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An Understanding of Common Morality
Linköping University, Department of Culture and Communication, Centre for Applied Ethics.
2007 (English)Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Magister), 10 points / 15 hpStudent thesis
Abstract [en]

The idea of common morality is not a new idea. Philosophers have been engaged with it from the very early days. Many modern philosophers intend to perceive it when they compare or contrast it with the implications of ethical theories for genuine understanding of moral facts. They believe that without having any reference to what common people think, believe and practice, it is preposterous to construct a complete set of abstract norms and postulate them as relevant to practical life. In this work, proceeding with a motive of understanding the characteristic strength of common morality and to see how meaningfully we can designate the relevance of common moral beliefs in our applied ethical discussion, I am basically exploring two different accounts common morality view. The first one is the universalistic account which emerges from the works or Bernard Gert and Tom Beauchamp (including their colleagues), and the other one, I believe, sets its journey from the wombs of the critics of the first one. In this work, in order to properly designate the relevance of common morality, I am intending to develop the second account.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Centrum för tillämpad etik , 2007. , 51 p.
Keyword [en]
Morality, Common, Local, Universalistic, Abstract
National Category
Social Sciences
URN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-9478ISRN: LIU-CTE-AE-EX--07/22--SEOAI: diva2:23930
2007-06-27, Utrecht University, 11:45
Available from: 2007-08-24 Created: 2007-08-24

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