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Contextualism, assessment-relativity and content-insensitivity
Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA. Linköpings universitet, Filosofiska fakulteten.
2009 (Engelska)Konferensbidrag, Publicerat paper (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
Abstract [en]

Recently, a number of authors have argued that contextualist analyses of for example epistemic modals and matters of taste are inadequate and need to be recast in terms of assessment-relative truth or assessment-relative contents. The viability of such relativist proposals have been much discussed recently, but what has not been noted is that a minor adjustment of a standard non-relativist background assumption yields the same predictions of linguistic intuitions and behaviour as does the intrusive revisions called for by relativism. The evidence adduced to support assessment-relative accounts consists mostly in cases where the following seems to be true: EVIDENCE: The correctness of an utterance (or belief) is appropriately assessed without sensitivity to the truth-conditions assigned to that utterance by contextualist accounts. Such cases might seem to suggest that the content of the utterance, or the proposition it expresses, has assessment-relative truth-conditions, or that the utterance has its contents relative to contexts of assessment. From the non-relativist perspective, however, such cases can simply be understood as cases of appropriate content-insensitive assessments; the assessor is simply assessing a content other than (but related to) that expressed by the original speaker or accepted as true by the original believer. Instead of relativizing contents or truth-conditions to contexts of assessment, this perspective gives a contextualist account of the content of acts of assessment, where the content of utterances like "no", "yes" or of the form "[what he said/that] is [true/right/wrong]" depend on their context in ways corresponding exactly to the assessor-relativity proposed by critics of contextualist analyses. In my talk, which is based on joint work with Alexander Almér, I compare this contextualist interpretation with relativist alternatives and argue that it provides a theoretically preferable accommodation of various examples of EVIDENCE.

Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
2009.
Nyckelord [en]
Relativism, contextualism, insensitive assessments, MacFarlane, Egan
Nationell ämneskategori
Filosofi
Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-54961OAI: oai:DiVA.org:liu-54961DiVA, id: diva2:312497
Konferens
Pragmatics, Semantics, and Systematicity; Stockholm 8-9 maj 2009
Tillgänglig från: 2010-04-25 Skapad: 2010-04-25 Senast uppdaterad: 2010-04-26

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http://people.su.se/%7Eppagin/Pragmasys09/Pragmasysprogram.html

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Björnsson, Gunnar

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