to construct themselves as male heterosexuals during the interviews. It seems to be very important for them, and they are in fact quite successful in doing it. From the beginning of the interviews, they know exactly how to talk about pornography – how to paint a picture of pornography – that emphasizes themselves as male heterosexuals. It is a well-known picture based on gender dichotomies, male spectators, female spectacles etc. In fact it is so well-known that it could be tempting to conclude that the interviews exemplify that the use of pornography by young boys in a sexualised and pornographised late-modern context reinforce old-fashioned stereotypes of gender and sexuality, where men are active and dynamic subjects, women passive and undynamic objects, and heterosexuality is a more or less compulsory way for men and women to relate to each other. This conclusion cannot merely be rejected.

However it is not the whole picture. Something more has to be concluded. Nuances have to be added to the picture: The interviews are also an example of how the use of pornography by young men now and then blur, now and then deconstructs gender-dichotomies in a number of ways. Whereas heterosexuality seems indispensable, the gender-dichotomies normally associated with heterosexuality, seem less indispensable.
Of course it should be remembered that these nuances come forward during the interviews as a result of my challenging the young boys’ generalised notions of the organisation of gender and sexuality in pornography. It was their point of departure. However, though the young boys needed some encouragement to come forward with the nuances, they were part of their repertoire. They were part of the ways the young boys used, interpreted and gave meaning to pornography

References
Mort, Frank (1996) Cultures of Consumption: Masculinities and Social Space in Late Twentieth-Century Britain, London: Routledge

Chapter 8
A Bedroom of His Own: Intersections of Webcams, Surveillance and Male Sexuality in the Transnational Context

Alp Biricik
Linköping University, Sweden

Alfred Hitchcock’s spectacular movie *Rear Window* is a visual commitment to explore the internalization of surveillance mechanisms in everyday life. Žižek (1992:57-58) argues that while Hitchcock’s frolicsome camera depicts a love and crime story, it collateral invites audience to involve into a practice of surveying “the other” through the eye of male protagonist who watches his neighbors’ bedrooms from his rear window. Furthermore, audience is un/consciously encouraged to justify the benefits of voyeurism with cinematic pleasure.

“The voyeur is a recognizable social type”, writes Norman K. Denzin (1995:5), “he or she takes morbid pleasure in looking at the forbidden, private activities of others” (Ibid.). In today’s post-modern era, I argue that global/transnational cybercommunities do promote voyeurism (e.g. Flicker, Facebook) where various forms of Information and Communication technologies (ICTs) and particularly webcams are ubiquitously interlinked. The visual transformation and translation of self in various matrix technologies, as part of virtually and visually be(come)ing in cyberspace, radically articulate new forms of hegemonies in everyday life while the process intensifies the profit, thus the power, of multinational corporations globally in the transnational context (Hearn, 2006).

In her extended essay, *A Room of One’s Own*, Virginia Woolf (1928/2004:3) welcomes the reader and writes: “But, you may say, we asked you to speak about women and fiction - what has that got to with a room of one’s own? I will try to explain”. In this working paper, similar to Woolf, I will try to “explain” what I mean by “a bedroom of his own”. Therefore, in the following sections, I examine the interplay of postmodern voyeuristic eye, surveillance and disciplining mechanisms in Web 2.0 technologies, particularly for some “gay / queer” men who

---

29 By acknowledging the socio-political and historical differences of gay and queer identity politics, I prefer to use this “ambiguous formulation” to address their epistemological “normalization” process.
look outside from their “digital rear windows” in the transnational context. As for the case, I present some early results of my cyberethnographic study, conducted during October-November 2008 in a cyber-community—Qruiser, to stress the transformation of “private space” (i.e. modern bedroom) in relation to the usage of webcams that I find close relations to advance discussions about the material/discursive/symbolic foundations of gay/queer male subjectivities in relation to (virtual) spatial forms.

Webcams, surveillance and the transformation of bedroom

In 1991 in a Cambridge University laboratory Quentin Stafford-Fraser and Paul Jardetzky, the computer scientists who wanted to keep their eyes on the availability fresh coffee while they were working, fixed a recycled video camera to an old computer and then a video frame-grabber over the coffee machine placed outside their working environment called the “Trojan Room”. In the name of having more “control” over the fresh coffee, they posted the very first real-time cyber surveillance recording process on the Internet, hence they could be able to watch it from other places, which later surprisingly grabbed thousands of Internet surfers’ attention and maintained the first global cyber surveillance experience. Since then, this new real-time recording device, namely known as webcam has become one of the crucial ‘killer applications’ on the Internet (Campella, 2002). Most notably, as I try to address in this paper is that the subject of surveillance has radically moved from coffee machine to “human” subject.

Mirzoeff’s insightful analysis on the etymology of webcam, derived from Latin for the word ‘room’, raises vital questions on the division of public and private, privacy and deliberately the transformation of domestic space (Mirzoeff, 2002). “Webcam users make the bedroom interior the scene of action” (Ibid.:13.), says Mirzoeff by highlighting the global influence of Jennifer Ringley, a young woman who broadcast her life from 1996-2003, in streaming the banality of everyday life. Here I ask whether bedroom is “still” a “room for sleeping in” (Hawkins 1987: 263), or as defined by some “national” authorities: a private space used for sleeping and having sex (UK The Sleep Council 2008, National Sleep Foundation 2008). I think the answer is getting critically queer.

30 Webcams can be named as cam, livecam, homecam or netcam (White, 2003:12).
Here I want to address two issues. Bearing in mind Lefebvre’s (1995:11) argument “(social) space is a (social) product”, I argue that bedroom is not “naturally” a private space but rather a space that is constituted and regulated within the networks of various gendered power relations, particularly patriarchy and capitalism in. Thus it has become a “privatized” space in the domestic sphere—most recognizably a space for “women” that is “naturally” acknowledged as “the feminine”.

Michel Foucault’s (1976/1998) insightful analysis on the history of (western) sexuality traces the discursive and material foundations of modern bedroom space in relation to the Enlightenment process. In the beginning of seventeenth century, writes Foucault, sex was deployed from public to private domain, in the name of regulating and managing the sex, and synchronously some new and modern social structures (i.e. modern family) became “utilitarian and fertile” in domestic spatial forms (i.e. the parent’s bedroom). This articulation of spatial and sexual forms cultivated new hegemonies in gender systems, such as “the hegemony of heterosexuality” (Garlick, 2003). Respectively, I argue that heterosexualized and privatized bedroom has historically and epistemologically become an important space of normative power to control and regulate the moral boundaries of sexuality and gender systems by promoting the notion of “proper sex”, which has strongly encouraged the exercise and diffusion of heteronormativity in everyday life.

Broadcasting everyday life from domestic spaces (i.e. bedroom), especially transmitting live gendered and sexualized performances via webcam, to virtual/cyber space raise critical questions on the epistemic and the change of subject in visual/ity (Mirzoeff, 2002), telepresence (Campella, 2002) and surveillance (Wise, 2004). Notably, as Campella (2002: 264) notes, “if the internet and World Wide Web presents the augmentation of collective memory, then webcams are a set of wired eyes, a digital extension of the human faculty of vision”. In the age of postmodernity, where reality is contested (Lyon, 1999), I stress that the “human faculty of vision” is open to be radical manipulations by the help of technology. For instance, the software program AV Webcam Morpher enables the Internet users to play with their gender identities by streaming “fake webcam stream” (Cam Thief, 2008). Put it explicitly, the program can “trick” people by broadcasting a set of programmed “human” visual and verbal expressions, such as using nick voices and faces for hello, goodbye, smile, disgust, kiss, flirt and so on. Also, the software enables the program user to record their audience who has become part of the gendered performance game. Drawing from this case

---

For further discussions see (Battan, 1999; Pearson, 2004; Crook, 2008).
and following Koskela’s (2003) captivative metaphor to address the emergent transformation, “Cam-era”, I ask, how webcamming interacts with the systems of gender and sexuality in the transnational context? And how surveillance mechanisms are integrated in this process?

**Coming out and transnational space**

“The closet is a term used to describe the denial, concealment, erasure, or ignorance of lesbians and gay men”, writes Michael P. Brown (2000:1), “it describes their absence - and alludes to their ironic presence nonetheless - in a society that, in countless interlocking ways, subtly and blatantly dictates that heterosexuality is the only way to be”. Examining the material spatial construction of the closet relatively suggests an analysis about “the intersecting norms of gender/sexuality” (Ibid.) of the “coming out” process. To put it differently, coming out, as an “never ending” process is an experience of performative sexualized and gendered acts of declaring the self as “gay”.

David Phillips (2002) considers coming out as a modern political and strategic tool of the gay individual that carries high risks of alienation, violence (i.e. gay bashing) and facing with (hetero)social stigma parallel to the declaration of the self as ‘other’ in a heteronormative world. For Phillips, ‘coming out’ suggests three important political input to subvert the heteronormative structures and values in societies. Notably, the process encourages the individual to face the fear and shame of social stigma while opening material, discursive and symbolic spaces in societies to constitute new forms of cultures and communities for political empowerment of the homosexual. Lastly and most importantly, coming out provides power to present the (homo)sexual self publicly and challenges for the social value of ‘gay identity’ by offering “an alternative to the received hegemony of the heterosexual, patriarchal ideal” (David, 2005: 97).

Analysing (offline) cruising, as Bech (1998: 220) notes “the interplay of gazes and glances”, proposes a certain critical ground to explore gay / queer men’s spatial-sexual experiences as well as advance the question of “the hegemony of men” (Hearn, 1992) in public space in relation to the diverse spatial foundations of heteronormativity. Moreover, discussing cruising delves further into to explore the amalgamated matrix relations of the closet and coming out process in everyday life while suggesting to discuss a spatial-corporeal issue: “being oriented” (Ahmed, 2006) toward “the desired” through the space of “gaydar -the game of the eyes” (Nicholas, 2004).
Web 2.0 platforms and related ICTs, particularly webcams, have provided a strong technological space for gay/queer individuals for communication and building new networks of struggle against the regulations of heteronormative structures. However, it can also be argued that these technologies have radically transformed, regulated and transcended sex/sexuality, gender, race and the body with neoliberal and patriarchal values by promoting “the liberation of the oppressed” from the closet where the self has made her/his self ‘visible’ globally. Especially, cybercommunities have become crucial transnational areas for gay/queer individuals where computer screens have become a site of coming out. In this meeting point, the ‘fast and cheap’ ICTs diminishes national borders of countries where the distance between the bodies and self/other relations get closer. To wind up, I argue that gaydar, as another form of (male) surveillance constituted through a set of gendered and sexualized power relations between gay/queer wo/men, is radically visually and virtually reformulated and regulated.

**Virtually cruising and surveying**

It is easy to become a member of Qruiser\(^3\)\(^2\). The system requires to fulfill a five-step registration, based on submitting “personal” information on the question of “who you are” and “what you are looking for,” the new member can log on to the website and start cruising virtually. Getting online on the website means to be oriented toward a decentered transnational space. After submitting the chosen nickname and password, the member automatically is forwarded/orientated by the server to her/his profile page while the act of cyber entrance is simultaneously displayed, including the information of location and time, on the “latest logged on” section of the website where other active/logged on members of the community can see. If the member has posted any profile picture, as it is encouraged by the website, it is also posted on the latest logged on section that is open to the interest of others to be orientated to the new

---

32 Qruiser is a Stockholm based web forum and provides service primarily for “Nordic” gay, lesbian, transgender, queer and their friends. The website is promoted as “Scandinavia’s largest, best and most active community” with more than 105,000 active members with great majority from Sweden (%78). According to December 2008 Qruiser member profile statistics report; %68 of the members registered as “man” (72,230 members), %29 as woman (30,676 members), %2 as other (2,101 members) and %1 as nothing (932 members). Concerning the diverse map of “sexual orientations” is reported as %36 homosexual (40,100 members), %29 bisexual (30,445 members), %14 experimental (15,011 members), %9 heterosexual (9,133 members), %7 other/don’t know (7,649 members), %3 queer 2,801, %1 asexual (800 members) (Qruiser 2008).
comer. However, these well-structured multiple directions of orientation means at a certain point is entering virtually and visually into the map of transnational surveillance and agreeing on to come out33.

Depending on the status of membership, the member can see up to thirty previous members34, who have visited their profile page, including the information of their visiting time, location and if it is posted their profile pictures and in some cases videos. The tricky point is that if the member clicks on one of her/his visitors’ profile link, s/he can reach to that person’s profile page where s/he can see also see five of the visitor’s previous visitors. The game of virtual orientatedness enables various “cruising” practices of its own, such as communication (i.e. chatting, sending message), nominating a member as ‘favorite’ public35, and so on. Depending on the process, members can meet outside the land of Qruiser, mostly via using webcam or chatting programs such as Skype and Windows Messenger. Under the light of these discussions, as I have tried to address earlier, likewise the voyeurism in Rear Window, the Qruiser members “watch others” - their neighbors from their windows where both parties enjoy a mutually agreed silent game where the postmodern self’s “new mantra of visual subjectivity: I am seen and I see that I am seen” (Mirzoeff, 2002: 10) is pronounced silently over the transnational space.

To sum up

Cyberspace is ontologically queer; its ubiquitous and decentralized spatial foundation interconnects various material/discursive/symbolic accounts that sustain a rich ground for researchers to explore changing hegemonies. As I have discussed earlier, the evolving Internet technologies effect gender and sexuality systems where control and filtering mechanisms of power, particularly in the form of surveillance, are put into the everyday life fabric.

For Mills Davis (2008), the chair of a Washington DC based research consultancy company specialized in semantic technologies, notes that the previous Web 1.0 technology was about connecting information and getting on the net where as the current Web 2.0 aims to connect people “putting the ‘I’ in user interface, and the ‘we’ into Webs of social par-

33 Members on Qruiser are allowed to post facial and bodily digital pictures on their profiles as long as they are not against the public rules of the cybercommunity (i.e. child pornography, homophobic).
34 The limited free membership displays only five visitors’ profile.
35 Gold members can have up to 200 favourite profiles, of which 25 profiles in the “collection” might be displayed for public’s interest.
ticipation”. In the upcoming later stages, Web 3.0 semantic technologies will represent meanings by connecting knowledge that will serve basis for Web 4.0 - the ubiquitous Internet system that will meet the power of artificial knowledge with ‘the human’. More importantly, in this queer expansion of virtual / cyberspace, multi-national companies and their market strategies will be significantly different where as today the global ICT market is $3.5 Trillion and will be more than $4 Trillion by 2010. In the next decade, the number of mobile Internet users will be 5 billion people including more than 7 billion internet-enabled devices. Going back to the discussion on the future of Web, it can argued that the information collected in the past two decades has maintained a substantial database and it changes the market strategies of multi-national companies strategically and globally where “the consumer” will also become the producer -“the prosumer” (Ibid.). So for me, one crucial aspect of this technological transformation process might be a radical shift of the current surveillance and dataveillance mechanisms that recalls Foucault’s (1980: 164-165) futuristic question: “Do you think it would be much better to have the prisoners operating the Panoptic apparatus and sitting in the central tower, instead of the guards?”.

References


Chapter 9
Outsourcing women’s subordination: Male buyers in business and leisure prostitution

Sheila Jeffreys
University of Melbourne, Australia

The behaviour of male buyers in the global prostitution industry harms the status of all women. It constitutes the outsourcing of women’s subordination, particularly in respect of the way in which male buyers from rich countries are able to buy in the sexual use of women from poor countries in the form of prostitution tourism, or trafficking for marriage and prostitution (Jeffreys, 2009). Understanding men’s buying behaviour in this way enables it to be seen as arising from and reinforcing the power relations of gender rather than being simply a harmless form of consumerism, which is how it is represented by some leisure studies academics (Ryan and Hall, 2001). It suggests that the development of the global sex industry is a serious obstacle to the achievement of gender equality for all women, both those who are prostituted and those who are not.

In the last decade more research has been carried out on the male buyers in the sex industry (Anderson and O’Connell Davidson, 2003; Coy, Horvath and Kelly, 2007; MacLeod, Farley, Anderson and Golding, 2008). Such research has been boosted by the requirement in Article 9 of the 2000 UN Protocol on Trafficking in Persons, which requires states parties to reduce the demand for trafficking (Jeffreys, 2006). Research on men to discover their motivations and what they feel would discourage their behaviour is useful because it indicates what forms of deterrence are likely to be most effective. But research on individuals of this kind does not necessarily place the buyers’ actions into their political context and show how they affect women other than those they are prostituting. Research on prostituted women has tended to take this individual approach too, looking at the motivations and effects of this form of men’s practice on individual women. Such research has been very important in showing the physical and psychological harms these women suffer (Farley, 2003; Farley, Baral, Mevals and Sezzin, 1998).
It is important, however, to go beyond the individual dynamics of the everyday practice of prostitution to look at the economic and political context in which it takes place. As prostitution is increasingly industrialized and normalized it not only causes serious harms to the status of women, but also creates other social and political harms in the form of organized crime and street violence, harm to cityscapes with prostitution advertising, to women’s safety in areas dedicated to male buyer behaviour, to local governance. It is harm to the status of women, however, that I will consider here. It is necessary to highlight these harms because those global forces that seek to normalize the sex industry and get brothel and escort prostitution legalized/decriminalized are most comfortable with the individualist approach of promoting prostitution as ‘sex work’ (Agustin, 2007; Jeffreys, 2006). Decriminalization of prostituted women is a most important feminist goal, but the decriminalization of the industry, pimps, procurers and traffickers is a different matter. NGOs and IGOs that are funded with ‘AIDS money’ to service ‘sex workers’ are happy to provide, as spokespersons in their campaigns to legalize the industry, individual prostituted women who claim that they ‘choose’ and ‘express their agency’ in prostitution. Such spokespersons act as antidotes to the plentiful research that shows the majority of prostituted women are harmed and would like to leave (Raymond et al., 2002). Unfortunately the messages of such sex worker organizations have been very influential within feminism and influential with governments who want excuses to legalize the industry. In Australia, for instance, brothel prostitution is legalized in most states and territories on the basis of these arguments and with the support of most feminist organizations (Sullivan, 2007).

It is also important, therefore, to look at the ramifications of men’s buyer behaviour for the status of women in general, which will enable feminists and policymakers to recognize the implications of supporting such developments. These effects are little remarked, as if an industry of prostitution could reasonably be developed in a society with no negative impact on the relations between the sexes and the subordination of women. In this article I shall argue that the status of all women is affected because male buyers are outsourcing women’s subordination. By the outsourcing of women’s subordination I mean a practice in which men seek to compensate themselves for the advances towards equality that women have made in western countries, by accessing the subordinated sexual services of poor women from other countries. Women in western countries have entered the workplace and public space in ways which can trouble men’s understanding of their superior status. In marriages women may be less happy to provide general servicing of men and may
be more able to say no to unwanted sex. This can be compensated for by
the buying in by men of the practices their wives refuse, such as deferential
behaviour, constant enthusiasm for being sexually used, oral sex or anal
sex, or sadomasochism, from women who are sufficiently economically
desperate or under duress that they cannot refuse. I shall look in
this article at men’s behaviour in ‘leisure’ prostitution through the ex-
amples of prostitution tourism, a practice that has been called sex tour-
ism with the effect of euphemizing the practices involved, and marriage
trafficking. I shall also describe some of the effects that the prostitution
industry in general has on the possibility of women’s equal opportunities
in the world of work.

