Regimes of Hospitality

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REGIMES OF HOSPITALITY

Urban Citizenship between Participation and Securitization
– the Case of the Multiethnic French *Banlieue*

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À Claude, Dominique, Sophie,
À Stanley, Sandy et Nedzad,
À Rafael, Salomé et Petronella,

Pour faire de l'hospitalité un art de vivre.

Regimes of Hospitality

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes various local development policies in Europe's big urban areas. Striving to understand the respective places accorded to the measures to increase the participation of the inhabitants on the one hand, and to improve for security and public peace in the context of social and territorial policies on the other, I examine how urban policies define models of urban citizenship. The empirical work concerns two sites in the greater metropolitan area of Paris, Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air in Saint-Denis and Les Cinq Quartiers in Les Mureaux. It consists of an analysis of public documents as well as a series of interviews and observations. This methodological approach serves to gain an understanding of how participative and security procedures emerge in the history of French urban policy and how these norms interact locally. By investigating the overlap of security politics and participatory devices, I demonstrate that deprived areas do not have access to an adequate form of intervention to meet the expectations and needs of its inhabitants, who are squeezed between a logic of development reluctantly accepted by, but rarely negotiated with its inhabitants, and a logic of security that often leads to the confinement of residents to their respective areas. The thesis thus demonstrates how institutional interventions in multiethnic areas can fuel feelings of suspicion between local stakeholders and civic distrust. Indeed, the participatory procedures that are developed in urban strategies influence the conduct of participants on matters of identity and belonging and can intensify socio-ethnic stigmatization. This effect provides me with a critical standpoint on new techniques of government. The local partners of the state develop daily routines in urban strategies that contribute to articulating participatory devices and security procedures. I claim that the results from this process are "regimes of hospitality".

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PREFACE

Social science research traditionally begins with an analysis of its own stance. As Bourdieu once said, “to understand is first to understand the field with which and against which one has been formed” (Bourdieu 2004: 15). For ten years, I was positioned at the meeting point of academic research and operational studies in France. More precisely, I carried out studies and national evaluations of programs of action in the fields of urban politics and housing, as well as of social policy in a broad sense.¹

Since my departure to Sweden my trajectory has changed considerably, as have my perception and the way I work. As a migrant, I learned to speak two more languages and discovered new cultural trends that led me to reconsider my own stance. Two years after my departure from France, I had the opportunity to get into the PhD program at REMESO, the Institute for Research on Migration, Ethnicity and Society, Linköping University. This new position was

1. I had the opportunity of undertaking team research work, analyzing such notions as “informal practices in the vicinity of the Stade de France,” “makeshift housing in the Seine-Maritime,” “residential paths in substandard housing”. In organizations as different as the RATP or FORS-Recherche sociale, this position allowed me to observe, describe, and interpret socio-spatial processes in response to ever changing public commissions: effecting social diagnoses of neighborhoods, studies of the functioning of segments of housing developed for low-income households in the framework of housing policies, local development projects. The players, the orientations, the financing, and the methods varied all the more with regard to already “constructed” publics: Roma adopting sedentary lifestyles, migrants in substandard housing or in housing made to accommodate migrant workers, young people in training or disenfranchised youth, abused women, ageing migrants, the isolated elderly in social or private housing. In analyzing many situations and publics in public policy, I often found myself positioned opposite political personnel and institutional representatives.

a cultural challenge: I became a French student who studied ethnicity in a Swedish academic institution. In fact, this became a real opportunity to reflect upon who I was and what I had done in the past. My thesis is thus embedded in the construction of a new life in a new country with its different phases of understanding and the new targets I have set for myself.

Because of my past experience, participants at research seminars have on several occasions referred to me as an “expert in urban policy”. To “hide” my position as an “expert” from the reader, who is not necessarily familiar with the subtleties of urban policy in France, would allow me to easily falsify my analysis, as I could find myself in the position of a “scholar” legitimating his knowledge. In order to clarify my position, I therefore need to specify the notions of research and of expertise.

The notion of expertise refers to the specialization of areas of knowledge as defined by Lyotard in *The Postmodern Condition* (1979). The expert’s position is connected to this specialization of knowledge. The expert possesses a power of enunciation; as an expert “you teach what you know” to an addressee in the context of scientific knowledge (Lyotard 1979: 45). In the field of urban policy, expertise consists in knowing a certain number of facts and techniques, delimiting them to specific registers and then “producing” information that can be used in social, academic, institutional or political circles. A case in point is the financing of social housing and its consequences on running a balanced municipal budget, population growth, its impact on the regional economy, the intake facilities for Roma populations, urban temporalities and their usefulness in confronting fragmented public services. Many subjects can potentially overlap the areas of knowledge that are developed by “experts” in urban policy.

However, the fact that I mainly understand the terms of urban policy debates through a qualifying experience in the field does not make me an expert. Indeed, each area of competence is based on referentials derived from public reports, on a deep-seated knowledge of policy guidelines, of laws and implementation decrees, of an eventual jurisprudence, of budgets and reference amounts, of their guidelines, but also of the logics of players, of strategies in a given field and empirical research lending itself to a critical analysis. A clear distinction must be drawn between the expert and the researcher. In the area covered by this dissertation, I am therefore not an “expert”. Rather, I

am generalist who has pursued a multidisciplinary – and hence non-specialized – educational and academic career in the fields of public policy, urbanism, urban development and, currently, international migration and ethnic relations.

To understand this position Lyotard may again offer some guidance in what he has to say about the philosopher in contradistinction to the expert. The approach of the former resides in *raising questions* and establishing modes of interpretation with regard to these questions. As a result, a researcher “knows what he knows and what he does not know,” unlike the expert: “One concludes, the other questions” (Lyotard 1979: 9). This captures, I believe, the attitude underlying my enterprise. I raise questions on the basis of a working hypothesis that will provide meaning *a posteriori* to my discussion. Providing meaning to a discussion *a posteriori* is precisely what scientific research calls having *a critical sense*.

This reflexive approach – mixed with Swedish sparkling water, English tea, Bosnian coffee and French wine – would not have been possible without the generous support of a number of people. First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisors, Stefan Jonsson and Magnus Dahlstedt. They have been generous, alert and patient with me during the whole research process. Stefan has strongly supported my choice of subject and made in-depth readings of various versions of the text, in French as well as in English, encouraging me during the whole research process to structure my arguments and providing me with an essential guidance through inspiring advice and incisive remarks. Magnus provided me a great support that concerns the development of my theoretical approach and my methodological choices. Without financial support from his own research project, this thesis would not have been completed at present.

Many thanks go to the REMESO Institute for giving me the opportunity to carry out doctoral research. The seminars and courses developed at this centre of excellence have been fruitful at all the stages of my project. I also recognize the support from Helge Ax:son Johnson Foundation as well as the financial contribution of my dear parents, Claude and Dominique Foultier.

I am grateful to Lisa Kings, Carina Listerborn, Anders Neegaard, Nazem Tahvilzadeh, Moa Tunström, and Aleksandra Ålund, for their readings, advice and comments during the seminars where I have

presented my research project. Mats Brusman and Lisa Kings also gave me the opportunity to present lectures at Södertörns Högskola and at Linköping University. Josefine Syssner, from the Centre for Municipal Studies, and Peo Hansen invited me to present my ideas at conferences. Suzanne Urban and Charles Woolfson gave me precious reading advices. Charles also supported me in a very helpful direction when he made me a partner in the design of his new course proposal at REMESO. My gratitude also goes to Erik Berggren, Anna-Carin Ramsten, Eva Rehnholm, Carl-Ulrik Schierup, Zoran Slavnić and the former and present PhD students who created a stimulating milieu: Sara Ahlstedt, Indre Genelyte, Karin Krifors, Jennie K. Larsson, Olav Nygård, Martin Qvist, Andrey Tibajev, Caroline Tovatt, Xolani Tshabalala, Viktor Vesterberg, Julia Willén. At the early stage of my research project, Peter Samuelsson, translator, Micael Nilsson from Boverket and Mikael Morberg at Mångkulturellt centrum helped me to get the foot in the door to the Swedish urban policy.

I would like to thank Gila Walker who has translated most of the chapters and quotes that are presented in the thesis. Her contribution was crucial during the final stages of the writing process. Many thanks go to Richard Lindmark who has generously created a graphic and elegant design. In France as well, a great number of people have contributed to the achievement of this thesis. François Ménard, at *Le Plan Urbain Construction Architecture*, and Frédéric Meynard, at *La Communnauté d'agglomération Terres de France*, have oriented the development of this research project. Furthermore, I warmly thank my friends Damien Bertrand, Stanley Genest and Sandy Messaoui for their readings, prudent advice and unfailing support. Special thanks also go to my friend and colleague Nedžad Mesić and his wife Mersada, who welcomed me at their place during five years. Their generosity, kindness and open minds are but a few expressions of their hospitality. They are voices of societies that have the ability to transform life into a kind of adventure.

I am grateful to Anna Petronella Foulter, my beloved wife, for her constant help in matters of translation, readings and all practical aspects in relation to academic life in Sweden. In Sweden, she changed – with the energetic support of Salomé and Rafael – my everyday life into an experience of beauty. I dedicate this thesis to my children, my wife, my parents, my sister and my nearest friends. They inspire every single moment of my life.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines local development policies in Europe's big urban areas. I will be using the French experience as a case in point. The aim of my research is to understand how civic distrust can be fuelled by the relationships of residents in so-called problem districts to institutions, and in particular how civic distrust develops in reaction to contradictory political orientations. On the one hand, urban projects in the *banlieue* districts articulate a range of methods that seek to further resident *participation*. On the other hand, these very same projects contain preventive and often repressive means that posit residents as *security* concerns. The result of this contradiction is, precisely, distrust on the part of the residents vis-à-vis the urban policies, programs and projects that seek to further their participation.

By studying the implementation of urban policy in two multiethnic urban districts in the larger Paris area, my dissertation examines this contradiction between participation and securitization and explains what consequences it has. As I will show, these consequences are apparent on the ground, so to speak; we can observe them as features in the everyday landscape of the Paris *banlieues*, in its buildings and ways of life. In order to conceptually capture these features I will argue that they constitute what I will be calling a *regime of hospitality*. In describing the contradictory structure and functioning of these regimes – controlling residents it seeks to involve, or activating through means of securitization – I hope to show how they may be seen as symptomatic of the ways in which contemporary French – and, by extension, European – urban policy “govern” the residents of multi-ethnic and underprivileged urban districts.

Let me flesh out this aim in greater detail. As mentioned, urban

projects articulate a range of methods: participative approaches, information campaigns, communication plans, activation techniques, preventive and repressive measures, and mediation procedures. In general terms, policies implemented to promote urban citizenship and territorial cohesion can transform the residents into political subjects.¹ But the political project that underpins this form of citizenship is not without risks of new types of subjection.² As Marion Carrel has noted concerning the French context (2004: 112–122) and Magnus Dahlstedt with reference to the Swedish situation (2005: 29), the engagement mechanisms proposed in the places where local development policies have been implemented tend to produce *suspicion*, that is to say, *distrust*. In this context, there is reason to wonder about institutional participation in light of urban strategies that incorporate increasingly territorialized systems of observation, surveillance, and control. If the distrust of civil society has been historically linked to the building of democratic regimes, through the function of state control (Rosanvallon 2011: 27, 266–268), there is surely a need to rethink this question in the contemporary period, and ask how participation and security function in today's European democracies.

The overall purpose of my research is thus to examine the significance of various urban development policies and their effect on civic distrust. Derived from this purpose are the following more specific questions that I seek to answer in this dissertation: How can we un-

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1. In this study, I define the notion of urban citizenship in relation to the idea of “the right to the city”, which, as David Harvey contends, is “far more than a right of individual access to the resources that the city embodies: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city more after our heart’s desire. It is, moreover, a collective rather than an individual right since changing the city inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power over the processes of urbanization” (Harvey 2008: 23). For Peter Marcuse, the right to the city can be exemplified as “the right to clean water, clean air, housing, decent sanitation, mobility, health care, democratic participation in decision making” (Marcuse 2012: 34). Jacques Donzelot argues that the notion has emerged as a result of the influence of the globalization process on the city development and the urban riots in regional centres that are related to the exclusion of marginal groups from the welfare state systems (Donzelot 2009: 7). The idea of an urban citizenship questions the construction of citizenship in democracies, in particular the idea of equality of opportunity and the place of ethnic minorities in regional centres (Uitermark et al. 2005: 622).
 2. In a survey on urban citizenship, Marion Carrel argues that most studies in political science do not focus on power relationships between the governing and the governed. Rather, the governed is seen as an individual who is subject to governmental decisions (Carrel 2007: 31).

derstand the respective places accorded to the measures to increase the inhabitants' participation on the one hand, and to improve for security and public peace in the context of social and territorial policies on the other? To what extent do local programs and tools, implemented in the French multiethnic areas, contribute to loosening the links between the governing and the governed? What do forms of local partnership tell us in the contemporary debate on urban citizenship?

In answering these questions I also will bring forth an argument as to why matters of participation and security have become increasingly salient in the French urban policy. Based on an empirical analysis, I argue that the institutional modes of engagement in multiethnic areas can fuel feelings of suspicion between local stakeholders. Indeed, the participatory procedures that are developed in urban strategies influence the conduct of participants in matters of identity and belonging. This local development process intensifies socio-ethnic stigmatization. These effects provide me with a critical standpoint on new techniques of government. The local partners of the state such as representatives of municipalities, housing companies and sometimes associations, develop daily routines in urban strategies that contribute to articulating participatory devices and security procedures. What results from this process are, as I argue, specific "regimes of hospitality", which I attempt to describe and conceptualize in this dissertation.

A QUESTION AND ITS ORIGINS

Let me continue by showing from my personal experience in a consulting firm how the idea of participation ends up being readily at odds with the idea of security in the institutional framework of an urban project.³ In the spring of 2007, a steering committee met

3. I worked for seven years at FORS Recherche Sociale (2001–2007), an independent association of research consultancy acknowledged for its expertise on housing for the underprivileged. My responsibilities at the consulting firm included designing of strategies of cooperation with residents in poor minority neighborhoods, evaluating urban contracts of social cohesion in part or whole, and conducting local social diagnostics.

with national government representatives, representatives from the municipality of Stains and representatives from the Social Housing Department (HLM) of Seine-Saint-Denis to discuss an urban renovation project in Clos Saint-Lazare, a large-scale social housing project of about 10,000 residents in the northern suburbs of Paris. The meeting marked the end of the pre-operational study period: an architect/urban planner presented his urban renovation strategy and it was my job to present the local community urban management facet on behalf of the consulting firm FORS-Recherche sociale. The issue that the architect was dealing with had to do with political objectives and how they translated into an urban project – in sum, with “what to do”. The problem that my consulting firm was tackling was related to methodology, the organization and functioning of the project on the local level – in sum, with the question of “how to proceed”.

There were some forty odd people around the table.⁴ I presented a “social diagnosis” of the neighborhood and a strategy developed together with local stakeholders to maintain over time the investments being made as part of the urban renovation framework act.⁵ The communist mayor of Stains, Michel Beaumale, approved the strategy proposed, stressing the issues involved in meeting the needs of residents. Among the examples he gave were a community-run garage to put a stop to illegal repairs in parking lots, neighborhood governance to offer avenues for social integration to the young, an annual cleanup operation with residents and school children and housing renovations undertaken by and for residents. The managing director of OPDHLM, the social housing agency, picked up the terms of the diagnosis, which he said had succeeded in transcribing the issues in a way that was “as close as could be to realities on the ground”.⁶ The government representative agreed. And so the evaluation of FORS-Recherche Sociale had succeeded in aligning the government, the municipality, and the public housing agency. Mission accomplished.

4. Including the mayor, representatives of the prefecture, decentralized government services, municipal services (techniques, citizenship, communication), the social service prevention division of the Conseil Général, the architecture office, etc.

5. Loi n° 2003-710 du 1^{er} août 2003 d'orientation et de programmation pour la ville et la rénovation urbaine.

6. OPDHLM: Office public départemental d'habitation à loyer modéré – a public housing agency.

Getting the idea of resident participation accepted by a municipality that had no prior partnership tradition was quite an accomplishment. I was appointed to this public mission with limited knowledge of the situation on the ground. Stains developed out of a series of experiments to house workers from the industrial area of the Plaine Saint-Denis: there were the worker housing projects of the 1920s, the garden city of the 1930s and the large-scale housing project of the 1970s.⁷ From urban utopia to political projects, Clos Saint-Lazare served to accommodate diverse categories of workers. In the 1980s, Annick Tanter and Jean-Claude Toubon see the management of incoming populations and the first operations of urban regeneration that led to a housing offer specialized in accommodating each new wave of “have-nots,” with all the social and professional integration difficulties that this entailed (Tanter et al. 1999).

In 2006, a slew of acts of violence, murders, and various other crimes impacted the “collective memory” of the neighborhood. The destruction of a power transformer plunged the district into darkness. A child mother threw her baby off a balcony. There were drug dealing and gang wars between Stains and Saint-Denis. Reporters were being stripped of their possessions, etc. Such events “punctuated” the already difficult everyday life of residents: the overcrowded housing stock, which was deteriorating rapidly; social situations compounded by a mix of problems (social, cultural, legal, financial); a declining shopping center; graffiti everywhere in the neighborhood; play areas that were dangerous; streets littered with wrecked cars, etc. The distance from the city center, the breaks in urban scale between the housing project, the nearby single-family housing area, and the gardening plots adjoining the district marked the boundaries of a “district in exile”.

Before the meeting, when I responded to the invitation to tender, I concentrated on the need to combine the technical aspects of the urban project with the social aspects, the aim being to get all the partners to combine their efforts in a way that would place the participative at the center of the project. But from the outset, at the first “technical committee” meeting, bitterness was apparent in the

7. The architect’s design was in the shape of butterfly wings with a shopping center in the middle. The second wing was never built.

exchanges between partners. Considering that there was no ongoing communication between the local actors that were involved in the project at the time, what chances were there of getting the inhabitants to participate? The technical services director at the town hall refused to hear anything about social development, intent as he was on limiting his field of action to wreck removal, trash collection and cleaning public spaces from bulky waste. The head of the civic service division of the municipal government was anxious about the insecurity, damages to facilities, drug dealing, gang wars, and religious gatherings in basements. The housing agency took issue with the idea of adding expenses to their investments. The head of the greater urban community project (*la Communauté d'agglomération*), who held the purse strings, wanted at all costs to link the project's architectural conception to the management of new urban spaces because the political issue of this project involved the reassignment of vast private spaces from the housing agency to the public sector. So the question was: Who does what and where? How do you get people and organizations that have opposed each other in the past to work together: the social housing agencies affiliated with the *Conseil Général*, the municipal government allied with the conservative wing of the Communist Party, and Plaine Commune, the newly created inter-municipal political body, whose agenda was in line with left-wing reformers. My director spoke up at the beginning of the study process: "Social priorities must be established prior to defining a common strategy". Sharply taken to task by the housing agency and the municipality, he left, declaring that he would not be back again.

I had to look for an opening in the project that would allow me to launch a "counter-attack". An analysis of the urban strategy revealed that the architect had neglected to include playgrounds for the youth who represented forty per cent of the district's population. I met with the architect in the presence of the project head: "How can we implement an urban project in these conditions?" I asked him. He smiled, and replied that the options of the project were chosen based on "important spatial limitations". But my criticism was picked up a few months later by intermediary state government bodies, and this reinforced my position with the project head. I took advantage of this period of grace to make a suggestion: "You know, people here do not have money to repair their cars; to avoid having the sidewalks

immediately covered in oil and spare parts, how about creating a community run non-profit garage for the district?” After a series of meetings, the social problems were more clearly identified and it became impossible to pretend that they did not exist. I may not have succeeded in allowing residents to have their rightful place in the decision-making process, but I was nonetheless getting tangible long-term commitments in specific areas.

Gradually, the dynamics of the project made me realize something about the public management of “priority” districts. For one thing, the idea of resident participation always risks being completely swept aside by the institutional framework. Premises were found and several meetings were organized to provide minimal communication on the project. In the spirit of the framework act for urban renovation (*Loi de rénovation urbaine*), the municipalities were expected to rapidly present an outline of the project to the *Agence Nationale de Rénovation Urbaine* (ANRU) to obtain financing, based on the idea of “first come, first served”. The search for institutional efficiency mainly focused on mobilizing local partners, which did not allow for setting in motion a process of working with residents on project options. For me, this marked a break with the participative ideas by which I had stood from the outset: that is to say, the involvement of residents in a decision making process is a meaningful input in democracy.

In addition, my assignment led me for the first time to establish points of connection between the social and security issues in the area of citizenship and public order. The removal of illegal dumps, the cleaning of graffiti, the protection of worksites against theft, the destruction of public facilities were mixed with considerations on insecurity and acts of incivility. The questions of security were palpable since the 2005 riots. The clashes had been intense. People gathering in the corridors, nighttime noise, petty acts of discourtesy like leaving motorcycles in the common areas of apartment buildings, gatherings of a “Salafist” group in the basements – these were issues with which the head of the civic service flooded the technical committee. At one of the last working meetings, the representative of the municipal government solemnly stated in a tone that said that he had won a battle, “We will soon be benefitting from the services of a special local delinquency unit (GLTD)”.

As an adviser for the organization and methodology of the pro-

ject, I found the lack of transparency regarding the security aspect problematical. How could I promote a participative approach in one corner of the project without inhabitants being able to express themselves in the decision-making process, especially at a time when active and passive security measures were being implemented in the district? What personal conviction could I form concerning my position in the area of local development politics? This experience led me to study the respective places accorded to measures intended to increase participation of the inhabitants, on the one hand, and measures to improve security and public safety in the context of integrated social and territorial policies, on the other.

A STUDY OF GOVERNMENTALITY

My thoughts on this subject gradually took shape against a backdrop of rioting in large urban areas in recent decades. Researchers generally agree that the riots and clashes between youth and police cannot be explained exclusively by a rise in juvenile delinquency (Mucchielli 2001: 85; Oblet 2008: 1–3; Castel 2009: 385). The riots that took place in France in 2005 were examined in postcolonial terms, with regard to the application of overly restrictive Republican principles: the outburst of urban violence was thus seen as a symptom of deep-seated deficiencies in the mechanisms providing immigrants and their descendants with access to citizenship (Donzelot et al. 2003: 323–324; Castel 2007: 77–110). The specialization and sectorial nature of police intervention in this context could prompt certain officials to manifest humiliating racist behaviours (Fassin 2011; Jobard 2011). However, the occurrence of similar phenomena in Great Britain in 2011 and Sweden in 2013 raised broader questions about the democratic principles at work in different European political systems. The rise in the number and systematic character of clashes in major urban centers in Europe had to be measured by parameters that surely went beyond the history of specific nations and philosophies of citizenship and integration.⁸

8. See Alain Bertho's blog "anthropologie du présent" (<http://berthoalain.com>).

A population survey (Tiberj et al. 2010: 111–12) showed the extent to which, in the French context, the degree of confidence of citizens of immigrant origin and people from overseas French territories could vary significantly with the institution. People continue to believe that schools are a means of social advancement (between 80 and 90 per cent), but confidence in employment assistance services varies enormously from one group to another depending on the group's position in the job market: the more social capital a group has, the greater the disappointment. The relationship of citizens to such institutions as the judiciary and the police is even more problematical. Whereas the majority population expresses global confidence (75 per cent have confidence in the police and 71 per cent in the judiciary), the exact opposite is true of descendants of immigrants. People from North Africa, Turkey, and Sub-Saharan Africa are the most likely to be stopped and questioned repeatedly by the police, and this triggers resentment and suspicion. Some ethnographic studies conclude that the national police are regarded by the youth as the embodiment of social and political domination or as an agent of repression in Western states (Marlière 2005: 238).

This trend toward increasing civil distrust is all the more paradoxical inasmuch as urban policies in Europe since the 1990s have sought to institutionalize various participative strategies. In France, the notion of resident participation or of local community democracy remains strongly bound up with the program *Développement Social des Quartiers* (Social Development of Districts). In the case of the United Kingdom, we have the “New Deal for Community” program, which systematized the participation of resident committees in projects of urban regeneration. In countries such as Sweden, community participation is promoted through electoral systems that offer voting rights to foreigners in municipal and regional elections, and also through techniques of institutional consultations widely disseminated in the successive strategy orientations of urban policies.⁹ However, whether

9. In Sweden, local development agreements, so-called *Lokala utvecklingsavtal*, formalize a contract between the Swedish municipalities and the State. This contractual approach aims at developing a partnership platform with various public authorities (Police authority, the regional authorities), key economic players and housing companies. The scope of intervention of local development policies in Sweden had grown considerably since the start of local development contracts: from 7 municipalities encompassing

we are speaking of practices of co-management or policies of activation, this participation has been nonetheless open to interpretation (Bacqué et al. 2011: 10–15).

How then are we to explain this paradox that consists in fostering the involvement in projects of those who are otherwise being kept under surveillance? Strategic orientations in the area of local democracy are questionable because, under the rhetoric of social and cultural diversity, they seem very much like modes of urban poverty management. To begin with, the procedures often have stigmatizing effects (Dahlstedt 2005; Lee 2008). In a study conducted within the European-wide URBACT program, urban project developers admitted that the “participative offer found a very limited response among populations with a significant ethnic, religious, or even territorial affiliation” (Badia et al. 2012: 23).¹⁰

Also, the role of residents in the decision-making process is traditionally at the center of criticism. The aforementioned study demonstrates the extent to which participation remains deeply associated with power and “governance” in European cities: “two founding notions of integrated urban development appear particularly fluid [...]: governance and resident participation [...] are partly conflated [...] in certain discourses and projects” (Badia et al. 2012: 23).

Here we can return to Sherry Arnstein’s analysis in her article “A ladder of citizen participation” (1969), which has had a significant impact on urban sociology by offering a reading grid that made it possible to assess the “effectiveness” of a participative approach with regard to the decision-making process. Sociologists such as Donzelot and Epstein argue that manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership, and delegated power are the many levels of citizen participation in urban projects that can be used to assess political manoeuvres (Donzelot et al. 2006).

But was it just the deficiency of forms of participation that was at play in these districts? From a democratic viewpoint, institutionalized

24 districts in 2004 to 21 covering 38 districts in 2010 (IJ2008/1218/IU: §5). In 2013, the Swedish urban policy designs a new “urban partnership”, the so-called “lokala partnerskap”, that focuses on 15 areas. (Boverket 2013:11)

10. URBACT is a European program that focuses on European Territorial Cooperation. In general terms, this program aims at launching and developing sustainable integrated urban projects in European cities.

participation – involving discussions on modes of minority affiliation and participation – has a concrete, technical reverse side that needs to be examined. This reverse side consists of institutional control in urban environments, in particular when it comes to public order, surveillance and security in the public arena. Against this background, I find it urgent to explore urban strategies so as to better understand how they articulate, against the general backdrop of distrust, a potential of social and civic mobilization as well as systems of control and security.

It is against this background that the aim of this dissertation – to examine how civic distrust develops in reaction to the contradictory political orientations of contemporary urban policies – attains its real interest and relevance. In the chapters that follow I will show how matters of participation and public safety have become increasingly important in the definition of urban integrated projects. This perspective provides me with a critical standpoint on new techniques of government that are developed according to territorial characteristics. In a theoretical perspective, I argue that participation and securitization are produced as norms of social control within the framework of institutional mechanisms.¹¹ In the name of urban citizenship, public and private players involve residents and experiment with new social models that seeks to recast socio-ethnic ties. But the conflicts of interest and feeling of distrust among residents lead the local actors to design an extended securitization process.

It follows from the above that my investigation attempts to reformulate the issue of state territorial restructuring, within the broad field of critical urban theory, in relation to the crucial controversy on *urban citizenship*. I will be using some of Michel Foucault's theoretical contributions to posit participation and securitization as citizenship norms produced within the framework of institutional mechanisms. My theoretical stance diverges from a liberal mode of understanding insofar as insecurity will be treated as a construct that reframes political participation and not as “integral” to urban development. It also diverges from a traditional Marxist mode of analysis in the

11. I borrow from Olivier Borraz the following definition of a norm: “the term [norm] covers rules in a broad sense, rules that have not necessarily been the subject of a written formalization, but that are for the most part internalized” (Borraz 2005: 124).

sense that the diversity of participative experiences in Europe does not allow us to consider participation as a process exclusively linked to social movements in reaction to class domination. Participative approaches, as developed in the framework of urban projects and local development agreements, may also have a questionable or even negative impact. According to my argument, participation and securitization raise normative problems within institutions, notably if they are examined in terms of modes of community affiliation.

This approach offers at least two advantages. Firstly it lends itself to an innovative way of understanding the suspicion, distrust and rejection displayed by inhabitants toward public institutions. I link these normative issues to the notion of “governmentality,” to borrow Foucault’s terminology, which can be understood as the association of techniques of subjugation – techniques of individual domination and processes of liberation – with security techniques – defined here as modes of prevention and control in a social organization.¹² My critique strives in particular to evidence the way in which the association of these power techniques produces subjectivities, confusion and distrust in urban policy.

Secondly, if the notion of participation feeds into the recurrent rhetoric about citizenship found in urban strategies, its meaning could potentially vary with different sites and players according to social risks and local threats. Two questions are pertinent here: How can we problematize forms of participation – often found in generic terms in urban projects – with the variety of meaning that “securitization” can have on the ground in the neighborhoods studied? To what extent could the levers of institutional participation lead local stakeholders to elaborate systems of observation, surveillance, or control? Problematizing participative and security issues in a local development program thus leads me to what I call *regimes of hospitality*, that is to say, the multiple tensions and amalgams linked to the formation of political subjects – “the residents” – in mechanisms that lead to strongly internalizing modes of securitization in the practices of local players.

12. “Contact between technologies of domination of others and those of the self, I call governmentality” says Foucault (Foucault 2005: 655)

ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

This examination of “regimes of hospitality” includes an introduction followed by seven chapters. The first one introduces the theoretical basis of my investigation as well as an account of the methodological approaches that have informed my research.

The second chapter presents the necessary historical framework for understanding French urban policy. This involves analyzing participation- and securitization-related instruments and norms throughout the sequence of policy reforms that has characterized French urban policy. This historical dimension serves to reconstruct the many discourses on “resident participation” and “security” in various modes of governance. In broad terms, we will see that, in the 1980s, participation is interpreted as a mode of socio-cultural activity; in the 1990s it is construed as a democratic and contractual procedure; in the 2000s, it becomes descriptive of a certain expertise that relies on users in the neighborhood for the management of urban projects; and, finally, in our contemporary context, participation is understood as techniques of empowering disenfranchised residents in public policies. As for securitization, it is linked to social prevention in the 1980s; to the redeployment of local police services in the 1990s; and then to the spatialization of modes of surveillance and control in the 2000s. The dialectical relationship between participative and security approaches leads me to query the sense of the various modes of governance connected to the different stages: social experimentation articulates modes of socio-cultural animation and prevention in the 1980s. The spread of urban policy by territorial contracts created an overlap between participative procedures and new forms of repressive intervention in the 1990s. In the 2000s, the new forms of project management established by the state with local players sought to increase the integration of residents into the procedures of securitization. As I will show, urban strategies – contractual strategies or urban project management – have served to negotiate different models of citizenship in local projects, based on potential social “risks” and cultural dangers linked to local development.

The third chapter presents a first local experience, Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air in the city of Saint-Denis. Historically, this is an immigration district. This analysis of a contractual strategy evidences the way in which political choices have contributed to establishing a new mode of local governance informed by a discourse on resident participation based on mobilization in socio-cultural networks. In the 1980s, this industrial city started to turn matters of social and civil insecurity into an object of policy. The municipality opted to set up participative procedures – socio-cultural activities, educational action, health – in order to address the effects of growing marginality in certain neighborhoods, like Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air.

The territorial contracts that were signed for this purpose served to overhaul the political and institutional organization in Saint-Denis as well as the civic procedures on the neighborhood scale. As we will see, this strategy contributed to political, social and ethnic conflicts of interpretation that concerned the fabric of solidarity or social cohesion. As far as participation is concerned, the territorial contract combined social development actions integrating associations with urban actions, properly speaking, in which resident took part. But facts also show that the participative process has remained very selective. It has lead volunteer residents and representatives of associations to define registers of socialization mixed with affects, moral judgments, and discriminatory comments. In so doing, this mode of governance, based on contract and participation, has prompted distrust of institutions and to a certain degree also among residents on the basis of identity and social or ethnic affiliations. This regime of hospitality, of social life with the “other” or with the “foreigner”, thus causes daily scenes of conflict, distrust and rejections, as well as discriminatory and sometimes racist practices.

The fourth chapter presents a second local experience, this time in Les Cinq Quartiers district of Les Mureaux. It shows how the efforts to promote urban citizenship takes on different forms depending on how the local inhabitants judge the risks and threats involved in local development and how the mode of governance varies as a result. In contrast to Saint-Denis, it was not social insecurity but rather the racism of the 1990s, the ethnic concentration and the rioting of youth in a ghettoized neighborhood that prompted the small city of Les Mureaux to launch a full-blown urban project, integrating prevention, control, and

public security. Here the mode of governance did not set out to favor the emergence of intermediary organizations, as was the case in Saint-Denis with the local associations and resident collectives.

On the contrary, the current mayor of Les Mureaux has held onto his power of representation, and sought instead to individualize procedures of integration through high-profile urban project measures, trying to create social diversity by massive destruction and rehousing, for instance. This project has been supported by a policy of prevention and mediation, focused to a large extent on the local youth and residents in integration, and on creating relays with residents in order to prevent and deal with anxieties, conflicts, and observable damage in the district.

With its Republican overtones, the policies conducted in Les Mureaux have caused a breakdown in the socio-ethnic bonds that were formed during the industrial development. The city has sought to improve the situation by means of policies aiming at “civilizing” residents through preventive measures that often implicate residents in processes of responsabilization, discipline and control in neighbor relations. The mayor of Les Mureaux has hired local youth to play a part in the project and show the example for others. These young mediators from a wide variety of cultural backgrounds are active in specific populations: school children, families where the inter-generational relations have been weakened by the social and economic environment, etc. A reticular social development gradually emerges in the management of the project that serves to relay important information to specific populations, within an urban environment that is highly categorized by social and ethnic factors. This system of engaging local residents and youth is far from eliciting unanimous support. Local participants gain recognition only in the framework of the mechanisms in which they are integrated. More generally, the policy of engagement tends to marginalize other social and political movements in the neighborhood.

Chapters five and six are analytical. Drawing on the two local experiences, the fifth chapter shows how engagement leads to “subjugating” residents to a mode of local governance in certain public meetings and work groups on local life and public tranquillity. In fact, modes of engagement present risks for local partners when it comes to public order and security, for it is easy to point to others and see

them as responsible. Chapter five focuses on examining the relationship between the local registers of citizenship and the modalities of securitization of districts. Taking a step back from the field, the sixth chapter aims at an understanding of how the norms of engagement are linked to the mechanisms of public security and tranquillity in the experiences of local development. As a result, this chapter also highlights and defines the regimes of hospitality that are activated in the name of urban citizenship.

The seventh chapter is the concluding one. Based on my two local examples, I here develop the concept of regime of hospitality. As I will argue, a regime of hospitality can be conceived as an analytical grid that sheds light on the relationship of hospitality and hostility in the residents' various responses in situations of institutional engagement concerning questions of private and public use, access to city services, integration of minorities, and public tranquillity. We will also see how a regime of hospitality gives rise to new professional practices in urban strategies that must be questioned to gain a better understanding of relations between the governing and the governed.

1. THEORY, SURVEY OF THE FIELD AND METHODOLOGY

Urban policies can have many purposes. The policies that will concern me in this dissertation are those that have been implemented in West Europe and North America as instruments in the fight against segregation and marginalization of social or ethnic groups in low-income housing districts and in certain private housing sectors (Droste et al. 2008: 163–170; Magnusson Turner 2008: 225–228; Kirszbaum 2008: 17–24; Le Galès 2011: 337–338; Badia et al. 2012: 11–13).¹ Four argu-

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1. In the U.S.A., there are devices that permit the combination of a residential mobility program (the so-called Housing Choice Voucher) with a mixed-income program (Hope VI). The Hope VI favor (Housing Opportunity for People Everywhere) aims at transforming public housing projects into mixed-income developments. The French experience is quite similar to the Dutch, if we consider its development in the 1980s and 1990s. The current so-called Urban Renewal program (Programme national de rénovation urbaine, PNRU) was launched in 2003 and aims at wiping out the ghettos (350 projects selected, 250,000 demolitions, 250,000 reconstructions and 400,000 rehabilitations). Each destroyed dwelling is, for the most part, to be reconstructed outside of the area. This ambitious favor is supported by new organizations (ANRU, ACSE, La Foncière Logement) and proposes a one step-funding center to support the plan (€30 billion budget). Another program called Urban Contracts for Social Cohesion (CUCS) was launched from 2007 to 2014, promoting employment, education, health and safety. In the United Kingdom, the New Deal for Communities, which has funded more than 100 local projects, aims at bridging the gap between the deprived neighborhoods and the rest of the city. In Germany, three different programs have been launched. The Soziale Stadt promotes integration and cohesion through projects based on education, employment, involvement of the inhabitants and improvement of public spaces (budget: €1.7 billion, 447 areas selected, the state, the Länder and the affected cities fund the program). Two other programs support demolitions in the western and eastern parts of Germany (Stadtumbau Ost launched from 2002 to 2009 has a €2.7 billion budget and concerns 342 areas, Stadtumbau West launched from 2004 to 2009 concerns 16 cities). In the Netherlands, many experiments were launched during the 1980s and taken over

ments can be put forward to explain the phenomenon of segregation: *rising poverty*, with regard to the casualization of forms of work, in particular the disappearance of certain low-skilled industrial jobs (Wacquant 2006: 273–275; Le Galès 2011: 36–37); *ethno-racial discrimination*, in connection with the history of citizenship peculiar to each country (Fainstein 2006: 116; Donzelot 2009: 7–12; Rosanvallon 2011: 203–221); and the *weakness of social and family bonds* that results from situations of social insecurity (Castel 2003: 47; Le Galès 2011: 203). Finally, segregation has been explained as a spatial phenomenon, in terms of ghettos and urban marginality (Wacquant 2006: 278–279; Donzelot 2006: 33–35).

Many analyses developed out of a critique of neoliberal theses in European modes of government, which entailed the withdrawal and/or reformulation of social politics and policies of integration in Europe (Castel 2003: 40; Wacquant 2006: 275–278; Donzelot 2009: 13–19; Le Galès 2011: 203; Eick et al. 2014: 11–17). The development of urban policies should therefore be rethought not exclusively as a counterpoint to urban phenomena, but as a “state territorial restructuring in contemporary Europe” (Brenner 2006: 259–266). One case in point are the so called “social cohesion” programs that set out to redefine social bonds in deprived neighborhoods, to promote civic participation and ensure public order (Donzelot 2008: 9–19; Eick et al. 2014: 13–17). After undoing the redistributive compromise based on the salary report (Castel 1995: 645–674; Rosanvallon 2011: 227–236), successive governments have had to deal with the major socio-anthropological questions of our day: how can government institutions ensure social order and the development of social ties in an urban society that has become increasingly unequal and discriminatory? Without social protection based on the value of work, “making a society” – to borrow the expression of Jacques Donzelot and Thierry Oblet – consists in knowing where to place the subject of social justice in the equation.

This question can be reformulated in the field of urban sociology

by national policies during the 1990s. For example, the “major cities policy,” *Grote Steden Beleid*, promotes, e.g., mix of tenures in deprived areas and destruction of social housing units. The program concerned 56 areas and proposes a €1.4 billion budget. Recent political orientations favor an integrated approach with the launching of a new policy that touches 40 areas.

in terms of an old theoretical controversy between liberal and Marxist currents. On one side, the insecurity in the city is explained by the conditions of the city's development. It is the city that is at the origin of incivilities, delinquency, and insecurity. The Chicago School correlated the notion of insecurity in particular with economic development and the shifting heterogeneous mobilities at work in big cities. In so doing, insecurity and collective forms of organization like ghettos or ethnic communities were "naturalized", so to speak, in the name of urban phenomena (Grafmeyer et al. 1979: 8–10). From a Marxist perspective, by contrast, "urban violence" is framed as a form of democratic expression. In this sense, the Marxist analysis situates participative approaches as a counterpoint to the inequalities that play out in a social space, rather than an urban space. From this perspective, the deficiencies in the system of citizenship and integration are at the center of protests and demands. The main representatives speak of a "right to the city", which represents a demand for basic rights: housing, health care and education, protests, etc. Thus, according to a Marxist approach, insecurity is a characteristic of the liberal political economics that generates inequalities, which can lead to challenging an established order. The institutional framework will be tempted for this reason to penalize collective movements informed by a social critique.

Let me now move on to consider the ways in which studies of governmentality have renewed the debate between Liberal and Marxist thoughts over community development and urban planning. Indeed, the governmental perspective provides a key to rethinking the development of urban policies according to power relationships, technologies and subjectivities.

INSECURITY AS A COUNTERPOINT TO URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Based on the ideas developed by the Chicago School, Oblet and Landauer point out that the notion of insecurity can be considered an intrinsic characteristic of urban development (Oblet 2008: 8–16; Landauer 2009: 7–10). Indeed, it has been a general feature of classical

sociological theory, especially in the US, to posit that big cities generate flows, migration and socio-ethnic differentiation by the effects of an urban setting and economic specialization. In contrast to community life in a rural setting, cities become places where there is a loss of social control in comparison with the types of traditional communities structured by the church, the school, or the family. Park's observations in particular show how urbanization causes a community to shed primary relations – deep relationships in a close social environment – which are replaced by indirect secondary relationships (Park 1979: 107). As a result, modes of collective control and systems of recognition of others vanish, giving rise in theory to “an increase of vice and crime” (Park 1979: 109).

Faced with strong urban growth, the French ethnologist Maurice Halbwachs testified on his return from the United States in 1932 to the impact of the disorganization of the city of Chicago in terms of race, nationality, profession, social status, but also lifestyle and moral characteristics. The individualization of lifestyles led to identifying changes in social organization through situations regarded as “abnormal”: disintegrated groups, homeless men, dispersed collective life, juvenile criminality, vagrancy, gangs (Halbwachs 1979: 292). But although population flows and migration may heighten insecurity, they do not truly determine it. Richard Sennett (2001) claims that city-dwellers are “not subject to a fixed scheme of identity”. The districts with immigrant populations are the ones that potentially form the most anxiety-provoking, criminogenic places, Park argued.² In this line, Ash Amin (2010: 1) points out that “the habits of living with diversity vary from place to place, weaving in emotions and precognitive reflexes formed in bodily, material and virtual encounter”.

According to this idea, the urban spaces themselves generate social distantiation, avoidance, and ethnic segregation. Jane Jacobs initiated in this sense a pro-urban current aimed at identifying factors of security in the city, such as a clearly marked boundary between public and private space, a collective dynamic rooted in the street, or any other

2. “Every great city has its racial colonies, like the Chinatowns of San Francisco and New York, the little Sicily in Chicago, and various less pronounced types. In addition to these, most cities have their segregated vice districts, like that which until recently existed in Chicago, and their rendez-vous for criminals of various sorts” (Park 1915: 582).

characteristic that turned public space into a place of indirect social control (Jacobs 1965: 367–378).

As these sociologists argue, “disorganization” gives rise to a weakening of social conventions and leads to incomprehension, incivilities, and delinquency.³ The security argument is thus naturalized by the urban phenomenon: the city is defined as a living organism, because of the complex mobilities at work in it and the residential strategies that it generates.⁴ As Oblet observed about American urban theory, insecurity is a constituent dimension of urban life, being itself “the counterpart to the freedoms that the city affords” (Oblet 2008: 3). By offering a passage from the state of community to the state of urban society, cities change the “nature” of social ties. Demographic growth leads to massive movements of population, but the forms of affiliation become more complex. As a result of the social division of labor, the individualization of lifestyles is often understood as the tipping point between a traditional “community” and a “society” (Halbwachs 1979: 292). Thus, according to Park, it is the position of individuals in space and the effects of distance between individuals within groups that characterize our manner of “living together” and forming grounds for social or cultural groupings (Park 1979: 198).

In response to this disorganization, local collectives could develop a space of expression and organization for minority groups in the early days of industrial development in Chicago. Citizens could take advantage of their capacity for organizing and influencing local public life. Paul Alinsky gave a theoretical framework to the protest movement that emerged locally after World War II to demand decent living conditions. Alinsky defined this form of local activism as “community organizing,” and he showed how it mobilized support for the poor districts of Chicago from a variety of organizations, including labor unions and the church. Alinsky’s idea was to promote the emergence of local minority movements through endogenous development that would themselves define the individual and collective modalities of a project of social justice and access to decent living conditions. Marie-Hélène Bacqué and Carole Bienwener have described this bottom-up

3. This argument is notably questioned by sociologists who focus on security, such as Laurent Mucchielli (2002: 99) and Thierry Oblet (2008: 19).

4. Concerning the naturalization of the city, see the introduction to the urban sociology of the Chicago School by Yves Grafmeyer and Isaac Joseph (1979: 8–9).

approach as a fundamental break with the overly bureaucratic and stigmatizing methods of social work. For them, community organizing was also one of the first major references of resident participation prior to the movements of the 1970s that called for the “empowerment” of women or African-Americans (Bacqué et al. 2013: 42). In the contemporary context, Frank Moulaert asserts that “locally based initiatives, often much more than official state-led programs, can galvanize a range of publics to engage in activities that have city-wide (if not greater) impacts on the dynamics of urban cohesion and social development” (Moulaert 2010: 5).

Quite logically, modes of engagement, association, or sociability in metropolitan areas lend themselves to an ephemeral or transient appropriation of territory. As Joseph has said of this urban ecology (2001), the boundaries of public and private are not clearly established. There are modes of socialization and affiliation that can be explained by the appropriation of micro-territories. It is in these spaces of transition that the notion of empowerment acts as an activist principle of organization, by getting individuals to interact in a collective.

Now, the sociological view of urban mobility and the early stages of “grassroots democracy” that I have just outlined will from a certain Marxist perspective be seen as fundamentally ahistorical and nearly apolitical. The Marxist theoretical approach strives to grasp a political and economic order, a center that works to disseminate dominant social norms. The relationship between center and periphery in cities is here fundamentally conceived as a political relationship, as Jacques Chevallier noted (1978: 12–16). So behind the notion of urban “disorganization,” one must see how transformations in modes of spatial production lead to the growing marginalization of a portion of the population in big cities.

By reframing the analysis in critical terms, certain sociologists, like Neil Brenner, David Harvey, Loïc Wacquant, and Neil Smith examine the way in which conflicts arising out of the relationships between the dominant and the dominated are expressed in the public arena.⁵ From this standpoint, marginality is not exactly a matter of a spatial

5. Brenner, among others, defines four key propositions underlying a critical urban theory: “critical theory is theory; it is reflexive; it involves a critique of instrumental reason; and it is focused on the disjuncture between the actual and the possible” (Brenner 2012: 14).

analysis. It is the result of an order that emerges in capitalist economic development. Starting from the process of globalization, this critical analysis concentrates on the competitive aspect of agglomerations, the economic and financial specialization of regional centers, the property regimes, and the modes of spatial appropriation. Illustrations of these processes are the specialization of financial markets, the development of new tourist regions in Asia, the gentrification of European urban centers, the separatist movements, or gated communities in the United States. Modes of private appropriations in cities are, in this perspective, particularly criticized for creating spaces of protection, surveillance, and control, increasingly handled by private players. As Harvey observes, “the results are indelibly etched into the spatial forms of our cities, which increasingly become cities of fortified fragments, of gated communities and privatized public spaces kept under constant surveillance” (Harvey 2008: 9).⁶ As I have already indicated, the emergence of participative movements would, in this framework, ideally be conceived as responses to this socio-economic and political domination. Balibar notes that references to community and to citizenship always have a whiff of cordite in history: they were initially attached to “insurrections” in cities after the French Revolution, or to the “right to resist” during the American Revolution. Having said this, Balibar is clearly indicating that community and citizenship are essentially connected to the political capacity to constitute a state or to define a public space (Balibar 1996: 364). It is on this basis that the forms of civil engagement act on the margins of a political order and consequently resist or oppose it (Chevallier 1978). Henri Lefèbvre, one of the illustrious representatives of this urban thinking, puts it as follows:

Segregation tends to prohibit protest, opposition, and action by scattering those who could protest, oppose, or act. Political life, from this perspective, will oppose or strengthen the center of political decision-making. This option will be [...] the criterion of democracy (2009: 113).

6. Neil Smith describes the first wave of gentrification in the 1960s as a sporadic movement. From the 1970s to the 1980s, it is understood as a wider process in relation to the urban and economic transformation. During the 1990s, it evolves into a global urban strategy. Smith also depicts the spatial consequences of global economic development (Smith 2002).

Robert Castel used this dialectic “from the margin to the center” to explain the riots of 2005 in France (2007: 59–75) and Loïc Wacquant (2006: 3) made this the centerpiece of his comparative analysis of urban marginality in Europe and in the United States, in looking for the “generic mechanisms”, the “historical matrix” or yet again the “effects of institutional transformation” specific to its system of “advanced marginality”. Wacquant (1999: 11) was one of the authors to denounce the failures of citizenship that lead to “criminalizing poverty”.

In this perspective, racial segregation in the United States and ethnic relegation in Europe can only be understood in terms of the philosophy of citizenship and the context in which they emerge: slavery or colonialism. Wacquant notes that districts of relegation in Europe are not:

incubators of homogeneous ethnic communities [...]. On the contrary, the demands of their residents are fundamentally social, related not so much with difference or diversity as with equality [...]. They pertain to the sphere of citizenship, not that of ethnicity (Wacquant 2006: 292).

Thus, this approach to community, conceived from top-down, starts with the observation that the state would not guarantee the protection of individuals because of the lack or the weakening of insurance mechanisms in social legislation (retirement, social benefits, sick leave). Peter Marcuse stresses this point, as he argues: “to gain rights for those that do not have them will involve eliminating some rights for those that do: the right to dispossess others, to exploit, to dominate, to suppress, to manipulate the conduct of others” (Marcuse 2012: 35).

The emergence of a participative strategy is regarded in this context as a local technique for regulating social conflicts since “citizenship is not founded on social inutility” (Castel 1995: 694). For Castel, it is the dissociation between individual and collective responsibility in particular that causes social and civil risks to emerge and gives rise to “a local management of problems” (1995: 692). This technique of social management would tend – as in a mirroring effect – to bring the burden of responsibility to bear on the individual who is the victim of social inequality, the unaffiliated individual with no property. As individuals are increasingly held accountable, collective affiliations collapse, with the result that a certain type of alterity can no longer be promoted in the functioning of public policies (Castel 2009: 108).

CITIES, PARTICIPATION AND SECURITY: A CRITICAL READING

The debate between conservative liberals and Marxists with regard to participation and security is useful for understanding the controversy at the heart of local development policies in Europe today. As we have seen, this debate traditionally consists in pitting – in the name of individual freedom – anti-social behavior and public security against social justice and access to social rights. But in my opinion this opposition must be rethought as far as local development policies are concerned, in the framework of discussions begun in the 2000s on the territorialisation of public action and its consequences for the relations between the state and the citizen.

This is also the theoretical arena in which I intend to situate my investigation in the following pages. In a more “postmodern” vein, I intend to discuss the notions of participation and security as a “mode of governance” not only focused on the repressive management of social insecurity but as the counterpart to a “repositioning” (the term is borrowed from Saskia Sassen) of citizenship in these geographical areas.⁷ I will concentrate on the formation processes of citizenship in the city based on participative and security orientations in local development projects. Indeed, local development policies involve “socio-ethnic” experiments that lead the state to diversify its discourse on citizenship and identity. It is this highly conflictual process of engagement that drive institutional and local players to define innovative modes to address the issue of security. Thus the debate is not that of civil security understood as a political response to the increasing social insecurity, but rather that of the governed subject, engaged in systems of security, to shape this new form of citizenship.

It is worth pointing out that my critique diverges both from the

7. The notion of “postmodernity” mainly refers here to the technological transformations that occur at the end of the 1970s and its incidence on our conception of knowledge. Lyotard argues in *The Postmodern Condition* (1979) that technological transformations have a “considerable impact on knowledge” in that the specialization they bring about leads to conflicts between scientific and narrative knowledge (1979: 18–19).

liberal urban theories inherited from the Chicago School, and from explanatory analyses of the urban crisis based on the division of labor in cities, as well as from political analyses based on defining individual and collective action in terms of empowerment and community action informed by a political discourse on the responsibility of players in the city (Brenner 2012: 11; Bacqué et al. 2011: 75–95).⁸ To my mind, this reasoning leads to disciplining the governed and identifying them as “responsible” for a conflictual socio-political process. As we shall see from the cases examined in this dissertation, we are often quite far from anything that could be considered “social de-conditioning” or a “liberating practice”.

Furthermore, my discussion does not rely on a Marxist reading of participation and security. Such a reading posits that the development of contemporary capitalism, due to its unstable phases, requires Western states to radically reform social action by shifting the focus from social rights to criminal justice. This securitization would be accomplished by the territorialisation of public policies (Wacquant 2009: xix; Brenner et al. 2012: 1).⁹ In opposition to this form of government, the “right to the city” would consist in promoting grassroots democratic principles starting from the city and from the diversity of social movements: freedom of expression through participation in political decision-making; equal treatment and access to public services, particularly urban services (Marcuse 2012: 37). As we shall see, it is not so much the phases of capitalism that I consider unstable as the regulatory policies initiated by the territorialisation of public action.

My position diverges more precisely from the Marxist reading in the sense that I do not intend to discuss the notion of political “participation” as a force driven by social movements, in a bottom-up logic.¹⁰

8. Keep in mind that the fiscal regulations that characterize community development in the United States produce as much social inequality as social bonds (Bréville 2014: 10–11).

9. This new mode of government refocuses the activities of the judicial system and the police in these districts “specifically turned toward managing the ‘problem’ categories residing in the lower region of social and urban space” (Wacquant 2009: xix). According to Wacquant, it tends to a form of submission to individual responsibility that goes hand in hand with a security-focused policy, in the name of dealing with incivility and delinquency.

10. In a Marxist approach, the lack of social justice would lead to the phenomenon of social insecurity, that is to a deficit of protection in terms of the environment, housing,

From this perspective, Margit Mayer is right when she points to the many conceptions and initiatives aimed at establishing a “right to the city,” notably in an institutional framework, along with enterprises of “mystification” around the positive aspects of “participation”:

the recent history of urban struggles that succeeded, thanks to broad coalitions, in impeding or at least influencing neoliberal urban or community development, is filled with cases that sooner or later turned out to be merely defensive, achieving hardly more than saving a piece of urbanity or protecting their alternative life styles (2012: 76).

With this in mind it seems essential to examine the most procedural aspects of participation. As we shall see, this is the question that underpins the construction of a “citizenship in cities” and this is why participation proves to be problematical to “implement” in metropolitan systems. Patrick Le Galès, in his analysis of “modes of governing” in European cities, has highlighted the extent to which “local democracy” has remained a forgotten dimension (Le Galès 2011: 30).

Moreover, and from a more postcolonial point of view, it is clear that the “participative” phenomenon is called into question. Wouldn’t it be this new urban citizenship, promoted as part of a neo-liberal outlook and a discourse on freedom, that underpins a socio-cultural conflict? The post-colonial perspective seems interesting from this standpoint when it criticizes the idea that space can be politically organized as a function of identity, culture and gender. The project of nation is embedded at the origin in a democratic history, that of a people. Participation as political discourse and institutional mechanism is not exclusively linked to acquiring social rights.

Sassen discusses the idea of allegiance related to the notion of “nationality” and the process of relocalizing citizenship to a trans-national, civil denationalized basis (Sassen 2006: 227–237). Modes

and health, and to difficulties in access to public and/or private services (education, transport, culture), as well as to a variety of social demands to acquire these rights. Further, urbanization is seen as an expression of capitalist development: it results in an internal contradiction that explains the indecent living conditions of marginal populations, the segregation processes, the emergence of social protest movements, and the related process of securitization.

of engagement are therefore based on affiliations that have a strong dimension of political, social, and cultural allegiance. For instance, the register of citizenship in the French Republic emphasizes an individual who refuses ethno-racial differentiation in the public arena. Thus, the standard of behavior expected by this philosophy makes it difficult to recognize the post-colonial sociological diversity of French society when immigrant workers and their descendants became full-fledged citizens of the French Republic. In comparing the French and the Dutch experiences, Marion Carrel observes that “the objective of ‘getting residents to participate’ seldom translates into a search for modes of elaborating public policies from bottom-up” (Carrel 2004: 4). The “top-down” conception of public space focuses essentially on the trajectories of the migrant, the thresholds and boundaries of a geographic area, the distances of localization, convergence and avoidance strategies, etc. Seen in these terms, local development policies, “social cohesion” in particular, are operating on the living environment through the rhetoric of the national identity: the one and indivisible republic in France (Donzelot et al. 2003: 129–137; Dikeç 2007: 144–145). From the opposite standpoint, the multicultural policies implemented in Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries have fostered “an approach with a focus on the importance of minority groups” (Bertossi 2007: 2, Dikeç 2007: 29–30). Bertossi argues that the British model of integration, for instance, traditionally presents:

a project of equal access to rights in a society based on a socio-ethnic reality. [...] This “plural” version of liberalism [concentrates] on fighting racial discrimination, including in the public arena, by giving social and political weight to members of ethno-cultural minorities (2007: 2).

In these terms, the philosophy of integration in Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries is based on language, cultural codes, and power relations within communities of residents or with respect to an institution. Through the notion of pluralism, this “local” perspective emphasizes the ethnic relations in the community life. Thus, the community development is based on “empowerment,” that is, a bottom-up policy centred on improving living conditions, developed by and for residents. According to Donzelot, Catherine Mével and

Anne Wyvekens the notion of community building is concretely implemented in urban programs according to three main characteristics: struggling with interethnic conflicts, setting up a patrimonial strategy and struggling with feelings of insecurity (Donzelot et al. 2003: 173).

From this comparative perspective, the assimilationist model of integration appears to be much more intolerant, argues Dikeç (Dikeç 2007: 29). Indeed, there is potentially a “negative” aspect to an engagement as a matter of national affiliation. As Paul Ricœur points out, in referring to a people, the citizen categorizes the “other” in a binary way in her search for collective belonging and sovereign protection: there is thus a boundary between “them” and “us” (Ricœur 1997: 2). It seems to me that phenomena of segregation should be analyzed in terms of modes of citizenship – not exclusively in terms of social citizenship in a global city but from an historical and anthropological standpoint. As Dahlstedt puts it (2009: 7):

Researchers have often taken *borders* and *space* (between nation-states as well as public/private, state/market/civil, society/family), *identities* and *categories* (based for example on race/ethnicity/nation/culture) quite for granted, as if they were unproblematic and self-evident “facts”.

