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Erlandsson, Arvid
Publications (8 of 8) Show all publications
Hagman, W., Erlandsson, A., Dickert, S., Tinghög, G. & Västfjäll, D. (2019). The effect of paternalistic alternatives on attitudes toward default nudges. Behavioural Public Policy
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The effect of paternalistic alternatives on attitudes toward default nudges
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2019 (English)In: Behavioural Public Policy, ISSN 2398-0648Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

Nudges are increasingly being proposed and used as a policy tool around the world. The success of nudges depends on public acceptance. However, several questions about what makes a nudge acceptable remain unanswered. In this paper, we examine whether policy alternatives to nudges influence the public's acceptance of these nudges: Do attitudes change when the nudge is presented alongside either a more paternalistic policy alternative (legislation) or a less paternalistic alternative (no behavioral intervention)? In two separate samples drawn from the Swedish general public, we find a very small effect of alternatives on the acceptability of various default nudges overall. Surprisingly, we find that when the alternative to the nudge is legislation, acceptance decreases and perceived intrusiveness increases (relative to conditions where the alternative is no regulation). An implication of this finding is that acceptance of nudges may not always automatically increase when nudges are explicitly compared to more paternalistic alternatives.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Cambridge University Press, 2019
National Category
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-161462 (URN)10.1017/bpp.2019.17 (DOI)
Available from: 2019-11-01 Created: 2019-11-01 Last updated: 2019-12-12Bibliographically approved
Erlandsson, A., Nilsson, A. & Västfjäll, D. (2018). Attitudes and donation behavior when reading positive and negative charity appeals. Journal of Nonprofit & Public Sector Marketing, 30(4), 444-474
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Attitudes and donation behavior when reading positive and negative charity appeals
2018 (English)In: Journal of Nonprofit & Public Sector Marketing, ISSN 1049-5142, E-ISSN 1540-6997, Vol. 30, no 4, p. 444-474Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This article tries to clarify whether negative charity appeals (i.e., advertisements emphasizing the bad consequences of not helping) or positive charity appeals (i.e., advertisements emphasizing the good consequences of helping) are more effective. Previous literature does not provide a single answer to this question and we suggest that one contributing reason for this is that different studies have operationalized appeal effectiveness in different ways (e.g., actual behavior, self-rated helping intentions, or expressed attitudes about the ad or the organization). Results from four separate studies suggest that positive appeals are more effective in inducing favorable attitudes toward the ad and toward the organization but that negative appeals are more effective (in studies 1A and 1B) or at least equally effective (in studies 1C and 1D) in eliciting actual donations. Also, although people’s attitude toward the appeal (i.e., liking) was a good predictor for the expected effectiveness in increasing donation behavior (in Study 2), it was a poor predictor of actual donation behavior in all four main studies. These results cast doubt on marketing theories suggesting that attitudes toward an advertisement and toward the brand always lead to higher purchase behavior.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Routledge, 2018
Keywords
Attitudes toward charity advertisements, donation behavior, negative/sad appeals, nonprofit marketing, positive/happy appeals
National Category
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-161460 (URN)10.1080/10495142.2018.1452828 (DOI)000452047400005 ()2-s2.0-85044780884 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2019-11-01 Created: 2019-11-01 Last updated: 2019-11-07Bibliographically approved
Erlandsson, A., Nilsson, A., Tinghög, G. & Västfjäll, D. (2018). Bullshit-sensitivity predicts prosocial behavior. PLoS ONE, 13(7), Article ID e0201474.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Bullshit-sensitivity predicts prosocial behavior
2018 (English)In: PLoS ONE, ISSN 1932-6203, E-ISSN 1932-6203, Vol. 13, no 7, article id e0201474Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Bullshit-sensitivity is the ability to distinguish pseudo-profound bullshit sentences (e.g. “Your movement transforms universal observations”) from genuinely profound sentences (e.g. “The person who never made a mistake never tried something new”). Although bullshit-sensitivity has been linked to other individual difference measures, it has not yet been shown to predict any actual behavior. We therefore conducted a survey study with over a thousand participants from a general sample of the Swedish population and assessed participants’ bullshit-receptivity (i.e. their perceived meaningfulness of seven bullshit sentences) and profoundness-receptivity (i.e. their perceived meaningfulness of seven genuinely profound sentences), and used these variables to predict two types of prosocial behavior (self-reported donations and a decision to volunteer for charity). Despite bullshit-receptivity and profoundness-receptivity being positively correlated with each other, logistic regression analyses showed that profoundness-receptivity had a positive association whereas bullshit-receptivity had a negative association with both types of prosocial behavior. These relations held up for the most part when controlling for potentially intermediating factors such as cognitive ability, time spent completing the survey, sex, age, level of education, and religiosity. The results suggest that people who are better at distinguishing the pseudo-profound from the actually profound are more prosocial.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
San Francisco, United States: Public Library of Science, 2018
National Category
Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology) Economics and Business
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-149915 (URN)10.1371/journal.pone.0201474 (DOI)000440300500039 ()30063739 (PubMedID)2-s2.0-85050828331 (Scopus ID)
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2017-01827Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, P14-0978:1Marianne and Marcus Wallenberg Foundation, 2014.0187
Available from: 2018-08-04 Created: 2018-08-04 Last updated: 2018-08-24Bibliographically approved
Lind, T., Erlandsson, A., Västfjäll, D. & Tinghög, G. (2018). Motivated reasoning when assessing the effects of refugee intake. Behavioural Public Policy
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Motivated reasoning when assessing the effects of refugee intake
2018 (English)In: Behavioural Public Policy, ISSN 2398-063XArticle in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

Do differences in worldview ideology hinder people from objectively interpreting the effect of immigration? In an experiment with Swedish adults (n = 1015), we investigate whether people display motivated reasoning when interpreting numerical information about the effects of refugee intake on crime rate. Our results show clear evidence of motivated reasoning along the lines of worldview ideology (i.e., whether people identify themselves primarily as nationally oriented or globally oriented). In scenarios where refugee intake was associated with higher crime rate, nationally oriented people were 18 percentage points more likely to make the correct assessment compared to globally oriented people. Likewise, in scenarios where refugee intake was associated with lower crime rate, nationally oriented people were 20 percentage points less likely to make the correct assessment compared to globally oriented people. Individuals with higher numeric ability were less likely to engage in motivated reasoning, suggesting that motivated reasoning more commonly is driven by feelings and emotional cues rather than deliberate analytical processes.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Cambridge University Press, 2018
Keywords
Motivated reasoning; partisan bias; politics; immigration; experiment
National Category
Economics Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology) Political Science (excluding Public Administration Studies and Globalisation Studies)
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-155088 (URN)10.1017/bpp.2018.41 (DOI)
Available from: 2019-03-15 Created: 2019-03-15 Last updated: 2019-08-12Bibliographically approved
Västfjäll, D., Paul, S., Burns, W., Erlandsson, A., Koppel, L., Asutay, E. & Tinghög, G. (2016). The Arithmetic of Emotion: Integration of Incidental and Integral Affect in Judgments and Decisions. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 325
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The Arithmetic of Emotion: Integration of Incidental and Integral Affect in Judgments and Decisions
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2016 (English)In: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 7, p. 325-Article, review/survey (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Research has demonstrated that two types of affect have an influence on judgment and decision making: incidental affect (affect unrelated to a judgment or decision such as a mood) and integral affect (affect that is part of the perceiver’s internal representation of the option or target under consideration). So far, these two lines of research have seldom crossed so that knowledge concerning their combined effects is largely missing. To fill this gap, the present review highlights differences and similarities between integral and incidental affect. Further, common and unique mechanisms that enable these two types of affect to influence judgment and choices are identified. Finally, some basic principles for affect integration when the two sources co-occur are outlined. These mechanisms are discussed in relation to existing work that has focused on incidental or integral affect but not both.

