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Captureteorin: Regleringar och konsten att fånga politiska beslut i den demokratiska processen tillämpad på den svenska läkemedelsmarknaden
Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics.
2003 (Swedish)Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Magister)Student thesisAlternative title
The Capture Theory. Regulation and the Art of Capturing Political Decision Making in the Democratic Process Applied to the Swedish Market for Pharmaceuticals. (English)
Abstract [en]

The Capturetheory wants to give an alternative explanation for the need of regulation. From this point if view the government does not have enough information to make an optimal regulation. There is a possibility for different interest groups to take advantage of the political arena by rent- seeking behaviour. An industry may be willing to be regulated to protect itself from competition. The objective of this paper is to account for the pros and cons of the theory of regulatory capture and also if it can be applied to the Swedish market of pharmaceuticals. The theory of regulatory capture is first and foremost a theory of the motives behind regulation. The Swedish market for pharmaceuticals has been analysed by looking into the underlying force of both the pharmaceutical industry and that of the State. There is room for the regulatory agencies to be captured by the industry because of the information provided to them by the industry. The concluding findings show that the Capture theory can applied to the Swedish market for pharmaceuticals.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Ekonomiska institutionen , 2003. , 66 p.
Master Thesis in Economics, 2003:2
Keyword [en]
Economics, The Capture Theory, regulations, interest groups, market for pharmaceuticals, Public Choice, rent-seeking behaviour
Keyword [sv]
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-1773OAI: diva2:19099
Available from: 2003-06-05 Created: 2003-06-05

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