The right of free movement: A story of securitisation and control in the UK

Or the story of Ion Popescu
Abstract

Recently in Britain there has been an on-going discussion on the right of European citizens to move to, work and reside freely in any European Union member-state. British politicians and media, stepping on the significant number of Eastern Europeans who moved to the United Kingdom, articulated a securitising discourse representing them as ‘benefit tourists’ and criminals who threaten the integrity of the welfare system and social cohesion. However, this is only part of the securitisation story. This paper argues that the securitisation of mobile European citizens and, consequently of the right of free movement itself, is used as governmentality in order to allow in the country only those who are needed and keep the rest out, and at the same time to raise support for a renegotiation of the relationship between Britain and the European Union. It will be demonstrated that the securitisation process takes place through policies and everyday practices on the one hand, and through the securitising discourse articulated by politicians and media on the other. Moreover, the possibility of securitisation having a long-lasting effect by creating a security rationale in which all future policies would be embedded is assessed.

Key words: Britain, Eastern Europeans, free movement of persons, governmentality, immigration policy, Romanians, securitisation, What’s the Problem Represented to Be

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Disclaimer: Ion Popescu and all the events and characters in relation to him appearing in this work are fictitious. Any resemblance to actual situations or to real persons, living or dead, is purely coincidental.
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<td>Copenhagen School</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUCtzn</td>
<td>European Citizen</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Free Mover</td>
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<td>FMvt</td>
<td>Free Movement of Persons</td>
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<td>IB-JSA</td>
<td>Income Based Jobseeker’s Allowance</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NRWR</td>
<td>No Rights Without Responsibilities</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>Problem Representation</td>
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<td>SSAC</td>
<td>Social Security Advisory Committee</td>
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<td>ST</td>
<td>Securitisation Theory</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>Ukip</td>
<td>United Kingdom Independence Party</td>
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<td>WMH</td>
<td>Welfare Magnet Hypothesis</td>
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1. Ion Popescu

Ion

That bloody old woman! Her look was stuck like a bullet in his mind, growing his upset. He still couldn’t tell what that look meant. On his way back home from the local public library, where he went to look for a new job online, he was standing at the bus stop waiting for number 3 when he got a call from the sandwich factory. The supervisor, furious asked why he didn’t show up for work. He gathered his courage and using his broken English repeated what he had already told him the day before, when he finished his shift, that he wouldn’t go on working under these horrible conditions and that they should pay him up immediately. He hung up irritated. First, he heard an exclamation of discontent behind him. Then he turned around, and there she was, staring at him with this ambiguous look. Was it discomfort for his broken English and strong accent gave away his Romanian origin? —and Romanians have a pretty rough reputation these days in Northampton, the media have done a wonderful job on that, presenting them as burglars and muggers. Or was it contempt for his frustration with the sandwich factory was mistaken for unwillingness to work? Being considered a social burden wasn’t his intention.

Maybe none of these is true, maybe it is just him and his vexation stemming from broken expectations. This is not what he had imagined when he left Băilești. After finishing school, he worked here and there, but the rural economy of the area didn’t offer many job opportunities. He was reaching thirty, and he needed to do something with his life. As the situation in Romania wasn’t very promising, he placed his hopes on the European Union and the right to move to another member state. He thought that now that Romanians are European citizens and the transitional restrictions are finally lifted, he could move to the UK, get a job and try to make a decent life. Instead, after a year, he is still staying with his compatriots, and the only job he managed to get, with his low skills and poor English, was the one in the sandwich factory, which was badly paid and under awful conditions.

Although fictional, Ion Popescu could be one of the many European citizens (EUCtzns) who believed in the European Union (EU) and the benefits of free movement of persons (FMvt), anticipating a better life through moving to, residing and working in another member-state. Instead, many of them found themselves amid a growing wave of exclusion and securitisation, i.e. their construction as a threat to the cohesion and stability of the local society. One of the countries the phenomenon is most intense in the United Kingdom (UK). Nevertheless, it is observed in other states as well, and in increasing intensity.

In light of the above, this research sets out to study the securitisation of the free movers (FMs)\(^1\), and consequently of FMvt, in the UK. The aim is to answer a how, a why and a what: the first

\(^1\)As the right of free movement is a prerogative of European citizens, the terms free mover (FM), European citizen and European will be used interchangeably.
goal is to reveal how the process of securitisation occurs. It will be argued that it takes place at two levels, a practical one through policies and everyday practices, and a political through the articulation of security discourse by the politicians and the media. The second objective is to explain the reasons why this is happening. I contend that securitisation has a twofold goal: to act as a form of governmentality, seeking to govern FMvt in order for the UK to reap the benefits of mobile high-skilled labour, and at the same time block the entrance or long-term residence of the FMs with low contribution to the national economy. And secondly, to create the conditions and raise support for a renegotiation of the relationship between the UK and the EU. The third aim of this research is to explore what the impact of securitisation is on policy-making. A case will be made for the impact the existing security rationales that inform policy have on shaping the understanding of the issue, and the proposed solutions.

In the rest of the chapter, a short historical background on FMvt will be given, followed by a discussion on its securitisation at the European and national level. Subsequently, the aims of the research and the main argument will be elaborated and the importance of the issue will be assessed. The chapter will conclude by outlining the structure of the research.

1.1. Free Movement

FMvt along with free movement of goods, services and capital constitute the four fundamental freedoms of the Union, as they were established in the third article of the Treaty of the EU (EU 2012:C326/17). The concept of FMvt is tied with those of European integration and EU citizenship, with their historical and political evolution going in tandem. This relationship is expressed by the fact that FMvt is considered one of the key benefits of European integration and that it is the most widely known right of the European citizenship. The inception of FMvt dates back to the 1960s, when Schuman envisaged a Europe without the inherent rigidness and ‘intransigent hostility’ of the national borders (Maas 2013:97). This vision was incorporated in the Treaty of Rome which gave the right to the citizens of the then member-states to move and reside freely within the Union\(^2\) as a whole, along with a batch of official and substantial rights, as the right to be treated equally with domestic workers in all aspects of working life and access to social welfare and other benefits (Hansen & Hager 2012:43, 46). In 1976, the Tindemans

\(^2\) Although at that time it was named the European Economic Community, for reasons of simplicity, it will be called European Union (or just the Union) throughout the whole text.
Report posed the idea of social and economic rights facilitated through ‘a citizens’ Europe’ (Hansen 2000:142).

In 1985, the abolition of internal borders between member-states and the simultaneous reinforcement of the external ones was decided with the Schengen agreement, while the 1992 Maastricht Treaty completed the Single Market based on the free movement of persons, goods, capital and services, and established the European citizenship which provided the right to all member-state nationals to circulate and reside freely in the Union. Although, on one hand these developments reinforced FMvt, on the other, the neoliberal ‘revolution’ which directly targeted the welfare state, sidelined social rights and advocated the superiority of market solutions in all aspects of life and activity, eroded the social dimension of EU citizenship, resulting in a market citizenship and the employable and flexible citizen (Hansen & Hager 2012:72). This trend was developed even further in the 2000s with the Lisbon Treaty which introduced the principle ‘no rights without responsibilities,’ thus tying social rights to the responsibility of citizens to become employable and competitive (Hansen & Hager 2012:113).

The rights of the European citizens to move and reside freely in the Union were codified in the Citizens’ Directive 2004/38. According to this, the EU sees the FMvt as an opportunity to strengthen the feeling of European citizenship and, through the option of permanent residence, to enhance integration and social cohesion (EP 2004:82-83). Even though this demonstrates the importance the Union places on the integration process, this is treated more as an economic project rather than a social one. This becomes more obvious in the individual provisions of the directive.

Article 6 provides that citizens have the right of residence to a member-state for three months without formalities. The right of residence longer than three months is held by the employed, jobseekers, students and those who can prove that they have sufficient resources to support themselves without becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the member-state (Article 7). However, the operationalisation of sufficient resources is left to the state to decide. Moreover, the citizen has to register his/her residence with the local authorities (Article 8). Additionally, the host state is not obliged to grant access to social benefits during the first three months or longer regarding jobseekers (Article 24). Finally, the directive allows room for expulsion of European citizens on the grounds of public policy, public health and public security (Article 27), without further specifying the conditions though, and thus being substantially ambiguous.
1.2. Securitising free movement

The ambiguities of the directive regarding the conditions of expulsion and the criteria for long-term residency, the privileging of the employed, and the discretion of the member-states to decide whether or not to grant social assistance to certain categories of European citizens, created the fertile ground for securitisation to thrive. The opportunity was given after 2004, and the gradual accession of eleven Eastern European states. In 2004, The Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia\(^3\) were admitted in the EU. This was followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. This meant that people like Ion, coming from countries experiencing adverse economic conditions and great differences in income and standards of living with the ‘old’ Europe, would have the chance to move to another EU state in search of employment and better living.

The prospect of a great influx of Easterners created fears of ‘social dumping’ and distortions of their labour markets for many Western European states, the UK among them. This led them to treat FMvt as a threat to social cohesion and stability and thus to securitise it. The process was reinforced by the EU sponsored transitional measures which allowed old member-states to restrict the right of the newly admitted Eastern European workers to move freely and work in their territory for a period up to seven years. The message conveyed by this practice was that FMvt is more of a threat than a right. In addition, states attempted to exploit the ambiguities of the EU directive and devise policies that discourage FMvt. Moreover, the media paints a very dark picture, overemphasising the movement of poor and low-skilled populations looking for a better life, and blatantly neglecting the benefits reaped of the influx of high-skilled EU citizens. At the same time the term ‘intra-EU migration’ is being used increasingly, transforming FMvt to a notion with a securitised connotation. This whole situation can be exemplified very well by the fact that Austria, Germany, Netherlands and the UK took the initiative in 2013 to ask the European Commission to tighten EU rules to stop ‘benefit tourism’ (Mahony 2013).

Specifically in the UK, a conscious effort has been made over the last two decades to reduce immigration and asylum-seeking. It is indicative that this objective is listed as one of the main responsibilities of the Home Office department on its official website (Home Office n.d.). To

\(^3\) Two non-Eastern European states, Cyprus and Malta, acceded to the EU in 2004 as well.
that end, the British migration management system underwent a significant restructuring which had a substantial impact on organisational cultures and practices (Düvell & Jordan 2003:299). In the light of the above, it is no surprise that the UK treats the increased flows of European citizens as a threat, since its migration systems are designed to control the entrance of third country nationals and have little operational utility when it comes to FMs.

1.3. The research

Taking into account the above, the research seeks to address three issues: to reveal the processes and mechanisms through which FMvt is securitised in the UK; to shed light on the motives underlying these process; and explore how the securitisation process affects policy-making. The following research questions codify and express explicitly the aims of the study:

1. How is the process of securitisation taking place?
2. Why is this happening? What are the motives driving this process?
3. What is the impact of securitisation on policy-making?

At this point it would be useful to clarify two points about securitisation. In essence, it is the process of constructing an issue as an existential threat. However, there are different understandings of securitisation and various ways to approach it. Some argue that this construction is achieved discursively and results in exceptional measures (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998). Others claim that it is a long-term process taking place through everyday routinised practices (Bigo 2000, 2002; Huysmans 2006). These differences will be discussed afterwards. For now it is important to remember that this study is about how FMvt is constructed as a threat to societal security, meaning a threat to a society’s norms, culture and customs (Wæver et al. 1993:23), or in other words, its existence in its current state.

The second point is that it is assumed that FMvt is securitised. This, apart from being a reasonable assumption given the short discussion in part 1.2, it is also supported by previous research. Parker (2012) and Parker and Toke (2013) identified a clear-cut securitisation in the case of the expulsion of Roma EUCtzn from France in 2010. The conclusions of other studies on European mobility into the UK point towards that direction, even though they do not explicitly mention securitisation. Fox, Moroşanu and Szilassy (2012:687) argue that the British media racialized the Romanians by subjecting them to a crime framing and presenting them as
‘dangerous criminals and social parasites’. Johns (2013:40) mentions that the British tabloids over-reported Polish crime, public drunkenness and welfare dependency. Likewise, Wilkinson (2014:40) identifies political and media discourses that accused EU citizens of abusing the National Health Service and occupying social housing. Additionally, a report on the representation of Romanians and Bulgarians in the British national press issued by the Migration Observatory (2014:12), found that among the most frequently nouns described as ‘Romanian’ were ‘gang’ and ‘criminal’. Although securitisation is not mentioned in any of these studies, it is clear that the framing of specific groups of EU citizens as criminals constructs them as a threat, and eventually as a security issue. The final point on this would be that this study will ‘trace and map’ securitisation processes in political discourses and practices, which according to Huysmans (2004:295) proves the existence and success of a securitisation.

The case of the UK was preferred for a number of reasons. First of all, it is a popular destination for many FMs and the issue has received significant negative attention by politicians and media. Secondly, there are several contextual factors. The UK has traditionally been an immigration country which has shaped a certain understanding about the social dynamics triggered by the presence of ethnically, culturally and racially different populations in the society. Furthermore, their objective to reduce immigration and the recent turn towards a citizenship policy based more firmly on national notions of belonging (Waite 2012), creates an interesting interplay with FMs. Also, an important factor is the general election held on May 7, 2015 and the substantial probability of a referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU its outcome signifies. Finally, the advantage of the language should be mentioned, as policy documents, political speeches and media reports are in English, which makes access to data considerably easier and eliminates the risk of erroneous conclusions drawn by the interrogation of the texts, due to misleading or simply bad translations.

The main argument is that the UK views FMs as a type of immigration that it cannot adequately control due to its regulation by EU law. In order to be consistent with the long-term objective of controlling immigration and be able to exploit the economic benefits of FMs without bearing the cost, the UK seeks to regulate it by integrating it in a security rationale. This will ensure the entrance of the ‘Useful’ Europeans while constructing the ‘Unwanted’ as a security issue that has to be dealt with security measures. In essence, the argument is that the UK tries to regulate the FMs and through them FMs using the concept of security, or in other words, a governmentality of security, combined with an economic rationale that guarantees the
exploitation of the benefits of European mobility. Governmentality should be understood in Foucaultian terms, as the different logics behind particular modes of government. It has a special focus on populations and achieves security and order by employing instruments as social and economic policy (Bacchi 2009:26-27).

In that sense, securitisation occurs at both the practical and political level. It takes place in the practical level through a policy-nexus that controls the path to permanent residence and integration, excluding gradually more and more European citizens, and thus discouraging FMvt and ensuring that only the ones with specific features will stay. At the political level, the excluded populations the policy-nexus creates constitute a visible abnormality in daily social life, which the securitising discourse of politicians and media constructs as a threat to the welfare system, to social cohesion and stability, generating the public demand to deal with the issue. Since the situation is framed as a consequence of EU law and policies, the proposed solution of renegotiating UK’s relationship with the EU gains public support and legitimacy. Moreover, this process produces the conditions for further measures and new policies informed by the same security rationale, and hence develops a vicious cycle of security and exclusion.

In order to study these processes, a two dimensional securitisation framework will be constructed, drawing on the work of a number of scholars. The purpose of the first dimension of the framework is to study the policy-nexus and reveal the security and economic rationales that inform it. For this, Bacchi’s (2009) method ‘What’s the Problem Represented to be?’ (WPR) is ideal, as it is devised to identify the logics underlying policies. At the second dimension, securitisation theory (ST) will be used in order to examine how FMVs are discursively constructed as a security issue by politicians and media. Contextual factors, as the historical approach of the UK to immigration policy and the general elections, will be included in the analysis.

1.4. Importance

The above discussion on European citizenship, FMvt, securitisation and governmentality raises a number of matters that highlight the importance of the issue. First, at a European level, the securitisation of FMvt, undermines and de-legitimises the EU in many dimensions. The core value of equality is challenged, as certain types of EUCtzn seem to be privileged and preferred, while the Eastern European states feel that their citizens bore all the cost of the reforms required for the accession to the Union, without getting much in return. In that sense, new kinds of
divisions, as East/West and North/South, are being consolidated, creating a highly differentiated Europe.

At a state level, securitisation shapes how governments and policy-makers understand concepts as European citizenship, FMvt and equality, and at the same time moulds the solutions proposed by the respective policies. Moreover, it affects the way specific groups of Europeans are treated, creating hierarchies as high-skilled/low-skilled, useful/burdensome and/or needed/unwanted. Additionally, the balance of competences between the EU and the member-states is brought into the fore since the UK tries to reconfigure its relationship with the Union, development which could open up the way for a series of such claims.

Most importantly though, the issue has great implications for the citizens. Securitisation challenges one of the core rights associated with European citizenship, compromises the principle of equality and hinders them from searching for a better or different life. This process assigns them into certain categories, based strictly on technical and typical criteria as income and professional qualifications, excluding them, or even worse stigmatising them as criminals and threat to the society.

Given the research aims and the issues raised above, this study is about how the UK creates certain categories of populations and governs them according to national and economic interests, challenging basic rights of the EU citizenship and core EU values. It is about the interplay of, at times contradicting and at others concurring, visions of Europe the EU and Britain have. But above all, it is about European citizens and their right to pursue a better life. In that sense, this study is about Ion Popescu.

1.5. Structure of the research

In this chapter, Ion Popescu introduced us to the difficulties many EUCtzns face when they exercise their right of FMvt, the exclusion and the securitisation they experience, which will be the focal point of this study. An outline of the historical and political evolution of the institution of EU citizenship and the right of FMvt was provided before a general discussion on the phenomenon of securitisation was presented. Then, the aims of the research were clarified and the main arguments articulated and, finally, the importance of the issue was explained.
In the following chapter, the academic contribution of the study will be clarified, by reviewing key works in the field and identifying their gaps, which this paper aims to cover. The third chapter will present and assess the different theories on which this study will build. In the fourth one, the framework used to conduct the investigation will be described in detail and analysed. The fifth chapter will be devoted to the practical dimension of securitisation. The policy nexus will be presented and the analysis and discussion of policy documents and practices will follow. The sixth will address securitisation at the political level, by conducting a discourse analysis on political speeches and newspaper articles. In the seventh and final chapter, securitisation will be read through the prism of historical and socio-political factors in order to complete the research. Ion will accompany us throughout the study, intervening at different points along the way, in order to demonstrate and clarify certain situations, processes and arguments.
2. Previous research

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to pick from where the previous one left off, the discussion on the political importance of this study, and clarify its academic contribution. Key works in the field will be reviewed, highlighting the inspirations they provide and identifying the gaps they leave, in order to determine the academic space this study aspires to cover in the field of the securitisation of migration.

2.2 External immigration and borders

The field can demonstrate a variety of studies of the securitisation of migration, either at the EU level (Bigo 2000, 2002; Huysmans 2004, 2006; Ceccorulli 2010) or at the national one (Karyotis & Patrikios 2010, Karyotis 2012, Swarts & Karakatsanis 2012, Ibrahim 2005, Bourbeau 2011). Although those studies employ a variety of methods and approach the subject from different angles, they overlap in certain points. All of them deal with ‘external’ immigrants which has particular implications. The fact that the immigrants come from ‘outside’ means that they must cross borders, national or European, and hence are subject to border controls. This reality does not apply to European citizens, as the intra-EU border checks have been abolished and the exhibition of a European passport is enough to enter another member-state’s territory without further bureaucratic procedures.

In that sense, both Bigo (2000, 2002) and Huysmans (2004, 2006) managed to capture the idea of the Europeanisation of migration and internal security policies leading to filtering migrants at the European borders through controls and technology. Both of them analysed securitisation as governmentality. Bigo calls it the governmentality of the unease and places particular attention on the production of security knowledge, the application of security technologies, as surveillance and collection of biometric data, and the internal logic of the professionals of security (Bigo 2002:85). For Huysmans (2004:314, 2006:153) it is a twofold technique of governing freedom through the management of its dangerous excesses: by externalising
excessive freedom through border controls and defining who can lawfully enter the EU territory and who cannot; and by internalising dangers through categorising populations according to their functionality/dysfunctionality and applying monitoring technologies on them.

Nevertheless, due to their focus on border controls and security technology, these studies fail to identify intra-EU divisions. The application of the same filtering logic to EU citizens by the member-states, through a complex network of policies and practices, not necessarily technologically advanced, seems to fall outside the scope of their research. The same goes for studies of national processes of securitisation, in which the construction of the threat usually revolves around the infringement of the national borders and the ‘(il)legality’ of the migrants’ or asylum-seekers’ presence in the territory, techniques that cannot be used in the case of the FMs, as they cross borders and reside in the country rightfully.

2.3 Immigration and belonging

Moreover, the case of ‘external’ migrants facilitates a securitisation process based on identity and the possibility of belonging. Both the ethno-cultural European identity and the national one construct the migrant as a threat based on cultural and racial differences, the coloured, non-Christian and uncivilised ‘other’. However, this dichotomy fails to include other kinds of divisions, as Western/Eastern, Northern/Southern, rich/poor, which are evident in Europe right now, and generate favourable conditions for further securitisations. For example, it is indicative that in Huysmans’ (2006:64) analysis, he considers the EUCtzns to be privileged and treated favourably in the internal market. This reasoning certainly applies to the European/third country national binary but fails to address the primacy of the national over the European that the institution of the EU citizenship seeks to remedy.

Studies dealing with the securitisation of migration and notions of belonging do not address this point directly but provide a sound basis for further thought. In this line of research, Louise Waite (2012) explores what the neo-assimilationist state perception of national belonging means for migrants living in the UK. She makes the case that the securitisation of migration, stemming from the discourses and practices surrounding the argument that the integrity and security of the state are assured only if migration flows and migrants are controlled and monitored, led to an attempt to create a tight bond between the institution of citizenship and
notions of national belonging. She concludes that there is a mismatch between the feeling of belonging the state wants immigrants to have and the actual feeling they experience in the context of their multi-scaled and multi-positioned belonging.

Here again, Waite is concerned about external immigration and therefore the migrants’ feeling of belonging oscillate between the British citizenship and their national identity. However, for Europeans exists an intermediate institution, the European citizenship, which stems from the participation of their country in a union of equals, and bestows them the right of FMvt. Even though this does not seem to seriously affect the loyalties of the mobile Europeans, it creates significant tensions between the institutions of European and national citizenship. Although Waite does not address this relationship, the neo-assimilationist notion of belonging she identified demonstrates the agony of the nation-states to retrench national identity to very specific notions, and provides a fertile ground to explore policy complications which result in the securitisation of FMvt and hinder the development of EU citizenship.

In addition, gaps can be identified even in studies which focus on the securitisation of mobile EUcitizens. One of the paramount works in this category is that of Owen Parker (2012). He analyses the case of the Roma in France in 2010, emphasising the neoliberal nature of European citizenship and the room it leaves open for the securitisation of the FMvt in national contexts. He employs a twofold understanding of securitisation, as speech act invoking exceptionality and as bureaucratic practises normalising a security logic; and at the same time he highlights the intertwined economic and security rationales of European citizenship. He argues that French politicians discursively constructed Roma as an existential threat to France’s republican way of life, calling for exceptional measures, i.e. their expulsion. However, he contends that this was facilitated by the vagueness of EU law allowing the abuse of certain legal gaps to restrict FMvt. That was achieved mainly through everyday practices, enabled by the transitional measures. Access of Roma EUcitizens to the French labour market was restricted, and thus they were marginalised. This opened the possibility to deport them on the grounds of insufficient resources, provided in the EU directive.

Parker manages to bring together many of the points the other studies missed in a coherent analysis. He deals with European citizens, highlights national exclusionary policies addressing the role of the EU legislation in this development, brings in the economic side of the story and sheds light on the relationship between securitisation, migration and citizenship assessing its effects on integration and social rights. Nevertheless, his focus on the Roma and transitional
measures leave some gaps: even though he studies EUCtzns, the Roma constitute an ethnically and culturally distinct minority with a long history of exclusion and discrimination, making their targeting easily visible. In contrast, the securitisation of the FMs concerns populations that are not so effortlessly distinguished by the mainstream body of people. Moreover, the transitional measures that facilitated securitisation indeed, were lifted as from January 2014, removing the fig leaf from the exclusionary national policies and pushing states to frame them differently. Finally, Parker treats securitisation through practices as the condition for more specific discursive securitisation that leads to exceptionality. Instead, the intention here is to regard it as a reinforcing vicious cycle in which policy constructs an ideational and visible threat, creating the conditions for discursive securitisation and leading back to a security rationale informing policy-making, without necessarily reaching the level of exceptionality.

2.4 Immigration and integration

This idea is inspired by William Walters’s (2004) domopolitics. Like Bigo and Huysmans before, he sees securitisation as governmentality and he introduces the concept of domopolitics as analytic, which implies the governing of the state as a home, understood as the secure space of community and citizenship as opposed to the external dangerous world of traffickers, smugglers and terrorists. Taking as a starting point the White paper Secure Borders, Safe Heaven published in 2002 by the UK government, he works backwards, conducting a discourse analysis in order to examine to what extent domopolitics is expressed in the White Paper. He argues (2004:241, 248) that immigration is represented as twofold: an economic aspect resembling the governing of a household (oikos) and expressed in useful labour; and a security one representing the infringement of the national borders, abuse of the national welfare system and the resulting desire for order (domus). This leads to a new system of migration management, promoting harsher border controls in order to allow in the ones in need and needed and exclude the rest. By combining the two aspects of immigration, a sense of security and trust is created, within which integration of newcomers, citizenship and social order are thought to be more easily achievable.

Although the basic principle of this process applies to the current study too, again the difference is that Walters is concerned with harsher border controls and immigration policy, which are non-applicable here. This research will employ this logic to deal with policies restricting access
to the welfare system and hindering the integration of Europeans into the host member-state. Apart from conceptual inspiration, Walters’s work also offers an intriguing methodological point, as he starts from a policy document and he traces back the rationality that underlies it, a logic that will be put at work in this study too.

To summarise, this study seeks to fill in the gaps other works left by addressing the intra-EU divisions created by securitisation, through complex normalised processes which on one hand exploit the ambiguities, and on the other reinforce the already existing possibilities for exclusion of the EU law.

In conclusion, this chapter focused on different works on the securitisation of migration. They were reviewed and used instrumentally, in order to determine the place a study of the securitisation of FMvt can take within the field; and to identify conceptual and methodological elements on which this research can be built. In the next chapter the theoretical premises of securitisation theory and Bacchi’s (2009) WPR approach will be elaborated, in order to set the theoretical base upon which the inquiry will be rested.
3. Theory

3.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to lay down the theoretical foundations upon which the research and the methodological framework will be built. First, the ST will be discussed and critically assessed and then the theoretical background of the WPR approach will be scrutinised.

3.2. Securitisation Theory

ST will form the second dimension of the analysis, of how certain categories of FMs are constructed as a threat. The discussion will be initiated by the presentation of the ST in its original form, as it was articulated by the Copenhagen School (CS), consisting mainly by Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde (1998). After that, certain points of criticism will be raised, discussed and addressed by drawing on the works of numerous contributors to the theory (Balzacq 2005, Bigo 2000, Bourbeau 2014, Huysmans 2006, Stritzel 2007, 2011a, 2011b, 2012 and Williams 2003). The selection of the contributions was made according to their impact on the theoretical and methodological framework of this study, and by no means are they exhaustive.

3.2.1. Copenhagen School

The CS attempted to combine a traditionalist notion of security as the survival of a referent object being threatened (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998:21), and a constructivist perspective leaning towards post-structuralism, by focusing on the performative power of the speech act. The aim was to produce a new, radical framework of analysis that sought to challenge the exclusive focus on the military sector and expand the security agenda to four additional sectors: environmental, economic, societal and political (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998:4). In this study the concept of societal security will be central. Societal security can be defined as the ‘ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats,’ or in other words, it concerns the sustainability and protection of language, culture, religion, traditions and customs (Wæver et al. 1993:23).
In that framework, they understand securitisation as a speech act which constructs an intersubjective understanding of an issue as existential threat to a referent object, legitimising the option of extraordinary measures to deal with the threat. Therefore, for the CS, securitisation is a speech act; it is the utterance itself that has the power to construct something as an existential threat, or as they put it: ‘by saying the words, something is done’ (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998:24, 26). The invocation of survival moves the issue beyond politics allowing for the breaking of the regular political rules. In other words, an issue from being politicised, i.e. being part of the public debate, becomes securitised, i.e. presented as a threat so existential as to justify extraordinary measures (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998:23-4). The focal point here is not whether the existential threat is real, but the process through which the issue is presented as such. In this study, for example, the aim is not to assess whether FMs constitute a real threat to the British society, but the processes through which they are presented as such.

However, the discursive framing of an issue as a threat is not enough. It is the audience addressed who decides whether securitisation is successful by accepting the issue as an existential threat and consenting to the possibility of emergency measures being taken. It follows then that securitisation is intersubjective and socially constructed (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998:26). It is not objectively defined, but it is negotiated among actors depending on the sector, the referent object, the effectiveness of the speech act and the acceptance of the audience. In that sense, for FMvt to be securitised, it is not enough for the politicians and media to frame it as a threat, but the British society has to be convinced it really is.

The constructivist approach is further emphasised by the introduction of the facilitating factors, which aim to assist in assessing the possibility for successful securitisations. These are (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998:33):

1. The demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security
2. The social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitising actor
3. Features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitisation

However, the CS opens a possibility to conceptualise securitisation as a broader process, beyond the narrow boundaries of speech act, by acknowledging that in certain occasions it is wise to shift the focus from the securitising actor who performs the act to the logic that shapes the action (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998:41).
As a final remark, it is worth mentioning that the CS sees securitisation as a failure to address issues in a normal political context. Thus, they advocate de-securitisation as the preferable course of action, meaning moving issues out of the security frame, back to the regular politics realm (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998:29).

3.2.2. Critique

The goals of this study are to identify the processes of the securitisation of FMvt in the UK, the reasons and motives underlying the phenomenon and its impact on policy-making. Although ST is a crucial instrument in the pursuit of the above objectives, the understanding of securitisation by the CS as a speech act, articulating a threat to a referent object so existential as to justify exceptional measures, involves certain drawbacks that ought to be pointed out and criticised in order to formulate a new proposal that fits better the purpose of this inquiry. More specifically, the emphasis placed on the speech act and the momentary, decisionist and emergency nature of securitisation raise a number of issues.

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998:25) have argued, ‘The way to study securitisation is to study discourse’. They focus solely on the speech act and the moment that the act is articulated. However, this exclusive reliance on language and rhetoric limits the available tools to grasp processes of securitisation by excluding other means of constructing meaning, which in the contemporary world of electronic media and educated and informed citizens play an increasingly influential role in communication, therefore risking to substantially reduce the analytical scope of the framework (Williams 2003:525). There are a plethora of suggested remedies for this, varying from the inclusion of images (Williams 2003) to the replacement of speech act by a pragmatic act complemented with contextual and non-linguistic elements (Balzacq 2005), or the concept of translation which incorporates sociolinguistic and socio-political processes of transforming past constructions of meaning into a new setting (Stritzel 2011b:2493). Based on Williams, the proposal for this study is to expand the speech act so as to include images, metaphors, values, diagrams and statistics. This way, it will become possible to study securitisation processes taking place through policy documents and media content, which could not be identified otherwise.

Furthermore, the focus on the speech act and its momentary nature impede the ability of ST to capture constructions of security produced by non-verbal acts and long term processes as bureaucratic practices, patterned actions, rituals and manifestations of expertise, which are of
substantial importance to this study, since it will be argued that they constitute a significant part of the overall securitisation process. This point has been also raised by Bigo, Huysmans and Bourbeau. The first two, proposed that securitisation should be studied as a governmentality, concentrating on the rationales behind the processes, and the concepts on which security knowledge and practice are built (Bigo 2000:328, Huysmans 2006:147-152). Bourbeau (2014:195-6) on the other hand, combines the momentary and long-term understandings of securitisation in a complementary and sequential relationship where speech act initiates securitisation and routine practices establish it or, reversely, the speech act legitimises a securitisation produced by routine practices. The underlying idea here is that the two logics interact in many different and complex ways. To capture the long-term and routinised securitisations involved in this investigation, a methodological framework will be constructed in the next chapter, drawing on all of the above suggestions.

Additionally, the condition of exceptionality is problematic too. The view that the emergency feeling created by securitisation must lead to extraordinary measures points at Schmitt’s idea of political order and his phrase which is often quoted ‘sovereign is he who decides upon the exception’ (Schmitt 1922 cited in Williams 2003:516). As McDonald (2008:574), Stritzel (2012:552) and Bourbeau (2014:192) point out, this perception favours state actors, leaders and elites, since they are the ones with the authoritative position to decide with a speech act to elevate an issue to security threat and create conditions of exceptionality. The result is the marginalisation of competent actors like the media, which I contend that play a central role in the securitisation process of the FMvt and thus, ought to be studied.

Moreover, the situation in the UK has not reached the stage of exceptionality, but this does not negate the fact that securitisation exists and although it does not result in extreme measures, has detrimental effects on the lives of European citizens like Ion. Therefore, insisting on CS’s emphasis on exceptionality means missing the opportunity to study securitisations that follow a long-term gradual intensification process, or function below the level of exceptionality. Stritzel has repeatedly voiced this concern (2007:367, 2011a:347, 2012:note 7:565), arguing that it limits the meaning of security to that specific concept and wastes the potential of the framework to be expanded in other types of securitisations.

For the CS, securitisation has an intentional and momentary nature yielding a clear and tangible result: the extraordinary measures taken to deal with the alleged existential threat. It is a production line that manufactures a series of end-products. This strand of the theory is not
concerned about why the production line was set in motion in the first place, or what happens with these end-products after the moment of securitisation. In other words, it does not recognise any historical continuity or long-lasting effects, disconnecting it from its wider social environment. However, securitisation, as understood in this study, is not an ahistorical concept, isolated from historical processes and social factors (McDonald 2008:576, Stritzel 2011a:347). Following the example of numerous scholars (Balzacq 2005, Stritzel 2007, Bourbeu 2011), this investigation will attempt to embed securitisation in its social and historical contexts that contributed to the construction of its meaning, and explore its lasting effects, hoping to contribute to the already existing body of literature.

In the next chapter, the above points of criticism will be put at work in order to construct a methodological framework, suitable for the present research. Now we will turn to the discussion of the theoretical grounding of the second major approach used in this study, the WPR.

3.3. What’s the Problem Represented to be

The second major pillar of the analysis is the WPR method. It was developed by Carol Bacchi (2009) as a new way to study policy which shifts the focus from the ‘problem-solving’ perspective of the policy-making process to a ‘problem-questioning’ one (Bacchi 2009:xvii).

The approach is based on the premise that the policies proposed show what is perceived as in need of being corrected, thus constructing it as a problem (Bacchi 2012:4). Moreover, policy proposals reflect cultural assumptions which mould the policy-makers’ understanding of the ‘problem’ and thus producing certain responses. In that sense, ‘policies give shape to “problems”; do not address them’ (Bacchi 2009:x, emphasis in the original). Therefore, the goal of the WPR approach is to investigate the assumptions and premises that inform certain policies, explore their implications and explain how they result in certain forms of government (Bacchi 2009:xiv). This is achieved by using any policy as a starting point and tracing the problem production path by working backwards.

The theoretical foundations of the method lie in the Foucaultian concepts of governmentality and problematisations, as with Bigo’s and Huysmans’ frameworks. Governmentality, describes the modes and rationales underpinning the different approaches to government or how rules
become effective through their rationalisation and legitimisation, with a particular emphasis on the role of professionals and professional knowledge (Bacchi 2012:5). It is these governmentalities the WPR method seeks to make visible by revealing how populations, as the FMs for example, are constituted as subjects to be governed.

For this, the concept of ‘problematisation’ is necessary. This is a method of identifying the process through which certain issues are posed as problems and the rationale and the mechanisms that establish them as real problems, calling for specific responses (Bacchi 2009:30). Building on this, Bacchi (2009:31) argues that we are governed through problematisations because policies (by which we are governed), by their nature constitute problematisations: by proposing change they imply that something needs to be fixed, thus constituting it as a problem; and subsequently they propose specific courses of action that are informed by the same rationale that perceived the issue as a problem in the first place. This logic will be demonstrated in the study by the vicious cycle of security and exclusion in which policies informed by a security rationale create populations constructed as a threat, and then security measures are proposed to deal with the issue.

The method shares the constructivist approach with ST. It holds that problems are socially constructed and they cannot be seen outside the policy context within which they were created and operate. Bacchi (2009:34) goes even further, by stating that ‘“problems” are constituted (given a shape) in the simple act of making policy’ and thus, moves the approach into the poststructuralist domain (a conceptual move taken by the CS but not adopted in the ST version used in this study). This is demonstrated in the concept of problem representation (PR). The method advocates the study of problematisations instead of ‘problems’ in order to question the ‘natural status’ attributed to objects, understand how they came to be and comprehend the complex processes through which they are used for governing purposes (Bacchi 2009:39, 2012:2).

Bacchi (2009:35) suggests that this task should be undertaken by studying PRs which are the processes through which a policy problem acquires the legitimate status of ‘real’. PRs are expressed through discourses, meaning in this case the socially constructed knowledge framework that carries a truth status via which it frames and constraints how a social issue is perceived, thought and articulated. Discourse is strengthened by the positional power of certain actors, and vice-versa, specific discourses legitimise qualified actors (Bacchi 2009:37). In light of the above then, it can be argued that the WPR approach is government-centric, as often
governments are favoured in the construction of problems due to their institutional nature, their status as legitimate articulators of discourse and the possession of effective means such as legislation and official statistics (Bacchi 2009:33). This is another point the WPR approach shares with ST, the importance of the positional power of the actor in discursively constituting an issue in a certain way.

Going one level deeper, the WPR method seeks to identify and critically assess the assumptions and presuppositions underlying the PRs, in order to challenge the entrenched PRs and problematisations. This is achieved by interrogating the discursive, subjectification and lived effects (Bacchi 2009:40). As assumptions shape how problems are perceived and articulated, discourses must be scrutinised, in order to discover what is not said and how this constrains thinking. Subjectification, the process of constructing specific types of political subjects through discourse, imposes divisions and controls the process of change. Finally, the lived effects refer to the material consequences certain discourses and policy choices have on the lives of people (Bacchi 2009:40-42).

In summary, the WPR approach, based on the Foucaultian concepts of governmentality and problematisations, tries to unravel the way certain issues are constructed as problems calling for specific measures and resulting in particular rationales of government. It is a poststructuralist method, as it is based on the idea that a problem is constructed by an act of making policy and has an inherent government-centrism as governments are privileged in the constitution of problems and policy-making. The next chapter will build on the theories and concepts presented here in order to construct the analytical framework that will be used to carry out the research.
4. Methodology

4.1. Introduction

This chapter will build on the theories and their critique, presented previously, in order to set the methodological framework of the research. First, as the idea here is to combine the ST and the WPR approach, the compatibility of the two will be assessed. Then, the framework will be described in detail and analysed, discussing at the same time the practical arrangements of its application to the FMvt in the UK. In the final section, how the proposed framework relates with the research questions and how it accommodates the demands of the study will be explained.

4.2. Compatibility of the two frameworks

Since the aim here is to combine the ST and the WPR method in order to devise a new framework to study securitisation, it is appropriate to address the issue of the compatibility of the two approaches. As it was made clear in the third chapter, both ST and WPR adopt a social constructivist perspective. The two approaches view the issues at hand, security for ST and policy problems for the WPR, not as objectively defined but as socially constructed, arguing that this takes place through discourse. Although, the focal point of analysis is discourse, as it will be explained in more detail below, in both cases this assumption can be relaxed so as to include other means of meaning construction as well, such as in ST images, diagrams and metaphors; the WPR method can include practices and processes.

Moreover, both approaches can be used to reveal the logic behind the action taken (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998:41, Bacchi 2009:xiv). In that sense, they share a critical character that aims to uncover and challenge rationales, processes and mechanisms that remain buried under and unquestioned by the guise of normality. An additional similarity is the emphasis put on the positional power of actors. They both stress the legitimacy and favourable position certain actors, as politicians and governments, have in articulating performative discourse and thus shaping and constraining the perception of an issue (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998:24, 26, Bacchi 2009:37).
A point of possible tension is the assumption of the intentionality of the action. The WPR approach, clearly considers the problem construction process unintentional, a product of the logics and cultural influences of the policy-makers (Bacchi 2009:x). The scholars who understand securitisation as governmentality and focus on long-term routinised practises that largely operate unintentionally share the same view (Bourbeau 2014:192). On the other hand, the decisionist perspective adopted by the CS leaves no doubt about the intentionality of the process. Nevertheless, the two opposite views can be reconciled if we see securitisation as a multilevel process that can operate unintentionally at one level, and then be established and reinforced intentionally at another. For example, the social context, within which actors (politicians, policy-makers, media) operate, could be dominated by a security rationale that urges them to perceive certain issues as a threat without that image being created intentionally. However, it could be argued that at a second level, where this threatening imaginary is elaborated and disseminated by certain agents, it becomes a matter of intentionality that may even serve a particular agenda. That is exactly the idea that will be developed in the following section: the construction of a framework that operates in two dimensions, a practical and a political, and thus it will be named ‘Two Dimensional Securitisation Framework’ (2-DSF).

4.3. 2-DSF: Building it up

In order to unveil the processes of the securitisation of FMvt, the reasons underlying it and its relation to policy, a new securitisation framework will be devised by bringing together the WPR approach and ST. The overarching idea draws mainly on the work of Huysmans (2006) while the framework incorporates Bacchi’s (2009) WPR method and elements of the proposals of Balzacq (2005), Bigo (2002), Bourbeau (2014), Stritzel (2007) and Walters (2004). I will start by defining securitisation and the securitisation of FMvt, and discussing the implications of the definition for the framework.

4.3.1. Defining Securitisation

Understanding securitisation as a speech act encompasses inherent limitations, since by excluding ways to construct meaning other than language neglects the constitutive power of practices and overlooks securitisations that do not reach the level of exceptionality but happen gradually over time. Given that the issue of FMvt entails the long-standing competition
between the EU and the UK over competences and the nature of their relationship, and the UK’s limited room for legislative manoeuvres due to the regulation of FMvt by EU law, I argue that securitisation processes hide in the policies dealing with the residence and integration of the FMs and the every-day practices they constitute. To elaborate this point further, since the only legislative competence the UK has is the transposition of the EU directive on FMvt into national law, the regulation of the FMvt is pursued by stealth, through the exploitation of ambiguities of the directive and the distorted practical application of the directive through policy. A speech act approach would risk missing these undercover, normalised and long-term processes of securitisation. Therefore, it seems appropriate to move away from the CS definition and towards broader conceptualisations, such as Huysmans’.

Taking up the point made by the CS that sometimes it is wise to shift the focus from the actor who performs the act to the logic that shapes the action (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998:41), Huysmans (2006:153), reads securitisation in Foucaultian terms and sees security as a technique of governing freedom through the management of its dangerous excesses. Hence, securitisation becomes a multidimensional process which shapes the relation between freedom and security through expert knowledge, institutional routines and discourses of danger. Consequently, immigration and asylum can be constructed as security issues by ‘being institutionally and discursively integrated in policy frameworks that emphasizes policing and defence’ (Huysmans 2006:4). This perception is similar to that of Bigo, although he focuses too much on the use of technology and the role of the security professionals.

Based on the above, the definition can be reshaped into a new proposition that understands securitisation as the long-term multilevel process of constructing an issue as a threat, institutionally by incorporating it in security-laden frameworks of policy, and discursively by constructing an image of it that casts insecurity to the relevant audience, seeking to gain legitimacy and support for the actions taken to deal with the threat. Building on this conceptualisation, the securitisation of FMvt can be conceived as a two dimensional process: one at a practical level, through policy-making and implementation; and one in the sphere of public deliberation through discourse, which will be called political.

The influence of Bourbeau’s (2014:195-6) suggestion of a sequential relationship of securitisation through practice and speech act becomes obvious. In his proposal, practices initiate the process and discourse legitimises it or vice-versa. In this case, policy and practice will be taken as the initial point of the relationship, on the ground that it is policy that
determines who integrates and who does not, constituting thus a marginal population ready to be subject to security-driven treatment, which the securitising discourse legitimises later in the process.

It would be useful to clarify a few points regarding the implications of the above definition for the conduct of the research. First of all, discourse is understood to comprise not only linguistic but, as proposed in Chapter 3, other ways of meaning construction as well, like images, diagrams, statistics, metaphors and values. Contrary to the performative power of the speech act, these means do not produce securitisation directly. They are considered to have an indirect influence, by framing an issue as threatening, and thus contributing to its construction as a security concern.

Then, securitisation is seen as a long-term and gradual process that can operate at the level of normality but generates social unease; hence the condition of exceptionality and emergency is not considered decisive in order to determine the success of a securitisation. I contend that whether or not securitisation will be escalated to the state of exception is a matter of contextual factors—not necessarily the result of a decision- and that this does not negate the existence of securitisation. This is a major conceptual difference with the original framework of the CS, which is focused on speech act and the condition of emergency. However, with such a narrow understanding, securitisation would seem incomplete, as only a last, extreme stage of the process could be captured and the significant detrimental effects on the reality of FMs and the political implications created during the earlier stages, would be missed.

Another important point to be mentioned is the role of the audience in this definition. At the practical level, securitisation is generated and established without the active participation or acceptance of the audience. It is a daily practice produced by state policy which, in most cases, is not known or realised by the audience, nevertheless, it has real effects that influence the normality of the audience’s life by creating an abstract unease. It is at the political level where the audience participates actively, by accepting, contesting or changing the securitising message of the discourse and ultimately by legitimising or rejecting the securitisation. Therefore, the audience remains an important aspect of this framework. It is the actor that will support and disseminate the construction of the European citizen as a threat, and in that sense securitisation is still an intersubjective understanding.

Now that the working definition is in place and the basic assumptions are clarified, I will turn to the construction of the framework itself. In order to be better understood, the practical details
of how the research will be conducted will be outlined, and then it will be explained how the different theories and methods will be combined and adjusted to accommodate the objectives of the investigation.

4.3.2. Practical dimension: Policy-nexus and WPR

The general idea is to research the securitisation processes of the FMs at two levels, the practical and the political one. First, at the practical level, the goal is to interrogate how policy filters FMs, allowing some to integrate into the national system and others not, and which are the rationales that inform policy. Filtering in this case is not a one-time event as with the immigrants from third countries who are subject to border controls that decide who enters the national/European territory. It is a process that takes place at different stages of the FM’s residence in the country. Therefore, it seems fit to identify a path, to be sure one of many possible paths, through which the FM goes in order to access key services that determine whether, and to what extent, (s)he will be integrated. The different stops on that path are regulated by a variety of policies. Hence, the aim here is to create a nexus of policies that represent key points in the integration route, and identify the rationale behind the treatment of FMs.

To see this idea at work, we can follow Ion along his path to integration:

*His head is going to explode. He needs to get some rest but these kids are so loud! There is no way he will ever get a moment of privacy and peace in his compatriot’s apartment. He must find his own place to live (Housing policy) but his situation makes it seem an unreachable dream and throws him into despair. He remembers when he first landed in Heathrow. How optimistic he was! He didn’t even need to go through border controls, his European passport was enough. He was still optimistic when he went to register with the local employment office (Jobseekers’ policy). He believed that his eagerness to work would be enough to get him a job. He stopped being optimistic after five months, when he tried to claim a job-seekers allowance (Welfare policy) until he manages to find something. He thought that all European citizens have the same rights, but obviously he was mistaken.*

In order to reveal the logic behind this sequence of policies, Bacchi’s (2009) WPR method is ideal. Bacchi argues that policies understand problems in specific ways and thus “‘problems’ are constituted (given a shape) in the simple act of making policy’ (Bacchi 2009:34) and ‘rather than reacting to “problems”, governments are active in the creation (or production) of policy “problems”’ (Bacchi 2009:1, emphasis in the original). Following this reasoning, and in order to make the pertinence between the WPR method, securitisation and governmentality obvious, it can be argued that policies outline a particular way to do something, prescribe specific actions...
to be carried out in certain situations. Therefore policy constitutes practice and consequently problems are constituted in practices. Combined with Huysmans’ (2004:302) claim that practices ‘shape the particular modalities of conducting free movement,’ it can be argued that the economic and security rationales that underpin the policy-nexus actually regulate FMs and through them FMvt. The WPR method can then reveal the securitisation process that lies within government policies.

The method is based on the theoretical foundations explained in Chapter 3 and, originally, consists of six interrelated questions (Bacchi 2009:2):

1. **What is the ‘problem’ represented to be in a policy?**
2. **What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the ‘problem’?**
3. **How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about?**
4. **What is left unproblematic in this representation? What are the silences? Can the ‘problem’ be thought differently?**
5. **What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’?**
6. **How/where has this representation been produced, disseminated and defended? How could it be questioned, disrupted and replaced?**

The original framework will be adapted to avoid repetition and better fit the requirements of the current analysis. Thus, the questions will be reduced to five and will be modified as follows:

**Question 1:** What is the ‘problem’ represented to be in a policy?

The goal of the question is to identify the implied PRs in a policy, meaning what the policy considers to be the problem that it aims to address (Bacchi 2009:xi), for example, welfare dependency. It is pointed out that there might be more than one PRs and that they could be contradictory (Bacchi 2009:xi).

**Question 2:** What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the ‘problem’?

In this case, presuppositions refer to the solidified knowledge that lies behind the policy, the ontological and epistemological assumptions that surround it, and which can hardly be questioned in order for alternative PRs to emerge, e.g. the ‘No Rights Without Responsibilities’ principle. The objective here is to identify the conceptual logics, or in other words, the meanings that must be in place in order for a particular PR to make sense (Bacchi 2009:5). In
this task, a useful tool can be discourse analysis to which we will return in more detail in the following section, as it is the main methodological instrument that will be used to identify securitisations at the political level.

**Question 3:** What are the discursive effects of this representation? What is left unproblematic? What are the silences? Can the problem be thought differently?

PRs tend to constrain policies in the sense that certain representations call for specific solutions, thus excluding alternative responses. The objective is to identify the discursive effects, which refer to what can and cannot be said, and how this constrains social intervention. By bringing into discussion issues and perspectives that are silenced, attention is drawn to tensions and contradictions. For example, when uncontrolled immigration is framed as a consequence of membership in the EU, the ostensibly reasonable solution becomes the reform of European treaties, silencing aspects of the issue as the importance of European integration. Discourse analysis will again be a valuable tool (Bacchi 2009:13). Note that the first sub-question was originally placed in question five. However, it was incorporated here as it seems to complement the other sub-questions.

**Question 4:** What effects are produced by this representation of the problem?

The objective here is to identify the effects of the PRs, meaning how some are benefited and others harmed, in order to assess them critically. For this task two kinds of effects will be taken into account: subjectification effects, which include the constitutive power of policy to shape social relationships, place specific populations in certain positions and form them as particular subjects for government, e.g. welfare dependants or homeless; and lived effects on real, material aspects of the lives of certain populations as hardship, poverty and exclusion (Bacchi 2009:15-18).

**Question 5:** How the representation is elaborated and disseminated by different actors? What is the response of the audience to it?

The purpose of this question is to examine the means through which PRs reach their audiences and achieve legitimacy (Bacchi 2009:19), and this is where ST comes in. After it has been identified that the policy-nexus filters FMs, constituting two distinct populations of the Useful and the Unwanted, based on an economic and security logic, ST will be employed to explore how the Unwanted are constructed as a threat in order to legitimise their exclusion and gain support for their future management. Note that compared with Bacchi’s original framework,
this question was rephrased, without changing the essence of its meaning, in order to create more immediate conceptual connections with ST.

The third question of the original framework, drawing on Foucault’s genealogy, aims to reveal the origins, history and mechanisms of the PRs, by analysing the non-discursive practices that contributed to their shaping (Bacchi 2009:10-12). However, as Bacchi herself admits, this process requires long detailed records of decision-making and the identification of specific institutional developments (Bacchi 2009:44). Given the time and resource limitations faced by this study, the question was omitted. Nevertheless, I expect the results of the analysis not to be distorted by this methodological move, since, to support the process of securitisation, it is enough to establish the existence of a security rationale behind the PR, without tracing its historical origins in detail.

The method will be applied on a variety of sources, as policy white papers, impact assessments, parliamentary and government reports, regulations, statutory guidance and the Prime Minister’s (PM) newspaper articles in which he announced policy changes. A detailed index of the documents can be found in Appendix 2.

4.3.3. Political dimension: Securitisation Theory

At the political level, the objective is to study how political and media discourse construct a particular type of FM as a threat. For this purpose a model close to the proposals of Balzacq (2005) and Stritzel (2007) will be used, which seeks to incorporate the socio-political and sociolinguistic context into the analysis. As already mentioned, apart from language, other ways of meaning construction, as images, metaphors and diagrams, will be taken into account.

The securitising actors, the role of who will be investigated in this research, are the British government and the national media. The reasoning for this choice is that both government agents and the media have the positional power to generate effective securitising discourse. The government officials carry the legitimate status of the representatives of the people and the protectors of their interests, and are responsible for the state policy that will be scrutinised at the practical level. The media, on the other hand, due to their wide reach and skilful use of language and images can influence the public opinion substantially. Regarding the government, the analysis will focus on the PM David Cameron, the Home Secretary Theresa May and the Work and Pensions Secretary Iain Duncan Smith. A total of 135 speeches, two newspaper articles and twelve parliamentary debates from November 2013 will be scrutinised. Note that
this point in time does not signify a beginning for the securitisation of FMvt. On the contrary, securitisation is understood as a long-term process and there are indications that it has been operating long before that. However, the limited scope of this paper cannot cover such a long time span, and that specific temporal point was deemed appropriate as it is considered to be crucial for the discussion on FMvt, due to the fact that from January 2014 the transitional measures regarding Romania and Bulgaria were lifted. For the same reason, the public debate revolved largely around the impact of inflows of Romanians and Bulgarians into the UK. Hence, the analysis of both the political and media discourse will focus on these two nationalities and their constructed images, without this meaning though that other Europeans have not been the subject of securitisation.

For the media, two newspapers were selected based on their reach and reputation, the Daily Mail and the Guardian. It should be mentioned that although the Sun is the best-selling newspaper in the UK, it will not be considered as its website requires subscription and therefore articles and news reports are inaccessible. According to the Audit Bureau of Circulation, in February 2015, the Daily Mail had an average circulation of 1.6 million (Ponsford 2015), taking the second place after the Sun, while its website is steadily the most popular one, reaching almost 200 million unique monthly visitors in December 2014 (Edge 2015). The Guardian on the other hand, had a remarkably low circulation of 176,124 in February, 2015 (Ponsford 2015). This brings it only second-to-last among the twelve national newspapers. However, its website is the second most popular with over 100 million unique monthly visitors in December 2014 (Edge 2015). In addition, a study concluded that the Guardian was first among 25 global media outlets in terms of transparency (Moeller et al. 2007), while in 2012 it was the world’s third most read newspaper website (The Guardian 2012). These establish it as a reliable, respected and influential newspaper, and thus its contribution to the shaping of the national public opinion should be considered. A total of 144 articles selected from the websites of both newspapers from May 2014 will be scrutinised. This point in time was selected in order to incorporate the reactions regarding the first four months without transitional measures, and the policy changes introduced for that reason in January 2014.

It should be mentioned that the analysis will follow an actor-centric presentation instead of one according to the different discursive frames. There are a number of reasons for this: firstly, both of the approaches employed place increased importance on the role of the actors, and thus is seems appropriate for the analysis presentation to incorporate and stress this point; secondly, the general election was held in May 2015, and it would be intriguing to discuss how this
affected the rhetoric articulated by the politicians; thirdly, the analysis identified differences in the intensity of the securitising discourses of the different actors. Although, an elaborate and informed explanation for this observation escapes the scope of this paper, it is interesting to highlight it. Furthermore, ST and WPR have a constructivist nature and fall under the rubric of critical approaches, seeking to challenge dominant representations and reveal the logics that underlie them. Consequently, this work will operate within this tradition, and therefore the analysis of both policies and discourses will adopt a critical point of view. This means that the aim is not merely to describe the discourses, but critically and normatively assess them and, where possible, debunk them.

At the political stage, the role of the audience is of great significance as it is its reaction to the securitising discourse that determines the meaning of the alleged threat. Therefore, how the public receives the securitising messages of the government and the media, and to what extent they accept it has to be addressed. This will be achieved by examining opinion polls and surveys conducted by the survey company YouGov, which is perceived as reliable, and the Eurobarometer. Moreover, the NatCen’s British Social Attitudes Survey (2014), which measure changes in in the social, political and moral attitudes of the public, will be used. Another aspect of the framework that has to be addressed, are the contextual factors. As Balzacq (2005) and Stritzel (2007) have argued, securitisation does not happen in a vacuum, but is has to be studied in relation to the wider socio-political and sociolinguistic context (Stritzel 2007: 369). One important parameter that influenced the political debate in the UK is the fact that on 7 May 2015, during the period of the research, the British general elections took place. Due to this, it has to be kept in mind that the discourse used by the PM and the other members of the governing Conservative Party probably incorporates the electorate pressure exercised by the populist and anti-immigration UK Independence Party (Ukip), as well as the Tories’ pre-election commitment for a referendum on whether the UK should remain in the EU. The last point expresses the long-standing UK desire to re-negotiate its relationship with the EU, seeking a balance of competences that favours national sovereignty. In addition, as the UK has traditionally been an immigration country, it is worth taking under consideration the principles that have been historically underlying immigration policy and the changing notions of citizenship and belonging. In reference to the sociolinguistic factors, attention will be paid to the available vocabulary and how it is used to conflate immigration and FMvt (Stritzel 2007:369). A good example is the use of the terms ‘EU migrant’ and ‘EU immigration’ by politicians and media, which have a security connotation, instead of the more positive
expressions of FM and FMvt or European mobility. In order to better understand the securitisation process, discourse must be read through the prism of the above socio-political and sociolinguistic factors.

4.3.4. Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis will be a substantial instrument of analysis used in both dimensions of the framework: in the political one, to interrogate political and media discourse in order to explain how the image of the FM as a security threat is painted; and in the practical, to analyse policy documents and identify conceptual logics and silences. Particularly, in the first question it will be employed to bring to the fore the PRs in the policy; in the second to reveal the conceptual logics of the PRs; in the third, what is not said and what is not allowed to be said will be highlighted; and the last question overlaps with the ST which, as explained before, uses discourse analysis to scrutinise political speeches and media reports. The only question in which discourse analysis is not necessary is the fourth which focuses on the subjectification and real effects of the policy.

For the analysis, various techniques, as binaries, key concepts and categories will be employed. Binaries frame an issue as a dichotomy in which the two sides are mutually exclusive, e.g. contributing/non-contributing. This way they tend to constrain our understanding of an issue by simplifying complex relationships and imposing a hierarchy with one part being the privileged or valued one and the other the problematic (Bacchi 2009:7). Key concepts are abstract concepts, as welfare, contribution and immigration that are contested and can take different meanings, which mirrors the power struggle between competing social and political agents and their ideologies. Therefore, it is important to identify the key concepts in policies and the meaning given to them in order to challenge them (Bacchi 2009:8). Furthermore, the categories constructed by policies, like useful, unwanted and homeless, must be determined and establish how they are used to frame a problem within a specific meaning (Bacchi 2009:9).

Moreover, to recognise discourse designed to obscure concepts, protect dominant representations from being questioned or even mislead the audience, analytical instruments as implication, vagueness and the fallacy of hasty generalisation can be useful. In implication, information inconsistent with the dominant representations is left implicit, as for example in presenting as a fact that EUCtzns from Eastern Europe are ‘benefit tourists’ in the UK, while downplaying the reality that most of them are working and do not claim benefits. In vagueness, it is avoided to provide enough and reliable information for a sound and transparent judgement.
of the issue (Ahmadian & Farahani 2014:2116-7). This would be the case of accusing immigrants for putting additional pressure on public services without mentioning their contribution through taxes or structural problems as low public funding. Finally, in the fallacy of hasty generalisation, the speaker makes a generalisation about the features of an issue or a group, invoking common-sense knowledge without offering any substantial evidence (Wodak 2012:530). For example, attributing a large number of sham marriages to EUCtzns based solely on an ambiguous estimation.

4.4. Conclusion: the research questions and the 2-DSF

Now that the framework has been explained in detail, it would be useful to demonstrate how it will accommodate the aims of the research. As it has already been explained in Chapter 1, the objectives are to reveal the mechanisms and processes through which FMs and FMvt are securitised, explain the reasons why this is happening, and explore the impact of securitisation on policy-making.

Starting from the first aim, the 2-DSF will interrogate and assess the securitisation processes at two levels. At the practical one, the security logic behind the policies implemented will be highlighted and how this, combined with an economic rationale, creates exclusionary dynamics that generate two distinct populations to be governed, the Useful and the Unwanted. At the political level, the process through which the Unwanted acquire specific threatening features and how this image is disseminated to the public will be scrutinised.

Regarding the reasons behind these processes, the analysis can establish the governing of the FMs, and consequently of FMvt, through the filtering effects of the policy-nexus and connect it with the British demand for less competences to the EU and re-negotiation of the UK’s membership in the Union. Finally, the 2-DSF will interrogate the existing rationales that inform policy and policy-makers, generate specific understandings of issues, and call for particular responses. This way it can be indicated how future policies regarding FMvt could be formulated and how this course of action could be challenged by alternative conceptualisations of FMvt and FMs.

The analysis will be presented in the next three chapters, to which we turn now.
5. Ion lost in the policy-nexus

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to interrogate practices and rationales. The former by demonstrating how the policy-nexus filters the EU citizens in practice by dividing them into two categories, the Useful and the Unwanted; and the later by revealing the two rationales in which the policy-nexus is embedded: the economic which requires only those FMs who can and do contribute to be welcomed, and understands welfare through the principle ‘No Rights Without Responsibilities’ (NRWR); and the security one, which perceives the Unwanted as a threat to the welfare system and society.

The chapter will proceed as follows: first, Ion will walk us through the policy-nexus presenting the procedures and the recent policy changes, and demonstrating the difficulties a FM goes through in order to be integrated. Then, the WPR method will be applied to the policy documents describing the changes in the policy-nexus, and the results of the analysis will be discussed.

5.2 The policy-nexus

A detailed account of the regulation and policy changes is provided in Appendix 1. Parenthetical references in the text refer to the corresponding number of the policy change as listed in the appendix.

Ion went down to the Job Centre Plus to register himself as a jobseeker. **Interpretation services are not provided anymore** (7), so he had to ask his compatriot and flatmate to help him. The clerk sitting opposite him suggested that to look for a job he should register to Universal Jobmatch, the state online job portal, or with a recruitment agency. He explained that job centre handles benefit claims, as **Income Based Jobseeker’s Allowance (IB-JSA)**, which, due to recent policy changes, he could claim after having lived in Britain for three months (4). He also informed him that as a **European jobseeker, he couldn’t claim Universal Credit** (9), the new integrated benefit that aims to gradually replace most of the income-support ones (DWP 2010:13).

At this point, it is fit to shortly discuss the role of recruitment agencies. They provide workers to different sectors as the food processing industry, helping businesses to cope with fluctuating customer demand. 70%-90% of the supplied workers are migrants, predominantly from Eastern
Europe. British workers are not attracted due to low wages, harsh working conditions and the physical demands of the job (EHRC 2010:7). According to the Equality and Human Rights Commission report (2010), agency workers have been subjected to physical and verbal abuse and exploitation. The latter constitutes in long-hour shifts, working without any days off, and working on ‘zero-hour contracts’, when there is a contract. Employment can be sporadic and in many cases workers are sent home due to overbooking, after having showed up for work. Moreover, workers experience problems with their payment, as in many cases they are not paid their full wages or they are charged excessively for accommodation and transportation. Many of them participate forcefully in a tax allowance scheme that keeps them below the National Insurance contribution threshold (EHRC 2010:16). This, combined with the unstable employment, hinders them form meeting the new definition of ‘worker’ (see below), resulting in them being ineligible for claiming benefits or even losing their right of residence.

Fortunately, Ion didn’t have to register his residence after the first three months. In Britain, it is not obligatory. Although he was told that a residency certificate could help him access services or claim benefits, the over-burdensome application form, asking for an immense amount of data and information (Milieu 2008:31) deterred him from going ahead with it.

After five months of fruitless efforts to find a decent job, for which the awful experience of the sandwich factory the agency sent him to does not qualify, we returned to the job centre to claim IB-JSA. The same clerk told him that as a jobseeker he could claim IB-JSA for only three months (8). Ion mentioned his sporadic employment with the recruitment agency and asked if he could claim benefits as a former worker, as then he could receive IB-JSA for six months. The clerk explained that the new definition of worker (5) requires the person to have been engaged to ‘genuine and effective work’. This condition is satisfied either by meeting the new minimum earnings threshold, which for 2014/15 is £153 a week, or by assessing factors as whether the work was regular, the period of employment, continuity, number of hours worked and level of earnings (DWP 2014). Ion didn’t satisfy either.

The clerk went on to say that to claim benefits Ion must satisfy the Habitual Residence Test. This meant that Ion should prove his right to reside under the provisions of the EU Treaty, i.e that he is a worker, self-employed, jobseeker or self-sufficient, and that he was habitual resident, i.e. he intended to settle in the UK. The test is conducted by an interview, the decision is made by the caseworker and it is based on a case-to-case assessment. Factors considered are the length, continuity and general nature of residence, reasons for coming to the UK, future intentions, employment prospects and where their ‘centre of interests’ lies (Kennedy 2011:8). The clerk also said that a new more ‘robust’ test has been introduced (1) which is applied by an interview with the use of an electronic tool that generates tailor made questions. (Kennedy 2015:6-7). Ion satisfied the Habitual Residence Test thanks to the address of his compatriot, which he could declare as stable residence, and the details of the recruitment agency and the job applications he had sent that proved he was actively seeking for a job.
What worried Ion though was the fact that after three months of receiving IB-JSA he would have to satisfy a **Genuine Prospects of Work test** (3) or he would **lose his right to reside** (2) in the UK as a jobseeker. He was amazed when he learned that under the new legislation, even former workers with employment period less than a year lose their status after six months. To pass the Genuine Prospects of Work test he had to provide ‘compelling evidence’ that a change in his circumstances offer a genuine prospect of work. This means that he must have either a job offer for genuine and effective work starting within three months, or prove that an improvement in his circumstances, as vocational training or relocation, have given him genuine prospects of employment and is awaiting the outcome of job interviews (DWP 2015: 073099). He started thinking that maybe it would be a good idea not to claim benefits, in order not to be considered a social burden and avoid risking to be removed.

Ion needed to get his own place, so since he was there, he asked about housing benefit and Social Housing as well. He was disheartened when he heard that as **from April 2014 European jobseekers didn’t have access to housing benefit** (6) while they never had access to Social Housing. As for the later, the clerk said that even as a worker, he must be a **resident in the district for at least two years before he can be added to the waiting list**. He couldn’t afford a flat in the private market, so he hoped his compatriot didn’t bring up the matter, otherwise he would end up either sharing a horrible place with a bunch of other Romanians or homeless.

It is worth mentioning that some of these changes are not completely compatible with EU law. In particular, the Habitual Residence Test has been challenged by the Commission as it is deemed to be discriminative based on nationality (Cornelissen 2013:104); doubts have been voiced about the minimum earnings threshold which is seen as more difficult to be met by EUCtzns, and thus restricting FMvt, while it creates the opportunity for a narrow understanding of the concept of ‘worker’ (Desmond Rutledge 2014 cited in Kennedy 2015:17); it is unclear whether Universal Credit can be considered ‘social assistance’ and therefore possible to be denied to EUCtzns or not (Kennedy 2015:25). For the rest of the changes, it was the EU itself that allowed room for exploitation and restrictive measures by the member states in general and the UK in particular. For a more detailed account see Appendix 1.

5.3 **WPR: changes in welfare policy**

Ion walked us through the recent policy changes regarding the access of EUCtzns to welfare and gave us a hint of the practical obstacles a FM may face. To unravel the rationales behind those policy changes and to go deeper into their practical implications the WPR was applied on a number of documents regarding the changes, among them two newspaper articles by the British PM David Cameron, white papers, and government reports. An analytical index of the documents scrutinised is presented in Appendix 2. For reasons of simplicity and space
limitations, the outcomes of the analysis will be presented for the body of documents as a whole and not document-by-document. Parenthetical references in the text (e.g. Q1, Q2 etc.) indicate when a question of the WPR method has been applied.

5.3.1 Results of the analysis

5.3.1.1 Crackdown on benefit tourism

From the analysis, the most frequent PR identified is the uncontrollable migration flows from Eastern Europe that result in ‘benefit tourism’, and from which the welfare system needs to be protected (Q1). The policy changes were initiated by the lifting of the transitional measures regarding Romanians and Bulgarians from 1 January, 2014 (SSAC 2014:25), a fact that made Cameron write (2013a), ‘I know many people are deeply concerned about the impact that could have on our country. I share those concerns’. The discourse used generates a sense of influx of Eastern Europeans:

But things have gone wrong. Since 2004, we have witnessed the biggest migration in Europe outside wartime. In Britain’s case, 1m people from central and eastern Europe are now living here (Cameron 2013a).

The image of influx is combined with the claim that the British benefit system is generous, attracting the wrong people for the wrong reasons (Cameron 2014b). This leads to the policy changes which aim to protect the welfare state by restricting EUCtzns access to benefits. Verbs like ‘discourage’, ‘curb’ and ‘deter’ are used throughout the policy documents to describe the attempt of the British government to control FMvt (Kennedy 2015:11, SSAC 2014:25, 53).

Two key concepts are ‘welfare’ and ‘contribution’, the meanings of which indicate particular logics in the policies and are able to explain certain decisions (Bacchi 2009:60). To get a better understanding of how they are translated within a British policy context, the WPR method was applied to the white paper ‘Universal Credit: Welfare that works’ (2010) which outlined the welfare reform voted in 2012. The analysis revealed that the PR was ‘welfare dependency’ (Q1). The idea of ‘welfare system’ is informed by a neo-liberal rationale and a workfare understanding that links benefits with contribution/employment. This rationale is based on three presuppositions: the first two are ‘personal responsibility’ and the concept NRWR, and they are interrelated; the third one is the value of ‘hard work’ and the notion of morality derived by this (Bacchi 2009:57) (Q2). The individual is constructed as being dependant by personal choice, immoral as he allows himself to become a social burden, and with a tendency to anti-
social and criminal behaviour. At the same time it is his personal responsibility to acquire the skills necessary to enter the labour market or improve his salary. Structural problems are completely silenced (Q3), while the welfare dependent is presented as the dysfunctional ‘other’ and faces the risk of exclusion, stigmatisation and exacerbation of his condition (Q4). With that understanding, welfare is neither a right nor a security-net offering support when needed (Q3). It is a concession that has to be earned, while being directly linked to the claimant’s previous or potential future contribution, understood here as work. However, this neglects a humanitarian conceptualisation in which deserving becomes irrelevant when something is needed for survival reasons (Q3). This understanding of benefit receiving individuals is at work in the rationales that inform the policy changes assessed below.

Going back to the initial PR, one of the main underlying presuppositions is that migration is perceived as a production factor (Q2). Migrants have only one valid reason for going to the UK, ‘Government policy is that migrants should come here in order to contribute to the economy’ (SSAC 2014:6). In this quote and throughout all policy documents, the term ‘migrants’ refers to EUCtzn. In the context of British policy the notion of FMvt is not distinguished from that of migration and a EUCtzn is not differentiated from a third country national (Q3). The criterion to tell one from another is whether the migrant is subject to immigration control or not, demonstrating the British obsession about managing migration. FMvt acquires a purely economic substance, neglecting alternative conceptualisations, for example as an essential part of the European integration project (Q3). In that spirit Cameron (2014b emphasis added) writes:

The success of this nation was built by millions of hands, many from overseas – doctors, teachers, investors, academics, businesspeople – and succeeding in the decades to come means staying open to those who can really contribute.

Migration is understood as a way to reap economic benefits. Note that only high-skilled and high-valued professions are mentioned, neglecting totally the contribution of low-skilled migrant labour (Q3). Combined with the last phrase, a binary contributing/non-contributing migrant is rendered with low-skilled migrants being placed in the negative pole (Q2). This binary structures all policy changes and reveals their economic logic. This is even more evident in the next quote:

The Government recognises the contribution that EEA migrants make to the UK economy, and welcomes migrants coming to this country to work and contribute to our economy. The measures on restricting access to benefits by jobseekers from other member states are
necessary to protect the UK’s benefit system from those who might seek to exploit it (SSAC 2014:53 emphasis added).

Here the economic rationale is intertwined with a security one. The welfare state is constructed as being threatened by those EU citizens who go to Britain with the purpose to abuse it. Behind this representation lies the welfare magnet hypothesis (WMH), according to which EU citizens go to Britain seeking to claim benefits attracted by its generous system (Giulietti & Kahanec 2013:111) (Q2). Based on this assumption Cameron (2014b) writes, ‘We’re also making sure people come for the right reasons – which has meant addressing the magnetic pull of Britain’s benefits system’, while in a government report (HMG 2014:28) is stated that, ‘the UK paid “in work” benefits, in particular tax credits and housing benefit, which made it an attractive destination for migrants working in low paid jobs’

However, it is impressive that although the WMH is apparent in all policy documents, the government provides no evidence whatsoever on the importance of benefits in the EU citizens’ choice of destination country or on how many of them actually use the British welfare system. The fact is highlighted by the Social Security Advisory Committee (SSAC) (2014:10), along with doubts of migration NGOs about the robustness of the data supporting some of the policy changes. Groenendijk (2013:15, 18) mentions that in the UK, data on the nationality of benefit claimants are not available. The official explanation is that it is not required for processing purposes and thus not recorded. Nevertheless, he contends that this has also political dimensions, namely the desire to express freely political speculations. This is blatantly evident in a government review on FMvt (HMG 2014), in which existent studies regarding the role of the benefit system in attracting migrants (reviewed in Giulietti & Kahanec 2013) and EU citizens’ contribution into the British welfare system (Dustmann & Frattini 2014), all of them reaching positive conclusions for the FMs, are simply downplayed or even neglected (Q3). Instead, the attempt is to conduct a public debate supporting the WMH and the constructed threat to the welfare state with speculations, assumptions, feelings and the perception of the public⁴. This way, the actual contribution of FMs is silenced and the projected reality is seriously and purposely distorted, aiming to shape policy-making (Q3).

⁴ The lack of empirical evidence regarding this issue and the dominance of the public debate by unsubstantiated views is addressed in detail by E. Guild, S. Carrera and K. Eisele (2013).
A third presupposition underlying the PR is the principle NRWR, on which the notion of welfare is based (Q2). As mentioned before, welfare is framed as a concession that should be earned:

This policy is being introduced to protect the integrity of the benefit system and to ensure that any available benefit support is increasingly focused only on mobile EEA nationals who contribute to the UK through work (Kennedy 2015:26 emphasis added).

The policy changes focus mainly on European jobseekers and former workers, both groups falling in the non-contributing pole of the binary. It is those EUCtzns who are seen as not deserving benefits since they do not contribute. Therefore, not only they are not useful, but they are unwanted too as they become a social burden and threaten the integrity of the welfare system. In addition, they are presented as a threat to social cohesion and stability by being described as dysfunctional, anti-social and being prone to criminality (Q4). Cameron (2013a, emphasis added) writes, ‘If people are not here to work –if they are begging or sleeping rough– they will be removed’. He assumes that those not working do so by choice and he links them to anti-social behaviour, constructing a population that makes absolute sense to be expelled.

Moreover, a security continuum is created, in which FMvt is presented as facilitating drug and human trafficking and the transfer of ‘illegal’ immigrants and counterfeit goods, while EUCtzns are linked to sham marriages (HMG 2014:45, 47) (Q3). It is worth mentioning that the government supports the latter claim by referring to an increase in the number of reported suspected sham marriages. No evidence is provided for the number of the verified cases though.

It becomes obvious that the policy changes are embedded in two logics intertwining economy and security. Starting from the economic rationale, EUCtzns are welcome only if they can contribute while benefits are accessible by those who ‘deserve’ it. On the other hand, those who do not work are constructed as threatening the welfare system and seeking to abuse it, while they have all the dysfunctional characteristics of the welfare dependant individual, namely, irresponsibility, immorality, anti-social behaviour and proneness to criminality posing a threat to social stability and cohesion. This constitutes the security dimension of the policy logic. These rationales represent what Walters (2004:248) called oikos and domus, two notions of insecurity, which shape the understanding of the problem and produce specific solutions. The former is the need to guarantee the economic security of the country by establishing an efficient way to regulate FMvt, which factors in the labour shortages of the market and allows in those with the required skills to maintain and increase the competitiveness of the British economy.
The latter takes the form of public order and social peace; it is the protection of social cohesion and stability against the dangers brought along with uncontrolled immigration.

This is captured very nicely by the following extract, according to which the overall aim of the government policy is to

…shape future EEA migration activity so that people do not migrate to the UK until they have a job (or if they still wish to come without a job they can fully support themselves until they find work) (Duncan Smith 2014 cited in Kennedy 2015:27).

In the pursuit of its objectives the government neglects or downplays the adverse effects of the policy changes and their impact on vulnerable groups (Q3). Issues were raised particularly by the SSAC (2014:16-17) in its report about the restriction of access to housing benefit. It is noted that although the risk of vulnerable groups experiencing hardship as a result of the policy is identified by the government, it is not adequately addressed. Moreover, even though all stakeholders agree that homelessness will increase, the government does not seem to take any measures to mitigate the effects of the issue despite its stated commitment to help the homeless.

As already mentioned, the discussion is structured based on the contributing/non-contributing binary. This establishes two distinct populations: the Useful migrants who work and contribute, and the Unwanted ones who claim benefits and abuse the welfare system (Q2, Q4). The policy changes affect directly the life of the Unwanted group by significantly increasing their risk to experience poverty and hardship, homelessness, discrimination, exclusion, stigmatisation and expulsion (Q4). Take Ion for example: He has access to IB-JSA for a short time and after that he would be left with no income at all. He has no access to housing benefit which means that if he cannot stay with his compatriot anymore and without a proper job, it is highly likely he will end up homeless. Moreover, he runs a high risk of losing his right of residence as jobseeker, while given the dubious practices of recruitment agencies, even if he gets a job with them it would be quite difficult to meet the requirements for the worker status. This pushes him into poverty, and maybe to activities in the informal economy to get by. In the eyes of the British state, he has no right or reason to be there and therefore, constitutes a target for removal. Besides, the government is quite cynical about this:

The best option for those EEA migrants who are unable to find work, who lack savings or support networks and who are at real risk of ending up destitute is to return home. (SSAC 2014:3)
Nevertheless, they neglect that this is not always an option, as in many cases FMs, with Ion among them, have no employment prospects, family or networks in their home countries either (Q3, Q4) and hence, they prefer to become homeless in the UK than home (SSAC 2014:13)

It has been made clear now that the changes in policies and practices instead of running through the integration path of EUCtzns, create a governmentality which filters the population of FMs. Or as Tyler (2010:70) puts it, ‘all social institutions […] become border zones – sites of immigration control’. The ‘right’ ones are placed in the Useful category, while those who are not economically productive are excluded and become the Unwanted. Their exclusion exacerbates their situation pushing them into deeper poverty and activities in the margin of legality, resulting in stigmatisation. The phenomenon becomes a visible and disturbing abnormality of daily life generating a social unease. Policy constitutes the Unwanted as a population threatening the welfare system and social normality, creating the conditions for their further securitisation and governing by modalities totally alien to the ones used for the Useful and to the ones that should be used for the EUCtzns in general.

5.3.1.2 Blame it on the EU

A second PR identified by the analysis and that is worth mentioning due to its relevance to the study, is constituted in the EU Treaties and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which have expanded the scope of FMvt on the one hand, and impose limitations on its regulation by the national governments on the other (Q1):

Successive judgments of the ECJ have interpreted the right to free movement broadly, with the consequence that the rights of entry and residence which may be asserted in reliance upon them have expanded. This has had the effect of limiting the ability of Member States to control immigration from within the EU (HMG 2014:30).

This is based on two presuppositions. The first one is that migration is a production factor, yet again. In that sense, FMvt was conceived in order to facilitate the mobility of workers across EU to fill skills and employment gaps (HMG 2014:13) (Q2). The ECJ and the EU Treaties decoupled FMvt from economic activity, which for Britain is a drift away from the original purpose of FMvt and towards national challenges:

The scope of the rules has been stretched to cover further groups of mobile EU citizens beyond workers and their families, the interaction between the social security rules and the residence rules has become increasingly complex, and fresh legal challenges relating to how the rules are applied in Member States are being raised on an increasingly frequent basis (HMG 2014:41).
The second presupposition is that migration is and should be a national matter or in one word, sovereignty (Q2). Migration, has traditionally been a purely national policy, the boundaries of which were blurred within the EU, as certain types of migration are not under national control anymore. Open Europe comments in the HMG (2014:26) report that ‘free movement throws up a huge number of political challenges, such as a substantial loss of national control over who can enter the country’, and Cameron (2013a) seems to be in total accord with that as he writes, ‘Individual member states could be freed to impose a cap if their inflow from the EU reached a certain number in a single year’.

The policy changes attempt to solve the represented problem of restricted control over migration. However, Britain envisages a long-term and more effective solution. As mentioned before, the lived effects of the policy create a visible problem producing social unease. The discourse used, frames the problem as a consequence of the EU and its regulations, constraining the possibilities for solutions and presenting the reform of EU Treaties that would introduce conditionality in FMvt as the only commonsensical one (Q3, Q4):

The Government considers that now is an appropriate time to review the EU level rules with a view to modernisation and ensuring they are fit for purpose in the EU of today. […] Migration patterns have also changed significantly, with much more migration than in the past, including more migration of non-working people including jobseekers. Without reform, legitimate public concern about how EU migrants access social security in other Member States is likely to significantly undermine support for the principle of free movement. (HMG 2014:57 emphasis added).