Keywords
emotions, incidental affect, integral affect, judgment, decision making
National Category
Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-126557 (URN)10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00325 (DOI)000443481400001 ()27014136 (PubMedID)
Funder
Ragnar Söderbergs stiftelse
Available from: 2016-03-30 Created: 2016-03-30 Last updated: 2018-12-10
Erlandsson, A., Björklund, F. & Bäckström, M. (2015). Emotional reactions, perceived impact and perceived responsibility mediate the identifiable victim effect, proportion dominance effect and in-group effect respectively. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 127, 1-14
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Emotional reactions, perceived impact and perceived responsibility mediate the identifiable victim effect, proportion dominance effect and in-group effect respectively
2015 (English)In: Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, ISSN 0749-5978, E-ISSN 1095-9920, Vol. 127, p. 1-14Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This study investigated possible mediators of the identifiable victim effect (IVE), the proportion dominance effect (PDE), and the in-group effect (IGE) in helping situations. In Studies 1–3, participants rated their emotional reactions (distress and sympathy toward the victims), perceived impact of helping, perceived responsibility to help, and helping motivation toward four versions of a helping situation. Gradually increasing victim identifiability in the helping situations primarily affected emotional reactions and sympathy completely mediated the IVE. Gradually making the reference-group smaller primarily affected perceived impact, and impact completely mediated the PDE. Gradually increasing in-groupness primarily affected perceived responsibility, and responsibility completely mediated the IGE. Study 4 included real monetary allocations and largely replicated the results using a between-subject design. Together, the results shed light on how contextual factors trigger help motivation, and indicate that different helping effects are primarily mediated by different mechanisms.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Academic Press, 2015
National Category
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-161463 (URN)10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.11.003 (DOI)000355026300002 ()2-s2.0-84917729561 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2019-11-01 Created: 2019-11-01 Last updated: 2019-11-08Bibliographically approved
Nilsson, A. & Erlandsson, A. (2015). The Moral Foundations taxonomy: Structural validity and relation to political ideology in Sweden. Personality and Individual Differences, 76, 28-32
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The Moral Foundations taxonomy: Structural validity and relation to political ideology in Sweden
2015 (English)In: Personality and Individual Differences, ISSN 0191-8869, E-ISSN 1873-3549, Vol. 76, p. 28-32Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Although Moral Foundations Theory claims that the foundations of morality are universal, there are still few studies addressing it through non-English measures. In the current research, 540 persons filled out a Swedish translation of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, and 332 of them filled out political attitude measures. Confirmatory factor analyses suggested that the fit of the five-factor model was better than alternative models but not optimal, replicating previous findings. Concerns with fairness and prevention of harm predicted political identity leftward, mediated mainly by preference for equality, and concerns with loyalty, authority, and sanctity predicted political identity rightward, mediated mainly by resistance to change and system justification, as hypothesized. Fairness and authority concerns were the best predictors of political ideology.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2015
Keywords
Moral Foundations, Morality, Political ideology, Political attitudes, Resistance to change, Preference for equality, System justification
National Category
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-161461 (URN)10.1016/j.paid.2014.11.049 (DOI)000349268500005 ()2-s2.0-84949119140 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2019-11-01 Created: 2019-11-01 Last updated: 2019-11-07Bibliographically approved
Erlandsson, A., Björklund, F. & Bäckström, M. (2014). Perceived Utility (not Sympathy) Mediates the Proportion Dominance Effect in Helping Decisions. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 27(1), 37-47
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Perceived Utility (not Sympathy) Mediates the Proportion Dominance Effect in Helping Decisions
2014 (English)In: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, ISSN 0894-3257, E-ISSN 1099-0771, Vol. 27, no 1, p. 37-47Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The proportion dominance effect (PDE) refers to a higher motivation to help when the victims are part of a small (you can help 56 out of 60) rather than a large (you can help 56 out of 560) reference group. In two studies using different experimental paradigms, we investigated possible mediators of the PDE. Study 1 (N = 168) was conducted in three separate steps in order to test each link of the mediator model independently. Students read six vignettes where it was possible to help a fixed number of victims but where the size of the reference group was either small or large. When the reference group was small, helping motivation and perceived utility were higher, whereas sympathy toward the victims and perceived rights were not. A within‐subject mediation analysis showed that perceived utility mediated the PDE. Study 2 (N = 36) presented four versions of a single helping situation in a joint evaluation mode where the size of the reference group became gradually smaller in each version. All participants compared and responded to each version. Helping motivation increased as the reference group became smaller, and this effect was mediated by perceived utility rather than by distress, sympathy, or perceived responsibilities. Our results suggest that unlike, for example, the identifiability and singularity effects, which have been suggested to be mediated by emotional reactions, the PDE is mediated by perceived utility. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
John Wiley & Sons, 2014
National Category
Psychology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-161464 (URN)10.1002/bdm.1789 (DOI)000328541400004 ()2-s2.0-84890370318 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2019-11-01 Created: 2019-11-01 Last updated: 2019-11-08Bibliographically approved
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