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A Comparison of Publicly Available Tools for Static Intrusion Prevention
Linköping University, Department of Computer and Information Science, PELAB - Programming Environment Laboratory. Linköping University, The Institute of Technology.
Linköping University, Department of Computer and Information Science, PELAB - Programming Environment Laboratory. Linköping University, The Institute of Technology.
2002 (English)In: Nordic Workshop on Secure IT Systems NordSec,2002, Karlstad, Sweden: Karlstad University Studies , 2002, 68- p.Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

The size and complexity of today's software systems is growing, increasing the number of bugs and thus the possibility of security vulnerabilities. Two common attacks against such vulnerabilities are buffer overflow and format string attacks. In this paper we implement a testbed of 44 function calls in C to empirically compare five publicly available tools for static analysis aiming to stop these attacks. The results show very high rates of false positives for the tools building on lexical analysis and very low rates of true positives for the tools building on syntactical and semantical analysis.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Karlstad, Sweden: Karlstad University Studies , 2002. 68- p.
Keyword [en]
Security intrusions, intrusion prevention, static analysis, security testing, bu↵er overflow, format string attack
National Category
Computer Science
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-29494Local ID: 14849OAI: oai:DiVA.org:liu-29494DiVA: diva2:250309
Conference
7th Nordic Workshop on Secure IT Systems, "Towards Secure and Privacy-Enhanced Systems", 7-8 November 2002, Karlstad University, Sweden
Available from: 2009-10-09 Created: 2009-10-09 Last updated: 2013-03-15Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Contributions to Specification, Implementation, and Execution of Secure Software
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Contributions to Specification, Implementation, and Execution of Secure Software
2013 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This thesis contributes to three research areas in software security, namely security requirements and intrusion prevention via static analysis and runtime detection.

We have investigated current practice in security requirements by doing a field study of eleven requirement specifications on IT systems. The conclusion is that security requirements are poorly specified due to three things:  inconsistency in the selection of requirements, inconsistency in level of detail, and almost no requirements on standard security solutions. A follow-up interview study addressed the reasons for the inconsistencies and the impact of poor security requirements. It shows that the projects had relied heavily on in-house security competence and that mature producers of software compensate for poor requirements in general but not in the case of security and privacy requirements specific to the customer domain.

Further, we have investigated the effectiveness of five publicly available static analysis tools for security. The test results show high rates of false positives for the tools building on lexical analysis and low rates of true positives for the tools building on syntactical and semantical analysis. As a first step toward a more effective and generic solution we propose decorated dependence graphs as a way of modeling and pattern matching security properties of code. The models can be used to characterize both good and bad programming practice as well as visually explain code properties to programmers. We have implemented a prototype tool that demonstrates how such models can be used to detect integer input validation flaws.

Finally, we investigated the effectiveness of publicly available tools for runtime prevention of buffer overflow attacks. Our initial comparison showed that the best tool as of 2003 was effective against only 50 % of the attacks and there were six attack forms which none of the tools could handle. A follow-up study includes the release of a buffer overflow testbed which covers 850 attack forms. Our evaluation results show that the most popular, publicly available countermeasures cannot prevent all of these buffer overflow attack forms.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Linköping: Linköping University Electronic Press, 2013. 249 p.
Series
Linköping Studies in Science and Technology. Dissertations, ISSN 0345-7524 ; 1503
National Category
Engineering and Technology
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-88330 (URN)978-91-7519-681-7 (ISBN)
Public defence
2013-04-22, Visionen, hus B, Campus Valla, Linköpings universitet, Linköping, 13:15 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2013-03-15 Created: 2013-02-01 Last updated: 2017-03-28Bibliographically approved

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