Leisure prostitution

The field of leisure studies has grown up in response to the developing
importance of ‘consumption’ in the global economy. Presently prostitu-
tion tourism is being researched and taught as a legitimate aspect of
‘leisure’ in leisure and tourism studies (Oppermann, 1998; Ryan and
Hall 2001). Consumption, leisure, and tourism itself, are all profoundly
gendered, as feminist leisure studies researchers are pointing out (Deem,
1999). Women both facilitate men’s leisure, through their unpaid work as
housewives, and become the objects through which men achieve leisure,
by being prostituted, or acting as hostesses or strippers. Men’s tourism
stresses adventure and risk, and, ‘Increasingly, women are themselves
viewed as the destination’ (Wonders and Michalowski, 2001: 551). Lei-
sure studies academics do not usually share the view that prostitution
tourism outsources women’s subordination. Thus two male professors
of leisure studies specifically reject feminist criticism of prostitution tour-
ism in scathing tones. They say that ‘much of the debate on sex tourism
… has been hijacked by a feminist rhetoric within which the client is the
male and the prostitute female…It also implies that the prostitute is the
victim’ (Ryan and Hall, 2001: 37).

The motives of prostitution tourism buyers

The field research and interviews of feminist prostitution tourism re-
searchers provide good support for the notion that prostitution tour-
ists from the rich western world seek to compensate themselves for the
loss of masculine status they experience from an increase in women’s
equality (O’Connell Davidson, 1995; Kruhse-Mountbatten, 1995; Coy,
Horvath and Kelly, 2007). An Australian study reports that ‘a variety of
factors have converged to endanger the individual’s sense of his place in
the world’ (Kruhse-MountBurton, 1995: 199) such as smaller families,
wives who work for payment and a reduction in women’s willingness to do housework. In relation to sex, men’s ideal of the passive woman, which allowed them to see themselves as teachers and initiators, has been undermined by women’s expectation of sexual pleasure. Even prostitution behaviour in Sydney, Australia, whose red light district is a hangover from the servicing of the US military in the Vietnam War, is unsatisfactory because the prostituted women are seen as being ‘emotionally and sexually cold...making little effort to please’ and as failing to ‘disguise the commercial nature of the interaction’ (Ibid.: 193). Also prostituted women in Australia may demand safe sex, restrict the practices they are prepared to offer, and may not be sufficiently young for the men’s taste. Prostitution tourism reaffirms their superior status as men and reassures them against the troubling ‘changing role of women’ which ‘appears to have posed a considerable threat to the male identity’ (Ibid.: 202).

O’Connell Davidson’s work on male sex tourists to Thailand demonstrated that they were all strongly motivated by the opportunity to ‘live like kings’ or ‘playboys’ (O’Connell Davidson, 1995: 45). In prostitution tourism they are serviced by women sexual servants, such as in a bar in Pattaya called the ‘No Hands Bar’ where prostituted women, ‘crawl under the tables in order to fellate the customers’ (Ibid.: 46). The men O’Connell Davidson interviewed were not just angry at European prostitutes but had what she calls a ‘misogynistic rage’ at Western women in general for acting as though they are men’s equals and not worshipping them as kings. The rage is at ‘women who have the power to demand anything at all, whether it is the right to have a say over who they have sex with and when, or the right to maintenance payments for their children’ (Ibid.: 53). ‘Sex tourism,’ says O’Connell Davidson, ‘helps British men to reinforce and construct a powerful and positive image of themselves as a particular kind of white heterosexual man’ (Ibid.: 52).

The motives of marriage trafficking buyers

Men who seek to engage in marriage trafficking express similar sentiments. I choose the use the term marriage trafficking because there is an increasing tendency in academic work to normalize the practice of what has most recently been called the mail order bride industry as simply ‘migration for marriage’ in a fashion similar to the renaming of trafficking in women for prostitution as ‘migration for labour’, and even to emphasize the adventurousness and positive agency of the women involved (Demleitner, 2000). The term marriage trafficking, on the other hand, expresses the seriousness of the harms to women that are involved (UNHRC, 2007). A considerable amount of feminist research on the buyers has shown that these men are outsourcing women’s subordina-
tion. Some theorists have identified the development of such practices as emerging from the creation of a ‘corporate masculinity’ which is being globalized through business practices and connections as well as the Internet. In this ‘corporate masculinity’ or what Felicity Schaeffer Grabiel calls, usefully, ‘corporate multiculturalism’, rich men are able to exercise their male sex right to buy women who are more subordinate than those in their countries of origin, to experience the excitements of exoticism and racist sexual stereotyping, and to cement international relationships through women’s bodies (Schaeffer-Grabiel, 2005). In ‘corporate multiculturalism’ U.S. men seek comparative advantage in the form of being able to buy women’s sexual subservience from poor countries in the same way that a US sneaker manufacturer can offshore their production to take advantage of the poverty of Asian workers, mainly women (Enloe, 2004).

The agency websites regularly solicit custom by promising their male customers that the women they offer will be more subservient than western women. Goodwife.com is a website which provides space for bride agencies to advertise. It states, ‘We, as men, are more and more wanting to step back from the types of women we meet now. With many women taking on the “me first” feminist agenda and the man continuing to take a back seat to her desire for power and control many men are turned off by this and look back to having a more traditional woman as our partner’ (Goodwife.com accessed, 2008). The site exhibits strong resentment of ‘radical feminists’ and calls them “feminazis” for their attitudes and position regarding the roles of the man and the woman in a relationship’. These feminists apparently ‘want a man to be sensitive to their needs and desires to the point of losing everything about him that makes him a man’ (Ibid.). The qualities that the Goodwife website identifies as abhorrent in non-traditional wives are the fact that they want to change their husbands, they stop ‘taking care’ of themselves when they are married, they want to be the ‘boss’, they provide takeaway food instead of cooking, and they want to work on and improve their relationships with their husbands.

The motives of strip club patrons

The strip club industry is also understood as part of the ‘leisure’ industry by some leisure studies researchers (Donlon, 1998). Research on the attitudes of male buyers in this sector also indicate that they are involved in outsourcing women’s subordination though they are not seeking to access poor women through visiting exotic destinations or making use of trafficked women in this case. Men interviewed in one study of clients of strip clubs expressed their anxieties about women’s increasingly
equal roles in the workplace and in marriage which could be assuaged by paying women to get naked and show them their vulvas (Frank, 2003). Frank found that an important reason for men to visit the clubs was that they provided a compensation for the decline in power that they experienced as their wives, partners and women workmates shed their subordination, began to compete with them and demanded equality. The strip clubs provided an antidote to the erosion of male dominance by institutionalising the traditional hierarchy of gender relations. The men found everyday relationships with women ‘a source of pressure and expectations’ and described relations between women and men in general as being “strained,” as “confused,” or “tense.” One buyer referred to the “war between the sexes” (Frank, 2003: 65). Frank’s respondents in the strip clubs sought respite from the problems of having to treat women as equals in the workplace too. ‘Philip’ said that he was able to, “let frustration out”, particularly about, “this sexual harassment stuff going around these days, men need somewhere to go where they can say and act like they want” (Ibid: 66). Frank points out that the rapid increase in strip clubs in the US in the 1980s ‘was concurrent with a massive increase of women into the workforce and an upsurge of attention to issues of sexual harassment, date rape’ (Ibid.).

The impact on women’s status

It is not unreasonable to expect that as more and more western men become buyers in different sectors of the sex industry this will create some problems for the progress of women’s equality. The male buyers have their masculine status enhanced which will not be helpful to the women they are in relationships with or work with. As one respondent explained in research on the motivations of male prostitution buyers in Scotland, ‘Women are becoming more domineering in the workplace and I think a lot of guys like to have power over women. They use prostitutes and talk bad about them, exercising their power’ (MacLeod, Farley, Anderson and Golding, 2008: 20). As men feel more powerful as men and have their negative attitudes to women reinforced, the expectations of equality of the women they work and live with are unlikely to be fulfilled.

More than three quarters of prostitution buyers in a study carried out in London, where massage parlour prostitution is tolerated, saw prostituted women as dirty (89%) and inferior (77%) (Coy, Horvath and Kelly, 2007). This is problematic for the safety and mental health of prostituted women. But their motives for prostitute use indicate how such male behaviour undermines men’s respect for women’s equality in general. Analysis of the reasons in this report for the men’s prostitution behaviour concluded that it, ‘reflects an underlying theme of male enti-
tlement’ (Ibid.: 19). Sex was viewed as a product to shop for, or something to be bought as a group after an evening out. It enabled the buyers to be disrespectful of women, ‘I don’t have to ask or think “No, is that too dirty for her?” or – like I don’t really have to be as respectful as if it was my girlfriend or my wife or partner’ (Ibid.:22).

But there is another very serious way in which men’s buyer behaviour has an effect on women’s status. This is the increasing use of the sex industry by male executives and corporations to network and do business, a practice which threatens to create a new form of the ‘glass ceiling’, the invisible barrier that prevents women achieving equal opportunities in the workplace.

### Business prostitution

Articles on the glass ceiling for women, are increasingly mentioning the role of visiting strip clubs in the restriction of women’s opportunities in the workplace. Thus an article in *The Economist* in 2005 comments on the three main explanations that top business women in America give for why so few of them get to the highest level. The first of these involves the sex industry: ‘First comes exclusion from informal networks. In many firms jock-talk and late-night boozing still oil the wheels of progress. In America and elsewhere it has become almost traditional for sales teams to take potential clients to strip clubs and the like. These activities specifically exclude most women’ (*The Economist*, 2005). In the UK the Fawcett Society, a feminist group founded in the nineteenth century, launched a campaign on 1 April, 2008, entitled Sexism and the City, which outlines the forces involved in making employment in the city unfair to women (Fawcett Society, 2008). The campaign manifesto identifies the practice of male bosses and co-employees in the city visiting strip clubs as one force which undermines women’s equal opportunities (Ibid, p. 10).

