2009 (English)Conference paper (Refereed)
Recently, a number of authors, in particular John MacFarlane, have suggested that evidence having to do with disagreement and retractions calls for abandonment of traditional contextualist analyses of some discourses, e.g., epistemic modals and taste judgments. Data, they argue, instead supports a new relativist notion of semantics, embracing that one and the same asserted proposition might vary in truth with context of assessment. We argue essentially two points with pertinence to adjudicate between this notion of relativism and contextualism. First, we point out that data only speaks in favour of relativism given certain general conceptions of semantics. Secondly, we argue that from within a certain well-known naturalistic semantic framework, the evidence suggests contextualist analysis of "true", "false" and cognates. We briefly sketch how such a non-standard contextualism would account for disagreement and retraction data in a way avoiding the objections from the relativist camp.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Contextualism, relativism, epistemic modals, taste, John MacFarlane, Andy Egan
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-54960OAI: oai:DiVA.org:liu-54960DiVA: diva2:312496
VAF 2009: Recent Trends in Philosophy of Language and General Analytic Philosophy, Tilburg, Nederländerna