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Pricing commercial train path requests based on societal costs
Linköping University, Department of Science and Technology, Communications and Transport Systems. Linköping University, Faculty of Science & Engineering. VTI. (Public transportation and railway)ORCID iD: 0000-0001-9535-0617
KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden.
Linköping University, Department of Science and Technology, Communications and Transport Systems. Linköping University, Faculty of Science & Engineering.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-1789-9238
2020 (English)In: Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, ISSN 0965-8564, E-ISSN 1879-2375, Vol. 132, p. 452-464Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

On deregulated railway markets, efficient capacity allocation is important. We study the case where commercial trains and publicly controlled traffic (“commuter trains”) use the same railway infrastructure and hence compete for capacity. We develop a method that can be used by an infrastructure manager trying to allocate capacity in a socially efficient way. The method calculates the loss of societal benefits incurred by changing the commuter train timetable to accommodate a commercial train path request, and based on this calculates a reservation price for the train path request. If the commercial operator’s willingness-to-pay for the train path exceeds the loss of societal benefits, its request is approved. The calculation of these benefits takes into account changes in commuter train passengers’ travel times, waiting times, transfers and crowding, and changes in operating costs for the commuter train operator(s). The method is implemented in a microscopic simulation program, which makes it possible to test the robustness and feasibility of timetable alternatives. We show that the method is possible to apply in practice by demonstrating it in a case study from Stockholm, illustrating the magnitudes of the resulting commercial train path prices. We conclude that marginal societal costs of railway capacity in Stockholm are considerably higher than the current track access charges.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2020. Vol. 132, p. 452-464
Keywords [en]
Train timetables, Train conflicts, Capacity pricing, Railway capacity, Capacity allocation
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-162784DOI: 10.1016/j.tra.2019.12.005ISI: 000514014700030Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85076736383OAI: oai:DiVA.org:liu-162784DiVA, id: diva2:1380191
Projects
SamEff
Note

Funding agencies:  Swedish Transport Administration (Trafikverket) [Samhallsekonomiskt effektiv tilldelning av kapacitet pa jarnvagar]

The accepted version is also available on the author's home page: 

http://abdeaitali.github.io/

Available from: 2019-12-18 Created: 2019-12-18 Last updated: 2021-12-01Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Methods for Capacity Allocation in Deregulated Railway Markets
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Methods for Capacity Allocation in Deregulated Railway Markets
2020 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Faced with increasing challenges, railways around Europe have recently undergone major reforms aiming to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of the railway sector. New market structures such as vertical separation, deregulation and open access can allow for reduced public expenditures, increased market competition, and more efficient railway systems.

However, these structures have introduced new challenges for managing infrastructure and operations. Railway capacity allocation, previously internally performed within monopolistic national companies, are now conferred to an infrastructure manager. The manager is responsible for transparent and efficient allocation of available capacity to the different (often competing) licensed railway undertakings.

This thesis aims at developing a number of methods that can help allocate capacity in a deregulated (vertically separated) railway market. It focuses on efficiency in terms of social welfare, and transparency in terms of clarity and fairness. The work is concerned with successive allocation of capacity for publicly controlled and commercial traffic within a segmented railway market.

The contributions include cost benefit analysis methods that allow public transport authorities to assess the social welfare of their traffic, and create efficient schedules. The thesis also describes a market-based transparent capacity allocation where infrastructure managers price commercial train paths to solve capacity conflicts with publicly controlled traffic. Additionally, solution methods are developed to help estimate passenger demand, which is a necessary input both for resolving conflicts, and for creating efficient timetables.

Future capacity allocation in deregulated markets may include solution methods from this thesis. However, further experimentations are still required to address concerns such as data, legislation and acceptability. Moreover, future works can include prototyping and pilot projects on the proposed solutions, and investigating legal and digitalisation strategies to facilitate the implementation of such solutions.

Abstract [sv]

Med ökande utmaningar har järnvägar runt om i Europa genomgått stora reformer som syftar till att förbättra järnvägssektorns effektivitet och konkurrenskraft. Nya marknadsstrukturer såsom vertikal separering, avreglering och öppet tillträde för flera operatörer kan möjliggöra minskade offentliga kostnader, ökad marknadskonkurrens och effektivare järnvägssystem.

Denna omreglering av järnvägsmarknaderna har dock skapat nya utmaningar för hanteringen av järnvägsinfrastruktur och drift. Tilldelning av järnvägskapacitet, vilket tidigare sköttes inom nationella monopolföretag, måste nu göras av en infrastrukturförvaltare (infrastructure manager). Förvaltarens kapacitetstilldelning till olika (ofta konkurrerande) licensierade järnvägsföretag (railway undertakings) måste samtidigt vara transparent, rättvis och leda till ett effektivt kapacitetsutnyttjande.

I denna avhandling utvecklas metoder som kan användas av en infrastrukturförvaltare för att tilldela kapacitet i en avreglerad järnvägsmarknad. Den fokuserar på samhällsekonomiskt effektiva utfall men även transparens, tydlighet och rättvisa.

Avhandlingens bidrag omfattar samhällsekonomiska analysmetoder som gör det möjligt för regionala kollektivtrafikmyndigheter att bedöma den samhällsekonomiska effektiviteten för deras trafikering och skapa ett effektivt utbud. Med dessa metoder som utgångspunkt beskrivs en marknadsbaserad och transparent tilldelningsprocess för kapacitet där infrastrukturförvaltare prissätter kommersiella tåglägen för att lösa kapacitetskonflikter med offentligt kontrollerad trafik. Dessutom utvecklas optimeringsmetoder för att estimera passagerarefterfrågan och för att skapa effektiva tågtidtabeller.

Framtida kapacitetstilldelning på avreglerade marknader kan inkludera lösningsmetoder från denna avhandling. Ytterligare experiment krävs dock fortfarande för att hantera problem såsom data, lagstiftning och godtagbarhet. Dessutom kan framtida arbete omfatta prototyper och pilotprojekt av de föreslagna lösningarna och undersöka lagliga och digitaliseringsstrategier för att underlätta implementeringen av sådana lösningar.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Linköping: Linköping University Electronic Press, 2020. p. 51
Series
Linköping Studies in Science and Technology. Dissertations, ISSN 0345-7524 ; 2101
Keywords
railway capacity, capacity allocation, train timetable, cost benefit analysis, deregulated market, spårkapacitet, kapacitetstilldelning, tågtidtabell, samhällsekonomisk analys, avreglerad marknad
National Category
Transport Systems and Logistics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-170193 (URN)10.3384/diss.diva-170193 (DOI)9789179297718 (ISBN)
Public defence
2020-11-16, Online through Zoom (contact abderrahman.ait.ali@liu.se) and TPM51, Täppan, Campus Norrköping, Norrköping, 13:15 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2020-10-01 Created: 2020-10-01 Last updated: 2021-12-03Bibliographically approved

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Ait Ali, AbderrahmanEliasson, Jonas

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