Where the industry of prostitution is not legalised it is possible that strip clubs are the main sex industry sector used by executives and corporations. Such use of strip clubs is common in the UK and the US. Estimates of the extent to which business usage contributes to the takings of strip clubs vary from one third, by the owner of the strip chain Rick’s in the US (O’Donnell, 2006), to 40% by Dave Manack, the editor of the US strip club industry magazine, Exotic Dancer (Antilla, 2005). The advantages of strip club visits are described by an auto industry salesman who said he had entertained auto executives at strip clubs thus, “You get a bunch of guys in a room who don’t know each other, you get drunk and look at naked women and the next day you’re great friends,” (Ibid).
Such comments suggest that the male bonding that takes place through the sharing of naked women can be particularly efficacious.

**Prostitution-related business practices**

In countries in which the industry of prostitution has been legalized business use of the sex industry extends beyond strip clubs to brothels and escort agencies. Corporations in Australia supply prostituted women as inducements and bribes to entertain international visitors, and cement relationships and contracts. Thus Ibisworld explains that the biggest escort agency in Australia, Royalty Services, which has an annual turnover of $20 million dollars, provides ‘escorts with modelling backgrounds to clients for negotiable prices ranging from $5000 per night to $130,000 per month’ (IbisWorld, 2007: 23), with ‘the bulk of business being visiting businessmen being entertained by corporations attempting to gain their custom’. Strip clubs and brothels in Australia promote themselves on their websites to businessmen for meetings, after work activities, networking with clients and product promotions.

The Penthouse Club in Sydney describes itself as a gentlemen’s club but is in fact a brothel that also offers strippers. The website makes it plain that businessmen are a target market niche, ‘Many gentlemen treat The Penthouse as their own private club. Our discreet lounges with the cool granite bar and billiard table are the perfect venue for sealing that important business deal. And when business is over, fulfill your fantasies in one of our private rooms with its huge double shower or deep, soothing spa’ (The Penthouse, 2008). The Boardroom brothel in Melbourne indicates in its name the kind of clientele it expects. The website explains that ‘Corporate Membership’ is aimed at ‘the corporate entertainer who brings their clients to us to entertain…there are further bonuses like, reduced Limousine Rentals to help look after and impress your clients’ (The Boardroom, 2008). Business and professional women in Australia are not in a position to network with clients in this way and the practice can be seen as a form of discrimination that legalization has opened up.

The normalisation of sex industry links with business in Australia was sufficiently startling to the media in the UK as to prompt a 2001 BBC News feature (Mercer, 2001). It pointed out that some of ‘Australia’s biggest retailers’ were offering ‘sex parties’ at brothels as Christmas bonuses. It quotes Robbie Swan from the Eros Foundation, an umbrella organisation representing the Australian sex industry, saying that firms should not be criticised for offering these sorts of inducements to workers, because ‘It’s an extremely popular way of paying bonuses,” he said. “Even politicians have been known to take friends to a brothel”’ (Ibid). Swan explained that a company sending four clients to a brothel
would expect to pay around $500 (Aus $987) for a spa, massage, sex and a complimentary drink or, according to Robbie Swan, ‘a nice cup of coffee’ (Ibid.). The paying of bonuses in this way is tax deductible in Australia, as in other countries.

In Germany too, where the industry of prostitution is legalized, the sex industry is being utilised by corporations. The practice of supplying prostituted women as bribes has been revealed, in an ongoing court case over corruption, to lie at the heart of employer/employee relations in the German corporation, Volkswagen (Marsh, 2007; Connolly, 2008; Boyes, 2008). In big companies in Germany industrial harmony is created by having workforce representatives on the boards and even involved in investment decisions. This system, called co-determination, raises productivity and enables Germany to maintain a large manufacturing base, but is open to abuse. In the 1990s the company set up a large slush fund to provide prostituted women to workforce representatives, support their mistresses, and even rent an apartment in which the men could bond through the bodies of prostituted women. The company ‘bought the support of union officials by supplying prostitutes and luxury holidays’ and during a meeting in Lisbon, ‘a string of escort girls arrived to order’ (Marsh, 2007). Peter Hartz, VW’s head of personnel and a former government adviser requested a “young and lively dark-skinned girl” in Lisbon and this Brazilian woman was later flown first-class to meet him again in his Paris hotel where he was attending a board meeting. She also met him in Sao Paolo. The Euro 700,000 slush fund was managed by Klaus-Joachim Gebauer, a personnel manager who used the money to buy Viagra for colleagues and rent a flat in northern Germany where union leaders and a ‘top manager’ then secretly met prostitutes.

Male professionals in many areas use the sex industry, such as those attending political and economic summits. Thus the city of Sydney, Australia, where brothels are legal, experienced a prostitution boom when the APEC summit took place in 2007. The male buyers were mostly secret service agents and international trade envoys. Business went up by 300% (Sydney Morning Herald, 2007). The varieties of sexual abuse of prostituted women on offer reveal a worrying lack of respect for women, ‘Interstate prostitutes were brought in to fill demand at the city’s establishment, where APEC-themed specials such as the Condi Combo, the UN Duo and the Presidential Platter were on offer’. The “United Nations Duo” comprised time with ‘two girls of different ethnicities’ (Ahmed, 2007). Such practice harms the equality of women in the international delegations and the possibility of women’s issues being fairly discussed at such meetings.
Conclusion

I have argued here that male buyers are involved in outsourcing women’s subordination in leisure and business prostitution. This practice compensates them for the loss of privileges, particularly the privilege of the male right of sexual access that they may feel they have lost through women’s progress towards equality. It is important for the status of all women because the behaviour of male buyers in all sectors of the sex industry, including strip clubs, is likely to have a negative effect upon women through the negative cultural attitudes towards women that are reinforced in this practice. One particularly serious effect is the creation of a new glass ceiling for women through the ways in which businessmen and corporations employ the sex industry, for product launches, for networking and deal making. Women are not in a position to access the sex industry in this way. The development of the sex industry and the increasing size of its client base thus stands as a most serious obstacle in the path of women’s equality.

References


Boyces, Roger (2008, 10 January) “I did not know about brothels or slush fund, Volkswagen boss tells court”, Timesonline. http://timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article3162451.e


120


IBISWorld (2007) Sexual Services in Australia, Q9528: IBISWorld Pty Ltd.


Marsh, Stefanie (2007, 2 May) “Sleazy Business: Corruption, prostitution and Viagra: Germany’s industrial giants have been rocked by a series of sordid scandals”, Times Online. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article1732123.e


Chapter 10
Subversions of techno-masculinity
in the global economy: Multi-
level challenges by Indian
professionals to US ICT hegemony

Winifred R. Poster
Washington University in St. Louis, USA

Introduction
As the global economy shifts from an industrial to informational so-
ciety, ICT represents a rare location where the “normal” or expected
operating patterns of masculine power are unhinged, challenged, and
rearranged. It is where an otherwise “subordinated” masculinity can be
seen in reverse mode – where male IT professionals of India gain mo-
mementum relative those of the United States, and strive for, if not achieve
to some degree, a position of dominance. I also take a unique look at
direct interactions between these multiple masculinities in virtual com-
munications, and ask what tensions arise when the typical context is
uprooted and overturned, and when competing masculinities are more
evenly balanced.

My premise is that techno-masculinities in the U.S. and India do not
have static forms, but take distinct shapes at three different levels – the
national, global, and transnational. At the global (or comparative) level,
the U.S. may exhibit hegemonic masculinity, with an edge over India in
terms of the material resources and infrastructure for carrying its tech-
noc-masculine project. However, this is not true at the other levels. In
the national imagery and political rhetoric of India, technology enhances
and forms the basis for hegemonic masculinity, whereas in the U.S., tech-
nology detracts from manliness – it is equated with subordinated mas-
culinities, if not effeminacy. The transnational level is where these vary-
ing techno-masculinities meet and come in contact, and where Indian IT
professionals take active roles in resisting power.

This analysis draws from research I’ve conducted over more than a
decade in the ICT industry, along with new analyses from a variety of
sources. Previous data collection involved original fieldwork in the U.S.
and India, first during 1995-96 when I conducted ethnographies of com-
puter manufacturing and engineering firms, and next in 2002-03, when I studied outsourced customer service call centers in India. Methodologies included interviews with ICT managers, engineers, factory workers, call center agents, along with observations of work environments and document analysis. New data collection involves newspapers, television advertisements, film, along with statistical data from international archives.

Below I discuss the theoretical motivations and framing of my project, in transformations of the information society, the development of techno-masculinities, and a multi-level approach for studying this issue. This is followed by focused analyses of techno-masculinities at three levels of the global economy. The conclusion considers implications of an emboldened Indian techno-masculinity for gender relations more broadly, both in terms of new equalities for women and new types of violence against them.

THEORETICAL MOTIVATIONS

Dynamics of the Info-Society

The information society fundamentally transforms masculinity on a transnational scale through two key dynamics – the development of information as a commodity, and the development of high-tech virtual communication.

Informational Commodities

ICT represents a new realm of political economy and power – a virtual economy – where information is the commodity being traded (Castells, 2000; Peterson, 2003). This leads to new kinds of power, like “intellectual piracy” (Shiva and Holla-Bhar 1993), as well as new kinds of information-based forms of inequality and stratification, like the digital divide.

But the virtual economy also means something else – that the central commodity is now (in relative terms) accessible and cheap to obtain, produce, and distribute. Information is not a commodity that requires the precondition of natural resources or an elaborate production infrastructure (especially compared to previous forms of colonial extraction). This uncouples the heretofore tightly bound linkage of economic power and the Global North. Now the Global South can gain its hand on the prized commodity – knowledge – for production (Evans, 1995). I will show how India has harnessed this new ICT commodification, and lodged it at
the center of its campaign for a masculinized national identity – in a way that has not occurred in the popular imagination of the U.S.

