Shapers, Brokers and Doers

The Dynamic Roles of Non-State Actors in Global Climate Change Governance

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Contents

ABSTRACT I

LIST OF APPENDED PAPERS II

AUTHOR’S CONTRIBUTIONS III

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONSIV

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSV

1. INTRODUCTION 1

 Aim and Specific Objectives..... 3

 Why Global Climate Change Governance? 6

 Conceptualising Non-State Actors and their Relation with States 10

 State of the Art 16

2. THEORY: THE ROLES OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE.....20

 Perspectives on Non-State Actors in Global Governance..... 20

 The Policy Space: Theories on why Non-State Actors are Involved in Global Governance 23

 Roles and Justifications: Defining Authority and Legitimacy..... 25

3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS27

 Questionnaire Data 29

 Interviews..... 31

 Document Analyses 33

 Observations 35

 Triangulation..... 36

4. RESULTS: THE ROLES OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE GOVERNANCE – THE WHY AND HOW QUESTIONS37

 State and Non-State Actor Relations: The Why Question..... 37

 Non-State Actors and their Governance Activities: The How Question 40

 Shapers, Brokers, Doers: Towards New Understandings of Non-State Actor Roles and Authority.... 45

5. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS IN GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE GOVERNANCE 48

6. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH49

7. REFERENCES54

Abstract

Non-state actors, such as international environmental organisations, business associations and indigenous peoples organisations, increasingly take on governance functions that can influence the delivery of global public goods. This thesis examines the roles of these actors in the field of global climate change governance. Specifically, the thesis examines why and how non-state actors are involved in global climate change governance, the governance activities that they may perform and are perceived to perform, and their views on climate change solutions. The thesis also discusses the implications of their roles for how authority is shared between states and non-state actors in global climate change governance. The research questions are addressed by triangulating several empirical methods. The results show that the roles of non-state actors are continuously evolving and depend on the changing nature of relations between state and non-state actors as well as efforts by non-state actors to expand their policy space by justifying and seeking recognition for their participation. Moreover, the findings point to the importance of differentiating between groups of non-state actors, as they represent diverse interests and have different comparative advantages across governance activities. Which non-state actors participate and to what extent therefore has implications for the effects of their involvement in global climate change governance. On the basis of a systematic assessment of a set of non-state actors, this thesis concludes that the key role-categories of non-state actors in global climate change governance are broadly: *shapers* of information and ideas, *brokers* of knowledge, norms and initiatives, and *doers* of implementing policies and influencing behaviours. Different non-state actors carry out activities within these role-categories to different extents. In addition to the empirical mapping of the roles of non-state actors in global climate change governance, this thesis contributes to two strands in the literature: one theoretical focusing on the authority and legitimacy of non-state actors in global environmental governance, and the other methodological, offering a toolbox that combines survey data with qualitative methods.

Keywords: Non-state actors, global climate change governance, legitimacy, authority, intergovernmental negotiations, UNFCCC

List of appended papers

This thesis is based on the following papers, referred to in the text by their roman numerals.

- I. Nasiritousi, Naghmeh, and Linnér, Björn-Ola. 2014. Open or closed meetings? Explaining nonstate actor involvement in the international climate change negotiations. *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, 1–18. Doi:10.1007/s10784-014-9237-6.
- II. Nasiritousi, Naghmeh, Hjerpe, Mattias, and Bäckstrand, Karin. 2015. Normative arguments for non-state actor participation in international policy-making processes: Functionalism, neocorporatism or democratic pluralism? *European Journal of International Relations*: 1-24. Doi:10.1177/1354066115608926.
- III. Nasiritousi, Naghmeh, Hjerpe, Mattias, and Linnér, Björn-Ola. 2014. The roles of non-state actors in climate change governance: understanding agency through governance profiles. *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*: 1-18. Doi:10.1007/s10784-014-9243-8.
- IV. Nasiritousi, Naghmeh. (forthcoming). Fossil fuel emitters and climate change governance: Understanding the roles of large oil and gas companies. Submitted to a 2016 special issue titled 'Non-State Actors in the New Landscape of International Climate Cooperation' in *Environmental Politics*.
- V. Nasiritousi, Naghmeh, Hjerpe, Mattias, and Buhr, Katarina. 2014. Pluralising climate change solutions? Views held and voiced by participants at the international climate change negotiations, *Ecological Economics* 105: 177-184.

Author's contributions

For Paper I, Naghmeh Nasiritousi designed the study, collected, analysed and interpreted the data, and had the lead in writing the article.

For Paper II, Naghmeh Nasiritousi designed the study, participated in collecting, analysing and interpreting the data, and had the lead in writing the article.

For Paper III, Naghmeh Nasiritousi designed the study, participated in collecting and interpreting the data, and had the lead in writing the article.

For Paper IV, Naghmeh Nasiritousi had sole responsibility for authorship.

For Paper V, Naghmeh Nasiritousi designed the study, participated in collecting the questionnaire data, analysed and interpreted the questionnaire data, and had the lead in writing the article.

List of abbreviations

BINGO	Business and industry non-governmental organisation
COP	Conference of the Parties
ENGO	Environmental non-governmental organisation
IGO	Intergovernmental organisation
IPO	Indigenous peoples organisation
LGMA	Local government and municipal authorities
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
RINGO	Research and independent non-governmental organisation
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
TUNGO	Trade Unions non-governmental organisation
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
YOUNGO	Youth non-governmental organisation

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To my family

1. Introduction

The role of non-state actors in global governance has in the past decades been a contested topic, both in the academic literature and in international policy-making (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Mathews 1997). Non-state actors, such as international environmental organisations, business associations and indigenous peoples organisations, increasingly assume responsibilities and roles that since the development of the international states system mainly have been under the purview of nation-states. There are generally three broad interpretations of this development (Bulkeley et al 2014): one is that the involvement of non-state actors in global governance represents a welcome shift for obtaining fairer or more effective solutions to cross-boundary challenges that states have been slow to tackle; another is to view non-state actor activities as a distraction or even as undermining state efforts to resolve global challenges; and a third is to view non-state activities as having little consequence in an international system dominated by states. In terms of the democratic legitimacy of global governance, some interpret this development as a transition towards more legitimate types of governance that allows for more voices to be heard, while others maintain that non-state actors lack clear-cut constituencies and circumvent democratic processes (see e.g. Bexell et al 2010; Steffek et al 2008; Scholte 2004). Regardless, the rise in the activities and visibility of non-state actors in the past half century has been documented across several issue-areas and thus raises questions about authority and legitimacy in global governance (Green 2013; Tallberg et al 2013).

The increasing prominence of non-state actors can be viewed as a representation of how political action and the role of the state is being changed through the processes of globalisation and the spread of neoliberalism, which highlights efficiency gains of strengthening the role of the private sector in the economy (Cerny 2010; Green 2010; Haas 2004). With greater interconnectivity through technological advances, and economic and cultural activities increasingly transnational in scope, political systems principally based on territorially-bound nation-states have been questioned in terms of their ability to ensure adequate legitimacy and efficacy to tackle global problems. The previously dominant perspective of a state-centric system has thus been challenged with the fragmentation of political authority, such that nation-states are now one of several significant actors on the international stage (Friedman et al 2005; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). This development has raised questions about the implications of polycentric

forms of governance, whereby actors other than states have the ability to shape the direction of world politics (Cerny 2010).

The observation that non-state actors increasingly assume roles that can influence the delivery of global public goods is particularly apparent in the area of global climate change governance, where actors with varying resources and interests participate in different forms at multiple levels (Bulkeley et al 2014; Green 2010). Questions about the roles played by non-state actors are important for understanding contemporary global climate change governance, not least since non-state actors are expected to play a more prominent role in future international climate action with the implementation of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda.¹ This initiative seeks to strengthen climate action by involving a host of state and non-state actors and involves a database known as the NAZCA portal where non-state climate action can be registered.² As of 1 December 2015, 10,773 commitments had been registered on the website, the majority in the areas of energy efficiency and energy access, renewable energy, and private finance. While regionally unbalanced with the majority of initiatives originating in developed countries, they nevertheless are global in scope (Chan et al 2015). The participation of non-state actors in international affairs therefore has a significant impact on the theories and practices of global governance in general, and global climate change governance in particular.

This thesis contributes to the literature on non-state actors by examining the roles of these actors in the field of global climate change governance. On the basis of a systematic assessment of a set of non-state actors participating in the UN negotiations on climate change, this thesis argues that the key role-categories of non-state actors participating in global environmental governance are broadly: *shapers* of information and ideas, *brokers* of knowledge, norms and initiatives, and *doers* of implementing policies and influencing behaviours, but that different non-state actors carry out activities within these role-categories to different extents. In order to understand these three role-categories, the thesis studies how non-state actors are involved in global climate change governance, the governance activities that they may perform and are

¹ "The Lima-Paris Action Agenda is a joint undertaking of the Peruvian and French COP presidencies, the Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the UNFCCC Secretariat. It is aimed at strengthening climate action throughout 2015, in Paris in December and beyond [...including through] collaborative actions and initiatives involving states and non-states actors." <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/about-lpaa>

² "NAZCA registers commitments to climate action by companies, cities, subnational regions, and investors to address climate change." <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/>

perceived to perform, and their views on climate change solutions. In short, the thesis examines questions of relations between state and non-state actors and assesses both conceptually and empirically the potential contributions that non-state actors can make to climate change governance. Importantly, this assessment goes beyond previous studies that focus on direct influence of non-state actors at intergovernmental negotiations (Hanegraaff 2015; Betzold 2014) to also look at what roles they can play outside formal intergovernmental settings. Moreover, the thesis makes a novel contribution by measuring the aspect of recognition of non-state functions that is important for understanding how non-state actors can gain authority (Dellas et al 2011). Through this dynamic understanding of the roles of non-state actors in global climate change governance, we gain insights into two pertinent questions: how authority is shared between states and non-state actors in global climate change governance, and how this is likely to affect governance outcomes.

The aim of this introductory chapter is to present the main contributions of the thesis in relation to previous research in the field, and to outline conceptual and methodological issues that the papers of this thesis have in common. The remainder of the introductory chapter is structured as follows. The next section outlines the overall aim and the research questions of the thesis, which is followed by a discussion on the reason for focusing on climate change governance. A definition of non-state actors is also offered, followed by a discussion of research gaps. Section two explores theories on the roles of non-state actors in global governance and presents the points of departure for the studies. Section three outlines the research design and methods used while section four presents the main findings. Section five explores implications for questions of legitimacy and effectiveness in global climate change governance. Finally, section six offers conclusions on the roles of non-state actors in global climate change governance and discusses implications for future research.

Aim and Specific Objectives

The overall aim of this thesis is to understand the roles of non-state actors in global climate change governance. The thesis also discusses the implications of their roles for how authority is shared between states and non-state actors in global climate change governance. According to the Oxford Dictionary, role means “[t]he function assumed or

part played by a person or thing in a particular situation.”³ Because a function is often determined in relation to others, an examination of the roles of non-state actors means that there is a need to open up the non-state actor category to look at different types of non-state actors, while at the same time examining how they are viewed upon by state representatives. Hence the thesis specifically examines non-state actor involvement in international climate change politics and the roles that they are perceived to perform in global climate change governance by representatives of states and other non-state actors. Involvement here means an examination of both their access to official arenas of the international climate change conferences and more broadly how they may participate (i.e. actively take part) and are perceived to participate in global climate change governance. Questions of why states open up space for non-state actors to participate in international affairs and how non-state actors operate in, and seek to expand, this space and justify their activities are important to answer in order to gain a better understanding of current global governance arrangements and their outcomes.

