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Municipally Owned Enterprises as Danger Zones for Corruption?: How Politicians Having Feet in Two Camps May Undermine Conditions for Accountabilit
Lunds universitet, Sweden.
Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för studier av samhällsutveckling och kultur, Centrum för kommunstrategiska studier – CKS. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
Jönköping Business School and The Ratio Institute, Sweden.
Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för ekonomisk och industriell utveckling, Institutet för analytisk sociologi, IAS. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
2019 (engelsk)Inngår i: Public Integrity, ISSN 1099-9922, E-ISSN 1558-0989, Vol. 21, nr 3, s. 320-352Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert) Published
Abstract [en]

The market-inspired reforms of New Public Management have been particularly pronounced in Swedish local government. Notably, municipally owned enterprises (MOEs) have rapidly grown in numbers. Principal-agent theory gives rise to the hypothesis that the massive introduction of MOEs has impacted negatively on the conditions for accountability in Swedish local government. To study this, social network analysis was employed in mapping networks for 223 MOEs in 11 strategically chosen municipalities, covering a total of 732 politicians. The analysis reveals substantial overlaps between principals (representatives of the ultimate stakeholders, citizens) and agents (the boards of the MOEs). Hence, corporatization of public services seems to imply worrisome entanglements between the politicians who are set to steer, govern, and oversee MOEs on the one hand, and the board members of MOEs on the other. The increasing numbers of MOEs may therefore have adverse effects on accountability in important and growing parts of Swedish local government.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Routledge, 2019. Vol. 21, nr 3, s. 320-352
Emneord [en]
Accountability, Corruption, Hybrid Organizations, Local Government, Moral Hazard, New Public Management, Principal-Agent Theory, Publicly Owned Enterprises, Social Networks, Transparency
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Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-153734DOI: 10.1080/10999922.2018.1522182ISI: 000474665000007OAI: oai:DiVA.org:liu-153734DiVA, id: diva2:1275955
Forskningsfinansiär
Swedish Research CouncilTilgjengelig fra: 2019-01-07 Laget: 2019-01-07 Sist oppdatert: 2019-07-30bibliografisk kontrollert

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Erlingsson, Gissur ÓWittberg, Emanuel

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