Here the government invokes the public concern to support its claim for reform, the same public concern the government generates with the adverse effects of its policies and the securitisation of the Unwanted population of EUCtzn. It is impossible to establish with certainty a link between governmental discourse and intentional use of securitisation, especially when a political actor operates within a security rationale. Nevertheless, the above quote hints to a securitisation practice employed intentionally and instrumentally by the government to serve its sort- and long-term purposes, i.e. the immediate control of FMvt and the claim for a permanent and deeper regulation through EU legislation. The lived effects this would have on EUCtzn and the EU itself are of course immense, as basic rights of the Europeans would be challenged and the whole nature of the EU would be in doubt (Q4).

In this chapter the WPR approach revealed that the policy-nexus is embedded in an economic and a security rationale. The former divides EUCtzn into contributing and non-contributing; the later transforms the non-contributing into the Unwanted and constructs them as a threat to
the welfare system and social stability. This opens the possibility for their further securitisation, which aims to raise public concern to be used as leverage in the EU reform negotiations. In the following chapter, we turn to the processes of further securitisation and the response of the public to it.
6. Is that really us?

Is that really us? This is what Ion wonders every time he reads the newspapers or listens to politicians talk about immigration and free movement. Romanians like him, or even other Europeans, are portrayed so unfairly! He is not a thief nor lazy nor the other Easter Europeans are; they are only looking for a better life. But people just won’t believe it.

6.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to take up the last question of the WPR method, ‘How the representation is elaborated and disseminated by different actors? What is the response of the audience to it?’ and demonstrate how the constitution of the Unwanted as a threat to the welfare system and social stability by the policy-nexus is developed by politicians and the media to more elaborate constructions of threat; and explore the audience’s response to this further and more direct securitisation. First, the rhetoric used by politicians will be scrutinised, followed by the analysis of the media discourse. The last part is devoted to the assessment of the public’s reaction.

6.2 Political discourse

6.2.1 Political securitising actors and sources

Three securitising actors were selected for this part of the research, the PM David Cameron, the Secretary of State for the Home Office Theresa May and the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions Iain Duncan Smith. The selection was based on the fact that they were members of the Coalition Government 2010-2015 and continue to serve in the same positions in the Conservative Government formed after the general elections on 7 May, 2015. This means that their discourse has the positional power to heavily influence and shape the public opinion. Moreover, the positions they hold are directly related with the policy changes regarding FMvt: the PM by being the one who decides the policy; the Home Secretary by being responsible for immigration policy; and the Secretary for Work and Pensions for being in charge of welfare policy.
The speeches analysed were retrieved from the official government website www.gov.uk for the period 1/11/2013-25/5/2015. For the PM, a total of 101 speeches were reviewed, plus the two articles in Financial Times and Daily Telegraph published on 26/11/2013 and 28/7/2014 respectively. A further 27 speeches for the Home Secretary and another seven for the Secretary for Work and Pension were retrieved and examined. In addition, parliamentary debates available on the official website of the House of Commons (www.parliament.uk) were scrutinised for the same period. The debates were selected according to the relevance of their title with the research. Thus, twelve debates on immigration, benefit tourism, and benefits to EEA nationals were selected, one conducted by the PM, seven by the Home Secretary and four by the Secretary for Work and Pensions.

6.2.2 Securitising discourse

The first item that needs to be pointed out regarding the securitising discourse of the politicians, is how they understand ‘immigration’ and ‘free movement’. All of them use the term ‘migrants’ to refer to EU citizens, while they make no distinction between immigration and FMvt, which is consistent with the discourse in the policy documents analysed in the previous chapter. Hence, the embeddedness of the perception of FMvt as a sub-category of immigration in their discourse is confirmed and reinforced. This is evident in the economic plan of the Coalition Government, which included a general objective of reducing immigration (HM Treasury 2014) and considered FMvt a component of this. Moreover, May (2015) admitted that FMvt was the ‘key reason we failed to meet our net migration target’. Duncan Smith (2014b) uses the term ‘migrants’ to refer to the policy changes concerning EU jobseekers. Even the PM (2015d), in his speech on immigration after his re-election, announced that EU migration will be a focal point in the new Immigration Bill. Instead of treating FMvt as a right of EU citizens and integral part of European integration, they see it as a problematic form of migration that poses control challenges, embedding FMvt in a security discourse.

This was put nicely by May (2014 emphasis added): ‘…when immigration isn’t properly controlled it makes it difficult to maintain social cohesion, puts pressure on our public services and infrastructure, and forces down wages for people on low incomes.’ Therefore, FMvt, which is the main reason for uncontrolled migration, is constituted as a threat to the cohesion of the British society, the well-functioning of the public services and to the vulnerable population groups. This statement presents three cross-cutting and interrelated threats, and sets the frame of the securitising discourse that needs to be filled with more detailed descriptions.
The securitising discourse is built on the back of two elements, which are evident throughout the speeches of all three politicians: a generated sense of influx of EU citizens and the establishment of a Useful/Unwanted binary. When referring to FMvt, Cameron insists in using expressions as ‘mass population movements’ (2013b) and ‘biggest migration in Europe outside wartime’ (2013a), while May (2013) argued that ‘It was the biggest single influx this country has ever experienced’. At the same time they make clear that ‘a modern, knowledge-based economy like ours needs immigration’ (Cameron 2014c), not unskilled though which Cameron considers ‘clearly mad’. The division line then, is between those who go to Britain to work hard and contribute, and the low-skilled and jobseekers who are constructed as aiming to abuse the welfare system by claiming benefits without contributing first.

The Unwanted are then securitised, since they are represented as breaching the principle of NRWR on which the welfare is based and thus, they infringe the social contract of the British society. The welfare system and its operational principle entail the collective memories and struggles of the creation of the British welfare society and therefore, over the course of its creation, it became part of the national identity (Wæver et. al. 1993:153). Hence, the Unwanted are not only a threat to the sustainability and well-functioning of the system due to its exploitation, but to the British identity as well. This type of securitising discourse is articulated very strongly by Duncan Smith (2014b emphasis added):

…these new immigration and benefit checks will clamp down on those trying to exploit the system ensuring that Britain’s growing economy and dynamic jobs market deliver for those who work hard and play by the rules. […] But those who come here should know that we will not compromise when it comes to protecting the principles on which our welfare state is based. We must do right by those born here, living here and working here, whose contributions fund the system.

Note that the phrase ‘play by the rules’ hints to delinquency, opening a window for the association of the Unwanted with criminality, which will be elaborated upon below.

Another stream of securitising discourse is that of linking uncontrolled immigration to the increased burden on public services, mainly articulated by the PM. The discourse used aims to provoke the emotional identification of the British citizens with the constructed as threatened referent objects. Cameron (2014c, 2015d) brings up what ostensibly are considered the everyday results of the EU citizens influx, like overcrowded schools where English is a minority language, hospitals experiencing great pressure and being unable to facilitate the needs of the citizens, and failure to meet the housing needs of the public due to an exhausted social housing programme. All of these services are vital for the daily life of Britons and constitute an integral
part of the citizens’ relationship with the state. By straightforwardly claiming that British citizens are not serviced because EUCtznis occupy a disproportionate and unfair part of public services, the feeling that their way of life is threatened is infused into the audience. Moreover, the doubts over the ability of the state to sustain the same level of service to its citizens acts as a threat to the established social contract and consequently to social cohesion. It is worth noting that even if the concerns about the integrity of the public services are valid, issues as funding, organisation and personnel, which could be alternative solutions to the control of FMvt, are not mentioned at all. The same goes for the contribution of EUCtznis through their taxes to the public services.

All three politicians emphasise the period 2005-2010 following the accession of 8 Eastern European countries to the EU. They argue that ‘the number of British people in jobs fell by some 400,000, while the number of foreigners in British jobs soared by more than 700,000’ (Duncan Smith 2014a emphasis added). Since all of them fail to provide additional information, as the sectors that the EUCtznis were employed, wages and working conditions, misleading conclusions could be reached. Nevertheless, the impression they convey is that EUCtznis took the jobs of British people. Duncan Smith takes it a step further by connecting FMvt to damaging people’s lives through the resulted unemployment and welfare dependency. As he says (2014b):

> In too many cases, it was a combination of the welfare system trapping people in dependency and removing the drive to go to work […] and the open door immigration policy which meant they were so easily replaced by foreign workers coming in.

To add to that, when criticising the welfare system for being ineffective, he argues (2014a) that ‘It is not only migration that rises as a result. Crime and health costs are high in such difficult communities’. With this phrase a security continuum is created, in which migration is placed side-by-side with crime and health costs as consequences of a ‘bad’ system. Hence, FMts are constructed as a threat to the social cohesion due to causing increased unemployment and welfare dependency to the local population, which has damaging consequences for their lives; and FMvt becomes part of a security continuum that includes crime and health costs and needs to be controlled.

This leads us to the last type of securitising discourse, which links the EUCtznis to criminality. FMts are constructed as being prone to anti-social behaviour, fraudulent activities and
criminality. Duncan Smith (2014b emphasis added) draws them as trying to deceive the state in order to appropriate benefits:

Banning new migrants from claiming Housing Benefit altogether, we have also clamped down on those trying to manipulate the tax credits system for too long a source of income for those in bogus jobs or falsely declaring themselves self-employed.

Cameron (2014c) establishes a straightforward relationship between FMvt and delinquency by saying that:

…tougher and longer re-entry bans for all of those who abuse free movement, including beggars, rough sleepers, fraudsters and people who collude in sham marriages. […] And this has driven a new industry in sham marriages, with this loophole accounting for most of the 4,000 bogus marriages that are thought to take place in our country every year.

In other discourses, those who abuse FMvt are the ones who claim benefits without contributing. Now they are placed in a melting pot with those engaging in questionable activities, and all together constitute a threat to the safety and normality of society. Therefore, they constitute a population to be removed. Moreover, the number of sham marriages attributed to EUcitizens is contestable. This number is mentioned in the Impact Assessment of the Home Office (2013:3) on the change of policy regarding sham marriages, which estimates that 4,000-10,000 applications of non-EEA nationals may be based on a sham marriage of civil partnership. However, on the explanation how the estimate is derived, they say that there are no records of how many non-EEA nationals marry in England, and so the number is based on the records of Scotland which registers information on country of birth (not nationality). Therefore, the estimate seems to be highly speculative and misleading. The fact has attracted the attention and comments of legal blogs in the UK as well (https://www.freemovement.org.uk/minister-misleads-sham-marriages-numbers-statistics-1300/).

To summarise, a specific population of the EUcitizens, the low-skilled and jobseekers, is constructed as taking British jobs and causing ‘dependency, hopelessness and despair’ (Duncan Smith 2014b) to British people; and as anti-social, criminals and fraudsters who went to Britain not to work and contribute but to abuse the benefit system. Hence, they constitute a threat to the integrity of the welfare state, the principles underlying the social contract of the British society and identity, and subsequently to social cohesion and stability. For this, as Cameron (2013a, 2014c) said, the government has to first ensure that this population can be removed and then that the problem is settled in a permanent way by regulating it through the change of the EU Treaties. It is worth mentioning that the discourse of the three politicians incorporates
the notions of *oikos* and *domus*: the first one is present through the distinction between the Useful and the Unwanted, aiming to assure economic growth and security; and the second through the harsh announcements of measures seeking to guarantee domestic order.

6.3 Media discourse

6.3.1 Media securitising actors and sources

Based on their circulation, website popularity and reputation, two newspapers were selected in order to assess their securitising impact: the Daily Mail and The Guardian. On both websites, searches were run with the key words ‘EU-migration’, ‘Romanian’ and ‘Bulgarian’ for the period May 2014-May 2015. The words ‘Romanian’ and ‘Bulgarian’ were preferred as the transitional restrictions were recently lifted for the respective countries and thus, it was assumed that worries for a fresh influx would be focused on them. For the Daily Mail, the searches included only the categories ‘news’ and ‘RightMinds’. The searches returned 687, 304 and 105 news reports respectively. After reading through all of them and excluding irrelevant pieces and duplicated results, 81 articles were selected (41, 33 and 7 respectively), as the most relevant, for further analysis. The search engine of the Guardian had no specification choices, returning results for the whole period available in its archives, but displaying only 100 of them sorted by relevance or date, creating an inconsistency in the searching method. Nevertheless, 300 articles were reviewed and a total of 63 were selected (27, 20 and 16 respectively).

6.3.2 Daily Mail

In general, the Mail discourse follows the political one although it is significantly harsher, making straight and naked connections of specific nationalities with criminality and anti-social behaviour, and hence having a strong securitising effect. FMvt is again understood as a sub-category of immigration which is difficult to control. Moreover, the low-skilled and job-seeking FMs are targeted once more, however, the presence of high-skilled/Useful ones in the

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5 It is noted that all the speeches and articles analysed for this part of the research are listed in an appendix. Due to its length, it deemed preferable no to attach it to the main text. However, it is available on a separate file and accessible at https://www.dropbox.com/s/o76ns6dlrprfqm9/Appendix%20Speeches%20and%20Articles.docx?dl=0, or it can be provided on demand to anyone who would like to scrutinise it.
discourse remains chiefly subtle, making the distinction blur and expanding securitisation to EUCtzn as a whole. The sense of influx is skilfully cultivated by headlines as ‘300,000! That was the overall number of migrants last year’ (Doughty 2015) and ‘The truth about East European migration: One in 30 Latvians are living in Britain, one in 60 Poles are also over here - and statistics don't even show latest influx’ (Doyle & Chapman 2014). To emphasise it even more, metaphors comparing the inflow of EUCtzn to cities as Coventry (The Daily Mail 2015d) or Birmingham (The Daily Mail 2015c) are used along with figures and photographs. Words as ‘soars’ and ‘sharp increase’ in the titles of figures 1 and 2 generate a sense of threat and urgency, while the separate figure (3) for Bulgarians and Romanians explicitly targets the specific nationalities. Note that all three figures are repeated again and again in many news reports referring to immigration or FMvt, establishing the feeling of unease.

EUCtzn are blamed for increased pressure placed on the public services, with the paper stressing how much money (according to their own estimations) is spent on translators (Beckford & Adams 2015) or to help children in British schools who do not speak English (Petre 2014). The latter point is combined with speculations about native speakers being neglected due to the focus on immigrant children, thus creating a threat for the future of the British society, which will be comprised by inadequately educated individuals.
Moreover, the paper constructs Eastern European ‘immigration’ as a threat to the economy. The argument is that they are willing to take jobs Britons will not do because the income disparity between Britain and their country allows them to earn more even in low-paid jobs, and the ‘generous’ welfare system tops up their earnings. Hence, the Mail contends that wages are pushed down and the subsidised low-skilled jobs erode the dynamic of the economy (Green 2014, Drury & Duncan 2015). So, the paper feels that it is justified to ask ‘Is there no one left in Britain who can make a sandwich?’ (Eccles 2014) and ‘Where did Britain’s truckers go?’ (Cockroft 2015) and to conclude that ‘…migration from eastern Europe has put thousands of Britons out of work’ (The Daily Mail 2015b).

Nevertheless, the explicit targeting of Romanians and Bulgarians and their construction as criminals, prone to anti-social behaviour and abusing benefits is where the discourse of the Mail becomes extreme and produces intense securitisation. From the analysis of the 40 articles selected from the ‘Romanian’ and ‘Bulgarian’ searches, it was identified that although the two nationalities are often mentioned together or there is a general reference to Eastern Europeans, the focus is placed mostly on Romanians. In 38% (15/40) of the articles, the headline contained the word ‘Romanian’ along with at least one word indicating criminal or anti-social activity, such as ‘thief’, ‘pickpockets’, ‘jailed’, ‘gang’, ‘sham marriages’ ‘beggar’, ‘homeless’. In half of these cases, the criminalising word immediately precedes or follows the word ‘Romanian’. Maybe the most characteristic headline is ‘Police warn
pickpockets in the only language they understand…Romanian’ (Ellery 2014). Moreover, statistics are used to demonstrate the tendency of Romanians to crime: ‘Romanians EIGHT times as likely to be jailed here as Britons’ (Beckford & Crawford 2015, emphasis in the original). Note that the article does not offer socioeconomic explanations for this, implying that the tendency to crime is a natural feature of Romanians. Furthermore, several news reports establish a link between FMvt and organised crime controlling sham marriages and Eastern European passports giveaway to third country nationals, hence securitising not only specific populations of EUCitizens, but the right itself.