Another idea is important to consider from the perspective of ethnic and migration studies.¹¹ The “participative” approach can be interpreted as a critical dimension of the notion of the subject in the public

11. Ethnicity is usually defined as a group of individuals that share a common “culture” or “language” (Petit Robert 2009). However, Stephen Castels and Mark J. Miller note in the context of globalization that “culture, identity and community [...] have become central themes in debates on the new ethnic minorities”. They argue in particular that: “First, [...] cultural differences serve as a marker for ethnic boundaries. Second, ethnic cultures play a central role in community formation: when ethnic groups cluster together, they establish their own neighborhoods, marked by distinctive use of private and public spaces. Third, ethnic neighborhoods are perceived by some members of the majority group as confirmation of their fears of a foreign take-over. Fourth, the dominant culture may see migrant cultures as static and regressive” (Castels et al. 2009: 40). As Irene Molina puts it, the notion of ethnicity cannot be reduced to a static cultural question. It has to be analyzed according to social interactions in which cultures and languages are understood in a given society (Molina 1997: 21). Christophe Bertossi considers that the nowadays very politicized notion of ethnicity generates normative representations of culture that question national models of integration in European countries such as France or the UK (Bertossi 2007: 7).

arena.¹² First, postcolonial criticism often abolishes the dichotomy between the public and the private arenas through concepts such as “global citizenship and cosmopolitanism” or “identity and subjectivity” (Wisker 2007: 101/186–189; Scott 2010: 91).¹³ Thus, the idea of “home” can refer to the sense of homeland or national community as well as to the actual space of my house (Ricœur 1997: 2; Jonsson 2005: 292). Wisker writes that “vernacular cosmopolitanism” can be seen from the “margins”, from the “peripheries of global centers of power and wealth” (Wisker 2007: 187). This nuance explains why I will refer to the notion of “multiethnic” neighborhood: segregated districts are reception areas for the poor but also for immigrants and “national outsiders”, to borrow Eleonore Kofman’s term (Kofman 2005).

Thus, my question is related less to “collective life in neighborhoods” than to the institutionalization of participation in local development policies through the definition of a political subject in the city. The meaning of engagement and the modes of participation are being discussed everywhere in Europe (Kings 2007: 50–53; Lister-born 2007: 62; Lees 2008: 2458; Bacqué et al. 2011: 15–18). Taking the French example as a starting point, this controversy often relies on Mustafa Dikeç’s work. In the footsteps of Bruno Jobert, Dikeç maintains that French urban policy is the site of a contradictory debate between neo-liberal political rationality (sharing responsibility with the governed subject) and the theoretical assertion of national cohesion, between globalization and the Republic. According to Dikeç,

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12. Let’s briefly review Hobbes’ approach to the contract between the state and the people. Hobbes broke with the Aristotelian political view of the subject of his day (Moreau 1989: 34). In particular, he thought that no natural authority existed that permitted human beings to live together peaceably. Doing so required a contract between a given population and a sovereign. Since “man is wolf to man” in the philosophical tradition of the time, Hobbes maintained that the sovereign state must guarantee civil peace through the authority of the law, in creating legal subjects who renounce their natural rights and abide by legal rules. However, Wisker notes that notions such as “identity and subjectivity” nowadays question the concept of “subject”. In the postmodern perspective, “there was indeed no real individualized subject or self” and “this assertion of the lack of self and the decentering of the subject was at odds with the needs of those from ex-colonies, those who had been silenced, to develop and express a sense of national identity and individual self, set against the erasure of those identities under colonial and/or imperial rule” (Wisker 2007: 100).
 13. Gina Wisker argues that “global citizenship suggests that instead of emphasizing differences and hierarchizing them, we are all citizens of the world. It is a goal of liberal education, which springs from the belief in cosmopolitanism” (Wisker 2007: 186).

the state reasserts Republican values in the “problem” neighborhoods in reaction to the threat that ethnic communities present to the national community. Secondly, the specificity of this territorial mode of governance is to set up norms aimed at branding populations of other origins. The territorialisation mode favors:

the relationship between space, politics and (urban) policy, understood as a practice of articulation that involves spatial ordering through descriptive names, categorization, definitions, designations and mappings (Dikeç 2007: 21).

It is the security dimension of territorialisation that will make it possible to reassert the Republican model in the face of “differentialist” theories. The security-based treatment is given shape within the national territory by urban policies centred on places rather than populations. Several architects, sociologists and political analysts have shown how urban projects have involved more and more extensive and specialized modes of control, in terms of urban design, surveillance using new information and communication technologies, militarized techniques of intervention, etc. (Dikeç 2007: 68–92; Landauer 2009: 61–93; Belmessous 2010: 79–148; Graham 2011: xiv). Thus, according to Dikeç, the integration of police power in local policies reinforces assimilation into the dominant cultural model.

Dikeç, however, does not stress an important dimension in this governmental perspective: territorialisation in France is not a phenomenon of the state’s deconcentration in the territory.¹⁴ It is firstly supported historically by processes of decentralization of public action, after which governmental action is re-centralized through the creation of regulatory authorities on the national scale to establish new institutional norms, distinct from the centralized institution. This clearly relates to what Randi Gressgård (2015a) calls the “plural policing and the safety-security nexus in urban governance”. As Thierry Oblet notes from the French context (2008: 97), city policing is not an exclusive “national government matter” as regards issues related to quality of life, public space and delinquency. France is not the

14. In a deconcentration process, the state delegates functions and competence to non-elected organizations (administrative tasks, financial control, etc.). The decentralization process, on the other hand, aims to give elective representatives and citizens a voice in a decision-making process.

only case in point in this regard; this is true in many other European countries. The case of Sweden seems significant in this respect. Faced with growing ethnic segregation in the big urban areas (Bråmås 2006), the great number of urban programs – as described by Roger Anderson (2006) – clearly shows how the institutional tools available to the state were in the process of changing. Using the city of Malmö as a case in point, Gressgård (2015b) analyzes the “unifying function” of social sustainability (2015: 110). She notes in particular that Malmö’s urban strategy acts as “a power of reattachment” in the city, which is socially and ethnically divided (2015: 117).

Dikeç is therefore not wrong in pointing to the rise in the use of security-based processes but he does not contextualize them in the framework of regulatory processes.¹⁵ Consequently, he does not extend his criticism to what may very well be the foundation of urban policy in France: the discourse on resident participation. This participative dimension is the starting point of my criticism. For me, practices of resident participation enable the production of subjectivity in power relations. It is after posing the question of subjectivity that we can take up the modalities of securitization.

As we see, I have not chosen to describe specifically the modes of securitization by the territorialization of policies from the European to the local scale. Moreover, I do not examine the question of participation through a study of social movements. Instead I have opted to concentrate on the local recomposition of citizenship in urban policies in order to describe the following process: the lapsing of participative institutional norms into security strategies. Rarely explored in its most concrete aspects in academia, this instrumental focus of modes of governance offers a concrete reading of the effects of urban policies on security processes.

15. Dikeç argues in particular that the French urban policy has “changed remarkably over the years, consolidating a ‘police order’ almost in a literal sense” and concludes that “the transformations of the state [evolved] on increasingly authoritarian and exclusionary lines” (Dikeç 2007: 33–34, 126). The “republican penal state [...] consolidates itself mainly in and though the social housing neighborhoods of *banlieues*, constituting the *banlieues* increasingly as ‘badlands’ that do not fit in the ‘republican’ imaginary” (Dikeç 2007: 126).

IMPLICATIONS AND POSITION

The first step of this research involves understanding how the notions of participation and security were constructed as techniques of government in the context of local development policies. I will relate those techniques to the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, where the term “technique” itself refers to procedures, analyses and methods that support institutional instruments of government – such as urban strategies.¹⁶

In this line of thought, the idea of participation is understood as a “technology of the self”, that is to say techniques in which individuals, volunteers, activists can “affect by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies, their own souls, their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform themselves, modify themselves” (Foucault 2004: 654).¹⁷ Magnus Dahlstedt and Andreas

16. Foucault defined the notion of governmentality as “The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has its target on population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and its essential technical means apparatuses of security” (Foucault 1991: 102)

17. Luc Blondiaux argues that a participative strategy often involves political risks. Public meetings and workshops generate anxiety and confrontations with the participants. Those risks can be avoided through participative methods and local development strategies, notably when local volunteers – such as residents in urban projects – are embedded in political arrangements, which are basically defined without their preliminary consent (Blondiaux 2008: 76). In this perspective, the role of the volunteers in participatory devices can be questioned in the straight line of Foucault’s pastoral function of government (Foucault 2004: 187). Indeed, Foucault was interested in the processes that prompt individuals to become subjects of knowledge and power, including in their perception of their own bodies. In the early 1980s, his thinking shifted from the field of political philosophy to that of ethics and morality. His study of Catholic and Protestant ethics shows the individualizing forms of submission based on a discourse of truth. The Christian approach promotes techniques of confession, examining one’s conscience, and self-renunciation: “We inherit the tradition of Christian morality which makes self-renunciation the condition for salvation. To know oneself was paradoxically the way to self-renunciation” (Foucault 1988: 22). Foucault formulates practices of self-liberation as a reflection of the notion of care of the self put forward by Greek philosophers and especially by the Stoics: “to improve oneself, to surpass oneself, to master the appetites that threaten to engulf you” (Foucault 1982: 3).

Fejes (2015:1) postulate that the idea of ‘active citizenship’ has become “prominent in a variety of policy areas in the Nordic states, as well as in European and others countries”. The idea of security is defined as a preventive means that allows administrating individuals and collectives in “risk zones” (to borrow Foucault’s expression). This preventive method is formalized by various procedures and disciplines by which governments influence the conducts of groups and individuals and impose rules and objectives (Foucault 2004: 654). The junction of those technologies in urban strategies underlies norms of urban citizenship as well as counter-conducts. I call the study of this process in multiethnic districts “regimes of hospitality”.

Techniques of participation and practices of rejection

To grasp this construction, it is important to keep in mind the way in which the emergence of local development policies in Europe has reflected since the 1980s new technologies of government. The “threads” of this history, from discourses to sociopolitical events, are too fragile and unstable to be approached in a linear manner. Many scholars have taken up the notion of governmentality in in-depth examinations of singular events in urban policy.¹⁸ Jacques Donzelot clarified Foucault’s influence on champions of the theory of governmentality, in an interview with Colin Gordon, published in 2005:

[Rose, Dean, Rabinow, and Gordon] all rely on the Foucauldian refutation of a fixed distinction between the domain of the State and the domain of civil society, between the domain of power and the domain of subjectivity. They use it to show that “the retreat of the State,” which is supposed to constitute neoliberalism, in fact corresponds to an extension of government (Donzelot et al. 2008: 53).

This is the enterprise of demystification to which these scholars are attached. The market is not a systematic means of regulation of individual liberties, a guarantee against the authoritarianism of states

18. Neoliberal access to power in the United Kingdom and the United States at the early 1980s, the attacks of 9/11 and the penal system set up in Guantanamo, the 2004 legislation in France on wearing religious signs, in particular the Islamic headscarf, and the treatment of riots in France or in the UK count among the singular events that have been extensively discussed.

(Hindess 2002: 133; Dean 2007: 44–59). And national societies have not become ungovernable as a result of the state’s withdrawal in a context of increasing economic competition on the international scale. Liberalism in its current form is firstly a form of government that operates on the basis of a discourse on liberty (Rose 1999, 41; Dean 2007: 199). Modes of participation are thus political techniques that operationalize a discourse on freedom.

Thus, to understand how states govern society – notably in the “difficult” neighborhoods of France, the “failed neighborhoods” in England, or the “*utsatta områden*” in Sweden – it is necessary to take a closer look at the conceptual breaks that occur in European democracies. Put very simply, the discourse on freedom has taken the place of the principle of equality or of national solidarity built up in the framework of nation states. Equality is a principle connected to the development of social law. As Castel has demonstrated, a whole social legislation exists, founded on insurance techniques. These techniques – developed through experimentation – served to guarantee decent living conditions for workers in terms of the main social risks (work, health, old age, housing). This social legislation proposed – like an envelope or a container – a system of protection to a massive population dealing with the inequalities resulting from industrial development (Donzelot 1994: 121–137). This “constructed equality” made it possible for heterogeneous masses of newcomers to cities to *live together in society* on the basis of political consent: the population accepts the social inequalities created by capitalistic development in return for a principle of redistribution and a guarantee against social risks. This principle of government is not right in itself, but it gets individuals to see themselves as equals in a political community (Rosanvallon 2011: 27, 266–268). This “social government” was traditionally fixed in (1) a moral discourse deeply related to health, happiness and civility; (2) a set of disciplines, norms and control; and (3) governable spaces – mainly embodied by the ideas of nation, colonies and family (Rose 1999: 101–112).

In redefining social policies in Europe in terms of a discourse on freedom, the champions of neoliberalism intend to promote the emancipation of the subject from the trap of social conditioning and dependency (Rosanvallon 1992: 88–96; Bacqué et al. 2011: 99–104). In rethinking the notion of power in this more decentralized context,

certain French scholars like Donzelot have refrained from reducing local development policies to a spatial treatment of poverty. In replacing a planning strategy by the coordination of territorial policies, the state gave itself the means to negotiate “the relationships between individual autonomy and the responsibility of all” (Donzelot 1994: 260). Donzelot calls this process “the state as moderator” (*l’État animateur*). In that perspective, territorial collectivities open up possibilities through the system of partnership, local negotiation and political participation. In engaging a dialogue with the residents of districts targeted by urban policy, local democratic procedures work to innovative partnerships between the institutions and society. The individual subject’s rational choice, her action, her responsibility, her vigilance in the public arena have all become issues of studies. In losing the “protection” that made “equals” of city residents, social and cultural hybridization here becomes the privileged means to govern individual conduct. “The cosmopolitan individual” and the “individual as a life-planner” become the dominant narratives by which political reforms allow governing the individual conduct, as Mitchell Dean puts it (2007: 78).

However, the involvement of civil society does not only become a support for civil liberty. Individuals are also supposed to be representatives for their rights and values through “not-for-profit organizations, volunteering, charity and good neighborliness” (Rose 1999: 265). Thus, individuals are devoted to a new role: to promote themselves and their own values and rights in communities. As such, incentive programs launched by the European commission and governments at the turning point of the 1990s do not really intend to encompass the metropolitan diversity in social, gendered and ethnic terms. Instead, those programs locally call for experiments on civilian populations. Indeed, involvement procedures allow categorizations of individuals and collectives at the local level according to their motivation and obedience to new civility requirements. Thus, for the most part, participation aims at distinguishing the citizenship members from the community aliens: it is an inclusive process as well as an exclusive one.

Various studies have questioned these institutional practices since the turning point of 2000 (Atkinson 1998: 80). And this point becomes particularly salient when we discuss the concrete aspects of institutional experiments that are centred on the recognition of eth-

nic minorities (Uitermark et al. 2005). Beyond traditional forms of institutional functioning, local development policies that are based on variable territorial scales and modes of coordination bring with them eminently complex normative questions in term of citizenship, identity and belonging. The champions of neoliberal theories have forgotten in this way that “difference” between community members and aliens can be a “negative” thing in an urban setting due to the extent to which systems of recognition and socio-ethnic affiliation contribute to discriminatory (in particular racist or sexist) discourses and representations (Balibar 2003: 26; Uitermark et al. 2005: 635). The political subject becomes producer of her environment, and is confronted with new “forms of subjectivation” in the context of public policies: the exercise of “self-training” or “practice of the self” is potentially translated as a “process of identification” in a collective dynamic. Searching for recognition in an imagined community, the subject becomes exposed by a sort of “allegiance” and “rejection” in terms of class, ethnicity or gender (Rose 1999: 177–178).

In seeking to foster civil involvement, the institutional procedures can thus lead residents to judge neighbors morally or stigmatize certain inhabitants said to be responsible for riots, deals of drugs, criminality or incivility. By the role that residents are expected to play (as users, experts, citizens), the participative process sometimes means leaving the door open to all sorts of xenophobic, racist or sexist reactions. In other cases, inhabitants are “enlisted” in security or control operations, and this can curb the potential for innovation and the training of citizens to join in participative debates. In a different context, the participation devices influence the conduct of the residents and at the same time fuel loss of confidence, fear, and suspicion, or what I initially called civic distrust in the formation of public space. In sum, the institutionalized participatory process results in counter-productive practices that obstruct the emergence of “urban citizenship”.

Strategies of securitization and the rescaling of territories

A whole area of research has been built up around local development policies, in an attempt to gain a better understanding of the way in which new modes of affiliation are formed according to “new geographies of power” (to borrow Sassen’s terms). Rouban and Sassen

identify a shift in power – taking place in the 1980s – from the legislative to the executive in democratic systems as a possibility offered to those who govern to develop new norms of action around non-governmental players acting in contractual setups on the local and international levels (Rouban 1998; Sassen 2006: 116).

Thus, urban project strategies based on contractual setup can be seen as instruments of government (Pinson 2005). As Pierre Lascoumes and Le Galès have observed, these projects are instruments of control in the sense that they “make it possible to materialize and operationalize governmental action” (Lascoumes et al. 2005: 12). They note further that those instruments elaborate local public norms, incentives programs, information campaigns and communication supports, which are developed according to contextual circumstances such as political cycles, the formalization of political agendas, program budgeting, local experimentation, and national and local evaluations (2005: 12).

This first analysis offers me an analytical framework that makes it possible to think about a rationalization of public action faced with a variety of social risks and threats. Beyond sovereign power, other mechanisms of power take hold, such as incentive contractual instruments, by which the state creates the conditions for a targeted mobilization of political, economic, institutional, and civic players; information and communication, by which citizens and users can be strongly solicited or conditioned; or yet again techniques aimed at defining norms and standards, such as logics of institutional partnership grouping, open methods of coordination, as Lascoumes and Le Galès put it (Lascoumes et al. 2005: 361). The approach thus enables an understanding of the reasons that prevail in the choice of local instruments that incorporate participatory devices and security procedures. That is to say, it allows us to reflect on the knowledge and experiences that legitimate these techniques of individual and collective regulation.

First, the notion of securitization can be useful to depict contractual setups and urban strategies if it is understood as a set of new techniques or methods that support instruments of government in liberal democracies (Huysmans 2006: 30–44; Bigo 2008: 113). Foucault explicitly defines the notion of security as a means of governmentality in liberal democracies: by security, Foucault refers to the apparatuses that “prevent” a risk and rationalize it through statistics and probabilities (Foucault 1991: 102). He further emphasizes three

features that characterize a securitization process: (1) a way of individualizing a collective phenomenon or of collectivizing phenomena; (2) a knowledge based on the ability to spot individuals or groups through series of data such as the age bracket, the place of residence, etc.; (3) the emergence of “risks zones” (Foucault 2004: 61–62).

Second, local agreements and urban strategies can contribute to the development of a securitization process according to global threats. As Stephen Graham puts it, security concerns in regional centers contribute to “split[ting] contemporary reality into the ‘home’ civilization of the rich, modern North and a separate civilization in the global South, characterized largely by backwardness, danger, pathology and anarchy” (Graham 2011: xxvii). Rachel Pain and Susan J. Smith observe the development of “political geographies of fear inspired by events which have global and national reach” and the “deep relationship between fear and marginality” in everyday life (Pain et al. 2008: 4). In that line, urban strategies are intended to “cure” various local dangers and pathologies for democratic purposes: the management of migratory flows, systems of social risk prevention, the elaboration of new social norms or the “new military urbanism” in metropolitan areas (Bigo 2008: 100; Graham 2011: xxvi). These contemporary threats are translated as sociopolitical risks (Huysmans 2006; Guild 2009). Thus, the concentration of poor groups in regional centers, “ethnic communities” in high-rise estates, urban riots or social movements, are not only the signs of social inequality in the course of economic development. As a result, the notion of (in)security simply activates a referential upon which civic political narratives are established and extensive security processes are designed (Huysmans 2006: 43).¹⁹ Rose

19. Keep in mind that whereas the notion of citizenship at the origin referred to a network of community affiliations hierarchically structured by the city, modern citizenship is founded on universal principles related to political participation, universal suffrage, and education. From ancient times to the modern period, it is the democratic idea that forms the passage from a collective social functioning to a more individualized mode, not the city (Balibar 1996: 358). The semiological work of Françoise Choay shows in particular how urban utopias, conceived during the first industrial revolution in the nineteenth century, provided a variety of political discourses on community as a counterpoint to the harmful effects of industrial growth (Choay 1965). Some analyses also show the extent to which, behind an egalitarian, functionalist stance, urban policies have contributed to engaging social experimentation and forming techniques of social action (Rabinow 1989: 39).

argues that the idea of community “constitutes a new spatialization of government” (1999: 136). As such, infrastructure and high-tech systems and cultural aspects of the metropolitan life reinforce targets, control and repression against democratic protests.

Various proceedings can be included in urban regeneration projects with more or less intensity. I will particularly focus on three aspects of these urban strategies: (1) the definition of a political narrative related to the urban crisis by which local partners form a strategy; (2) the efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of the security procedures and/or propose graduated responses in transversal management that aims at preventing social risks in a local environment (a few measures of this orientation are socio-cultural mediation of the conflicts between inhabitants, crime prevention regarding young groups, new safety management that includes the local policy department and the commitment of the residents); (3) the attempts to set up controlling devices through environmental design in order to make the neighborhood safer and “reduce feelings of insecurity” among the residents: the measures concretely go from lighting design to the definition of leisure activities in private areas and the construction of gates around housing blocks (example security systems at the access point or locking gates in front of the backyards).

Moreover, I will also make a distinction between two types of urban government, one based on “contracts”, the other one on “projects”, that certain sociologists have seen appearing in local development plans in the 2000s (Castel 2003: 70; Epstein 2005: 101–106; Bacqué 2005: 91). In the French urban policy, the notion of contract refers to the system of contractualization of objectives between the state and municipal governments. The urban contracts policy was, first and foremost, the privileged tool for Mitterrand’s presidential majority at the turning point of the 1990s to engage public services, local and regional governments, providers of social housing, and associations in the fight against urban segregation (Mitterrand 1990).²⁰ The idea of projects, by contrast, applies rather to situations in which “collective action is organized around a relatively restricted number of players,

20. The *Contrat de ville* picked up from the *Contrats de plan État-Région* (Regional-National Planning Contracts), which for long served as the financing channel for DSQ projects. See further Chapter 2.

mobilized to remedy a specific problem or to take responsibility for a circumscribed area for a limited time” (Pinson 2005: 200).²¹ As I will show, the discourse on freedom “materializes” through such strategies in transversal organizations, some of them being informed by the attempt to create a “protective” environment (destroying “inner-city ghettos”, reconquering the “no-go areas”, preventing the concentration of poor groups in deprived areas), and others by an effort to further “emancipation” and social justice (such as the promotion of “inclusive neighborhoods” and “residential mix” in order to encompass the metropolitan diversity in social, gendered and ethnic terms).

Reversibility of participative and security norms: a system of hospitality

Let me now go on to explain why the notion of hospitality is of particular interest in the development of new forms of citizenship and in what way “regimes of hospitality” constitute a specific form of governmentality. I define this concept as the forms of engagement in security measures that serve to govern individuals and collectives in multiethnic areas. The institutional offer of participation refers to forms of integration and socio-political recognition. Through an institutional participative approach, engaged residents are confronted with complex and increasingly individualized modes of belonging. Using local political anecdotes, I will concentrate on the way in which participative modes can lead to modes of categorizing marginalized populations. Three dimensions will be emphasized in the analysis of regimes of hospitality.

The first point is related to the paradoxical characteristics of community development in a multiethnic environment. The regimes of hospitality consist in understanding how institutional modes of participation are constructed as a counterweight to systems of securitization in these areas. In a discussion with Anne Dufourmantelle, Derrida calls attention to the contradiction inherent in the notion of Hospitality:

21. In this line, the *Programme National de Rénovation Urbaine* drew inspiration from New Public Management against a backdrop of public sector reforms (Epstein 2005, 2010).

Because exclusion and inclusion are inseparable in the same moment, whenever you would like to say “at this very moment,” there is antinomy. The law, in the absolute singular, contradicts laws in the plural, but on each occasion it is the law within the law, and on each occasion outside the law within the law. That’s it, that so very singular thing that is called the laws of hospitality (Derrida et al. 2000: 81).

Based on the idea of hospitality regime, modes of engagement may have a highly contradictory impact on the local community development. In the identity quest involved in a participative approach, we find expressions of identity that exacerbate the risk of resident differentiation and categorization. The risk is that the “excluding” or “stigmatizing” elements end up feeding into the civic norm. One readily finds in a single district a nationalist, racist discourse overlapping with the promotion of a diaspora network or a minority interests approach. From this standpoint, modes of engagement aimed at turning the neighborhood into a place of hospitality are met with modes of subjectivizing directed at minorities in marginalized neighborhoods.

I have set out precisely to analyze these ambiguities by studying how discourses on urban citizenship are organized on a local level. As we shall see, the mechanisms of participation often culminate in elements of social and civil protection – education and training, employment, tranquillity, self-liberation, the activation of new social bonds, transferring responsibility to the people involved, the right to be different that can be linked to recognition for stigmatized movements of affiliation by ethnicity, religion, or gender. But the minimization of these discourses in urban strategies and the interaction of these norms give rise to frictions, manipulations, and confusions that lead to the securitization of the locality.

Second, my research here will focus particularly on the analysis of organizations and of the institutional functioning in relation to the participative process and to modes of securitization. Implemented in local development projects, these experimental approaches remain unstable and not easily representative. In France, in particular, Jacques Donzelot notes,

Since the start of local development policies, programs succeed one another without putting an end to the preceding ones, due to multi-annual contracts and to the stated interests of local elected representatives as much on the left as on the

right who have benefitted from them and defend them when the central government undergoes political change (Donzelot 2006: 65).

From this unstable perspective, it becomes possible to explore and potentially criticize the sensitive points of urban strategies that have the “capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings” (Agamben 2009: 14). Through the notion of regimes of hospitality, I intend to understand the reversible effect between participation and security in local development projects. In line with recent thoughts on urban securitization in Europe, it is also worthwhile to empirically test whether “such policies of discipline and security generate intersecting processes of activation, coercion and empowerment of policing within and between localities” (Eick et al. 2014: 16). Does the dialogue on coexistence promoted by the initiators of urban projects and their partners²² produce power relations that require setting up securitization procedures?

Third, the notion of regimes of hospitality also aims at elucidating the shadowy side of forms of participation. This perspective, theoretically bound up with the formation of the subject, has been developed by such scholars as Nikolas Rose, Mitchell Dean, and Donzelot. But the questions that they trigger concretely in the implementation of urban strategies remain unanswered. How do local actors understand these questions of subjugation in the framework of public setups? How do institutional representatives deal with community borders when it comes to discussing the idea of otherness and that of the foreigner? How do they manage the most subjective aspects of urban citizenship?

As we will see in the discussion of my empirical research, the accumulation of knowledge in connection with institutionalized participative approaches is related to social risks or civic dangers bound up with the industrial and economic development in the area. These risks are statements, discursive elements that form political discourses. But contemporary analyses do not sufficiently highlight the way in which these statements (the fight against ghettos, the prevention of incivilities, social and cultural mediations between residents, the dialogue be-

22. We can mention the municipalities, intercommunalities, social housing agencies, social workers in the Conseil Général, police, and school personnel notably.

tween residents and police) are operationalized. There is a shadowy side to the mechanisms and procedures that put residents center stage. The guidelines on “modes of resident engagement” say nothing about the way that incentive mechanisms influence the behavior of residents and normalize socio-cultural relations. There is here an amalgamation between participation and security that needs to be understood and it is underpinned by rejection, mistrust, and hostility.

How do local actors concretely organize the social work, the social prevention, and the cultural mediation together with the less visible aspects of public order, surveillance, and repression? Are actors trained to think about these questions and act accordingly? We will see in Les Cinq Quartiers of Les Mureaux how the “urban violence” of the “ghetto” is a statement that is used to fix the rule of “civility” for the young population. In Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air, Saint-Denis, the development of mass unemployment and job insecurity not far from the biggest historical center of French industry, raises fears of widespread socio-political disaffiliation in the most marginalized neighborhoods. It necessitates the structuring of work between different intermediary associations. What does this mean in terms of strategy? By calling into question the norms of participation and securitization integrated into the urban project, the hospitality regime proposes an analytical grid that serves to identify more clearly the pitfalls and institutional limits encountered when one tries to put urban citizenship into practice.

METHODOLOGY: DISCOURSE, RULE, AND INTERACTION

My methodology is in part inspired by an article by the political scientist Bruno Jobert (2008) who notes the importance of taking several types of discourse or analytical modes into account in defining a “regime of citizenship”. These discourses are based on *cognitive*, *instrumental*, and *normative* referentials in particular. In addition, Jobert posits a problematical element in the definition of these regimes, “rules of interaction” (Jobert 2008: 407). Jobert’s focus on interactions

between different norms provided me with a methodological basis for structuring my investigation, and in particular for understanding the ways in which modes of involvement could emerge as a counterpoint to the process of securitization.

In more concrete terms, my research is based on a qualitative study that includes an analysis of public documents and various phases of interviews and observations. The empirical work concerns two sites, which have been integrated into a great number of urban programs. Thus, my methodological approach is designed to fulfill multiple tasks. First, it serves to gain an understanding of how participative and security procedures emerge in the history of French urban policy. Second, it serves to better grasp whether and to what extent institutional mechanisms lead to developing locally different norms for building communities based on participative and/or security strategies. Finally, and mainly through interviews and observations, my methodology is devised to describe how these norms interact with and arrange what I call the regimes of hospitality.

To each of these tasks corresponds a specific set of empirical material that has been compiled for the purpose of the various phases of my analysis.

Roughly speaking, my research has thus moved between three levels or areas. I first undertook a historical study to understand the instruments and norms of urban policy with regard to participation and security. This was conducted by analyzing documentary sources (books, research documents, newspapers, statistics, photos and graphics). Second, I examined more directly the functioning itself of the instruments based on pre-operational documents and semi-structured interviews conducted in the field. Lastly, I studied interactions between local actors and residents, based on observation sequences at public meetings, partnership meetings, on-site conferences, participatory consultations and workshops, etc. Let me now explain the details of my methodological approach.

Participation and security: a historical perspective

In methodological terms, my research intends to analyze how discourses are translated into practices of players within specific in-

stitutional proceedings.²³ The fact is that “defining a participative strategy” or “securitizing a neighborhood” are not merely statements. In the framework of urban strategies, such statements turn into procedures in which players will elaborate norms and practices of citizenship. Interested in putting back into perspective emerging discourses of citizenship within systems of engagement, control, and security, I intend in particular to understand how notions such as participation and securitization are constructed, how they intersect or contradict one another.

My research thus involves an obvious historical aspect. The historical approach defined in the second chapter serves to establish a procedural filiation from the national to the local for the purpose of having a clearer picture of the contexts in which local strategies emerge. It also gives us a grasp of the notions of participation and securitization based on different stages in French urban policy. The reason I begin by exploring the various urban policies as defined at the national level is because, as we shall see, the notions of participation and securitization established in the procedures are not stable. They depend on forms of power and instruments of governance developed by the state, which are then re-appropriated by local political players in different periods of French urban policy.

This also explains why I concentrate my historical survey on government action initiated from the 1980s to the beginning of the 2000s. As to the selection of references that I am using in this context, I’ve given prominence to researchers who focused on the instruments of governance in French urban policy. Some thematic research was done using search engines in order to further explore the topics of participation and security in urban policies. This first chapter relies on academic studies by, among others, Jacques Donzelot, Thomas Kirszbaum, Renaud Epstein, Philippe Estèbe, Marie-Hélène Bacqué, and Yves Saint-Omer. The list of authors is not exhaustive but it goes without saying that these academic discourses have had and continue to have considerable influence on urban policies in France. Beyond that, they have also helped shape the representations of generations of professionals who have become involved in urban policies. Within the

23. The notion of discourse is considered here as “a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements” (Mills 1997: 17–18)

framework of this study, these public reports and research works in the field of social geography, political sociology and urban and housing politics have been important for developing a solid conceptual apparatus, which, in turn, has helped me to analyze the meaning of a local policy and to develop guidelines for the interviews that inform my analysis.

Multiple sites: testing regimes of hospitality

The next phase in my research has consisted in an analysis of institutional modes of engagement and their potential links with security devices in territorialized and transversal projects. Thus, my methodological approach is not set up to compare two local experiences, but rather to identify public orientations in matters of participation and security. It is on this basis that I have analyzed intersecting processes in urban strategies.²⁴ A series of preliminary discussions with researchers, experts, and institutional representatives enabled me at the outset to identify sites in France that could be interesting to study and analyze.²⁵ (See appendix 1 for the complete list of interviews.) After the series of interviews, I have selected sites that are targeted in public policy as *Zones Urbaines Sensibles* (ZUS, Sensitive Urban Zones).²⁶ It

24. The multiplication of research sites allows moving across local contexts and aims at looking up and out. This method intends in that framework to analyze relationships between the different sites in terms of similarities and differences. These recurrences and nuances will provide the researcher with a reflexive positioning, as Yasmin Gunaratnam argues (Gunaratnam 2003:184).

25. The main difficulty was not to identify the sites but to obtain the necessary political authorizations and other technical validations to launch my investigations. At first, I had hoped to select field study sites with which I was already familiar, such as Stains. However, the project head in Stains said, “we’re in the operational phase of the project: we haven’t the time right now”. In Les Mureaux, the reluctance was of more political character. “I may not be the right person to give you an entry,” the project head told me before asking me later to “send the principal motivations that made you choose Les Mureaux”. I answered him that the history of the site in terms of urban policy was the decisive factor that made me want to do research in Les Mureaux. My referent was incidentally the director of urban risks, not of the urban project. Next, I managed to get a hold of a listing of all the players in the urban project. In Saint-Denis, on the other hand, the project head was freer to act and agreed to discuss my proposal when I first got in touch with him.

26. In the French urban policy, a sensitive urban zone is an administrative classification by which the national authorities define high-priority targets in the national territory.

is in the framework of these public devices that local actors define priorities for action plans such as security and public peace or resident participation.

After some initial difficulties and negotiations, I eventually decided on two sites of study (see Figure 1). The first is Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air in the city of Saint-Denis, located in the south of the city center, and very close to north of Paris. The second is Les Cinq Quartiers in Les Mureaux, located in the north-western suburbs of Paris. Both sites are classical high-rise estates that were mainly developed during the post-World War II industrial development. However, Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air in Saint-Denis also consists of an older urban deprived area. The social characteristics of the population in both areas are, generally speaking, those of a multiethnic neighborhood. Diverse migration flows, linked to the industrial development, have forged the history of those housing districts. Furthermore, both areas are composed of low incomes households and poor groups. Both sites have been integrated into multiple urban programs launched by the French government since the beginning of the 1980s.

Material and mode of analysis: the “local” dimension in focus

The empirical work in these areas has been structured around various methods of investigation: analysis of documents, collection of data, interviews, and observation. In general terms, a local-scale analysis is useful in the analysis of complex urban processes that encompass various registers: built environment, social composition of a district, interactions between public agents and private players, etc. (Grafineyer 2000: 27). Frank Moulaert, Andreas Novy and Flavia Martinelli evoke in particular the relevance of “a multidimensional methodology” for the understanding of socio-economic development phases in territories (Moulaert et al. 2013: 1). One of their arguments is that “mainstream theories take little heed of institutional contexts and time space variations” (Moulaert et al. 2013: 7). These researchers argue for the necessity to “combine methods from geography and history, multivariate statistical analysis and anthropological case study work” (2013: 7). This combination of data will allow me to problematize the “regimes of hospitality” locally. We will see this, in particular, in the

Figure 1. The two sites of study

third and fourth chapters, where I re-contextualize urban strategies, which derive from national political agendas, in their local history.

In the first place, the method is based on collecting data on each site (newspapers, studies, public agreements, operational documents, statistics, etc.). For this purpose, I examined the archives at the two sites. This research involved a study of documents on the construction of housing projects, the reconfiguration of territories as a result of strategic changes in economic and industrial sectors, migration phenomena and related housing policies, forms of job insecurity, and such processes of housing-related exclusion as ghettos, pockets of poverty, and stigmatized neighborhoods. The selection of data in the local archives, research documents and local newspapers was here defined according to thematic key words such as “Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air”, “Les Cinq Quartiers”, “participation”, “prevention”, “security”, “mediation”, “urban strategy”, etc. Chapters three and four present some descriptive statistics: this is useful in particular for depicting the social context where urban strategies are developed. The short time scale during which the urban strategies have been designed in the two sites explains why I have not chosen to bring the statistical series in chapters three and four up to date. The data I refer to are intended to give an idea of the situation at the time of implementation of the urban programs that I analyze.

A particularly crucial part of this work has been to find *prescriptive statements* concerning participation and securitization in public reports, local urban diagnoses, and public notes circulating in the framework of urban projects. The implemented measures in France in the field of social and urban politics are based on the introduction of territorialized and transversal agreements between the state and the municipalities or groups of local authorities. Thus, I analyzed public documents such as City Contracts, Urban Contracts for Social Cohesion (CUCS) or urban renovation projects (PRU) in order to better understand the orientation of the political discourse at the local level and the mode of analysis that supported it. In this way, it has been possible to conceive what “instrumental logics” could mean behind the discourse of urban citizenship: how to define local urban strategies in relation to the national context? What are the links between urban strategies and the systems of involvement proposed? What are

the main features of the participatory devices? How are references to safety and security made within local strategies? In this way, I have also been able to contextualize the norms that inform community development projects and relate them to political instruments and to technical knowledge on the neighborhood communities.

Interviews and observations

My empirical work also includes series of interviews and observations on each site. On the basis of qualitative interviews, I have sought to define more precisely the notion of “regime” as it figures in my conceptualization of regimes of hospitality. To begin with, a regime does not imply social control over all of the population. It is more like a system of mediation that offers those in charge the capacity to set up civic cooperation and “determine specific modes of organization of the population to ensure functionally important activities” (Atkisson 1989: 221). As a result, the mode of production of citizenship can be made operational using a variety of citizenship models. We have seen that document research provided the possibility of defining modes of citizenship in the city based on the institutional offer of participation and procedures of prevention, mediation, and securitization of neighborhoods. But how can this mechanism be described concretely around urban projects? How can we understand the effects of procedures as they appear in processes of subjectivization involved in community-based models and identity-based modes of categorizing? The qualitative interviewing afforded me partial answers to these questions.

I have undertaken three series of interviews to clarify the norms of participation and security in urban strategies. First, seven preliminary interviews with researchers, experts and institutional representatives have provided me with a grasp of the discourse, the orientations, and the organizational logics. Second, I have made twenty-three interviews with local players according to a chain of accountability: politicians, managers, technicians, consultants and architects, developers and social workers. (See details in appendix 1.)

The method of analysis used here is based on two series of semi-directive interviews in which the respondents oriented my questions. I

used to present the research themes to the interviewed persons. Then I raised a few questions according to my interview guide.²⁷ During an interview, I used to repeat the statements of the interviewed person, like an “echo”, to stimulate the discussion (Combessie 1996: 25–27). The end of an interview was always punctuated with questions in relation to the access to research material or the suggestions of local contacts. Most of the local players did not want me to record the interview. Thus I took notes that I transcribed and analyzed after the interview process. This set of interviews gave me a better understanding of the local context: political options, phases of the project development, participatory procedures, collective movements, mediation procedures, cooperation with the police forces, etc. The collected material has allowed me to identify and analyze differences and recurrences that appear in the discourse of each actor and sometimes also to show the gap between stated objectives and anticipated or achieved results. On this basis I had to determine if processes of participation and security could intersect or not.

Certain institutional players (Representative of the General Secretariat of the Inter-ministerial Committee For Cities, director of professional training in the framework of local development policies, project heads) considered my questions “pertinent” or “interesting,” and offered avenues for further reflection, but on the ground the reluctance was widespread. Some local representatives have been key-actors in the research project. They have opened their profes-

27. An interview began with a brief presentation of my research background, the characteristics of my study and the main research themes: the notion of “participation” and the notion of “security” in urban strategies. I always tried to understand the role of the interviewed person and the type of organization in which she/he was working. I was also interested in discussing historical facts, the social history in relation to the formation of the site and the context in which the urban strategies emerge. Moreover, I tried to understand “the methods of engagement” and the procedures related to participative actions within the urban project (from the information campaign to the cooperation in decision-making processes). Discussions concerned the main stakeholders in a participatory process and the features of the decision making process within the urban strategy. Finally, I tried to grasp the notion of security in urban projects and to what extent the main partners of urban strategies are concerned by this theme: How do we define and understand the notion of insecurity in the local context? What are the main characteristics of the security orientations in relation to the project? In the course of the interview, I tried to comprehend the links between objectives, procedures and decision-making process.

sional networks, communicated the addresses or the mail lists of local partners (the associations, housing companies). For instance, the project head of the urban renovation in Saint-Denis and the district director of *la démarche quartier* greatly facilitated my research by making themselves available and giving me access to the network of local partners as well as the archives, notes, budgets, projects, etc. In particular, I had access to internal notes concerning the running of the local democratic organ of Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air, orientations of the urban development, criticisms linked to institutional procedures, letters sent from the representative of the municipality to the Police, etc. In Les Mureaux, the contacts developed locally were more erratic. For example, I contacted the six housing agencies in Les Cinq Quartiers in Les Mureaux and two in Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air but I managed to interview only two in Les Mureaux and one in Saint-Denis. In addition, even when actors were available, important documents were not always transmitted to me because of the sensitivity of the issues being examined in my thesis: security diagnosis, qualitative evaluation of rehousing, for instance.²⁸

Further, I had to find “points of contact” between the governing and the governed. In the first place, I was looking for civic representatives and engaged residents recognized by the institutions as “referents”. In the second place, I wanted to meet residents who were opposed to

28. In this context, one methodological detail is of importance. The professionals I met in Les Mureaux – project heads, program managers, and providers of housing – refused to put at my disposal certain documents in local development policies. For this reason, instead of working to build a relationship of trust, which is the traditional approach in field studies, I tested ideas, speaking sometimes abruptly about project options – based on previously gathered elements – in order to get local players to tell me how they could conceive of an urban strategy based on incentives and/or securitization. Calling into question my interlocutors yielded good results. For example, during an interview in Les Mureaux, the responses of the director of the *Syndicat Intercommunal du Val-de-Seine* were so evasive that I decided to plan a second interview with him. I prepared a new guideline that included a deep analysis of the renovation project, the strategy of the local players, the references to participation, workshops, meetings, etc. Thus it was easier to challenge the director during the second interview: “I do not understand! Are you telling me that Les Cinq Quartiers went through all the phases of a local development program without the local stakeholders thinking about a participative mechanism? The renovation project explicitly mentions an integrated participative approach. How do you reach the residents?” (Interview 18, 12 June 2012.)

or could resist the project.²⁹ It was not easy to find representatives of residents willing to get involved in my investigation. The issue was to build a relation of “trust” with my institutional correspondents in order to find a few residents involved in participatory devices that concern themes such as conviviality, safety or security. I interviewed twelve residents who are involved in and/or opposed to participatory procedures and dialogue strategies in projects: volunteers, resident-relays, association representatives, activity leaders, mediators, etc. (See details in appendix 1.) I succeeded only partially in finding points of contact due to the difficulties that I encountered on the ground. Living in Sweden and studying several sites in France, my periods of observation and interviews needed to be tightly structured. As a consequence, I sought points of contact between civic representatives and institutions and spent a lot of time on the phone with actors on site or close to it: the housing providers, district development services, social centers, etc.

In this context, asking questions on the topics of resident participation or securitization of neighborhoods in semi-structured interviews was a well-advised approach. But the interview topics were different from the interview grid of local players. First of all, the interviews tended more toward neighborhood life and the residents’ experience of engagement in a participative procedure. They required knowing elements of neighborhood life – such as urban history, demographic developments, migration processes, urban project agendas, the municipal government’s political leanings, municipal services, the housing offer of the different agencies, and public facilities – in order to pick up from a sentence or two the modes of belonging bound up with the motivations of the engaged individuals or considerations linked to insecurity and public order in the district. In a second phase, I always tried to connect those narratives with the participatory procedures included in the local development projects. It is through listening and questioning again that you end up hearing expressions of distrust and in particular what might be foreign to the person. Ethnic and exclu-

29. I have thus contacted a few local associations that question the political orientations of the local urban strategies and promote models of intervention that include a right to housing or an access to health care.

sion issues are apparent. Therefore, preparing for the interview phase with residents required extensive local knowledge. This was done through document study and analysis at each site.

The last phase of my empirical work was punctuated by a series of eleven observations. (See details in appendix 2.) This research was undertaken at the end of the study period. It was short but important in the sense that it enabled me to verify the prior analyses and hypotheses with regard to my concept of regimes of hospitality. In particular, I had to identify the situations in which institutions, civil society, neighborhood organizations, and residents could be engaged as a matter of conviviality, tranquillity, or public security.

My local referents played a significant role here in directing me to local participative and partnership events related to the development of urban projects. After some time, I was able to cross-reference the elements from telephone interviews and familiarize myself with local institutional agendas, set up more focused on-site interviews with a dozen residents per district and target observation points so as to spend time with the on-site players and residents most directly concerned by my study.³⁰

My period of “immersion” in each district coincided with important local developments. This phase extended over a whole month and included sequences of observation, interviews, and attending a variety of meetings and workshops.³¹ As Stéphane Beaud and Florence Weber put it, ethnographic observation lies on three areas research phases: perceiving, memorizing and noting down (Beaud et al 1997: 143). It included concrete observations, notes – and a few interviews – and was planned with the support of municipal services and associations (the service “Prevention and Urban Risks” of the municipality of Les

30. In Saint-Denis, the project head of Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air was the one who informed me about an upcoming public meeting with the police commissioner in attendance on the topic of insecurity in the district. In response to my repeated calls, several people at the town hall of Les Mureaux told me about upcoming events on the site of Les Cinq Quartiers. These included a person working in social development for the municipality who told me about the meetings she was organizing on the topic of public order and tranquility with the social housing agency. The director of urban risks told me about a meeting he was organizing with the local partner on securitizing the worksite.

31. Regular missions of mediators, working meeting on securitization in working sites, preliminary workshops for neighborhood party, public meeting on safety and security and public consultations related to housing renovation.

Mureaux, the association Réciprocité, Espace Service Public and *la démarche quartier* in Le Franc-Moisin–Bel–Air). Those observations gave me the opportunity to analyze the type of relations that are formed between the residents and diverse local partners (Municipal Police in Les Mureaux, Construction Companies, the head of the National Police forces in Saint-Denis, Social Housing Companies, Local Development Services).

This method, inspired by ethnography, was important – not to say essential – in the sense that it helped me to grasp the social interactions on the ground, the way people acted in particular situations, the discourses at the junction of participation approaches and security devices. For example, I was able to attend the meeting of a commissioner with neighborhood residents, speak with a representative of the police during a march in the district, develop informal discussions with mediators on the occasion of a meeting on insecurity, participate in an informal discussion between association representatives after a public meeting, take part in a cooking workshop in preparation for a neighborhood party, observe mediators at work, and join residents at information meetings held by local stakeholders. The observation phases allowed me to see and hear what could not be consulted in writing. The interviews allowed me to delve into what is usually left unsaid and observe cruder modes of expression. In striving to understand how social interactions are formed in the day-to-day reality of the two sites, this approach served in the end to avoid the danger of information manipulation in the diagnoses and other instruments of analysis.

Let me cite an example that allowed me to gain “non-discursive” information essential to the comprehension of my problematic. As mentioned, i participated in preparations for a neighborhood party in Le Franc-Moisin–Bel–Air with an exclusively female group of African and Asian origin. The women were institutionally engaged in reproducing their own culinary code to reinforce the conviviality of the neighborhood. The conviviality covered an aspect very strongly correlated to gender that it seemed important to internalize in the development of my analyses. I was the only man, supposed to be studying the manner in which the group could be thinking of their engagement. Beyond my surprise at discovering the way in which institutions were once again as always placing women in the kitchen, I was skilfully introduced to the group by the head of the public service

pole as a researcher “from Sweden” and not in terms of my French citizenship. (Observation 3 – 17 February 2013.) It was therefore in terms of my immigrant past and references exterior to France that it became possible to “break the ice,” step outside a male stereotype – dominant by culture and gender – and talk informally about the specificities and social practices of Malian, Moroccan, and Swedish culinary arts. This simple observation gave me insight into the weight of identity-based, ethnic or cultural dimensions in the organization of a dialogue on conviviality and hospitality in the neighborhood.

A second example taken from a situation that I analyze in the fourth chapter also provides a grasp of aspects that are often disregarded when we speak of resident engagement. In observing residents who volunteered in *la démarche quartier* I understood the extent to which they lacked credibility in the eyes of other residents, especially when it came to security issues. In a public meeting, these volunteers had a hard time gathering points of view on essential day-to-day questions. They didn’t garner criticism behind them. The residents were nervous, frustrated, anxious, and had difficulty stepping outside their own context of experience. The representations and the blurring of distinctions flared up on social and civil insecurity, immigration, and physical violence. It is out of considerable attachment to this phase of on-site observation that I decided to integrate empirical elements of analysis in chapter 4. It is more than a question of style. Including situations in which residents participate in processes of securitization seemed to me to be a means to put the reader into the role of a faithful witness to the regimes of hospitality.

2. FORMALIZING REGIMES OF HOSPITALITY

The aim of this chapter is to provide an understanding of how new norms of participation and security have emerged in different governmental periods since the 1980s. This “diachronic reading” reveals how notions of participation and securitization can be diversely interpreted depending on the modes of government set up during the studied period. I limit the analysis to French national policy, even though I am aware of the strong penetration of European urban policies in the framework of national programs in Europe (Listerborn 2007). It is not a matter of providing a global explanation here for the formation of “regimes of hospitality” but rather of understanding how these regimes emerge from a national framework.

Although French urban policy has succeeded in initiating interventions in districts undergoing processes of depreciation, this policy is aimed more at redeploying government intervention in “stigmatized” areas. Indeed, for over thirty years, this type of public intervention has addressed issues related to quality of life, housing and transport, unemployment and professional integration, academic failure, citizenship-building, public health, and crime differently in different areas and in different periods. From the outset, defining this policy is challenging because of the diversity of areas of government action that are involved. Due to its cross-disciplinary nature and the multiplicity of the stakeholders, it unremittingly raises questions concerning the coherence of government policies, financing, monitoring, and evaluation at the local level. And for this reason, municipal policy

has been criticized repeatedly for its lack of legibility, its technocratic management, and its ineffectiveness.¹

The difficulty encountered by some public officials in grasping retrospectively the object of urban policy is quite clearly linked to the progressive transformation of public action itself and its modes of intervention.² As Jacques Donzelot, Daniel Béhar, Philippe Estèbe, Thomas Kirszbaum, Marie-Hélène Bacqué, Renaud Epstein and Christine Lelévrier have all said in their individual ways, urban policy often gives priority to discourse and rhetoric, with catchphrases on citizenship, integration, or democracy. Despite all the criticism from academic circles and the failures observed by experts in public policy, urban policy does not die; it changes with each new government report: “Remaking the city together”, “The city tomorrow”, “The Marshall Plan” for the *banlieue*. The ineffectiveness of the various programs often provides a breeding ground for radicalized debates and extremist political rhetoric.³ Policy shifts, conceptual breaks, changes

1. The first 40 pages of an assessment report on urban policy concentrate on a policy that the authors deem “overvalued but impossible to evaluate”. The compilation of statistics from local data and the fragmentary analyses initiated by several organizations (ANRU, CUCS, Observatoire des ZUS) do not facilitate implementing a policy in the absence of an overall perspective (Kirszbaum et al. 2010:30–32). *La Cour des Comptes* (the French Court of Auditors) also questions the validity of the guiding framework of the Urban Renewal Plan (*Plan de Rénovation Urbaine*) launched in 2003 by Jean-Louis Borloo in the context of increasing insecurity, unemployment and social precarity: “Many information and evaluation reports from a variety of sources note that the policies implemented over the last ten years have had positive effects on economic development and housing improvement. The policy text adopted in August of 2003 (*La loi du 1er août 2003 d’orientation et de programmation pour la ville*) constituted in this regard a re-foundational act of urban policy [...]. However, the measure has not had a sufficient impact to sustainably change the everyday life of the local population. Improvements are not tangible in some districts where the poverty and precarity remain at high levels and where insecurity persists in a context aggravated by the economic crisis. Recently again, in Sevran, Grenoble, Marseilles, Montceau-les-Mines and Clermont-Ferrand, for instance, repeated acts of violence put the question of the effects of this policy back on the table” (*Cours des comptes* 2012).
2. The Cours des Comptes report brings up this problem of definition in the following terms: “The ambiguity of the expression and the difficulty in proposing a simple definition point to fundamental problems concerning the content and aims of a policy that has been described as a priority by successive governments” (*Cours des comptes* 2002: 7).
3. Laurent Mucchielli identifies the touch version of the Front National discourse on “cultural conflict” embodied by the violence of youths of immigrant origin and that of the “social anomie” for certain representatives of the state (Mucchielli 2001: 8–9).

in intervention strategies ... What can we learn from the vagaries of urban policy in its historical dimension?

First, urban policy is the expression of a contradictory debate focused essentially on the mode of regulating multiethnic districts in regional centers. From an attraction to a multicultural dynamic at the outset, urban policy has increasingly shifted in the direction of reasserting a Republican intervention in problem neighborhoods. It is this first historical dimension that is highlighted by Jacques Donzelot, Thomas Kirszbaum and Mustafa Dikeç who point to the shift from a “people policy” focused on the development of local communities to a “place policy” focused on the treatment of places of exclusion (Donzelot et al. 2003: 58; Dikeç 2007: 69; Kirszbaum 2008: 21–23).

A second important historical dimension concerns the development of forms of government action initiated throughout the course of urban policy history. For Renaud Epstein and Philippe Estèbe, the forms of public action initiated over the past thirty years in social housing districts must be nuanced according to periods of intervention. From the late 1970s to the late 1990s, the state took an important step in its redeployment in local territories through the contractualization and the territorialisation of its objectives in conjunction with local political representatives. In the early 2000s, this contractual system ended with a recentralization of government action and the introduction of new instruments of intervention based on new public management.⁴

It is in this framework that I will be circumscribing the analysis of the norms of participation and security. First, based on a series of experiments, we shall see how the involvement of the network of associations can be understood as a modality of social development. The security dimension will be considered as preventive means with the reallocation of resources for public services, such as the police. Second, we shall see, through the institutionalization of French urban policy, how territorial contracts seek to reinforce public action in the most stigmatized territories. The participative dimension becomes procedural in the urban projects and the security focus proceeds from

4. These management techniques imported from the United States referred to the rationalization of budget choices in the French context and raised the issue already in the 1970s of the evaluation of public action and of the rationalization of goals and means of administration. Anne Amar and Ludovic Berthier present the foundation and evolutions of this new public management in France (Amar et al. 2007).

the curative treatment on the district scale. Third, we shall examine how participation – transformed into a policy of activation – and security will become dimensions that are totally integrated into the definition of urban projects. Highly criticized, this new form of engagement in securitizing procedures leads to contemporary questions of resident empowerment in stigmatized districts.

CONTRACTUALIZING THE TERRITORIES

Urban policy was established at a time of increasing social inequality and a weakening of the system of social protection (Bailleau et al. 2000: 18; Castel, 2003). It emerged in the wake of the first elements of urban crisis after the *Circulaire Guichard* of April 1973 put an end to the building of large-scale social housing projects (“*les grands ensembles*”).⁵ Beyond aesthetic or moral considerations bound up with social aspirations in the 1970s, the large urban estates which had been rapidly built in reaction to the post-war housing crisis brought out the risks of social and ethnic segregation. The middle class gradually left social housing districts to buy their own homes, which led in turn to the relegation of immigrant populations to these districts.⁶

In the large metropolitan areas, social housing districts were already characterized in the early 1980s by their multiethnic diversity and by the pauperization of a segment of their inhabitants. Thus integration through residential trajectories became problematical insofar as these trajectories manifest inequalities between the majority population and the populations of immigrants and their descendants: 56 per cent of populations from Sub-Saharan African and Algeria occupy the social housing stock, as does a large proportion (40 per cent) of the population from Morocco and Turkey (INED/INSEE 2008).

5. The circular notes that the “monotonous” urban forms developed in recent decades and architectural excess no longer correspond to “the aspirations of inhabitants” and represent risks of “social segregation” (*Circulaire Guichard* 1973).

6. French historians and sociologists speak of the dual process ethnicization and pauperization that is played out progressively in the social housing stock (Castel 2007: 20–25; Donzelot 2006: 33–57).

In a context of economic crisis, this “relegation” ended up weighing in particular on second-generation immigrants. In response to the first riots in the French banlieues, politicians placed the emphasis on social development in the problem neighborhoods, through strategies of prevention and fostering resident involvement in collective projects. It was on this basis that a system of contractualization of objectives between the state and municipal governments was established, formalized in the agreements signed within the framework of the *DSQ* (*Développement Social des Quartiers*, Social Development of Districts). These social development agreements focused on the *endogenous development* of the neighborhood, which meant that they relied on local strengths and resources: the renovation of housing units and buildings, experimentation in schools, the prevention of juvenile delinquency, the development of social and cultural activities, etc.

The DSQ strategy gradually came to overlap with a new approach to exogenous development, which culminated in debates on social diversity in urban environments. Public officials looked to the urban environment, to its housing stock, to the system of housing allocation in its effort to fight phenomena of socio-ethnic specialization in metropolitan areas. This change of method went hand in hand with new regulatory instruments. Public action was structured around territorial contracts, with priority given to preventive treatment from the level of the district to that of the greater urban area: *Contrats d'Agglomération* (political component), *Contrats de Ville* (social component), *Grands Projets de Ville* (urban component). But the number of scales of intervention, of procedures, and of actors involved considerably increased the complexity of the modes of intervention. This complexity masked the hesitations of a preventive and social policy with Republican overtones: on the one hand, the successive governments aspired to make public action more effective at the local level; but on the other, the procedural logic covered up practices of control aimed at immigrant neighborhoods. Let us now look into this process in greater detail.

The “social development of districts” (DSQ)

The “social development of districts” (DSQ) is a national urban development program that aimed at strengthening the social bond through strategies of prevention and participation. The question of

the intervention of the state in local urban policy was raised after the violent incidents that took place in the summer of 1981 in the Minguettes district of Vénissieux, in the greater Lyon area: *rodéos* in the parking lots, rioting, car burning, and damage to public facilities. Clashes between youngsters and the police occurred again in March 1983 in the same sector of the greater Lyon area. These movements harbored demands that were picked up in marches “for equality and against racism”, better known as the “*marches des beurs*” (*beurs* being the term for second-generation North African immigrants) that took place between October and December 1983: demands for an extension of residence permits to 10 years and the right to vote for foreigners. These marches corresponded at the time to a message of hope in the possibility of integration for immigrants into French society. They led to the creation of SOS Racisme in October 1984, an anti-racism organization whose goal was to fight discrimination. SOS Racisme, whose logo was “*touche pas à mon pote*” (do not touch my pal) organized demonstrations, events, and conferences.