**Virtual Mutability**

ICT is also a realm of symbolic fluidity, where the transformation of identities is uniquely accessible. There are several implications of this virtual fluidity. First, ICTs are matching disparate groups together (across class, nation, gender, etc.) in ways that are new. Varying types of masculinities – especially across North and South boundaries – are being put into direct contact as never before (Poster, 2007b). Second, the separation of the body from the communication means that new gender, ethnic, and national identities are capable of being generated (Nakamura, 2002, 2008; Turkle, 1995). ICTs take part in “the creation of virtual bodies, the blurring the ‘real’ and the ‘representational’” (p. 949) (Hearn, 2006). This means that previous forms of masculinity can be unhinged and reformed. Third, identities are also capable of being masked or hidden in new ways. This has consequences of using deception as a tool for control by certain masculinities in relation to others.

**Techno-Masculinities**

Yet, if information societies are still societies (Hearn, 2004b), then it follows that the virtual economy is socially constructed according to the masculine. Indeed, the information society is still a world of men – male engineers, designers, businesses, legal experts, etc. Therefore, the information society begets a unique image of manhood, which I will refer to as “techno-masculinities.” This is not a cohesive or comprehensive identity, but it does carry a common – and newly-defined – set of narratives for understanding manhood. It uses distinct sets of imageries, such as displays of technical expertise and a love of tinkering (Faulkner, 2000; Lohan and Faulkner, 2004). It uses different sources of power, involving technical tools and information economies (Wajcman, 1991, 2004). And it operates within a different realm of communication, such as the internet.

Trends in the information society raise questions about the form and relations of masculinity on a global scale. If certain masculinities are globally hegemonic, for instance, what is the “face” of this male power? Looking at photos of the world’s 20 richest men in the most recent issue of Forbes, we see that those faces appear to be varied (Forbes, 2008). Numbers 1 (Warren Buffet, $62 billion) and 3 (Bill Gates, $58 billion) are indeed white American men, but 4 through 7 are Indian: Lakshmi Mittal ($45 billion), Mukesh Ambani ($43 billion), Anil Ambani ($42
billion), and K.P. Singh ($30 billion). We need to unpack exactly who is holding power, and how is it being challenged in the contemporary information economy.

Evolution of the virtual economy is heightening rather than submerging questions about nationality, ethnicity, and race in the construction of masculinity. Scholars of whiteness urge us to consider how ethnicity is often left outside the purview of critical analysis. Race is often left unacknowledged, as whiteness is considered invisible (Bonilla-Silva, 1999; Feagin, 2006). Likewise, “hegemonic masculinity” is often assumed to be white, and rooted in the West – U.S., Europe, etc. I want to bring this assumption to the surface, and ask exactly how it operates. While there is certainly a “Eurocentric” foundation for the construction of transnational masculinities and their institutionalization in the information economy, this is also being challenged, eroded, and subverted in key ways by actors in the Global South.

Multi-Leveled Approach

We’re indebted to Critical Men’s Studies for analyzing such differentiations through multiple masculinities (Connell, Hearn, and Kimmel, 2005; Hearn, 2004a). Yet as Connell and Messerschmidt mention in their recent reformulation, this theory now requires (among other things) a “geography” (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). As a strategy toward this end, Hearn argues for a “gendered multi-level theory and gendered multi-actor analysis” (p. 273) (Hearn, 2004c).

I adopt such an approach in attempt to differentiate the relations between India and the U.S. techno-masculinity as broad constructs across the Global North and South, but also to identify the differences among those subjectivities at varying meeting points of globalization. I will argue that Indian and American techno-masculinities do not have static forms and relations. Rather, they take distinct shape and changing power relations at three levels – national, global, and transnational.

The global represents the realm of comparative national standing – how states measure up to one another in international hierarchies of technical capacity. In some sense, this is the physical framework upon which masculinities rest. The national is the role of the state, media, etc., in constructing an internally hegemonic imagery of masculinity for a society. It reflects the degree to which technology is integral to or externalized from the dominant masculinities.

The transnational represents the interactions of states and their actors. I am grateful to Hearn for underscoring and renewing the “trans” element of this international realm (Hearn, 2004c); he reminds us there is a critical dynamism to globalization. This involves either a “moving
across” of actors between boundaries (like the nation-state), or else a “metamorphosing” of such boundaries. Interactions between actors are key to my analysis at all levels. For this reason, I depart from multi-level schemes like those of Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) where face to face interaction only occurs at the “local” level. Indeed, part of my objective is to show how this kind of relationship occurs at all levels, especially the transnational.

Next, I walk through the varying and shifting relations of Indian and the U.S. techno-masculinities across these three levels.

**Unpacking the Levels**

**The Global**

I start my analysis with masculinity at the global level, as this is where techno-masculinities of the U.S. and India follow expected patterns. Simply put, U.S. has an edge over India in the material resources and infrastructure for carrying its techno-masculine project.

For one thing, the U.S. occupies a dominant position in the world technology market. In 2000, the U.S. spent $261 million on research and development, while India spent the equivalent of $21 million (UNESCO, 2005). Technology has penetrated American society to a much greater degree than in India. Everyday technologies are more common: India has 82 cell phones and 55 internet lines per 1,000 people (as of 2005), compared to 680 and 630 respectively in the U.S. (UNDP, 2008).

Indeed, scholars assessing the overall information-capacity of nations have ranked the U.S. and India differentially on a global level (Sciadas, 2005). Classified into “info-states,” the U.S. ranks “high” (with indexes in the 200s) listed between Canada and Finland, while India lands at the very bottom of the “moderate” list (with indexes in the 30s), just below Gambia and just above Djibouti, and missing the “low” category by a few tenths of a percent.

As India and the U.S. exhibit two different degrees of technological penetration in economy and society, they represent two tiers of economic and social power. They conform to what is commonly seen as variations in techno-power across the North and South. One could say that on this “global” level the U.S. is positioned as a hegemonic techno-masculinity relative to that of India.
The National

The national level is where we begin to see reversals in the patterns of techno-masculinity across the U.S. and India. This happens both structurally and symbolically in the socio-economic landscapes of these countries.

Structurally, techno-masculinity in India has been far more integrated in the broader agenda of the state than in the U.S. The India government has been increasingly defined by ICT economies, so much so, that technical imagery has taken front and center stage in the imaginings of the nation. Indian leaders from the across the political spectrum have touted the IT industry as the path to national development – from Jawaharlal Nehru’s mechanical and steel “temples of the future,” to Rajiv Gandhi’s political entourage of “computer boys” and “computer missionaries,” to Vajpayee’s “Shining India” – each using the imagery of the science, technology, and/or computers in their political rhetoric and discourse (Chakravartty, 2001; Nigam, 2004). Quite poignantly, India’s newfound source of financial support after the fall of the Soviet block has been the information economy. Even communist party officials in India are courting foreign IT capital, and firms like IBM (Rohde, 2004). India’s nuclear tests of 1998 were a penultimate announcement (or reminder) of its techno-masculinity to the world: many nations including the U.S. started to take notice of India at this time, representing a pivotal moment in the balance of power in its global relations.

A significant consequence of this agenda is that the Indian state has poured material funds into building IT men. Most of the research and development funding in India in comes from the state, 75% in 2000, which contrasts sharply with the U.S. where the state provides merely 26% of the national spending on R&D (UNESCO, 2005). The Indian state is also more interested and successful in pushing technical education. Twenty-two percent of tertiary (college or post-high school) students are concentrating in engineering and science in India, while only 16% are in the U.S. (UNDP, 2008). In global rankings, India sits at 52 and the U.S. at 87 (among 108 countries with data available).

Because of these trends, India now produces more technical bodies (mostly male) than the U.S. The Indian government set up early on an elaborate system of technical colleges, lead by the Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT). The cost of this policy is “massive”: on the order of $25,000 per graduate (Evans, 1995). Now, India is generating as many as 300,000 engineers, versus 100,000 in the U.S.

This Indian superiority of skilled technical labor represents one of the key reversals in techno-masculinity between US and India at the national level. Indeed, despite the fact that India lies behind the U.S. in techni-
cal resources and infrastructure, government and industry have taken advantage of the opportunities of the information economy to enhance ICT education and skills even beyond that of the U.S.

Symbolically, there is a parallel disjuncture in the popular cultures of India and the U.S. Take for example the imageries of technology and masculinity in the action movies of these countries. In India, popular films now have techies as leading men. In many cases, these technomales are portrayed as the saviors of family and nation. In contrast, the U.S. film hero is often strikingly non-technical. He is smart, along with being courageous and handsome, but he doesn’t necessarily know how to operate the computer equipment, and he has pride in not knowing it. He needs that techie person with him, who is almost always male and subordinate to the hero. Many Hollywood films have this new kind of male techie sidekick.

In sum, technology is a source of hegemonic masculinity in India, unlike the U.S. where it is equated with subordinated masculinities, if not effeminacy. Hence, this marks a reversal of techno-masculinities across India and the U.S. from those at the global level. The contradiction between these “global” and “national” level masculinities will be increasingly apparent in the transnational level of masculinities next.

The Transnational

The transnational level is where these varying techno-masculinities meet. This is where we see challenges to the U.S. dominance of technomasculinities, and where Indian IT masculinities take active roles in restructuring power, so that former positions and relations are often in direct conflict, equalized, and in some cases reversed.

In theorizing masculinities of the transnational, India has a noteworthy presence. This is especially true of historical accounts, as masculinity was central to Indian politics of the colonial era (Nandy, 1983; Sinha, 1995; van der Veer, 2001). It was Ashis Nandy who coined the term “hypermasculinity” when describing the narratives and tactics of the British empire in India: “The colonial culture depended heavily on Western cosmology, with its built in fears about losing potency ... and the ability to be violent” (1983:54-55). Indeed, colonialism created the notion of the “effeminate Bengali” Indian as a counterpoint to and as a means of enhancing the status of the “manly Englishman” (Sinha, 1995).

However, several scholars are noting how technology is the new face of global power and hypermasculinity in the post-colonial age (Aneesh, 2006; Chang and Ling, 2000). Chang and Ling refer to “techno-muscular capitalism” to describe contemporary transnational relations: “technology is driving the latest stage of capitalism” through a masculine “global
umbrella of aggressive market competition” (p. 27). Aneesh refers to an emerging “algocracy,” a new economic mode, in which codes, programming, and information are dominant forms of labor, production, and governance of firms in the global economy. This is signified especially in the ICT industries of the US and India, and how the multi-sited distribution of labor subordinates Indian IT professionals “virtually,” by masking their bodies to the Global North and creating a transnational “invisibility” of labor.

While working within the framework of these important theorizations, I would like to chart a different path – to uncover some alternate (perhaps parallel) dynamics happening in the global economy and in the transnational field of masculinities. In fact, I’d like to argue that the contemporary dynamic of the IT industry – through its platform of virtual identity mutability and informational commodities that I mentioned at the outset – is doing something different from just the straightforward downward press of control.

The following presents three ways that Indian masculinities have asserted themselves at various sites in the transnational arena. These dynamics are actually linked to dynamics of the previous section. In particular, India’s endorsement of techno-masculinities at the national level has provided a growing sense of power for Indian men. In turn, these ICT professionals bring this outlook to their exchanges and interactions with U.S. institutions at transnational level.

What marks these exchanges in common is that they involve direct kinds of contact between Indian technical personnel and those in the U.S. As I will show, this includes – but is not limited to – the top echelons of Indian IT capital. Indeed, techno-masculinities at the middle and level tiers of the ICT economy engage with and subvert hegemonic masculinities as well.

**Techno-Entrepreneurs**

Indian techno-masculinity has asserted itself transnationally, to begin with, through IT capital and enterprise. Indian IT professionals have contributed substantially to the development of the IT industry in the U.S. As immigrants, they are providing a significant amount of the knowledge labor for the U.S. information economy (Varma, 2006). As managers, they are founding and heading a large number of firms for IT firms in Silicon Valley and other high-tech regions (Saxenian, 2000). As entrepreneurs, they are buying and taking over ailing communications and technology firms in the U.S. and Europe.
These techno-entrepreneurs illustrate the socio-economic ascendance, if not physical movement, of Indian IT males from the Global South into the Global North. This poses a challenge to what Connell calls “transnational business masculinity,” i.e., an ascendance of masculine industrial power based in the Global North and emanating outward (Connell, 1998; Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). Rather than a hegemonic dominance of the European/U.S.-based masculinity in the information society, this case demonstrates a more dynamic, interchangeable, and especially “upward” pattern. This is more like what Saxenian calls “brain circulation” (Saxenian, 2006), and what I have linked explicitly to techno-masculinity through the concept of “gendered circuits” (Poster, 2007a).

**Cyber Elites**

Techno-masculinity is being transformed at the mid-level of the IT infrastructure by male managers and engineers. This secondary layer of techno-masculinities – not the male CEOs or owners, but the men who run the global firms and provide their high-tech knowledge power – are contesting the authority of U.S. technical institutions. These actors are challenging the hegemony of U.S. masculinity *within* multinational firms, rather than just across them.

In my case study of a U.S. high-tech transnational firm in India, for instance, I found that Indian male managers rarely accepted and / or adopted AmCo policies straight-up (Poster, 2008). They either ignored employee policies regarding gender, diversity, and work-family balance, or else transformed them by integrating their own agendas. Their innovations in policy, and refusals of the dominant modes of conduct, represent resistance to the U.S. hegemony of business masculinity.

**Virtual Service**

Techno-masculinities are even being refashioned at the lower levels of the industry – by technical workers in the field of ICT service. Since 2000, U.S. firms have been sending their “back office” clerical work to India. Some of this work is communication related, involving the use of satellite phone connections, fiber optic cable linkages, and the internet. Indian employees are assigned tasks in handling, transcontinentally, the complaints and queries of customers for U.S. firms. These customer service call centers in India reveal further subversions in the virtual world of satellite and internet communications.
For instance, the Indian men sometimes take advantage of their socio-economic superiority relative to the Americans they talk to. While the American consumers are often seniors, working class, disabled, etc. – and male – the call center employees are largely middle class, young, and highly educated. Given their dominant masculinities in this situation, some Indian men used their positions to exploit the vulnerabilities and ignorance of the American consumers, in selling them things they don’t need, and in using the internet-based profiles of the consumers on their computer screens to manipulate American men emotionally during the call. These were practices I found to be distinctly “male” among my respondents, as the women agents had entirely different reactions to American customers.

Thus, even though these service employees represent the lowest level of all the ICT professionals considered in this project, they still exhibit a similar trend of contesting techno-masculinities in the transnational arena.

**Implications of Indian Techno-Masculinity for Women**

The remaining question is whether or not the alternative techno-masculinity presented by India in the global ICT economy is better for women than that of the U.S. What is the content of the Indian model(s) of manhood? Is it less associated with violence?

This project suggests that the ascendance of male Indian ICT professionals offers new forms of disempowerment for women, and new opportunities for support. Some feminist scholars argue that Indian masculinity in the virtual world draws new problems – like contemporary forms of violence structured around Hindu fundamentalism (Gajjala, 2003; Mallapagada, 2006). Indeed, Hearn explains how: “The Internet and ICTs can be and are used for the delivery of sexuality, sexual performance, sexualized violence, violence and violation, as in the promotion of racist hatred and racial violence...” (2006:135). There are cases of abuse against Indian women – in the call centers for instance – that are linked directly to the entrance of Indian men to these ICT positions.

On the other hand, there are some benefits of this alternative paradigm of techno-masculinity. For one thing, it is often more closely defined by notions of family than that of the West, and can be more supportive of ICT women who are balancing home and work (Poster and Prasad 2005). Moreover, the Indian version of techno-masculinity can actually be more effective in pulling women into the privileged tiers of the global information technology workforce (Poster, 2007a). Thus, there are simultaneously transgressive and regressive implications to the trends in Indian technomasculinities.
References


Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo (1999) “‘This is a white country’: The racial ideology of the Western nations of the world-system”, Research in Politics and Society 6.


Hearn, Jeff (2004a) “From hegemonic masculinity to the hegemony of men”, Signs 5(1).


133


Introduction

This chapter represents part of a paper prepared for a seminar delivered at GEXcel, Linköping, in May 2008. The ideas that follow are what I consider to be ‘new’ ways of thinking about hegemony and hegemonic masculinity and in that respect the paper is a ‘work-in-progress’ within the frame of GEXcel’s Theme 2 Deconstructing the Hegemony of Men and Masculinities. Specifically, this work seeks to introduce and develop in the first section the idea and importance of what I have referred to as “hegemonic principles” (see Howson, 2006, 2007; Howson and Smith, 2008) for understanding the nature and operation of the ‘hegemonic’ within hegemony. The second section introduces and shows the operation of the ‘hegemonic’ in particular hegemonic masculinity as an “empty signifier” (see Laclau, 1996, 2005) and that through this form of signification hegemony is produced and maintained.

The complexity of hegemony: Gramsci

Classical formal logic sets out the universal abstract parameters from which the process of identification develops. Its laws broach no contradiction and ensure that the logic underpinning the explanation of some ‘thing’ ensured the purity and truth of that same ‘thing’. But the very notion of truth is dubious because truth can only ever be what we find ourselves believing for example, classical formal logic confirms that everything is what it is and so it cannot be anything else. All things have self-identity but “self identity is pure abstraction” (Hegel, 1969: 412). In effect, self identity and then self interest are part of the world of interaction, motion and change and so while reflecting the essential relationality of life it is precisely the realm that Hegel sought to transcend because it could not produce universal knowledge (Norman and Sayers, 1980: 3). In other words, the social world is marked by the ubiquity of contradiction and thus finding the purity and truth, that is the knowledge of identity becomes the imperative of the Hegelian dialectic and
life. However, where Hegel saw all contradictions about identity able to be resolved dialectically, Marx’s materialism was less accepting of the inevitability of dialectic resolution. Marxism showed through dialectical materialism that contradiction is antagonism and that only through complex struggle and not the immediacy of ‘the negation of negation’ do all things develop and change. In fact, where Absolute knowledge is synthesised from an essential contradiction, it only has the appearance of universal representation.

The importance of dialectical materialism to our understanding of masculine identity and in particular hegemonic masculinity should not be underestimated. I have already shown in the introduction that many of the problems that continue to be associated with applying hegemonic masculinity can be explained because of an incomplete approach to theory. Through Hegel we begin to recognise that self-identification or man-identifying-himself-as-man ignores the reality of identity that is, it is based on contradiction: man opposing woman. But in the Hegelian dialectical model synthesis would produce the negation of woman into man and the production of man as the Absolute. This movement maintains the dualistic structure of contradiction as foundational to gender identity and so, as the above discussion of the commodity form showed, the basis for identification is mediation. But that mediation does not produce dialectic synthesis only the obfuscation of a continuing antagonism and dislocation. Human identification has gender as one of its foundational planks and as such requires the mediation of two oppositional and differential expressions of humanness that is, ‘masculinity’ (= man) and ‘femininity’ (= woman). The human, whether its natural, physical form is as man or woman (or some other) is a thing whose matter is expressed through contradiction of these two co-existing human expressions. In other words, it is impossible for a man to be representative of a totalised and complete masculinity; there will always exist in men aspects of femininity. However, classical logic demands the purity of identity, that is if Human, then Human. A problem emerges here because in effect gender identity shows that if Human, then Femininity but also, if Human, then not-Femininity (masculinity). Therefore, to identify as human is to exist as a gender contradiction that is, with the expression of both femininity and not-femininity that is, masculinity. So to make sense of this prima facie irreconcilable contradiction and ‘suture’ these opposing expressions as humanness upon the human, a mediating quality must be constructed that becomes the point of focus in signification and practice for the balancing of these contradictory but co-existing expressions. In the capitalist mode of production money is the ideal form of value and so is constructed as the hegemonic value-form that sutures the dialectic dual-
ism EV to UV but further, it enables EV to become hegemonic. In gender
this hegemonic task is taken by the assumed ideal form of gender that is,
‘hegemonic masculinity’. However, before it is possible to develop the
nature and operation of the hegemonic it is first necessary to examine its
emergence through the complexity of hegemony.

Hegemony represents the process of building, maintaining as well
as, the changing of ‘authority’; understood as the product of power and
legitimacy. In particular hegemony expresses the ‘hegemonic authority’
of certain interests and identities achieved through the mediation of its
foundational contradiction: consensus and coercion and the consequent
suturing of antagonisms (particularity) into equivalence (universality)
within a particular situation. It is therefore constituted by dialectical and
historical imperatives that ensure the tendency of movement, critique
and change. As such, hegemony is by necessity a “complex process” (see
Howson and Smith, 2008: 1-15) and at its centre is the unstable equilibria
of authority. In other words, hegemonic authority will not always repre-
sent the dialectical achievement of the Hegelian Absolute as the ethical
Idea and thereby operate as pure “ethico-political” where reconciliation
favours consensus rather then its negation by coercion (Gramsci, 1995:
399). Rather, mediation is always a complex hegemonic struggle that
when imposed aprioristically that is, according to a pre-established plan
and by force if necessary it represents a “politico-economic” hegemo-
y. The hegemonic in this situation must protect a dualistic structure in
which coercion removes ‘opposing’ interests to the realm of the alien and
inferior making it a particularly regressive force. The outcome is a loss
of legitimacy and as a result a “crisis of authority” (Gramsci 1995: 400).

Crucial actors in the management of politico-economic induced crisis
are the “traditional intellectuals” (Gramsci, 1971: 6-7). While the intel-
lectual task is to preside over “historical continuity”, in order to do this
they must be able to convert what has become a forced authority into
the perception of an ethico-political reality. These intellectuals operate
within the institutions where hegemonic authority is embedded such as,
religion, the mass media, the workplace, government departments and
the judiciary (Connell, 1987: 184). The result is that hegemony regresses
to a politico-economic level where the leading group no longer leads the
people as a national-popular collective will in a moral and intellectual
way but rather, it must resort to coercion, conducted and/or condoned
via State institutions. We now have a situation of closure or asymmetry
where the “hegemonic principles” (Howson, 2006: 23) are no longer
able to represent and include the diversity of interests and needs. In ef-
fect, the intellectuals have effectively mobilised the ‘system’ to expel op-
position and in so doing, contain any reaction and disorder and as a con-
sequence the unstable core appears stabilised. This coercion and system closure underpins hegemony as “dominative” (Howson, 2006: 29).

Hegemonic principles play a central role in determining the nature of hegemony. Their objective is twofold. First, they define and describe the hegemonic by setting out the broad principles that then determine the identifications, configurations of practice and relationships that in turn become legitimate and ultimately, normative. Second, these principles represent the ‘nodal points’ from which the hegemonic is able to extend across and expand the hegemony. Because of this they are also the points that must be protected so as to ensure the continuation of the nature, operation and reproduction of the hegemonic and the hegemony. Crucially though, the hegemonic principles that become the basis for normative practice and identification are not given aprioristically they are always the historical product of the complex accumulation of contradictions imposed on and being imposed by ‘real’ social relations, practices and consciousness (see Althusser, 1969: 97). Therefore, they are never determined but always “overdetermined” (see Althusser, 1969: 101; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 97-105). Most importantly, through the idea of social construction as overdetermination the aprioristic notions of essentialism, reification as well as slippage between practice and identity are negated and become ideology.

Thus when a crisis of authority leads to system closure so as to protect the hegemonic principles, the hegemonic is transformed into a regressive force producing a “dominative hegemony”. This is opposed to organic intellectual activity that seeks to construct a progressive and organic hegemonic within an “aspirational hegemony” (see, Howson 2006: 31). A progressive reaction or “war of position” (Gramsci, 1971) produces aspirational hegemony and expresses an emphasis on renewal and organic action. Aspirational hegemony is really what ethico-political hegemony is all about and is referred to as aspirational because (i) it is never complete (ii) it is developed by “organic intellectuals” in such a way that it engages the people in a moral and intellectual way rather than forces people to comply, and (iii) it is socio-historically articulated around renewal. As ethico-political it is the “moment of the universal and of liberty” (Boothman in Gramsci, 1995: 575). There are few examples of aspirational hegemony although Gramsci’s (1971: 65-66) discussion of the

---

36 The “essential condition for the existence” of capitalist hegemony “is the formation and augmentation of capital” (Marx, 1950: 43). In effect the hegemonic principle of capitalism can be understood as private property; the condition for which is profit.

37 That is, as Connell identifies hegemonic masculinity as a set of asymmetrical and ossified configurations of practice (see above).
Jacobin movement suggests its hegemonic principles expressed organic (intellectual/mass) authority. In the same way the solidarity movement in Poland represented an aspirational hegemony (see Laclau, 2005: 81). Nevertheless, what we can point to as a basis for aspirational hegemony is that its hegemonic principles promote consensus and give recognition to diversity in the people. Therefore, principles such as self-determination as opposed to nationalism and/or respect as opposed to equality or even justice as opposed to (black-letter) law express contradictions whose progressive reconciliation in turn offers a new way to think about the nature of hegemony.

However, the problem is that the implementation of dualistic and thereby exclusionary hegemonic principles will at some point require their protection in the face of a crisis of authority. This protection requires coercion that undermines the possibility of unstable equilibria and leads to system closure. In this situation the various mechanisms of hegemony such as, the media, State, religion, judiciary, police and army can be put to the task of regression rather than progression; in other words, to reproduce and then obfuscate exclusion. This is the basis of the distinction between aspirational hegemony and dominative hegemony. It is also why dominative hegemony remains the most common form and can be seen in the operation of gender (men), capitalist (owners), ethnicity (Western), race (whiteness), religion (Christian-secular), sexuality (heterosexual) and globalisation (developed). All these hegemonic expressions are regressive and effectively reproduce themselves. However, though it is possible to recognize in each expression a crisis of authority occurring at some level, it is equally possible to recognise that there is an organised progressive reaction to the hegemonic authority albeit, operating at different levels of complexity and efficacy. Nevertheless, this reaction is well managed by the traditional intellectuals who are able to keep the potential for equivalence between the various antagonisms disarticulated and fragmented (see also Connell, 1983: 182). This disarticulated antagonism is what we might call ‘identity politics’.

**Hegemonic masculinity as the ‘empty signifier’ of gender: From Connell to Laclau**

So far this deconstructive examination has shown that at some level human identity must manage the contradiction between masculinity and femininity (regardless of whether it is perceived as real or symbolic), upon which is imbricated the historical and contextual accumulation of contradictions such as, sexuality, class, race/ethnicity and religion that ensure its always overdetermined nature. Within this milieu the task of
producing, through mediation, the appearance of stability and the obfuscation of its dislocatory condition of existence as a taken-for-grantedness is the task of hegemony. Whether hegemony is constructed as a dominative or aspirational reality, the hegemonic is the encapsulation of hegemony’s normative principles. So from Hegel to Marx to Gramsci what becomes central to the project of hegemonic identification is the need to deal with the always potential for, if not existence of, dislocation within identity. In the context of gender, the primary operation of the hegemonic as hegemonic masculinity is to give coherence and meaning to the multiplicity of gender identities, configurations of practices and relations that operate within and across national, international and transnational gender orders marked by what we can now refer to as the “hegemony of men” (see Hearn 2004). In other words, the coherency and meaning given by the hegemonic is achieved because it represents those symbols and their consequent practices that embody the “currently accepted answer” (Connell 1995: 77) to ensuring the domination of men.

Seen in this way the significance of hegemonic masculinity for gendered social life is made visible not as the configurations of practice that will include for example, heterosexual practices, paid work practices and aggressive practices but rather as a symbolic representative or “empty signifier” of social homogeneity (see Laclau 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005) within what we can now refer to as the dominative hegemony of men.

To refer to hegemonic masculinity as an empty signifier is not to suggest that it is simply a signifier without a signified. In other words, that it represents some ‘thing’ but lacks any meaning or that meaning is marked by relativism. As Laclau (2005: 170) puts it, integrating the particularity that exists within any community, and where that particularity very often exists as antagonism, requires a hegemonic mediation through a particularity that is able to assume the representation of the community as a whole. To achieve such a representation a particularity must first empty itself of its own ‘corporativist’ interests.

We know that there is an insurmountable abyss between the particularity of groups integrating a community – often in conflict with one another – and the community as a whole, conceived as a universalistic totality. We also know that such an abyss can only be hegemonically mediated, through a particularity which, at some point, assumes the representation of a totality which is incommensurable with it. But for this to be possible, the hegemonic force has to present its own particularity as the incarnation of an empty universality that transcends it. So it is not the case that there is a particularity which simply occupies an empty place, but a particularity which, because it has succeeded, through hege-
monic struggle, in becoming an empty signifier of the community, has a legitimate claim to occupy that place. (Laclau, 2005: 170).

Thus, it is referred to as empty precisely because its task is to mediate the heterogeneity of the people and the particularity of their interests into homogeneity as stability and order around the hegemonic principles. This of course is a hegemonic operation and as a hegemonic operation it ensures that the practices and identifications emergent from the hegemonic principles are not just legitimate but appear as ethico-political. This is reflected in Connell’s (1995: 77) reference to hegemony as the “correspondence between cultural ideal and institutional power”. This also exposes hegemony not just as a complex dialectical process but also as a balancing of competing logics. In particular it is the ‘logic of difference’ that produces social homogeneity through predominantly coercive force while the ‘logic of equivalence’ gives greater recognition to social heterogeneity by giving a greater emphasis to consensus and the idea of unstable equilibria (Laclau, 2000: 303). Through these opposing logics the fundamental incommensurability of the essential contradiction is recognised as determining the politico-social relations but rather than trying to overcome this incommensurability with the abstraction of identity it attempts to articulate a new process of synthesis around ‘equivalence’.

What is important for our discussion is that within any gender order whether at the national, international or transnational level the hegemonic takes the form of an empty signifier whose content is drawn from the particularity of masculinity and whose task is to mediate heterogeneity to produce normative gender regimes and ultimately, gender orders. It is used by the traditional intellectuals as a mechanism for demanding complicity to the hegemonic principles that express the nature of the dominative hegemony of men. The hegemonic principles of a dominative hegemony of men are ‘heterosexuality’ (includes configurations of practice such as, marriage, reproduction, etc.), ‘breadwinning’ (includes characteristics such as, economic autonomy, wealth, etc.) and ‘aggression’ (includes characteristics such as, competitiveness, toughness, authoritarianism, warfare, misogyny, etc.). Further, they produce a desire towards an ultimately unachievable ideal (see Howson, 2006: 73-76). Those who reject or are unable to put in place an appropriate program of complicity that involves both practice and identification such as, subordinate and marginalized men (for example, many migrant men) as well as women, are excluded from the legitimacy of the dominative hegemony of men. This hegemonic exclusion gives the appearance of homogeneity as stability, order and completeness about gender orders but it is a taken-for-granted reality because in fact, it is premised on the logic
of difference that hides the incommensurable and the ultimate incompleteness of gender.

The incompleteness of any order is a central aspect of politics (see Laclau, 1990: 89-92). In effect, in any society there is always an ‘excess of meaning’ that hegemony can never master (Laclau, 1990: 89). We can of course see this in the structuring of gender types around hegemonic masculinity and in particular, how this hegemonic structuring today excludes subordinate and marginalised ‘meanings’ such as, queer, black, Muslim, effeminate and disabled from its normativity. Thus, to maintain the appearance of stability the hegemony must continuously emphasise its hegemonic principles and in so doing focus need and desire away from these practices and identifications while simultaneously obfuscating the reasons for their exclusion in the construction of complicity. The crucial point is that complicity with the dominative hegemonic identifications, practices and relations can only be achieved through their relation to what has been excluded in other words, following Hegel, through the Law of Contradiction. However rather than accepting the inevitability of the negation of the negation the Derridean ideas of deconstruction and supplementarity suggest that meaning is always already contingent because all meaning has a radical outside. But even more, while the supplement is positivity to meaning construction it also enables a focus on power and politics. In this sense, any action to totalise and unify meaning must be a hegemonic action but the reality of it producing ‘pure’ homogeneity and stability and ultimately, completeness is effectively impossible. This of course we recognised in Marx’s metaphysics and Gramsci’s interpretation of unstable equilibria.

The impossibility of a unitary and totalised gender order ineluctably gives rise to the reality of an antagonistic “frontier” (see Laclau, 2000: 302) that acts as a line of delineation between the hegemonic or at least, aligned to the hegemonic and subordinate and marginalised that is, the excluded. It is at this frontier that the gender order produced from the dominative hegemony of men experiences “dislocation” (Laclau, 1990: 3-84). In other words, although hegemonic masculinity encapsulates the hegemonic principles around which is constructed the appearance of homogeneity and stability it can only do this by imposing a frontier that marks the limit of inclusion/exclusion. More importantly, the depth of the limit of the frontier or what we might understand as the distance between the included normative and the excluded other also represents the source of the ethical experience (Laclau, 2004: 287). Higate and Hopton (2005: 432-447) argue that “militarism is the major means by which the values and beliefs associated with ideologies of hegemonic masculinity are eroticised and institutionalised” thus the hegemonic principle
of aggression exposes the frontier between the hegemonic aggression of the Western soldier and that of the subaltern ‘terrorist’. In turn it also exposes the frontier between what is deemed to be ethical in aggression and what is not.

In the dominative hegemony of men incompleteness is precisely the outcome of the reflexive operation of hegemonic masculinity upon real people. In fact, the appearance of homogeneity stability produced around hegemonic masculinity is always a contingent reality in so far as, the complicity it requires from the vast mass of men (and women) can only ever be successful if the distinction between the hegemonic and the other is clear. In effect, authority in the dominative hegemony of men is defined more by what it is not, then by what it is. This idea sits at the core of the logic of difference that continues to be operationalised around hegemonic masculinity in national, international and transnational gender orders. In other words, hegemonic masculinity achieves homogeneity and stability precisely, by producing at best complicity and at worst ambivalence to its hegemonic principles. This order is not produced by correlating directly to the great mass of men’s and/or women’s ‘real’ bodies, or to their ‘real’ actions or to their ‘real’ knowledge of their self, just as money does not represent the real value of something. Instead, the primary task of hegemonic masculinity is to represent an ideal through a set of hegemonic principles to which people focus desire and aspiration to produce certain bodies, configurations of practice and identifications. It is examining the process of constructing configurations of practice, as Connell (1995: 72) recognised, that is far more important than simply describing their nature and existence. This approach is precisely a historical and ontological. Thus by showing that hegemonic masculinity employs the logic of difference whose product is the encapsulation of hegemonic principles that also represent real practices and identifications but that also have real and material consequences it becomes evident that homogeneity and stability are appearance. Thus hegemonic masculinity as the empty signifier of gender does not set out the practices that men and women achieve but rather, what men and women aspire towards.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued, through deconstructive method, that hegemonic masculinity remains an important concept to contemporary understandings of men and masculinity. It has also shown that the emergence of the hegemonic within hegemony is always based on the resolution of contradiction. However, hegemonic resolution will not always produce the Absolute or ethico-political understood as aspirational hegemony, there is always the potential for hegemony to become dominative.
Specifically, in gender, the maintenance of the ascendance of men and masculinity within the dominative hegemony of men will produce, at best, the appearance of homogeneity and stability through hegemonic mediation. Nevertheless, whether aspirational (and substantive, logic of equivalence) or dominative (as appearance, logic of difference) hegemony requires the hegemonic as hegemonic masculinity to assume the role of empty signifier and in so doing suture difference and heterogeneity.

The crucial outcome of this deconstructive argument resonates with the central idea of Connell’s definition of gender that is, gender cannot be reduced to bodies but always refers to bodies. Thus masculinity and hegemonic masculinity in particular, cannot be reduced to the materiality of practice but is always informed and must always refer to practice. In this way hegemonic masculinity expresses contextually, what men ‘should’ do and what men ‘should’ be based on navigation through the accumulation of contradictions that represent a cultural situation. The distance between the hegemonic ‘should’ and what men ‘really’ do or what men ‘really’ are describes the nature of normativity. For migrant men in a ‘new’ culture hegemonic masculinity as the ‘empty signifier’ of gender plays a crucial role in their lives because it encapsulates and gives expression to men and women’s aspirations.

References
The contributors

Alp Biricik is a doctoral researcher, Tema Genus, Linköping University, Sweden.

Anna Boden is a doctoral researcher, Department of Geography, Lancaster University, UK.

Toni Calasanti is Professor of Sociology at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, USA.

Benedict Carton is Associate Professor in History, George Mason University, Virginia, USA.

Jeff Hearn is Professor of Gender Studies, Tema Genus, Linköping University, Sweden.

Richard Howson is Senior Lecturer in Sociology, University of Wollongong, Australia.

Neal King is Associate Professor in Interdisciplinary Studies, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, USA.

Nina Lykke is Professor of Gender Studies, Linköping University, Sweden.

Robert Morrell is Professor of Education, University of KwaZuluNatal, Republic of South Africa.

Sheila Jeffreys is Professor of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, Australia.

Winifred Poster is Lecturer in Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Washington University in St Louis, USA.

Linn Sandberg is a doctoral researcher, Tema Genus, Linköping University, Sweden.

Nils Ulrik Sørensen is Associate Professor at the Danish School of Education, University of Aarhus.
Mini conference, GEXcel Theme 2, Linköping University

Thursday 20 November

*Location: TEMCAS, T-building*

**Programme**

09.15–10.15 Coffee & registration
10.15–10.30 Welcome
   Prof. Nina Lykke (Linköping University)
10.30–11.00 Deconstructing the hegemony of men and masculinities
   Prof. Jeff Hearn (Linköping University)
11.00–12.00 Male buyers in the global sex industry: Outsourcing women’s subordination in business and leisure prostitution
   Prof. Sheila Jeffreys (University of Melbourne, Australia)
12.00–13.00 Lunch
13.00–13.30 A bedroom of his own: Intersections of webcams, surveillance and male sexuality in the transnational context
   PhD student Alp Biricik (Linköping University)
13.30–14.30 Detours for heterosexuality: Young boys viewing male bodies in pornography
   Dr Niels Ulrik Soerensen (University of Aarhus, Denmark)
14.30–15.00 Coffee
15.00–16.00 Subversions of techno-masculinity in the global economy
   Dr Winifred Poster (Washington University, St Louis, USA)
16.00–17.00 End panel
17.00 Mingling

Chair: Prof. Jeff Hearn
Symposium, GEXcel Theme 2, Linköping University

Tuesday 2 December
Location: TEMCAS, T-building

Programme

12.30–12.45  Registration
12.45–13.00  Introduction Prof. Nina Lykke and Prof. Jeff Hearn (Linköping University)
13.00–14.00  Aging bodies, constructions of masculinities, and the anti-aging industry
Professor Toni Calasanti (Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, USA)
14.00–14.30  The slackening self: Concepts of agency in old manhood
Associate Professor Neal King (Virginia Tech, USA)
14.30–15.00  Coffee
15.00–15.30  Performing grandfatherhood: The intersections of age and masculinity
PhD student Anna Boden (University of Lancaster, UK)
15.30–16.00  Young, male and experiences of aging
Dr Niels Ulrik Soerensen (University of Aarhus, Denmark)
16.00–16.30  Getting intimate: Old Age, Masculinity and new(?) Heterosexual Morphologies
PhD student Linn Sandberg (Linköping University)
16.30–17.00  Break
17.00–18.00  Roundtable

Chair: Prof. Jeff Hearn