Extensive coverage is given to the increase of homeless EUCitizens, and especially Romanians and Bulgarians, with the emphasis of the news stories being that they bed in exclusive districts of London demonstrating anti-social behaviour as ‘begging, washing in fountains, dumping rubbish and defecating in public’ (Robinson 2014), while Richard Littlejohn (2014) outraged wonders ‘Why the hell are we importing beggars?’. Notwithstanding, the possibility of increased homelessness being the result of the government policy to restrict access to housing benefit is not mentioned anywhere. Finally, stories about extreme cases of benefit claims are presented, emphasising on the alleged vulnerability of the British system and constructing the benefit receivers as having the ‘unashamed’ (Charlton 2014) plan of using the benefits to fund activities in their home country or to have a ‘free ride’ in the UK.

The headline ‘No country can cope with so much change’ (The Daily Mail 2015a) indicates that the bottom line in the Mail’s discourse is that the influx of ‘EU-migrants’ in general, and of Eastern Europeans particularly, threatens the cohesion of the society and the British national identity. Max Hastings (2014 emphasis added) puts it almost offensively:

The reality is there in the statistics about Britain’s crazy passport giveaway and the huge tribe of EU migrants nesting here: our society is being wrenched askew in ways most British people do not want.

The influx, the pressure on public services, the predicted population boom, the increasing numbers of foreigners acquiring British citizenship, the rising criminality, all of them threaten to change Britishness. Children at school will not learn proper English, collective memories and history cannot be upheld with all these aliens, and criminality and antisocial behaviour compromises the British way of life.
On the contrary, it can be safely argued that the Guardian’s discourse has a de-securitising effect. The paper devotes significant space to the topic of immigration. It urges politicians to use more constructive language (The Guardian 2015) and holds a sober and balanced public debate trying to introduce a different way to approach the issue (Freedland 2015). In the context of this debate, even the negative views are expressed in mild and careful language (Ormerod 2015, Collier 2014) and immigrants are given the opportunity to voice their view. Hence, another side of the story is articulated on the part of immigrants, highlighting issues as the negative effects of migration to the sending countries (Krastev 2015), the personal cost of moving to a new country (Younge 2015), the difficulties and attitudes they face (Tomescu 2014) and their concerns about their home countries (Stirbu 2014).

Moreover, the Guardian adopts a positive and realistic discourse regarding FMvt and immigration. The economic benefits reaped of incoming labour are emphasised, while the social contribution of EUctznrs and migrants is celebrated as cultural richness and vibrancy (Young-Powell & Gil 2015). Considerable effort is made by the paper to debunk popular securitising discourse by deconstructing misconceptions and misleading interpretations, explaining calculations, analysing statistics and setting facts straight (The Guardian 2014, Portes 2014 and Robbins 2015).

In sharp contrast with the Daily Mail, none of the 20 articles selected from the ‘Romanian’ search and the 16 of the ‘Bulgarian’ referred to them as thieves or any other criminal characterisation. In addition, the same topic was represented very differently in the two newspapers. For example, the Mail constructed as threat to the British society and public services the migrant students not speaking English (Petre 2014), while the Guardian viewed schooling of migrant children as a social cohesion policy (Fogg 2015). Or where the Mail saw immigration ‘soaring’ (Chorley 2015), the Guardian felt that ‘that’s no reason to panic’ (Finch 2015). It is worth mentioning that the lack of securitising moves notwithstanding, even the Guardian conflates immigration and FMvt.

In conclusion, the Daily Mail has a strong securitising effect, in essence following and complementing the discursive pattern of the rhetoric of the politics. EUctznrs in general are constructed as putting pressure on public services, driving down wages and taking ‘British’ jobs, while Romanians are particularly represented as criminals and benefit tourists. On the
other hand, the discourse articulated by the Guardian aims to politicise the subject by opening it for public discussion and conducting a sober, balanced and respectful debate. In that sense the Guardian is deemed to have a de-securitising effect as it attempts to move the issue out of the sphere of threat and fear and bring it back to the realm of normal politics. The different approaches adopted by the two newspapers must be seen through the prism of a political struggle between different ideologies and discourses. Although, it would be interesting to dig deeper into the question why the particular papers articulate the respective discourses, it escapes the scope of this paper.

Table 1 at the end of the chapter summarises the discursive securitising process by listing the security discourses and providing respective illustrative quotes by different actors.

6.4 The audience

The intersubjective nature of securitisation dictates that the audience has to accept it and legitimise it in order for it to be successful. Although in this case, a clear-cut acceptance of the securitisation of FMvt is not easy to be established, strong indications can be identified. Keeping in mind the conflation of the concepts of immigration and FMvt in the British context, the idea that current immigration levels are too high is rendered (NatCen 2014:1). The Eurobarometer surveys show that since 2010 at least, immigration ranks constantly among the three perceived as most important issues facing the UK, along with unemployment and the economy (figure 4), trend that is corroborated by YouGov too (figure 5). Observe that the public concern increases impressively after 2013.
However, the fact that immigration already ranks among the top three concerns since 2010 implies that the securitisation process had probably started long before the time span of this research. What is also interesting is that the British public is significantly more concerned about immigration compared with the rest of the EU.

Evidence indicates that the public largely accepts the threatening stereotypes of EU citizens constructed by politicians and media. Immigration is deemed to undermine the British culture by 45% of the public, while another 47% think it is bad for the economy. 55% of them believe that the main motive of migrants to go to Britain is to claim benefits. Moreover, 54% think migrants should have access to benefits after 3-5 years of working and paying taxes (NatCen 2014:1). In addition, immigration is considered responsible for low wages, lack of jobs and school places and waiting times in hospitals (YouGov 2014c). The Romanians are seen as having the most negative contribution of all foreign ethnic groups (45%), with Bulgarians being fourth in that ranking (33%) (YouGov 2015). It is no surprise then that in December 2013, 49% answered that Romanians and Bulgarians going to the UK would be damaging, and that the British government should have acted to restrict their right to live or work there, even if it means breaking EU laws (YouGov 2014a). It is worth noting that the percentage was significantly reduced to 35% in May 2014, obscuring the reaction of the public to the securitising discourse. It remains a fact though that in October 2014, 68% wanted ‘EU-migration’ to be limited to skilled-workers only (YouGov 2014b).

Apart from the surveys’ findings, a strong indication of the audience’s acceptance of securitisation is the election outcome. The Conservatives won an unexpected 12-seat majority...
attracting 36.9% of the voters (BBC 2015). The Tories’ manifesto (2015:29) explicitly states their commitment to reduce net immigration in the tens of thousands, control EU migration through welfare rules and tackle criminality and abuse of FMvt by reforming the EU. It could be argued that the public, feeling unease created by the distortion of their daily normality caused by EUCitizens experiencing exclusion and hardship due to the government policy, accepted the securitising discourse of the three politicians and Daily Mail. Based on this constructed unease, they decided that the proposed solutions of more control of FMvt and EU reform are the appropriate ones, which was translated into the election result. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind, that in an election campaign there is not only one issue under consideration and that voters often have different priorities. The fact is though, that immigration seems to be chronically within the top concerns of Britons.

This concludes the analysis of the political dimension of the securitisation process. In the next and final chapter, the methodological framework, the 2-DSF, will be completed by the incorporation of a number of contextual factors, and further aspects of the study will be highlighted.
## Table 1: Securitising discourses and illustrative quotes.
(Source: Political speeches and media articles used for the analysis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Securitising discourse</th>
<th>Illustrative Quote</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Conflation of FMvt and immigration. FMvt is a problematic form of immigration because it cannot be controlled</td>
<td>Uncontrolled mass immigration increases pressure on public services and can drive down wages for people on low incomes. That is why we are committed to reducing net migration [...] My hon. Friend is right to identify the significant increase in the number of people coming to this country from inside the European Union as the key reason we have failed to meet our net migration target. (Home Secretary T. May 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Influx</td>
<td>[T]he truth was that more than 1 million came. It was the biggest single influx this country has ever experienced (Home Secretary T. May 2013)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The truth about East European migration: One in 30 Latvians are living in Britain, one in 60 Poles are also over here - and statistics don't even show latest influx (The Daily Mail, Doyle &amp; Chapman 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Abuse of the welfare system. Threat to its sustainability</td>
<td>The third point I’d make is on the issue of free movement. I don’t think that the status quo really reflects, as I said in my remarks, what was originally put in place. That it was meant to be about movement to go and, you know, take on a job that was – that you could apply for. It was not about free movement for benefit tourism (Prime Minister D. Cameron 2013b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romanian scrap worker pledges to bring his wife and five children to join him in UK 'because it's my right to £25,000 benefits and a four bedroom house' (The Daily Mail, Charlton 2014)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>But those who come here should know that we will not compromise when it comes to protecting the principles on which our welfare is based. (Secretary for Work and Pensions I. Duncan Smith 2014b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Increased burden to social services</td>
<td>Because if you have uncontrolled immigration, you have uncontrolled pressure on public services. (Prime Minister D. Cameron 2015d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£244MILLION - That's the staggering sum YOU pay each year to help children in British schools who cannot speak English (The Daily Mail, Petre 2014, emphasis in the original)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 They take British jobs and drive wages down</td>
<td>[W]hen immigration isn’t properly controlled it makes it difficult to maintain social cohesion, puts pressure on our public services and infrastructure, and forces down wages for people on low incomes. (Home Secretary T. May 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In other words, for every British person who fell out of work, almost 2 foreign nationals gained employment. (Secretary for Work and Pensions I. Duncan Smith 2014a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>This paper holds no torch for Mr Farage, but wasn’t he articulating, in forthright language, what the silent majority think – that migration from eastern Europe has put thousands of Britons out of work? (The Daily Mail 2015b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Criminality and anti-social behaviour</td>
<td>And it includes tougher and longer re-entry bans for all of those who abuse free movement, including beggars, rough sleepers, fraudsters and people who collude in sham marriages. (Prime Minister D. Cameron 2014c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romanians EIGHT times as likely to be jailed here as Britons: Shock new figures show they are worst offenders with 11,000 arrested each year... as foreign nationals fill 1 in 8 UK prison places (The Daily Mail, Beckford &amp; Crawford 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Threat to social stability and British identity</td>
<td>It’s wrong that we open our doors and communities to such rapid levels of immigration they can’t manage. (Prime Minister D. Cameron 2014a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The reality is there in the statistics about Britain’s crazy passport giveaway and the huge tribe of EU migrants nesting here: our society is being wrenched askew in ways most British people do not want. (Daily Mail, Hastings 2014, emphasis added)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Conclusions

7.1 Introduction

The purpose of this last chapter is to summarise and conclude the paper. To ensure that the study has achieved its purposes, we will go back to the research questions, recap what has been said so far and address the pending issues. At the same time, an attempt will be made to introduce contextual factors as the general election in May 2015, the historical and conceptual continuity of British immigration policy and the notions of British citizenship, and to interpret the results of the analysis through their prism. Then, the limitations faced will be shortly discussed and a suggestion for further research will be made.

7.2 Back to the research questions

7.2.1 How is the process of securitisation taking place?

I argued that securitisation of FMvt takes place at two levels: the practical, through the policy-nexus and the consequent practices; and the political through the discourse of politicians and media. The analysis of the former dimension revealed that policy changes, introduced to restrict access of EUCtzn to benefits and curb FMvt into the UK, are informed by an economic and a security rationale, which are intertwined. The economic logic seeks to facilitate the needs of the British economy in high-skilled labour in order to ensure the country’s competitiveness in a globalised world. To this end, the policy discourse renders a division between the Useful and the Unwanted, while policy practices perform a filtering function, granting access to the welfare system to those who can and are contributing while excluding those who are not. The security rationale, on the other hand, constructs the Unwanted as seeking to abuse benefits and as having a propensity to criminal and anti-social behaviour, while FMvt is placed in a security continuum along with drug and human trafficking, sham marriages and other criminal activities. The result is a noticeable irregularity in the British normality feeding social unease. This opens room for further securitisation at the political level. The analysis revealed a differentiating securitising intensity among the different actors, ranging from a de-securitising
effect, which the Guardian is deemed to have, to a strong but controlled securitising rhetoric by all political actors, to an extreme securitising discourse articulated by the Daily Mail. In general, the three top government politicians and the Daily Mail construct the Unwanted as a threat to social stability and cohesion due to their alleged goal to abuse the welfare system, the pressure they place on wages and public services, and their delinquent and uncivilised behaviour. Nevertheless, the Daily Mail’s language has been considerably harsher, posing an intrinsic connection between eastern Europeans, particularly Romanians, and crime. The image conveyed is that criminality is not an outcome of social conditions and government policies, but a behaviour ascribed to the EU citizens’ nature (Fox, Moroșanu & Szilassy 2012:688). On the other hand, although the politicians use a firm language, they never reach extreme articulations, while they make sure they emphasise the need for and the benefits of high-skilled immigration.

The May 2015 general election may have played a role in the securitising strategy adopted by the politicians. Even though immigration was a hot issue for the public during the pre-election period, the Tories chose to run a campaign with the economy and EU reform in the fore and with immigration kept in the background. A possible explanation for this is that the Conservatives had to compete with their traditional rival, the New Labour Party, and with the anti-immigration and anti-EU UKip. They dealt with the Labour party, by managing to put the blame on them for the alleged influx caused by the ‘open-door’ immigration policy they followed in the 2000s and the ‘monumental mistake’ (Cameron 2013a) not to impose transitional restrictions to the newly admitted states in the 2004 EU enlargement. However, on their right, UKip articulated a harsh anti-immigration discourse and an outspoken intention to push for withdrawal from the EU in order to regain sovereignty over national borders. Nevertheless, if the Tories were enticed to follow a similar discourse, they would probably not be able to convince the anti-immigration voters, while they would alienate the more liberal audience and the business class, who are pro-immigration and consider membership in the EU valuable (NatCen 2014:14). Therefore, they pursued a more balanced strategy, promoting a ‘tough love’ rhetoric (Düvel & Jordan 2003:302) of welcoming those that want to work and contribute and cracking down on ‘benefit tourists’ who threaten social cohesion. Also, to the discourse of national sovereignty out of the EU, they opposed staying in a reformed EU that suits British interests, i.e. allows them to control FMvt.

Judging by the outcome of the election, the Tory strategy paid off. Undoubtedly, the elections are not judged by only one issue and it is highly complex to establish the true intentions and
priorities driving the voting choices of the public. However, the surveys (see p.61, Eurobarometer, YouGov) confirm that immigration and economy have been the top two out of three considerations of the voters. Hence, assuming that the oikos and domus aspects of the Conservatives’ securitising discourse cover the needs of the audience for economic security and domestic order, it is possible that the voters opted for the Tories. On the other hand, Cameron (2015c) himself interpreted the election result as ‘a mandate to deliver change in Europe, and that mandate will be very powerful’. So, his reading is that the securitising strategy raised the necessary public support to be used as leverage in his government’s negotiation for EU reform and an institutional restriction of FMvt.

7.2.2 Why is this happening? What are the motives driving this process?

So far I have argued that the securitisation process had two goals. The first one is to remedy the problem of uncontrolled immigration by acting as a form of governmentality regulating FMvt. By rendering the binary Useful/Unwanted, two distinct populations are created. The Useful are those who are welcomed to work and contribute with their skills to the UK economy, and through their contribution they earn their membership in the British society. The Unwanted are those who are deemed as not having the competences and qualifications to make an essential contribution, and therefore they have no place in Britain and must be removed or hindered from coming. Thus, through securitisation, the Unwanted are constructed as a threat, making their differentiated treatment and governing possible.

The second objective is to promote a more permanent solution to the problem through EU reform. In Chapter 5, we saw that the British wish FMvt to stop being an unqualified principle (Cameron 2013a) and be linked back and restricted to the economically active population. This way, the UK could ensure that it continues to reap the benefits of European skilled labour and is able to keep the Unwanted out. Securitisation has an integral part in achieving this, as the unease created by the constructed threat raised public concern and support for the government’s strategy, resulting in a perceived as very powerful mandate to renegotiate Britain’s relationship with the EU.

 Nonetheless, these objectives should not be seen in isolation, but they must be placed in the wider socio-political and historical context of British immigration policy and notions of citizenship. The immigration policy in Britain has demonstrated a continuity which is underlined by the need to minimise social disturbances and enhance social stability and
cohesion by successful integration (Smith & Marmo 2014:348), establishing an enduring conceptualisation of immigration as a threat to domestic order that needs to be controlled (Walters 2004:239).

Since the 1950s, this has taken different forms. In the post war period Britain filled its labour shortages with immigrants from the colonies, allowed to enter the country as citizens of the UK and the Commonwealth established by the 1949 British Nationality Act (Diez & Squire 2008:570). In the 1950s and 1960s, concerns about ‘coloured immigration’ triggered a discourse similar to the securitising one identified by this study, using metaphors as floods and accusing immigrants for inner city decline (Tomlinson 2013:67). This resulted in the ‘good race relations’ paradigm, according to which immigration had to be managed in order to maintain social stability. Based on that premise, the 1962 and 1971 Immigration Acts attempted to restrict entrance to ‘coloured’ migrants and at the same time, by the introduction of the category of patrial (those with a father or grandfather born in the UK), allowed in white Commonwealth migrants (Fox, Moroșanu & Szilassy 2012:683). In general, controls were adopted in an attempt to balance the economic need for migrant labour against the supposed social instability caused by uncontrolled immigration (Smith & Marmo 2014:352). In the 1980s and 1990s, the evolution of the ‘good race relations’ paradigm into the multicultural model, which was based on the organisation of immigrants along ethnic lines (Joly 2012:472), consolidated the idea that uncontrolled immigration results in social unrest.

The 2000s were marked by the retreat from the multicultural model in favour of more assimilationist policies. The terrorist attacks in the early 2000s raised preoccupations that increased cultural differences could erode social cohesion and result in extremism, thus reinforcing the conviction that uncontrolled immigration generates social problems, and allowing the emergence of more nationalistic notions of belonging (Waite 2012:356, Gray & Griffin 2014:302). A ‘managed migration’ policy was adopted in order to cover labour shortages in the economy and protect social peace (Fox, Moroșanu & Szilassy 2012:683), while a new citizenship test emphasised on British values and imposed a framework of national sameness (Grey & Griffin 2014:302). Although, this approach was introduced by Labour, the Coalition Government continued it. David Cameron (2015a, 2015b) and Theresa May (2015) in their speeches construct Britain as a pluralistic multicultural and open society on one hand, and on the other, they condition acceptance and integration of migrants on the embrace of
British values, defined as democracy, equality, freedom of speech, rule of law and respect for minorities.

British immigration policy then, has been historically underpinned by the concept of managed inflows in order to balance between economic benefits and social stability. As FMvt cannot be directly controlled, in terms either of numbers or of qualities, it does not fit this understanding of immigration policy, and poses a challenge to the government. Seen in this context, securitisation makes more sense, as it aims to impose a control system on FMvt and legitimise these restrictions; and to generate the necessary support for an EU reform that would give back to the state the sovereignty to control its borders and justify its protective function (Groenendijk 2013:20).

7.2.3 What is the impact of securitisation on policy-making?

According to the definition introduced in Chapter 4, securitisation is the multilevel process of constructing an issue as a threat, institutionally by incorporating it in security-laden frameworks of policy, and discursively by constructing an image of it that casts insecurity to the relevant audience, seeking to gain legitimacy and support for the actions taken to deal with the threat. However, it would be naive to think that a process that puts a society through the stressful and traumatic experience of living under unease and insecurity, does not have any lasting effects on the conceptualisation of the threatening issue and the social self-understanding. This last question, aims to explore the imprint of securitisation in the perceptions of and reactions to FMvt and immigration in general, and how they alter the socio-political context within which securitisation continues to operate.

Bacchi (2009:ix) contends that policy constitutes problems that are seen as in need to be fixed. The shaping of the problem is contingent upon the political, social and cultural context within which policy-makers and governments function. Such a context is offered by the historical and political continuity of British immigration policy according to which immigration is perceived as a threat to social stability and policy has to weigh economic benefits against social peace. Within this securitised imaginary, immigration controls and restrictions are perceived as the only logical solutions (Tyler 2010:66). The consequences of these policies are exclusion and a sense of threat and emergency, generating an atmosphere of insecurity which permeates the socio-political realm and familiarises the whole of society with the idea that immigration entails risks that must be mitigated. When this mental representation resonates firmly in the society, it
becomes institutionalised, cements a security rationale informing perceptions and policy, and blocks out any alternative conceptualisations. When inflows cannot be easily controlled, like FMvt, a gradually escalated spiral is created, which calls for more control, resulting in more exclusion and more insecurity, and eventually falls back to even more control.

This vicious cycle can be observed in the course of action pursued by the Conservatives. Following Cameron’s strong pledge to reduce immigration to ‘tens of thousands’ in 2011, (Watt 2015), restricting policies to limit access of EUCtzns to the benefit system and curb their decisions to go to the UK were introduced (those analysed in Chapter 5). However, in 2014, the number of Europeans moving to Britain increased significantly, while total net migration was triple the target set by Cameron and reached near record levels (Travis 2015). Instead of constructing an alternative narrative, according to which FMvt is integral part of European integration, cultural richness, economically beneficial and socially just in terms of offsetting economic hardships experienced of other member states, the Tories chose to reiterate their pledge to reduce immigration in their manifesto for the 2015 election (Tories 2015:29). This time it was downgraded from a goal to an ambition though. Their plan is to introduce even more stringent measures, including restricting access to benefits for four years, removal of jobseekers after six months and tougher requirements for non-EU spouses of EUCtzns. Based on the pattern described above, it is highly likely that this policy will exacerbate exclusion, marginalisation and stigmatisation, generating more social unease and the demand for harsher policies. Here, it is important to stress the long-term nature of the securitisation process. Cameron’s Tories did not invent the threatening construction of immigration and FMvt. As the surveys and the continuity of the British immigration policy show, they were already operating in a securitised environment, prescribing to think immigration in security terms.

Securitisation then is not only about the immediate actions taken in response to the constructed threat. It is about establishing certain perceptions and conceptual logics that leave a strong imprint in society, and hinders policy-makers from understanding the problem in a different way and formulating alternative solutions. The real effects this could have on Britain are living in a permanent state of fear and insecurity; discrimination, racism and social disturbances (contrary to the long-standing objective of British immigration policy); and distortion of the country’s relations with the EU with devastating consequences for both.
7.3 Limitations

At this point it seems prudent to say a few words about the limitations facing this study. Firstly, the methodological framework used presupposes the selection of a policy-nexus reflecting the integration path followed by EU citizens moving to Britain. However, this path is different for each one, and the policy combinations are endless. Imagine, Ion for example: if he was highly-skilled, he would not have faced some of the problems I put him through, but he would definitely have to deal with other difficulties of a different nature. Moreover, if instead of Ion it was Maria, the factors influencing her experience would be totally distinct. The same holds for the policy-nexus, as the outcomes of the analysis would vary according to the policy combinations. In addition, the second dimension of the framework requires the selection of a limited number of securitising actors. Again, the choices made influence the results of the research, while differences in discursive patterns and intensity of the securitising rhetoric are often quite problematic to explain, exactly as in this case with the diametrically opposite discourses of the Guardian and the Daily Mail.

A further point would be that, both approaches employed, ST and WPR, are constructivist. They take into account the socio-political and historical context within which the phenomenon takes place, and the conclusions drawn are based on these specific circumstances. The actors scrutinised, the policies reviewed, the historical continuity of immigration policy and the elections, all constitute particularities of the British reality, which cannot be easily translated into another national context. In that sense, the results of the research do not offer a basis for generalisation that could be applied to other member-states or the EU as a whole. Nonetheless, I contend that the 2-DSF, the methodological framework constructed for this work, could be very well employed to study the processes of securitisation in any other context.

This paper concentrated on the securitisation of FMvt in the UK and how the British government tries to restrict access to benefits in order to control the movement of Europeans crossing the national borders. However, the dominant representation of the welfare dependant identified by the analysis and the securitising policies and discourses regarding the sustainability and role of the welfare state in modern Britain, could indicate a link between the securitisation of the Unwanted (low-skilled and disadvantaged population), the securitisation of poor populations, irrespectively of nationality, and the neoliberal wish to reduce welfare for everyone. Thus, the relationship between the securitisation of immigration, the securitisation
of ‘poorism’ and the neoliberal re-configuration of traditional European welfare states could constitute a field for further research.

7.4 Final thought

Almost two years have passed since Ion first came to the UK, and only now his life started looking normal. He worked hard on his English and he managed to get a better job that actually allows him to make a decent living. He even enrolled himself on a course to become an air conditioning technician. It took a lot of time, effort and hardship, but now he is settled and he earns his life and place in the British society step by step. Now he gets a glimpse of what Europe can become!

While working on this paper, I was considering what end I should give to the story of my hero, and at the same, to the story of securitisation and control of FMvt in the UK. I chose to be optimistic. FMvt can definitely entail economic benefits for all, for the sending and host countries, the EU citizens and Europe as a whole. However, the real gain FMvt can yield is social: it is the cornerstone of the European integration project and process; it is the path (long and rough) to less inequality and more social justice; it is an opportunity to create a culturally rich and open Europe; it is a chance for us Europeans to meet each other, identify our common grounds and build on them.

Nevertheless, reality may prove to be substantially different. The Conservatives were re-elected in May with an agenda of stringent measures and a pledge to reform the conditions for FMvt. To what extent the aspirations of the new British government will be fulfilled and what consequences this would have on the lives of Europeans and the nature of the EU itself, is yet to be seen.
## Appendix 1: Policy changes index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Legislation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Compatibility with EU law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Introduction of new more ‘robust’ Habitual Residence Test</td>
<td>No legislation</td>
<td>December 2013</td>
<td>There are problems regarding the compatibility of the Habitual Residence Test with EU Law, which have been identified by the Commission who issued an opinion in 2011 and later referred the case to the Court. The disagreement is grounded on the premise that a requirement in national legislation that claimants comply with an additional condition (the right to reside) is incompatible with regulation 883/2004 on the EU-wide meaning of the term ‘residence’. Moreover it constitutes indirect discrimination based on nationality (Cornelissen 2013:104).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 A person with the right to reside as ‘jobseeker’ or 'retained worker' who worked less than a year before being made unemployed would lose that status after six months unless they could provide ‘compelling’ evidence that they have a genuine chance of being engaged.</td>
<td>The Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) (No 2) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/3032)</td>
<td>01/01/2014</td>
<td>This is in accord with EU legislation. The provision about persons with the status of retained worker transposes effectively Article 7(3c) of the Directive. Regarding jobseekers, Article 14(4b) prohibits expulsion of persons who can provide evidence that they are continuing to seek employment and have genuine chance of being engaged. Moreover, the ECJ ruling on the Antonissen case confirms the right of jobseekers to reside for the period they are seeking work and concluded that six months is a reasonable period, which could be extended if the jobseeker continued to seek employment and had genuine prospects of being engaged (EPRS 2014:10). Although the UK regulations are in agreement with EU law, it could be argued that the British chose to interpret the Antonissen ruling narrowly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Introduction of Genuine Prospect of Work assessment to be conducted on the completion of six months of being a jobseeker. (Note that for those who went to the UK as jobseekers the period is consisted by the three months of initial residence and the three months claiming benefits)</td>
<td>The Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) (No 2) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/3032)</td>
<td>01/01/2014</td>
<td>This is in accord with EU legislation. The provision about persons with the status of retained worker transposes effectively Article 7(3c) of the Directive. Regarding jobseekers, Article 14(4b) prohibits expulsion of persons who can provide evidence that they are continuing to seek employment and have genuine chance of being engaged. Moreover, the ECJ ruling on the Antonissen case confirms the right of jobseekers to reside for the period they are seeking work and concluded that six months is a reasonable period, which could be extended if the jobseeker continued to seek employment and had genuine prospects of being engaged (EPRS 2014:10). Although the UK regulations are in agreement with EU law, it could be argued that the British chose to interpret the Antonissen ruling narrowly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Three months period before being able to claim income based benefits</td>
<td>The Jobseeker's Allowance (Habitual Residence) Amendment Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/3196)</td>
<td>01/01/2014</td>
<td>This is in accord with Article 24(2) of the Citizens' Directive 2004/38/EC which provides that ‘the host member state shall not be obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during the first three months of residence’. Again, it is the EU itself that provides the room for restriction of access to benefits for EUcitizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Introduction of minimum earnings threshold</td>
<td>No legislation</td>
<td>01/03/2014</td>
<td>The minimum earnings threshold can cause frictions with the EU law: 1. Introduction of a threshold gives the opportunity to the national government to apply a restrictive understanding of the EU concept of worker 2. It is more difficult for a EUcitizen working part-time to meet the threshold, therefore restricting the scope of the right of FMvt. (Desmond Rutledge 2014 cited in Kennedy 2015:17).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Restriction of access to Housing Benefit to European jobseekers</td>
<td>The Housing Benefit (Habitual Residence)</td>
<td>01/04/2014</td>
<td>No compatibility issues with the EU law have been mentioned. The house benefit is a social assistance benefit and therefore it can be denied to EU jobseekers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Legislation</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Compatibility with EU law</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) (No 3) Regulations 2014 (SI 2014/2761)</td>
<td>10/11/2014</td>
<td>This is based on the narrow interpretation of the Antonissen case, and the questionable requirement of the Habitual Residence Test to have a right to reside in order to satisfy it and be eligible for benefits. Jobseekers lose their right of residence after six months and therefore they are not entitled to IB-JSA. If the Habitual Residence Test was to be judged incompatible with EU law, then this provision would probably collapse along with it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Universal Credit (EEA Jobseekers) Amendment Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/546)</td>
<td>10/06/2015</td>
<td>This measure is questionable as well. The British government considers Universal Credit to be a 'social assistance' benefit and therefore access of EU jobseekers to it can be restricted. However, the ECJ has held that 'benefits “of a financial nature intended to facilitate access to employment in the labour market of a Member State” cannot be regarded as “social assistance” and should be granted to a person who has a “genuine link” with the employment market of the host Member State' (Kennedy 2015:25).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The stipulation of the policy changes was adopted by the corresponding legislation introducing the changes.
## Appendix 2: Policy Documents Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Universal Credit: Welfare that works</td>
<td>Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)</td>
<td>November 2010</td>
<td>White Paper</td>
<td>Outlines and explains the proposed welfare reform which was voted in 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Free movement within Europe needs to be less free</td>
<td>David Cameron, British MP</td>
<td>26/11/2013</td>
<td>Article in Financial Times</td>
<td>Cameron announced changes aiming to restrict the access of EEA jobseekers to the welfare system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 We're building an immigration system that puts Britain first</td>
<td>David Cameron, British MP</td>
<td>28/07/2014</td>
<td>Article in Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>Cameron announced changes in the immigration system in order to better serve the national interest and needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Measures to limit migrants' access to benefits</td>
<td>Steven Kennedy</td>
<td>13/03/2015</td>
<td>House of the Commons Library, SN06889</td>
<td>Describes the policy changes in order to restrict EU citizens' access to the welfare system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union Single Market: Free Movement of Persons</td>
<td>Her Majesty's Government (HMG)</td>
<td>Summer 2014</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Reviews the current situation regarding the legal framework of FMvt and its impact in national interest. Also, presents evidence from a variety of stakeholders who gave their opinion on the current conditions and made recommendations for changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Providing social housing for local people: Statutory guidance on social housing allocations for local authorities in England, Department for Communities and Local Government</td>
<td>Department for Communities and Local Government</td>
<td>December 2013</td>
<td>Statutory Guidance</td>
<td>Provides guidance to local housing authorities on how to make full use of the flexibilities within the allocation legislation to better meet the needs of their local residents and their local communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7* The Housing Benefit (Habitual Residence) Amendment Regulations 2014 (S.I. 2014 No. 539): Report by the Social Security Advisory Committee under section 174(1) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 and statement by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions in accordance with Section 174(2) of that Act</td>
<td>Social Security Advisory Committee</td>
<td>November 2014</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>The aim of the report is to assess the potential impacts by the removal of access to housing benefit for EEA jobseekers, on particular groups and geographical areas, and to identify any potential unintended Consequences caused.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8* Equality Analysis for Removal of Access to Housing Benefit for EEA Jobseekers</td>
<td>Anna Bartlett</td>
<td>27/02/2014</td>
<td>Equality Analysis</td>
<td>Assesses how the removal of access to housing benefit for EEA jobseekers will affect vulnerable groups as women, children, disabled etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10* The Housing Benefit (Habitual Residence) Amendment Regulations 2014</td>
<td>Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)</td>
<td>01/04/2014</td>
<td>Legislation</td>
<td>The legislation that introduced the removal of access to housing benefit for EEA jobseekers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The documents No 8, 9, 10 are included as appendices in document 7. They are listed separately in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of the documents analysed. However, for citation purposes, they are treated as part of document no 7.*
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**EU documents**


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