Bullshit-sensitivity is the ability to distinguish pseudo-profound bullshit sentences (e.g. “Your movement transforms universal observations”) from genuinely profound sentences (e.g. “The person who never made a mistake never tried something new”). Although bullshit-sensitivity has been linked to other individual difference measures, it has not yet been shown to predict any actual behavior. We therefore conducted a survey study with over a thousand participants from a general sample of the Swedish population and assessed participants’ bullshit-receptivity (i.e. their perceived meaningfulness of seven bullshit sentences) and profoundness-receptivity (i.e. their perceived meaningfulness of seven genuinely profound sentences), and used these variables to predict two types of prosocial behavior (self-reported donations and a decision to volunteer for charity). Despite bullshit-receptivity and profoundness-receptivity being positively correlated with each other, logistic regression analyses showed that profoundness-receptivity had a positive association whereas bullshit-receptivity had a negative association with both types of prosocial behavior. These relations held up for the most part when controlling for potentially intermediating factors such as cognitive ability, time spent completing the survey, sex, age, level of education, and religiosity. The results suggest that people who are better at distinguishing the pseudo-profound from the actually profound are more prosocial.

Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998) reported that participants primed with a category associated with intelligence (professor) subsequently performed 13% better on a trivia test than participants primed with a category associated with a lack of intelligence (soccer hooligans). In two unpublished replications of this study designed to verify the appropriate testing procedures, Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, and Holland observed a smaller difference between conditions (2%-3%) as well as a gender difference: Men showed the effect (9.3% and 7.6%), but women did not (0.3% and -0.3%). The procedure used in those replications served as the basis for this multilab Registered Replication Report. A total of 40 laboratories collected data for this project, and 23 of these laboratories met all inclusion criteria. Here we report the meta-analytic results for those 23 direct replications (total N = 4,493), which tested whether performance on a 30-item general-knowledge trivia task differed between these two priming conditions (results of supplementary analyses of the data from all 40 labs, N = 6,454, are also reported). We observed no overall difference in trivia performance between participants primed with the professor category and those primed with the hooligan category (0.14%) and no moderation by gender.

Most people dislike the idea of “health economists” having influence on medical decision making and who gets what when it comes to health care. Health economics is often thought of as inhumane, promoting efficiency at the expense of more profound moral values, such as equality and need. The fact that allocations solely based on cost-effectiveness are unlikely to be compatible with public views has been illustrated in experimental studies (1, 2). Moreover, lessons from the Oregon experience on priority setting illuminated that rationing decisions based on health maximization are likely to conflict with the view of the general public. For an economist this can be hard to understand, why is not the quest to maximize the value for money something that strikes a chord with the general public? Here we will outline two fundamental psychological mechanisms that will help to explain why people hate health economics.

The two psychological mechanisms – taboo-tradeoffs and compassion fade – are emotional phenomena that bias decision-making. These biases are of amplified by the fact that health is of special moral importance to most people. Not only our own health, but other people’s health as well. Moreover, decisions on how to allocate scarce resources in health care also ultimately lead to policies that carry life and death consequences. Thus, health care rationing elicits strong emotions making it an area of decision-making where emotion and reason often diverge. We will argue that health economics at large has been oblivious to the core aspects of human nature outlined in this paper, and this has limited the use of health economics as a productive input in health policy.

To improve our understanding of how people make financial decisions, it is important to investigate what psychological characteristics influence individuals’ positive financial behavior and financial well-being. In this study, we explore the effect of individual differences in self-control and other non-cognitive factors on financial behavior and financial well-being. A survey containing measures of financial behavior, subjective financial well-being, self-control, optimism, deliberative thinking and demographic variables was sent to a representative sample (n=2063)" role="presentation" style="box-sizing: border-box; display: inline-block; line-height: normal; font-size: 14.399999618530273px; word-wrap: normal; white-space: nowrap; float: none; direction: ltr; max-width: none; max-height: none; min-width: 0px; min-height: 0px; border: 0px; padding: 0px; margin: 0px; color: rgb(80, 80, 80); font-family: Arial, Helvetica, 'Lucida Sans Unicode', 'Microsoft Sans Serif', 'Segoe UI Symbol', STIXGeneral, 'Cambria Math', 'Arial Unicode MS', sans-serif; position: relative;"> of the Swedish population. Our findings extend the application of the behavioral lifecycle hypothesis beyond savings behavior, to include general financial behavior. People with good self-control are more likely to save money from every pay-check, have better general financial behavior, feel less anxious about financial matters, and feel more secure in their current and future financial situation.

