As a policy which presumes to be based on a norm of “good neighbourliness” the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) depends for legitimacy on interpretation and understanding of an extremely complex human association. This essay focuses on the rhetorical dynamics involved in the neighbourhood policy and their consequences in terms of external input legitimacy. An analysis of the main policy documents between 2003 and 2015 suggests that the ENP cannot be dismissed either as a rhetorical ruse to promote EU power interests, or a naïve vision of good-natured cohabitation. Even if the neighbourhood discourse was introduced to cover a policy of tranquilization or subjugation, it still communicates and supports key norms and ethical standards of international relations. Arguably, this amounts to a dilemma in terms of external input legitimacy: The commitment to a responsive and reflective order among neighbours is quite visible, but so are the elements of conditionality and differentiation.

The concept of smart power has gained wide currency in recent years. However, it seems that the term is more persuasive than informative, a problem shared with the associated concepts of soft and hard power. This article aims to show that smart power covers a conceptual understanding and ideals of practice with much more depth than meets the eye, falling back on important elements of the classical realist tradition of international thought, and in particular ideas of prudent statesmanship. By highlighting the connection between current, policy-oriented statements and understandings of smart power, and principal elements of classical realism, I bring increased theoretical depth and contour to the concept and – in effect – a re-interpretation of the idea of smart power. 

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the idea of “neighborliness” as contained in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). I will confront the official EU policy discourse with a review of the meaning of neighborhood and neighborly relations as a variation of close association between social actors in general and states in particular. My point of departure is the claim that the adoption of a concept and discourse of neighborhood in EU’s relations with its near abroad is both significant and consequential, and therefore in need of analysis and interpretation. Significant because the adoption of the neighborhood discourse is a deliberate choice that indicates and implies commitment to further values and ideas of how the EU should conduct its foreign relations. Consequential because the choice and use of a suggestive group of concepts centered on the idea and image of “the good neighbor” is likely to raise and define expectations among actors, thus affecting the legitimacy of the policy.

Accordingly, this is not an analysis of policy but of ideas, based on the presumption that the coherence and intelligibility of guiding ideas are essential for the legitimacy of the poli- cy itself. But the meaning and significance of a proclaimed policy of neighborhood is only partially determined by the authors of that policy. Bringing the concept of neighborhood into the field of foreign policy-making is to open up an interpretative space where different expectations and understandings meet, but don’t necessarily merge. Thus referring to neighborhood as the defining element of external policy raises questions not only about the contents of this policy but more importantly about what kind of relationship and asso- ciation are envisaged, and made possible.

The following questions will be addressed. First of all: What is the EU idea of neighbor- hood and neighborly relations? This is not primarily a question about the content and de- sign of the policy in terms of action plans and programs; it is a question about the intended and implied value basis of the policy. In the declared rationale of the ENP, what is the ex- pressed or suggested meaning of neighborhood and neighborliness? Has this idea changed over time? And second: Is the EU idea of neighborhood and neighborly relations compatible with and understandable in light of normative standards of neighborhood and neighborli- ness? 

Before appreciating the “unprecedented changes” of our time, we need to ask what qualifies as change, and what is the measure of significance. This paper recognizes the need to de- velop a middle ground between those who claim that the character of contemporary inter- national politics has changed fundamentally, and those who maintain that nothing signifi- cant at all has happened. A first step is to realize that notions of change and continuity constitute each other as the variable pace of political time. Change is not uniform: processes of integration are aligned with disintegration, globalization with regionalization, etc. A se- cond claim is the proposition that significance is a matter of interpretation and understand- ing. This paper takes the study of political change to be essentially a study of ideas and patterns of thought, the ways in which change is conceived. Against the common claim that realism fails to address change, I maintain that classical realism largely is about significant change, and how to come to terms with an environment in flux. A discussion of the smart power discourse serves to illustrate the enduring impact of classical realist thought on the analysis of international change. 

Problem based teaching has been on the agenda in higher education for at least the last twenty years and is embedded in professional educations often to prepare students for real life problem solving. However, in when higher education rather aim to provide deeper theoretical and reflective competences promoting the students capacities to address unpredictable challenges in different contexts, there might be other ways of applying and using problem based educational tools. In this paper we describe and discuss our experiences of such attempts in three different higher educational programs.

The three educational settings are a Master of European and International relations, teacher-training courses on master level and Master of Political Science. The work on our new curriculums and pedagogical approaches has taken place within a development project and we have shared ideas and experiences throughout the project. The approach has been differently designed into the three programs but the common focus has been that we do not take off in the problem, but the students have to find the problem and explain how it fits to the theories they learn. We conclude, so far, that a key for success is to present and introduce the students to the model of teaching to be successful.

The concept of smart power has gained currency in recent years, not least, or in particular, through the writings of Joseph Nye. This paper departs from the proposition that smart power is a deeply problematic notion, and this for several reasons. On the one hand, the term as such is infelicitously rhetorical, suggesting a distinction between smart and not-so-smart (dumb) strategies. On the other hand, from a conceptual point of view, the idea of smart power as a successful combination of soft and hard power comes dangerously close to triviality. The purpose of this paper is to take smart power seriously, claiming that the term actually covers a conceptual understanding and ideals of practice with much more depth than meets the eye, falling back on important elements of the classical realist tradition of international thought. By highlighting the connection between current, policy-oriented statements and understandings of smart power, and principal elements of classical realism, I attempt to bring increased theoretical depth and contour to the concept and – in effect – a re-interpretation of the idea of smart power. 

The questions whether the EU possesses a “strategic culture” and is capable of developing a “grand strategy” has attracted considerable attention at the nexus of policy debates and the academic discourse on EU foreign relations. Arguably the salience of grand strategy increases in times of change, both as a condition for and a hindrance to necessary adaptation. The paper departs from the perception that the EU is challenged by external developments that involve armed territorial conflicts on its eastern and southern borders. In the main part I discuss different understandings of grand strategy and make the argument that polities have grand strategies whether they know it or not, and that grand strategies concern the institutionalized organization of knowledge which is in part a rational and conscious process but in significant ways concern tacit rules and routines of collective thought.  I conclude that developing appropriate responses to the diverse external challenges that faces the EU presumes a better understanding of the grand strategy it actually presents.