The gap between the internationally agreed climate objectives and tangible emissions reductions looms large. We explore how the supreme decision-making body of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Conference of the Parties (COP), could develop to promote more effective climate policy. We argue that promoting implementation of climate action could benefit from focusing more on individual sectoral systems, particularly for mitigation. We consider five key governance functions of international institutions to discuss how the COP and the sessions it convenes could advance implementation of the Paris Agreement: guidance and signal, rules and standards, transparency and accountability, means of implementation, and knowledge and learning. In addition, we consider the role of the COP and its sessions as mega-events of global climate policy. We identify opportunities for promoting sectoral climate action across all five governance functions and for both the COP as a formal body and the COP sessions as conducive events. Harnessing these opportunities would require stronger involvement of national ministries in addition to the ministries of foreign affairs and environment that traditionally run the COP process, as well as stronger involvement of non-Party stakeholders within formal COP processes. This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > International Policy Framework

Formal deliberations for the new collective quantified goal on climate finance began at COP26 in Glasgow. This Perspectives article aims to inform this process by discussing the potential size and nature of is post-2025 target. We argue that the climate finance system around the current target to mobilise US$100 billion per year to support developing countries has been fraught with difficulties, and that it would be ineffective to simply increase the climate finance target without addressing these difficulties. Therefore, we identify and discuss five priority elements for negotiations: the relation to Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement; the adaptation-mitigation balance; financial instruments; mobilising private finance; and new and additional finance. To increase transparency, accountability, and trust in climate finance under the UNFCCC and to simultaneously allow for the mobilisation of finance at scale, we suggest setting a sub-target for grants. In combination with additional (sub)target(s), this could define an overall new collective quantified goal that is better suited to serve the challenging dual role of mobilising finance at scale and transferring resources to developing countries. Key policy insights Ambiguous definitions of climate finance and the US$100 billion target allow for multiple interpretations, reducing transparency and trust between countries. Climate finance targets can be interpreted in a dual and sometimes contrasting way: mobilising investment at scale and transferring resources from developed to developing countries. Recognising this duality may help to find common ground for a post-2025 climate finance target. Increasing the climate finance target may prove ineffective without further clarity on private finance mobilisation, the relation to Art. 2.1(c), and other priority elements. More detailed assessments of needs, priorities, costs, and support are needed to inform the post-2025 target and assess climate finance provision effectiveness. A sub-target for grants could increase accountability, trust, and transparency, and target the needs of the most vulnerable developing countries. Negotiations on the post-2025 climate finance target could also consider additional aspects such as access to and prioritisation of finance, and loss and damage.

Nationally determined contributions (NDCs) were key to reaching the Paris Agreement and will be instrumental in implementing it. Research was quick to identify the ‘headline numbers’ of NDCs: if these climate action plans were fully implemented, global mean warming by 2100 would be reduced from approximately 3.6 to 2.7°C above pre-industrial levels (Höhne et al. Climate Pol 17:1–17, 2016; Rogelj et al. Nature 534:631–639, 2016). However, beyond these headline mitigation numbers, NDCs are more difficult to analyse and compare. UN climate negotiations have so far provided limited guidance on NDC formulation, which has resulted in varying scopes and contents of NDCs, often lacking details concerning ambitions. If NDCs are to become the long-term instrument for international cooperation, negotiation, and ratcheting up of ambitions to address climate change, then they need to become more transparent and comparable, both with respect to mitigation goals, and to issues such as adaptation, finance, and the way in which NDCs are aligned with national policies. Our analysis of INDCs and NDCs (Once a party ratifies the Paris Agreement, it is invited to turn its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) into an NDC. We refer to results from our INDC analysis rather than our NDC analysis in this commentary unless otherwise stated.) shows that they omit important mitigation sectors, do not adequately provide details on costs and financing of implementation, and are poorly designed to meet assessment and review needs.

While seasonal outlooks have been operational for many years, until recently the extended-range timescale referred to as subseasonal-to-seasonal (S2S) has received little attention. S2S prediction fills the gap between short-range weather prediction and long-range seasonal outlooks. Decisions in a range of sectors are made in this extended-range lead time; therefore, there is a strong demand for this new generation of forecasts. International efforts are under way to identify key sources of predictability, improve forecast skill and operationalize aspects of S2S forecasts; however, challenges remain in advancing this new frontier. If S2S predictions are to be used effectively, it is important that, along with science advances, an effort is made to develop, communicate and apply these forecasts appropriately. In this study, the emerging operational S2S forecasts are presented to the wider weather and climate applications community by undertaking the first comprehensive review of sectoral applications of S2S predictions, including public health, disaster preparedness, water management, energy and agriculture. The value of applications-relevant S2S predictions is explored, and the opportunities and challenges facing their uptake are highlighted. It is shown how social sciences can be integrated with S2S development, from communication to decision-making and valuation of forecasts, to enhance the benefits of ‘climate services’ approaches for extended-range forecasting. While S2S forecasting is at a relatively early stage of development, it is concluded that it presents a significant new window of opportunity that can be explored for application-ready capabilities that could allow many sectors the opportunity to systematically plan on a new time horizon.

