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Judgments of moral responsibility –a unified account II
Linköping University, Department of Culture and Communication, Arts and Humanities. Linköping University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
Institutionen för Filosofi, Lingvistik och Vetenskapsteori, Göteborgs universitet.
2009 (English)In: ESPP 2009 Budapest, Book of abstracts, 2009, 16- p.Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Recent work in experimental philosophy shows that folk intuitions about moral responsibility are sensitive to a surprising variety of factors. Whether people take agents to be responsible for their actions in deterministic scenarios depends on whether the deterministic laws are couched in neurological or psychological terms (Nahmias et. al. 2007), on whether actions are described abstractly or concretely, and on how serious moral transgression they seem to represent (Nichols & Knobe 2007). Finally, people are more inclined to hold an agent responsible for bringing about bad than for bringing about good side effects that the agent is indifferent about (Knobe 2003). Elsewhere, we have presented an analysis of the everyday concept of moral responsibility that provides a unified explanation of paradigmatic cases of moral responsibility, and accounts for the force of both typical excuses and the most influential skeptical arguments against moral responsibility or for incompatibilism. In this article, we suggest that it also explains the divergent and apparently incoherent set of intuitions revealed by these new studies. If our hypothesis is correct, the surprising variety of judgments stems from a unified concept of moral responsibility. Knobe, J. (2003) Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language. Analysis 63, pp.190–93. Nahmias, E.; Coates, J.; Kvaran. T. (2007) Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: experiments on folk intuitions. Midwest studies in Philosophy XXXI Nichols, S.; Knobe, J. (2007) Moral responsibility and determinism: the cognitive science of folk intuitions, Noûs 41:4, 663-685

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2009. 16- p.
Keyword [en]
moral responsibility, moral psychology, experimental philosophy
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-54963OAI: oai:DiVA.org:liu-54963DiVA: diva2:312500
Conference
ESPP 2009
Available from: 2010-04-25 Created: 2010-04-25 Last updated: 2010-04-26

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http://web.ceu.hu/phil/espp09/docs/ESPP09_program_abstracts.pdf

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Björnsson, Gunnar

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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • oxford
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf