Multi-Class User Equilibria under Social Marginal Cost Pricing
2002 (English)In: Operations Research 2002, 2002, 174-179 p.Conference paper (Other academic)
In the congested cities of today, congestion pricing is a tempting alternative. With a single user class, already Beckmann et al. showed that ``system optimal'' traffic flows can be achieved by social marginal cost (SMC) pricing where users have to pay for the delays the incur on others. However different user classes can have widly differing time values. Hence, when introducing tolls, one should consider multi-class user equilibria, where the classes have different time values. In the single class case, the equilibrium conditions can be viewn as optimality conditions of an equivalent optimization problem. In the multi-class case, however, netter claims that this is not possible. We show that, depending on the formulation, the multi-class SMC-pricing equilibrium problem (with different time values) can be stated either as an asymmetric or as a symmetric equilibrium problem. In the latter case, the corresponding optimization problems is in general non-convex. For this non-convex problem, we devise descent methods of Frank-Wolfe type. We apply the methods and study a synthetic case based on Sioux Falls.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2002. 174-179 p.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-14438ISBN: 978-3-540-00387-8OAI: oai:DiVA.org:liu-14438DiVA: diva2:23505