The private sector’s role in climate finance is increasingly subject to political and scientific debate. Yet there is poor empirical evidence of private engagement in adaptation and its potential contribution to the industrialised countries’ mobilisation of USD 100 billion of annual climate finance from 2020 onwards to support developing countries to address climate change. This paper analysed 101 case studies of private sector adaptation under the Private Sector Initiative (PSI) of the UNFCCC Nairobi work programme, and examined these against ten ‘adaptation finance criteria’ that were distilled from UN climate negotiation outcomes. Results show that private adaptation interventions complement public adaptation activities. Yet the ten adaptation finance criteria are not met, which demonstrates that the diplomatic UNFCCC conceptualisation of financing adaptation is dissonant from the private sector reality. For example, while the case studies’ investments are ‘new and additional’ to Official Development Assistance (ODA), their ‘predictability’ remains unclear. And despite some commitment for ‘up-scaling’, plans and associated costs for doing so remain undisclosed. Developed countries’ role in ‘mobilising’ private financial resources under the PSI seems limited. It is unrealistic to expect that the UNFCCC alters existing criteria to suit private initiatives, or that the private sector aligns its initiatives to meet existing criteria. This paper advocates monitoring and reporting only of those private investments that principally finance adaptation. This practical way forward would allow private finance to meet criteria such as predictability, transparency, and mobilisation, but would drastically reduce the amount of private investment that could contribute to reaching the USD 100 billion climate finance target.

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Both mitigation and adaptation can reduce the risks of climate change. This study reviews the complementarity and comparability between the two, looking first at the global level and then at the national-to-local domain. At the global level, the review finds differing definitions and viewpoints exist in the literature. Much of the economic literature reports that global mitigation and adaptation are substitutes (in economic terms). In contrast, the scientific literature considers them to be complementary (in policy terms), as they address different risks that vary temporally and spatially. The degree of complementarity and comparability therefore depends on the perspective taken, although there is a policy space where the two can overlap. However, the governance, institutional, and policy-based literature identifies that even if a global mitigation and adaptation mix could be defined, it would be highly contentious and extremely difficult to deliver in practice. The review then considers the complementarity and comparability of mitigation and adaptation at the national-to-local domain, in national policy and at sector level. The review finds there is greater potential for complementarity at this scale, although possible conflicts can also exist. However, the institutional, governance, and policy literature identifies a number of barriers to practical implementation, and as a result, complementary mitigation and adaptation action is unlikely to happen autonomously. Finally, the lessons from the review are drawn together to highlight policy relevant issues and identify research gaps. WIREs Clim Change 2015, 6:541–557. doi: 10.1002/wcc.368This article is categorized under: * Integrated Assessment of Climate Change > Methods of Integrated Assessment of Climate Change * The Carbon Economy and Climate Mitigation > Benefits of Mitigation * Climate and Development > Sustainability and Human Well-Being

The past ten years have seen a substantial increase in research on climate change adaptation, but a large gap remains between adaptation research and action. Adaptation researchers have either failed to demonstrate the relevance of their findings to practitioners and policymakers, or stakeholders have based their views and decisions on other kinds of information. In addition, in sectors such as agriculture, forestry, nature conservation, urban planning, water management and energy supply, adaptation has been studied separately from mitigation, which contradicts the reality of many practitioners. This paper identifies five bottlenecks to the use of adaptation research in adaptation practice and policy. These bottlenecks have gone unnoticed because the traditional framing of adaptation does not adequately consider the notion of agency, often rendering stakeholder interactions ineffective. Knowledge and use of actor-oriented theory when analysing and discussing adaptation needs and options could serve to find ways to overcome the bottlenecks and narrow the gap between research and action. The paper presents a novel framework for actor-oriented adaptation research that is being conducted within the Nordic Centre of Excellence for Strategic Adaptation Research (NORD-STAR). It frames climate adaptation as addressing both the impacts of climate change and the consequences of climate policy. Two methodological approaches - modelling and visualisation, and policy analysis - are applied to three thematic issues: land-use change, energy transitions, and insurance and finance.

In a global context, the outlook for the Nordic region is relatively favourable, given its relatively stronger resiliency to climate change impacts in comparison to many other geo-political regions of the world. Overall, the projected climatic changes include increases in mean temperatures and in precipitation, although regional variations can be significant. The countries’ robust institutions and economies give them a strong capacity to adapt to these changes. Still, the need for adaptation to the changing climate has been and still is substantial, and in most of the region, there has been progress on the issue. This paper explores the potential for Nordic cooperation on adaptation; specifically, for the development of a regional adaptation strategy. In particular, it addresses two questions (1) What is the current state of adaptation in the Nordic countries? and (2) What are the potential benefits and weaknesses of a Nordic strategy for adaptation? In order to answer these two questions, this paper examines reviews the current national adaptation policies of each Nordic country and discusses the challenges facing a Nordic strategy and finally assesses the potential for common Nordic adaptation policy and further cooperation.

The concept of barriers is increasingly used to describe the obstacles that hinder the planning and implementation of climate change adaptation. The growing literature on barriers to adaptation reveals not only commonly reported barriers, but also conflicting evidence, and few explanations of why barriers exist and change. There is thus a need for research that focuses on the interdependencies between barriers and considers the dynamic ways in which barriers develop and persist. Such research, which would be actor-centred and comparative, would help to explain barriers to adaptation and provide insights into how to overcome them.