The main empirical site of this thesis is the international climate change conferences under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as this is a venue where the multilateral (state-centric) and the transnational (including non-state actors) arenas meet (Betsill et al 2015). The UNFCCC is an important site for discussions about the politics of climate change and as such constitutes a central node in global climate change governance (Hjerpe and Nasiritousi 2015; Keohane and Victor 2011). Key policy debates are held both in the intergovernmental negotiations (with near universal participation by states) and in discussions at side-events held in conjunction with the negotiations.⁴ The UNFCCC conferences are thus important for global climate change governance both in terms of the significance of the decisions negotiated and in terms of serving as a platform for the exchange of views and ideas amongst a range of stakeholders. The conferences offer non-state actors, who are accredited with observer status, the opportunity to lobby negotiators to influence climate change policy (Hanegraaff 2015; Betzold 2014). They also provide a platform for non-state actors to showcase their own initiatives in the field of climate change and to network with other stakeholders (Schroeder and Lovell 2012; Hjerpe and Linnér 2010).

³ <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/role>

⁴ Side-events take place in parallel to the negotiations and are a platform for participants at the COPs (state and non-state) to present their work and discuss pertinent issues.

These activities, carried out by actors that represent a range of views and have diverging interests and resources, have wide-spread implications for governance theory in general, and notions of authority and legitimacy in particular. A focus on the roles that non-state actors play in global climate change governance contributes to our understanding of whether authority and legitimacy are taking on new meanings in global environmental governance and sheds light on how current practices affect and are affected by state/non-state relations. These issues are pertinent given the increasing emphasis on new governance arrangements, resulting in the need to understand the ensuing division of labour between different actors in global governance (Haas 2004).

The thesis therefore seeks to answer the following two research questions:

1. Why are non-state actors increasingly involved in global climate change governance?
2. How do non-state actors participate in global climate change governance?

The why question is the focus of Papers I and II and the how question is examined in Papers III, IV and V. The five papers taken together provide insights as to how legitimacy and authority can be construed in non-state terms. Section four of this chapter therefore synthesises the findings from the five papers and seeks to provide a first answer to the question of what the implications of current non-state actor roles in global climate change governance are in terms of authority. Together, the thesis provides an assessment of current practices of non-state actor involvement in global climate change governance and perceptions of the roles of non-state actors in terms of governance activities, authority and legitimacy.

Paper I studies the why question by examining practices of non-state actor involvement in the international climate change negotiations. Specifically, it assesses the structural constraints and opportunities for non-state actor participation in the UN climate change conferences and state representatives' views on involving non-state actors in the intergovernmental process. Paper II examines varying perceptions of why non-state participation is important in intergovernmental negotiations and what the current practices mean for democratic legitimacy. Paper III seeks to provide an overview of the how question by studying perceptions of governance activities of different groups of non-state actors, to examine potential contributions of various non-state actors across the policy-cycle. Paper IV studies the governance activities of the ten largest oil and gas companies in the world, to provide a more fine-tuned analysis of how one set of non-

state actors engage in climate change governance. This group of non-state actors was chosen as the focus of the study since the production and consumption of fuels extracted by oil and gas companies have been identified as one of the largest contributors to greenhouse gas emissions (Heede 2014) and since their participation in climate change governance is controversial⁵ and provides interesting angles on studying non-state actors and their potential roles. Since these companies have different ownership structures, with some closely linked to states, and operate in diverse markets facing differing regulatory demands, the paper seeks to unpack their various roles and discuss how they can both contribute to and undermine effective climate change action. Paper V examines a potentially important role for non-state actors that has been highlighted in the academic literature but studied less empirically (Dryzek and Stevenson 2011), namely whether non-state actors contribute to pluralising views on solutions to climate change at the international negotiations, in order to assess their potential contributions to deliberative decision-making.

The thesis employs both quantitative and qualitative methods to inform answers to these research questions. With its mixed-methods approach, this thesis provides new insights into a field that has previously been dominated by case studies (O'Neill et al 2013). By exploring the complex interactions between states, non-state actors and the UNFCCC as a site for their interactions, as well as considering its implications for authority and legitimacy, this study seeks to conceptually and empirically contribute to further our understanding of the roles of non-state actors in and beyond the international climate change conferences. In addition to the empirical mapping of the roles of non-state actors in global climate change governance, this thesis contributes to two strands in the literature: one theoretical focusing on the authority and legitimacy of non-state actors in environmental governance, and the other methodological, offering a toolbox that combines survey data with qualitative methods.

Why Global Climate Change Governance?

Governing climate change represents a defining challenge for the 21st century. Climate change has been depicted by scholars as a wicked problem, meaning that the problem

⁵ See e.g. the petition to the parties of the UNFCCC asking them to withdraw access to the international climate change conferences for representatives from the fossil fuel industry: <http://www.pollutersoutpeoplein.com/>.

resists resolution because of its complex nature and lack of simple solutions (Levin et al 2012; Hoffmann 2011). Except for the scientific uncertainties involved in understanding complex climate systems and their environmental impacts, there are socio-political challenges that contribute to the difficulties in addressing climate change. Such challenges include the fact that the major drivers of climate change—fossil fuel combustion and land-use change—are linked to nearly all human activities, and thus are an integral part of modern economic growth paths. Most of the greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change have long time-lags in their effects and therefore give rise to questions of inter-generational equity. Moreover, for most greenhouse gas emissions there is no relation between where emissions are released and their eventual effects, which means that everyone is a potential victim of climate change but with varying degrees of vulnerability (Depledge 2005). Climate change is thus an issue where people all over the world are affected either through its consequences and/or through the policies to address it (Hulme 2009). Climate change touches upon a range of issues that are central to human development, such as economic competitiveness, policies on agriculture and forestry, and disaster-risk reduction. Together, these challenges mean that it is difficult to generate political will to implement climate policy on a scale that can adequately address the drivers and effects of climate change. As action is needed on multiple fronts, there has been a growing recognition of the need to involve a wide range of actors.

Based on the definition offered by Jagers and Strippel (2003, 388), climate change governance is here defined as: all purposeful mechanisms and measures through which collective interests on issues of climate change are articulated, decided-upon and implemented, with a deliberate, although not necessarily primary—nor always consistent—aim, to avoid, mitigate or adapt to climate change. This definition thus covers a wider range of issues than purely emission reductions, as climate change is intertwined with questions of sustainable development (Winkler et al 2015). Because the issue of climate change includes discussions about other political domains, such as energy, finance, food security and health, it has attracted the involvement of a myriad of actors that “are operating across various scales, in different regions, and are seeking to mobilise a wide range of discourses, tools, techniques and practices in order to govern” (Bulkeley et al 2014, 38). The defining features of global climate change governance are thus that it includes a range of actors, requires cooperation across multiple levels, and is transnational in scope. The governing of climate change therefore represents a microcosm of wider global environmental governance (Green 2013). By studying the

actors in and around global environmental meetings, we can thus gain a better understanding of global environmental governance (Campbell et al 2014; Friedman et al 2005).

The international climate change conferences under the auspices of the UNFCCC attract thousands of non-state actor participants every year (see Figure 1). Moreover, many more non-state actors that lack accreditation participate in events and actions outside the conference venue. According to some early estimates, COP 21 in Paris in December 2015 attracted around 50,000 participants, including 25,000 official state and non-state delegates.⁶ At these intergovernmental proceedings and beyond, non-state actors seek to influence the course of climate change action. While their activities have been identified as very valuable by states (UNFCCC 2004, paragraphs 98 and 103), little empirical research has been undertaken to systematically understand the many roles that different types of non-state actors may play in global climate change governance. This thesis seeks to bridge this gap in the literature.

⁶ <http://www.cop21paris.org/about/cop21>

Figure 1. Participation at UNFCCC COPs 1997-2014

Source: UNFCCC

Conceptualising Non-State Actors and their Relation with States

The term non-state actor is very broad and encompasses virtually any actor involved in international affairs that is not a nation-state. As the definition is conceived of in negating terms as actors that are not states under international law, non-state actors can refer to a range of entities. In much of the literature, the term is relatively loosely used and poorly defined (Lövbrand et al 2013). How actors are characterised often depends on the context, and the boundary between state and non-state actors is in many cases blurred. For example, are local governments and intergovernmental organisations non-state actors or are they intrinsically linked to states? The answer depends on the context, as these entities may in some cases take actions independent of states, whereby they may be considered as non-state actors. Another example of blurred relations between state and non-state actors are organisations that are mainly funded by states. While the independence of these organisations may be questioned, they nevertheless do not have the rights of sovereign states under international law and are therefore often considered as non-state actors. Thus in analytical terms, non-state actors are a diffuse category of actors whose status depends on the nature of the state and relations between public and private authorities (Lövbrand and Linnér 2015; Bulkeley and Schroeder 2012).

As the term non-state actor remains imprecise, the literature often employs other terms to speak about these actors. Other common terms used in studies are civil society actors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), transnational actors, stakeholders, private actors or international interest groups. While some of these terms are equally broad, such as stakeholders or international interest groups, others leave out some types of non-state actors. For instance, the terms civil society actors and non-governmental organisations are often only used for private non-profit-making organisations while non-state actors can be both profit and non-profit-making organisations (Friedman et al 2005). The term non-state actors is more encompassing and captures those actors that: “are created voluntarily by citizens; are independent of the state; can be profit or non-profit-making organisations; have a main aim of promoting an issue or defending an interest, either general or specific; and, depending on their aim, can play a role in implementing policies and defending interests” (Alston 2005, 15). As discussed above, “independent of the state” can refer either to their status in legal or operational terms.

The term non-state actor is thus generally defined as any group involved in international relations that is not a sovereign state, while excluding armed groups (Büthe 2004). As this thesis centres mainly on the international climate change

negotiations, the non-state actors in focus are those accredited to the UNFCCC. In the UNFCCC system, the divide between states and non-state actors is clearly seen by the colour of their badges, with non-state actors that have observer status at the conferences wearing yellow badges.⁷ Similar to the major groups system of the Agenda 21 process, non-state actors are divided by the UNFCCC into constituency groups, which include Business and industry non-governmental organisations (BINGO),⁸ Environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGO), Indigenous peoples organisations (IPO), Local government and municipal authorities (LGMA), Research and independent non-governmental organisations (RINGO), Trade Unions non-governmental organisations (TUNGO), Farmers and agricultural NGOs, Women and Gender, and Youth (YOUNGO).⁹ Constituencies are intended to be loose groups that represent “diverse but broadly clustered interests or perspectives” (UNFCCC 2011). The constituencies vary in size, resources and approach to climate diplomacy. Figure 2 shows attendance at COP 20/CMP 10 by constituency, showing that ENGOs, RINGOs and BINGOs constituted the largest groups attending the Lima conference in 2014. Another group of observer organisations is constituted by intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), such as the World Bank, OECD and UNEP.¹⁰ Figure 3 shows the cumulative admission of observer organisations between 1995 and 2014, showing that both NGO and IGO interest in observing the negotiations has grown over the years. In fact, it has grown so much that the UNFCCC introduced a quota system for observer access to the conferences after COP 15 in Copenhagen (Paper I). As Figure 1 showed, media is another group of actors that are not states at these conferences. However, this group is beyond the scope of this thesis as their role is strictly speaking to report from the conferences rather than to engage in “promoting an issue or defending an interest” (Alston 2005, 15).

On one level, therefore, the UNFCCC system allows for easy identification of non-state actors since state parties are distinguished from other actors with pink badges. On the other hand, several state parties include non-state actors in their delegations, whereby they receive a pink badge (see e.g. Schroeder et al 2012). Those that are included, however, lose much of their independence as they are often restricted in what they can say and do, which means that their non-state status can be questioned. This is

⁷ The yellow badges previously had ‘Non-governmental’ written on them but were in 2014 changed to the term ‘Observer’ after pressure by some non-state groups that did not identify with the term non-governmental.

⁸ For-profit organisations cannot be accredited but must join trade organisations etc.

⁹ http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/constituency_2011_english.pdf

¹⁰ Intergovernmental organisations wear green badges and UN organisations blue.

only one example of how the state/non-state actor distinction is blurred and shows that it may be useful to speak of a continuum of these two categories (Paper IV).

While in much of the thesis the non-state actors in focus are those accredited to the UNFCCC, the thesis is not primarily interested in their roles as observers at the conferences. Rather, these actors are studied as they provide extensive empirical material to understand the broader landscape of climate change governance. At the conferences, a broad mix of actors participate as observers, but the same groups carry out a multitude of other roles beyond the conferences. Thus the thesis uses the term non-state actors as an encompassing term to discuss the roles of these actors both at these key conferences and in the wider global climate change governance landscape. In recent years, the term non-state actors has increasingly entered the language of official UNFCCC documents to describe those actors that are not states but that are involved in taking climate change action in different forms (see e.g. UNFCCC 2013).

Non-state actors thus constitute a varied group that originate in different geographical locations, operate according to different purposes, and employ a range of tactics. For instance, some are international in scope with operations in various locations while others are based in one country. Some are part of larger networks while others take more independent action. Some engage primarily with advocacy while others are more operational on the ground. Finally, some only engage in lobbying while others also take part in protests and demonstrations. Despite these distinctions, much of the literature on non-state actors has not offered a systematic analysis of the similarities and differences across groups of non-state actors. While the great variation in type and interests between non-state actors is often acknowledged in the literature, few studies systematically compare the different types of non-state actors involved in a given governance regime. Thus while it is acknowledged that different types of non-state actors may exert different types of pressures and to different extents (Betsill and Corell 2001, 66), the literature on non-state actors in environmental negotiations has nevertheless tended to focus on their similarities rather than their differences. In order to answer research questions on what roles non-state actors play in global climate change governance and the implications of their activities, we need to know who the non-state actors are and how they exercise authority in international affairs. This thesis therefore seeks to move beyond the characterisation of non-state actors as a monolithic group.

It should be noted that the focus on non-state actors does not mean that states are no longer important. Rather, this thesis seeks to complement the state-centric

International Relations literature to understand why and how non-state actors participate in processes of contemporary governance in an international system dominated by states. In doing so, this thesis views non-state actors' engagement in governance arrangements as a relational process whereby non-state actors cannot be studied in isolation but must be understood in tandem with the study of states (Green 2013). Therefore this thesis seeks to examine the roles of non-state actors by also studying relations between state and non-state actors in the context of global climate change governance.

Figure 2. Breakdown of attendance of NGO representatives by constituency at COP 20/CMP 10 in Lima 2014

Source: UNFCCC

Figure 3. Cumulative admissions of non-governmental organisations and intergovernmental organisations in the international climate change conferences 1995-2014

Source: UNFCCC

State of the Art

This section provides an overview of how the roles of non-state actors have been portrayed in the global environmental governance literature. It begins by reviewing explanations for why non-state actors have been particularly involved in global environmental governance before turning to research gaps.

Several explanations have been offered in the literature on non-state actors as to why they have participated relatively extensively in global environmental governance. First, some environmental problems fall outside the mandate of individual nation-states and therefore scientists and environmental organisations started raising awareness about these global issues. These types of actors have thus built up expertise that is valuable to states. States have therefore opened up intergovernmental negotiations to non-state actor participation in order to gain from the services that these actors offer states in terms of resources and expertise (Green 2013; Bernauer and Betzold 2012). Similarly, it has been shown on a more general level in other policy-areas, that intergovernmental organisations increasingly enlist the help of non-state actors to strengthen their own mandates (Tallberg et al 2013).

Second, the resolution of global environmental problems is a task that involves highly normative considerations. At its core is the question of sustainable development, hence solutions to global environmental problems will ultimately play a part in determining what type of society future generations will live in. Democratic processes for dealing with these issues are therefore considered important both in terms of legitimacy and output effectiveness. The “participatory turn” in global environmental governance (Bäckstrand 2006) has often been viewed as a way to address the democratic deficit in global governance, whereby the legitimacy of international organisations – the centre of much international rule-making – has been questioned as the distance between citizens and decisions has widened (Tallberg and Uhlin 2011; Steffek 2010; Steffek and Nanz 2008; Scholte 2004; Woods 1999). In this view, non-state actors are part of a global civil society that can help bring accountability to international organisations that operate on a weak electoral mandate. In addition, non-state actors can help in focusing attention on issues that are of a global concern that the nation-state system has failed to address. Hence, the democratising potential of non-state actors lies partly in the perceived ability

of such groups to act as watchdogs and represent marginalised voices (Biermann and Gupta 2011).

However, several studies have questioned the rosy picture of non-state actors often presented in the literature and call for more empirical research into their nature and activities (Bernauer and Betzold 2012; Bexell et al 2010). An alternative view to the above is that states have invited non-state actors to intergovernmental negotiations in order to manage criticism from non-state actors by bringing them into diplomatic fora and providing them with some participation rights. In this view, the involvement of non-state actors in intergovernmental meetings may represent an attempt to coopt critical voices (Clark 2003).

In sum, the prominence of non-state actors in global environmental governance can be said to reflect a more general trend in involving these actors in global governance (Tallberg et al 2013) but is also due to reasons particular to the environmental field. In much of the literature, non-state actors are perceived to contribute to processes that the inter-state system is ill-equipped or unable to solve. Many environmental problems fall under this category, as they are often characterised by complexity, uncertainty, and the need to transcend narrow state-interests. It is often assumed that non-state actors can contribute by providing information and expertise and by articulating views that are not adequately represented through governmental channels. As such, they are perceived to contribute both to input legitimacy – in terms of reducing the democratic deficit – and output legitimacy – in terms of contributing to more effective governance through their resources and expertise (Steffek et al 2008).

The extensive literature on non-state actors in global environmental governance has beyond normative debates on why non-state actors should be involved in governance activities (Biermann and Gupta 2011; Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002) also empirically studied the activities that non-state actors are involved in. Typically, scholarly attention has focused either on their activities around intergovernmental conferences (Witter et al 2015; Hanegraaff 2015; Betzold 2014; Corell and Betsill 2001) or on their transnational initiatives (Bulkeley et al 2014; Abbott 2012; Hoffmann 2011; Andonova et al 2009). More recent work describes their roles across these arenas as activists, diplomats and global governors (Betsill 2015). These broad roles refer to their activities as awareness-raisers and advocates, as representatives of particular values or interests that seek to influence processes and outcomes, and as implementers or

initiators of initiatives. The conclusion from most of these studies is that non-state actors are important actors that carry out a range of roles in global environmental governance.

While the literature on non-state actors has offered theoretical insights into how these actors can complement the roles of states in global environmental governance, it has suffered from three main limitations. First, the literature has offered little conceptual clarity on what constitutes the group of non-state actors involved in global environmental governance and what their relations to states are. Second, the literature has not systematically compared across groups of non-state actors to better understand the plurality of actors and their respective governance activities, with past literature focusing mostly on influential NGOs or business actors. Third, the literature has provided limited empirical accounts of how non-state actor legitimacy and authority is constituted in the global climate change governance landscape.

For example, questions that pertain to the agency and views of the non-state actors that influence our common future have not always received adequate scholarly attention. The extensive body of literature that has examined non-state actor involvement in global environmental governance has focused mainly on the functions that non-state actors perform in terms of influencing states and international institutions (Betsill and Corell 2001; Newell 2000). A result of this has been a tendency to focus on the most influential actors at certain stages in international decision-making while saying little about how this compares to the work of non-state actors that have less visibility. In other words, less attention has been paid to the power structures of non-state actors to answer questions about *which* non-state actors are most successful in exercising authority in global governance across the policy cycle, and what views these actors further. The tendency of selectively describing non-state actors in the global environmental governance literature has prompted calls for “larger-scale comparisons that pay equal attention to potentially positive, negative, or irrelevant implications of civil society involvement” (Bernauer and Betzold 2012, 65).

Another question that has received relatively little scholarly attention is why states have chosen to open up opportunities for non-state actors to participate in international rule-making. Does their participation represent a rise in private authority in international affairs (Green 2010) or do states orchestrate private initiatives to strengthen their own governing capacities (Abbott and Snidal 2009)? What is the relationship between state and non-state actors? While much of the early literature was concerned with exploring whether non-state actors represent a challenge to state power

(Mathews 1997), scholarly attention has increasingly turned to empirical documentations of their activities (Bulkeley et al 2014; Greene 2013; Betzold 2013; Vormedal 2008; Corell and Betsill 2001; Newell 2000). According to this literature, these “political entrepreneurs” (Keck and Sikkink 1999) are important players that carry out a multitude of roles, including information-sharing; capacity-building and implementation; and rule-setting (Andonova et al 2009). Nevertheless, we know little about states’ relations with non-state actors and what factors affect decisions on when non-state actors can participate as observers in negotiations.

Global climate change governance is an area where non-state actor agency has been particularly visible and therefore represents a good case to explore these questions further. Participation by non-state actors in international climate change governance has grown in recent years (Muñoz Cabré 2011; Dimitrov 2010; Betsill and Corell 2008; Pattberg and Stripple 2008). Non-state actors have not only participated in the intergovernmental process to influence international rule-making, but they also take action on the ground independent of state efforts (Bulkeley et al 2014; Green 2013; Bernstein et al 2010; Pattberg 2010; Pattberg and Stripple 2008). Both by carrying out vertical cooperation with states and horizontal cooperation with each other, non-state actors now perform a range of roles that impact on the outcome of climate change governance. However, the literature has in large parts been based on case studies (e.g. Betsill 2008; Vormedal 2008) and therefore there are few studies that combine theoretical analysis with empirical material obtained through mixed methods to provide insights into the reasons for, and the implications of, non-state actor participation in global climate change governance.

Questions about what the involvement of non-state actors means for global climate change governance thus have far-reaching importance for our understanding of new arrangements for the supply of global public goods. This thesis therefore seeks to provide new conceptual and empirical insights into questions about the different roles played by groups of non-state actors, the factors determining their inclusion by states, and what their involvement means for global climate change governance. In sum, the thesis’ primary contributions to the literature are to examine the reasons for the growing role played by non-state actors, the differences in governance activities and capabilities amongst groups of non-state actors, and the implications of their involvement in terms of legitimacy and authority.

2. Theory: The Roles of Non-State Actors in Global Governance

Key questions in the previous literature on non-state actors have been: can non-state actors influence policy outcomes and if so how? This thesis seeks to broaden the literature and focus on the roles that non-state actors play not only in influencing policy outcomes through lobbying states, but also their wider roles that may influence governance outcomes more generally. That is, can non-state actors through the different roles that they play also influence broader outcomes such as implementation and the changing of behaviours? This section draws upon different theoretical perspectives to explore the roles that non-state actors can play in global governance. It begins by discussing two prominent theoretical perspectives on non-state actors in global governance: the (neo)realist view and the sociological view of non-state actors. These perspectives differ as to whether non-state actors can play roles and have political influence beyond that allowed by states. This thesis argues that a combination of these two perspectives is necessary for understanding the roles of non-state actors in climate change governance. Additionally, building on the work of Steffek (2013), it is maintained that it is important to both look at what terms states set for non-state actors, or their policy space, and how non-state actors seek to expand this space through justifying their roles. In other words, it is important to look at both the demand side, i.e. why states allow non-state actors to participate in global governance, and the supply side, i.e. how non-state actors participate and how they justify their roles. The following sections review the literature on these topics, and conclude by arriving at definitions for non-state actor legitimacy and authority.

Perspectives on Non-State Actors in Global Governance

Non-state actors have long played a part in global environmental governance, but their status was elevated through their participation in a number of intergovernmental conferences, most notably at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm and the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio, also known as the Earth Summit (Friedman et al 2005). Given their increasing visibility in global governance in general and in global environmental

governance in particular, scholars have debated the extent to which non-state actors can play roles in global governance independent of states. Specifically, the International Relations literature has arrived at different perspectives on whether non-state actors have authority and legitimacy in an international system where legitimate authority has traditionally been based on the principle of state sovereignty. In this system, non-state actors have a different status to states. Importantly, they do not have a legitimate basis for authoritative rule-making as states do (Bulkeley et al 2014; Hall and Biersteker 2002). Scholars have therefore debated whether non-state actors can and should have any independent authority in an international system dominated by states.

According to the (neo)realist view, non-state actors only exert authority to the extent that states allow them to (Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1971). In this view, non-state authority is a mere reflection of the interests of powerful states. In other words, non-state actors “exercise authority only at the behest and under the control of states”, meaning that non-state authority only emerges when they “can offer some material benefit to states” (Green 2013, 19). This explanation thus has a narrow focus on material interests and views the relation between states and non-state actors as hierarchical. In other words, states can delegate authority to non-state actors if it is deemed beneficial to state interests. Beyond this, state-centric theories see little role for non-state actors in affecting policy outcomes (Drezner 2007).

A different view is offered by the sociological explanation of non-state authority. This view posits that non-state actors can influence policy outcomes independent of states “through three main mechanisms: information, accountability, and discourse” (Green 2013, 20). In this view, non-state actors are important participants in the international system as they can influence policy outcomes by providing information, holding states accountable for their behaviours, as well as changing how issues are debated through discourse and contestation (Ruggie 2004). According to the sociological explanation, therefore, the relation between states and non-state actors is viewed as being less hierarchical and more autonomous.

While the realist and the sociological views offer two different perspectives on the authority of non-state actors in the international system, this thesis argues that some elements of both are required to understand the roles of non-state actors in climate change governance. In accordance with the works of Green (2013) and Dingwerth and Pattberg (2009) and others who have previously sought to bridge the divide between these two perspectives, this thesis posits that the realist view on its own is too state-

centric as it does not offer explanations for non-state actor agency beyond delegation by states, while the sociological view on its own often fails to account for the role of political contestation and power in shaping policy outcomes.

A fuller picture emerges when combining the realist focus on actors and structures with the sociological focus on ideas and processes. The sociological perspective complements the realist perspective in that it can provide an understanding for how states' material interests are determined. Rather than viewing states as unitary actors with given interests, the sociological perspective can provide insights into how perceptions about states' material interests are formed and can shift over time. The role of ideas is important to explain how states (and non-state actors) define their interests and how they view the choices to pursue these interests. According to Rodrik's (2014, 194) notion of strategy space, while states face a number of political constraints, ideas contribute to "expanding or restricting the menu of options" and thus shaping the strategy space for states. Political constraints may thus be relaxed when new ideas gain currency, thereby shifting interests and broadening the states' strategy space. In short, while material interests, especially those of powerful actors, are important for determining policy outcomes, norms and ideas play a role in shaping how interests are defined and pursued.

It follows from this that non-state actors can play a role in shaping policy outcomes by partnering with states to carry out governance activities or by trying to influence state policy through lobbying or advocacy. However, the literature has identified a third role for non-state actors not covered by these two perspectives; non-state actors can also be entrepreneurial through independent action on the ground, for example by forming transnational initiatives with other non-state actors (Bulkeley et al 2014; Green 2013). While some of these initiatives have been orchestrated by states and can therefore not be considered to be independent, others, such as industry standards, can take place without government intervention and have an independent effect on actors' behaviour (Hoffmann 2011). These three roles combined thus imply that non-state actors have important roles to play in shaping the rules and norms that affect the delivery of global public goods, not only by influencing policy outcomes but also broader governance outcomes in general.

The concepts of authority and legitimacy must therefore take on new meanings in this broader governance landscape. Unlike states that have a legal basis for governing, non-state actors "must attempt to *achieve*, rather than *maintain*, authority and legitimacy

to govern” (Auld et al 2014, 152). These theoretical proposals provide the context for this study as they raise pertinent questions concerning why non-state actors increasingly are involved in, and how non-state actors participate in, global climate change governance. In sum, this thesis maintains that an assessment of the roles of non-state actors in global (climate) governance involves both an examination of structures and actors, as in the realist perspective, and ideas and processes, as in the sociological explanation, as well as a study of the practices of their involvement as they may be entrepreneurial and take independent action. Next we therefore look at what determines how states set the terms for non-state actors, or their policy space, and thereafter how non-state actors seek to expand this space through justifying their roles.

The Policy Space: Theories on why Non-State Actors are Involved in Global Governance

In order to understand the roles of non-state actors in global climate change governance, it is important to examine what their policy space looks like. In other words, what structural opportunities and constraints do they face for taking action on the international stage? Some non-state actors take on roles mandated to them by states, while others take independent action beyond that provided by states. An example of the former is the role of non-state actors that participate in the Clean Development Mechanism, such as consultancy firms that participate in the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanism (Green 2013). Examples of the latter are organisations that operate in voluntary carbon markets that are not mandated by states (Pattberg and Stripple 2008). In both these cases, non-state actors have to relate to states in some way and therefore it is pertinent to study states’ views on non-state actors.

One important research question in this regard has been why states allow non-state actors to participate in intergovernmental negotiations that have traditionally been a domain for sovereign states. In other words, what drives the demand for non-state actor involvement in global governance? Institutional theories have provided some answers to this question. The dominant approach maintains that states open up for non-state actor participation in international organisations when it is functionally efficient to do so (Steffek 2013; Tallberg 2010; Raustalia 1997). Building on rational choice

institutionalism, this approach highlights the services that non-state actors can provide to states in the form of resources and skills. In this view, actors follow a “logic of instrumentality” (Hall and Taylor 1996). According to this literature, the potential for non-state actors to play a supportive role in international decision-making processes is particularly beneficial in regimes that are complex. In such cases, states can choose to incorporate non-state actors in order to further their own regulatory powers, as non-state actor participation “provides policy advice, helps monitor commitments and delegations, minimises ratification risk, and facilitates signalling between governments and constituents” (Raustiala 1997, 720). In sum, this approach holds that the granting of participation rights to non-state actors in intergovernmental fora is the result of rational decisions by states based on considerations of functional gains.

Other institutional theories that have received less attention in this body of literature are historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism.¹¹ Historical institutionalism emphasises the importance of formal and informal rules and considers the logic of path dependence to shape actors’ behaviours (Fioretos 2011). Sociological institutionalism, on the other hand, highlights culture, rules and norms as important for determining behaviour where actors follow a “logic of social appropriateness” (Hall and Taylor 1996). Historical institutionalism can thus explain how rules constrain states’ behaviour on whether or not to include non-state actors in intergovernmental negotiations, but it has little to say about how those rules came to be established. Sociological institutionalism can help in understanding why states have opened up to non-state actor participation by assuming that there is a participatory norm in global governance in general, and at UN conferences in particular (Willettts 2012). However, this approach cannot explain why within one institutional setting, there is variation between open and closed meetings.

This implies that there may be variations in motives to grant non-state actors accreditation rights to intergovernmental negotiations more broadly and access rights to particular negotiation sessions more specifically. On the broader level, if we assume that non-state actors gain accreditation rights to a particular intergovernmental fora based on rational decisions by states, these decisions can be taken based on a consideration of what non-state actors can contribute through their participation. According to Willettts (2006) there are three key rationales for including non-state actors in intergovernmental

¹¹ Sometimes also referred to as normative institutionalism.

meetings: functionalism, which highlights non-state contributions to expertise and specialist knowledge; neocorporatism, which views non-state actors as stakeholders that represent certain interests; and democratic pluralism, which values the democratising potential of non-state actors as a way to enhance the representation and empowerment of marginalised groups in society. Which of these partially competing rationales is most preferred by states can have implications for the roles that non-state actors are encouraged to play in intergovernmental policy-making processes (Paper II).

On the question of access rights to particular negotiation sessions more specifically, there has been little scholarly attention on how states' views on non-state actors may differ depending on the composition of the non-state actor community and whether functional efficiency considerations may vary between states, thereby leading to political conflicts (Paper I). As argued in Paper I, this thesis maintains that it is necessary to examine both the motives and procedures for including non-state actors in intergovernmental negotiations in order to gain a more nuanced picture of what determines their access to negotiation sessions. As intergovernmental conferences are important venues for non-state actor activities (Willetts 2012, Friedman et al 2005), understanding the level of access and participation of non-state actors at these conferences provides insights into both the structural space for non-state actor participation in global environmental governance more generally and the views of states on the roles played by non-state actors more specifically.

Roles and Justifications: Defining Authority and Legitimacy

While the policy space is an important determinant of what roles non-state actors can play in an international system where states set the terms, non-state actors can seek to expand this space by providing justifications for their involvement in international affairs. In other words, they seek to legitimise their involvement to gain authority. It is therefore important to explore what legitimacy and authority mean in non-state terms and also look at the supply side of non-state actor involvement in global governance.

Non-state actors do not have a self-evident role to play in an international system dominated by states, where states remain the central locus of legitimate authority. States draw legitimacy from the principle of state sovereignty which is a cornerstone of

international law and has resulted from long historical processes (Hurd 1999). Scholars have tended to approach the topic of legitimacy from a normative form of analysis, whereby an institution is legitimate if it has a right to rule (Buchanan and Keohane 2006). Non-state actors lack legitimacy in the strictly legal interpretation of the term, which is why they have traditionally not been viewed as possessing authority in the international system. Authority is commonly understood as “the condition in which power is married to legitimacy” (Hurd 1999, 400) and can therefore be thought of as legitimate power.

This then begs the question: how are legitimacy and authority constituted in non-state terms? As these actors lack state sovereignty by definition, the legitimisation process must be different. Recent works have suggested several paths to legitimate authority for non-state actors (Bulkeley et al 2014; Bernstein 2011). This literature highlights an alternative approach to legitimacy, namely sociological legitimacy, whereby an institution is legitimate “when it is widely *believed* to have the right to rule” (Buchanan and Keohane 2006, 405). Here the focus shifts from legal standards emphasised in normative legitimacy, to actors’ perceptions of organisations or institutions. Legitimacy thus becomes a “subjective quality” that is relational and dependent on actors’ perceptions (Hurd 1999, 381). In this vein, authority builds on actors’ beliefs about “the rightfulness of the operation of power” (Bulkeley et al 2014, 136), meaning that authority is generated through a process of recognition-granting “achieved through various forms of justification” (ibid). This means that non-state actors can be accorded a form of authority if they are recognised as legitimate by some larger public, including by states in most cases (Hall and Biersteker 2002).

This thus puts the justifications for non-state actor participation in governance arrangements in focus. Non-state actors use various arguments to justify their participation in international affairs. Some build on claims for knowledge and expertise, others on moral and democratic grounds, and others on their abilities to implement policies on the ground (Paper II; Paper III; Willetts 2006). For authority to be generated, these claims need to be recognised by a community (Bernstein 2011). In order to understand the roles of non-state actors in global climate change governance, it is therefore important to examine different aspects of activities by non-state actors and how these are justified and recognised by various actors.

In Paper III a typology of power sources used by non-state actors to gain authority in global governance is developed. These powers are: *symbolic*, i.e.

representative legitimacy and/or ability to invoke moral claims, *cognitive*, i.e. knowledge and expertise, *social*, i.e. access to networks, *leverage*, i.e. access to key agents and decision-making processes, and *material*, i.e. access to resources and position in the global economy. Different types of non-state actors possess different combinations of these power sources and therefore have varying degrees of agency across the policy cycle (Paper III). The thesis advances a dynamic interpretation of agency and views agents as actors with authority, i.e. those with legitimised ability to influence the outcome of events (Dellas et al 2011; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Paper III). Agency is contingent upon how actors understand themselves and how others perceive them – it is therefore necessary to study both ego- and alter perceptions (Hall and Biersteker 2002; Arts 1998). By studying perceptions among both states and non-state actors on the roles of non-state actors in global climate change governance, the aspect of recognition that is important for generating authority is examined. Recognition has not been well-explored in previous literature, perhaps because of difficulties in studying it. According to Newell et al (2012, 369), agency is important to study since it “relates to the ways in which actors exercise influence, proscribe behaviour, substantively participate in rule making, set their own rules, and as such contribute to the purposeful steering of society”. This thesis seeks to further knowledge in this area by employing a novel approach involving mixed methods.

3. Research Design and Methods

The thesis addresses the research questions using several empirical methods: questionnaire data, interviews, document analyses and observations. Previous studies have often drawn on case studies using process tracing and counterfactual analysis to examine non-state actor activities and their influence. However, by only focusing on one set of non-state actors and generalising from that, the analysis of non-state actors’ roles becomes limited and incomplete and runs the risk of providing us with an over-deterministic picture (O’Neill et al 2013). This thesis therefore contributes to broadening the empirical material by employing a range of approaches and triangulating different types of data in order to probe the research questions from different vantage points (Bryman 2012). The empirical material predominantly consists of questionnaire data and

interviews with non-state actors and government negotiators. Observations from the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) of the UNFCCC and document analyses of primary and secondary sources have also been carried out to serve as a basis for devising rigorous interview and survey questions. Methodological pluralism strengthens the research findings by bringing together a more comprehensive account since each method has its strengths and weaknesses (Brady and Collier 2010). For example, the questionnaire study allows for systematic comparisons of observations over cases and time whereas the qualitative methods provide contextual knowledge and allow for more in-depth understandings of relationships.

The data collection has predominately taken place at the UNFCCC conferences. There are two main reasons for why these conferences constitute a valuable venue for data collection. First, they are considered as one of the most open international regimes in terms of non-state actor participation and attract a large number of organisations from a wide geographical area (Muñoz Cabré 2011). Participants have interests in different aspects of climate change and have various levels of experience of working with these issues. Therefore they offer a rich source of perspectives on global climate change governance that can be tapped into using interviews and surveys (Schroeder and Lovell 2012). Second, the conferences are part of the overarching architecture of global climate change governance (Betsill et al 2015) and have recently undertaken a review of how to enhance observer participation in the process. Thereby they offer an insight into the decisions behind involving non-state actors in the international climate change regime. While a focus on those actors that participate at the UNFCCC conferences leaves out non-state actors that are not accredited to the UNFCCC, the range and types of actors present nevertheless represent a broad set of non-state actors engaged in global climate change governance. By using the conferences as an empirical site, therefore, a sound understanding can be obtained as to how non-state actors' activities in the climate field affect global climate change governance.

While each paper provides more detailed information about methods for data analysis, the following sections provide an overview of the methods and materials used.

Table 1. Methods used and time of data collection

Study	Method	Time of data collection	Research question addressed
Paper I	Interviews, document analysis, observations	May 2011-May 2012	RQ1
Paper II	Questionnaire	Dec 2011-Dec 2014	RQ1
Paper III	Questionnaire, document analysis	Dec 2011-Dec 2012	RQ2
Paper IV	Document analysis, interviews	Dec 2014-Oct 2015	RQ2
Paper V	Questionnaire, content analysis	Dec 2011-Dec 2012	RQ2

Questionnaire Data

Several of the papers analyse data from the International Negotiations Survey. The survey, which is coordinated by the Centre for Climate Science and Policy Research at Linköping University, has been collected yearly since COP 13 (2007) in Bali. The database currently contains around 8000 responses from delegates to the UNFCCC COPs (including from negotiators, national government representatives and non-state observers). It exists in two versions: one that follows a quota sampling approach in the conference venue and a second that is distributed to participants at selected side-events during the COPs.¹² This means that the former is better at capturing the views of the average COP participant while the latter better captures the views of the average side-event participant. Fewer negotiators, particularly from the developed world, tend to attend side-events, meaning that this sample underrepresents negotiators compared to the COP sample and over-represents observers. Nevertheless, as shown in Paper II the two questionnaires produce similar answers to the same question and because the studies are more interested in the differences between actor types than absolute figures, the questionnaires provide a sound basis for such analysis. Moreover, side-event

¹² See Paper II for explanations on the sampling and data collection approach. To view examples of INS questionnaires, please visit www.internationalnegotiationssurvey.se.

participants have a relatively high familiarity of non-state actor activities (Schroeder and Lovell 2012; Hjerpe and Linnér 2010).

The International Negotiations Survey measures individual preferences on various topics at the negotiations, such as roles played by non-state actors and possible solutions to climate change. The in situ collection of questionnaires allows for the compilation of structured data amongst participants at the climate change conferences in the form of expert surveys. This method is increasingly being used to gauge the views of actors participating at the climate change negotiations to study for example advocacy strategies of NGOs (Betzold 2014) and the activities of interest groups at such conferences (Hanegraaff 2015). The survey has the advantage of obtaining many responses each year (around 400 for each questionnaire) and produces more reliable results than other studies that send out the questionnaire via email-lists, since the onsite collection of questionnaires ensures that we have an informed view of who the respondents are and produces a higher response rate.

The data for Papers II (n=542), III (n=834) and V (n=1,843) were collected during COP 17 (2011) and COP 18 (2012) and Paper II also includes data from COP 19 (2013) and COP 20 (2014). The questions were designed based on readings of the academic literature on non-state actors and tailored to the specific research questions of this thesis. For Paper II, for example, the questions were designed to capture the main elements of three rationales highlighted in the literature on why non-state actors should be included in the international policy-making process. An option was also included for those who do not believe it is important to include non-state actors, as well as an open option for those who did not agree with any of the response options or wanted to elaborate on their answer. The same survey questions were repeated over at least two years to reduce sampling biases resulting from the location of the conference. The data is generally robust over the years, with only slight variations in the data (see Paper II; Paper III; Paper V). This indicates that the survey methodology adequately captures views from a heterogeneous sample of participants at the climate change negotiations.

Different statistical methods, such as t-tests and chi-square tests, have been used both to provide descriptive statistics and tables and to show relationships in the data. The statistical tests were undertaken in SPSS. These methods of analysis were chosen over for instance regression analyses based on the categorical nature of the data, in order to facilitate interpretation of the results, and because the aim of the analysis has been to explore relationships in the data rather than to predict probabilities of possible

outcomes. Thus, for example, Papers II and V employ chi-square tests of association in order to examine whether there are any significant differences in how different actor categories have responded to the same survey question.

While this methodology is valuable for obtaining data from a large set of respondents, the questionnaire does not allow for probing. Because of its short format and considerations to keep questions simple so as to be understood by people with different backgrounds, the questionnaire cannot provide in-depth answers and there is a risk that questions are misinterpreted by some. Moreover, it is less effective in capturing the views of constituencies with few representatives (see Figure 2). Therefore qualitative methods were used to complement the survey data.

Interviews

Semi-structured interviews are used in two of the papers in order to gain rich descriptive data that provide insights into the research questions from the perspective of the interviewees. These interviews largely follow the seven stages in designing and implementing an interview study as outlined by Kvale (1996). The key steps of selecting the interviewees, carrying out the interviews and analysing the data are described below for the two papers.

For Paper I, 18 semi-structured interviews were conducted during the period May 2011 and May 2012. The sample consists of negotiators from different negotiating blocks and non-state actor representatives in leading positions from different constituency groups (see list of interviewees in Paper I). In addition, an anonymous interviewee in a position of trust within the negotiations was included to enable the corroboration of accounts. Most interviewees were identified through observations at the negotiations in order to ensure a wide representation of perspectives. The selection thus enables insights from actors with wide-ranging knowledge of global climate change governance. For Paper IV, five semi-structured interviews were conducted during the period December 2014 and October 2015. Four interviewees were senior members of staff of major oil and gas companies working with climate change issues and one interviewee was a senior member of staff at the climate change division of the Ministry of Environment in Iran. This paper deals with ten major oil and gas companies,

all of which were contacted for an interview. An email was sent either through a contact person identified on the website, or through the companies' press offices. Several reminders were also sent in case of non-response and follow-up phone calls were made to several contacts in an attempt to secure interviews. In both cases, interviewees were granted anonymity if preferred in case they were not comfortable with being identified. Even with this provision, the difficulties in securing interviewees for Paper IV may indicate sensitivities involved in discussing climate change issues in the oil and gas industry.

In designing the questions, particular care was given to formulating questions that aimed at obtaining data to help answer particular research questions without making them too specific and avoiding leading questions. For Paper I, two interview guides have been used, tailored to the specific interviewee groups (negotiators or observers), with a set of common core questions. The interview questions focus on what roles non-state actors serve in global climate change governance, at what junctures they are allowed to participate during negotiations, and general understandings of state/non-state actor relations. For Paper IV, the interview questions concerned the companies' positions on climate change and their activities on this issue, including their engagement with the UNFCCC.

Most of the interviews were recorded but the answers of those who preferred to speak freely without a recording device (five interviews) were noted down by hand. For Paper I, those interviews that were recorded with the negotiators were transcribed (since these were deemed most relevant for the study). The majority of the interviews, which lasted between 30-45 minutes, were conducted face-to-face at the inter-sessional meetings of the UNFCCC in Bonn. Four were conducted over the phone. The conducted interviews for Paper IV lasted from 30 to 60 minutes and were either transcribed in full or in part, where the recording was listened to first and then the relevant parts transcribed. These interviews were conducted face-to-face (one), over the phone (three) or via e-mail (one), where the interviewee submitted written responses to the interview questions. As the studies are interested in what the interviewees said rather than how they said it, the loss of nonverbal messages in the phone or email interviews was not a concern.

To analyse the interview materials, the transcribed materials and notes were read in full and a descriptive analysis of the interviews was carried out in order to get familiar with the data for each paper. Here, I looked for recurring topics in the data and

compared and contrasted the answers of the different interviewees. Next a thematic analysis was carried out to sort through the data and find patterns in the interviews. Here, my literature review helped in identifying broad themes. For Paper I, for example, I looked in the data to see how state/non-state relationships were discussed by different interviewees and how the question of open or closed meetings was answered by interviewees. With the main theoretical arguments for why some meetings are open and some are closed in mind, I looked at the interview data to see whether and how these theoretical arguments appeared in the interviewees' answers. It clearly emerged that some interviewees focused on questions about sensitivity while others discussed rules of procedures, and others mentioned the political aspects of having observers attend meetings. The different insights gained were thus interpreted through the theoretical arguments as presented in Paper I. For both Paper I and Paper IV, cross-comparisons with other material, such as observations (for Paper I) and document analysis conducted of the companies' websites (for Paper IV) were made in an attempt to verify the data.

Document Analyses

Document analyses have been undertaken in order to gain insights into how different actors choose to represent themselves in official texts, or for documents written by state actors about observers, how they present their views on the roles of observers in the negotiations. Papers I and III analyse submissions from state and non-state actors on enhancing observer participation in the climate change negotiations. These documents were obtained from the UNFCCC website and provide insights into how different actors perceive the role of observers in the climate change negotiations. The documents analysed were identified by following the discussions on enhancing observer participation in the UNFCCC, and reading messages through the Climate-L list¹³ for the latest climate change information. The documents were read in full in search for descriptions of perceptions of roles and answers were categorised based on different arguments as to why non-state actors should participate in UNFCCC meetings and their potential contributions.

¹³ This is an e-mail list for policy makers and practitioners involved in climate change policy, managed by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD): <http://climate-l.iisd.org/about-the-climate-l-mailing-list/>.