In the wake of these social movements, the government quickly launched a series of measures embedded in the tradition of renovation operations undertaken in nearly fifty districts as part of the *Habitat et Vie Sociale* (HVS, Housing and Social Life) program launched in March 1977. Several stakes emerged for the newly elected Socialist government. It had to demonstrate its capacity to manage the social crisis without recourse to repressive measures, while at the same time engaging the administrative apparatus in a process of decentralization. The experiments conducted in the early eighties would serve as test cases for decentralization of power in the social sphere as in urbanism and in education. In this context, Alain Savary, the Minister of National Education, issued a circular dated July 1, 1981 establishing the first *Zones d'Éducation Prioritaire* (ZEP, Priority Education Zones), 355 of them defined on the basis of two types of indicators: academic results and the proportion of foreign children. The system was meant to rectify “social inequality” through reinforcing financial and human resources (11,625 new jobs were created). The Minister of Social Affairs hastily initiated the first versions of the *Ville-Vie-Vacances* (City-Life-Vacation) program. This “anti-hot summer” plan, a joint operation of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice in 1982, was intended to offer activities to young people in prob-

lem neighborhoods to avoid eruptions of violence during summer vacation. Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy also commissioned three reports: the Schwartz report (1981), the Bonnemaïson report (1982), and the Dubedout report (1983) respectively recommended measures for delinquency prevention, socio-professional integration, and social development in social housing districts. So it was in an emergency context that the first inter-ministerial actions developed.

1. A *Comité National pour le Développement Social des Quartiers* (CNDSQ, National Committee for the Social Development of Districts) was created in December 1981, presided over by a former Mayor of Grenoble, Hubert Dubedout, a recognized expert in urban policy, known for his policies of local management in districts of Grenoble.
2. A *Conseil National de la Prévention de la Délinquance* (CNPd, National Council for the Prevention of Delinquency) was created in 1983 to mobilize local elected representative in the fight against juvenile delinquency. *Conseils Communaux de Prévention de la Délinquance* (CCPD, Municipal Councils for the Prevention of Delinquency) served as a relay on the ground for the new approach advocated by the government. The idea was to fight delinquency with prevention and solidarity, and not only repression.

With the creation of CNDSQ, several experimental programs were initiated between 1984 and 1988. At the time, the designation of problem districts was done “subjectively” by local elected representation who brought attention to the local history of immigration and marginality (Estèbe 2005: 48). 148 DSQ agreements were signed by the state and local municipalities between 1989 and 1994, to reach 296 with the extension of the mechanism. The approach was informed by the observation that social housing districts were strongly shaped by migration flows. In the conclusion to his 1983 report to the Prime Minister, “*Ensemble, faire la ville*” (Making the city together), Hubert Dubedout noted signs “of intolerance, rejection, and racism” and the designation of “scapegoats” whose “culture” was rejected by society at large. There was a tendency to “criticize places” rather than designate the population by name (Dubedout 1983: 87). The report recommended setting up an innovative grassroots mechanism, based on reinforcing the role of the mayor in the development of problem

districts and the participation of residents in their environment. Social movements structured around SOS Racisme demanded the right to vote for foreigners and called on resident participation in a strategy that resembled the multiculturalism of Anglo-Saxon countries.

How was the notion of the participation of local residents defined at the time? It was still basically anchored to an ideological debate, and framed as a movement to counter technocratic power through a strategy of emancipation, consultation, and dialogue. It was a matter of establishing an experimental framework that promoted the active involvement of residents, along the lines of such projects from the 1970s as the renovation of Alma-Gare in Roubaix where the local population mobilized to oppose institutional plans and support alternative projects (Bacqué et al. 2011: 167). Describing the novelty of this approach, Donzelot, Mével and Wyvekens later stated that the participative approach differed from traditional social work that focuses essentially on “services organized around the workforce: unemployment and retirement benefits, sick pay but also family allowances” (Donzelot et al. 2003: 118). The aim of the participation was rather to produce a collective dynamics around tenant associations inspired by the PC (Communist Party), the PS (Socialist Party), and activists from 1968. We have to “democratize the city” the Dubed-out report concluded, following in the footsteps of debates raised by the socialist party in the years 1975–77, particularly on the subject of self-management in districts and the creation of non-governmental civic bodies (Lefebvre 2011: 67). But the institutionalization of the notion of participation turned it into an ambiguous concept, since it was a proposition originating in the State. It can be understood in the DSQ projects as a way of doing “for residents” in an approach based on managing services or as a way of doing “with residents” in an approach based on local democracy, as Bacqué and Sintomer put it (Bacqué et al. 2001).

With the creation of the *Conseil national de prévention de la délinquance*, CNPD (National Council for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency), the state also intended to refocus the policy of prevention initiated in the seventies in dealing with juvenile delinquency. Dealing with this issue, Bonnemaïson reported a rise in the sense of insecurity and in the number of acts of delinquency, although the taskforce was careful to specify that it “did not always have reliable

scientific data” (Bonnemaïson 1982: 14). Seeing a limit to the repressive system, which in addition to being ineffective was very costly for taxpayers, the recommendations of the report focused on social life and the living environment, on the one hand, and on preventive actions aimed at youth, on the other. Like the Dubedout report, the local dimension of a social problem – delinquency, in this case – was acknowledged; whence the importance of social housing attributions, of finding a balance between the rental offer and first-time home buyers plans, but also of reducing the size of schools.

Density, height of buildings, dormitory town, lawns peeling up at the foot of towers, spaces abandoned to cars, insufficient public facilities, lack of streets [...] these are the criticisms levelled against the housing and urban conditions in the banlieues of the great metropolitan areas. In addition to these deficiencies, it is common to criticize the sociological and ethnic makeup of the large-scale housing estates, due in particular to the large number of HLMs (Low-Income Housing) that upset balances (Bonnemaïson 1982: 33).

The report set up a preventive approach based on improvements to youth-oriented programs and services: civic education and cultural activities in schools for children with difficulties; availability of facilities outside school hours; facilitated enlistment of “marginalized” youth in the army, professional training in case of academic failure, use of public facilities for youth activities.

In the 1980s, the fight against social segregation was thus defined in an experimental approach marked by the reinforced presence of government action on a local level, by the development of the associative sector, and by the mobilization of inhabitants drawn from militant circles, activists, and environmental movements. It was a somewhat bustling period when the “local” was moved to center stage. It was a matter of preventing delinquency by setting up community policing, increasing the support available in schools, and developing an employment assistance program aimed at 16 to 25-year olds. In this spirit, the mayor had to favor prevention, listening, information dissemination, and orientation. The notion of “housing district” was also seen as a place to revive “social bonds” and stimulate a network of associations through sports and socio-cultural activities. However, the development of associative activity around channels of financing is

not synonymous with resident engagement in decision-making. The participative strategy was intended here to create collective action. It acknowledged implicitly that solidarity was not an active principle in society, but rather a project to be constructed on a political basis. It was this policy that represented the foundation of urban policy with the initiation of a territorialized, contracted, and transversal action: territorialized insofar as this policy designated for the first time a series of social housing districts as the level of intervention for government action; transversal because, depending on local priorities, it involved inter-ministerial actions in the fields of prevention, public health, the economy, employment, professional integration, and housing. More fundamentally, through the DSQ, the State officially acknowledged the new social forces taking hold in certain districts and the shift in the locus of conflicts from the factory to the urban environment (Donzelot 1991, Ascher 1995).

The institutionalization of urban policy

Riots erupted again in the 1990s. In fact, they became a continual recurrent presence in the news.⁷ The state had to face a rising number of conflicts and demands that “found no other means of resolution than violence, be it physical or symbolic” (Aballéa 2000: 4). It is in this context that the institutionalization of urban policy brought participation modes and security devices up to national standards. Violence broke out with clashes, fires, and looting in Vaulx-en-Velin, in the greater Lyon area, on October 6, 1990 after a young man died when the motorcycle on which he was a passenger crashed into a police barrage. Often movements of solidarity, shows of outrage, and explosions of violence would follow the death of a youth who was chased by the police, or subjected to a security guard check, or brought in for questioning.

Laurent Mucchielli wrote of the “ethnicization of relations between youth and the police” from the late seventies on and of the “cycle of

7. There was rioting in 1991 in Sartrouville in the Indes housing project and in the Val-Fourré estate in Mantes-La-Jolie; in 1992 in the Minguettes district in Vaulx-en-Velin; in 1993 in Saint-Fons; in 1994 in Rouen, Le Blanc-Mesnil and Garges-lès-Gonesse; in 1995 in Vaulx-en-Velin, Noisy-le-Grand and Nanterre; and in 1997 in the Duchère district of Lyon and then in Dammarie-lès-Lys a week later.

provocation” in which the youth were subjected to racial profiling by the police, along with discourteous use of language (the informal “*tu*”), heavy-handed arrests, and insults, and they would then take over public spaces in the projects for car *rodéos*, riding motorcycles in playgrounds, and squatting entrance halls (Mucchielli 2001). Branded “banlieue youth” by outsiders, which is another way of saying second-generation immigrants, they were also rejected by insiders, with a portion of the residents deploring as much their deviant behavior (noise, vandalism, etc.) as the struggles for territorial control that went with the drug trade. Rap groups, such as Ministère AMER (Action Musique Et Rap) or NTM (Nique Ta Mère, or Screw Your Mother), relayed in their lyrics the provocation, revolt, and frustrations of a whole multiracial generation (“*black-blanc-beurs*”): “outrun the bullets, it’s capital punishment or the grave”; “white and black, we gotta remake history”; “time to set the place on fire”. The period was also marked by debates about the “Muslim headscarf affair” that led to the ban in 2004 on wearing ostensible religious symbols or clothing that shows religious affiliation in primary, middle, and secondary schools.

The period was characterized not so much by demands for social and civic rights, as was the case ten years earlier, but by the despair of second-generation immigrants, 70 per cent of whom had become French citizens and yet had to face an accumulation of institutional obstacles and socio-economic discriminations. The more the children of immigrants suffered from a lack of social recognition, the more likely they were to search for their identity through individualized strategies of religious affiliation. It seems to me that many researchers were inspired by a Goffmanian analysis of the management of stigma to explain the situations of confrontation, the strategies of flight or avoidance, of resignation to invisible and frustrating stigma, or of resistance or confrontation.⁸

8. From the fighting in 1983 to the riots of 2005, researchers maintained that youth of immigrant origin were neither recognized by society nor totally excluded by it (Donzelot 2004; Castel 2007: 27). They were shaped in a rejection of socio-ethnic particularities by their socio-economic and institutional environment, and were subjected to the effects of stigmatization by the media that consolidate political discourse and public opinion (Champagne 1993). The recurrence of stigmatization effects pushes them at times to forge their identities through socialization in the street, far from traditional family models. They are in an unstable balance between a desire for social belonging and identity-based claims related to the stigmatization. The

These eruptions of violence, the negative reactions to social inequality, and the denunciation of racial discrimination prompted the successive governments to question the effectiveness of the DSQ in terms of *prevention* and *participation*. In the 1990s, the district was clearly not a place for reinforcing the collective dynamics since it led to repeated confrontations with the police, riots, and socio-ethnic community-based demands. These obvious developments of the early 1990s posed questions that did not find simple answers. Should a policy of substitution be developed aimed essentially at supporting populations in sectors “in crisis” or would it be better to define an incentive policy aimed at preventing the process of exclusion of immigrants? (Epstein 2006: 6.) It was in this climate of uncertainty that urban policy developed a new mode of regulation of society on the regional and local level: that of contractualization. On the one hand, participation of the inhabitants became a procedure in which residents were enlisted in order to improve their conditions of living in the neighborhood. In this contractual strategy, the national approach of participation became a tool for local governments that incorporated a preventive approach to social and ethnic polarization. On the other hand, a global approach of security linked prevention to repression. Dikeç in particular has emphasized the “repressive turn” of the 1990s in urban policy.

“The new penal commonsense” (Peck 2003) came to France with a republican twist, and shifted emphasis from prevention to repression through a legitimizing discourse organized around “the republic” under threat by allegedly incompatible cultural differences and the formation of “communities” unacceptable under the “one and indivisible” republic (Dikeç 2007: 32).

At start, I present here preventive and repressive measures that are articulated in urban contracts. We will see subsequently how the notion of participation of inhabitants becomes a rhetorical device without clear political objectives.

violence that preceded the march for equality in 1983 spoke of their hope for a better treatment, just as the self-assertion of youth through illicit business, drug dealing, and rap music expresses a need for recognition through personal success. The youth that forge their identity in cultural and/or religious traditions are expressing a need for moral recognition and the right to be different (Donzelot 2004; Beaud et al. 2006).

The contractual system as a preventive approach to social and ethnical polarization

The contract is an agreement by which several stakeholders or people “enter into the obligation toward one or more others to give, to do or not to do something” (art. 1101, Code Civil). The contractual approach was conceived as a way of systematizing a transversal policy on the local scale by relying on the combined competencies and financial strengths of the state and local authorities. This backbone, from the national to the local, enable the state to negotiate systematically local objectives relative to housing, the living environment, unemployment, training, public order, and local citizenship. On the one hand, the emphasis was put on security and, with this in mind, mechanisms were set up to involve mayors in prevention, mediation, and the treatment of delinquency. On the other, the state reasserted the importance of involving local inhabitants in public decisions. This contractualization had a policy reformation aspiration, summed up in the slogan, “free citizens in safer cities”.

In this context, the government of François Mitterrand, re-elected in 1988, set out to give greater visibility to its policy in problem neighborhoods. After all, weren't the eruptions of violence in the *banlieues* the sign of a lack of comprehension between a portion of the youth and the institutions? Mitterrand's speech in Bron in December 1990 thus signaled a shift in urban policy, proposing as it did first to promote the development of “city contracts,” and second to “focus its efforts on 400 neighborhoods” (Mitterrand 1990). The state basically took back control of its development policy for social housing districts, reorienting its method of intervention on three points.

First, the state proposed an organization intended to foster transversal cooperation on the government level. Modes of cooperation on the government level intend to clarify objectives and rationalize the means to be invested in local projects. The decree of October 28, 1988 established a *Comité Interministériel des Villes et du Développement Social Urbain* (CIV, Interministerial Committee for Cities and Urban Social Development) as the political body and the *Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville* (DIV, Interministerial Delegation for the City) as the institutional body. Two years later, in December 1990, an Urban Ministry was created. In this way urban policy was provided with

its own separate means (a budget of around 4.1 billion € in 2001) in addition to the variety of non-political mechanisms.⁹

Second, a new mechanism was proposed to provide a firm basis and the means for implementing a dynamic local policy: the *Contrats de Ville* (City Contracts).¹⁰ Third, the government instituted 50 *Grands Projets Ville* (GPV, Great City Projects) in 1999 in the framework of the city contracts, mainly for the purpose of concentrating investments in certain districts by undertaking large-scale redevelopment of the urban environment. The GPV sought particularly to foster the integration of problem districts in their greater urban area and to balance urban transformations with the resident expectations. These changes were not easily made. They caused institutional tensions between the local network of mayors and associations, on the one hand, and ministerial representatives, on the other, who mainly strove to implement sectorial policies.¹¹

On the national scale, implementing this new transversal policy in which “everyone tries to coordinate everyone else” also led to tensions (Jobert et al. 1995). The institutionalization of urban policy encountered a problem of legitimacy with relation to the more traditional ministries. Claude Brévan, former delegate to the interministerial delegation for the city from 1988 to 2005, recalls having first dealt with various state secretariats before the creation of the ministry of cities with “4 ministers and 6 configurations of ministries connected with different people”. Within the state apparatus itself, ministerial

9. Positions of *sous-préfets*, or permanent ministerial representatives to the *départements*, were established to enable the national government to define a regional strategy together with local representatives and to mobilize the various sectors of government action (social action, public education, police, housing and facilities, etc.).
10. A circular dated December 31, 1998 stated the organizational modalities for the period 2000–2006 and the CIV of June 30, 1998 defined four objectives: ensuring the “Republican pact”, reinforcing social cohesion, mobilizing local stakeholders around a collective project, and building a new democratic space together with local residents.
11. The emergence of urban policy was constructed in a contradictory relationship. At its origin, it translated an emancipating dimension, with the requirement of “implementing a policy for the inhabitants” around the DSQ agreements and the first city contracts, and then with a dimension proposing a more pronounced control over social movements, “a policy for the inhabitants” based on institutionalizing the policy of social diversity and the French version of an “affirmative action”, as put it Donzelot, Mével and Wyvekens (Donzelot et al. 2003: 119–141). This distinction is important because it allows us to understand how the issue of the treatment of discrimination emerges in the field of urban policies.

functionaries were “suspicious” of the Urban Ministry staff, regarding them as “leftists” (Recherche Sociale 2010: 81). When the projects were first implemented, the transversality was more an idea than an actual practice. In the framework of city contracts, the *Ministère de l'Équipement* (Ministry of Public Works) wanted to hold on to their prerogatives with regard to housing policy, the “Ministry of Education was not interested in collaborating and neither was the Ministry of Health inasmuch as there was no regional policy of public health. The Ministry of the Interior did not want to get too involved [...] And then one day [...] the prevention of delinquency was entrusted totally to the Ministry of the Interior” (Recherche Sociale 2010: 81).

On the local level, the exceptional allocation of funds in the framework of urban policy often led municipalities to delegate projects to already existing socio-cultural associations without any real accountability, which inevitably caused the objectives set by the first city contracts to be completely illegible (Kirszbaum 2004: 106). With the intensification of urban violence in the early 1990s, the risk of losing municipal elections drove some mayors to shift radically from social prevention to security policies. This was the case in Amiens, Le Havre, Drancy, and Les Mureaux (Maillard 2006). The schedule of elections also remained a predominant factor in issues of resident participation and the integration of minorities. In the controversy over the Islamic headscarf incident (“*foulards de Creil*”) of October 1989, the ideological debate prevailed over the content of the program (Chevalier 1996: 210–211). It was against this tense backdrop that the initial forms of local democracy were institutionalized in places such as Saint-Denis. An attempt was made to recreate capacities for mobilization by creating a virtuous circle of representation of immigrants and minorities in the political field and offering access to public services close to home. This first form of fighting against discriminations came rather late in the arena of urban policy in comparison to the social movements that were developing there.

These contradictory stances became increasingly apparent in the 1990s and political forces tended to reassert the state action in the social housing districts by a new preventive approach: the previous sociocultural prevention was replaced by two-pronged policy of “anti discrimination action” and “social diversity”. The preferential measures did not merely aspire to foster access to rights in the con-

text of trajectories of migration; it also attempted for the first time to fight against mechanisms of discrimination at work in society (Fassin 2002). Translated legally into an article in the penal code, the principle of affirmative action did not succeed in treating the complexity of discriminatory processes that immigrants and their descendants encountered.¹²

The republican translation of an “affirmative action”

In France, the notion of “local affirmative action” refers to the development of preferential measures in certain neighborhoods put into place by the state in the 1990s to reduce social inequalities. The republican translation of an “affirmative action” can be seen as a first preventive option in urban policy. The concentration of low-income households of immigrant origin was regarded as a factor in the unequal treatment of citizens because it works against the integration of immigrants and increases social injustice through the abandonment of public services in certain districts. Behind the renewal in method,¹³ the transformation was deep-seated since the decision-making process that was initiated ran counter to earlier methods: the political mechanism was reversed from a bottom-up approach with regard to local actors to a top-down approach from the state down. By giving further impetus to urban policy, state services transformed for the first time the notion of districts or neighborhoods into a category of intervention founded on the development of indicators of exclusion and a cartographic reference system.¹⁴

With the launching of local affirmative action, the district became a “national government issue” (Estèbe 2005) leading to a rise in the

12. Article 225-1 of the penal code states that discrimination comprises any distinction applied between legal persons “by reason of the origin, sex, family situation, physical appearance or patronymic, state of health, handicap, genetic characteristics, sexual morals or orientation, age, political opinions, union activities, membership or non-membership, true or supposed, of a given ethnic group, nation, race or religion”.

13. The DSQ notion is gradually replaced by “*Développement social urbain*” (DSU, Urban Social Development).

14. In the DSQ approach, the “district” is seen as a living organism that is to be transformed through its history, its interactions, and its capacity for mobilization. It becomes in the DSU an institutional reference unit, determined by indicators and delimited administrative boundaries.

importance of a “priority geography” with 400 new agreements implemented between 1989 and 1993. This new geography was based in particular on a zoning practice (the radius of the district was defined by decree) and the definition of relevant indicators to identify the areas to be treated in priority. Districts were “targeted” on the basis of the percentage of deviation from the national mean determined in 1991 and 1992 by the INSEE. The areas were selected on three criteria: population under 25, long-term jobless, and foreigners (Donzelot et al. 2003: 125; Estèbe 2005: 49). Experimented in 1980 with the *Zones d'Éducation Prioritaire* (ZEP, Priority Education Zones), the zoning was put into more widespread use on the basis of a reading of urban risks linked in particular to the concentration of ethnic groups, the eruption of violence, and the development of social exclusion.

The election of Jacques Chirac as President in 1995 and Alain Juppé's nomination as prime minister had only a mitigated impact on the principle of “local affirmative action”. With the urban policy program entitled “*Pacte de Relance pour la Ville*” adopted in January 1996, the new government shifted the direction of urban policy from public services to economic development. A new indicator was devised, the ISE (*Indice Synthétique d'Exclusion* or Synthetic Index of Exclusion), to locate areas with a high concentration of youth under 25, long-term jobless, and people without diplomas. The number of targeted districts in urban policy exploded: from 400 DSQ agreements to 750 ZUSs.¹⁵

In putting an economic development strategy in the place of a previous social development, the government only refined the priorities of intervention in a given district based on its socio-economic characteristics.¹⁶ Donzelot, Mével and Wyvekens argue that the index of exclusion eliminated the idea of the “foreigner” and focused instead on the population “without diplomas” (Donzelot et al. 2003: 125;

15. The *Zones Urbaines Sensibles* (ZUS, Sensitive Urban Zones) includes *Zones de Redynamisation Urbaine* (ZRU, Urban Regeneration Zones) that incorporate in turn *Zones Franches Urbaines* (ZFU, Free Urban Zones).

16. Employers in ZRUs are exempted from social contributions; the ZFU designation comprises an exemption from income and business taxes for a period of 14 years. Based on Anglo-Saxon models, tax exemption policy in neighborhoods where the economic crisis hit the hardest, was developed in response to criticism from local elected representatives seeking ways to stop companies from moving away and thereby boost employment for local residents as a measure of social prevention (Body-Gendrot et al. 2001: 385).

Estèbe 2005: 50). According to Estèbe and Béhar, it was the notion of “residual poverty” that was used by the state (notably INSEE and DIV) both to specify the notion of exclusion and to reaffirm the need for an interventionist Republican strategy in social housing districts (Estèbe et al. 1995). From an epistemological standpoint, segregation was regarded as the result of a marginal, residual phenomenon, emerging in scattered geographical points: the problem districts. Residents in “priority areas” were basically seen as “victims” of the industrial and economic crisis in France. In seeing segregation as the result of a socio-economic imbalance to be countered, government representatives invalidated the idea of segregation being based on the exclusion of groups of immigrant origin. The local studies and diagnoses often illustrate strategies framed in terms of “reconquering areas,” “remedial” or “compensatory” strategies. In practice, the development of a zoning policy lent itself to a reading of urban phenomena through the standardization of social handicaps, a standardization that then subtended the process of locating minorities.

The variety of zoning grids for urban policy purposes (ZUS, ZFU, CUCS, ANRU, “*Dynamique espoir banlieue*” – the Hope for the Banlieue scheme: cf. table below) depending on the priorities of public intervention (schools, tax exemptions, social service dispensations, urban regulation dispensations) ended up making the framework for urban policy interventions especially confusing¹⁷ and the operational modes particularly incoherent.¹⁸

17. In a public report, Gérard Hamel and Pierre André note that “1,596 CUCS neighborhoods are not in a ZUS; the area of some ZUS does not correspond to a physical reality (some are divided into two parts); some ZFU extend beyond the boundaries of their associated ZUS; some ANRU eligible sectors are not in a ZUS” (Hamel et al. 2009: 18).

18. The inability to reduce unemployment in the priority sectors was not the only difficulty encountered by the state and its local partners in their attempt to diminish gaps. For Gérard Hamel and Pierre André, “perverse effects” in the use of urban policy financing were even noted in public reports since the budgets allotted to urban intervention and tax exemptions for businesses far exceeded the financial provisions earmarked for social action, that is for support services for people in need (Hamel et al. 2009). “In 2007, exonerations linked to the ZFU alone amounted to 582 M€ (246 M€ for fiscal exonerations and 336 M€ for social exonerations) while funding for ‘social development and prevention’ which covers the state participation in CUCS amounted to 479 M€ in 2009” (Hamel et al. 2009: 23).

Summary table of urban policy priority geographies

Priority geographies	Number of districts	Number of municipalities	Population
ZUS	751	509	4.4M
ZRU	435	337	2.8M
ZFU	100	147	1.6M
ANRU <i>including ANRU outside ZUS</i>	542 112	370 57	3.4M 40,000 people
CUCS <i>Including CUCS outside ZUS</i>	2493 1596	934 443	8.3M 3.9M

Source: SG-CIV (Hamel et al. 2009)

Social diversity in cities

Yet the subject of discussion in the 1990s was not so much the categorization of neighborhoods that emerged from the French legislative context as the principle of “social diversity”. Social diversity in cities can be considered here as a second preventive option in the French urban policy. In the name of a “right to the city,” the state used the *Loi d’Orientation pour la Ville* (LOV, Framework Act for Cities) adopted in 1991 to promote the principle of social diversity in cities with the express purpose of “integrating every neighborhood into the city and ensuring in all metropolitan areas the coexistence of a variety of social categories”. The principle of social diversity was mentioned several times in the legislative texts and government reports but it was the “Besson law” of March 31, 1990 concerning social housing and the LOV, also known as the “anti-ghetto” act of July 13, 1991 that together formed the first legal framework of reference for the notion of social diversity.

The “Besson law” came in a context of a scarcity of housing for low-income and poor categories of the population. This decree was firstly the occasion to reexamine the attribution criteria for social housing in order to make it more accessible to “the most underprivileged categories of the population”.¹⁹ The act was also intended to counter the

19. The law is meant for the homeless, households living in unfit housing, in hostels or furnished hotel rooms, as well as people cohabitating, or lodging with a third party.

effects of segregation by improving the management of populations in the social housing sector through *Protocoles d'Occupation du Patrimoine Social* (POPS, Occupation Protocols for the Social Housing Stock) and then through the agency of a variety of “collective agreements” on the departmental, inter-municipal, or municipal levels, depending on the local political configuration. The idea behind the act was to guarantee conditions of access to housing for people with low incomes, in view of ensuring the neighborhood’s “social diversity”. It was a matter of improving the management of candidates to social housing so as to avoid social polarization but also in an informal way to counter the concentration of populations of immigrant origin. The *Loi d'Orientation pour la Ville* completed the management aspect of the social housing sector by obliging municipalities to provide 20 per cent social housing in their housing stock.

The strategy of social diversity in urban policy was clearly informed by an exogenous approach. This approach was not specific to France, so much so that there have been longstanding debates between proponents of an endogenous approach and partisans of exogenous development in a variety of countries, including the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Canada, and Germany (Kirszbaum 2008: 17; Droste et al. 2008: 163–170). Depending on the measures adopted, development could be based on internal levers and resources in the neighborhood – which is what defines an “endogenous” development – or could draw on means of intervention that complement or replace internal resources – in which case the development is exogenous. What was specific to France in this debate was the reaffirmation of the Republican line. State intervention in the problem districts relied on a “Republican” conception in the sense that urban policy basically advocates equality between geographical areas. Every area must have services available in “the most equal manner so that no one can say that he/she suffered an injustice in the framework of the Republic” (Donzelot et al. 2003: 128). These two acts, LOV and the Besson decree, masked phenomena related to individual immigrants and their trajectories of integration with such categories as “underprivileged populations”. Patrick Simon, Malika Chafi, Sylvie Tissot and Thomas Kirszbaum note that the 1990 Population Census showed that the concentration of people of foreign nationalities in the social housing sector represented three times the national average

(Simon et al. 2001: 30). The LOV and Besson acts implicitly sought to disperse immigrant populations and the most precarious categories of the population by controlling the attribution, construction, and eventually the demolition of social housing.

Simon saw in these acts a very negative interpretation of the immigration process in French public policies and a means for social housing providers to determine attribution based on ethnic and racial criteria (Simon 1999: 5). The polemic swelled until the publication in 2001 of the GELD study by Simon, Chafi, Tissot and Kirszbaum confirming the existence of local practices of ethnic discrimination in the attribution of social housing (Simon et al. 2001).²⁰ The local management of attributions was not transparent insofar as the basis for rejecting candidates is not open for evaluation except in the case of “high-risk” population when the attribution is handled by the *préfectures*. In addition, the treatment itself of housing applications on the local level lent itself to confusion due to, among other things, the variety of places for submitting applications, delays in handling them, late notifications, etc. Seen from an historical perspective, such control over housing attributions was not new; it existed in the housing developed for migrant workers, the *Foyers de travailleurs migrants*, but the type and the means of intervention became significantly more substantial in the shift from a selective policy of social housing to a policy involving the physical transformation of districts, destruction, and changing demographics by population transfers.

Two types of criticism have progressively been directed against these framework acts. First, it has been argued that the political discourse on social diversity draws its strength from the “myth” of the integrating city. As Béhar puts it (1997: 285–286), this mythical function serves a political project aimed essentially at mobilizing local actors as part of an urban renewal strategy. Second, it has been argued that the vagueness around the notion of diversity is not accidental. Indeed, the social dimension of the phenomenon of segregation masks to a great extent the “ethnic” problem. Since law prohibits an “ethnic” reading, no public statement can refer explicitly to “ethnic” origins, the acceptable legal term being “immigration” (Simon et al. 2001: 62).

20. GELD: *Groupe d'étude et de lutte contre les discriminations* (Anti-discrimination Research Unit).

Kirszbaum and Dikeç argues that “the republican tradition”, which is universalistic and assimilationist, influences greatly urban reforms. As Kirszbaum observes, the republican discourse calls for reservations when it refers to the notion of “ghetto”:

Ever since the *Loi d'orientation pour la ville* (1991), ghetto has been used by politicians as a coded term for residential groupings of immigrants [...] and to express the failure of their integration. What is a ghetto [...] if not the very opposite of Republican integration, that is, an urban situation marked by the exclusive relations of individuals with the groups to which they belong, their submission to the particular rules of that group and [...] a lack of allegiance to the national community? (Kirszbaum 1997: 52)

The notion of social diversity thus becomes paradoxical when the political rhetoric is based on notions such as “social cohesion”, “solidarity”, “social bonds” (Dikeç 2007: 29–31). The critique evinced a divide between the academic world and political circles when the reference to social diversity came to be reasserted many times in legal texts, as was the case, for instance, in the *Pacte de Relance pour la Ville* in 1996 and in the *Loi Solidarité et Renouvellements Urbains* of 13 December 2000.

From prevention to repression

The Chirac government set out to promote its urban policy in the designated neighborhoods by a global approach to security, open to multiple orientations and competencies. From prevention to repression, a consensus emerged during the cohabitation between the President Chirac and the Prime Minister Lionel Jospin for transferring the treatment of delinquency to the local level. A conference was organized in Villepinte on 24–25 October 1997, at the instigation of the Interior Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement and attended by Prime Minister Jospin on the subject “of safer cities for free citizens”. This conference was the occasion for the Interior Minister to note that security is a “fundamental right inscribed in the declarations of the rights of man and of the citizen” (Mucchielli 2001: 31).

Freedom for the citizen thus became associated with conditions of prevention, mediation, and safety in French cities. This was not

the case beforehand: the Bonnemaïson report, for example, basically promoted a system of prevention based on social action rather than repressive measures. In the wake of this conference, a *Contrat Local de Sécurité* (CLS) was established in a circular from the Interior Minister dated 28 October 1997. It would become the “prevention and citizenship” dimension of the *Contrats de Ville*. This mechanism served as a basis for policy negotiations between the state and a whole series of stakeholders in the fields of prevention, mediation, and security. Thus security no longer came only within the jurisdiction of the state. These mechanisms mainly concerned neighborhoods targeted by urban policy, since, according to an evaluation by the national audit office, 544 CLS were signed in 2001, 60 per cent of these in problem neighborhoods.

In introducing the CLS, the state sought to gain new sources of local support to implement a more assertive policy on public order and security. This objective was manifested in the notion of “co-producing security” and in the proposal the state made to mayors for “community policing”. Several mayors at the time were particularly energetic in seeking to establish their own municipal police force (Le Goff 2002: 107–109). The circular creating the CLS stipulates in its first article “that it is up to the prefect, as a representative of the state, to initiate the process of drawing up these contracts with local governments” and to do so “in priority in the sensitive zones”. These contracts were thereby “drafted conjointly with the prefect, the state prosecutor, and the mayor”. They were applicable to a grouping of municipalities, a single municipality, a district, or a transit network. In cases where *Conseils Communaux de Prévention de la Délinquance* (CCPD, Municipal Councils for Delinquency Prevention) did not already exist, a “consultation” could be set up with all of the “institutional and social stakeholders”. These included “heads of schools, the police [...], social services [...] and juvenile protection divisions. The consultation could also include associations and sports organizations, representatives of public housing agencies, and public transit authorities” (Circular dated October 28, 1997).

The “free citizen” evoked at the Villepinte conference appeared nowhere in any of the platforms for “consultation” during the process of drawing up the CLS. As Donzelot explains:

the CLS are explicitly created around the idea of co-producing security. But is this co-production actually taking place? If we use as a criterion of evaluation the degree of participation of the local population in defining the goals and means of action, it becomes clear that the co-production in France basically comes down to a partnership between institutions and has little to do with resident participation” (Donzelot 2003: 292).

This difficulty in including inhabitants in discussions on security issues points to the difficulty at the time in initiating an innovative discussion of citizenship. In view of the very wide variety of competencies, the hierarchical structures of the national police and the legal system make working on transversal projects difficult.

The participation of residents in a procedural framework: a national speech without clear political objectives

Urban policy is far from evincing a single strategy of intervention from the national to the local scale in the sense that this new mode of intervention leads to systematizing the development of regional strategies by seeking to reconcile “technical strategies” with a “more democratic ambition” (Epstein 2005: 103). In December 1990, Mitterrand explicitly defined the notion of participation as a principle of public intervention (Mitterrand 1990). The circular from 31 December 1998 on city contracts stipulates the following:

Resident participation [...] must reach new levels when preparing forthcoming city contracts. The success of these contracts is predicated on a stronger involvement on the part of residents. In particular, measures need to be organized that enable residents to express their opinions before projects are adopted concerning priorities when it comes to their everyday living environment, but they must also be involved in developing, implementing, and monitoring such programs [...].

Democratizing procedures mainly meant providing access to services and to public life for categories of the population that could not vote (foreigners, youth) or those living on the margins of society (the jobless, mono-parental families, casual workers, etc.). The notion of participation signified therefore an improvement in the reception and treatment of the social demand in local public facilities and housing

services. Thus the notion of participation was closely connected to a local development approach based on local institutional stakeholders and their various community partners.

The offer of participation, rooted in a local power game

The participative approach can be likened in the context of city contracts to “an institutional offer of participation”, or a “communicational inflection in a representative democracy” (Bacqué et al. 2011: 17), meaning a space for conversation essentially integrated into a local development dynamic (Kirszbaum et al. 2010). Resident participation was less a condition for the success of the projects, as was the case in the DSQ, than a condition for the attribution of public funds (Donzelot 2003 et al.). The notion of participation refers to a procedure of management, that is to say, a rule instituted and systematized in the context of the city contracts. Claude Bartolone, the Urban Minister in Jospin’s government, stated this explicitly: “no contract will be signed without participation” (Faraldi 2005: 16).

Participative procedures and processes (forums, consultations, urban workshops, juries) thrived in the urban policy context but they remained highly dependent on the positioning of local elected officials: such cities as Saint-Denis or Le Blanc-Mesnil in Seine-Saint-Denis experimented with “neighborhood approaches” or “resident councils” to improve management procedures, while other municipalities conferred with residents in more targeted urban workshops seeking to negotiate architectural or urban options; still others simply informed residents of construction dates, risks of disturbances, and the like.

But locally, these spaces of dialogue had very little real impact on the decision-making process (Bacqué 2005: 96). The research conducted by Bacqué and Sintomer in this regard shows that the inclusion of residents in the decision-making process remained very limited in France as a result of a series of pitfalls: participation is a social movement that cannot be decreed from above; scales of intervention, when restricted to the neighborhood, tend to stifle the participative dynamic; the instrumentalization of associative movements by governmental institutions tends to split local development strategies, with social movements on one side and public stakeholders on the other;

the public–private partnership is not highly developed in the participative approaches (Sintomer et al. 2001; Bacqué et al. 2011: 17–18).

Céline Braillon, *chargée de mission* in 1999 on issues of local democracy for the National Council of Cities looked back at the difficulty of fostering participation in the context of the city contracts. When issues of participation are tackled,

it's the failure of the whole city that we have to deal with. It's not a matter of working on participation only in problem neighborhoods. [...] We have to raise the question [...] of the complexity of regions and think about it on every level: neighborhood, city, metropolitan area" (Faraldi 2005: 16).

Sharing the decision-making process with residents turned out, in Braillon's opinion, to be a major check on the elaboration of local policies. Because urban policy imposed a procedural framework on districts, the system of local representation needed to accommodate civic involvement on the local and regional level. The idea of "grass-roots democracy" had to be promoted by force of law to counteract the procedural effects of urban politics.²¹ The initial ambitions of the law on local democracy were gradually lowered as deputies and elected officials added amendments to the general principles. The key measure was to systematize neighborhood councils in cities of more than 20,000 inhabitants, but they were only made compulsory in cities with a population of more than 80,000. This meant that they only concerned mid-size and big cities, or only 440 out of a total of 36,685 municipalities. In practice, this new decree was still tied to the area of "urban policy" and gave intermediary bodies and associations nothing more than an advisory role to the mayor.

In an historical perspective, Donzelot, Mével and Wyvekens (2003) as well as Luc Blondiaux (2008: 28–30) explain the "circumspection" of the French political personnel vis-à-vis common citizens. This is why they did not spontaneously seek to delegate some of their representative power to intermediary bodies, such as resident groups or user associations. In the framework of urban policy itself, it was feared that the pace at which local policy was developed could be strongly

21. The decree on "*démocratie de proximité*," or grassroots democracy was in fact promulgated on February 27, 2002.

curbed by institutional participative processes of such extensive scope. Various forms of opposition and resistance would hold back the public action, and thus present risks for the municipal staff at the helm of a city. In addition, local elected representatives feared the sway of particular interest groups over consultative procedures that would thereby not represent the majority of residents. The voices of the most well-organized residents and the users who speak the loudest would cover up the needs of the voiceless and newcomers who could not readily integrate into the district's sites of socialization. In sum, the participative approach could present a risk to the workings of the local system of representation.

Participation of residents or proximity of public services?

In the early 1990s, participation was systematized through the redeployment of public services and the financing of associations supporting the development of neighborhood projects. The development of collective actions was carried out through "centers of public service" and their deployment in districts was clearly regarded as an issue of national sovereignty and citizenship (Lataulade et al. 2001: 23). The participative incentive was thus bound up with very localized action that concerned the development of services with regard to employment, social action, culture, and housing (public property management, cleaning and maintenance of public spaces, removal of cumbersome items and graffiti, etc.). This approach was meant to meet resident "needs".

Resident involvement was measured sporadically with the implementation of new projects. Participation was no longer conceived as a solution to the general problem of the democratic functioning of society (Blondiaux et al. 2011: 19) but rather in terms of improving urban services, by small theme-specific or area-based groups. In systematizing the participative approach, the state pushed local elected officials to clarify their position and set up a constructive exchange, or eventually be challenged by the residents themselves so that elected representatives, technicians, and residents could each have a role in the decision-making process.

As part of a strategy of "reconquering the territories," resident involvement in decision-making procedures turned out to be less a dif-

ficulty than a paradoxical injunction. On the one hand, the spread of City Contracts essentially tended to systematize “a dialogue” between elected representatives and residents in the framework of local actions. Marion Carrel spoke in this regard of an offer of participation faced with a “public that cannot be found” (2004: 164). On the other hand, public policies could fly in the face of the choices made by residents when it came to living environment, residence, social life or induced institutional relationship (school, town hall, etc.). The principle of social diversity promoted from 1991 and on was very significant from this standpoint since it tended to control the social makeup of the big metropolitan areas.

Resident participation versus community-based development?

Urban policy stands on Republican principles in the sense that it does not allow ethnic or religious criteria to be used as a basis for public policies. It cannot address particularisms, affiliations or identity-based claims. A universalist approach of this kind can only be understood as a strategy of intervention based on targeted geographical areas rather than targeted people or social groups. Relying on the notion of “territories” by way of “district” zoning serves precisely to avoid references to population type in developing public policy, with the only acceptable reference being to inhabitants.

This blind spot in urban policy was particularly notable with regard to the biographical relationship of minorities and immigrants to the geographical area (their path of integration in society, their often complex residential trajectory, modes of socialization, etc.). By referring the question of participation to the local level, public policies mask the process of ethnic exclusion from the 1970s through the 1990s in neighborhoods of public housing projects. The reference to disembodied inhabitants tends in this respect to underplay the “resources that could be mobilized” by inhabitants of the districts, as put it Kirszbaum and Epstein (Kirszbaum et al. 2010: II-1-a). Élise Palomares and Aude Rabaud argue that the civic injunction in a context of increased insecurity even appeared locally as a “reproach” directed at minority groups (Palomares et al. 2006: 138).

The participative approach thus evades the issue of the cultural dimensions of the population or the multiethnic dimension of

neighborhoods. Community in France is conceived in a national context, which, as Bacqué has argued, is very much at variance with the approach in the United States where community representation is a key mode of expression for minorities:

This difference is related in part to the way in which majority and minority groups are apprehended in social and political life. In the United States, intermediary forms of affiliation are granted legitimacy of action” (Bacqué 2005: 98).

Thus, in France, debates on the construction of an urban civic sense are intimately bound up with tensions between the imperative of equality in the treatment of citizens and the attempt to reduce poverty by exceptional measures promoting equality of opportunity (Donzelot 2006: 36–47; Kirszbaum 2004: 103; Carrel 2004: 111–128).

LA LOI BORLOO: URBAN STRATEGY FOR AN INCLUSIVE SOCIETY

In 2002, a report by the National Audit Office gave a very critical assessment of thirty years of urban policy, noting the escalation in the number of goals, the growing complexity of contractual procedures, and the significant increase in expenditure. The Audit Office went so far as to regard urban policy as illegible. Is it “for geographical areas or for the population?” it asked, noting how “outrageous” it was that urban policy, in the name of “Republican principles,” did not endeavor to reduce unemployment in problem districts and thereby give every individual “the means to achieve social and economic autonomy”. Instead, the efforts of the state in the period of contractualization tended to “dictate to citizens their choices in terms of place of residence or work” (Cours des comptes 2002: 282–283).

Jean-Louis Borloo acknowledged the severity of these critiques when he was appointed Minister of the City and Urban Renewal in May 2002. Borloo proposed to recentralize the means of intervention in the districts through a *Programme National de Rénovation Urbaine* (PNRU, National Program of Urban Renovation, instituted by decree

August 1, 2003). The main aim of the program was to create positive residential experiences for local inhabitants through the agency of massive demolition and renovation of housing units, including a vast program of re-housing. Social and urban diversity remained the prevailing concept, but the program of urban renovation proposed new modalities of intervention and financing as well as new public actors. In short, the concept was not changed but the mechanisms of intervention and power relations were.

The *Programme National de Rénovation Urbaine* drew inspiration from New Public Management against a backdrop of public sector reforms (Epstein 2005, 2010). First, the period of contractualization left room for a method that aimed to bring together new regulations (definition of objectives complete with financing) and new modes of assessment (national observatory for ZUS, an evaluation committee, new standards of accountability for urban project management and for integration mechanisms). Thus, the state combined a zoning policy with a statistical apparatus that enabled it to identify and treat areas where the minority population was high. As a reminder, article 2 of the 2003 law created an *Observatoire National des Zones Urbaines Sensibles* (ONZUS, National Observatory of Sensitive Urban Zones) directly reporting to the Ministry of the City. The institutional treatment allows for combining quantitative analyses by neighborhood and by theme. For Dikeç, the acquisition of knowledge and the assessment modes set up in the framework of the PNRU, highlighting the risks of fusion between a political space and a social space:

the Borloo law reduced the spaces of urban policy to an ensemble of housing estates. Over the years, urban policy gradually shifted focus from the inhabitants themselves to spaces of interventions” (2007: 123).

Second, this public sector management replaced such institutional actors as ministries and their local representatives (DDE, DDASS) with governmental agencies. The *Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine* (ANRU) was put in charge of initiating, financing, and assessing urban renovation projects. The ACSE (the National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunities) was put in charge of the social aspects of the program of renovation (education, employment, discrimination). Third, this method proposed “a one-stop source” of

financing endowed with 30 billion euros, 2.5 billion of which was from the state. The aim was to simplify financial procedures for local representatives and project managers. The *Foncière Logement* association, which represents the employers organization in the field of housing policy, was particularly mobilized to finance and develop a private stock of affordable homes for first time buyers in the sectors under renovation. In sum, the new institutional framework was set up for efficiency reasons.

A curative treatment meant to reassert equality of opportunity and fight the effects of ethnic concentrations

The implementation of a new version of urban policy thus took a decisive turn when Borloo announced a series of exceptional measures, as part of the urban renovation program (PNRU) comprising 250,000 demolitions, 250,000 reconstructions and 400,000 renovations. This program on a hitherto unprecedented scale, with its motto “put an end to ghettos,” succeeded in creating a consensus between political actors and their local partners, considering the number of agreements signed between the state and the municipalities (397 projects had been signed by July 31, 2012).²² The mayors saw the program as an opportunity to find a definitive solution to problem neighborhoods, while the providers of social housing saw it as an interesting means of renewing their housing stock by obtaining construction and demolition loans on advantageous financial terms. The national plan stimulated the main local stakeholders, but it was accompanied by strict conditions that the municipalities had to respect in order to acquire funding.

The urban renovation program promoted the notion of social diversity in its struggle against social inequalities and against the increasing insularity of ethnic communities. From this point of view, the Borloo plan extended earlier programs. But instead of proposing a preventive approach based on housing attributions and intermittent demolitions, the program became curative by systematizing several guiding lines. The main features studied before signing ANRU agreements were thus the principle of massive demolition, the full reconstruction of

22. The initial budget for the national program of urban renovation was 30 billion € over 5 years.

the housing offer, partly outside the neighborhood, the diversification of the housing stock with the development of affordable housing for first time buyers, the defining of a strategy of re-housing for displaced residents, the development of an agreement in the neighborhood to improve the management of outdoor spaces, housing services, and the coordination of local stakeholders in the context of a global strategy (municipality, providers of social housing, associations for integration, etc.). This policy relied on the reaffirmation of the principle of equality of opportunity available to all residents through the transformation of the physical and social environment of their neighborhoods.

Beyond the technical details, it was the initial primacy of the physical over the social dimension of this program of urban renovation that was striking, with the presentation first of a decree on urban measures in 2003 and then the so-called social cohesion decrees structured around employment, housing, and equality of opportunity. The focus of attention was on urban reform before social reform. The announced fiscal effort dedicated to urban transformations was more than twice the budget for social actions: 30 billion euros for the ANRU as against 12.7 billion for the ACSE. Behind the neutral terms that led to demolition, diversification, and rehousing, what we have here is clearly an attempt to transform society through urban intervention.

Midway into the implementation of the program, evaluations indicated three major problems: the difficulty in reconstructing a social housing supply equal to the number of demolished units; the consequences of production on re-housing management; and the difficulty in introducing private housing into these neighborhoods. Beyond the operational limits of the program, the very strategy of project financing held back the implementation of a consulting strategy with local residents, so that the project tended to be defined in technical rather than social terms. Moreover, the issues involved in setting up the urban renovation projects were linked to project management, that is, to real technical, financial, and accounting competencies. The operational approach positioned residents not as decision-makers but as experts about day-to-day life, the use of local spaces in the neighborhood, and what does not work in these buildings. The role of residents was thus reduced to its most individualizing dimension: what was expected from them was to express their views on the uses of their place of residence through actions of urban management if

their residence was renovated and resettled or to express re-housing choices directly to public housing agencies or associations.

The prevention of juvenile delinquency in urban conception

In the absence of a reversal in the deterioration of living conditions in problem neighborhoods, the focus of attention of the ANRU program turned to undesirable, abnormal, or unmanageable elements. One of the central arguments was that the development of delinquency and pauperization reinforced the “feeling of abandonment” of residents. But references to the “population of ZUS” essentially worked as a democratic justification for introducing new mechanisms of prevention and security. Minister Borloo stated as much (2004: 8):

Acts of delinquency and public order offences increase the feeling of abandonment of the population in Sensitive Urban Zones (ZUS) [...] The prevention of delinquency contributes to reestablishing public order and security. It is therefore one of the priorities of urban policy, with the goal of reducing inequalities in the ZUS.

The introduction of mechanisms for situational crime prevention in the renovation program was emphatic in the general principles of the *Loi d'orientation et de programmation pour la sécurité intérieure* (LOPSI) of 29 August 2002 and this was reinforced by the decree on delinquency prevention of March 5, 2007 as well as the plan of delinquency prevention and assistance to victims (2010–12). The LOPSI stated in 2002 in the chapter IX entitled “Reinforcing prevention and social insertion”:

It is now widely accepted that certain types of urban environments or economic activities prove to be conducive to crime and that it is possible to prevent or reduce the sources of insecurity by acting on urban planning and architecture (LOPSI 2002: chapt. IX.)

These strategies, which drew on Anglo-Saxon thinking on making neighborhoods safe, from theoreticians ranging from Jane Jacobs to Oscar Newman, grew significantly stronger after the outbreak of riots in 2005 that spread throughout the country. The “delinquency

prevention” facet promoted by the government and set up in the framework of the PNRU required an urban treatment. “Urban design projects [...] which can have an impact on protecting people and property against threats and aggressions, should be the subject of preliminary public order studies in order to evaluate consequences,” article 14 of the decree of March 5, 2007 stipulates.

To begin with, the program of urban renewal integrated measures for the prevention of juvenile delinquency when it came to the security of facilities and the built environment. The road network was restructured and the district physically opened up to facilitate the interventions of public services such as the police and fire departments. Residentialization strategies between public and private spaces served to ensure safety, notably by adding entry gates and walls to buildings. This technique offered solutions to deter youth from gathering and loitering in entrance halls. The installation of video surveillance systems discouraged degradation, in particular during construction work, and the development of video protection in public spaces and in the communal parts of buildings served to deter crime.

Secondly, the urban renovation plans were subjected to public security studies and diagnostics that required the approval of the *Préfecture de Police*. Thus a construction application had to receive prefectorial approval, and building permits could be rejected if security conditions were not satisfactory. State representatives played an important role, assessing the acceptability of designs in terms of security and thereby restricting to a certain extent the freedom of municipalities and social housing providers. These mechanisms were financed by the budget of the ANRU as far as urban restructuring was concerned (opening up the road system and making it accessible). Other mechanisms could find financial support through the ACSE (notably, the CUCS).

In broad terms, the introduction of Anglo-Saxon methods of intervention in France seems to have derived from a misinterpretation of the notion of “community”. Strategies of delinquency prevention deployed in England or in the United States rely extensively on the active mobilization of the “local community”. As Bacqué has observed (2000), the notion of “local community” basically refers in the United States to a social and not a geographical entity, acting as an intermediary body between the state and the individual. Belonging to a community can be structured on a geographic, ethnic, or reli-

gious bond and thus override weaker social bonds. Organized into intermediary bodies, community representatives have the power – on the individual scale as on the community scale – to contest or participate in policies when it comes to fighting against poverty and ethnic segregation (Bacqué 2005). Crime prevention programs like “neighborhood watch,” rely on local communities and their representatives.

The idea that resident involvement in the management of their neighborhood could be coordinated with the work of the national police was not conceived in France as it was in the Anglo-Saxon world. For this reason, the penetration of Anglo-Saxon security approaches into the French context of urban projects appears as a misunderstanding. When the issue became a subject of debate around the beginning of the 2000s, the “broken window theory” was the emerging idea in France. This theory basically explains the mechanism by which a vandalized space leads to further degradations and then to a feeling of abandonment. Studies in a generative approach to urban sociology, by Michel Bonetti among others, note that “urban insecurity is fed to a large extent by deficiencies in urban management and the inappropriateness of the organizations in charge of it” (Bonetti 2005: 8).

This was the sense of the introduction of a “sustainable urban management” (*Gestion Urbaine de Proximité* in French) in the context of the urban renovation program. But whereas Bonetti proposed reinforcing urban management systems by developing management competencies and partnerships with residents when it came to regulating social life in the environment, the “sustainable urban management” program, as it was conceived, aspired at best to improve the internal and external organization of local stakeholders, social providers, and municipalities. The delinquency prevention facet of sustainable urban management thus became focused on the security of public facilities and equipment with an eye to improving forms of collective living.

From participation to accountability

Studies on the impact of participative approaches in projects of urban renovation show that by and large they encounter similar obstacles as during the contractual period. Specifically, these studies do not show a real capacity for residents to impact the contents of urban projects. At best the coexistence of many participative approaches reaches the

level of consultation and cooperation (Donzelot et al. 2006). The powerful re-centralization movement aimed at changing the face of the problem neighborhoods marked a renewal of discourse on “citizenship”: the management dimension of the urban renovation projects is conceived as part of a strategy of making residents responsible rather than encouraging their participation in the process of decision-making in the public sector (Fondation Abbé Pierre 2005).

Resident involvement was firstly incorporated into project management by systematizing procedures of “sustainable urban management” and by professional integration programs proposed to neighborhood residents.²³ At bottom, these procedures prompted elected representatives and social housing providers to rethink modes of housing management (reception of new residents, reception and treatment of applications, etc.), public or semi-private spaces (cleaning and maintenance: removing graffiti or illegally parked cars) based on the configuration of spaces defined in the framework of the project. They could also mobilize residents through resident associations and neighborhood boards to generate innovative projects (associative garages, etc.). As Damien Bertrand from the independent research firm Cabinet FORS-Recherche Sociale writes (2005:79), there was a shift in strategies of local development from resident participation to their accountability:

Procedures for improving sustainable urban management [...] are increasingly producing a shift from the notion of tenant “participation” to that of tenant “responsibility” in the management of their homes and buildings, and this for the purpose of perpetuating investments. Examples of such procedures include: identifying “designated” residents for the management of stairwells; setting up information campaigns on the rights and duties of tenants; painting frescos on buildings; and getting residents involved in the condition and appropriation of their homes.

Residents were also mobilized through the measures set up in the context of community policing. This approach to projects has sometimes provoked strong tension amongst residents, most of whom were

23. Sustainable urban management is one of the facets of the *Projets de Rénovation Urbaine*. It is the object of a specific agreement between the state and the municipality in the context of a project of urban renovation. A professional integration facet must also be the subject of a specific agreement in the framework of urban projects.

not involved in strategic project decisions. After the start of the first operations of demolition, many residents had to wait until there were vacancies in the local housing stock to settle into new homes. Some residents manifested resistance to a program of urban transformation on this scale. The 2005 report from the Abbé Pierre Foundation on housing conditions, “L’État du mal-logement en France” (2005: 61) insisted on the “scepticism” not to say “the opposition” of local resident groups and associations concerning the implementation of urban projects:

The terms heard locally to describe the aims (“take back the neighborhood”, “give it another vocation” or “transform it socially”) clearly indicate the hope that changing the neighborhood will lead to changing its population. This way of speaking of these neighborhoods [...] is belittling and even humiliating to residents.

A “FRENCH” EMPOWERMENT

In 2013, French urban policy took a new turn when the Minister of urban affairs of the Hollande government, François Lamy, asserted his desire to renew the national orientations in urban policy in order to fight the demobilization process in deprived areas and promote a greater involvement of residents and communities who are obviously “absent from the general debate” (Lamy 2013: 5). In the new public report issued to the minister, *Pour une réforme radicale de la politique de la ville* (For a Radical Reform of the French Urban Policy, 2013), Bacqué and Mechmache promote the idea of “empowerment”, which made a splash in the French institutional debate. “Nothing will be get done without the inhabitants”, the authors argued:

A French style of empowerment supposes that *participation* is not understood as a way to compensate for the loss of means, to replace the common law or public services; on the contrary, it goes with an intensification of public policies, but public policies that are co-designed and rely upon citizen initiatives. It is based on the empowerment of citizens and recognition of collectives, in order to go beyond the French dread of communitarianism (2013: 20).

The reference to a “French style of empowerment” endeavored in particular to restore the individual and collective capacities of residents in deprived areas through their involvement in local decision-making processes: “the challenge [in matter of participation] is above all political”, as the authors put it (2013: 15).

The report recommended redesigning the institutional landscape and providing new human and financial resources to local actors – residents, associations and communities – which are immersed in socio-ethnic tensions and institutional conflicts, in particular with the police force. The pillars of this radical reform consisted in granting the foreigners the right to vote, redefining the institutional roles and promoting a set of procedures in a bottom-up approach: developing social initiatives under the aegis of a new authority, putting people at the center with the development of spaces for citizens in order to reform the running of public services and initiate a training process. This new discourse has an experimental vocation that consists in updating public instruments and setting up new standards for community development.

While the voting rights for foreigners have been shelved in parliament, the interesting point is that this new form of bottom-up approach – another way to deal with the issues of citizenship and ethnicity in public policy – was quietly discussed in urban policy before the release of the public report, that is to say long before 2012. In particular, the Urban Construction Architecture Plan (PUCA – *Plan Urbanisme Construction Architecture*) of the Ministry of Employment, Social Cohesion and Housing launched an international consultation in April 2007 which was related to the program *Gouvernement des villes et fabrique du bien commun* (governing cities and the making of the common good).

One of the key thematics was “urban citizenship: forms of involvement and issues of solidarity”. The program was oriented around three angles: (i) the growing disconnection between institutional participation and the development of social relationships in singular and in the plural, (ii) confrontations at the margins of society and innovative opportunities in segregated areas and (iii) delimitation of the political sphere in deprived areas (PUCA 2007: 7). In an annexed bibliographic synthesis of this research program, Marion Carrel introduces her analysis by stating that,

research on governing cities and the making of the common good can only make sense if the analysis is situated from the standpoint of the governed and their role and practices are taken into account (Carrel 2007: 5).

The notion of empowerment that was under study already at the end of Nicolas Sarkozy's presidency, precisely at the time when the PUCA department reaped the benefits of its discussion on city safety and launched the first experiments on urban security in deprived areas (PUCA 2007). Emmanuel Raoul, permanent secretary of the PUCA in January 2012, argues:

Safety in urban design is a major concern for the state and the local authorities. It has been incorporated into a legislative disposition in 2007 that requires a preliminary study of public safety dedicated to equipment and important urban projects. For many years the "PUCA" department has developed an investigative work [...] on the spatial dimensions of safety. First discussed through the prism of the program Urban areas and safety ("*Territoires urbains et sûreté*") this work led to an operational extension with the experimental program Quality and safety in urban areas ("*Qualité et sûreté des espaces urbains*") (Raoul 2012: 5).

As we can see, the French experience echoes the issues and experiments in matters of participation and security that have been implemented in different European countries, such as the UK within the area-based favor New Deal for Community (see the example of the Coventry NDC, Appendix 3).²⁴

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I have attempted, in this chapter, to give an overview of some four decades of urban policy in France. In this extensive reassessment of public action it is not surprising to find injunctions linked to democratic functioning ("resident participation") side by side with impera-

24. The NDC national program favors the regeneration initiated in 1998 of the UK's most deprived neighborhoods.

tives of security (“the first freedom is security”) since the relationship between the governing and the governed is rethought and adapted to the territories of urban policy. Approaches with regard to resident participation and security in social housing districts, which were disconnected at the outset, have been gradually conjoined on the local level and today raise the question of civic involvement in public spaces, and tenant responsibility and autonomy in residential strategies.

Three periods translate, in broad terms, the development of relations between the governing and the governed: the period of experimentation around the *Développement Social des Quartiers* (DSQ, Social Development of Districts 1984–88); the period of institutionalization of urban contracts policy around *Contrats de Villes* (City Contracts 1988–2002) when new standards were promoted at the local level; and the centralization of policy implementation in *projects of urban renovation* (PRU) that promote new institutional tools and rules (2003–15). As we have seen, too, a new orientation has been promoted since President François Hollande’s election in May 2012. François Lamy, Urban Affairs Minister during the first period of Hollande’s term mandate, announced a reform package in February 2013 in which inhabitants and communities are to be empowered in an updated cartography of the deprived area.

Throughout these successive discourses and norms, the establishment of urban policy has involved strained relations between knowledge forged on a national level and locally developed political mechanisms. The history of urban policy is not just evidence of the increasing hold of such concepts as “affirmative action”, “social diversity” or even “empowerment” in local political discourse, it also reveals a transformation in the modes of interpretation of territories – in particular when it comes to participation and securitization. For Estèbe and Béhar, there is no academic consensus on these modes of interpretation due to the existence of very divergent conceptions of poverty (Estèbe et al. 1995). Is poverty a matter of a “socio-spatial specialization” of certain housing segments on the scale of a metropolitan area in the context of increasing job insecurity? Are cities confronted with the development of “structural poverty” in multiethnic districts, as a result of the exploitation of one social class by another or forms of ethnic or gender discrimination? Are cities facing “marginal pov-

erty”, with the effects of poverty in problem districts being the result of cycles of economic crisis?

The modes of interpretation that have emerged from national political orientations have led to defining and establishing different local strategies and management tools. The social development of districts aimed more at establishing a local system for negotiating socio-cultural norms in order to factor in the diversity of expectations, in particular those of minority groups (class, gender, or ethnic). In addition, the project approach initiated in the 2000s set out to give present-day relevance to national and republican norms in a top-down movement. These modes of public action have been conceived on the basis of evaluations of territorial dynamics by local governments. It is in this strained relationship between acquiring knowledge of a geographical area and defining management tools that power plays are structured and that the response to conflicts between social movements and institutions must be thought out. The choice of a model of intervention in an urban environment depends of course on its history, on the socio-economic context, the institutional framework, and the particular territorial situation.

These are the elements of contextualization that I will now endeavor to describe in Saint-Denis and in Les Mureaux with regard to three criteria: the formation of districts, the diagnostic elements applied, and the implementation strategies. In Saint-Denis, local stakeholders seem to have drawn extensively on the contractual period with the establishment of a local contract. Here we also find a structured metropolitan area that has been able to weigh politically in negotiations between the state and the cities of Saint-Denis. In the Mureaux, by contrast, it appears that the strategy of project management has prevailed in a socio-political context that has not allowed for the development of inter-municipal cooperation between local councils.

3. SAINT-DENIS AND THE CONTRACTUAL STRATEGY

This chapter examines how a regime of hospitality is established at the local level on the basis of a given urban strategy. In the first two subchapters, I intend to show how a contractual approach leads to a type of regime attached to participative democracy. An analysis of local historical data and statistics will show how several trends have contributed to a loosening of social bonds and a questioning of collective affiliations in the old industrial city of Saint-Denis: the loss of the status of workers for immigrants; the transformation of community ties with changes in strategies of social integration; the evolution of family structures; and the differential treatment toward immigrants in the job market and in housing.

This class disaffiliation raised particularly strong issues in terms of socialization, citizenship, and integration that led to new forms of conflict by the 1980s. The development of juvenile delinquency progressively replaced traditional forms of conflict in the labor society. The municipality responded to these new forms of conflict in the mid-1980s by laying the foundations for a participative development project in deprived areas.

I will illustrate this historical perspective with the case study of Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air, a ZUS classified district of 10,000 inhabitants, situated in the south of the city of Saint-Denis, close to the huge industrial area in La Plaine Saint-Denis north of Paris. The district is delimited by the Saint-Denis canal, Highway A1 and the fort (le Fort de l'Est) that bounds the area to the north, west, and east. Ten per cent of the total population of Saint-Denis, known as "*Dionysiens*", live in this district.

In the last two sub-chapters, I examine the activities and procedures of the local democratic body. I focus on how associative representatives and residents perceive their involvement in participative democracy.

Figure 2. The city of Saint-Denis and the area of Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air (red area).

Figure 3. ZUS of Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air (red border).

DISAFFILIATIONS IN AN INDUSTRIAL CITY: THE CASE OF LE FRANC-MOISIN-BEL-AIR

Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air forged a strongly stigmatized local identity throughout the twentieth century, as it went from slums to “neighborhoods of relegation”. Close to an industrial area, the formation of this district can be read above all as a history of migration. Based on a collection of research documents and newspapers, this section describes how the successive migration flows that resulted from changing socio-economic and political contexts changed the face of the district.

The stumbling block of the social project in the housing estate¹

The subunit Bel-Air attached to the Franc-Moisin housing estate is one of the last expressions of what “little Spain” used to be. This neighborhood was built on an area of garden plots by Spanish migrants who came after World War I to work in the glass factories in La Plaine. The waves of migration began in the first years of the twentieth century with individual Spanish migrant workers who settled here with the intention of returning to Spain. According to historian Natacha Lillo (2008: 18), the need for labor immediately after World War I amplified this migratory trend. The contractors in La Plaine Saint-Denis sent Spanish migrants to bring new recruits from Spain, which led to the formation of channels of immigration. Some families, fleeing extreme poverty, settled as a matter of urgency on the garden plots belonging for the most part to a large landowner. The population first grew and then dwindled, from 255 in 1926 up to 529 in 1931 and down to 476 in 1936.² The neighborhoods that

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1. This section partially relies on Natacha Lillo’s work on Le Franc-Moisin-Bel Air, commissioned by the Délégation Interministérielle de la Ville in 2008.
 2. The demographic drop between the later two census surveys is essentially due to the departure of migrants after the massive dismissals of foreigners consubstantial with the restrictive measures taken by the French government against employing foreigners after the 1929 economic crisis.

developed not far from the factories were given exotic names like *El Barrio Chino* (the Chinese district), in reference to the district in Barcelona known for prostitution and shady dealings, or yet again *El Barrio Negro*, situated not far away in Drancy. Segregated from the local residents, a number of whom developed xenophobic and racist feelings toward them, these migrant workers remained within French society.

Between the 1930s and the end of the 1950s, the Spanish community became organized. Far from the center of Saint-Denis, it developed its own shops, cultivated gardens, and erected places of worship without any infrastructure or urban planning rules.³ At the same time, the workers were joined by their wives and children to form the community of *Petite Espagne*. The arrival of families transformed the migratory process, from temporary settlement to long-term strategies of integration and the beginning of a real “Spanish community”. The formation of this community brought it in contact with public institutions (the municipality, police, and school for the most part). The community became integrated through the social recognition of migrant workers active in the communist party and unions and in local political debates. A second threshold of integration was bound up with the status of “resident” of Saint-Denis. The municipality of Saint-Denis developed an active social policy toward its inhabitants in proposing the first elements of social coverage (unemployment benefits, holidays and camps for the children, building schools to promote education) to all regardless of nationality.

The Spanish migrants formed a community but they were not the only migrants to settle in Le Franc-Moisin sector. Some Polish and Portuguese workers also came to the area after World War I. Another wave of migrant workers came after World War II, mainly from Portugal and North Africa. The old housing stock was ill-equipped and insufficient, so hovels quickly appeared in interstices from the city

3. The community environment remained extremely run down. Plots were lacking running water and electricity. Wood shacks were gradually replaced by cinder block constructions, but the installations in the area remained run down until the first years after World War I, well after the constraining urbanism regulations set down by the Sarraut decree by 1928. Neither the *Préfecture de la Seine* (representing the state) nor the health service of Saint-Denis had any legal control over the development of shantytowns on private land.

center to La Plaine Saint-Denis.⁴ At the beginning of the 1960s, Portuguese fleeing extreme poverty settled massively in Le Franc-Moisin area that had gone from the hovels of the period of development of the Spanish community to a full-blown shantytown accommodating in 1965 about 1,677 Portuguese, 159 Spanish, 51 Algerians, 21 French, 17 Tunisians, 14 Moroccans, 6 Italians, and 4 Germans. The communist Mayor, Auguste Gillot, regularly denounced in municipal bulletins the scandal of the “biggest shantytown in France”.⁵ In a period of growth, the housing crisis was severe in Saint-Denis and intensified with the waves of migrants. The municipal government saw this crisis striking “workers” and the “under-housed” particularly hard. From the 1950s to the mid 1960s, isolated migrant workers were seen from the perspective of the worker condition and migrant families were still considered “under-housed” in municipal bulletins.

Several outbreaks of fire in the shantytowns of La Plaine Saint-Denis ended up bringing the indecent housing conditions into the spotlight, which led in turn to an initial series of legislative measures. In the wake of a visit by government representatives to Le Franc-Moisin shantytown, the Vivien Decree was promulgated on July 10, 1970 to speed up the first operations aimed at reducing housing unfit for habitation. To begin with, the municipality obtained financing in 1970 to construct 900 housing units in Le Franc-Moisin. The actual re-housing of residents took a long time, between 1968 and 1974.⁶ There were several

4. The city of Saint-Denis was even described in 1950 as the “capital of slums,” in *L'Humanité* (13 November 1950) in reference to its unfit housing conditions. Algerian workers settled in the sector, mainly moving into furnished hotels, which were soon overcrowded. To resolve the housing problem, on August 1956, during the Algerian War, the Interior Ministry created the semi-public company “Sonacotral” *Société Nationale de Construction des Travailleurs Algériens* to develop *Foyers de Travailleurs Migrants* (FTM, Migrant Worker Hostels) for “French Moslems from Algeria who had come to work in metropolitan France and their families”. This management of immigrant labor through housing turned out to be a powerful tool of “settlement and control of North African populations” (Bernardo 1999: 40).

5. Housing was one of the main themes of the political discourse of Auguste Gillot (mayor from 1945 to 1971) and then of Marcelin Berthelot (deputy of Seine Saint-Denis from 1968 to 1978 and Mayor of Saint-Denis from 1971 to 1991) who denounced social injustice and the exploitation of the working class and demanded state funding to develop social housing and eliminate units unfit for housing.

6. It was during this period that the large-scale social housing project was built with over 2,000 units.

reasons for this delay.⁷ First, the construction of Le Franc-Moisin housing estate represented a major step in getting rid of the shantytown but this re-housing solution was not exclusive. The Sonacotral, renamed Sonacotra (*Société Nationale de Construction des Travailleurs*) after the independence of Algeria, was alone responsible for the process of re-housing. The Saint-Denis public housing office, HLM (*Habitation à Loyer Modéré*) and LOGIREP (a subsidiary of Sonacotra) were in charge of building the housing estate. It was a long process from the time funds were released until the operational implementation of the project. In fact, in addition to the usual construction obstacles (budgetary constraints, escalation in real estate costs, difficult negotiations with owners, etc.), it was hard to build over 2,000 apartments in the heart of a shantytown that was extensively inhabited. Individual migrant workers were re-housed in Foyer Sonacotra in other sectors of Saint-Denis, and the first families moved into emergency housing projects.

Thus most of the under-housed went through the post-war boom years without access to decent housing. Social diversity was not really achieved in the housing estate. Nevertheless the process of re-housing did provide most of the residents of Le Franc-Moisin with access to standard modern housing facilities (kitchen, bathroom, toilets, parking). It constituted a critical step in improving the living conditions of the residents of the shantytown. But the re-housing process came to an end with the first developments of the urban crisis in April 1973, when Olivier Guichard issued a directive that effectively ended the construction of large-scale social housing projects. Beyond the aesthetic and moral considerations of the time, these large-scale projects quickly experienced a variety of problems.⁸ In the 1970s, the immigrant families (mainly Portuguese and Algerian) who moved into

7. The municipal bulletin from 1970 echoes the complaints of households that had not yet been rehoused: "There is an empty unit in one HLM group. How is it that it is not yet occupied?" (*Bulletin municipal* 1970: 13). In actual fact, the municipal government only had control over a portion of the social housing attributions. The social housing companies and private companies with more than 10 employees also had attributions reserved to them and, as a result, salaried employees also moved into the new housing units.

8. Due to the urgency with which the housing programs were launched, public facilities were not built (nurseries and school, socio-cultural center, etc.), which made the lives of residents difficult. In addition, technical problems appeared in the housing units and in the newly constructed Garcia Lorca middle school three years after the housing estate was finished.

social housing projects as a result of the family entry and settlement policy of 1974, no longer corresponded to the figure of the migrant worker engaged in politics and union activities. Locally, the integration of the children of immigrants raised issues in areas of early childhood, education, and employment. It was in this social context that the municipality sought to promote a variety of cultural programs (theatre, sports, leisure activities), to develop a dialogue with residents (through resident letters in municipal bulletins, neighborhood festivals, and sporting events) along such public services and facilities as nurseries and schools.

The birth of a multiethnic district in a context of socio-political disaffiliation

Resolving issues of integration in these districts became all the more pressing at a time when groups of workers were divided and hierarchized in the local socio-economic space. Thus, the trajectory of then-recent Algerian immigrants in the 1950s did not become as readily anchored in the local political context as that of the Spanish migrants in the interwar period. As Bacqué and Fol noted (1997: 46), it was especially the second generation of Algerian immigrants that became bearers in the early 1980s of the political discourse advocating equality of rights in line with the anti-racist marches organized in 1983. In addition, many representatives of the Portuguese community, who had been re-housed in Le Franc-Moisin projects eventually chose to become first-time home buyers. Lillo's research (2004) shows how the work of women was decisive in the integration of households of Portuguese origin, but also in the schooling of their children, allowing them to take their place in the strong local development of the service sector that took place in the early 1980s.

The effects of social differentiation in the world of workers led to a deep divide between politicians and the residents of Saint-Denis. Voter turnout rates dropped significantly between 1960 and 2000, from 60–65 per cent to 20–25 per cent (Sintomer 2000: 3). Voter registration in Saint-Denis plummeted in particular between 1982 and 1990 – factoring in demographic variations (Vidal 2004: 57). The former Communist Party stronghold had an efficient mode of affiliation until the early 1970s due to the fact that the locally elected officials repre-

sented a countervailing force to national politicians in the structured framework of the party. This was no longer the case after the Socialist and Communist Parties agreed on a common program at the end of the 1970s. “The ‘party’ form is dead as a political organization,” (Faraldi 2005: 54) declared Patrick Braouezec, Communist Party Deputy Mayor of Saint-Denis from 1991 to 2012 and now president of the Plaine Commune agglomeration community.

In Saint-Denis, the two main issues on which the municipality was strongly mobilized in the 1970s was rising unemployment against a backdrop of deindustrialization and the unsanitary housing conditions throughout the city with all the difficulty involved in fighting against the exploitation of migrant workers by slum landlords. The discursive shift in the seventies from worker to immigrant signaled a fundamental political issue: in a context of rising unemployment, the migrant worker was progressively put into the category of “immigration”. In the early years of deindustrialization, Saint-Denis Mayor Marcelin Berthelot pointed to “unemployment,” “slums,” “police controls,” “differentiated administrative treatment” as penalizing the “immigrants”. The Mayor often spoke out against the way in which unemployment and immigration were lumped together from the early 1960s through the 1970s. But the effects of social insecurity made themselves felt and the socio-economic climate had an adverse impact on the political debate. The working conditions of the residents became precarious. Bacqué and Fol note that the jobless rate in the city climbed 38 per cent from 1975 to 1982 (Bacqué et al. 1997: 46). The late seventies and early eighties even witnessed a resurgence of racist acts against a backdrop of renewed activism of extreme right-wing groups. The Mayor was outraged. He could not tolerate that the city of Saint-Denis be turned from the industrial cradle of France to the condition of an impoverished city. The concentration of immigrant populations in the districts of social housing thereby became a political problem for which the local and national levels of government blamed each other.⁹ Local representatives held employers

9. The deputy mayor of Saint-Denis thus denounced the formation of ghettos in his city: “We have alerted public opinion and the government about the problem of the massive arrival of migrant workers in working-class cities. This arrival, organized by the government and the employers, or clandestine, leads to extreme concentrations of population [...] The housing situation deteriorates and many French and immigrant

and the government responsible for the formation of “ghettos” while the state, through the intermediary of the prefect, held the municipal government responsible for the abusive construction of social housing. At the end of the 1970s, the category of immigrants – used to designate unskilled workers, some of them jobless – become a divisive category: victims in the eyes of some and culpable in the eyes of others. But the backdrop to this was a socio-political balance based on housing and industrial employment that had begun to falter in a dual movement of deindustrialization and the development of the service industry.

THE SCENARIO OF SOCIAL INSECURITY AND URBAN FRAGMENTATION

Saint-Denis and the surrounding cities underwent the effects of a changing job market beginning in the mid-1970s. With the industrial crisis and mass unemployment, new forms of social precariousness developed in the family, at work, and in school. They did not so much cause an intensification of the phenomena of “exclusion” (despite assertions to the contrary in the presentation of the urban renovation project in Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air), but rather a diversification of precarious situations. And this phenomenon impacted principally the young. The casualization of work in the late eighties and early nineties went hand in hand with other processes that weakened social relations in the district.

families find themselves refused HLM attributions [...]; difficulties at school are aggravated: the children of immigrants make up 80 per cent of some classes in our city; municipal costs for social assistance and health rise considerably [...]. What the state is looking for in Saint-Denis as in other working-class cities is the constitution of genuine ghettos of immigrant populations. We cannot tolerate this, [... we] reject the creation of these ghettos in Saint-Denis, [...] demand a fair distribution of immigrant workers in all the cities of the greater Paris area, [...] along with an end to official and clandestine immigration so as not to add to the number of French and immigrant jobless [...]" (*Saint-Denis, notre ville*, 1981).

In the first place, the last three census results¹⁰ show the strong presence of a young population (more than 50 per cent of the population in 2006 falls into the two age groups of 0–14 and 15–29), a higher rate of monoparental families than in the city as a whole (a quarter of the families in the district were monoparental in 2006) as well as a significant proportion of immigrants and foreign nationals (foreign nationals represented 35.8 per cent of the population in 2006 as opposed to 31.1 per cent throughout the city). In the second place, the fragility indices are identified with respect to the structure of socio-professional categories and their living conditions: over-representation of the least skilled socio-professional categories in the district (manual workers and employees) and strong representation of unskilled workers; higher occupancy numbers in housing units than the municipal average; higher percentage of households dependent on public transit.

However, the district was not harder hit by unemployment than the city as a whole¹¹ and the proportion of the working-age population with jobs had decreased only marginally. 76.6 per cent had employment in 2006 as against 78 per cent in 1999 (this rate was higher than in the city as a whole at the time of the 1999 census). The majority of the working population from Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air were employed beyond the city limits in the wider regional employment market. This meant that the majority of residents were not part of the local economic fabric. In 1990, 67.7 per cent of them commuted to work in the region (outside the city and department) as against 73.3 per cent in 1999 and 58 per cent in 2006.

An analysis of the employment structure points to a significant rate of casual employment (paid internships, temporary work, training, subsidized employment, fixed-term contracts) that, combined with the number of jobless, gives a measure of the various dimensions of the population's "fragility" on the job market. A total of 20.8 per cent of the working population was in casual employment in 1999 as

10. The figures were established by the municipal government in 2010 based on the INSEE censuses of 1990, and 1999 to 2006. On the basis of an analysis of these results, we can identify through indices of fragilization of the population in the district as compared to citywide averages.

11. Even though unemployment hits women harder, the employment rate for women rose over the last twenty years whereas the rate for men declined (75.5 per cent in 1990, 70.4 per cent in 1999, 66.8 per cent in 2006).

against 17.3 in 2006. For one thing, manual laborers and employees, a category that is strongly represented in the district, had difficulty becoming part of the industrial recomposition of La Plaine Saint-Denis and the development of the service industry.¹² For another, lack of qualifications (32 per cent of the residents had no diploma in 1999 and 40.3 per cent in 2006) and a high dropout rate among 18 to 24 year olds (43.5 per cent of this age group was pursuing studies in 1999 and 45.2 per cent in 2006) mark the fragility of the population in the job market.

It is interesting to compare the figures in the district with those of the city as a whole, because, contrary to the ANRU assessment, the indices do not show significant deviations between the two (generally no more than a few points). There is reason to conclude then that the district was not confronted with phenomena of “rupture” or “exclusion” but rather with a process of “fragmentation” or “fragilization” at work within the district itself.

Coupling social insecurity to civil insecurity

The early political discourse first developed in the 1960s by the various mayors of Saint-Denis on the subject of security evolved continuously over time.¹³ A study of the municipal bulletins between 1950 and 1960 shows the tendency of mayors – all of them elected by the left – to criticize the strategy of police control over the local population. Between 1960 and 1970, the tendency was to criticize the repressive strategy of the various governments under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing insofar as it targeted migrant workers in particular. Policing was reinforced in response to the various protest movements culminating in May 1968, and then at the beginning of the 1970s in

12. “The growth of service sector employment requires skills [...] that do necessarily correspond to the profiles of local populations. [...] The lack of linguistic command, problems of mobility, and the absence of childcare solutions all constitute strong obstacles to employment. Likewise, the new industrial sector hubs are out of step with local populations [...] As a result, a high percentage of the working-age population – notably the low-skilled, youth, foreigners, and women, is excluded from the job market. [...] The arrival of new companies produces job transfers and not job offers for the local population” (CUCS 2007).

13. This section is largely based on an analysis of the municipal bulletins of Saint-Denis, *Saint-Denis, notre ville*, between 1950 and 1986.

an attempt to control immigration in the context of decolonization. Confronted with the turmoil of demonstrations in the streets and in factories, the police basically sought to control public space (Le Goff 2005: 419). It was in opposition to the forms of intervention being used by the national police in their area of jurisdiction that the mayors were expressing themselves.

With the coming of the Left to power nationally in the early 1980s, there was a shift in the emphasis of discourse on security to notions of “prevention” and “mediation” in line with the early DSQ experiments. The municipal government acknowledged the different forms of insecurity emerging in its area of jurisdiction, as evidenced in letters from residents to the Mayor. This tense context eventually led to defining a division between the competencies of the municipal government in delinquency prevention and the repressive competencies of the national police in the area of public security.

The municipality of Saint-Denis is seriously concerned about the staggering rise of delinquency in our city. Whenever necessary, it will not fail to alert the government and request that it takes the necessary measures to guarantee the security of our residents (*Saint-Denis, notre ville*, 10.1980).

The Mayor, by his role as a mediator attentive to the needs of the local population, sought to show that he was in the best position to deal with the rising sense of insecurity among residents. Starting in the 1980s, municipal bulletins continually discussed the many forms of insecurity undermining the living conditions and environment of Saint-Denis residents: robberies, attacks, assaults, conflicts between neighbors, noise pollution, but also unsafe roads and health and social hazards in unsuitable housing.

Municipal discourse focused in particular on the social dimension of the notion of insecurity, in identifying “its roots in the deterioration of living conditions, the unpreparedness of youth for careers and

To the right:

Figure 4. “Security: tightening the links”,
Municipal paper *Saint-Denis, notre ville*, 10. 1983.
Figure 5. “Security: knowing in order to prevent”,
Municipal paper *Saint-Denis, notre ville*, 10. 1984.

SECURITE

RESSERER LES LIENS

Aut Francis-Moisin : une importante des associations et du quartier

Des enfants blessés par balle alors qu'ils jouaient tranquillement près de chez eux : ce drame s'est produit par deux fois cet été à Saint-Denis. A quelques jours d'intervalle, Paolo et Laura à la Courtille et Salah aux Francis-Moisins, heureusement, n'ont pas été gravement atteints ; les tireurs ont été rapidement arrêtés : dans un cas, un mineur de 15 ans s'était servi d'une arme chargée que son père avait l'habitude d'avoir à portée de main. Dans l'autre, il s'agissait d'un déterré, habitant Saint-Denis depuis peu. L'émotion a été grande dans notre ville, et même si ces événements ont peu à voir avec « l'engrenage de la violence dans les H.L.M. de banlieue » évoqué par une presse plus soucieuse de sensationnel que d'objectivité, ils sont présents dans la mémoire de chacun et ont rendu plus vives les préoccupations des Dionysiens concernant la sécurité.

Devenir de tels faits, une constatation s'impose : la possession abusive d'armes, lors d'apparitions de la sécurité, augmente au contraire les risques d'actes insouvenés et dangereux, voire meurtriers.

Les récentes décisions gouvernementales concernant la réglementation de la vente et de la possession d'armes à feu ont pour cette raison été approuvées par la Municipalité. Une délégation d'élus

venus faire part de l'émotion suscitée dans la ville par les événements, auprès du Cabinet de Monsieur François, secrétaire d'Etat chargé de la Sécurité Publique, a émis le souhait que cette règle-

mentation soit appliquée avec toute la rigueur nécessaire. Si la détention d'armes a révélé plus dangereuse qu'efficace pour améliorer la sécurité, par contre le bon sens rejoint sur la police, la population et les élus a fait, elle, la démonstration de son efficacité.

Cela a été le cas avec les policiers chargés de l'enquête aux Francis-Moisins et les habitants de cette cité et c'est aussi dans ce cas que s'est engagée l'action de la Municipalité pour améliorer la sécurité à Saint-Denis. L'effectif, à sa demande, s'élève dans trois quartiers (Centre, Est, Francis-Moisins) commande d'ailleurs à donner des résultats, puis que c'est en partie à leur présence préventive que le Commissaire de Saint-Denis attribue la diminution très sensible de la délinquance. On assiste en effet depuis un an à une diminution certaine du nombre de plaintes enregistrées (de 15 à 23 %). Dans le cadre de ces rapports contractuels avec la police, la Municipalité est intervenue auprès du Ministère de l'Intérieur pour qu'un mini ordonnance, prévu pour régler les tâches administratives des agents, soit installée dans les meilleurs délais au commissariat.

C'est maintenant chose faite, et si n'est un service permettant prochainement de libérer sept inspecteurs supplémentaires pour renforcer les effectifs sur la voie publique.

Ce travail de la police est déterminant, mais le comportement de chacun également : régler au sang, à l'agressivité, aux dégoûts, c'est empêcher des actes

plus graves, mettre des limites à l'absence, desquelles certains finissent par se croire tout permis. D'une façon plus positive, ce qui favorise le rassemblement des liens entre les gens, entre les générations, le plaisir de partager, de partager, de connaître ensemble, ont une influence bénéfique sur la sécurité. Ainsi, aux Francis-Moisins justement, où existe depuis longtemps une importante vie associative et de quartier, le délinquant reste faible.

La Municipalité, par sa politique sociale et culturelle, en aidant les associations, travaille également à cette vie en harmonie de la communauté.

Les Dionysiens ont en fait pas mal d'atouts pour que leur ville soit une « ville saine ». A condition que chacun prenne ses responsabilités.

Les plaintes sont reçues au commissariat de Saint-Denis de 8 h à 19 h sans interruption.

Ce travail est aussi adapté à être exploité, dans le cadre de recherches d'entretien de service public.

9

SECURITE

CONNAITRE POUR PREVENIR :

deux décisions du conseil municipal

Plus de cent personnes ont assisté, le jeudi 27 septembre, au Conseil municipal. A l'ordre du jour, la sécurité dans la ville. Deux mesures ont été adoptées par le Conseil sur proposition de Jean-Pierre Jeffroy, Maire adjoint à la Sécurité : un Conseil municipal de prévention de la délinquance va travailler pour mettre en commun le maximum de compétences, et un « Bureau d'aide aux victimes » va fonctionner au Mairie.

Dans son rapport de présentation, Jean-Pierre Jeffroy rappelle que malgré les réelles améliorations constatées depuis un an (diminution des vols et cambriolages — augmentation des « faits étudies » (1), le serment d'insécurité continue à exister fortement ; avec la création du Conseil municipal de prévention

de la délinquance, il s'agit de favoriser une « action collective, réfléchie et responsable », chaque fois que des para-s'organisent ensemble, que des réseaux sociaux forts relient les familles, les individus, les causes de l'insécurité et les sentiments qu'elle engendre reculent.

Un riche débat a suivi le rapport de Jean-Pierre Jeffroy. Daniel Grimbet suggère les points sur lesquels pourrait pon-

ter la réflexion du Conseil municipal : nature de la délinquance, définition des « lieux privilégiés de la prévention », lutte contre la toxicomanie, développement des peines de substitution à l'incarcération, et la question de la lutte contre les armements.

André Jouin souligne la nécessité de « lutter contre la peur et le racisme ». Pour Pierre Zarka, la sécurité n'est pas une

simple affaire de spécialistes. « Chacun peut contribuer à créer un climat plus vigilant, à lutter contre le laisser-aller et les attitudes à la propriété collective et individuelle (...) il ne faut pas assombrir l'existence et la délinquance, mais c'est un fait que le sentiment d'insécurité et l'incertitude sur l'avenir pèsent particulièrement sur la jeunesse. En même temps, ce sont les jeunes qui sont le plus préoccupés par l'insécurité, comme le montre une récente enquête menée dans la région parisienne ».

Simone Nicol préconise de réintroduire des « leçons de morale » à l'école et affirme : « Tout le monde est contre l'autoritarisme ».

Jacqueline Astor souligne que dans l'augmentation de la délinquance, il y a une grande part de « délinquance en col blanc ou délinquance « astucieuse », (escroqueries, trafics financiers, etc.).

Pour Joëlle Leter, la faillite du système éducatif a une part de responsabilité, qu'une « des cours ne sont pas assés pendant un trimestre » et que « les enfants sont à la rue ». Quand les CAP sont dévalorisés et pas reconnus pour trouver un emploi.

« Avoir un vrai métier, ce n'est peut-être pas suffisant, mais on ne peut pas se passer de lui, pour tout ce qui est nécessaire », pour saut Patrick Braouezec dans le même ordre d'idées : « les mesures transitoires de formation et d'accueil des jeunes relâchées du système scolaire doivent encore. Le patronat ne cède toujours pas d'emploi ».

Patrick Braouezec cite les propositions pour la sécurité des parlementaires communistes, parmi lesquelles une meilleure formation des policiers et la maîtrise par les maires des attriba-

tions de logements, de façon à assurer l'équilibre sociologique des cités. Se réjouissant de la création du Conseil municipal de prévention de la délinquance, Philippe Bordier affirme que c'est la politique municipale qui est responsable de la délinquance : Patrick Braouezec lit remarquer que jusqu'ici, sur 350 propositions de la Municipalité, seulement onze avaient été refusées par Monsieur Bordier et ses amis, ou bien cette politique est bonne, et il ne faut pas dire qu'elle est mauvaise, ou bien elle n'est pas bonne, et il faut voter contre.

Marcelin Berthelot, Maire, souligne que la délinquance est un phénomène national, lié à la crise, et que la question qui reste posée est bien celle des solu-

tions à cette crise ; quant à la politique municipale, sous tous ses aspects, elle œuvre au mieux-être, elle contribue au développement de la vie associative, c'est un facteur de sécurité.

Jean-Pierre Jeffroy conclut le débat en rappelant que le Conseil municipal devrait permettre de rassembler les moyens, pour les coordonner, et que la participation active de la population était nécessaire pour que ses travaux soient ouverts et efficaces.

La création de ce Conseil fut décidée à l'unanimité, ainsi que celle d'un « Bureau d'aide aux victimes » qui sera mis en place prochainement ; un numéro d'appel, un accueil pour les victimes de vols ou agressions.

conseil municipal de prévention de la délinquance :

réunir les compétences

Au Conseil municipal de prévention de la délinquance siègeront des membres élus par la Préfecture, et des élus et personnalités locales dont la désignation a été adoptée lors du Conseil municipal.

« Michel Bernet, Maire de Saint-Denis, Président de droit.

« Jean-Pierre Jeffroy, Maire adjoint à la Sécurité.

« René Miron, Maire adjoint à l'enseignement secondaire et supérieur.

« Michel Miron, Maire adjoint à l'économie.

« Jacqueline Astor, Conseillère municipale.

« Simone Nicol, Conseillère municipale.

« Serge Perlet, Principal du Collège Henri Barbus.

« Bernard Leter, Membre du Bureau de la Fédération des Conseils de Paris de la Région de Saint-Denis.

« Michel Rogier, Secrétaire de Saint-Denis.

« Chantal Delaunay, Présidente du C.A.

« André Gaborit, Secrétaire de l'Union des Commerçants.

Par ailleurs, le Conseil associera à ses travaux les professionnels et personnalités concernés par les questions traitées.

(1) Voir « Saint-Denis Notre Ville » d'octobre 1983, février et juin 1984.

jobs, academic failures, unemployment, and the poverty of working-class populations” (*Saint-Denis, notre ville*, 02.1982). For municipal representatives, the emergence of “petty delinquency” in the 1980s was the flash point on the surface of events that essentially emerged from the spread of social insecurity. These social risks were explicitly regarded as the result of the economic crisis undermining the local social fabric.

The situation [...] finds its source in the global crisis that emerged in the early 1970s. [...] We are basically dealing with petty delinquency in Saint-Denis. Repression is not the only answer to this. There is a social dimension. This delinquency is the product of the socio-economic situation, unemployment, social and racial segregation, the sense of being uprooted, the lack of professional training, and academic failure (*Saint-Denis, notre ville*, 06.84).

It was still the early 1980s when this analysis was penned by Jean-Pierre Jeffroy, Adjunct Mayor in charge of problems of insecurity, putting the emphasis on the social dimension of delinquency, which was echoed twenty years later in the notion of “social insecurity” as developed by Castel.¹⁴ In this context, the political line of the municipal government gave priority to mechanisms of consultation, prevention, and mediation, considering that “tightening the bonds between people [...] has a beneficial influence on security” (*Saint-Denis, notre ville*, 07.1984). The management of conflicts and feelings of insecurity required managing the social dialogue with residents and local associations.¹⁵

This discourse remained current throughout the 1980s and formed

14. Castel (2003: 53) analyzes the shift of “social conflictuality” from the factory to the neighborhood as a “permanent feature of the problem of insecurity”: “the high rate of unemployment, casual work, and marginal activities, run-down housing, soulless urbanism, overcrowding of groups from different foreign origins, the permanent presence of idle youth that seem to display their social uselessness, visibility of delinquent practices connected to drug dealing, stolen goods, times of tension and agitation and conflicts with the police, etc. Social and civil insecurity intersect and feed one another”.

15. “In a more positive manner, whatever encourages bonds between people and generations, the pleasure of participating, sharing, and building together has a beneficial influence on security. Thus delinquency remains low in Le Franc-Moisin precisely, where neighborhood life is strong and associations have long been active” (*Saint-Denis, notre ville*, 10.1983).

the basis of the municipal policy stance guiding the various systems of local security in the 1990s. Prevention of the social risk was gradually integrated into programs of local development, with the state conserving in this way its mission of maintaining public security and order. But this discourse was later reversed due to the deterioration in the living conditions of the district's residents.

The rise of precarious situations reinforced the sense of insecurity among residents who saw it as a negative point in the district, but not only. For Saint-Denis became the everyday theatre of a huge back and forth movement of diverse social categories and their co-existence in public spaces. On the one hand there were upper and middle-level management employees living outside La Plaine Saint-Denis and working in industrial firms and service industries; on the other, there were the underqualified local residents, caught in a global movement of “deskilling” and highly constraining professional mobility on the regional scale. The combined effect of “social distance” and “spatial proximity” between users and residents was the cause of conflicts and social tensions in the public spaces of the city.

Urban fragmentation in the metropolitan area and relegation in certain segments of housing

Through the development of civil and social insecurity, the industrial city became “fragmented” and socially “specialized” based on the available housing stock and the residential neighborhood. The analysis found in public documents (notably CUCS and PRU agreements) retrospectively sheds light on this process of specialization on the scale of the metropolitan area. It was not one district in one city but a group of districts spread out over several cities that were affected by the social and economic crisis. These diagnoses were established on three different scales: the metropolitan area, the city, and the district.

The metropolitan area (*agglomération*) was presented as an aggregate of “*working-class municipalities*” that underwent “destructive economic transformations” in a region with “many polluted terrains” and “cuts in the urban fabric” due to the railway and highway networks. It was in this context that the 9 *communes* that together formed a *communauté d'agglomération* were now confronted with the “development of significant exclusions, correlated with the rise in structural unemploy-

ment and the emergence of spatial segregations, added to the isolation of entire neighborhoods” (PRU de Saint-Denis 2005: 3).¹⁶

The analysis on the scale of the city of Saint-Denis presents socio-economic characteristics similar to the tendencies of the metropolitan area as a whole: a “higher than average household size” with 2.6 people per household, a “relatively high percentage of foreigners” at 26.2 per cent of the city’s population, “a young and active population” with 28 per cent of the city’s population younger than 20, “significant economic precariousness” with 20 per cent unemployment in the working-age population, and significant “economic development” linked to the industrial redevelopment in connection with the building of the Stade de France in La Plaine Saint-Denis and the presence of 4,600 firms (PRU of Saint-Denis 2005: 8).

The statistics for the Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air district shows a deviation from the city average that paints a dark picture of the socio-economic situation: a higher percentage of the population under 20: 32 per cent in the district as against 28 per cent in the city. Households of 6 or more represent 8 per cent of the district as opposed to 5 per cent in the metropolitan area. The percentage of the population of foreign nationality is “relatively high”, with 31.2 per cent of the total population in 1999 as against 26.2 per cent in Saint-Denis.

The analysis on the metropolitan level clearly shows the double dynamic of a concentration of foreign populations and pauperization.¹⁷

16. Plaine Commune is a public body for intermunicipal cooperation grouping nine cities of Seine-Saint-Denis (Aubervilliers, Épinay-sur-Seine, L’Île-Saint-Denis, La Courneuve, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Saint-Denis, Saint-Ouen, Stains and Villetaneuse), with a population of 408,000. The *communauté d’agglomération* has a rich history. A first intermunicipal body formed in the framework of the redevelopment of the industrial sector of La Plaine Saint-Denis covered three municipalities. The intermunicipal cooperation began in 1985 with the *Syndicat Mixte Intercommunal Plaine Renaissance*. It was active in 4 areas: urban social development, economic development, public space management and culture. These areas were grouped into 10 areas of intervention: local strategy, urban ecology, mobility, urban planning, housing, urban renovation, public space, economic development, employment, integration, management of media and reading libraries (Plaine Commune 2015).

17. “The foreign population rate is high in La Plaine Commune: 25.3 per cent in 1999 when the rate in the greater Paris area is 12.9 per cent. [...] The discrepancies between La Plaine Commune and the surrounding regions are even more significant among the population of households where the head of the household is a foreigner. [...] These results confirm the specialization of the geographical area in the reception of working-class families, mostly of immigrant origin” (CUCS 2007–09: 5). “The median income

The treatment of phenomena of “segregation” was therefore not a localized issue in a given neighborhood but a political issue in the metropolitan area that needed to be addressed on the regional scale. This double ethnic and social dimension illustrated a process of urban fragmentation.

On the one hand, the “ethnicization” of certain segments of the housing supply (social housing and private housing unfit for habitation) took shape during the interwar period of industrialization of La Plaine and was reinforced in the context of the policy conducted by France in the post-World War II period and until the 1980s. This mainly concerned economic immigration in the 1950s and 60s and the policy of family reunification in the 1970s. On the other hand, the pauperization came in the context of mass unemployment and a casualization of jobs, the difficulty in gaining access to skills training programs and in attracting higher social strata. The process of exclusion was by no means limited only to social housing districts targeted by urban policy programs.

On the district scale, the mechanism of exclusion was indirectly related to the reception role of the neighborhoods accommodating the successive waves of immigration. There is reason to credit to some extent the Chicago School’s ecological analysis, which defends the idea that an immigration neighborhood is nothing but an area with a particularly high population turnover. Historically, Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air fulfilled its reception role, with the settlement of migrant workers and families seeking integration.¹⁸ But the history of the district does not stop there. Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air includes very different social categories because of the nature of its housing stock: a large-scale social housing project on the Franc-Moisin side, and small privately-owned collective housing and individual homes of private landlords and homeowners on the Bel-Air side.

According to INSEE, the income of the wealthiest segments of

of the population in the cities of La Plaine Commune ranged between 9,521 € and 11,346 € in 2002 when the regional median was 13 285 € and that of the Île-de-France area was 18,355 €” (CUCS 2007–09: 6).

18. Like the Spanish migrants in the 1930s, then the Portuguese and Algerians in the 1950s and 1960s or the Malians in the 1970s and 1980s, many residents in Le Franc-Moisin experienced the shift from transnational return migration to settlement when the policy of family reunification was put into effect in 1970.

the district's population was 9.4 times higher than that of the poorest residents in 2009, which means that the social disparity was highly significant. Residential strategies differed more or less strongly from one group to another with some settling for long periods and other residing temporarily. A study of 155 families living in Building 3 of the Franc-Moisin housing project, conducted by a consulting firm as part of an urban project, speaks of the co-existence of a "captive population" and a "short-stay population" in the same building. In addition, a petition signed by the board of directors of the association *Mieux Vivre à Bel-Air* (Improve Quality of Life in Bel-Air) speaks of how different the district "natives" are from the newcomers:

Never before have we seen such a situation. For many years already, numerous residents have been leaving the district, and newcomers (in the areas of Jeanne d'Arc, Dohis-canal, Daniel Casanova...) are planning to do the same.¹⁹

The residential trajectories or strategies (renters, homeowners, etc.) and property strategies (public housing, owner-occupier, and small owner) that are at work in the district have thus contributed to the tension in the neighborhood, to the strategy of "deconstruction" of spaces, and to phenomena of "internal segregation" based on arrivals and departures. Isaac Joseph observed (1997: 275):

Categories of the population that are settling down see the transformations in the district as an ever present threat to their security. The succession of waves of immigration reinforces the logic of deconstruction of the district into micro-areas and gives rise to phenomena of internal segregation and also, for example, to the formation of specific residential sectors.

This analytical framework fits Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air. The notion of "residential migration," which measures residential movements (moving in and out of housing) in the housing stock of Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air, offers decisive information for understanding the situation: only 51.9 per cent of the inhabitants of Le Franc-Moisin-

19. Petition sent on June 14, 2012 conjointly to the prefecture, the Saint-Denis police station, and the town hall, with the title "Remarks on Security in the Bel-Air district".

Bel-Air remained in one home in the intercensal period between 1982 and 1989 and only 45.1 per cent between 1990 and 1999. This means that there was a turnover of more than 50 per cent of the population in the district during the two intercensal periods combined. An equal percentage of these populations originated from other neighborhoods in the city and outside the city. There can be several different reasons for this turnover: Could it be due to the flight of dynamic residents who left as soon as their situation permitted (new social housing attribution)? Or did residents leave because of social, legal, or economic difficulties (expulsion, etc.)? Or was it the cycle of generations in Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air housing stock that was at work?

A STRATEGY OF REORGANIZING PUBLIC SPACE

As Bacqué and Fol have observed, the future of the “banlieues rouges”, the red-belt of communist suburbs, raised above all a political problem for the Saint-Denis municipal government. For these two researchers, the political representatives of the municipal government, carried by the reformist wing of the Braouezec Communist Party, distanced themselves little by little from the communist rhetoric of social conflict and class struggle (Bacqué et al. 1997). In the 1980s, the local elected officials developed a new discourse with regard to new social conflicts, a discourse mainly aimed at recreating ties that had been strained with the local population. Braouezec, former Saint-Denis Deputy Mayor and current president of the Plaine Commune agglomeration community, was trying to stay in step with the local population by defending causes important to local youth and residents of immigrant origin: he took a stance in favor of decriminalizing marijuana and giving foreigners the right to vote, and against the widespread use of video-surveillance in cities. In 2002, Éric Grignard, adjunct general secretary of the Saint-Denis municipal government, and Sylvie Ritmanic, director of the mayor’s office, adopted a political discourse that concentrated on renewing ways of “living together” based on “grassroots democracy”

and a “network of practices” (Grignard et al. 2002: 34).²⁰ In this context, the issues at stake in Le Franc-Moisin centred on the definition of a new *public space*. It was the city that became the integrating element for immigrants and descendants of immigrants. How can shared meaning be produced in a neighborhood that is deconstructed with each new wave of immigration? What forms of collective organizations could work to reduce violence in the neighborhood and the city as a whole? What political system and what modes of participation could be conceived to ward off conflicts, insecurity, and delinquency? In Saint-Denis, answers to these questions were sought mainly by employing the contractual strategy launched by the national governments new urban policy, as I discussed in the previous chapter.

Contractualizing objectives from the district to the metropolitan area

The contractual strategy covered political intentions that fed the Saint-Denis project. Applied to different territories, the contractualization sought first to establish a new methodological approach based on getting a conversation going between institutional stakeholders and local partners, aimed at setting common objectives and finding broad-ranging funding mechanisms. Contractualization was a response to the explosion of competencies in the public sphere and offered a flexible framework of negotiation between the central state and the local collectivities. Secondly, the aim of this instrument was to integrate the district into a larger geographical area through a form of action negotiated between all of the institutions and civil society. It was in this context that the discussions were to take place about the formation of a real public space, between the social, the political, and the urban. Third, the territorialization of public policies was meant to respond to the sectorial partitioning of the administration.

20. The city of Saint-Denis “of working-class tradition where firms have shut down and moved away, creating a real social destructuration and a narrowing of the arena of political and union activities [...]; in a city where nearly 30 per cent of the population is of foreign nationality and deprived of the right to vote [...]; a city that sees its diversity and communal living as the only way to develop [...], the Saint-Denis municipal government took the first steps in 1986–1987 toward a grassroots democracy, around which a whole network of practices could be built” (Grignard et al. 2002: 34).

In Saint-Denis, the urban crisis was thus the occasion to redefine new political bodies and new tools of intervention. The city set up a strategy of redeployment of public action in the districts during the contractual period. In its political dimension, the contract stipulated the conditions of involvement and the constraints between the governing and the governed. In its economic dimension, it stipulated the conditions of economic development and redistribution over the geographical area. In its social dimension, it sets down conditions of social protection for individuals. In its territorial dimension, it defined the conditions of its development by perimeters of intervention.

The desire to create a collective dynamic around the political was translated in particular by the formation of an agglomeration community (*communauté d'agglomération*) with the 9 surrounding cities in 1998, accompanied by the transfer of competency from the cities to the agglomeration community. It gave rise to an agglomeration project signed by the nine neighboring municipalities, which notably included the economic development of La Plaine Saint-Denis, cross-subsidization of local taxes, housing policy, and urban policy. The territorial strategy essentially sought to develop a new model of economic and social redistribution revolving around the industrial hub of La Plaine Saint-Denis. This contractualization of objectives had an impact on urban policy. Plaine Commune gave itself political weight to negotiate agreements with the state. Operative modes were transferred in this context from cities to the new agglomeration community: policy steering was negotiated on the level of the agglomeration and the level of the municipality. The urban renovation project managers were hired directly by the *communauté d'agglomération*. This was the main political body in charge of steering, politically and technically, the projects within the frameworks of the National Agency For Urban Renovation (ANRU, *Agence Nationale pour la Renovation Urbaine*) and the National Agency for Social Cohésion and Equal Opportunities (ACSE, *Agence Nationale pour la cohésion Sociale et l'Égalité des chances*).²¹

21. On the political end, a steering committee was co-presided by the president of the *communauté d'agglomération* and by a representative of the state (prefecture delegate for equality of opportunity or departmental sub-prefect). This committee approved priorities, calls for projects, and financing operations (usually by the state, the city, and the *communauté d'agglomération*) and evaluated project progress and the impact of

A territorial contract of urban renovation was signed in Saint-Denis between the communauté d'agglomération, the municipality of Saint-Denis, the main local housing companies, public agencies, public companies and developers, national housing associations and the state on January 25, 2007 for 7 years.²² The investment budget covered 24 urban projects in all of the cities of the metropolitan area and operations on 50,000 social housing units and 8,000 private homes.²³ The aim was to diversify the housing stock in the 9 municipalities and to promote integration through housing. The social dimension was led jointly by the *communauté d'agglomération* and the cities, and each institution had an Urban Contract for Social Cohesion (CUCS, *Contrats urbains de cohésion sociale*) in order to promote consistency between the local level and that of the metropolitan area and to pursue the effects of the urban project through social action.

The municipality of Saint-Denis was in reality only partially divested from steering the projects of urban renovation (ANRU) and social action (CUCS); municipal elected officials were integrated into strategic committees in order to be able to take a stance in the negotiation of contracts with the state and ensure the coherence of urban and social projects between the city and the *communauté d'agglomération*.

financing operations. A technical committee for managing the CUCS was made up of agents of the state, of Plaine Commune, of the CUCS. It was open to public partners. This technical committee prioritized the social actions to be renewed and defended an opinion on new projects after auditioning the project leaders. It examined the necessary financing and provided support to the steering committee in drafting the annual operations assessment report (CUCS 2007–2009: 31–33).

22. The urban renovation project was signed by the following partners: State, National Agency for Urban Renovation (Public authority), Municipality of Saint-Denis (political body), Opac communautaire de Plaine Commune (housing company), Communauté d'agglomération Plaine Commune (political body), Association Foncière Logement (national housing developer), Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (public financial body), OSICA (housing company), ICADE Patrimoine (developer), l'association syndicale libre de la cité florale (local association), l'OGIF (Housing provider), France Habitation (Housing provider), Logement Francilien (Housing provider), La Maison du Cil (national association), Les réseaux ferrés de France (Public Company) (Convention partenariale 2006–2011: 52–53).
23. In the city of Saint-Denis, the total investment budget came to 1.6 billion euro (440 million euros of this was paid by the state, 607 million euros by the departement of Seine-Saint-Denis, 31.5 million by the Region Île-de-France, 22,8 million by the Communauté d'agglomération, 9,7 million by the municipality of Saint-Denis and 86,7 million euros by the housing companies) (Convention partenariale 2006–2011: 38).

The city remained in charge of neighborhood services and the social dialogue around the elaboration of the urban projects. Indeed, the successive urban projects became an opportunity to consult residents for their opinions about the design of public plazas, meeting places, circulation spaces, parking, plans to reinforce road safety, development of neighborhood services and recreational activities, trash collection, etc. The district was thus here conceived as providing places for meeting, socializing, and relaxing, local shops, and public services accessible to all.

From the start these contracts led to rethinking local development through the formation of a public space, a space for dialogue and deliberation on the level of housing districts. Politically, it was a matter of broadening the status of citizens to the residents of these districts so that the latter could become “free individuals” (Grignard et al. 2002: 34). The point was to allow the most vulnerable residents to gain access to their political, social and civic rights by looking for effective levels through the implementation of an urban project. The contractualization engaged by the representatives of Saint-Denis had the effect of creating two new political and institutional links. These new local links structured the public intervention of the metropolitan area to the districts and aimed at negotiating a collective interest with the different political and social partners on the metropolitan level. In the new political framework, the neighborhood project could be considered as an instrument apt to create a public space. The neighborhood became in this context a territorial unit within a politically constituted metropolitan area – a unit in which an institutional body sought to inform, consult, and stimulate residents and users, but also to initiate and coordinate social projects with institutional actors and representatives of associations.

Urban renewal in Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air: a 30-year history

The idea of a “neighborhood project” saw the day in Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air in 1986 when a first municipal team was put in charge of drawing up a project of urban and social interventions. The team defined the first transversal steps in the district with regard to social development and policies of urban renovation. The district was later incorporated into a series of financial mechanisms in 1990 to 1994

Figure 6. In the area of Plaine Commune, the urban policy concerned 24 districts in 2005 (the red areas are ANRU agreements).

Source: "Le Projet de Renouvellement Urbain, Saint-Denis", July 2005.

aimed at prolonging urban and social actions, first in the name of affirmative action and then of social diversity.

In the framework of a *Grand Projet Urbain* (GPU) and then of a *Grand Projet de Ville* (GPV), between 1995 and 2001 the municipal government formalized an urban master plan for Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air in an attempt to diversify urban functions by creating a commercial hub, create more diversity in the housing stock, and open up the district with new ingresses and egresses (in particular a bridge over the canal). The new means of access were intended to facilitate connections to the city center and integrate the district into the surrounding urban fabric, with the building of the Grand Stade de France to the West. In 1993, a framework program was also defined in the sub-unit of Bel-Air to urbanize abandoned plots, develop affordable housing for first-time buyers (*Zone d'Aménagement Concerté*

du Bel-Air Nord), safeguard old housing by offering owner-occupiers subsidies for façade restoration, and get rid of substandard housing on the site.²⁴ Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air district was also categorized as a *Zone Urbaine Sensible* (ZUS) and benefitted in this way from a sizeable public investment (150 million francs). The creation of a master plan for the district in the 1990s served to determine guidelines for its development and reformulate the issues related to its social makeup.

This explains why the launching of the ANRU in 2007 did not have an enormous impact on the district in terms of housing demolition. A building of 155 apartments had already been demolished in the context of the GPV and the housing stock was already being diversified with the development of certain urban wastelands in the Bel-Air sub-unit and on the banks of the canal. The ANRU financed the renovation and building of private and public housing as well as reconstruction work on the urban structure (restructuring an internal road into a landscaped boulevard, redefining public spaces, pedestrian areas, parking, public gardens) and the installation of public facilities (a toy library and miscellaneous local facilities).

Figure 7. A few characteristics of the Master plan in Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air.

24. According to the municipal government, slum landlords rent rooms to undocumented migrants in the single-family home fabric of Bel-Air. (Interview 10, 18 November 2012)

The foundation of the district project on resident participation

Resident participation was historically built on a grassroots democracy structure developed in 1996 by the municipality of Saint-Denis, the so-called *démarche quartier*. An institutional partner, *Espace de Services Publics* (ESP, Public Services Space), facilitated the implementation of transversal undertakings.²⁵ Many associations, whose development was linked to the district's history, were in touch with the director of *la démarche quartier*, which is nowadays financed as part of the CUCS, the social cohesion contract. Resident participation took on extremely diverse forms in this framework, with different channels of participation allowing for different types of involvement.

The structure of participative democracy, the public services center and the local associations all served to encourage residents as well as various social movements to participate in discussions on the restructuring and management of the neighborhood. Nowadays, these local channels of participation mainly depend upon *la démarche quartier* and the Public Services Space. Although *la démarche quartier* is supposed to promote collective actions and citizenship, it involves a number of difficulties related to the community development. On the one hand, despite a rich associative fabric, there are notable conflicts between local figures of activism. On the other hand, the involvement of residents and local actors does not lead to a fruitful dialogue. The internal rules or the cognitive framework in which local figures of activism are involved bring socio-ethnic power relations to light and lead to suspicion as well as diverse forms of stigma.

25. The ESP was a grassroots structure created in 1995 by the municipality. It brought local and national services closer together and proposed a shared reception platform. Beyond the municipality, this platform was financially supported by the *Caisse d'Allocation Familiale* and the *Caisse Régionale d'Assurance Maladie d'Île-de-France*. The aim of the public service space was to support residents in their administrative procedures, through specialists available to help households understand a particular procedure or answer a specific difficulty (e.g., legal problems caused by the loss or theft of documents, etc.). The personnel represented a "facilitating component" in the life of residents. The space was staffed by social workers and consultants in health insurance, a public letter writer, a lawyer, and a prefect delegate. Cultural activities were developed in close connection with *la démarche quartier*.

The predominant role of local institutions

Experimented as early as 1986 in Le Franc-Moisin–Bel–Air, participative democracy spread to all 12 districts of the city of Saint-Denis in 1995. The organization and functioning of *la démarche quartier* rested at the time on a simple, innovative idea. It sought to promote ties between a district elected representative and the residents to ensure that service management was more adapted to resident needs. A director, appointed to work under the direction of a municipal adjunct, acted as the cornerstone of the system of civic engagement, ensuring the efficient working of the institutional apparatus by combining two strategies of intervention.

First, *la démarche quartier* had an internal intervention strategy. Every year residents could apply to sit on a borough board on a volunteer basis (the town hall sent letters to all residents to this effect) where the political agenda for the district in the framework of a budget were discussed and its priorities set. They would communicate the results of discussions to other residents and speak for them at public meetings on a variety of public policy topics. Resident applications were submitted to municipal representatives and validated for a year. But the voluntary service remained ambiguous since a selection of profiles was made based on criteria of representation (Oudin 2004).²⁶ Volunteers submitted proposals for improvements in everyday life and took stands on projects presented by officials. A borough board meeting, attended by a dozen volunteer residents, the elected representative of the district and the director of *la démarche quartier*, was usually held yearly in late January.

After that, topical meetings were held every three weeks or so. These meetings were the occasion to discuss with these volunteers the priority subjects to be presented to all of the residents at *public meetings*, open to all. The latter were presided over by the elected district representative. Proposals for intervention were submitted for discussion and guidelines for the participative budget were set. The aim of this procedure was to change priorities by promoting a bottom-up

26. According to Julia Oudin, gender parity was the first condition of composition for the borough board. The second was an even distribution of age groups (18–30, 35–55 and over 55). Finally, a selection was made to ensure a balance between the sub-units of Le Franc-Moisin and Bel-Air (Oudin 2004).

decision-making process. But in actual fact, priorities continued to be driven by the district director of *la démarche quartier* in ongoing contact with a local elected representative. In the case that the number of new volunteers was insufficient, previous volunteers could be maintained on these bodies. The analysis of the profile of volunteers in a local register of *la démarche quartier* has shown that a nucleus was formed from the outset.²⁷ The previous district director of *la démarche quartier* found himself faced with people who had long been involved in the life of the district and in the different associations.²⁸ There were also more erratic profiles: some volunteers were simply curious; others were motivated by precise issues (security, management of public spaces, neighborhood festivals, etc.). But, according to the current district director of *la démarche quartier*, there has been a tendency among the latter to become increasingly demobilized or disappointed (Interview 12, 15 February 2013).

In addition, an external strategy of intervention aimed at partnership development has been established with the offices of the prefecture, community and municipal services, public services, associations, and public housing agencies. Indeed, the activities developed were interesting in their own right if they led to synergies between the district's stakeholders. The current district director of *la démarche quartier* initiated and participated in a series of meetings aimed at the deployment of the CUCS financial provisions, technical meetings to mobilize partners around maintenance and repairs, and coordination of cultural actions, in particular with the new media library. Resident engagement in this framework took on a variety of forms.²⁹ Mounted

27. During my empirical study, I collected diverse documents (mails and letters, administrative documents in relation to urban projects, meeting minutes in relation to working meeting with volunteers, etc.) in *la démarche quartier* (15 February 2013). I checked the profiles of the volunteers since the creation the structure with one of the employees of *la démarche quartier*.

