“Quality of life” has since a long time been an expression à la mode. It is much used in the public debate and it is influential in the field of?commerce. It has been claimed that this or that measure or this or that product will enhance our quality of life. But “quality of life” has also?become a technical term in social science and medicine. One can ask: what lies behind this development? And how comes that quality of life has become a technical concept also in scientific research?

PURPOSE: To argue for and propose bipartite concepts of functioning and disability, to tally with the structure of the ICF classification list, concepts of social models and clinical needs.

METHOD: The ICF concepts are discussed in relation to the history of ideas regarding disability concepts and the needs for such concepts in interdisciplinary rehabilitation.

RESULTS: Bipartite concepts are presented; they refer to actual functioning, simply body functions/structures and participation, including functioning in standardized environments. Participation refers to actually performed "activities", with "activities" simply denoting things that people may do. Bipartite concepts are congruent with the ICF classification and the structure of social models of disability, suitable for clinical and interdisciplinary use and easy to understand. The issue of standardized environments represents a methodological issue rather than the conceptual issue of defining functioning and disability. An individual perspective on activity and activity limitations, i.e. the middle part of the tripartite ICF concept, is somewhat similar to concepts of traditional language that were regarded as too generalizing already in 1912, when the interactional concept of "disability in a social sense" was introduced in rehabilitation practices.

CONCLUSION: Bipartite concepts of functioning and disability are recommended for interdisciplinary use of the ICF.

IMPLICATIONS FOR REHABILITATION: The ICF classification is useful, but the ICF concept of activities in an individual perspective is confusing. We suggest a use of the term "activities" simply to denote things that people may do and "participation" to denote actually performed activities. Estimations of ability should be explicit about how they are related to environmental factors.

In this paper an outline of a theory of health based on the notion of ability is presented. A persons health is defined as his or her second-order ability to realize vital goals given standard or otherwise reasonable circumstances. The crucial concepts: vital goal, standard circumstance and second-order ability, are characterized in the paper. Special emphasis is laid upon the third concept, second-order ability, which is of particular importance for the theory of rehabilitation.

Current sports injury reporting systems lack a common conceptual basis. We propose a conceptual foundation as a basis for the recording of health problems associated with participation in sports, based on the notion of impairment used by the World Health Organization. We provide definitions of sports impairment concepts to represent the perspectives of health services, the participants in sports and physical exercise themselves, and sports institutions. For each perspective, the duration of the causative event is used as the norm for separating concepts into those denoting impairment conditions sustained instantly and those developing gradually over time. Regarding sports impairment sustained in isolated events, sports injury denotes the loss of bodily function or structure that is the object of observations in clinical examinations; sports trauma is defined as an immediate sensation of pain, discomfort or loss of functioning that is the object of athlete self-evaluations; and sports incapacity is the sidelining of an athlete because of a health evaluation made by a legitimate sports authority that is the object of time loss observations. Correspondingly, sports impairment caused by excessive bouts of physical exercise is denoted as sports disease (overuse syndrome) when observed by health service professionals during clinical examinations, sports illness when observed by the athlete in self-evaluations, and sports sickness when recorded as time loss from sports participation by a sports body representative. We propose a concerted development effort in this area that takes advantage of concurrent ontology management resources and involves the international sporting community in building terminology systems that have broad relevance.

This article is a reply to Venkatapuram's critique in his article Health, Vital Goals, Capabilities, this volume. I take issue mainly with three critical points put forward by Venkatapuram with regard to my theory of health. (1) I deny that the contents of my vital goals are relative to each community or context, as Venkatapuram claims. There is no conceptual connection at all between standard circumstances and vital goals, as I understand these concepts. (2) Venkatapuram notes that I stop short of filling the framework of vital goals with any content and thereby make my concept of health less concrete. I reply that some vital goals are indeed universal, viz. the ones which are necessary conditions for survival. Many other vital goals are individual and cannot therefore be included in a universal list. (3) Venkatapuram claims that my definition of vital goals is too broad, since it entails that some persons without any disease can be regarded as ill. However, in my understanding health is a relational concept from a state of complete health to a state of maximal illness. In this framework, a minor reduction of a state of complete health does not entail illness. This article also contains a comparison between my theory of health and Martha Nussbaum's theory of capabilities for dignity.

In this article I respond to Bjorn Hofmanns criticism of some elements in my theory of health. Hofmanns main objective is to question "Nordenfelts basic premise that you can be ill without having negative first-person experiences, and to investigate the consequences of abandoning the premise." One of Hofmanns critical points is that my theory of health does not lend voice to the individual. My response is essentially conducted in four steps: (1) I question the aim of conceptual analysis that Hofmann proposes for the analysis of the notion of health. (2) I maintain that my analysis, in spite of Hofmanns contention, lends voice to the individual. It does so via my notion of subjective illness but also via my notion of vital goal. (3) I argue that conditions, such as coma, paralysis and mania are salient instances of ill health and that these may become neglected if the use of the terms "ill" and "illness" is restricted to instances where negative subjective experiences are present. (4) I rehearse my main arguments for selecting disability as the core element of ill health and respond to Hofmanns contention that persons who are in great pain can sometimes nevertheless perform perfectly.

In personalized nutrition, food is a tool for good health, implying an instrumental relationship between food and health. Food receives a secondary value, while health would appear to be a descriptive biological concept. This article gives an introduction to cultural understandings of food and health. The wider definition of food and health is explored in relation to the commonly used scientific approach that tends to take a more reductionist approach to food and health. The different discourses on food and health are being discussed in relation to ethical aspects of personalized nutrition. The success of personalized nutrition is likely dependent upon the ability to integrate the scientific approach with everyday cultural, emotional, ethical, and sensual understandings of food. Health theories can be divided into two principal rival types-biostatistical and holistic. Biostatistical focuses on survival, while holistic focuses on ability as a precondition for health. Arguments in favor of a holistic and individualistic theory of health and illness are presented. This implies a focus on the ability of the individual to realize his or her "vital goals." A holistic and individualistic health concept may have a reinforcing effect on the individualized approach in personalized nutrition. It allows focus on individual health premises and related dietary means of health promotion, as well as an individualized perspective on the objectives of health promotion. An individualistic notion of health also indicates that people with high levels of vital goals benefit more easily. To reach beyond these groups is likely difficult. This potential injustice should be balanced with global preventive medical programs.

What counts as health or ill health? How do we deal with the fallibility of our own bodies? Should illness and disease be considered simply in biological terms, or should considerations of its emotional impact dictate our treatment of it?  Our understanding of health and illness had become increasingly more complex in the modern world, as we are able to use medicine not only to fight disease but to control other aspects of our bodies, whether mood, blood pressure, or cholesterol. This collection of essays foregrounds the concepts of health and illness and patient experience within the philosophy of medicine, reflecting on the relationship between the ill person and society. Mental illness is considered alongside physical disease, and the important ramifications of society's differentiation between the two are brought to light. Health, Illness and Disease is a significant contribution to shaping the parameters of the evolving field of philosophy of medicine and will be of interest to medical practitioners and policy-makers as well as philosophers of science and ethicists.