Paper IV analyses the websites of the ten largest oil and gas companies in the world. A search was made on the websites for the terms “climate change” and “global warming” in both English and the original language of the company where applicable. Additional searches were made in the companies’ annual reports and corporate social responsibility reports if the search function did not return these documents. The search hits, that included general pages on climate change, speeches, reports, and newsletters, were each read to examine in what context the search terms were used. The search hits numbered in the hundreds for each of the Western oil companies, around 50 for Gazprom and Pemex, and 10 for Saudi Aramco. PetroChina and KPC’s search functions did not return any hits and therefore their websites were searched manually. A document guide had been prepared to focus the search according to the analytical framework of the paper, where information relating to the companies’ general position on climate change, mention of national or international legislation on climate change, shareholder activism on climate change (where applicable), and their governance activities were collected. The relevant findings were therefore pasted into the document guides (the same for each company), which were used to provide a structure to facilitate comparison of the findings across the ten companies. The categorisation of the information from the websites to group them under the different governance activities required subjective interpretations of what the governance activities entail. The results presented in Paper IV, thus, do not describe how the companies themselves would describe their governance activities; rather, they are an interpretation of the activities that they carry out as described on their websites. While these documents expectedly seek to portray the companies in a good light by highlighting their efforts to address climate change, they nevertheless give insights into the degree to which climate change is an issue that the companies deal with and offer examples of their governance activities.

Paper V includes a content analysis of 959 side-events abstracts for COPs 15-18 (2009-2012). The approach follows the method developed in Hjerpe and Buhr (2014) using keywords to code side-event abstracts from the UNFCCC website in order to gain an understanding of what is discussed at these venues that are held in close proximity to the negotiations. A set of keywords were iteratively selected based on our research question and used in a quantitative database search (see Appendix Paper V). We developed the keywords based on the survey question on what the most effective solutions to climate change are in order to measure to what extent these solutions are

explicitly referred to in the abstracts as an indication of them being discussed at the official side-events. The search terms were developed in an iterative process through reading abstracts and adding relevant key words. While the limited number of words (average 45 per abstract) delimits the possibilities of a more elaborate content analysis, the abstracts are often very informative as they are the primary means through which the side-event host advertises the event to prospective attendees.

When analysing documents it is important to remember, as Bryman (2012, 555) points out, that “documents need to be recognised for what they are – namely, texts written with distinctive purposes in mind, and not as simply reflecting reality.” While official documents may be biased in terms of portraying a partial picture, they nevertheless provide additional accounts that together with the other material contribute to acquiring a better picture of the roles of non-state actors in the global climate change governance landscape.

Observations

Observations were made at the climate change negotiations at COPs 16, 17, 18, 20 (2010, 2011, 2012, 2014) as well as two inter-sessional meetings in Bonn (2011 and 2012). The observations provide insights into the practice of the negotiations from an observer (non-state actor) viewpoint. As a member of the research community, I have also participated in RINGO constituency meetings. Except for observations of general state/non-state actor relations at plenaries, contact groups and side-events, particular attention has been paid to the discussions on enhancing observer participation conducted in the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). At those negotiating sessions, notes were taken of how state representatives discussed the pros and cons of greater observer participation and how observers sought to influence towards greater participation rights. Of particular interest have also been briefing sessions for observer groups by the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC and key negotiating chairs. Through these meetings, I have obtained insights into observers’ activities within the UNFCCC and how they argue for greater participation within the conferences. Moreover, in meetings with the UNFCCC Observer Organisation Liaison Officer, I have gained insights into the UNFCCC Secretariat’s efforts to engage with observer groups and their

difficulties in funding their operations. Attending these conferences has added both to contextual knowledge and provided me with specific examples that were used in Paper I to show how state representatives discuss whether some meetings should be open to observers. While these observations did not follow a strict methodology for participatory observation (Jorgensen 1989), they have proven valuable in providing a deeper understanding for the practices of climate diplomacy and the dynamics between state and non-state actors.

Triangulation

The methods described above were used to uncover various aspects of the roles of non-state actors in global climate change governance and to provide new insights into their activities and how these are recognised in an official setting. The combined insights from the different methods provide a richer understanding of the roles of non-state actors in global climate change governance. In designing the studies, an attempt was made to ensure both depth and breadth in the data collected through using both qualitative and quantitative methods. The use of a mix of methods is also a means through which different types of data can be verified (Bryman 2012). For example, the perceptions on business actors' governance activities in the area of climate change obtained through questionnaires in Paper III, was found to match well with that found through the document analyses of company websites in Paper IV. Nevertheless, triangulation cannot offset all types of weaknesses in the methods employed, such as the low number of interviews in Paper IV. The combination of methods does, however, allow for acquiring information from different vantage points to provide a more comprehensive understanding of research problems. The thesis is thereby in step with calls for "greater methodological pluralism" when studying complex issues in global environmental governance (O'Neill et al 2013, 442).

4. Results: The Roles of Non-State Actors in Global Climate Change Governance – The Why and How Questions

How can we understand the roles of non-state actors in global climate change governance? This thesis seeks to approach the question from different angles by first examining why non-state actors are increasingly involved in global climate change governance (Paper I; Paper II) and then assessing how they are involved by studying the different governance activities that they may perform and are perceived to perform (Paper III; Paper IV) and the views that they represent and voice (Paper V). An overview of the results of these studies is presented below. Taken together, they provide insights into the implications of their participation in global climate change governance in terms of authority and legitimacy.

State and Non-State Actor Relations: The Why Question

Non-state actors contribute to global climate change governance in different ways and to different degrees by offering knowledge and expertise, moral arguments and new ideas, and by taking action on implementing policies and assuming the role of stakeholders (Paper I; Paper II; Paper III). Papers I and II show that state representatives value these qualities to different extents and that there is a dynamic process to define the roles of non-state actors in global climate change governance that is highly political, but also steered by norms and precedents. Specifically, Paper I examines the question of why certain negotiation sessions are open to observers while others are closed. By looking at when and why non-state actors are allowed into negotiating sessions and when and why their access to negotiating sessions are restricted, Paper I provides insights into relations between state and non-state actors at these meetings. Generally, state representatives value non-state actors for their information-sharing capacities and for providing transparency in the negotiations. However these services are not valued by all states and at all times (Paper I). The paper therefore argues that in order to understand why certain negotiation sessions are open to observers while others are closed, it is important to not only differentiate between the motives of states to include non-state actors but also to look at the procedures in place for such involvement.

Paper I shows that it is too simplistic to assume that the rational choice of states always determines the level of non-state actor involvement at intergovernmental meetings. Specifically, it is demonstrated that the oft-held view in the literature that states collectively decide to hold meetings behind closed doors if the functional efficiency of secrecy outweighs the functional efficiency of non-state actor participation is too narrow (Tallberg 2010; Depledge 2005). Rather, states have to relate to the institutional framework with its rules of procedures and precedents. These rules structure states' decisions on when non-state actors are allowed to observe negotiating sessions, thereby constraining states' options on when to exclude non-state actor participation (Paper I). At the same time, the rules have been designed to offer states certain degrees of flexibility on when to allow non-state actors into negotiation rooms. Interviews conducted with negotiators and observers show that this flexibility can be exploited by certain states for political purposes (Paper I). For instance, some non-state actor functions, such as lobbying—for example, in terms of advocating particular issues (e.g. climate justice) or specific policy options (e.g. emissions trading)—can be exploited to the political advantage of individual states by opening up negotiations when non-state actor pressure or support is perceived as important. As the level of non-state actor interest in the negotiations differs across issue areas, and the positions of observer are often clear to states, state representatives know whether or not observer participation in a particular session will benefit them. For example, interviews with non-state actor representatives indicate that the business sector follows the issue of intellectual property rights with great interest, while forestry issues are followed more closely by environmental groups and indigenous organisations. As state representatives can lobby to have particular sessions open or closed, this indicates that functionality considerations can be dependent on the political dynamics of the negotiations—a factor often ignored in the literature.

In short, Paper I shows that relations between state and non-state actors in intergovernmental negotiations are complex and refutes the traditional view of non-state actors as a monolithic group of service-providers that states only involve in certain policy phases (Steffek 2013; Raustalia 1997). In an institutional setting like the UNFCCC, there are continuous struggles and ongoing processes to define the roles of non-state actors in global governance (Paper I).

Paper II examines the level of support for three different rationales for non-state actor participation in international policy-making among participants at the COPs.

Whereas the first rationale—functionalism—highlights the contribution of non-state actors to output legitimacy in terms of expertise, the second—neocorporatism—emphasises the inclusion of affected interests, and the third—democratic pluralism—claims that non-state actors increase input legitimacy through procedural values (Willetts 2006). Using questionnaire data, the paper provides an empirical analysis of how state representatives and different types of non-state actors view and justify the contribution of non-state actors in international policy-making processes. By studying the level of support for these rationales amongst both a set of non-state actors and state actors, the paper enhances our understanding of on what grounds non-state actors participate in international policy-making processes and offers insights into the type of participatory governance model preferred by a range of states and non-state actors.

The results show that the participation norm is strong in global environmental governance, indicated by strong support for the neocorporatist rationale overall, but that views on rationales for non-state actor inclusion differ between actor groups. For instance, negotiators and national governments are significantly more likely to support non-state actor inclusion on the basis that they provide information and expertise, which is well in line with the literature that highlights that states are concerned with maintaining state sovereignty and favour a functionalist rationale for non-state inclusion (Tallberg 2010; Raustalia 1997). Representatives of business and industry groups, on the other hand, are significantly less likely to support non-state actor inclusion on the basis that they voice marginalised views, and significantly more likely not to support non-state actor inclusion in the international policy-making process. In contrast, respondents from environmental NGOs are significantly more likely to support non-state actor inclusion on the basis that they represent interests that have an important stake in the decisions, significantly less likely to support non-state actor inclusion on the basis that they provide information and expertise, and significantly less likely not to support non-state actor inclusion in international policy-making processes. This highlights how non-state actors differ in their functions and how these functions are valued and recognised differently by actors. While non-state actors can be viewed as largely apolitical information providers, political stakeholders, or actors enhancing democratic representation (Willetts 2006), the first two functions appear most recognised amongst participants in climate change diplomacy (Paper II).

Overall the results in Paper II indicate a strong instrumental view of non-state actor participation, highlighting non-state actor contributions to output legitimacy in

terms of improving the performance and efficiency of policy-making processes. One important implication of the widespread support of the neocorporatist rationale is that non-state actors are viewed as political actors in their own right and that the evolving practice of non-state actor participation may favour those organisations that are particularly strong in representing interests and contributing to output rather than input legitimacy (Paper II). This finding corroborates studies that portray non-state actors that participate in international affairs as international interest groups (Bloodgood 2011).

Taken together, the reasons for why non-state actors are increasingly involved in global climate change governance are as much about a demand from states that is based on considerations of functional efficiency to allow non-state actors to play a supportive role in the governance of complex issues, as about norms and precedents that have developed through political processes. This means that the roles of non-state actors are continuously evolving and depend on the changing nature of relations between state and non-state actors as well as efforts by non-state actors to expand their policy space by justifying and seeking recognition for their participation. It also shows that focusing on expertise as the predominant source of non-state actor authority (e.g. Green 2013) provides too narrow a focus and largely omits the political roles that many non-state actors play in the contemporary climate change governance landscape. These different roles will be explored in greater detail below.

Non-State Actors and their Governance Activities: The How Question

The preceding results point to the importance of differentiating between different groups of non-state actors when studying their activities. Paper III looks at the question of what governance activities different groups of non-state actors are perceived to perform in global climate change governance. Adapting Albin's (1999) typology of NGO activities, the following non-state governance activities are identified: influence the agenda, propose solutions, provide information and expertise, influence decisions and policy-makers, raise awareness of issues and causes, implement actions, evaluate consequences of policies and measures, represent public opinion, and represent marginalised voices (Paper III). The paper offers a cross-comparison of perceptions of governance activities across a range of actors and presents an analytical framework for

understanding how power sources, governance activities, and agency of non-state actors are interlinked. With previous literature in this field consisting mainly of case studies of individual and often influential non-state actors, the aim of the paper is to better understand the comparative advantages of different non-state actors across governance activities. To this end, the paper introduces the concept of 'governance profiles' to facilitate analysis of how agency differs across non-state actor categories through a unique measure of recognition amongst a wide range of actors obtained through questionnaire studies. A governance profile refers to a systematic measure of the roles a category of non-state actor is attributed in (climate) governance. A governance profile is thus the combination of governance activities that a category of non-state actor has gained recognition for, which is an indication of agency for that actor in particular governance activities (Paper III).

The results in Paper III show that all groups of actors surveyed, including government representatives, perceive important roles for non-state actors in global climate change governance. Moreover, perceptions of governance activities for the examined categories of non-state actors are distinctly different. The governance profiles reveal how actors have comparative advantages in various governance activities. We find for example that certain activities are strongly associated with one particular category of non-state actors, such as raising awareness (ENGOS 73%), providing expertise (RINGOs 67%) and representing marginalised voices (IPO 60%). However, no single category of non-state actors is strong across all governance activities. Rather, we find that agency appears to be centred around either i) influence and action (largely BINGOs and IGOs, and to some extent LGMAs), ii) ideas and expertise (largely RINGOs), or iii) awareness raising and representation (largely ENGOS and IPOs), with ENGOS being the only category with a relatively strong governance profile across most activities. This indicates that different types of non-state actors with different power sources and agency may cooperate with other categories in order to achieve greater impact across the policy cycle. The trend toward partnerships in global climate change governance may reflect this insight (Paper III). These findings are in line with previous studies that show that non-state actors have various perceived competencies through which they can gain a certain authority (Avant et al 2010). Moreover, the governance profiles correspond well with the governance profiles found in a study of non-state actor agency in a broader global environmental governance setting, namely of actors participating in the Rio+20 conference (Linnér et al 2013).

The analytical framework developed in Paper III is used in Paper IV to study the ten largest oil and gas companies in the world and how they present their activities on climate change. These companies are different in terms of the world regions in which they are based and their company structures but have in common their significant contributions to greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the production and consumption of the extracted oil and gas (Heede 2014), thereby having high stakes in how response measures are developed to mitigate climate change. A common position among the oil and gas companies is thus that climate change represents a business risk. The ten companies, that have all acknowledged climate change as a serious problem, work to mitigate this risk to their business through different strategies. The paper finds that most of the companies present themselves as being active across the various governance activities, with greatest attention given to taking mitigation action in their own organisations (with the most common being cost-cutting measures such as energy efficiency projects, or voluntary initiatives to reduce the need for regulation such as reduced gas flaring) and providing information and expertise to both policy-makers and other networks. Most companies are frequent visitors to the UNFCCC COPs and actively participate in side-events. While often avoiding using the word lobbying, it is clear from their websites and interviews with company representatives that much effort goes into persuading other actors as to how climate change solutions can be most cost-effective, thereby seeking to influence policy outcomes. Moreover, the paper shows that these companies often pursue contradictory advocacy policies in the area of climate change, for example by seeking to undermine government policies that are perceived as threatening their competitiveness. Many of these companies also seek partnerships and initiatives to further their climate change work, joining such organisations as the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short Lived Climate Pollutants and the World Bank's Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership. An important aim of these activities can be interpreted as being to legitimise their business activities and shape states' policy choices/ action space on climate change (Paper IV).

While to a large extent confirming the governance profile of businesses found in Paper III, this paper shows the value in also differentiating between non-state actors at the organisational level. The paper finds variations in how these ten companies engage in climate change governance, and attributes these differences largely to three factors: national level policies on climate change, resources and capacity such as technological capabilities, as well as company-level factors, such as how the management of the

company assesses opportunities and strategic interests. These factors are in line with findings from previous studies (e.g. Sæverud and Skjaereth 2007) but the paper provides additional insights as it is based on a study of a wider set of companies in different countries.

The previous discussions highlight the need to not only examine what non-state actors do but also examine what they stand for to better understand their roles in global climate change governance. Paper V studies how different actors (state and non-state) view a set of broad policy measures to effectively tackle climate change and to what extent they discuss these diverse solutions at the side-events that they host. The aim of the paper is to examine whether non-state actors play a role in voicing alternative views to states at intergovernmental meetings and to empirically assess the claim that non-state actor participation in intergovernmental organisations contributes to democratising global governance through the voicing of plural views. Specifically, it explores the assertion that non-state actors enhance global deliberative democracy by improving discursive heterogeneity and representation of views (Dryzek and Stevenson 2011; Nanz and Steffek 2005; Sikkink 2002). The paper finds that non-state actors do contribute to pluralising the views voiced at these meetings, even though the participating non-state actors analysed have not expressed as diverse views from state parties as the literature on non-state actors has implied (Biermann and Gupta 2011; Scholte 2004). This implies that non-state actors are not primarily involved in international policy-making processes to promote marginalised views. This echoes findings in Paper II, where it was shown that non-state actors as a group are recognised less for their contributions to input legitimacy (e.g. representing marginalised voices), compared to the recognition they have gained for their contributions in providing information and expertise and representing important interests. This shows that the literature that claims that non-state actors through their involvement in international affairs democratise global governance (e.g. Biermann and Gupta 2011; Dryzek and Stevenson 2011; Scholte 2004; Scholte 2002) receives little empirical support in these studies. Paper III showed that IPOs is the only category of non-state actors that has gained recognition for representing marginalised voices.

Paper V also identified a gap between the perceived importance of lifestyle changes as an effective mode of solution and discussions about lifestyle changes at side-events. Such a theme was relatively rare at side-events, with lifestyle changes being almost exclusively raised as a topic by particular NGOs. With certain perspectives being

seen to more closely be associated with certain groups of non-state actors (i.e. market mechanisms and technological innovations strongly associated with business actors and government regulation with environmental NGOs), the composition of the group of participating non-state actors is important for the overall balance of ideas voiced. This implies that there may be structural obstacles to the democratic potential of non-state actors in terms of who can attend and who can effectively promote certain views (Paper V).

Overall therefore, the papers show the existence of a broad supply of non-state actor involvement in climate change governance. Specifically, it is shown that non-state actors participate in climate change governance in many different ways—from raising awareness of new issues and causes, to seeking to influence governments, to taking actions on the ground—and that different types of non-state actors have gained recognition for these activities to different extents. Non-state actors thus have diverse governance profiles and therefore various levels of agency across governance activities (Paper III). Paper V also showed how different types of non-state actors differ significantly in the views that they hold on preferred solutions to tackle climate change and thereby the ideas and views that they propagate. Different types of non-state actors thus seek legitimacy for their views and activities amongst other actors and participate in climate change governance according to their comparative advantages.

In sum, non-state actors can draw on various sources of authority (expertise, moral claims, position in the global economy) to gain agency—and reputation and credibility are key for achieving and maintaining this authority as it needs to be recognised by a wider community (Paper III). What this means is that non-state actors seek to influence governance outcomes and that different groups of non-state actors have achieved authority and legitimacy to govern across various governance activities in the field of climate change. Taken together, this means that states do not have a monopoly on ideas, knowledge and resources—all of which are employed by non-state actors to gain legitimacy on the international stage (Pattberg and Stripple 2008). The thesis therefore maintains that the activities of non-state actors—particularly the well-organised and well-resourced ones—can affect how states and other actors choose to define and pursue their interests. The next section examines these issues further by discussing what these findings mean in terms of understanding the general roles that non-state actors play.

Shapers, Brokers, Doers: Towards New Understandings of Non-State Actor Roles and Authority

The preceding section showed that non-state actors have gained authority in global climate change governance by being recognised as rightful participants in various governance arrangements seeking to address the climate change challenge—at the international as well as the transnational levels. There is both a demand for their functions from states in terms of their expertise and roles as representing important interests, as well as the transparency and pressure functions that they have during negotiations (Paper I; Paper II), and a supply of various competencies that non-state actors use to play different roles and thereby seek to gain authority (Paper III; Paper IV; Paper V). While some of this non-state authority is delegated by states, other results from entrepreneurial activities by non-state actors themselves that gain recognition by other actors (Paper III; Green 2013). As this thesis shows, the implication is that authority is increasingly shared between states and non-state actors and that non-state actors engage in governance activities that are broader than merely seeking to influence the negotiating text of intergovernmental meetings.

While this thesis has not examined how non-state actors can influence outcomes, the assessment of governance activities and what roles non-state actors can play in global climate change governance indicates three main paths that may lead to influence. Specifically, while different non-state actors participate in different capacities, to different extents and for different purposes, this thesis identifies their overall key role-categories as being broadly *shapers* of information and ideas, *brokers* of knowledge, norms and initiatives, and *doers* of implementing policies and influencing behaviours. Here *shapers* of information and ideas means that non-state actors for example write reports, participate in awareness-raising activities, send press releases etc., in order to share information and ideas amongst their networks or the wider public and thereby influence how issues are perceived and discussed. *Brokers* of knowledge, norms and initiatives refers to activities aimed at directly influencing actors in positions of power to act in certain ways, for example through lobbying for particular solutions or by forging partnerships to gain authority to drive change. *Doers* of implementing policies and influencing behaviours means that non-state actors can seek to change outcomes through their own actions, for example by the investment decisions they make in the case of companies and cities, and campaigns by NGOs for businesses and consumers to

adopt greener policies, or by carrying out tasks delegated by states. Doers thus seek to implement change on the ground either by being mandated by states to carry out actions or through their own transnational or private initiatives. Different types of non-state actors can therefore engage with these three role-categories to varying extents through different activities.

Of course these three role-categories are partially overlapping and have to some extent been highlighted in previous literature, for example by portraying NGOs as transnational norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) or activists, diplomats and global governors (Betsill 2015). What *shapers, brokers and doers* can add, however, is to focus the discussion around the paths through which non-state actors seek to influence governance outcomes through their different roles. In particular, these three broad role-categories direct our attention towards the activities undertaken by non-state actors in global climate change governance and highlight the processes through which they seek to gain authority. Moreover, the terms are distinct but broad enough to capture the range of activities conducted within each role-category by different types of non-state actors. For instance, whereas activist is a term that is problematic to use for business groups, *shapers* captures the activities of business groups that aim to shape information and ideas, for example in terms of issuing reports. Such an example are the outlook reports about the world's energy mix that some oil and gas companies issue to present their predictions about the energy sector as well as their views on policy, thereby seeking to shape how problems and solutions are perceived (Paper IV). Hence, different types of non-state actors can carry out various activities as *shapers, brokers and doers* and thereby get involved in all three aspects of climate change governance as highlighted by the definition used in this thesis, by playing a role in how issues of climate change are articulated, decided-upon and implemented.

Through shaping information and ideas, non-state actors can influence how problems and solutions are perceived, for example by highlighting the idea that to address climate change a focus on mitigation is not enough and there is also a need to adapt to the effects of climate change (Paper V). Through brokering knowledge, norms and initiatives, non-state actors can influence how problems and solutions are addressed, for example by working with policy-makers to design particular aspects of climate change policy (Paper IV). Through acting to change behaviours through initiatives and actions, non-state actors can influence how solutions are implemented on the ground, for example, through sharing industry guidelines and best practices with

other major companies in order to set the standard for others in the industry (Paper IV). Through these key roles non-state actors can be an important force for change in world politics.