28. A survey of profiles showed that six people had been volunteering year after year since the beginning of *la démarche quartier*. In addition, a study by Oudin shows that the volunteers had other functions in associations. Out of the 18 board members (12 permanent and 8 substitutes), 9 were presidents or board members in other associations; three were active members, and two were involved in association projects (Oudin 2004).

29. For instance, a few residents of Le Franc-Moisin are involved in the organization of a local festival, in cooperation with the *ESP* and *la démarche quartier*. The local festival of Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air organizes banquets and music events. The director of *la démarche quartier*, in cooperation with the head of the Plaine Commune urban project,

with neighborhood associations, these institutional participative strategies were not only intended to involve residents in decision-making processes or consult them on very specific aspects of urban planning. In recent years they have also made it possible to reach out to other inhabitants in the public space (in places that residents often visit frequently, such as post offices or the central square in summer). For instance, an informal gathering on an urban project was set up around a café with representatives of the youth department and the offices for family allocations (*La caisse des allocation familiales*). Another example: the current district director of *la démarche quartier* organizes thematic urban walks with residents and representatives of social housing agencies to identify places for improvement or the technical and social difficulties encountered in different sectors of the district (pest control, cleaning, maintenance, embellishment).

A rich but fragile associative fabric

The district's associative fabric today comprises twenty-odd associations. These include a few large professionalized structures with salaried employees seeking to meet social needs at the grass-roots level;³⁰ associations representing group interests (tenant associations, the association *Mieux Vivre à Bel-Air*); emerging associations dedicated to the development of various forms of solidarity from diverse perspectives (Clinamen, AMA, Mamatinal, Femmes actives, l'Association

architects, and representatives of public housing agencies organized urban workshops in order to take into consideration the remarks of the residents. The director of *la démarche quartier* also planned urban visits, with the support of the volunteers of the local democratic instance and the technicians of housing companies in order to identify problems related to sustainable urban management (better understanding of the spatial uses and the time in which they are developed, coordinating the institutional work and the local partners as regards the everyday life in the neighborhood, defining and linking together a short term, a middle term and a long term perspective).

30. The Santé Bien-Être, Les Femmes du Franc-Moisin, Les Enfants du Jeu or Artismultimédia are professionalized. Les Femmes du Franc-Moisin has been teaching French to immigrant populations for 30 years. It started with about 30 women and now has 200. The structure goes beyond language teaching to promote the socio-economic integration of its members (childcare, assistance for getting a driver's license, etc.). Les Enfants du Jeu also plays a structuring role in the district's social life by managing a media library and organizing activities for youth. The association managed to get 200 children to help move the toy library of Le Franc-Moisin after the building that housed it was destroyed.

EntreAide, Le fil qui danse, Les amis du Franc-Moisin, etc.);³¹ and small associations of amateur athletes (Asso Lumpini 93 for Thai boxing). The profusion of associations makes it possible to maintain many varied contacts, frequent or spontaneous, with residents outside the institutional framework. Privileged relays for local residents, these associations have often acted as intermediaries in formalizing actions of solidarity, organizing events, calming friction or fighting with the police, or taking stands and organizing rallies and marches.³²

Development projects emanating from the associative sector are proposed by professional associations in employment, language, housing, health and citizenship. However, the fact that associations are in charge of meeting social demands stands in the way of the emergence of other innovative actions to develop social bonds in the district. In addition, even though their presence on the ground is attested, these associations are weakened in their functioning by bureaucratic funding applications, short-term financing systems, and a continual decrease in funds within the CUCS over several years. This situation is due to the fact that the co-funding of associations in the framework of the CUCS depends on the long-term commitments of the ACSE (on the national level), the city, and the *communauté d'agglomération*.³³

To illustrate the weakness of associations, we will take the example of the *Association Communautaire Santé Bien-Être* (ACSBE – Community Health & Wellbeing Association), a professionalized structure that renewed its associative project by relying on the participation of the district's residents. The association did an important job of consulting with local inhabitants, which led to setting up a neighborhood social-medical center. The aim of the facility was more precisely to improve

31. Morning reception service for children, meetings around cultural events, or around maintaining traditional ties in ethnic groups, intergenerational ties, collective on parenting, etc.

32. Les Femmes du Franc-Moisin organized a march on March 17, 2012 in reaction to the suicide of two women in the neighborhood. "We, the women of Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air and Saint-Denis," they declared in an open letter, which is registered at *la démarche quartier*, say, "enough of women suffering day after day: increasing rent costs, decreasing income, casual and part-time work [...] We sometimes have to choose between paying rent and eating or getting health care. [...] Last month 2 women in our district committed suicide. They left children behind. We are outraged! We say never again! No more expulsions! No more isolation! No more being in debt!"

33. Funding requests are mainly addressed to the ACSE (1,412,611 € in 2013 as against 750,245 € to the city and 250,861 € to the *communauté d'agglomération*).

the health and wellbeing of the residents of Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air and to constitute a community-based health project involving residents, associations, institutions, and decision-makers, in the manner of the community health centers developed in Ottawa in 1986. Doctor Didier Ménard conceived the project 22 years ago in an attempt to promote health, counter inequalities of access to health care, and create a collective site on the district level. The ACSBE was created in 1992 because of the noticeable shortage of medical services in the district.

It all started 25 years ago in the Franc-Moisin district, where there were some fifty-odd nationalities. The idea was that you cannot practice medicine in a working-class district where there are major social problems without establishing a social-medical-psychological approach. We set up a structure with people who act as intermediaries between the local population and the health-care personnel. It's a resource space animated by local residents. Instead of responding to sickness with medication, there is a network that deciphers what the person is expressing through their pain (Ménard 2012).

The project was quite clearly reformulated in 2008. The current manager had noted at the time “the loss of impetus” due in part to the “the institutionalization of the staff” (Interview 6, 14 June 2012). It was against this backdrop that the new health project assumed its full scope. The participation of the local population was crucial for the viability of such a project. Since “reaching out to residents” was necessary, and since “the women of Le Franc-Moisin” were not taking care of themselves because of a lack of financial resources, the involvement of residents had to take the form of conversation, collective mobilization (defining workshop topics), a transfer of competencies (hiring social mediators), and a gradual turnover in the staff (hiring 5 young internists). This new commitment toward the residents required budgetary independence, or as the staff like to say to make the philosophy of the project explicit, “control over the management of the project” (Interview 6, 14 June 2012). This situation led the personnel to devote a considerable amount of their time to looking for funding.

Like this local association, the more structured associations have had to deal with the following dilemma: finding funding for their activities while maintaining their independence of decision to keep their agenda

on course. Since the three or four major associations are co-financed, the disappearance of one of the sources of financing could weaken a job position, an activity, or the very project of the association. This dilemma creates tension for the local actors and for the sometimes rival associations. They are unevenly distributed over the area, their methods of development diverge, and some of them remain legitimate due to their seniority and their support for residents.³⁴ These associations end up competing with the grassroots democracy structure and its strategy of political mobilization.³⁵ On the institutional side, the difficulty of getting the associations together is regarded as a result of corporatism. Some institutional actors point to the paradoxical situation of the three biggest associations, competing to set up a participative policy: associative life is very much alive, but not very coordinated with the action of *la démarche quartier*.³⁶ Furthermore, the associative fabric is considered competent but aging.³⁷

Figures of activism in Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air

An examination of some figures of activism in the district sheds light on the motivations and perceptions of the people who choose to get involved in civic affairs. The collected material, which shapes the idea of this sub-section, is based on qualitative interviews and participatory observations. The selection of interviewers illustrates the development of various channels of participation in the district, as I mentioned in the previous sub-section: two local associations acknowledged for

34. According to accessible information, only one association represents the residents of the Bel-Air sector. All of the other associations are active in the area of large-scale social housing.

35. Association representatives are respected by all inhabitants not only because they develop much needed programs in relation to access to social rights (health, language learning, educational support, etc.) and cultural activities, but also because of their everyday presence and attentiveness on the ground.

36. "There are the very professional people who've been there for twenty years, and who are salaried. There's Santé Bien-être that did a huge job of consulting [...] Les Femmes du Franc-Moisin. Then there are sports associations, and many small structures. We tried to set up a meeting to establish a common agenda [...] But we find ourselves faced with professionals and amateurs," explains a former director of *la démarche quartier*.

37. "The fabric of associations is coming apart. Nobody is there to take over and people stay there too long without being relieved, even in soccer clubs. All of which makes the institutional landscape poorer," says one state representative attending CUCS meetings.

their role in the development of the neighborhood and two inhabitants, “volunteers”, who are involved in *la démarche quartier*.

The diversity of positions shows how the philosophy of involvement varies from one person to another. There are at least three clearly defined civic approaches informing the involvement of representatives of associations and of borough boards: partisans of civility and civic responsibility based on a local reading of national citizenship; partisans of associative mediation or of negotiations between institutions and society; and partisans of social transformation through grassroots movements. An interesting point is related to the position of these figures in the community development: always volunteers but with a vehement criticism of institutions. This mixed attitude leads to a great variety of misunderstandings and conflicts in the discussions of community standards.

Charismatic activists and the collective consciousness of the district

We have mentioned above the experience of the Director and the president of Santé Bien-être in the institutional framework. They have been involved in association movements that keep a distance from institutional participative strategies. These association representatives are concerned foremost with consolidating their project. This concern has led them to think about the principles of good management in the association. They are recognized in the district for their innovative activities in the field of health care and for their interest in putting the residents at the center of their project. Their experience on the ground has long been the focus of national and regional media attention. “They have privileged access to the ministries!” comments a municipal representative.

Not letting themselves get caught up in the institutional game and staying in touch with what is happening on the ground are top priorities. This stance has brought them gradually to rethink their organization in terms of integrating residents into their operations. They may be “resistant to institutional discourse” but local politicians and residents alike listen attentively to what they have to say. Their development strategy is endogenous. A social dynamic requires collective action and to create this collective “necessitates starting from what exists”, reaching out to residents, forging relationships on the

street, through networks, often on the strength of conviction. These representatives have long lost confidence in the law and in institutional procedures to deal with the distress that certain households are experiencing. Petty delinquency, pickpocketing, and drug dealing are only manifestations of a much deeper malaise linked to the lack of parental support, situations of institutional precariousness and poverty, social inequality, rejection of others. “If the residents start taking charge of security, there will be vigilante groups!” declares the president of the association (Interview 7, 14 June 2012). At bottom, they position themselves in opposition to current public programs. They know that in looking for “sociological explanations,” they often become “complicit” in misdeeds and then will easily be criticized for “Pollyannaism” (Interview 7, 14 June 2012).

In this context, any social project necessitates building ties of trust and solidarity with the residents. Participating involves recognizing the other: “For example, the women have to feel recognized to get them to participate. We adapt to them and not the other way around” (Interview 7, 14 June 2012). Listening attentively for quite some time before proposing solutions is fundamental because relations of solidarity get built up over the long run. There are no ongoing discussions, but rather gradual approaches, exchanges, repeated interactions with residents, some of whom find themselves in “survival strategies”. For these representatives, co-constructing a project remains difficult because many of the residents remain “too fragile”. It is more a matter of negotiating than of imposing a result at a set date and also of “accepting to lose at times” in a negotiation (Interview 7, 14 June 2012). This is true in general but more particularly in the field of health and wellbeing because of the impact on the body and its cultural representations.

Setting up a dynamic in the district is precisely what proceeds from the “collective consciousness”. This strategy leads to negotiating or adapting norms through socio-cultural mediation, for there are appropriate ways of approaching residents when speaking about sensitive subjects like the body, contraceptive practices among youth, normative conceptions related to sickness, specific socio-cultural attitudes to the body and symbolic relations between men and women in the context of medical examinations. Mediators, trained for this purpose, establish contacts on the street and offer coffee in the as-

sociation's reception area in premises renovated by the association's active residents for the district's residents. "The question of training is central. We have hired our staff for their skills not their diplomas. The mediators set down rules and value residents; that what's called mediation" (Interview 7, 14 June 2012). This strategy made it possible to forge and progressively mobilize discussion groups and to identify the most sensitive topics.

Citizens, education, community harmony

"I do not like the politics of the municipal government much. The extreme left is not my thing," comments one property owner in Bel-Air, who does not see herself as "an activist" (Interview 16, 18 February 2013). She is a volunteer in *la démarche quartier* because she feels responsible as a user of city services. "I see myself mostly as a user of the city, its theater, its shops, but also as a citizen." If this resident feels that responsibility is a chief concern in her life, it's because she has watched the day-to-day deterioration of her environment. "It's not necessarily people from the neighborhood!" She recommends placing "cameras to see who's illegally dumping" even though the "city is not ready" for this. Her observations concern as much simple acts of incivility, because some people "have no respect for anything" and "lack education" as the development of petty delinquency: "there are drugs, dealers, car jacking, and more". And with regard to all this, she expects more from the city itself "since the police cannot resolve everything" (Interview 16, 18 February 2013).

Volunteering for the district board allows her to take a position on subjects like security or cleanliness. Active in a participative structure from the outset, she regards the thinking in the context of *la démarche quartier* as overly limited to improvements in day-to-day life. Problems are listed but fundamental solutions are not being found. She has grown tired of the recurrence of the participative mechanism. The treatment of the demand takes time and becomes inefficient. She feels particularly limited in her civic activities because the decision-making process is out of her hands. "We have topics, an agenda, everyone takes a stance. It's a bit too down to earth. We are more involved in improving daily life than in working on a project." The politicians are the one who "discuss" and develop projects. A list of questions

are drawn up but “after that, decisions are made by the municipal council” (Interview 16, 18 February 2013).

So why volunteer for *la démarche quartier* if it does not have the capacity to change life in the district? As she herself says, it is a “question of standards,” of necessity, or of her threshold of tolerance for the stigmatizations of the district and its surroundings. She holds up the banner of a more “harmonious” and orderly life in the district. This is the way she seeks to create social bonds. Bringing order back to the city does not solely involve law enforcement; it is also a matter of education and civic responsibility. “A way has to be found to change the way people behave,” she says. She points to the development of “socio-ethnic communities” as a problem, amongst the “Malians,” among others, because she regards this as an expression of insularity and rejecting others. “People do not approach outsiders; they greet only people from their own community.” And the presence of hundreds of Roma families in camps set up between highways that are unfit for habitation “does not project a good image of the city” (Interview 16, 18 February 2013).

The representative of an ethnic community and solidarity between Soninkes

“I have been active in an association for a long time because of my origins. I’m for the collective. I’m Soninke” (Interview 13, 16 February 2013). This is how the representative of the Soninke community in the district introduces himself. His civic activism is old, multifaceted, and complex. He himself succeeded thanks to the support of the priest of Saint-Denis, who helped him greatly in his studies. He was a militant in several unions and a representative of the Malians of France, the founder and president of two community associations, extremely active in the Soninke diaspora, and a volunteer on the district board since its creation.

He has worked relentlessly to tighten the bonds within the diaspora community and for the recognition of his people in France. He was a union activist in 1976 in the CGT and then in the CFDT “out of solidarity”.³⁸ Even though he was an accountant, and therefore a

38. The Confederation of Labor (CGT, *Confédération Générale du Travail*) and the French Democratic Confederation of Labor (*Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail*, CFDT) are major trade unions in France.

“white collar worker”, he took part in the 1968 strikes in the logistics firm for which he was working. His desire was to “protect employees,” manual laborers and warehouse workers, many of whom were immigrants from Central Africa and the Maghreb (Interview 13, 16 February 2013). He created an association in 1979 to promote the Soninke language and culture. The association thrived in the 1980s and 1990s, with a variety of offerings: language courses, audiocassette production, cultural festivals, conferences on the history of immigration, radio broadcasts with question-answer shows on the subjects of rights and integration. This association, with its 500 members throughout France, has offices in Rouen, Le Havre, and Marseille. He was the president until 2008 of the High Council of Malians of France, created in 1997. The formation of a national movement facilitated consular relations, setting up summer camps in Mali, and improving the conditions reception and housing between the two countries.

He was also active in his district as president of the association Marenmakhou Fraternité Soninke, founded in 1988, which brings together the heads of Soninke households to reinforce diaspora solidarity in the district. Only men? “Yes, only men,” he answers, adding: “There are 150 Soninke families in the district. They have no help, no support, no grandfathers, and no grandmothers. The idea was to lend each other a hand. Here we are in an environment, amongst ourselves.” He has also mounted several partnerships with other communities in the district to work on projects related to reinforcing intergenerational and inter-ethnic bonds. The problem is that “the youth run away from talks” and “the parents are disarmed” to deal with the “very troubling insecurity in the district” with young people snatching handbags, burning cars, smoking, selling drugs, and so on. His project to open an office in the town hall has not been accepted for the moment (Interview 13, 16 February 2013).

That he does not regard *la démarche quartier* as effective is something he does not openly express since, in line with his civic and ethnic activism, he wants to reinforce the conviviality in his district, for that is the way to fight against incivilities. The search for conviviality within the Soninke community is a project that is “misunderstood” by municipal government representatives... Even though he has a voice on the district board, it remains “somewhat bureaucratic [...] The newcomers have to have contact with the borough board. On-the-ground

activities have to be conducted. [...] Neighborhood festivals, initiatives of tenant circles. We need ties, relays, openings. The board must rely on associations, circles, parents associations.” Before leaving, he adds: “you know, I’m ashamed when I see the young hanging out all night in stairways”. The use of alcohol and drugs does not fit into the traditional life he seeks to revive. He is convinced that “young people have lost a sense of values” (Interview 13, 16 February 2013).

*The representative of Mieux Vivre à Bel-Air:
a thorn in local political action*

The representative of the association *Mieux Vivre à Bel-Air* has been living in the district since 1975. She is a property owner, living alone in a condominium. Retired since 1993, she and a former union activist created this association as a result of annoyances caused by the nearly construction of Stade de France: traffic deviations, repeatedly dropped phone calls, disconnected TV broadcasts, etc. “We created the association thinking to resolve these problems.” But more political issues ended up emerging with the creation of the association. “Bel-Air was attached to Le Franc-Moisin though they are different entities,” she says, drawing a clear distinction between Bel-Air with its fabric of individual homes and Le Franc-Moisin with its large-scale housing project. “The atmosphere was very politicized in Le Franc-Moisin but not in Bel-Air” (Interview 14, 17 February 2013). The fabric of associations and most of the energy invested by the town hall were directed toward the housing project and the management of the two entities remains completely unbalanced in her opinion. Braouezec, she maintains, encourages “immigration,” the result being patent “community insularities” today and “Arabs” ... (Interview 14, 17 February 2013).

The association enabled her to “get to know the people in the district” and to represent a lobbying force: “We had 130 new members by the time of the first meeting of the board of directors!” she comments (Interview 14, 17 February 2013). The association progressively found its own position in relation to the institutions and to the other associations based on the “desire to maintain our independence”. She sees the creation of this association as competing with the grassroots democracy movement. Its members did not feel politically or institutionally represented. “*La démarche quartier* is steered by the municipal-

ity. There was talk of participative democracy but the municipal officials decided everything. They would say yes to us but do nothing” (Interview 14, 17 February 2013). The lack of representation in the socio-cultural geography consolidated the associative movement and gave it a “pivotal” role in the district.

Even though the enrolment of new members has dropped off, the movement demands that the municipality upgrades its standards of cleanliness, security, and commercial development – alongside the necessities of social development in the housing projects. Where there used to be “two dumps” in Bel-Air, there are now “games for children,” she says to underscore the association’s accomplishments. A lot is done in the area of “social action” and little for anything else. Very paradoxically, aside from the work of her association in Bel-Air, she claims to have a “relay” role to the borough board, which is her way of saying that she has a foot in the boardroom without being on the board. “We were a thorn in the side of politics,” she confides with a smile, adding: “Braouezec knows me well!” Indeed, the representatives of the association know all the political and institutional mechanisms. As a former administrator in the Conseil général de Seine-Saint-Denis, she knows how to “put together a dossier and follow up on it,” and the former union activist knows “how to get his voice heard” (Interview 14, 17 February 2013).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In tackling urban policy from an historical perspective as I did in chapter two, the main risk is to “decontextualize” procedures. As we have seen in this chapter, the analysis of context is highly relevant if we are to apprehend how social processes and interactions are shaped between the different actors on the (in)security side as on the participative side. This comparison of the national and the local is necessary because it allows us to shift our focus from a “mechanistic” analysis of “systems” and gain a better understanding of the socio-political elements involved in the construction of an area. I have attempted in particular to recontextualize the expression of conflicts and the

emergence of modes of participation in a local urban history, that of Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air. In Saint-Denis, social housing was the state's response at the time in the fight against the unfit living conditions of migrants who had settled in Saint-Denis.

However, from the Spanish community to the development of *la démarche quartier*, my demonstration shows how the notion of "community" became a politicized stake with the rise of the urban crisis. The deprivation of the neighborhood in Saint-Denis in the late 1970s contributed to embedding the area into a new type of public action. We have seen how the Mayor Marcelin Berthelot criticized the ethnic segregation process that strikes areas of the city such as Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air, and he pointed out the responsibility of the representatives of the state and employers in this matter. The first municipal paper that mentions social insecurity as a dimension of the security topic is printed in May 1978 (*Saint-Denis, notre ville*, 1978). The Mayor considers security as a "complex" notion in which working conditions forge "worries about tomorrow" (*Saint-Denis, notre ville*, 1978: 8–11).³⁹ "Austerity generates insecurity" insists Berthelot and calls for the elaboration of new "forms of prevention" (*Saint-Denis, notre ville*, 1978: 12–14).

Designed by Patrick Braouezec, new mayor in 1991, the local democracy project sought to recreate a public space based on the social development of the district and using the instruments of participative democracy (stimulating associations, volunteering, participative budget, public meetings). For the municipal team, this public space actually constituted a lever for social prevention and civil support: the values of volunteering and activism served to "affiliate" residents with their residential environment. Class relations, in which generations of migrant workers were embedded, have given way to other forms of socio-political mobilization: the issue at stake is not so much to improve working conditions anymore as to establish systems of collective negotiation around the living conditions and environment of residents, by promoting access to civic and social rights.

Nevertheless, the implementation of the contractual strategy has

39. The Mayor noted various infringements to basic rights. Protecting the exercise of union trade in industrial companies, maintaining the health care system, sustaining higher living standards in the environment (housing construction, transport, pollution and noise pollution) became "local" issues.

remained overly bureaucratic and not responsive or inventive enough to attract for instance the young people or involve marginalized inhabitants in the district. The approach was not impelled by militancy and the institutionalization of procedures did not encourage the renewal of activism on the local level. Thus, the new forms of local affiliations are squeezed in between the participative procedures and the traditional associative fabric. In that sense, the institutional procedures reduce the scope of the community development. This dimension of the participative procedures remains a blind spot in the institutional game.

4. LES MUREAUX AND THE PROJECT STRATEGY

This chapter presents the second case study. It focuses on a large high-rise estate, the so-called *Cinq Quartiers* (Five districts). This area is classified a *Zone Urbaine Sensible* (ZUS). It is located in the south of the city of Les Mureaux, with its 32,000 inhabitants. About 40 per cent of the city's total population, that is, 13,000 inhabitants, live there. The sector is made up of six sub-units – La Cité Renault, Bécheville, Bougimonts, Île-de-France, La Vigne Blanche, Les Musiciens – each of which has developed its own specific social and ethnic affiliations.

This area was rapidly stigmatized during the 1980s with the development of the industrial crisis. It was the factory that set the pace of resident life. With the rise of structural unemployment came a break in the trajectories of integration of migrants, which undermined inter-generational and family relations and reinforced ethnic ties in certain sectors like La Vigne Blanche. As collective bearings collapsed with de-industrialization, the areas of conflict increased. In the 1990s, the district erupted in a series of riots and fighting with the police.

The argument that I would like to put forward in the study of Les Cinq Quartiers concerns the way that the institutional actors and local partners made use of the 2003 *Loi de Programmation et d'Orientation pour la Ville*, “the Borloo Law”, to set up instruments of involvement that effectively upended power relations in the district.

The Borloo Law emphasizes three main priorities: the physical renovation of housing districts, the institutional reform in the name of the decision-making efficiency and the integration of urban strategy into a local economic development. In that framework, the urban project has had a great influence on participative actions. Faced

Figure 8. The city of Les Mureaux (in purple) and Les Cinq Quartiers (in red).

with the multiplication of areas of conflict, the project itself has been used to establish standards of integration on the district level through mechanisms (diagnoses and agreements) and steering instruments (conception in project mode, management mode by reorganizing services, evaluation mode). Behind these instrumental strategies that proceed from the Borloo Law, the local authorities and the housing companies elaborate a dialogue strategy, made of practices of cooperation and networking that locally intend to resolve local conflicts.

Thus, the institutional strategy for participation in Les Cinq Quartiers has another meaning than in Les Francs-Moisin-Bel-Air. In Les Mureaux, the strategy is based on two pillars: *an activation policy*, supported by the municipality that posits the young people of

the neighborhood in the prevention field, and a *dialogue strategy* which is set up by the housing companies with the support of the municipality. The term “dialogue” (“*concertation*” in French), which explicitly appears in the urban renovation project, is broadly overused in the local context. The main focus of the chapter is the rise of individualized forms of engagement and the way in which they promote new aspects of an environmental discipline. According to the political orientation, the participative game is structured between those who are included in the project management and those who are gradually excluded from it. It is through these modes of participation that I intend to illustrate another facet of the regimes of hospitality.

After a brief history of Les Cinq Quartiers, I present the way in which the urban crisis is politicized at the local level. Then I present the key points of the project that the state’s representatives, the local politicians, the institutions representatives and the housing companies designed in order to tackle the ethnic segregation in the city. Finally, I analyze the modes of involvement that are generated by the local instrument of government. Basing myself on interviews with local partners and local sequences of observations, I intend to show how individuals assess their own involvement in the neighborhood.

LES CINQ QUARTIERS AND THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT OF THE OUTER RING OF PARISIAN SUBURBS

During the post-war industrial boom, Les Cinq Quartiers’ social housing project accommodated a massive influx of migrant workers. The one per cent contribution of employers to housing financed the large-scale housing projects to accommodate workers, for the most part immigrant workers, and the communist Mayor of Les Mureaux, Paul Raoult, proposed plots in 1955 to provide new workers with decent living conditions. In a few decades, the population of Les Mureaux had almost quadrupled from several thousand to 40,000. The urban development plans designed on the regional scale in the 1960s and 1970s led to the formation of highly stigmatized sectors.

From massive recruitment to the segregation of immigrants

In 1950, the city of Les Mureaux was a small town in the valley of the Seine with a population of approximately 8,000, 40 kilometres west of Paris. The city, which still had a rural character at the time, was known for its aerodrome and its aeronautic performances in the interwar period. The population had climbed to 30,000 by 1975. The demographic explosion was mainly due to the redeployment of the automobile and aerospace industrial activity in the valley of the Seine. This industrial development outside Paris, far from the “Red suburbs” encircling the capital, was the result of a strategy adopted by the large industrial groups, banking on “industrial deconcentration” to modernize their production system. This strategy was organized by the state in the framework of the SDAU master plan for Île-de-France, which stated in 1969,¹

Just as automobiles accentuated the spread of industries, so they accelerated the spread of people to peripheral metropolitan areas. [...] Activities established within Paris underwent far-going mutations. The departure of factories picked up speed: because of extension and renovation needs, we have to consider the possibility of a movement that would affect half the industrial jobs existing in Paris today. Added to the creation of new units, the transfer of these workplaces would lead to the creation of 650,000 jobs outside of Paris (SDAU-RP 1965: 216–217).

The feasibility of such an industrial project in the outer suburbs of Paris depended on the housing capacities of the small towns in this outlying sector. The massive need for workers in reshaping the industrial fabric in the 1960s led to an urban metamorphosis. The city of Les Mureaux became the caricatural example of a modern urban approach that broke with the traditional bearings of the city. Where fields surrounded the small town, the state and the industrial firms, with support from the mayor, developed a functional urbanism embedded in a logic of urban sprawl in the Île-de-France region, ensuring that work, housing, transport and leisure activities were within reach of the 10 million residents. This industrial policy also evidenced the state’s

1. SDAU means *Schéma Directeur D’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme* (Master Plan for Urban Development).

desire to put an end to the spread of shantytowns and the overpopulation of working-class and immigrant residents in major industrial areas like La Plaine Saint-Denis. The state responded to the urban and social disorder around the industrial cradle of Île-de-France by putting the regional level in order. “Delouvrier, put some order into this mess!” General de Gaulle is reported to have said to Paul Delouvrier during a helicopter ride over the Parisian region (Vadelorge 2005: 7).²

Renault anticipated this movement as of 1951 in choosing as a location for the group’s largest automobile factory the city of Flins, not far from Les Mureaux. The choice of place was directly related to recruitment issues since the Flins factory, in the center of the Seine valley, could serve as a link between several employment areas (East Parisian-Paris, the Seine valley, and Normandy). With an annual production target of 300,000 cars, the process of hiring became massive. The workforce increased fourfold, from approximately 3,000 to 12,000 between 1955 and 1968 to reach a high point of 21,000 in the mid-1970s (Guillon 1988: 463). This hiring process led the company to get involved in the construction of social housing. It was in this context that Les Cinq Quartiers were progressively built in a row outside the city: 2,689 housing units were constructed between 1949 and 1975, 1,200 of them in 1958–59 to accommodate a portion of Renault’s personnel (Jambard 2002: 45–62).

The districts went up on either side of the main road, the *départementale* 43, but without the road network connecting the whole to the city center of Les Mureaux and its functional resources (in terms of transit, shopping, and administration). By 1957, the industrial group organized bus services connecting Les Cinq Quartiers to the factories. The city of Les Mureaux accommodated about 2,500 factory workers, with families in low-income housing and single migrants in worker hostels. Michelle Guillon recalls the main phases of this mass recruitment basically oriented toward immigrants (Guillon 1988). The first workers at Flins came from the surrounding rural areas of Île-de-France and from other regions, notably Brittany and Sarthe. They were joined from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s by Polish,

2. Paul Delouvrier was a high-ranking civil servant during the fourth and fifth republic. He was one of the acknowledged designers of the “planification” for the development of the Paris region (Vadelorge 2005: 9).

Figure 9. La Vigne Blanche, 1967.

1. 1953: Construction of Cité Renault
2. 1955: Construction of the Bougimonts district
3. 1958 to 1960: Construction of La Vigne Blanche
4. 1960: Start of construction on the Île-de-France district (social housing)
5. 1963 to 1965: Completion of the Île-de-France and Bougimonts districts (social housing)
6. 1966 to 1967: Construction of the Bécheville district (private housing)
7. 1970: Construction of Les Musiciens district (private housing)
8. 1971: Construction of a single-family residential district, Le Grand Ouest, by a private developer

Portuguese, Algerian, and Moroccan migrant workers. Half of the workers came by themselves and joined work teams at the factory. Families followed, filling up the social housing projects as they were built. During this period, nine out of ten workers were housed by Renault. Between 1970 and 1975, faced with a labor shortage, the company also recruited migrant workers from Senegal and Mali.

In retrospect, the process of migration at work in Les Cinq Quartiers was one that concerned men and followed the same pattern as the migration process of Spanish workers to La Plaine Saint-Denis in the mid-twentieth century. For instance, in 1965–70, the Peuls, Soninkes, Toucouleurs, and Bambaras who came from the Senegal river valley to work in France did so with the intention of returning home. They were the economic support of the families they left behind in the villages. But the family reunification policy implemented by the state starting in 1975 radically changed the migratory strategy. As a result, to the problem of integrating and managing an immigrant workforce, came the challenge of assimilating the women and children. These migrant trajectories still mark collective memory in the area since some young workers in the district present the sub-units of Les Cinq Quartiers in terms of various periods of migration. According to a host at the Social Center of La Vigne Blanche:

Algerians from Nanterre, from Bezons, from Houilles were the first to move into Les Musiciens. [...] The same worker hostels, the same reunifications...

Afterwards, there was a mix in all the districts. In La Vigne Blanche, the first to arrive were the Spanish (Interview 34, 24 February 2013).

What was at work in Les Mureaux at the start of the 1980s was related to Renault's management of its immigrant workforce, and had both a social and an ethnic impact on the city. The two dimensions were indissociable at first since social housing programs served first and foremost to house "immigrant workers" and their families. But gradually a parallel urban pattern developed between the historical city center and the peripheral districts, informed by a powerful logic of social hierarchization between unskilled workers, foremen, and managers: Roselyne de Villanova and Anne d'Orazio note that "foremen lived in the Bougimonts district, and managers had houses in Elisabethville" (Villanova et al. 2010: 115).³ The peri-urbanization brought on by the opening of a factory and the development of a housing stock for the factory's blue- and white-collar workers went hand in hand with a process of ethnic segregation: gradually the French bought single-family homes whereas the vast majority of immigrant workers lived in the social housing projects. According to the personal register established in 1984 by the company Renault (Guillon 1988: 463), 89 per cent of the workforce of foreign origin moved into the social housing and worker hostels in Les Mureaux, as against only 30 per cent of workers of French nationality that ended up buying houses.

The multiplication of areas of conflict in a context of deindustrialization

When it comes to the formation of Les Cinq Quartiers, the industrial crisis weighed heavily in this city. At the start of the 1990s, Les Mureaux was confronted with an acute series of complex problems including juvenile delinquency, regular scuffles with the police, poverty

3. The socio-ethnic distance between the French and the foreigners is illustrated by different skill levels in the Flins factory: in 1990, 77 per cent of the French workers at the factory were "skilled" as opposed to only 41.2 per cent of the foreign workers. 57.6 per cent of French workers owned single-family houses as against 9.1 per cent of the foreign workers (Berger 2006: 205–206).

and precariousness, youth dropping out of school, racial tension, and territorial stigmatization. The collective frameworks that ensured the social functioning of the city until then (factory, union, political party) were undermined by the emergence of mass unemployment.⁴ In this context, the socialist Mayor from 1989 to 2001, Alain Étoré, invested strongly in issues of security and integration. In a tense political context, Étoré began developing a firmer political discourse. Indeed, the underground economy, pickpocketing, drug dealing were more or less regarded as “common characteristics of urban violence”. But, in 1992–93 “the situation got markedly worse, with stone throwing at police officers and regular burglaries in the shopping mall, which almost had to close its doors,” he observed in *L'Humanité* (Étoré 2000). On a local level he sought a balance between prevention of social risks (economic and social integration, social mediation) and law enforcement by setting up a series of partnership programs, including the Local Security Contract and the Local Group for the Treatment of Delinquency.⁵ Beyond the scenes of urban violence, which often attracted national media attention,⁶ and the Mayor's shift toward security policies, the social functioning of Les Mureaux was more profoundly structured by conflicts that lend themselves to an intersectional analysis: the systems of dominance and constraints as they were experienced locally by the inhabitants intersect as many issues of social class, ethnic discrimination, and gender.

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4. The Renault factory at Flins, which had 20,000 blue- and white-collar workers at the height of its activity, had only 10,000 in 1990, and lost one-third more by 1999. By 2009, there were 3,278 employees. The drastic drop in industrial jobs was the result of mechanization and more recently of production centers moving to Slovenia and Turkey.
 5. “My credo is that fighting insecurity involves first promoting integration, both economic and social. [...] This requires all-out support: youth jobs, urban prevention agents (APU), local agents of social mediation [...]. On the security end, I signed a local security contract (CLS) three years ago. [...] It enables real coordinated work between all the partners. I have an urban risks director working with the national and municipal police, [...] social housing providers and Public Education. As soon as there's an important event, a crisis unit meets around him. Finally, I have a local group for the treatment of delinquency (GLTD) working in the two more difficult neighborhoods. Thanks to this structure, we can apply gradations in penalties resorting immediately to prison” (Étoré 2000).
 6. A show on France 5 on the “Mureaux affair” on 5 October 2006 focused on what happened when a driver was stopped by the police on October 1, 2006 and the fighting that occurred between the police and residents of Les Cinq Quartiers. <http://www.france5.fr/c-dans-l-air/societe/laffaire-des-mureaux-30058>

A first type of conflict is embedded in the context of deindustrialization: the development of structural unemployment on the city scale, and the widening of social inequalities in Les Cinq Quartiers with the arrival of increasingly precarious households. In Les Cinq Quartiers sector itself, the income of the wealthiest segments of the population was 6.1 times higher than that of the poorest.⁷ In 2009, the medium monthly income in Les Cinq Quartiers was, at 791 euros, under the poverty threshold (the poverty threshold, established by the INSEE, was 807 € in 2009). The first quartile of the income structure reached 486 euro per household within the *Zone Urbaine Sensible* as against 654 for the city at large.

Pattern of Income Distribution per month, Les Cinq Quartiers (Euro)

Income structure	ZUS Les Cinq Quartiers	Les Mureaux	Urban Unit of Paris
Median	791.8	1,109.7	1,774.3
First quartile	486.2	653.9	1,016.5
Third quartile	1,187.3	1,708.6	2,725.2

Source: Insee-DGI, local taxation revenues in 2009

The development of massive unemployment impacted foreign nationals and young people more strongly and it was accompanied by more casual forms of employment.⁸ The safety nets (family allowances, earned income supplement, handicapped adult allowance) played a significant role in the district. The rapid descent into these new forms of poverty came in the 1980s, when the deindustrialization completely shook up the social functioning of the city. There was significant decrease in blue-collar workers in the socio-professional categories after the mid-1980s: 21.6 per cent of all socio-professional categories in 1999 as against 17.5 per cent in 2009 (INSEE 2012).

7. The figure rises slightly city-wide and more significantly in the greater Parisian area at 6.3 for the municipality and 7.8 for the Parisian area (INSEE 2009).

8. An INED/INSERM study shows in 2001 that 44 per cent of employment was casual in the district, which meant one working person out of four, as against only 12.6 per cent for all the ZUS of the Île-de-France region and 12.8 in the Île-de-France region as a whole (Parizot et al. 2002).

A retired worker living in the district illustrates how the Renault factory could once regulate local life beyond the walls of the factory itself. Until the 1980s, life in the district was punctuated by factory work during the week and youth activities on weekends – the latter organized by union representatives living in the Renault projects and then later by residents in associations.

I started working at Renault on January 1, 1967. [...] Until 1980, everything was manual. In 1981, they installed the first robots to do the cutting. After that, there were more and more robots. [...] Before, there were 10 buses from the district [...] Renault paid for one part and we paid for the other. Now there is only one bus... it's sad to see. At the time, there were 24 apartments for the managers and foremen. The team leaders, taskmasters, and blue-collar workers lived all together in the same buildings. Everyone left at the same time and came home at the same time. If there was a conflict, everybody got involved. What's so hard to take today is that there is no communication between people anymore (Interview 35, 24 February 2013).

Secondly, this deterioration of the social climate went hand in hand with increasingly unbalanced residential patterns that fuelled racial tensions throughout the city and contributed to the tendency of the district's ethnic communities to keep to themselves. Municipal elections yielded a very approximate social representation of the city, notably with regard to the high percentage of young people and of people of foreign origin in the local population.⁹ Social violence emerged out of this phenomenon and the situation was so bad that even the social center started by the first-period residents closed down between 1993 and 1995,

9. Indeed, during municipal elections in 2001, the Ministry of Interior estimated that there were 12,880 registered votes out of a total population of 31,717, that is, 40.6 per cent of the population. The rate of abstention was 42.8 per cent during the first round and 41.81 per cent for the second. In 2008, the rate of abstention during municipal elections hit 52 per cent of registered voters for the first round (Interior Ministry election results). Moreover, a study in 2002 noted that about 30 per cent of the district's population was of foreign nationality, of which 16 per cent were from North Africa and 13.2 per cent from Sub-Saharan Africa (Parizot et al. 2002: 15). The national institute INSEE also estimates that 50 per cent of the population were under 24 in the district in 2011.

The social center is fifteen years old. It was an association-run social center and today it's paramunicipal. [...] It started after the center was burned down during riots, and then closed down in 1993-95. There was breaking and burning... sometimes for next to nothing. It was their way of making themselves heard. The police and the youth, all big kids. There was Paris, the first trains... The thing was to be seen, to form a gang, go into stores with six or seven others. There was this protest side to it... a question of living, being accepted, and getting some respect (Interview 34, 24 February 2013).

Election results also evidence the racial and social tensions caused by the social imbalances in the 1990s. In Les Mureaux, of the registered voters who voted, 42 per cent voted for the extreme right-wing Front National during legislative elections in 1993 (as against 12.5 per cent nationally), 25 per cent for the presidential elections in 1995 (versus 15 per cent national votes in the first round), 30 per cent for municipal elections the same year (the Front National only actually won the city of Toulon that year), 25 per cent for the presidential election in 2002 (16.9 for the Front National in the first round). In 2006, the effects of a concentration of people of foreign origin remained important (30 per cent in the district, 24 per cent in the municipality, 13.3 per cent in the urban area (Insee RGP 2006). Beyond statistics, the phenomenon is present in the discourse of residents and the town hall staff. One of the municipality's social development staff members, pointing to an area on the city map on his wall, commented: "I worked in the Western sector, which covers much of the single-family housing area, and I can tell you that I was sometimes the target of racists comments" (Interview 33, 23 February 2013).

The transformation of social tension into ethnic tension did not stop there. With the loss of the status of "worker" many of the jobless were thrown back to their condition of "immigrants". The picture of the district painted by a former worker of Portuguese nationality indicates the ethnicization of relations between residents during the population turnover that took place. In a nostalgic discourse, this resident of the Cité Renault notes a profound contrast in social relations between the period "before," when he had the status of a worker and "everyone was with everyone," and the current period, "today", when "in a building of 236 apartments, there is only one French person, 4 from Maghreb and the rest are black Africans". People hardly

speak because they do not recognize each other: “if we speak the same language, it’s okay” (Interview 35, 24 February 2013).

The third component that engaged power relations is related to changes in the family structure, in particular with regard to modes of transmission. Several sociologists and ethnologists have pointed to the consequences of changing structures of parentality as a major issue in the district. The studies conducted in the neighborhood by Philippe Bernardet and Danièle Poitou (2002) from the Center for African Studies (*Le Centre d’Études Africaines*) on the subject of violence among African immigrants in the context of “rapid acculturation” or by the sociologists Hugues Lagrange and Suzanne Cagliero (2001) on schooling and juvenile delinquency throw light on this point. These qualitative studies demonstrate the way in which social and family relations in immigrant households are sometimes breaking up in the process of integration – often in a context of violence.

Bernardet and Poitou analyze the integration trajectories of sub-Saharan African groups from a single region and show how they are structured differently depending on whether the immigrants come from a rural area – often with no diplomas – or urban area – often with skills and diplomas. The populations of African origin that came to Les Mureaux in the 1980s were from rural areas. The study of their trajectories shows how the role of fathers, mothers, and the relations of families with their community were radically transformed depending on the background of the family.¹⁰ The tone varied from one family to another. The effect on children of the destruction of family and social frameworks was noticeable in the district despite a diaspora that promoted solidarity around La Vigne Blanche social center in the 1980s and 1990s. This is a far cry from explaining phenomena of violence through an exclusively “ethnic” prism.¹¹

10. From the Peul village to the housing estate in Les Mureaux, modes of conversing and of regulating family and social conflicts become looser because some members have to deal with a complex situation of assimilation of the social norms of the integrating country: thus, the transmission of the mother tongue often prepares the child for French language acquisition. But studies found that this was not the case in Les Mureaux, where there were significant deficiencies in the transmission of the mother tongue.

11. As Bernardet and Poitou observe (2002: 22): “The modification of status in immigrant families from these regions reveals the extent to which norms are overturned in a situation of rapid acculturation. As a result, [...] preadolescence and the passage to middle school appear more and more critical at around the age of 12–13. However,

Furthermore, the role of the father and the mother changed considerably depending on the migration project. With the father at work, it was often the mother who would take charge of institutional relations. And when the mother was not linguistically capable of doing so, it was the child who would take on the support role for administrative procedures. Mothers tended to demand more autonomy and to challenge the father, who was often accused of failing in the integration project. Conflicts, breakups, and divorce have been a sociological reality in Les Cinq Quartiers. This reality is statistically corroborated: in March 2011, there were 542 monoparental families in the district out of 3,841. It is also evident in the variety of women's associations in the district: the Femmes de la Cité association aims to consolidate inter-generational bonds in the Cité Renault; Mélange de Femmes proposes family outings and creative workshops; Femmes Solidaires des Musiciens proposes social and cultural mediations and discussion on topics of parenting and schooling. These women-dedicated intervention strategies have a single overriding concern that is best expressed by the declaration of one of these women: "We want to protect our children!" Lagrange and Cagliero (2001: 9–12) demonstrate that children of Les Cinq Quartiers who have had dramatic experiences (death or disappearance of a father, separation of parents, placement of a child in a foster home when the parents stayed in their country) drop out of school, socialize on the streets, and sometimes get involved in petty delinquency. It is the "logic of the vacuum" that takes hold, according to Lagrange and Cagliero, and it is present in the stories told by these young people who cannot express themselves without pain or bitterness (2001: 15).

To conclude, young people are often living in "neither-nor" or "in between" situations of ambivalence and conflict. They will not be workers and do not try to identify with civic values, such as activism in political parties or in unions around salary negotiations, or with

neither this acculturation, nor the particularly precarious material conditions suffice to account completely for the behavioral problems and deviant or delinquent behavior observed [...] Moreover a strictly culturalist approach appears insufficient, even though it does contribute [...] elements of comprehension. To identify such difficulties, it is usually necessary to delve in detail into the family and migration history, notably with regard to the formation of the marriage, which could have taken place in Africa [...] Recourse to the history of groups, families, and individuals thus appears indispensable for defining support and prevention actions".

traditional family values. Children lose interest in school very early because of the trouble-fraught trajectory of integration in the host country. And those who later get jobs working, notably at the factory, often have short-term contracts. In a context where production chains are outsourced, work is hard to come by. One youth encountered on his way out of a local sports club had this to say,

There's no work here. That's the problem: work. Young people are hungry. They open their mouths like this ... They have to eat. So when they see a granny walking with her bag ... I understand them. When there's nothing to eat ...
(Participatory observation 8, 22 February 2013).

FROM URBAN SEGREGATION TO SOCIO-SPATIAL DISCRIMINATION: THE POVERTY POCKET SCENARIO

The main difficulties that institutions and their local partners have to face in Les Cinq Quartiers are evidenced in the key agreements signed at the beginning of the 2000s. The city contract in Les Mureaux (*Contrat de Ville* 2001) has here been the privileged instrument for the state to involve local and regional governments, public services as well as housing companies in the fight against segregation. For the most part of it, the instrument aims at redeploying public services in segregated areas. According to Borloo Law, the urban renovation agreement (*Convention de Rénovation Urbaine*), which Les Mureaux signed in 2006, is to design an urban strategy based on massive housing destructions and a rehousing strategy. Beside the urban strategy, an urban agreement for social cohesion (*Contrat Urbain de Cohésion Sociale*), signed in 2007, integrates a socio-cultural dimension in terms of employment, education, housing and security.

First, social and ethnic discrimination is noted in the agreements (*Contrat de ville* 2001: 3; CUCS 2007: 11) as the major issue in the district, one that brings with it a whole set of integration problems. Second, this discrimination process is geographically manifested by a “pocket” in the urban area when sub-units with strong identities take

shape, with a tendency of some to become “ghettoized.” The diagnosis underlying the agreements or contracts problematizes the social question on a basis of an urban analysis. There is talk of “constraining environment for residents” who are subject to a rise in juvenile delinquency, in particular. These phenomena work to stigmatize and downgrade the area.¹²

Thus, the use of the notion of discrimination has less to do with the rationality of economic and institutional actors (with a focus on what type of actor discriminates against what type of population) than with assessing the characteristics of a geographical area and of the populations “as victims” of deindustrialization. Although the use of statistical data tends in general to validate the scenario of “discrimination,” the nomenclature of statistics tends nonetheless to comprise normative aspects. Developed on the national scale by the INSEE, the statistics that inform the diagnoses often proceed from national standards and thus dramatize the effects of the district; there is a warped “magnifying effect” of sorts on the population studies that makes it possible to take a position on the abnormality of the “poverty pocket” phenomenon.

What are we to conclude from this? If you put around a table a series of institutional actors and local partners, the shared diagnosis that serves to draft agreements actually represents an exercise limited to the local treatment of social imbalances. On the one hand, it should be kept in mind how hard it is to gather information on social processes in a city of 32,000 inhabitants like Les Mureaux that does not have an internal research department (which a big city like Saint-Denis does have). For this reason, the work of shared diagnosis, delegated to an outside research firm, necessitates compiling infra-municipal data related to populations and movements in the housing stock of 5 different providers, which are not simple to analyze. The instrumental strategy of districts orchestrated on the national scale,

12. The social and territorial discrimination that strikes Les Cinq Quartiers is imputed in public agreements to urban violence, the effects of ghettoization, and social dependency. The urban project, intended to reunite the city and its residents, focused on making the district safe, mixing populations, and making residents take on responsibilities. The project for Les Cinq Quartiers thus radically transformed the identity of the district and its social life. The massive destruction of the housing stock, the redefinition of available land and the integration or preventive and dissuasive actions worked to redefine the rules of collective life.

attached to static series from the INSEE, determines only very normative elements that hold back a deep-seated analysis of the social processes at work locally.

Discrimination effects in Les Cinq Quartiers and their relationship to national norms

The *Contrat de Ville* (City Contract) from 2000, the *Projet de Rénovation Urbaine* from 2006 and the *Contrat Urbain de Cohésion Sociale* from 2007 are public documents all of which feature an analysis of discriminatory criteria in Les Mureaux's social housing districts. They have the advantage of targeting the issues specific to social life in the districts, notably tendencies linked to unemployment, the precarious situation of households, academic failure, juvenile delinquency, urban problems (in particular, related to the lack of centrality and the effects of the split between the city center and Les Cinq Quartiers) and accessibility of transit networks. Expressions are sometimes different from one document to another but one postulate stands out from the different documents: the districts (and their inhabitants) are subject to discriminatory effects that lead to a form of socialization of groups keeping to themselves and to strategies of confinement within districts.

1. The *Contrat de Ville* notes:

Today, in Val-de-Seine, a large proportion of the population "is subjected to" social housing districts: whether they live there, do not want to live there anymore, and cannot leave for socio-economic reasons; or lived there and have left; or never lived there but stigmatize wholesale its urbanism and its residents. The paradox is that the more choice there is, the less constraining the place is (if people stay, it's because they want to) (2000–06: 1).

2. The ANRU agreement stipulated in 2006:

In social terms, the city of Les Mureaux, and especially the southern district accumulate social difficulties and signs of precariousness. 40 per cent of the population of Les Mureaux consists of youth under the age of 25; the unemployment rate is 16 per cent citywide and up to 30 per cent in the southern districts, the area of the large-scale project of urban renovation. Another

significant statistic: 27 per cent of the population over 15 has no diploma; 59 per cent of households are taxable (the percentage is 79 per cent in the Yvelines region as a whole). Lastly, the average household size is 3.09 (5.6 in La Vigne Blanche) (Les Mureaux GPRU agreement, May 31, 2006).

3. The CUCS diagnosis from 2007 mentions “discriminatory social data” related to “population,” “type of housing,” “unemployment,” “schooling,” and to “income and precarious situations of households”.

The discrimination essentially refers here to the definition of distinctive characteristics that negatively impact Les Cinq Quartiers. Those who design diagnostic tools concentrate on describing the consequences of the discrimination process on the area, notably through statistical series that measure deviations from the mean (city-wide, nation-wide, or in the ZUS). Thus, behind the notion of discrimination, the deviations from the mean between different geographical areas are what determine the normality or abnormality of a phenomenon. The whole system of indicators is imposed nation-wide, in particular with reference to the ZUS mean on the national level. This device sets a tolerance threshold when it comes to social tendencies in French housing projects. I will take two examples from the CUCS (latest analysis) that are problematical.

The first case in point concerns the assessment that the city of Les Mureaux accommodates too many foreign residents. To demonstrate the effect of the “overrepresentation” of foreigners, the research firm in charge of the diagnosis compares it to the average of foreign residents throughout the country then to the average of the areas benefitting from social cohesion contracts, or CUCS. The contrast is striking: 5.6 per cent in France as a whole and 23.8 per cent in the district.¹³ It is surprising that no analytical work was undertaken on the type of migration (by place of origin, or by period) and that no reference was made to integration trajectories and to the generation of

13. “The over-representation of foreign residents in Les Mureaux, at 23.8 per cent of the population in 1999, far exceeded the national level (5.6 per cent), and even that of CUCS territories (16.5 per cent) at the same time. A selective and differentiated increase of foreign residents by district was also observed” (CUCS 2007: 8).

immigration concerned, which would considerably refine the diagnosis and shed light on the reality of this “overrepresentation”.

The second case in point is the description of the structural characteristics of households in Les Cinq Quartiers, which states that “the biggest households comprise well over five people”.¹⁴ The authors evoke polygamous families, mainly living in the Vigne Blanche subunit, without specifically mentioning them. More generally speaking, the deviations are interpreted in relationship to the means moving from the national to the local. Thus, the *Projet de Rénovation Urbaine* (the urban facet) was signed in 2006, a year before the CUCS (the social facet). The urban comes before the social. In addition, the use of diagnosis systems made available by the national institutions produces significant discrepancies in the analysis of social processes underway in the district.¹⁵

Unemployment indicators (per cent)	Cinq Quartiers in 1999	Les Mureaux in 1999	Deviation of Cinq Quartiers and the city	National average of the ZUS in 2005
Unemployment rate	23.8	16.6	+7.2	22
Unemployment rate of ages 15 to 24	39.2	29.8	+9.4	41.7
Unemployment rate of women	26.6	17.8	+8.8	22
Unemployment rate of foreigners (outside the EU)	26.5	23.3	+3.2	31.7

Source: INSEE, RGP 1999 and DIV, ONZUS 2006

To base the diagnosis on the problem of the settlement of migrant workers in the area – without examining the process of settlement of families – is to mask a complex part of the integration process of im-

14. “Average household size in the five ZUS exceeds three (3.61) when the national average in ZUS is around 2.6. As a result, the average size of households in Les Mureaux exceeds that of the ZUS households nation-wide. Naturally [...], the percentage of one-person households in the five ZUS is relatively low [...] At the other end of the spectrum, there are many households of at least five people (29.2 per cent), significantly more than the average in Les Mureaux (19.6 per cent), but apparently and paradoxically, significantly less than the ZUS nation-wide (34.4 per cent).” (CUCS 2007: 15)

15. For example, some CUCS analyzes use a statistical basis from 1999 even though the CUCS was signed in 2007.

migrant households. This integration concerns the life of residents and family situations with which all local stakeholders are familiar. As we shall see, local actors interpret the situation very differently from the arguments presented in the formal agreements. A filtering of information exists between the diagnosis and the work of the local actors.

A socio-spatial reading: Les Cinq Quartiers as “forced” enclaves

The issue of social exclusion as it appeared at the start of the 1980s in this area was spatially manifested in the different diagnoses as the emergence of a pocket of poverty, in other words, of a vast social housing complex essentially accommodating the victims of deindustrialization. The CUCS of Les Mureaux returned retrospectively to the urban dimension of an economic crisis that hit foreign workers hardest of all.¹⁶ The crisis that Les Cinq Quartiers underwent was mainly perceived in the diagnoses of the district as the result of an economic change. The process described is firstly of workers left on the margins of industrial development. The perspective of “victims” fed the segregative effects in a causal sequence of events that impacted relations of family, school, training, and civic engagement: the loss of the father’s job at the time of family reunification in 1974; the renewal of generations in the 1980s and 1990s; the unemployment affecting a low-skilled population; the high percentage of young people; the appearance of monoparental families; academic failures and the rise of delinquency; the tendency to withdraw into socio-ethnic identities.

As a result, the pocket of poverty is considered a marginal effect of the economic crisis, which the institutions are expected to address. This conception diverges from a Marxist reading of poverty as structurally produced by the economic system to advocate more free-market solutions. The agreements describe the sector as “sizeable pockets of precariousness and districts of social and urban exclusion”

16. “Foreign resident workers were massively marginalized by the automobile industry. Generally low-skilled, foreign workers tended to be more vulnerable to the process of economic exclusion. 37.3 per cent of foreign workers citywide in Les Mureaux were unemployed in 1999. In the districts of Les Musiciens, La Vigne Blanche and Bécheville, the rate exceeded 50 per cent. We can see how the development of the service sector currently underway in Les Mureaux cannot eliminate the economic exclusion that strikes foreign workers living mainly in peripheral districts” (CUCS 2007).

(*Contrat de Ville* 2000–06: 6), “districts fragilized by the city’s development” (CUCS 2007: 6). These descriptive terms acknowledge a process of socio-economic exclusion geographically delimited to a group of social housing districts. The CUCS emphasizes that it is the structure of the housing stock that leads to an accumulation of social difficulties and that justifies an urban strategy informed by the diversification of the housing offer. The formulation of the social diagnosis actually includes the strategic response, which corresponds in every respect to the implementation of the *Programme National de Rénovation Urbaine* (PNRU).

The spatial analysis of discrimination – that is to say, of the mechanism that sets Les Cinq Quartiers apart from other areas – is essentially based on comparisons with averages city-wide or in the ZUS nationwide. It is in this comparative analysis on the scale of the municipality, the metropolitan area, or of all of the ZUS in France that we find the “urban problem,” generator of a socio-ethnic polarization. The CUCS notes a “very strong predominance” of collective housing in the district: 92 per cent of buildings of at least 10 apartments in the district as compared to a national average in the ZUS of only 68 per cent (CUCS 2007: 15–16). In addition, the number of “large housing units” (five rooms or more) in Les Cinq Quartiers is lower than the national average in the ZUS, and this, the diagnosis states, in a context where very large families are “overrepresented” in Les Mureaux.

The use of the notion of discrimination here develops in a direction that is the opposite of what could be expected. In fact, in explaining the discrimination process mainly by effects of concentration linked to the district’s housing structure, an important part of the process of formation of the district is disregarded, including its historical dimension and the mechanisms at work locally in the social sphere or in the arena of migration. An analysis of how migration was managed through the housing policy of the 1960s and 1970s, followed by an acknowledgment of the shortcomings, if not the absence, of an integration policy in France in the 1980s would have served to identify the issues of social life in Les Cinq Quartiers with greater clarity. Instead, the diagnosis concludes that the “sense of ‘keeping to one’s own’ [...] is reciprocal” in the different districts of Les Mureaux (*Contrat de ville* 2000–06: 2). The strategy of concentration leads to

a “process of confinement” in the districts, that it to say, it leads to blocked residential trajectories.

Currently many residents see their situation like a form of house arrest. The young react with violence; the older ones with despair and fatality. But also, the less choice there is, the easier it is for people to choose their environment and the more likely they are to stay within their group “amongst themselves”. The discrimination is reciprocal, and the processes of confinement mutual (Contrat de Ville 2000–06: 2).

Six years later, this scenario was confirmed by the CUCS. The only ones to remain in Les Cinq Quartiers were those who could not leave.¹⁷ In 2006, the INSEE found that 2,536 out of 3,841 households were in the same apartments as 5 years earlier. From 2001 to 2006, 44 per cent of households moved, with a corresponding highly intense population management activity on the part of social housing providers. The district began to lose residents. A representative of OSICA, one of the social housing providers, said that in 2003, there was no turnover in population in this sector of Les Cinq Quartiers, where “rents were particularly low” (Interview 25, 14 February 2013).

