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Non-cognitivism and thick moral concepts
Linköping University, Department of Religion and Culture.
2006 (English)Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
Abstract [sv]

Enligt ett argument mot nonkognitivismen som många kritiker hänvisat till, så är denna teori oförenlig med förekomsten av så kallade ‘tjocka moraliska begrepp’. Argumentet har dock aldrig artikulerats och preciserats ordentligt, vilket lett till att det ofta misstolkats av både anhängare och kritiker av nonkognitivismen. I uppsatsen rekonstrueras och utvärderas argumentet såsom det formulerats av John McDowell. Enligt argumentet är nonkognitivismen bristfällig eftersom den inte både kan ge en tillfredsställande analys av tjocka moraliska begrepp och framställa moralisk argumentation och debatt som rationell. Uppsatsen visar dock att nonkognitivister kan undvika denna slutsats på flera sätt. Uppsatsen innehåller även en översikt över olika nonkognitivistiska perspektiv på tjocka moraliska begrepp.

Abstract [en]

Many critics of non-cognitivism have argued that the existence of ‘thick moral concepts’ constitutes a serious challenge to non-cognitivist views of moral language. While this argument is frequently invoked, it has never been clearly articulated. Hence, the argument is often misinterpreted by both friends and foes of non-cognitivism. In this thesis, John McDowell’s forceful rendering of the argument is reconstructed and evaluated. According to the argument, non-cognitivism is not an adequate metaethical view because it cannot both provide an adequate analysis of thick moral concepts and construe moral discourse as rational. It is argued in this thesis that there are several ways in which non-cognitivists can avoid this conclusion. The thesis also contains a survey of various non-cognitivist views on thick moral concepts.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Institutionen för religion och kultur , 2006. , 76 p.
Keyword [en]
thick concepts, non-cognitivism, metaethics, John McDowell, rule-following
Keyword [sv]
tjocka begrepp, nonkognitivism, metaetik, John McDowell, regelföljande
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-6112ISRN: LIU-IRK/PFIL-D--06/001--SEOAI: oai:DiVA.org:liu-6112DiVA: diva2:21648
Subject / course
Practical Philosophy
Presentation
2005-12-15, KG31, Key, Linköpings universitet, 13:00
Uppsok
Humanities, Theology
Supervisors
Examiners
Available from: 2006-03-22 Created: 2006-03-22 Last updated: 2011-12-13Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

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Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • oxford
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf