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Restricting factiveness
Linköping University, Department of Culture and Communication. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
2009 (English)In: PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, ISSN 0031-8116, Vol. 146, no 1, 29-48 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In discussions of Fitchs paradox, it is usually assumed without further argument that knowledge is factive, that if a subject knows that p, then p is true. It is argued that this common assumption is not as well-founded as it should be, and that there in fact are certain reasons to be suspicious of the unrestricted version of the factiveness claim. There are two kinds of reason for this suspicion. One is that unrestricted factiveness leads to paradoxes and unexpected results, the other is that the usual arguments for factiveness are not as compelling as is commonly thought. There may in fact be some kinds of contexts, where factiveness doesnt hold for knowledge-the usual arguments for factiveness dont suffice to support the claim that knowledge is unrestrictedly factive. Perhaps all that can be shown is that knowledge is at times factive, or that it is default factive, as it were: this doesnt show that there cant be counterexamples, however. Certain aspects of knowledge without unrestricted factiveness are examined briefly.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2009. Vol. 146, no 1, 29-48 p.
Keyword [en]
Knowledge, Factiveness, Knower paradox, Fitchs knowability paradox
National Category
Social Sciences
URN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-51471DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9243-zOAI: diva2:275243
Available from: 2009-11-04 Created: 2009-11-04 Last updated: 2009-11-04

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Stjernberg, Fredrik
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Department of Culture and CommunicationFaculty of Arts and Sciences
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ReferencesLink to record
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