GEXcel Work in Progress Report
Volume XIII

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Violences and Silences: Shaming, Blaming – and Intervening
October 12th–14th, 2010, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden

GEXcel Theme 7:
Getting Rid of Violence. TRANSdisciplinary,
TRANSnational and TRANSformative Feminist
Dialogues on Embodiment, Emotions and Ethics
Autumn 2010

Edited by
Barbro Wijma, Claire Tucker and Ulrica Engdahl

Centre of Gender Excellence – GEXcel

Towards a European Centre of Excellence in
Transnational and Transdisciplinary Studies of

- Changing Gender Relations
- Intersectionalities
- Embodiment

Institute of Thematic Gender Studies:
Department of Gender Studies, Tema Institute,
Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Linköping University
Gender and Medicine,
Faculty of Health Sciences, Linköping University

&

Centre for Feminist Social Studies (CFS), School of Humanities,
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Gender Studies, School of Humanities,
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Towards a European Centre of Excellence in Transnational and Transdisciplinary Studies of:  

- Changing Gender Relations  
- Intersectionalities  
- Embodiment  

Nina Lykke,  
Linköping University, Director of GEXcel  

In 2006, the Swedish Research Council granted 20 million SEK to set up a Centre of Gender Excellence at the inter-university Institute of Thematic Gender Studies, Linköping University and Örebro University, for the period 2007-2011. Linköping University has added five million SEK as matching funds, while Örebro University has added three million SEK as matching funds.  

The following is a short presentation of the excellence centre. For more information contact: Scientific Director of GEXcel, Professor Nina Lykke (ninly@tema.liu.se); GEXcel Research Coordinator, Dr. Ulrica Engdahl (coordinator@genderexcel.org); GEXcel Research Coordinator, Dr. Gunnel Karlsson (gunnel.karlsson@oru.se); or Manager, Gender Studies, Linköping, Berit Starkman (berst@tema.liu.se).
Institutional basis of GEXcel

Institute of Thematic Gender Studies, Linköping University and Örebro University
The institute is a collaboration between:
Department of Gender Studies, Linköping University;
Gender and Medicine, Linköping University
&
Centre for Feminist Social Studies, Örebro University;
Gender Studies, Örebro University

GEXcel board and lead-team
– a transdisciplinary team of Gender Studies professors:
• Professor Nina Lykke, Linköping University (Director) – Gender and Culture; background: Literary Studies
• Professor Anita Göransson, Linköping University – Gender, Organisation and Economic Change; background: Economic History
• Professor Jeff Hearn, Linköping University – Critical Studies of Men and Masculinities; background: Sociology and Organisation Studies
• Professor Liisa Husu, Örebro University – Gender Studies with a Social Science profile; background: Sociology
• Professor Emerita Anna G. Jónasdóttir, Örebro University – Gender Studies with a Social Science profile; background: Political Science, Social and Political Theory
• Professor Barbro Wijma, Linköping University – Gender and Medicine; background: Medicine and Associate Professor Katarina Swahnberg – Gender and Medicine; background: Medicine

International advisory board
• Professor Karen Barad, University of California, St. Cruz, USA
• Professor Rosi Braidotti, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands
• Professor Raewyn Connell, University of Sydney, Australia
• Professor Emerita Kathleen B. Jones, San Diego State University, USA
• Professor Elzbieta Oleksy, University of Lodz, Poland
• Professor Berit Schei, Norwegian University of Technology, Trondheim, Norway
• Professor Birte Siim, University of Aalborg, Denmark
Aims of GEXcel

1) To set up a temporary (five year) Centre of Gender Excellence (Gendering EXcellence: GEXcel) in order to develop innovative research on changing gender relations, intersectionalities and embodiment from transnational and transdisciplinary perspectives.

2) To become a pilot or developmental scheme for a more permanent Sweden-based European Collegium for Advanced Transnational and Transdisciplinary Gender Studies (CATSgender).

A core activity of GEXcel 2007–2011

A core activity is a visiting fellows programme, organised to attract excellent senior researchers and promising younger scholars from Sweden and abroad and from many disciplinary backgrounds. The visiting fellows are taken in after application and a peer-reviewed evaluation process of the applications; a number of top scholars within the field are also invited to be part of GEXcel’s research teams. GEXcel’s visiting fellows receive grants from one week to 12 months to stay at GEXcel to do research together with the permanent staff of six Gender Studies professors and other relevant local staff.

The Fellowship Programme is concentrated on annually shifting thematic foci. We select and construct shifting research groups, consisting of excellent researchers of different academic generations (professors, post doctoral scholars, doctoral students) to carry out new research on specified research themes within the overall frame of changing gender relations, intersectionalities and embodiment.

Brief definition of overall research theme of GEXcel

The overall theme of GEXcel research is defined as transnational and transdisciplinary studies of changing gender relations, intersectionalities and embodiment. We have chosen a broad and inclusive frame in order to attract a diversity of excellent scholars from different disciplines, countries and academic generations, but specificity and focus are also given high priority and ensured via annually shifting thematic foci.

The overall keywords of the (long!) title are chosen in order to indicate currently pressing theoretical and methodological challenges of gender research to be addressed by GEXcel research:

– By the keyword ‘transnational’ we underline that GEXcel research should contribute to a systematic transnationalizing of research on gender relations, intersectionalities and embodiment, and, in so doing, develop a reflexive stance vis-à-vis transnational travelling of ideas, theories
and concepts, and consciously try to overcome reductive one-country focused research as well as pseudo-universalising research that unreflectedly takes, for example ‘Western’ or ‘Scandinavian’ models as norm.

– By the keyword ‘changing’ we aim at underlining that it, in a world of rapidly changing social, cultural, economic and technical relations, is crucial to be able to theorise change, and that this is of particular importance for critical gender research due to its liberatory aims and inherent focus on macro, meso and micro level transformations.

– By the keyword ‘gender relations’, we aim at underlining that we define gender not as an essence, but as a relational, plural and shifting process, and that it is the aim of GEXcel research to contribute to a further understanding of this process.

– By the keyword ‘intersectionalities’, we stress that a continuous reflection on meanings of intersectionalities in gender research should be integrated in all GEXcel research. In particular, we will emphasise four different aspects: a) intersectionality as intersections of disciplines and main areas (humanities, social sciences and medical and natural sciences); b) intersectionality as intersections between macro, meso and micro level social analyses; c) intersectionality as intersections between social categories and power differentials organised around categories such as gender, ethnicity, race, class, sexuality, age, nationality, profession, dis/ablebodiedness ; d) intersectionality as intersections between major different branches of feminist theorising (for example, queer feminist theorising, Marxist feminist theorising, postcolonial feminist theorising etc.).

– Finally, by the keyword ‘embodiment’, we aim at emphasising yet another kind of intersectionality, which has proved crucial in current gender research – to explore intersections between discourse and materiality and between sex and gender.

Specific research themes of GEXcel

The research at GEXcel focuses on a variety of themes. The research themes are the following:

Theme 1: Gender, Sexuality and Global Change
On interactions of gender and sexuality in a global perspective.
Headed by Anna G. Jónasdóttir.

Theme 2: Deconstructing the Hegemony of Men and Masculinities
On ways to critically analyse constructions of the social category ‘men’.
Headed by Jeff Hearn.
Theme 3: Distinctions and Authorisation
On meanings of gender, class, and ethnicity in constructions of elites.
Headed by Anita Göransson.

Themes 4 and 5: Sexual Health, Embodiment and Empowerment
On new synergies between different kinds of feminist researchers’ (e.g. philosophers’ and medical doctors’) approaches to the sexed body.
Headed by Nina Lykke (Theme 5) and Barbro Wijma (Theme 4).

Theme 6: Power Shifts and New Divisions in Society, Work and University
On the specificities of new central power bases, such as immaterial production and the rule of knowledge.
Headed by Anita Göransson.

Themes 7 and 8: Teaching Normcritical Sex – Getting Rid of Violence. TRANSdisciplinary, TRANSnational and TRANSformative Feminist Dialogues on Embodiment, Emotions and Ethics
On the struggles and synergies of socio-cultural and medical perspectives taking place in the three arenas sex education, critical sexology and violence.
Headed by Nina Lykke (Theme 8) and Barbro Wijma (Theme 7).

Theme 9: Gendered Sexualed Transnationalisations, Deconstructing the Dominant: Transforming men, ‘centres’ and knowledge/policy/practice.
On various gendered, sexualed, intersectional, embodied, transnational processes, in relation to contemporary and potential changes in power relations.
Headed by Jeff Hearn.

Theme 10: Love in Our Time – a Question for Feminism
On the recent and growing interest in love as a subject for serious social and political theory among both non-feminist and feminist scholars.
Headed by Anna G. Jónasdóttir.

Themes 11 and 12) Gender Paradoxes in Changing Academic and Scientific Organisation(s).
Theme on gender paradoxes in how academic and scientific organisations are changing and being changed.
Headed by Liisa Husu.
In addition, three cross-cutting research themes will also be organised:

a) Exploring Socio-technical Models for Combining Virtual and Physical Co-Presence while doing joint Gender Research;
b) Organising a European Excellence Centre – Exploring Models;
c) Theories and Methodologies in Transnational and Transdisciplinary Studies of Gender Relations, Intersectionalities and Embodiment.

The thematically organised research groups are chaired by GEXcel’s core staff of six Gender Studies professors, who together make up a transdisciplinary team, covering the humanities, the social sciences and medicine.

Ambitions and visions

The fellowship programme of GEXcel is created with the central purpose to create transnational and transdisciplinary research teams that will have the opportunity to work together for a certain time – long enough to do joint research, do joint publications, produce joint international research applications and do other joint activities such as organising international conferences.

We will build on our extensive international networks to promote the idea of a permanent European institute for advanced and excellent gender research – and in collaboration with other actors seek to make this idea reality, for example, organisations such as AOIFE, the SOCRATES-funded network Athena and WISE, who jointly are preparing for a professional Gender Studies organisation in Europe.

We also hope that collaboration within Sweden will sustain the long-term goals of making a difference both in Sweden and abroad.

We consider GEXcel to be a pilot or developmental scheme for a more long-term European centre of gender excellence, i.e. for an institute- or collegium-like structure dedicated to advanced, transnational and transdisciplinary gender research, research training and education in advanced Gender Studies (GEXcel Collegium).

Leading international institutes for advanced study such as the Centre for the Study of Democracy at the University of California Irvine, and in Sweden The Swedish Collegium for Advanced Studies (SCAS at Uppsala University) have proved to be attractive environments and creative meeting places where top scholars in various fields from all over the world, and from different generations, have found time for reflective work and for meeting and generating new, innovative research. We would like to explore how this kind of academic structures that have
proved very productive in terms of advancing excellence and high level, internationally important and recognised research within other areas of study, can unleash new potentials of gender research and initiate a new level of excellence within the area. The idea is, however not just to take an existing academic form for unfolding of excellence potentials and fill it with excellent gender research. Understood as a developmental/pilot scheme for the GEXcel Collegium, GEXcel should build on inspirations from the mentioned units for advanced studies, but also further explore and assess what feminist excellence means in terms of both contents and form/structure.

We want to rework the advanced research collegium model on a feminist basis, including thorough critical reflections on meanings of gender excellence. What does it mean to gender excellence? How can we do it in even more excellent and feminist innovative ways?
Editors’ Foreword

This volume presents many of the lectures given at the conference which took place in Linköping on 12th – 14th October 2010: Violences and Silences: Shaming, Blaming – and Intervening (see Appendix for program). Thirty-five participants gathered from all over the world and gave lectures and seminar papers on the most varying topics. Due to the rather small format of the conference, many new contacts arose and several new research networks were created during and in the aftermath of the conference.

All participants were invited to submit papers for this volume and we were delighted that so many of them did.

The conference took place during the seventh research theme of the Centre of Gender Excellence, GEXcel, during the autumn 2010 in Linköping: Getting Rid of Violence. TRANSdisciplinary, TRANSnational and TRANSformative Feminist Dialogues on Embodiment, Emotions and Ethics. In short, the theme was called The Violence Theme. During this theme, invited GEXcel scholars were working with their research projects at the Department of Gender Studies, Linköping University for various periods of time, and during the period from October till December 2010 all of them were in place. A very dynamic research milieu was thus created, which probably is reflected also in the outcome of the conference, and might be visible also in the present book.

This volume is literally a “Work in Progress” report, meaning that some of its texts are not preliminary as to intellectual content but will in future be elaborated more before they are finally published. Only some minor editorial comments and suggestions have been exchanged between the authors and the editors. The texts from authors who do not have the English language as their native tongue have gone through a formal language check by a native English speaking editor.

We thank Berit Starkman, Björn Pernrud, Ulrica Engdahl, and Claire Tucker for all their efforts in the practical arrangements for the theme and the conference, Ka Schmitz for the illustrations for the programme, Liz Sourbut for excellent work with English language corrections and Tomas Hägg for his careful work with the printing of this book.

Linköping, March 2012
Barbro Wijma, Claire Tucker and Ulrica Engdahl
Chapter 1
Violences and Silences: Shaming, Blaming – and Intervening. An Introduction

Barbro Wijma
Linköping University, Sweden

This introductory chapter begins by presenting Theme 7 of the GEXcel programme, then provides a short outline of the aims of the conference, and thereafter gives an overview of its content.

The research Theme 7, Getting Rid of Violence: TRANSdisciplinary, TRANSnational and TRANSformative Feminist Dialogues on Embodiment, Emotions and Ethics was referred to in short as Violence Theme 7 during all the activities of which it was comprised, and it will often be referred to in this way throughout this volume. It was in fact the second theme on Violence during the GEXcel programme – see the first chapter by Nina Lykke in this volume for further information on GEXcel!

The first part of the Violence Theme was arranged together with Professor Nina Lykke at Tema Genus, Linköping University, during 2009 under the title: Theme 4 & 5: Sexual Health, Embodiment and Empowerment: Bridging Epistemological Gaps. For this theme we invited researchers from all over the world who focused on either of the two main topics: sexual health or violence. Throughout the theme period we worked on bringing together different and often opposing perspectives on the research topics discussed, “bridging the epistemological gaps”. This became a very rewarding experience and was thus also applied during work on the following theme on violence, Theme 7.

For various reasons beyond our control, Theme 7 was carried through without scholars dealing explicitly with research on sex, and without the close cooperation of Professor Nina Lykke. However, quite naturally, the scholars involved in Theme 7 also explored many issues connected to sex in their research, e.g. sexual violence, pornography, or sexual mutilation.

When selecting scholars, we aimed at involving participants who were of course highly qualified, but who could also represent various fields of research and different cultural contexts. All in all, 12 researchers worked together during the autumn of 2010, mostly for one to three months. Their enthusiasm at having the opportunity to meet and work
together with so many researchers from such different parts of the world and from such different scientific paradigms was overwhelming. Many new networks and joint research projects were set up as a result of the close collaboration created in this milieu.

During the theme we held seminars and the conference presented here (see Appendix for overview of the programme). For this conference we also hoped to attract participants from all over the world and from many different segments of the research community – and we succeeded in this endeavour, as will be evident to the readers of this volume. This breadth of knowledge contributed greatly to the fantastic intellectual climate during the conference and the creative context that the participants established.

The title pinpoints the research field the conference wanted to highlight: “Violences and Silences: Shaming, Blaming – and Intervening”. There were several reasons for choosing this focus:

- The intricate interactions between violence and silence need to be explored, e.g. how silence contributes to the existence of violence.

- With this in mind, it seems logical to question the often very narrow definition of “perpetrator” and open up a discussion about also including “silent witnesses of violence” in the concept of perpetrator, i.e. all those who hear about, witness or vaguely suspect the existence of violence and who do not speak up, intervene, try to help, confront perpetrators or report to the authorities in an attempt to achieve change. In Swedish there is a saying: “to remain silent is to consent”. Even in the English dictionary there is a corresponding saying: “silence gives consent”. This means that (at least) these two languages find the need to reflect in a saying something that is a well-known truth in society.

- Shame as an internal concomitant of having experienced violence or having taken part as a silent spectator is another factor contributing to the silencing of violence, thereby silencing the victim as well as the silent spectator (perpetrator).

- Shame on the part of the victim is often maintained by a blaming attitude towards, for example, victims of sexual violence in society, while a blaming reaction to violence from those around the victim, whether directly expressed or not, can also reinforce the silence and, indirectly, the violence as well.

- When all these interactions are taken into account, the issue of intervention becomes very complex and wide, but no less important and urgent. During the conference it was argued that this wider perspective on interventions should be taken, and the reader will find interesting and probing examples of this approach in the chapters of this book.
All the speakers at the conference were invited to submit a chapter to the conference proceedings, which finally resulted in the 14 contributions detailed below.

The chapters in the book have been arranged into seven sections according to the various topics covered in the conference programme. These were:

I. Violence – silence – shame in institutions with the task of helping subordinated people
II. Silence – violence – law
III. Violent and silent discourse and representation
IV. Violence and sexualities
V. Ways of intervening
VI. Problematic intervention and care as violence
VII. Gendered violence in war and conflict

Section I. Violence – silence – shame in institutions with the task of helping subordinated people

Chapter 2: Abusive experiences in healthcare: Silence and shame as targets for intervention
   Barbro Wijma and Katarina Swahnberg, Linköping University, Sweden

Chapter 3: Humiliation and shaming in institutionalised helper interactions
   Åsa Wettergren, University of Gothenburg, Sweden

Section II. Silence – violence – law

Chapter 4. Silent witness – violence and the law’s framing of silence
   Susan Edwards, University of Buckingham, United Kingdom

Section III. Violent and silent discourse and representation

Chapter 5. If I Want to Whistle, I Whistle: The metaphor of gendered violence as solution to racial and class oppression
   Mihai Lucaciu, Central European University, Hungary
Section IV. Violence and sexualities

Chapter 6. Silencing violence by making aggression pleasurable: Content analysis of U.S. popular pornography
*Chyng Sun, New York University, United States*

Chapter 7. “Porn Chic” – An underlying cause of gendered violence in intimate relationships? – An introduction
*Nicola Steffen, Johan Wolfgang Goethe University, Germany*

Section V. Ways of intervening

Chapter 8. Out of solitude
*GullBritt Rahm, Karlstad University, Sweden*

Chapter 9. Turning points and the “everyday”: Exploring agency and violence in intimate relationships
*Lotta Samelius, Linköping University and Police Academy, Stockholm, Sweden; Christa Binswanger, Basel University, Switzerland; Suruchi Thapar-Björkert, Uppsala University, Sweden*

Chapter 10. Playing violence: The psychic dynamics of symbolisation in a theatrical work
*Giuseppe Stanziano, University Federico II, Naples, Italy*

Chapter 11. A conspiracy of silence: Violence against ethnic minority women in Denmark
*Bo Wagner Sørensen, Yvonne Mørck and Sofie Danneskiold-Samsøe, Roskilde University, Denmark*

Chapter 12. Reporting intimate partner violence to the police: Reasons, experiences and consequences when women leave violence
*Mari Brännvall, Malmö University, Sweden*

Section VI. Problematic intervention and care as violence

Chapter 13: Love, fear and power / Shame, blame and silence – professionals’ discourses about victims and perpetrators of gender violence in Portugal
*Maria José Magalhães, University of Porto, Portugal; Yolanda Rodríguez Castro, University of Vigo, Spain; Salomé Coelho, University of Coimbra, Portugal; Deidré Mathee, University of Porto, Portugal*

Chapter 14: Intersecting agendas: Multi-professional anti-trafficking efforts in the United States and the Netherlands
*Jennifer Musto, UCLA, United States*
Finally, as the conference was such an inspiring experience, I hope that the reader of this volume will at least get a glimpse of what happened during those three days of intense listening, reflecting, questioning and discussing.
SECTION I.
VIOLENCE – SILENCE – SHAME IN INSTITUTIONS WITH THE TASK TO HELP SUBORDINATED PEOPLE
Chapter 2
Abusive Experiences in Health Care: Silence and Shame as Targets for Interventions

Barbro Wijma, Katarina Swahnberg
Linköping University, Sweden

Introduction

For more than a decade, our research group at the unit of Gender and Medicine at Linköping University, Sweden, has been investigating the research area “abuse in health care” (AHC). We got into exploring this field after having had clinical experiences as health care staff of patients who suffered intensively after such experiences. This made us feel morally obliged to conduct high-quality scientific research in order to learn how such events could happen at all and what strategies could be utilised to intervene against their occurrence.

What do we mean by “abuse in health care”? Generally, it means a “failed encounter in health care, where the patient feels abused/violated and afterwards suffers from the experience”. It is important to stress that it is the patient’s subjective experience that is the focus, and whether or not what happened is wrong from a medical perspective is not decisive. Abusive experiences may coincide with medical mistakes, but may also occur “when no (medical) mistakes were made”.

For health care providers, this phenomenon is mostly extremely challenging. Medical staff usually chose their profession because they wanted to help people, i.e. in this context, the patients. Therefore it is hard to accept and integrate into one’s own professional expertise that even if you do your very best to help a patient you might at the same time be acting in a way that the patient can experience as abusive. This difficult issue often becomes a taboo, and anything from vague hints of it to clear confrontations with the issue, coming either from a patient or a colleague, can be met with aggression.
Our research within this field

We constructed the NorVold Abuse Questionnaire (NorAQ) within a Nordic network on violence against women, in which emotional, physical and sexual abuse and abuse in health care (AHC) were operationalised by means of 3-4 questions that included concrete examples of events (Swahnberg and Wijma, 2003; Wijma, Schei and Swahnberg, 2004; Wijma et al., 2003). The respondents were asked to report whether they had ever experienced those acts, and if so, whether they had done so during the previous year. If the answer was “yes”, they also answered questions about how much they suffered from the experiences at present, and who the perpetrator was. The NorAQ has been used in several Swedish and international studies, and the Swedish version has been validated for both a male and a female sample with good psychometric quality in the results (Swahnberg, 2011; Swahnberg and Wijma, 2003).

From the researcher’s perspective and using the definitions given in the NorAQ, we found in a Nordic sample of gynaecology patients (n=3641) a mean lifetime prevalence of ever having experienced AHC of 22% (range 13-28%), and a level of present suffering from those experiences of (mean) 14% (range 8-20%) (Swahnberg et al., 2007). Experiences of childhood abuse was a risk factor, in both female and male samples, for experiencing adult AHC, with a dose response relation, i.e. the more kinds of abuse experienced in childhood, the greater the risk of experiencing AHC as an adult (Swahnberg et al., 2012; Swahnberg, Wijma, Wingren et al., 2004). An example: a woman who as a child was subjected to emotional, physical and sexual abuse, i.e. a severe abusive experience, runs a risk of experiencing AHC as an adult which is nine times higher than for a woman without abusive experiences in childhood. Table 1 displays the definitions of three degrees of severity of AHC together with the prevalences from the Nordic countries. While roughly 1/5 of Swedish women have experienced AHC, it happens to 1/10 of Swedish men (Swahnberg, Hearn and Wijma, 2009; Swahnberg, Wijma, Schei et al., 2004).

Table 1. Prevalence of experiences of three degrees* of abuse in health care in Swedish female gynaecology patients (N=3641).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEVERITY</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>PREVALENCE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MILD AHC</td>
<td>Have you ever felt offended or grossly degraded while visiting health services, felt that someone exercised blackmail against you or did not show respect for your opinion – in such a way that you were later disturbed by or suffered from the experience?</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MILD AHC: Have you ever felt offended or grossly degraded while visiting health services, felt that someone exercised blackmail against you or did not show respect for your opinion – in such a way that you were later disturbed by or suffered from the experience?

Prevalence: 6.9%
MODERATE AHC: Have you ever experienced that a “normal” event, while visiting health services, suddenly became a really terrible and insulting experience, without you fully understanding how this could have happened?
Prevalence: 9.4%

SEVERE AHC: Have you ever experienced anybody in health service purposely – as you understood – hurting you physically or mentally, grossly violating you or using your body to your disadvantage for his/her own purposes?
Prevalence: 5.5%

*If a respondent had answered “yes” to more than one of the severity alternatives, she was categorising according to the most severe degree that she had experienced.

From the patient’s perspective, AHC often results in long-lasting suffering, and some patients even suffer from post-traumatic stress symptoms after such experiences. In qualitative studies men and women gave different descriptions of AHC: men talked about how they had felt “mentally pinioned”, including feelings of having been ignored and strong frustration and distrust of health care, while women described having been “nullified”, i.e. that they had been met without empathy, and had felt powerless, ignored and neglected (Swahnberg, Thapar-Bjorkert and Bertero, 2007; Swahnberg et al., 2009).

Having come so far in our exploration, the next step was to focus on staff. Our research questions were: how do they experience AHC? How is it possible that AHC exists at all? What can be done to prevent AHC? Qualitative interviews with staff revealed that they were prone to interpret AHC as “ethical lapses”, i.e. minor ethical mistakes, for which they did not take on full responsibility and often handled without landing in a moral conflict (Swahnberg, Zbikowski and Wijma, 2010). Moreover, their awareness of AHC varied with the situation and their perceived ability to act (Swahnberg and Wijma, 2011). In order to understand these paradoxes and find strategies to counteract AHC, we turned to theories.

**Theoretical basis for an intervention against AHC with a focus on staff**

In short, we base our intervention projects on theories developed by Galtung, Glover, Zimbardo, Boal and Bennet-Levy.

**Galtung**

A very useful pedagogic tool in talks with staff was Galtung’s “vicious triangle”, which suggests that violence occurs in the form of a triangle; never with only one angle of the triangle present but always all three. Direct violence is the obvious event, but it is always accompanied by struc-
ultural violence, i.e. the hierarchies in the system, and cultural violence, e.g. the language, religion, beliefs, and/or “culture” (Galtung, 1969, 1996). Structural and cultural violence nurture the direct events.

A case history gives an illustrative example: A, born in 1966, was treated for ten years, 1992–2002, for anorexia-bulimia in a psychiatric clinic. She had therapy throughout that time and was an in-patient for more than two years. She made several suicide attempts, exhibited self-mutilating behaviour, and suffered from unbearable anxiety. As soon as she had gained some weight she lost it again. The therapist knew that A had been a victim of psychological and physical abuse as a child, and that there was an on-going daily telephone terror. A was once asked if she had been sexually abused, but she denied it. In 1998 she got yet another diagnosis: Borderline Personality Disorder, which she never accepted. In 2002 she went through an assessment for sexual problems. Also during these assessments A was asked several questions about experiences of sexual abuse, which she again denied. A was asked several questions about her father’s dominance over her, which evidently was a huge problem. The on-going daily telephone terror was stopped by encouraging A to buy a number presentation device and not to answer calls from her father’s telephone number. Half a year later A “spontaneously” told the sexologist about the sexual abuse that she had been subjected to since she was four. Only then did the abuse come to an end.

As a psychiatric in-patient, A was exposed to sexual harassment from a nurse. At night he would come, sit on her bed and caress her thighs while she, struck by horror, pretended to sleep. During the daytime he would hold her tight from behind and whisper suggestions in her ear. After a long time A decided that she had to tell her therapist, who answered: “But you see, that’s how they are…” In this case history all the three corners of the vicious triangle are present – see Figure 1.
If one corner is there – all three are present...

CULTURAL VIOLENCE — “That’s how they are...”

DIRECT VIOLENCE
- the nurse caresses her thigh at night when she pretends to be sleeping
- holds her body tight from behind
- whispers into her ear

STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE
Unequal power balance between:
- Patient /care giver
- Client /therapist
- Psychiatric patient /other patient
- Male/female

Figure 1. Examples from a case history of the three corners of the vicious triangle (Gahtung, 1990) (Wijma and Swahnberg, 2010).

Direct violence
Structural violence
Symbolic violence (threats)

Concealment
Anxiety
(Short relief of) anxiety
Shame
Guilt
Binging
Starving
Self-harming

Figure 2. Psychiatric symptoms nurtured by abusive experiences AND by the concealment of those experiences (After Wijma et al., 2007)
A’s eating disorder and self-mutilation can be interpreted as anxiety-reducing strategies, helping her to manage her situation in the short term. In the long run, however, these behaviours increased her shame and her inclination to conceal the abusive situation as well as her own silence, which had made her an accessory to what happened. Her silence created the prerequisite for the continuation of the abuse, which in its turn increased the shame and guilt – and reinforced her position of being silent (Figure 2).

The culture of silence in health care about abuse, manifested, for example, by not asking about such experiences in medical history taking, may therefore function as “cultural violence”, which means that we need to expand the concept of perpetrators...

Glover

In his book *Humanity: A moral history of the 20th century* (Glover, 2001), Jonathan Glover explores many of the atrocities that took place during the last century, and he asks several questions: What factors allowed misuse of power to arise and exist? What made some people able to withstand and not take part in atrocities? How was people’s resistance erased? On what human resources could a new hope be built that those evil things would “never happen again”? And how should such resources be nurtured? The moral resources Glover describes are human responses: respect and empathy, and moral identity, which in short means the person one would like to be. Glover’s point is that in all human beings there exists a moral identity, making them prone to do good; and this moral identity is expressed in their moral resources, which therefore should be taken care of, protected when threatened, and trained to become more and more developed and strengthened. And on those moral resources the hope should be built that “it will never happen again.” Although Glover describes the most dreadful events, he is in fact optimistic and throughout his book gives many examples of how a chain of evil events can be broken, when individuals let their moral resources come to the surface and take over.

Glover gives good examples of how moral resources can be protected, which we integrated into the intervention. For example:

- Scepticism about ideologies and belief systems
- Culturing of moral imagination, i.e. the capability to imagine what the present situation might be and feel like for the other person you are communicating with
- Refusing to accept immorality and being aware of a “moral slide”
- Learning to recognise misuses of power; also in disguised forms
• Identifying the prevailing ideology and disclosing the ethical conflicts it might conceal.

For our intervention project, these examples mean more concretely that we presumed the following:

When patients are abused in health care, staff members find themselves in a moral conflict. If staff members go against their own moral self they will violate their moral resources, which in turn means destroying one of the most important forms of capital for caring. In contrast, when staff members’ moral resources are strengthened, their ability to act against AHC will increase. For this to take place, staff members need to become aware that AHC exists, and there needs to be a “cultural” change in health care, making it legitimate both to talk about AHC and to act to stop it. Such alternative behaviours need to be trained and that could be achieved through the format of role plays, meaning that the staff as a group takes on the responsibility to act and start helping each other to counteract AHC.

Zimbardo

In his book *The Lucifer Effect* (Zimbardo, 2008), Zimbardo describes the famous Stanford Prison Experiment, which took place in California in 1971. In a provisional, feigned prison, students were given roles to play, prisoners or prison guards, both with minimal instructions. After only a few days the prison guards became brutal and some of the prisoners broke down. One of Zimbardo’s conclusions was: “Any deed that any human being has ever committed, however horrible, is possible for any of us under the right or wrong situational circumstances” (Zimbardo, 2008). He means by this that the explanation for why good people do evil is to be found in the situation and the system in which the individual lives; thus his reasoning is similar to that of Galtung. Solzhenitsyn makes a similar statement in his book *The Gulag Archipelago*: “If only it were all so simple! If only there were evil people somewhere insidiously committing evil deeds, and it were necessary only to separate them from the rest of us and destroy them. But the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of every human being... it is after all only because of the way things worked out that they were the executioners and we weren’t...” (Solzhenitsyn, 1988: 319, cited in Glover, 2001: 401; author’s underlining).

Boal

Boal introduced his “Theatre of the Oppressed” during the sixties and seventies and used theatre as a modus to, for example, make illiterate workers aware of their rights and ready to take action to change their
life situation (Boal, 1992; Boal, 2000). He saw the dialogue as a central and healthy interaction between people and intended that the audience should have a dialogue with the actors on the stage concerning the way in which theatre should be created. We decided to include “Forum plays” – one form of Boal’s theatre – in our intervention with health care staff. This took the form of half-day workshops, where genuine material concerning AHC was collected from the participants. In role plays some of the scenes were then elaborated, until it was clear to everybody what the moral dilemma in the scene was. Then the group tried out in action different alternatives for handling the problematic situation, and went on until it was clear to the participants what were the pros and cons of the different potential solutions. Often the group agreed on one best way to act, but sometimes consensus was not reached and the outcome was instead one or more clear views on the consequences for the patient and other staff of the different actions that could be taken.

Bennett-Levy
According to Bennett-Levy (2004), behavioural experiments mean that a certain presumption is tested in an experiment and that afterwards conclusions are drawn according to the outcome. If the hypothesis cannot be confirmed, the pre-experimental assumptions are questioned. This means that a new behaviour is tested as the basis for a potential revision of thoughts and emotions. Behavioural experiments are often included in cognitive behaviour therapy, as they represent very powerful intervention tools.

The intervention project: sample and methods

Sample
The intervention took place at a department of obstetrics and gynaecology at a county hospital in southern Sweden. All staff members were targeted (N=136), and 74/136 participated at least once in a workshop during the study period of one year.

Intervention methods
Twenty half-day workshops were held. Participation was voluntary, but staff could take part during working hours. A drama pedagogue headed the workshops (see above under Boal).

Evaluation methods
A. Qualitative interviews were conducted before and after the intervention, focusing on staff members’ perceptions of AHC; to what extent
they were aware of AHC and how they defined it. In the first interview 21 informants took part, representing all staff categories, and 10 of them also participated in the second, post intervention interview. An evaluation of the Forum play workshops was an added theme in the second interview. The first and second authors performed the interviews, which were analysed by means of constant comparative analysis (Charmaz, 2009; Glaser and Strauss, 1967/1999; Morse, 2009).

B. Another set of qualitative interviews was conducted after the intervention by an external researcher who was not at all involved in the project. Here 15 informants took part, from all staff categories. Interviews were conducted, analysed and reported according to de Bono’s “Six thinking hats” (de Bono, 1985; Nilsson, 2010).

C. Questionnaires: Short questionnaires of approximately 20 questions investigated the respondents’ experiences of AHC before, during and after the intervention; how often they had met/heard of AHC at their workplace, and whether or not they had taken any action to stop the situation or to decrease the patient’s suffering afterwards. The questionnaires were sent out by post four times during the project period. Out of 136 staff members, 97 answered at least once.

Results of the intervention project

The qualitative interviews before the intervention showed detached attitudes towards AHC, where staff gave explanations and justifications for AHC and described such incidents as “ethical lapses” (Swahnberg, Zbikowski and Wijma, 2010). Moreover, staff members’ awareness of AHC was dependent on the possibility of them taking action (Swahnberg and Wijma, 2011). After the intervention, AHC was described as something that minimised human dignity, was unpleasant for staff to witness, and required action (Berterö and Swahnberg, 2011; Nilsson, 2010; Swahnberg and Wijma, 2011). The staff members’ views were in these respects much closer to the patients’ experiences of AHC than in the interview series conducted before the intervention (Swahnberg, Thapar-Bjorkert and Bertero, 2007; Swahnberg et al., 2009).

A. The informants gave many examples of situations when they had acted against AHC (Nilsson, 2010). Here is one: “For example, a patient asked if she could pee when she was at the X-ray department. Her wish was refused and then she peed in her pants. Later I called them and asked to speak to the person who had denied the patient her wish. That person was made to apologise to the patient. I felt that the patient was compensated. I also think that it was an eye-opener for
the staff. I like them; they are really nice and kind, so I guess it was an exception.”

Later the informant goes on: “Before the project I didn’t act like after the project. For example, the case in the X-ray department. Earlier I would have made excuses for what happened by saying that they didn’t mean to harm her and I would have taken the health carers’ side, now I acted and gave the patient redress.”

B. According to the questionnaire results, 86% of the workshop participants found that after the workshops they had gained an increased ability to act in accordance with what they believe is right in situations involving a moral dilemma. Many of them attributed this change to their participation in the workshops. Another finding was that such changes as described above were sustainable over time. A third main finding was that staff who had participated in the workshops had experienced that patients were abused more often than non-participants and had more often heard about AHC occurring at their workplace.

Yet another result was that certain “signals” became upgraded. It became obvious during the workshops that certain feelings amongst staff members had to a great extent contributed to their remaining silent about an episode of AHC; for example: “I regretted it so much”, “I felt ashamed”, “it did not feel all right”, or “I have forgotten all about it”. Thus, during the workshop it was often discussed how signals of shame and regret should not be repressed but “taken care of” and used as cues to do something active against AHC. It became evident that regret is a forgotten virtue in medical training.

Finally, as a result of the intervention, our pre-intervention theories were revised, and these results will be presented in forthcoming publications.

Future plans

The intervention study may be regarded as a pilot project, as we tried out methods not previously used in the education of health care staff. At present we are working on a follow-up to the pilot intervention. This project has the following aims, and for each aim we list what has so far been achieved:

1. To implement the project within existing structures at the clinic to achieve “sustainable development”. This is now taking place at the pilot clinic, where a special working group was created with the com-
mission of implementing into the clinic’s daily work and structures the advances made during the intervention.

2. To carry out a replica at another clinic to test if the project can be repeated by other researchers and thus spread to other settings. This aspect will begin at a psychiatric clinic in 2012.

3. To implement the project at hospital and County Council levels and in official policy documents recommending/claiming for example: “Zero-tolerance against AHC – we’ll do it together”, “yellow card” (meaning that all staff members have a yellow card in their breast pocket. The card can be slightly raised by a staff member who is present when an AHC event is about to occur – in order to help a fellow staff member/agent to avoid hurting the patient – without having to degrade him/her by making a comment in front of the patient) and training “ethical ambassadors” at each clinic in Forum plays focused on AHC. The last part is presently being carried out in the county where the pilot intervention took place.

4. To produce pedagogic material to enable the spread of the knowledge obtained. This aspect of the project is on-going.

To conclude

AHC is highly prevalent and causes suffering for the patient. For staff, AHC often represents suppressed memories charged with negative emotions. This uneasiness is actually the focus of the intervention method described in this paper, as it recommends that staff explore it in groups, sharpen its moral dilemmas and train in alternative ways to act. The silence around AHC is thereby broken and AHC becomes a generally acknowledged phenomenon which staff as a group can face and work on together in order to find better ways of handling such situations. Shame and regret came out as reactions that could be regarded as useful signals instead of something to suppress – if a staff’s moral resources are to be protected, cared for and trained.

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Chapter 3
Humiliation and Shaming of Institutionalised Helper Interactions
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Introduction
It is indisputable that the use of non-universal welfare services is to some degree associated with a feeling of shame (Letkeman, 2002; Neckel, 1991; Starrin and Jönsson, 2006; Starrin et al., 2003; Thörn, 2004). Indeed, it has been argued that the experience of shaming explains the occurrence of the disproportionate amount of ill-health among the unemployed and recipients of welfare benefits in comparison to the general population in Sweden (Starrin and Jönsson, 2006; Wettergren, 2010). Universal benefits – the Swedish child allowance for instance – are considered to be the right of all citizens of a particular welfare state, while non-universal benefits – for instance social allowances – contain the element of selecting out those in need (the deserving) from those who are not. This in turn involves the evaluation of a person’s needs and available resources, and generally comes with the requirement that the person renders his/her needs and resources transparent to a civil servant or a frontline worker (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Schierup et al., 2006; Schooneveldt, 2003). The assessment of need highlights the moral side of the welfare state and raises questions about responsibility and about the role of the state; about the status of individual autonomy and integrity; about human nature as such. These questions are inherent in the political ideologies of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990). In sociology, the topic of emotions in social life has been an expanding area of theoretical and empirical inquiry over the last 20–30 years (for an overview see Turner and Stets, 2006). Yet it may be necessary to clarify that, as an emotion-sociologist, I consider morals to be emotional as well as cognitive constructs; and as systems of meaning co-produced with collective effervescence and social solidarity in the continuous ritual interactions of particular groups/societies (Collins, 2004; Durkheim, 1994). Values on the other hand are not just emotionally “anchored” or “hot” cognitions (cf. Gamson, 1992) but rather symbols of unity and solidarity simulta-
neously informed and shaped by emotion and cognition (cf. Barbalet, 1998). By their emotional colour and intensity, they regulate belonging and place both objectively (in the eyes of the other) and subjectively (in the subject’s self-gaze) (Clark, 1990).

The purpose of this paper is to outline a theory of humiliation and shaming in institutionalised helper interactions. By this concept I mean an interaction that involves a frontline worker/civil servant with resources, tied to an institution or organisation that is sanctioned by the state to deliver social welfare, assisting a client in need of these resources. By resources I mean concrete resources as well as emotional resources such as recognition, respect and sympathy. Beginning with theories of shame, humiliation and sympathy I will argue that institutionalised helper interactions are analogous to sympathy interactions in the micro-setting, but differ from these by being structured to implicitly humiliate the client. I will also argue that structural humiliation is purposeful and functional to the maintenance of the nation state.

My focus will not be on the standing of welfare recipients within the welfare state but on a group of people whose standing is rather more debatable, that is, migrants from outside Europe. In a qualitative case study on the reception of asylum seekers in Italy and Sweden, conducted between 2006 and 2009 (Wettergren, Forthcoming), a pattern emerged in the comparative analysis of the structurally contrasting cases (reception in a region in Italy and in a region in Sweden). This pattern brought to my attention the complexity of the emotional processes involved and embedded in the interactions between frontline workers and migrants. Here I attempt to approach this complexity with a theoretical model. Although the idea originates in the analysis of empirical material, my argument in this paper is theoretical. I will use examples from my data merely to illustrate some of my points, but the strength of the theory needs further empirical testing.

In the following, I will introduce the broad theoretical framework and thereafter proceed to discuss the particular case of asylum reception with examples from the Swedish case. In conclusion I discuss the way in which the humiliation built into the help offered to unsolicited migrants functions to sustain the exclusivity of membership in the welfare state and thereby also the exclusivity of access to human rights.

The sociology of shame, humiliation and sympathy

It is a basic assumption and finding in psychology and social psychology that recognition/respect and belonging are essential to personal development and self-realisation (e.g. Erikson, 1969; Goffman, 1990; Goffman, 1959; Honneth, 2003; Maslow, 1968; Mead, 1976). In his theory on
interaction ritual chains, Collins (2004) offers an emotion-sociological perspective on this by asserting that positive or negative self-feelings (emotional energy) are directly related to the success or failure (in terms of collective effervescence and solidarity) of social interactions (interaction rituals). High emotional energy gives a person a strong sense of acceptance and belonging, it will motivate him or her to participate in the group with self-confidence and pride. Low emotional energy achieves the opposite and will rather motivate the individual to withdraw and, if possible, exit the group. According to Collins, human beings tend to seek out the social interactions that give them most emotional energy. Of course, the actual amount of emotional energy that a person derives from a successful interaction ritual depends on that person’s standing or status within the group. The sociology of shame emphasises the emotional cues that inform social actors about their status.

Shame is a self-reflective feeling of low self-worth in the eyes of others, a feeling signalling that others think badly of me/my behaviour and therefore are prone to withdraw from me, turn away from me, and exclude me from the social community (Scheff, 1990a; Scheff, 1990b). In Scheff’s terminology, shame signals “danger to the social bond” and in its various culturally contingent versions and outfits it is the primary master emotion of social conformity and order. From a structural perspective, the feeling of shame is similarly related to a loss of status; the subject’s apprehension that he or she (in the eyes of others) is not worthy of the status claimed (Barbalet, 1998; Kemper, 2006). The function is basically the same – to push the subject to seek redemption and repair, to readjust to and conform to group norms and values. However, while Scheff is inherently suspicious of what he calls “unacknowledged shame,” leading to pathological patterns of behaviour such as aggression and/or depression, Barbalet (1998) and Kemper (1978) suggest that the rejection of shame is situational and contingent upon the particular interactions, and its outcome (“negative” or “positive”) is an empirical issue. For instance, if shaming is a tool of oppression, then anger and resentment in response may give rise to change towards a more equal relationship. The outcome of shaming processes thus depends, on the one hand, upon whether the subject believes that the shaming agent is right or wrong, and on the other hand on the preparedness of the shamed subject to cede place (Clark, 1990) and accept lower status as a sign of redemption. Structural circumstances play a role in the choice of actions available to the shamed subject. His or her position in terms of access to resources and alternative sources of recognition (other groups) are important to consider. If there is no exit opportunity, the subject may accept low status in spite of believing that it is wrong. Such a position may give rise
to heightened sensitivity to wrongful shaming that one can do nothing about, or, in other words, strong feelings of resentment about being humiliated. It may also result in “emotional numbing” (Clark, 1990), where experiences of humiliation become so commonplace that the subject accepts this as part of his/her identity and stops reacting, or as an integral component of one’s habitus if the humiliation is related to stereotyping (Smith, 2001).

Feelings of humiliation belong to the shame family in Scheff’s theory. Smith (2001) differentiates between shame and humiliation, also enabling us to better see the complex system of humiliation processes as part of society. In Smith’s account, shaming may take place between equals and does not presume power differences or social hierarchy, but humiliation takes place where such an inequality in terms of power already exists or is in the process of being established. He defines humiliation as “the forced ejection and/or exclusion of individuals or groups from social roles and/or social categories with which they subjectively identify in a way that conveys the message that they are fundamentally inadequate to fill those roles or belong to those categories” (Smith, 2001: 542). He further identifies four different types of humiliation, of which expulsion-humiliation and reinforcement-humiliation are the ones most interesting for our purposes. Expulsion-humiliation is the ejection of an individual or group from “a society to which they previously belonged,” for instance through banishment; reinforcement-humiliation is the “routine abuse of inferiors in order to maintain the perception that they are, indeed, inferior” (ibid: 543). Shame may or may not be part of the experience of humiliation, says Smith, but, in contrast to shaming, humiliation does not imply the possibility of repair. The function of humiliation is to make the other’s position as lower, or as an outsider or outcast, permanent. Thus, the “humiliated habitus” coined by Smith is “a structure of feeling and behavior at the level of the personality shaped by the experience of humiliation. This habitus comes into existence as a consequence of humiliation mechanisms (...) employed to create and maintain social hierarchies” (Ibid: 539).

In societies where inequality and hierarchy are perceived as just and fair, as a consequence for instance of one’s caste, of God’s will, or of insurmountable and fundamental differences between people that one cannot escape, humiliation may be accepted as a matter of fact. The subject assumes the humiliated habitus as destiny. But things become complicated when there exists “a human rights code” building on the idea that every individual is born free and equal and is fundamentally entitled to the same worth, the same opportunities and the same rights to a good and decent life (Smith, 2006). Humiliation, even if there are no
exit alternatives and it must therefore be endured, may then evoke anger, resentment and vengeance (Barbalet, 1998). Shame will be constantly involved because the subject is denied the equal status that he or she claims as a right, and in addition he or she will be denied the opportunity to repair, hindered from proving his or her worth and forced to accept lower status.

If humiliation is an emotion embedded in the effectuation of social hierarchies and shame is the emotion of endangered status/social bonds, sympathy is another crucial emotion regulating social cohesion, belonging and recognition in ways that are of interest to us here. According to Clark (1987: 291), sympathy is “feeling sorry for or with another person” and its social relevance is clear in that 1) it is “a role-taking emotion” – empathy is a necessary ingredient in sympathy; 2) it is shaped by feeling and display rules (Hochschild, 1983); 3) it relates to and reinforces “power and intimacy dimensions of relationships.” This means that, even if sympathy, like shame and pride, can be assumed to be universal and hardwired emotional capabilities, it is socially constructed in terms of why and when it should be felt, by whom and how it should be given and received. The rules of sympathy in American (or, as I will argue, Western) society are: Never make false claims to sympathy; never claim too much or too little sympathy and do not accept sympathy too easily; claim small amounts of sympathy now and then and to keep the “sympathy account” open; always pay back sympathy by (adequately) offering sympathy in return (see also Clark, 1997). These rules are in turn affected by the status and power hierarchies positioning individuals in society. Sympathy, in Clark’s account, is a limited resource given and received in accordance to people’s “sympathy biography”, “sympathy margins” and “sympathy accounts”. Like most emotions, as suggested by Clark (1990), sympathy may be manipulated to manœuvre social place (status) in micro-interactions. Hence, sympathy can be expressed but not felt or felt but not expressed. It can be claimed but not given, offered but rejected. Most importantly, if the giving and receiving of sympathy is asymmetrical it carves out a power relationship: the giver on top and the taker as the dependent, weak party. This is why accepting sympathy in equal relationships entails a tacit promise: that in return the sympathy giver can not only expect sympathy but will also accept sympathy when it is offered in the future. If this is not the case, one party will be weakened in relation to the other. Alternatively, it reflects already existing hierarchies: the superior may offer sympathy downwards but the subordinate may not offer sympathy upwards. Instead, his or her gratitude, loyalty and submissiveness are expected in return. It may severely disturb such hierarchies if a subordinate offers sympathy to a superior,
thus implying that the subordinate and the superior are *equals*. Offering sympathy or rejecting the sympathy offered may thus serve as mechanisms of humiliation or shaming.

**Sympathy, shame and humiliation in institutionalised helper interactions**

Sympathy is involved in a helper interaction because the offering of help presumes the feeling of sympathy, the recognition of the other’s need and possible suffering. Like all emotions, sympathy is “a readiness to act” (Barbalet, 1998; Bergman-Blix, 2010), in this case the action of giving sympathy and concrete help. The distribution of welfare to the poor is, I argue, to be seen as sympathy elevated to a moral imperative on the societal level. Although, during an interaction with a beggar, the giver might not actually experience the feeling of sympathy, but simply gives a few coins away on his or her passing by, it is a sympathetic act. It is however also an example of an asymmetrical sympathy exchange, where in return for sympathy, the giver expects gratitude (cf. Cahill and Eggles- ton, 2001). A beggar who does not thank the giver violates these rules. According to Clark, a person’s sympathy account can be emptied. That is when the receiver of sympathy has asked for too much for too long. He or she is then likely to be seen as both weak and dependent or as an imposter, someone who claims sympathy on false grounds (cf. Sahl- in, 1994). This implies that even in asymmetrical sympathy exchanges, when sympathy is rewarded by gratitude and/or loyalty, this tacit recognition of the giver as a good person is not enough to restore the account. In the end the one who asks for “too much” sympathy undermines his or her own standing as someone worthy of help, and becomes seen as someone who has no self-respect and therefore “deserves” shaming and humiliation. The exchange may be re-negotiated so that the receiver of sympathy must accept in return an increasing amount of humiliation. Exactly how gratitude should be displayed by the receiver, or where the line is drawn, i.e. when “too much” is reached, is an empirical matter.

Translating these ideas to the welfare state, I suggest that at its core we find the idea of bureaucratised helper interactions and of institutionalised sympathy for the suffering other. In the social democratic welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990), no-one should be dependent on the mercy of individuals and their subjective ideas of how sympathy should be rewarded and when “too much” has been reached. In the words of Smith (2006), the modern bureaucratic welfare state administrates a “human rights code” (a code of quality) as opposed to the “honor code” (a code of force) that dominates feudal society. Through the depersonali-
sation of asymmetrical sympathy, the receiver is supposed to be offered help as a citizen’s right (albeit needs tested). Ideally sympathy is not involved, nor is the receiver required to display gratitude or submission to the particular case officer or civil servant. However, the bureaucratic appearances are deceptive, because the person receiving welfare benefits is in fact required to return it with loyalty – to the state – and with subservience – to the abuses of personal integrity inherent in the means test and other terms and conditions that accompany such benefits. Indeed, even the welfare recipient or the unemployed person who has paid his or her taxes and fees to the unemployment benefit fund during years of employment, will have to accept humiliation in return for benefits. The lack of emotional engagement, of at least displayed (if not felt) sympathy, in many civil servants adds to the humiliation rather than lessens it, because it denies the clients recognition of the particular unfortunate circumstances that forced them to ask for help. In late capitalism personal success is celebrated as the outcome of individual achievement and the belief that more or less anyone with the right spirit “can make it” (Bauman, 1997; Neckel, 1996; Sennett, 1998). In this context, recognition of particular circumstances is especially important for the self-esteem of the help-seeking individual, who is struggling to avoid the shame of lost social status. Clark’s study (1990) showed that people who believe that society is just are less likely to offer sympathy than those who don’t. This leaves us with the paradox that the more society strives to eliminate inequality and injustice and the more it succeeds with this task in the eyes of its members, the less inclined they will be to feel sympathy for those in need, and the more the need for help will be associated with shame and humiliation pertaining to the idea that those who did not make it – in spite of all the resources available – are indeed of lower worth.

Reception of asylum seekers as institutionalised helper interactions

While nationals in need of welfare services can claim to be citizens and therefore basically entitled to help from the state, migrants’ rights vis-à-vis the receiving state are conditioned by the discretion of the state and its willingness to offer help and hospitality (Derrida, 2001; Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000; Rosello, 2001) to non-citizens. If a migrant is classified as a refugee or in need of subsidiary protection according to the Geneva Convention, he or she may claim rights in the nation states that have chosen to sign the convention. The type of welfare regime characterising the receiving state will also be decisive, as will the degree to which it does in fact implement the Convention. Moreover,
states interpret the meaning of the Geneva Convention differently. The “third country national” migrant may on the other hand fall completely outside of rights due to being classified (classifications are ultimately at the deliberation of nation states) as neither a refugee nor a person entitled to subsidiary protection of some sort. In this case, he or she may be a potential labour migrant that the receiving state acknowledges and “wants” and thereby entitled to a set of rights. Or, more likely, he or she will be an unsolicited migrant without rights, subject to deportation and repatriation. It may be objected that “human rights” also apply to the unsolicited migrant, as universal individual rights. However, in the absence of a supranational, global institution to guarantee these rights, it is the nation state that implements human rights in practice and it does so primarily with regard to its own nationals (Smith, 2006; Stammers, 2009). The consequences of this may be seen in particular in the treatment of unsolicited and rejected migrants both within and outside the EU (Castles and Davidson, 2000; Ellerman, 2006; Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000; Hansen, 2008). The reception of asylum seekers into a nation-state can be seen as a particular type of institutionalised helper interaction, where the “unsolicited migrant” does not possess “automatic” rights unless the receiving state decides that he or she should have them. This in turn raises expectations that the receiver of help should be even more grateful and submissive and therefore also less demanding. On the other hand, deterrence mechanisms such as humiliation and shaming can be expected to be accentuated here, at least if the nation-state believes that its welfare system is attractive to foreigners and that they come with the purpose of exploiting it.

The unsolicited migrants that we talk about here all belong to the category of migrants who have left their countries because of war, conflicts, persecution and/or poverty. The process of migration, or the results of war, have bereaved them of their main context of belonging and of significant others. From the perspective of the sociology of emotions, it can be argued that these migrants are in limbo, characterised by insecure social bonds and an eagerness to seek out new groups and contexts through which they can reload emotional energy and restore their sense of self. However, entering the new society as an unsolicited migrant means entering at the lowest possible level on the power/status nexus, a position of near or total dependency. In Sweden, this means a long-term relationship with state institutions such as the Migration Board and, if a residence permit is granted, with the municipal authorities such as the welfare office, the unemployment agency and municipal adult education. The institutional grasp includes various types of obligatory education and work/life training tied to the allowances and benefits necessary for
the migrant’s everyday existence. A job is very hard to get; the organisation and regulation of the Swedish labour market, together with discrimination, has made the threshold very high for newcomers (Schierup et al., 2006).

These conditions lock the migrant into the subordinate position of one receiving help, for often unspecified but long periods of time. I suggest that unsolicited migrants are perceived by the receiving society as analogous to sympathy deviators; they burden the welfare system with their needs and they need help for too long. In many cases they are also suspected of demanding sympathy on false grounds.

In interviews with the frontliners, an emotional career pattern emerged, going from experiencing strong emotions of sympathy (pity, compassion, grief) towards the migrants “in the beginning” (when starting to work with asylum seekers) to a more “professional” attitude where bureaucratic distance was used to protect the frontliner’s self. This pattern can be labelled sympathy burnout. The professional position, prescribed by the frontliner’s organisational emotional script (Wettergren, 2010), ideally means a balanced and neutral perception of the other where neither sympathy nor antipathy is openly displayed. However, underneath the professional surface it appeared that a once “overly” sympathetic attitude towards the clients had turned into controlled antipathy and a baseline belief that: “they all lie” (accommodation assistant). A moment of “awakening”, when a migrant person that the frontliner had trusted turned out to be “a liar”, was commonly referred to, both by frontliners who had experienced it and those who had not. In many ways the idea of the false asylum seeker was embedded in the institutional (Migration Board) discourse. Part of the professional attitude handed down to employees (through training and socialisation into the organisational culture) was the assumption that “they all lie, but who wouldn’t in their situation?” (Migration Board officer). The emotion work accompanying this professional attitude was therefore empathetic – understanding – but not sympathetic (cf. Wettergren, 2010).

Like the migrants, the frontliners were locked into a position, but theirs was the structurally superior position of helping agent. Their action space was limited by the law, and by tacit rules and regulations as well as by organisational/institutional productivity goals. This aside, the fact that officers did have an action space at their disposal was visible when the professional self was moved in the direction of either sympathy or antipathy. For instance, sympathy could lead a teacher at the introduction programme to personally accompany a student to a job interview. At the other end of the scale, through the allegedly neutral bureaucratic position, frontliners were able to express “backgrounded”
(Barbalet, 1998) antipathy and resentment towards clients who challenged their authority or judgement (Graham, 2003; Wettergren, 2010). Here it is important to understand that such challenges are always potentially “personal” in the sense that they attempt to lower the status of the professional. The migrant may try to become “an equal” by aspiring to higher status in the interaction, for instance by contesting rules that circumscribe his or her autonomy. The tendency among the migrants to resort to secondary arrangements (Goffman, 1961) was an often-cited source of resentment:

They have to be steered somehow, it’s like a pattern of communication! We have to get around this resistance and ignore it or, well, yes, I pretend it’s not there, I don’t let it affect me… to become angry and upset because you can’t help it it’s an automatic response. (...) I don’t know anyone who does not feel irritated in that situation. Because they can be incredibly provocative. (Teacher, Introduction Programme, Sweden)

On the migrant’s part, locking into the subordinate position as a receiver of help required emotion work to cope with potentially hurtful feelings of shame. Apart from the loss of status, they also lost power and autonomy when entering the institutionalised helper interaction. The fact that they had no other options (such as “returning home” or changing country) forced them to endure the humiliation of the helper interaction while struggling to maintain hope and self-confidence for the future; to balance the shame and anger evoked by routine humiliation with the gratitude, deference and submissiveness expected in return for the help that they received. The ambivalent self-feelings and the complexity of emotion work (balancing feeling rules and display, cf. Hochschild, 1983) that results from this are illustrated by the following quote:

Everything is fine! Very good. I wait [to get a job]. I am registered everywhere: the unemployment agency, I talked to the municipality. I wait. You must have work life practice first. I am used to working all the time, but now I study. I am unemployed [laugh]. My profession is a chauffeur and car mechanic, I want to work with that. You have to try work life practice and then you will be approved [laugh]. That’s good. (Ben, permanent residence permit, 4 years in Sweden).

The bold passages mark the display of gratitude, deference and loyalty that Ben believed that I (as a Swede representing the giver side) expected to hear. The underlined passages mark what I argue to be slippages, revealing ambivalence in terms of the shame that Ben was holding back.
His struggle to hold back and display emotion may be understood as *surface acting* likely to produce emotive dissonance (Hochschild, 1983) and resentment in the long run. This type of coping, if “revealed”, may also lead to allegations of claiming sympathy on false grounds. The interviewee Johanna may instead serve as an example of *deep acting*, emotion work by cognitive re-framing of the situation (Ibid). Johanna described the position of “foreigners” in Sweden as very difficult but she had decided that “it’s going to be different for me.” To this end she avoided contact with compatriots because their negativity depressed her; she interpreted neighbours’ tacit looks and gazes (being the only black person in a Swedish middle-class neighbourhood) as curiosity rather than antipathy; she asserted that the fact that there were unemployed Swedes was not a reason why she would not get a job (this opinion was expressed by an officer at the unemployment agency); and she tried to make her wants and ambitions clear to her teachers in order to get the kind of help that she needed to “move on”. Although it enabled her to remain proud and protect her self-feelings, this strategy may lead to the withdrawal of sympathy because of being considered too proud or too sure of herself, accepting help/sympathy too self-evidently as *if it was her right* (cf. Clark, 1987): “Fine you’ve given me all that [help] you’ve started me off…don’t just leave me there! You understand what I’m telling you? I have a life ahead I’m not going to sit and wait for you all the time!” (Johanna)

Within the long-term, asymmetrical structure of the institutionalised helper interaction that unsolicited migrants enter into, the danger of habituating the humiliated habitus is ever-present, especially if the institutionalised discourse of the false asylum seeker – which may be seen as a structural version of sympathy burnout – is taken into account. Next, I will exemplify the types of humiliation involved and connect these to the wider context of rights and nation state belonging, as well as the functional aspects of humiliation, in this case, for the nation state.

**Types of humiliation involved in the reception of asylum seekers**

As argued earlier, among Smith’s (2001) types of humiliation the ones relevant to institutionalised helper interactions are *expulsion-humiliation* and *reinforcement-humiliation*. In the case of unsolicited migration, the former is clearly seen in the practice of deportation, sanctioned by all nation states, and often involving both mental and physical violence of the kind that not only deny the migrant access to recognition and autonomy as a member of a nation state community, but also ignores
his or her human rights (Hansen, 2008; Khosravi, 2006; Schierup et al., 2006). It is ultimately from the aspiration of belonging to a community of humans, and of human rights, that the unsolicited migrant is expelled. In terms of reinforcement-humiliation, it became clear through comparison between the Italian and the Swedish case that: 1) the business of dealing with migrants is located in remote areas and worn out or abandoned buildings. This may be seen in the light of the conditional nature of the helper interaction, quite concretely communicating the fact that the asylum seekers were situated on the fringes of society; 2) resources put into reception are consistently kept lower than the resources available to nationals. Again, this signals conditionality and difference. By no means can the asylum seeker aspire to the same rights as citizens; 3) together these structural circumstances sanction “otherisation”, i.e. the perception cherished by frontliners that the migrants were culturally different (coming from non-democratic “clan societies”) and rightfully to be submitted to socialisation as part of the introduction programme (to “learn to think like individuals” and “democratic subjects”). Secondary arrangements and “resistance” to the introduction programme were seen as effects of this clan mentality.

It is interesting to note that, when the topic of humiliation was brought up in the interviews, some interviewees tended to point out “minor” events rather than things that they had already talked widely about: such as being badly treated in interactions with authorities, detention, interrogation, being forced to follow the introduction programme, exclusion from the labour market, and so on.

I wear glasses. And, ah, they had given [a pair of glasses] to me. My other glasses were broken so I was given these glasses. (...) So now when I read a lot my eyes start watering. So I kind of told them I have this problem and they say “ok you go there” and I am sent a letter being told, ah, you can go there but you have to know that it’s going to be...cut off from my monthly [allowance]. So it means we are not going to help you with it and I kind of find that a bit, ah, humiliating to me like we give you what we want to give you we’ll help you with what we want to help you with. You understand what I’m telling you? (Johanna)

Smith (2001; 2006) argues that humiliation does not evoke shame if it appears reasonable or just. Indeed, the accounts of blunt humiliation that Johanna talked about were accompanied by statements such as “I understand that they must do this, it’s how the system works,” thereby protecting herself from shame. She accepted that she must pass “tests”
to prove her worth and work her way into the community. But the authorities’ refusal to provide glasses denied her the very right to prove her worth by studying and working hard to reach the explicit goals of the programme that she insisted on taking seriously. It refused recognition of the proud and ambitious self.

Conclusions

In this paper I have argued that humiliation and shaming processes are inherent in the institutionalised helper interactions of the welfare state. This theoretical argument was briefly illustrated by results from a study of the reception of asylum seekers. In this case, humiliation and shaming as part of a deterrence strategy through which persons in need are discouraged from seeking help becomes more evident. It reflects the assumption that there are large numbers of people willing to abuse the welfare system. “Protecting” the nation from such abuse by “foreigners”, this strategy also maintains the idea of the attractiveness and exclusivity of nation-state membership and rights. The problem is that it also effectuates the exclusivity and contingency of human rights (cf. Fassin, 2005; Gibson, 2003; Tazreiter, 2010).

The long-term position as receiver of help may lead to habituation (cf. Bergman-Blix, 2010) of the humiliated habitus, part of which may be the surface acting of gratitude and loyalty while holding back resentment and shame and engaging in secondary arrangements. Another strategy is to take help seriously and try to use it as an individual human right to personal development. Both strategies are likely to give rise to new humiliations as both threaten the status of the civil servant/frontliner. On the giver’s side, sympathy burnout is a likely effect of distributing welfare to clients in long-term need. Professionalisation may protect the giver from these effects, but it may also gloss over resentment towards the client, which arises when the client’s strategy to assert his/her own worth threatens frontliner self-feelings and status. The mythology of the unsolicited migrant as liar – claiming sympathy/help on false grounds – is all but part of the Migration Board’s professional discourse, as is the idea that Swedish migration policy is fair and just (e.g. Wettergren, 2010). The interaction may result in mutual resentment and stereotyping, where the giver resents the receiver’s lack of recognition of the value of the help given and the receiver will resent the giver denying personal recognition and for having to display gratitude and loyalty. The result is the reinforcement of social cleavages instead of social integration.
Summary

In this paper I have outlined an emotion-sociological framework for understanding the shaming and humiliation processes involved in institutionalised helper interactions. By institutionalised helper interaction I mean an interaction that involves a frontline worker with resources who helps a client in (often long-term) need of these resources. By resources I mean concrete resources as well as emotional resources such as recognition, respect and sympathy. Beginning with theories of shame, humiliation and sympathy I suggest that institutionalised helper interactions are analogous to sympathy interactions in the micro-setting, but differ from these by being structured to implicitly humiliate the client. The function of structural humiliation and shaming is to regulate and discipline welfare receivers by associating the use of welfare services with a potentially painful emotional cost. This argument is exemplified by material from a qualitative study on the reception of asylum seekers. Through the examples given, the contingency of a person’s sympathy account becomes evident as well as mechanisms such as expulsion-humiliation and reinforcement-humiliation. The emotion work and emotional processes involved are discussed from the viewpoint of both the frontliner and the migrant/asylum seeker. It is argued that both are locked into their respective positions of giving and receiving help/humiliation, but that a resentful frontliner may use the bureaucratic position to “rub it in” vis-à-vis the subordinate client; and that the migrant develops a humiliated habitus that may protect against shame and cover up for secondary arrangements.
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SECTION II.
SILENCE – VIOLENCE – LAW
Chapter 4
Silent Witness – Violence and Law’s Framing of Silence: “Have you nothing to say?”

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In this chapter, it is my intention to examine how silence is dominantly received by, and within, the law. My purpose is to explore especially the silence of women who face domestic violence and abuse and law’s failure, through the exclusion of alternate realities on the meaning of silence, to comprehend women’s motive for silence. Traditionally, the essence of silence before the law has been understood as an expression of guilt and a desire not to self-incriminate. The development of law and jurisprudence, has therefore focused on strategies around protecting and preserving the right to silence. However, women’s explanations for silence frequently reveal alternate meanings and motives including:- the need for self-preservation and survival; as a response to fear; shame; and family and ‘cultural’ pressures. Although, it is also recognised that women victims of violence are on occasion silent in an act of resistance. However, it is only in very recent times that the law and discourse has begun to hear and heed these alternate discourses. The law’s new imaginings on the meaning of silence are the result of the legal community’s efforts, who in advocacy and in putting legal questions and legal argument to law, articulate the predicament of the fearful victim of domestic violence forcing law’s makers to consider these different realities. This recent reappraisal of women’s silence has brought forth new statutory provisions which assist women, thereby overturning the common laws’ habituated approach where the response to her silence and reluctance to use law was to disavow her even further. This posture is exemplified by Lord Salmon in Hoskyn v Metropolitan PC (1978), when he said of a terrified and abused woman who did not want to give evidence against

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at a plenary session during the conference “Violences and Silences: Shaming, Blaming – and Intervening”, an arrangement of the Centre of Gender Excellence, Linköping University, October 2010.

2 Hoskyn (appellant) and Metropolitan Police Commissioner (respondent) [1979] A.C. 474.
her husband, “If she doesn’t want to avail herself of the law’s protection the common law cannot force it upon her.” These new statutory developments are further supported by an interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Art.6 “fair trial” rights, which reverses the former default position which interpreted Art.6 as an exclusive right of defendants and extends fair trial thinking and considerations to embrace the possibility of protecting the right of the victim to effective prosecution.3 In this regard the law has begun to draw on the feminist discourses on women’s silence around male violence and developed provisions to deal with silent victims who through fear are unwilling to give evidence. The experiences of women as victims of violence and as victim turned defendant in the criminal justice system are experiences that are rarely articulated from ‘her’ standpoint. And so it is now, at this moment, for the gender silent subject to speak.

In developing this critique of silence I explore women’s silence within and outside the law. I explore the rhetorical force of the silence of alternative meanings of silence through placing the reader in the subject position or place of the victim or victim turned defendant. Jonathan Culler in his book *On Deconstruction* asks, “Suppose the informed reader of a work of literature is a woman. Might this not make a difference?.....” (Culler, 1982: 43). What then does a feminist perspective bring to an understanding of silence? Many women victims of domestic violence cannot speak. Fear of further violence, a sense of shame and loss of dignity, and in some cases the added burden of the unwritten law of preserving family pride and honour, otherwise known as the claims of ‘culture’ (Benhabib, 2002) prohibits their speech and enlisting of any help. This affects women victims of violence who kill their abusers, as the life and trials of Zoora Shah and Kiranjit Ahluwalia amply demonstrate. Even when women find the courage to speak, and so break the chains of their silence, as did Zoora Shah she was not considered a credible witness and therefore her story was not heard by those to whom she appealed. Zoora Shah killed the man who abused, pimped and controlled her. Her silence was imposed by fear of his further violence, and fear of the mortification of self and the social death she and her immediate family would endure if she spoke out about his abuse and sexual violence against her. Why was she silent? “It was my culture” she explains. For Kiranjit Ahluwalia who killed an abusive husband, silence was also a ‘cultural’ requirement if she was to survive. She too said “It was my culture”. In both cases when these women finally broke their silence and spoke out about the truth of their lives the law could not hear what it could not comprehend.

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3 *Opuz v Turkey* (2009) 27 BHRC 159.
The case of Nyla Hussain, provides another perspective on women’s silence. She faced a criminal trial for conspiracy to murder her lover. But Nyla was not abused by him nor had she taken any part in his murder only being pressurised under duress to reveal his address to those who could then discover his whereabouts and commit the killing. She too said nothing and was silent. She said nothing in her defence either prior to or during trial. She spoke no words, and she exercised her right not to be present in the courtroom during the trial. But her silence and every manifestation of it was taken as an indicator of guilt and of complicity.

Women victims of domestic violence are silenced by fear of further violence. Fear causes women to withdraw statements made to police and recant testimony before, or at, trial. The law has recently recognised ‘her’ fear of further violence and has permitted prosecutions to continue in the absence of her courtroom testimony of his violence. The law has also recognised that fear of violence from violent men may compromise women’s ability to protect their children, a compromise totally unintelligible to a woman who has never faced abuse. Sally Emery could not, or otherwise failed to, protect her child. Hedda Nussbaum could not, or otherwise failed to, protect her child. This general provision was drafted to accommodate the problem battered women hitherto had faced in securing manslaughter-provocation convictions as an alternative to murder. But these recent legal efforts are uneven and inconsistent, since in the same breath the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 s 5 has also provided that where a child dies failure to protect a child becomes a criminal offence where: “D failed to take such steps as he could reasonably have been expected to take” and carries a manslaughter conviction with a potential prison sentence of 14 years which undermines somewhat any of the lessons learned about women’s fear of violence against them and their inability to protect a child. Further the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s 55(3), has for the very first time recognised fear of violence as an adequate ground for killing. The defence is intended to assist battered women who kill.

**Guilt – a one dimensional silence**

For legal positivism, silence equates with guilt. This presumption is so firmly embedded in Anglo-American and European jurisdictions that it is difficult to comprehend the possibility of alternate meanings. The law does not say that silence equates with guilt but it provides that “adverse inferences may be drawn from a person’s silence.” These statutory developments in the UK and in Europe and in Sweden (van Dijkhorts,

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4 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s 34.
2008) have turned back the hands of time on the common law principle that a person has the right not to incriminate him or herself. Under the common law, the right to remain silent when accused of an offence has its origins in the 17th century objections to the techniques of the Star Chamber of King Charles 1 (Easton, 1991).

**Critiquing the received orthodoxy on silence**

Yet, silence may include for example, the silence of intimates, liturgical silence, the silence of women. It may contain many different meanings and it may be freely chosen or imposed. The one-dimensional view of silence is drawn from a view that silence is an active attitude and a positive choice of the legal subject. The orthodox construction of silence draws on a male view and a male experience of silence. This perspective is documented in philosophical exegeses on silence and in legal discourse, where silence is refusal, is resistance, is defiance and is insurrection. It is for the most part a positive attitude where the legal subject takes the decision to be silent from a position of empowerment. As Dauenhauer has observed, “It itself is an active performance” (see Dauenhauer, 1980: 4). Max Scheler similarly accedes it is “an active attitude” (Scheler, 1954: 225). But it is, or is more likely to be, an active attitude when it is vested in the hands and hearts of men.

The discourse on silence however has rarely explored the meaning of gendered silences. Indeed, within the legal forum the notion that silence is guilt, or silence is resistance, as for example in the ‘no comment’ so called interviews has been at the expense of alternate narratives. For women, silence is the inversion of speech, it is an expression of their powerlessness and dispossession as speech is wrested from them. Silence becomes the meta language of the powerless and especially of women. De Sousa Santos writes, “The meaning of a specific instance of silence has to be inferred from the logical connection of the discourse, from the structural position of the silent participant and from the language of the participant that precedes and follows the silence” (de Sousa Santos, 2002: 154.)

In this grounded critique, I draw on women’s lived experience before the law in unravelling the meaning of female silence through content analysis of a number of individual cases involving women of ‘other’ cultures either as victims or offenders exploring configurations of gender, class and culture and women’s reasons, justifications and rationalisations for their silence. I examine the gender and ‘ethnicity’ issues raised by the law’s understanding of silence for women’s legal protection, their justice, and their human rights by drawing on their experience as both
victims and defendants and the consequences this has for their invisibility as subjects and for the dissimulation and erasure of their voices.

Male Silence – resistance and defiance

The contention that silence can be a powerful act is seen when silence functions as resistance. But this space is inhabited by men. Silence is the central motif in Ken Kesey’s *One flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest* (Kesey, 1980). It is Chief Bromden who narrates the story, and it is Chief Bromden who, for the most part of the narrative, fakes muteness in an act of defiant resistance against a system which robs its ‘victims’ and tries to rob him of identity, personage and self. Silence becomes, in Goffman’s (Goffman, 1968) imagining, a strategy against the mortification of self. But it is not Chief Bromden who explains his motive for faking muteness; it is the book’s central character McMurphy who realises and discovers Chief’s raison d’etre.

McMurphy: “Ya know, Chief, I was just rememberin’ a time down in Williamette Valley – I was pickin’ beans outside of Eugene and considering myself damn lucky to get the job. It was in the early thirties so there wasn’t many kids able to get jobs. I got the job by proving to the bean boss I could pik just as fast and clean as any of the adults. Anyway, I was the only kid in the rows. Nobody else around me but grown-ups. And after I tried a time or two to talk to them I say they weren’t for listening to me – scrawny little patchquilt redhead anyhow. So I hushed. I was so peeved at them not listening to me I kept hushed the livelong four weeks I picked that field, workin’ right along side of them, listening to them prattle on about thus uncle or that cousin. Or if somebody didn’t show yo for work, gossip about him. Four weeks and not a peep out of me. Till I think by God they forgot I could talk..I bidded my time. Then, on the last day, I opened up and went to telling them what a petty bunch of farts they were…Hooe did they listen then…What I was wonderin’, Chief, are you bidding your time towards the day you decide to lay into them?” (Kesey, 1980: 169-170).

Knowledge goes silent on women

Women’s experiences of and reasons for silence have been excluded from shaping the discourse on silence, thus only the experiences of those who can speak and can be heard pass into the understanding of knowledge on silence. In so far as knowledge is a social and legal construction (Berger and Luckman, 1971) so too are the configurations of silence, and in this regard women’s silences have been passed over as has been the experience of women in discourses about knowledge in general. From the
standpoint of sociological and feminist theory Dorothy Smith writes: “Being excluded, as women have been, from the making of ideology, of knowledge, and of culture means that our experience, our interests, our ways of knowing the world have not been represented in the organization of our ruling nor in the systematically developed knowledge that has entered into it.” From the standpoint of legal theory Niemi-Kiesilainen, Honkatukia and Ruuskanen write: “Our ideas and concepts are historically specific. In addition, all ways of understanding are historically and culturally relative. Legal concepts have also their historical and cultural background. In discourse analysis, we try to make visible the historical and cultural connections and underpinnings of concepts....” (further they argue) “power makes itself visible as a strategy used by different people in the discourses that they use. Thus some ‘truths’ or states of affairs are legitimated and others marginalised” (Niemi-Kiesilainen, Honkatukia and Ruuskanen, 2007: 78.)

Women’s systemic exclusion from the history of knowledge and the history of the meaning of silence has resulted in her reasons for silence being excluded and erased from life and from law. Women’s silence is rarely about insurrection, defiance, or refusal, it is more often, although not always, about fear, and about shame, it is a bleak and defeatist attitude of the powerless.

Women’s Powerlessness in silence

These alternate discourses provide a compelling critique and rejection of legal positivism’s orthodology on the meaning of silence and raises new possibilities for female suspects, and victims.

Silence imposed– the bane of custom

For women, silence is imposed by powerful others on the silenced subject. For the silenced, the imposition of silence is an act of theft, it is the antithesis of self-determination, it is a total denial of self. For Kiranjit Ahluwalia who killed an abusive husband, silence was a cultural requirement of honour, and of izzat. She said “It was my culture”. She was the victim of long term violence from an adulterous husband. She was mentally, psychically and psychologically subordinated to him, beaten, abused and raped. She tried to do all she could through compliance to bring about a better life for herself. In a letter to her husband which was read out in court at her trial, her subjugation to him and her pleadings were apparent, she wrote:

“Deepak, if you come back I promise you- I won’t touch black coffee again, I won’t go town every week, I won’t eat green chili, I ready
to leave Chandikah and all my friends, I won’t go near Der Goodie Mohan’s house again, Even I am not going to attend Bully’s wedding, I eat too much or all the time so I can get fat, I won’t laugh if you don’t like, I won’t dye my hair even, I don’t go to my neighbour’s house, I won’t ask you for any help.”

He had beaten her with the buckle end of belts, with the heels of shoes, broken her fingers, tried to run her over, thrown her downstairs, raped her. He threatened to burn her face with an iron, pulled her by the hair into the back of their car, held a screwdriver to her eyes, threatening to gouge them out. Kiranjit said “It could be anything that triggered the violence,” ... “Maybe he didn’t like the tea.” Ahluwalia was finally freed on appeal when her conviction for murder was reduced to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility due to the effects of fear and long term abuse at the hands of her husband.

The reality of the life of Zoora Shah is a living testimony to the imposition of silence through the bane of patriarchy framed by the protective shield of ‘custom’. At her trial for the murder of Mohammed Azam on December 21, 1993, who died from arsenic poisoning, Shah gave no evidence and in police statements denied any involvement in the killing. On appeal she confessed to killing Azam, pleading guilty to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. It was necessary to provide a convincing account of why she had remained silent about what her life had been like and why she perjured herself at trial, and why now she had decided to speak the truth. Zoora Shah’s case on appeal was that she had administered a substance which she knew would make Azam ill and she hoped would make him impotent so he could not carry out his threat of sexually abusing her daughters. She tried to explain the influence of her culture, her religion, her way of life and izzat (honour) on her silence at trial. The story of the taveez is illuminating and compelling. Whilst in Pakistan for the wedding of her daughter she visited a Holy man from whom she obtained a taveez – a Holy writing or charm that offers protection and represents the physical manifestation of a plea for divine assistance. The taveez consisted of the Holy man’s incantation of

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5 [1992] 4 All ER 889.
8 Consultations with Holy men are an integral part of Pakistani/Islamic tradition and culture both in Pakistan and in the UK. The Holy man functions as the Sunday priest and is consulted on all matters of birth, sex of a child, life, death, family and financial troubles.
words on a piece of paper, which were intended to make Azam impotent. She was to put the paper in water until the ink dissolved, and then ensure that Azam drank from the glass. In this way the charm would work. The court no doubt found this account incredulous. Indeed, overall they found Zoora Shah to be ‘a most unsatisfactory witness.’ She also claimed that a Doctor in Pakistan gave her a ‘neela totha’ (green powder which would make Azam weak and impotent). The powder was discovered to be arsenic! ”I did not know about the thing,” she explained. The court’s task was to consider whether the fresh evidence, including the impact of izzat, were the reasons for Zoora Shah’s denial of involvement in the killing and silence at trial. On appeal, her story of silence and shame fell to be interpreted by judges whose reference points were fixed in their own ethnocentric cultural references and experience, and limited by their monocular view (Spivak, 1988; see also Nandy, 1983). Her silence was perceived as an expression of guilt and her more recent speech was perceived as an expression of her efforts to manipulate and deceive.

Edward Fitzgerald QC: Is it right you didn’t tell the truth to your lawyers who represented you at trial?
Zoora Shah: Ji,(Yes) I didn’t tell them. I didn’t tell them.
EF: Why?
ZS: A disgrace for me, it was my sons and my daughter, I was frightened, disgrace for me, and my children in danger, some could have killed children or my daughter.
EF: If you told this?
ZS: Disgrace.
EF: Who would harm you if you told the truth?
ZS: Azam’s family would have done that.
EF: What were you ashamed of?
ZS: How could I tell them the truth, bed made into mattress, it was always sex, sex all time. This is not for my children.
EF: Did you tell lawyers?
ZS: No, No.
EF: What do you mean?
ZS: Disgrace to myself and my children.
EF: What did you think would happen?
ZS: No one would marry them, their mother so bad.

EF: You were married to Mr S?
ZS: Ji.(Yes) He said if he had sex with me he will help me and take child to hospital. I had to accept I had no other options.
EF: Did you have sex with him?
ZS: Ji.(Yes)
EF: Were you happy?
ZS: I didn’t have a choice.

Silence and a curtain of shame

On January 14th 2000, seven members of the same family were charged with the abduction and killing of Amjad Farooq, the uncle of three of the accused, in a remote field in Silsoe. Nyla Hussein one of the co-defendants – was the niece of the deceased and had been having an affair with him for some time. She had been subjected to an arranged marriage but the affair continued during this marriage. It was this affair that led to the killing of the deceased. Her father Khadim Hussein, her brothers Shazad and Shabaz, her husband – by arranged marriage – Imran Farid, and Ashiq and Pervaz – Khadim Hussein’s brothers were charged with the killing. At the time of the killing, Nyla, (acceded the prosecution), remained 200 miles away in Wakefield. (Charges against two further members of the family were dismissed a week into the trial.) Nyla, by her affair with the deceased, had brought dishonour to the family. Similar intimate liaisons have led to the murder of women killed either by the husband or by close family members (see Hussein, 1997, and also Naz, 1999). Saved from death, her fate was another. In an unusual turn of events she was accused of being one of the co-conspirators and was said to have ‘aided and abetted’ the murder by ‘supplying’; the address of Farooq and ‘recruiting’ the others. The prosecution ‘recruitment’ theory was fundamentally flawed since her position within a traditional Asian family structure meant that she would be subordinate and would have no authority or responsibility for avenging perceived transgressions of honour and would have no role as orchestrator or ‘recruiter’ or any influence in providing encouragement. Ms Oldham for the prosecution said: “She knew the anger and hostility the family felt towards him and she knew how carefully he had kept his address secret. She set out to recruit members of her family to remove the obstacle of Amjad Farooq from their lives.” But Nyla Hussein was no Bandit Queen (Phoolan, 1995).

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10 I was present in court throughout the duration of the trial of Zoora Shah. The examination-in-chief is taken from my own verbatim notes of the appeal hearing.
In the absence of any evidence brought in her defence it is more than likely that Nyla was absolutely terrified of her family and of the likelihood of reprisals against her, and under duress revealed (not ‘supplied’) the deceased’s address. If she could have spoken – but then she could not, as silence became a necessity for psychological survival, so profound her dishonour and shame and overwhelming sense of moral responsibility for the chain of events that unfurled she found refuge in silence and uttered not a single word. Silent at police interview, silent at trial. Beyond silence and speech itself, she created a persona of invisibility appearing only in the court at the commencement of trial and when ordered to do so during the judge’s summing up. And during summing up, she used her hair as a veil from behind which to hide. Since Nyla Hussein did not speak even to instruct her counsel, she could not be properly defended. Her counsel said, somewhat helplessly, “I couldn’t call the evidence for her.” Her counsel made an application that since her silence was ‘so exceptional’ no directions should be given at all with regard to adverse inference. Her counsel said, “This is a highly unusual case...because of the cultural background which gives rise to the underlying motive. When she was in the dock she found it extremely upsetting,.....then there was her relationship with other defendants in the dock....” Mr Justice Moses, the trial judge, said he would give directions but that the directions would not to be too onerous. “We must not look at silence in the same context as lies... In this case there are all sorts of other reasons why she is silent, she wanted to protect others.”

Listening to the silence of the victims

The law has not been inexorably closed to alternate strategies however, and defence lawyers when defending women who kill abusive men or when women fail to protect others for whom they are responsible, have put to law other arguments. Likewise, where women are victims of domestic violence and refuse to give evidence in trials of the perpetrators, legal argument has also tried to explain that their apparent refusal to testify is the expression of fear of further violence. Duress arguments have recognised that women’s inertia can be the result of fear. In the case against Sally Emery,11 expert evidence was admitted in support of her defence of duress. Sally Emery faced a trial for failure to protect her child from the violence of Brian Hedman, her partner. Chanel, her daughter, died from her injuries at 11 months of age. In her defence, her lawyers argued that “because of her fear of the [child’s] father she had totally lost her capacity to act independently of him”. Emery was recognised as

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suffering from “post traumatic stress disorder” including an inability to resist or stand up to the abuser coupled with a dependence on the abuser which made her unable to seek help. The trial judge acceded “there is potential expert evidence to the effect that if she is right, her will could have been crushed.” However, the defence of duress was rejected by the jury who found her guilty of failing to protect the child from the father. The duress arguments were repeated in an appeal against sentence. On appeal, the appeal court accepted that her fear of Brian Hedman might well have ‘sapped her will’ (Colman and Mackay, 1995, see also Edwards, 1989; 1986; 1990: 59-60; 1985: 1076-1078). Her sentence was reduced to 30 months.

Fear, silence and evidential matters

The fear of women who experience domestic violence affects not only their ability to report the violence against them but also their ability to sustain a prosecution to trial. In 1988, in the UK, the Criminal Justice Act section 23(3)(b) introduced for the first time a provision which allowed for the admissibility of a written statement made by a witness to the police in place of oral testimony in court. I wrote extensively about this new provision at the time. (Edwards 1990; Edwards 1985) Regrettably, it was little used to protect women victims of violence and in fact little used at all. This provision is resurrected in section 116 Criminal Justice Act 2003 which provides, “In criminal proceedings a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings is admissible as evidence of any matter stated if- (a) oral evidence given in the proceedings by the person who made the statement would be admissible as evidence of that matter....(2) (e) that through fear the relevant person does not give (or does not continue to give) oral evidence in the proceedings, either at all or in connection with the subject matter of the statement, and the court gives leave for the statement to be given in evidence...”

The provision allows the court to accept the witness statement and admit it in court in the absence of the victim appearing in court and being examined and cross-examined. This provision recognises that women’s silence in the context of domestic violence is the product of fear of further violence. In R v Boulton, the complainant had a relationship with the defendant and became pregnant by him. During the relationship the defendant’s behaviour towards her became violent and she was physically abused and raped by him on multiple occasions. In one incident Boulton kidnapped the complainant from a traveller’s site, raped

12 Above at. 397.
her several times, and subjected her to multiple assaults. The defendant was charged with rape; false imprisonment; putting a person in fear of violence; and conspiracy to intimidate witnesses. The judge allowed the complainant’s evidence to be read pursuant to section 116. The defendant was convicted. He appealed against conviction and submitted, inter alia, that the cumulative effect of the judge allowing the complainant’s evidence to be read and allowing the prosecution to call the evidence of D, was such that a fair trial had not been possible. The trial judge Rennie J said: “I am completely satisfied, having considered all of counsels’ submissions and bearing in mind the relevant law, section 116 (2)(d) has been satisfied and that [the complainant] is absent from court through fear. I am further satisfied that she is frightened of Mr Boulton and what might happen to her, her family or friends if she were to testify, and this is the very mischief which this piece of legislation is designed to protect against.”

Inherent contradictions

Whilst the legal discourse on silence is currently under scrutiny and women’s meanings and motives for silence are penetrating the traditional orthodoxy on silence, uneven development and contradictions in the law abound. In an attempt to protect children the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act (DVCVA) 2004 introduces a new offence in section 5(1) of “causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable person” where that person is a member of the same household, and (d) either D was the person whose act caused V’s death or - (i)D was, or ought to have been, aware of the risk mentioned in paragraph (c),(ii) D failed to take such steps as he could reasonably have been expected to take to protect V from the risk...

The person must be a member of the same household as the child. Although this is to be interpreted loosely and does not require the party to live in the same household, it does, however, require the party to be a regular visitor, so as to include boyfriends who may not cohabit but visit on a regular basis. It is important that prosecuting authorities and the courts recognise that in cases where children are abused female partners are also frequently assaulted by the perpetrator. Many mothers and female carers who are responsible for the care of children and who experience violence or the threat of violence may be unable to take “reasonable steps” or else to recognise the risks to the child because of their own fear.
and inability to act. The US case, *People v Steinberg* (1989),\(^{14}\) involving the death of Lisa Nussbaum, the adopted daughter of Hedda Nussbaum, Hedda Nussbaum was battered and terrorised by the perpetrator and unable to act to prevent the death of the child in her care. Lisa Nussbaum died of injuries to her head and body inflicted by Joel Steinberg (Hedda Nussbaum’s cohabitant). Hedda Nussbaum herself sustained a wide range of chronic injuries over time, including a broken nose and gangrenous wounds including a ruptured spleen. In giving evidence for the prosecution she said she ate when permitted to do so, went to the bathroom when permitted to do so, and when asked by the prosecution why she did not call an ambulance for Lisa when she knew that the child was dangerously ill, she said, “Joel told me he would get Lisa up and I didn’t want to show disrespect.” This case demonstrates that a woman’s fear of the perpetrator may prevent her from speaking about what has occurred, which suggests the thinking behind this section of the DVC-VA puts the fearful woman at risk of conviction for failure to protect. However, the Lord Chief Justice in *Khan* [2009]\(^{15}\) said that actual physical violence perpetrated by a defendant of the homicide of a vulnerable adult or child against a woman charged with failure to protect under s.5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 may, depending on the facts, render her failure reasonable.

**The injustice of silence**

These cases demonstrate that silence is a strategy not of concealment of the truth or of a desire to evade justice and discovery but a device of survival, in the face of violence. So long as the ontology of knowledge and herein legal knowledge on silence is framed around the male experience alternate realities will be eclipsed and victims will continue to suffer grave injustice. In all these expressions of silence women share a similar experience, ethnicity may impact on and compel women’s silence and issues of nationalist or global nationalist struggle may further compromise her speech. The sounds of silence must be reconfigured and reconstructed through the lens of gender, race, ethnicity and class if women’s voices in silence are to be authenticated and understood.

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\(^{15}\) EWCA Crim 2; [2009] 1 W.L.R. 2036 at [33].
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SECTION III.
VIOLENT AND SILENT DISCOURSE
AND REPRESENTATION
Chapter 5
*If I Want to Whistle, I Whistle*: the Metaphor of Gendered Violence as Solution to Racial and Class Oppression

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Presented as an authentic picture of the situation young people in Romania face, where juvenile delinquents have no future and are demonized and exploited by institutionalized classism and racism, *If I Want to Whistle, I Whistle* won a Silver Bear at the Berlin International Film Festival in 2010 and other important festival prizes, rapidly becoming a cult movie in Romania.

Florin Serban, the director, who studied film at Columbia University, based this movie on a play by the same title, while he incorporated important elements in the script from an acting workshop at Minors’ and Youth Penitentiaries in Romania that took place over several months. Fourteen inmates are acting in the final version of the movie as inmates. The director explains:

“The most important thing that we kept is the spirit and the attitude of the inmates, the bold, uncompromising, somehow childish way of thinking and jumping into action without caring too much for the consequences. The determination of reaching a goal no matter what it takes to get there. The title was kept from the original play, as well as the kidnapping of the girl. We focused on Silviu.” (Interview with Florin Serban.)

Silviu, played by George Pistereanu, a non-professional actor, has been in a reform school for almost four years, without the film explaining why he has been detained. While the inmates do farm work during the day, life in the reform school is bleak, depressing and dominated by bullying and petty intrigues. The motif of the film is that no one listens to the oppressed youth or to what they actually feel about the situations they confront. The inmates are presented as acting their own lives and Silviu’s story is presented as *their own* life story.

Fifteen days before his release, Silviu learns from an unexpected visit by his younger brother that their mother has just come back from Italy. She doesn’t plan to stay in Romania but will quickly return to her job and

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take the younger brother with her, leaving Silviu to face freedom alone. This deeply troubles the young man and sets in motion a vicious chain of events. Silviu, up until then easy-going and non-violent, explodes with rage when his mother visits him. He shouts, calls her a whore, threatens to kill her and his brother if they leave and becomes extremely aggressive. The staff does little to intervene in this disturbing scene. It doesn’t seem to occur to him that he, too, had abandoned Marius, his little brother, by being sent to jail for several years.

His rage culminates in a violent outbreak during a session of interviews made by sociology students doing field work in the reform school. He punches one of the researchers, smashes a chair over the head of a guard, seriously injuring him and takes Ana, played by Ada Condeescu, hostage and issues a series of demands. He wants a promise from his mother that she won’t take his brother back to Italy and for the reform school to provide him with a car so he can take Ana out for a coffee. For her part, Ana not only has to contend with an aggressive man holding a glass shard at her throat, but also the clumsiest hostage-negotiation conceivable. When Silviu demands to see his mother, the director contacts her and allows her to enter the room where he has taken the hostages, unprotected and with her son not even being asked what he might give up in return. When Silviu and Ana are eventually given a car and drive off to a nearby restaurant, the reform school inmates cheer, expressing their own unfulfilled hopes while chanting “fuck her”.

In the film’s final scene, Silviu and Ana are seen sitting drinking coffee in an empty restaurant. The perpetrator and the victim are exchanging empty words: Silviu: “You have beautiful lips.” Silviu drink coffee. Ana: “Do you like it?” Silviu: “Yes, it’s very good”.\(^1\) The small talk takes place after he kisses her.

Producer and co-writer Catalin Mitulescu said in an interview that the Romanian-Swedish production is aimed to appeal to ordinary people and that it has been very successful in Romania, particularly among youth. “I’ve received numerous emails from young people with suggestions for a sequel. That’s because young people can identify with Silviu; they have a lot in common”. In the same interview Mitulescu pointed out that “Romania has passed through some very difficult phases and didn’t have a natural elite that could lead us to a better model of society.” (Redzovic, 2010). He also added: “It’s difficult to pass from a communist to a capitalist model when the major part of society doesn’t understand what is happening” (Redzovic, 2010).

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1 Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
Eva Weissman, a film critic, explained the film efforts as an impulse for national courage, which should be a general project applied to all Romanians as a national confrontation with an eternal truth that has the role to awaken all Romanians (Weissman, 2010). This interpretation reduces the story to a young man who blames his mother for a bad upbringing and for not giving him the chance to be part of a “natural elite”.

In the same interview that I cited earlier, Florin Serban explored how acting can function as a form of “understanding” the benefits of capitalism and commodification for real inmates: “For somebody who has only heard that they are not good at anything and worth less than a dog in the street, it’s a huge thing to realize that he can engage an audience with his simple presence, with one smile, one gesture and that he can make 200 people laugh or shiver at once.” He believes deeply in acting as a healing process: “I imagine a place where people can act out their inner demons and explore places that can only be dreamt of.” (Interview with Florin Serban.)

Silviu wants two things: To save his brother through becoming his surrogate father and to get into a heterosexual relationship in order to fulfill the heteronormative standard of “normalcy”. Good impulses, spectators might think. But the excessive, violent and life-threatening means that Silviu has to resort to in order to achieve them reveals the flaws of heteronormativity accomplished through violence, as it is celebrated cinematographically. Hailed as a hymn to freedom, Silviu’s brutality towards Ana and his desire to marry her against her will are not commented or criticized by the film-maker in any way. The last scene is typical for the prison movie genre: hundreds of prisoners’ dream of a farm, dream about the sea, dream about horses or any stereotype of normalcy. Silviu dreams of heteronormativity.

Throughout the movie, verbal and visual forms of violence function as challenges and insults in masculine homoerotic/homophobic exchanges. Verbal violence gets constructed around an erotic aggressive subtext where the term to fuck becomes to fuck over. In this context provided by the movie, we can understand the cheerful yells of Silviu’s friends and enemies when he escapes the prison with Ana as hostage: “fuck her”. Aggression and violence are internalized as narrative contents which are shifting from violence among men to violence against women disguised as romance and coherent narrative closure, both having similar intensities (Willis, 1989: 63). Silviu achieves mastery by projecting his own experience of being bullied and being harassed into submission and defenselessness onto Ana’s body.

The movie, due to its realism and its casting is marketed as natural, sincere, direct and authentic. Considered by Romanian critics a success
of the left by showing poor men, “socially charged sordid minimalism” and refusal of any compromise: (Grădinaru, 2010) a social movie that uses fourteen prisoners (most of them Roma) as actors. The victims of violence are easily silenced and forgotten: “The girl’s misfortune is that she is in the wrong place” (Blaga, 2010 a) or even glamorized: “Dressed with a glass shard, he leads his partner as if on a dance floor. The spectators know that he is not a bad guy and do not fear for the girl’s life, the girl who seems to understand him” (Ion, 2010). The oppressors, the representatives of the state, are joined by another character. One of the critics explains: “it’s the mother’s fault for everything that is going on” (Blaga, 2010 a).

Surprisingly, Florin Serban rejects any social aspects in another interview: “the essence of the movie is the fact that it is a love story between a prison boy and a student. It is an action movie and a love story, not a social movie.” George Pîstereanu won the casting because the director looked for “a man with leadership qualities that usually develop in a team sport. You recognize the captain of a football team by the way that he sits, how he smokes, how he eats” (Blaga, 2010 b).

Papan Chilibar would have never fulfilled these characteristics at casting. He played one of the Roma inmates while he was sentenced for theft. For acting in this movie, he was released earlier but he committed another theft, a reason for the media to connect the film to “Roma crime” and to develop a racist discourse targeted against the movie. Florin Serban defended his actors in the media by explaining that for Roma criminals there is only one language: violence, their only argument is the fist and they should be treated with forgiveness for being simple minded and not being helped by “the rest of us” after living an assisted life, getting used to be constantly helped by the state (Serban, 2010).

Florin Serban declined any responsibility for the social implications ascribed to his creation. His characters lack depth and are constructed as typologies. Ana does not have any reactions to what is happening to her because she is constructed only as victim, similarly to the injured officer. The Roma inmates fulfill the role of necessary extras: they add a local flavor, being used as simple props to make the story “real.” Silviu is also constructed as a stereotype: the sensible brute or the bad boy who could have been good if only he had had a chance. The movie functions like a Western: the hero is bad and violent but good at heart.

In this sense, Florin Serban does not play the realist card of presenting the protagonists in a balanced way, as complex characters with rich psychologies. He prefers a melodramatic approach: he uses the camera, the script and the editing to create permanent empathy for Silviu or to discover his enemies (the Roma bullies, his mother, the police officers,
etc). The two women are constructed as stereotypes, we do not know anything about them, but they are melodramatically charged with the major problems that haunt the Romanian society.

While being constantly humiliated by the vilified Roma inmates, Silviu does not react: he accepts everything up until his rage explodes, not against his tormentors, but against the women. This moment provides a predictable emotional outlet for the empathetic spectator. The narrative way out for the characters lacking psychological depth is through the mechanism of physical and verbal violence: the brutalities against Ana and the mother function as dramatic twists or sensationalist events in the script by maintaining the theme of Silviu – the team captain or the authoritarian male.

Silviu’s masculinity is constructed by the cinematographic language in opposition to the feminine, as an opposition to what is not perceived as masculine in a patriarchal culture (feminine women, sissies, mothers) which defines power and masculinity as synonymous (Kirkham & Thumim, 1993: 18).

The metaphor of gendered violence functions as an eraser, the meaning of violence is suppressed, while its silencing is promoted. The effects of gendered violence are not recognized, while the images play with its familiarity and normalization. Violence is preserved by promoting the myth of the woman as the glamorized object of harassment. Ana as subject disappears, her presence is canceled by the camera in a wish-fulfilling fantasy of the male producers: they want to see her life being threatened, they want to see her kidnapped and kissed against her will as great gestures of freedom, the metaphoric whistle in the title. The eroticism of the harassment has the final meaning of Ana’s silence and fear, in a closing gesture of violent transgression of her subjectivity: (Bernheimer, 1989: 17) her construction as a de-humanized quintessential woman in an economy of violence.

Ana’s desire is erased by constructing her character as the object of Silviu’s fulfilled erotic drive (the whistling). And through this fulfillment his lack of mastery and dominance in terms of class and social status is solved cinematographically. His awareness of suppression makes him wanting in turn to suppress: the sense of mastery is achieved in this deluded reflection of his own restraint. Serban’s machine of pleasure functions as a gratuitous, socially and politically irresponsible objectification in almost perfect simulacra (to the point of being more real than the real thing) and fulfils the capitalist desire of reproducibility of reality in a consumable form. This type of cinema claims not to produce anything but to reproduce a consumable reality through what Deleuze and Guattari call “an entire economy of violence, a way of making violence durable, even unlimited” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 77)
References


SECTION IV.
VIOLENCES AND SEXUALITIES
In the past three decades, pornography’s popularity has grown tremendously with annual sales increasing from eight billion dollars in 1996 to over twelve billion dollars by 2005 in the United States (Stack, 2004). Currently, about 1,000 new pornographic videos are produced monthly, an increase of 60% over the same ten-year period (Adult Video News, 2006). Although some industry leaders have complained that the pornography industry is not recession-free, it has remained lucrative (Relative, 2009). Robert Jensen argues that in recent years there is a peculiar trend afoot: while pornography has become more and more accepted by the mainstream, its content has become more overtly violent and degrading to woman (Jensen, 2007). Moreover Gail Dines, citing the pornography industry’s trade journals, points out that the fastest growing genre for heterosexual audiences is “Gonzo” pornography which tends to depict nonstop and violent sex (Dines, 2010).

The research community, in focusing mainly on the effects of pornography consumption, has stirred up a hot debate regarding whether all pornography or particular types of pornography are cause for alarm. In contrast to effects studies, comparatively few studies have attempted to systematically document content patterns in pornographic materials. Most of the content analyses of pornographic videos were conducted in the 80s and early 90s during the so-called “porn war” when the nature, function, and effects of pornography were fiercely debated between liberal and radical feminists (Dworkin, 1989). However, during the mid 90s to 2000s, when the pornography industry grew tremendously in terms of its profit and volume, the research on its content sharply decreased.

Our research goal is thus to update the current content analysis of popular pornography which is mostly marketed to heterosexual men. While earlier content studies also attempted to examine popular pornography, they relied primarily on convenient sampling methods (such as relying on the catalog of local video stores or the recommendations...
of store clerks) and lacked a systematic approach, shortcomings that limited their ability to generalize (Gossett & Byrne, 2002).

Our research team decided to utilize a resource that was never tapped into by previous content studies. Adult Video News (AVN), a monthly magazine often described as the Variety of the porn industry, is an influential and profitable trade journal with a circulation of 40,000 that reviews new pornographic movie titles per issue. AVN also sponsors the yearly Adult Entertainment Expo and an Oscars-like awards ceremony in Las Vegas (Wallace, 2006). When we began our study in the summer of 2005, the magazine was regularly surveying the video stores all over the country and publishing a monthly list of the 250 top-selling and most-rented movies in the industry. We selected the top 30 videos from each list from the issues of December 2004 to June 2005 and, after deleting duplications, we narrowed the list to 275 titles. From those, we randomly sampled 50 videos, yielding a total of 304 scenes.

**Defining Key Terms**

Most content-analysis studies have been concerned with how “violence,” “aggression,” and “degradation” are depicted in pornographic films. Our research team has modified the definition of aggression that was introduced by Mustonen and Pulkkinen and conceptualizes it as any action causing physical or psychological harm to oneself or another person, in which psychological harm is understood as assaulting another verbally or non-verbally (Mustonen and Pulkkinen, 1993). We neither code violence against objects or non-humans, nor do we code violence that occurs accidentally. This definition describes an action that may be considered to be aggressive in normal social situations, regardless of the intention of the perpetrator or the response of the target. We found a universal standard of aggression to be important precisely because we wanted to identify actions that, though unacceptable or unwelcome in normal social settings (such as spanking, pulling hair or name-calling like “slut” or “whore”), are not only common in pornography but also are depicted as inducing pleasure.

**Definitions of Concepts and Operationalization**

Although we tried hard to recruit male coders, we ended up with three female coders – two graduate students and one undergraduate – with the intercoder reliability reaching a satisfactory level. (Through the use of Holstii’s coefficient of reliability for all variables, the overall composite level of agreement across all variables and all pairs of coder comparisons was 0.958). We used two units of analysis in this study: each scene
and each aggressive act. We coded the gender (male or female) and race (White, Black, Asian, Latino/a, other, or unknown) of the primary characters who were engaged in explicit sexual interactions. We also coded common sexual acts in pornographic videos. Money shots—external ejaculations—are omnipresent in mainstream pornography. The location on a woman’s body where the ejaculation occurs may signify different meanings. For instance, some researchers consider ejaculations on the face as “degrading” (Cowan & Dunn, 1994). Thus the coders specifically recorded the money-shot locations, such as breast, mouth, face, etc.

Acts of aggression within each scene were recorded using the PAT technique as outlined in the National Television Violence Study (NTVS, 1998). The PAT technique tallies instances of aggression by counting as a unique act each time the perpetrator (P), target (T), or specific physical or verbal aggressive act (A) changes during the course of the scene. An individual instance of aggression is recorded only when one or more of these three components change, subsequent to initiation of the first aggressive act. In other words, in a scene where the perpetrator spanked a target ten times in a row, we would count this as only one spank.

The aggressive acts that we recorded were divided into physical and verbal types. Verbally aggressive acts included (a) name calling/insults and (b) threatening physical harm. Physically aggressive acts included (a) pushing/shoving; (b) biting; (c) pinching; (d) pulling hair; (e) spanking; (f) open-hand slapping; (g) choking; (h) threatening with weapon; (i) kicking; (j) closed-fist punching; (k) bondage/confining; (l) using weapons; (m) torturing, mutilating, or attempting murder; and (n) gagging. Gagging is an act of sexual aggression that, to our knowledge, had never been coded in previous content analyses. It is defined as when an object (e.g., a sex toy) or body part (e.g., penis or hand) is inserted into a character’s mouth and induces a gag reflex.

We also coded the genders of both the perpetrators and targets of aggressive acts as well as the targets’ responses to aggression: if they expressed pleasure, displeasure or neutrality. We were concerned that if we focused solely on aggression, we might overlook positive expressions. Researchers on sex and relationships identified examples that indicated positive behaviors that we asked the coders first to record—kissing, hugging, and/or giving one another compliments—and then to describe qualitatively (Denney, Field and Quadagno, 1984).
Results

Positive Behaviors

A total of one tenth (10%, n = 30) of the scenes analyzed contained positive behaviors. Most of the positive behaviors observed were kissing; in addition, laughing, embracing, caressing, verbal compliments, and statements of “making love” or “I love you” were noted. Scenes that contained positive behaviors were significantly less likely to contain aggression. On average, scenes with positive behaviors contained 4.00 acts of aggression (SD = 5.04), while scenes without contained three times this amount (M = 12.36, SD = 15.56); t (110.88) = 6.31, p < .001.

Sexual Acts

While female-to-male oral sex appeared in 90% (n = 274) of the scenes coded, male-to-female oral sex was found in only 53.9% (n = 164) of the scenes. Vaginal intercourse appeared in most of the scenes (86.2%, n = 262), and anal sex was also frequent (55.9%, n = 356). Same-sex activities appeared only between women, with female-to-female oral sex taking place in 22.7% (n = 69) of the scenes. Some extreme sexual acts that may cause pain or injury for the female performers—if done without careful preparation—were fairly common. For example, double penetrations were recorded in almost 20% (19.1%, n = 58) of scenes, most commonly simultaneous vaginal/anal penetrations (18.1% of scenes; n = 55); less common were double vaginal (1.6%; n = 5) and double anal penetration (2.0%; n = 6). The ass-to-mouth (ATM) sequence, in which a man inserted his penis first in a woman’s anus and then put it in a woman’s mouth, is a relatively new phenomenon and was never recorded in any of the previous content analyses. But this act was seen frequently in our study, occurring in about 40% (41.1%, n = 125) of scenes.

Money Shot

The “money shot,” the male external ejaculation, is omnipresent in pornographic movies. Almost all of the ejaculation scenes occurred outside of a woman’s vagina (96.7%; n = 295), most frequently in her mouth (58.6%; n = 178). Less common locations included the anus (11.8%; n = 36), breasts (6.9%; n = 21), and face (3.9%; n = 12). Multiple ejaculation sites were portrayed in 12% of scenes (n = 37).
Aggression

Overall, the popular pornographic movies depicted a world that mixed sexual excitement with aggression: only one-tenth (10.2%, n = 31) of the scenes did not contain an aggressive act. Across all scenes, a total of 3,376 verbal and/or physically aggressive acts were observed. On average, scenes had 11.52 acts of either verbal or physical aggression (SD = 15.04) and ranged from zero to 128. Physical aggression (M = 9.31, SD = 12.30) was much more common than verbal aggression (M = 2.13, SD = 4.01), occurring in 88.2% (n = 268) of the scenes. Verbal aggression occurred in almost half (48%, n = 146) of the scenes and almost all the expressions (97.2% of verbally aggressive acts; n = 614) involved name-calling (e.g., “bitch,” “slut”). The most frequently observed physically aggressive act was spanking (35.7% of physically aggressive acts; n = 980). Data about spanking revealed drastic gender differences regarding the roles of spankers or spankees. While women were spanked on 953 occasions, men were spanked merely 26 times, less than 3% of the total. Gagging, which was unknown in previous content studies, appeared in 28% (n = 759) of the scenes. The data revealed other types of aggression, including open-hand slapping (12.1%, n = 408), hair-pulling (8.2%, n = 276), and choking (5.5%, n = 184).

Women as targets

In the popular pornographic movies we analyzed, women were overwhelmingly the targets both of physical and verbal aggression (94.4% of all aggressive acts, n = 3,191). Most of the perpetrators were men, who committed more than two-thirds (70.3%, n = 2,373) of the aggressive acts, while female aggressors engaged in closer to one-third (29.4%, n = 991) of the offenses. Although the targets of male aggression were almost always of the opposite gender (98.4% of the aggressive acts), female aggressors mostly targeted other women (60.6% of their aggressive acts), and they were even more likely to be aggressive against themselves (24.4%) than against men (14.5%). When aggression occurred, most of the targets (95.0%, n = 3,206) responded either with expressions of pleasure (encouragement, sexual moans, and so forth) or neutrally (e.g., no change in facial expression or interruption of action). However, there was a significant difference between female and male targets’ responses to aggressive acts ($\chi^2 (1) = 51.31, p<.001$). Female targets were significantly more likely to express pleasure or neutrality (95.9%; n = 3,049) than male targets (84.0%; n = 147). In contrast, men were four times more likely to show displeasure when they were targets (16.0%, n = 28), compared to female targets (4.1%; n = 132).
Discussion

In contrast with previous studies, we did not observe depictions of rape or scenes that perpetuated the “rape myth” (Duncan, 1991). In fact, while most of the targets of aggression were women, almost all of them expressed enjoyment or did not respond while being aggressed. These findings mirror those in the current literature on pornography effects: recent studies have failed to replicate the previously robust findings that aggressive pornography increases acceptance of rape and endorsement of the rape myth (Garos, Beggan, Kluck and Easton, 2004). Garos et al. suggest that this shift has occurred because people have become more educated about women’s rights and sexual assault. Nonetheless, these same researchers found that pornography increases benevolent sexism. It may be that consumers of pornography on the whole are content to be uninterested in and sexually unaroused by sexual dominance of unwilling women. Yet it appears that what has taken its place has been sexual dominance of willing women—many of these same dominating behaviors were evident in these popular films but were met without resistance by women. This consensual depiction of aggression concerns us as we run the risk of rendering true aggression against women invisible (Sun and Picker, 2008).

These portrayals of women expressing pleasure while being aggressed has significant implications in terms of the effect of pornography on consumers. Social cognitive theory suggests that whether an individual will model aggression learned from viewing a media text depends in large part on whether or not the act that they observed was rewarded or punished (Bandura, 2001). By extension, viewers of pornography are learning that aggression during a sexual encounter is pleasure-enhancing for both men and women. Therefore one may ask: what are the cultural—and by extension—societal implications for this type of learning?

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Chapter 7

“Porn Chic”– An Underlying Cause of Gendered Violence in Intimate Relationships? – An Introduction

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What is “Porn Chic”?

According to media researcher Brian McNair, Porn Chic is a sub-trend of a phenomenon which he calls “Striptease Culture” (McNair, 2002: ix). The term “striptease” has “both literal and metaphorical meanings that embrace a range of texts and images including pornography, the sexualised art of the body, documentaries about strippers and confessional talk shows” (McNair, 2002: ix). McNair also refers to documentaries and “docu-soaps,” print media, television and the internet – anywhere that people talk about their own or other people’s sexuality (McNair, 2002: 88).

Porno-chic is not porn [...] but the representation of porn in non-pornographic art and culture; the pastiche and parody of, the homage to and investigation of porn; the postmodern transformation of porn into mainstream cultural artefact for a variety of purposes including [...] advertising, art, comedy and education (McNair, 2002: 61).

In other words, Porn Chic “describes the infiltration of representations of pornography into mass culture, thereby becoming an accepted, even idealised, cultural element of the mainstream” (Nicola Bockelmann cited by Harvey, 2007: 68). Or, to be even more concise, we can say that “porn-chic is always culture which refers to the pornographic, while not being pornographic” (McNair, private correspondence, 2004).

Definitions of pornography, however, depend very much on the historical and cultural context. It is an imprecise term, and there are as many definitions as there are authors; a frequent response is: “I know it when I see it.” Today, it is more difficult than ever to determine pornography as it is entering the cultural mainstream and the term is shifting.
With the nature of pornography changing, the term “porn” is replacing “pornography”, as Scott and Sarracino explain: “Porn is the grandchild of pornography. Porn may share the same gene pool, more or less as pornography, but it is much younger and hipper, and far more varied” (Scott and Sarracino, 2008: xiv).

Until a couple of years ago, pornography largely existed outside mainstream culture. Although it was accessible and sought after, it wasn’t imposed upon us. This is no longer the case: Amidst the course of the current sexualisation of culture, spurred on by the media and advances in technology (the “digital revolution”, “web 2.0” the boundaries between pornography and culture have become blurred and elements of pornography are trickling into the mainstream. As a consequence, pornography has lost its stigma – and “porn” is now “chic”.

Why this topic, “Porn Chic”? 

Around 2000, as a student at Paderborn University, Germany, I noticed a tendency towards sexualisation in the styling of students – lower back tattoos (“Arschgeweih”), (visibly worn) G-strings – and also in student party culture (parties themed “Porno”, or “Fuck Me I’m Famous”). These are all manifestations of Porn Chic. Back in 2000, there was no academic research available on the topic, so I decided to formulate a definition for a limited area: club flyers1.

When I moved to the UK in 2003, I realised that the trend was more pronounced than in Germany: for example, I noticed a clear division between girls’ and boys’ toys, and girls’ clothes were highly sexualised (pink, frills and sequins everywhere, revealing dresses, padded bras, heels for toddlers). Due to the strong prevalence of “Celebrity Culture” in the UK and the emergence of the “Glamour Model”, the beauty regime of teenage girls nowadays typically involves straightening hair, applying fake tan and full makeup, and wearing hair extensions and false eyelash-
es, even at school. I also became aware of “sexting” – the swapping of self-produced pornographic images and video clips amongst peers. Studies from 2008 suggest that about 20% of teenagers engage in sexting. The figure for 2009 has risen to 30% (A Thin Line, 2009).

Against this background, I started wondering whether the rise of Porn Chic was one of the reasons for the UK’s teenagers being sexually more active and having sex earlier than any other teenagers in Europe, and for the rise in alcohol and drug consumption as well as violence that goes along with it (Barter et al., 2009; Plant et al., forthcoming 2011), so my research interest shifted towards the pornification and sexualisation of British society, and in particular the sexualisation of children and young people (cf. Steffen, 2010).

Examples of “Porn Chic”

Fashion items originally worn by porn stars have now entered the mainstream. These include “stripper platforms” and over the knee boots, underwear worn visibly, G and C strings, invisible bras and the appearance of SM Chic in high fashion. Further, we see slogan t-shirts that read: “porn star”, “I love porn”, “your little princess is my little slut”, as well as t-shirts by the fashion label “fcuk” (French Connection UK); and there’s a children’s line as well. Meanwhile, Playboy has now expanded into a fashion brand, for girls as young as six. Recent years have seen the emergence of body modifications and body forming procedures to imitate the physiques of porn stars – from minor interventions such as hair extensions, the grooming of pubic hair and “sexy” piercings (belly button, tongue and, obviously, genitals and nipples) to plastic surgery (breast implants, vaginal rejuvenation and labioplasty).

Girls – amicably – refer to female friends as “sluts”, “whores” and “bitches” etc. We have also seen the emergence of “bisexual”/”lesbian chic” (Levy, 2005), which ranges from dressing or dancing in an overtly provocative manner to engaging in sexual behaviours that are staples of porn, such as girls kissing other girls, or they “flash” – all for the viewing pleasure of teenage boys and young men.

Jessica Ringrose names social networking sites such as Facebook, Myspace and Bebo as manifestations of online hyper-sexualisation and the commodification of femininity through idealised visual display (Ringrose, 2009). In the music business, Porn Chic manifests itself in the form of sexually explicit lyrics (in particular in Rap and Hip Hop; cf. Miller and Kinnick, 2003), but also in the shape of raunchy music videos. Britney Spears and the late Michael Jackson both commissioned porn film directors to direct their music videos (Lippert, 2005).
On television, there is an abundance of programmes about sex and pornography, confessional programmes and documentaries about anything from cross-dressing husbands to bestiality. In advertising, the mechanisms of “Food Porn” operate by drawing on the conventions of pornography (lighting, camera angles, sultry voiceovers, elevator music).

Porn Chic is now a lifestyle choice: “Hen” and “stag” parties involve displays of sexual freedom such as hiring strippers, playing sexually explicit party games and wearing skimpy costumes; striptease has become a serious entertainment option for both men and women. There has been a rise of pole dancing and other forms of sexual self-display (taught in classes), and we also see the emergence of the neo-burlesque (with performers like Dita van Teese) as well as naked self-portraiture (“boudoir photography”). With the development of new technologies such as mobile phones and the internet, there has been a sharp rise in the amount of amateur pornography; everyone can be a porn star!

As a consequence of these developments, former taboos are crumbling – extramarital sex and masturbation are now the norm and casual sex (“hooking up”) has become acceptable. McNair adds: “Mainstream culture has become, not just more sexually explicit, but also more sexually deviant, perverse, radical” (McNair, 2002: 147). What is more, the sexualisation of culture, like pornography, is gender specific, first and foremost constructed from a male perspective (“gendered sexualisation”, Ringrose, 2009). The crucial point, however, is that all this happens as a reaction to, or in defence of, pornography: Images and behaviours that were previously subject to pornography, and pornography only, are being flaunted in mainstream culture. In support of my argument, these only affect women – they are not reciprocated by men. Moreover, interviews with persons involved (Ariel Levy, for instance, interviewed girls involved in Girls Gone Wilde series), clearly point to what by some is interpreted as empowerment, in reality leaves women feeling worthless and depressed.

**Consequences for society**

Researchers predict that (cyber) porn will rapidly become our “cultural wallpaper” (Scott and Sarracino, 2008: 47; Amsden, 2007). The identities – porn star vs. everybody else – are merging (Scott and Sarracino, 2008: 10). As a consequence, the pressure on young women to compete with pornography is immense. According to Naomi Wolf, today, real naked women are just “bad porn” (Wolf, 2010). In this hypersexualised culture, young women can choose to be “fuckable” or “invisible” (Dines, 2010: 105).
[A woman:] Well, I am 40, and mine is the last female generation to experience that sense of sexual confidence and security in what we had to offer. Our younger sisters had to compete with video porn in the eighties and nineties, when intercourse was not hot enough. Now you have to offer – or flirtatiously suggest – the lesbian scene, the ejaculate-in-the-face scene. Being naked is not enough; you have to be buff, be tan with no tan lines, have the surgically hoisted breasts and the Brasilian bikini wax – just like porn stars. (In my gym, the 40-year-old women have adult pubic hair; the twentysomethings have all been trimmed and styled.) Pornography is addictive; the baseline gets ratcheted up (Wolf, 2010).

[A man:] “I think it’s made me more picky,” he says. “These girls on the computer are just so hot. Obviously, you want to get with a girl like that. So you may be at a bar with a girl, and she’s really cool, but she’s not a ‘10,’ you know? She’s cool, she’s cute, but you quickly start to notice flaws.” Meanwhile, the women who manage to come off as relatively flawless are curiously categorised in his mind: “Say I see a girl who’s hot, I’ll think, That girl is like a porn star!” (“Jonathan”, after Amsden, 2007).

Implications of violence?

One potential area for violence is the intersection of children/childhood and pornography – the sexualisation of children (including their exposure to porn), childified porn and childporn – the very nature of this combination implies violence in various forms and on different levels. As yet, paedophilia is one of the few sexual taboos that remain in our society, but Lautmann believes that it will only be a matter of time until it too will disappear (after Scott and Sarracino, 2008: 86).

For Rush and La Nauze, the sexualisation of children has taken an especially worrying turn in the developments that are occurring in girls’ magazines, such as Disney Girl, Total Girl and Barbie Magazine, where advertising is merged with articles that aggressively market beauty products and prescribe beauty regimes to their young readers. What is more, primary school aged girls are actively encouraged to have crushes on adult male celebrities. Developments such as these, it is feared, “groom” girls for paedophiles (cf. Rush and La Nauze, 2006: 21; see also Singer et al., 2007: 35; Dines, 2010).
Another worrying trend in this context is the persistence of child pornography, which is a multi-billion dollar industry and one of the fastest growing criminal fragments on the internet (National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, 2005; Hoover, 2006; DeLisi and Conis, 2007: 264). The NCMEC claims that around 20% of all pornography contains images of children (National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, 2005). But even in popular pornography, children and pornography are interlinked: Steven McDermott claims that when men see women depicted with childlike attributes, as is frequently seen in mainstream pornography, this conditions them to view children in a sexual manner, even when there is no sexual context (McDermott, 2009; this is confirmed by the result of Bryant Paul’s experiment, 2004).

One thing is certain: there is more porn – at a much younger age. The average age when young people first see pornography has dropped from 15 to 11, on average teenagers now consume pornography for 90 minutes a week (Chittenden and Holehouse, 2010). Not for nothing does Dina Sørensen refer to today’s youth as “Generation P” (Sørensen, 2003).

Another major area of concern involves the derogatory tendencies in current pornography. Scholars such as Gail Dines believe that extreme porn has now become the norm: Images are said to have become so extreme that acts that were almost non-existent a decade ago have become commonplace (Dines, 2010). My concern is that this will trickle down into the mainstream along with Porn Chic.

With regards to the effects of this sexualisation on children and young people, Rush and La Nauze identify five different categories: physical, psychological and sexual harm, the “opportunity cost” of sexualisation and ethical effects (Rush and La Nauze, 2006). They name a whole range of risks related to premature sexualisation, which include eating disorders such as anorexia and bulimia and body dissatisfaction, low self-esteem and depression (Singer et al., 2007: 24). Problems surrounding academic performance are also feared. With regards to sexuality, more extreme attention-getting sexual behaviours are mentioned; also a first sexual intercourse that occurs at younger ages. The promotion of paedophilia is a further concern, as is the undermining of the ability to maintain a healthy relationship (Rush and La Nauze, 2006: 47). This point is also a concern for Scott and Sarracino, who believe that it is very likely that sexualisation is contributing to unhealthy or even violent intimate relationships: Young women are often misunderstood by boys and men, 2

McDermott reports, disconcertingly, that the age when girls develop these disorders is continuing to fall: children as young as primary school age are now plagued by body concerns and eating disorders (McDermott, 2009).
as their permissive behaviour and revealing clothing are interpreted as a go-ahead for inappropriate advances (Scott and Sarracino, 2008: 214).

Current research provides evidence of a number of similar problems that are also related to the sexualisation and pornification of women, which condition men to look at women with a “pornographic gaze.” Some of these problems are linked to violence, which occurs as a result of the objectification of women: Objectification – as present in pornography, including soft porn in lad’s mags – virtually rules out the ability to empathise with the person involved (Herman, 1992; after Singer et al., 2007: 29). Mesch also makes reference to a variety of sources to support the claim that pornography may motivate a greater acceptance of sexual permissiveness and negative attitudes towards women, while the confirmation of rape myths is another concern (Mesch, 2009: 3).

Conclusion

My preoccupation with Porn Chic seems to result in a never-ending stream of further questions. For instance, the degree of objectification of women is closely linked to concepts of masculinity – therefore, we can ask whether the current occurrence of Porn Chic is an indication of a turn towards “backward” gender roles. What can be done to counteract the sexualisation of children? How does pornography influence consumers’ sexualities and attitudes towards women? And, how violent is popular pornography really? A lot more research is needed and, in particular, further empirical work on pornography.

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SECTION V.
WAYS OF INTERVENING
Introduction

According to the WHO (2002), child abuse forms a significant proportion of the global burden of disease and being female is seen as a risk factor that needs to be highlighted. Violence against women is regarded as the most pervasive human rights violation in the world (Heise et al., 2002; WHO, 2002). One form of violence against girls is child sexual abuse, CSA, with an indicated prevalence internationally of 15-30% (Fergusson and Mullen, 1999; Vogeltanz et al., 1999). In Sweden the reported figures for females are 10% (Lundqvist et al., 2004), but there is probably a large number of unreported cases.

Many studies show that exposure to CSA leads to vulnerability to a range of long-term psychological and physical health problems, e.g. post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, anxiety, somatisation, substance abuse, eating disorders, suicidal behaviour, symptoms of anxiety and distress in social situations (Feerick and Snow, 2005; Fergusson and Mullen, 1999; Lundqvist et al., 2004; Thompson et al., 2002; Tanskanen et al., 2004; Rowan and Foy, 1993; Saunders et al., 1992; Epstein et al., 1997). Herman (1990) reports that there is a high rate of CSA among psychiatric in- and outpatients in the mental health system, who are both misdiagnosed and mistreated.

In Tomkins’ (1987) affect theory, shame is one of nine innate affects linked to both bodily and psychological reactions. He describes shame as constituting a continuous spectrum between a mild feeling of embarrassment at one end and humiliation at the other. Frequently finding oneself on the humiliation end of the continuum or remaining there for a long time may lead to chronic feelings of shame with the risk of effects such as low self-esteem, social phobia and tendencies towards isolation. Persons suffering from shame often compare their “self” with others, ending with a negative evaluation of their own “self”. By causing the sufferer to attack the “self” in this way, shame becomes a very painful and self-destructive affect (Lazare, 1987; Retzinger, 1989; Epstein, 1994). Shame has, according to Scheff (1990), a signal-function with respect to social
bonds, signalling threatened bonds. Opposed to shame are feelings of pride, which signal intact bonds.

Tomkins (1987) differentiated between shame and guilt and stated that guilt concerns *what one has done* whereas shame concerns *who one is*.

Self-help groups (SHGs) emerged as grassroots movements and as an alternative to existing treatments when people found that their needs were not being met by existing social institutions (Adamsen and Rasmussen, 2001; Hooper et al., 1997; Katz and Bender, 1976). Shame and guilt are frequently mentioned when it comes to sexual abuse. Bass and Davis (1996) point out that working in an SHG is often successful when working with feelings of shame, isolation, secretiveness and lack of self-esteem.

The main philosophy of SHGs is that when a person shares his/her problems with other people suffering stress from similar situations (Rosenberg, 1984), thus giving mutual support (Hodges and Segal, 2002), they will be empowered. The concept of empowerment, in turn, has its roots in the self-help and feminist movements (Wallerstein and Bernstein, 1988; Gibson, 1991; Rissel, 1994).

The SHGs in this study were organised by three different women’s shelters in Sweden. Participation was voluntary and the women themselves had contacted the shelters and requested to join a group. Before each group started, an intake interview was conducted by a psychotherapist who, together with the woman, determined whether an SHG was appropriate at that time. The inclusion criteria were: remembering the CSA and knowing who the perpetrator/s was/were, and exclusion criteria were: suffering from psychoses, having suicidal tendencies or having a problem with alcohol or drugs. The SHGs were leaderless and consisted of three to six women. The work in the group was governed by a strict structure, e.g. with “rounds”, themes and a specific time limit set for each person. The groups were intended to meet once a week for three hours and work for at least six months, but the period could be extended. Most of the groups continued beyond the initial period and worked for between one and two and a half years. The organisers made rooms available to the groups. Attendance was free of charge. If needed, the psychotherapist could be contacted by group members.

**Aims**

1. The overall aim was to examine the health, relationships and circumstances around the abusive experiences for women who had been sexually abused in childhood and were about to start in a self-help group.
2. Further, we wanted to investigate whether and how the affect shame influenced the women’s lives.

3. We also wanted to know how the women perceived participating in a self-help group.

**Method**

Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used. Women about to participate in an SHG were asked to fill in questionnaires and some of them were asked to participate in interviews. The following instruments were used:

- **Sense of Coherence (SOC)** was measured with SOC-29 (Antonovsky, 1993). Possible scores range from 29 to 203, with higher scores indicating a stronger SOC.

- **IES-R (Impact of Event Scale-revised) 22** (Horowitz et al., 1979; Weiss and Marmar, 1995) measured the risk of PTSD. IES-total score was used for comparisons. A subscale score between 0 and 8 indicates minor reactions, 9–19 indicates moderate reactions, and a score of ≥20 signifies reactions of clinical importance (Malt et al., 1993).

- **SCL-90-R** (Derogatis and Cleary, 1977a; Fridell et al., 2002) assessed psychological health and used the Global Severity Index, GSI, as mean. Higher values indicate more serious psychological distress. The GSI for a normal Swedish female population is 0.49.

- **A self-constructed questionnaire;** demographic questions, questions about relationships, the sexual abuse and reasons for participating in an SHG.

Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with 10 women before the groups began to meet regarding health, relationships with family and friends, circumstances during childhood and around the sexual abuse. The interviews were analysed for verbal expressions of shame using a content analysis scale for the identification and quantification of linguistic expressions for different states of mental health, in this case shame (Gottschalk et al., 1969; Retzinger, 1991). The interviews were transcribed verbatim and were thoroughly read in order to obtain a grasp of the whole, after which cue-words and phrases denoting shame were marked in the text. Certain words recurred in the context of shame and these were sorted into indicator-groups (Retzinger, 1991):

- ALIENATED
- INADEQUATE
- HURT
• CONFUSED
• UNCOMFORTABLE
• RIDICULOUS

The cue-words were sorted into the most suitable indicator-group and categorised into various aspects of shame. Thereafter these cue-words and phrases were counted to form an idea of the frequency of different verbal expressions of shame and how they were distributed.

To evaluate the SHGs we once again used a qualitative method. Interviews were conducted with 17 women at different stages in the group process. Some were interviewed after six months in an SHG which was ongoing, some directly after terminating the group and some a couple of years after the group had ended. The duration of the groups varied between six months and two and a half years.

Results

The women (n=87) were asked to choose between alternatives as to why they wanted to participate in an SHG. There were ten alternatives and they could choose the ones they agreed with. The most common answer was “to be able to talk to others who can understand,” 86%, followed by “I feel different from others,” 59%, and “wanting support,” 48%. “Feeling alone” was chosen by 31% of the women and 33% declared “feeling shame” and 25% “feeling guilt.”

According to their answers about the circumstances around the abuse, almost 40% of the women had experienced more than one abuser, 49% were abused by a father/step-father, for 34% the perpetrator was another member of the family (e.g. siblings, uncles, grandfathers). More than half, 59%, reported that the abuse had started before they were 7 years of age and just as many did not tell anybody at the time.

The women rated their health as poor (GSI=2.11, sd 0.68), i.e. significantly poorer than a group of psychiatric female patients (n=955, different diagnoses and ages, GSI=1.21, sd 0.73) (Fridell et al., 2002). The SOC mean was also extremely low (m=104.1, sd 27.0) (Renck and Rahm, 2005) and 57.5% of the women rated high on both the sub-scales Intrusion and Avoidance (IES-total), which means that they are at risk of PTSD.

Correlations were performed and among other things they showed that “feeling shame” correlated significantly with poor mental health measured with SCL-90 and IES-R, whereas “feeling guilt” did not.

The interviews were rich in verbal cue-words and phrases indicating shame, and it was evident that shame had a negative influence on
the informants’ lives. “Alienated” was the indicator-group with the most frequent cue-words. Alienation is a feeling of being rejected, isolated or withdrawn in different ways (Retzinger, 1991) and the identified cue-words were sorted into three aspects within this indicator-group: “feeling betrayed,” “feeling alone” and “feeling like an outsider.”

Statements of aloneness, of the experience of not being understood or of being looked upon as estranged from others, were common in the interviews. One woman described it like this:

In purely logical terms, I know that other people are abused, but it feels as though you are alone, so I won’t get any understanding …..so there has been a lot of taboo and oh, how awful and how dreadful and the shame….

Many women described the importance of people looking upon them as being happy, nice and capable people. When that image didn’t match reality they wanted to withdraw and conceal this picture of themselves.

…..when I’m ill, I isolate myself …. I’m not at all the kind of person who wants someone near me when I’m ill, because I’m not nice then…

To withdraw and try to conceal are typical coping strategies against the feeling of shame (Nathanson, 1992).

The participants gave a lot of credit to the work they did in the SHGs, describing feelings of pride when they told of positive changes, such as coping better with mental health difficulties, decreased PTSD symptoms, less alienation and an improved self-image. Meeting others with the same background, feeling a sense of community and gaining knowledge around abuse and its effects were some benefits of the SHGs that were also reported two years after terminating the group. It seems that the group situation might have increased signals of pride and decreased those of shame (Rahm, 2008).

The women in this project experienced great strains in their lives according to the results of the questionnaires. The interviewed women reported mostly positive experiences of participating in an SHG, such as feeling respected, that they belonged and were needed. It also seems that they felt empowered with better self-confidence, feeling less lonely, having decreased psychological symptoms etc. (Figure 1).
Fig. 1. The model shows that the women entered the SHGs loaded with psychological problems. Participating in an SHG led to the experience of changes involving empowerment and better health that promoted each other.

References


Chapter 9
Turning Points and the “Everyday”: Exploring Agency and Violence in Intimate Relationships

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Introduction

In this transdisciplinary work, we highlight the intersections between silences and violences in fictional as well as empirical material, by “reading one through the other”, which also suggests that we need to understand the violences that occur in violent and ‘non-violent’ relationships.

Our central analytical tool is the field of turning points, which we see as embedded in the politics of everyday ordinary life. Turning points represent moments, when the multivocality of the word regains its meaning; when the monologic discourse becomes dialogic again; when a multitude of discursive repertoires appears within a given frame, intelligible for the actors involved. We draw on the work of Ricoeur (1991) and Certeau (1984) to illustrate our ideas, with supporting analyses from other theorists in the field.

In exploring the intersections between silences and violences, we suggest that:- first, silencing is related to power which manifests itself during social interactions among dominants and subordinates. We see the relationship between the dominated and dominant as a complex process of interaction, one’s dominance (and domination) is dependent on the recognition by the subordinate. However, while this recognition sustains the domination it also simultaneously harbours hidden transcripts (or inner monologues) which may or may not surface but are only discernible through the silences within the interactive text between the dominant and subordinate. But as James Scott (1990) argues, sometimes the
hidden transcript breaks through the mask of silence – thus offering the rare possibility of transformative resistance. In relation to this, we engage with the concept of cryptic incorporation (Abraham and Torok, 1980), which embodies these silences. But the cryptic enclosure can be transcended at specific moments which we call turning points. Second, silence can be an effect of a discourse, but it can also function as resistance to regulatory discourses. However, while the silenced discourses can contain elements of freedom – their resurfacing as public narratives can remove their agential significance. In situations of violence, the Certeuian idea of tactics enables us to see silence as a tactic – a tool that incorporates passivity and resistance. Thirdly, silencing refers to how certain discourses can be rendered as delegitimate, invisible or unspeakable. Fourthly, there are methodological implications of researching silences and violences – where our research could re-impose further silences in the narratives.

Everyday narratives: Certeau and beyond

Certeau refers to the everyday as the “cultural activity of the non-producers of culture” (Certeau, 1984). He explores the everyday in terms of how ‘culture consumers’ make use of the practises offered and inflicted upon them by the dominant culture producing ideology, to create a possibility for action within the dominant system. He defines this use as a production, but a hidden one. “[I]t does not manifest itself through its own products, but rather through its ways of using the products imposed by a dominant economic order” (Certeau, 1984). Moreover, through repetitive gestures and repetition of acts, there is movement and agency (capacity to act), although not always consciously articulated as such.

These hidden productions, this way of using the available cultural products, Certeau (1984) refers to as tactics – the way the subordinates make use of the practises offered and inflicted upon them by the dominant culture and the way they create a possibility for action within the dominant system. Tactical practices do not overcome; instead they operate within the space of totalizing systems indicating alterity into these systems. As discussed by Colebrook (2002) there is nothing inherently transgressive about tactics. They are everyday events within an already ordered strategy and, for the most part, not viewed as tactics. Thus tactics mostly remain hidden in that they are not articulated as such. We argue that by use of Certeau’s tactics, the presence of agency in what is often reduced to passivity (the passivity of the violated woman) becomes evident, becomes part of the process of handling the everyday, including a possibility for change, but not necessarily leading to change.
How then does the transformative turning point come about? The beginning of the turning point process is not possible to pinpoint. The transformative turning point comes about by a performative movement in the tactics as well as through the articulation of the movement. As such, narratives become part of the movement, which in itself are also tactics. For transformative change to occur – i.e. an agential turning point where a new meaning making occurs – delimitation is necessary. The projected delimitation is not to be understood as a fixed distinction, rather as a manifestation of agency at a certain moment. Not only through deciphering of meaning, but as much through the enactment of moves the new meaning occurs. The articulation of a limit makes for the possibility to transgress that limit, physically or symbolically. Certeau (1971) states that the limit has a permissive function, as it thus has to allow other assemblages outside of itself. In this contribution, we exemplify with two narratives, a fictional and an empirical one, in order to analyse agency in the violence of the everyday. Our understanding points to the procedural nature of turning points. In the words of Ricoeur: “[...] an event can be of any duration; what makes it count as an event is its capacity to produce significant change, a ‘turning point’ in the course of time” (Carr/Taylor/Ricoeur, 1991: 185). Ricoeur also admits another problem, related to the question of a limit: “Narrative identity stresses the intelligible organization of events at the expense of the will, the ethical moment, the moment of decision, of impetus. [...] narrative does not just heal, it opens new rifts” (Wood, 1991: 5).

We draw on Ahmed’s analysis of “happiness” and the “un/happy housewife” (Ahmed, 2010). Ahmed points out that the image of the “happy life” involves regulation of desire, “happiness is imagined as what you get in return for desiring well” and suggests that gendered scripts can be viewed as “happiness scripts’ providing a set of instructions for what women and men must do in order to be happy”. For a woman, this script briefly means obliging to a conditional happiness – being the caretaker and “happiness-provider” on which the husband’s happiness is dependant, and, thus, happiness as the opposite to “making trouble”, where trouble is much associated with desire and will. So, in short, being happy is reached by giving up desire. With regard to domestic settings, including the possibility of domestic violence, the script of the “happy housewife” and the “happy objects” related to it, form a powerful totalizing, ideological system, incorporating a specific type of symbolic violence.

We will now look at two narratives which illustrate the projection of new borders producing significant change and including the opening of new rifts.
Laura Brown – the troubled figure embodying a ‘turning point’

In reading fictional narratives through empirical material and empirical narratives through fiction, we discuss a scene from Cunningham’s novel, *The Hours* (1998) and relate our interpretation to the figure of the ‘unhappy housewife’, recurring to Ahmed’s interpretation (see Ahmed, 2010: 75-79). The figure of Laura Brown, represents the American post-war housewife in Los Angeles 1949, living in a new wealthy home, married to a returned soldier, mother of a little boy, pregnant with the second child. But Laura is silent and unhappy; she always longs for reading, for Virginia Woolf’s *Mrs. Dalloway*, in order to escape the duties of a housewife and mother: “Laura Brown is trying to lose herself. No, that’s not exactly – she is trying to keep herself by gaining entry into a parallel world” (Cunningham, 1998: 37).

One day in June, Laura can hardly stop reading *Mrs. Dalloway* and enter the “real” world in which it’s her husband’s birthday. Before she joins her son and her husband in the kitchen, we get to know through an inner monologue that Laura’s husband Dan was believed to have died, but then he returned from Second World War (Cunningham, 1998: 40). We learn that she got Mrs. Brown because she was not able to deny the proposition to get married; and that she had lost her former self, that Laura Zielski had gone. Even if the good-heartedness of her husband is out of question, Laura represents the unhappy housewife of post-war America in 1949 (see Ahmed, 2010: 75-79). The duties attributed to her through her becoming a mother and spouse are not satisfying her, and her desire for reading – as well as her desire for her neighbour Kitty – are not part of the normative expectations from an American housewife in 1949. Dan is not only the former soldier-hero and the man in charge of an important job; he does anything he can to keep up the picture of the happy family. E.g. by buying the bunch of flowers himself, which should be arranged by his wife on his birthday. His certainty to actually be the happy family, post-war America expects them to represent, has a powerful effect on Laura, as long as he is physically present. Him being present, the symbolic violence inherent in the role of the happy housewife does act upon her. But when Dan leaves the house, Laura becomes uncertain about her behaviour towards her little son. After her husband has driven off to work in his car that day, we can read her inner monologue in the novel:

“Here, then, is the daily transition. With her husband present, she is more nervous but less afraid. She knows how to act. Alone with Richie, she sometimes feels unmoored […]. He seems, almost always, to be waiting what she will do next. She knows, or at least suspects, that other
mothers of small children must maintain [...] an ongoing mother-self to
guide them in negotiating the days spent alone with a child. When her
husband is here, she can manage it. She can see him seeing her, and she
knows almost instinctively how to treat the boy firmly and kindly, with
an affectionate maternal offhandedness that seems effortless. Alone with
the child [...] she can’t always remember how a mother would act” (Cun-

Thus Laura lacks an “ongoing mother-self”. She has become Laura
Brown through the act of marriage, but this part of her self gets lost, when
her husband leaves the home. The body of motherly rules, she should
incorporate, does not remain within her – it’s just a state of transition,
she achieves, when “she sees her husband seeing her”. The husband’s
gaze –“almost instinctively” transforms her into the expected role of
the mother. Thus, the respective transition to “loss of direction” and her
self-reception as finding herself at the margins of how a mother should
act never gets uttered towards her husband; the unease and unhappi-
ness of her life as Laura Brown is kept in an inner monologue, unheard
or unspeakable. The inner monologue of Laura constitutes the hidden
transcript, the underlying script, but gets overwritten by the script of the
‘happy family’, when Dan is present.

Cunningham has given the ‘unhappy housewife’ the name Laura
Brown, referring to Virginia Woolf. To Woolf, Mrs. Brown is a metaphor
for evasiveness and change, an incorporation of a turning point. Mrs.
Brown becomes a symbol for the multiple layers of meanings, created by
fiction, and the loss of solidity, the procedural nature of subjectivity (see
Laurence, 1991; Woolf, [1924] 1988), including certain aspects of sym-
bolic violence. Laura Brown is a passionate reader. Laura’s own readings
of Mrs. Dalloway and her passion for the fictional protagonist involve
her in Mrs. Dalloway’s stream of consciousness, which finally leads Lau-
ra, as a reader, to change her self-interpretation. Even if Laura is capable
to engage in an inner conversation with herself, the new meaning mak-
ing of her life will be triggered by her readings of Mrs. Dalloway. After
having made a birthday cake for her husband together with her son (she
actually makes two, the first one does not seem beautiful enough and
gets thrown away), she drops her son at a nanny and hires a hotel room
for a few hours. In this room of her own she reads Mrs. Dalloway and
reflects upon the meaning of life and death. Laura’s tactical performative
move to a hotel in order to read Mrs. Dalloway does not yet voice a nar-
rative to the outside world; but it produces a lot of articulation with re-
gard to her inner monologue. It produces guilt in her and can be read as
a first, ‘unspeakable’ try to leave the ‘happy home’. It is her first, hidden
performative move out of the space of the family; but she returns home
Laura’s reading of Mrs. Dalloway has opened up new ways of understanding herself and her kind of unhappiness, which finally lead to a major change – due to an inner dialogic engagement with the fictional character, Mrs. Dalloway. The process, leading to a turning point, entails silences as tactics for handling the ‘every day’ of a mother and housewife, which finally can’t be kept in an inner monologue any longer. Through reading and through new ways of self-interpretation it leads to the decision to escape the symbolic violence entailed in the figure of the American post-war ‘happy housewife’. This decision for change is not innocent at all; it entails a decision to leave her husband and her two little children behind. Violence thereby gets incorporated in her new meaning making, as an unavoidable part for Laura to escape the situation, in which tactics of silence cannot integrate the loss of the self in the ‘every day’ any longer.

An empirical example

The empirical example is part of a larger qualitative interview sample of 30 transcribed interviews conducted in 2003 with women who have experienced physical, sexual and/or psychological violence at some stage in their lives (see Samelius et al, 2007). Today we use one empirical narrative to illustrate and discuss our points. We highlight two elements with reference to our points today; tactics as agency with regard to turning points in violence narratives; and the family as the site of the ‘happy object’.

Sara’s narrative

Sara, 39 years old, lived in an abusive relationship for 5 years (age 22-27) with a man who (ab)used drugs. She describes him as the then ‘dream man’ – beautiful, having money, his own company, working with beauty products. Quite early in the relationship he behaved threatening, but Sara says that she just shrugged it off. Fairly soon it escalated to denigrating behaviour in public, harsh words, physical abuse and then also...
letting his friends use her for sex, sometimes photographed and filmed in these situations. At that stage she says she believes that she just shut off and let it go on.

Sometime during this ‘black period’ – referring to the last two years of the relationship being quite blank in her memory – Sara writes a letter to a local organisation working with counselling for drug abusers and relatives. This was an important contact for Sara. She started to read up on drugs and drug abuse.

At some stage she visited a doctor, although she can’t remember any details from that, and was prescribed tranquillizers. She also became pregnant and had a son during these years.

During this ‘black period’ a neighbour often visited: “and apparently we became friends” Sara narrates. The neighbour has later told Sara that during this time she mostly just sat in a corner, although Sara remembers some of the conversations she and the neighbour had:

“We made nasty plans, I remember. About escape routes and things... and like setting up a fox trap. But it was in a joking manner, never about killing him, but more well if we do this then he’ll be... like cutting off his long, beautiful hair...“

She describes the ‘turning’ as a process starting with the drug squad being more visible around their house and calling on her more often. She then starts to fear for her children perhaps being taken away from her. She starts talking a little about her situation with a colleague who suggests that Sara has to do something about the situation, but she didn’t just say leave him as Sara had feared. The colleague instead says “we have to think about what you can and should do up until you can leave him”.

We will start our reflections on Sara’s tactical manoeuvres in the ‘everyday’ by a quote from her narrative:

”And there wasn’t really any fear for being beaten, but it was fear for the whole situation...Or perhaps one shouldn’t call it fear, rather one was constantly on guard. One knew that it could happen, and one could almost provoke... the beating. Because then I had control... And often it ended with him being inconsolable. Not because I was hurt, but because he had hurt his hand or strained a muscle... and then one could comfort him, then one had a worth again. I had a task to do...“

In her everyday, being constantly on guard, having her space invaded and controlled by the violent man, her possibilities to act are minimal. What she demonstrates, ‘provokes ... the beating’ is an attempt, a tacti-
cal maneuver to exercise some control in a highly uncontrollable situation. Through this she, for a short while, gains a sense of control and eased tensions. We are aware of problematic aspects pertaining to such an analysis. However, in order to move beyond the binary dichotomy of passivity/resistance so as to be able to address agency and change in violent intimate relationships, it is important to recognize that agency is a capacity to act (within a certain moment) and not to conflate it with choice, which usually implies a ‘Western’ modernity notion of free choice of the sovereign subject, a notion that also renders the context invisible/insignificant.

We read Sara’s manoeuvres of trying to learn as much as possible about drugs and drug addicts (contacting the NGO and reading up) in the same manner – a tactic of gaining knowledge, so as to gain more control over the situation, which later on might enable her to exercise more elaborated tactical moves. Even if by this tactic she remains within the logic of the violent relationship with a drug abuser, she grows into the role of an ‘expert’. This can be read as a beginning of a process of locating the problem outside of her and instead placing it in the man – a delimitation – which acknowledges her as an agential subject.

Connecting to the trope of the ‘happy family’ –, she stated that she didn’t want to meet in a therapy room as she was “allergic to therapy rooms” and when later, by the end of the interview, was asked about this ‘allergy’, she said:

“Well, yes, the two I have been to, at the counsellor and this psychologist, there were pictures of the family. Happy children and grandchildren. Everything was so nice and happy. It was such a contrast to me and my life. The happiness felt like a real mockery... And when one leaves that place feeling awful and anxious and is given a new appointment in 14 days’ time... one carries these images along, and one feels terrible. And one thinks, no, I won’t go back.”

Sara is, in many ways, already before these meetings constituted as ‘the other’ by living in the margins of society (the drug milieu, being the partner of a drug user), and here the symbol of the ‘happy family’ contributes to not only imposing a victim identity upon her by professional caregivers, but marking her as ‘the other’ and, thus, rather circumscribing agency than promoting it.

Her colleague, on the other hand, does respond and views her as a subject with agential power – “we have to think about what you can and should do up until you can leave him” – which Sara marks as important for change to occur, for the transformative turning point process.
Conclusions

In reading one through the other’, reading Laura through Sara as well as Sara through Laura, multiple dimensions of silence become evident. Silences can be tactically used to inhabit a room of one’s own. In the case of Laura, in combination with her reading, it leads to a major change. In the case of Sara, narrative spaces, shared with a friend and kept out of reach of the violator, create new possibilities for self-interpretation. The tactics (which can be repetitive) constitute the new palimpsestic layers that overwrite the existing ones – thus co-existing.

In the work of Virginia Woolf at least three levels of silence are addressed: “Distinctions are made in her novels between what is left “unsaid,” something one might have felt but does not say; the “unspoken,” something not yet formulated or expressed in voiced words; and the “unsayable,” something not sayable based on the social taboo (…) or something that is ineffable” (Laurence, 1991: 1). The “unsayable” can take the form of a cryptic incorporation, representing some stage of self-loss. By regaining an understanding of the unsayable as crypt, the two women can take their heroic decision, projecting a border between the other and the self and accepting to enact a delimitation, which might include some harm towards others. Finally, silent spaces are important to discover a narrative identity instead of having one imposed upon oneself. Referring to a Bakhtinian (1986) understanding of the heteroglossia of the word, our reading as well as the narratives themselves are understood as a discourse, voiced at a specific moment in a specific context, always entailing turning points and silences; and always entailing new rifts.

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References


Chapter 10
Playing Violence: The Psychic Dynamics of Symbolisation in a Theatrical Work

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Introduction
According to the 2006 “Safety for Women” survey carried out by the Italian National Institute of Statistics in Italy, nearly 7 million women aged between 16 and 70 have been victims of physical, sexual or psychological violence, at least once in their lives; 96% of the violence cases are not reported.

These results point to an obstinate tendency towards denial. A historically-consolidated silence has been concealing men’s violence against women for centuries.

From a more specifically intrapsychic perspective, violence presents itself as a trauma, that is, an event that is beyond the victim’s ability to comprehend and feel what is happening. In this sense, traumatic violence may not be communicable, because it outweighs the capacity for psychic development and becomes a long-lasting laceration. Starting from this “economic”, psychoanalytically motivated meaning of the concept of trauma, what is insufficient with respect to the emotional impetuosity is the ability to symbolise the trauma, that is, the ability to represent it in such a way as to exercise affective ideational restraint on what is felt as excessive and unmanageable. The processes of symbolisation are rooted in psychism and significantly contribute to psychic development, by shaping and representing what pertains to the body and to exchanges with the external world (Aulagnier, 1981). The body is the starting point for the dynamics of symbolisation. It is the engine powering the constant significations that characterise psychic life, but, at the same time, it is also a tool of de-symbolisation in the specifically somatic manifestations that lack a conscious representation. Violence pertains to the dramatically painful clash between the victim’s body and the external world. Nonetheless, the trauma not only breaks the material vulnerability of the victim’s corporeal space, but also clashes with the limits and capabilities
of the victim’s interior world, and fills it with contents that are not symbolically conceivable.

Traumatic violence deeply destabilises the ability of the victim to make sense of the world, becoming encysted into their psyche as a non-thinkable element that, nonetheless, keeps growing at the unconscious level, causing distress. These remarks explain why it is impossible for the victims to articulate experiences imbued with pain and hatred, experiences that cannot be voiced into communicable forms.

The experience of an intervention

Given this theoretical framework, the purpose of an intervention in favour of victims of violence is primarily to get them over interdiction, by finding narratively significant and emotionally connoted forms that permit them to represent their experiences of life.

Between 2007 and 2009, as a psychologist and group trainer responsible for expressive activities, I conducted an experimental laboratory with eight female patients from public health facilities located in a peripheral area of Naples. The patients shared a deprived social background, and a history of physical and psychological violence. The meetings were held on a weekly basis for four hours. The methodology chosen required the presence of two observing psychodynamic psychologists, as well as supervision by a psychologist from the public health service.

Theatre is not only a form of expression; it is also a symbolic and transformational container able to (re)shape dramatic violent experiences. The theatrical play offers a chance to mediate the passage from an internal world of phantasies, made shapeless and chaotic by psychological suffering, to a clearer, more defined external reality, which is regulated by the time, space and roles of the dramaturgical exchange. As well as the phantasies belonging to the internal space of the patient, and beyond the perception of a far-from-self objective reality, the psychoanalyst W. D. Winnicott (1953) recognises another place for psychic activity, consisting of cultural experience and creative play, in which what is considered real mixes and merges with what appears to be created by the patient. This is a transitional space between the reality outside the patient and their internal world. Processes of symbolisation are located in this potentially creative area. In this sense, the theatrical space may be considered a place where reality is suspended through creative fiction, thus permitting the free flow of phantasies that are shaped into communicable, shareable representations.

The intervention was divided into three stages.
1- The first stage, of about six months, aimed at consolidating a protected space in which to share fantasies and experiences. Through the techniques of theatre dance, which required a significant involvement of bodies, the patients created a cohesive work group able to suspend their judgment and entrust any creative cue, either real or fictitious, to the theatrical space. I encouraged the patients not to ask themselves questions about what happened during the improvisation activities, so as not to inhibit spontaneous creativity, and to put forward any gesture or word that popped into their minds upon receiving my prompts. At the end of each working session, 30 minutes were dedicated to discussing what had happened, during which the patients tried to put the experience they had just had into a discursive form.

A dramaturgical sequence was particularly important. During an activity, I asked the patients to imagine a birthday party during which they had to make a wish. To facilitate the exchange of experiences, each of them had to whisper her wish to another patient who would perform it for her. Anna, an introverted, taciturn 50-year-old woman, whispered her wish to the sociable Marta. Marta walked into the spotlight area carrying a candle, and stood still, staring at the others in the half-light. After a long silence, she tried to babble something. Then, she looked down, blew the candle out and cried quietly in the darkness. During the final discussion, no-one felt the need to ask what Anna’s desire was. In its ideational form, it was left uncomprehended, as if the emotional wave hitting Marta and shaped by her into such a powerful representation was more telling than any form of verbalisation. In this sequence, the symbolisation elaborated through the mise-en-scene is a container receiving and conveying the affective aspect, which is expressed and shared beyond words.

2- The second stage of the intervention lasted about one year and was mainly devoted to the analysis of Perrault's fairy tale of Bluebeard. In particular, the sequence in which the female protagonist breaks the ban imposed on her by her violent husband, and opens the door to a part of the castle she was forbidden to access, where she finds the corpses of other women, drew the attention of the group, stimulating new fantasies on the themes of fear, desire and guilt. During this stage, it was important to harmonise the individual improvisations into a single scenic sequence summarising the phantasies of each patient. In the final show, it happened that Marika came on stage wearing a wide bridal dress, moved ahead slowly, and was reached by another who lifted her up to undress her, thus showing the audience her legs covered in blood. Then they lay her on the floor, washed her, and combed her hair. This sequence was the result of different improvisations: it revealed Rosaria’s memory of when
her mother passed away and she prepared her body for the funeral, but also Marta’s fears about her first period. Real life experiences and intimate phantasies recovered their emotional charge through the theatrical play, and were expressed and shared in different forms through scenic fiction. From a psychoanalytic point of view, we know that menarche is often represented as a bloody hole, a cavity giving rise to fear and angst (Ferraro & Nunziante Cesàro, 1985). The psychic representation of menarche is unconsciously linked to a wound that evokes a scenario of violence and defloration.

The theme of artistic creation is a frequent one in Freud’s observations on fantasy: in particular, he wonders what the difference is between simple daydreaming and the fantasies leading to poetic production (Freud, 1908). In both these forms, Freud recognises the attempt to preserve a field/an area in which the pleasure principle could be fulfilled freely from real factuality, in order to find ways to satisfy the desire beyond the limits of reality. Nonetheless, during this quest for pleasure beyond the frustrations of reality, the artist, unlike the daydreamer, also finds a way back to reality. The Freudian aspect to be delved into here is the capability of artistic creation to transform fantastic content into something real and concrete, that is, a tangible symbol of one’s internal world. The artist introduces two levels of representation: one is rooted in the field of meanings, of psychic representation and subconscious fantasy, and the other exists in the factuality and concreteness of creation. Artistic virtue is poised between these two matrices, like the result of a process of transformation of fantastic content into communicable, shareable material forms showing traces of the emotional world of representation.

3- The last six months of the intervention were devoted to the mise-en-scene of the show, which was performed in a local theatre. The symbolisation process here implies a reactivation of past experiences and phantasies, their new formalisation through theatrical play, and, finally, the creation of a shared symbolic form that becomes a concrete piece of work and is performed in front of an audience. In this sense, the transitional theatrical space creates a symbol subsuming aspects of the patients’ internal world in an external form that they feel is separate from themselves at the level of reality, but, at the same time, deeply imbued with their interiority.

In 1929 Melanie Klein wrote Infantile Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in the Creative Impulse, whose starting point for her observations was the biography of a young depressed Swedish painter. Klein briefly told the story of this young woman, who was oppressed by a feeling of internal emptiness, which she represented through a gap in the collection of her paintings hanging on the wall. She stared at the
empty wall and suddenly felt an incontrollable impulse to paint in order to fill that visual gap that was causing her so much suffering. In describing this story, Klein goes back to her remarks on the infantile anxiety that follows the early phases of psychological development, during which the baby, after depriving the mother’s body of its precious goods, feels attacked by them and is, at the same time, worried about the safety of the love object it destroyed. The painter’s impulse to paint stems from the need to repair the object she has attacked and to fill her internal gap and its external reflection on the wall with her own new work of art. In this sense, the internal object is repaired through a material activity.

According to Hanna Segal (1990), the formation of symbols is the very essence of artistic creativity, in that the symbol, like the work of art, is a new creation through which a subject conveys the meanings of their internal world.

Based on these theoretical remarks, I took great interest in Claudia’s experience. Claudia is a woman with serious psychiatric problems as a result of abuse and violence that has been going on since her adolescence. She decided to join in the show only through the medium of some pre-recorded videos, which were interwoven with the main plot of the Bluebeard fairy tale. In these visual sequences, she told about men who stalked her. During the premiere of the show, Claudia saw herself in one of the videos and asked me: “Is that really me? Or is it the show?” The space of the mise-en-scene is on the border between the internal world and the external reality, drawing fond feelings, phantasies and memories from the former and real, representable, shareable forms from the latter.

The symbolisation process, according to Segal, falls within the process of redevelopment of the depressive position, in that it consists of the repair of objects destroyed by aggressive attacks. In this sense, the symbol requires the loss of the object and its possible recreation in which separation is accepted. Likewise, the artist redevelops their depressive position, bringing their internal world to life through the actual making of the object they produce. The artistic value of this object, through which the artist communicates their method of recovery and reconsolidation of their internal world, can reactivate a similar form of redevelopment in those who look at and benefit from the work. With respect to this, Segal considers creative work to be an incessant attempt to reconstruct an “inevitable truth” (Segal, 1990), and as an opportunity to find ways to symbolise it in a form that invites us to live it again and to continue the research.
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This paper focuses on the silencing of those who try to speak up about violence against women in general, and in particular violence against ethnic minority women. More specifically, it shows how the phenomenon of silencing takes place in different contexts involving different social actors whose joint practices may cause a conspiracy of silence.1

The paper opens with a discussion of public understandings and reactions to “violence against women” (VAW) and “violence against ethnic minority women,” that is, VAW as a generic phenomenon and VAW from a culturally-specific perspective (Counts et al., 1999; Welchman & Hosssain, 2005). This discussion serves as a framework for presenting and analysing our empirical data on those ethnic minority women of Middle Eastern origin living in Denmark who have fled their families because of domestic violence and/or arranged marriages.

Our data for this paper consist of 30 interviews with women who have agreed to tell their stories of violence in order to break the silence. Most of the women related how their husbands and/or families expected them to endure violence and abuse, and that they, not their abusive husbands or families, were blamed for breaking up marriages and families. Consequently, the women were often socially isolated, suffering social death, and were sometimes even threatened with physical death if they insisted on not going back to their abusers. The women were shamed and blamed for being disloyal to their husbands, families and ethnic communities. In the sort of reverse logic that underlies victim blaming, the perpetrators of violence were usually not held responsible as such by their communities, whereas the victims of violence were cast as the

1 We use the expression “conspiracy of silence” synonymously with “culture of silence.” Although conspiracy signals intent, not all the actors we refer to are necessarily aware of the implications of their practice.
perpetrators, that is, “bad women” who humiliated and dishonored their families and put them at risk.

Reactions to VAW

There are numerous examples of the silencing of objections to violence against women. In a chapter entitled: “Reframing ‘Domestic Violence’: Terrorism in the Home” (1994), professor of law Isabel Marcus opens with a prologue on encounters across cultures. Here she describes how discomfort sets in whenever she raises the issue of violence against women in the home, no matter whether she is in the US, China, Poland, Pakistan or India:

As I travel around India and lecture about women’s rights and international human rights, I notice time and time again that as soon as I raise issues of silencing women through violence in the home in many societies, including my own, there is a palpable and perceptible level of discomfort. Male jurists and reporters in the audience are quick to retort “But what about the divorce rate in your society? Shame!” The first time this happens, I am taken aback by such a non sequitur. Then I come to recognize a pattern. It is either a denial response or a justification of the violence. That I have been critical of my own country as well is irrelevant. It is my raising the subject of violence in the home and my connecting it to the silencing of women which is so threatening. (Marcus, 1994: 13)

Marcus goes on, saying: “While the men in the audience are vocal and dominate the question-answer period, the women watch closely. After I finish my talk, however few their numbers, they cluster around me. They tell me stories about violence against Indian women in their homes; sometimes they thank me for raising the issue. No woman denies its existence; no woman justifies or excuses it” (ibid.).

According to Marcus, women are silenced by means of violence and she seems to argue that men have a common interest in ensuring that violence against women in the home remains a non-issue. Thus violence is minimised, trivialised and explained away. In her view, violence against women in the home needs to be identified and addressed directly as violence. There is a need to discard euphemistic terms and to name it in order to break the silence.

Many other violence researchers report similar experiences. Violence against women is not a popular topic. Although domestic violence is a global phenomenon with devastating effects on women’s lives, violence
against women is more often than not considered to be both a narrow and an ideological research interest.

Violence against women is indeed a disturbing and unpleasant phenomenon – the so-called “dark side of culture” – which may also be part of the explanation why many people react in the way they do. In her preface to the volume entitled *To Have and to Hit: Cultural Perspectives on Wife Beating*, anthropologist Dorothy A. Counts writes:

> The reactions of some of our colleagues when we began to discuss wife beating and battering as a cross-cultural problem give us insight into why anthropologists have until very recently either ignored domestic violence or given it only summary treatment. Some argued that we should not exploit our hosts’ hospitality by exposing dark sides of their culture; others said that they would talk about the problem but they would not publish on it because they feared such publication would result in their being denied permission to return to the field. (Counts, 1999: xvii-xviii)

She also writes that: “Some were concerned that their informants might be punished if they had discussed the subject with an outsider” (ibid.: xviii).

Violence against women is indeed a political and politicised issue; not least when the focus is on ethnic others. The silencing of discussions about violence, however, benefits the perpetrators, not the victims, of violence.

**Reactions to our project**

Our own project deals with violence against women in ethnic minority families in Denmark. The material consists of interviews with women who have been exposed to violence and who, because of the violence, have been staying in one of the shelters organised by LOKK, the Danish National Organisation of Shelters. We have also carried out interviews with a number of employees and directors of women’s shelters.

We have been puzzled by people’s reactions to our project. Many colleagues, both women and men, express deep concern and advise us to be very careful. The concern, however, is not about the actual victims of violence.

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2 The project title is “Violence against Women in Ethnic Minority Families – a Qualitative Study with a Focus on Future Efforts.” The project has been conceived by Danner shelter and financed by the private foundation TrygFonden. See Danneskiold-Samsøe, Sørensen & Mørck, 2010; Mørck, Sørensen & Danneskiold-Samsøe, forthcoming; Sørensen, Mørck & Danneskiold-Samsøe, n.d.
violence but rather about ethnic minorities in Denmark and how they are represented. It seems that people are concerned about our focus on ethnic others; how they become associated with violence, and the possible abuse that might be caused by our results. According to some people, we may inadvertently contribute to the current demonisation of ethnic minority men. And we may end up seeing our results being abused by politicians and others with a certain political agenda.

Being implicated in the “concern industry” ourselves, we are concerned as well. But our concern takes another direction: It seems that many people in contemporary Denmark privilege ethnicity over gender and that representation is considered larger and more important than real life. The consequences of such a position may be that the voices of victims of violence are silenced. As we see it, victims of violence deserve better. They deserve to be taken seriously. The “risk of abuse” argument is not especially valid in our case; research results are always subject to both political and ideological abuse and misinterpretation.

**Violence against women of Middle Eastern origin**

The women we have interviewed are not only victims of violence but are also often subject to victim blaming in the sense that they are blamed by their families and ethnic communities for not keeping silent about the violence, for leaving their husbands and breaking up their families. Many of the women lived with their violent husband and/or family for years before they finally had enough and wanted out. The break-up has usually been a painful and emotionally draining experience, not because of love for their husband, but because of lack of support from close family members, who strongly disapprove of any move towards a divorce.

Wafa, from Kurdish Iraq, is a case in point. She has not had any contact with her parents, sister or brother-in-law in Iraq for a whole year since she divorced her husband of 10 years. Her marriage was marred by physical and psychological abuse. She excused her husband on the grounds that he had psychological problems and gave him many chances, but eventually she wanted out. The turning point came when he beat her in front of one of their children.

Her close family in Iraq has made it clear that they do not want to even talk to her until she returns to her husband. During the interview she explained to us that in her culture – where she comes from – divorce is not allowed. It may be legal according to the law but it is considered nothing less than a disaster. Her family neither can nor want to understand her and her (good) reasons for having left her husband. According to them, she must give him yet another chance. Alternatively, she must return to Iraq. They present her with two options: either to get back with
her husband or return to Iraq to live with her relatives. Her present life is not an option for them. The facts that she has her own apartment, has got custody over the children and is doing rather well – she is recovering from the many years of violence and abuse and thinks her quality of life has improved considerably – do not persuade her close family or make them reconsider their demands. Only “bad women” leave their husbands; only “bad women” live on their own. The family’s rejection and emotional blackmail play a major role in Wafa’s life. The situation drains her, and sometimes she has been about to give in to their demands in order to get some peace of mind. They are her only family, and she longs to talk to them and have them back in her life.

It also appears from Wafa’s story that divorcees are stigmatised in her ethnic community in Denmark. Hardly anyone knows that she is divorced except for two women friends she has had for years. She cannot tell others because she cannot trust them not to gossip about her and spread rumours about her being a loose woman and a bad example. If anyone asks how she is, she just smiles and says she is doing fine. She keeps up appearances. She does not want to lie, but she has to, because otherwise they will claim that she is a “bad woman”. Most divorcees that she knows of hide the fact that they are divorced. Life in Denmark and Iraq do not differ in that respect. It is bad if a woman is divorced, and according to Wafa it also works the other way around: “She is divorced because she is bad. The woman is always to blame.”

Being a woman and living on one’s own, that is, without a husband or another male head of the family or household, seems to represent an anomaly and a severe threat. Apparently it signals that the men of the family did not do their job well enough; that they failed as male guardians, and ultimately as males. Wafa also told us that her mother’s brother’s son, who lives in another Nordic country, rang her up to tell that she should go back to Iraq and if not, he would come to Denmark and kill her.

**Conclusion**

Women are controlled and kept in their place by means of violence and a conspiracy of silence. The overall silencing creates a fertile ground for violence and its continuation. Women who flee and disclose their stories of violence behind closed doors are challenging the conspiracy and thus the violence itself. On the face of it, breaking the silence may seem an innocent act, but it is a crucial first step that is often met by massive countermoves.

Various actors are implicated in the conspiracy of silence for very different reasons. The general Danish public, and perhaps especially men,
may prefer not to out violence against women because the issue is somewhat unsettling. Danish scholars, including colleagues, some of whom are declared feminists, are probably uncomfortable with cultural differences in the field of VAW and guided by their good will to work against any sign of othering. Ethnic others, however, do not represent homogeneous communities and common interests. A conspiracy of silence is in the interests of the people in power, not the victims of violence.

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This paper will introduce an ongoing PhD project being undertaken at Malmö University. The title of the project is: “Reporting intimate partner violence against women to the police: Reasons, experiences and consequences when women leave violence.” The project is funded by the Swedish Fund for Victims of Crime. First, I will describe the project, and then some initial results from the pilot study will be presented.

**Background**

It is commonly thought that most intimate partner violence against women is not reported to the police. The hidden numbers are estimated to be high, 62-81% in some Swedish studies (Brå-rapport, 2002:14; 2008:3; Lundgren et. al., 2002). The Swedish authorities regard this situation as problematic, and working towards persuading more women to report violence to the police is seen as urgent.

There is, therefore, a discrepancy between what the authorities want women to do when they are subjected to intimate partner violence – which is to report the violence to the police – and what most women actually do – which is to keep it to themselves.

This discrepancy raises the question of why some women don’t report intimate partner violence to the police, despite the publicly expressed opinion that such crimes should be reported.

**Aim**

The aim of this study is to investigate women’s attitudes towards, and experiences of, reporting violence to the police when subjected to intimate partner violence, and also what reporting such incidents can mean when women leave violent partners.
Theoretical framework

The study is situated within a theoretical context of feminist theories of men’s intimate partner violence against women and of women leaving violence, and theories and perspectives on gender and intersectionality. In this project, leaving an abusive partner is regarded as a process that begins before, and ends a while after, the actual break-up. Physically leaving an abusive partner is not enough – a woman also “leaves” both emotionally and cognitively (Enander and Holmberg, 2008). Another crucial point is that both physical and psychological violence must have come to an end before a woman can be said to have “left” her abusive partner.

Method and material

In-depth interviews will be held with about twenty women who have left an abusive partner at least one year prior to participating in the study. Informants will be recruited mainly through public notice boards and organisations, such as women’s shelters and the social services. The recruiting process will start in spring 2011. Each woman will be interviewed twice. The empirical material will consist of women’s narratives of their experiences as they are constructed during the actual interview situation.

The pilot study

The aim of the pilot study was to field-test the method and to find out whether or not it could provide answers to the research questions.

Method

In-depth interviews were held with two women who had left their abusive partners more than one year prior to participating in the study. Each woman was interviewed twice, within a period of two to three weeks. During the first interviews, each of the informants was asked to tell about the relationship with their abusive partner from the beginning until the end of the leaving process. While they told their stories, questions relating to the research questions were asked. During the second interviews, the informants were invited to reflect upon their experiences in connection with the research questions and some themes were brought up that needed to be entered into more deeply. The method worked quite well, and some minor adjustments have been made. The analysis is inspired by a hermeneutic approach. The analysis is still in progress and the results...
presented here are preliminary. The results of the pilot study, based on interviews with only two women, indicate some tentative answers to the research questions.

The informants

The informants were both subjected to repeated physical and psychological violence by their male partners both during the relationship and after the break-up. Both of them chose to report and not report violence to the police at different times. One of the informants was married to her abuser and she and her husband had two children together.

Preliminary results

The preliminary results of the pilot study indicate that it can be fruitful to understand women’s decisions about reporting violence as being connected to their leaving process.

The results indicate that reporting violence might not be regarded as an alternative as long as a woman is in the relationship. Neither of the informants considered reporting the violence they experienced while in the relationship. As long as they wanted the relationship to work, reporting violence was not an option. Reasons for not reporting violence at that moment can include: a will to keep the family together, a belief that the “problems” are private matters that should be solved within the relationship and fear. Another reason for not reporting violence can be that a woman minimises the violence, that is, that she doesn’t regard it as a serious matter. Also, shame can keep a woman from telling anyone about the violence and from reporting it. A woman can feel ashamed of being regarded as a battered woman, of not breaking up with the perpetrator or of starting over again with the perpetrator after breaking up.

The results also indicate that having ended the relationship and the continued experience of violence after the break-up can be preconditions for reporting violence to the police. Both informants say that they probably would not have reported the violence if it had stopped when the relationship ended. The decision to report violence can be understood as the result of a woman coming to a turning point when she realises that the violence will not stop unless she seeks help from the police. Reasons for reporting violence can be to seek help from the police to end it, and for wanting the police to help establish boundaries, since the perpetrator does not respect the woman’s. Another reason for reporting violence can be a desire for justice to be served. This reason can be important when a woman understands that she has been abused. She might then want society to confirm her experience and react against the violence.
Shame can be instrumental in both reporting and not reporting violence after the break-up. If someone else outside the relationship has learned about the violence, it can be too shameful not to report it to the police – and in that way shame can be a reason for reporting violence. On the other hand, shame can prevent a woman from reporting violence after ending a relationship if she doesn’t want anyone to know about her having had a relationship with an abusive partner, especially if she reported his violence against her before.

Both of the informants were disappointed by the way in which they were treated by the police. Their stories indicate that the police, at the worst, can minimise violence and make it invisible, and impose guilt upon a woman. One informant was blamed for contradictory reasons – for reporting the violence too late and for reporting it at all.

The pilot study indicates that this kind of behaviour, together with few or no reactions against violence can help to expand the space of action the perpetrator has for using violence. It can also leave a woman with a sense of not being protected by society, that intimate partner violence is not a serious matter and that there is no point in reporting violence to the police at all. One informant warns that there is a great risk that this kind of behaviour can prevent women from coming forward, and may even force their return to the perpetrator and the violence.

Further on, the pilot study indicates that one strategy for handling negative experiences with the police can be to become an active and competent crime victim. This is a crime victim who fights for her legal rights, who has knowledge of the criminal justice system, who helps the police to collect evidence and who wants to know how her case is proceeding. But, a question that remains unanswered so far is: is it possible for a woman subjected to intimate partner violence to be an active and competent crime victim, and at the same time be regarded as trustworthy as an abused woman?

Finally, the pilot study indicates that reporting violence to the police can help a woman to leave a violent partner. Police reports, restraining orders and convictions can help in ending violence. But, seeking help from the police does not necessarily lead to ending the violence and getting help. If the criminal justice system does not act against violence, then the perpetrator can continue to use it. Poor treatment and lack of actions against violence can also make it harder for a woman to process her experiences. Then, a woman not only has to process her experiences of being subjected to violence by her partner, she also has to process the fact that the police did not help in ending violence, even though she reported it.
References


SECTION VI.
PROBLEMATIC INTERVENING AND
CARE AS VIOLENCE
Chapter 13
“Love, Fear and Power/Shame, Blame and Silence: Professionals’ Discourses about Victims and Perpetrators of Gender Violence in Portugal”

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Introduction
In this paper we focus on discourses of shaming and blaming that occur among professionals working in the field of gender violence intervention in Portugal. The work presented here is part of a larger research project entitled: “Love, fear and power: Pathways to a non-violent life” (financed by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology — FCT, and the Commission for Citizenship and Gender Equality – CIG), in which we aim to investigate gender violence, specifically as it occurs in intimate relationships. Drawing on material collected in semi-structured interviews with professionals working at support centres and shelters for victims of gender violence, we specifically consider the ways in which the interviewed participants talked about “the perpetrator/aggressor” and the “victim”; and how discourses of shaming and blaming operate to maintain the lines, not only between perpetrator and victim, but also between professional and client. We subsequently interrogate the possible implications this might have for intervention, and how differ-
ent forms of exchange could challenge potentially silencing practices. As Carol Hagemann-White argues, “awareness of violence has become wider and deeper” and the concepts of power, gender and violence have been changing over the last few decades (1998; 2004).

The justification and aims of the research and methodology
Shelters are residential units of temporary refuge for victims, with or without minor children, and with a multidisciplinary technical team on the staff (Law No. 112/2009 of 16 September). Currently, there is a network of shelters throughout Portugal, and the State must provide for their financial support through what are called “cooperation agreements”. In Portugal, Social Solidarity Institutions represent 78% of the available shelters, 17.4% are run by Non-Government Institutions and 4.8% by other kinds of organisations (Gender Equality Commission, 2008). The lack of previous research on the quality and functioning of institutions such as these was the main reason for this study (cf. Baptista, 2007). In this study, we worked with a shelter that was founded in 2004 and belongs to a Catholic and humanist institution, commonly referred to as a Private Institution of Social Solidarity (IPSS), located in an urban area of Portugal. The Professional Team is comprised of the director of the institution, a technical director who is a social worker, a psychologist and a team of “domestic caregivers” consisting of five women. The shelter has a maximum capacity of 25 occupants, women and children. In this shelter, the internal regulations stipulate the daily timetable: to wake up at 7:00 or 8:00, for children to go to bed at 21:30 and for women no later than 23:00, at which time there must be complete silence. The internal regulations also detail the use of the bathroom, in which baths can only be taken by one person at a time. The director is careful to state that the shelter is not “a five star hotel” (CA5-d: p.7), and because of this, the regulations define the distribution of domestic work and the cooking of meals completely by the women (dinner and weekends), except during the week when lunch comes from another facility within the institution. In a certain way, we can designate the shelters as social work organisations (Harlow, 1996) due to the legislative framework and the underlying paradigm both inside and outside the institution. The explicit purpose of the shelter is to ameliorate the consequences of violence, but one may question whether it does not also “employ societal legitimate forms of violence as a means of control” and/or “administer societal and organisationally illegitimate violence” (Harlow, 1996: 62). This study utilised a qualitative methodology with individual semi-structured interviews that each lasted one hour. Staff members were asked about: the methods of work, dilemmas and problems, evaluation, the daily
organisation of the house, personal and social values and philosophy. Afterwards, content analysis was performed using categories generated from words and expressions used by the respondents (Bardin, 1986). To maintain objectivity, we crossed the content analysis of interviews from various points of view of the members of the research team. For ethical reasons we will conceal the identity of the shelter, including its location (its code will be CA5) and also of the respondents, with the following code: d (for the director of the institution), dt (for the technical director) and ps (for the psychologist).

Professional discourses around “woman”, “perpetrator/aggressor”, “victim” and “violence”

The analysis presented here is organised into two broad categories: notions around womanhood; and the theme victim, violence and perpetrator.

Womanhood from the perspectives of the staff team

The view of a woman as a mother and her responsibilities in the domestic sphere is the vision shared by all the professionals in this shelter; from this perspective women are seen almost exclusively in terms of their domestic and maternal skills, submerged in the family. On the one hand, in the interviews it is noticeable that a great vigilance (Foucault, 1977) about whether or not the women do domestic tasks in the shelter, and how much attention they give to their children, is pervasive:

“[our purpose] is to help the mothers to look after their children, as many are very nervous about assuming their function as mother.” (CA5-dt: p.4) “[our purposes] are to try to help the mothers look after their children, ask them about their day, help them with school work, read messages from teachers (if they are sent).” (CA5-ps: p.12) “We are concerned with and we know, and it should be clear, that we have no intention of replacing the mother, but there is also a concern with the child, of his or her situation at school, the evolution of the adolescent at school, his feelings, if he is integrated, if he is not.” (CA5-ps: p.6) “(…) this responsibility of educator and mother, because, in the end, this is the only parental figure that these children have.” (CA5-dt: p.4) “We try to promote family relations. We try not to interfere in these aspects.” (CA5-ps: p.5)

As stated in law, the staff members have the task of elaborating a “Plan of Intervention for the Individual” with their clients. Here too, with re-
gard to this specific function, these professionals focus their attention not on the woman, but on her status as a mother:

“Yes, we define a Plan of Intervention for the Individual, right from the start, where we define everything, but the plan changes because each week she has a different perspective, so we change and adjust if (...) what is defined in the beginning is not accomplished.” (CA5-dt: p.6) “But this Plan, in our opinion, exists not for the woman, but for the family unit. This is our perspective, and never forget that the woman is a refugee there, but she isn’t there alone, she has her children and the plan is elaborated for the entire unit.” (CA5-ps: p.6)

It should be noticed that these professionals rarely use the word woman or women, except when talking about maternal functions. Even the subject is rarely used in the feminine. On the other hand, there is no reference by the staff to the professional experiences of the women, to their interests, their participation in the marketplace, or anything outside and beyond domestic and maternal work. In this sense, there is a silence about the participation of women in other dimensions of life within the public sphere. Furthermore, there is also silence about the women’s suffering, which is never mentioned at all. Instead, they always refer to the suffering of the children or of the family unit. From this notion, we can emphasise the general patriarchal idea that women are naturally suffering subjects (Bosch, Ferrer and Alzamora, 2006). There is also a very particular idea, mostly articulated by the director of the institution, about the people who work in the shelter. From her perspective, the professionals and the “domestic caregivers” have to have stability in their own family lives, be married, and have a “calm” family trajectory:

“The domestic caregivers in the house are women. People who (...) are married, are of a certain age, have a set course in life, more or less...we could see that it was more or less calm.” (CA5-d: p-3)

As for the technical staff, this director emphasised the importance of hiring a male psychologist in the shelter:

“Because, as you have already noticed, we have a man [working] in the shelter. Because I think that the masculine figure (...) in this context is related to the aggressor. But I also think that the children should not keep this view, nor should the victims ...” (CA5-d: p.3)
Related to this question of the masculine figure, the psychologist states:

“It was an opportunity that appeared (...) In the first place, because it was a challenge to me, because I am a man.” (CA5-ps: p.8)

Although this appointment is in contravention of Portuguese law for the staff in a shelter, and the director told us about the resistance of Social Security and other Portuguese institutions, at last they agreed to it with experimental intent. Perhaps we can understand the desire to have a male psychologist in the shelter as a “prevention” against an institution being too feminine. Linda Gordon (1989) has argued that charitable organisations excluded women when they became professionalised: “scientific” charity organisations wanted no sentimental, muddle-headed ladies dispensing alms, but tough-minded men engaged in long-range vision and strategies. In a brief summary, by linking the notion of the woman as being exclusively centred on her maternal function with the criteria for hiring staff as examples and role models for family life, we can infer that this shelter’s philosophy is a normative one.

**Notions about “violence”, “perpetrator” and “victim”**

Concerning notions about violence, it is important to note that the staff members actually criticised the team of interviewers for not mentioning abuse against men by women perpetrators, explicitly expressing their non-feminist perspective. In addition, the suffering of the women was never referred to by these professionals. Moreover, sometimes, the professionals believed that the husband had reason to be violent, and although they did not agree with the violence, they understood why it had occurred. On the other hand, if he has no reasons he must have some psychopathologies. The director states that violence “begins with a lack of respect, I think there are a lot of forms, this depends on the perpetrator” (CA5-d: p.9), and links the offender with a person who has no imbalance in his/her life:

“No, for instance, he can be a person more or less balanced, I am not saying that this is like that. But he arrives home, has his wife at home, has two or three kids at home, his wife doesn’t do anything, he arrives home and finds everything dirty, everything messy, I think the man will not be satisfied, don’t you agree? It doesn’t mean... what motivates them to have nothing... And I am against violence. It is obvious, isn’t it?” (CA5-d: p.9)
The psychologist does explain the factors which, in his opinion, led to the violence, such as dependency and the psychological traits of the people involved:

“It is a cluster of facts that led to this [violence], we all know, the addictions... Obviously, there is a factor, that is intrinsic to the person, that is (...) the personality of the person. We all know that there are people who are more dependent than others and this fact, added to the others (...)” (CA5-ps: p. 14)

The notions of “perpetrator”, “victim” and “violence” fit into the philosophy of each one of the professionals, or even of the institution itself. In the sequence of her non-feminist values, mentioned above, the director shows a preoccupation with explaining that men are also victims of domestic violence from their wives. This interviewee has the idea that being a victim depends on the character, the personality, the traits and the will of the woman:

“Well, this also depends a lot on the character, I think, of the woman.” (CA5-d: p.6)“There are others who suffer and are able to overcome everything and everyone, and have their own will. It depends a lot on the will and on what is inside of the head of the woman.” (CA5-d: p.10)

Following this kind of discourse of tolerance to violence, the director considers that the women are, in certain ways, responsible for their situation, because they are not competent in domestic terms, neither with their children nor with the tasks they should perform at home:

“Because things, sometimes, don’t go so well within the families, because they [women] sometimes don’t have the minimum capabilities either with their children or with [domestic] tasks, let’s say, the basics.” (CA5-d: p.7)

Furthermore, as well as saying that violence crosses every social class, she considers that there are economic reasons, such as financial dependency on the husband or companion, that justify the violence:

“So, ‘in a house where there is no bread, everyone shouts and no one is correct.’ I think, in my opinion, they are from big families, and because they need (...) the partner, economically... As they have no work, they do not want to work, they are there, defeated, there, in that life, nothing appears to them. (...) In part, it is essentially because of economics.” (CA5-d: p.9)
The director of the institution CA5 places too much emphasis on the stability of family life, considering instability and a lack of rules in a family to be the main causes of violence. Thus, despite explaining that domestic violence crosses all social classes, from the director’s perspective it is the financial dependence of the woman or the fact that she “doesn’t want to work” that justifies her continuing in the relationship with the abuser. Apart from tolerating violence and the abuser, there is also the myth that violence is caused by the personality or character of the victim. Consistent with this is the idea that to leave the violent situation depends on the “will” of the victim and on what she has “inside her head”. This view goes along with the organisation of daily activities in the shelter, where regulatory practices are very much present, with the professionals working in the sense of soft policing. We can see these organisations as task-focused and scientifically rational; as Elizabeth Harlow (1996) argues, task-orientation and rationality are characteristics that are predominantly attributed to men.