This means that non-state actors can affect outcomes by proposing innovative ideas, forming the debate, and normalising actions. For instance, some of the initiatives that started as non-state actor experimentation for climate action (Hoffmann 2011), such as the Carbon Disclosure Project, have now developed into international cooperative initiatives that are highlighted by the UNFCCC as important governance arrangements (Hjerpe and Nasiritousi 2015). Non-state authority is therefore broader than simply setting rules and standards (e.g. Green 2013). While *doers* can have a more direct impact on governance outcomes than *brokers* or *shapers*, the roles of norms and ideas are important to explain why certain actions are more likely than others as they can broaden or restrict the menu of options available to actors (Rodrik 2014). On the other hand, norms and ideas do not gain currency on their own and it is often difficult to trace where ideas first originated from (Betsill and Corell 2008). How ideas are acted upon is determined through processes that involve power politics and contestation. Ideas proposed by powerful non-state actors or those that are in line with dominant discourses (such as marketization) are more likely to gain traction (Bulkeley et al 2014). Paper V for example notes that there is a strong emphasis on market mechanisms in the climate change negotiations even though market mechanisms are viewed as the least effective solution to tackle climate change amongst those examined according to the survey,¹⁴ with BINGOs standing out for viewing it as an effective solution to climate change. This suggests that views favoured by non-state actors are not weighted equally in the political bargaining that results in an agreement (Paper V). Moreover, it is important here to note that non-state actors can both seek to strengthen and weaken efforts to address climate change through their roles as shapers, brokers and doers—the implications of which will be drawn out in the next section.

¹⁴ Limiting population growth was added as a response option in later versions of the survey and this option receives less support than market mechanisms as an effective solution to tackle climate change. It should be noted however that limiting population growth is not being discussed in the context of the climate change negotiations, unlike market mechanisms that has been an important topic in the negotiations.

5. Implications for Legitimacy and Effectiveness in Global Climate Change Governance

The results presented above have important implications for questions of legitimacy and effectiveness in global climate change governance. For instance, as was seen in Paper IV, while all ten studied oil and gas companies have recognised climate change as a serious problem, their activities in the area of climate change are often contradictory and to a large extent not in line with a low-carbon transition of societies. The rosy picture of non-state actors often depicted in the literature as either defenders of the public good or as actors that can spur more effective actions, for example in terms of bridging the emissions gap (Blok et al 2012; Biermann and Gupta 2011; Hoffmann 2011) is thus only part of the story. As this thesis demonstrates, non-state actors encompass a wide range of actors with varying interests and views, and different capabilities to promote these interests with authority. This therefore raises questions about the implications of the involvement of non-state actors in global environmental governance on the legitimacy of evolving governance arrangements, the answer to which remains inconclusive in the literature (Widerberg and Pattberg 2015; Lövbrand et al 2009; Bernstein 2005) and requires further empirical work. If global climate change governance is moving in the direction of global stakeholder democracy as suggested in Paper II, a key question is whether this strengthens already strong actors or whether it provides opportunities for marginalised voices to be heard. The results from Paper V indicate that perhaps these two scenarios are not mutually exclusive, as mainstream voices dominate at the climate change conferences but where the plurality of actors ensures that some marginalised perspectives are heard that otherwise would risk being left out.

Another important issue that remains unresolved is the implications of the growing participation by non-state actors in global environmental governance on environmental outcomes. The additional ideas, knowledge and resources that non-state actors bring to the table arguably contribute to enhancing environmental outcomes. On the other hand, the high degree of contestation within the non-state actor community (Paper V) indicates that non-state actors do not all pull in the same direction. While this may benefit global climate change governance in terms of adding to the plurality of voices, the high degree of contestation may also mean that different non-state actor efforts undermine each other, thereby reducing overall effectiveness. This is thus an issue where further empirical work is required. Given the considerable participation of

non-state actors in the contemporary global climate change governance landscape, the question concerning their effectiveness is not a yes or no question. Instead of asking whether non-state actors can contribute to effective global governance, it is necessary to examine how and under what conditions they can do so (Green 2013). One implication of the previous discussions is that institutional arrangements that govern non-state actor participation in international affairs are important for setting the terms of which non-state actors can participate effectively and with what effect.

Questions about whether and how non-state actors can contribute to input and output legitimacy in global environmental governance are likely to gain prominence as climate change continues to engage a broader set of actors—from the tourism industry to faith-based organisations. As complexity and fragmentation of climate change governance increases (Zelli 2011), non-state actors may find themselves playing new roles. It remains to be seen whether an increase in the involvement of non-state actors in global environmental governance may lead to calls for more decision-making powers for these actors, or whether concerns about their accountability may weaken their authority.

6. Conclusions, Limitations and Implications for Future Research

This thesis has examined why and how non-state actors are involved in global climate change governance and discussed the implications of such involvement by identifying three key broad role-categories for non-state actors. Conceptually, the thesis distinguishes between the motives and processes of involving non-state actors in global climate change governance and differentiates between types of non-state actors to provide a systematic study of a range of actors. Empirically, the thesis provides an assessment of current practices of involving non-state actors in global climate change governance and provides unique insights about perceptions of different actors on the roles that non-state actors play. Methodologically, it demonstrates how a triangulation of quantitative and qualitative data can provide new insights. Survey methodology combined with qualitative methods, e.g. interviews and document analyses, is thus suggested as one useful methodology for studying issues of non-state legitimacy and

authority. The thesis has thus contributed to the literature by offering a novel toolbox on studying non-state legitimacy and authority as well as relations between state and non-state actors in the contemporary global climate change governance landscape.

A few general conclusions on why and how non-state actors are involved in global climate change governance can be drawn from these insights. First, the findings suggest a dynamic interplay between state and non-state actors and indicate a range of roles for different types of non-state actors. While state interest is an important factor for understanding the extent to which non-state actors can participate in global climate change governance, these interests vary and are continuously being shaped through processes and practices involving non-state agency (Paper I; Paper II; Paper III). The finding that state representatives perceive different functions for non-state actors and have different motives for involving them at different stages of the negotiation process, modifies the functional efficiency argument. One implication is that non-state actors are not only recognised for their more neutral service provision functions, but are also acknowledged for being political actors in their own right (Paper I; Paper II). Which non-state actors participate and to what extent therefore has implications for the effects of their involvement in international affairs. Thus, although state representatives' instrumental views of non-state actor involvement in international affairs are important and to some extent determine their policy space, the dynamic interplay between state representatives and non-state actors means that the roles of non-state actors are determined through patterns of cooperation and contestation.

Second, the study design offers comparisons across groups of non-state actors and shows that activities and views differ not only at the individual organisation level but that they are also linked to the type of non-state actor. Different types of non-state actors have distinct comparative advantages across governance activities, where their governance profiles show the activities where they have gained recognition from the wider community of state and non-state actors. The results indicate that non-state actors have to different degrees gained recognition for their activities across a range of governance activities, thereby shaping their agency (Paper I; Paper II; Paper III). This means that authority is shared between states and non-state actors in global climate change governance, where practices of involving non-state actors are relatively extensive and where non-state actors seek to expand their policy space by justifying and seeking recognition for their participation. While states appear to be most willing to share authority with non-state actors in order to benefit from their expertise or include

representatives of important interests in the discussions, non-state actors can seek to gain authority for other activities that aim at influencing how issues of climate change are articulated, decided-upon and implemented. An example of wider governance activities that non-state actors can carry out is the shaping of information and ideas to influence how the climate change problem and its solutions are perceived by the wider public (Paper IV).

Third, contemporary participatory arrangements in the field of global environmental governance with the constituency system seem to favour a neocorporatist model for non-state participation (Paper II). To the extent that different actors are associated with particular discourses (Dryzek and Stevenson 2011; Paper V), their empowerment or disenfranchisement can have significant effects on the way that governance arrangements play out, with implications for global democracy. For example, previous literature has identified an uneven pattern of non-state actor participation and initiatives depending on the geographical location of where they originate (Chan et al 2015; Bulkeley et al 2014; Nordang Uhre 2013). While global environmental governance has opened up spaces for deliberation (Paper V; Bäckstrand et al 2010; Dryzek and Stevenson 2011), structural inequalities and power appear to have a greater impact on governance outcomes (Bäckstrand 2006; Young 2001). Therefore, not only governance profiles, but also strategic interactions among groups of non-state actors can influence governance outcomes. This is in line with neopluralist thinking, which envisions power relations as a web of competing interest groups (McFarland 2007). What is clear is that the open accreditation policy of the UNFCCC and other global environmental governance institutions more generally enables a multitude of non-state actors to perform various roles on the international stage (Paper II; Paper III; Paper V). This highlights the importance of institutional arrangements that govern non-state actor participation in international affairs as these can set the terms for which non-state actors that can participate effectively and with what effect.

Finally, this thesis identifies non-state actors' overall broad role-categories as being *shapers* of information and ideas, *brokers* of knowledge, norms and initiatives, and *doers* of implementing policies and influencing behaviours. These can be thought of as three key paths that may lead to influence of governance outcomes for non-state actors. Different types of non-state actors carry out activities within these role-categories to different extents and in diverse ways. To take oil and gas companies as an example, they are active in all three role-categories: as a group they shape information on the centrality

of oil and gas in the energy mix, they broker knowledge about carbon capture storage technologies to policy-makers, and they are *doers* for instance when they direct their investments toward less carbon-intensive sources of energy and thereby change outcomes on the ground (Paper IV). While *doers* can influence outcomes on their own (but often do so in partnerships with others), *brokers* and *shapers* need to work together with other actors to influence outcomes. Where, when and how these interactions take place is a pertinent question for future research.

This highlights the need to improve conceptual and theoretical understandings of non-state authority to understand how power and interests, ideas and norms, and governance practices combine when seeking to understand governance outcomes. As this thesis seeks to show, such a theory of non-state authority needs to not only combine realist perspectives – that focus on actors and structure – with sociological perspectives – that focus on ideas and processes – but also needs to take into account the practices that non-state actors partake in that allow for non-state governance to take shape. This is why this thesis has attempted to shed light on different aspects of non-state actor participation in global climate change governance. With the focus of this thesis being on the policy space for non-state actors, their relations with states, their governance activities and agency, and the views that they represent, it has sought to provide a novel account of how non-state authority can be studied in global climate change governance to better understand which non-state actors participate in climate change governance when and how. Further theoretical work is however required to answer the question of how different non-state actors become authoritative and what role power has in making different non-state actors legitimate (Hurd 1999).

These observations open up new lines of enquiry for research. One limitation of this thesis is the lack of data for some types of non-state actors that are relatively less visible at the international level (e.g. indigenous people organisations, women and gender groups, faith groups). The women and gender constituency has succeeded in recent years to draw attention to gender issues at the climate change conferences, for example having influenced the establishment of a dedicated Gender Day at the UNFCCC COPs as well as decision 23/CP.18 to encourage gender balance in the delegations at the conferences. Greater efforts should therefore be made in future research to study a wider range of non-state actors, including those that do not participate in the UNFCCC COPs. Likewise, an examination of the roles of non-state

actors that are included in state delegations at intergovernmental negotiations would also add additional insights into relations between state and non-state actors.

Moreover, this thesis identifies the need for future research to answer the question of how the process of recognition that has been identified as important for gaining authority (Dellas et al 2011; Paper III) plays out in practice. A related question for future research is how non-state actors that wield authority in the international system can be made accountable. Furthermore, since this thesis has focused on the issue of climate change – an area with relatively open non-state actor arrangements – future research will need to determine whether these conclusions hold outside the area of global environmental governance. Such a research agenda would have implications for how we understand the interactions between the international and transnational arenas and the factors that are transforming global governance (Ruggie 2004). This thesis has contributed to such a research agenda through its empirical mapping of the roles of non-state actors in global climate change governance, through its mix of theories and through its triangulation of methods.

In conclusion, non-state actors have a range of roles to play in global climate change governance as *shapers*, *brokers* and *doers*, (e.g. contributing with ideas, raising awareness, shaping discussions, influencing decisions, implementing policies, etc.). Nevertheless, states still set the terms of climate action through laws and regulations. In order to understand the complex pattern of governance activities in global environmental governance, it is therefore fruitful to better understand relations between state and non-state actors as well as how power, interests, ideas, norms, and governance practices are redefining authority and making it more dispersed.

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