To say that the neighborhood has certain “constraints” hardly suffices to cover the issues of social life in Les Cinq Quartiers. It disregards in particular the representations and practices of residents with regard to their district. And this tendency to homogenize situations from the single perspective of “constraint” does not correspond to the realities described by actors on the ground and by the inhabitants. The institutional hypothesis that can be summed up such as “if you have a choice, you leave” seems too simple to result from an exhaustive field study combining the quantitative and the qualitative.

It is symptomatic that the words of local stakeholders and inhabitants do not appear in the diagnoses. Here again, the shared diagnoses and agreements have the effect of powerfully filtering the complex

17. “In 1999, housing vacancy was very high inside the five ZUS (17.4 per cent) [...] It was higher than the national ZUS average (8.2 per cent). But since 2003, the vacancy rate diminished and changed structurally citywide, from 11.4 per cent in 2003 to 7.9 per cent in 2005 [...] There is an observable increase in vacancies in La Vigne Blanche with a housing vacancy rate of 42 per cent in 2003. However, half of the vacancies are deliberate and linked to the planned demolitions in the framework of the PRU” (CUCS 2007: 17).

local realities. In the first place, they do not mention social movements, the capacity of local associations for mobilization, the systems of affiliation structured by sector, the often divergent representations from one neighborhood to another, but also from one generation to another. What are we to make of the comment by one young person that “everyone knows everyone” in Les Cinq Quartiers when a former worker at Renault, now retired, says that “no one says hello anymore”? The process of confinement or social isolation does not affect the city’s residents with equal intensity. And this is evidenced in the reaction of a host of a social center – and resident of Les Cinq Quartiers – to the urban renewal project: “We’re not saying that we do not want to leave. We’re saying that leaving means losing our bearings, our friends, and our neighbors. We’re talking about 10 years or 40 years of history” (Interview 34, 24 February 2013).

URBAN RENOVATION PROJECT: REUNITE A CITY FACED WITH SOCIO-SPATIAL SPECIALIZATION

It is important to specify that Les Mureaux’s urban renovation project was initiated in response to the acknowledged failure of urban policy. The institutional documents note the difficulty in changing the socio-economic situation of the population in priority districts and the tendency to “the segmentation of the city into entities that ignore one another: the city center, the single-family home area in the West and the social housing project in the South” (PRU of Les Mureaux). The failure of past policies is all the more striking in that Les Cinq Quartiers went through all the stages of urban policy, and, in particular, the territorial contractualization period with the creation of the *Syndicat Intercommunal du Val-de-Seine*.¹⁸ The *Programme*

18. A brief reminder is in order here: a first procedure of “problem area” (“*flot sensible*”) was initiated in 1984 to improve living conditions and reinforce the presence of public services. In 1990, the municipality was part of an intermunicipal city contract in the metropolitan area. A *Syndicat Intercommunal du Val-de-Seine* was in charge of steering the metropolitan policy. Several European programs (“Horizon” and “Districts in Crisis”)

National de Rénovation Urbaine (PNRU) was the occasion to assert not so much a conceptual break with the preceding contractual period (the project picks up the themes of discrimination and social diversity) as a *methodological break*, with the idea of defining locally a more efficient framework of intervention to stop ghettoization, channel urban violence, and guarantee public tranquillity.

A strategy of diversity to fight against ghetto effects

Les Mureaux's urban renovation project is regarded as one of the most ambitious in France and is often presented as such in official communications. Why is this so? First, the project affected a grouping of districts with a population of 13,000 out of the 33,000 inhabitants of the city as a whole, which amounts to 40 per cent of the city's total population. The second reason is that the budget was enormous: 404 million euros.¹⁹ An agreement was signed on December 12, 2006 between the municipality of Les Mureaux and the ANRU as part of the national program for urban renovation (urban facet) for a period of 10 years.²⁰ The project of urban renovation has a twofold sense: it was at the same time a political intention or projection and a preliminary trial, a program meant to evolve with the operational issues.

supported the economic restructuring. Les Cinq Quartiers area, which is a priority site in the metropolitan area, benefitted from urban restructuring with the signing of a major urban project in 1994. The district, classified as a *Zone Franche Urbaine* (ZFU), benefitted from tax exemptions for businesses. European subsidies (PIC URBAN 1 and PIC URBAN 2) supported the economic redeployment in the area (employment center, development of a business area and a reading center). This intermunicipal dynamic failed however, as the cities involved remained different as much in size as in the social situation of their inhabitants. The *Syndicat Intercommunal du Val-de-Seine* shifted its focus to Les Mureaux and Equevilly. In 2007 the CUCS notes that "several phenomena endanger the pact and this despite relentless efforts made over a period of more than thirty years of urban policy" (CUCS 2007: 37).

19. It was mainly financed by social housing providers, the state (via the ANRU), the Municipality of Les Mureaux, the Île-de-France region, the Conseil Général des Yvelines and the European Union (via the FEDER program). The city carried the project for public spaces, facilities and the creation of an urban park. The social housing providers were in charge of the process of demolition-reconstruction, the residentialization of buildings, and the renovation of apartments. An architecture-urbanism firm was appointed for the conception of the urban project.
20. The agreement was amended in 2009 with the launching of the *Pacte de Relance pour la Ville* for financial questions.

In the first sense, the (political) project was built on the principle of social and urban diversity: the mix, the meeting, and the diversity are regarded as the strengths of a city that “integrates” its inhabitants unlike a city that “destroys” the social bond and produces constraining and conflictual enclaves. In strictly political terms, the ambition was to reunite the districts of the city, to create cohesion, unity and territorial identity where it did not exist before. The stated aim in the 2000s was therefore “the reintegration of the districts with difficulties in a strategy of territorial development” (*Contrat de ville* 2001: 14); the new project was meant to allow for the “sustainable integration of the southern districts” in the framework of the ANRU. The terms thus hardly changed from the *Contrat de Ville* to the Urban Renovation project. The CUCS provided an illustration of the force of this political discourse with Republican overtones, concerning “equality” of treatment and “solidarity” in response to the “perils” of social exclusion, ghettoization, violence, and dependency.

In the second (technical) sense, the project was turned into a program. For the city to become a place of integration, the project was divided into four major orientations that countered, point by point, post-war functionalist architectural principles: (1) redefine a plot grid and a circulation plan inside and outside the district; (2) diversify the segments of the housing supply (social housing, private rentals, affordable homes for first-time buyers) to dynamize the residential trajectories of the most captive residents of the housing stock; (3) diversify urban functions by adding new facilities of public service and cultural activities to promote encounters between users from outside the districts and its residents and to contribute to the attractiveness of the site; (4) redefine and create new public spaces that clarify the function of parking, circulation, collection, etc.

Behind the urban project, powerful social issues were being raised. In fact, the aim of physically reuniting the city caused major social transformations. Where there was discrimination between different districts and ghetto effects, it was a matter of de-concentrating the districts by rehousing the most dependent inhabitants, promoting interactions between residents of all districts, and supporting the integration of residents in their new environment. Where there was a break, connections had to be created and flows intensified. Where there was deterioration and conflict, it was a matter of promoting

public awareness through information and providing support for inhabitants by way of prevention and mediation services.

This policy of diversity involved therefore a policy of integration. The most symptomatic example of this concerned the polygamous families, most of them in the subunit of La Vigne Blanche where there was a concentration of social situations deemed problematical and an ethnic social functioning marked by the presence of about sixty polygamous families.

The situation was not new and had mobilized the staff of the municipal government for over twenty years. In the late 1980s, the municipal government and educational actors became aware of the phenomenon of over occupancy in polygamous households in certain apartments in La Vigne Blanche. The living conditions and environment (in terms of eating and sleeping) weighed on the children's success in school. An association of women was created, under the impetus of the municipal government, to host cooking and health workshops. The housing provider also undertook to turn some four-

Figure 10. A few characteristics of the Master plan in Les Cinq Quartiers.

room units into seven-room units between 1992 and 1995. But these responses did not measure up to the task: an apartment occupied by 30 people undergoes accelerated deterioration, from condensation to worn water heaters that must be replaced every year. The neighbors complaining about noise from these apartments ended up applying to the housing provider for transfers to other buildings. The polygamous families themselves asked for bigger apartments. The housing provider was mobilized but these families posed other problems, with regard to parenthood, education, delinquency, etc. Thirteen families were identified in the framework of the CLSPD for recurrent acts of delinquency. The Prefect and the Mayor organized a collective meeting with these families that had become a more general “problem” in public policies. It was against this backdrop that a global approach emerged in the urban project. The joint effort on the part of the housing provider and the municipal government gave rise to a support service to assist the families in a process of de-cohabitation and to train stakeholders on the ground.

From project conception to management: the participation as the hidden side of the project development

I stated in the introduction that I followed “Foucault’s refutation of a set of distinctions between the realm of the state and that of civil society”. In this line of thought, I emphasize how a few inhabitants can be at the same time involved in the project management and politically manipulated in the name of citizenship, dialogue and participation. Since one of the purposes of the Mureaux project was to recast socio-ethnic ties and promote a greater individual responsibility in the neighborhood, the residents have in general been removed from the decision-making process. Instead, the Mayor in collaboration with the housing companies have defined an activation policy linked to a dialogue strategy. The mediation devices for the integration of the youth in the neighborhood and the involvement of residents in the management of the housing blocks in which they live illustrate the variety of participative tools. I point out in particular how these individualized modes of engagement can be understood from a non-formalized side of participation. Through a set of interviews and observations in the site, we will see how these modes of involvement

contribute to dividing the inhabitants in daily life between “participants” in the project and “activists” who remain distant to the project development – if not also rejected by it.

Residents remote from the decision-making process

Les Mureaux’s current Mayor François Garay was born in the city and spends time there every day. He knows all its districts and all the social movements developing in it. Before being elected in 2001, during the first round of elections, on the slogan “breath new life into Les Mureaux,” he was municipal counselor and Adjunct Mayor in charge of youth and sports from 1983 to 1995. His political stance with regard to the involvement of residents in a collective project stands in radical contrast with the conception found in the municipality of Saint-Denis. Garay’s discourse is essentially based on reasserting the system of representative democracy to set up a territorial project of this scope. In legitimating the project by political representation, the Mayor makes the development of the project dependent on elections. And the project’s development did in fact have an effect on the local political scene, reversing the trends in the 1990s: the Front National vote dropped to 13.7 per cent during the presidential elections of 2012 (as against 17.9 per cent of the national vote during the first round of this election). In this model, there is a time for consultation with residents, a time that is situated in its daily dimension, and a time for decision-making that belongs to the elected representative based on the agenda presented. The politician decides; the residents participate in setting up the project. The elected representative has control of the decision-making process and the instruments of the project. The scope of planned construction work necessitates in this framework important organizational changes. First, the *Syndicat Intercommunal du Val-de-Seine*, in charge until then of the political aspect of the city for the metropolitan area, has shifted its focus to the social housing districts of Les Mureaux and the neighboring town of Équevilly. A new director has been appointed to cover all phases of project conception, development, and evaluation. The launching of the project has also involved the internal reorganization of the partners (Les Mureaux municipal government and the housing providers). This PRU management mode was designed in response to three political problems.

First, the inter-generational, social, and ethnic tensions within the local population do not incite the Mayor to define a project after a broad-based consultation. For the Mayor, due to the increasing “tribalization,” different types of conversation exist in everyday life in different socio-cultural groups.²¹ In a context where special interests could rival common interest, representative democracy remains for the Mayor the privileged mode of government and this despite the limits of the system of representation mentioned earlier. He says about the dialogue with residents (Garay 2010):

We are elected to listen, but we are elected above all to make decisions, and [...] being a fervent advocate of participative democracy ... I believe that when you're in power [...] there comes a time when the local population is expecting you to make decisions and to lead them.

How can the Mayor dismiss the idea of local participation when this is a city with twenty years of experience with urban policy mechanisms and when a good percentage of the inhabitants do not have the right to vote for local representatives? The director of the *Syndicat Intercommunal* argues as follows: “The Mayor, you see, talks with everyone, from imams to shopkeepers. He’s got his finger on the pulse of the city” (Interview 18, 12 June 2012). The heads of social, ethnic, and religious networks have ready access to the Mayor. This explains the fact that an Islamic center and a mosque could be built right outside Les Cinq Quartiers and that they are situated on the edge of a plot where a police station is planned.

Second, the Mayor’s work on urban projects is embedded in a complex procedural and financial system that is far removed from the daily temporality of the residents.²² This political temporality is all the more

21. “The dialogue with people living in a state of total precariousness and poverty is perhaps not the same as with, say, hipsters [...]. It’s not a dialogue, it’s dialogues. When you speak of dialogues, it’s [...] everything related to everyday life. For example, household trash, problems of maintenance, problems at school [...] After, there is the long-term dialogue. But [...] speak to residents about a large-scale project ... and they do what we all do, [...] we leaf through the documents they give us and throw them in the air [...]. That’s the difficulty” (Garay 2010).

22. “In speaking of residents, the important thing is the issue of temporality. We are elected for six years, with renewable terms, and others involved in the projects are there for longer. And then several projects are financed like the Rénovation Urbaine over a

significant in that the mechanism of financial incentives proposed by the state leaves little leeway to local political personnel.²³ Elected on his agenda, the Mayor sought to show the efficiency of his political projects and to avoid all tension over the slow pace of the administrative treatment. He also undertook a profound reorganization of the city to adapt it to the implementation of the project. A financial audit was done in 2001 to define the financial capacity of the municipality with regard to the urban project and, from 2002 to 2005, the administrative divisions (200 people) were regrouped around a new unique center. Moreover, in 2006, the Mayor launched the “Synergies” project to reorganize all municipal departments with a focus on a transversal functioning and a policy of intensive training. It was in this framework, that a center of social mediation was reinforced by the arrival of young coordinators from the district. It was also in this context that the Mayor initiated a dynamic training policy for young people: 96 were trained for new employments between 2001 and 2003; 32 internships were created annually; 250 work experience posts were filled; a citizen passport was created in 2006 for the discovery of institutions by 18-year-olds as part of a training course to promote civic values (diligence, secularism, respect for differences, etc.) (Garay 2013: 2–3).

Third, the Mayor sought to unite for the first time all the social housing providers around a common project. At bottom, the project strategy focuses on promoting the legibility of local political action to the detriment of dialogue – consensual or conflictual – with the residents. It necessitates the development of a common program between institutions and the social housing providers. This scheme of intervention was formalized by a decision-making body and a technical body: the *steering committee*, bringing together the state, the *Syndicat Intercommunal du Val-de-Seine*, the mayor, and housing providers, sets down the general guidelines and validates the major steps in

period of five years. Therefore between the temporality of the elected representative, the temporality of the project, and that of the resident, there are significant differences” (Garay 2010).

23. With the ANRU, the state created a payment strategy to speed up the financing of operations, on a first come first served basis. This strategy motivated the mayors and social housing agencies to accelerate considerable administrative procedures aimed at defining an urban project. This context shed light on the conditions in which municipal governments and project heads implement a project. By accelerating procedures, public intervention gains visibility, but in certain cases public debates with residents cannot be held.

the project; the *technical committee*, piloted by the *Syndicat Intercommunal du Val-de-Seine*, brings together some forty local representatives. The social housing providers set up a common project management structure in order to organize the rehousing process. This strategy of bringing stakeholders together was a success in its own right.

The local partnership necessitated the establishment of an overall program, in the manner of the “comprehensive plans” developed in the United States. The global intervention in the district has above all been an exercise in innovation and development in the urban field. The conception phase has been strategic to the project’s mechanics. The program specifies the perimeter of intervention and all of the components of the projects (demolition of housing units, diversification of the housing structure, public spaces and facilities, etc.). Unlike the city contract, the project of urban renovation defines the project phases, quantifies precisely the number of housing units to be renovated, demolished, and refitted. The rehousing process is also specified. And all of the elements come within the framework of a budget that is held to strict rules of public accountability.

It was only during the implementation phase of the project that a “resident participation” program was set up. The housing providers organized consultation meetings in the various sectors of intervention. But the term “consultation” is not really appropriate since it was mainly a matter of presenting the project and the construction work that would be undertaken in each sector. The head of the *Syndicat Intercommunal du Val-de-Seine*, in charge of the urban renovation project, and the local development manager from the municipality of Les Mureaux both recognize that information meetings gave only a small number of residents the opportunity to discover the scope of construction work and react personally to the problems that these transformations would cause in their daily lives (Interview 18, 12 June 2012 & Interview 33, 23 February 2013). Thus, the meetings essentially excluded the “voiceless” (foreigners, youth, precarious households).

A method of activation based on individualizing procedures

The *Syndicat Intercommunal du Val-de-Seine*, in conjunction with the municipality of Les Mureaux and the housing providers, proposed a panel of services and provisions to the residents meant to accom-

pany the project's implementation. All those services are related to a Sustainable urban management strategy.²⁴ The city's urban risk prevention division – which includes the social mediation division – proposed a local conflict prevention program. The municipal police department and the prevention officers division were affiliated with the project in an attempt to counteract potential damage to construction work and risks of conflict with certain inhabitants or youth groups.²⁵ According to Mayor Garay,

we know that this monitoring mechanism served its purpose because when the tension was most acute (riots and state of emergency in 2005, riots in 2007), we were impacted less by and large than other problem neighborhoods (Garay 2013).²⁶

This urban risk prevention division was able to coordinate construction work with the national and municipal police force and construction site managers. For instance, surveillance cameras were installed around the sites and arrangements were made to protect material and the construction sites themselves.

The urban social development division of the municipal government, in conjunction with the district's social housing providers, have also developed the concept of *resident-relay* in the framework of the urban project. Resident representatives in each newly built or renovated unit were mobilized after a process of identification undertaken by local development officials (information meetings and consultations organized by the *Syndicat Intercommunal du Val-de-Seine* to present the urban strategy and the different phases of the project to the inhabitants). Municipal government officials organized regular meetings to

24. Recall that the sustainable urban management strategy (*Gestion Urbaine de proximité*, in the French version) is one of the facets of the *Projets de Rénovation Urbaine*. It is the object of a specific agreement between the state and the municipality that concerns the project development of urban renovation, the organization and functioning of the project on the local level, in sum, with the question of “how to proceed.” A professional integration program must also be the subject of a specific agreement in the framework of urban projects.

25. This division worked in close collaboration with schools, stepping in when necessary inside and outside middle and secondary schools, to get a conversation going with students about rules for life in their schools and neighborhoods. The division targeted risk behavior: scooter speed, wearing helmets, dealing with conflict through violence, racketeering, etc.

26. Cabinet du maire, save. 2013.

discuss the observations made by residents as to what worked well and what did not and the quality of services provided by public stakeholders and their partners. The “resident-relay” passed on useful observations for efficient project management. A control chart was used as a social development tool to keep track of the information received, monitor changes at each residential unit, and respond to identified needs.

An association for integration, *Réciprocité* (Reciprocity) was created at a later phase under the impetus of the *Syndicat Intercommunal du Val-de-Seine* to improve the “management” dimension in the district. Directly financed as part of the urban renovation project, *Réciprocité* was initially given a twofold mission: raise resident awareness of new urban uses during construction work by the presence of on-site mediators (providing information on the phases of the work in progress, identifying problem related to use of the places, defective or damaged urban installations, etc.) and improve the upkeep of the district through *eco-citizen agents* (for the maintenance of public spaces and landscaped areas) by proposing employment integration contracts to district residents.

These services and provisions tended to individualize modes of dialogue, and thereby upend power relations in the district by warding off the effects of massive mobilization. Residents were faced with three types of procedures: rehousing directly with the provider; the consultation by building for those who were rehoused in the sector; and urban services to support residents in everyday life. By individualizing procedures, the urban project individualized the social issues on the site through rehousing but also through the development of its services. This individualization meant that the urban project sought to give residents an opportunity for integration by offering them housing in a new environment and employment in the framework of the urban renovation project. Equality of opportunity did not however rhyme with equality of treatment, since those who took advantage of the opportunity clearly benefitted more from the urban project.

This project was well received at the outset by inhabitants because many families were living in conditions of over-occupancy, in particular polygamous families, and the buildings in which they were living – many of them functional buildings from the 1950s – had deteriorated over time. The issue of living environment was therefore of utmost importance to the residents. But it was the conditions in which

the project developed and the methods that raised the most questions and problems. First, consultation phases were organized by the housing providers for each residential unit or group of units. The aim was to work with the residents who would be staying in the district on rethinking the living environment and functionalities of their residence (playground, garden, access system, etc.). This method of mobilizing by way of procedures rather than through social movements and local associations yielded highly contradictory results depending on the providers and the buildings. One provider, for instance, managed to work with the residents to install a garden in one the buildings while another had to go through an outside agency to research the social composition of the building and assess the risk factor involved in doing construction work (drug dealing, squats, etc.).

Second, the process of rehousing was seen politically as an opportunity offered to residents to change their social and urban environment. Rehousing was supposed to offer additional chances at integration to families and to adult children still living with parents. It thus represented a means of involving residents in the project. Political and institutional stakeholders created for this purpose a partnership structure in charge of rehousing – the *Maîtrise d'œuvre Sociale et Urbaine* (MOUS, Social and Urban Project Management) – to guarantee that the social and family needs of the displaced residents were taken into account (composition of the family, household income, special treatment for polygamous families). This support for families was provided after residents met on an individual basis face to face with representatives of MOUS. An assessment of the rehousing project in 2012, that is, six years later, evidenced its scope: 716 apartments were vacated in Les Cinq Quartiers, 84 by spontaneous departure or acquisition (that is 93 per cent of the housing stock concerned by the demolitions); 766 families were rehoused, 134 of which when members of a single household moved into separate apartment.

Figures of activism in Les Cinq Quartiers

Just as in Saint-Denis, the people in this district have different reasons for their activism. However, some residents here are active not so much within the project as for or against it. The question of the project's legitimacy in itself has been a burning issue in the district.

It seems as if the activation policy has only exacerbated the tensions related to the civil recognition process: mediators and the residents involved are only recognized in the framework of their own mission. What is more, the residents who are involved in the project have difficulties to cooperate with each other.

This part is based on interviews and participatory observations that I realized during a week of immersion in the neighborhood. I first interviewed the coordinator of the mediators of Réciprocité (Interview 27, February 2013). We visited the site during his day's work and he introduced me to two other colleagues (Participatory observation 6, 21 February 2013). I repeated the same method with one mediator from the urban risk prevention department of the municipality during a whole day (Interview 30, 22 February 2013). The mediator introduced me to two colleagues as well as local partners: representatives of the local school, agents of the library, shopkeepers in a mall center, young people in the street (Interviews 31 & 32, Participatory observation 8, 22 February 2013). I also interviewed two other persons, less connected to the project management, but who are recognized for their connection to social movements and their concern about participation of inhabitants: an activity leader (or a host) from the Social Center of La Vigne Blanche and a former adjunct for urbanism in the municipality of Les Mureaux (Interview 34, 24 February 2013 & Interview 22, 18 December 2012). At last, I followed a whole day the local development manager from the municipality (Interview 33, 23 February 2013). She gave me the opportunity to meet inhabitants in *La résidence Renault* and plan an interview with a resident involved in the dialogue strategy of the municipality (Interview 35, 24 February 2013).

Mediators in the prevention division and self-presentation

Mediators wear yellow vests in the streets of Les Mureaux. Their work basically involves informing, supporting, directing, monitoring, managing conflicts in the district and its immediate surroundings. The mediators "have legitimacy" because "they are all from the district. They play the role of an older brother, having, as they do, a detailed knowledge of the district and what's going on there," said the director of Les Mureaux's urban risk prevention division (Interview

19, 12 June 2012). Working in partnership with schools, they also create a “visible presence for everyone to see: shopkeepers, residents in district institutions, around RER train stations and in places where gatherings take place, like gatherings of seniors by the Bécheville park” (Interview 19, 12 June 2012).

The mediator I met is the “fourth highest-ranking staff member” in the urban risk prevention division (Interview 28, 22 February 2013). Each mediator has a precise task depending on the subunit and/or facility (sports, cultural, educational, social) to which he or she is assigned. One mediator, for example, works exclusively with the elderly in the retirement home: “the Mayor does not like when elderly people are harassed, so the mediator accompanies them when they leave the retirement home,” the mediator explains. Another mediator is in charge of keeping watch when middle-school students get out of school. Yet another is mobile and can go to a construction site. Mediators can be called up at night in case of fighting or rioting.²⁷ They have the authority to discuss, question, observe, and socialize with the personnel in public facilities, schools, the new media library but also with young adults around sport centers or security guards and shopkeepers in the mall at the district’s edge.

Socialization modes are usually established on the basis of recognition of others. How does one become a mediator in Les Cinq Quartiers? One mediator explains that the service was started by a caretaker of a building to help out young people in the district and that candidates to become mediators have to get themselves presented, as if they were applying for membership in a private circle (Interview 28, 22 February 2013). The importance of self-presentation has to do with hidden socialization rules in a district faced with legal issues (drug dealing, organized gangs, influential communities, trafficking and black markets) but also and especially with social inequalities (over-occupancy in apartments, complex social situations, cultural stigmatization) that can not be addressed without adequate knowledge on the ground. The youth who have authority in the district only appreciate people who show “humility” and “respect for others” (Participatory observation 8, 22 February 2013). One of the young

27. Regular overtime was identified by the regional audit chamber as a substantial expense for the municipality.

men that I met in the street describes the situation in the district, “It’s calmed down a lot. The Mayor did a lot for us. I see him often in the sports center. I like him: he’s humble” (Participatory observation 8, 22 February 2013). This ritual of presentation is fundamental because the residents do not want to expose the inequality, and even the injustice, or yet again the illegal practices that are developing.

The media library is the meeting place for the mediators and the reception staff at the library. “The conversation is natural. It’s a small town; everyone knows each other,” one of the receptionists comments. “In Bécheville, we talk to the seniors who tell us about their lives. We are out in the field a lot, acting as relays, passing on information,” says a former mediator who now works at the media library’s reception desk. What’s more,

There’s never really a problem that cannot be resolved. And the young people often come seeking comfort. If they’re distressed, we listen to them. It gives them a safe haven (Participatory observation 8, 22 February 2013).

A mediator assigned to the middle school keeps watch when the students get out of school. A fight starts between a girl and a boy. The mediator steps in with a loud “Hey there!” The fighting stops at once. The mediator takes each one to task: “What have I told you?! None of that here. Understood?” The two hang their heads. He commands immediate obedience and respect. “These days, they’re all on Facebook ... It makes a big fuss” (Interview 32, 22 February 2013). These mediators have an authority and legitimacy to intercede in social relations; they intimidate the adolescents with their physical presence and verbal command. “If there’s a fight and no parents are around, we take the students home. Then we are contacted by the school’s education counselor (CPE). We can also go see the CPE at school and find out how things are going” (Interview 30, 22 February 2013). The national education personnel and the staff at municipal facilities appreciate their friendliness during visits.

There is an interphone at the entrance to the middle school. The gate opens mechanically and the reception service greets and orients whoever comes in. The main education counselor (CPE) explains the importance of the grassroots work being done by the mediation service:

The local information network is a regular, daily, invisible job. There's a global project and sub-projects. Because there are specificities there are necessarily different projects. We cannot work with the young people from the single-family homes area in the same way that we work with those from La Vigne Blanche. There are cultural affiliations... different approaches. There are things that are not seen and that are counterproductive. Beforehand, there was more closeness. Now there's more diversity (Participatory observation 8, 22 February 2013).

Particularism, specificity, social and cultural affiliations... the mediators use their language skills, their social networks, their own exemplary integration trajectories to create more stable relations between residents, to listen, to explain, to translate, to calm, to support, etc. The activity of mediator allows them to get messages across using the tone of an older brother,

You got to do your schoolwork and practice sports. Otherwise you're lost ... When the disciplinary committees [in middle school] send families a letter, we deliver it personally. If there are illiterate North African families, we can translate, explain to them what's happening, because the kids do not tell them everything. In high school, we can intercede at committee hearings. We can help students and speak to the disciplinary committee if they do something stupid. So before a student is expelled, we can discuss the problem. It's important. If they are definitively expelled, there are street educators who take over. There's a follow up available; it's up to the youngster (Interview 30, 22 February 2013).

Knowledge of a second language (Portuguese, Soninke, Arab, etc.) allows mediators to clarify complex situations with district residents. The mediators play the role of "go-betweens" in their work between institutions and families. They benefit from training that defines and specifies their framework of intervention. But what the municipality is looking for, and this is the most challenging aspect, is the capacity to connect the institutional arena with the social arena. The three mediators of the urban risks prevention division explain that they have the ability to intercede in almost all cases of conflict, as they did during the uprisings in 2006 after a police arrest, and will do when a car is stolen, when there's an altercation between two teenagers, etc. "Once some kids stole a bus. They wanted to burn it. We stepped

in. We knew them, we had grown up together. There's respect there and we got the bus back" (Interview 31, 22 February 2013). What stimulates a mediator in his work is the feeling of "being useful" to his neighborhood (Interview 30, 22 February 2013).

The mediators of Réciprocité and teaching by repetition

The work done by the association Réciprocité involves facilitating the urban project's implementation and testing urban services by promoting the professional integration of youth.²⁸ This still young association hires employees from the district under subsidized employment contracts. With the exception of the director and the coordinator, 70 per cent of the association's staff are locals. The residents who are the farthest from the job markets are the ones who benefit from back-to-work employment. The director distinguishes two types of profiles for two different roles: maintenance agents and mediators.²⁹ He takes out a chart and comments on each agent's profile, one by one, the hiring situation, the successes, the conflicts, the difficulties. One of the main things to come out of this interview is the difficulty the mediators have in adjusting to the association's activity because their contract is for 6 months only. Employees of the association, who are fragile, often have to face very tense situations with other residents.

There's the demolition and the rebuilding. It's good but there are problems. People are asked to move. They have lived in one place all their lives [...] To go from collective to individual heating and suddenly pay your own water

28. The director of the structure has 4 "red vests" and 4 "green vests". The young job seekers from the district are hired under a single "integration contract" for 6 months, renewable for 4 months. The contract is basically intended for job seekers 18 and over, those receiving a *Revenu de Solidarité Active* (RSA, Active Income of Solidarity), the disabled, or job seekers in ZUS. The contract calls for 26 hours of work a week including one hour of training. The monitoring of these youth in training is externalized, which, for the director, "is a guarantee of neutrality".

29. "This 'back-to-work contract' is aimed at people who are very far from the job market. Some have done prison time, others have addiction issues. At Réciprocité, we have outcome goals: 60 per cent dynamic success (permanent job contracts), 20 per cent lasting success (fixed-term contracts of 6 months or assignment contracts of more than 6 months) and 10 per cent into another back-to-work employment (training, temporary work)," explains the association director (Interview 26, 21 February 2013).

consumption ... it changes a lot of things. Bills soar in some households. They had no idea of the cost of their consumption (Interview 26, 21 February 2013).

In an often conflictual context, the association's mediators have to help residents take possession of their sites. They have an educational mission that corresponds to the urban model that has been developed. The director says:

We help people make all this their own. They used to throw garbage in the staircase. Now they have to learn to sort. Illegal dumping is a problem, bulky waste left on the sidewalks ... In the spirit of the project, they will have to be educated (Interview 26, 21 February 2013).

This educational mission goes together with covert monitoring of problems of appropriation that the housing providers face or user conflicts between residents.

In 2011, we stepped in to deal with housing appropriation issues. The provider I3F had an inventory taken. Thermostats need to be adjusted. It's better to take a shower than a bath. Pots can be cooking for three hours ... it's cultural. Another provider also contacted us to conduct a study on parking. In theory, there's one parking space per apartment, but some households have three cars and, because underground parking is expensive, some residents unlawfully occupy outdoor spaces. The study involved finding out who does what (Interview 26, 21 February 2013).

The coordinator of the mediators backs the director. He joined the association in late 2012. He is still trying to "understand the organization" of services in the district and "get to know the area" better. This is the only way he will be able to bridge the association's two missions: cleaning/maintenance and raising resident awareness. And he finds these missions difficult to carry out in the context of the project:

We do more technical monitoring than raising awareness. I have the feeling with my agency of having difficulty speaking to the residents. I do not know what to say ... because the construction work was imposed here ... it's always dirty, it's taking time, and people have had enough. So the residents do not participate. The young mediators themselves do not know what position to take. When

they speak to young people in the neighborhood they come back saying: it's normal that they're loitering; there's nothing for them to do! (Interview 27, 21 February 2013.)

How can you be effective when it comes to maintenance in a district where more than ten thousand residents live and simultaneously take the time to converse with the inhabitants? What kind of stand can the mediators take when they have had no solid training to gain in-depth knowledge of the project, its mechanisms, and its actors? How can you train a young person who's just passing through the association for a short period of time? These are the dilemmas that the coordinator faces with his teams of mediators without finding a ready balance in his mission. He stops and corrects himself from time to time and goes from one analysis to another. He knows his work inside out, shows me the most difficult areas, knows how efficient he is in his daily tracking work, but still does not know exactly what position to take about raising awareness. His work is determined by strategic elements of the project over which he has no control. In addition, since he does not come from the district, he speaks of the "mentality of the neighborhood" and the difficulties of developing a "shared" activities around "a network of residents".

A resident of Les Cinq Quartiers and a mediator in the association, also speaks of his mission in the framework of the urban project. He is doing monitoring in front of the district's shopping area:

My role is to report back about potholes, things that are damaged... the problems that residents have during construction work. At one building, for example, you had to press a button to leave the building and one old resident could not get out because he walked too slowly and the door closed before he had time to get to it. The door mechanism had to be adjusted (Interview 28, 21 February 2013).

Since the mediator has changed caps, he feels more responsible. He was a resident, now he is also employed by an association. Like the mediators of the urban risk prevention department, he too feels useful to the district's residents. He becomes more responsible in trying to get other residents to be responsible. His outlook changes as he begins to master the terms of his mission:

Your outlook changes when you work here. Today, when I hear of a problem my aim is to report it. You can say to the residents: don't litter! [...] There are a lot of people going by here and they throw papers on the ground... Repeat, repeat, repeat... it's teaching by repetition! (Interview 28, 21 February 2013.)

The mediator's head is in his work but his feet are on the ground in his district. He is well aware that his job has its limits and that he cannot solve all of the problems that arise in the framework of project management. "When things are thrown out from the top of a tower, it's often because the elevator's not working. Breakdowns can last 10 days and some residents do not go out all week long," he notes in speaking about the day-to-day difficulties encountered by residents (Interview 28, 21 February 2013).

The resident as resource: from altruistic gesture to an education support for residents

The legitimacy of the role of residents as relays stems from their everyday knowledge and of public, semi-private, and private spaces. Almost nothing that happens in and around their building escapes their attention when it comes to the maintenance of these spaces, changes in the population, relations between neighbors, an increase in charges, technical breakdowns, damage to mailboxes, stashes and drug dealing in corners of the building, excessive traffic on neighboring streets, the quality of housing services and public services. This is why the Mayor and housing providers conjointly solicit them in the monthly "local monitoring coordination" meetings. Initially, residents were approached to act as relays by local development agents working for the city and by their counterparts working for the housing providers, during the fourteen information meetings organized about the project by the municipal government and the *Syndicat Intercommunal du Val-de-Seine*. A municipal agent, which is local development manager in Les Cinq Quartiers, admits that, "we missed the opportunity for cooperation" (Interview 33, 23 February 2013). The meeting "never mobilized more than 60 people and it was usually focused on individual questions, on everyday problems, respecting do-not-enter signs, parking, construction work". She readily recognizes

that “residents are tired, disappointed, and worried. Those who come complain about rent costs and charges... and about the construction work taking so long”. But the local development manager believes in the involvement of residents in the project. “My background is in urban social development,” she comments with a smile explaining her philosophy of professional activism (Interview 33, 23 February 2013).

Usually the most motivated, concerned, active, and pugnacious residents at meetings are the one invited to participate at regular information meetings about what is working smoothly in their building. A resident, who lives in Cité Renault, expresses through his involvement a need for urbanity and civic responsibility. He challenges the widespread indifference and the lack of ordinary signs of courtesy by his altruistic conduct. It is his way of asserting his belonging to a collective. He participates in all the meetings about the project, stops to talk with his neighbors, watches the comings and goings in his building, and calls on the local development manager from the municipality when there are problems: a damaged flowerbed, an increase in charges, etc. He defends the interests of others in a militant vein. But his role does not stop there and he is sometimes brought to ethical considerations beyond protecting the individual residents. This is the case when he encourages residents to improve their behavior:

My role is to communicate with the residents. They have to be careful about letting the water run. Some brush their teeth or wash their face with the water running. It's the same thing with shower. Water's expensive and can't be wasted. They have a hard time with this and come to see me when they're in a conflict situation. I tell them ... You have to keep your eye on the water, gas, and electricity meters every month. What else can I say? (Interview 35, 24 February 2013.)

Individual residents turn out to be relays between all of the residents and the project managers, the municipal government, and the housing providers. They gather information and thoughts for the mayor and the providers. They criticize and question the administrators of the project for their buildings but also credit local representatives of the city and the providers who contribute to improvements by financing small projects. “I say hats off to M. [the local development manager in Les Cinq Quartiers] and to the housing provider ... They are involved

and they invest money!” (Interview 35, 24 February 2013.) However, residents do not systematically see the resident-relays as representative of them. One resident met during one of my tours of the district when the local development manager was visiting shopkeepers observed

It's always the same people who get involved. In a given building, there's one person who knows the project, not the whole district. Life in the district is something else ... people have other problems (Participatory observation 10, 23 February 2013).

Political activism and resistance to the project

A former adjunct for urbanism, now retired, strongly opposed the urban project. He rejects the

residentialization by small confining inward-looking groups. There's an attempt to individualize residents and even make them feel guilty. It's as if they were being told that it's up to them, that it's their fault and, at the same time, all social life is being eliminated (Interview 22, 18 December 2012).

He has led his opposition to the project in liaison with a collective of tenant associations. The methods employed are what outrage the tenant representatives and associations most, and especially the fact that the urban project was adopted by decision of the municipal council, without the mayor taking the opinion of residents into account. The former adjunct accuses the Mayor of instrumentalizing the associations and legitimating his project through PR work:

Residents are not consulted; they're informed! Municipal representatives are relying on associations that are dependent on the municipal government. Many of the representatives have immigrant origins. The Mayor uses them as facilitators. But in actual fact these associations did not work in the framework of the project; they did communication, wall painting activities for children, maquettes, work on the history of the district (Interview 22, 18 December 2012).

The social movement in Les Mureaux brought together three tenant associations for La Vigne Blanche, Bécheville, and Cité Renault. It emerged in 2005 as part of an anti-demolition movement through-

out the Île-de-France region. And to former adjunct's mind, the criticism is the same in Les Mureaux as in other districts listed in the Borloo plan,

The associations are fighting again the decline of social housing. After all, 500 social housing units disappeared and only a portion were rebuilt on the site and with the aim of selling them in the private sector (Interview 22, 18 December 2012).

In Les Mureaux, he points to two consecutive obstacles to implementing the project. First, the continued present of precariousness and poverty in Les Cinq Quartiers.

It's not by changing residents that the problem of unemployed working-age young adults will be resolved, and that's the case for 30 per cent of young adults in Les Cinq Quartiers (Interview 22, 18 December 2012).

Second, people reacted violently to the first phase of rehousing at a time when the social housing stock had not been restored.

The Mayor thought residents would leave Les Mureaux but people are attached to the district. Industrial wastelands could have been used to build new housing (Interview 22, 18 December 2012).

The political stakes and the strategic elements of the project were not negotiable. Rebuilding an equivalent social housing supply on the site, maintaining rental costs per square meter for rehousing, recognizing the rights of tenants alongside their duties in managing housing units and new buildings were all issues, among others, for the militant front. The opposition took a variety of forms: recurrent refusals to be rehoused at the start of the operation; refusal of tenant associations to sign tenant codes; resistance to the rebuilding of parking areas with partly paid spaces, etc. This activism, which was organized in resident meetings outside the PRU framework, was undoubtedly informed by a socio-political ideal that was increasingly strained by the urban project. But it notably convinced the project's technical stakeholders that the project could not be carried through against the residents.

And in 2013, this lesson was not forgotten by the stakeholders when they set up in-depth consultation sessions with the district's residents ahead of the construction of an urban park to hear what residents had to say.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The urban development that I have depicted begins as much in Les Mureaux as in Saint-Denis. Social housing was a support of the industrial development along the Seine but the move of the industrial structure away from Les Mureaux at the junction of the 1990s contributed to embedding these areas into a project strategy. Thus, in the space of thirty years, local responses became more varied as urban policy developed its public action with reference to social development, civic responsibility, and prevention of juvenile delinquency.

In general terms, the two examples show that the effects of the process of migration in the construction of a public space do not give rise to the same diagnoses or the same procedures. In comparison to Saint-Denis, the urban project of Les Mureaux was intended to put an end to the development of insular socio-ethnic communities and juvenile violence. It was in this context that the project served the civic reflections of the municipal government. The aims of the project included a breakdown of socio-ethnic community networks, a respect for the rules predefined in the project, an integration of young people and residents in various mediation procedures that contribute to the logic of dissuasion in public spaces. Based on the Borloo Law, the Urban renovation agreement gives the opportunity to the local authorities – with the support of the housing companies – to use the urban project as a lever, and to raise the awareness and responsibility of residents as the project developed.

By adopting a project based on municipal deliberations, the local actors implemented a more authoritarian form of intervention that divided engagement strategies between participants and activists. As I pointed out in the introduction, urban renovation projects are

privileged means to govern individual conduct. It generates participative tactics that are not really visible and masks implicit aspects of the power relations at the local level. Beside his activism, the former adjunct notes that “representatives” with “immigrant origins” in participative devices are “facilitators of the project”, an attitude that can generate suspicion between those who are considered to be involved in the project and those who are not.

5. THE REVERSIBILITY OF PARTICIPATIVE AND SECURITY NORMS

The aim of this chapter is to examine the conditions of emergence of a sense of urban citizenship in urban strategies, using Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air and Les Cinq Quartiers as a basis for the discussion. As I shall argue, the notion of urban citizenship is not limited to a demand for basic rights, “a right to the city”. This notion integrates an “ethnic” dimension in the sense that “the city is becoming increasingly salient as a site for generating, managing, negotiating and contesting cultural and political identities” (Uitermark et al. 2005: 622). As Justus Uitermark, Ugo Rossi and Henk Van Houtum put it, “the institutional implication” is generally underestimated as regards “the mode of accommodation of ethnic diversity” in deprived areas (Uitermark et al. 2005: 622). Therefore, according to the institutional supports for participation, this part examines the conditions of emancipation from local conflicts along with the treatment of social inequalities and ethnic or racial discrimination.

As I will argue in this chapter, a real tension exists between the notions of participation and security that are the constitutive modes of urban citizenship in multiethnic districts. According to rules of conduct – such as *recognizing, differentiating, protecting, freeing* – the participative actions become integral parts of everyday power plays in these districts. Participation and security are two complex notions that local and institutional actors use to bolster their view of a right to the city. They can be interrelated and articulated with one another, or be in friction and opposition to each other, depending on the local situation and the political diagnoses of socio-ethnic problems: ethnic

concentration, job discrimination, pauperization or exclusion from social policies, etc.

What is at stake in my approach is a critique centred on the modernization of public action and a critical reflection on the state's capacities to bring about sociocultural transformation.¹ Based on a set of interviews with institutional representatives and observations in public meetings, I will examine how institutional and social interactions – which strives to organize of liberties – come with a risk of categorizing the very populations that are supposed to be emancipated: the immigrants, the young people, and the “ethnic communities”. I will be giving particular attention to what those who are most involved in the interplay of freedom and security have to say. Extensive sections of this text will be devoted to situations or debates.

LES MUREAUX AND THE PITFALLS OF INDIVIDUAL ENGAGEMENT

As we have seen in the case of Les Mureaux, the urban project apparently legitimated the difference of the other by individualizing the subject. This operation made it possible to engage a process of “ethnic” recognition – an informal operation that served to reveal and reconcile a “plurality of worlds” (Joseph 1998: 23) and to consider the city dweller in his/her “simultaneous multi-affiliation” (Ascher 1995: 122). However, the institutionalization of this operation is experienced as inequalitarian treatment. The resident who is not engaged does not feel protected by a collective; in fact, this difference in treatment is seen as an injustice and even as a threat. The urban strategy in Les Mureaux thus discloses its flip side: the process of withdrawal from

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1. My analytical approach diverges from those that set out to demonstrate, through a micro-sociological study, the variety of practices of engagement and their liberating potential in the public arena (Borzeix et al. 2006; Marlière 2005), and also from academic discussions that examine systems of civic engagement for the limits and contradictions of systems of national representations with regard to evolutions in civic and social engagements on the supranational and local level (Sassen 2002: 5 & 2006; Balibar 2010; Scott Wallach 2010).

others and of setting others apart in residentialized spaces. Some find themselves truly liberated through the project: young people from immigrant backgrounds speak of “their” neighborhood, plan activities, and appropriate vernacular spaces as if they were at home. Some families are able to take advantage of housing opportunities, structuring their family platform and sometimes even their professional careers as a result. At the same time, others feel they are receiving unequal treatment and sometimes being dispossessed of their power to influence the collective. The socio-spatial regulation is not handled by the national police – which watches from afar and only intervenes surgically – but rather by the project’s system of mediation.

Equal treatment in question in the project’s dynamics

The principle of individualization aimed to revitalize households by giving them a sense of greater responsibility in the management of their living environment. But in the opinion of some housing providers, like OSICA,² the policy of activation paradoxically produced “a feeling of passivity” (Interview 25, 14 February 2013). On the residential unit scale, the head of the Urban Renewal for OSICA can show results “when dealing with individual cases, but there are no perceivable impacts on the district’s social life” as a whole (Interview 25, 14 February 2013). In reality, the great variety of procedures, from rehousing to residence projects, translates into a game of winners and losers that affects the principle of collective mobilization.³ This individualization of institutional treatment, codified in the Social Cohesion Urban Contracts (CUCS) as “equal opportunity,” often explains the confusion found in what the residents themselves say about the urban project. The project may seem necessary for the district but very often this sense of necessity is combined with expressions of incomprehension and criticism.

“When social housing providers rehouse you, they can’t refuse to give you what you want,” claims one young mediator who benefit-

2. OSICA is one of the major social housing operators in the Paris regional center. The housing company is one of the 13 housing companies of the Caisse des Dépôts Groupe, a “state-owned group” that support public policy development in France.

3. The individualization of procedures is notable in the processes of rehousing, campaigns of raising public awareness, of identifying resident-relays by residence, and of professional integration through the association Réciprocité.

ted from a new apartment outside the municipal boundaries, adding: “This is what I told my parents, brothers, and sisters” (Interview 28, 21 February 2013). Although his point is open to question, many residents in fact regard the process of rehousing as one of the positive aspects of the urban operation. They themselves often recognize that the local actors are struggling against poor living conditions, with a focus on the over-occupation of apartments. In addition, the possibility offered to adult children to move out fosters the independence of young professionals: a quantitative assessment midway through the operation showed that 112 rehusings concerned adult children, that is, young professionals, many of whom were supported by a dynamic municipal policy of job training and access to employment. The rehousing offers for women from polygamous families are also accompanied by job offers or programs for social integration.

However, not all the measures adopted in the framework of the urban project concern all the residents. In this sense, the mode of intervention selected to put an end to “the ghetto” of Les Mureaux resembles a differential treatment that is contingent on the district’s housing stock. If all the residential units are not destroyed, all the residents of the sub-units will not be rehoused. As a result, unequal treatment of residential buildings creates social tensions depending on the spaces that are transformed and those that are not. In the case of Les Musiciens, a renovation was carried out ten years ago. The social housing providers still have not recouped their investment, so they cannot go forward with demolishing further buildings in another area of the project. The residents in the latter area continue to live in a building that will benefit from urban transformations in proximity to their residential building, but whose services do not rival those of the new residential building.

In La Vigne Blanche, on the other hand, all of the polygamous families were rehoused in the framework of a “large family” project directed by MOUS (*Maîtrise d’œuvre sociale et urbaine*). Well before the start of the urban renovation project these families were, as we have seen, the focus of attention on the part of local institutions in the framework of multicultural development.⁴ According to the housing

4. Les Mureaux had founded a linguistic skills center in 1997 offering workshops in oral and written expression, advanced socio-linguistic sessions, and workshops to fight against illiteracy.

provider, the legal conditions for rehousing these families required a change in their status since polygamy is illegal in France. Thus the task of social engineering is not exclusively social: the MOUS project was intended to break down the polygamous family structure by advocating divorce and then providing stability to the women and children by giving them benefits and work. Such a method, as the housing provider admits, can be painful and dramatic. The question is not limited to the socio-ethnic aspects of the process of rehousing – formally unacknowledged – but it also concerns the reception of this specific method by the district's residents. Without an explicit discussion of these fundamental questions between the project's stakeholders and the residents, the operation of urban renovation remains clouded in obscurity, which only exacerbates insular identity reactions: representatives of the African community feel stigmatized; the residents who have not been rehoused feel like they are on the losing side; and those in new residential units end up witnessing the "ethnicization" of their social environment in the rehousing operations.

The project, which aims at developing a diverse mix of residents, thus does not succeed in eradicating the "ghetto effects", which are simply displaced to the fringes of the district. Social diversity remains difficult to achieve through the urban project. For this vast rehousing operation, the housing providers end up selecting family profiles: studies of applications, individual offers adapted to the household's needs, exchange of profiles between providers. Even though the aim of the project is to destroy the ghetto, negotiations between providers do not allow them to take into consideration the most vulnerable families. The effects of concentration of sub-Saharan populations in smaller pockets persist, according to the representative of the housing provider OSICA.⁵ Changes in housing bear witness to the impossibility of completely opening up the system of housing allocations to any household: there is an "unhousable" caste in each provider's housing stock, often grouped together in the same buildings, while the more active elements can move from one building to another, from one provider to another, and thus set out on an upward social and residential climb.

5. This representative refused to provide me with the data I requested, deeming it too "sensitive" because the handling of data on the geographic or religious origin could expose the provider to criminal sanctions.

From project coherence to the fragility of partnerships on the ground

Certain working relations between two entities are effective – such as, for instance that between the development agents from the social housing providers and from the municipal government in setting up meetings with resident-relays. However, not all partners are in agreement about partnership practices. In spite of the regular feedback from the ground reported by the intermunicipal board, some housing providers feel “isolated” when it comes to dealing with tricky situations. Otherwise put, the project’s purported coherence – based on a consensus between signatories – does not prevent tensions from arising between partners in the operational phase. Who handles contentious situations? For instance, the urban services departments remain impervious to some problems, as much in their philosophy as in their functioning. The result is very few synergetic effects in the logic of the project.

To begin with, it is the thorniest problems, such as squatters in the halls or drug traffic that cause the project to stumble. The gaps between residencies widen with the movement of drug traffic. Often the position taken by institutional stakeholders and the disengagement of some representatives illustrate the fragility of the partnerships:

In 2008, we did a security analysis with the SURTIS consultants’ agency, which concluded that there was heavy drug trafficking going on. We contacted the commissioner who participated in a public meeting to mobilize residents. The commissioner has been changed since then. It’s been four years now that we’ve been saying with the municipal government that the problem has to be resolved. Now we began construction work and we are managing it alone. We asked mediators for help to deal with the squatters. We’ve had no contacts; we put up a sign in the halls ... What will be will be! (Interview 36, 22 Mars 2013–)

One housing provider opted to dispatch a specialized security agent to assess the risks of starting construction work rather than engage in an unproductive conversation. In this context, the mediation agents from the urban risks prevention division did not get involved, despite their ability to defuse immediate conflicts by their freedom of speech, action, and their authority. It seems therefore that there are

two distinct lines of reasoning that are not totally specified behind the notion of “global prevention” in the operational phase: depending on the degree of hierarchy and the situation, this prevention can be understood as being suppletive to the police with an emphasis on relaying information and identifying problems, or as an element of social control, by their influence on residents. This ambivalence is not without consequences for the managers of social housing who think that the “older brothers” show up rarely for their internal problems.

The fragility of partnerships leads to problems of urban management. Mediators from different organizations do not have the same responsibilities and do not receive the same training. The lack of thoughtful planning with regard to the activity of the mediators has an impact on their day-to-day work. A case in point is the work done by mediators from *Réciprocité* in La Vigne Blanche. Early in the morning, three so-called “red jackets” are talking with friends from the neighborhood. One of the three mediators, coffee in hand, observes something that does not look right at the small shopping center. His observation skills have sharpened with experience. He gains legitimacy from focusing attention on problems in the project’s management: a door that does not work well, a damaged road surface or shrub. But the sense of value he has in his work has its limits: he has little influence over the structuring of his activity due to the process of integration defined by *Réciprocité*. When a mediator has spent six months on the job without skills training, the sense of the mission is partially lost. In order to convince the residents and himself that his activity is meaningful, he must feel that his work is given value, by his status and his education. And what is true of mediators is even more so of the maintenance agents whose job it is to pick up litter and trash; they are the most vulnerable members of the neighborhood in the framework of the employment integration program at *Réciprocité*.

Without upgrading their jobs, without providing them with solid training and a say in the decision-making process, the effects of training are limited if not counter-productive. The director and coordinator are well aware of this: the jackets worn by these young people in the employment integration program are stigmatizing to the point that the mediators from the urban risk prevention department do not acknowledge the coordinator of the *Réciprocité* team on the ground. “They do not say hello to me,” he complains during a visit to the

site. He is not from the neighborhood and his mission is not as highly regarded and legitimate in the eyes of the young people in the neighborhood. There is a world separating the prevention division of the municipality and *Réciprocité*, with the prestige of authority on one side and the weakness of instruction on the other. Exercising civility is closer in this sense to a call to order than to civic instruction.

From the appropriate use of rules to continued stigma

The fragility of the partnership does not only concern the management of the staff. It is also present in the management of the system of communication with residents. There are firstly the ordinary limits of cooperation, which we will only mention briefly: the meetings initiated by the municipal government and the intermunicipal board in the context of the project's presentation were limited to providing information about the project, followed by questions concerning personal situations. Instead of a political debate, communication was centred on the project's technical issues. In the words of a representative of the housing provider:

The tenants at the information meetings organized by the municipal government focused not so much on the project itself as on its immediate impacts, like the inconveniences occasioned by the construction work, the nuisances, or the dangers presented by the circulation of construction vehicles (Interview 25, 14 February 2013).

But aside from the general communication, the information mechanisms established on the scale of the residential units mobilize residents in a very *unequal* manner, and often in debatable circumstances. This localized coordination technique leads to a wide variety of methods applied by the different housing providers, with the effect of not allowing partnerships to be activated in a timely fashion, according to criticism from residents. But on the other hand, it points to the buildings that do not work well without a consolidated representation system among residents. Of course, the housing providers manage at times to generate a sense of solidarity around the creation of a gardening area in collaboration with professionals and young people benefitting from subsidized employment integration contracts. But

in other residential units, it is much too hard to take up questions of living environment. Some buildings accumulate the social, cultural, and legal difficulties associated with extreme vulnerability, youth not reached by mechanisms of integration, squats, drug dealing, etc.

For the manager of the urban renovation project from Efidis, a leading housing company in France, the partnership with residents was set in motion with the very first renovation job following a well-functioning mechanism: mobilization of resident-relays identified in advance by custodians; meetings on preliminary plans “so as not to come empty-handed” (Interview 36, 22 Mars 2013); remarks from tenants and subsequently a public meeting. The housing provider even tried to innovate with a comic book presenting the new facilities, the uses of new equipment like the garden gate, “to create a nice atmosphere”. But this approach could not be repeated for three other operations. “There was less involvement”. It was hard to get this mobilization to emerge at “residential units 4 and 5 of Île-de-France” (Interview 36, 22 Mars 2013). Problems of squatters in the halls and drug dealing undermine the environment and have done so “for a long time, with vulnerable young people who do not necessary want to get out of the situation they’re in” (Interview 36, 22 Mars 2013). The head of the Urban Renewal for OSICA, for her part, speaks less of the pitfalls of getting residents involved than of the difficulties of institutional cooperation in the operational phase of rehousing. The stakeholders hide behind the “it’s hard to mobilize” argument, she says (Interview 25, 14 February 2013).

More deep-seated problems emerge from the communication initiated in the residential units themselves. The head of the Urban Renewal for OSICA says,

Many residents do not have a good command of French, others are tired of announcements that lead to nothing, and in meetings there’s considerable lassitude, lethargy, and reorientations. (Interview 25, 14 February 2013).

The conversation between managers and residents is awkward, which hinders in turn the coordination on the ground. There are adult-relays who can act as interpreters, but “they are not used enough”. The social center in La Vigne Blanche gives priority to support for residents in its 2010–14 project on the road to “a new environment,”

“access to economic, social, and legal rights,” and “the confidence and desire of young people to be enterprising and forward-looking” (Levy-Kéloufi 2012: 7). But the center is not included in this framework of cooperation. As a result, the purported cohesion between partners is not really operative outside decision-making, political, or technical bodies. On the ground, coordination problems are legion. The people who attend the meetings are those with a capacity to understand and who are interested in the process of urban transformation. And the difficulty in mobilizing “the young vulnerable population,” those “who speak French poorly,” and those “who are burned out,” increases over time.

It is easy to see in this context why there would be a shift in the urban service staff discourse, from noting a lack of civility and politeness to a normative discourse underscoring the families’ lack of education: “They have to take fewer showers” or “use the gas cooker less” because the costs are too high; “they are dirty” in public spaces, “the parents are overwhelmed” ... It is as if the issue was to teach a given group (the “they” in question) how to live without negotiating a normative framework. This difficulty in grasping the notion of a collective without legitimate social representation puts some project operators in the position of moral teachers without however grounding their thinking on a particular social dynamic. At work here is a form of Republican paternalism. But what exactly are we referring to when we speak of a group? The question is touchy a fortiori when the actors refer to the difficulty of mobilizing residents.

Demobilization is but one of the consequences of these cross-cutting problems. In a project that aims at enhancing living conditions by segmenting space, the lack of solutions to difficult situations tends to accentuate the need for protection and to point to responsibilities related to environmental trouble, incivility, and illegal practices. Badly handled, the discussion runs the risk of stigmatizing families and young people. Let us examine more closely the way in which resident engagement can contribute to turning a sense of insecurity into a means for reproducing a stigma. A meeting was organized by the city government and the housing provider I3F for the purpose of reactivating a resident-relay network in Cité Renault that was going through a difficult period since the rehousing. The meeting started with a few preliminary remarks by the municipal government

representative about the advantages of mobilizing the resident-relays. Then a resident from Block B in La Cité Renault spoke up about life after the renovation: “It was nice at the beginning, but now with the north-south entries, everyone is passing through!” Yet, the unit has entry doors and is surrounded by gates. The housing provider representative continued:

We were too utopian; we thought we could resolve the problem of dealers and squatters through demolitions. Some have taken over the parking areas, dealing and selling. We’ve contacted the police. I asked for video cameras and support from the “older brothers” (Observation 11, 23 February 2013).

The housing provider specifies that the police has the power to act in the common parts of the residential unit. Another resident takes the floor: “I know, I see them in the underground garage!” And another resident comments, “I’m reliving what I went through at La Vigne Blanche thirty years ago!”

Symptomatically, the creation of a sense of togetherness in the residential unit makes it difficult to tolerate the passage of “young people”: “We have to put a stop to the passage of young people and separate the buildings!” says the representative of the housing provider. He points in particular to the responsibility of residents in the development of this hostile environment, regarding it as a key factor in the worsening or improvement of the social climate:

We have a responsibility, but the residents must also make this a priority. The young ones [les jeunes] have been busting doors and some parents saw them doing so and didn’t say a thing! Cité Renault will be what the residents make of it. When a car is broken into, the residents do not want to file a complaint... If they feel like living in a hostile environment, that’s their business (Observation 11, 23 February 2013).

One resident adds nostalgically:

I lived for 40 years in La Vigne Blanche, and the young were always polite. Now, young people look my way and scare me! Not one word of hello! (Observation 11, 23 February 2013.)

Another replies: “That depends on the person! Some youngsters stop to talk. Others destroy the projects with their dealing.” “Why was the surveillance camera removed from the residential unit when the construction work was completed?” asks a resident. The representatives of the housing provider and the municipal government do not pick up on the discussion about the youngsters or their families.

We can see how the conversation remains limited to the residential unit and how the notions of youngsters, delinquency, and parental responsibility are all lumped together. A discussion like this – that would benefit from the analyses of sociologist, a police officer, and a social worker – are not neutral insofar as they provoke visible distress from participants: annoyance, exasperation, injunctions. “Why can’t you do anything?” asks a young resident whose distress has led to demobilization. The provider recognizes the failure of a defensive urbanism and points to the lack of communication inside his agency between those who “design” and those who “manage” the residences: “They do not consult with us. The architects work with other departments,” says the representative of the housing provider who would put forward other defensive suggestions: “We’ll try planning thorny vegetation and I suggest that you put grease on the fences and you’ll see, they’ll stop coming.”

The lack of coherence in the housing agency’s internal organization does not call for a response but gives residents an idea of the inefficiency of the organism and of the decision-making process. In this context the promoted sense of solidarity within the residential unit evaporates and all that is left is self-interest: “Look at the charges we have to pay! What purpose does the garden serve? I do not use it!” By the end of the meeting, the disgruntlement of the residents is met by the exasperation of the management. One of the representatives of I3F ends the meeting with an angry outburst:

We push papers for the sake of pushing them, we have meetings that serve no purpose. I’m sick of this dialogue business! The municipal government complains to us about clashes and drug dealing ... but that’s not the housing provider’s problem! (Observation 11, 23 February 2013)

The discourse on making the residents take responsibility for the problems mirrors exactly the lack of responsibility of the stakeholders

on the ground. The representative of the municipal government does not respond but it is clear that he agrees. The mobilization demobilizes and the concerting is disconcerting. In the absence of better solutions, people ask to close the perimeters of the residential unit even more. The momentary rejection of dialogue by the housing agency representative is exhibited to the very people who are supposed to relay messages to other residents. It is out of this impossibility of establishing a conversation, and beyond the lack of mobilization of the stakeholders on the most problematical issues, that the profound stigma are forged concerning the passivity of “some of the poorly integrated families” and the “young people” passing through, who may seem potentially threatening.

Political legitimacy versus socio-cultural dynamics: a subtle game of appropriation and dispossession

In choosing to legitimate the urban project through the system of local representation, the institutional stakeholders and local partners dispossess the residents of their capacity for political expression. The space of conversation retracts with the project's implementation. When residents say “if you want me to listen to you, you better listen to me,” they are verbally expressing the need for a social development project to be based on recognition and legitimacy. In reality, measures to enhance social life are held back to a large extent by urban renovation which puts a strain on the city's finances and personnel.⁶ The service logic applied by the municipal government starting in 2004 in the framework of the urban project has progressively taken the place of incentives and funding for the local fabric of associations.

In the 2011 and 2012 annual activity reports, Monica Levy-Kéloufi, president of La Vigne Blanche Social Center, emphasized the consequences of a municipal restructuring that brought with it “budget

6. Note that in Les Mureaux, the debt per inhabitant in 2006 was 930€ as against an average of 1 084€ for cities of the same size. It increased 97 per cent between 2006 and 2011 – that is, during the period of the project's implementation – to 1 722€ per inhabitant. The municipality receives significant funding from the state (Endowment for Urban Development, CUCS) but the fiscal pressure remains higher than in other cities of the same size. The municipal government taxes more heavily due to the increase in the tax burden in 2009, but it receives less tax revenues. This situation is due in particular to the weak fiscal potential of the residents (Cours régionale des comptes 2013).

restrictions,” a “precarious financial situation” due to the lack of a “reserve fund,” “decreased funding,” “delayed payments,” “fusion with the Georges Brassens Center” in Les Musiciens, and the non-renewal of an “adult-relay” position. It became hard for the staff of the social center to “undertake activities with the residents” (Levy-Kéloufi 2012: 3–6). On the positive side, these structural weaknesses imposed “new ways of working,” “enhancing the sense of responsibility of staff members,” “pooling resources as much as possible” through the development of cross-cutting projects in the district’s sub-units or looking for “the most cost-effective solutions” in defining budgets and social measures (Levy-Kéloufi 2012: 6).

The restructuring and the fusion of social centers are one of the consequences of the project logic in the district. The social centers from each sub-unit will eventually be combined in a new public facility: the Molière Center in the heart of the neighborhood that is expected to modulate and pool a whole series of educational and civic activities. This municipal-run facility, open 7 days a week, will house two schools, a game library, meeting rooms, a restaurant, a café, multipurpose rooms, and a sports center. The multipurpose social center is part of a global educational approach combining the arts with leisure and educational activities. The structure is also in keeping with the municipal commitment to enhancing civic engagement: this is where young professionals can find leisure activities, internships, contacts, and access to public services. The centralization of activities is a move away from the local community-oriented social development approach set up by the individual staffs of the social centers.

Without a local community relay, certain residents with problems of integration do not have a say in the decision-making processes. And this disconnection contributes in particular to radicalizing the debate between the partisans of institutional cooperation and the partisans of a more radical political critique. “Too many rules destroy trust,” says a host from La Vigne Blanche Social Center, who thinks that everything became “political” with this project (Interview 34, 24 February 2013). Activities carried out by civil society organizations disappear and are replaced by an urban management approach and processes that are not visible to residents. The host testifies to a sense of “dispossession” that he feels not only as a member of the staff of an association social center but also in a more evasive way as a

representative of the African community. He readily recognizes that before the project “there was a lack of social diversity” (Interview 34, 24 February 2013). The district was turning into a “ghetto,” where “the blacks stuck to themselves”. But, according to him, the project did not help at all in 2001.

The rehousing caused a lot of problems for the polygamous families in La Vigne Blanche. Already in 2001, there was less and less social diversity. Those with money who could leave, did so: the older North African families left to buy (Interview 34, 24 February 2013).

This inequality had an impact on people, especially on the staff of the social centers, that saw their influence on young people diminish and shift to mediators who serve up an excessively smooth discourse on doing well in school and the benefits of sports. As a result, no one takes the time to listen to “what the young ones have to tell” (Interview 34, 24 February 2013). The staff at the social centers are afraid that this feeling of injustice sends a bad signal to the young who all too often see “people making money without working” and who may have a tendency to think that “in this society, you’re strong when you have money and you’re weak when you don’t”. Drug dealing provides them with the individual recognition they seek without having to work.

Thus the activation mechanisms do not have a “representative” effect, with the exception of the mediators. There is no legitimacy in speaking in the name of a collective in a place dedicated to exchange. The politicized collectives that are against the destruction of social housing and the community representatives who are active in the social centers report that they have been marginalized by cutbacks in endowments. They also maintain that the urban project does not respond to social and cultural issues. Rather it instrumentalizes ethnic representation and does not address a slew of problems: keeping households below the poverty threshold in social housing, finding decent rehousing for squatters, reinforcing the education system through leisure activities for the very young, providing language support for people of immigrant origin, particularly for exchanges with institutional representatives, developing innovating programs for parenting, etc. The engagement of civic actions for the districts tends to

create a division between activist residents and cooperative residents. By placing too much emphasis on political effectiveness, the project has in the end not paid enough attention to the social imbalances of Les Cinq Quartiers.

SAINT-DENIS AND THE LIMITS OF LOCAL COMMUNITY AFFILIATION

Saint-Denis proposes an urban contract that attempts to legitimate the difference of the other through institutional standards. Equal treatment is reasserted as the constitutive principle of social relations, in particular through the representation of foreign communities on the district board. This equality is translated at the same time by a mechanism for protecting individuals. It acts in public space to demand rights or get them recognized. After every serious incident, residents organize marches and gatherings on Place Rouge. They take their place. In this way the socio-cultural dynamics that prevailed in the district are reinforced and public space becomes a forum where people speak of equality.

But this very positive force of political representation, which was forged at the end of the 1980s, has been impacted by the sociological changes that the district is undergoing. Local actors are often unable to understand the combined effects of the turnover in the population, the increase in the percentage of young people, and the increasing vulnerability of families. In this context, the system of representation can no longer contain the forces that are at work in the district. As a result of this sociological change, the hopes generated by the “establishment” of a new public space in Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air have vanished due to a lack of local affiliation. Multiple forms of violence are tearing the social fabric and exacerbating xenophobia. This critical situation progressively creates an overlay in public space of militant action – stimulated by the institutions but less and less representative – and an institutional control with the police as its cornerstone. This leads to a panoptic organization: on the one hand, the visibility offered in public space masks powerful, controversial, and counter-

productive institutional controls; on the other, the young population in the district is by no means visible in contexts of engagement. But it is visible elsewhere, on the district's squares and corners.

Social forces distorted by the effects of representation

Upon hearing the variety of discourses concerning resident engagement, one is immediately struck by the very clear-cut difference in outlook between the people who are active in Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air: there are on the one hand the property owners who speak of enhancing the beauty and value of real estate and the security of public spaces; on the other, there are the militants who aspire to improve living conditions for the most vulnerable categories of the population and the activists who reassert the traditional values of the ethnic community as a bulwark against the loss of collective values. This rivalry between different participative approaches does not present a democratic problem as such. It is rather a challenge that raises questions not only about urban priorities but about what it means to live together in society. Indeed, the face of Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air has changed over a period of twenty years.⁷ The social distance progressively organized in local community spaces greatly distorts the representations of the “conflicts” that exist in the district.

There are the newcomers, notably first-time property owners, who move progressively into the outskirts of Bel-Air; improvements in transportation in the districts around the Stade de France and the chance to purchase inexpensive property near the capital at a time when the Parisian market is extremely tight combined with a policy of diversification of the housing supply all paid off. These residents mainly want to influence the decision-making process with an eye to enhancing the value of their environment and the security of public spaces. The technical constraints specific to matters related to urban planning and security make it hard to accommodate the aspirations of these new residents but new expressions are emerging on the edges of the district: sheep-raising in vacant corners of the district; the desire

7. Here it is important to keep in mind that the destruction of social housing (tower 3) in Le Franc-Moisin and the development of private housing in the Bel-Air sector led to a “gentrification effect” in the edge of the neighborhood and an increased stigmatization of the nearby high-rise estate and its residents.

to revive the old nineteen-thirties décor without destroying plant life; the environmental and farming activities in changing urban areas; urban design next to public facilities, etc.⁸

These new residents only widen the divide between the social housing projects in Le Franc-Moisin and the sub-unit of Le Bel-Air. At the other end of the district, in the very heart of the projects, the participative mechanisms concern residents very unequally. The charismatic representatives, militants right from the start, are the ones who hold sway. Admittedly they are “always the same,” yet these people have the capacity to connect, to listen to residents over time, to “network” using several hats: representatives of associations, tenants, schools, etc. At bottom, the recognition given to civic activists stems from the emphasis they put on the need for reflection on the living conditions of vulnerable categories of the population: the altruist fighting against isolation, the affiliated involved in institutional or associative work, the feminist setting up mechanisms of solidarity for women, the advocate of a more radical environmental dimension to urban projects, the resident who acts as an opposition force to municipal politics, the representative of an ethnic community looking for financial support. To them, the social and socio-cultural dimensions are major issues because they want to highlight the specificity of the development approaches needed to reach a minority population that is silent and sometimes hidden.

The attempt to redefine a “bottom up” social intervention framework presents a problem with regard to representation. The volunteers who form the local community do not oppose each other without reason on the question of ethnic or religious allegiance. This is not an opposition of class or a matter of ethnic difference or racism. It is rather the system of affiliation that does not resolve the problem

8. The political aspect (influencing the decision-making) and the technical-institutional dimension (improving mechanisms) are the primary issues that motivate the new residents in *la démarche quartier*. Engaged residents develop viewpoints manifested in the desire to improve the *reactivity* of public mechanisms, and to see more *reflexivity* and a *critical analysis* of the management of the district. The prism is thus wide. Those whose focus is on more reactive mechanisms are seeking formalization, the concrete, actions on the materiality of the district (Interview 15 – 18 February 2013). Others are looking to integrate their own practice into an urban development program (media library, community facilities). We find here the classic figures of users seeking an advantageous practice of places or property owners looking to enhance the value of their real estate. Self-interest is a strong tendency in the processes of cooperation.

of young people who are ethnicized by the social environment – between xenophobic rejection and the inculcation of traditional values. We are speaking here of young people who are neither entirely recognized by nor completely excluded from their environment. The affiliation presupposed a reinforcement of community ties but it does not resolve the generational conflict that is eroding the district. Incidentally, this is a deep-seated difference as compared to the model of Les Mureaux that gets its youth involved. The stakeholders do not dare speak of gangs but the violence and vandalism are on everyone's mind, as indicated by the comments that are made:

The difficulty is the young people. I've been banging my head against this problem for ten years now. It's not so much the youngsters themselves as the institutional framework (Interview 12–15 February 2013).

The director of *la démarche quartier* here emphasizes the lack of coherence in the municipal government's policy toward the young population. In a system of recognition through attachment to the community, the young have no truly defined "status" (they are not tenants or electors or employees) and they are continually the object of relativist comment ("there are more and more young people," "they are less and less respectful," etc.). How then does the community shape its youth? The young population has not even been the subject of a sociological field study, even though the 14 and under age category comprises 26.7 per cent of the total population and 17 per cent of the population is between 15 and 24 (RGP 2011). As a result, we know nothing about the categories or the situations that put the young population of the district in difficulty. Nearly half of the district's population falls outside any system of affiliation. Initiatives in the direction of the young remain compartmentalized and sporadic, and are generally intended for early childhood and young children.

The absence of a framework for welcoming and accommodating newcomers (aside from the arrangements made by the housing provider) accentuates these distorted representations because it reinforces the idea that the social environment changes with the turnover of tenants. This basically leaves room for two types of civic profiles – the first one being the activists from the start, or the militants, the second one the engaged users, meaning the newcomers, and property own-

ers who get demobilized quickly out of a lack of “responsiveness”. The discussions that take place in the context of *la démarche quartier* in preparation for meetings require a capacity for verbal expression that many do not have (illiteracy is a fundamental problem in this regard). Thus, the system of affiliation does not play its regulating role: people dealing with unstable, violent, precarious situations readily go to knock on the door of neighborhood associations that set up safety nets insofar as health, education, and literacy are concerned, without turning to *la démarche quartier*.

Reappropriating public space

According to the Adjunct Mayor of Saint-Denis, the contractual approach tries to connect the sense of public order to resident participation by “reappropriating public space”. Various local actors do not emphasize the “establishment” of a public space anymore (the creation of *la démarche quartier*) but its “reappropriation”. As we will see, the public space is characterized by a skewed representation, and this effect leads the representatives of the police and the municipality to develop a panoptic view. The semantic slippage has contributed to placing the issues of public order at the center of discussions. In particular, the Adjunct Mayor points out that public space must very concretely ensure that “the appropriation of some residents is not achieved to the detriment of others”. In Saint-Denis, public space has to fulfil the function of social control.

Indeed the strategic development of public space inevitably comes up against multiple facets of social anxiety. To put it differently, the sense of insecurity that residents have can by no means be explained, as the Adjunct Mayor thinks, by the intensification of urban violence and the fear of eventual reprisals that keeps residents from lodging complaints. The anxiety of the population raises questions as well about the politics of social development, professional training and employment (social insecurity), urbanism (urban safety), and public order and safety. The district board has submitted several requests for meetings with the national police to discuss and nuance questions of security, without ever receiving a positive response. There is no desire on the part of the national police to engage an ongoing conversation between the district board and the police squads in the district.

Indeed, security-related procedures are still top-down, subject to hierarchical and functional logics bound up with the sovereign function of the state, and this is the case despite the stance taken by local politicians. In 2008 the district board was in touch with representatives of the *Unités territoriales de quartier* (UTEQ, Local Territorial Units) in an attempt to meet with them when they arrived in the district. But they only succeeded in meeting with their hierarchical superior: “The general employment doctrine for UTEQ field work personnel does not give them enough time to participate in meetings” (Correspondence, October 10, 2008). According to the police delegate himself: “UTEQ personnel do not know who’s who, the young people who spend time in the district, the delinquents.” A meeting was set up in November 2009, in the wake of incidents that took place during the urban project launch, with the national police, the prefecture, and local representatives, including representatives from the agglomeration community, and the public works company. Aside from the director of *la démarche quartier*, residents were not invited. The aim was to discuss the “organization of construction work,” notably regarding “the involvement of companies,” the “role of the national police” and the *sous-préfecture*, and to set up preventive measures with the middle school (GLTD, Decision report, 11/24/2009).

The security strategy adopted in the framework of the urban project was never up for discussion with residents, despite requests from the district board. Even urban grid suggestions made by residents for road safety purposes, such as limiting speed on the major avenues, were not taken into consideration because of the technical requirements for police intervention. That does not mean that the residents and institutional actors – first and foremost, the national police – never had the occasion to meet. Several methods for developing ties between the police and the population were even favourably received by some representatives of associations and of the district board, in particular the activity of the social cohesion delegate of the national police. He explained,

The aim is to restore resident confidence in their police. For this purpose, I went into the various communities, I went to see the heads of families to explain to them why the police were stopping people for questioning and why there were injuries during some interventions.

This means that there are hierarchical layers of decision-making and logics that mask some of the issues that the residents would like to discuss and this plants the seeds of doubt about the legitimacy of policy interventions: brutality of identity checks in everyday life, ethnic profiling, rudeness, ethnic or religious discrimination.

There is then a panoptic effect in the organization due to the many different spaces of discussion concerning safety and public order depending on the actors. In particular, the Saint-Denis municipal government meets with the national police without representatives of the district board in the *Groupe de traitement local de la délinquance* (GLTD, Local Unit for the Treatment of delinquency) and plays both sides when it also participates in district board meetings on the topic of public order and safety in the district. In this sense, the security-focused policy is not a concern that is impervious to the “social question” that preoccupies residents: that is, the question of the “young” and the day-to-day unrest that is attributed to them. The exchange between the Adjunct Mayor and the Prefect of the surveillance unit on February 2009 evidences the difficulty that the police encounter on the ground in distinguishing between “delinquents” and “minors”:

Mme [...], Adjunct Mayor of Saint-Denis [...] regretted that the GLTD focuses exclusively on delinquent acts by minors. She notes that the ANRU construction sites are part of an overall project. Instead of focusing exclusively on the construction site, the surveillance unit should pay attention to all the problems of delinquency that affect the district. She emphasizes that the presence of several organized gangs constitutes the heart of the problem.⁹

Urban citizenship in Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air has a dark side and the residents of the housing projects are well aware of it. At meetings of the district board, residents attack the credibility of the people who are supposed to represent them and lash out against the institutions, accusing them of bad treatment and stigmatization. The principle of volunteer work is shattered and the solicitations of the municipal government through public meetings lead to distrust and defiance.

9. These sentences are an extract from the minutes taken at the surveillance board meeting, 9 February 2009.

Violence in the democratic arena: a sovereign visibility of the police

Let us now give the floor back to the residents in order to fully understand how public space acts as a regulator of life in society and how it neutralizes the opposing social dynamics in the district through the agency of the head of police in Saint-Denis. The police commissioner listens to residents, responds, and decides what to do next. The residents talk to him about all kinds of things: unemployment, to be sure, but also domestic abuse, violence against children, and racism extending even to minor differences. A meeting is organized in February 2013 by *la démarche quartier* on the topic of insecurity (Observation 5, 19 February 2013). The representatives of the district board, who meet with a variety of local stakeholders, question the police commissioner about problems of public security. Some fifty-odd residents are gathered in the room. One of the members of the district board – the “volunteers” – speak to the assembly after a brief introduction by the Adjunct Mayor on what the “problem” is:

Young people, even those with diplomas, and the unemployed are not benefiting from the local development plan. Young people complain about police profiling and about their rudeness, which they take very badly. Violent police interventions, in particular the use of teargas on Rue de Montfort last November in the presence of children and parents, represent disproportionate measures ...

Residents have seen regular aggressions, pickpocketing on Rue du Flot or along the canal, drug dealing, with addicts leaving needles in the street, noise pollution from mopeds, robberies, illegal parking, drug stashes ...

One resident interrupts the representative of the district board: “We know all that. No point in repeating what everyone knows!” Another one pipes in: “That’s for sure!” The credibility of the representative of the district board has been undermined from the very start of the meeting and the representative will not be heard from again on this occasion.

The Saint-Denis police commissioner stands up and takes the floor. He reviews the details of the violent police intervention near the primary school on Rue de Montfort, basing his argument from the outset on the hierarchical mechanisms at work in the national police:

When police officers make a mistake, you know, we're dealing with one of the most strictly controlled and monitored jobs around. Any slip-up is penalized. And we are in the process of reviewing our code of conduct... Now, the fact is we do not live in a wonderland... I have 290 police officers in the city of Saint-Denis for 100,000 inhabitants, and we've had 87 injuries. You have to see what the police officers have to live through.

Hierarchical logic, understaffing, and bad working conditions – these are the first limits that the commissioner delineates, adding:

Officers are not machines. Show me if there's wrongdoing and it will be penalized. Independent magistrates decide on sanctions and they're inflexible about the illegitimate use of violence.

He expresses himself strongly, distinctly, and precisely to the assembly in this tense atmosphere. The general direction of exchanges can be divided into three basic phases: the conversation turns into an open combat between the representative of the police force and the residents, before shifting to reveal contradictions between residents, and then, at the end of the meeting, to the inadequacy of procedures with regard to emerging problems.

The first exchanges resemble a combat in the sense that the residents attack the police representative and rail against him about a host of things while the commissioner stands his ground. This scene testifies to the wide gap that developed between the institution and the residents. Not all of the residents' comments are negative. Some talk about the police being useful, responding quickly to a particular situation, and being supportive when a complaint is filed. However, the liberating power of fifty-odd tired, frustrated, outraged residents being able to express themselves illustrates the relations that most of the assembly has with the police. The charges against the police are weighty. After the heavy-handed police intervention in front of the school, the commissioner speaks of the risk of disproportionate responses by police officers when they are feeling outnumbered: "Against women?" one resident remarks, "Mothers waiting for their children at school?" The commissioner replies: "In some neighborhoods it is hard for them to face 20 people!" "Your officers behave

like cowboys ... they speed through the streets without sirens; I keep thinking that one of these days they're going to kill a kid," another woman says. "But you have every right to come and see me if that happens!" the commissioner replies. "You personally?" one resident asks. "At what number?" "I'll give it to you, of course," he replies.

Then the discussion tones down:

I'm one of the old-timers here. In the 1980s, there were beat officers and all went well. Then came the community policing, and one day a policeman said to me: hey, you, dirty Arab, get off your bike!

"But, monsieur, things have changed a lot since the beat officer days," the commissioner replies, standing in the middle of the room.

I live in Bel-Air and all you see are officers giving traffic tickets when there are two stores that are dealing illegally in tobacco, gas, and cigarettes, and there are people pissing on the walls!

A young woman comes back to the police intervention in front of the school: "We were waiting for our children and a policeman told me: you have no business here you dirty Muslim!" The commissioner knows the woman and is familiar with the story since it is under investigation. "But you should have reported the incident!" he retorts. "I'm a French citizen, of Tunisian background," she continues very emotionally. "You do not trust the police control mechanisms? I've requested an investigation and am waiting for the report". The director of the primary school steps into the discussion: "Before, the police targeted delinquents, but now all residents are the object of ill-treatment by the police".

As the discussion presses on, the assembly turns to internal controversies. The commissioner's role shifts, with remarks being addressed to him that are really intended for other residents. At this point some residents begin to leave the room, outraged.

You're in a hard-hit district because of the insecurity and you talk to us of progress. A little humility would be in order. Also, I must say that the parents have a role to play. Don't forget it's the immigrants who are a problem,

declares a resident of Bel-Air. The barely concealed racism and the almost commonplace arrogance do not call for an answer. Five minutes later, a man gets up, says that he has children and educates them well: “When you arrest a minor for a petty crime, you take them away but do the parents get a reminder of the law? If they give their kids a beating, the kids call a hotline!” One young adult replies angrily: “Our minors are our children. The juvenile delinquents are our brothers and sisters. There are no walls. Fortunately it’s the minors who are getting into trouble, not the grown-ups!” “Whoah!” – the collective interjection rises from the gathering. My neighbor is outraged: “Now it’s turning into a free for all”... Four people leave the room, and then others. “But we haven’t even spoken about the violence against women, and it’s an important subject here,” a young woman remarks. The commissioner seizes on the comment:

You’re absolutely right to make that point. There’s a direct hotline and also a support group for victims that the police publicizes but as far as sanctions are concerned, the police have no say.

Thereupon follows an exchange between the commissioner, the Adjunct Mayor, and a social worker of the *Conseil Général de Seine-Saint-Denis* concerning the procedure for lodging complaints in cases of domestic violence: “You know, filing a complaint is a complicated process for women who are victims of domestic violence. Not only do they need support in case of language difficulties but many women are afraid,” a social worker says.

The end of the meeting is basically devoted to questions of procedure and the difficulty of adapting them to the local context: creation of a pre-complaint filing system, revision of the code of conduct for the police, coordination with the police prefecture concerning illegal commercial activities, etc. The commissioner is familiar with all the details of the issues discussed and identifies problems even before they are raised. He is a good professional. But he avoids answering one of the last questions: “There’s a lot of talk about the UTEQ and its high-profile operations. But what are we doing for the long term?” the district board representative asks him.

We are at once very close and very far from the contractual logic of Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air. Close insofar as this public meeting brings

together a commissioner, two school group representatives, four representatives of the municipal government and some fifty residents, that people are given the chance to speak and problems are raised with passion: institutional violence, racism and integration, vocational integration for young people, parenting, and domestic violence. Nonetheless, the problem that this meeting raises very concretely is that it only serves to shed light on conflictual relations, not to gain a real deep understanding of their mechanisms and even less to resolve them. At bottom, it is clear that the “contract”, formalized by the transactions between the institution representatives and the local volunteers, does not protect the individuals who live in the city.

Crisis of representation and lack of reflexivity

Outside of public meetings, the local stakeholders are lacking in reflexivity when it comes to adapting their action to the social environment of the district. Can a new contract based on transactions between social forces and the institutions suffice to get subjects engaged in a common living environment? The reductionism of the idea runs up against its limit. Indeed, to establish a public space, individuals are often reduced to representing categories of population – in particular, minority groups – in a per unit decision-making process in which they have little or no say. Without knowledge of the social processes at work, there is a real difficulty in grasping what the social anxiety of the residents involves. The democratic functioning of the district is overseen by the municipal government and there is no independent critical – *reflexive* – space for associations and residents.¹⁰ The volunteers of *la démarche quartier* discuss, target, classify technical problems (pest control, creation of parks, etc.) that are communicated to all the local stakeholders (municipal government, housing providers, community of communes, police, representatives of public education) in a very tight decision-making framework. The decision-making process is limited to a handful of residents when it needs to be extended to broader groups, to take into consideration contradictory points, to foster thematic reflections followed by training procedures to guarantee legitimate decision-making.

10. The local associative fabric, which is fragile in Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air, mainly depends on public subsidies awarded in CUCS (Urban Contract for Social Cohesion).

Faced with the difficulties of institutional mobilization, individual stakeholders become suspicious of one another and criticism is levelled inside association projects. The more important association representatives provide opposition and resistance in a way that garners trust from residents. Representatives demand “control over their project” not without difficulty, relying on a variety of networks and multiple sources of funding. Observing the social reality as it is forces some associations to shift away from security-focused “normalizing” institutional methods: they know about the drug dealing, the income of families supported by the informal economy, domestic violence, the lack of support for undocumented mothers with children, the racism, etc. The legitimacy of some representatives is such that they can get a family to return a stolen object in some situations. Are we dealing here with bonds of connivance or of confidence? In this suspicious atmosphere, gaining freedom in the name of a certain philosophy of equality sometimes amounts to a mistrustful if not a defiant attitude toward others. The racism displayed by some people appears to be a reflection of the promotion of traditional values by others? The lack of reflexivity is then extended to “visible” categories of the population that are not readily represented: young people, migrants, ethnic communities.

In this context, it is the police force that serves as the bulwark of the community, guaranteeing the freedom of individuals and working to create “cohesion” with the population; and it wields the carrot and the stick with difficulty. Inside the police force itself, the police-population delegate works to enable the normal “functioning” of the collective of residents. He is supported by the prefect but not well accepted by the police squads on the ground whose methods and stance is very different from his. This delegate consults with residents and “ethnic” communities (he uses the term with caution, acknowledging with no prompting that he does not know exactly what it covers). He wants to believe that his job serves a useful “civic” purpose, because “he does not draw a distinction between citizens”. A citizen is a citizen. But he also knows that his work contributes to breaking down the boundaries between civil security and social security: the police hit, insult, reprimand children but they also visit families, representatives “of ethnic communities,” protect against domestic abuse and contact social workers. This absence of boundaries between civic, civil, and

social is very problematical, of course, for the contractual approach. Neither understood nor discussed, it necessitates a far-going reassessment of the underlying notions of emancipation and protection in the district's collective representations.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

How do local actors concretely join modes of engagement in socio-cultural activities, in social prevention, in cultural mediation with the less visible aspects of collective discipline, surveillance, public order in multiethnic neighborhoods? We have seen in this chapter that participatory methods, which are integrated into urban strategies, are related to major security concerns. I observe in this particular case the links between modes of engagement in security matters. These links question the emergence of a sense of urban citizenship in urban strategies. Those questions are actually challenging the tripartite joint organisations set by public authorities, housing companies and associations.

In broad terms, it seems to me that the local partners too easily involve the residents and their responsibility without considering the weak points of local partnerships and its consequences on local socialization processes. The speech on individual responsibility in particular becomes sterile if it is operationalized without a clear and legitimized vision of collective dynamics in deprived areas. This particular problem leads the operational partners of the projects to reconsider their routines in the registers of prevention and security. In that sense, participatory norms become reversible in local institutional games. The empirical work shows in particular that involvement modes in debates on community safety and security crystallises various dimensions of the nexus hospitality–hostility in a neighborhood (a home of one's own, in other places, between us). In workshops and meetings, I noticed that the liberating power of residents through various forms of dialogues is not leading to a common sense.

In fact, this regime of hospitality, which categorises and rejects local people, is not balanced at all by reflexive supports and learn-

ing processes in matters of community safety and security. The local partners show in their routines that they do not have the ability and the sufficient means to analyze deeply the meaning of terms such as “migration”, “young people”, “squat”, “attack”, “insecurity”, etc. Such complex topics are not called into question in cross-decisional instances.¹¹ Instead residents individually fuel local controversies that lead the partners to design a communication strategy. Everything happens as if public debates and workshops were used for formalizing a set of subjective considerations. In this context, the problem resides in a lack of coherence in the methods of engagement itself. In general terms, there is a clear gap between political discourses on involvement orientations and the mechanisms developed in urban strategies. Indeed, a representative capacity in a given local collective deserves a critical distance to institutions and partners and learning supports that basically do not exist at the local level. These requirements could strengthen and legitimize the role of the residents in decisional processes.

In Saint-Denis, the mobilization of “volunteers” remains limited by their representative capacity in matters of safety and security as many residents delegitimize the status of the volunteers in public meetings: cutting them off when they are speaking, interrupting them in the midst of developing a thought to indicate disapproval, etc. Without a clear representative status, the dialogue strategy based on volunteers loses all meaning from the outset. The district boards do not mobilize more than fifty residents in a district that counts ten thousand. In fact, *la démarche quartier* fails to anticipate the sociological movements that are gradually changing the district: difficulty to diversify the range of institutional responses in term of social development, lack of training supporting the volunteer work, lack of new prospects of life when it comes to youths or innovative support for the most vulnerable ones. As a result, the exchanges and discussions on the insecurity phenomena often lead to dealing with a series of private interests and subjective points of view, which sometimes contribute to rejecting residents or groups of individuals on ethnic bases and according to the social background.

11. I am referring to decisional instances such as *la démarche quartier* and CLSPD in Saint-Denis or the CLSPD and the steering committee of the renovation project in Les Mureaux.

In Les Mureaux, the mode of engagement shows similar lacks of coherence. First, the set of dialogues that are planned at the residence level do not go with the sufficient means in terms of training and discussions when it comes to organizing discussions on living conditions. The absence of nuanced representations in matters of safety and security (environmental degradation and rudeness versus delinquency and crime) is stressful and ineffective. Limited to top-down information and feedbacks of the residents based on subjective considerations, the dialogue even becomes a non-sense. The reaction of I3F's representative is quite clear in this regard: "We have meetings that serve no purpose. I'm sick of this dialogue business." At the same time, we see how the representative of the same housing company proposes increased surveillance and control procedures that are perfectly integrated into the urban strategy of Les Cinq Quartiers.

Second, the municipality and the association *Réciprocité* involve young residents in mediation programs, which are strongly connected to the project development. We have seen in the previous chapter how mediators, employed by publicly funded associations and local authorities, are gradually embedded in the community life and use cultural resources in order to negotiate new environmental standards with families of the neighborhood. Activists such as the former adjunct, who fight against the political options of the municipality, consider that a few residents with an immigrant background, who are enlisted in municipal services and civic associations become "facilitators" in the political project. The ethnic dimension, which is a non-neutral dimension in terms of power-relationship, is properly squeezed from the public debate.

6. URBAN CITIZENSHIP, BETWEEN DIALOGUE AND MILITARIZATION

In this chapter I intend to demonstrate the links between participative orientations and security devices in the organizations that support urban strategies. To what extent do urban strategies articulate these two dimensions in order to pacify the city? Urban strategy is not just a tool to foster resident engagement. It also substantializes the idea of community and instrumentalizes citizenship in a residential area according to threats or risks.¹ These experimental strategies make a multiethnic community exist “on paper” whilst reducing anthropological reflections to their simplest expression.² These local strategies will in reality be formalized by dialogue, mediation, prevention, control, or repression.

In Les Mureaux, the individualizing procedures lead to a preventive system through the trope of civility and mediation. In fact, the project establishes a system of flexible citizenship, in which public and private spaces are regarded as “porous”. As Joseph observes, public space is a space of intrinsic engagement that does not mark a clear boundary between public and private. Indeed, public space

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1. With “substantialism”, Philippe Genestier suggests that the notion of district becomes a unified and unifying representation: “The district is also a societal substantialization. Users of the term ‘district’ posit that the thing they are designating thereby possesses in a homogenous manner essential properties that confer upon it its peculiar identity and endow it with the attributes of the entity (that is, unity and totality). This approach consists, as Wittgenstein says, in thinking that to a substantive corresponds a substance” (Genestier 1999: 145).
 2. The “territorial community” can for instance manifest an idea of social or ethnic recognition (notably through modes of representation or of legitimation), an idea of equality or an idea of civil protection.

combines a visible, shareable, sovereign dimension (square, street, park) with an invisible dimension relative to positioning, posture, and privileged modes of affiliation for interacting or conversing: “taking place,” “having one’s place” (Joseph 1995, 1997). Through this mode of adherence or appropriation, every resident has a potential mode of engagement that leads to producing a type of socialization: encounter, interaction, avoidance, use conflict, transgressive uses, etc. It seems to me that this porosity is the very matrix of the type of engagement set up in Les Mureaux through its system of mediation. Mediation makes it possible to articulate the links between public and private space, between the integration of cultural codes in a reduced public space and the incursion into semi-public or semiprivate spaces. Socialization in networks delineates relations of trust and distrust when it comes to matters of engagement.

In this way, the strategy of the project emphasizes the thesis of individuation in the metropolitan environment. Residents speak differently depending on the network (institutional, social, ethnic), the space, and the situation. This “poor” socialization is manifested in strategies of recognition or avoidance of the other. Without a presentation of the other that takes cultural and social codes into account, one excludes oneself from a social network. The position that the municipality of Les Mureaux has taken is at odds with the contractual framework used in Saint-Denis insofar as the former seeks to set up a principle of recognition through a mediation in which spatial regulation through preventive and educational measures push residents to take responsibility and be autonomous. The rule of involvement governs individual conduct through preventive modes of action. The notion of securitization, which is related to the involvement, is illustrated by the dissuasive urban strategy.

In Saint-Denis, the urban contract sets up a system of citizenship, in which the public arena is separated from the private. In this configuration, the modes of appropriation of the district and the modes of affiliation to a collective overlap and merge to become a collective of uniting. In this contractual experience, the participative mode can be understood as an attempt to affiliate “foreigners” or newcomers within a pre-existing social whole in which each member would be equal. The affiliation is related to a process of becoming anchored into a host neighborhood: it “attaches” the newcomer or foreigner to

the community. This process of attachment to the community can be understood as the condition by which the foreigner gains access to equal treatment, and this postulate is necessary for implementing redistributive social policies. However, with the construction of public space in Saint-Denis, local partners of the project shifted to an emphasis on a repressive intervention legitimated by public order.

In the first place, this chapter presents those models of participation, which are implemented in the local experiments. The model of affiliation in Saint-Denis neutralizes socio-ethnic conflicts while the model of civility in Les Mureaux intends much more to influence the self-conduct of the inhabitants. In the second place, we will see how these institutional modes of involvement are compatible with the extension of security procedures in urban projects.

MODELS OF PARTICIPATION IN MULTIETHNIC DISTRICTS: BETWEEN CIVILITY AND AFFILIATION

One conclusion to be drawn from the observations in the previous chapter is that the stakeholders in Les Mureaux through their project wanted to bring about a meeting place, a space of social interaction and of metropolitan civility. The idea is to transform the foreigner into an ordinary city-dweller among a multitude of others. Alleviating the anxiety of the other requires learning to say hello in suitable spaces and to recognize one another. This process of mutual recognition, without qualities, works minimally in a public space (places, streets, parkways for instance) and more so in semi-private spaces (common areas, gardens and playgrounds in a residence) purported to create a sense of togetherness through usage and rules defined jointly by residents and housing management. Public space then allows for a co-presence of residents, individualized and multiple. The space of recognition is essentially vernacular – the interplays in the use of public space and semi-private space – with the exception of strategic spaces, which are controlled by mediators: stations, school, retirement home, etc. The job of the mediator is to act as a cultural go-between,

attentive and vigilant, in public space, while the task of the resident relay is to promote a sense of responsibility among residents in semi-private spaces.

In Saint-Denis, by contrast, the citizenship stance is not about recognizing differences in public space because the foreigner is regarded as another self. Rules of affiliation must then be created that make it possible to connect the newcomer to a community of inhabitants sharing a common space. In Saint-Denis, rather than mediators, representatives of social and/or ethnic groups are engaged. Public space is therefore a twofold concept of adherence and adhesion (to borrow Joseph's terms): adherence has to do with the functional use of public space; adhesion with taking or having a place in the group. The district citizen will then be recognizable by his or her mobilizing capacity, charisma, and rallying force.

In Les Mureaux, an ordinary civility in a normalized district

In Les Mureaux, the "ordinary civility" is a key-element of the ongoing normalization process of Les Cinq Quartiers. Civility, from the same etymological family as the word "city," is defined as "the observance of conventions and good manners in a social group" or as "a set of rules proposing models of appropriate behaviour for different social situations" (Picard 2010). Historically, treatises on social conventions, after Erasmus's *On Civility in Children* (1530), set out to "codify manners according to rank," often with a Catholic thrust, without imposing a universal morality since the aim was usually to "delineate more carefully the already existing divisions in the social body" (Fumat 2000: 102). This notion has broken down, partly because democratic societies are forged on an ideal of authenticity (Fumat 2000: 103). Unlike the civility marked by the hypocrisy of the royal courts and the respect for class hierarchy, social relations in democracy are expected to be less artificial and more sincere. The construction of a civility as a democratic reference must therefore "guarantee" social life on the condition that every individual can grasp its underlying social representations and norms. "Ordinary" civility in a public space like that of Les Mureaux therefore functions as a representation of a spatial order and its rules of conduct. Patrick Pharo underscores this aspect when he writes that

pre-existing rights that members hold to be guaranteed and that enable them to carry on with ordinary expectations of life (for example, knowing that they are in security somewhere) will be regarded here as cognitive and practical sources [...] that become questionable and partially problematical as soon as it is a matter of having an interaction with another (Pharo 1991: 13).

Refusing to say hello is in this sense an invitation to reconsider the rules of urbanity or to rethink a “genesis of rights” (Pharo 1991: 13). The application of rules of civility in Les Mureaux is a move to counter the potential “incivilities,” rejection of the other, acts of violence, and ghettoization. Through ordinary civility, the project tries to establish a set of values that underpin the basic rites of social life in a given area. The notion of civility locally refers to the porosity of public and semi-private, minimal socialization and self-control. It prevents “deviant” behaviours, but also and above all it seeks to create social bonds through minimally regulated public spaces and a sense of belonging within the residential complexes. Public space is conceived as an articulation between different modes of access to the district and modes of recognition established inside the residential spaces: public school personnel work with “the older brothers” (*les grands frères*) to accompany young people from school to their homes; the media library opens on weekends with agents from the prevention division; providers of social housing work together with mediators on improving the uses of residential spaces. This structuring of services that bridges public and private spaces is done with an eye to enhancing a sense of belonging to the city. To be a resident of Les Cinq Quartiers is to respect the shared rules of civility in a city that takes care of its socio-cultural environment and whose norms and statistics are elaborated on the national level. Maintaining cleanliness and respect for the environment and the institutions are important in the development of this mediation. In this way, the democratic stake in Les Mureaux’s urban project is bound up with educational measures targeting young people and families.

But this paternalistic pedagogy, elaborated “by forceps,” suffers from a lack of means, of support, and of a critical perspective. Less emphasis is put on discussions than on disciplining the city’s inhabitants with regard to the soundness of the promised civility, through programs of training and social integration. For the most part, civility

is here a matter of supporting the project through mediators who keep in close contact with young people, families and their needs, identifying problems on the ground and preventing deviant behaviour and vandalism. These departments do not provide a constant presence because they are limited by the project's budget. Hiring youth from the district in these departments and networking teams is meant rather to establish conventional frameworks adapted to the stakeholder they represent and the situations they face. This activation policy is found again in their complementary roles with each person having a dual pivotal role between civil society and the institutions. So tackling the question of civility involves much more than superficial politeness. The stakes involved in calling children to order, in communicating with parents, in the tolerance threshold for circulation in certain residential buildings, or in the maintenance of common areas evince a social regulation that is not identified as one because it relies on the legitimacy of the resident, of his/her life experience, and familiarity with the neighborhood.

Often, it is the residents themselves who take on the role of *conveyors of civility*. The mediators and resident-relays are first and foremost residents who bring to the attention of other residents the small everyday gestures upon which a system of values is built. By this cognitive approach, they themselves are subjected to the rules of conduct in relation to their engagement while at the same time keeping a legitimate position by way of the more informal rules of neighborhood life. This is what is so clever about the subjectivation of the engagement in the project. In this civic construct, everyone "wants to be useful" to the district. Individuals express themselves in different terms, and refer to particular situations, but the interest for the district is general. The people build a relationship to their self – the socializing part of the person – and a way of behaving within the project, through its social rules.

As I have shown, too, incentive mechanisms are designed to free individuals from their own family and their social and cultural group, to break the "strong bonds" by integrating the young into training programs and making them less dependent on the socialization in sub-groups. The components of the urban project thereby work to renew the action of the State in the districts according to a principle of *individuation*, that is, of a development of individuality and of au-

tonomy and a capacity to differentiate oneself from holistic integrating forces (Le Lay 2003: 27–32). Operations of individualized rehousing serve to reactivate the social and financial autonomy of immigrant families and young generations. However, through individualizing processes, the major challenge that the local stakeholders face is to establish a coherent institutional framework.

A system of territorial affiliation in Saint-Denis

Affiliation is a notion that is related to adhesion, to the adhesion of members to a society, a group, or a community. Castel has developed an analysis of the formation of processes of affiliation and disaffiliation in wage society focused on the complementary effects of forms of integration through work and the density of the resulting networks of sociability (Castel 1995: 667–73). Thus he argues that relations to work – stable, unstable, excluded – have an impact on more or less vulnerable social relations, primary relations – within the family – and secondary relations – neighbors, political groups, and associations. Bacqué and Sintomer (2001) take the analysis further in the context of the “*banlieue rouge*” that includes Saint-Denis and Aubervilliers. The notion of affiliation, in its relationship to Durkheim’s thoughts on the social division of labour, is not seen by these two scholars as only relevant in terms of functional responses aimed at regulating social situations; it has in addition a capacity to forge a community of sentiments and beliefs.³

In Saint-Denis, the aim of the contractual formula is to forge some form of affiliation around a neighborhood collective. Of course, the contractual and democratic approach has a functional dimension: public services being structured to take social needs into consideration in the decision-making process; residents participating to improve institutional work; stimulating the fabric of association to develop bonds between residents. But also, in its civic dimension, the aim is to promote “volunteer work” among inhabitants and the “activism” of association representatives to fight against social abnormality. In

3. For Bacqué and Sintomer, Durkheim considers that a purely contractual solidarity cannot in itself produce real social stability and, to be functional, it must be structured by the state and rely on a community of sentiments and beliefs (Bacqué et. al 2001: 219).

this way, an attempt is made to engage spaces of *the political* – that of discourse – of the *social* – the norm – and of *militantism* – the instrument – in a single territory.

In Saint-Denis, one could say that the political representatives are more Durkheimian than Weberian. The organization of solidarity must rely on a community of collective beliefs, values, and ideas to constitute the society. This community development is to neutralize conflicts, create attachments and a gathering of “equals”. The president of the *Association Communautaire Santé Bien-Être* thus spoke of “collective consciousness” in the neighborhood, the representative of *Soninké* spoke of a “sense of the collective,” and a volunteer of the “harmony” of the community in the neighborhood. It is the capacity of collective representation that forms the linchpin of strategies of engagement, in terms of asserting rights and defining justice and injustice. Hence, the majority of volunteers on the district board and the association representatives involved in neighborhood organizations tend to accumulate several engagements and to know the local political personnel well. If they are recognized by residents, it is by the activities that they develop and by what they represent, when they are involved in promoting health, literacy, leisure activities for children and more. The construction of society through political engagement structures the power relations in the district. It establishes a principle of equivalence between social forces with the aim of offsetting socio-cultural differences: all claims have their place in the public debate.

Year in and year out, using a dynamic of affiliation, local actors thus try to foster a conversation with residents on the “multi-cultural” uses of the neighborhood, in workshops, forums, and joint action research projects. However, as interesting as these events may be, they are scattered and piecemeal. Thus, diaspora activities are very rarely connected to local development since they raise controversial identity issues with regard to gender or equality.⁴ Their development is outside the district – that is, at the opposite end of the spectrum from activities organized by *Santé Bien-Être* that advocates an intercultural mediation on the basis of professional training and a thematic reflection on the

4. A case in point is the inability of the representative of the Soninke in Le Franc-Moisin to develop joint projects with his colleagues in Les Cinq Quartiers in Les Mureaux whom he knows well, while he has succeeded in doing so with other Soninke communities, even in the United States.

subject of gender, age category, culture, and religion. Can a Muslim woman see a male doctor in the community health program? The question is discussed amongst all members of the group. It is because these diverse – and contrasting – measures exist that they provoke not only theoretical incomprehension, but a xenophobic reaction among some residents, along with racism and arrogance bordering at times on colonial nostalgia.

In Saint-Denis, the socio-cultural debate is very clearly “politicized” around the construction of public space, and it is so because of the interconnection between discourse, norms, and instrumentalization. Opening a conversation with institutions highlights the ideological presuppositions that result from different participative approaches: institutional, self-managed, differentialist. The invitation to a discussion on the topic of community is a benefit to be attributed to the system of affiliation. But the principles of life in society are neutralized by the normative institutional treatment: affiliating in the name of a common good does not authorize differentialist demands or self-valorization through individual actions. By returning to the founding principle of equality in social relations, the Saint-Denis contract promotes a world of similar people.

EXPENDING SECURITY IN URBAN STRATEGIES: BETWEEN DISSUASION AND RECONQUEST

Recasting social bonds in a territorial framework involves a darker dimension, one of protection, prevention, and security. Even though this dimension is not declared as a major goal, it is often understood to be the flip side of a “pacification” of city.⁵ In Saint-Denis, the notion

5. The current mayor of Les Mureaux considers that the mechanisms of mediation have served the district well since “moments of great tension (riots and the state of emergency declared in 2005; riots again in 2007)” have affected the city less than other “other trouble-prone cities” (Garay 2013). In Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air, a study on the 2005 riots by Michel Kokoref, Pierre Barron and Odile Steinauer clearly show how the mobilization of the network of associations and residents during clashes with the national police capably act as a relay to local political representatives (Kokoref et al. 2005: 33–36).

of public space is torn between the possibility offered to inhabitants to gather together and the re-appropriation that is made of this by public services, in particular by the police. In Les Mureaux, the municipality, in cooperation with housing companies, will try to prevent behaviour that diverges from the spatialized norms by adapting urban services to different conventional frameworks. Recognizing the local engagement in prevention, the national police keeps its distance.

In Les Mureaux, local stakeholders and resident-relays engaged in the management of a dissuasive urban model

In an environment marked historically by uprisings, the urban project constituted a lever to formalize preventive mechanisms in the earliest possible stages: the idea was to inform, to plan, to prevent, to dissuade before penalizing infractions to rules.⁶ This approach is part of the “community urban management” facet of the project. Inhabitants are encouraged to take responsibility in their apartment buildings, in public facilities, and on public plazas. Resident engagement here is not based on a conversational reflection, as in Saint-Denis, but on a phenomenological undertaking. The engaged residents have to think about the materiality of questions of sociability and share their environmental perceptions in specific spaces: Should the urban park be enclosed? If it is open, how will public order be ensured? What arrangements would it require? These reflections take into consideration the sensation of others, their gaze, their behaviour, and the situations that are part of their everyday lives.

In so doing, local stakeholders seek to downplay security issues by regarding the urban project as a way to mend the district's woes.⁷ The preventive approach remains in the background for local partners, more preoccupied by the extent of the vandalism and the management of rehousing. In addition, when it comes to security,

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6. “In Les Mureaux, petty crimes reinforce the sense of relegation in ‘priority districts’ [...] It is a matter of durably establishing public order [...] In this regard, the development of a global preventive watch (a specialized prevention watchdog) is recommended to act more efficiently in these neighborhoods” (CUCS 2007).
 7. “Security? It's not the issue of the day anymore in Les Mureaux,” says a representative of the housing provider (Interview 25 – 14 February 2013). Their architect also downplays the security dimension of the project: “Security has been tightened but not to the point of being decisive” (Interview 23 – 1 February 2013).

all the stakeholders defend their own particular area of competence: the police speak of public security, the architect of visibility and accessibility, the housing providers are concerned about ownership and urban management, the intermunicipal board and the city about social development, raising public awareness, and prevention. It is in the logic of the project, in an incremental and heuristic approach, that a tension is created between the production and the management of a preventive system. The intermunicipal board director thus refuses to give in to “fantasies” and draws a distinction between “the work of control and repression” by the Police and the “potential for urban violence that leaves its mark due to the history of the area”. In his opinion, these two factors “impact the mechanisms of the projects” but do not constitute “the main entry for all of the actors”. A certain reluctance remains to discuss the security issue in view of the complexity of treating past historical and political elements.⁸

A toughening of municipal development policy in the city from 1990 to 2000 was followed by a series of measures all of which were informed by an urban development strategy. The goal was not only to develop an overall system of social prevention; it was also to articulate it with the different spatial dimensions. A Local Security and Delinquency Prevention Contract was signed on July 17, 2002 by then Mayor of Les Mureaux, Alain Étoré (1989–2001), the foremost aim being to reduce violent thefts and other acts of urban violence. Étoré did not run for mayor again in the 2001 municipal elections and a list composed of environmental militants for the most part unaffiliated with a mainstream political party took over the municipal government. The security-focused discourse disappeared from political rhetoric with Garay’s election, but the mechanisms were not abandoned. Jacques de Maillard remarks in this regard that in periods of transition, political discourse essentially changes symbols. The new municipal staff dropped the term “security” for “rules of conduct” to distance itself from what it saw as an overly security-focused politics (2006: 46).

8. By way of reminder, Les Mureaux was one of the cities that took part in the security movement that began in 1997 with the signing of a Local Security Contract (CLS) and establishing of a Local Group for dealing with petty crime and rioting. In 1998 the city co-founded the “association of mayors for safer cities” with several other left-wing municipal governments, in cities such as Vaulx-en-Velin, Trappes, and La Courneuve.

The urban project integrates security-focused methods of prevention (preventive methods of intervention, mediation, coordination of actors, expansion of video-surveillance) into the urban strategy (decentralizing the district, redefining the principle of closed blocks, organizing streets by fluidity of approach routes, etc.). These measures, which are integrated into the project's conception, stand in marked contrast to the earlier "repressive" approach because their exclusive goal is not to punish or repress targeted categories of the population in the district. It sets out instead to dissuade all of the inhabitants from transgressing the rules of conduct associated with the project. To increase security is above all to reduce the likelihood of a risk, Foucault noted (2004: 62). The intermunicipal board director cites the mayor of Les Mureaux who would rather speak of a *Priority Zone for Consciousness Raising* than a *Sensitive Urban Zone* (ZUS), advocating as he does an approach based on "rules, ethics, values, and support systems" for residents. Rules of conduct inform and foster public awareness, they warn and notify, they control when necessary, they reprimand, reintegrate and are reestablished in cases of non-compliance. The Mayor of Les Mureaux, François Garay, has called this overall preventive method "the five-finger rule": "prevention, dissuasion, repression, punishment, post-punishment".⁹

The conception of the urban project integrates to begin with groups of residential units. This measure of situational prevention draws on the separation of public and private spaces with fences or small walls. The separation is not intended as a confinement but rather as a way of limiting circulations.

[In] the collective spaces, from lobbies to the immediate areas around the buildings [...] through-circulations will be avoided by an urban treatment that delimits this space and physically curbs the circulation in it (Contrat de ville 2001: 22).

The stakeholders rationalize the procedure to define the graduated responses that connect the different spaces: dissuasion of poor use, enhancing user's sense of responsibility, and activating relays are totally integrated into the reticular management of the space.

9. Garay proposes the expression in a video interview in 2009 that concerns the general guidelines of the municipal policy (Garay 2009).

Second, the urban project adopts a principle of “spatial hierarchy” on the block scale by recreating a hierarchized road network and private spaces that provide security of access to buildings (interphones, digital locks, magnetic cards) and a smooth flow of circulation.

Third, a video-surveillance system is set up in the context of the project. These systems are installed during construction work and outside the district’s perimeter; units of municipal mediators also patrol the streets of the neighborhood. Passive prevention is connected to other systems set up by the state, which include Police Headquarters and the Justice Ministry.

The demands made belatedly by the National Police after the uprisings in 2005 did not undermine the nature of the project, since the battery of previous security measures was maintained.¹⁰ They are simply less visible. According to the Cabinet Director of the Prefect in the department of Yvelines, local representatives “are cooperative” (Interview 24, 14 February 2013). Some criticism has been formulated nonetheless. The architect/main contractor deems that the state destabilized the project with the rise of situational prevention after the riots of 2005, even though the urban planning principles had already been established (Interview 23, 1 February 2013). For some housing providers, the integration of security parameters into the project also restrained its momentum,¹¹ and impacted cooperation with the residents because it is impossible to communicate about urban planning principles that are continually being challenged (Interview 36, 22 March 2013).

In this dissuasive scenario, the deployment of urban services gives institutions “consciousness-raising” tools adapted to different socialization circumstances (housing, residences, facilities, public spaces). We could speak of an “economy of security” since the right party intervenes at the right time in the right place. The graduated response – from dissuasion to repression – proceeds in this way from a principle

10. Their main demands in terms of architecture and urbanism were taken into account in the framework of discussions with the CLSPD: (1) in terms of accessibility, the network of roads ensures that the police “are not trapped, because this is the fear of the police” says the architect; (2) in terms of the visibility of spaces, public order is confined to the public arena; (3) in terms of street equipment, “no benches, no street furniture” according to the architect (Interview 23, 1 February 2013).

11. For example, when the principle of hierarchization of spaces is applied less room is available for parking and this is a major issue for residents.

Figure 11. Prevention of delinquency in urban conception in Les Cinq Quartiers.

Fences and low walls separating public space and semi-private spaces (private gardens, parking lots, etc.).

Hierarchization of circulation spaces: streets, parkings, fences bordering residences, door-entry systems.

Video-surveillance system: two cameras located at the entrance and in the center of the district.

of urban management. The day-to-day management of the project makes it possible to modulate the degree of intensity of urban services and security at different spots.

In public space, the mediators from the prevention and mediation division do not patrol the neighborhood everywhere. They intervene at certain spots based on instructions or alerts. They may be posted around public facilities (schools, retirement homes, sports centers, media libraries) at specific times but they may also intervene in more flexible ways – in the evening or on weekends – based on the urgency of situations (outburst of violence around a police operation, thefts, etc.) and special events (secondary school parties, gathering of seniors, etc.). Housing providers solicited resident-relays and mediators from *Réciprocité* to identify management problems in semi-private or residential spaces, and responded in this way to a variety of problems of public order (speeding on new roads, parking in places that disturb shopkeepers, vandalism in lobbies or mailboxes, etc.) by coordinating and adapting local surveillance according to the problems, in particular in the area of security. For instance, on the occasion of an unlawful occupation by young people, the national and municipal police and the public housing agencies were mobilized.

In private spaces, the mediators from the prevention division can bring home a young student after a clash at school to talk with the parents. The same is true of *Réciprocité*, which can be mobilized in cases where there is a risk of conflict with tenants. *Réciprocité*'s director explains how the housing providers gradually anticipate a risk after daily reports.

[The housing providers] know when there will be problems. To cut off the gas, people have to accept an individual contract termination when only 50 per cent of residents at best attend the public meetings organized in advance. To operate the front gate, housing agencies give tenants key fobs but cannot provide 8 fobs for households with 8 people. As a result, some families cut the gate's electrical wires (Interview, 21 February 2013).

It is important to make residents aware of the management of new equipment in the building and in the apartment: a heating settings aide (“not too hot in the bedroom and warmer in the living room”), water filters to reduce household consumption, meters to measure the

Fermer le robinet pendant le brossage des
(18 litres d'eau économisés à chaque fois)

Learning to wash: "Close the tap during teeth brushing. (18 liters of water saved each time)."

Dépoussiérer la grille arrière du réfrigérateur

Maintaining equipment: "Dust the pipes at the back of the refrigerator."

frequency of baths and showers, hydrometers to measure temperatures. Residents often have a "visceral reaction" against this incursion into their private lives. "The mission of our staff is not simple when it comes to dealing with dissatisfied residents," adds the director. It is worth noting that such housing assistance can be an integral part of social work services in France.¹² Residents have simply taken on the role of social workers.

The principle of fostering "respect for rules of conduct" is aimed at affecting the lifestyles of residents by bringing social work into the private sphere. The common terms are "raising awareness" among the personnel of *Réciprocité*, "mediation" in the urban risks prevention department and "dissuasion" of "deviant" behaviour. The whole structure could not work without a thorough knowledge of what is happening on the ground. All of the actors in the field use a system of reporting (dashboards, priorities for meeting, remedial measures) that enables them to gather information in the field and establish communication strategies: brochures, exhibitions (cf. above images). The ur-

12. Without referring to the structure of the position of social workers in the 1970s, note that social work in the field of housing can still today be financed through the "Allocation Sociale Liée au Logement" (Social Housing Related Fund) in the framework of the *Fonds de Solidarité pour le Logement* (FSL, Solidarity Fund for Housing) managed by the General Councils.

Figure 12. Brochures produced by the municipal government for dissemination by the association Réciprocité in its mediation work.

Baisser le thermostat pendant vos absences

Adjusting temperatures: “Turn down thermostats when you are away.”

ban services division exercises this power of influence over residents, and to begin with the mediators and the resident-relays themselves. As the director of Réciprocité says, “when you’re a mediator you must first be convinced about what you’re doing”.

In Saint-Denis, the reappropriation of public spaces: control and repression

In Saint-Denis, the contractual approach led local stakeholders to place more emphasis on security in public spaces and on public facilities at the start of the 1990s. The community was looking for a mode of protection of sorts and the contractual strategy was to give it the opportunity to formalize scenarios of control by opening up and giving visibility to the district’s public spaces. The changes in the systems adopted over a period of less than 30 years (1984–2009) show how the principle of prevention gave way over time to a curative treatment of juvenile delinquency. In the contractual approach, the role of the police becomes preponderant. The principle of neighborhood policing proposed by the State in the mid 1980s in the framework of the social development of these districts became the occasion to demonstrate the pacifying work of community policing in public spaces. The local government put particular emphasis in this context on preven-

tive responses. It was a matter of demonstrating to the population of Saint-Denis that the police force was attentive to their needs, present in public spaces and close to the inhabitants by developing contacts that foster social ties. The Saint-Denis municipal paper wrote about community policing in 1984 in the following terms:

The community police officer has the same task as his colleagues, but he is assigned to a single spot: one area of the neighborhood. He thereby gains solid knowledge of the places, the people, and the problems, and can concentrate more on prevention than on repression (*Saint-Denis, notre ville*, 1982: 10).

Behind this display of community-oriented policing, the representatives of the local government wanted to “know for the sake of preventing,” to gain a better understanding of the categories of the young population who get involved in petty crime, and to improve the mechanisms of social integration for the young. This policy was coordinated on the city scale with the creation in September 1984 of the Municipal Council for Delinquency Prevention (CCPD) that brought together representatives of the police, local stakeholders (particularly representatives of schools) and representatives of the local government, and which was presided over by the mayor.

In 1991, the new municipal government under Mayor Braouezec noted a rise in petty crime linked to drug traffic in Le Franc-Moisin housing project. This underground economy had been developing for a decade but had become increasingly visible over time. The adjunct mayor of Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air noted that the hidden practice of drug dealing that had not previously affected the social interactions of residents in public and private spaces was heightening tensions, as certain groups began taking over spaces, both public and private: the drugs were stashed inside apartments; comings and goings in stairways were monitored, with dealers stopping and questioning people about the reasons for their visit; outposts near the small shopping area were also monitored. The national police delegate (“Delegate Cohesion Police Population”) described the situation as follows:

There are young people keeping a lookout, with others stashing the drugs. The school principal called me because mothers are being stopped and questioned in

the stairwells. So are the social workers. If they step foot in 21 Saint-Exupéry, they get fleeced (Interview 5 – 11 June 2012).

The extent of the phenomenon was hard to evaluate but residents immediately felt its presence. According to the manager of the urban renovation project for the Communauté agglomération, the refurbishing of Place Rouge even became the occasion for a “trench war” between some youth gangs in the projects and the public institutions. The destruction of a number of problem sites “disturbed” drug traffic. Every phase in the construction work had to be accompanied by added surveillance to prevent its immediate destruction and this created turmoil in the district. “Pressured” by some people in the district, those sent by the municipal government for surveillance of the work sites seemed to have become mixed up in the organized traffic.

Could drug dealing in itself destabilize the district’s social regulation? There was no doubt that it is an important element in the neighborhood’s functioning but the prospect of social anomie remained unlikely given the multiple forms of solidarity and the strong presence of associations. The problem was rather the fact that residents and professionals alike were witnesses to and victims of violence in day-to-day life.¹³ A municipal study of the dynamics of the local society in 2001 demonstrated the issue: “Outlooks for the future of the districts are clearly positive, but the sense of insecurity is hitting record highs. The pleasant character of the district is much discussed” (Vidal 2001: 33).

At the beginning of the 2000s, security mechanisms were set up under the impetus of the state. The national government got involved in local debates by establishing a battery of more robust mechanisms in the district, while the local government endeavored to draw a sharp distinction between prevention and repression. A series of mechanisms were set up, one after another: defining a *Conseil local de sécurité et de prévention de la délinquance* (CLSPD, Local Council for Security and Delinquency Prevention), implementing a *Groupe de traitement local de la délinquance* (GLTD, Local group for the treatment of delinquency), creating a *Unité territoriale de quartier* (UTEQ, Local Territorial Unit

13. The former director of *la démarche quartier* mentions extortion of money every month from an elderly woman; threats to residents who are forced to stash drugs in their apartments; a grocery store set on fire in the context of tension between the owner and some gangs; pressure exerted on municipal political staff, etc.

Figure 13. Presentation of the district by the municipality to the Local Territorial Unit (UTEQ) of the National Police, 31 March 2008.

of the National Police) and a police “mediator” position to promote resident comprehension regarding the work of patrols.¹⁴ The police could be mobilized readily and their missions adapted to a specific problem encountered in the district or to a tense situation.

The increased presence of security procedures and bodies in the steering mechanisms of the district impacted the definition of the urban strategy. Indeed, the strategy was “reconstructed based on public spaces” in the words of the adjunct mayor in charge of the district. From a security standpoint, it focuses on the visibility of places and their accessibility, recreating concrete slab passages for security forces and maintenance crews.

The first and foremost concern was to ensure the smooth functioning of an urban program or to improve its management. Surprised by

14. I remind here that the GLTD created in Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air brought together representatives of the municipal government, the courts, and the national police. This group was intended by the national government to integrate the security dimension into the local development of these districts. It was activated for a period of a year in 1995, 1998 and 2008 in the framework of a “monitoring committee,” a partnership body under the prefect until 2009.

the radicalization of the conflicts with the youth, new professional practices are built up during meetings between the agglomeration community, the city, the housing providers, and the police: visualization of incivilities during a presentation of the district to the police; taking elements of urban design into account in the GLTD; coordinating interventions between the project head and the police when a new construction phase is launched.

In this rapidly changing context, the city strives to maintain a role that is exclusively centred on prevention through reliance on public services and on the fabric of associations. In this historic stronghold of the Communist Party, in contrast to the attitude of the municipal government in Les Mureaux, the city government refuses to have a role in security-focused policies and inhabitants only benefit from measures of access to rights and prevention “in principle”: establishment of a *Maison de la justice et des droits* (law center), development of sentences of community service (TIG) for minors in connection with the arts academy and the circus, recruitment of community agents to ensure security when students are entering and leaving schools – all promoted by the municipal government as part of the program of public security and the prevention of juvenile delinquency.¹⁵ But in actual practice, the Local Security Contract (CLS) is hardly promoted by the city and defensive urbanism gains ground among local actors with the introduction of a surveillance system in basements, security bars over ground floor windows, electronic door locks, and fences around the entrances to public facilities.

Relations between the police and the neighborhood youth deteriorated considerably over a period of more than 10 years. This situation reached its paroxysm when a UTEQ (local territorial unit) was set up on April 4, 2008. Clashes became systematic for several months between groups of young people and police equipped with Flash Balls. The delegate for cohesion between the police and the local population speaks of the hostility with which they were met when they were first deployed in Le Franc-Moisin–Bel Air.

15. The Local Security Contract (CLS) of Saint-Denis signed in July 2002 and implemented in 2003 spelled out eight guidelines for improving the management of the day-to-day environment and enhancing police presence in public spaces, including “a community police force close to the area and its residents” (Barra et al. 2004: 35).

At 4 pm, the UTEQ arrived in the district. They were equipped with military gear and Flash Balls, and there were incidents right away: projectiles were thrown, trashcans were set on fire ... My role was to act as a bridge between the UTEQ and the residents (Interview 5, 11 June 2012).

Residents were initially shocked by this “militarized” presence, in particular by the helicopter reinforcements, but subsequently many residents and users were reassured after the “cohesion delegate” of the police undertook an explanatory mission concerning the heavy-handed arrests. His work was quite effective in Bel-Air where there was a “population of Spanish origin and a few squats”, but less so in the housing projects where the residents were “afraid of dealers and of reprisals”. Four years after he took up his position, the delegate had developed contacts with the neighborhood associations and residents. He refuses to think in terms of “informers”, since it runs against his deontology, but he knows details of everyday life, practices, times, places, illegal activities: “You see this boulevard, there’s lots of pickpocketing and thefts from cars. Many are middle school students who come here during classes,” he explains during a visit to the neighborhood.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

According to the difficulties experienced by the local authorities and the representatives of the housing companies in matter of project development, we see how modes of engagement can be integrated into a securitization process in the respective areas. Notions such as “safety” in public spaces and “security” in residences are articulated to involvement devices and operationalized by modes of dialogue, prevention, mediation or repression. For instance, we can observe this process concretely when a project manager of a housing provider prefers to realize a security study in a residence stigmatised by the social profile of the residents and the frequent deals of drugs rather than launching a risky participative approach. A project manager can also coordinate renovation operations with the representatives of the police in order to watch over construction materials and protect the working teams who

Figure 14. Prevention of delinquency in urban conception in Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air.

Situational prevention mechanisms in Le Franc-Moisin sector: windows with security bars, security entrances, reserved access to parking, posts to prevent illegal parking and security doors.

fear reprisals in the social environment. A housing company grants permission to police intervention in semi-private spaces.

Here we can see that the notion of “security” does not refer exclusively to the control of public space. The securitization process takes into account the prevention of difficulties generated by individual responsibility. The stakeholders such as project managers, coordinators, developers, housing managers in the neighborhood, and those who are involved on the ground, contribute to extending the process of securitization through the organization of collective life in a neighborhood. Do they have training support and sufficient means in order to think about this topic and to act accordingly?

The contractual strategy, initiated in Saint-Denis, shows that the new system related to urban citizenship does not work well. It links the involvement of the residents in sociocultural activities, social prevention supported by the associative framework and specialized interventions of the police forces, between dialogue and militarization. In Saint-Denis, interviews and observations show that the captain and the police delegate set up dialogues with representatives of the local authorities and the residents in matters of conflicts and violent events. This communicative strategy raises questions in the public domain (violent police intervention close to the local school, rackets, etc.) as well as in the private sphere (domestic violence, child neglect, etc.).

The strategy launched in Les Mureaux aims at recasting the relations between ethnic communities and struggle against juvenile delinquency. This strategy is operationalized with the support of a few residents involved in specific devices that are well connected to the project management. In doing so, the municipality and the housing companies intend to manage collective risks in new public facilities, schools, residences and dwellings. As we have seen at the end of chapter 3, young mediators of the association *Réciprocité* are “the facilitators” who implement new environmental standards in residences. Young mediators of the city’s urban risk prevention division keep watch on movements and behaviours in public facilities. Public space is thus not exclusively that of engagement. It is also a space of prevention and submission to institutional rules. When its rules are transgressed, public space goes on the “defensive”. In this case, the work of the police and the local authorities becomes visible, repressive, and sovereign.

7. ON THE USEFULNESS OF REGIMES OF HOSPITALITY

At the outset of this study I asked how civic distrust develops in reaction to the contradictory political orientations – of participation and securitization – that characterizes much urban policy and urban community development in today's Europe. I specified this general aim by posing three more specific research questions. (1) How to understand the respective places accorded to the measures to increase the inhabitants' participation on the one hand, and to improve for security and public peace in the context of social and territorial policies on the other? (2) To what extent do local programs and tools, implemented in the French multiethnic areas, contribute to loosening the links between the governing and the governed? (3) What do forms of local partnership tell us in the contemporary debate on urban citizenship?

In conclusion, I will now pull these questions together and discuss what answers this dissertation has provided. Let me set out by briefly recapitulating the theoretical and methodological framework of my study. First, I chose not to analyze the emergence of forms of citizenship from the vantage point of social movements so as to avoid establishing an overly rigorous dividing line between civil society and the institution. By starting instead with an examination of governmentality, I sought to gain a better understanding of how feelings of anxiety and distrust emerge with respect to what is regarded as “foreign” or “abnormal” in institutional participative processes. Even though the notion of urban citizenship cannot admittedly be boiled down to these “hostile” interactions, my research aims to show that a normative critique vis-à-vis modes of engagement in urban projects is essential to an understanding of how institutions interpret and deal with such hostility.

Second, it did not seem useful to me to examine discourses on urban citizenship without also studying the institutional mechanisms involved. In my opinion, both the discursive and non-discursive dimensions of the notion of urban citizenship must be examined. Thus, the analysis of regimes of hospitality undertakes to consider the norms and practices bound up with civic engagement in a multicultural environment. It seemed interesting to construct a concrete critical reading grid of methods of development in marginalized districts that would take into account the invisible boundaries related to modes of socio-cultural affiliation and to ethnicity. By analyzing different modes of engagement in a local development project, we have seen that these perceptions are often translated into a stark and symbolically violent reality: individually residents classify, categorize and reject foreigners, and say so in the participative processes. These boundaries thus delineate a territorial community. Thus, my research does not reduce the notion of urban citizenship to institutional dispositions related to the nexus participation and security in urban strategies. Instead, the regimes of hospitality have to be considered as a specific form of power relations that can generate suspicion and civil distrust in a multicultural environment.

The institutional tendency to manipulate the notion of resident participation in neighborhood projects clouds the fact that local players are not trained to pay attention to and translate the democratic aspirations formulated by the most marginalized and stigmatized residents at the “boundaries of the territorial community”. It is certainly because of these failures to perceive what is not visible in participative aspects that my analysis of regimes of hospitality criticizes the meaning of forms of institutional participation and its articulations with securitizing processes. These failures thus disclose how institutional and local players, in the absence of legitimacy of engaged residents, construct new norms of development based on the “soft” securitization of the neighborhood. The incursion of institutions into the private arena – made possible by security procedures in buildings and housing units in relation to questions of parenting, education, and civility – leads to unfounded moral judgments and feelings of injustice inexpressibly confusing incivility with ethnic affiliation, violence with youth, poverty with migration, family with irresponsibility. Local players, who often have to deal with complex functional and hierarchic logics, are

not sensitized enough to these perceptions of districts. In this sense, the regimes of hospitality that have been revealed and analyzed in this study are meant to lead to a more extensive consideration of these phenomena in their institutional setups.

The conclusive argument I will present in this chapter is made on the strength of these premises. I will first reiterate the theoretical and methodological position and consequences of my research, and then I will move on to the empirical results of my thesis. Then I will present the answers to my research questions through a discussion of the characteristics and usefulness of regimes of hospitality in the development of urban strategies.

URBAN CITIZENSHIP IN A GOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVE

Discourses on the role of residents emerge from a breach in democratic history due to the decline of the system of social protection and the development of individual systems of protections in public policies. Historically traced in my research from the industrial decline and the promotion of the “local” as a form of emancipation, urban policies seek to problematize the crisis of cities based on phenomena of insecurity (social, civil, environmental, etc.). Shortcomings in social protection, education, professional training, and public security are offset by new modes of public action and new modes of “subjugation” in cities.

In a theoretical perspective, I set in perspective the debate between Liberal and Marxist considerations on community development and urban planning (chapter 1). On the one hand, the idea of insecurity is linked to intrinsic expression of the economic development. On the other hand it is framed as a democratic expression in which the diversity of social movements do not have an access to political decision-making in order to set up a right to the city. Studies of governmentality have renewed this democratic issue. Indeed, new norms of action are emerging around non-governmental players who act in contractual setups on the local level.

In that sense, I argue that local agreements and urban strategies contribute to the development of new norms of participation and securitization that also correspond to perceived global threats. In the French urban policy the state proposes a set of political options based on participation and securitization to local authorities in order to better control urban development. In the history of French urban policy, the notion of participation can be translated as a mode of socio-cultural action, a contractual and deliberative procedure, expertise relying on neighborhood users, or a technique for empowering marginalized residents in public policies. The notion of securitization can be associated with techniques of social prevention, with bringing police services closer to the neighborhoods, with the development of modes of surveillance and control in the framework of district conversion operations.

Donzelot analyzed in 1994 the role of the state in territories as a moderator that initiates new public programs, coordinates and evaluates them in territories. Epstein has critically analyzed this new governmental technic as an opportunity for the state to “govern from afar”, in particular since the launching of the National Program of Urban Renovation (2005). He argues that local actors adapt new governmental techniques to local frameworks: in particular, the government decentralises a set of responsibilities and launches new incentive programs at the local level but still controls the aims and the instruments. Dikeç criticizes the republican tradition that consists in repressing cultural differences in the name of citizenship and the development of communities (Dikeç 2007). Bacqué denounces this “art of government” (to speak with Foucault), and proposes a radical reform with a particular emphasis on resident empowerment strategy in order to take into account feelings of distrust as well as complex – and often conflicting – relations between the institutions and civil society. For her, empowerment is to be understood as an emancipatory experience (Bacqué et al, 2013: 139–145).

There is no doubt that Donzelot, Epstein, Dikeç and Bacqué have brought new forms of power relations to light, but compared to these authors, yet also basing myself on what they have accomplished, I have preferred to investigate the “local dimensions” of these relations. In my mind, instruments of government such as projects and contracts are not only to be thought according to national mechanisms

(top-down versus bottom-up) but through transversal movements and networks in the globalization process. In a diachronic perspective, I have first depicted the governmental options and successive implementations of national urban programs in order to put in perspective the new democratic standards of *participation* – the involvement of inhabitants in decision-making processes (political dimension), in the associative fabric (civil dimension), their access to public services (social dimension) and their accountability in the housing management – and of *security procedures*: preventive and curative aspects of the treatment of delinquency (chapter 2). As I have shown, different angles of participation and securitization are thus proposed in the name of citizenship. Disconnected at the outset, approaches with regard to participation and security in social housing districts have been gradually conjoined on the local level. This development raises normative questions in relation to civic involvement in public spaces, and tenant responsibility and autonomy in residential strategies.

Next, I have also demonstrated how these instruments and standards are operative in specific territorial developments (chapters 3 and 4). In the areas I have studied, the local partnerships provide a range of standards in urban projects. Indeed, urban strategies incorporate multiple participative dimensions and security options that contribute to recomposing normative frameworks at the local level. I emphasize that participative measures refer to multiple democratic registers that go from “community protection” in Saint-Denis to “the emancipated individuals” in Les Mureaux. Urban public services co-funded by the state, the municipalities, and their main partners, such as housing agencies, establish horizontal organizations (*la démarche quartier* or *le pôle éducatif et citoyen*, for instance), which structure social activities. In their own individual way, each of the strategies models systems of engagement and modes of recognition based on “small treatises” of civility and affiliation.

In this context, the notion of “insecurity” in deprived areas is politically constructed and varies drastically from one city to another. I stress that these local narratives are thought according to the territorial development: demographic growth, migration processes during the industrial development from the 1950s to the 1970s, growing unemployment during the industrial crisis, residential segregation or ethnic discrimination in the labour market and lack of means in

matters of integration policies during the 1980s, for instance. Thus, in Saint-Denis, the Mayor notes in the 1980s that the Communist party was losing its representative power in the context of deindustrialization and the social vulnerability (casualization of work, fragile family structures and population renewal) that was hitting multiethnic areas accentuates the “feeling of insecurity”. In the municipality of les Mureaux, by contrast, the available public documents rather stress “the segmentation of the city into entities that ignore one another” and “districts weakened by the city’s development” (CUCS 2007: 6).

WIDENING THE GAP BETWEEN LOCAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

In a local perspective, the experimental models developed in Saint-Denis and Les Mureaux clearly show the widening gap between the local citizenship registers and the republican register (chapter 5). One of the commonalities of these forms of institutionalized engagement is that the local political personnel position themselves as *breaking with* the national policies implemented until then with regard to integration. In the social and cultural configurations that characterize the history of low income housing neighborhoods, public authorities and their local partners experiment with palliative norms of integration based on participative and security norms. Access to rights, the fight against poverty and stigmatization are interconnected through a more preventive, defensive, and security-focused experience of the territory. As a result, the representatives of civil society become active and breathe life into mechanisms of consultation, prevention, and mediation.

In the name of citizenship, public and private players develop, as we have seen, a range of procedures and services in order to recast socio-ethnic ties and stimulate relationships between residents. The affiliation system in Saint-Denis is a local model of integration that consists in stimulating collective movements and promoting a deliberative process in which volunteers take part in public decisions. The model of civility in Les Mureaux can be considered as the incarnation of the

“third way”, a political orientation in which new social representatives are involved (mediators, resident-relay) in public devices. However, this activation policy is based on moral presuppositions on citizenship and demands respect of the “five-finger rule”: “prevention, dissuasion, repression, punishment, post-punishment” (Garay, 2009).

With the rising influence in the 1990s of the Front National at the political scene, official documents in the municipality of Les Mureaux started focusing on the problem of ghetto effects deeply imbedded in territorial development. Urban violence, social dependency and ethnic discrimination were observed as affecting the territorial cohesion. The urban renovation plan acts here as an ideal projection of the community. On the one hand, the cohesive strategy endeavors to restore equality between all the inhabitants of the city through diverse procedures and provide an emancipatory process through a relocation strategy: a massive destruction/relocation process in the housing stock, the development of activation programs and mediation devices. But on the other hand those dispositions aim at breaking the previous community bonds and set up a new reticular management of the space.

In the local context, the mayor won the political battle due to the decline of the influence of the National Front during the French presidential election in 2012. However, the community development remains very unstable in the targeted area. A part of the relocation process is quite confusing since associations with strong socio-ethnic markers manage targeted groups. What is more, the young mediators intend to influence the behaviour of the residents and manage the everyday conflicts in the residential area according to local networks and cultural codes. In a militant vein, the urban renewal process raises new community issues since residents are remote from the decision making process: “Many of the representatives are of immigrant origin... The mayor uses them as facilitators” notes the former deputy mayor in Les Mureaux (Interview 22, 18 December 2012). “What’s so hard to take today is that people do not communicate anymore,” observes an altruistic resident who is involved in a local monitoring coordination (Interview 36, 22 March 2013). The activation policy, based on a very individual engagement and specific institutional opportunities, weighs on the socio-ethnic recognition.

In Saint-Denis, the urban strategy of Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air leads to another cohesive approach. Thirty years ago, the municipal-

ity developed a “contractual method” in order to stimulate associative networking and individual involvement in participatory devices. However, representatives of social movements that are involved in the community development are gradually neutralized by the normative treatment of the institutions. For instance, *la démarche quartier* does in fact not authorize differentialist positions or self-valorisation through individual action. “We have topics, an agenda, everyone takes a stance” and a list of questions are drawn up but “after that, decisions are made by the municipal council”, argues a volunteer from *la démarche quartier*. In that sense, the local democracy contributes to “enlisting” subjects in public devices. Thus, a feeling of distrust emerges in the community development strategy: “One has to find a way to change people’s behaviour”, argues one of the volunteers in *la démarche quartier* who notes: “People do not approach outsiders; they only greet people from their own community”. A representative of the Malian community, also volunteer, claims on his side that “the parents are disarmed”, and that the root of the problem is that “young people have lost all sense of value”. While a few activists embedded in the associative fabric develop activities in relation to the health and wellbeing of the residents in the district – in the name of a “collective consciousness” – others ask for an administrative scission between the sub-districts Le Franc-Moisin and Bel-Air.

Thus, an analysis of urban strategies brings to light the difficulties related to the normative reconstitution at the local level and the power relationships that arise in diverse joint organizations: local partnerships target and categorise people through suspicion and accusation. Such devices have a set of negative consequences, from civil demobilization to racial discrimination.

DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT OF REGIMES OF HOSPITALITY

I have introduced the notion of “regime of hospitality” to measure the negative consequences of engagement procedures. These regimes show the way in which institutional participative approaches lead resi-

dents to formulate critiques, reserves, and distrust toward everything that is “alien” to their own engagement or “abnormal” as far as their experience goes. Starting from thoughts on self-management, participative processes can lead to suspicion and rejection of migratory processes or ethnic demands. On the basis of a better understanding of urban strategies, I have sought to describe the institutional process in a cognitive manner (cf. meaning of participation) and in localized social interactions (cf. chapter 5).

First, I have observed that the offer of institutional participation is not legitimate in the eyes of all residents. Why does the question of the legitimacy of residents emerge so sharply in the context of resident engagement integrated into strategies? Without legitimacy, the participative process can all too readily turn into finger-pointing and stigmatization. The ethnographical experiences that residents have when they are engaged in neighborhood life lead to conflicts of interest and power struggles. They give rise to political manipulations and negotiations that bring residents to wonder about the classification and modes of recognition of others and local players to manage projects integrating a strong socio-ethnic dimension.

I have also demonstrated how systems of engagement are established on the basis of instruments and expertise with a disregard for a district’s history, demographics, and characteristic cultural and social realities. The empirical analysis evidences how the mayor of Les Mureaux “uses” neighborhood youth to set up modalities of forced integration and a preventive system that incorporates the management of the urban project. This manipulation also concerns the cultural associations that make rehousing polygamous families possible. The political instrumentalization of residents here is very different from that in Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air in Saint-Denis, where youth are under-represented in participative procedures, if at all. In Saint-Denis, it is the network of associations that compensates for institutional action in the district through activities, follow-up, and support. From this standpoint, negotiations between civil society and the governing bodies are very different from one local strategy to another.

Second, it is often through the limits encountered in partnerships by local players that these problems of legitimacy generate uncertainty about the process of engagement. Indeed, the public or partner meetings I attended showed that the regimes of engagement end up

placing the burden of responsibility on individuals or groups of individual, without fundamentally challenging the urban strategies. It is often in the process of questioning the boundaries between the public arena and the private arena that we encounter finger-pointing in relation to culture, education, civility, family life, etc.

This public finger-pointing at specific behaviours and groups is rarely dealt with by any of the partners involved. Without any genuine listening on the part of the police, for instance, this process leads to a sense of injustice.

Depending on internal and external constraints, local players devise regimes of engagement seeking points of articulation between the public and the private (by creating civil, social, ethnic and cultural norms). It is on the ground that the institutional offer of participation and strategies of prevention, surveillance, protection, and control are articulated. Those who are the least “engaged” in participatory policies are the ones who will be the target of measures of prevention and security: the youth in Saint-Denis may not be represented, but they constitute the starting point for all discussions on insecurity in the district.

Setting out on this study, I was expecting to see evidence of the most pronounced tensions between modes of institutional participation and modes securitization. However, one of the surprising findings of this study is that there is an almost dialectical relationship between participation and securitization. The difficulties in gaining legitimacy and acceptance for a certain conception of civil engagement among the least well-represented minority groups forces partners to face limits of intervention and obstacles in some residencies: the absence of dialogue between the developer and managers at a provider of social housing in Les Mureaux; the obvious malfunctioning between the youth division of the Saint-Denis town hall and certain players of Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air; the difficulty that housing providers have in mobilizing mediators or existing associations; the difficulty of imposing a resident-participant dialogue mission within the police, etc. Out of the difficulty of getting residents to participate on a legitimate basis comes a potential reversal from participative norms to sovereign security norms.

EXTENSION AND REVERSIBILITY OF NORMS IN URBAN STRATEGIES

New participatory standards are often defined in the name of urban insecurity and contribute to diversify the mission of the local players on the ground: a policeman informs community representatives and develops contacts with the local associations, institutions and residents, a mediator provides housing assistance as an integral part of social work, etc. But, in turn, those participative norms generate safety standards that are incorporated into the local community models. As I mentioned in the sixth chapter, this development is not really formalized in projects mainly because procedures are internalized in the routines of the local players. The process becomes operative into strategies when difficulties emerge in the project development. It is the local actors themselves – in collaboration with the police – that generate a securitization process in one way or another.

In Les Mureaux, the project management contributes to mixing the function of “social development” in urban projects with that of “preventive approaches”. The implementation of an urban strategy is not only a way to distribute budgets and articulate social programs to urban projects but also an opportunity for managers and housing company representatives to prevent social and civil risks: set spaces “in order” according to housing programs, develop urban control through environmental design and emergent professional practices around mediation and prevention, such as in the techniques of residentialization in the National Urban Renovation for Social Cohesion in France. The social prevention system in Les Mureaux is embedded in a spatial regulation mode in which the municipality implements multiple intervention methods (immersion in the private sector with the support of mediators, local coordination of schools and recreation centers, etc.). Social housing companies, on their side, launch safety audits and “participative approaches” in targeted housing blocks.

The local democracy in Saint-Denis is subject to a multi-faceted control since the police forces are involved in the development pro-

ject. While the police diversifies its tasks – communication with local actors and residents on regular bases, participation in workshops and public meetings and delinquency control – local actors such as the representatives of housing companies and municipalities experiment new standards in term of securitization through the coordination of operational instances (within the CLSPD or *la démarche quartier* for instance).

Thus, according to the local configuration, participation and securitization can be understood as a matter of cooperation between institutions and local partners. The process is however antagonistic as regards the distrust that resident groups express towards institutions. The demotivation, resistance and opposition to institutional representatives can vary significantly according to the framework of intervention.

FINDING LEGITIMACY OF ACTION IN MORE REFLECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS

Finally, I'd like to discuss in more general terms the usefulness of a reading through regimes of hospitality. First it serves to give us a better understanding of resident modes of perception and to find reflective forms of intervention in institutions so as to direct their engagement toward more formative processes. Urban citizenship must not be limited to protecting or liberating; it must stimulate and criticize institutions through modes of engagement. Then it serves to spur the professional practices of local players by more reflective engagements. In order to confront what are often multi-dimensional acts of violence, local players must generalize for themselves the idea of places of hospitality for listening, training, follow-up, criticism, and so on, so that they can reflect upon and renew their own practices.

As we have seen, local players fail to respond to the many frustrations and accusations of residents. And there must be an institutional response to some of the comments made by residents about immigration and insecurity, ethnicity and socialization or gender. In a horizontal development strategy, local players have to seek a better understanding of the “blind spots” of their own actions in order to

regulate the processes of subjectivation of residents. The creation of a diversified space for dialogue is not sufficient in and of itself. Organizations must reflect – in the sense of mirroring – what the residents say in order to establish a legitimating function in the framework of projects. In urban strategies, “reflectivity” must prevail: this necessitates finding time for lengthy, discontinuous, and argumentative conversations. It must make it possible to criticize the management logic behind processes of contractualization or urban public management.

In the first place, we must go beyond the kind of acquisition of expertise that characterizes instruments of governance. Instead, we should focus on the “legitimizing” functions that would enable residents to be players in the socialization of their districts. For this purpose, residents must feel useful in defining a common direction and not feel that the instruments are manipulating them. This principle of legitimacy of representatives must be discussed in terms of non-represented or underrepresented groups. This initial effort of listening is required if local players are to embody access to urban citizenship.

It is particularly interesting to analyze the failure of representation in the framework of participative strategies – as a function of demographic, cultural, and socio-economic evolutions of residents. For example, the fact that young people in a district like Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air – who represent 50 per cent of the population – do not have any potential to influence cultural policy seems to be a strategic mistake that needs to be addressed. Local players could themselves develop a monitoring function that would promote a participative strategy based on the social and ethnic makeup of the district, on the modes of collective recognition that they imply, on power relations and forms of individuality.

Beyond representative capacities, there is a lack of facilities that are truly hospitable, reflective, diversified, and formative in neighborhood urban projects, facilities receptive to the daily critiques of engaged residents. It is by capitalizing on this precious material that local players will have to integrate what they cannot “see,” “read,” or “hear” in their everyday practices. These participative approaches necessitate a function of animation and distantiation that are not available to operational players in terms of human and financial means.

Second, there is a need to train local players (providers of social housing, social workers, police) by setting up facilities for reflective

conversations. As we have seen, training processes, when they exist at all, are piecemeal and uncoordinated. The lack of feedback and criticism from academic circles is regrettable in this respect. Connections and partnerships are lacking between institutions and universities in the creation of activities and critical reflection. Statements like “migrants are to blame” or “parents don’t do anything about their children’s misbehaviour” cannot go without a response in a participative process. Providers of public housing who responsabilize residents while disengaging from the most sensitive problems of social prevention, mediation, and public order must also be overtly criticized. Shifting the lines of rejecting the other by thinking about one’s own discourses and perceptions, by discussing the place of the other, and by more opening criticizing institutional action would make it possible to reactivate the beautiful concept of hospitality.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. LIST OF INTERVIEWED PERSONS

Preliminary interviews

1. Mucchielli Laurent, Research director at LAMES/CNRS – 22 January 2012.
2. Bertrand Damien, previous research director at FORS Recherche Sociale and current manager of Profession Banlieue, a resource center on urban policy located in Saint-Denis – 18 February 2012.
3. Genest Stanley, Manager at Guam Consulting and lecturer at L'Institut d'Urbanisme de Paris (IUP) – 1 Mars 2012.
4. Meynard Frédéric, Assistant general manager at Communauté d'agglomération Terres de France – 1 Mars 2012.
5. Ménard François, Coordinator, research programme at Plan Urbain Construction Architecture (PUCA), Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Urban Planning – 13 June 2012.
6. Deharo Gilles, Project leader in the department of criminality prevention, citizenship at the secretariat of Inter-ministerial Committee for Cities (Comité Interministériel des Villes) – 13 June 2012.
7. Epstein Renaud, Researcher at ENS/Cachan (École Normale Supérieure) – 22 February 2013.

Interviews in Saint-Denis

1. Head of the urban renovation school (École de la Rénovation Urbaine) and previous project manager in Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-air – 5 April 2012.
2. Head of the local agency Logirep (a social housing company) – 11 June 2012.
3. Head of the unit “Vie des Quartiers”, administrative center of the municipality of Saint-Denis – 11 June 2012.

4. Delegate of the Prefect, *Seine-Saint-Denis Préfecture* (93) – 11 June 2012.
5. Delegate, Cohesion Police Population, *Seine-Saint-Denis Préfecture* (93) – 11 June 2012.
6. Director of the Community Health & Wellbeing Association of Le Franc-Moisin (*Association Communautaire Santé Bien-Être*) – 14 June 2012.
7. President of the Community Health & Wellbeing Association of Le Franc-Moisin (*Association Communautaire Santé Bien-Être*) – 14 June 2012.
8. Manager of the urban renovation project in Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-air, *Communauté agglomération “Plaine Commune”* – 15 June 2012.
9. Head of the public service pole, *Espace de service public* (ESP) – 15 June 2012.
10. Deputy mayor in charge of Solidarity, social development, public finances, sport and women’s right, municipality of Saint-Denis – 18 November 2012.
11. Previous manager of *Profession Banlieue*, a resource center on urban policy located in Saint-Denis – 17 December 2012.
12. Director of *la démarche quartier* – 15 February 2013.
13. Resident involved as volunteer in *la démarche quartier* – 16 February 2013.
14. Previous head of the association *Mieux vivre à Bel-Air* – 17 February 2013.
15. Resident involved as volunteer in *la démarche quartier* – 18 February 2013.
16. Resident involved as volunteer in *la démarche quartier* – 18 February 2013.
17. Resident involved as volunteer in *la démarche quartier* – 18 February 2013.

Interviews in Les Mureaux

1. Director of the *Syndicat Intercommunal du Val-de-Seine*, in charge of the urban renovation project – 12 June 2012.
2. Director of the unity urban risk prevention division, Municipality of *Les Mureaux* – 12 June 2012.
3. Study manager at *FORS-Recherche sociale* – 18 November 2012.
4. Project leader, deputy director of the unity “Politique de la Ville”, Direction of Citizenship and proximity management in the Municipality of Les Mureaux – 10 December 2012.
5. Former deputy mayor in charge of urban planning in the Municipality of *Les Mureaux*, affiliated to the Communist Party and activist in Les Cinq Quartiers – 18 December 2012.
6. Architect, *Atelier JAM*, support for project management in Les Cinq Quartiers – 1 February 2013.
7. Cabinet Director of the Prefect in *Yvelines Préfecture* (94) – 14 February 2013.
8. Head of the Urban Renewal for *OSICA* (a social housing company) – 14 February 2013.
9. Head of the association *Réciprocité* – 21 February 2013.
10. Coordinator of the mediators who are employed by the association *Réciprocité* – 21 February 2013.
11. Mediator and resident, association *Réciprocité* – 21 February 2013.
12. Mediator and resident, association *Réciprocité* – 21 February 2013.
13. Mediator and resident, urban risk prevention division, Municipality of Les Mureaux – 22 February 2013.
14. Mediator and resident, urban risk prevention division, Municipality of Les Mureaux – 22 February 2013.

15. Mediator and resident, urban risk prevention division, Municipality of Les Mureaux – 22 February 2013.
16. Local development manager in Les Cinq Quartiers, unity “Politique de la Ville”, Direction of Citizenship and proximity management in the Municipality of *Les Mureaux* – 23 February 2013.
17. Host at the Social Center of La Vigne Blanche and resident in Les Cinq Quartiers – 24 February 2013.
18. Resident-relay in the residence “Renault” – 24 February 2013.
19. Manager of the Urban Renovation project for Effidis (a social housing company) – 22 Mars 2013.

APPENDIX 2. SEQUENCES OF OBSERVATION

This phase included observations and a few interviews:

1. Conference reading organized by l’Espace Service Public in Le Franc-Moisin–Bel-Air – 11 June 2012.
2. Visit in Les Bougimonts Les Cinq Quartiers with the head and coordinator of the Service Prevention of the municipality of Les Mureaux – 11 June 2012.
3. Workshop with women organized by the public service pole (*l’Espace Service Public*) in Le Franc-Moisin in order to plan a neighborhood party – 17 February 2013.
4. Public consultation related to the design of public spaces in a sector of Bel-Air – 18 February 2013.
5. Public meeting in Le Franc-Moisin with the head of the Police in Saint-Denis – 19 February 2013.
6. Participatory observation with the coordinator and three mediators of the association Réciprocité – 21 February 2013.
7. Working meeting organized by the city of Mureaux in partnership with the representatives of the municipal police and construction companies – 22 February 2013.
8. Participatory observation with the mediators of the Service Prevention of the municipality of Les Mureaux – 22 February 2013.
9. Working meeting related to the launching of a housing renovation in Les Cinq Quartiers, with Social Housing Companies, Municipal Police, Service Prevention and Urban Risks, local development service – 23 February 2013.
10. Participatory observation during the whole working day with the local development manager in Les Cinq Quartiers – 23 February 2013.
11. Meeting in the Résidence Renault with 8 resident-relays, organized in collaboration with representatives of the housing company I3F and the Municipality – 23 February 2013.

APPENDIX 3.

COVENTRY NEW DEAL FOR COMMUNITY

*W.E.H.M.*¹ is a targeted area, which is located in northeast Coventry (7000 residents and 2976 homes in total). Built during the post world war at the edge of the city, the estates were first considered to have cutting-edge designs (a mixture of two storey and four storey housing). Whitefriars Housing Group owns the majority of the housing stock and land. With the decline of the motor industry, the area had a reputation for a high level of crime, low aspiration and unemployment. The buildings and the physical environment were neglected. In April 2000, the area has been selected to be a part of the New Deal for Communities (N.D.C.) programme and received from the central government £54 million for a ten years regeneration development.² Based on an integrated approach, the strategy gives priority to housing, community empowerment, health and employment. Planners from the City Council approve the detailed Masterplan stepwise. The partnership board presents the plan, designed by a developer consortium and the housing association, to the city. The whole process, which is supported by a combination of national, regional and local policies, aims at empower the current community and attract new residents represent the two sides of the strategy.

The N.D.C. programme is managed by a group of residents and agency representatives called the *Partnership Board*. This board has elaborated a Masterplan, makes the strategic decisions and implements them on a project basis. Residents are in majority on the board. In addition, the Partnership Board includes agency representatives (police, health authority, job center, benefit agency, college, Education Action Zone, Whitefriars Housing Group, and local ward councillors). A range of projects has been defined to go deeper into all the priorities. Among others, a Community empowerment strategy proposes three community involvement officers and funds training and events

1. *Area Wood End, Henley Green, Manor Farm and Deedmore (W.E.H.M.)*

2. A national programme for the regeneration of the U.K.'s most deprived neighborhoods.

for the community. Groups and forums are supposed to encourage residents to get involved in the work of the theme areas. Each theme area has its own Resident Chair. Regular meetings for residents have been organized to involve them in a subject area (education, employment, housing, safety). Many tools for communication are developed: a community magazine, newsletters, a community web site, community events and consultation meetings.

A neighborhood agreement is to improve the community safety (steering committee, police number, patrol in the area). Even if structural problems remained in 2011, the project manager notices “positive outcomes” that have been stressed thanks to a constant evaluation: crime has fallen significantly (reported crime down by 23 per cent, anti-social behaviours down by 65 per cent). The average of residents who feel that they can influence the decision making process has risen from 17 per cent to 23 per cent (in contrast with national trends in the N.D.C. program).

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACSE	Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances (National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunities)
ACSBE	Association Communautaire Santé Bien-Être
ANRU	Agence nationale pour la rénovation urbaine (National Agency For Urban Renovation)
CCPD	Conseils Communaux de Prévention de la Délinquance (Municipal Councils for Delinquency Prevention)
CIV	Interministerial Committee for Cities
CLS	Contrat local de sécurité (Local Security Contracts)
CLSPD	Conseil local de sécurité et de prévention de la délinquance (Local Council for Security and Delinquency Prevention)
CNDSQ	Comité National pour le Développement Social des Quartiers (National Committee for the Social Development of Districts)
CNPD	Conseil National de la Prévention de la Délinquance (National Council for the Prevention of Delinquency)
CUCS	Contrats urbains de cohésion sociale (Urban Contract for Social Cohesion)
DDASS	Direction Départementale de l'action Sanitaire et Sociale
DDE	Direction Départementale de l'équipement
DIV	Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville (Interministerial Delegation for the City)
DSQ	Développement Sociale des Quartiers (Social Development of Districts)
ESP	Espace de Services Publics (Public Services Space)
FTM	Foyers de Travailleurs Migrants (Migrant Worker Hostels)
GELD	Groupe d'étude et de lutte contre les discriminations (Anti-discrimination Research Unit)
GLTD	Groupe de traitement local de la délinquance (Local Group for the Treatment of delinquency)
GPU	Grand Projet Urbain (Great Urban Projects)
GPV	Grands Projets de Ville (Great City Projects)
HLM	Habitation à Loyer Modéré (Low Income Housing)
HVS	Habitat et Vie Sociale (Housing and Social Life)
INSEE	Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies)
LOPSI	Loi d'orientation et de programmation pour la sécurité intérieure
LOV	Loi d'orientation pour la ville (framework act for cities)

MOUS	Maîtrise d'œuvre sociale and urbaine (Social and Urban Project Management)
ONZUS	Observatoire national des zones urbaines sensibles
PNRU	Programme National pour la Rénovation Urbaine
POPS	Protocoles d'occupation du patrimoine social (Occupation Protocols for the Social Housing Stock)
SDAU	Schéma Directeur d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme
SRU	Loi Solidarité et Renouvellements Urbains
UTEQ	Unités territoriales de quartier (Local Territorial Units)
VVV	Ville-Vie-Vacances (City-Life-Vacation)
ZEP	Zones d'Éducation Prioritaire (Priority Education Zones)
ZFU	Zone franche urbaine
ZRU	Zone de redynamisation urbaine
ZUS	Zones urbaines sensibles

SOMMAIRE EN FRANÇAIS

Cette recherche analyse de façon critique la notion de citoyenneté urbaine à la lumière des procédures participatives et sécuritaires mises en œuvre dans les quartiers inscrits au titre de la politique de la ville. L'intérêt de cette recherche est de mieux comprendre comment cette politique territoriale a permis d'orienter et d'articuler les volets participatif et sécuritaire des stratégies urbaines dans un contexte où les acteurs locaux et les habitants de banlieue peuvent exprimer des oppositions et des résistances fortes aux projets. Les jeux participatifs et sécuritaires que j'observe dans les stratégies urbaines seront ici qualifiés de "régimes d'hospitalité". Le cadre conceptuel de cette recherche prend appui sur les réflexions politiques de Michel Foucault, et en particulier sur les notions de *gouvernementalité* et de *technologies de pouvoir*.

UNE ÉTUDE DE GOUVERNEMENTALITÉ

Je n'ai pas fait le choix d'analyser l'émergence de formes de citoyenneté à partir de mouvements sociaux de manière à ne pas tracer une frontière trop étanche entre la société civile et l'institution. À partir d'une réflexion sur le concept de gouvernementalité, je souhaite plutôt mieux comprendre comment peuvent émerger des sentiments d'angoisse, de méfiance et de défiance à la jonction des démarches institutionnelles de participation des habitants et des modalités de sécurisation dans les quartiers multiethniques. Ces deux notions,

participation et sécurisation, sont entendues ici comme des procédures. La participation, dans une perspective foucauldienne, sera traitée comme une forme de “technologie de soi”, c’est à dire un mode d’engagement visant à interroger le rapport à soi et les rapports à autrui. La sécurisation sera définie comme l’ensemble des techniques et méthodes préventives qui consistent à “diriger la conduite des hommes” (Foucault 2005: 653).

En premier lieu, les notions de participation et de sécurité produisent des amalgames au sein des stratégies urbaines car elles sont ambiguës ou polysémiques.¹ En effet, les technologies de pouvoir, dont les élus locaux se saisissent pour structurer des stratégies urbaines, sont développées sur la base d’un discours sur “la liberté” et le “droit à la ville”. Cependant, très localement, ces stratégies urbaines peuvent être décrites comme des expérimentations socio-ethniques. Dans ce cadre, j’examine le rapport à soi et aux autres à partir de formes d’engagement institutionnalisées et les modes de développement préventifs attachés au développement des stratégies urbaines. Ce cadre d’analyse me permet de construire une grille de lecture critique et concrète des méthodes de développement dans les quartiers marginalisés. En effet, le croisement des démarches participatives et sécuritaires fait apparaître des frontières invisibles liées aux modes d’appartenance socio-culturels et à l’ethnisation des rapports sociaux.

Dans ce cadre, il ne me semblait pas pertinent de remettre en perspective les discours relatifs à la notion de citoyenneté urbaine sans étudier les mécanismes qui y sont liés. En toile de fond d’une violence sociale et civile, la “participation” et la “sécurisation” sont ainsi analysées comme des dispositifs dont se saisissent localement les acteurs publics, leurs partenaires locaux et les habitants dans le cadre de Projet de renouvellement urbain, de démarches de développement local afin d’influencer les modes de vie en collectif.

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1. D’un côté, il est possible d’entendre la participation comme un acte structurant de démocratie locale qui s’illustre par de multiples pratiques politiques, sociales ou civiques (Bacqué et al. 2011: 9–35; Blondiaux 2008: 37–62). D’un autre côté, la notion de sécurisation n’est pas nécessairement traduite chez les acteurs locaux comme une orientation de “sécurité publique” même si la police y tient un rôle important. La sécurisation peut-être apparentée à la construction de normes préventives visant à faire vivre ensemble des communautés, dans la même logique que les systèmes contractuels et assurantiels fondés au cours du 20^{ème} siècle en France (Castel 1995: 431–518).

La méthode d'analyse qualitative basée sur un travail d'archive, des entretiens et une série d'observations me permet d'analyser la notion de citoyenneté urbaine à travers des dimensions discursives et non-discursives. À ce titre, la notion de "régimes d'hospitalité" tente de rendre compte des normes et des perceptions liées à l'engagement dans un environnement multiculturel. En analysant différents modes d'engagement dans un projet de développement local, j'observe que ces perceptions se traduisent souvent par une réalité crue et symboliquement violente: assujettis à des formes de connaissance, les habitants opèrent individuellement des classements, des catégorisations et des rejets de l'étranger qui seront communicables en tant que tels au sein des processus participatifs. Ces frontières ébauchent ainsi une communauté de territoire.

Sur le fond, l'analyse des modalités de développement des quartiers d'immigration ("comment") – et non pas des objectifs d'intervention définis dans un cadre de politique publique ("quoi") – me semblait un angle théorique intéressante car elle permettait de mieux comprendre quels étaient le sens et les effets des instruments de gouvernement dans les villes. Ces technologies me permettait en particulier d'explorer au sein des stratégies urbaines leur: *"capacité de capturer, d'orienter, de déterminer, d'intercepter, de modeler, de contrôler, et d'assurer les gestes, les conduites, les opinions et les discours des êtres vivants"* (Agamben 2007: 14).

L'ÉMERGENCE DES RÉGIMES D'HOSPITALITÉ: UNE PERSPECTIVE HISTORIQUE

Cette thèse présente en premier lieu un cadrage historique utile à la compréhension de la politique urbaine française. Il s'agit d'analyser à chaque réforme majeure de la politique de la ville les instruments et normes qui sont liés à la participation et la sécurité. Cette perspective historique permet plus particulièrement de restituer les multiples discours attachés à la "participation des habitants" et à la "sécurité" dans des modes de gouvernement différents: la participation est traduite comme un mode d'animation socio-culturelle dans les années

80, une procédure démocratique et contractuelle dans les territoires au tournant des années 90, une expertise prenant appui sur l'usager du quartier intégré au management de projet dans les années 2000 et des techniques d'empowerment des habitants marginalisés dans les politiques publiques pour la période contemporaine. La sécurisation est liée à la prévention sociale dans les années 80, au redéploiement des services de police dans les quartiers dans les années 90, puis à la spatialisation des modes de surveillance et de contrôle des années 2000 jusqu'à nos jours.

La relation entre démarche participative et sécurisation me mène en particulier à m'interroger sur le sens des différents modes de gouvernement liés à ces différentes étapes: l'expérimentation sociale articule des modes d'animation et de prévention socio-culturelle dans les années 80. La généralisation de la politique urbaine par les contrats territoriaux va faire chevaucher des procédures participatives et de nouvelles formes d'intervention répressives dans les quartiers au détour des années 90. Les nouvelles formes de management de projet établit par l'État avec les acteurs locaux vont chercher à mieux intégrer les habitants dans des démarches de sécurisation des quartiers. L'habitant responsable agit dans des espaces de plus en plus sécurisants. Ce sont pour moi les stratégies urbaines – stratégie contractuelle ou basée sur un management de projet urbain – qui vont permettre de négocier les modèles de citoyenneté dans les projets locaux en fonction des “risques” sociaux potentiels et de menaces culturels liés au développement territorial. Je note en particulier, qu'à la différence des fonctionnements institutionnels centralisés, la construction d'une citoyenneté urbaine implique des discours, des instruments et des jeux de pouvoir qui doivent être considérés dans leur diversité et non pas exclusivement à partir d'un discours républicain. Ce sont précisément ces articulations locales entre les aspects participatifs et les aspects sécuritaires des stratégies urbaines que je qualifie de “*régime d'hospitalité*”. L'ambiguïté des termes entretenue dans la construction des communautés locales est donc propice à la diversification des registres de citoyenneté “urbaine”.

L'ÉTUDE DES FORMES D'ENGAGEMENT INSTITUTIONNEL ET LEUR ARTICULATION AUX MODES DE SÉCURISATION DANS DIVERSES STRATÉGIES URBAINES D'UNE MÊME AGGLOMÉRATION

Si une forme de citoyenneté locale ou urbaine émerge dans le champ des politiques territoriales, sous forme d'information et d'accès aux services, d'échanges participatifs ou de procédures délibératives, cette réflexion devait être problématisée – non pas exclusivement du point de vue d'un mécanisme national descendant mais également en fonction de la construction des territoires, de leurs histoires, à leurs registres d'intervention et en fonction des dynamiques démographiques et sociales qui s'y inscrivent (Béhar et al. 1995): croissance urbaine, orientations des politiques locales, études des organisations, analyse des trajectoires résidentielles et des parcours de migration dans un parc de logement. L'étude de deux quartiers d'habitat social inscrits dans le cadre de la politique de la ville et situés tous deux au sein de la région Île-de-France permet de compiler des statistiques, de réaliser des entretiens et des observations pour étayer un regard critique sur la diversification des discours sur la citoyenneté urbaine au sein d'une même métropole. L'originalité du sujet de recherche tient ici au fond à une innovation méthodologique. Il s'agissait de questionner deux notions – au lieu d'une seule en général – afin d'initier une méthodologie adaptée à l'analyse des politiques publiques transversales.

Dans ce cadre, une première expérience locale, celle du quartier Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air dans la ville de Saint-Denis, est analysée. Le Franc-Moisin-Bel-Air est un quartier d'immigration. Dans ce contexte local, j'identifie un premier instrument à travers l'histoire politique locale: la stratégie contractuelle. Cette première analyse met en évidence comment les choix politiques vont contribuer à mettre en place un nouveau mode de gouvernement local à partir d'un discours sur la participation des habitants et mise en œuvre avec la mobilisation des réseaux socioculturels locaux. Cette grande ville industrielle

se politise à la fin des années 70 sur le thème de l'insécurité sociale et l'insécurité civile. Dans ce cadre, la municipalité fera le choix de mettre en place des démarches participatives – animation socio-culturelle, action éducative, santé – pour mieux prendre en compte les effets de marginalité naissante dans certains quartiers comme le Franc-Moisin.

Dans les années 90, la démarche contractuelle engagée à Saint-Denis donne lieu à une refonte de l'organisation politique et institutionnelle de l'agglomération dionysienne et des démarches citoyennes à l'échelle des quartiers. Cette démarche contribue, à mettre en place un mode de gouvernement contractuel, c'est à dire basé sur des transactions et des négociations à diverses échelles territoriales. Dans ce cadre, j'observe localement comment les revendications des collectifs mènent à des conflits d'interprétation (politique, sociaux, ethniques) sur la manière de vivre ce nouveau mécanisme de solidarité. La participation des habitants est avant tout un discours sur la manière d'agir avec les représentants du tissu associatif local et les volontaires pour lutter contre les processus d'insécurité sociale.

En matière de participation, le contrat territorial articulera pour ce faire des actions de développement social intégrant les associations et des actions proprement urbaines dans lesquelles les habitants prendront position. Mais dans les faits observables, le processus participatif reste localement très sélectif. Il mène les habitants volontaires et les représentants associatifs à définir des registres de socialisation mêlés d'affects, de jugements moraux, de propos discriminants. Ce processus sélectif confronte les volontaires à leur propre subjectivité. Ce faisant, ce mode de gouvernement basé sur le contrat et la participation mène à une méfiance envers les institutions et à une certaine défiance entre les habitants revendiquant leur identité et leur appartenance sociale ou ethnique. Cette politique de l'hospitalité, de la vie sociale avec "l'autre" ou "l'étranger", mène quotidiennement à des petites scènes de vie qui confinent à la méfiance, au rejet, aux propos souvent discriminants, parfois racistes.

La deuxième expérience locale analysée est celle des Cinq Quartiers, quartier d'habitat situé dans la commune des Mureaux, petite ville située en lisière de la région Île-de-France. Mon analyse a pour intérêt de montrer comment la dimension citoyenne intégrée au projet urbain se présente différemment en fonction de risques et des

menaces que font peser la population sur le développement territorial. Nous verrons mettons en lumière comment le mode de gouvernement va varier en conséquence. Ce n'est pas l'insécurité sociale mais le racisme des années 90, la concentration ethnique et les émeutes d'une jeunesse plongée au cœur d'un quartier "ghettoisé" qui détermineront la ligne politique d'un projet urbain d'ampleur. Ce projet intègre notamment des campagnes d'information, de communication et de concertation ainsi que des actions de prévention et de contrôle. Le mode de gouvernement local ne s'attache pas à favoriser l'émergence d'organisations intermédiaires comme c'est le cas à Saint-Denis avec les associations et les collectifs d'habitant. Bien au contraire, le maire des Mureaux conserve son pouvoir de représentation politique et cherche plutôt à individualiser les procédures d'intégration à travers des mesures phares du projet de rénovation urbaine: mixité sociale, destruction-relogement massif, hiérarchisation et requalification des espaces publics et privés, nouvelles politiques d'équipement public, etc. Ce projet va être soutenu par une politique de prévention-médiation, tournée en grande partie vers la jeunesse du quartier et les habitants en insertion. Cette orientation vise à créer des relais avec les habitants du quartier pour mieux prévenir et traiter les conflits et actes de délinquance observables dans le quartier.

Sous des accents républicains, la politique d'activation menée aux Mureaux a pour conséquence de casser les liens socio-ethniques formés au cours du développement industriel. Le projet est le support d'un discours politique qui vise à "civiliser" les habitants par des méthodes de prévention qui engagent souvent les habitants à se responsabiliser, se discipliner et à contrôler les relations de voisinage. Par le biais de la mairie et des structures associatives financés dans le cadre du projet urbain, le maire des Mureaux embauche la jeunesse du quartier qui s'engage et montre l'exemple à suivre. Les jeunes médiateurs qui viennent d'horizons culturels variés font alors autorité des public spécifiques: enfants scolarisés du quartier, amis, familles dans lesquelles les relations intergénérationnelles sont très fragilisées par l'environnement social et économique. Dans la gestion de projet, se dessine peu à peu un développement social réticulaire permettant de relayer les informations importantes auprès de publics spécifiques, dans un environnement urbain très catégorisé par le social et l'ethnique. Ce système d'engagement de la jeunesse et des habitants du

quartier est loin de faire l'unanimité. Leur reconnaissance ne vaut qu'au sein des dispositifs dans lesquels ils sont intégrés. Plus généralement, la politique d'activation tend à marginaliser d'autres mouvements sociaux et politiques dans le quartier.

En prenant appuis sur les deux expériences locales, je montre comment l'engagement conduit à "assujettir" les habitants à un mode de gouvernement local dans certaines réunions publiques et groupes de travail concernant la vie du quartier et la tranquillité publique. En effet, les modes d'engagement ne sont pas sans risque pour les partenaires locaux en matière de tranquillité et de sécurité publique, tant la démarche participative peut conduire à "stigmatiser" autrui. C'est sur ce constat que je mets en rapport les registres locaux de citoyenneté et les modalités de sécurisation des quartiers. En prenant plus de distance par rapport au terrain, je cherche à comprendre comment les normes d'engagement s'articulent aux dispositifs de tranquillité et de sécurité publique dans les expériences de développement local. De ce fait, cette étude met à jour les procédures et caractéristiques des régimes d'hospitalité.