Final remarks

As a final conclusion, we can say that this shelter for female victims of gender violence, run by a charitable organisation with humanistic values, but not feminist ones, shows a misunderstanding of the phenomenon of domestic violence within intimate relationships. It presents, in terms of the discourses of its professionals, a normative philosophy about women, which consequently seems to lead to a very rigid organisation of women, which is evident in the organisation of the shelter. These institutions are at serious risk of causing revictimisation by blaming the victims because of the concepts they hold about the victim, the offender and violence, and the prospect of the aggressor’s apology and the institutions’ tolerance to gender violence. Finally, we would like to remark that we are hopeful that in working with victims we will encounter a different pattern.

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Chapter 14
Intersecting Agendas: Multi-Professional Anti-Trafficking Efforts in the United States and the Netherlands

Jennifer Musto
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Introduction
Human trafficking for the purposes of forced labor is a widespread local and global problem. Although it signifies multiple interconnected phenomena, in policy and practice, it is primarily situated as a crime subject to criminal justice interventions and remedies. Indeed, law enforcement responses constitute the majority of anti-trafficking responses (Lindstrom, 2007: 77). A significant body of feminist and sex worker rights’ literature has emerged which calls attention to the insufficiency of anti-trafficking efforts organized expressly through the criminal justice system (Kempadoo, 2005: xix; Ditmore, 2009). This research challenges the dominant role that law enforcement agents have been assigned under international and domestic trafficking policies, and questions law enforcement’s centrality, concentrated power, and broad discretion in identifying victims of trafficking and managing their protection. These scholars note that historic legacies of police violence, incarceration, and harassment of voluntary sex workers (Bernstein, 2007) have undermined efforts to combat trafficking, and further reveal how policing tactics have been harmfully deployed against voluntary sex workers and forced victims alike under the auspices of anti-trafficking police raids (Ditmore, 2009). Despite such critiques, however, anti-trafficking efforts continue to be organized predominantly vis-à-vis the criminal justice system, efforts which have been lauded by some contemporary Western feminists who embrace the expansion of criminal justice responses to human trafficking.

The contention that gendered violence should be primarily fought through the criminal justice system is not new. Merry, for example, notes that feminist activists involved in the battered women’s movement in North America and Europe “turned to the law as a strategy for eliminating violence, advocating tougher laws and more active policing, pros-
ecution, and punishment (Merry, 2009: 50). Indeed, liberal and socialist feminists engaged in antiviolence advocacy in North America and Europe in the 1970s and 1980s viewed the state and the criminal justice system as important venues through which to ameliorate violence against women (Merry, 2009: 49). Yet feminists involved in contemporary anti-trafficking research and advocacy, particularly those who advocate transnational and pro-sex work perspectives, have critiqued the criminal justice model of intervention for its failure to comprehensively protect trafficked persons, its propensity to re-victimize trafficked persons (Lindstrom, 2007), and its inability to longitudinally secure trafficked persons’ social and economic rights outside the scope of criminal investigations (Goodey, 2008: 403). Such analytic reservations emerge alongside more recent feminist antiviolence research, which have likewise highlighted the limitations of the criminal justice system to stop violence against women more generally (Ptacek, 2009: 10). In light of thirty plus years of feminist reform efforts, this research questions the mainstream feminist antiviolence movement’s over-reliance upon the criminal justice system to redress gendered violence, and emphasizes the very real limitations of police orchestrated efforts to respond to domestic violence, rape, and militarization, and more recently, irregular border crossing and human trafficking.

While I agree with the general prognosis of pro-sex work and antiviolence feminist research which richly details the shortcomings and structural failures of criminal justice responses to gendered violence in general and human trafficking in particular, my concern nevertheless rests with how such theoretical perspectives foreclose examination of the ways in which law enforcement agents are increasingly working with non-governmental actors such as social service providers and advocates around trafficked persons’ protection. Moreover, if historical feminist advocacy efforts to curb domestic violence and rape offer any clue regarding the fate of human trafficking, it seems important to keep in mind that radical feminist movements to end gendered violence have been consistently followed by reformist efforts to streamline definitions, change laws, develop training programs, and to centralize law enforcement responses (Merry, 2009). If human trafficking is to be primarily managed by and within the criminal justice system now and perhaps within the future, and ever more law enforcement agents are developing partnerships with non-governmental advocates as is the case in both the Netherlands and the United States, it is fitting for feminists to examine how the problem is managed by this cohort of state and non-state actors.

This paper – and the larger book length project in which it is based – proposes that the contours of anti-trafficking criminal justice work is
more nuanced than previous scholarly work has suggested. Given the paucity of research that explores alliances between NGOs and law enforcement around trafficked persons’ protection and since few studies have assessed the broader critical import of these newfound multi-professional collaborations in addressing the problem of human trafficking, this project endeavors to fill that gap by gauging the effects of law enforcement-NGO practices – what I call carceral protectionism – (Musto, 2010: 385) on trafficked and potentially trafficked persons in the Netherlands and the United States.

Merger of Multi-Professional Responses

There is a persistent scholarly tendency to treat non-governmental “advocacy,” “victim-centered,” or “human rights” interventions as distinct from state based “law enforcement,” “security,” and “carceral” approaches. The NGO/victim-centered approach is typically facilitated by advocates, social service providers, and activists without formal alliance to the state, but who may depend upon state funding. NGO anti-trafficking efforts include activities and programs such as “social and psychological assistance, shelter provision, financial, return, and reintegration, assistance, telephone advice, counseling, housing, vocational training, legal advice, and documentation assistance” (Tzvetkova, 2002: 61). NGO, victim-centered approaches aim to promote trafficked persons’ immediate and in some instances, long-term protection, strive to “empower” trafficked persons throughout all phases of their trafficking situations, and support trafficked persons’ right to self-determination (Wijers, 1998).

The law enforcement/state approach, conversely, is overseen by law enforcement as well as non-uniformed state employees and focuses on trafficking and trafficking-related law enforcement activities, such as supervising commercial sexual establishments (Dettmeijer-Vermeulen, 2007: 80), monitoring illegal border crossing, and pursuing investigations against traffickers. The law enforcement approach prioritizes the prosecution and punishment of traffickers, and “to a lesser extent, the protection of victims” (Chuang, 2006: 148). Within the law enforcement approach, trafficked persons’ protection is contingent upon their ongoing cooperation with law enforcement and if called upon, their ability to serve as effective witnesses in criminal proceedings against traffickers. Farrell and Fahy offer a typical, albeit empirically unexamined assessment of social service providers’ relationship to law enforcement when asserting that service providers are often “unwilling to alert law enforcement about human trafficking victims they are assisting out of fear that the victims will be harmed by the criminal justice system” (Farrell and
For Farrell and Fahy, the criminal justice system's de facto agenda of "identifying and punishing offenders" remain at odds with victim service providers' goal of assisting trafficked persons and providing them with protective services. In such analyses, the criminal justice system is positioned as separate from nongovernmental social service and advocacy institutions and distinguished by its decidedly offender-oriented, prosecutorial agenda. While it certainly remains the case that the criminal justice system and the spate of anti-trafficking NGOs that comprise the "human rights" or "victim-centered" social justice system hold divergent policy and programmatic mandates, and although anti-trafficking NGOs may, in principle, be theoretically opposed to the stricter immigration regulations and anti-prostitution efforts implemented by law enforcement agencies, scholarly assessments that continue to treat these systems as innately oppositional and customarily bifurcated fail to account for the newfound collaborative networks that have emerged between actors, nor have they adequately assessed the significance of state and non-state cooperation.

In *Human Rights & Gender Violence*, Sally Engle Merry traces the transplantation and application of transnational human rights and anti-violence discourses into local settings seeking to protect victims of violence and to eradicate violence against women. Merry notes that two distinct approaches emerged from her research: a social service and human rights advocacy approach (Merry, 2006: 138). She finds that despite their differential origins and aims, there is "growing convergence" between these disparate approaches. In the realm of anti-trafficking protection efforts in the Netherlands and the United States, I find there is also a growing synergy between social service providers and care coordinators that provide shelter, social and medical service provision, and ongoing case management to individual trafficked "clients," on the one hand, and professional NGO advocates, activists, feminists, religious groups, and attorneys who work to change local, state, national, and international policies and who offer legal remedies to trafficked persons on the other.

Yet, a third approach – a law enforcement approach – has increasingly defined and indeed dominated anti-trafficking activities whereby countries of destination orient victim identification and protection efforts through collaborative networks organized around the criminal justice system. Rather than displacing the social service and human rights advocacy approaches and the professionals who oversee them, however, the law enforcement approach has instead enfolded particular aspects of the social service and advocacy approaches into its repertoire of anti-trafficking criminal justice work. In effect, increased governmental and nongovernmental attention to trafficking has helped to create a specific
brand of multi-professional collaboration, one which fosters professionalization, specialization, and expert knowledge above activism, and which promotes trafficked persons’ rights through an expansion of criminal justice enforcement efforts juxtaposed to promoting their labor and human rights. By investigating collaborative alliances between Dutch and US based NGOs and law enforcement agents, I find that despite their seemingly disparate aims, NGO efforts to empower trafficked persons in fact aligns with rather than circumvents dominant law enforcement approaches (Musto, 2010).

Given the nascent transfer of knowledge and borrowing of practices that I have found to take place between state and NGO actors, a few conclusions can be drawn as to how trafficked persons’ protection is altered when carried out by multi-professional cohorts of governmental and non-governmental agents and professionals. First, trafficked persons’ recognition as victims of crimes and their corollary access to state protection requires that they cooperate not only with police, but NGO advocates and the burgeoning network of professional experts who comprise the enforcement apparatus. Because state funded NGOs in the Netherlands and the United States function as proxy enforcers of state-sponsored anti-trafficking policies, protecting trafficked persons, particularly those who may consciously desire to remain in the sex industry, is severely limited.

That trafficked persons’ justice and empowerment is myopically aligned to the criminal justice system emerges as yet another effect of these collaborations. Feminist scholars and antiviolence advocates have drawn attention to the very real limitations of carceral-situated, police orchestrated efforts to address domestic violence, rape, and militarization. They have further pointed to the myriad ways in which women of color and immigrant women have been disproportionately exposed to state-sponsored and “enforcement violence committed by the police, correction officials, and immigration officers” (Ptacek, 2009: 6; Merry, 2009). Applying such insights to the case of human trafficking, it similarly stands to reason that justice for trafficked persons is notably blunted when explicitly and singularly orchestrated by the criminal justice system and its enforcement-oriented NGO partners.

My interview data not only showcase the “crossover” of roles and approaches to trafficking (Goodey, 2008; Musto, 2010: 385), but also demonstrate that NGO efforts have been increasingly enfolded within and instrumentalized by law enforcement anti-trafficking efforts, which has diversified state power and control. Rather than warn victims about the harms of the criminal justice system, social service providers and advocates instead act as translators and “gatekeepers” (Musto, 2008)
between victims and police. By translating law enforcement goals to vic-
tims while helping to stabilize victims and render their stories legible for
criminal justice cases, service providers and advocates offer a “softened
glove” of assistance which obfuscates from the otherwise “punishing” or
at the very least law enforcement-oriented “fist” (Chapkis, 2005) of law
enforcement interventions. And just as “the public framing of trafficking
has shifted from a human rights problem in the 1990s to a predominant-
ly crime and criminal justice problem at the turn of the century” (Farrell
and Fahy, 2009: 623), advocates and social service providers have like-
wise experienced a shift in how they frame their advocacy; herein victim-
centered and human rights goals are increasingly tailored to align with
rather than circumvent criminal justice goals. That’s why when Candice,
an NGO advocate from Los Angeles states, “it is important that we pro-
vide trafficked persons with a safe shelter to help them heal from the
trauma and also help them become better witnesses for the case,” she
asserts the central role that service providers and advocates play in sup-
porting carcerally-oriented, criminal justice efforts to protect victims of
trafficking. Her comment also helps to explain why for police officers
like Lia, “ the law enforcement approach to trafficking wouldn’t work at
all without service providers” (Individual Interview, 2009). Indeed, the
integration of a victim-centered approach to anti-trafficking police work
is made possible precisely because it directly supports criminal justice-
oriented ends.

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SECTION VII.
GENDERED VIOLENCE IN WAR AND CONFLICT
Chapter 15
Mass Rape in Bosnia and Rwanda: Violence, Silencing and Feminist Answers

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Introduction

This paper examines mass rape during the wars of the 1990s in Bosnia and Rwanda – conflicts which are usually known as “ethnic wars”. The aim of this work is firstly to show how the ethnic definition is inadequate and hides a deeper construction of nationalism. This construction is implemented, for example, by using the female body as a symbol of the nation, and by the focusing of violence (which is not only sexual and physical but also psychological and symbolic) in both Bosnia and Rwanda on women’s bodies with the aim of affecting the future of the enemy group, and thereby interconnecting nationalism, gender, gendered bodies and sexuality. Secondly, it will be described how, in the aftermath of these wars, recovery programmes are not sufficient and leave out many women, while rape survivors in the programmes are marginalised and stigmatised. Finally the chapter will analyse how women try to find answers to the problems in the post-war period through their own organisations and associations.

This approach questions the post-feminist focus on women’s inferiority and on the psychology of rape victims, and instead agrees with a feminist approach on gender and sexual violence that calls into question the excessive victimisation of raped women (Mardorossian, 2002: 747-48, 776). Here the focus is still the victim, but the term “victim” itself should be rethought in relation to women’s lived experience both in the rape

1 The term “Bosnia” is used for brevity instead of “Bosnia and Herzegovina”. After the war, three states were born from the former Yugoslavian Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina: the small Brčko District of BiH, which is a self-governing administrative unit with international control and which is the only exception to the Dayton Agreement of 1995; the Republika Srpska (inhabited by Serbs) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (inhabited mainly by Bosniaks, that is Muslims of Bosnia, and Croats).
situation and afterwards, taking into account the political, social and psychological aspects of rape, survival and recovery. Women themselves may describe their experiences and their strategy for reacting by using other words and categories than “victim” and “survivor”. My study follows this interpretation and uses the intersection of gender, sexuality, ethnicity/nationalism and identity/memory to scrutinise the processes developed by those women who survived mass rape and rethought their engagement in post-war societies as citizens more than as victims.

Nationalism and rape in Bosnia and Rwanda: A weapon of war to affect the future

There is a linguistic distortion in the ethnic issue (Macedo, 2000: 21) and in the temptation of primitivism and tribalism (Vidal, 1996: 326). The war of dissolution of the former Yugoslavia (1991-1995) immediately received a great deal of attention from the media, which was interested in “ethnic rapes”, and many theoretical analyses were tempted by the ethnic issue (Bruneteau, 2004: 218-220) and by the “tribal trap” (Glover, 2001: 123). Nevertheless, the ethnic label does not explain what happened in the former Yugoslavia or in Rwanda, where the violence was characterised by an aggressive nationalism to split Bosnia and Herzegovina and a fight for political and economic power in Rwanda through nationalistic policies. The conditions for the Rwandan genocide of 1994 had already been prepared in the previous civil war (1990-1994) through intra-ethnic intimidation (Strauss, 2006), the creation of artificial boundaries and opportunism in the competition over fields or crops or cattle (Tilly, 2003: 31-32, 136-142). Also the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia has many causes: the economic collapse due to all the contradictions that emerged with the end of communism, inefficiencies and frustration, and competition among the republics of the Federation (Ramet, 2006: 285-323).

Mass rape organised in rape camps, or in the so-called “women’s rooms”, during the war in Bosnia (1992-1995) is something that had never occurred before, and had its origins in the idea of women as embodiment of the nation on the one hand, and on the other hand the building of the nation state with rape as a weapon of war that is mapped onto women’s bodies. The political construction of Serbian nationalism in the Eighties defined itself in opposition to an external “other” from which it had to differentiate through body symbols and metaphors, such as the body of the nation versus the external bodies of its enemies. As a consequence, the violation of one’s own people passes through the violation of one’s own women. This explains why, after the death of the
President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, in 1980, the false accusations of an increasing number of rapes committed by the Albanians in Kosovo (one of the two autonomous provinces of the Republic of Serbia) against both Serbian men and women contributed to creating the Serbian belief in a “nationalist rape”, that is the politicisation of rape, which was seen as part of the Albanian political plot to force the Serbs to leave (Bracewell, 2000: 563-565).

Serbian nationalism was soon imitated by the Croatian regime of Franjo Tudjman, thus empathising with the process started during the nineteenth century’s nationalisms, which linked masculinity and political aggressiveness through the metaphor of the mother-homeland and of the holiness and inviolability of the homeland’s body, whose boundaries have to be protected (Blom, Hagemann and Hall, 2000; Banti, 2005a; Banti, 2005b). As a consequence, when the war was brought to Bosnia in 1992, mass rape was used to define the boundaries between different groups, to terrorise and above all to use the “enemy child” issue for the future assets of the nation states. In fact, in Bosnia, rape aimed above all at giving birth to “children of another religion” (Héritier, 1996: 15) or to children “of the perpetrator’s ethnicity” (U.N S/1994/674/Add.2 1994: 11), and rape was “usual/normal/systematisable” (Nahoum-Grappe, 1996: 192). The United Nations stated that women of all national groups were raped during the Yugoslavian war, but there is no “moral equivalency in the analysis” (U.N S/1994/674/Add.2 1994: 9): the rape of Bosniaks (Muslim women of Bosnia) was used as a military strategy, as a symbolic defamation of the enemy’s culture and religion – for instance, with deliberate cruelty and humiliation through killing victims by cutting their throats with a butcher’s hook, thus mocking the ritual Muslim killing of animals for food consumption (Goytisolo, 2001: 22). In Rwanda as well, rape was used massively, and also here the purpose was to obstruct the future recovery of the enemy group: women were raped, deliberately infected with HIV and kept alive to spread the infection (Sharlach, 2002: 117).

The international jurisprudence settled by the two International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) took important steps in recognising the meaning of rape in these wars. The two tribunals in fact established that rape and genocide were strictly connected: the massacre in Srebrenica was a genocide (ICTY IT-98-33-A: 87); rape was used in Bosnia to force the population to leave (U.N S/1994/674/Add.2 1994: 10) and as a crime against humanity (ICTY IT-96-23-T&23/1-T: 281-283); and rape was used as an act of genocide in Taba in Rwanda (ICTR-96-4-T: 149). Nevertheless, the formal success of this juridical process must not be allowed to conceal several unsolved problems, which I will analyse in the next paragraph.
The aftermath: Silencing and new violences

“I can’t sleep without pills. [...] I have to run away from children not to shout at them. I don’t want my problems to affect them. I need help,” a women living in Republika Srpska confesses 14 years after the end of the war (Amnesty International, 2009: 3). Health care is crucial, but also practical aspects such as housing have to be solved for all those women who cannot or do not want to go back to the place where they lived before the war and where today they are stigmatised by their own community – such as Zilhada, a rape victim who cannot join her surviving sons because she fears their judgement (Doni and Valentini, 1993: 34).

In Bosnia (divided after the war mainly into the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), women rape victims face exclusion in terms of wealth, geographical area and community as well as being stigmatised by their families (CEC, 2008: 18; Avdibegovic et al., 2008), against which they are not legally protected. In both countries, by law, war veterans count more than civilian war victims when it comes to insurance refunds. In the Rep. Srpska, war veterans need a lower certified body damage from the war to get a refund from insurance: for war veterans 20% damage is enough, while civilian victims of sexual violence need a certified damage of 60% – where a complete damage of 100% would mean total disability (RS Law N. 25/93, n. 46/04 and 53/04 Art. 4). In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the case of victims of sexual violence is not even considered (FBiH Law n. 39/06 Art. 5), and civilian war victims receive a maximum refund that is 30% lower than the one granted to veteran invalids of the war (FBiH Law n. 39/06 Art. 9).

This creates a vicious circle: few women find adequate treatment, and even fewer women seek help (Klarić et al., 2007). The situation is similar in Rwanda (Mukamana and Brysiewicz, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 1996), where women’s marginalisation is even greater than in Bosnia due to the high HIV/AIDS rates among survivors of the genocide, a lack of basic hygiene and an inadequate infrastructure in the aftermath (African Rights, 2004: 30; UNAIDS/WHO, 2008: 11-12). Several women interviewed in Rwanda describe how they are not even allowed to take the HIV test in order not to worsen their situation (African Rights, 2004: 50), how their communities often expel them, how even their families may force them to leave and how they feel obliged to deny having been raped so as not to be left by new partners whom they have met in the aftermath (de Brouwer and Hon Chu, 2009: 39, 83, 110).

Even justice is often denied: witnesses from Bosnia are intimidated and feel abandoned (Lombezzi, 2006). In Rwanda, many former perpetrators threaten women that they will “complete the job,” that is the
genocide, and survivors are often beaten or killed (de Brouwer and Hon Chu, 2009: 71, 90, 105, 116, 123). Women are humiliated by being offered inadequate compensation, as in the case of a woman whose abuser offered her a cow to “buy” her forgiveness (de Brouwer and Hon Chu, 2009: 63).

Important trials do not include rape among the charges, even if there is much evidence (ICTY IT-98-32/1-T, 2007: 18). The gacaca (Rwandan local courts) exclude women from the judging function and release many of the perpetrators who have been charged, and thus women feel that the gacaca “are bringing more tears than smiles,” as P. affirms (de Brouwer and Hon Chu, 2009: 77). Social stigmatisation within the community, lack of justice, inadequate health care, economic problems and revictimisation by former perpetrators may force some women into prostitution in order to obtain food (Amnesty International, 2004: 9).

Women’s reactions: A feminist perspective

Like many other post-colonial feminist movements in sub-Saharan Africa, Rwandan activists have to face poverty, harsh labour conditions and a lack of adequate education and health care (Maerten, 2004: 1); all these problems have become worse after the genocide. Women responded to the deterioration in their living conditions by entering politics in order to tackle gender inequality, and many of them today hold important positions (Gallimore, 2008: 25). Nevertheless, their high participation in politics is usually not reflected at local level, and many women found that they had to develop other strategies to fight the increased discrimination in the aftermath of the war. The most committed among them organised women’s associations and activist networks. Activists are gathered under Pro-femmes Twese Hamwe, a platform of different associations (among which Avega Agabozo – Association des Veuves du Génocide is the one most closely linked to institutions). This platform is devoted to peace culture, gender promotion, legal affairs, combating violence against women, education, anti HIV/AIDS programmes, economic empowerment, training and housing, and to the supporting of widows and orphans of the genocide.

In contrast, in the Former Yugoslavia the first women’s network was devoted to opposing nationalism, war and violence and to keeping women from different national groups together, and had been working since the beginning of the war. In the aftermath, women believed especially in the importance of creating a gender dimension to memory, directed against the exploitation of the rape victims, as was done by the media during the conflict itself (Cockburn, 2001). Any violated woman could then suddenly be turned into a symbol of the violated nation, while after
the war women’s memories were excluded from the new public, male-focused, patriarchal collective memory (Kesić, 2003a: 011; Kesić, 2003b: 043). The first step was therefore for women to start sharing memories of the war, in the belief that facing the past was the only way to construct a peaceful future by including previously suppressed memories into the collective one. The Croatian Centar za Žene Žrtve Rata (Centre for Women War Victims) then significantly decided to change its name in 2003 into Centar za Žene Rosa (Women’s Centre Rosa): “we wanted to emphasize and record our collective memory of a specific women’s history of resistance and civil society building” (Kesić, 2003a: 010). The group felt uncomfortable with the expression “war victims” as it did not stress women’s resistance to the war and their efforts to rebuild the civil society with a particular attention to gender needs. This is a new “philosophy of feminism” (Kesić, 2003b: 049), whose culture of tolerance and responsibility is the feminist answer to past and present violence and to women’s victimisation.

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References


Appendix

Violences and Silences: Shaming, Blaming – and Intervening

Conference at GEXcel Gender Excellence Centre, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden, October 12th – 14th, 2010.

Venue: TEMcas amphitheatre, Tema-Building, Campus Valla.

The Conference Programme

Tuesday October 12

9:00–9:30  Registration and coffee
Venue: TEMCAS

9.30–9:45  Welcome and Introduction by Barbro Wijma and Nina Lykke

9:45–10:45  Barbro Wijma & Katarina Swahnberg
Violence – silence – shame in health care: mechanisms and options for intervention

10:45–11:15 Coffee

11:15–12:15  Dubravka Zarkov
Feminist analysis as transformative intervention: transnational feminist writing on sexual violence against men in the ’war on terror’

12:15–13:30 Lunch

13:30–17:30  Parallel Workshop Sessions
Venue: Lethe
Violent and silent discourse and representation I
Jan Matonoha – Embodied dispositives of silences …
Angela Maria Toffanin – Narrations and discourse on violence
Elena Panican – “A bunch of rednecks living in straw houses…”

Venue: TEMCAS
Ways of intervening I
Justyna Jochym – Experiencing care as a sexual assault survivor
GullBritt Rahm – Out of solitude
Vânia Martins et al – Feminisms in intervention
15:30–16:00  Coffee, fruit

*Venue: Lethe*

**Violences and sexualities I**
Chyng Sun – The price of pleasure (film screening, 58 mins)

*Venue: TEMCAS*

**Problematic interventions, and care as violence**
Maria José Magalhães, et al – Love, fear and power/shame, blame and silence
Jennifer Musto – Anti-trafficking carceral protectionism

18:00  Conference Mingle

**Wednesday October 13**

*Venue: TEMCAS*

10:00–11:00  **Susan Edwards**
The aetiology of women’s silence in violence – lessons from the legal field

11:00–11:30  Coffee, fruit

11:30–12:30  **Lotta Samelius, Christa Binswanger & Suruchi Thapar-Björkert**
Turning Points and the ‘everyday’: Exploring agency and violence in intimate relationships

12:30–13:30  Lunch

13:30–18:00  Parallel workshops sessions

*Venue: Lethe*

**Violences and sexualities II**
Chyng Sun – Intensified violence: a content analysis of popular pornography
Mathabo Khau – Genital beauty: at what cost?
Nicola Steffen – “Porn chic” and underlying cause of gendered violence

*Venue: TEMCAS*

**Ways of intervening II**
Guiseppe Stanziano – Playing violence
Kimberly Twarog – My story is your story
15:30–16:00  Coffee, fruit  

**Venue: Lethe**  

**Violent and silent discourse and representation II**  

Halimah DeShong – Talking violence, negotiating gender  
Mihai Lucaciu – If I want to harass, I harass  

**Venue: TEMCAS**  

**Ways of intervening III**  

Yvonne Mörck – Violence against women in ethnic minority families  
Mari Bränvall – Shame and silence when women leave violence  

19:00  Conference Dinner  

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**Thursday October 14**  

**Venue: TEMCAS**  

9:30–10:30  Åsa Wettergren  

The humiliation and shaming of institutionalized helper interactions  

10:30–11:00  Coffee, fruit  

11:00–12:00  **Ka Schmitz & Sandra Klauert**  

Getting in touch: comics and activism - communication, means of intervention and language of resistance – the great chance of comics  

12:00–13:00  Lunch  

13:00–15:00  Workshop session  

**Venue: TEMCAS**  

**Gendered violence in war and conflict**  

Mary Anne Case – “… wrong to do to the prisoners what the Army does to its own soldiers?”  
Sara Valentina Di Palma – “No one really cares about us”  

15:00–15:30  Coffee, fruit  

15:30–16:30  Concluding panel and goodbye