The compensation to victims of nuclear accidents is based on a Paris (OECD) and a Vienna (UN) convention. A problem with the system is that a strictly liable, but insolvent or uninsured plant owner leaves victims without compensation. In this paper, it is argued that a system could be better organised by, for example, the European Union (EU). A State that permits a nuclear reactor on its territory should be strictly liable. Benefits are: (i) States are able to compensate large damages, (ii) theory suggests that stepwise modified risk-sharing could be made beneficial for risk-averse States, (iii) the EU can enforce sharing agreements by Member States, (iv) a State can limit its financial burden by redressing some liability to the domestic nuclear industry. The incentive created hereby, as well as regulations on location and safety may prevent accidents. A European nuclear accident pool will have a collective interest in accident prevention. © 2008 The International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics.