liu.seSearch for publications in DiVA
Change search
Link to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Publications (3 of 3) Show all publications
Jansson, F. & Eriksson, K. (2015). Cooperation and Shared Beliefs about Trust in the Assurance Game. PLoS ONE, 10(12), Article ID e0144191.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Cooperation and Shared Beliefs about Trust in the Assurance Game
2015 (English)In: PLoS ONE, ISSN 1932-6203, E-ISSN 1932-6203, Vol. 10, no 12, article id e0144191Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Determinants of cooperation include ingroup vs. outgroup membership, and individual traits, such as prosociality and trust. We investigated whether these factors can be overridden by beliefs about people’s trust. We manipulated the information players received about each other’s level of general trust, “high” or “low”. These levels were either measured (Experiment 1) or just arbitrarily assigned labels (Experiment 2). Players’ choices whether to cooperate or defect in a stag hunt (or an assurance game)—where it is mutually beneficial to cooperate, but costly if the partner should fail to do so—were strongly predicted by what they were told about the other player’s trust label, as well as by what they were told that the other player was told about their own label. Our findings demonstrate the importance for cooperation in a risky coordination game of both first- and second-order beliefs about how much people trust each other. This supports the idea that institutions can influence cooperation simply by influencing beliefs.

National Category
Social Sciences Interdisciplinary Sociology Social Psychology
urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-123350 (URN)10.1371/journal.pone.0144191 (DOI)000366902700074 ()26640892 (PubMedID)
Swedish Research Council, 2009-2390EU, FP7, Seventh Framework Programme, 324233

Funding agencies: Swedish Research Council [2009-2390]; European Research Council under the European Unions Seventh Framework Programme (FP7)/ERC Grant [324233]

Available from: 2015-12-11 Created: 2015-12-11 Last updated: 2018-01-10Bibliographically approved
Jansson, F., Parkvall, M. & Strimling, P. (2015). Modeling the Evolution of Creoles. Language Dynamics and Change, 5(1), 1-51
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Modeling the Evolution of Creoles
2015 (English)In: Language Dynamics and Change, ISSN 2210-5824, E-ISSN 2210-5832, Vol. 5, no 1, p. 1-51Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Various theories have been proposed regarding the origin of creole languages. Describing a process where only the end result is documented involves several methodological difficulties. In this paper we try to address some of the issues by using a novel mathematical model together with detailed empirical data on the origin and structure of Mauritian Creole. Our main focus is on whether Mauritian Creole may have originated only from a mutual desire to communicate, without a target language or prestige bias. Our conclusions are affirmative. With a confirmation bias towards learning from successful communication, the model predicts Mauritian Creole better than any of the input languages, including the lexifier French, thus providing a compelling and specific hypothetical model of how creoles emerge. The results also show that it may be possible for a creole to develop quickly after first contact, and that it was created mostly from material found in the input languages, but without inheriting their morphology.

creoles, pidgins, cultural evolution, mathematical modelling, simulation, kreoler, pidginspråk, kulturell evolution, matematisk modellering, simulering
National Category
General Language Studies and Linguistics Other Mathematics Sociology (excluding Social Work, Social Psychology and Social Anthropology)
urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-115745 (URN)10.1163/22105832-00501005 (DOI)
EU, FP7, Seventh Framework Programme, 324233Swedish Research Council, 445-2013-7681Swedish Research Council, 2009-2390Swedish Research Council, 2009-2678Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, M12-0301:1
Available from: 2015-03-18 Created: 2015-03-18 Last updated: 2018-01-11Bibliographically approved
Jansson, F. (2015). What Games Support the Evolution of an Ingroup Bias?. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 373, 100-110
Open this publication in new window or tab >>What Games Support the Evolution of an Ingroup Bias?
2015 (English)In: Journal of Theoretical Biology, ISSN 0022-5193, E-ISSN 1095-8541, Vol. 373, p. 100-110Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

There is an increasing wealth of models trying to explain the evolution of group discrimination and an ingroup bias. This paper sets out to systematically investigate the most fundamental assumption in these models: in what kind of situations do the interactions take place? What strategic structures – games – support the evolution of an ingroup bias? More specifically, the aim here is to find the prerequisites for when a bias also with respect to minimal groups – arbitrarily defined groups void of group-specific qualities – is selected for, and which cannot be ascribed to kin selection.

Through analyses and simulations of minimal models of two-person games, this paper indicates that only some games are conducive to the evolution of ingroup favouritism. In particular, this class does not contain the prisoners' dilemma, but it does contain anti-co-ordination and co-ordination games. Contrasting to the prisoners' dilemma, these are games where it is not a matter of whether to behave altruistically, but rather one of predicting what the other person will be doing, and where I would benefit from you knowing my intentions.

In anti-co-ordination games, on average, not only will agents discriminate between groups, but also in such a way that their choices maximise the sum of the available payoffs towards the ingroup more often than towards the outgroup. And in co-ordination games, even if agents do manage to co-ordinate with the whole population, they are more likely to co-ordinate on the socially optimal equilibrium within their group. Simulations show that this occurs most often in games where there is a component of risk-taking, and thus trust, involved. A typical such game is the stag hunt or assurance game.

Ethnocentrism, Minimal groups, Cooperation, Replicator dynamics, Game theory, Assurance game, etnocentrism, minimala grupper, samarbete, replikatordynamik, spelteori
National Category
Evolutionary Biology Other Mathematics Sociology (excluding Social Work, Social Psychology and Social Anthropology)
urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-115764 (URN)10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.03.008 (DOI)000354002800009 ()25794651 (PubMedID)
EU, FP7, Seventh Framework Programme, 324233
Available from: 2015-03-18 Created: 2015-03-18 Last updated: 2017-12-04

Search in DiVA

Show all publications