This paper studies whether individual cooperation is stable across settings and over time. Involving more than 7,000 subjects on two different continents, this study documents positive correlation in cooperative behavior across economic games in Norway, Sweden, Austria, and the United States. The game measures also correlate with a tendency to make deontological judgments in moral dilemmas, and display of general trust toward strangers. Using time-variation in the data, we test whether temporal stability of behavior is similar in the United States and Norway, and find similar stability estimates for both the American and Norwegian samples. The findings here provide further evidence of the existence of a stable behavioral inclination toward prosociality – a “cooperative phenotype,” as it has recently been termed. Also in line with previous research, we find that punishment and cooperation seem to be uncorrelated.

According to luck egalitarianism, inequalities should be deemed fair as long as they follow from individuals’ deliberate and fully informed choices, i.e. option luck – while inequalities should be deemed unfair if they follow from choices over which the individual has no control, i.e. brute luck. This study investigates if individuals’ fairness preferences correspond with the luck egalitarian fairness position. More specifically, in a laboratory experiment we test how individuals choose to redistribute gains and losses that stem from option luck compared to brute luck.

A two-stage experimental design with real incentives was employed. In total, 226 subjects were randomly assigned to either the brute luck or option luck treatment. Treatments were identical except for how monetary compensation for participation in the experiment was settled in stage one. In the option luck treatment, subjects were given the option to chose between a safe option (50 SEK) and a risky option (a 50/50 gamble between 0 SEK and 150 SEK). In the brute luck treatment no such choice was given, instead all subjects were compensated based on outcome of the risky option. In the second stage, subjects were asked to distribute additional endowments (100 SEK) in an anonymous dictator game using the strategy method, i.e. making decisions contingent on the recipient losing or wining in the gamble.

Individuals change their action associated with re-allocation depending on the underlying conception of luck. Subjects in the brute luck treatment equalized outcomes to larger extent (p=0.0069). Thus, subjects redistributed a larger amount to unlucky losers and a smaller amount to lucky winners compared to equivalent choices made in the option luck treatment.

We find strong support for people having a fairness preference not just for outcomes, but also for how those outcomes are reached. Our findings are potentially important for understanding the role citizens assign individual responsibility for life outcomes, i.e. health and wealth.

Research has demonstrated that two types of affect have an influence on judgment and decision making: incidental affect (affect unrelated to a judgment or decision such as a mood) and integral affect (affect that is part of the perceiver’s internal representation of the option or target under consideration). So far, these two lines of research have seldom crossed so that knowledge concerning their combined effects is largely missing. To fill this gap, the present review highlights differences and similarities between integral and incidental affect. Further, common and unique mechanisms that enable these two types of affect to influence judgment and choices are identified. Finally, some basic principles for affect integration when the two sources co-occur are outlined. These mechanisms are discussed in relation to existing work that has focused on incidental or integral affect but not both.

When should nudging be deemed as permissible and when should it be deemed as intrusive to individuals’ freedom of choice? Should all types of nudges be judged the same? To date the debate concerning these issues has largely proceeded without much input from the general public. The main objective of this study is to elicit public views on the use of nudges in policy. In particular we investigate attitudes toward two broad categories of nudges that we label pro-self (i.e. focusing on private welfare) and pro-social (i.e. focusing on social welfare) nudges. In addition we explore how individual differences in thinking and feeling influence attitudes toward nudges. General population samples in Sweden and the United States (n=952) were presented with vignettes describing nudge-policies and rated acceptability and intrusiveness on freedom of choice. To test for individual differences, measures on cultural cognition and analytical thinking were included. Results show that the level of acceptance toward nudge-policies was generally high in both countries, but were slightly higher among Swedes than Americans. Somewhat paradoxically a majority of the respondents also perceived the presented nudge-policies as intrusive to freedom of choice. Nudge- polices classified as pro-social had a significantly lower acceptance rate compared to pro-self nudges (p<.0001). Individuals with a more individualistic worldview were less likely to perceive nudges as acceptable, while individuals more prone to analytical thinking were less likely to perceive nudges as intrusive to freedom of choice. To conclude, our findings suggest that the notion of “one-nudge- fits-all” is not tenable. Recognizing this is an important aspect both for successfully implementing nudges as well as nuancing nudge theory.